Outsourcing household labor:

Gender, class and migration in the rebirth of domestic work in Spain

By

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ABSTRACT

In post-industrial economies domestic work is increasingly available for purchase on the market, and the domestic work sector is growing after a period of decline. In Spain, the number of paid domestic workers more than doubled in less than a decade. For some scholars, this increasing commodification of household labor is a positive trend because it promotes the valorization of typically unpaid domestic labor and stimulates women's employment. Other scholars, however, see in this trend nothing more than a reproduction of inequalities. In this dissertation, I argue that the current regime of household labor commodification both maintains the economic devaluation of domestic work and redistributes paid and unpaid work within and between households in ways that can generate economic polarization.

Focusing on the rebirth of the domestic work sector in Spain, this dissertation asks how the increasing commodification of household labor affects social inequalities. I draw on two major data sources. Using survey data on time use and income, I study how the practice of hiring a domestic worker is associated with the distribution of women's work and income within and between households. In analyses of unpaid work I find that women who hire domestic workers spend less time than other women doing housework but do the same share of total housework relative to their male partners. I conduct a counterfactual analysis and estimate that, in the absence of domestic workers, the gap in time spent on housework between more and less affluent women would decline by 20 percent. My analyses of paid work provide evidence that hiring domestic work can boost some women's economic mobility through increases in their paid work time. Women

who hire domestic work earn substantially more than those who do not, and this trend can contribute to some increases in income inequality between households.

Using qualitative data from documents and interviews, I study how paid domestic work is culturally and socially valued. Drawing on interviews with professional Spanish women, I argue that women hire domestic workers to bargain with both husbands' resistance to housework and with gender norms about working mothers. I show that domestic workers contribute to the gender dynamics of couples in different ways. On the one hand, domestic workers emphasize gender task segregation among those couples that share household labor, and on the other hand, domestic workers emphasize the femininity of the domestic sphere among those couples that do not share household labor. Lastly, I study how political discourses legitimize the exclusion of domestic workers from the scope of general labor rights legislation. Using transcripts from parliamentary debates about domestic workers between 1979 and 2011, I show how the productivist discourse defines domestic work as a *special job*. This discourse was contested up to the late 1990s, but since the 2000s it became hegemonic, partly through the cooptation of feminist rhetoric and the mobilization of divisions between migrant and native workers. Altogether, these findings show that the commodification of household labor changes the ways in which different social inequalities intersect in the gender division of labor.

CHAPTER 1. Introduction

For a long time, the social organization of reproductive labor has been a major obstacle to achieving equality between women and men. Reproductive labor refers to the work that must occur in order to sustain the productive labor force, which includes caring, feeding, teaching, cleaning, and nurturing individuals so that they develop the capacity to become productive workers (Brenner et al. 1991; Engels 1884; Laslett et al. 1989). With the rise of industrialization, the modern gender-based division of labor assigned women responsibility for housework and care of children, the elderly and the sick in the household, while men sought employment and wages in the labor market. This division of labor made women dependent on men—and the institution of marriage—for not only income but also political rights (e.g., Pateman 1988). At the same time, men's—as well as states' and companies'—dependency on women's unpaid labor was invisible and ignored (Delphy 1984; Hartmann 1981; Walby 1990). In the breadwinner-housewife model all households have generally equal access to reproductive labor through the work of unpaid wives. The economist Galbraith (1973: 33 cited in Lutz, 2011: 3) noted the relevance of this fact when he concluded: "The conversion of women into a crypto-servant class was an economic accomplishment of the first importance. Menially employed servants were available only to a minority of the pre-industrial population; the servant-wife is available, democratically, to almost the entire present male population."

While not all women were full-time housewives, women from all socioeconomic backgrounds more or less shared responsibility for household labor. This condition both directly and indirectly placed women at a disadvantage in the labor market in several

ways. For example, women's responsibility for housework and caregiving has been associated with occupational segregation, gender wage gaps, discrimination, and glass ceilings, among other forms of gender inequality (e.g., Gornick et al. 2003; Pettit et al. 2009; Treas et al. 2010).

Domestic work, however, is increasingly available for purchase on the market. Many households purchase services and products to complete jobs that, in the past, were typically produced via (women's) unpaid domestic labor. Families buy pre-cooked foods to produce warm meals, and hire cleaning services to produce shiny floors. These processes of commodification change who is involved in providing for and valorizing these services, much like the implementation of mandatory education changed who was engaged in children's socialization and education and how this work was valued and paid for.

As part of this trend, the paid domestic work sector is growing. So-called domestic service is an employment niche typically associated with pre-industrial and highly unequal societies. Modernization theories, which assumed that women would remain housewives, predicted that the sector would progressively disappear as technological innovation simplified household labor (e.g., Coser 1973). In some cases, the sector did decline for a number of decades and became relegated to the elite (Duffy 2011; Gregson et al. 1994). After this downturn, however, the sector began to escalate in a number of countries (Shutes et al. 2012; Williams et al. 2012).

According to some scholars this process of the commodification of household labor is a positive one. The commodification can potentially constitute a mechanism that stimulates defamilialization (Lister 1997). Some feminist economists have defended the

full incorporation of women in the labor market and the commodification of household labor as a way to advance emancipation (Bergmann 2005; Boserup 1970). Esping-Andersen (2009b) also argued that market goods and services that substitute for unpaid household labor are emancipating for women. Women no longer need to be responsible for doing this work if they can purchase it in the market. In a similar vein, Greenwood et al. (2005) referred to technological progress in the household and the spread of consumption of both durable and nondurable goods as engines for women's liberation. From this point of view, the market (relative to the housewife) is more efficient in producing household goods and services partly because the principles of organization are based on competitive norms rather than coercive gendered norms. The market also assigns economic value to these typically unpaid goods and services.

Other scholars, however, are more wary of the consequences of the commodification of household labor. Ehrenreich and Hochschild (2002) argued that outsourcing domestic labor reproduced gender inequalities at home and emphasized inequalities between women. Researchers have also highlighted that only *some* women benefit from the process of commodification. Gregson and Lowe (1994) studied the resurgence of the paid domestic work sector in the UK and concluded that the service economy provided a venue for some women, but not others, to refrain from housework and pursue careers outside the home. Similarly, Cohen (1998) stated that: "the movement away from housework may be easier for those women who have access to service economy assistance, in the absence of greater housework contributions from their husbands."

It is unclear whether purchasing domestic work can transform gender relations in the household. In reference to domestic workers, Parrenas (2008: 14) argued that: "negotiating the burdens of domesticity through marketization indicates not a reconstitution of notions of women's domesticity but instead its retention, as this solution depends on the availability of female low-wage workers (i.e., women with fewer resources). It also absolves men of the need to increase their responsibility for care." These critics raise an old concern: Is the liberation of one class of women provided by the subjugation of another? Do liberated women need to hire a wife? (Ferree 1990; Hunt et al. 1977).

Scholars are also skeptical that employment is per se liberating. Many studies, particularly those that examined the feminization of the workforce in the Global South, showed that entering the workforce did not guarantee empowerment (Ferree 1979; Peterson 2010; Salzinger 2003). Further, studies of domestic workers and other service workers found that the fact that these services and goods were produced and delivered through the market (rather than through family/kin relations) did little to eradicate the feminization and gendered connotations associated with performing these tasks (e.g., Lutz 2011; Parreñas 2008). Glenn (1992a) and Duffy (2007) also demonstrated that the change from paid domestic work in the household (domestic servants) to paid domestic work outside the household (e.g., fast food workers) could lead to greater gender balance among the workers involved, but at the same time strengthened racial-ethnic hierarchies that continued to devalue domestic work.

As a whole, these studies emphasize that the competitive principles of the market are far from gender or race neutral, especially in the realm of reproductive labor. Some

economists have suggested that not only does reproductive labor tend to be devalued but also there are limits to its full commodification. These scholars argue that there are kinds of reproductive labor, particularly in relation to care work, that can never be fully commodified (Folbre et al. 2000; Lewis et al. 2005).

I understand the rebirth of the paid domestic work sector as a piece of the broader shift toward the commodification of household labor. This dissertation focuses on paid domestic work and not on other forms of household labor commodification for several reasons. Hiring domestic workers is arguably one of the most controversial forms of outsourcing household labor to the market; this practice resembles the purchase of a housewife and is often associated with the reproduction of gender, racial, and class inequalities as well as legacies of servitude and slavery (Glenn 1992b; Romero 1992). In fact, feminists remain divided on the issue of whether it is acceptable to hire domestic work (Bowman et al. 2009; Meagher 2002; see also Chapter 6). The rebirth of the paid domestic work sector has received significant attention in both academic and nonacademic audiences. In western Europe, the large influx of immigrant women workers in this employment sector has raised questions about how new racialized divides map onto old forms of inequality (e.g., Lutz 2011). Finally, in comparison to other forms of household outsourcing, the practice of hiring domestic work more fully and directly relates to the gendered division of household labor, because the worker literally enters the home.

This dissertation asks how the commodification of household labor through the rebirth of the domestic work sector promotes is related to different dimensions of economic inequality between women and men and among women. How does hiring a

domestic worker affect the distribution of women's time spent on housework within and between households? And the distribution of women's time spent on paid work and income? How is it associated with norms about the gender division of labor within Spanish middle and upper-class families? And how is it related to cultural understandings about the economic value and labor status of domestic workers?

I argue that this shift toward the commodification of household labor maintains domestic work devalued and redistributes paid and unpaid work within and between households in ways that can contribute to economic polarization. Hiring domestic work is in part motivated by men's resistance to housework and the pressure to keep household labor in the private sphere. And the fact that women from marginalized backgrounds are overrepresented in this sector also perpetuates the devaluation of paid domestic work. The expansion of the domestic work sector means that not only the elite, but also the middle classes access these services and thus shift the responsibility for domestic work onto other women. At the same time, and in contrast to the past, the practice of hiring domestic workers is related to women's out of home employment. Altogether, this kind of commodification of household labor can facilitate socioeconomic polarization among women and households.

I build on feminist political economy theory, which has long emphasized the relevance of women's social location and women's work for understanding processes of social stratification. Joan Acker (2006: 61) argued that "unpaid family work, no matter how satisfying to the individual, how central to child and family well-being, or how important to the society, increases gendered economic inequalities as well as racial and class inequalities between women." The unpaid labor that occurs in homes, as well as

social reproductive labor in general, has often been understood as centrally organized along gender lines. Glenn (1999) noted that unpaid household labor "has been extensively explored as a form of gendered labor." Indeed, for some theorists, the gendered division of labor and the gendered construction of reproductive labor are central to women's oppression (Barrett 1984; Delphy 1984; Hartmann 1976). Researchers have repeatedly shown, however, that other social divides also influence the organization and distribution of social reproductive labor. There is a long history of well-off women transferring some of the burden of household labor to other women, and of women (and men) from racialized and marginalized positions carrying the overwhelming majority of that burden (Glenn 1992b; Ray et al. 2009; Romero 1992). It is crucial to understanding both the complex interplay between categorical inequalities in the effects of hiring and the processes through which these inequalities interact with each other in who is hired and what hiring means.

My approach emphasizes that the organization of social reproduction entails important social conflicts and dilemmas of collective action that cut across gender, class, and race/nativity (e.g., Folbre 1994). These conflicts perhaps become more visible as they shift from the family to the market, and public debates begin to focus on "the care crisis" and the challenges of caregiving in an aging society. In this dissertation, I contribute to the scholarly understanding of the consequences of shifts in the organization of social reproduction. As Folbre (1994: 2) noted, "a better understanding of conflicts over the organization of social reproduction might foster a different set of alliances and a better solution to the problem."

The remainder of this introductory Chapter provides a brief overview of the intersectional approach to inequalities and a description of the emergence and growth of the paid domestic work sector in western Europe and the United States.

Intersectionality as an approach to understanding inequalities

I understand intersectionality as a theoretical approach concerned with elucidating the relationships between different forms of oppression based in social processes associated with salient social categories such as gender, sexuality, race, class, and age. Intersectionality signals a commitment to move beyond theoretical frameworks that assign each of these forms of inequality to independent and separate conceptual boxes.

Intersectionality theories differ from frameworks that assign specific social categories more and less relevance solely according to the institution being considered (thus making class alone a feature of the economy, gender alone a feature of the family, or nationality alone a feature of states). Instead, intersectionality theories attempt to incorporate crosscutting sociopolitical processes that focus on social positions in relation to multiple categories in specific contexts and at specific times. As Walby and others have argued, this aspect of the theory implies recognizing that "one set of social relations rarely saturates a given institutional domain or territory … different regimes of inequality coexist within institutions and within countries" (Walby 2009: 68). For example, gender is always produced and reproduced in institutions other than the family, and all families are organized by relations of power other than gender. From this multi-institutional perspective, the relative salience of particular categories to the organization of

inequalities in specific institutions at any given place and time is a matter of inquiry rather than an a priori commitment.

A central claim made by scholars using intersectionality theories is that social processes that construct and reproduce relations along any axis of inequality are inherently entwined with processes that construct and reproduce inequalities on other axes. This theoretical principle does not translate clearly into any one specific understanding of how these relations of power and axes of inequality influence one another, and thus has led to theoretical debates that foreground different understandings of where and how power operates.

Some theorists have emphasized the social categorization processes that generate diverse categories of identities (Crenshaw 1991; Yuval-Davis 1997). From this perspective, those who are assigned marginal positions in multiple categories fall through the cracks between the group identities being constructed. For example, because black women are seen as central to neither the category "black" nor the category "women," they become invisible both theoretically and politically. This understanding of the exclusionary character of theories focused on a normative standard type has been central to the development of intersectional theories—even before the term itself was coined—in the writings of black feminists in the United States and the UK (Anthias et al. 1983; hooks 1984). In emphasizing such relations, intersectionality offers a unique framework to interrogate unmarked categories—the male in gender, the heterosexual in heteronormativity, or the white/native-born in racism—and unravel how these unmarked categories are constructed in relation to and are dependent upon problematized and

marked categories—the woman in gender, the homosexual in heteronormativity, or the black/immigrant in racism.

Other theorists have stressed the multiple processes that generate inequalities and how they affect one another within the multi-institutional contexts in which they operate. This tradition also has a history in so-called "dual systems theories" in which feminists struggled to explain the ways that "patriarchal capitalism" organized inequalities not merely as the sum of patriarchal and capitalist oppressions but as an inseparable mix of both (Brenner et al. 1984; Hartmann 1976; Walby 1990). From this theoretical perspective, the issue is less pinpointing the categories of invisibility generated by this duality than identifying the ways in which, throughout history, institutions have interacted to generate both reinforcing and contradictory forms of power and privilege. For example, the workings of globalized patriarchal capitalism "feminize" ever more workers by placing them in the informal sector with below-subsistence wages, while "masculinizing" both male and female managers with wages that allow them to outsource their domestic labor, and thus decreasing the opportunity for such feminized and masculinized workers to share the same household, and increasing demands on the state to replace informal familial redistribution of income with more formalized policies.

Finally, some theorists are concerned with joining the social constructionist emphasis in the perspectives on race-gender intersectionality and the historical materialist emphasis on the intersections of capitalism, patriarchy, imperialism, and nationalism as macro-institutional processes. Glenn (1992b; 1999), for example, stressed both the cultural power working in the co-construction of race and gender in specific categorical labels, identities, and images and the economic, political, and legal foundations of

material advantage and marginalization that are embedded in the historical development of specific communities, corporations, states, and transnational institutions. From this perspective, the "controlling images" (Collins 2005) associated with the "other," as well as hegemonic discourses as the "heterosexual imaginary" (Ingraham 1994) are forms of cultural power that configure, constrain, and complicate the operations of material advantages. As Acker (2006), for example, showed, "jobs" are not merely "empty slots" that can be filled with any worker, but rather are organized both consciously and unconsciously around understandings of ideal workers and the suitability of particular social groups for specific social tasks. Glenn (1999) illustrated this idea in her analysis of the gendering of reproductive labor, in which jobs that are associated with dirt are designed for people "who belong there" because of their subordinate and degraded racial status.

All three of these traditions are fruitful. I conceive of intersectionality, at its core, as involving three conceptual movements that distinguish it from conventional frameworks of inequality and power. First, a movement from additive to interactive models implies that theories of social stratification must consider how different types of categorical inequalities interact with one another. Forces that shape class inequality are not independent and autonomous from forces that govern gender inequality or race inequality. Second, a movement from categorical to process-based frameworks shows that an emphasis on categories obscures the processes that maintain group boundaries and sustain their sociopolitical salience. This approach prioritizes analyzing the mechanisms that create differences between categories rather than accepting these differences as given. Finally, a movement from autonomous individuals to embedded social relations

emphasizes the role of institutions in distributing both material and discursive resources that individuals bargain for, deploy, and pursue in social interaction.

In the context of the current project, this approach means that I understand the processes that change and redistribute individuals' relationship to paid and unpaid work as simultaneously produced by dynamics based on gender, class, and race/nationality divides. This thesis emphasizes gender and class inequalities more than the racial/nationality axis, a limitation I discuss in the concluding Chapter.

Why has the paid domestic work sector grown?

The trend toward greater commodification of domestic and care services as well as the reenergized growth of the paid domestic work sector is widespread in Europe and the United States (Shutes et al. 2012; Williams et al. 2012). A number of studies have documented that international migration expanded the paid domestic work sector in the Global North, in countries such as the United States (Duffy 2011; Milkman et al. 1998), the UK, Germany, Italy, and Spain (Bettio et al. 2006; Lutz et al. 2010). This pattern is evident even in social-democratic welfare countries where governments are retrenching with regard to public investment in defamilialization (Mahon et al. 2012). Broadly speaking, both supply and demand processes have contributed to this trend toward commodification, and their combination has produced an employment boom for migrant domestic workers.

On one hand, globalization, economic restructuring, and the feminization of international migration has increased the supply of women traveling from countries on the Global Periphery to Europe or North America and seeking opportunities in the service

sector (Ehrenreich et al. 2002; Misra et al. 2006; Parreñas 2008). Enloe (2006) argued that economic restructuring policies dictated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) contributed to the creation of incentives for women's migration. Parrenas (Parreñas 2001) showed the ways in which neoliberal economic restructuring and migration policies contributed to channeling large flows of Filipino domestic workers across the world. Misra et al. (2006) found that economic and migration policies shaped the flows of domestic workers from Morocco to France and from Poland to Germany. Spanish researchers focused on migrant flows between Latin America and southern Europe (e.g., Parella 2003). The concept of a global care chain is used to illustrate how the current social organization of paid and unpaid domestic/care work links women and families across the world. For example, a mother from Mexico migrates alone to the United States to work as a live-in domestic worker in Los Angeles and at the same time asks her aunt or sister to take care of her children in Mexico (e.g., Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2011).

On the other hand, there is a care crisis driven by aging populations, welfare restructuring, rising economic inequalities, women's labor force participation, and the increasing number of dual-earner families, all of which have expanded the demand for care and household services (Bettio et al. 2006; Williams 2012). Where the state has not stepped in to develop childcare and eldercare services, the development of market goods and services that replace household labor has been described as a natural response to women's growing incorporation into formal employment (Anderson 2007; Hondagneu-Sotelo 2007; Lutz 2011).

The resurgence of paid domestic work has not occurred uniformly across the Global North; it has followed patterns related to institutional, demographic, and welfare

policies (Kofman et al. 2000; Misra et al. 2007). Yet scholars disagree on whether these variations constitute differences of degree or kind. Some argue that the expansion of this sector differs substantively across countries (Bettio et al. 2006; Devetter et al. 2009), while others argue that there is a clear convergence and that variation in welfare regimes or migration flows shapes the contours of a singular pattern (Williams 2010). Thus far, these studies have stressed four factors that determine the magnitude and type of the resurgence of paid domestic work in a given country: economic development and inequality, welfare regimes, immigration and employment policies, and cultural models pertinent to the family and caregiving.

Modernization theory predicted that economic development would progressively simplify routine household labor through the introduction of technological advances, and thus would gradually reduce the need for domestic workers. Scholars like Coser (1973) argued that domestic service would fade with economic modernization, and characterized the occupation as "pre-modern." Academics in the critical theory tradition, later noted that globalization and post-industrial economic development generated a new demand for low-wage service jobs such as paid domestic worker. Sassen (2003), for example, noted that these jobs would be particularly prominent in urban areas, or global cities, where workers in the highly skilled and very demanding jobs of the new economy would outsource household labor onto the market. Other scholars noted that pressures to commodify women's labor, in the absence of state intervention, would produce a new demand for low-wage jobs to substitute for unpaid household labor (England et al. 1999).

Growing levels of economic inequality can also lead to both greater demand and greater supply in the domestic work sector. Milkman et al. (1998) argued that the extent

of employment in paid domestic work varied systematically with class inequality because well-off households could afford to forego household labor. The authors used 1990 U.S. census data and found that there was a statistically significant association between the level of household income inequality at the metropolitan area and the level of employment in domestic service. Estévez-Abe (2010) also put forth an argument about wage dispersion and domestic outsourcing; she contended that inequality, particularly among women, increased the opportunity cost of staying out of the labor market for educated women and made outsourcing more affordable. In her preliminary results, Estevez-Abe found that among educated women, those in highly unequal societies spent more time in paid work than those in societies with lower levels of inequality. Cooke (Cooke 2011) made a similar argument in her book, stating that where there was greater class inequality, affluent households shifted more household labor onto the low-wage service sector.

In addition to economic factors, scholars have noted that the characteristics of the welfare state also condition the growth of the paid domestic work sector. Generally speaking, countries with solid and comprehensive public services for childcare and eldercare (e.g., Scandinavia) generate less demand for domestic workers than countries without these state-provided services (e.g., the UK or the United States). Yet, shifts in social policy paradigms are increasing the influence of the market in the provision of these services. The adult worker model (Lewis and Giullari 2005) and the social investment approach (Jenson 2008) promote the labor activation of all adults and the retrenchment of the public sector as both a niche of employment and a provider of basic social services. Employment in the private sector is seen as the key to social inclusion for

all adults, while at the same time employment in care and domestic work are seen as sources of new job growth.

These policy changes are influential even in solidly social democratic welfare states. For example, Mahon et al. (2012) showed that neoliberal ideas about the marketization of childcare have influenced public policies in both Nordic countries (Finland and Sweden) and liberal Anglo-Saxon countries (Australia and Canada). In relation to domestic work, Morel (2014) provided evidence of a trend among European countries to provide public subsidies for purchasing domestic services. She attributed this trend partly to the influence of the European Union, which in key documents has declared that stimulating the consumption of domestic/care work services is important for economic growth.[1]

Scholars have noted that, in addition to social policy paradigms, migration and employment policies also influence the growth and shape of employment in domestic work. Researchers found that the largest expansion of this employment sector occurred in countries that had liberal migration policies and large informal economies, like Spain or Italy (Williams and Ganvas, 2008; Bettio et al., 2006). Lutz and Palenga-Mollenbeck (2010) found that in Germany, the growing demand for in-home care workers and the lack of government involvement in the regulation of migrant flows resulted in the emergence of a large undeclared care work sector. Shutes and Chiatti (2012) showed that in both Italy and the UK migration policies implicitly facilitated the employment of migrant workers in elder care, even though these countries had very different institutional

[1] Documents such as "Europe 2020" in 2010 and 2012 directly argue that domestic services are important for economic growth, not so much for the limited direct low productivity of the sector but for the "potential for indirect productivity increases if clients of PHS [personal household services] are able to focus more on their own, higher productivity-work" (in Morel, 2014)

models for elder care (based on the family in Italy and the private sector in the UK). The authors emphasized that policies restricted wider job options for migrants but that restrictive migration policies did not target domestic workers.

Finally, cultural factors can also stimulate the demand for domestic work. Pfau-Effinger (2010) noted that across Europe different family norms inform preferences for how and where care should be provided. She argued that in countries that embraced a breadwinner/extended family model, such as Spain or Italy, there was a preference for modes of outsourcing childcare in which the children remained inside the home, and that this pattern favored demand for domestic workers. Similarly, Bettio et al. (2006) studied elder care workers in Italy and concluded that "female migrants are gradually replacing unpaid care by native women, and a new division of labor is emerging." The authors argued that this trend occurred in part because cultural preferences for in-home caregiving did not stimulate either government involvement or private initiatives for elder care centers. Other cultural factors, such as legacies of and tolerance for servitude can also encourage the demand for domestic workers (Ray and Qayum 2009).

In sum, researchers agree that there is a trend toward the escalation of the paid domestic work sector in Europe and the United States. Economic development and inequality are expected to generally intensify this pattern. At the same time, the magnitude and pace of this trend is shaped by welfare regimes, migration and employment policies, and cultural factors. Spain—a nation characterized by liberal migration policies, meager public services for childcare and eldercare, and a large informal economy—is one case in which the escalation of paid domestic work has been

particularly prominent (Chapter 2 presents details about Spain as a case study). Next, I offer a short outline of the content of each Chapter.

Chapter outline

This dissertation includes four empirical Chapters that all use different kinds of data and analyses. Chapter 2 lays out my mixed methods approach and introduces the data employed in each section. In Chapters 3 and 4 I use survey data and quantitative techniques of analyses to examine how hiring domestic work is related to inequalities in paid and unpaid work. In Chapters 5 and 6 I use qualitative data from interviews and documents to analyze how the practice of hiring domestic workers is culturally constructed in relation to the gender division of labor within households as well as in relation to the labor status and rights of the domestic workers.

In Chapter 3 I focus on unpaid work and study the relationship between hiring domestic work and women and men's time spent on housework. I argue that hiring domestic work is an important mechanism whereby the distribution of time spent on housework changes within and between households. I use Spanish survey data on time use and study how hiring domestic work affects women's and men's housework time in heterosexual cohabiting couples. I find that within households, hiring is associated with reductions in both women's and men's time spent on housework, which diminish the absolute gender gap but not the relative gender gap in time spent on housework – women's share of total housework time does not vary between hirers and non-hirers. I find that between households, hiring a domestic worker is associated with reductions in the class gap in time spent on housework among women.

