Constructing Curriculum History and the Child in Taiwan: A History of the Present

By
YuChen Lin

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The dissertation is approved by the following members of the Final Oral Committee:
Bernadette Baker, Professor, Curriculum and Instruction
Tomas Popkewitz, Professor, Curriculum and Instruction
Marianne Bloch, Professor, Curriculum and Instruction
Francois Tochon, Professor, Curriculum and Instruction
Dawnene Hassett, Associate Professor, Curriculum and Instruction
Richard Miller, Assistant Professor, Music, University of Nevada, Las Vegas

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter One
Introduction

What is a child in Taiwan? What is a model student to adults in Taiwan?

Example One: Hu Shih, one of the most well-known philosophers in twentieth-century China, mentioned that he started to read and memorize books at the age of four (1895). These books included:

1. *The Book of Filial Piety,* a post-Confucian classic of unknown authorship.
2. *The Elementary Lessons* (literally, "The Small Learning"), a book of Neo-Confucianist moral teaching commonly attributed to the Sung philosopher, Chu Hsi.
3. *The Four Books: The Analects of Confucius, The Book of Mencius, The Great Learning, and The Doctrine of the Mean.*
4. Four of the Five Classics: *The Book of Poetry, The Book of History, The Book of Change, and The Li Ki.* (Hu, 1931, p.240-241)

Hu Shih's story is not a unique one, for many people in his time had similar learning experiences if they intended to become high-ranking officials in China. However, there was considerable disagreement as to whether Hu's learning experiences, beginning at four years old, was an appropriate and effective education. This topic became a larger issue after the discourse on "liberation" emerged during the May Fourth era (circ. 1919).

Example Two: In 1968, nineteen years after the Kuomintang (the Chinese Nationalist Party or the KMT) came to Taiwan and declared martial law, we see the establishment of the National Institute for Compilation and Translation, which regulated the scope of content in the standardized textbooks used across the nation. In 1976, the nationally standardized social studies curriculum delineated the educational objectives that were in place before the lifting of martial law in Taiwan:

To help students understand the origin of Chinese civilization; to discuss Chinese

> geography, history, and the cultural diversity in China; to study how the *Three Principles of the People* by Dr. Sun Yat-Sen--nationalism, democracy, and livelihood--were fulfilled in Taiwan; to define Taiwan as a revival base for the KMT government to reunify China in the future; and to develop loyalty to Chinese nationalism. (Su, 2006, p.43)

Example Three: In 1994, a public demonstration called for a modernization of education in Taiwan. The leader of the demonstration, Huang Wuxiong, a professor at National Taiwan University, mentioned that the contents of modern Taiwanese education included:

> a) Respect for autonomy, the invention of individuality and an emphasis on the education of autonomy of all ethnic groups and minority groups through which multicultural education can be developed. b) The main goal of education is not to categorize, to rank, or to classify people. Conversely, its goal to perfect educational environment, to provide educational resources, to allow everyone to pursue the best inner development through one's free choice to the utmost. All the advanced, modernized countries encourage the majority of their citizens to receive as much higher education as possible but not to restrain it. (Huang, 1997, p14)

Example Four: At approximately the same time referenced in Example Three, there was another paradigm defining what constituted an ideal child in Taiwan, which one can see expressed through the process of "Taiwanization:"

> Taiwanization implies shifting away from mainland Chinese affiliations to respecting local ethnic identity and cultures, and constructing and honoring Taiwan as the new political and cultural identity of its people. In education this means accommodating and enhancing the multicultural composition of the island whilst recognizing such diversity as the real overall identity of Taiwan as a collectivity in, by and for itself. (Law, 2002, p.72)

The four examples outlined above signify the shifting conceptions of the child within Taiwan, shifts expressed through the various redefinitions of education and the role of education. The four presented examples are not strictly understood in terms of time sequences because recounting them in a chronological narrative might assume that the figuration of the child shifts from one pole to another in a reductive manner. To avoid this, the current study strives to unpack the underlying patterns of the shifting conceptions of the child in Taiwan. The child is not a unitary category due to the inscribed nature of the child within a given society and space, as this study will explain.

The Parameters of the Child and Power

The concerns that prompt this study are neither to write the history of education or curriculum discourses in Taiwan in a chronological sequence, which would assume that the present is simply a natural consequence of the past. Through analyzing the thoughts and writings of Confucius, Hu Shih, Yeh Shitao, and Lee Yaun-zhe, I aim to: 1) Disentangle the grounds on which the Confucian child was named in postwar Taiwan. This study will discuss the factors that enabled the discursive conditions to shift from Example One to Example Two, as outlined above. 2) To trace what enables the discursive conditions of educational reform in order to frame the historiography of late twentieth-century Taiwan. The notion of Hu Shih's child will allow me to analyze the differences that separate the modern Confucian child from those depicted in Examples Three and Four. 3) To identify the contours of the localized and globalized discourses that rendered Yeh Shitao and Lee Yaun-zhe's child into view that like the term Confucianism, which I argue are not mere fixed points in the discursive space.

In this study, through examining the concept of the modern Confucian child, I do not restrict solely to the thoughts or works of Confucius himself. The thoughts of Confucius in this study correspond to the notion of "founder of discursivity" (Foucault, 1984, p.114). Michel

Foucault's commentary is relevant because Confucianism has deeply influenced a substantial number of people, including many distinguished poets and writers in ancient feudal China. The works of many of these famous Chinese poets and writers can be found in school textbooks during certain time periods, which helped forge what constitutes a "good" student in Taiwan. The thoughts of Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, and Chiang Ching-Kuo that became parts of the curriculum discourses from the 1940s to the 1990s, also helped fulfill the concept of the Confucian child, but with some modifications. One could also apply the conditions to the concept of Hu Shih's child. Hu's ideas later became popular with people like Lien-Chan, as well as by some liberal scholars and political activists that called for the democratization under the KMT's one-party rule. The concept of Ye Shitao's child, per this study, embodied the idea of Taiwanese consciousness and later incited the localization movement in curriculum discourses in the 1990s. The concept of Lee Yuan-zhe's child is the symbol of a globalized child that proposes what a child looks like within a globalized context.

Throughout the work that follows, I use an author's name as a shorthand strategy to help me position the necessary historical and cultural specificity, and at the same time manage to exceed it. These names are "a complex interplay of ontological and epistemological assumptions" (Baker, 2003, p.460) that directly or indirectly comport the child. The citation of the authors-texts in the possessive is "always to be understood as beyond reference to an individual and outside discourse of ownership" (Baker, 2001, p.14). In short, I treat the child as the epistemic subject (see Deleuze & Guatteri, 1994). By the same token, although the four examples outlined above were narrated by an individual or a specific group, I suggest that readings of the four examples are best viewed within discursive regularity, because the author's name in the four examples, as Foucault suggests, "has no legal status, nor is it located in the fiction of the work; rather, it is located in the break that founds a certain discursive construct and its very particular mode of being" (Foucault, 1984, p.107).

In addition, I do not use my analyses of such authors-texts to provide their perspectives on what the child should learn in twentieth-century Taiwan. For example, my purpose of using the example of Hu Shih's child does not serve for my extracting of notable educational advice that Hu Shih can offer us. Rather, the perceived Hu Shih's child provides an icon, which can render the ideas being formed through the notion of pragmatism.

To turn to the questions outlined above, if I intend to answer those questions, the best fitting theories are ones of power, which allow me to explicate the mapping of the discursive shifts and describe how the child was inscribed in a specific locale. The Foucauldian sense of power-as-effects (see Baker, 2001) will be a primary device I use in this study. Broadly speaking, the notion of power for Foucault is not a given, possessed, or dominated force held by one group but a force that is exercised, and hence, exists only in action. Foucault is not interested in how power maintains and reproduces economic relations, but rather, how it operates within the relations among subjects and institutions. Viewing the omnipresent power flowing and traversing divergently, not linearly, enables me to analyze relevant questions, such as explaining the emergence of Yeh Shitao and Lee Yaun-zhe's child. The construction of the Yeh Shitao and Lee Yaun-zhe's child is far more complex than an approach keen to temporal and structural dualism could offer, an approach promoted by neo-Marxian historical dialectics. To elaborate, Baker (2009a) argues that the critical theoretical approach embedded in neo-Marxism, "challenge some versions of non-neutrality and vested interests in the formation of objects while upholding "materialism" and the validity and mastery of the subject" (p.64). On the other hand, the "post" deployments of negativity embedded in the Foucauldian of power-as-effects try to "reclaim the other-regionality lost in the flattening of World by refusing to name "it" as an it, to hold out the promise of the abyss, the edge, aporia, or the non-knowable alterity irreducible to familiar and finite borders between" ontology and epistemology (p.64).

Departing from a conflict/consensus[1] template and a struggle/submission framework, thus, helps rethink notions such as identity-politics, empowerment, and hegemony, which typically presume populational reasoning, as based on a settlement and spatialization of value distinctions that in turn generate the analysis of the agentive, the local, or the material. It opens new possibilities for rethinking the trajectories of history that acted directly and indirectly as "incitement to discourse" (Baker, 2007, p.124) in ways that interpenetrated the field formation of education by viewing power as an array of mediating forces situated within multiple and uneven effects, rather than trying to forge it through strategies of essentialization and homogenization.

After answering the questions outlined above, I must add one more question to address the present trajectories of what the child has become today. To expand, this study is based on Foucault's notion of the "history of the present," which assists me to develop more innovative understandings of how the meanings and the conditions of discourses of the child have shifted across time. The later part of this section provides elaboration on the "history of the present" concept. The ideas of archaeological and genealogical approaches that form the basis of Foucault's approaches to historiography are, in my view, interrelated with the notion of the history of the present. Archaeological and genealogical approaches to the study of history are not mutually-exclusive. The two approaches are complementary to each other in terms of discourse analysis, for there is "no pre- and post-archaeology or genealogy in Foucault" (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, p.104). The establishment, consolidation, and implementation of the relations of power require the production, accumulation, and circulation of a discourse.

[1] The strategy I use here comes from Baker's analyses of curriculum histories. For example, rather than viewing the advents of animal magnetism and hypnosis as the "new foundation for curriculum historical work or that there is an essence to such practices that now requires them to be centered over and above other approaches" (Baker, 2007, p.124), Baker (2007) argues that they acted directly and indirectly as "*incitement to discourse* in ways that interpenetrated education's field formation and that eventually helped shape the possibility for curriculum history" (p.124).

Foucault expresses his notion of the history of the present through his archaeological and genealogical projects. Thus, I will discuss the notions of an archaeological approach in its relation to space, the notion of genealogical projects in its relation to the positioning of the subject, and the history of the present and its relation to the meaning of time. Collectively, the interpenetrations of subject, time, and space help bring the Foucauldian sense of power-as-effects into view.

Traveling Discourses: Its Coagulations and Spatializations

In this section, I pay attention to the interconnection of language and social practices that make possible the existence of the *savior* and the human science (economics, politics, culture, and the history of curriculum), which also helps me to elicit the conceptualization of discourse. The term "*savior*" refers to depth knowledge (Hacking, 2002, p.90). The connection between the emergence of language and the construction of social practice lays the ground in which discourse operates within, and at the same time, this connection ties itself to the concept of power relations. Power relations, or the Foucauldian sense of power-as-effects, do not produce a structural dualism in the discursive space, as French Marxists have argued, as a space through which a fundamental hypothesis about power is presupposed on the mechanisms of certain social actors' domination over another. Through this approach, many catchwords such as voice, individual identity, empowerment, or social reproduction arise (see Apple 1986 & Whittly 1985). The present study does not undertake the articulation of the suppressed voice and a contextualization of identity position as ownership in a hierarchical system, as presentism that flows in a sequential manner, or as a taxonomy that makes variables of stratification available, such as race or sex. The relationship between language and the humanities is complex because of the density and dynamism carried in discursive practices. It is thereby necessary that I problematize the universal claims for practices associated with an

epistemology of dualism that exists within social control scholarship. The issue of power in social science that is marginalized and delegitimate in the guise of dualism, therefore needs to be explored through a Foucauldian historiography of archaeology.

The binary concepts of new/old, tradition/modernity, and normal/deviant embedded in the notion of dualism contain an ensemble of rules that tend to separate the superior and the inferior, which ensures that the specific effects of power attached to the superior category are discursively untenable. It ignores the historical relations in which the categories and distinctions of truth-production are part of the embodiment of social fields and power relations. The categories of truth-production embedded in the regularity of statements produced within institutional patterns and power relations also bring a Foucauldian notion of exteriority[2] in discursive space into view. The notion of the regularity of statement refers to the conditions that bring statements into existence in the world, which I use as a comparison with the regularity of other discourses. The formation of truth-production arises through the deployment of the opposition of exterior and interior domain (see Foucault, 1972). I do not view the domains here as an embodiment of man's thought, in their consciousness or unconsciousness, in the sphere of transcendental constitutions, or in a single or parallel set of cause or origins (Foucault, 1972). Rather, they describe the anonymous realm that defines the positions of speaking subjects. As Michael Shapiro (1981) puts it, "it would be appropriate…to reverse the familiar notion that persons make statements and say that statements make persons" (p.141). The domains can exist in dispersed patterns across political, economic, and linguistic arenas. For, as Foucault writes:

> Discursive practices are not purely and simply ways of producing discourse. They are embodied in technical processes, in institutions, in patterns for general behavior,

[2] The term is drawn from Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language,* (New York: Pantheon, 1972), 120.

> in forms of transmission and diffusion, and in pedagogical forms which at once, impose and maintain them (Foucault, 1980, p.200)

In the field of education, for example, Popkewitz uses the phrase "social epistemology" as a means of positioning the exterior/interior discursive domains that intend to "emphasize the relational and social embeddedness of knowledge in the practice and issues of power" (Popkewitz, 1991, p.15). In this study, the exterior/ interior discursive domain helps to examine how the discourses of "Mr. Democracy," as embedded in Hu Shih's child, traveled in both postwar time/space in the 1970s through shifting conditions in international realignment and market economy. The mappings or description of the conditions of possibility via Hu's child elucidate subsequent effects that have produced different sets of social regulations and a reconstitution of the nation-state as it relates to education.

It is, therefore, the goal of this project to neither oversimplify the transcendental illusion nor to conform to the narratives about origins that would reduce the accumulated discourses to a fixed starting point. The conceptions, such as progress and modernization, would be considered within a particular social space that gives them historical/cultural specificity. As a result, there is no constant definition of the conception; rather, its meaning shifts within a continually changing institutional framework.

It is also important to note that this study is not concerned with how distinctions occur in particular social/cultural patterns and the practices by which "solidification of self" is produced. Rather, the exterior/interior discursive space or the individual/the social are constitutive of each other. Their juxtapositions help to generate a space that demonstrates the blurring between the macro- and micro-problems of schooling in relation to the nation-state and facilitate us to think about the location of curriculum history relative to such a "space." The production of ambiguity partly comes to bear through the strategy of the Foucauldian notion of rarity[3] in discursive

[3] Ibid., 119.

space, which serves as a "motivator for the value attributed to presence-naming" (Baker, 2009a, p.31). In doing so, it generates, for instance, an incitement to discourse that undermines the sense of national and cultural particularity based on ethnonational and racial perspectives. It is through such strategy that the notion of rarity reveals "how concepts of species specificity, national unity, racial particularity, ethnic exceptionality, gender exclusivity, fixed ability, and more, could not always convincingly account for issues of cultural belonging or sentiments of Being" (Baker, 2009a, p.30). The terms such as "Taiwan/Taiwanese" and "China/Chinese" in their attempted totalization as geopolitical notions and their unsuccessful substitutions at different periods, therefore, should be understood as sliding signifiers[4] that incessantly generates discomfort (see Gilroy, 2001).

Moreover, to the question of specificity, the purpose of the constitution of the present is "to understand the unique as part of a critical situation in which there is an opening of time and an intrusion of the possibility of novelty" (Popkewitz, 1991, 238). It is unable to be complicated without the (re)insertion of the critical moments into the series in which their intelligibility resides. The notion of critical moments brings the Foucauldian notion of rarity in discursive space into play. For Foucault, the notion of rarity in discursive projects aims not to uncover or to rediscover another set of rules, but rather, to explore aporia that arrives in the structural aperture between the constituted and the unconditional (Baker, 2009b, p.xxvi). By doing so, concepts such as gender, class, or curriculum history, do not have neatly fixed boundaries when blurring the chronological categorization and provincializing the geopolitical locations. As such, the analyses of the regionalization of discourses positioned within fragmented time/space allow us to think about how discursive shifts are not presumed to lie only in the scope of social

[4] I borrowed the notion from Baker. For instance, rather than presuming a homogeneity regarding America's (historical) place in a geographied world, Baker (2013) argues that "every portrait of America reveals the term sliding signifier, silently comporting the object through a series of inclusions/exclusions, as well as comporting the acceptable forms of critique" (p.38).

practices that are immediately available for inspection, “but [is] a composite that transcends the lines of particular people and events as they interact over time” (Popkewitz, 1991, p.220).

Before proceeding to curriculum history and the child, I further outline the theoretical framework through expanding on the role of shifts in discourse for this study. Foucault elaborates on the notion of rarity in discursive space in relation to time/space in *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason*. For Foucault, the Age of Reason incorporated and classified the notion of madness that ushered in the “Age of Great Confinement,” which proceed in a non-linear fashion. It is important to note that if the meaning of madness changed gradually, it was not from the intention to cure the sick, nor was it based on a medical need that brought about the birth of the asylum as an institution. Instead, the phenomenon of segregation and confinement “generated the possibilities for inscribing the “mad” (Baker, 2001, p.440). The insights gained from botanic classification or medical research in the 18th century was not responsible for the fact that the notion of “the mad” was gradually isolated (see Foucault, 1965). The ideas of medical research used in the classification of the mad emerged out of the opportunities based on the experience of segregation and confinement. The archaeological analysis of madness through the experience of confinement reflects the shifting discursive practice that “cautiously offer new possibilities for claiming authority by drawing previously unaligned elements” (Baker, 2013, p.5). In *The Birth of Clinic*, Foucault targets modern medicine and delineates the birth of the clinic, which for Foucault is not a necessary condition that is bound to follow. He analyzes the birth of the clinic by paying attention to the role of “the gaze” that makes possible the emphasis of the science of Man. The science of Man manifested through the relationship between exterior surfaces and internal organs, which generated the possibilities for explaining a different form of life and authorized a “rational discourse” via the inscription of the individual as a noticeable object of science (Baker, 2001, p.486). In addition, for Foucault, a fundamental reorganization of the gaze

between medical discourses and the individual did not discard previous discourses of medicine, but rather, the advent of a new alliance "forged between words and things, enabling one to see and say" (Foucault, 1975, xii).

Foucault's treatment of discourses informing one another is crucial for recognizing the complexity of the child in Taiwan. In this study, the ideas of Western democracy expressed through Hu Shih's child that was marginalized in relation to what has been said under the KMT governance illustrate the rule of rarity in discourse. Without an examination of Hu's child dispersed in the localized "site," the emergence of Yeh Shitao's child and Lee Yuan-zhe's child would not be able to provide ways to challenge the idea of transcendental entities, what is bound to follow, and to refuse to seek "universal or continuously grounded principles" (Barker, 1998, p.92). The ruptures between the Renaissance episteme and Modern episteme, as explained in Foucault's *The Order of Things*, suggest a strong correlation of these epistemes with the ruptures between the Confucian child and Hu Shih's child in this study. Therefore, I position the child within an assemblage of discourses that appear in constant mobilization across time and space.

The issue of accumulation[5] in discursive space also arise when one considers whether truth-production is reducible to specific a time/space through the interconnection of 1) The mapping of location of exteriority in discursive space demonstrates how exterior and interior domains operate in a synergistic relation, which projects an image of truth-production as "structural" and antifoundational formed against the always-shifting pluralized backgrounds, 2) The reading of Fernando Coronil's bifocality strategy (see Baker, 2009), which claims that the notion of rarity in discursive space is brought about for the identification of both isolated links or trails located in dispersed space and the consideration of the danger of modern structure of subjectivity. For Foucault, the processes of accumulated discourses are more than the

[5] Ibid., 122.

continuous addition of ordinary events that index to the unfoldment of a modern desire for monistic conceptions of the universal grid. Instead, these processes describe a specific form and are determined by the place and their capacity for circulation and exchange. Therefore, discourse itself is a finite, desirable, and useful asset that has its own rules of appearance, its own appropriation, and operation. This definition indicates how the conditions-of-possibility-in-the-making became conflicted sites inseparable from other regionalisms that functions as a medium of refiguring itself recursively.

To provide an example of the above theory, take the example of the Confucian child. I will view this figure less from the notion of "origin," and more from the rules of accumulation in a discursive framework. This approach mirrors my aims because I am interested in complexity, not to learn about Confucius in more detail, nor to "tell a 'complete' or 'full' story by following their unfoldment in neat rows and organized layers" (Baker, 2013, p.22). Rather, the study sets out to comport Confucianism around a *Jen-Li-Tao* nexus that fabricates the "origin" and then to delineate its transmogrified present as embodied in the modern Confucian child.

In sum, by viewing discourses as enablers in that act of studying the child in Taiwan historically, I drew correlations with Foucault's notion of dispersal as articulated in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. If we look at discourse spatially, the child in this study is like an image silhouetted against the horizon, yet the image is not so homogenous. One must view this image through a series of differentiation, juxtaposition, and nuance that shape and gives attributes to the child. Under such circumstances, for instance, I do not wholly disarticulate Hu Shih's child from the perceived notion that pragmatism opposes, nor am I going to efface this notion through recounting the emergence of the perceived Lee Yuan-zhe's child in late-twentieth-century Taiwan. Kennedy's child-adult relation research suggests that images of childhood and adulthood are not an evolution, but rather, involve a dialectic interplay between

"adult" and "child" (Kennedy, 2000, p.535) in each social age category. Relatedly, the emergence of Hu Shih's child does not simply mean the marginalization of the Confucian child, but rather, involves dialectic interplay with one another. Similarly, the parameters of Lee Yuan-zhe's child that became known in late-twentieth-century Taiwan cannot fully symbolize global capitalism. It is partially a byproduct of Hu Shih's child. Therefore, it should be seen as the operation of the contrast models that frequently coexist and compete, rather than succeed each other in a harmonious fashion. As Burman (1994) suggests, "there are continuities between images at different times, many conceptions reverberate on in powerful ways today" (p.53). By doing so, it incites further (re)construction on how the child has been viewed within Taiwan society.

Genealogy and the Positioning of the Subject

Foucault uses Nietzsche's genealogy as a starting point for developing a method that would allow him to associate the effects of power with exercises of discourse. This method leads him to pay increased attention to power and the body in relation to the human sciences. In his 1970 lecture "The Discourse on Language," Foucault speaks to genealogy in relation to archaeology. Foucault says:

> Critical and genealogical descriptions are to alternate, support and complete each other. The critical side of the analysis deals with the system's enveloping discourse; attempting to mark out and distinguish the principles of ordering, exclusion, and rarity in discourse. We might, to play with our words, say it practices a kind of dogged detachment. The genealogical sides of analysis, by way of contrast, deals with series of effective formation of discourse: it attempts to grasp it in its power of affirmation, by which I do not mean a power opposed to that of negation, but the power of constituting a domain of objects, in relation to which one can affirm or deny true or false propositions. (as cited in Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, p.105)

Foucault suggests a complementarity between the rarity of discourse and the discursive formation initiated by either discursive or non-discursive practices through which power operate. By situating discourse spatially, the notion of archaeology suspends the validity of established beliefs and disciplines, so their condition of emergence, existence, and rupture can be located. Genealogy appears based on archaeology, which guards against the "presentist effects by locating those positivities as the historically contingent outcome of the historical trajectories of an ensemble of discursive and non-discursive practices" (Dean, 1994, p.36).

The notions of archaeology and genealogy are therefore not two distinct concepts, but rather, they interpenetrate with one another. Archaeology is concerned with the description of historical presuppositions of a given system of thought that discourses construct. The idea of genealogy concerns itself with tracing the historical process and emergence of the system of thought (the practices) and analyzing how it comes into being and is consequently transformed with the various deployments of power. In *Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,* Foucault argues that, like the idea of archaeology, genealogy opposes itself to the traditional historical approaches. Its objective is to "record the singularity of events outside of any monotonous finality" (Foucault, 2003, p.351). Traditionally, historians and society largely view history as operating in a linear fashion according to a specific law of development that was inevitably progressive. The evolutionary view claims that "history has meaningful trajectories, purposes, and teleologies" (Irving, 1999, p.30). On the contrary, the role of genealogy is to record its history and the traits of the historical sense. Foucault's genealogical attempts delineate the features and conditions of every historical stage that involves social inclusion and exclusion from the discursive archives. His attempts also demonstrate the epistemological ruptures that challenge traditional approaches to history. As a Nietzschean strategy, Foucault opposes this traditional historical method. The genealogist confronts this view, opposes the search for the foundations, origins, and essences. The genealogists seem to "oppose depth, finality, and interiority. Its

banner: Mistrust identities in history; they are only masks, appeals to unity" (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, p.107). In other words, the genealogist views the modernist's historical method is a socially constructed product. The genealogists seek neither a transcendental nor a presupposed trajectory to be traced and followed. They assert the radical contingency of discourse in their historical context.

For instance, at the outset of *Discipline and Punish,* Foucault deals with the practice of punishment (torture) in the old Regime. The ruling party imposed punishment on an individual's body (ex. the public execution of the regicide Damiens). Foucault shows us that the body here denotes the social body and the punishment displays the sovereign power. He then argues that the center of the power is not the sovereign, but rather, power is within the social body itself between the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth century. Due to the development of a complicated network of commerce, the change in the patterns of trade directly affected the patterns of punishment. In addition, the social practice of punishment changed to meet the changing patterns of crimes. For example, beginning at the end of the seventeenth century, there was "a considerable diminution in murders and, generally speaking, in physical acts of aggression; offences against property seem to take over from crimes of violence; theft and swindling, from murder and assault; the diffuse, occasional, but frequent delinquency of the poorest classes was superseded by a limited, but "skilled" delinquency" (Foucault, 1979, p.75). The shift from brutal punishment to a more "humane way" is not what concerns Foucault. Rather, he shows us two ways of exercising the technologies of power in which the second one involves a more complex control over the individual.

> In fact, the shift from a criminality of blood to a criminality of fraud forms part of a whole complex mechanism, embracing the development of production, the increase of wealth, a higher judicial and moral value placed on property relations, stricter methods of surveillance, a tighter partitioning of the population, more efficient

> techniques of locating and obtaining information: the shift in illegal practices is correlative with an extension and a refinement of punitive practices. (Foucault, 1979, p.77)

For Foucault, the emergence of a new penal reform does not mean that it is more progressive than the brutal way of punishment. What attracts Foucault's attention, then, is the resorting to a linear conception of time and the dependence on the social discursive practice, which subsequently elicit theories of power and eventually explains the shift to the new form of punishment

Foucault's genealogical approaches in *Discipline and Punish* are popular in the field of education and has proved quite fruitful and insightful in the past several decades. For example, in the United States, Popkewitz excavates the multiple historical narratives that typically come together to form the objects of schooling in America in the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. First, he views the curriculum as "converting ordinances" (see Popkewitz, 2011) in American Progressive education, which inscribes religious purposes and calculated designs in schooling in the nineteenth century. Popkewitz then analyzes the emergence of American Progressive education within the changing contexts of American Exceptionalism. He explores Stanley Hall's child studies, John Dewey's pragmatism, Edward Thorndike's educational psychology, and the Chicago School of Sociology to analyze the different social and cultural practices that come together as responses to the Social Question. American Progressive education at the turn of the twentieth century displays a discontinuity from the previous Puritan ideas of pedagogy. Popkewitz again treats the teaching of school subjects as converting ordinances that enable the amalgamation and transformation of sciences, social sciences, and humanities into school subjects. By doing so, Popkewitz argues "the historical trajectories today are not the sum of parts, formed through a singular origin, or emerging from an evolutionary progression" (Popkewitz, 2011, p.18). Progressive education embodies a rupture

in the reading of the history of the child.

Similarly, Baker examines the emergence of the developing child since the late nineteenth century by viewing the study of the history of the child, a study filled with eruptions and jolts. She argues that some macro-level practices, such as racializing discourses, public schooling, and science, gave rise to the advent of developmentalism in the late nineteenth century. At the turn of the twentieth century, education introduced Herbartian developmentalism, along with some conflicting thoughts, such as Froebelian and Deweyan ideas, which signals a rupture in the reading of developmentalism (see Baker, 1999). In the field of early childhood, Bloch examines the rupture between nineteenth- and twentieth-century early childhood education discourses by investigating the works of Froebel, Dewey, and Addams (see Bloch, 2006). Lastly, Fendler examines the shifting assumptions of teachability by investigating the works of Plato and Socrates. She then turns to the medieval era and the Enlightenment to analyze how an "educated subject" (see Fendler, 1998) becomes constructed. By doing so, she concludes that the modern educated self is vastly different from the one that preceded it historically, and thereby draws our attention to the rupture.

In Europe-based education studies, Rose focuses on nineteenth- and twentieth-century England. He suggests that the development of the sovereign state and the decline of religious authorities facilitated the private family to emerge. In this model, a child from a working-class family becomes moralized and normalized by interacting with well-to-do families in the 19th century. In the early 20th century, the technologies of governing that exemplify ideas of "rule of law" and the accompanying advent of psychology based on scientific analyses, help shape definitions of the abnormal in comparison to the definition of the normal. The ideas of "normal child" are not generalizations from the accumulated past. Rather, the constitution of the child is a historically specific outcome of technologies for the government (see Rose, 1990). In the field of educational psychology, Walkerdine's work on developmental psychology and child-

centered pedagogy uses a Foucauldian approach to seek out how developmental psychology developed. She pays attention, in a broad sense, to the linkage between the emergence of scientific truth and the accompanying social conditions. For instance, the ideas of Kay-Suttleworth and Robert Owen represent a considerable break with the study of Biblical texts. Their counter-arguments criticize monitorialism, which helps transform the then-prevailing notion of defining the developing child in the nineteenth-century U.K. (see Walkerdine, 1998). Walkerdine then suggests that the advent of child-focused studies and mental measurement render Piaget's naturalization of mind into view. Lastly, Walkerdine argues that the problems of poverty and juvenile delinquency led to a series of political actions adopted in the U.K. These actions, in concert, foster a modern child-centered pedagogy. Walkerdine's investigation allows us to see that the regimes of truth created by psychology are internally related to shifts and transformations in discursive practice. In Sweden, Hultqvist uses the notions of interactionism and intergrationism to illustrate the shifting discourses in the inscription of the child both within local as well as globalizing contexts from the nineteenth century to the twentieth century (see Hultqvist, 2004).