Chapter 4 concerns the realm of paid work and I examine the relationship between hiring domestic workers and women's incomes. I argue that hiring domestic work can constitute a mechanism of economic polarization. I use Spanish survey data on income and study how hiring a care worker affects women's and household's incomes in heterosexual cohabiting couples. I find that hiring a care worker is positively associated with both women's and households' incomes, but that it does not lead to substantive increases in inequality between women and households.

In Chapter 5 I examine how hiring domestic work is related to couple's projects about the gender division of household labor. I argue that the generalized practice of hiring domestic workers limits the transformative potential of women's employment on gender relations. Using interview data with 27 professional women who hire domestic workers, I show how hiring is used to bargain with both husbands' resistance to do housework and with gender expectations about working mothers. I find that the relationship between hiring domestic work and women's employment is complex. Unexpectedly, women in couples that share household labor tend to cut back from paid work time upon childbirth, whereas women in couples that do not share household labor tend to maintain full-blown professional careers. I show that domestic workers contribute to couples' gender dynamics in different ways for these two types of couples.

Lastly, in Chapter 6 I study how political discourses legitimize and challenge the common exclusion of paid domestic workers from the scope of general labor rights. I argue this form of exclusion contributes to sustaining the devaluation of paid domestic work. Using transcripts form parliamentary debates about domestic workers between 1979 and 2011, I analyze political discourses before and after the rebirth of this

employment sector. I find that the productivist discourse defines paid domestic work as a *special job* and legitimizes the exclusion of domestic workers from the scope of general labor legislation. This discourse was contested up to the late 1990s but became hegemonic since the 2000s. In this later period the productivist discourse coopted feminist rhetoric and mobilized divides between migrant and native workers to legitimize the hierarchy between productive and un(re)productive workers.

The conclusion offers a synthesis and discussion of the findings from the dissertation. I evaluate the contributions and implications of the research as well as the limitations and future extensions.

CHAPTER 2. Methods and Case Study

The methodological approach adopted in this thesis is based on mixed methods. The combination of quantitative and qualitative data and types of analyses seeks to capture the distinctive nature of the social processes involved in the organization of domestic work (e.g. changes in time spent on housework as well as ideas or values about the domestic sphere). As a social scientist, I begin from the conviction that scientific research advances our understanding of causal relationships that exist in the social world. Social scientists, however, have over the years become more aware of the challenges of determining causality (Moffit 2005). This is because most of our studies have to rely on causal inferences derived from observational data. Experiments with random assignment are unreasonable for most of the questions that social scientists are interested in, including the questions that guide this dissertation. And even when randomized experiments are possible, these do not necessarily guarantee that causes have been appropriately identified (Deaton 2010).

Though still a minority approach, there is a growing appreciation for the combination of multiple methods to strengthen our understanding of causal relationships. Each method has its own strengths and weaknesses, and researchers must always make choices among complementary possibilities, which are all flawed. Typically, structured methods like survey research are considered to be good for generalizability and external validity, and unstructured methods like semi-structured interviews are deemed appropriate for internal validity and the identification of mechanisms.

There are multiple ways of and reasons for combining methodologies. Researchers might want to test the robustness of one particular relationship by measuring

it in multiple ways and counterbalance the weaknesses of different methods. Researchers might also want to combine different methodologies to focus on different sections of any given social process. In this study I use the latter approach. I combine more structured with less structured methods to look at different parts of the overall social process that I am interested in. The Chapters are organized with each employing a single methodology.

The causal model

Counterfactuals provide a useful framework to think about causal determination. In simple terms, an event constitutes a cause when we can say that the consequences associated with such event would not occur had the event itself not taken place.

The underlying causal model for this study suggests that hiring domestic work allows women to spend more time on the job and avoid work disruptions. Such consistency in employment is predicted to lead them to, in the long run, earning more money than do women who do not hire help. The model also implies that maintaining a full-time career is an important motivation for hiring domestic work, as it also is to avoid conflict with husbands concerning the division of household labor. The model suggests that hiring domestic workers does not involve change in gender norms about the division of household labor.

Thus, the implicit counterfactual model says that had women who hire domestic workers not hired help they would spend more time on housework, spend less time on the job, and earn less income. Alternatively, had women who do not hire domestic workers decided to hire they would do less housework, work more hours and earn higher incomes. The model assumes that economic resources crucially determine the decision to hire

domestic work. I expect that those who can afford to hire domestic workers generally do hire because it provides comfort and frees time to spend on the job. Women earning higher wages will be more likely to hire and women with lower wages will be less likely to hire, all else being equal. Because household's and women's income are positively associated, better-off households will be more likely to hire than lower-income households, and will concentrate the positive returns to hiring domestic work (via women spending more time in paid work). In sum, I hypothesize that at the population level the practice of hiring domestic work will lead to an increase in economic inequality between households.

This project relies entirely on observational data, which means that I cannot observe this implicit counterfactual. I cannot observe, for instance, whether a woman who decided to hire a domestic worker would have decreased her time spent on paid work and increase her time spent on housework had she been unable to hire. Likewise, I cannot observe whether a woman who decided not to hire a domestic worker would have spent more hours in paid work had she decided to hire.

If I wanted to declare that I identified a causal effect, I would have to assume that there are no unobservable characteristics that affect the relationship between hiring a domestic worker and the time spent on housework or paid work. This is, clearly, an unrealistic assumption. There are a number of ways in which hiring domestic work is endogenous; in other words, there are a number of generally unobservable characteristics that influence both hiring domestic work and the time spent on housework and on paid work time. These unobservable characteristics are typically thought as a concern about selection effects into the position of interest, in this case hiring a domestic worker.

Consider, for instance, individuals' preferences towards the gender division of labor. It might be the case that people who have preferences for an egalitarian gender division of labor are also more likely to hire, and that the associated reductions in housework time and increases in paid work time are really a product of individuals' preferences rather than an outcome of hiring a domestic worker. In addition to selection into hiring, these preferences might condition the kinds of causal effects that hiring can have on women's work. Hiring domestic work might cause some professional women to increase their paid work hours but not others, and this variation might well be related to their preferences about the gender division of labor, among other things. For those who have a preference for a gender egalitarian division of labor, hiring a domestic worker might be indeed time-saving: reducing their time spent on housework and increasing their time spent on paid work. For those hirers who do not have such preference hiring a domestic worker might not substantively reduce women's involvement on housework or stimulate increases in their paid work time.

These concerns about selection effects are common in social sciences. In quantitative analyses there are a number of strategies that can be adopted to reduce the amount of bias in the analyses, such as instrumental variables or regression models that deal with selection effects. In the Chapters that follow I employed some of these techniques successfully and others less successfully, the later partly due to limitations of the data. In Chapter 3, for instance, I use endogenous switching regression to address the problem of selection into hiring domestic workers. In Chapter 4 I tried to employ instrumental variable and fixed effects regression models but the data available proved to be insufficient. Additionally, I use qualitative data to inform some of the assumptions

built into the model. Chapter 5, for instance, uses interview data with professional women to investigate the role that preferences about the gender division of labor play in the decision to hire domestic work and how it affects women's work. While imperfect and limited, the combination of these methods has proven useful to examine the nature of causal relations between hiring domestic workers and women's work lives. Next, I describe and discuss the data sources I employ for this study.

Data

The dissertation is divided into two main sections. The first section is based on quantitative analyses using survey data, and the second section is based on qualitative analyses using data from both interviews and documents. Survey data provides highly structured and generalizable information. I use surveys to analyze the relationship between hiring domestic work and time spent on housework, (time spent on paid work), and income. There are three main survey sources in Spain that are useful for the purposes of this research. I next briefly describe each of them, their strengths and limitations.

The Spanish Time Use Survey (conducted in 2002-2003 and 2009-2010) aims to offer information about non-remunerated labor carried out by households, the distribution of family responsibilities in the household, and individuals' time spent on recreational and cultural activities. The keynote of this survey is an individual diary that all members of the household 10 years and above must complete on a selected day of the week. In these diaries the informants report in 10-minute intervals their primary and secondary activities. The survey included a sample of 24,000 household units in 2002-2003 and of 11,538 in 2009-2010. This dataset is rich on measures about the use of time and the

amount of household labor outsourcing, but it is limited in other ways. For instance, individuals' and households' income is only recorded in intervals.

I use this dataset to examine the relationship between hiring domestic workers and time spent on housework. In Chapter 3 I use the 2002-2003 data and estimate the effect of hiring on both women's and men's time spent on housework. Given the limitations of this dataset with respect to income measurement, I use a different dataset to conduct the analyses about the relationship between hiring and women's earnings.

The European Union Survey on Income and Living Conditions is a cross-sectional and longitudinal study about income, poverty, social exclusion and living conditions in the European Union. I use the Spanish sample of this dataset for 2008 that includes very detailed information about individuals' income and labor market attachment (with variables for years of experience or detailed occupational category). Unfortunately, however, the information about outsourcing household labor is very limited. The survey only included questions about paying for childcare, but not for other kinds of household labor. These questions asked interviewees about the number of hours a week children were looked after in daycare centers or by persons who were not their parents, and whether they paid these caregivers or not. Based on this information I constructed a variable that identified households that hired a nanny. This measure includes far fewer cases than the previous measure of hiring a domestic worker, but it does capture the form of outsourcing that is arguably most consequential for women's employment.

In Chapter 4 I use this dataset to estimate the effect of hiring a nanny on mothers' and households' income. The limitations of the data made it challenging to address the

issue of endogeneity between the main variables of interest. For this reason, the analyses I present are provisional and insufficient. At best, these analyses provide a first model to think about future analyses. I further discuss the limitations in Chapter 4.

The second part of this dissertation uses qualitative data, which is less structured but contains information about social processes that are often not recorded in surveys. For this study, I was interested in gathering information about the ideological and cultural understandings associated with the practice of hiring domestic workers, both at the individual and at the social level. I use two kinds of qualitative data, interviews with professional women who hire domestic workers and transcripts from parliamentary debates in which politicians debate questions related to domestic workers.

I conducted twenty-seven semi-structured interviews with professional women with young children and who hired domestic workers in Madrid (Spain). The interviews were conducted between January and May of 2012. The interview instrument was structured in two main parts. One focused on the practice of hiring domestic workers. I asked women about their experiences, decisions, ideas and feelings towards hiring out domestic work. This section included questions about the role that personal preferences about the gender division of labor played in the decision to hire a domestic worker and in how it affected women's paid and unpaid work. The second section focused on women's work, both paid and unpaid, and how it changed over time. I asked my interviewees to identify critical points in their lives when the volume or organization of paid/unpaid work in the household substantially changed (e.g. having a child) and to tell me about the course of these events, their decisions and feelings about the division of labor both before and after these points of inflexion. This section provided information about the temporal

ordering of events that facilitated the understanding of possible causal relationships. In my interview data I can observe, for instance, whether women tend to reduce their time spent on housework after hiring a domestic worker or to increase their time spent on paid work.

This data provides rich in-depth information but is flawed in other ways. I want to highlight two important limitations of the qualitative data I collected for this study. First, the sample included only hirers; I did not interview similarly positioned women who did not hire domestic workers. This means that this data cannot address questions that compare hirers and non-hirers as my quantitative analyses do. I believe, though, that this data is still useful to assess the possible causal effects of hiring domestic work. The interviews provide information about the role that preferences about the gender division of labor play in the decision to hire domestic work and in its effects on women's housework and paid work time.

Second, the sample is limited to one particular set of hirers: professional women in dual-earner households with young children. Yet other households also hire, and housewives also hire domestic workers presumably for different reasons than working mothers do. My interviewees might have cultural and ideological understandings about hiring domestic workers that systematically differ from these of housewives. Thus, I do not claim that these interviews speak to how Spanish women's in general understand the practice of hiring domestic workers. My claims are confined to the specific profile of women: professional and highly educated mothers living in urban areas and in dual-earner households.

Finally, I use documents from political debates in the Spanish Parliament between 1979 and 2011. I gathered 43 transcripts in which politicians discussed questions that referred to and affected paid domestic workers' labor rights, using a key word search function to search the Spanish Parliament transcript database. This data provided a general overview of how the political representation of domestic work changed over time. I complemented this dataset with 15 interviews with key informants, which included politicians and also organizations related to domestic workers' rights advocacy, such as unions or feminist organizations.

Though this data provides a unique source of information to understand the ideological representation of paid domestic work, it is also limited. Debates in the Parliament might be staged and not explicitly mention or represent polemic views about the topics in discussion. For instance, despite the underlying racism that is regularly expressed in relation to domestic workers, politicians in Parliament rarely make explicitly racist comments. The view of the politicians is also partial and might not appropriately represent variation in the population. Political debates, nonetheless, do provide a window into the socially accepted ways of talking about domestic workers.

In sum, quantitative analyses have proven very useful to establish the relationship between the variables of interest across the population and to estimate counterfactual scenarios with respect to the prevalence of hiring domestic workers. Qualitative data has been effective in providing information about the cultural and ideological makeup of these relationships, their complexities and variations. The interview data has been very helpful to explain some of the paradoxes and surprises that emerged in the quantitative analyses. Overall, the mixed methodology approach has been fruitful.

Spain as a case study

Spain provides an extreme case of the escalation of the paid domestic work sector: the number of domestic workers more than doubled in less than a decade. Spain is also unique in many other ways. With respect to gender relations, Franco's dictatorship (1939-1975) institutionalized a catholic and conservative patriarchal order from until the late 1970s, but by the 2000s Spanish politicians were declaring, even if it was far from true, that Spain was at the forefront of gender equality policies (Valiente 2008). The gender division of labor is in general more conservative in Spain than in most other European countries, but change in the past decades has been substantial. These traits, though distinctive, are also interesting for the purpose of this study.

Spanish women were first given the right to vote during the Second Republic in 1931, but the gender regime underwent a dramatic shift during the 40 years of Franco's dictatorship that institutionalized catholic patriarchy (Threlfall et al. 2005). During this period divorce was illegal and women needed the permission of their husbands to open bank accounts, find employment, obtain passports or buy property. Franco died in 1975 and the Democratic constitution, signed in 1978, established a new political regime, a democratic monarchy and equal rights for men and women. Over the next 30 years Spain underwent a rapid process of democratization and economic modernization, at the same time that women's position in society changed (Threfall et al. 2005).

A few facts can illustrate these social transformations. Women drastically decreased their fertility, which dropped from 2.8 children in 1975 to 1.35 in 2005. Only 29 percent of women were in the labor force in 1978, and nowadays over 50 percent of

women are in the labor force (INEbase 2014). As for positions of power, in 2010 women made up 34 percent of seats in the national parliament (WorldBank 2014).

The Spanish welfare state is typically defined as a southern European regime. This means that the institutions of social security and labor protection resemble the corporatist model in continental Europe that is structured around agreements between government, unions and companies (Esping-Andersen 1990). In the southern European variant, however, there is greater fragmentation along occupational lines and the labor market is more heavily dualized; insiders have good and stable jobs whereas outsiders have precarious and temporary jobs (Ferrera 1996). Researchers note that labor market regulation is typically more rigid than in liberal countries and that it offers comparatively fewer opportunities for flexible and part-time employment (Salido 2011).

The southern European welfare state is typically characterized by low levels of defamilialization, which means that the state heavily relies on the institution of the family to provide for childcare, elder care, and other services. In Spain family allowances and public services for childcare and elder care are generally limited in comparison to other European countries (Flaquer 2004). Children's formal education is universal and public for 3 year-olds and above, but childcare coverage rates for younger children are lower than in most European countries (OECD 2007). Celia Valiente (2003) argued that the Spanish childcare system was developed to assist housewives and not working parents. With respect to elder care, both public and private services are limited partly because there is a cultural preference for care inside the home. A recent study using 2004 European Social Survey data reports that nearly 40 percent of Spaniards support familial in-home care for aging parents (Ruppanner et al. 2014).

Despite these seemingly unfavorable structures, women's activism inside and outside institutions as well as the incorporation in the EU contributed to rapid changes in the Spanish gender regime (Threlfall et al. 2005). The institutionalization of Spanish gender politics officially began in 1983, when the Women's Institute was created and launched a series of instruments, like the Gender Equality Plans, that secured the continuation and monitoring of gender politics. This also provided a protected niche for femocrats, who played an important role in shaping gender politics (Threlfall et al. 2005). Spaniards were eager to "catch up" with Europe, which symbolized modernization and progress, and which also meant embracing gender equality as a national goal. By the 2000s gender politics had become in Spain a symbol of modernity and nearly all the political actors across the ideological spectrum claimed to defend gender equality (Valiente 2008).

Some argue that positive changes toward gender equality have been greater in the political realm than in the socioeconomic realm. Threlfall et al. (2005) conclude that "in Spain, politics, ideology and women's aspirations were transformed more readily than the economy was able to respond to the challenge of women's inclusion, and more profoundly than men were able to adapt to the shift in gender relations." This conclusion is reiterated by researchers who note that the rigidities of the labor market and masculinist work culture make it hard for working women to equally compete with men (Salido 2011).

In 2011, working women in Spain earned 82 cents for every euro earned by men, a gender wage gap of 18 percent (Eurostat 2014). This gender pay gap is lower than in other European countries (e.g., in Germany the gender wage gap is 22 percent) and this is

partly due to the fact that Spanish women are more positively selected into employment. The prevalence of part-time employment is also smaller in Spain compared to other European countries. For instance, in that same year 22 percent of employed women had part-time jobs in Spain, compared to 45 percent in Germany or 43 percent in the United Kingdom. Spanish mothers earn less than other women. Using data from the European Household Panel from 1994-2001, Molina and Montuenga (2008) estimated that the birth of a child was associated with a 9 percent decrease in the wages of Spanish mothers. And gender inequalities in household labor are also substantial. According to the 2009-2010 Spanish time Use survey, women spend on average two hours more per day than men on activities related to household and family (INEBase 2014).

Altogether, these characteristics of the Spanish state, families and labor market contributed to producing a boom in the demand for domestic workers; to that I turn next.

Domestic work in Spain

The growth of employment in domestic work is particularly strong in southern European countries. The combination of low levels of defamilialization, liberal immigration policies and large informal economies there encouraged and channeled truly spectacular increases in paid domestic work with migrants supplying most of the increase. This is conspicuously true in Spain.

In Spain domestic work constituted the main job for women for most of the 20th century. In feudal Spain domestic work was a well-defined strata (Botija 1961). Census data shows that between 20-35 percent of working women were employed as domestic servants from the turn of the century up to the 1950s. In 1900 the Spanish Census showed

that there were 246,942 women working in domestic service, a number that more than doubled to 534,478 by 1950. This increase reflects in part the decline in agriculture and urban population growth. In relative terms growth in women's employment was strongest in other occupations for this period, but domestic work continued to grow and to remain by far the most important occupation for employed women (Botija 1961). Though women were generally discouraged form working under Franco's regime, working class and women migrating from rural areas were employed throughout. Domestic workers were mostly young women who migrated from the rural areas and worked in domestic service until they married, unless they remained single (Duran 1972; Melendez 1962).

During the following decades paid domestic work underwent important socioeconomic transformations. In the 1970s domestic work still constituted an important source of employment for Spanish women. According to the 1970 Census data, 21 percent of employed women had a job in domestic work and in 1977, when the first Labor Force Survey was conducted, the number of domestic workers had remained at over half a million (537,175). The domestic work sector soon started to decline in the early 1980s and in 1996 the Spanish Labor Force Survey reported a historic low of 221,500 employed domestic workers. This year marked the turning point for major shifts in the domestic labor force.

First, employment in domestic work more than doubled in the next fifteen years, the Spanish Labor Force Survey reported a high of 570,000 workers in 2009. Second, the composition of workers in this occupation importantly changed. While the level of feminization remained starkly constant, over 90 percent women, and the absolute number of Spanish-born workers also remained constant at around 200,000 workers, the share of

Spanish-born workers of the total drastically changed. The Spanish Labor Force Survey reveals that the percentage of foreign-born workers was merely 6.9 percent in 1996 but 62.5 percent in 2010. This huge rebound of the domestic work sector reflects a new labor force of migrant women coming largely from Latin America, North Africa and Eastern Europe. These changes also meant transformations in the types of domestic work employment, as the share of live-in domestic workers declined and different forms of live-out contracts became the norm (e.g. weekly or daily cleaning and/or caring) (ColectivoIOE 1990).



Source: INEbase database for census and labor force participation survey.www.ine.es/inebmenu/indice.htm

Much of paid domestic work transactions take place in the informal economy. Only about half of the total number of domestic workers are actually registered in the Social Security office (León 2013). Moreover, the irregular employment of migrant

workers is also very common, and even encouraged by immigration policies. Spanish approach towards immigration has been found to promote undocumented migration. There is no efficient program to formally recruit workers from abroad and the majority of migrants enters the country under tourist visas and overstay. To obtain residence and work permits, migrants must demonstrate that they have been working and living in Spain for a number of years, even if they have done so without the official documentation (Rodriguez 2009).

The escalation of paid domestic work in Spain has been publicly framed as the logical outgrowth of women's economic emancipation. Politicians regularly imply that hiring domestic work is necessary for gender equality. This study takes a critical view of these statements and examines the extent to which hiring domestic work transforms gender relations in paid and unpaid work, and the extent to which it has implications for inequalities between families. I also consider the consequences of these changes for domestic workers' labor rights.

CHAPTER 3. Housework inequalities

This Chapter examines the effect of household labor outsourcing, via hiring a domestic worker, on the time individuals, mostly women, spend on housework. Women in affluent households do less housework, on average, than other women (Heisig 2011). If outsourcing is concentrated among affluent households, it is likely to accentuate this class housework gap between women. Within households, women do more housework, on average, than men (Evertsson et al. 2004). Outsourcing can reduce the total amount of work to be divided within the couple and may narrow the difference between the time women and men spend on housework. Yet, if women do the same share of housework even in households that outsource, men must also be off-loading some of their already lower time too.

Regardless of their economic position, women continue to spend more time than men doing housework (Evertsson et al. 2004; Hook 2010). Cross-nationally the gender difference correlates with several factors: policies and welfare regimes (Fuwa et al. 2007; Geist 2005; Hook 2010; Knudsen et al. 2008), gender inequalities in the economic and political spheres (Davis et al. 2004; Fuwa 2004), religiosity and technological development (Voicu et al. 2009), the history of maternal employment (Treas et al. 2012), and work cultures (Thébaud 2010). Other studies have suggested that researchers should pay more attention to the service economy, which also varies substantively across countries (Cooke 2011; Gupta et al. 2010; Heisig 2011) and offers services and products that can replace unpaid labor in the household (Dwyer 2013). To date, however, the focus on the service economy remains underdeveloped, in part because few datasets provide good measures of both housework and household labor outsourcing.

Some studies disputed the common-sense premise that outsourcing is time-saving. Studies about household appliances found that the spread or ownership of these technologies did not lead to reductions in women's housework time (Bittman et al. 2004; Robinson 1980; Vanek 1974). Researchers also found that for some households outsourcing practices, notably hiring domestic work, constituted a way to display status rather than a time-saving strategy (Anderson 2000; Ray et al. 2009; Romero 1992)

Despite such skepticism, recent research does indicate that both household appliances and outsourcing are time-saving. Heisig (2011) studied 33 countries and found that the spread of technology reduced housework inequality among women. Lippe et al. (2004) used data from the Netherlands and found significant time-saving effects for domestic help, microwave and dishwasher ownership. Moreover, qualitative research showed that individuals purchased market substitutes to reduce from housework burdens, particularly among affluent dual-earner households with tense work-life balance (Hochschild et al. 1989; Hochschild 1997). These results support the premise that outsourcing is time-saving but the impact of these purchases remains unclear.

Previous studies have investigated how outsourcing varies by household income, women's income, and men's income (Baxter et al. 2009; Cohen 1998; Treas et al. 2008). Oropesa (1993) found that the propensity to outsource increases with the objective demand for domestic work, as indicated by the presence of children and the time family members dedicate to paid work. Individuals' values or lack of trust in others, however, might discourage certain forms of outsourcing, such as hiring domestic work (Baxter et al. 2009; Pfau-Effinger 2010; Ruijter et al. 2005). Qualitative research indicates that affluent dual-earner households who struggle to maintain work-life balance outsource to reduce housework burdens and avoid marital conflict (Lutz 2011;

Ruppanner 2010). Other studies have considered the effects of outsourcing on the amount of time individual women and men spend on housework (Gupta 2006; Gupta 2007; Lippe et al. 2004). No studies, however, have considered two particular effects of outsourcing: 1) differences in the gender division of labor within households, and 2) inequalities across households between more and less affluent women.

In contrast to Gupta's approach, which treats outsourcing as a strategy independent of intra-household bargaining over labor time, I contend that outsourcing is better understood as one outcome of a gendered economic bargaining process. Both economic bargaining and gender theories produce distinctive arguments about which households are most likely to outsource and how outsourcing affects the time women and men spend on housework. I use these theories to propose a decision model in which both bargaining power and gender norms jointly shape couples' choices about how to spend time and/or money to get housework done.

I employ a sample of 3,540 dual-earner households from the 2002-2003 Spanish Time Use Survey. I use regression analyses to examine the propensity to hire domestic work and explore how this propensity relates to the amount of time women and men spend on housework and affects gender and class housework inequalities in Spain. I then conduct a counterfactual exercise to assess how the class housework gap among women would change in absence of domestic workers.

The results indicate that hiring domestic workers is associated with substantially less time spent by women on housework and proportionally smaller reductions in the time men spend on housework, which results in a decline in the absolute but not the relative within-household gender gap in housework time. The counterfactual analysis indicates that the between-household class gap in time spent on housework among Spanish women would be 20 percent lower if domestic workers were not available.

Housework and economic bargaining

Economic theories about housework understand the household as a relationship within which self-interested individuals negotiate to reduce their own housework time, as housework is assumed to be universally undesirable (Bittman et al., 2003). The basic economic model proposes that spouses agree on a division of labor that maximizes a the family utility, which is assumed to be the same for all members of the family (Becker 1981).

Structural and feminist critiques of new home economics theory argued that women and men had conflicting interests and that their relative earnings were crucial sources of their power to bargain and achieve favorable outcomes (England et al. 1986; Sorensen et al. 1987). As a result, the division of labor was seen not as result of cooperation but result of contestation and negotiation. The weaker the position of women in this bargaining process, a position that is structurally conditioned by their lower earnings compared to their partners, the more housework they do. The formal model of this dynamic is often explained in terms of exchange (sociological perspectives) or in terms of bargaining (economic perspectives).

Social exchange theorists assert that women's economic dependency on men generates an exchange between money and housework (England and Farkas, 1986). When women access income, their dependency declines and they gain power to negotiate more favorable exchanges (Blumberg et al. 1989). Economic bargaining theorists, in comparison, argue that negotiation depends on threats or potential threats. For example, a divorce threat model shows that bargaining outcomes are more favorable to individuals who have more resources to rely on in the case of divorce (Lundberg et al. 1993). In either case, the economic-bargaining framework suggests that

the individuals use their relative power (commonly operationalized as a ratio of each individual's share to the total earnings) to determine the division of housework.

Numerous studies have shown that the partner who earns more income does less housework (Bittman et al. 2003; Brines 1994; Evertsson and Nermo 2004; Schneider 2011). However, in these studies, relative earnings explained only a small share of the variance in housework, and women did much more housework than men even after controlling for work hours and relative earnings (Bittman et al. 2003). Analyses using longitudinal data have also shown that changes in relative resources did not correspond with changes in the gender division of housework (Evertsson et al. 2007). And Gupta (2007) showed that relative earnings ceased to be statistically associated with women's housework time once her absolute earnings were taken into account.

With regard to outsourcing, the economic bargaining model understands market goods as direct substitutes for home production, thus implying that money, goods, and time are directly interchangeable (Becker 1981). Households base the decision to outsource on a cost-benefit analysis. Outsourcing enables individuals to spend time on other activities, mostly paid labor, and opportunity costs indicate that outsourcing becomes more attractive as individuals' potential earnings increase. Because this framework is gender neutral and assumes that households have a single preference function, it predicts that outsourcing will be concentrated among the households with the highest total incomes. Studies have shown that household income is positively associated with the propensity to outsource (Bittman et al. 1999; Lippe et al. 2004).

Other researchers argue that, within households, couples who outsource may reduce or even eliminate the need to bargain over the amount of time devoted to housework (Gupta 2006; Gupta 2007; Killewald 2011; Killewald et al. 2010). Outsourcing should save time spent on the routine and time-intensive tasks that often

fall on women's shoulders (Bianchi et al. 2000; Twiggs et al. 1999). Thus, women should benefit proportionally more from outsourcing than men, and women's share of total housework should be reduced. Outsourcing has, therefore, the potential to reduce gender inequalities within households. Between households, the concentration of outsourcing among the highest-earning households and its time-saving effects on women's housework indicate that outsourcing should significantly accentuate the class gap in housework time among women.

Housework and doing gender

An alternative approach focuses on the importance of gender relations above and beyond individual's relative power within a couple. The family is a crucial site in which gender norms and inequalities are produced and reproduced (Berk 1985; Ferree 1990; Ridgeway 2011). Gender theory suggests that washing dishes and ironing are not simply unpleasant tasks that individuals seek to avoid; rather, these are daily activities and routines through which gender identities and relations are performatively realized.

West and Zimmerman (1987) proposed that gender is a social accomplishment to which individuals are held accountable. This perspective emphasizes social interaction and moves beyond previous theories of socialization that relied on the internalization of norms. The basic theoretical premise is that individuals' behavior is affected by the expectations held by others about appropriate behavior. Norms are not internalized; instead individuals learn expectations about behavior that they use in interaction with others. This approach can usefully account for variation and changes in gendered behavior that the socialization perspective cannot.

Many studies show that whatever independent variables are used, most seem to affect women's housework time much more than men's (e.g. Brines 1994; Greenstein

2000). And the relative earnings models do not explain nearly enough of the variation in housework between men and women (Bittman et al. 2003). Gupta (1999) found that women increase their housework upon marriage but not men. These differences between married and cohabiting couples are interpreted to denote the higher salience of gender relations in conventional family arrangements.

Because gender is done in social interaction, gender deviant actions in one realm might be compensated by accentuating the gender normativity in another realm. Several studies found that when women earn higher incomes than their husbands, their housework decreased less than expected and men's housework did not increase as predicted. Hochschild and Machung (1989) noted that housework sharing was far less frequent among couples in which women earned more than their husbands. Brines (1994) and Greenstein (2000) examined these dynamics using quantitative survey data. They found that men's time spent on housework did not further increase when women's share of income was greater than theirs. They interpreted this finding to denote that couples (particularly men) neutralize potential challenges to gender norms through adjusting their behavior. Brines (1994) called this process gender display, and Greenstein (2000) deviance neutralization. Other studies also found partly similar findings (Bittman et al. 2003; Schneider 2011).

In relation to outsourcing, this gender relations approach suggests that women have a particular interest in purchasing market substitutes, because housework tasks are socially expected of them and husbands resist involvement (Ridgeway 2011). Women with greater economic resources are assumed to use their own income to directly purchase market substitutes or influence household spending decisions (Cohen 1998; Gupta 2006; 2007). In contrast to the economic bargaining approach, the gendered expectations approach predicts that women's income may matters more than men's.

Some studies have found that increases in women's income induce greater consumption of substitutes for typically feminine tasks than increases in men's income do, suggesting that money continues to carry gender meanings even after it enters the household (Cohen 1998; Treas and Ruijter 2008).

The gender perspective indicates that outsourcing would likely reduce women's housework burden without disturbing its gendered foundations because individuals will rearrange their behavior to conform to gender expectations (Ridgeway 2011). Since gender is constructed relationally, I argue that only changes in the *relative* share of housework imply a substantive shift in gender housework inequalities. For example, outsourcing might be considered help for women, who might then compensate for the reduced burden by taking on new tasks that they would not otherwise have performed. Hiring a domestic worker may also benefit men by reducing perceived pressure to contribute to housework. Thus, women in households that outsource might spend less time doing housework than other women, but continue to be in charge of a similar proportion of the housework as they would be without outsourcing.

In sum, both the economic bargaining approach and the doing gender approach predict that outsourcing will be associated with increases in the between-household class gap in housework time among women; however, the economic model predicts a greater magnitude of this relationship because it sees outsourcing as more directly correlated with both total household income and housework reductions for women. The two theories diverge in their predictions about the within-household effect of outsourcing on the gender division of labor. The economic model suggests that outsourcing will contribute to more equal gender relations by reducing women's housework not only in absolute terms but also relative to their partners. The doing

gender model, in contrast, suggests that outsourcing will not reduce gender inequalities in housework despite reducing the total time women and men spend on housework.

I argue that these two theories emphasize different mechanisms but that they can be integrated in a decision model in which within-couple negotiations over spending time and/or money to get housework done occur in a wider context of gendered expectations. Economic resources and bargaining power shape these negotiations, but do so in relation to gender norms that are particularly salient in couple bargaining (Ridgeway 2011). In some households bargaining might focus on time, whereas in others it might focus on finding the money to outsource. While bargaining about time allocation is available to all couples, outsourcing is constrained by household economic resources.

Method and Data

I analyze data from a sample of 3,540 dual-earner households from the 2002-2003 Spanish Time Survey. I limit the study to dual-earner households because the hypothesized mechanisms are most relevant for these couples. The number of dual-earner households in Spain has increased significantly in recent years; by 2000 these households represented 45 percent of all households with at least one earner between the ages of 20 and 59 (Franco et al. 2002).

The full survey sample included 14,921 household units; and it achieved a 70 percent response rate. I selected households who met the following criteria: (a) included a heterosexual couple, (b) both members of the couple were between 18 and 64 years old, and (c) both members of the couple were employed. I defined respondents as employed if they provided an affirmative response to either of the following two questions: Did you work last week? Do you have a job even if you did not work last

week? The three restrictions yielded a sample of 3,819 households; of these, 279 cases (7 percent) were dropped due to missing data on some of the independent variables. Respondents who had flexible job schedules or took the survey during the weekend were more likely to present missing data. The results are robust to sensitivity tests imputing values for missing data (analyses available upon request).

Dependent variables

Hiring domestic work is a dichotomous variable that takes the value 1 if a household hires a domestic worker and 0 otherwise. The use of domestic services is reported by the member of the household filling out the questionnaire (not by the service worker). Hiring households are those that report having domestic service and/or paying someone to carry out any of the following feminine housework tasks in their homes: cooking, cleaning, laundry and ironing, shopping, household management, care of children, and care of adults[2]. Though domestic and care work are substantively different tasks with distinctive gendered implications (e.g. Twiggs et al. 1999), I opted for the broader specification because, as detailed studies of domestic workers have shown, care work and domestic labor are typically provided by a single worker with time overlaps among these tasks. The exclusion/inclusion of care work does not affect the results (analyses available upon request).

The time women and men spend on housework is measured as a continuous variable that indicates the daily minutes spent doing typically feminine routine housework tasks including cooking, cleaning, laundry, ironing, shopping, and household management.[3] Care work time is not included in this composite variable.

[2] Outsourced care work is included only when a domestic worker performs it inside the respondent's home. Households that outsource care outside the home (e.g. kindergarten) are excluded.
[3] This item includes tasks like going to the post office, bank or veterinary. The exclusion of this item does not change the results (analyses available upon request).

Data are taken from the time diaries, which ask each adult in the household about their primary activity throughout the day in ten-minute intervals. Only 2 percent of women but 21 percent of men report doing no housework at all. I use the original metric of data collection: minutes per day.

Independent variables

Economic resources are measured via survey questions about monthly wages at the respondent's primary and secondary jobs; respondents could reply in one of eight categories. I center these intervals on the corresponding median wage value; final values are: 1= 255€; 2= 750€; 3= 1,124.5€; 4= 1,374.5€; 5= 1,740.5€; 6= 2,250€; 7= 2,750€; and 8= 3,500€. For individuals with more than one job (2 percent of women and 4 percent of men), I sum the wages for all jobs to create a single income variable. The household income variable is the sum of both partners' incomes. The categorical nature of the original data is a limitation of the Spanish Time Survey; robustness checks confirmed that results were not sensitive to different specifications of the income variable (available upon request).

Individuals' relative power is measured by the conventional earnings' share variable: men's income minus women's income divided by total income (Bittman et al. 2003; Brines 1994; Evertsson and Nermo 2004; Schneider 2011; Sørensen and McLanahan 1987). I rescale the variable so that its range is from 0 to 1; values greater than .5 indicate that within a specific household the man's income is greater than the woman's income.[4]

[4] This measure of bargaining power is susceptible to measurement error. Ignoring assets or other sources of income might lead to underestimating or overestimating individuals' relative power (for a detailed discussion see Sørensen and McLanahan 1987). The categorical nature of the original income reports further undermines its precision. Measurement error downplays the parameter estimates and might induce bias, yet there is no evidence to expect this error to be more/less prevalent among those who hire domestic workers.

Control variables

I include a series of control variables based on previous studies on outsourcing and housework. Education data was collected in six categories: 1= less than lower secondary; 2= lower secondary; 3= lower secondary plus professional training; 4= upper secondary; 5= three-year college degree; and 6= four-year college degree and above. I include this six-category variable in all models with one exception—in the last model, the outcome equation employs a dummy variable for university degree; I use the simplified education variable to increase the model's parsimony.

Weekly hours of work indicates the usual number of hours that individuals work for pay during the week. This variable is important because of its association with both individuals' income and the time available to do housework. I combine information from two survey items, one that inquired about weekly hours of work for those with fixed schedules and another for those with flexible schedules.

Since the volume of housework influences the demand for outsourcing, I control for the number of members in the household and the number of children under 10 years old. Other control variables include age, marital status (a dichotomous variable that takes the value 1 for married and 0 otherwise), whether the respondent was not working that week (due to holidays, sickness or leave), and whether the diary was completed during the weekend.

Analytical models

The data include complete diary and income information for both individuals in each couple in the sample of 3,540 dual-earner households, (a total of 7,080 individuals). The survey created frequency weights to account for sampling design; I apply weights

in all analyses presented below. The analysis is divided into three sections. First, I employ a logistic regression model to examine the predictors of hiring domestic work. Second, I analyze the relationship between hiring domestic work and the time women and men (within couples) spend on housework. I employ the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model, which statistically accounts for the fact that couples belong to the same household and the error terms of these two equations are correlated (Zeller 1962). To determine the relationship between hiring domestic work and the within-household gender gap in housework, I compare the coefficients for hiring across the equations for women and men in couples.

Finally, I conduct a counterfactual simulation to assess the extent to which hiring domestic work is related to the class housework gap among women. I use observed data to estimate the class gap and then contrast the result to a hypothetical estimation in which hirers cannot purchase domestic work. To conduct this simulation, I employ a two-step regression method called an endogenous switching equation (Gerber 2000; Winship et al. 1992). This technique models the sorting of persons into different regimes and the effects of these regimes on outcomes. In this case, the regimes are hiring and not-hiring, and the outcome variable is the time women spend on housework. The calculation produces estimates for the outcome variable for both the observed (actual) and the unobserved (hypothetical) regime, and facilitates the calculation of the expected time women hirers and women non-hirers with different characteristics spend on housework (Mare et al. 1987). This model also addresses the sample bias that may occur when the dependent variable in the model depends on a binary regime switch or nonrandom assignment to treatment effects, and tests whether the effect of regime change (i.e., hiring) is robust to unobserved endogeneity (Mare and Winship 1987).

Using a decomposition technique, I calculate an estimate of the time women hirers would spend on housework if they had been observed not-hiring. I use this feature to create an aggregate measure of the class housework gap that contrasts two scenarios: (a) the estimate of the time that women hirers and non-hirers spend on housework based on observed data; and (b) the estimate of the time women non-hirers spend on housework based on observed data, and the hypothetical time women hirers would have spent on housework had they been observed not hiring. I further describe the details of this exercise in the results section. Comparing the two scenarios assesses the extent to which hiring is related to the class housework gap among women.

Table 1 presents summary statistics for the full sample and two subsamples, hirers and non-hirers. On average, Spanish women living in dual-earner households spend 4.5 hours per day doing housework and men just over 1.5 hours. In this sample 21 percent hire domestic workers. Among women, hirers spend slightly less time on housework than non-hirers, while among men, hirers spend more time on housework than non-hirers. Thus, hiring couples seem more gender egalitarian than non-hiring ones; the within-household gender gap amounts to 2 hours for hirers and 2 hours and 40 minutes for non-hirers, and women's share of housework is 67 percent and 72 percent, respectively. These differences could reflect the differing compositions of the hiring and non-hiring populations, which should be controlled using multivariate models. In particular, the average number of children is substantially larger among hirers, which is likely to affect the volume of housework. The time women spend in paid employment is similar in the two subsamples. Compared to non-hirers, hirers have more education and larger incomes.

(TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE)

Results

The first set of analyses determines which households hire domestic work. Table 2 presents logistic regression results; in all tables, all variables are centered to the mean to facilitate interpretation (the value of the constant represents an average household).

As women's and men's incomes increase, so do the odds of hiring domestic work; however, the coefficient for women's income, 0.091 (s.e. 0.01), is notably larger than the coefficient for men's income, 0.058 (s.e. 0.01). These results do not support the single household preference model; instead these suggest that outsourcing reflects underlying gender relations and that it is more prevalent when women have larger incomes (Cohen 1998; Gupta 2006; 2007; Treas and Ruijter 2008). The odds of hiring are greater for those with more education at each income level (Lippe et al. 2004), and among households with young children (Oropesa 1993). Interestingly, married couples are more prone to hire than cohabiting couples, unlike Treas and Ruijter's (2008) finding that outsourcing expenditures were not different between married and cohabiting couples in the United States.

(TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE)

Table 3 estimates the relationship between hiring domestic work and the total time women and men spend on housework. Holding all other variables constant, in Model 3 women hirers do 22 minutes less housework per day than women non-hirers. An equivalent reduction among non-hirers requires both a high household income and a very low men's share of earnings, a scenario that is far less common in the sample than hiring domestic work. For hiring and non-hiring men, the difference in time spent on housework is eight minutes. Thus, on average, hiring domestic work is associated with a reduction of 14 minutes in the absolute within-household gender gap in housework.

However, subtracting the hiring coefficient from the intercepts in each equation reveals that in relative terms, hiring is associated with a 12 percent (22.01/179.6) and a 15 percent (7.7/50.97) decline in the time spent on housework for women and men, respectively. In additional analyses I constrained the intercepts to be equal for men and women and found that the coefficient for hiring domestic work among women is not statistically different from that among men (-12.4 for women and -11.6 for men; results available upon request). Thus, on average, hiring couples reproduce the relative within-household gender gap in housework; men benefit from this strategy since women do about three-fourths of the housework regardless of outsourcing. In contrast to the impression given by the descriptive statistics, hiring households are not more gender egalitarian than non-hiring ones. The number of children is important to explain this disparity, because it is positively correlated with both hiring domestic work and men's housework time.

Model 1 confirms previous results that as men increase their share of earnings, women do more housework and men do less[5]. Comparing Models 1 and 2 shows that controlling for hiring does not reduce the coefficient for relative earnings in either partner's equation. Model 3 includes an interaction term to test whether outsourcing changes the relationship between their relative earnings (power) and time spent on housework. The interaction is statistically significant only for women, and the magnitude of the coefficient indicates that among hirers, the association for women between relative power and time spent on housework nearly disappears. This result suggests that women in hiring households are less able to transform their greater share of income into decreases in their own housework time. For women in non-hiring

[5] I used women's and men's absolute incomes to re-estimate the model and compare my results to Gupta's (2007) autonomy hypothesis. I find that the coefficient for hiring is about the same size (-19.96 for Model 2) and that the coefficient for women's income is negative and substantively larger than the coefficient of their partners' (results available upon request). This alternative model specification does not alter the substantive findings.

households, however, relative power remains relevant—as men's earnings share declines so does women's housework time. I further consider this result in the discussion section.

(TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE)

Control variables follow conventional patterns. Both women and men do more housework on the weekends, as expected for dual-earner households. The effect of education is much stronger for men than women. Compared to less educated men, those with high school or university degrees do more housework and their partners do substantially less at each income level. Men who work more hours for pay per week do less housework and their partners do more. For women, each additional hour per week of paid work is associated with only a minute and a half less time spent on housework.

To examine whether the effect of hiring is robust to unobserved endogeneity, Table 4 presents the results of the endogenous switching regression. Columns 1 and 2 include estimates of OLS coefficients for all variables that were significant in previous models for the time women spend on housework; Column 3 estimates the equation model for selection into hiring. RhoA and RhoB indicate correlations between the residuals that form the selection and the outcome equations for hirers and non-hirers, respectively. These coefficients test whether unobserved selection bias affects the estimation; the fact that neither reaches statistical significance indicates that all significant selection processes occur through the observed variables. The difference between the intercepts shows that hiring domestic work is associated with a similar reduction in the time women spend on housework (24 minutes compared to 22 minutes in Model 3 Table 3). The results also reaffirm the findings for the interaction term tested above, that relative power is significantly associated with reductions in women's

housework time only for non-hirers. The significant negative effect of total household income might reflect the presence of additional outsourcing processes (other than hiring) or buying more time from the person(s) hired (since this variable is only measured dichotomously in this data).

(TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE)

The results of these analyses show that hiring is more likely among affluent households and that hiring women spend less time doing housework than other women. These patterns suggest that the class gap in housework among women would be smaller in the absence of hiring. I next focus on the magnitude of the association between hiring and the class housework gap, which due to data limitations can only be estimated counterfactually.

I extrapolate the individual-level results to create aggregate-level measures. To simplify the calculation, I divide households into income quartiles and within each quartile I determine the sample mean for all covariates for hirers and non-hirers separately. Using these sample means for each income group and the regression coefficients in Table 4, I calculate the average time hiring and non-hiring women in each income group spend on housework. Next, I calculate the expected average time all women in each income group spend on housework, weighting the sum of hirer and non-hirer estimates. For example, if the expected average time that hiring women in low-income households spend on housework is 100 minutes and the time for non-hiring women in low-income households is 130 minutes, but only 10 percent of low-income households hire, the resulting average is (100*0.1) + (130*0.9). This first calculation produces estimates based on observed data; in other words, within each income quartile, coefficients for non-hirers are applied to observed sample means for non-hirers, and

coefficients for hirers are applied for hirers. The hypothetical calculation repeats this process but modifies the estimation; for hirers, the coefficients for non-hirers, rather than the coefficients for hirers, are now applied. The result permits the comparison of the average time women in each income quartile spend on housework under the observed and hypothetical scenarios.

Figure 1 illustrates the results of the exercise. The bars indicate the average time women in each income quartile spend on housework; the black bars are the results based on observed coefficients for hirers and non-hirers and the grey bars are the results based on hypothetical coefficients for hirers and observed coefficients for non-hirers.

The graph shows that the time women spend on housework is more stratified when the option of hiring domestic work is available and that the change is greatest for women in the top income quartiles. The gap between the bottom and top income quartiles amounts to 65 minutes in the observed scenario and 52 minutes in the simulated scenario. This result suggests that in the absence of domestic workers, the class housework gap in Spain would decline by 20 percent (13/65)[6]. The housework income gradient remains substantial in this artificial scenario; that is, affluent women would still do less housework than less well-off women even if hiring domestic work was not allowed. This outcome indicates both that other outsourcing processes might also influence the class gap in housework and that non-hiring women mobilize their

[6] The counterfactual analysis has obvious limitations, including the assumption that behavior would not change in the absence of domestic workers. This assumption can be violated in a number of ways. Although the results are robust to unobserved heterogeneity, if hiring was not available hirers might do less housework by lowering their standards of cleanliness, for example. The absence of hiring could also lower the wages of affluent women who hire (because they would incur a labor market penalty as a result of spending more time on housework), which would consequently depress their relative power to bargain with their spouses (reverse causality). In addition, the absence of hiring would affect the lower-income women who would lose their jobs in the domestic work sector and thus potentially diminish their power and increase the housework gap, as women at the bottom of the income distribution would be doing more. All these are possible scenarios, and thus the hypothetical exercise is not meant to be completely realistic but to provide a compelling approximation of the stratifying implications of market substitutes for domestic labor.

relative power, which is positively correlated with household income, to reduce their housework time.

(FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE)

Discussion

This research demonstrates that outsourcing is associated with differences in the distribution of housework both within and between households. The results stress the economic foundations of the gendered division of household labor. Women and men who hire spend less time on housework than their non-hiring counterparts. In both hiring and non-hiring households, however, women complete about three-fourths of the total housework. Hiring is more strongly related to women's absolute income than to men's, and among hirers women's bargaining power does not significantly shape the time spent on housework. The counterfactual exercise indicates that hiring accounts for a non-negligible portion of the housework gap that separates women in more and less affluent households.

These results challenge the optimistic view that the market provides liberating resources for women, and lead to skepticism about the power of outsourcing to reduce gender gaps in housework. In Spain, outsourcing of domestic work is associated with maintaining gender inequalities within households and accentuating class inequalities among women. These findings might well vary cross-nationally. In Spain, hiring domestic work is normalized as a form of work/life balance for professional women (e.g., Peterson 2007). In other countries where hiring domestic work is common for all middle-class families (e.g., India) or a more controversial practice (e.g., Sweden), hiring might have different implications for the distribution of housework within and between households.

This article sheds light on two debates in the study of family inequalities. First, my decision model proposes that bargaining power and gender norms *together* shape couples' decisions about the allocation of both time and money for housework. This revised framework allows the simultaneous analysis of housework outsourcing and sharing – unlike the autonomy model in which these strategies are automatically contending (Gupta 2007) – and highlights the relevance of gender relations across class levels, and the persistence of gender under different circumstances.

The results show that time bargaining leads to changes in women's share of housework but outsourcing does not. At least two interpretations can be offered to explain why women's share of housework is the same in hiring and non-hiring households. One says that this result is a mathematical outcome of hiring's relatively small effect on reducing women's housework time. If hiring had a larger effect, then women's share of housework would have dropped as expected. An alternative interpretation based on gender theory suggests that hiring is irrelevant for women's share of housework because gender norms strongly shape how couples do housework, even when they outsource. The analyses provide evidence consistent with the idea that gender expectations frame how outsourcing operates (Ridgeway 2011). The interaction finding indicates that hiring dampens women's but not men's capacity to use bargaining power to decrease their own housework time. Among hirers, the substantial direct effect of women's absolute income on the decision to hire is apparently framed as her relative contribution; the relative share of income she contributes is associated with no further reductions of her own housework time. Among non-hirers, in contrast, relative power remains an influential force shaping the time women and men spend on housework. In

light of these findings, outsourcing should be considered a less transformative use of women's economic power than time bargaining.[7]

This study could not closely examine either what factors motivate households to pursue outsourcing or the exact mechanisms whereby outsourcing undermines the influence of relative power for women's housework time. Future research should examine these processes more directly in order to evaluate their ramifications for inequality as globalization expands the supply of outsourcing options. Valuable extensions of this research would further explore these dynamics across several countries and consider care work in the analyses.

Second, the current study stresses the importance of analyzing the intersection of gender and class in shaping the allocation of housework labor as a whole. The gender division of labor within households varies systematically by class: although both affluent and less affluent women complete the larger share of housework, women who hire spend substantially less time doing housework than these who do not hire. The reduction of time spent on housework among women who hire is due to purchasing a substitute, which requires economic resources. Differences in the absolute amount of time spent on housework are important because, among other things, spending time on housework incurs penalties in the labor market (Bryan et al. 2011; Noonan 2001).

The growth of the service economy might thus yield potentially polarizing effects. Outsourcing opportunities may contribute to economic inequality at the household level: Women in affluent households would be able to outsource more readily or extensively and by spending less time on housework avoid some of the wage penalties for limits on labor force participation. Women in less affluent households

[7] I also replicated the analyses with a sample of single women and the results suggest that, consistent with the doing gender approach, the coefficient for hiring is greater for single women than for coupled women (-36.17 and -24.23 minutes respectively; though the *t* test of the difference is not statistically significant due to the large standard errors in the single women's equation. Analyses available upon request).

would still be spending more time on housework and facing relatively greater obstacles to increasing their market income. However, even in hiring households, the pressure on women to do unpaid labor is not eliminated and that on men is reduced. Making hiring easier or cheaper might both enhance the earnings of women in households affluent enough to afford it but also lower the pressure on men to share housework more equally.