In the abovementioned studies, there are no origins, no hidden meanings, and no constants for the genealogists. Genealogy is an ahistorical approach to historicity that seeks forces whose relations occur in the interstices. Therefore, history becomes "effective to the degree that it introduces discontinuity into our very being" (Foucault, 2003, p.360). By doing so, the ability to sense the effect of de-familiarization rests upon some familiar documents. If de-familiarization is the purpose, then the exercise of power-as-effects is the method. What Foucault's "new" method, genealogy, will help me consider are power relations in which every discursive formation must be situated. For Foucault, power is not domination or coercion imposed by one particular group, but it is an interplay of techniques of discipline. The task of the genealogist is to isolate the constituent components and to analyze the interplay of these

components. By doing so, genealogy lets us trace the interstices and surprises of history in terms of the effects of power. Thus, genealogy guides us to uncover the power-knowledge-subject relations. As he writes:

> Indeed, it is in discourse that power and knowledge are joined together. And for this very reason, we must conceive discourse as a series of discontinuous segments whose tactical function is neither uniform nor stable. To be more precise, we must not imagine a world of discourse divided between accepted discourse and excluded discourse, or between the dominant discourse and the dominated one; but as a multiplicity of discursive elements that come into play in various strategies. It is this distribution we must reconstruct, with the things said and those concealed, the enunciation required and those forbidden, that it comprises; with the variants and different effects- according to who is speaking, his position of power, the institutional context in which he happens to be situated – that it implies; and with the shifts and reutilizations of identical formulas for contrary objectives that it also includes. (Foucault, 1990, p.100)

The abovementioned concepts enable us to see how power becomes exercised in regard to discourse. The power/discourse analysis also induces another orientation: the problem of the subject. What is the notion of the subject under a Foucauldian sense of power? Foucault locates the subject in *The Order of Things* in a historical and cultural specificity; he attempts to identify the objectification of the subject in knowledge disciplines such as those dealing with language, labor, and life. Furthermore, Foucault discerns the subject in *The History of Sexuality* volumes as the knowing subject via a variety of discourses about sex. As Foucault (1990) claims, the arts of existence:

> are those intentional and voluntary actions by which men not only set themselves rules of conduct, but also seek to transform themselves, to change themselves in

> their singular being, and to make their life into an oeuvre that carries certain aesthetics values and meets certain stylistic criteria. (pp.10-11)

The two different inscriptions of subjects in Foucault's works do not inquire about actual subjects here, but about "subject positions" as defined by the discourse itself (Shumway, 1989, p.102). Therefore, Foucault's stress on the subject's dispersal across texts resembles his perspective on the function of the author, which produces a critique of the classic conception of the unitary subject. The subject is not the expression of the individual speaker, but rather the speaker is to be understood as part of a system of discursive practice.

Although the history of subjectivity began in Foucault's works by studying terms such as madness, male, female, and Greeks that helped to formulate social division, the paradox emerges, as Foucault suggests (1980) that:

> One has to dispense with the constituent subject, to get rid of the subject itself…..to arrive at an analysis which can account for the constitution of the subject within a historical framework…..And this is what I would call genealogy……a form of history which can account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects etc., without having to make reference to a subject which is either transcendental in relation to the field of events or runs its empty sameness throughout the course of history. (p.117)

Foucault seems eager to reject the phenomenological approach and Cartesian rationality, which places priority on the origin of historicity that leads to the constitution of an a priori subject and a transcendental consciousness. He argues that the constitution of the subject must be discarded because it is unable to be solved by historicizing the subject (Foucault, 1980, p.117). The assumption based on Foucault's discarding of an a priori subject is paradoxical, for Foucault himself makes it identifiable in the ruptures and discontinuities of discourse in his historical comparative approach of the Greeks and Christianity in the first volume of *The*

History of Sexuality. As a result, one stopgap measure is to identify an a priori subject and fracture the unified subject. This point corresponds to the Foucauldian claim that "an a priori subject who places its own point of view at the origin of all historicity has to be completely discarded in writing either an archaeology of science or genealogy of sexuality. It also reverses such a claim; the a priori subject is required to make noticeable the ruptures and breaks that Foucault's later works in particular trade on" (Baker, 2001, p.26).

Likewise, for instance, if I completely reject the known Confucian child and deny the idea of an a priori child or transcendence, it would be near impossible to read related documents and attempt to research them. If I were to follow Foucault's idea that the subject in its a priori form is to be rejected, it would be unmanageable to analyze and write the genealogy of the Confucian child in modern Taiwan, since it is imperative to trace Confucius' ideas regarding power's various operations to the subject. The alternative approach to this predicament is as follows: instead of discarding an a priori subject completely, the "decentering of the subject" suggested by Popkewitz and Brennan (see Popkewitz & Brennan, 1998), is more appropriate for treating the child as a new kind of subject. By not eliminating the subject and rather, retaining it, the subject is thus constituted in a discursive space, which makes a known child become noticeable and assists us to understand the rules that regulate a specific discourse at a particular time/space. By doing so, the known child is a kind of an a priori subject, but with a shift. That is, the notion of discontinuity, or rupture, exists in continuity and discontinuity as well.

A History of the Present and the Notion of Time

A genealogy of the subject makes evident "how this experience of personhood is given to us within the myriad ways we are made transparent to ourselves and others so that we might be rendered calculable and ultimately governable" (Dean, 1996, p.220). If the knowing subject

is a cultural-historical specificity constituted through a myriad of ways, this reorientation to the subject in genealogy can provide even more insight through Foucault's theorizations about time. The strategy of identifying the child as a priori subject in a different form is necessary for this study, and it emerges out of a decentering of an a priori subject. Similarly, the deployment of linear conceptions of time and resorting to periodization for the reading of the child in Taiwan are necessary, but the notion of time must be complicated to fully account for the implications of the child. Foucault uses periodization terms, such as Renaissance, the Middle Ages, classic, and modern, in his works and at the same time the notions of rupture and discontinuity are made noticeable through a dependence on the muddying of a divisibility of time. By doing so, complicating the notion of time brings Foucault's third approach to historicity into play. I refer to the history of the present, as he describes in *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison.* The history of the present that Foucault details shows itself throughout his theorizations of both archaeology and genealogy. Akin to archaeology and genealogy, time for Foucault is in opposition to evolutionary processes and against the attribution of a singular origin. The history of the present does not "run in its empty sameness throughout the course of history" as Foucault warns, but instead constitutes the jolts and eruptions by turning from time to space in disentangling the constitution of a knowing subject in the discursive space. The spatialization of time, therefore, allows the rendition of the knowing subject as formed through a variety of negotiations, tensions and disconnections that have contributed to the constitution of the present. As a result, the passage of time remains theorized as one-dimensional, but it moves as multiple intersecting forces with uneven flows (see Baker, 2001 & Popkewitz, 2008).

A historical study of the child will also highlight the divisibility of time to make the specificity of discourse identifiable and assist us to investigate the historically and culturally specificity, rupture, and discontinuity. For example, the differences between the construction

of the Confucian child and Lee's child will be inoperable without situating the notion of time as one-dimensional. The analyses of time that shift from one-dimensional movement to a spatialization of time are likewise necessary for the study of the child. The reading of Confucius, Hu Shih, Yeh, and Lee as authors-texts assumes that time moves in a straight line, yet that does not mean, for instance, the reading of Lee's child naturally follows the concepts of the Confucian child. More so, the constitution of the child should be understood as moving on a line that allows various intersecting forces to operate unevenly within it. It thus "bring into view the discursive shifts and reversals that deliberately confuse the orderly births of authors-texts with present(?) strategies for reading them" (Baker, 2001, p.39). The passage of time does not necessarily mean that the concept of Lee's child is more advanced than the Confucian child, nor does it mean that the present is a culmination of the past.

Further, the history of the present is a method on how to rewrite the past by reflecting upon the ways that the discursive and institutional practices of the past still affect the constitution of the present (Tamboukou, 1999, p.205). This helps us avoid an approach that attempts to understand and interpret past events only in terms of the present (Tamboukou, 1999, p.209).

> I would like to write the history of this prison, with all the political investments of the body that it gathers together in its closed architecture. Why? Simply because I am interested in the past? No, if one means by that writing a history of the past in terms of the present. Yes, if one means writing the history of the present. (Foucault, 1979, p.31)

The analyses of time still require appeals to events of the past to understand its present, even while they do not consider the present through treating time as a single universal movement that determines the configuration of the present in neat fashion. Rather, the location of the present can be understood as "operating as shattered mirrors, projecting present selves as the

outcome of ruptures, seeing present selves as the product of disparate and unexpected conjuncture, looking at a reflection that comes back differently" (Baker, 2001, p.31). The confounding and fragmentation of evolutionary narratives, like an active a priori subject that mobilizes within and through deciphering discourses, makes possible the configuration of the present not a natural outcome of the past. The contour of the present becomes knowable and at the same time away from its initial location. Therefore, the present is less a result of historical conjuncture than it is a strategy of making the familiar strange (see Baker, 2001). As Berry, Osborne, and Rose (1996) suggest "our time, that is to say, is not presumed to be the bearer or culmination of some grand historical process, it has no inevitability, no spirit, essence or underlying cause" (p.5).

In sum, this study suggests that the concepts of space, subject and time as articulated through Foucault's historical methods of archaeology, genealogy, and the history of the present are more conceptual than factual and more spatial than temporal. Foucault's power-as-effects (see Baker, 2001) tries to enable power to be positioned everywhere, and at the same time research how power reproduces or transforms itself within the fields of discourse, time, and the subject. In reading the curriculum discourses of Taiwan, for instance, Foucault's notion of power enriches the scope for examining the subjects (the child in this study), as the subjects are constituted "through a multiplicity of organisms, forces, energies, materials, desires, thoughts, etc." (Foucault, 1980, p.98). Therefore, the reading of Confucius' child and Hu Shih's child (and later, even the Ye and Lee's child) in the study will not pay attention exclusively to how one group dominates over the other that view power as static, in this approach would hinder the analysis of ascending or hidden powers in the analysis of the history of the child. The contexts of the study that I outline below are examples concerned with how power-as-effects flow and mutate.

An Outline of the Study: Curriculum History, the Child in Taiwan, and the History of the Present

This study attempts to analyze the underlying thoughts within curriculum discourses in Taiwan and the ways in which they display themselves in Taiwanese educational policy from the 1940s to the early twenty-first century. The thoughts and writings of Confucius, Hu Shih, Yeh Shitao, and Lee Yuan-zhe are selected in order to map the discursive shifts that inscribe the child and the ways they are subject to theories of power.

In Chapter Two, the dissertation considers how Confucianism is a historical fabrication, shaped by the conceptual boundaries that make the configuration of the superior man, or *Chun Tse*. Next, I explore the role of the superior man and their relations with society and government in the formation of conceptual boundaries around the *Jen-Li-Tao* nexus. Confucianism, a way of shaping a perfect man and a perfect ruler, was re-inscribed and reemerged in a different form in the Song Dynasty (960-1279) that led to the advent of neo-Confucianism. The shift from Confucianism to neo-Confucianism, however, was through confrontation with Taoism and Zen Buddhism via processes of acceptance, resistance, and challenge. The comporting of neo-Confucianism that serves as a springboard for thinking about the postwar period Confucian child, therefore, complicates a neat order of a historiographic mode time and space. Moreover, the attempts to remake China in the late nineteenth century and the Chinese Nationalist Party's (the Kuomintang's [KMT]) retreat to Taiwan after the Chinese civil war are crucial for me to account for the shifting meanings between a superior man embedded in Confucianism and the modern Confucian child. The former enables Sun Yat-sen's most important concept, *The Three Principles of the People* to contemplate ways to transform China from a "weak" nation to a "modernized" one and how it contours the figuration of the modern Confucian child. The latter permits the KMT government to foster anti-communism discourses in Taiwan while simultaneously helping to engender the by-product of anti-communism discourses, that is, the notion of Chinese-ness that directly and indirectly marginalize or exclude the notions of Taiwanization. The KMT as *Fa Tong* proclaim these three trajectories as come together to make

possible the modern Confucian child (see Chen, 2003). The three discursive shifts that facilitated the modern Confucian child to appear in postwar Taiwan and incited operations of discursive space elsewhere, which inspires continuous processes of dialogue and tension with the notions of *Fa Tong*.

In Chapter Three, I outline several conditions of possibility that develop Hu Shih's concepts of "Mr. Science" and "Mr. Democracy" and the debates over methods about how to remake China through the help of Sun Yat-sen's *The Three Principles of the People* and Marxism. I do not elaborate on their different philosophical beliefs or the background, but pay attention to the discursive matrices that make noticeable Hu Shih's Mr. Science and Mr. Democracy in China amid the wake of the May Fourth Movement, in addition to how the borders of Mr. Science and Mr. Democracy have formed and re-formed in postwar Taiwan. This especially relates to how the Confucian child, as opposed to Hu Shih's child in this study, became a regime of truth in postwar Taiwan. I propose that the ideas of Mr. Science and Mr. Democracy are quite different from the KMT's and from Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek's conceptions of democracy and science. The ideas of Mr. Democracy are partially incorporated in the narration of the Confucian child while the ideas of democracy remain hidden in the curriculum discourses. Foucault's analyses of rarity in discourses help me to explain the marginal positions of Mr. Science and Mr. Democracy in postwar Taiwan. These figures elucidate the "impure" location of the Confucian child formed in the nexus between "traditional" and "scientific" circulations of discourse and help to produce a legacy regarding the contours of democratized and localized citizens.

In Chapter Four, through Foucault's analyses of exteriority in discourses, I argue shifting meanings in diplomatic relations and market economy in 1970s Taiwan highlight the ideas of Mr. Democracy in Hu Shih's child at this time. The call for democratization propelled the pursuit of the localization discourses and the notion of Yeh Shihtao's child manifested in the

middle of such cross-currents. However, this does not necessitate that ideas of localization discourses arise in a vacuum, which would thereby assume that the birth of localization discourses emerges in the context of the democratization movement. Rather, I suggest that the previously marginalized and elided localization discourses come to the forefront in the context of democratization movement. Thus, the shifting meanings of localization discourses that existed before Yeh Shihtao wrote his *Introduction to the History of Taiwan's Nativist Literature* are crucial to explore. Further, the presence of localization discourses does not mean the demise of Chinese-ness, but rather involve the process of conversation and tension with each other.

In Chapter Five, I discuss the three chief discursive ruptures that fostered Lee Yuan-zhe's child of the 1990s to appear differently as relative to the Confucian child. These ruptures are understood as the uptake of global capitalism within the GATT/WTO framework, the emergence of liberal democracy that was to a considerable extent the incarnation of Hu's Mr. Democracy, and the conceptions of social/cultural pluralism that were to some extent the by-products of Hu's Mr. Democracy and Mr. Science. These ruptures interpenetrate each other in that they move beyond the domain of Lee's texts and gives a new and not-so-new historical meaning for thinking about the child's place in the universe, pedagogy, and teacher-student relations, and so forth. Chapter Five additionally suggests that the critiques of *Fa Tong* pedagogy that these intersecting ruptures inevitably invite do not necessarily mean the eradication of *Fa Tong* pedagogy in the face of the "modern pedagogy" embedded in Lee's child. Rather, the two trajectories are involved in the process of conversation and tension with each other.

In Chapter Six, I scrutinize terms such as "indigenous courses," "constructive teaching," and "bilingual education" that bourgeoned and became the pivotal location for depicting a new ontologization of the child at the start of the twenty-first century. These terms emerge out of a complex relationship between subject, time, and space that Lee's child entailed. Although, the

child is familiar yet at once loses its recognizability since there are also a variety of trajectories in operation that challenge and critique some basic premises on which Lee's child have been predicated. The borders of the child, therefore, form and re-form in the processes of social inclusion/exclusion, which undermines claims to purity in discourses. I also seek to unsettle the historical route of the child as based on a "critical use of history to make intelligible the possibilities in the present and so can yield to neither universalist concepts of rationality and subjectivity nor metanarrative of progress, reason or emancipation" (Dean, 1994, p.21).

Chapter Two
"Be the Righteous Chinese:" The Confucian Child in Postwar Taiwan

The chapter considers the Confucian child in postwar Taiwan regarding the imaginings concerning the child, the characteristics ascribed to the child, and the parameters of the child being articulated when Taiwan ended her fifty-year period of colonization under Japanese rule (1895-1945). I suggest that there were at least three historical trajectories that brought the Confucian child in postwar Taiwan into view. First, Sun Yat-sen's the *Three Principles of the People* allowed the uptake of the imagined ideal society and nation, and in turn the imagining of an ideal modern Confucian child. Secondly, the strategies of anticommunism discourses deployed in postwar Taiwan charted the parameters in defining an orthodox Chinese person. Thirdly, the KMT's nationalism-related discourse permitted the depiction of a refined Chinese society, while at the same time circumvented the image of the "vulgar" Taiwanese. The three shifts are inseparable and they all responded explicitly or implicitly with Confucianism. It is therefore imperative to discuss Confucius' ideas, especially the concepts of the superior man as depicted in the *Analects*. Then, the chapter shows a different conception of Confucian power that was taken up in early twentieth-century China. In doing so, I lay the ground for understanding how the Confucian conception had been disseminated and mutated by the time that the modern Confucian child could be ascribed in postwar Taiwan. It should be noted that the approach deployed in this study is far from simply being "a genealogical project that moves in unspoken gestures across epochal comparison of epistemes" (Baker, 2003, p.440). The first part of the chapter traces the shift in power's role and location from Confucianism to Confucian power of early twenty-century China. Then, I follow this tracing to the modern Confucian conception in postwar Taiwan as a strategy of contrasting the three periods/texts, which helps explain the reconfiguration or redefinition of Confucianism and make observations about Confucian child in postwar Taiwan.

Moving towards the *Analects*

Confucius' *Analects* was recorded and compiled by the disciples of the succeeding generations after his death. This book basically narrates the ways of being a superior man and it posits that when everyone becomes a superior man, an ideal world (*Datong*) shall manifest. In Confucian cosmology, the idea in the *Analects* that everyone can become "a superior man" suggests an important break, for it is no longer the image of aristocracy that demonstrates a superiority of character. It is also through the distinction between a superior man and a mean man in the *Analects* highlights that the virtues Confucianism intends to propagate. The relevance of the two terms to the articulations of virtues can also be viewed as ways in which the universe, the state, the society, the family, and human relations come into creation in Confucianism. This current chapter specifically examines the terms *Jen* (humanity), *Li* (propriety), *Tien* (the Heaven), and *Tao* (the Way), to demonstrate that a convergence of the different concepts collectively depicts the methods of becoming a superior man and they also give shape and characteristic to the child (a superior man).

Jen, Li, and Tao

The concept of *Jen* informs conceptions of a superior man and a mean man per Confucianism. *Jen* is an extremely important term, and it even appears 109 times in the *Analects* (Peng, 2007, p.83). The concept first emerges frequently in the *Book of Poetry* and carries a specific meaning, benevolent love (see Wan, 1980). Confucius borrows the word and enlarges its scope to connote the genuine nature of man and a measurement of human virtues. *Jen* is thereby neither a mode of transcendence nor a set of abstract concepts. Its appeal to action, for one can obtain *Jen* from the monotonous chores of daily life, and inner excellence begins with the self. To reach *Jen*, one must "perceive his faults, and inwardly accuse himself"

(Peng, 2007, p.79). In short, for Confucius one can achieve *Jen* through self-cultivation, and then its scope expands into practices in one's family, society, and nation.

> When things are investigated, intelligence is extended. When intelligence is extended, the thought becomes sincere. When the thought is sincere, the heart is then rectified. When the heart is rectified, the self/character is cultivated. When the self/character is cultivated, the family is regulated. When the family is regulated, the state is rightly governed. When the state is rightly governed, there will be peace throughout the land[6] (as cited in Peng 2007, p.72)

The process of self-cultivation involves learning, so that one can achieve sincere action and a rectified mind. This process imbues the essence of humanity into the self. When one finds sincere action and a rectified heart, this self-cultivation produces *Jen* (humanity). Therefore, the term *Jen* in this context dovetails with wisdom and morality. Confucius provides explicit directions for the cultivation of *Jen* in the process of human becoming that also marks a shift relative to his forebears. *Jen* thereby is not possessed by the noble, but rather, anyone can reach *Jen*. *Jen* can resonate infinitely from the self to the family, a society, and the state and manifest in every facet of life if a man practices *Jen.*

A man is not qualified as possessing the quality of *Jen* (humanity) without interaction with others since the constant theme in the *Analects* is the "Man-in-relation" (Morton, 1971, p.69). Hence, the relationship with other human beings is the basis of all virtues. One is thereby endowed with duties and obligations in terms of human relations. These human relations include those between father and son, husband and wife, older and younger brother, king and

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[6] The quote is from *The Great Learning,* not from the Analects. This text was essentially confected by Chu Hsi (1130-1200), after study of somewhat earlier versions by the Cheng brothers.

minister, and friend and friend (see Lam, 1989). These relationships exist within a hierarchy, among them, the king and the minister are the most important. The family is the primary ground for one's cultivation of humanity, because the family fosters the most natural and essential characteristics, such as affection and love, to occur in the very first relationship of life. The head of the family, the father, is responsible for the moral education of his family members. The father's foremost duty is to educate his sons. The sons should show filial piety to the parents as well. In this way, the family is a basic political unit. Virtues such as filial responsibility and caring for the young can extend to the members beyond the locale of the family. In the community, the duty of friends is to give advice and guide each other discreetly.

> One stands to be improved by friends who are upright, who are trustworthy in word, and who are broadly informed; one stands to be injured by friends who are ingratiating, who feign compliance, and who are glib talkers (as cited in Peng, 2007, p.120).

To extend this concept of the family to the political arena, Confucius views the state as an enlarged family structured and managed in the same way as the family. The ruler's relation to the subjects resembles that of a father to his children. The subjects should show loyalty to the ruler and the ruler shows courtesy to ministers. The loyalty of his minster reciprocates the benevolence of the ruler, similar to how the love of the parent is reciprocated by filial piety from his son. Thus, this formula helps maintain a greater harmony of the state. By doing so, the political and social mores are to be handed down from generation to generation.

The five sets of human relations based on the principle of reciprocity require the notion of *Li* (propriety). Before the time of Confucius, the notion of *Li* was many integral for rituals practiced of sacrifices and many sorts of ceremonies. The *Analects* describes *Li* in a profoundly altered way. Confucius articulates *Li* with moral connotations that come with important cultural and educational implications (see Lam, 1989). If one viewed *Jen* as a well-received value for

inner self-cultivation (Peng, 2007, p.132), then *Li* embodies the external form of *Jen* through a code of social conduct used to guide human relations. As a result, *Jen* is conceptualized as a transforming power that generates personal excellence through learning. It is the appeal to *Jen* that comports the immanence of the superior man, whereas the system of *Li* is a matter of cultivating, training, and disciplining one's body so that it will always practice and manifest truth, virtue, and sincerity (Chaibong, 2001, p.318). For instance, Confucius suggests that people conduct themselves appropriately through one's words and behaviors to look, listen, speak, and act in a manner that is not contrary to *Li* (see Peng, 2007). One can deploy the actual practice of *Li* as a measurement for the development of *Jen*. The attainment of *Jen* can help one further strengthen *Jen* through the practice of *Li. Jen* and *Li* are thereby two sides of the same coin. When superior men discipline themselves and strive to attain *Jen* and *Li*, they do so out of an innate disposition, not out of an adherence to dogmas. It is through *Jen* and *Li* that the hierarchical arrangements of human relations are established, within which the individual finds his proper place as a particle subject to take part in a network of social relations.

The combination of *Jen* and *Li* constitute happiness and harmony with the universal order, *Tao* (see Lam, 1989). The term *Tao* literally means a "road" or a "path" whose sense extends to a normative course of action in the *Analects* (see Savage, 1985). A discussion of this sense of *Tao* and its association with *Tien* will clarify their symbiosis regarding the conception of order. The idea of *Tien* refers to the concept of heaven, the cosmic order, or the way of Nature. Long before the time of Confucius, the idea of "*Tien*" was narrated in a metaphysical sense that permitted power to thrust itself into all natural things or in an astrological sense, acting as an organizing principle. For instance, the Sun, the moon and the stars, the seasons of the year, the majestic mountains, and great rivers (such as the Tai Shan and Yangtze River), the wind, and the rain all possess the power to mobilize movement. *Tien* allows for the initiation of movement that leads to the interplay of all things and shapes the events of life. For example,

the power of Nature cultivates crops and gives birth to men of greatness. These events are pivotal to the establishment of a state. The rise or fall of the state depends on whether the ruler follows the notion of *Tao.* The king or emperor is viewed as a mediator between *Tien* and man, an agent sent down to the world by *Tien*. If the king follows *Tao,* then *Tien* will foster a prosperous state and a happy life. When the king dies, the belief is that his soul remains in the present world and controls the vicissitude of the state. His spirit returns to heaven (*Tien*) from which he originally came. It is also through the appeal to natural and theological power that ancestor worship developed in China. On the contrary, if the king does not follow *Tao*, *Tien* will befall misfortunes to the state and disasters such as flood, famine, drought, and war will occur. *Tien* is thereby conceived of as the ultimate principle of Nature that produces and reconciles various forces or movements in the universe.

The idea of "*Tien*" reads a bit differently in the *Analects*, because it goes beyond phenomenal distinctions and superficial differences. Again, power moves to the ethical level, which is the cosmic order that functions under the power of Nature as inscribed as an ethic sense in man. Thus, the immanent interpretation of *Tien* occurs when *Tien* comes to equate with the Way of man. It is under Confucian cosmology that the cosmic order has moral nature in man, which is innate and intrinsic, endowed in him by the Decree of Heaven. The philosophy of human nature developed in Confucianism is thereby an offshoot of the doctrine of *Tien* (Kim, 1972, p. 157).

The concept of *Tien* has undergone a shift from a natural or theological phenomenon to an immanent way of the universe inscribed in man. According to Kim (1972), the way of Heaven, the Decree of Heaven, and the Mandate of Heaven in the *Analect*s refer to *Tien* as meaning "immanence" according to Confucius (p.153). It should be noted that the inscription of ethical power in *Tien* is by no means an eradication of natural or theological power manifested in *Tien* for Confucius. As a result, one should understand the notion of *Tien* for

Confucius as a semi-anthropomorphic and a semi-naturalistic deity (Savage, 1985, p.318). For Confucius, *Tao* plays a significant role in initiating a dialogue between transcendence and immanence. *Tao* gives spiritual life and destiny to human beings, just as the power of Nature gives life to plants. The notion of *Tao* gives the Superior Man instructions on observing, perceiving, following, and communicating with the principle of *Tien* and understanding its patterns on Earth. It intends to reach a spiritual plane that both corresponds to and transcends the secular world. A superior man thereby unites *Tao* and humanity in oneness.

> The Master said, I wish I did not have to talk. Tzu-kung said, if you master, did not talk, what would we, the little ones, have to transmit about you? The Master said, does Heaven do anything speaking? The four seasons follow upon one another and all creatures spring forth each after its own kind. Does Heaven do anything speaking? (as cited in Savage 1985, p.331)

This passage reveals the process that the power of Nature corresponds to the consistency and order in human action that *Tao* manifests. The power of Nature functions as the human behavior that reaches to oneness between the two elements of the powers of Nature and human behavior. This kind of *Tao*, according to Benjamin Schwartz (1975) is "the emergence of a kind of Chinese rationalism...is the image of an all-embracing and inclusive order which neither negates nor reduces to some one ultimate principle that which is presumed to exist" (p.59)

Tao and the Supreme Ultimate

It is through the *Jen-Li-Tao* nexus that the ideas of man, his nature, and his relationship with others are reworked, and therefore the parameters of the superior man are refigured and reimagined in the *Analects.* The arguments that Confucius establishes represent a break in the reconceptualization of the ideal child (the Superior Man). It is the appeal to *Jen, Li* and *Tao* that virtues are evenly owned by some and that all can own through self-cultivation.

In addition, the embodiment of ethics in the *Jen-Li-Tao* nexus allows for power's conceptualization in the spiritual realm to help the superior man reach the metaphysical level. Thus, he spiritualizes his perception of the phenomenal (see Dietz, 2010), within which comes the forging of the process of becoming a superior man and the depiction of Utopia. Those who follow *Tao* are leaders of men and in turn enlarge *Tao* to include the nation and the world.

It should be noted that "metaphysical" means that the constitution of the superior man corresponds to that of Heavenly order. This is especially evident when situated within a macroscopic frame of reference of the universe as opposed to a microscopic perspective of the nature of man. It is the belief that these metaphysical elements of *Tao* in Confucian cosmology came into existence through serious philosophical confrontations with Taoist and Buddhist religious texts, which makes apparent the notion of Neo-Confucianism.[7] The shift of *Tao* that previously had a moral significance as "the Way of mankind" to the principle that transcends shape as defended by Neo-Confucianism, therefore, complicates these lines of thought as they interact over time. As such, a reaction of the Confucianism against Taoism and Buddhism that brought Neo-Confucianism into view, in the end, generated not simply rivalry among the three lines of thought (see Legge, 1881), but rather produced the processes within which discursive practices brought into and elided from via at least two lines of flight.

First, Taoism under Laotzu develops a metaphysical and cosmological theory that is concerned with the relations between the man and universe, something which Confucius does not attempt. The discussion of *Tao* reflects this relation. For Laotzu, he concerns himself with the notion of something existing or appearing without a cause or it is "natural" growth, as opposed to something artificial (e.g., human civilization). It is thereby effortlessness and exists

[7] Neo-Confucianism was an intellectual movement led by a group of Confucians during the eleventh- and twelfth-century Song period. The movement has been called "Cheng-Chu Learning," named after the surnames of the two representative scholars of the school, Cheng Yi (1033-1107) and Chu Hsi (1130-1200) (see Kim, 2000).

in nonaction (e.g., the law of gravitation control material entities that embodies Wu-Wei). It was against the Taoist moral and political anarchism that Neo-Confucianism arose as a reinstatement of the Confucian positive attitude toward morality, government, and truth (Wen, 1954, p.88). This attempt continued until Neo-Confucianism worked out a cosmology by incorporating many Taoistic elements (see Kim, 2000).

Secondly, the Indian metaphysical obscurantism and religious imagination embedded in the Buddhist cosmology became discarded in the local context that brought into view the arising of Zen Buddhism. For Zen, salvation must be sought not through the preaching of ritualism or verbalism, but rather via intellectual enlightenment or insight. For these, no external assistance could avail and must result from an individual's seeking with patience, traveling, and coming into contact with the best minds of the age (Wen, 1954, p.108). In doing so, one may achieve a moment of quietude and mastery of the supernatural powers. Zen was the only form of Buddhism that Confucian mind could assimilate, and thus it prepared the way for the advent of Neo-Confucianism.