Tables and Figures

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics

	Full sample		Hirers		Non-hirers		
Variable	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	Range
Woman daily housework time (minutes per day)	264.1	151.5	254	154.7	266.9	150.6	0 – 990
Man daily housework time (minutes per day)	108.0	119.5	127.3	129.7	102.6	115.9	0 – 740
Hires domestic work[a]	0.218	0.413					
Woman income	940.5	567.6	1380	693.1	818.2	457.8	255 - 4,625
Man income	1307	687.8	1798	918.7	1171	533.7	255 - 7,000
Total income	2248	1073	3178	1332	1989	819.7	510 - 10,500
Earnings share	0.589	0.137	0.560	0.133	0.597	0.137	.084 - .932
Woman education	3.345	1.616	4.504	1.446	3.022	1.509	1 - 6
Man education	3.248	1.604	4.430	1.513	2.920	1.469	1 - 6
Woman university[b]	0.281	0.449	0.588	0.492	0.195	0.397	
Man university[b]	0.232	0.422	0.522	0.5	0.152	0.359	
Woman age	40.49	8.439	41.69	7.307	40.16	8.699	18 - 64
Man age	42.86	8.756	43.89	7.663	42.58	9.017	18 - 64
Number of children	0.531	0.743	0.784	0.861	0.460	0.69	0 - 4
Household size	3.532	1.036	3.738	1.01	3.475	1.036	2 - 14
Married[c]	0.916	0.277	0.965	0.184	0.903	0.297	
Woman weekly workhours	37.13	14.38	37.86	12.29	36.93	14.91	5 - 100
Man weekly workhours	45.31	15.77	44.80	16.08	45.45	15.69	5 - 100
Weekend sample[d]	0.303	0.46	0.306	0.461	0.303	0.459	
Not working	0.0627	0.242	0.0545	0.227	0.065	0.247	
N	3540	3540	770	770	2770	2770	

[a] Hires domestic work: 0 = *does not hire domestic work,* 1 = *hires domestic work*. [b] Woman/Man university: 0 = *does not have university degree*, 1 = *has university degree*. [c] Married: 0 = *not married*, 1 = *married*. [d] Not working: 0 = *worked last week*, 1 = *did not work last week*.

Table 2. Logistic regression for hiring domestic work

	Model 1	
Variable	*B*	*SE B*
Woman income	0.0909***	0.0122
Man income	0.0579***	0.0101
Woman education	0.241***	0.0504
Man education	0.271***	0.0482
Woman age	0.0323**	0.0154
Man age	0.0128	0.0128
Number of children	0.693***	0.0958
Household size	0.0286	0.0666
Married	0.906***	0.261
Woman weekly workhours	0.00661	0.00443
Man weekly workhours	0.00737*	0.00384
Constant	-2.627***	0.255
Pseudo-R2	0.2845	
Observations	3540	

Note: Woman, man and total income are divided by 100 to facilitate coefficient readibility.

*$p < .1$ **$p < .05$ ***$p < .01$

Table 3. Seemingly unrelated regression for women's and men's housework time minutes per day

	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3			
	Women		Men		Women		Men		Women		Men	
Variable	*B*	*SE B*	*B*	*SE B*	*B*	*SE B*	*B*	*SE B*	*B*	*SE B*	*B*	*SE B*
Total income	-1.560***	0.228	0.0989	0.148	-1.333***	0.236	0.186	0.154	-1.289***	0.237	0.190	0.154
Earnings share	77.81***	15.05	-38.23***	9.78	75.69***	15.03	-39.04***	9.782	93.93***	16.7	-37.43***	10.86
Hires domestic work					-19.63***	5.529	-7.596**	3.6	-22.01***	5.605	-7.808**	3.654
Hiring*Earning share									-86.60**	34.63	-7.701	22.55
Woman education	-0.220	1.652	2.411**	1.075	0.357	1.657	2.633**	1.079	0.228	1.657	2.622**	1.08
Man education	-6.105***	1.62	2.630**	1.054	-5.420***	1.629	2.895***	1.061	-5.232***	1.629	2.912***	1.062
Woman age	2.053***	0.538	-0.789**	0.35	2.136***	0.537	-0.758**	0.35	2.126***	0.537	-0.759**	0.35
Man age	0.628	0.511	0.346	0.333	0.648	0.51	0.355	0.332	0.656	0.51	0.355	0.332
Number of children	-8.569***	3.256	-0.738	2.116	-6.790**	3.289	-0.0555	2.14	-6.607**	3.287	-0.0377	2.14
Household size	12.87***	2.341	-1.290	1.523	13.00***	2.337	-1.239	1.522	12.89***	2.336	-1.250	1.522
Married	15.93**	6.536	0.291	4.251	17.34***	6.537	0.841	4.256	17.22***	6.531	0.830	4.256
Woman weekly workhours	-1.599***	0.143	0.0665	0.093	-1.596***	0.143	0.0680	0.0929	-1.582***	0.143	0.0692	0.093
Man weekly workhours	0.364***	0.132	-0.731***	0.0859	0.382***	0.131	-0.725***	0.0859	0.383***	0.131	-0.725***	0.0859
Weekend	22.80***	4.16	33.08***	2.706	23.20***	4.154	33.23***	2.705	23.25***	4.151	33.24***	2.705
Holiday	43.14***	6.071	45.84***	4.992	42.73***	6.063	45.64***	4.992	43.38***	6.064	45.66***	4.992
Constant	176.7***	6.47	49.88***	4.192	179.5***	6.507	50.96***	4.221	179.6***	6.501	50.97***	4.221
R-squared	0.175		0.114		0.178		0.115		0.180		0.115	
Observations	3540		3540		3540		3540		3540		3540	

Note: Total income is divided by 100 to facilitate coefficient readibility.

*$p < .1$ ** $p < .05$ ***$p < .01$

Table 4. Endogenous switching regression for women's housework time minutes per day

	Hirers		Nonhirers		Selection into Hiring domestic work	
Variable	*B*	*SE B*	*B*	*SE B*	*B*	*SE B*
Total income	-1.605***	0.453	-1.183**	0.521		
Earnings share	19.53	32.83	89.10***	20.51		
Woman age	2.337*	1.37	2.030***	0.768		
Man age	-0.128	1.329	0.921	0.75		
Number of children	-8.307	7.028	-6.626	5.274	0.259***	0.0446
Household size	16.20***	6.15	12.77***	3.111	0.132***	0.0339
Married	7.537	14.64	18.49**	8.546		
Woman weekly workhours	-1.162***	0.393	-1.63***	0.195		
Man weekly workhours	0.840***	0.303	0.322*	0.165	0.005***	0.00208
Weekend	36.09***	9.224	20.36***	5.771		
Not working	46.64***	13.75	41.80***	9		
Woman university	12.85	10.89	-2.598	7.175		
Man university	-12.04	10.67	-10.79	8.008		
Woman income					0.060***	0.0069
Man income					0.035***	0.00634
Woman education					0.111***	0.0272
Man education					0.155***	0.0267
Constant	163.7***	24.12	187.1***	10.59	-1.034***	0.0334
Rho	-0.0524	0.131	0.114	0.18		
Observations	770		2770		3540	

Note: Income variables are divided by 100 to facilitate coefficient readibility.

*$p < .1$ **$p < .05$ ***$p < .01$

Figure 1. Time women spend on housework (minutes per day) by income quartile. Observed and hypothetical estimates



CHAPTER 4. Women's work and household income inequality

As the economic status of women has improved, some scholars have raised the concern that changes in women's employment and wages might worsen inequality between households (Pettit and Hook 2009). Inequality might increase if economic improvements are concentrated among women in highly skilled jobs and these women are married to similar men. Inequality might decrease, however, if changes in women's employment improve the economic position of households at the middle and lower end of the income distribution. Some studies have concluded that women's employment has had an equalizing effect (e.g., Cancian and Reed 1999; Harkness 2010), while other researchers have found that changes in women's earnings could contribute to polarizing the distribution of household income (Cooke 2011; Esping-Andersen 2007; Esping-Andersen 2009a). I argue that the social organization of household labor substitution mediates how changes in women's employment affect household inequality.

In countries with meager public sector services, the market plays a growing role in organizing the provision and distribution of services and goods that substitute for unpaid domestic work (e.g., housecleaning, hiring a nanny, buying prepared food). The marketization of domestic and care labor can affect inequality between households in at least two ways: a) by generating demand for low-wage jobs in childcare or domestic work, which have been found to polarize the occupational structure (Dwyer 2013; England 2005; Folbre 2008), and b) by generating unequal access to the potential income

returns to outsourcing (via increasing women's time spent on the job).[8] This Chapter focuses on the latter process and considers the ways in which the consumption of domestic/care services affects women's earnings and household inequality.

Previous studies as well as the findings in Chapter 3 indicate that the hiring of domestic workers is concentrated among affluent households, and that women who hire spend less time on housework (Cohen 1998; Lippe et al. 2004; Gupta 2006; 2007). Other research suggested that hiring domestic workers increased women's labor force participation and work hours (Cortés et al. 2011), and that women who spent less time doing housework or took less time off after childbirth were less vulnerable to wage penalties (Gangl et al. 2009; Noonan 2001). No studies, however, have examined the impact of this set of relationships on inequality between women and inequality between households.

The next section presents background information that suggests that the consumption of domestic/care services is a plausible mechanism of socioeconomic polarization. Due to data limitations, the empirical analyses are limited to hiring care workers. In contrast to housekeeping, outsourcing care work can arguably have the highest potential effect on women's incomes because it is more closely linked to motherhood penalties (Budig et al. 2001; Budig et al. 2012; Correll et al. 2007).

I use data from the 2008 Spanish sample of the European Union Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC hereafter). The analyses examine the effect of hiring a nanny on women's and households' incomes. The results suggest that hiring a nanny is associated with higher incomes for both women and households, but returns to

[8] Returns to outsourcing are the economic benefits that women receive from outsourcing domestic/care work, largely through devoting more time to paid work and increasing their chances of wage growth and occupational mobility.

hiring do not translate into increased inequality between women or between households. In the discussion section I consider possible explanations for this outcome.

Background

The relationship between women's employment and inequality between households has not been thoroughly explored. Using U.S. data from the 1970s and 1980s, researchers found that changes in women's employment and earnings reduced inequality between households (Cancian et al. 1993; Cancian et al. 1998). Other researchers designed counterfactual analyses that compared observed inequalities to those that would exist in the absence of women's earnings and found that, in general, women's employment contributed to the reduction of inequality between households (e.g., Harkness 2010; Pasqua 2008).

Other studies found that women's income could increase inequality. For example, Esping-Andersen (2007) used a decomposition analysis of the coefficient of variation and found that women's contributions to household income had disequalizing effects in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Similarly, other studies examined the association between wives' and husbands' earnings and found that growing economic homogamy could notably increase inequality across households (Blackburn et al. 1995; Cancian et al. 1993; Cancian et al. 1999; Hyslop 2001; Schwartz 2010). Moreover, Harkness (2010) found that a growing proportion of dual-earner households tended to be concentrated in the top income quintiles.

One explanation for these conflicting results lies in the fact that researchers make different methodological and analytical decisions. The studies reviewed above employed

different measures of inequality (some used the coefficient of variation, others the Gini coefficient), focused on different samples (some included only married couples and others all households), and defined the empirical problem in distinctive ways (some examined the association between women's income and other income components of the household while others simulated counterfactual income distributions, manipulating the values of women's income).

Another explanation for these findings is substantive. Many of the pathways that might link changes in women's employment to between-household inequality, are context and time dependent. One of these pathways is unequal access to substitutes for unpaid household labor and the associated effects on women's wages (via increased time spent on paid work). In a world of market-based household outsourcing, better-off women might be able to bypass some of the gendered barriers in the labor market, while those with fewer resources get stuck on the "mommy track" and thus experience greater motherhood penalties.

The consumption of domestic services as a disequalizing mechanism

Among other things, responsibility for housework and care work continues to be an important source of disadvantage for women in the labor market (e.g. Pettit and Hook 2009; Gornick and Meyers 2003). A number of studies reported that spending time on housework had substantial negative effects on wages, particularly women's wages. Coverman (1983) found that being responsible for housework had negative occupational consequences for both men and women of all economic classes. Shelton and Fireston (1988) found that the time women spent on domestic labor explained a portion of the

gender gap in earnings in the United States. Baxter (1992) also found that the time women spent on domestic labor was directly implicated in the reproduction of the gender gap in earnings. Stratton (2001) showed that time spent on housework had negative effects on women's wages. Using U.S. data and fixed effects regression models, Noonan (2001) found that housework had negative effects on wages for women but not men, because of the kinds of tasks women do. Similarly, Bryan and Sanz (2011) used the British Household Panel Survey and fixed effects models to study time spent on housework. The authors found that spending time on housework reduced wages for women but not men, because of the type and timing of tasks.

In addition to housework, time spent on care work is also a source of disadvantage. Mothers continue to spend much more time on childcare than fathers. In Spain, Gracia and Bellani (2010) found that Spanish mothers in full-time dual earner couples spent almost twice as much time as fathers in child care activities. The relationship between employment and time spent on childcare is not, however, clear cut. In the U.S., researchers found that, counter-intuitively, as mothers increased time spent on paid work they did not substantively reduce time spent on childcare (Bianchi 2011; Bianchi et al. 2006; Craig 2007; Sullivan et al. 2009). Further, cross-national variation indicates that childcare time is lower in countries with short work hours (Sayer et al. 2011). Moreover, parents with higher education, who have the highest earning potential, spend the most time in childcare (England et al. 2013; Sayer et al. 2004). Finally, in general, researchers found that fathers' involvement with childcare was positively associated with mothers' employment, work hours, and earnings (Gracia 2014; Gutiérrez-Domènech 2010; Raley et al. 2012).

The fact that, relative to their lower-income counterparts, better-off couples spend more time on childcare seems to suggest that these couples might face more of the earning losses associated with parenting, relatively speaking, but the research on the motherhood penalty is inconclusive. Some studies found that the wage penalty associated with motherhood was lower among couples with higher incomes. Budig and Hodges (2010) used longitudinal data from the United States and found that the motherhood penalty was substantively greater for low-income mothers. But Killewald and Bearak (2014) re-estimated Budig and Hodges' model using a different method and found that the motherhood penalty was similar for women at the low and high ends of the wage distribution. Cooke (2014) found that in the United States, the motherhood penalty declined as income increased, but in Australia and the United Kingdom penalties were more similar across the wage distribution. Moreover, Wilde et al. (2010) reported that the motherhood penalty was greater for women in highly skilled jobs, because potential wage mobility was greater for these women than for low-skilled women.

Mothers can face wage penalties as the result of a number of mechanisms, such as losses of job experience, productivity declines, job changes, and discrimination (2001). Gangl and Zeifle (2009) found that taking time off and changing jobs fully accounted for the motherhood penalty in the United Kingdom and the United States, but not in Germany. Studies showed that women with fragile childcare arrangements were more likely to have work disruptions (Usdansky et al. 2008; Uttal 1999). Further, studies suggested that mothers' access to reliable, high quality, and flexible childcare could avoid work disruptions (such as reducing work hours, taking time off, or changing jobs) that resulted in wage penalties (e.g. Budig and Hodges 2010). Qualitative research also

provided evidence that using financial resources to purchase desired care work helped mothers maintain consistent full-time jobs after childbirth (Damaske 2011).

Outsourcing can reduce time spent on housework and provide the flexibility to adjust care time in ways that avoid work disruptions. The time-saving effects of outsourcing housework, however, are not direct because standards of cleanliness vary over time (Bittman, Riche and Wajcman 2004; Robinson 1980; Vanek 1974) and because outsourcing is also related to status display (Anderson 2000; Ray and Qayum, 2009; Romero 1992). Nonetheless, researchers have found that outsourcing can be time-saving, and that it is associated with notable decreases in time spent on housework. Heisig (2011) found that the dissemination of household technology explained part of the gap in time spent on housework between more and less affluent women in 33 countries. Lippe et al. (2004) used data from the Netherlands and found significant time-saving effects for domestic help and microwave and dishwasher ownership. In Chapter 3, I found that in Spain hiring domestic workers was associated with women spending 20 minutes less per day doing housework.

A thorough literature review revealed no studies that directly examined the effect of outsourcing on time spent on care work, however, outsourcing care work has been found to increase time spent on the job. A long-standing literature in economics has examined the effect of childcare costs on women's labor force participation, and, in general, the literature has shown that lower costs increase women's labor supply (see Blau et al. 2006 for a review). Studies also examined policies that affected the price or availability of childcare services and how these related to changes in women's labor supply (e.g., Lefebvre et al. 2008). The results generally showed that women who had

access to satisfactory childcare services were more likely to return to their jobs after childbearing, and do so on a full-time basis (e.g. Gornick and Meyers 2003).

Only recently have some studies explored the impact of other forms of household outsourcing, particularly hiring domestic workers, on women's economic activity. This form of outsourcing, compared to childcare centers, is generally less widely accessible (more sensitive to income) but constitutes a more flexible and comprehensive care service. For example, mothers can leave a sick child at home with a nanny but cannot do the same at a childcare center (Macdonald 2010; Nelson 1990). This form of outsourcing offers greater control over time spent on care work and on the job, which can allow women to avoid work disruptions that occur frequently among mothers who must depend on less reliable childcare services (Usdansky and Wolf 2008; Uttal 1999). In contrast to using childcare centers, then, hiring domestic workers can lead to greater returns for women in the form of increased paid work hours and wages.

So far, studies examining the effect of hiring domestic workers on women's economic status have focused on labor supply. Cortes and Tessada (2011) exploited cross-city variation in the concentration of low-skilled immigrants in the United States and showed that the presence of low-skilled immigrants was associated with increases in the work hours of highly skilled native women but unrelated to their labor force participation rates. Farre et al. (2011) replicated this study using data from Spain and found that female immigration allowed Spanish women to work more hours, return earlier to work after childbirth, and continue to be employed when caring for elderly dependents. The authors concluded that between 1999 and 2008 about 3 percentage points of the employment rate of skilled women with family responsibilities could be

attributed to the effect of female immigration flows in providing domestic services. Barone and Mocetti (2011) adopted a similar approach using data from Italy and found that the number of immigrant domestic workers was related to increases in highly skilled women's work hours but not in their labor force participation rates.

Relatedly, Cortes and Pan (2013) estimated the effect of hiring domestic workers on women's labor supply by analyzing a change in Hong Kong's immigration policy that substantially increased the availability and affordability of domestic workers in Hong Kong. The authors found that the presence of foreign domestic workers was associated with an 8-12 percent percentage point increase in employment for native women with young children, a change entirely propelled by middle and highly skilled women.

Hallden and Stenberg (2013) is, to my knowledge, the only study that has examined the effect of hiring domestic work on women's earnings rather than labor force participation. The authors used data from Sweden and examined the effect of a policy change that reduced the cost of hiring housekeepers. They found small but positive effects of this reduction of the costs of outsourcing on married women's earnings.

As a whole, these studies indicate that market-based outsourcing concentrates housework and care work penalties at the bottom of the income distribution and can contribute to the polarization of economic resources between households. Access to substitutes for unpaid household labor can condition which women spend more time on the job and earn higher wages, and in turn determine the extent of potential disequalizing effects of changes in women's employment on household income inequality. When access depends on income, returns to outsourcing will disproportionally benefit those who are already advantaged. Women in households that can afford to hire care services

for young children can develop career paths structured around typically male life-courses and can avoid the income penalties associated with motherhood, whereas women in households that cannot afford to hire will tend to have the irregular attachment to the labor market, which reduces their individual and household incomes.

To observe a disequalizing effect of household labor outsourcing two conditions must be met. First, outsourcing must generate wage returns—it should be associated with income increases among employed women. In other words, holding constant relevant variables that predict wages, women who outsource should have, on average, higher incomes than equivalent women who do not hire. Second, household outsourcing must be sufficiently concentrated among higher-income households. That is, better-off households should disproportionally benefit from returns to outsourcing. If both conditions are met, returns to outsourcing will be associated with increases in inequality between households; between-household inequality will be greater when some households can outsource than when nobody can outsource.

Data and Methods

I use data from the 2008 Spanish sample of the EU-SILC. The Spanish EU-SILC is a rotating panel study of households' income and wellbeing that began in 2004 and succeeded the European Community Household Panel (ECHP). The survey was designed to monitor inequality, poverty, and social exclusion in the European Union. My sample is composed of households of cohabiting or married couples with at least one young child (12 years old or younger).

This set of preliminary analyses focuses on one form of outsourcing: hiring a nanny. Data constraints required this limitation: the survey did not include questions about other types of outsourcing of household labor (e.g., hiring cleaning services). Although this measure captures only one specific form of outsourcing, childcare is arguably the most consequential aspect of domestic labor for women's employment and paid work intensity. Hiring a nanny is a common practice among Spanish mothers. Childcare centers are also widely used, but these are often insufficient for the long workdays of most professional working women (Valiente 2003). Nonetheless, this measure allows for the identification of only a very small sample of hirers.

I examine the association between hiring a nanny and women's individual and total household income. Hiring a nanny is a dichotomous variable that takes the value 1 if a household hires a nanny and 0 otherwise. The member of the household who completed the questionnaire (not the care worker) reports the use of nanny services. The variable used in the analyses defines hiring households as those that report paying someone to care for their child or children; this question was only asked to households with children under the age of 18. The income measure includes monthly wages, salaries, and business revenue. Women's income is taken from individual reports. Household income is the sum of a woman's income and her male partner's income.

Other variables in the model include standard human capital measures. Education data is collected in four categories: 1 = primary education; 2 = lower secondary education; 3 = higher secondary education and/or professional training; 4 = higher education. Working experience is measured in years. Occupational data is recorded in ISCO88 codes and summarized in nine categories: 1 = legislators, senior officials, and

managers; 2 = professionals; 3 = technicians and associate professionals; 4 = clerks; 5 = service workers and shop and market sales workers; 6 = skill agricultural and fishery workers; 7 = craft and related workers; 8 = plant and machine operators and assemblers; 9 = elementary occupations. The size of the workplace is measured in 4 categories: 1 = 1-10 workers; 2 = 11-19 workers; 3 = 20-49 workers; 4 = 50 or more workers.

Married is a dichotomous variable that takes the value 1 if the respondent is married and 0 otherwise. The age of the youngest child is measured in years. Lastly, geographic dummy variables divide Spain into five regions: northwest (Galicia, Cantabria, and Asturias), north-center (Basque Country, Navarra, Aragon, and Rioja), northeast (Catalonia, Valencia, and Balearic Islands), south (Andalucia, Canary Islands, Murcia, Ceuta, and Melilla), and center (the baseline, which includes Madrid, Castilla-Leon and Castilla-La Mancha, and Extremadura). I use this variable to account for regional difference in economic development and women's wages.

The analytical strategy is twofold. First, I estimate a linear regression model that includes an independent variable for hiring a nanny. The model is estimated for both women's income and household income. Second, I use the predicted income distribution to conduct a simulation exercise that compares two scenarios: one in which the observed households that hired nannies can hire and one in which these households cannot hire. Finally, I calculate the Gini coefficient and the coefficient of variation for both the predicted income distribution when some households can hire and the simulated predicted income distribution when no households can hire. The difference between the coefficients for the two distributions indicates whether the disequalizing dynamics described above are at play.

The results presented below are preliminary and should be interpreted with caution for two reasons. First, the key variable of interest, hiring a nanny, is clearly endogenous. Reverse causality or simultaneity is a very clear source of concern in this analytic model: women who earn higher wages are more prone to pay for care work, in addition to potentially earn higher wages because they can afford to hire a nanny. I have explored a number of analytical strategies to treat endogeneity that I describe below, but I do not consider these to be sufficient. Second, the measure of whether households hire a nanny captures only a very specific and small sample of outsourcing households.

Descriptive Results

I analyze data from a sample of 1,374 coupled working women with children and from a sample of 2,225 coupled households with children (that includes both working and nonworking women). Table 1 presents summary statistics for both samples. On average, Spanish working women earn EUR 1,498 per month, while household income (in the household sample) is 2,707 euros per month. In both samples, women are, on average, 38 years old. In the working women sample, women have an average of about 14 years of work experience; in the household sample, women have an average of 12 of work experience and men have an average of 19 years of work experience. Only a small proportion of respondents reported hiring a nanny: 4 percent of working women and 3 percent of households. In both samples the majority of interviewees are married and the average age of the youngest child is 5 years old.

(TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE)

Regression Results

The first step in the analysis estimates the effect of hiring a nanny on women's and household income. Table 2 presents OLS regression results for the log of women's and households' monthly incomes.

(TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE)

As expected, hiring a nanny has a positive and statistically significant association with both women's and households' monthly income. The model for working women estimates that those who hire a nanny earn EUR 300 more per month than equivalent working women who do not hire a nanny. The model for all households with children estimates hirers to earn a little over EUR 150 more per month than equivalent households that do not hire. A portion of these two coefficients (even if not all) is surely endogenous, reflecting the fact that those who have high incomes are more likely to hire a nanny. However, the coefficients might also reflect the returns to outsourcing mentioned above, specifically that hiring a nanny allows women to work more hours and thus is associated with higher incomes. As a robustness check I conducted a propensity score matching analysiss to estimate the difference in incomes between hiring and non-hiring women. Using the nearest neighbor matching method this analysis estimates that the average treatment effect of hiring a nanny is EUR 296, a result that closely mirrors the coefficient in the OLS regression[9]. I also conducted regression analyses for women's work hours and found that mothers who hire domestic workers spend over 3 hours more per week on the

[9] The consistency of the results in these two analyses makes me confident that the OLS regression is appropriately specified. The propensity score matching method, however, does not address the question about reverse causality or simultaneity.

job than mothers who do not hire domestic workers. I report both of these complementary analyses in the appendix (see tables 4 and 5).