Within these frameworks, Confucian philosophers procured Taoism and Zen Buddhism into their teachings and reconstructed the entire system of thought on a new basis. The notion of Yin and Yang[8] in the universe, for instance, corresponds to humanity and delimits the parameters of good and evil in human beings. The five agents of Neo-Confucianism evoke five moral qualities of a human being: humanity, rightness, proper behavior, wisdom, and sincerity. Human beings and the cosmos are united by human beings' sense of order that constitutes oneness in Neo-Confucianism.

The notion of oneness can further be discussed as viewed through the lens of the

[8] As Chou Dun Yi stated: "The Supreme Ultimate through movement generates the yang. When its activity reaches its limit, it became tranquil. Through tranquility the Supreme Ultimate generates the yin…By the transformation of yang and its union with yin, the five agents of water, fire, wood, metal and earth arise…..The five agents constitute one system of yin and yang, and yin and yang constitute one Supreme Ultimate" (Kim, 2000, p.120)

relationship between “principle” and “material force” in Neo-Confucian cosmology. “The idea of principle signifies the pattern or foundation of every materiality. On the other hand, “material force” refers to reality or existing substance. The arrival of harmony and peace depended on the linkage between principle and material force. Within the context, if one follows in accordance with who one is and simultaneously as what Heaven (Heavenly Principle) mandates one to be, the idea of “as what it is” and “what it ought to be” are forged as oneness in Neo-Confucian metaphysical system, which constitutes harmony. The metaphysical system necessitates a society that has a hierarchical stratification. The depiction of oneness and its linkage to the Supreme Ultimate transcends time and space, whose existence remains rooted in Confucian morality, rather than reduced to non-being as Taoism promulgates. Oneness is the ethical ground for all the things, both seen/tangible and unseen/intangible, within which all other things are produced and the root of all moral conduct that exemplify metaphysical and ethical power (see Needham, 1977). These powers thrive within in the omnipresent *Tao* and thus constitutes the Supreme Ultimate for Neo-Confucianism.

The Supreme Ultimate functions as a generator of power for the superior man that permits the perception and implantation of righteousness to every affair and merges with the universal to ultimately achieve a Confucian Utopia:

> A public and common spirit rules throughout the world; virtuous and capable people are elected to public office; the truism of living is to believe in peace and harmony, sincerity and trust among all people. Thus everyone loves and respects his or her own parents and children, as well as the parents and children of others. There are caring, provision, and protection for the aged until their last days; there is appropriate employment for the able-bodied; and there are nourishment and education for the children and youth. There is kindness and compassion for the widowers and widows, for the orphans, for the childless and for the disabled and sick; these people are all

> sufficiently maintained. Men and women have an appropriate role to play in the family and society. (People live a life of plenty.) Although nobody likes to see natural resources and wealth wasted on the land, no one keeps it for oneself. Nobody likes wealth which is not the creation of one's own labor, mental and manual. Moreover, nobody does things just to benefit oneself. In this way, a devotion to public service leaves no room for idleness, while schemes and intrigues are repressed and found no development. Robbers, filchers, and rebellious traitors no more exist. The door of every house needs not to be locked, and can remain open during day and night. The above-mentioned is what we call *Datong*. (Peng, 2007, p.41)

The idea of *Datong* in Confucian cosmology took on a new meaning as it incorporated several metaphysical elements that Neo-Confucianism conceptualizes. During the postwar period, *Datong* became the springboard to think about the "orthodox" Chinese living in Taiwan, as opposed to the "traitors" living in mainland China. This process involved the practice of the notion of *Hao Jan Chih Chi,*[9] which means to have the morale reach to the Supreme Ultimate without any obstructions. The practice of *Hao Jan Chih Chi* thereby expresses an understanding of practicing the proper way and reverberates through all human connections.

Confucian Power in Early Twentieth-Century China

When Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, and the KMT wrote about the nation, educational discourses, and the child, they did not rely wholeheartedly on what Confucius had written.

[9] The term exists within the school textbooks of postwar Taiwan. It often read like the superior man practices *Hao Jan Chih Chi* for the people when one obtains the chance to fulfill it. He practices *Hao Jan Chih Chi* alone when the conditions disappoint him. By doing so, the superior man is beyond worry, doubt, and fear (Dietz, 2010, p.85). He may be killed and coerced, but he cannot be constrained and disgraced.

They still appealed to the concepts of *Jen, Li* and *Tao* as the terms for explaining the events of early twentieth-century China and postwar Taiwan. Those concepts had, however, somewhat been redefined in a way that shined relevance on Sun Yat-sen's *Three Principles of the People*. In a broad context, one important rupture that brought a different conceptualization of the child into view was the advent of modernist discourses, which burgeoned in the May Fourth era (1915-1921). The term "modernist discourses" indicate China's advances toward practices of Western civilization through the intellectual transformation and sociopolitical movement that took place in 1920s China. The term Western civilization also encompasses a democratic conception of politics and scientific materialism.

The modernization movement in the May Fourth era falls into three categorical divisions: cultural iconoclasm, cultural nationalism, and cultural eclecticism. The May Fourth intellectuals exhibited features and interests that often differed from Confucianism and from each other. For instance, Chen Tu-Hsiu proposed an anti-traditionalist argument based on his attack on Confucianism and the acceptance of complete Westernization closely tied to the concepts of science and democracy. Another May Fourth intellectual, Hu Shih, similarly advocated complete Westernization based on the concepts of science and democracy. Chen Tu-Hsiu's complete Westernization referred more to the exercise of political power via giving a person the capacity to act within a struggle-submission framework that would eventually reshape the national character. Hu Shih focuses more on the embedding of cultural power into a person through the scientifically-generated norms that could also incite democratization. Unlike Chen or Hu, Liang Chichao's cultural eclecticism proposes that the nation must respect Chinese culture and accept Western culture. At the same time, he argued that they must meticulously examine Western culture in light of the overemphasis of scientific materialism in the West that led to a splitting of science from morality. The term morality resembles the Confucian concept of *Tao*. Similarly, Sun Yat-sen's *Three Principles of the People* and his

notion of a Five-Power Constitution articulated democratic ideas based on Confucian concepts. What made Sun Yat-sen's cosmology different from the notion of *Hao Jan Chih Chi* were his arguments of political power, which endowed a person with the capacity to reverse the concept of "Mandate of Heaven."

Even though Chen Tu-Hsiu, Hu Shih, Liang Chichao and Sun Yat-sen articulate different ways of thinking about modernist discourses, these concepts signal a cultural transformation and their differences hinged on their respective proximity to Confucianism. Collectively, the relocation of power out of the statist conception of politics, as ingrained in the modernist discourses, suggests that distinctive moments in the rupture of humanity's central place and the ways of governance would eventually forge a different inscription of the child that the Confucian *Hao Jan Chih Chi* could never have imagined.

Making the Confucian Child Possible in Postwar Taiwan

Among the modernist discourses present in early twentieth-century China, Sun Yat-sen's the *Three Principles of the People*--nationalism, democracy and the principle of people's livelihood are the most important political/educational beliefs. These beliefs constituted the first discursive trajectory in the formation of the Confucian child in postwar Taiwan, fostered reading strategies of anticommunism discourses, and ways to approach the depiction of the "orthodox" Chinese in postwar Taiwan. The three shifts are inseparable because all were explicitly or implicitly compatible with Confucianism to a substantial extent. However, that is not to say that the attribution of the modern Confucian child to the three discursive shifts require that there are only three "kinds" of trajectories that help forge the "child." For instance, the Western cultural and social ideas such as liberalism, individualism, socialism, pragmatism, utilitarianism, anarchism, Marxism, democracy, and science that flowed rapidly into China in the May Fourth time/space also directly or indirectly circulated in postwar Taiwan. Some of

these cultural and social ideas constituted the so-called liberal atmosphere embedded in Hu Shih's child in postwar Taiwan. The lines between the Confucian child and Hu Shih's child therefore should not be understood as mutually exclusive categories but should be nuanced through a mapping of how the discourse travel between, within, and beyond the borders.

Consequently, the next section focuses on the treatments of the nation-state, governance, and economy of state capitalism in *The Three Principles of the People* and then considers this text's rendition of the child. It might appear that the ideas *The Three Principles of the People* offer are irrelevant to child-rearing advice. But, I claim that the shifting conceptions of ethical categories, democratization processes, and state capitalism significantly reorient notions of the state and humanity, and consequently, notions of the child. Sun rewrote the child in a different and yet similar form of becoming. It is this rupture that takes the child out of the "traditional" unfolding of reasoning and supports the child to remain alongside the chain of the continuum that corresponds to anticommunism discourses and orthodox Chinese beliefs in postwar Taiwan.

Chinese Nationalism and Chinese Consciousness

The idea of Chinese nationalism did not emerge until the Ching Dynasty witnessed foreign imperialism, which eroded the sovereignty and independence of the empire (see Gregor, 1981). It is through the comparison between the "inferior" Ching dynasty and the "superior" West that modernization discourses came to the fore in early twentieth-century China. The modernization discourses refer to the Western civilization inextricable ties to materialism, science, and liberal democracy. These discourses help shed new light on the questions concerning what "we" Chinese must do to become an "advanced" nation like those of the West. The concepts of "modernization" and "Chinese nationalism" constitute synergistic relations that reinforce each other. Sun Yat-sen's concepts of nationalism could be understood as being born of these contexts that help shape the modern Confucian child.

First, for Sun, a nationalist China vis-à-vis Western nations comprises Sun's first meaning of Chinese. It is the comparison between Chinese nationalism and Western nations that facilitated power's location and meaning from the conception of Confucian system of loyalty towards the ruler to the notion of nationhood, from allegiance to the emperor to the love of one's nation by overthrowing feudalism, and from a concern with family and clan groups to a strengthened connection with national consciousness. These shifts collectively suggest a break in which the question of what constitutes Chinese identity is refigured and rewritten. In addition, it is also through the comparison between the Chinese nationalism and Western nations that the "true" spirit of the Chinese consciousness and Chinese nationalism are highlighted. Sun utilizes the term *Pao-tao* from Mencius. *Pao-tao* personifies the Confucian conceptions of *Jen*, brotherhood, kindness, and justice. Then, Sun extrapolates this concept into his discussion of a desirable nationalism. *Pao-tao* is based on violence and military invasion, not on kindness, in describing the deeds of imperialists. As such, Sun argues that Chinese must follow Mencius' term of "*Wang-tao*," which is based on kindness when treating others, including minorities, with respect and claims that people should never resort to military invasion and sovereign dominion.

> We are a weak country at the moment. We must be aware of this. In the future we must keep in mind how we had suffered under the imperialists. In addition, we must also keep our bad experiences in mind in order to prevent suffering from recurring among the weaker minorities. We want to work with the minorities in the fight against imperialism. (Chin, 1982, p.100)

It is at this point that Confucian thoughts surface in Sun's ideas of nationalism to think about diplomatic relations. The modern Confucian child is thereby depicted as possessing the power to respect others, love others, and be a peace-loving person in the international community.

Secondly, for Sun, the term "Chinese" is synonymous with the Han group, a primary

culture. The Han group composes a majority the Chinese population and they epitomize "the descendants of Yellow Emperor" (Chen, 2003, p.82). The Han culture is generally known as immersed in classic Confucian concepts. When put together, the characteristics of Han group/culture constitute a complexity of "superiority" over other ethnic groups in China. This attitude took hold even when the Han group did not possess political authority:

> China in these thousands of years has been twice crushed by political power to the point of complete subjugation, during the Mongol and Manchu dynasties. But both these times we lost our country to a smaller not a larger people and these smaller peoples were inevitably absorbed by us. (Wu, 1971, p.293)

Even though the "we" Han group were ruled by "alien" political power twice in the Mongol (1271-1368) and Manchu (1636-1912) periods respectively, the Han cultural power assimilated the political power of these two periods. Viewing the "hard" political (military) power as subordinate to the "soft" Han cultural power helps Sun to articulate the overthrow of the Manchu-ruled Ching dynasty.

Thirdly, after the establishment of the Republic of China in 1912, Sun's notion of Chinese includes the five sub-groups living in China. Later, the KMT government utilized idea that the Hans, the Manchus, the Mongols, the Mohammedans, and the Tibetans all exist within the domain of Chinese as a tool of political propaganda The claim that Chinese is composed of five ethnic groups was nothing novel. What was new is that the five ethnic groups received equal and fair treatment. Sun's idea marks a radical departure from the traditional definition of Chinese that exclusively pays attention to the Han group, and it calls for the equality of China with other nations, as Sun's *Three Principles* exemplify.

It is important to note that the three different meanings of Chinese detailed above still reverberate today. The discourse that five ethnic groups unite under the Republic does not mean the five groups are consequently being viewed equally, nor does it mean that the sentiment of

Han Chauvinism disappeared hereafter. The distinction between the first and second kind of Chinese is still evident because the same strategy persists through the identifications of "elegant" Chinese and "vulgar' Taiwanese in postwar Taiwan (see Mao, 1997). They differ sometimes in kind due to the ethnic backgrounds and sometimes in degree, depending on their proximity to Confucian thought.

Democracy, Power, and the Child

For Sun, the shift from Chinese cosmopolitanism within the notion of "Kingdom of Heaven" to Chinese nationalism as theorized in the modern nationhood cannot be achieved without the concept of democracy. The weight and location that Sun attributes to democracy suggests both continuity and rupture regarding the possession of power configured around the child. The continuity refers to the concern with the issue of learning from the West without losing national character. The rupture created a new discursive space that enabled Chinese people to think about cosmology in different ways through Western thought.

At least three discursive ruptures facilitated Sun's expression of his version of democracy. First, the portrait of human civilization as a steady advance with the passage of time gave rise to Sun's rendition of political contexts, which preceded democracy. Later, the arrival of democracy itself also enabled this part of Sun's thinking. As he writes:

> Man sought to live and the animal sought to live….In very ancient times men ate beasts and beasts also ate men; there was a constant struggle between them. The land was covered with venomous snakes and wild animals; man was beset by dangers and so had to fight for his very life….. Later, when man had about exterminated the venomous reptiles and savage beasts, when his environment was somewhat improved, and his dwelling place was better suited to his type of existence, then groups of people began to live in one place and to domesticate the

> tamers animals. This was the beginning of the pastoral age and also of civilization. (as cited in Strawn, 1999, p.222)

From his depiction of human civilization as flowing from man's constant struggles with beasts to man's domestication of the environment, Sun continually argues that human civilization ushered in a type of theocracy in which man must confront the forces of Nature and ask theological powers for assistance. Then, civilization entered a period in which man had to deal with human relations and "autocratic power was the chief weapon" (Strawn, 1999, p.209). Theocracy and autocracy unevenly and unequally possessed power. As a result, the democratic concept of politics became visible and accessible to people.

> Like the Yangtze River, which makes crooks and turns, sometimes to the north and sometimes to the south, but in the end flows eastward and nothing can stop it. Just so the life of mankind has flowed from theocracy on to autocracy and from autocracy now on to democracy, and there is no way to stem the current. (Wang, 1995, pp.179-180)

Furthermore, the transplantation of European history, in the Enlightenment mode (ancient, medieval, and modern), into Chinese history reinforces Sun's narration of the imagination of democracy (see Duara, 1995). Like in Europe, Sun argues that Chinese history began with creation characterized by an appeal to purity. Next, Chinese history moved into decadence coupled with its glorious past that corresponded to Sun's time/space. Finally, like the West, Sun claims that China will follow the same historical trajectory to replace its political system of autocracy with democracy that brings about a new civilization.