The other variables follow well-known patterns. Education, particularly having a university degree, has a positive effect on both women's and household income. Years of working experience is another important variable. In the working women's model, each additional year of work experience is associated with about EUR 20cents in women's monthly incomes. In the household model, only women's years of work experience but not her partners are statistically significant. Occupational controls compare other work categories to the baseline of high-status bureaucrats, large firm owners, and professionals (ISCO88 categories 11 and 21). The variables for marital status are statistically significant only for women's (but not household) income. The geographic controls are statistically significant in both models and indicate regional differences in average wages and incomes. Those living in the northeast, which includes the prosperous Catalonia, tend to have higher incomes.

The second stage of the analysis examines the impact of hiring a nanny on predicted inequality between women and predicted inequality between households. This exercise includes two steps. First, I use the predicted monthly incomes from the estimated regressions and calculate the Gini coefficient for women's and household income. Second, I manipulate the data and, based on the same regression models, calculate predicted monthly incomes when hirers are not able to hire. In other words, I set the variable for hiring a nanny to 0 for each woman or each household in the sample and create new predicted income values based on the estimated regression model. Table 3 presents the results of this stage of the analysis.

(TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE)

This exercise indicates that hiring a nanny does not substantially affect either inequality between women or inequality between households. Shifting from the predicted to the simulated income distribution does increase inequality, but by a small amount. For the working women sample, in the scenario in which nobody is able to hire a nanny the Gini coefficient declines by 4 percent. For the household sample, the parallel reduction is 6 percent. I also conducted the analyses using alternative measures of inequality and the results did not substantively change. In sum, although the regression coefficients are consistent with the hypothesis that hiring would operate as a disequalizing mechanism, the influence of this mechanism appears to be much weaker than expected. The next section discusses alternative explanations for these results.

Discussion

Women's employment is changing the distribution of household income in ways that can potentially increase inequality. However, empirical studies have led to contradictory results: some studies indicated that the growth of women's incomes was associated with increases in inequality between households, while other studies found that women's income growth was associated with lower levels of between-household income inequality. I proposed to examine whether these contradictory results were due to the lack of specification of mechanisms that condition women's paid work time and employment. I argued that the unequal distribution of household labor substitutes is one mechanism

whereby increases in women's employment can lead to greater income inequality between households.

The analyses presented above provide a set of preliminary tests of the association between household outsourcing and between-household inequality. I examined the effect of hiring a nanny on women's and household incomes and estimated income distributions based on both observed and counterfactual characteristics. The results suggest that, as expected, hiring a nanny is associated with higher incomes for both women and households. However, this effect does not translate into substantial increases in inequality either between women or households. There are both technical and substantive explanations for this null finding.

The limitations of this set of analyses might obscure the true effect of outsourcing returns on inequality. As noted above, the measure of outsourcing captures only one specific form of outsourcing (hiring a nanny) and the resulting sample of outsourcers is very small. In addition, endogeneity in the models (due to the association between hiring a nanny and income) reduces the precision of the coefficients. Addressing this endogeneity would greatly enhance the precision of the results. Moreover, income returns on outsourcing may be lagged. That is, the analyses might not adequately identify the true effect of outsourcing because this effect might take years to emerge.

Consider two women who work at the same company in the same position and earn the same wage at time 0. Both women get pregnant, but A hires a nanny and does not change her work hours and B requests a small work hour reduction (e.g., <4 hours per week) that decreases her wage by 10 percent. At time 1, A earns somewhat more than B. Several years later, A gets promoted but B does not, and now the wage difference

between the two is substantially greater than at time 1. Theoretically speaking, both of A's wage increases are related to the decision to hire a nanny. In the cross-sectional estimation, however, I capture only the difference at time 1 since I cannot measure whether women who do not currently hire a nanny did so in the past and vice versa. Future extensions of this study could deploy longitudinal data to model women's income growth.

There are at least two possible substantive explanations for the null finding. First, hiring a nanny may generate the expected returns on women's income but not increase inequality because hiring is not sufficiently concentrated among better-off households. This scenario is plausible given the heterogeneity among hirers. The framework above is based on a career-oriented professional woman as the typical hirer: if these women hire and others do not, then the returns to hiring would be concentrated among the top earners and would increase inequality. However, less advantaged women might also hire nannies because they do not have access to alternative forms of childcare or because they need to work irregular hours. Bridget Anderson (2014) suggested that in the United Kingdom it was not unusual for poor working mothers to hire nannies.

Second, hiring might only generate the expected returns for a subsample of hirers; that is, the effect of hiring on women's income might vary across subgroups of women. The coefficient for hiring in the linear regression is, at best, partly endogenous, and does not accurately represent the effect of hiring on women's wages. Some women hire nannies and simultaneously move to mommy-track jobs. Their decision to hire a nanny is not geared towards sustaining a high-powered professional career but due to preferences about caregiving arrangements. I employed the propensity score matching analysis to

investigate this possibility of heterogeneous treatment effects (Xie et al. 2012). Unfortunately the sample characteristics did not suffice to produce accurate estimates.

Yet, it is plausible that the positive returns to outsourcing concentrate among women in middle or lower income households. In these households the decision to hire might be more directly related to incentives to increase women's income contribution to the household, whereas in higher-income households the decision to hire might be less of an economic mobility strategy than a lifestyle choice. The next Chapter provides some suggestive evidence in this direction. In addition, hiring a nanny is not the only way to sustain a full-time professional career. Some women in the non-hiring group might be career-oriented and rely on family members to care for their children. In Spain, grandmothers are often involved in caring for small children.

The stylized framework suggested that the purchase of domestic/care work services could operate as a mechanism of economic polarization. When substitutes for unpaid domestic/care work are available through the market, only better-off women access these services and, in turn, reduce time spent on housework and control their paid work schedule in ways that avoid wage penalties and work interruptions. This framework is based on a single homogeneous ideal hirer (a model career-oriented woman) and may well insufficiently represent the heterogeneous motivations and profiles of actual hirers. The real world is much more complex than the model. Market services are not the only form of household labor outsourcing available to women. Women with low incomes might also hire to maintain a full-time job, and highly skilled women who hire might still shift to part-time jobs. In the next Chapter I use interview data to analyze motives for hiring and examine how these motives are related to women's choices about their jobs.

Tables

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics

VARIABLES for Working women	All		Non-hirers		Hirers	
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*
Woman monthly income	1,499	938.2	1,498	930	2,219	1,129
Hires a nanny	0.0444	0.206				
Woman age	38.22	5.778	38.31	5.707	38.92	5.243
Woman education	3.122	0.974	3.153	0.959	3.610	0.81
Woman years of experience	14.08	6.854	14.16	6.697	15.29	6.597
Woman occupation score	3.771	2.359	3.722	2.301	2.390	1.857
Woman firm size	2.457	1.314	2.499	1.322	2.712	1.204
Married	0.868	0.339	0.878	0.327	0.881	0.326
Age of youngest child	5.771	3.568	5.833	3.576	4.136	2.603
Northeast	0.260	0.439	0.257	0.437	0.169	0.378
Northcenter	0.172	0.377	0.172	0.378	0.339	0.477
South	0.252	0.434	0.257	0.437	0.102	0.305
Northwest	0.109	0.312	0.105	0.307	0.102	0.305
N	1,374		1,167		61	

VARIABLES for Households	All		Non-hirers		Hirers	
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*
Household monthly income	2,700	1,712	2,646	1,668	4,333	2,185
Hires a nanny	0.0319	0.176				
Woman age	37.96	6.066	37.93	6.083	38.75	5.508
Man age	40.39	6.582	40.36	6.582	41.34	6.544
Woman education	2.882	1.043	2.859	1.042	3.577	0.805
Man education	2.769	1.055	2.754	1.051	3.211	1.094
Woman years of experience	12.09	7.516	12.00	7.527	14.86	6.655
Man years of experience	19.26	7.597	19.31	7.565	17.92	8.453
Woman occupation score	3.886	2.561	3.935	2.569	2.408	1.801
Man occupation score	5.536	2.581	5.575	2.565	4.352	2.798
Woman firm size	1.607	1.548	1.580	1.549	2.423	1.317
Man firm size	2.309	1.394	2.291	1.395	2.859	1.246
Married	0.891	0.311	0.891	0.312	0.901	0.3
Age of youngest child	5.634	3.585	5.679	3.6	4.282	2.799
Northeast	0.235	0.424	0.237	0.425	0.183	0.39
Northcenter	0.168	0.374	0.161	0.368	0.366	0.485
South	0.284	0.451	0.290	0.454	0.0986	0.3
Northwest	0.111	0.315	0.112	0.316	0.0845	0.28
N	2,864		2,154		71	

Table 2. OLS regression for women's and household's income

		Working women		Households (log of income)	
		B	*SE B*	*B*	*SE B*
Woman education	baseline				
	2	14.62	79.84	-0.023	0.039
	3	171.8**	81.24	0.0712*	0.041
	4	414.0***	86.99	0.0971**	0.045
Man education	baseline				
	2			0.0482	0.036
	3			0.105***	0.038
	4			0.266***	0.041
Woman years of experience		14.18***	3.258	0.0059***	0.002
Man years of experience				0.00056	0.002
Woman occupation	baseline				
	3	-614.4***	69.77	-0.246***	0.058
	4	-810.0***	59.41	-0.178***	0.042
	5	-1,113***	69.82	-0.202***	0.036
	6	-869.9***	261.1	-0.291***	0.040
	7	-1,038***	119.2	-0.223*	0.117
	8	-805.4***	156.5	-0.261***	0.058
	9	-1,275***	75.37	-0.248***	0.082
	no job			-0.368***	0.043
Man occupation	baseline				
	3			-0.271*	0.164
	4			0.133***	0.044
	5			0.118***	0.038
	6			0.118***	0.044
	7			0.033	0.037
	8			-0.225***	0.081
	9			0.006	0.030
	no job			0.007	0.035
Woman firm size		90.66***	14.26	0.086***	0.007
Man firm size				0.115***	0.007
Hires a nanny		306.9***	89.78	0.152***	0.057
Married		-91.60*	55.54	0.0511	0.032
Age of youngest child		9.280	6.34	0.003	0.004
Number of children		66.27**	28.16	-0.013	0.017
Northeast		93.14*	53.5	0.0604**	0.030
Northcenter		19.16	59.43	0.087***	0.033
South		3.642	53.96	0.0365	0.029
Northwest		-66.96	67.67	-0.008	0.037
Constant		2,353***	624.6	7.121***	0.104
N		1377		225	
R squared		0.503		0.453	

Notes: models include control variables for age and age square for women and men

Table 3. Predicted and simulated inequality

	Working women		Households	
	Predicted	Simulated	Predicted	Simulated
Gini coefficient	0.26	0.25	0.24	0.23
Coefficent of variation	0.47	0.46	0.45	0.44

Appendix tables

Table 4. OLS regression for women's hours of work

		Working women	
		B	*SE B*
Woman education	baseline		
	2	0.978	1.159
	3	1.989*	1.18
	4	2.855**	1.256
Woman years of experience		0.167***	0.047
Woman occupation	baseline		
	3	-0.196	0.996
	4	-0.366	0.847
	5	0.397	0.997
	6	4.556	3.711
	7	3.362*	1.722
	8	3.219	2.226
	9	-3.441***	1.079
Woman firm size		0.713***	0.204
Hires a nanny		3.649***	1,276
Married		-2.057**	0.8
Age of youngest child		0.0549	0.0909
Number of children		-0.361	0.406
Northeast		0.998	0.766
Northcenter		-0.358	0.85
South		1.464*	0.772
Northwest		1.133	0.972
Constant		56.33***	9.157
N		1377	
R squared		0.082	

Notes: models include control variables for age and age square for women and men

Table 5. Propensity score

	Working women			
	Treated	Controls	ATT	Std. Err
Nearest neighbor	61	56	296.72	203.5
Stratification method	61	1004	323.301	146.95

CHAPTER 5. Reclaiming Domesticity

The previous chapters showed that hiring domestic work did not change the relative gender division of work within the household and that it did not increase economic inequality between households as much as might be expected. In the conclusion of Chapter 4 I suggested that domestic workers might be employed for reasons other than pursuing a high-powered career. And even when domestic workers are hired at least partially to remain in full-time employment, the exchange between money and unpaid work might not be direct. Gendered expectations about whose responsibility it is to keep the house clean and take care of the kids can still motivate women to reduce work hours and devote time to unpaid household labor, including childcare.

This Chapter analyzes the ways in which the practice of hiring a domestic worker reproduces gendered expectations about the division of paid and unpaid labor among heterosexual couples. In other words, hiring a domestic worker does not simply eradicate how doing housework is involved in the production of gender relations in the household. Instead, domestic workers enter a field that is strongly shaped by gender relations (Ridgeway 2011). I suggest that professional women hire domestic workers to strike a patriarchal bargain at two levels, one vis-a-vis their husbands and the other vis-a-vis cultural norms about working women. Through hiring domestic workers, professional women reclaim domesticity and keep the privacy of the household sphere.

I employ interview data collected from professional women with young children and who hire domestic workers. I focus on their narratives to justify the decision to hire a domestic worker and examine how these relate to their ideas about family, work and

gender. I find that professional woman's justifications for hiring domestic work often refer to the family rather than to their jobs or career goals. I find that among those who hire domestic workers for both daily housework and care work, only half maintain or increase the amount of paid work hours after childbearing, while the other half reduces the amount of paid work hours. I suggest that the practice of hiring domestic work contributes to sustaining a variety of couple gender projects about the division of labor that have implications for gender economic inequality.

I propose that domestic workers will maintain different kinds of gender boundaries in couples in which women cut back from paid work compared to couples in which women follow man-like careers. I find that couples in which women reduce their time spent on paid work also tend to share household labor and that domestic workers maintain the institutionalized difference between feminine and masculine tasks. Couples in which women do not reduce their time spent on paid work also tend to not share household labor and domestic workers help busy working mothers maintaining the feminine responsibility over the entire domestic sphere.

Background

Kandiyoti (1988: 275) argued that "women strategize within a set of concrete constraints that reveal and define the blueprint of… the patriarchal bargain of any given society." The incompatible cultural schemas that organize work and family are one example of such patriarchal blueprint. Blair-Loy (2003) argued that in the US the cultural schemas of family devotion and work devotion organized gender relations at home and at work; women were supposed to prioritize the family and workers to prioritize work. She

showed that these schemas constrained the kinds of choices that high-powered career women made throughout their lives. For instance, she found that even though the women she interviewed earned more income than their husbands, after childbirth they, and not their husbands, cut back from work to take care of the kids. More recently, Damaske (2011) showed that the force of family devotion pushed women, regardless of their class background, to frame their decisions about employment as motivated by family financial needs.

A number of studies have examined women's decisions and strategies in the face these gendered structures. The pioneering work of Gerson (1985) looked at the decision of childbearing. She showed that women's orientation towards domesticity, the kinds of jobs they had, and the experience of unexpected events such as divorce or job loss shaped whether women chose to become homemaker-mothers, childless or reluctant mothers. Gerson argued that independently of their youthful gender ideology, women mobilized gender ideology to defend the legitimacy of their choice. For instance, homemakers who were not originally oriented to domesticity defended the values of domesticity later in life. Structural forces can lead career-focused women to give up on professional ambitions and to develop domestic-oriented values. Stone (2007) contested the popular narrative that educated women were willingly opting out of the labor force; her research instead showed that those who dropped out were in minority and largely did so because they faced discrimination and rigid workplaces.

Relatedly, Risman (1998) elaborated the concept of gender as a social structure to elaborate how individuals social location shaped gendered behavior. Her research showed, for instance, that single fathers developed behavior culturally defined as

mothering (Risman 1986; Risman 1998). She found that women too replicated masculine behavior and values when they occupied typically masculine social locations. Other researchers also found that when women took on breadwinner roles, they tended to adopt values that devalued femininity and underappreciated the value and skills of care workers (Nelson 1990; Rothman 1989).

The domestic sphere is a realm in which the fulfilling of gender expectations is very salient (Ridgeway 2011). Research found that, for instance, in contexts with strong housewife-breadwinner norms men tended to underreport their time spent on housework (Ferree 1984; Hochschild et al. 1989). Hochschild and Machung (1989) showed that working women juggled between simplifying housework and maintaining the responsibility over the organization of the domestic sphere. She found that women who earned more than their husbands tended to compensate at home by doing more housework, thus emphasizing their femininity and protecting their husbands' masculinity. This finding inspired the gender display or deviance-neutralization research using quantitative data discussed in Chapter 3 (e.g., Brines 1994).

The performance of gender at home can involve other individuals aside from husbands and wives. Focusing on care work, MacDonald (2010) showed that working mothers established a pattern of relations with their nannies and husbands that sought to achieve the ideals of intensive mothering. This meant, for instance, that mothers strongly policed both their partners and nannies' role in childrearing. This Chapter takes a similar approach to examine how the practice of hiring domestic workers is involved in the production of gender relations in the household.

Despite general similarities, there is cross-national variation in the specific contents of these cultural schemas of family and work as well in the ways in which these relate to ideas about masculinity and femininity. Pfau-Effinger (2005; 2010) argued that different cultural models about the family – defined by social preferences for the relationship of family members to employment, the appropriate spheres for bringing up children and the appropriate gender division of labor within the family – resulted in distinctive forms of gender division of household labor that varied across countries. She identified four family models among European countries and argued that Spain had a dual-breadwinner/extended family care model that tended to culturally support the substitution of informal child care by relatives with paid but undeclared child care by immigrant women.

Quantitative research also shows that cultural variation affects how individuals strategize and enact conformity to gender expectations. Fuwa (2004) used the notion of discount factors (Blumberg et al. 1989; Blumberg 1984) and showed that in less egalitarian countries the effect of women's assets on the division of housework was smaller. Relatedly, Thébaud (2010) found that in countries that value more strongly the breadwinner role, men tended to compensate for gender deviation more than in the other countries; in other words, in these countries men reduced their housework more strongly than in other countries when their wives out-earned them.

Hiring domestic work as a patriarchal bargain

Studies about paid domestic work tend to frame the decision to hire domestic work as a matter of privilege or need. Scholars usually state that households hire because 'they can

afford it' or, alternatively, because they 'need it' (Gerson 2009; Hochschild 1997). Researchers also note that hiring domestic work is a strategy for working mothers. Romero (1992) concluded her book arguing that hiring was a strategy for women to avoid the double day and deal with the difficulty of shifting the responsibility of housework to other family members. Enloe (1989) suggested that this choice was almost forced because even politically conscious women needed to make the tough decision to hire a domestic worker to preserve their careers. In a similar vein, Lutz (2011) encouraged feminist women to acknowledge that their husbands did not do housework and that instead other women did it. Parreñas (2008) argued that while hiring was a logical decision for working women, hiring did nothing to subvert the gender division of labor because household labor was simply handed down to migrant or marginalized women.

These interventions suggest that hiring domestic work can function as a patriarchal bargain at the individual level. There are well-founded reasons to believe that hiring domestic work increases the well-being of some women but maintains and reinforces the gender order at home. Working women want to offload some of the household labor, but face resistance from their husbands. Husbands might be fine with their wives not doing much housework as long as they are not required to do any of it. Domestic workers are symbolically similar to housewives; they are overwhelmingly women and work inside the home. At the same time, hiring domestic work might function less as a patriarchal bargain for couples that share household labor and hire primarily to free time for non-domestic activities (Gregson et al. 1994).

Hiring domestic work might be a way to bargain not only with husbands but also with cultural expectations about working women. Analogous to nannies being hired to

accomplish the ideal of intensive mothering (MacDonald, 2010), domestic workers might also be hired to accomplish ideals of the domestic sphere. Parreñas (2008: 13) argued that women's purchase of migrant women's labor to do domestic work was "encouraging the privatization and continued feminization of reproductive labor." Thus, domestic workers might help maintain household labor into the private sphere.

Foregoing routine household labor can reinforce the idea that this work is not important or valuable. The practice of hiring domestic work is conventionally embedded in status relations that associate servitude with doing domestic labor (Berk 1985; Ferree 1983; Glenn 1992a). Those who hire domestic workers often seek the status that comes with having a subordinate (Anderson 2000; Anderson 2007). Masi de Casanova (2013) argued that the very bodies of domestic workers manifest the status difference between workers and employers. These servitude connotations, however, might be less present if employers establish professional arrangements with domestic workers. Lutz (2011) found that in Germany some hirers were developing new forms of employment relations that considerably differed from previous connotations associated with servitude.

I suggest that hiring can constitute a patriarchal bargain both at the individual and cultural level if professional women explicitly use it to bargain with their husbands and to navigate cultural expectations about working women. I propose that couples have specific gender projects about the division of labor that shape how hiring domestic work relates to women's employment trajectory and to the maintenance of gender relations in the household. For couples that do not share household labor, domestic workers fulfill the housewife-assistant role, and for those who share household labor, domestic workers tend to demarcate and perform the "excess" of feminine tasks.

Data and Methods

The women interviewed belong to a group of highly educated professional women living in urban areas. Fieldwork was conducted in Madrid from January to July 2012. Twenty-seven professional women with children living in dual-earner heterosexual households and who employed domestic workers were recruited to be interviewed. Young professionals in their 30s and 40s who represent the first cohort of women to gain formally full and equal access to education and employment after Franco's military dictatorship were purposely selected. This cohort entered the labor market in the 1990s. All interviewees held university degrees (and often Masters or PhDs) in a variety of fields, including but not limited to lawyers, engineers and economists.

The recruitment took place through advertisements in professional women's networks. After initial contact, a snowball strategy that sought to expand the range and variation of interviewees' occupations and job characteristics was utilized. Interviews lasted between two and six hours, and were recorded and transcribed. The content of the interviews was divided in two sections. The first section focused on women's life trajectories and the events that substantively changed the amount of paid and/or unpaid work they performed, such as having a child or shifting to part-time employment. I asked interviewees to tell me about these events, their decisions, feelings and evaluation. The second section focused on a comprehensive overview of women's motivations for hiring domestic work, their experiences as employers and their relationships with domestic workers.

(TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE)

I transcribed the interviews and analyzed the data in two steps. First, I compiled the information about their life trajectories in a table that mapped how the organization of paid and unpaid work in these households changed over time (see Table 1 for an example). These tables visualize how the decision to hire domestic work is associated with changes in the women's own and their husbands' paid and unpaid work. Second, I used a qualitative approach to code women's narratives about hiring domestic work. I did a first round of inductive coding to find general themes and then focused on four categories: how hiring domestic work was related to ideas about the domestic sphere, how women described their relation with the domestic worker, how they justified the decision to hire domestic work and the kinds of tasks that the domestic worker did and did not perform.

Descriptive findings

Generally, interviewees' first experience hiring domestic work occurred upon marriage or cohabitation. Out of the 27 interviewees, only 7 decided to hire domestic work several years after they started living with their partners. This fact is important for at least two reasons. First, we often do not observe couples division of household labor before and after hiring because couples frequently start hiring when they move in together. Second, hiring upon marriage indicates that this practice is intimately tied to gender couple projects that concern the division of labor. Those few who did not start hiring when they moved in together generally started hiring when they had their first child, with only one

exception. One couple started hiring upon the second childbirth because they resisted the idea of hiring a domestic worker for ideological reasons.

Interviewees varied in terms of the intensity of hiring, the spectrum ranged from hiring four hours per week for housework to hiring a live-in domestic worker. For the purpose of this research, I distinguish between those who at the time of the interview hired only for housework and those who hired for housework and care work. Those in the first category, 9 out of 27 women, typically hired between 4 to 8 weekly hours of housecleaning. The activities that were more easily outsourced were ironing and cleaning floors. Those in the second category, 18 out of 27, included three types of hiring: a) women who hired live-in domestic workers (n=2); b) women who hired full-time domestic workers who typically spent eight to ten hours a day at home but did not live in the house (n=8); and c) women who hired part-time domestic workers who typically worked for three or four hours in the afternoon to do housework and care for children after school until parents returned home from work (n=8).

The relationship between hiring and the division of paid and unpaid work revealed some surprises. As expected, women who hired less intensively also tended to cut back from paid work upon childbirth. Out of the 9 less-intensive hirers, seven reduced their paid work hours substantially when they became mothers or changed career paths (e.g., changed companies or shifted to mommy-track jobs). These women also tended to do the lion share of household labor. The remaining two less-intensive hirers were unusual in that they maintained or increased work hours after childbirth and also shared household labor with their partners.

Women who hired more intensively were evenly split with respect to reducing their paid work time after childbirth, 10 maintained or increased their work hours after childbirth whereas 8 cut down on paid work time. Interestingly, the division of household labor was notably more unequal among those who did not cut back from paid work, and nearly all of them started hiring upon marriage. Women who reduced their investment in paid work time were also more likely to share household labor with their partners and only half of them began hiring upon marriage or cohabitation.

(TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE)

In light of these patterns (see Table 2 for a summary) it is less surprising that hiring domestic work did not have a larger impact on inequality between households (Chapter 4). I observe that nearly half of these women who hire domestic workers intensively also reduce their work hours, just like women who do not hire domestic workers to do care work. As I show next, understanding how hiring domestic work is tied to couple gender projects is crucial to understand the characteristics associated with this variation.

In terms of the nationality of domestic workers, most professional women hired migrant workers, except for five who hired Spanish-born workers. The Spanish-born domestic workers were considerably older than the migrant workers. The kinds of relations between professional women and migrant domestic workers varied, partly in relation to the hours for which they were hired. Among those who hired migrant workers, some women described their relation with the worker using professional terms and others using personal or family-like rhetoric. All the women who hired Spanish-born domestic

workers, however, emphatically described their relation with the worker using family-like rhetoric, using terms like aunts or grandparents to describe the domestic worker status in the family. This pattern suggests that, perhaps paradoxically, hiring Spanish-born workers is more associated with the historical servant order whereas hiring migrant workers is linked to newer and more professional forms of hiring domestic work, of the kind that Lutz (2011) discussed. Though this pattern is interesting, the data I collected is unfortunately not rich enough to investigate it more thoroughly.

The results section is organized as follows. First, I provide some evidence that suggests that hiring domestic work can function as a patriarchal bargain for professional women in Spain, both at the individual and cultural level. Second, I focus on intensive hirers, women who hire domestic workers to do both housework and care work, to examine the difference between the women who do and do not reduce paid work hours. I suggest that for women who do not change or increase their paid work hours, hiring a domestic worker can emphasize their femininity at home and compensate for potentially threatening their husbands' masculinity. For women who reduce work hours and share household labor with their partners, hiring a domestic worker can enhance gender differentiation between feminine and masculine tasks.

Results section

My interviewees emphasized their identities as wage earners. They argued that being employed was fundamental for their own personal development and self-esteem. Most of them had stepped out of their jobs for some period of time after giving birth, some more than others. Most considered the time spent at home to be important, but only temporary.

None of the interviewees ever considered or expressed desiring to quit their job or to take longer unpaid leaves. Unlike the working women in the US that Damaske (2011) studied, these Spanish women did not argue that they continued on the job because their families needed it. The women I interviewed did not shy away from saying that they worked because they found it personally fulfilling. This contrast reveals, I believe, cross-national differences in the cultural content of stereotypes about working women. Women's justification for hiring domestic work provides some useful information to understand this contrast.

Whereas the contemporary dominant public narrative in Spain describes hiring domestic work as a need for working women (see Chapter 6), women's justifications for hiring domestic work had much more to do with the family than with their own jobs or career prospects. In the interviews, women recurrently invoked a social stereotype that said that working women placed burdens on others when they were employed. One common version of this stereotype is that working mothers overburden their parents who are expected to take care of their children for them. Professional women recurrently framed their decision to hire domestic work in reference to this stereotype, saying that they hired so as not to bother others, particularly their parents. This rhetoric supports the idea that hiring domestic work can function as a patriarchal bargain at the cultural level because it is explicitly linked to negotiations with cultural norms about working women. Professional women hire domestic workers to preserve domesticity: peaceful, self-sufficient and private homes.

I found that in Spain, unlike the United States, references to domesticity were more salient than references to mothering with respect to the decision to hire domestic

work. For the purpose of illustrating this contrast, take the case of hiring nannies studied by Cameron Macdonald. She showed that ideas about intensive mothering figured prominently in US mothers' decisions to hire nannies and in how they related to their nannies. She argued that US mothers sought a nanny who would take over mother tasks while they were absent but move to the background when they were home so as to avoid threatening their identity as intensive mothers. The women I interviewed, however, did not perceive domestic workers as potential threats to their identity as mothers. Both Cameron and my interviewees reported that their children had sometimes called the domestic workers "mom", but where US mothers saw this as a threat, Spanish mothers did not seem as conflicted by these events and some saw it as a good sign about the domestic worker. My interviewees did express conflict between what they thought a mother should do and what they actually did, but these considerations were less directly tied to the decision to hire domestic work than considerations about domesticity.

Reclaiming domesticity

My interviewees hired domestic workers to maintain peace at home in face of husbands' resistance to doing housework. Through hiring domestic work professional women turned their homes into peaceful and pleasurable spaces. Several interviewees emphasized that hiring a domestic worker secured marital peace. For instance, I asked Olga about how she and her husband divided the housework and she explained:

> "Our strategy is fundamentally based on having a girl (domestic worker); otherwise we would have already divorced. My husband has very little consciousness of … household stuff, now a little bit more than before. But the

> fundamental condition for family peace is to hire someone to take care of the housework, no question."

Similarly, Victoria who is a sociologist working at a human resources company that she owned with three coworkers explained:

> "Before having kids we already decided to include one person at home, because this issue caused lots of conflicts between the two of us, ok? We got married in 2002, I think we cohabited a couple of years, and I think that in 2002 we decided to hire one person to do a few hours of housecleaning per week. We could not reach an agreement about cleaning. My husband and I do not fight much, we get along well, but the cleaning issue was horrible, we understand it differently. I am not very demanding but I like order, and Angel is a mess, so the easier thing was to hire, the hard thing was to have a fight every Saturday. Plus, we could afford it, so we hired a person to do cleaning."

These quotes illustrate that for Spanish professional women hiring domestic work is a common form of individual patriarchal bargain. Yet, hiring domestic work is not simply a way to resolve an argument with their husbands. Through hiring domestic work professional women also negotiated the cultural stereotype that women's employment burdens others unfairly. Hiring domestic work eliminates politics about housework from the domestic arena. Professional women actively avoided conflict with their husbands and reiterated that they did not want to cause trouble where there did not need to be. For instance, Olga continued:

> "If we have to share housework I become a fairly unfriendly person because I say all the time what needs to be done, I remind him of this or that … hiring another person to do the housework avoids many of these choices and many of these annoying interactions, cause this is what it means at the end. For this reason, I'm telling you, our strategy is paying somebody else to do it."

Similarly, Laura complained that her husband wasn't doing enough housework, and said she felt hurt by his lack of involvement. Yet, when I asked her whether they talked about this issue, she said "no, we are so over it. I am not combative. Me? Zero arguments. I mean, I only fight for things that are important; I am not going to fight for this. No, nothing. It does not cause any trouble now."

My interviewees were careful to show that they hired domestic workers *because* they did not want to overburden their parents. As mentioned above, their justifications for hiring were regularly framed as decisions not to rely on their parents. This point of reference is obvious in face of the words that women chose to describe these decisions; they used concepts like *overburden* or *chain* to describe the practice of regularly relying on parents for childcare.

For instance, Cristina who is a manager in a software company argued that the reason why she looked for a domestic worker who could both do housework and care for the baby was that "we didn't want to have grandmothers *chained* to this [care for children]. And thus, we reached the conclusion that the best solution was, if we found the right person, for the baby to stay at home." Similarly, Paula who is a public employee at a high school clarified that: "my kids spend just enough time with their grandparents,

whatever they [the grandparents] want, but we did not want to *overburden* them, we do not want them to be *overburdened*."

Those who did rely on family members (generally their parents) to provide for childcare emphasized that they were careful not to abuse them. Frances, who was self-employed after a high-powered career in international financial companies, described this balance in the following way: "Even though you always try to keep your independence, and not having to ask for favors, at the end it is also reassuring to know that your family will help if needed." Also, Aina explained: "to be honest, there are times that I truly feel embarrassed about it [regularly relying on her parents to care for the children], you know? I really try to abuse as little as possible." Similarly, Sonia who is the general manager at a company that sold office supplies described how she decided to hire a domestic worker and to decline her mothers' offer to help with her daughter:

> "My mom offered to take care of Silvia, but I thought it was too much. You see, I leave home at 7.30am and come back at 6 or 7pm. I stop to eat, but she would have to take care of Silvia for 10 or 12 hours, and of course, my mom offered many many many times, she is young, but at the end Carlos and I decided that we wanted to have Silvia at home, this way she would not need to wake up early, leave early, and my mom could come in the afternoons or whenever she wanted to."

It is important to note that domestic workers are also more convenient than relatives because they can also do the dirty work. Professional women's parents, especially mothers, are often involved providing care for children. But they are never,

ever, involved in doing housework. Dolores who owns a software company and also worked at the university, described this boundary between care work and dirty work in the following way:

> "I have always relied on my parents' help for childcare, but I never liked giving them too much work. I could have potentially had my parents do most of childcare and do without this person [the domestic worker], but I didn't want to, because after all my parents are healthy and young, and one thing is for them to enjoy their grandchildren and the other to ask them to make beds or iron clothes on top of caring for the kids."

In sum, professional women's narratives to hire domestic work suggest that this decision is related to the maintenance of ideals of domesticity. Through hiring domestic work professional women often stroke a double patriarchal bargain, one vis-a-vis their husbands, and the other vis-a-vis the cultural expectations about working women and domesticity. Domestic workers resolved conflicts, maintained peace, comfort, privacy, and avoided posing burdens on others.

This reclaiming of domesticity functions in different ways for different kinds of couples. Next, I focus on those women who hired intensively (those who hired for daily housework and care work) and suggest that domestic workers can either enhance gender differentiation or femininity in the household. For women who retain their full-time careers, hiring domestic work is related to emphasizing the femininity of the domestic sphere as a whole, in a way that compensates for these women's typically masculine position in the labor market. For those who cut back from work, domestic workers are

associated with the demarcation of feminine and masculine tasks, and hence assist gender differentiation. I use two characteristic cases to illustrate these patterns.

Gender differentiation

Sandra arrived at the site of the interview wearing non-professional clothes and telling me about how much she loved her work schedule. “It makes such a huge difference to have three afternoons per week to do stuff”, she affirmed, “though I am rarely out there”, noting that she normally dedicated these *free* afternoons to be at home and with the kids. When I met her, Sandra had been a lawyer for a multinational consulting firm for the past twelve years.

When she started working at this company she experienced rapid upward mobility. She had been highly regarded by her colleagues, who used to call her “a machine”. She won recognition prizes and large productivity bonuses. At the time of her first pregnancy she was supervising several teams and in charge of a number of projects. She took a standard four-month maternity leave and hired Ana to stay at home while she returned to her job. Ana was, she assured, “the center of the family.”

When she went back to her job, she negotiated a work time reduction of six hour per week with her boss. With her second child on the way, she requested a formal workday reduction “It is our right now, they could not deny it to me”, she explained in reference to a recently passed legislation about workday reduction for parents with children under eight. She also requested to move to a different position with no supervision or managerial duties, “where all moms go”, she said. Ana continued to care for the children at home, but now Sandra was able to pick up her children from school

three times a week. For the past years she felt satisfied with this arrangement. At the time of the interview, however, Sandra explained that she desired to expand her professional profile again; she wanted to become involved in new projects but felt that she had "missed the train."

Sandra thought she was the "smart one" among her friends, because she married a British man who (implicitly unlike Spanish men) would be willing to contribute at home. And indeed, Sandra and Antonio did have one of the most egalitarian divisions of household labor I observed among my interviewees. Antonio shared child-care and some housework tasks. Antonio also reduced his paid work time to spend more time with the kids, though only after their second childbirth.

Despite being egalitarian in terms of the time spent on unpaid work, the tasks were gender-coded and not easily exchangeable between them. Sandra described the tasks that Antonio did as those tasks that he desired and was good at, whereas Sandra did the rest. For instance, Sandra explained that Antonio was in charge of grocery shopping because "he is incredibly good at it." Not only was he good at it, but Sandra also emphasized that he turned the entire activity into a sophisticated endeavor: "he has a very well-thought strategy, he sends the kids on missions to find products, compare prizes, or expiration dates." Sandra also emphasized that because he was "a good man" he was in charge of all tasks that involved technology or the car. Sandra's share of routine household labor, on the other hand, were those tasks in which the domestic worker was also involved. For instance, she was in charge of tidying up the house and any tasks that involved clothes. Sandra did not define her tasks as skilled or special in any way; neither did she express having any particular preference for them. She did what was left to do,

which was also coded as feminine. For instance, Sandra described her responsibility for shopping for children' clothes in the following way: "yes, I am the one who does that, and even Antonio's clothes because he, as a good man, hates to go shopping."

In these more egalitarian households, domestic workers can help define the boundary between feminine and masculine tasks, between undesirable or skilled work and that which is desirable and skilled. Domestic workers perform these tasks that are coded as feminine, as do the professional women in their own homes. Domestic workers do not perform tasks in which men are involved. One area that is overwhelmingly coded as feminine is that of clothes, laundry and ironing. Tasks involving food, on the other hand, fluctuate. I observed that in these more egalitarian couples men often became involved in cooking or grocery shopping.

Emphasized femininity

I met Sonia in her office. The company she ran sold printing and paper-related equipment, she was in charge of the Spanish corporation and a set of subsidiary offices in Portugal, Italy and France. She used to travel a lot, she indicated, but not anymore. "My children took it very badly when I travelled … When a father travels it feels ok, but a mother traveling feels different. My husband, who helps a lot at home, used to tell me that I should not leave when our kids got a fever." Eventually, she did cut back from travelling, but this was prompted by changes in the organization of the company, not her own initiative.

When Sonia got married, she looked for somebody to do weekly cleaning and ironing. She hired Nora who at the time was also working for her mother. After a couple

of years, Sonia gave birth to her first child and took a standard four-month maternity leave. When she returned to the job, Nora became a full-time employee who worked every weekday from 9:00 to 18:00. In addition to doing household chores, she now also took care of the 4 month-old baby.

Sonia got pregnant for the second time when her first child was three. Because she had been recently promoted to chief manager, this time she took a shorter maternity leave that lasted a month and a few weeks. Nora took on caring for the second child. At the time of the interview, the youngest child was six years old and about to start elementary school later that year. Sonia was considering what to do with Nora, "there's not enough work for her to be at home every day, but I still need somebody to pick up the kids after school till I get home", she asserted. By the end of our meeting, she showed me a picture hanging on the wall. The picture featured her and four other women as Spanish women leaders in managerial positions.

At the company Sonia felt greatly valued and her promotion opportunities had been promising. She was never too ambitious, she assured that she did not pursue the job as a manager, "I was very comfortable at my previous position." But her father, who was the former manager, had sponsored and mentored her; she explained that she agreed to substitute her father only when it became obvious that the other candidates were not good enough. Sonia's career path followed a trajectory that resembled that of an idealized worker, an unencumbered worker. She rarely skipped work and agreed to shorten her maternity leave when she became a chief manager. She never reduced on paid work time, nor did she make any requests at home. She felt anxious when she was traveling a lot and these feelings of guilt haunted her for a while. When external conditions reduced her

travel rhythm, however, she felt relieved and comfortable with her position as a manager mom.

Sonia was proud of her professional accomplishments. And she felt that she deserved it. Her ideas about women's equal competency for high-profile careers, however, did not match with her views about women's unequal responsibility for the household. She believed that children felt the absence of a mother differently to how they felt the absence of a father, and so did her husband. At home, Sonia described her husband as "helping" and considered his contribution to be fair. Yet, he did not actually do much, his sole task was to put the dishes into the dishwasher. Sonia spent much more time both doing housework and caring for the kids than her husband did (about two hours a day difference).

These women who kept full-time employment and did not reduce work hours after childbearing seemed compelled to enhance their femininity by taking on the full responsibility of household labor, as if apologizing for being too powerful/masculine in the workplace. They tended to do what was leftover in housework and to justify husbands' lack of involvement or appreciate any small contribution. This trend could be both driven by women's own impulse to emphasize femininity at home and also to emphasize husbands' masculinity through their retreat from household labor.

Perhaps paradoxically, the values that accompany these women's claim that the domestic arena is their full responsibility also support the view that in the labor market women should perform and be treated like men. They tended to support the view that women should not claim for special accommodations at work, such as work hour reductions. They also tended to hold negative views about mothers who made those

requests, and saw them as lazy or over-demanding, as if they were illicitly placing burdens on others.

Discussion

This Chapter has shown that Spanish women frame their decision to hire domestic workers in relation to family-related bargains that take place both at the individual and cultural level. At the individual level, interviewees commonly refer to conflicts with their husbands about the division of household labor as triggering the search for a domestic worker. This commonly took place before or soon after the couple started cohabiting. At the cultural level, interviewees recurrently referred to cultural stereotypes about working women to justify their decision to hire domestic work. This suggests that hiring a domestic worker might constitute a form of negotiating these cultural expectations without challenging them. In fact, through hiring domestic workers professional women protect key values about domesticity, such as peacefulness and privacy.

These findings suggest that the spread and legitimacy of hiring domestic work can limit the transformative potential of women's employment on the gender division of household labor. As Sullivan (2004) among others argued, changes in the domestic sphere do not solely respond to adaptation to changes in the labor market. Ideational changes are crucial to shape change in individuals' consciousness and behavior. In this sense, this Chapter showed that hiring domestic work did not overcome many of the obstacles to changing the gender division of household labor because hiring was associated with yielding to husbands' resistance to do housework and to cultural expectations that continue to associate women with domesticity.

I found that the relationship between hiring domestic work and women's employment is complex. As expected, those who hired less intensively tended to reduce their time spent on paid work after childbirth. The group who hired more intensively, however, was split between women who reduced paid work hours and shared household labor with their husbands, on the one hand, and women who neither reduced paid work hours nor shared household labor, on the other hand. The analysis suggests that these couples have different gender projects in which domestic workers contribute to in specific ways. At home, domestic workers enhance femininity among full-time workers and contribute to doing gender difference among couples that share household labor.

There are multiple possible explanations for the counterintuitive pattern that in couples that do not share domestic/care work professional women tend to remain in full-time employment, and that in couples that share domestic/care work professional women tend to cut back from work. Upon first impression, it seems that Spanish conservative ideas about the gender division of household labor might correlate with neoliberal values about employment, and that gender egalitarianism about the division of household labor might be associated with views that emphasize maternal or parental care as well as support the view that employers need to adjust for working parents. Differences in work careers and experiences might also help explain the difference.

These results are consistent with the discussion in Chapter 4 that hiring effects on socioeconomic inequality can be limited by the fact that many women who hire domestic workers do not remain in full-time employment. Additionally, the results from this qualitative study suggest that successful career women in Spain also tend to be those who have the most unequal gender division of household labor. This tendency might

contribute to further dampen the potentially transformative effect that women's employment can have on both gender inequalities at home and in the labor market, because successful women managers might disproportionally represent those who believe in the unencumbered worker norm.

Tables

Table 1. Sample life trajectory map

Year	Cristina		
	She	*Husband*	*Others*
Before married	Full-time work at public company		
1998 married	Full-time work at private company (>9 hours) // no housework	Full-time work at private company (>9 hours) + frequent work trips // no housework	Cleaning 3 hours/week
1999 job change	Full-time work at a new private company, upward mobility (>9 hours) // no housework	Same	Cleaning 3 hours/week
2000 first child	Full-time work with worktime reduction 3 days per week // afternoon care	Same	Cleaning and caregiving 8 hours/day
2002	Back to full-time work // evening care	Same	Cleaning and caregiving 8 + hours/day
2003 second child	Full-time work with worktime reduction 3 days per week // afternoon care	Self-employed full-time work (8 hours) // share care and cooking	Cleaning and caregiving 8 hours/day
2005	Full-time with worktime reduction 3 days per week // afternoon care	Same	Cleaning and caregiving 8 hours/day
2007-2011	Quits previous job. New flex time job at husband's company // afternoon care	Self-employed full-time work (>9 hours) // share care	Cleaning and caregiving 6 hours/day

Table 2. Summary table hiring and work intensity

VARIABLE	Paid work intensity		
	Reduced	*Full-time*	*N*
Hiring only cleaning	7	2	9
Hiring cleaning plus care	8	10	18

Table 3. List of interviewees and occupation

	Name	Occupation
Intv#1	Marina	Manager
Intv#2	Laura	Marketing
Intv#3	Cristina	Sociologist (private sector)
Intv#4	Sandra	Lawer (employee)
Intv#5	Ursula	Psychologist (self-employed)
Intv#6	Aurora	Manager
Intv#7	Sofia	Lawyer (self-employed
Intv#8	Francis	Economist (self-employed)
Intv#9	Helena	Manager
Intv#10	Maria	Business owner
Intv#11	Analucía	Manager
Intv#12	Paula	High school teacher
Intv#13	Sara	Psychologist (self-employed)
Intv#14	Olga	Lawyer (self-employed and part time professor)
Intv#15	Dolores	University professor
Intv#16	Ana	Manager
Intv#17	Sonia	Manager
Intv#18	Rosa	Geographer (self-employed)
Intv#19	Esperanza	Manager
Intv#20	Victoria	Manager
Intv#21	Aina	Journalist
Intv#22	Paz	Doctor
Intv#23	Carmen	Industrial engineer
Intv#24	Antonia	Business owner
Intv#25	Gemma	Journalist
Intv#26	Lola	Architect (self-employed)
Intv#27	Monica	Manager (employee)

CHAPTER 6. Servants of Gender Equality

Many countries group domestic workers in a special labor category that is excluded from general labor and social security legislation. Some countries have special labor regimes for the domestic work sector while other countries largely rely on customs and norms and do not strictly enforce labor legislation when it affects domestic workers (FRA 2011). As a result, domestic workers generally have far fewer rights than other workers. This form of discrimination against domestic workers has recently become the focus of political controversy in both national and international arenas. For example, in the United States, the National Domestic Workers' Alliance has been advocating for state- and federal-level legislation to improve domestic workers' rights.[10] At the international level, in 2011 the International Labour Organization signed an unprecedented document to protect the rights of domestic workers.[11]

The discourses used to justify this form of discrimination against domestic workers have been the focus of a significant body of research. Research in the United States tends to emphasize the role of ideologies of racial domination in these discourses (Glenn 1992b; Palmer 1995). Racial domination cannot solely account for this type of exclusion, however, because this exclusion is also common in countries without such systems of racial domination. Numerous studies have shown that gender, class and race inequalities intersect in the organization of paid domestic work (Glenn 1992a; Glenn 1992b; Parreñas 2008; Rollins 1985; Romero 1992). After a period of decline, this

[10] National Domestic Workers' Alliance campaigns have helped pass a domestic workers' bill of rights in California and Washington, DC. Domestic workers' activism has also contributed to the federal decision to extend the Fair Labor Standard Act to home health workers.

[11] The 189 Convention's "Decent Work for Domestic Workers" has been ratified by 14 countries.

employment sector is now booming in Western countries as part of a broader political and economic shift toward the commodification of household labor (e.g., Folbre et al. 2000; Lewis et al. 2005). This shift may have engendered a corresponding shift in the discourse used to justify discrimination against domestic workers. Thus, the current study examines political discourse to analyze whether the ideological rationale for this form of exclusion has changed in the age of commodification.

Recent studies have shown that in both Spain and Sweden, political discussions about domestic workers are often tied to questions about work and family reconciliation (Bowman et al. 2009; Kvist et al. 2010; Peterson 2007). Peterson and colleagues (Peterson 2007; Kvist and Peterson 2010) argued that this policy frame was disempowering for domestic workers because it promulgated a narrow vision of gender equality that prioritized economic independence. In contrast, Bowman and Cole (2009) asserted that this link was not problematic because it highlighted the relevance of paid domestic work. At this point, however, no research has analyzed how these policy frames are related to the exclusion of domestic workers from the scope of general labor rights legislation.

This article examines political discourses about domestic workers in Spain. I analyze 43 parliamentary debates that occurred between 1979 and 2011 and I use policy frame analysis (Bacchi 1999; Bustelo et al. 2003; Lombardo et al. 2008; Lombardo et al. 2009) to examine the content and influence of the discourses that justify and challenge the institutionalized exclusion of domestic workers. Spain provides an interesting case because ethnic/racial divides are a relatively recent characteristic of the domestic work

sector. While the number of domestic workers in Spain has long been substantial, it has more than doubled since the 2000s, fueled by an influx of international migrant women.

I find that in Spain the divide between productive and reproductive work is the key ideological frame legitimating institutional discrimination against domestic workers. This divide is the cornerstone of the productivist discourse that defines domestic work as a *special job*. In the pre-commodification period, the productivist discourse was contested by counter-discourses that I call labor justice and gender justice. In the commodification period, however, the productivist discourse is hegemonic and faces no opposition. I show that through both the cooptation of gender equality frames and the marginalization of domestic workers as non-nationals, the productivist discourse turns domestic workers into servants of gender equality. In the commodification era, the productivist discourse replicates the divide between productive and reproductive work within a new set of parameters: productive workers are now native women and men instead of husbands, and reproductive workers are migrants instead of women/housewives.

Background

The controversy surrounding domestic workers

Feminists remain divided on the question of whether or not it is socially just to hire domestic work. There is no single feminist stance on this issue. Feminists do not agree about whether domestic work is problematic because of its intrinsic qualities or because of its labor conditions, or both. Some scholars argue that hiring domestic work divides women and creates a serious obstacle to the development of solidarity bonds between women from different backgrounds (Parreñas 2001; Parreñas 2008; Romero 1992). For

some, the structure of paid domestic work is so deeply ingrained in subordination and oppression that it is intrinsically incompatible with the values of democratic societies, and would be better abolished (Arat-Koc 1989; Ehrenreich et al. 2002; Orozco 2014; Rollins 1985; Tronto 2002; Tronto 2013).

These positions build on research that found that the very fact of employing a domestic worker can be a social symbol signifying a household's membership in a dominant group in a given society (Glenn 1992b; Ray et al. 2009). Studies showed that when employers hired domestic workers they purchased not merely labor power but also the status that came with having a subordinate (Anderson 2000; Anderson 2007; Rollins 1985). Gorz (1994) argued that domestic work is a morally inacceptable form of employment because dirty household labor is rightly the responsibility of each individual. Research has also demonstrated that race and class ideologies do the work of constructing the ideal worker for domestic service by defining particular social groups as docile, helpless or in need of proper socialization or discipline. Scholars have documented these stereotypes in reference to Black, Chicana and Asian women in the United States as well as migrant women in Europe (Anderson 2007; Glenn 1992b).

The location of the job—inside the household—is also relevant for at least two reasons. First, scholars have found that domestic work is often subject to weak regulatory oversight by the state and that informal contract relations in the shadow economy were pervasive (Hondagneu-Sotelo 2007; Lutz 2011; Ray 2011). Tronto (2002) also emphasized that this context gave employers an unusually high level of control. Second, researchers have stressed that domestic workers become involved in a complex set of personal and family-like relations (Hondagneu-Sotelo 2007). Degliuli (2007) argued that

the emotional involvement and lack of privacy, particularly in live-in jobs, made domestic work a uniquely exploitative job. Collins (1998) argued that the rhetoric that domestic workers are "like one of the family" served to naturalize the hierarchical relationship between domestic workers and employers. Rollins (1985) contended that these personal and intimate relations subject domestic workers to a level of psychological exploitation unknown to other occupations.

Despite these arguments, other feminists assert that paid domestic work is not all that different from other jobs. Meagher (2002) argued that what separates domestic workers from other workers are differences in degree rather than in kind. She indicated that there were other forms of employment in which employers purchased status and not only labor power. Further, Meagher showed that paid domestic work was by no means the only form of commodity that "invaded" private life. Similarly, Bowman and Cole (2009) advocated for treating paid domestic work more like other forms of household labor commodification, such as out-of-home food preparation. The authors analyzed a political controversy about domestic work in Sweden and concluded that feminist arguments criticizing the practice of hiring domestic work hurt women's employment, both for those who hired domestic workers and for the domestic workers themselves. The authors contended that those who criticize hiring domestic workers are inadvertently relying on the idea that the household is a sacred private space, an idea that contributed to the marginalization of domestic work in the first place.