Despite the emphases on human civilization and European history, some democratic ideas, such as the slogans of the French Revolution and Abraham Lincoln's famous dictum "government of the people, by the people, and for the people" (Hana, 1982, p.128), constituted a substantive amount of content in Sun's version of democracy. It was at this point that the

modern Confucian child made a radical departure from its predecessor.

Both Confucius and Sun proclaim that the more talented should help mediocre persons. The construction of Superior man epitomizes this concept. The difference between Confucius and Sun rests in Sun's greater stress on dealing with natural inequality through the political system (democracy). However, the political system of autocracy had superimposed the "artificial inequality" (Wu, 1971, p.322). The ranks of nobility in feudal China reflect this artificial inequality, ranks such as Emperor, Prince, Duke, Marquis, Earl, Viscount, Baron, and people.

> Nature originally did not make men equal; but when autocracy developed among mankind, the despotic kings and princesses pushed human differences to an extreme, and the result was an inequality far worse than Nature's inequality. The inequality created by kings and princes was an artificial inequality. (Wu, 1971, p.322)

As such, the social structure that generated man-made inequality requires removal. It was through the rewriting of historical narrative that most forcefully challenged the "out-of-date" monarchism. This rewriting permitted the vivid imagination of the future Utopia of a democracy. The new/traditional split conceptualization of political power has enormous implications for thinking about the child in that under Sun's formulation. The previously power owned by the selected few was now allocated to the child in an even and equal way.

It must be accentuated that Sun's constant appeal to Western democracy does not suggest that Western civilization was superior to that of China. For Sun, all the democratic ideas have always been in the Chinese tradition, for example, the ideal of *Minben* (the people as the base of the state) and the Confucian idea that "When the Great Way prevails, all under heaven will work for the people" (as cited in Wang, 995, p.112). However, they failed to embody these concepts in democratic institutions, like those established in the West. Sun, therefore, draws

heavily on a history of democracy[10] in the West and simultaneously examines their flawed political systems in their democracies. By doing so, it provides an alternative way to think about democracy and to surpass the Western way of thinking. Democracy, therefore, is not a wholesale transplantation from the West under Sun's epistemology. For instance, Sun's Five-Power Constitution is a combination of the Western concept of the three political powers of Executive, Legislative and Judiciary, the vestiges of the ancient Chinese Examination, and Control entities. For Sun, under the system of three-power separation, the executive branch was too powerful, because the executive also exercised the power of examination. As a result, the examination branch and executive brand must be separated to ensure that the positions in government would consist of persons with the talent to govern. Sun expands on ancient Chinese examination systems in which this same system recruited officials of various rankings. Likewise, the power of control and powerful legislature had to split to avoid corruption. The control system in feudal China included the supervision of officials at all levels including, supposedly, the emperor. Many ancient Chinese people working in the control systems were Confucian scholars who criticized the government officials or the emperors at the cost of their lives. Their actions relate to what Mencius called *Hao Jan Chih Chi*, which means to have the morale reach to a supreme degree. The already existing control and examination powers in China conjoined with the typical Western three branches of government (legislative, executive, and judicial). In theory, this would result in a more efficient government. It was also through the reading of Sun's ideas of a Five-Power Constitution that the modern Confucian child

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[10] Sun Yat-Sen was educated in the US and was a Congregationalist. This has some relevance to his thought about democracy, and to the way in which his ideas intersect with Confucianism. There is a soteriological strain to much of Sun Yat-Sen's ideas (i.e. the salvation of the Chinese nation) that is not directly attributable to Confucianism but is more likely an echo of notions of salvation through democracy found in Congregationalist theology. (Richard Miller, 2017, personal communication).

remained in contact with classic Confucian teachings of the Superior Man. At the same time, the Superior Man bore distinct characteristics from those of its predecessor to the point that became unrecognizable through the appeal to democracy.

For Sun, the Five-Power Constitution is the most proficient form of governance. Even though the immediate uptake of democracy did not lead to this proficient form, particularly because autocratic atmosphere absorbed people for such a long time. Sun thereby suggests a delay of democracy in the transitory period from autocracy to democracy and divides it into three periods that might finally achieve a democratic system: first, military government; second, preparatory; and third, constitutional reconstruction (Hsu, 1982, p.120). The adoption of a three-stage governance to realize democracy is due to the traditional Confucian thoughts and Western experiences available to Sun. He wrote within a cultural context that assumed a traditional Confucian scholar must bear responsibility for improvement for the quality of life of his fellow citizens. Furthermore, the appeal to French experiences incited Sun's desire for delay democracy.

> But after the French Revolution, great troubles took place, and the structure of France was changed five times. In France, there was twice a monarch and three times a republic, and the Republic was only firmly established eighty years after the first revolution……. France was one of the foremost European States, with a very courageous and cultured people. Moreover, before the Revolution, the French people passed through a hundred years' propaganda of the rights of the people and philosophical teachings. Although she followed the lessons taught by America, France still proved unable to arrive at a democratic republic immediately after the Revolution. Why? Wherein lie the reasons for this? The fact is that the form of government in the West had long been monarchial, and State policy had for long been one of centralization. France had not the virgin soil of the New World with

> its basis of local self-government. The defects of our own China are similar to those of France, but in addition the political intelligence of our citizen is immeasurably lower than that of the French at the time of the French Revolution, just as is their capacity for self-government. Hence arises the question, how then do I strive in China to arrive directly through the Revolution at republican constitution? But it is for this very purpose that I propose a preparatory period- just in order to get out of this difficult situation. (as cited in Hsu, 1982, p.120)

In this context, the idea of the modern Confucian child lacks the power to reason democratic concepts in the transitory period from autocracy to democracy, for the power to reason about democracy involves Sun's concept of three-stage governance. Through Sun's reasoning, the individual power to participate in politics in any substantial way is subordinate to the nation-state. Sun's concept of three-stage governance in relation to the democratization process contradicts Hu Shih's ideal for an immediate path to democracy. Their different conceptualizations of the individual, the state, and democracy insinuated their different conceptions of political power and inscription of the child.

State Capitalism: Sun's *Principle of Livelihood* as the Springboard

Sun articulates his economic discourses through the *Principle of Livelihood*, which resembles his illustration of the government-citizen relationship that gives priority to state power over individual rights en route to modernization. It is state intervention and restriction of individual capitalism as the laws of governing that structure one's actions. For Sun, a healthy society is a centralized nation-state that manages to equalize property distribution to avoid the phenomenon of pauperism. The rich-poor gap in the West results from the overindulgence that occurs in the pursuit of private capitalism. Sun's concern is more with the state's well-being and the quality of life for the individual, over the "material" aspects of social life that highlights a mercantile register of a cost-benefit mode of production. The term livelihood goes beyond the scope of its "material" aspect. Rather, Sun thinks that livelihood should be moved to the

center of societal considerations at large.

Sun's notion of livelihood does not squarely align with Western capitalism; moderate capitalism seems a bit desirable for Sun. Furthermore, the idea of state socialism expressed in the *Principle of Livelihood* has a smack of communism. Sun appreciates the communist perspective, which we can see hints of within the Confucian notion of *Datong*. These divergent points of view find grounding in their differential visions of imagining history and the distinct ways to reach Utopia. The Marxist materialistic interpretation of history is too insular for Sun's philosophy because it overlooks multitudinous factors in the construction of history. Secondly, Sun challenges the oversimplified Marxist capitalist-labor relations and class war in communist doctrines. Sun advocates for less violent measures, such as the use of love, justice, wisdom, and morality that constitute mutual aid to replace mutual struggle, to reach a communistic sharing of what life has to offer.

> Chinese industry in the future shall be placed on a cooperative basis. Both politics and industry shall be thoroughly democratized, and every class will be dependent on every other class and all will live in an atmosphere of complete confidence and natural love….In the industries to be developed, everybody shall have a due share in the benefits in the proportion to his contribution to the work, enjoy the full fruits of his labor, obtain better working condition, and have plenty of leisure to attend to matters outside of his bread-earning activities. In this way the workers will become more and more intelligent and enjoy adequate recreation and lead a happy life…..It is my wish to see that all members of the nation be guaranteed opportunities to make a living and be completely free to order their own lives in their own way without outside interference. (as cited in Li, 2000, p.179)

The complexity of Sun's conception of livelihood is borne from the movement of state socialism to Confucianism and then to moderate capitalism. Again, his economic discourses

that the nation-state, the individual's place in the world, and their collective inscription of the child fuses these discourses together.

Sun's *Three Principles of the People* functioned as the KMT's political philosophy and the KMT's pedagogical tool in Taiwan. As such, *The Three Principles of the People* in postwar Taiwan became almost a truism that no one could challenge. Junior High school students, for instance, were required to study Sun's *The Three Principles of the People* with the aim that the students would acquire a geographical and historical sense of Chinese nationalism, to learn how social life and one's actions correspond to democracy, and to learn the vocational skills based on the *Principle of Livelihood* (see Ministry of Education, 1994). In doing so, these learnings constitute a "spiritual" weapon with which to counterattack communism.

Anti-Communism Discourses

The significance of Sun Yat-sen's *Three Principles of the People* lays in the KMT governments; heavily emphasizing the principles. In the political context, the KMT wrote these principles into the constitution of the R.O.C. When the CCP defeated the KMT during the Chinese Civil War and came to Taiwan in 1949, people read *Three Principles of the People* as providing ways to construct both an ideal society and good citizens, which served as a blueprint to counterattack communism. It was also through the weaving of political discourse, cultural reasoning, and economic comparison that the discursive space of anti-communism that fabricated and thereby constituted the conceptualization of power in anti-communism. In this section, I discuss the sequel to the Confucian child that entailed the inscription of anti-communism into the inside and outside of individual humans, thus giving texture to the child in postwar Taiwan.

The conception of power in anti-communism also indicates a shift of conceptualizing the locale of Chinese from Sun's epistemology to the KMT government in Taiwan under the

leadership of Chiang Kai-shek.

Constructing Anti-Communism in the Global and Local: Inscription of the KMT's Infallibility as Political Power

In 1949, when Chiang Kai-shek's Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang or KMT) was defeated by Mao's Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in China, the KMT came to Taiwan and viewed the island as a base for a recovery for the lost motherland. The ultimate political discourse for Chiang was to "fight against the Communist (in the period of time it referred to both Chinese and Russian communism) to revive the sovereignty of the ROC's territory integrity" (as cited in Chen, 1995, p.94). It was the KMT-CCP conflicts that underwrote the most important theorization of power of anti-communism and the child-rearing advice the KMT government gave.

> In passive ways, the relation between schools and government institutions should be closely connected and the communist spies' activities be prohibited. In active ways, all schools should strengthen their spiritual training of students and emphasize political education and disciplinary tasks…… every policy will focus on the highest national policy of anti-communism and resistance to Russian communist, as the policy of the educational domain. (Quoted Mao, 1997, p.95)

It should be noted that school textbooks did not contain negative images of Russian Communists nor were there allusions to the Chinese Communist Party between 1945 and 1949 (see Ho, 2007). The depictions of anti-communism did not emerge until the retreat of the KMT government to Taiwan. As a result, there was an urgent need for the KMT to initiate anti-communism discourse as an important curricular strategy when the CCP took over China. At the outset, it was illustrated in the supplementary materials of school textbooks. For the KMT, the Russian invasion and its collusion with the Chinese Communists needed particular emphasis. The military "rebellion" by the CCP in China was to "exterminate our nation under the order of Russia. Therefore, the means that it employs are the same as those by which Russia

annexed the Eastern European countries" (as cited in Wu, 2007, p.43). The KMT in their campaign against communism mobilized the juxtaposition of the Soviet Union and CCP because the KMT government viewed the CCP as a puppet controlled by the Soviet Union.

> If Russia conquers all of our China, this will be like tiger that has grown wings with its might redoubled, and the whole human being will never have peace. If Mao Zedong and Zhu De, leader of the bandits, hand over all of our China to Russia, this will be like playing a jackal to the tiger to help the villain do evil, and one quarter of the world's population will be imprisoned under the black curtain and be slaves of Russia, without any hope to stand up in the future…..At this critical conjuncture of life-and-death importance, only by wiping out the communists completely and resisting Russia determinedly can our countrymen nationwide save the nation and ourselves. (as cited in Wu, 2007, p.43)

In this period, the KMT-CCP contradiction significantly corresponds to the wider U.S.-Soviet disagreement. The Soviet-backed invasion of South Korea in 1950 caused the Truman Administration to shift its foreign policy from not getting involved in the KMT-CCP conflicts into a wholesale endorsement of the KMT government. The Korean War made the U.S. believe that the invasion of Taiwan by the Soviet-backed Chinese Communist forces directly threatened the security of the Asia-Pacific region, thus, the long-term U.S. military and financial support of the island became established. In the international context, based on U.S. support, the KMT government was able to keep its permanent seat in the Security Council of the U.N. (Lin, 1999, p.46). Taiwan in the postwar period became a member of the global anti-communism bloc and the presence of the U.S. helped the KMT government to construct "we" as democracy as opposed to "otherness" as authoritarianism in anti-communism texts.

Furthermore, the depiction strategies of anti-communism brought the U.S. character into the KMT's field of vision (see Ho, 2007). Basically, the KMT government adopted a friendly

attitude towards the U.S. government. Terms such as democracy, justice, and modernity were synonymous with the U.S. character that appears throughout anti-communist texts at this historical time. The U.S. character became the offshoot of anti-communism such that through it, one could glimpse the American values inscribed into the ontology of the child. The site of the Confucian child in postwar Taiwan developed in a rewritten manner around the portrait of the U.S. character. The possession of power to reason about conception, such as democracy, thereby became possible and imaginable.

The portrait of U.S. character was sometimes associated with some derogatory terms. For instance, the U.S. sometimes met criticisms for its failure to live up to the KMT expectation as the role of mediator between KMT-CCP conflicts during the Chinese Civil War (1945-1949). According to the KMT, the indecisive U.S. government contributed to the ascendance of communism in post-war China, which consequently led to the transfer of political authority and the KMT's retreat to Taiwan. The KMT basically used euphemistic ways to criticize its ally's policy when their interests seemed harmed. The underlying assumption was that if the U.S. had followed the KMT's advice, then the CCP's military "rebellion" would have never been successful. Construing about the U.S. character in anti-communism texts indicates an image of the infallible KMT government in the discursive space. The term infallibility does not denote that the KMT claimed itself to be impeccable. The inscription of KMT's infallibility as power was frequently used throughout anti-communist texts, as directed toward the archrival, and at the same time aided the KMT's infallibility to be underscored.

One of the portrayals of KMT's infallibility directed at the CCP was the issue concerning sovereignty at home. For instance, the KMT claimed that the ROC government was the only legitimate sovereignty to represent China. Its legitimacy was based on the R.O.C Constitution, which passed into law on December 25th, 1946. The CCP was a group in rebellion who "usurped" Mainland China (see Chen, 2003). When the usurper took over China, the

establishment of a different national anthem, flag, and title under the CCP rule could not be recognized by the KMT, along with being intolerable for them. The appeals for recognition of the U.N. and R.O.C Constitution denote the advocacy of the KMT's infallibility and justified the launching an anti-communism campaign. On the other hand, it was through the neat antithesis between the KMT-as-infallible and the CCP-as-evil that anti-communism gained reinforcement.

Besides the issue of sovereignty, the construction of "the other" was through the presence of democracy. In the international context, the KMT positioned the U.S.-Taiwan alliance in the democratic bloc as opposed to the authoritarian Soviet-CCP bloc. Again, the term democracy carried into the domestic sphere to demarcate free China under KMT governance and authoritarian China under CCP governance. When the KMT came to Taiwan, they suspended the implementation of the democratic procedures stipulated in the Constitution yet elections at the village, town, municipal, and county levels remained active. These elections under KMT control became framed as "openness," "freedom," and "competition" (Su 1998, p.140). Taiwan at the time resembles how one might think of a non-democratic entity today. Still, this history shows how the construction of the stark differences between free China and an authoritarian regime was constructed.

> Everywhere in Taiwan, everyone is free and comfortable. There is no fear in their minds and smiles can be observed on their faces. Everyone on the mainland shows dull expressions and even the feelings of delight, anger, sadness, and happiness are gone. Our powerful government devotes itself to developing this place, which had once been damaged seriously during the second World War, into becoming worthy of the name "Formosa;" while the Communists build a pandemonium of blue workers ants on the mainland (as cited in Pai, 1995, p.126-127).

The different political systems constituted a dramatic difference in people's facial expressions.

In this historical moment, the presence of democracy meant happiness, and the absence of democracy in China meant disaster. As such, the "superior" democracy took Taiwan from a war-stricken area to a beautiful and peaceful one, while "inferior" communism dehumanized the people living in Mainland China.

> The government officials must serve the people and can no longer oppress them. We live in a democratic society. Everybody is equal and has a stable living that people in a dictatorial aren't able to obtain. (as cited in Pai, 1995, pp.90-91)

The articulation of the KMT's infallibility and the perceived inappropriateness of various depictions of the CCP's political systems constituted a part of the theorization of the child and power across anti-communist works that became the basis of the oft-asserted strategies used by the KMT. It was around "the KMT conception of democracy," through the incorporation of vestiges of American character and Sun's *Three Principles of the People*, that helped to imagine the conceptualization of anti-communism inscribed in the perceived Confucian child in postwar Taiwan.

Latent and Manifest Anti-Communism Discourses as Ways of Shaping the Orthodox Chinese

As noted above, the theorization of power in anti-communism largely aided to exhibit the KMT's cosmology to the point that the distinctions between margin and center was absolute. It is through strategies of oversimplified dualism that the site of the perceived CCP occupied a position in which the linking of negativity to CCP became available and depicted in school textbooks.

> For the facts about the Communist's sabotaging human basic rights and physical freedom, destroying families, humiliating culture and education, cheating the children, ruining villages, and the Communist group's invading our country etc., we should make every possible effort to incorporate them into the subject matter of civics and history. (as cited in Pai, 1995, pp.77-78)

For the KMT, the CCP was the incarnation of the devil that constituted the danger of harming our freedom, private property, and culture. The school textbooks repeatedly narrated stories of the CCP's character. For instance, one lesson recited that when the Communist "usurped" China, they tried to find the elusive anti-communist guerrilla band but failed to catch them. Another tale recounted that "the armed soldiers brought civilians into town, accused them of being the guerrillas in disguise, and killed them all" (NCTO, 1954, v.4, p.47). One lesson even told this story: when a Communist official asked a civilian named Lee Ming: "Do you think your lives are better here than before?" Lee answered: "What do you expect me to say?" After that, Lee mysteriously disappeared (NCTO, 1954, v.5; 1964, v.6). The stories attempted to convey how brutal the CCP's actions were; any innocent person was subject to public or private death with no reasons required. It was through readings about the CCP's character that produced the hatred and phobia of the communists. By doing so, in the face of the communists' "atrocities," the KMT became the imagined savior to initiate the retaliation. Through this process, they intended to impart feelings of patriotism to ensure that identification with the KMT would be generated and guaranteed.

The CCP character thrived through narration anywhere that it could manifest. For example, it manifests by one child who depicts the beautiful homeland in China and consequently the brutality of the CCP:

> My Mom and Dad told me that our home is on the mainland. There are five great mountains and three great lakes. There are the Yangtze River and the Yellow River…. Now, our hometown has turned into a killing field. The Communists are the brutal killers who have dismantled one sweet family after another, and destroyed one peaceful village after another…… We ought to recover the mainland and eliminate all the Communists. (NCTO, 1964, v.6, p.99-100)

Some modern poetry expressed the CCP stories, which in the example below, underlines the

stark differences across the Taiwan Strait.

> The crescent sheds light on all four directions
> The water of the Taiwan Strait seems without boundary
> The water is a separating line
> Hell on one side and heaven on the other…
> The crescent moon sheds light on the four directions
> The water of the Taiwan Strait seems without boundary
> We want to return to the mainland recover the country and reconstruct
> our homes. (NCTO, 1970, v.7, p38-39)

As well as in textbooks, anti-communism lived through songs, movies, TV shows, and literary works. Together, the multidimensional depictions of the CCP's character suggest the analytic of power that the KMT could conjure. It is important to emphasize that the banning of Marxist-related books does not entail that the Confucian child in the postwar Taiwan acted as an insulator to communism. Sun's *Three Principles of The People,* for instance, draws some ideas from communism as well. The KMT, however, intentionally ignored this as schools taught the *Three Principles of The People*. The fabrication of the Confucian child in postwar Taiwan allowed for no inscription of the Communist character into the ontology of the child. However, Sun's epistemology implicitly inculcated the Communist character into the child.

In 1966, the CCP launched the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution that tried to discard traditional Chinese historical/cultural discourses. The same year, Chiang Kai-shek initiated the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement to counterattack the CCP's Cultural Revolution through schools, mass media, and civic organizations.

> To redeem the sin of communist bandits' "cultural revolution movement", first we need to be aware and to delete any habits and customs which are not appropriate for the modern time, any unrealistic statements about Confucian values, and any

> irrational thoughts and behaviors. We have to spiritually mobilize the whole nation to counterattack and recover our nation from communist bandits on the base of our civilized and supreme national morals--propriety, justice, honesty, sense of shame, filial piety, brotherly love, loyalty, trustworthiness, the pursuit of the very source of a learning, honesty and righteousness, the practice of moral culture, family values, the government of a nation, and the achievement of world peace--and to revive and enhance our traditional cultures. (Department of Education, 1989, p.44)

For the KMT, the abandonment of Confucian values by the CCP was inappropriate, unrealistic, and irrational. In result, the KMT had to make all necessary efforts to revive and enhance Confucian values. Schools at all levels reinforced the instruction of Confucianism, civic values, and moral behaviors. The movement existed beyond just schools. The academy, mass media, and community all worked to consolidate the Confucian child. The Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement launched by the KMT here was not merely the beginning of the teaching of Confucian values in postwar Taiwan, but rather, an escalation of it both in depth and breadth. Before 1966, the inculcation of Confucianism had been viewed as a weapon to deal with communism.[11]

The advent of Confucian reasonings required the advent of communist notions. The Confucian values were read within the primary sources, so the reading of Confucianism here became the latent anti-communism movement. It was through the reading of Confucianism that an "orthodox" Chinese consciousness was constructed. This construction included the naming of Teacher's Day after Confucius' birthday, the version of the fixed male and female roles, the prioritizing of collectivism over individualism, and an emphasis on filial piety that eventually

[11] As Chiang Kai-shek (1965) argues that "to implement the anti-communist education, we must first know what the Communists are most afraid of….. What they object to the worst is education on national spirit. What is the education on national spirit? It is what I often mention, the education on traditional virtues and values." (p.23)

converted to patriotism (see Lee, 2007).

The virtues foregrounding the orthodox Chinese gained security through appeals to the Confucian works and could be reinforced through the reading of Confucius' informants' deeds. Yueh Fei, the famous general of the Song Dynasty, for instance, fell into the dilemma of whether to look after his aging mother or go to battle to defend against invaders. Eventually he converted to idea that the virtue of filial piety was part of being loyal to the state.

> In such a critical moment, a man must devote himself to the national cause. If the country collapses, there will not be any single home left. When being torn between patriotism and filial piety, one must know the priority; and that is, country comes first. (NCTO, 1954, v.6, p.33; 1964, v.7, p.45; 1970, v.7, p.50)

It was through the reading of Yueh Fei that accomplished the Confucian notion of turning filial piety into patriotism and sparked the imagining of the ideal Confucian child in postwar Taiwan. However, I am not suggesting that the notions of filial piety and patriotism are mutually exclusive, but that the acknowledgement of filial piety's existence guaranteed the emergence of patriotism. It is through the transformation from filial piety to patriotism that produced the notion of *Hao Jan Chih Chi*. For the KMT government, the cultivation of *Hao Jan Chih Chi* acted as a spiritual weapon that enabled the Confucian child to bravely fight against the enemies (communists), to take precedence of collective interests over individualism, and to be loyal to the KMT. The KMT's actions promised that people would repeatedly narrated several other stories, similar to the Yueh Fei's example. Such stories constituted the latent anti-communism discourses in the textbooks while the character was replaceable with figures such as the old farmer, the little child, the KMT martyr, or concubines.[12]

The Confucian inscription of *Hao Jan Chih Chi* also exists in the work of Shao Kang, the

[12] For instance, lessons such as *The Childhood of Our Founding Father*, *Speech on Huang-Hua-gang Martyr Commemoration Day*, and *The Biography of Shen Yun-yin* highlighted the sacrifice of one's life for one's country.

heir of the Hsia Dynasty. He was determined to take revenge and revive the country after a follower killed his father, Hsiang. The charismatic Shao Kang rebuilt his nation with meager resources and insufficient manpower within a small territory, which gradually grew in strength under his excellent leadership. Finally, the "rebellious" group was annihilated, and the Hsia Dynasty took power. The KMT government hoped to build a strong analogy between Shao Kang and Chiang Kai-shek. Both Shao Kang and Chiang Kai-shek were victims harmed by "treacherous" people, and they both came to places with small territories to rebuild their nation. Chiang, like Shao Kang, wished to take revenge and revive his nation. The story of Shao Kang imparted a message that the villain might overwhelm another via conspiracy and violence but would be unable to rule the state permanently under his atrocious leadership. Thus, one day the brutal Mao in China would likewise suffer expulsion by the KMT under the virtuous leadership of Chiang Kai-shek. Again, we see the repeated telling of several other stories that bear similarities to Shao Kang's. Such stories instituted the latent anti-communist discourse found in textbooks. The Confucian child in postwar Taiwan became depicted as having the courage needed to win over the evil forces of Communism. It was through the depiction of Shao Kang that produced the by-product of a leader cult status in the KMT. The accompaniment of an admirable character and exemplary behaviors of leaders, such as Sun and Chiang Kai-shek, connects their stories with the child's ontology.

In summary, the KMT's appeals toward both manifest and latent anti-communism articulated the Confucian child's willpower as the child acquired the anticipated abilities to hate the CCP, cultivate *Hao Jan Chih Chi* to expel the CCP, and love one's leader.[13] Together, these abilities constituted the orthodox Chinese consciousness, which did not rely

[13] Fenby depicts Chiang Kai-shek as a man who consciously used Confucian notions of piety and loyalty to inspire respect, and who imagined himself as a "paterfamilias" of the Chinese nation (see Fenby, 2003).

wholeheartedly on *Analects*, however. Rather, they appear as something more akin to "Confucian Fascism" (see, Fenby, 2003). That is, to consider that almost everything started with discourses such as "recovery of the lost land" or "the Chinese communist vicious bandits." Further, the demarcation between manifest and latent anti-communist texts cannot be positively identified, as they were sometimes interchangeable.

The Shifting Locations of the Notion of anti-Communism

Various strategies helped to weave together the anti-communist discourses, such as global/local comparisons, political philosophies, and cultural reasonings. The global and local play of powers in the 1970s went through several shifts that changed the parameters of the anti-communism cosmology. The idea that the R.O.C was the only legitimate government of China met challenges due to the U.N. Assembly's resolution to replace Chiang Kai-shek's representative with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the U.S. government's diplomatic relationships with China. As a result, the plan to aggressively counterattack the Chinese and Russian Communists transformed into a relatively moderate policy of reunifying China under the *Three Principles of The People.* At the same time, the KMT government worked to emphasize Taiwan's capitalist economy and compare Taiwan's *Three Principles of The People* with mainland's communism. On the one hand, the KMT claimed that the diplomatic setbacks were due to the malfunctioning U.N. and the wrong U.S. foreign policy. Here, this reinforced the KMT's concept of its own infallibility. Yet, this same moment placed emphasis on the achievements made under the operation of a capitalist economy in Taiwan. The introduction of several industrial and transportation projects occurred, such as "round-the-island highways and railroads, the international airport and harbor facilities, shipbuilding companies, the steel-wire industry, and nuclear and hydroelectric power plants" (as cited in Su 1998, p.138). Large-scale development projects undertaken in Taiwan, when compared with the destitute situation in Communist China, once again proved how the "superior" *Three*

Principles of The People overwhelmed the "inferior" communism. The shifting play of power's role in the 1970s refigured the site of the Confucian child.

In addition, urbanization and industrialization emphasized by the KMT also marks a shift from an agricultural society to a modern society as inhered in the utilization and, sometimes, exploitation of nature. To achieve higher standards of living at the expense of harming the environment here constituted yet another facet of the Confucian child in postwar Taiwan.

The Shaping of the Orthodox Chinese through Political and Cultural Nationalism

The term "Chinese" in anti-communist texts largely refers to those who follow Confucian values and Sun's *Three Principles of The People*, particularly directed toward the CCP. In this section, "Chinese" comprises the third element of the postwar Confucian child in Taiwan. Usage of "Chinese" serves to distinguish it from what we today recognize as Taiwanese. The term "Taiwanese" refers to people under Japanese colonial rule (1895-1945) who spoke either Japanese or Taiwanese dialects, and later, to those who promoted Taiwanese consciousness. Power enters into the narrative at least three levels in the invention of the Chinese: 1) as a cultural dimension to de-Japanization and de-Taiwanization linguistically, which enabled Taiwanese to become Chinese; 2) as a historical quality that highlights the relationship between Taiwan and China, which views Taiwan as part of China and claims refined Chinese culture; 3) as a political philosophy that opposes Taiwanese independence.

Chinese as De-Japanization

Taiwan, similar to many African countries, ended its colonial period after World War II. However, the end of colonialization for Taiwan did not come with independence, but with a reunion with the lost motherland, China. The transfer of political authority from the Japanese government to the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) in 1945 came with a change of language

policy. For the KMT, the Taiwanese were considered "tainted by long exposure to the Japanese ways and ideas" (Edmondson 2002, p.29). Japanese policies of colonization and assimilation operated through the ways in which the Taiwanese dressed, lived, and spoke, but more importantly, constituted the grounds on which the Taiwanese became colonized people and second-class citizens.[14] As such, the KMT's cultural discourse "should be focused on promoting national consciousness and eradicating the slave mentality" (Hsiau 1998, p.84). It was a policy, in a sense, to de-Japanize as well as re-Sinicize.