The commodification of domestic labor

One way to address this controversy is to analyze whether and how the extensive commodification of household labor has affected the status of domestic workers. The escalation of the domestic work sector transformed this seemingly pre-modern occupation (e.g., Coser 1973) into a relevant employment sector in post-industrial societies (Sassen 2000). Paid domestic work has become global and is now intimately linked to international migration flows (Yeates 2005; 2009). A number of studies have documented that international migration has expanded the paid domestic work sector in the Global North, in countries like the United States (Duffy 2011; Milkman et al. 1998), the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy and Spain (Bettio et al. 2006; Lutz and Palenga-Mollenbeck 2010; Williams 2012). This trend is part of an ongoing move toward the commodification of reproductive labor in which "many of the traditional intimate tasks of caring for other people (and also cleaning or cooking) are performed in relationships that include explicit movements of money" (Folbre and Nelson 2000: 123).

The commodification of household labor could improve the status of domestic workers in a number of ways. First, after being considered a private household responsibility for centuries, domestic and care work has now been accepted as a public issue (Lister et al. 2007). This shift toward the public sphere can highlight the conditions of the domestic work sector and motivate political initiatives to transform the status of the job. There is some evidence that this is indeed happening. For example, the European Economic and Social Committee (2010) published a report that advocated for the professionalization of domestic work and proposed bringing it into the formal sector.

Others commentators have argued that the generalization of market transactions in domestic and care work can challenge coercive norms and gendered connotations that have conventionally governed which individuals are expected to do this work and how the job is supposed to be performed (Folbre and Nelson 2000; Esping-Andersen 2009). The shift toward commodification can turn more attention to the value and skills related to domestic work. For instance, Lutz (2011) found that in Germany some hirers developed professional relationships with domestic workers that substantially differed from the semi-familial servant types of relationships common in the past. She also argued that professionalization could potentially challenge the association between femininity and domestic work "because even when done by women, typifying these tasks as skills could potentially break the naturalization of domestic work as an inherently feminine quality" (2011: 187).

Furthermore, the marketization of domestic work can contribute to changing the distribution and valorization of domestic work (Folbre and Nelson 2000). The expansion and visibility of domestic workers can encourage collective organizing among these workers, as well as broader collective struggles to shift the costs and distribution of domestic work (Federici 2012).

It is also possible that despite expanding commodification, the status of paid domestic work will remain unaffected. Researchers report that the sector is still strongly feminized and deeply infused with gender ideologies that devalue and naturalize domestic work. This scenario suggests that the status of domestic workers is unlikely to change if, despite formalization, the job is still perceived as one that requires no special skills or training, is performed according to natural instincts, and involves abilities rooted

in women's essence (England and Folbre 1999; Folbre 2008). Even training and professionalization programs might not suffice to change the gendered nature of domestic work. Researchers have found that these programs often bolster rather than challenge beliefs that reinforce devaluation (Boris et al. 2012; Glenn 1992a; Glenn 1992b). Similarly, extensive commodification might not erase the multiple obstacles that workers in private homes and caregiving jobs face as they seek to be recognized as regular workers and to make claims and demands like other workers do (Macdonald et al. 2002).

The fact that domestic workers are increasingly migrant women also affects the status and perception of domestic work. At the end of their article, Bowman and Cole (2009: 176) asked: "Can this labor be revalued if it is performed mainly by those who remain on the margins of the dominant social and political community? How does the marketization of housework contribute to elevating degraded women's work if the workers are themselves women—and undocumented women to boot?" Multiple studies have shown that racial and ethnic stereotypes are used to produce an ideal of a domestic worker who is also a subordinate (Anderson 2007). Racial divides can serve to legitimize and maintain hierarchies of work. Both Glenn (1992) and Duffy (2007) showed that in the United States the continuing force of racial occupational segregation has served to maintain the distinction between more and less desirable jobs in paid domestic work, even as major changes in its institutional organization moved these jobs from private households to service work.

Shifts in the social policy paradigms that accompanied this wave of commodification might also be unfavorable to domestic workers. The adult worker model has replaced the breadwinner-housewife model (Lewis 2001). Policies are now geared

toward emphasizing the role of the market rather than the family or the public sector in providing these goods and services, which were previously produced through unpaid household labor (Lewis and Giullari 2005; Lewis 2001). Scholars recognize that this change can positively promote women's economic independence, but also note that these policy projects tend to co-opt gender equality goals. Jenson (2008), for example, argued that these new policy paradigms make it difficult to continue progress toward a goal of gender equality. She documented that in the European Union (EU) gender equality policies have been incorporated into different policy goals and women have been written out of policies. Similarly, Straigaki (2004) showed that the incorporation of work and family reconciliation policies in the EU occurred only after transformative concepts (e.g., sharing family responsibilities) had been co-opted and lost their original meaning and potential to change gender relations. These policy paradigm shifts might undermine the effectiveness of feminist arguments that seek to challenge the exclusion of domestic workers from the scope of general labor rights.

This study examines how this wave of commodification is associated with changes in the discourses that legitimize and challenge the exclusion of domestic workers from the scope of general labor and social security laws in Spain. I analyze policy debates before and after the turn of the millennium to determine how the representation of domestic work as a political problem changed over time. I suggest that commodification offers new opportunities if it is associated with the formulation of discourses that challenge institutional discrimination against domestic workers, and that it offers new challenges if it is associated with the reconfiguration of the discourses that legitimize such exclusion.

Spain provides a useful case to examine changes in the discourse surrounding domestic work because the exclusion of domestic workers was debated and formalized with the restoration of democracy in 1978. As I show next, the escalation of the paid domestic work sector and the associated changes in the political sphere have been particularly visible and concentrated in time in the Spanish context. In addition, the paid domestic work sector shifted from relying entirely on native women to having migrant workers compose the majority (over 60 percent) of its workers in less than a decade. These changes and the existing records of political discussions about domestic workers offer an opportune context and rich material for an analysis of the ways in which the discursive legitimization and rejection of domestic workers' *special* labor status has evolved over time.

Paid domestic work and legislation in Spain

In Spain, domestic work constituted the most common job for women for most of the twentieth century. Census data show that 20-35 percent of working women were employed as domestic servants from the turn of the century through the 1950s. Efforts to organize and unionize these workers occurred as early as the Second Republic democratic period (1931-1936), when domestic workers carried out a number of strikes to demand better work conditions. These attempts at labor organizing, which were promoted through anarchist movements, were severely repressed during the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) and the almost four decades of dictatorship that followed (1939-1975) (Sánchez 2009).

Since that time, formal organizing of domestic workers has been very weak, both in labor unions and women's groups (ColectivoIOE 1990).

With the return of democracy, Spain redesigned its core welfare and social policy institutions within the framework of the breadwinner-housewife model. In 1979 two laws established the new regime: the Labor Statute Law and the National Social Security Law. Core social benefits were attached to the idea of the male breadwinner and workers in masculine sectors of the economy, and minimal pensions were made available for widows. The employment rate was low for women, and both the rigidity of the labor market and the low level of defamilialization discouraged more women from seeking employment (e.g., Flaquer 2004). These two laws also institutionalized the exclusion of domestic workers from the general labor and social security regime. A few years later, a special legal framework for domestic workers was approved in the Royal Decree 1424/1985.

This legal framework established that domestic workers had fewer labor and social security rights than the rest of the workforce.[12] The framework met resistance in parliament, and legislators discussed a number of legal reforms in the following decades. Yet no new legislation passed until 2011 when Law 27/2011 updated the National Social Security Law and incorporated domestic workers under a new special internal regime, and Royal Decree 1620/2011 created a new special labor rights regime for domestic workers. These reforms significantly improved the labor and social security rights of domestic workers, yet maintained the exclusion of domestic workers from a number of

[12] For example, employing a domestic worker did not require written and formalized contracts, employees could be asked to work for much longer hours than the Labor Statute allowed for the rest of workers and they could be fired without explicit justification. In relation to social protection, legislation allowed employers to pay no contributions to the social security system and domestic workers had less access to sick leave and retirement pensions and no unemployment benefits.

provisions: unemployment benefits, dismissal protection, labor inspection, work time restrictions and employers' social security contributions.

As described in Chapter 2, during these decades the domestic work sector underwent an important socioeconomic transformation (León 2010). This employment sector began to decline in the early 1980s and then began to escalate at the end of the 1990s. This rebound is related to immigration flows from Latin America, North Africa and Eastern Europe. These changes also coincided with transformations in the form of employment, as the share of live-in domestic workers declined and different forms of live-out contracts became the norm (e.g. weekly or daily cleaning and/or caring) (Colectivo IOE 1990).

This rebirth of the paid domestic work sector that began in the late 1990s was accompanied by the emergence of the adult worker social policy paradigm. Political discussions about women's activation as well as work and family reconciliation escalated in the late 1990s and dominated social policy and employment debates throughout the 2000s. In 1999, the Spanish conservative government passed the first law that signaled the influence of the adult worker paradigm, Law 39/1999 on family and work reconciliation. As in other European countries, such policies were often framed as promoting gender equality. Spanish politicians sought to "catch up" with Europe, and gender politics became a sign of modernization during this period (Thelfall et al. 2005).[13]

[13] The institutionalization of Spanish gender politics officially began in 1982, when the Women's Institute was created and launched a series of instruments and spaces, such as the Gender Equality Plans, that secured the continuation and monitoring of gender politics. Researchers claim that two kinds of actors were central to the development of Spanish gender politics: a) feminist activists within political parties who progressively became femocrats (rather than activists from outside) and b) the European Community (the current EU), which provided funding and institutional legitimacy/support to these initiatives (Threfall et al. 2005).

In sum, in the 2000s the adult worker social policy paradigm replaced the breadwinner-housewife model, at least rhetorically. Simultaneously, the paid domestic work sector escalated rapidly after a period of steady decline, and political debates engaged more directly with questions about the provision and distribution of domestic work. The following analysis examines the discourses that legitimized and challenged the institutionalized discrimination against domestic workers before and after the turn of the millennium.

Data and methods

I analyze data from a sample of 43 parliamentary debates that took place between 1978 and 2011. I selected debates that focused on domestic workers, including both those that primarily discussed domestic workers and those that mentioned domestic workers in relation to other topics, such as labor regulations, gender equality or social security. I complemented this data with interviews and supplementary documents. I conducted 17 interviews with key informants (8 elected politicians and 9 organizational leaders) who were involved in past or current debates about domestic workers' rights. I purposely selected the interview subjects to gain insights into backroom discussions among politicians and to gather information from participating agents and organizations outside parliament. Through the interviews, I gathered complementary documents from organizations including position papers, reports, leaflets, and press releases.

I employ the policy frame analysis developed by the MAGEEQ project on gender policy framing in Europe (Lombardo and Meier 2008). The purpose of this coding scheme is to analyze the representation of social problems, the interpretative frameworks

used to describe social problems and how these interpretative frameworks shape the possibilities for change, action and solutions. I use three of MAGEEQ's dimensions of analysis. First, diagnosis codes references to the definition the problem, what it entails, who has it, what causes it and why it is visible. Second, prognosis codes information about the solution, what solves the problem, who has to act, or how a solution can be reached. Third, voice identifies actors, organizations and institutions that either directly participated in or were invoked in these discussions.

To fully capture the references to definitions of domestic workers, I added two dimensions to this coding scheme. Categorical representation codes references to images of domestic workers, employers and households or families. This category provides information about how actors think about the typical domestic worker, employer or family. Language codes key words used in diagnosis, prognosis and categorical representation that link the problem of paid domestic work to other political themes and projects. For example, words such as justice or discrimination connect paid domestic work with broader projects of social justice, and concepts such as the cost of domestic services relate paid domestic work to the political theme of work and family reconciliation.

Based on the evolution of the paid domestic work sector, I define the turn of the century as the inflexion point between the pre-commodification (1979-1999) and commodification periods (2000-2011). I analyze the data in a series of cross-tabulations that show how each of the five dimensions relates to the others and how these relationships have changed over time. I use these patterns to identify discourses, which I operationalize as distinctive combinations of diagnosis, prognosis and language. For

instance, when examining the language codes I observed that the concept of justice was frequently used in the pre-commodification period, whereas the concept of discrimination was employed both before and after the turn of the millennium.

The results are presented in two sections. First, I outline the discourses about domestic workers that were present in parliament between 1979 and 2011. I describe the contents and actors who mobilized particular frames. Second, I analyze the processes whereby these discourses either were contested or became hegemonic at different points in time.

Results

In the period covered in this study (1979 to 2011), political discussions about domestic workers occurred in the Spanish parliament on 43 occasions. The first discussions took place in 1979 and dealt with the question of whether domestic workers should be included in the general legislation concerning workers' labor rights and social security. These debates resolved to define domestic work as a *special job* that could not be regulated under general laws (because it was a matter of household authority) and should instead be regulated separately. Discussions continued but declined in frequency during the 1990s, before peaking during the 2000s when domestic work was a topic of parliamentary discussion nearly every year. This pattern supports the expectation that the commodification of domestic work increased public interest in the topic.

Discourses about paid domestic workers

Between 1979 and 2011 Spanish political actors[14] used three different discourses to talk about the paid domestic work sector. The *productivist* discourse argues that the paid domestic work sector is different from all other employment sectors. The *labor justice* discourse claims that domestic workers are no different from other workers who are struggling against powerful employers. And the *gender justice* discourse argues that domestic workers are no different from other women who are struggling against patriarchal men and institutions. Table 1 summarizes the components of each of these discourses, which I describe in detail in the next section.

(TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE)

The productivist discourse

The distinction between productive and unproductive work is central to the productivist discourse. Paid domestic work is defined as a *special job* because the employer of a domestic worker, unlike employers in other industries, is defined as an individual who does not seek profit. For instance, in 1979 Congressman Felix Manuel Perez Miyares, also member of the UCD government, stated:

[14] List of relevant political party acronyms:
Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol (PSOE), major social democrat party
Partido Popular (PP), major conservative party
Union de Centro Democrático (UCD), major conservative political party during the first years of democracy, replaced by PP in 1990.
Izquierda Unida (IU), left-wing party
Partido Comunista (PC), communist party and major left-wing party during the first years of democracy, replaced by IU in 1986.
Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV), conservative Basque nationalist party
Convergencia I Unio (CIU), conservative Catalan nationalist party
Bloque Nacionalista Gallego (BNG), conservative Gallician nationalist party
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC), left-wing Catalan nationalist party
Euskaldik Ezkarra (EE), left-wing Basque nationalist party

> It is obvious that the labor relation in domestic service is not a generic labor relation, it is not that which organizes labor relations in industrial settings, and this law proposal recognizes this particularity. The employer side is not an employer in the real sense, he does not seek profit; and the delivery of services is towards a family, this is not really an industrial relation.

Within the logic of separate spheres, domestic workers are not exactly workers and employers are not exactly employers. Employers are depicted as families hiring personal services, rather than employers of workers. Domestic workers receive a wage for their labor, time and effort, but they are not quite workers because their motivation to serve their employers supposedly extends beyond money; they are *almost* family members. Domestic workers are often depicted in paternalistic terms. For instance, in 1979 UCD congresswoman Maria Dolores Pelayo Duke concluded: "Indeed, this job takes place within the employer's home and for live-in workers cohabitation intensifies their relation, in many cases the worker even becomes a member of the family community."

From this perspective, the problem that paid domestic work poses to social policy concerns the accommodation of its *special character* to the general labor regime (defined in Spain in two laws: the Labor Statute and the Social Security System). Those who use this discourse urge the government to define and regulate those areas in which domestic workers are to be treated like other workers and those areas in which they are to be treated differently. The solution is to establish exceptions to general labor laws for domestic workers and to regulate the specificities of domestic work in separate laws. The

special job trope justifies giving domestic workers fewer labor rights and less access to social security benefits than the rest of the workforce.

Political actors used the productivist discourse throughout the period of analysis, albeit with variations in language and motivations. This discourse was clearly dominant among conservative parties—they used it in nearly every intervention. Other political forces such as social democrat and left-wing groups used this discourse occasionally but embraced it more often over time.

The labor justice discourse

The labor justice discourse defines domestic workers as members of the working class, and maintains that the problem is that they are not recognized as such. Their treatment as a *special and different* category of workers is problematized. Actors using this discourse claim that any regulation that excludes or separates domestic workers from the general labor regime is unjust and constitutes a form of institutional discrimination. Like other members of the working class, in the absence of an institutional balance of power, domestic workers will potentially be abused and exploited by their employers. The labor justice discourse directly opposes the productivist discourse idea that paid domestic work is a *special job*, an idea that proponents of the labor justice discourse claim originated in the patron-servant ideology institutionalized during Franco's dictatorship. For instance, a Communist Party law proposal in 1979 stated: "This law proposal is motivated by our categorical rejection of the doctrine that considers domestic service as a special labor relation, this designation inevitably leads to systematic discrimination."

The solution is implied in the definition of the problem; those who adopt the labor justice discourse seek the elimination of all exceptions to general labor laws for domestic workers as well as any regulations that treat domestic workers differently than other workers. They propose a labor regime that guarantees the same fundamental rights and protections to all workers, including domestic workers. In 1979, PC congressman Bandres Molet declared:

> [Domestic service] is a normal labor relation, with its own specificities like any other, but normal, it should not be seen as a relation of a different kind. There is a labor relation, because there is a contract that relates domestic workers to their employers. As a result, there should be a working schedule, that does not currently exist, a list of tasks, and so on.

The labor justice discourse relies on class rhetoric that depicts all wageworkers as belonging to the same status category. Proponents of this discourse refer to domestic workers as "compañeras" or "trabajadoras," while employers are depicted as privileged families who become employees by virtue of hiring a domestic worker. Like other employees, these families have more power than their workers and have incentives to extract as much effort for as little money as possible.

This discourse is exclusively mobilized by political actors on the left and some union leaders, such as the Communist Party (PC) and Euskadiko Eskerra (EE), a nationalist left-wing political party from the Basque country. The labor justice discourse was only employed between 1979 and 1985.

The gender justice discourse

The gender justice discourse considers the condition and situation of paid domestic workers to be an expression of patriarchal domination. This discourse relies on feminist thought and defines the problem of paid domestic work as being related to the devaluation of feminized work, discrimination against women in the labor market, the gendered division of work in the household, and the patriarchal state that protects it. Like the labor justice discourse, the gender justice discourse considers the exclusion of domestic workers from the general labor regime to be unjust and a form of institutional discrimination. Furthermore, this discourse believes that the characterization of domestic work as a *special job* is part of the patriarchal ideological apparatus used to legitimize the exclusion and marginalization of domestic workers. In 1997 IU congresswoman Cristina Almeida expressed this idea in the following statement:

> I have to say that when men do the same activities, they transcend this difference of status. I mean, if they clean windows from the outside, they fall under the general labor regime for office and public building workers, and we [women] clean windows from [the] inside, and we fall under the special regime for domestic workers, and we do not transcend this difference of status. If you are a female domestic worker, you are here [under the special regime], but if you are a male domestic worker, then you are a butler and fall under general labor law....I believe that we should turn around this regime and universalize the general regime, instead of keeping a separate regime just because it employs women.

Those who use the gender justice discourse argue that solving the problem of the paid domestic work requires systemic social transformations, such as achieving an equal division of work in the household and recognizing the value of domestic and care work. In the near horizon, however, the solution proposed from this discourse emphasizes treating domestic workers like other workers and including them in the same labor regime. In 1997 IU congresswoman Cristina Almeida explained the broader implications of solving the paid domestic work in the following way:

> "This [paid domestic work] question not only affects many women but also the consideration that all society has about women, because women do this work, some for a wage and some for no wage, but at the end of the day we all do it and we are affected by its devaluation. Valuing this work is not just a request from Beijing satellite accounts, but it is a need of our societies and it is very important to take a global view to discuss men' and women's shared responsibility for these tasks."

The gender justice discourse represents domestic workers as women and employers as male heads of patriarchal households, even though those who hire domestic workers might be women. Domestic workers are like other women and face a common set of obstacles, discriminations and injustices. This discourse is employed by left-wing political actors (e.g. IU), by some members of the social democrat party (PSOE), and feminist activists outside the Parliament. It emerges in the mid 1980s and disappears by the late 1990s.

In sum, between 1979 and 2011 political actors in the Parliament use three discourses to represent paid domestic work. Each involves different understandings about who domestic workers and employers are, what they do, and what they deserve. Thus, each implies distinctive solutions that lead to different forms of institutionalizing this labor relation. These discourses highlight the political character of defining paid domestic work as a special or regular job and express some variation in the universe of possibilities for establishing different institutional frameworks to regulate labor relations in paid domestic work.

This descriptive analysis also reveals that the emphasis that many feminist scholars put on the special exploitative character of domestic work can easily resonate with the productivist discourse, which represents the most disadvantageous and precarious form of institutionalizing paid domestic work. While not agreeing that domestic work is unproductive, feminist claims that domestic work is special easily reinforce the *special job* trope. Clearly not all feminist arguments favor the productivist framework; the gender justice discourse centrally relies on feminist rhetoric and is categorically opposed to the *special job* trope. Nonetheless, as I show next, the cooptation of feminist rhetoric has been crucial in recent years in legitimizing and bolstering the productivist discourse.

Political contestation about paid domestic work

The productivist discourse is clearly dominant throughout the period of analysis. However, the level of contestation is starkly different in the two periods. In the pre-commodification, the productivist discourse was contested by both the labor and the

gender justice discourses. In the commodification period, however, the productivist discourse became hegemonic and faced no opposition. Table 2 summarizes the findings.

(TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE)

The pre-commodification period

The first set of discussions about paid domestic work took place during the transition to democracy, when politicians debated two laws: the Labor Statute and the Social Security Regime. Conservative and social democrat congress members aligned with the productivist discourse, while parties on the left aligned with the labor justice discourse.

In 1979 the conservative UCD government proposed a Labor Statute and Social Security laws that explicitly excluded domestic workers. They argued that paid domestic work was so substantively different from other jobs that could not be regulated under the same laws. They said that the *special character* was so obvious that "even feminist activists" accepted this principle.

Two political parties on the left disagreed, however. The Communist Party and Euskaldik Ezkarra both mobilized the labor justice discourse and argued that excluding domestic workers from the general labor and social security laws constituted institutional discrimination. They associated the productivist discourse narrative with the "scientific doctrine" that feed the dictatorial ideological apparatus on labor relations. This doctrine declared that domestic work was not real work. They rejected this statement and defended that domestic workers were just like other workers. They claimed to represent domestic workers' disappointment with the government initiative to exclude them from

the general labor regime. In 1979 and 1981 the Communist Party presented official requests to incorporate domestic workers in the general labor regime.

Despite these actions, the labor justice discourse was defended only by a minority and was easily dismissed. The Communist Party gathered little support, partly because the idea of treating domestic workers like other workers was ridiculed. Most political forces in the Parliament aligned with the productivist discourse. For instance, in 1979 PSOE congressman Saavedra Acevedo claimed, in response to the Communist Party's proposal to include domestic work in the general labor regime, that:

> "Across Europe the labor relation for domestic workers is regulated as a special labor relation. It is not right to apply the full general regulation for common workers, instead it is appropriate to select those issues that need to be protected. Being mindful of the special particularities of this labor relation excludes the possibility of applying the same legislation that regulates common labor contracts."

These debates culminated with the approval of the Labor Statute and Social Security Laws that excluded domestic workers and institutionalized the productivist discourse in democracy. In 1985 the PSOE Social-democrat government, in office between 1982 and 1996, approved a Royal Decree for domestic workers' special labor statute. This piece of legislation improved some of the characteristics of the previous dictatorship-era law but also reinforced the institutionalization of the productivist framework that separated domestic workers from the rest of the workforce.

Starting in the mid80s the productivist discourse was challenged by the gender justice discourse. In the context of progressive institutionalization of gender politics and the decline of the Communist Party, political opposition to domestic workers' exclusion from the general labor regime started to draw on feminist rhetoric. Gender institutions and instruments, such as the Equality Plans, provided a new space for talking about domestic workers. For instance, the first draft of the Equality Plan in 1987 declared that domestic workers faced institutional discrimination, because their work was not appropriately valued or recognized, and criticized that the labor market did not offer alternative opportunities for these women. Politicians in the social-democrat party (PSOE), the left-wing party coalition (IU) and feminist activists in unions and other organizations used this framework. The official Social-democrat party line and other conservative parties continued to employ a moderate version of the productivist discourse.

The peak of this confrontation took place in the mid 90s, when IU congresswoman Cristina Almeida strongly criticized the exclusion of domestic workers from general labor laws. She persuasively argued that the *special job* trope was a sexist device to justify the devaluation and exclusion of domestic workers. She further argued that domestic work was an example of both the condition of women's unpaid work and of the precariousness of women's employment in the labor market. She initiated one of her interventions in 1997 by saying:

> "It is about time that we think about the legal regime created for domestic workers that was incorporated to the Labor Statute as a special regime and how it creates a series of differences in comparison to workers in the general system that affect,

fundamentally, women. And I believe that it is affects women through the devaluing of these kinds tasks."

Political actors using the gender justice discourse invoked institutions that legitimized gender equality policy, such as the European Union or the UN Women's Conference in Beijing (e.g., reference in the quote from the previous section). In some cases these references were very specific. For instance, Isabel Ochoa Crespo, member of the domestic workers' rights association ATH-ELE who was invited to speak at a Congressional Hearing used the 1995 European Commission report on the implementation of Directive 79/7/EEC[15] (EC 1995) to claim that Spanish' special social security regime for domestic workers was a form of gender discrimination.

Though advanced by a minority among congress members, the gender justice discourse got traction and was perceived as legitimate, unlike the labor justice discourse that was ridiculed. In fact, the productivist discourse moderated by the late 90s. For instance, the response of the Conservative party in government to congresswoman Cristina Almeida's declarations in 1997 was evasive. They expressed agreement with the gender justice discourse, accepted the premise that the *special regime* was discriminatory and no longer explicitly claimed that domestic work was a *special job*. They did, however, argue that the situation of domestic workers was so complex that required more studies and careful attention to avoid hurting the workers themselves.

In sum, in the pre-commodification period the productivist discourse was clearly dominant but also challenged by alternative ideological discourses. The level of

[15] Council Directive 79/7/EEC of 19 December 1978 on the progressive implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women in m3atters of social security.

contestation increased as feminist voices entered the Parliament and the breadwinner-housewife social policy paradigm decayed. The gender justice discourse gained substantive legitimacy by the end of the 1990s. It did not, however, gain enough political power to threat the institutionalized productivist discourse and to change the legislation.

The commodification period

Instead of growing contestation about the value and status of paid domestic workers, I found that the productivist discourse faced no opposition after the turn of the millennium. This discourse appeared in new clothes and incorporated new policy frames and language, but the main principles remained intact: it defined the problem in terms of the *special character* of domestic work and the solution was to find an institutional arrangement that accommodated this *special job* to the general labor regime. All political actors in the Parliament and many activists outside it aligned with this discourse; there was virtually no argument against the *special job* trope after 2001.

Despite this lack of contestation, the topic of domestic work was frequently invoked in Parliamentary discussions. All political agents agreed that the existing legislation was outdated and that there was a need to find a new *special* accommodation for this employment sector in the general labor and social security laws. The following quote showed how the *special job* trope, core to the productivist discourse and moderated at the end of the 90s, appeared again in full swing and was adopted by left-wing political parties, who had in the previous period always categorically opposed this policy frame. For instance, in 2005 a left-wing ERC congressman stated:

"The need of a special regime is obvious. To begin with, the employer it is not an

employer per se, it is the head of the household who does not receive profit - strictly speaking - from that labor relation."

I find that in the commodification period the productivist discourse renewed its legitimacy in two main ways. First, it used the image of the migrant worker to legitimize a hierarchy of workers, creating a category of marginalized workers for whom employment in domestic work was appropriate. These workers were not seen in need of rights but in need of protection. Second, the productivist discourse coopted feminist concepts and folded discussions about paid domestic workers into work and family reconciliation debates.

This change of framing had two consequences. On the one hand, it represented all native women as potential hirers of domestic workers and erased inequalities among native women. On the other hand, it weakened the potential of feminist discourse to oppose the productivist discourse. In the 2000s the productivist discourse gained legitimacy by construeing domestic workers as servants of gender equality.

References to migrant workers were key to maintaining the special status of domestic workers. As large flows of international migrants changed the faces of domestic workers, the undocumented migrant became the epitome of the domestic worker. The category of domestic worker was thus not only separated from that of the typical worker but also from that of the citizen. Domestic workers were portrayed as uneducated, uninformed, marginalized, and helpless individuals. Political actors' references to domestic workers often took a paternalistic tone. For instance, in 2010 congressman Olabarría described the reach of the paid domestic work problem by saying:

> "it affects a large sector of the population, men but particularly women who most likely had no other option but to work in *our* homes, either because they didn't have qualifications or because nowadays many migrant women and men is where they can find a wage to survive, under very difficult situations."

This change in the representation of the typical domestic worker came with changes in the language used to define their demands and requests. Whereas critics of the legislation earlier used the language of rights and justice, in this period critics asserted that domestic workers needed protection. The marginal condition of the population justified its involvement in domestic work, which also helped to protect the distinction between domestic work and other jobs.

Second, references to employers acquired in this period an unprecedented importance within the productivist discourse. Employers were no longer depicted as a privileged elite, or as potential exploiters or patriarchs as in the gender or labor justice discourse. Instead, employers were seen as women and dual-earner families in *need* of services to juggle work and family demands. The promotion of women's employment as a central political condition for realizing the adult worker model turned the privilege of hiring a domestic worker into a legitimate *need*. All political forces took for granted that hiring domestic workers is *the* form of work and family reconciliation. The modern family was the dual-earner one, where both men and women were employed, and they needed additional help to take care of children, elderly or other dependent individuals. For instance, in 2005 congressmen Olabarría Muñoz presented their law for the improvement of the protective action of the domestic work special labor regime saying:

> "Nowadays, when sons need to be educated and both spouses fortunately, the *husband and the wife, work outside the household*, these female and male workers employed in domestic service acquire an important and much more sophisticated dimension (...) This important configuration does not fit with the marginal situation of domestic workers, their lack of protection in the Social Security system, and the prevalence of informal contracts."

Discussions about paid domestic work became a subset or folded in debates about work and family reconciliation policies. In fact, most debates about paid domestic work since 2001 were framed as discussions about policies for work and life balance, and focused on the *needs* of employers (e.g. 5 out of 8 explicit debates about domestic work). Social modernization and these new needs motivated politicians' advocacy for the improvement and professionalization of the domestic work sector.

The productivist discourse also coopted feminist concepts. Both conservative and progressive political actors claimed that domestic work was devalued and lacked proper social recognition. In the gender justice discourse these concepts stood as pieces that explained the institutional discrimination against domestic workers legitimized through the *special job* trope. In the productivist discourse, however, these policy frames were not inconsistent with the *special job* trope and lost their transformative potential. The domestic work sector was both devalued and special, workers were not like other workers, nor were employers like other employers.

This formulation of the productivist discourse, that subordinated domestic workers to gender equality, was pervasive inside the Parliament. Non-systematic evidence from interviews and documents showed that it was common outside as well. In my data only

two feminist activists declared feeling uncomfortable with statements that directly linked the practice of hiring domestic workers to other Spanish women's employment. Neither of them discredited the productivist discourse itself, they maintained that domestic work was special. And domestic workers' activists, for the most part, framed their demands in relation to this discourse. For instance, one of the migrant domestic workers activist groups declared in their website:

> "we are a group of migrant domestic workers who fight for our rights (…) We contribute to the working, family and personal life reconciliation. In Spain, women's labor force participation has increased from 27 percent in 1982 to 37.7 percent in 1998. According to this source, 30 percent of these women became employed thanks to domestic workers who took care of their homes. We allow them to study, work and contribute to a labor market that needs them."

Whereas in the pre-commodification period gender equality frames were used to defend the workers rights, in the period of commodification these frames were used to defend the employers. The productivist discourse not only dismisses the possibility of ever reconciling work and family for domestic workers, but also disempowers domestic workers to make autonomous claims for their demands. Domestic workers demands become attached and limited by the greater good that advancement in gender equality and work and family reconciliation represent. For instance, in 2010 a PSOE congresswoman thanked domestic workers for facilitating other women's economic emancipation in the following way:

> "I would like to finish acknowledging the labor of this group, who always in silence

> allows other sectors of our society, like us, those who are here today, to be able to work outside the home, without them it would be probably impossible, particularly for women, to be outside the household."

This new link between hiring domestic work and "gender equality" posed the rights of domestic workers as being in direct conflict with the rights of the employers. This was obvious in the fact that politicians talked about the affordability of domestic workers, a topic that was never mentioned in the pre-commodification period. The solution to the paid domestic work problem concerned the design of a new special labor regime that would not hurt employers' access to these *necessary* services, by which was meant keeping prices low. For instance, in 2011 the conservative party proposed a policy to subsidize the purchase of domestic services.

Thus, the commodification of household labor did stimulate state intervention in relation to domestic work, but it did not challenge the private status of the household or the special status of domestic workers. The need for domestic work became public, but the work and workers were still in the private sphere. In 2005, a left-wing ERC congressman representative stated:

> "It [the domestic work employment sector] is only covering an obvious need in our society, and at the end in many cases these workers are hired to do those things that cannot be reconciled between the work and family life. This is, therefore, a context outside of the competitive market that regulates general labor laws. On the other hand, we find an employer that provides services in a very specific context in which trust, distrust, and familiarity is crucial, and where not

> all working time is an actual delivery of work, in which the framework of rights and duties is relative and where life and work are intimately linked to an extent that it is difficult to distinguish, and in which the organizing capacity of workers is most difficult."

The commodification seemed to have served the purpose of arising awareness about the domestic work backstage for a specific sector of society, the middle dual-earner class, but it did not move either domestic workers or the family as a sphere of social relations into the public sphere, neither did it help reconsider the value of domestic work. Both the marginalization of domestic workers through their representation as migrant workers and the cooptation of feminist rhetoric by the productivist discourse made it difficult to elaborate discourses that criticize the *special job* trope.

In sum, in Spain the political representation of domestic work since the turn of the millennium was characterized by the hegemonic productivist discourse that coopted feminist rhetoric and bolstered its legitimacy. This discourse faced virtually no opposition and at the end of this period and the social democrat government approved two laws that re-institutionalized the special job regime. These laws improved some of the rights and protection for domestic workers, but reinstitutionalized the same idea that domestic workers were special workers, maintained crucial inequalities in comparison to the rest of the workers, and reinforced the exclusion of domestic workers from the scope of general labor legislation.

Discussion

This article showed that political discussions about domestic work in Spain between 1979 and 2011 involved three different discourses that legitimized and challenged the exclusion of domestic workers from general labor laws: the productivist discourse, the labor justice discourse, and the gender justice discourse. The analyses indicated that the wave of commodification of household labor coincided with an inflexion point in the political contestation about domestic work. The pre-commodification period was characterized by political conflict between ideologically distinct forms of understanding paid domestic work. The commodification period, however, was characterized by the hegemony of the productivist discourse, that which justified a separate and unequal domestic work labor regime. This discourse coopted feminist rhetoric and mobilized divides between migrants and natives to re-legitimize the hierarchy between productive and reproductive work. In Spain, thus, the commodification is associated with improvements in the working conditions of domestic workers but with little substantive change in the labor status and rights of this employment sector.

This analysis is based on one country, and the wave of household labor commodification can have different implications in different contexts. Particularly, I would expect that where gender equality frames are not as important discursive devices to legitimize other policy projects, there might be less of an interest to coopt feminist rhetoric and leave more room for discussions about the status of domestic workers. Similarly, countries where the *racialization* of domestic work has a long history might be better tuned to identify how racial hierarchies are mobilized to legitimize inequalities.

Despite the country-specific singularities, it is important to note that the discursive frame in which domestic workers' value is put in relation to what they contribute for other workers is common elsewhere. Peterson (2007) and Peterson and Kvist (2010) found that this frame was present in Spain and Sweden. And international organizations are also echoing this same message. For instance, the 2010 European Economic and Social Council report asserted that the first goal of the professionalization of the paid domestic work sector was: "a better work-life balance. Paid work for women, which is a prerequisite for gender equality, has required services to be set up to replace the work that women used to do at home" (EESC 2010: 42). Similarly, the ILO approved Convention 189 in 2011 stated in its first paragraph: "recognizing the significant contribution of domestic workers to the global economy, which includes increasing paid opportunities for women and men workers with family responsibilities."

My analysis suggests that this frame was not solely related to changing meanings of gender equality, but that it was part of a larger logic that resignified the productivist discourse, the division and hierarchy between productive and reproductive work, through racial/nationality divides between native and non-native workers. Productive workers are now both native men and women in the skilled and strategic sectors of the economy, while un(re)productive workers are migrant women who maintain and reproduce them not through unpaid labor in the household, but through paid work both inside and outside the household, employed in less desirable, devalued and stable jobs. Productive workers depend on the affordability of the goods and services provided by these reproductive workers.

This analysis speaks to at least three important questions raised in debates about domestic work. First, the discourse analysis in Spain suggests that feminists' claims that domestic work is *special, different or unique* can feed discourses that justify and legitimize the exclusion of domestic workers from the scope of general labor and social security legislation. Commentators should be aware of this affinity between the productivist discourse and feminist rhetoric. Further, this study provides yet another example of the cooptation of gender equality frames to advance other policy projects and of how these processes demobilize feminist politics.

Second, this study reconsiders the role of racial and ethnic divides in the exclusion of domestic workers from labor and social security rights. In Spain when this exclusion was first institutionalized in 1979 domestic workers were nearly all Spanish-born. At that time, the divide between productive and reproductive work was most crucial to legitimize such exclusion. In 2011, however, the fact that domestic workers are not native became crucial to sustain the hierarchy between productive and reproductive work. If domestic workers had been seen as native women, it might have been harder to sustain that they were special because they helped emancipating fellow native women.

Finally, Bowman and Cole argued that recognizing the needs of work and family conciliation for women was a useful frame to make visible questions about paid domestic workers. Yet, I show that this frame helps to subsume domestic workers' claims to the greater good that work and family reconciliation represents in the current social policy paradigm. My analysis shows that this frame resignificates the hierarchy between productive and reproductive labor and devalues the status of paid domestic workers.

Tables

Table 1. Summary of discourses

Discourse	Diagnosis	Prognosis	Period	Actors
Productivist	Domestic work is a special job	Special labor regime for domestic workers	All	All
Labor justice	Domestic workers not considered workers	Domestic work under general labor regime	1979 - 1985	PC, EE
Gender justice	Domestic work not considered a real job	Domestic work under general labor regime	1985 - 1999	PSOE, IU

Table 2. Political contestation about domestic work

Period	#Interventions	Political contestation
1979-1985	10	Productivist vs. labor justice
1986-2000	9	Productivist vs. gender justice
2001-2011	29	Productivist discourse hegemony

CHAPTER 7. Conclusion

This dissertation has examined the rebirth of the paid domestic work sector in Spain. This topic is of interest to sociologists for a number of reasons. On the one hand, the growing relevance of market transactions in the domestic/care realm denotes an important change in the kinds of relations and institutions involved in the organization of household labor. On the other hand, the comeback of the domestic work sector is intimately related to broader changes in the occupational structure and labor markets of post-industrial societies. Both of these viewpoints are crucial to understand the processes whereby the commodification of household labor is involved in forging and reconfiguring social inequalities by gender, class and race. This dissertation argues that in its current form, the growing domestic work sector maintains the devaluation of domestic work and redistributes paid and unpaid work within and between households in ways that can generate economic polarization.

The empirical chapters of this dissertation focused on four distinctive dimensions. In Chapter 3 I demonstrated how hiring domestic work was associated with the reproduction of gender inequalities and the increase of class inequalities in time spent on housework. Building on previous studies, I proposed to model couple bargaining to include decisions about both spending time and/or money to get housework done. I found that in households that hired domestic workers both women and men spent less time on housework. Hiring women spent about 22 minutes less per day than non-hiring women, whereas hiring men spent about 8 minutes less per day than non-hiring men. In hiring households, the absolute difference between women's and men's time spent on

housework was smaller but in relation to their partners hiring women continued to do the same share of total housework than non-hiring women. Because hiring was positively correlated with income, women in better off households tended to spend less time on housework than other women. Using a counterfactual exercise, I estimated that if domestic workers were not available the gap between more and less affluent women in time spent on housework would decline by 20 percent.

In Chapter 4 I argued that the practice of hiring domestic workers could constitute a mechanism of economic polarization between households. Because time spent on housework is related to time spent on paid work, if advantaged women can afford to hire domestic workers they can also spend more time on the job and earn more than other women who cannot hire domestic workers. I found that women who hired nannies also tended to earn notably higher incomes than those who did not, the difference amounted to about EUR 300 per month. I used another counterfactual exercise to evaluate the implications of this association between hiring and women's income on income inequality between households. The results revealed that if no households hired nannies the income inequality between women and households would only slightly decline. I concluded that this somewhat surprising null finding was probably due to heterogeneity among the women who hire domestic workers, many of which might not hire to increase their paid work time.

In Chapter 5 I examined more thoroughly the relationship between hiring a domestic worker and women's work lives. Using interviews from 27 professional women with young children in Madrid, I showed that the decision to hire a domestic worker was far from driven by purely economic motives, instead it was prompted by values and ideas

about domesticity. I suggested that hiring could function as a patriarchal bargain vis-a-vis both husbands and cultural norms about working mothers. Focusing on intensive hirers I showed that domestic workers contributed to couples' gender dynamics in different ways. In couples that shared household labor, domestic workers emphasized gender task segregation and were associated with women reducing their paid work time after childbirth. In couples that did not share household labor, domestic workers emphasized the femininity of the domestic sphere and were associated with women maintaining or increasing their paid work time after childbirth.

Finally, in Chapter 6 I showed that the greater demand for and visibility of the domestic workers did little to challenge the exclusion of this job from the scope of general labor laws. Using data form Parliamentary debates between 1979 and 2011, I studied how political discourses legitimized and challenged this form of discrimination against domestic workers. I found that the productivist discourse drew a division between productive and un(re)productive work and claimed that domestic work was a *special job*. Interestingly, I found that this discourse was challenged in the period before the rebirth of the domestic work sector, but that it became hegemonic ever since the turn of the millennium. The modern version of the productivist discourse mobilized divides between migrant and native workers and coopted feminist rhetoric. These two discursive devices legitimized yet again the hierarchy between productive and un(re)productive work and kept domestic workers out of the scope of important labor rights.

Limitations

This dissertation drew on different data sources and analyses to understand the motivations and implications of outsourcing household labor through the practice of hiring domestic workers. These analyses have several limitations that should be kept in mind.

The analyses in Chapters 2 and 3 relied on survey data to study the relationship between hiring domestic workers and women's (and men's) housework, paid work and incomes. The benefit of using this kind of data is that it provides a nationally representative sample that can be used to produce generalizable comparisons between hirers and non-hirers. The data have drawbacks with respect to breadth and measurement, however, which limited my capacity to better estimate causal relations. The Spanish time use survey was cross-sectional and did not include good measures for personal and household income. The Spanish sample of the European Survey on Income and Living Conditions was longitudinal, but it did not include good measures for household labor outsourcing. The consistency of the results across a number of robustness checks makes me confident that estimated associations between hiring domestic work, women's housework and incomes are correct. Nonetheless, I cannot disentangle whether these coefficients reflect the effect of hiring on the outcome, or whether they reflect reverse causality.

The counterfactual exercises and simulations in these chapters also have limitations. I found this analytic approach to provide a very useful method of estimating the implications of individual level effects on population distributions as a whole. These analyses rely on strong assumptions, however, most importantly the premise that

behavior would not change in absence of domestic workers. There are a number of plausible ways in which this assumption can be violated. Supposing that hiring causes some women to increase their paid work time and earnings, if hiring was not a possibility these women might have turned to their parents for full-time caregiving. Similarly, assuming that hiring caused some women to reduce their time spent on housework, if hiring was not available these women might have decreased their standards of cleanliness or pressured their husbands to increase their time spent on housework. All these are possible scenarios. Given data limitations, counterfactual analyses provide compelling estimations about the stratifying implications of outsourcing household labor.

The qualitative analyses have their limitations as well. The interviews in Chapter 4 proved useful to examine some of the ways in which hiring domestic workers contributed to couples' gender projects about the division of labor. Yet the sample was not large enough to further explore a number of relevant questions. For instance, the difference between hiring a migrant domestic worker and a native domestic worker was left unexplored partly because my sample only included a few women who hired Spanish-born domestic workers. The data about political discourse could also be improved. The finding in Chapter 5 that the productivist discourse was hegemonic since the turn of the millennium could be further contrasted against additional sources. Though I conducted interviews with outside actors, the data focused on debates that took place in the Spanish parliament. This analysis could benefit from including more information about the political agendas and interests of the political representatives.

Future extensions

This dissertation opens new avenues for future research. One of the many remaining question marks concerns the relationship between migrant workers and the devaluation of domestic/care work. In Chapter 6 the political discourse analysis indicated that the category of migrant domestic worker was mobilized to perpetuate the exclusion of domestic workers from the scope of general labor laws. In the future I would like to study how the proportion of migrant workers affected the wages and working conditions of domestic workers and other care workers in different European countries. I would like to use an analytical strategy that has been previously employed to study the care work penalty, which examines the difference in wages between similarly qualified workers in care and non-care occupations. The goal of this study would be to analyze how the care work penalty varies in relation to the proportion of migrant workers. Such research could illuminate the ways in which racial/nationality divides play a role in maintaining the devaluation of specific jobs.

In Chapter 5 I argued that ideas of domesticity and about the gender division of labor are reproduced through the practice of hiring domestic work. In the future I would like to study how different kinds of care arrangements have distinctive implications for the gender division of labor within the household. For instance, do couples that use in-home caregivers, as opposed to childcare centers, tend to be more or less gender egalitarian in their division of housework and care work? Based on this dissertation I would hypothesize that care arrangements in the home tend to more greatly emphasize gender norms and inequalities. I plan to use the available surveys on time use to examine

the relationship between type of care arrangement and mothers and fathers' time spent in caregiving, housework and paid work.

The analyses concerning the effect of hiring domestic workers on household income inequality were unsatisfactory, for reasons related to the nature of the data. In the future I would like to design a stronger empirical test to more convincingly examine this question. Based on the analyses that economists have conducted about the effect of hiring domestic workers on women's labor force participation, I plan to replicate these analytical strategies focusing on women's income as an outcome variable. These analyses will use data from the United States, and perhaps some other European country. Spanish survey data on income is, unfortunately, insufficient for these kinds of research designs. This study constitutes one piece of a larger research agenda that will comprehensively examine the relationship between changes in women's employment and income inequality, how it varies systematically over time and across countries, and the mechanisms that drive these trends. This investigation will help elucidating the ways in which class (and race/nationality) inequalities are involved in the production of gender relations and vice versa.

Lastly, this dissertation indicates that we need better survey data about how individuals organize household and care work. Data on time use is very useful but limited given the growing relevance of market transactions in the organization of household labor. To thoroughly study how families organize and make choices about how to allocate household labor, survey data must combine information on time use, economic resources and expenditure choices. It is also crucial to gather more information about the involvement of unpaid caregivers, like relatives or friends. I plan to collaborate with

other researchers in Europe to propose a topical module for the European Survey on Income and Living conditions. I believe that it is plausible to obtain support for such project of data collection given the amount of political interest about work and family reconciliation questions among European policy makers.

Implications

The findings from this dissertation speak to at least three broader theoretical debates in Sociology: the role of economic and cultural mechanisms in the household division of labor, the stalling of the gender revolution, and the social organization of household labor as an arena of social stratification.

I have shown that both economic and cultural mechanisms are relevant to dissect the relationship between the decision to hire domestic work and women's paid and unpaid work. Though economic and cultural processes are in real life indivisible, it is useful to contrast economic and cultural approaches to analyze the practice of hiring domestic workers and its implications. On the one hand, a purely economic framework emphasizes that hiring domestic workers is primarily motivated by economic incentives, only the well-off purchase domestic work services and do so to either spend more time on paid work or leisure. In this market exchange model, we would expect the increased availability of domestic work in the market to downplay the significance of gender relations in the distribution of housework and paid work within homes. A purely cultural framework, on the other hand, tends to emphasize noneconomic motives for hiring domestic work, such as those related to class, gender and racial identities. It follows from this argument that the increased availability of domestic workers might tend to reproduce

cultural systems of status distinction and inequalities. For instance, women hire not because they want to spend more time on paid work but because it symbolizes status.

Economic resources undeniably constrain the possibility to hire domestic workers, but the decision to hire is by far more complex than the purely economic model would envision. The force of gender norms about the division of labor plays an important role in shaping the decision to hire a domestic worker and its effects on women's work. These norms and gender expectations are not invariant or uncontested, however. The interviews showed that there was a fair amount of variation, conflict and contradiction with respect to norms about the gender division of labor. I argue that these conflicts and contradictions would be greater if hiring domestic workers was not such an accepted and available social practice.

Second, the findings from this dissertation also have implications for the debate about the stalling of the gender revolution (e.g., England 2010). Paula England and others noted that advancements in women's economic positions slowed down after a period of important transformations. They also observed that most of the transformations occurred because women entered male fields rather than because men entered feminized fields. England emphasized that the trends and the stalling of the gender revolution was related to the structure of economic incentives. She argued that, given the continued devaluation of feminine occupations, incentives had pushed highly educated women to enter male occupations when upward mobility was not possible in feminized occupations, whereas working class women had been able to move up and still work in feminized occupations. Others emphasize the role of cultural norms. Ridgeway (2011), for instance, argues that gender norms about caregiving are very resistant to change.

My research shows that inequality in economic resources between households facilitates men's resistance to feminine work and the perpetuation of its devaluation. Both men's power to resist housework and women's economic advantage to purchase domestic/care services produce an arrangement in which some women can move up without challenging the devaluation of feminized tasks and reproductive labor. In Spain, the practice of hiring domestic workers maintains gender norms about the division of labor in the household and stimulates the economic advancement of some women.

Lastly, this dissertation makes the case for taking more seriously the social organization of reproduction as an important sphere that produces inequalities not only between men and women but also among women and among households. Most of the research about housework and care work focuses on explaining inequalities between women and men. These studies argue that women's assigned responsibility over reproductive labor is partly responsible for women's lower economic resources, as discussed in the literature about the gender pay gap or the motherhood penalty. Yet the burden of social reproductive labor not only varies systematically by gender but also by class (and by other categories of inequality). These inequalities place women in different positions with respect to the labor market and the accumulation of economic resources.

Inequalities in reproductive labor not only have implications for economic resources but also for the alignment of political interests and conflicts. This research suggests that in its current form, the commodification of household labor via the rebirth of the domestic work sector heightens the conflicts of interest between different groups of women. On the one hand, some women advocate for the affordability of domestic and care services to promote women's employment and economic autonomy. On the other

hand, other women advocate for the full recognition of labor rights for domestic workers, which can lead to substantial increases in the price of the services they deliver. The fact that this conflict maps onto divides between racial/nationality groups, between migrant workers and Spanish-born women in Spain, further complicates the picture.

These conflicts, if left to the individuals, will surely contribute to maintaining if not increasing economic disparities. Finding fairer solutions to these conflicts requires collective action and state interventions that encourages forms of organizing reproductive labor in ways that guarantee paid workers' rights and individuals' access to affordable and quality domestic/care services. In Europe current developments in social policy seem to be mainly concerned with facilitating access to domestic/care services for the middle classes (e.g., Morel 2014). Collective initiatives toward a greater socialization of the costs of reproduction would not only help valorizing feminized work but also advancing equality for all women.

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