Soon after the KMT came to Taiwan, the newly established Taiwan Provincial Committee for Compiling Subject Matter for Elementary and Middle Schools proclaimed principles of a Sinicization curriculum that included aims to "(1) re-write textbooks in subject matters such as Mandarin, Chinese history, Chinese geography and Common Sense in the hope of instilling in students a national consciousness; (2) to reprint the national standardized textbooks and select authorized textbooks from the mainland; and (3) to translate Japanese materials in areas such as math and physics" (Chen, 2003, p.85). Outside of the educational domain, the also newly created Provincial Mandarin Committee endorsed Mandarin Chinese at the city and country levels (see Chen, 2003). Meanwhile, the KMT launched a movement of de-Japanization, which included the prohibition of written Japanese communication, speaking Japanese, and the publication of Japanese newspapers/magazines. The strategy of learning Chinese was "to recover the Taiwanese dialect so as to enable the public to learn the national language by comparison between the dialect and the national language" (Hsiau 1998, p.85). In this period, the appeal to Taiwanese in the process of learning Mandarin Chinese and the eradication of Japanese were written into the Confucian child.

[14] The presence of the Japanese colonial system in Taiwan for over five decades and the Japanese role in establishing the Japanese consciousness will be addressed in Chapter Four.

Chinese as De-Taiwanization

The inscription of Chinese through de-Japanization is not the only version of Chinese in this process of Sinicization. Learning Chinese with the aid of Taiwanese dialects during the process of de-Japanization formed merely a stopgap measure. The facilitation of the de-Taiwanization policy emerged after the 228 Incident[15] and the KMT's retreat to Taiwan. Furthermore, the multidimensional de-Taiwanization brought the child into view. In the field of education, for example, the KMT government requested that schools use only Mandarin Chinese (see Mao, 1997). The students could not speak Taiwanese dialects in school. If they did, they would receive punishment (see Hsiau, 1998). Moreover, the teacher's main task was to impart anti-communism and Chinese nationalism by using standard Mandarin Chinese.

In family circles, the censorship mandates restricted television programs from using native languages on television. This restriction reached its peak during the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement period when the KMT government requested that Hoklo programs, which included puppet shows and traditional Taiwanese soap operas, should air for less than one hour per day on each channel (see Hsiau 1998). The Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement operated to direct to the CCP's Cultural Revolution and to attempt to enlarge the scale of de-Taiwanization that inserted Chineseness into every fiber of the Confucian child.

> In 1972 the government ordered that all television station could not air more than one hour per day of Taiwanese-language programs and that hour had to be broken up into two segments at lunch and at night. During 6:30 P.M. prime-time hour, only one of the three stations could air a Taiwanese-language program. In 1976, another

[15] On the evening of February 27, 1947, an illegal female cigarette vendor was beaten up by Taipei City Monopoly Bureau agents. An angry crowd gathered and violence broke out after an officer killed a bystander. The next day, the protesters marched to the Monopoly Bureau Headquarters and Chen Yi's office. In the afternoon, a soldier at Chen Yi's office fired into the crowd, triggering an island-wide "uprising." Violence against the mainlanders and the KMT administration soon spread beyond Taipei.

> rule was passed which said that all television shows had to be in Mandarin and the shows in Taiwanese would be gradually be phased out over the year. (Wachman 1994, p.107)

The denial of Taiwanese dialects facilitated the child's admittance to Chineseness that engendered a dual purpose of state cohesion and elimination of regionalism. These processes of Sinicization and de-Taiwanization inscribed understandings about the worldview of language into the child. The term "Chinese" was synonymous with higher social economic status, thus denoting being superior, refined, and positive. On the contrary, the Taiwanese and Hakka languages were "not only minor but also backward" (Liao 2000, p.6). Theese strategies enabled the announcement of speaking Chinese as being patriotic as opposed to speaking Taiwanese, which was considered separatist.

> The Taiwan Independence Movement is intended to divide the ROC, so [its members] absurdly claim that Taiwanese are not Chinese; they call themselves *tang-wai*, promote the use of Hoklo, deprecate the national language, and cause obstruction to propagation of the national language and linguistic unification. These [actions] will lead to the division of the country. The *tang-wai* group thus asks: "Are students wrong if they speak dialect?" "Mandarin, Hoklo, and Hakka all should be treated as official languages." Isn't this a plot to divide the country by [creating the tension in] the linguistic issue? Why must students speak dialects? Why don't they speak the national language?...[This] absurd separatist idea must be totally purged (Mu 1983, p.23)

The KMT's dualistically linguistic cosmology resembles its strategies to represent the CCP that attempted to generate an absolute center ("us," the Chinese) vis-à-vis the demarcation of a margin ("them," the CCP or Taiwanese). Despite the fact that the KMT did not demonized the Taiwanese dialects to the same extent as the CCP had, the fact that Taiwanese occupied a

negative place helped to shape a constant episteme to fabricate what the child should be per these terms. The episteme involved a process of social inclusion/exclusion that, as determined by the competence or incompetence of the Mandarin Chinese.

Chinese as Cultural Nationalism

The third inscription of Chinese in Sinicization occurred through the weight on the relationship between Taiwan and China that situated Taiwan at the margin and China at the center. This concept brought the Confucian child in postwar Taiwan into view.

> Thousands of years ago, Taiwan and China were connected. Geologically, Taiwan is a part of a long Pacific chain of separated islands which extends from Japan to Taiwan to the Philippines. Because of the sinking of the edge of the mainland that was connected to the Asian continent. Taiwan was separated from the continent and isolated as an island. (as cited in Su 1998, p. 109)

The fabrication of history further extended the lack of a clearly-demarcated geographical boundary. According to the KMT, Taiwan was historically an integral part of China, and the Taiwanese, like the people who inhabited China, were Chinese as well. Even though under the Dutch (1624-1662) and Japanese (1895-1945) colonial periods, the Taiwanese were depicted as being loyal to their motherland, China (see Su, 1998). Cheng Cheng-Koung's story, for example, was a tool to highlight the relationship between Taiwan and China. Cheng ended the Dutch rule of Taiwan in 1662 and viewed the island as a base from which to recover the Ming Dynasty, which the Ching Dynasty overthrew. Cheng's letter to the Dutch general claimed that Taiwan historically belongs to China and that the Taiwanese's ancestors come from China, which became part of school textbooks (see Lee, 2007). Further, the KMT government stressed the parallels between Cheng Cheng-Koung and Chiang, as both were described as anti-colonial heroes who had fought against the "illegitimate" mainland regimes from bases on Taiwan (see Taylor, 2006). As for the Japanese rule, it was depicted as an undemocratic entity in which the

people of Taiwan did not have freedom of speech (see Hsiau, 1998). At the outset of the Japanese rule, the KMT claimed that some Taiwanese attempted to cooperate with the motherland to try to fight against the Japanese. Later, the nationalist revolution initiated by Sun Yat-sen in early-twentieth-century China incited the Taiwanese anti-colonial movement against the Japanese. Sun's attempts to oust the Ching Dynasty, coupled with the Sino-Japanese war (1937-1945) led by Chiang Kai-shek, were "in part intended to liberate the Taiwanese from Japanese colonialism" (Hsiau, 1998, p.264). In both colonial periods, the China-Taiwan relationship figured as mother and son unwittingly provided the grounds for greater renditions of China's child.

The conception of a greater China consciousness as written into the child shined through the cultural domain as well. A notion of embryonic cultural nationalism of China traces back to the idea of *huaxia*. This term initially referred to "a general sense of Chineseness emanating from the mythical *Xia* dynasty" (Chen, 2003, p.82). In ancient China, the belief was that Chinese culture developed along the Yellow River, and that when compared, it was the Han culture that was more "civilized" and "refined" as against other Chinese tribes.

> Historically, different ethnic tribes who were called *dong yi*, *nan man, shi rong, and beei syi* (popularly known as *yi*, later so called *hwa*) entered into the Central Plain along the Yellow River and joined the Cathy tribe. The Cathy tribe was like a huge river which other branches of tribes like tributaries. These tributaries gathered together into the river. The greater the amount of water, the stronger the power of the Chinese. This is how Chinese races were composed and developed (as cited in Su1998, p.39).

These ethnic tribes were so-called "barbarians" that either made peaceful treaties or were involved in conflicts and wars with the Han Chinese in the process of immigration (see Su, 1998). As time went by, the ethnic tribes "settled down in Central China, these tribes naturally

imitated the Han Chinese life styles, written language, customs, celebrations, and beliefs" (as cited in Su 1998, p. 41). The trope of the mainstream river that collected several kinds of streams together suggested that the Han Chinese had cultural "superiority" over other "uncivilized" tribes. Minority groups experienced cultural assimilation when they encountered the Han culture, and such groups eventually became part of the Han group.

The Han culture assimilated the minority groups and even expanded its cultural colonization to neighboring countries, such as Japan and Korea. These countries imported Chinese art, Confucian philosophy, medicine, language, and so forth into their culture. For the same reason, the KMT believed that the strong Han culture would enrich the "backward" Taiwanese culture. For instance, Wu Feng's story, served to feature the Taiwan aboriginal group's "immorality" and, more importantly, the Han culture's superiority.

> In the early 19th century, a group of mountain people had a barbarian custom of hunting human heads for the ritual of harvest. They usually went out to hunt Han Chinese heads in certain days of a year. Wu Feng, as a righteous Han Chinese businessman, came to this area and wished to do business with the barbarians for the exchange of deerskins and others. However, the custom of hunting human heads scared off many Han Chinese and created a tension between mountain people and Han Chinese. Only Wu Feng was trusted by both sides. He became an only person who can convert mountain people to abolish their barbarian custom. But how he converted mountain people was heartbreaking and respectful. He told mountain people that there would be a Han Chinese riding a white horse passing through the village. They could hunt his head but this should be the last one that they hunt. As it turned out, that person mountain people hunted was Wu Feng. Wu Feng finally converted mountain people to abolish their head-hunting custom by sacrificing himself. (as cited in Mao, 1997, p.105)

The appeal to the Han culture superiority fostered the articulation of Mandarin Chinese as refined, orthodox, and brought about the inclusion of Chinese history and geography.

> The promotion of civic education must pay special attention to the teaching of "Chinese history" and "Chinese geography," for it is only through them that the students' patriotic fervor and national pride can be really aroused, that s/he can be made to realize the fundamental significance of the basic virtues of loyalty, filial piety, humanity, love, honesty, justice, peace and harmony as well as those of propriety, righteousness, incorruptibility and honor, and that he can taught to become a citizen who loves his country more than his own life. (Quoted in Wilson, 1970, pp.154-155)

It should be noted that there existed no diametric opposition between the Han culture and Taiwanese culture. For the KMT, Taiwanese culture was lesser than Chinese culture. The Taiwanese needed immersion into the "Han-motherland authenticity" (Lin 2005, p. 114). By doing so, a Taiwanese person might be able to love his country (the R.O.C or the KMT) more than his own life. Here, the adherence to orthodox Han culture was equated with a loyalty to the R.O.C that was inscribed in the Confucian child in the process of Sinicization.

Chinese as Political Nationalism

The connection of cultural nationalism with political nationalism grew in vibrancy after the 1980s. It was a time when the KMT faced diplomatic setbacks and oil crises. The legitimacy of the KMT's rule over Taiwan met challenges. These challenges incited a surge of Taiwanese Consciousness.

> As for the few youth who are bewildered by the absurdity of Taiwan Independence, we should identify their education in national spirit. The so-called "education in national spirit" was to teach students that all people in Taiwan, except for a few "aborigines" in the "mountains," come from the Chinese mainland and are

> descendants of Huangti (the Yellow Emperor). They are 100 percent nationals of the Republic of China. They share the same culture, language, blood, customs, and habits. Their ancestors' tombs are all on the Mainland. Their common cause and their future hinge upon returning to mainland. (as cited in Mao, 1997, p.96-97)

The cultivation of "education in national spirit" was one of the ways that paved space for the creation of the Republic of China. For the KMT, the appeal to common blood ties and shared cultural backgrounds meant a final reunification between Taiwan and China in the form of an entity named the R.O.C. This effort was by no means the pursuit of Taiwan as an independent political entity. In sum, there are at least four categories of Chinese character inscribed in the process of Sinicization. Chinese character involved: (1) the eradication of Japanese culture that at the same time acknowledged the existence of the R.O.C, (2) the process of de-Taiwanization and re-Sinicization that occurred in conjunction with the imposition of Mandarin Chinese, (3) the geographical, historical, and cultural concepts that enabled the construction of greater China consciousness and situated Taiwan at the margin, and (4) a political correctness and moral high ground that proclaimed that the R.O.C represented all of China and that never allowed the Republic of Taiwan to exist.

Conclusion

The chapter has laid out several trajectories on which the child seems to be the Confucian child in postwar Taiwan. Before doing so, I addressed the shifting conceptions from Confucianism to neo-Confucianism that preceded the emergence of the Confucian child in postwar Taiwan. The processes are more than the continuous addition of quotidian events but include the modifications that took place as Confucianism competed within a partially shared intellectual world with Taoism and Zen Buddhism. Confucianism defined itself in conversation with and against these philosophies, which brought about the advent of neo-Confucianism. In doing so, this history operates as a springboard that enables the analysis of the modern Confucian child in postwar Taiwan.

The inscriptions of Sun's *Three Principles of the People*, as well as the conceptualization of anti-communism and Sinicization, together, constituted the child. These shifts led to the contouring of the modern Confucian child and brought into relief the ruptures between "classic" and "modern" Confucian child engrained within the notion of being Chinese. The modern Confucian child demonstrated itself through Sun's *Three Principles of the People* that allowed for the allocation of power to reason the concepts, such as democracy and nationhood, which was almost unrecognizable in Confucius' time/space.

Even though the KMT government highly honored Sun's *Three Principles of the People*, the KMT did not rely wholeheartedly on Sun's reasoning about the state, political philosophies, and humanity's central place. The multiple renditions of the term Chinese under the KMT government emphasize less about Sun's concept of democracy and more about the fabrication of orthodox Chinese through cultural and political nationalism in anti-communism campaigns. The locale of Sun's *Principle of Democracy* coupled with the "radical" American democracy in KMT's anti-communism discourses became overshadowed by the "conservative" KMT conception of "democracy." Moreover, when the term nationalism shifted from the concept of

China vis-à-vis the West under Sun's cosmology to the scenario of the KMT vis-à-vis the CCP-Russia political alliance, this enabled a different reconfiguration of the child. It was through the conceptualization of Sun and the KMT's ideas of democracy that opened the possibility for another kind of child (Hu Shih's child) in which resided the internal powers of the child to reason democratic conceptions of politics and the reversion of government-citizen relationship.

The analysis in this chapter suggested that a reworking of nationalism in anti-communism discourses from Japanization to de-Japanization and de-Taiwanization partly shaped different subjectivities available to the Confucian child. These reworkings also led to the identification of center/margin, refined/vulgar, patriotism/separatism distinctions to ascend and face challenges in postwar Taiwan. The strategy of de-Japanization-de-Taiwanization-Sinicization nexus that produced the marginalization of Taiwanese culture/consciousness and brought Yeh Shitao's Taiwanese discourses into the context of shifting diplomatic relations that took place in 1970s Taiwan, which I cover in Chapter Four. But, I suggest that, the center/margin, refined/vulgar, and patriotism/separatism dualisms used to discern the proximity to Chineseness are by-products of Sinicization that also helped Lee Yaun-zhe and the educational reform discourses of the 1990s to be articulated in Taiwan. This history is a major topic in Chapter Five. To this end, the very regionalism attributed to naming the "Chinese" in this chapter is both necessary and challenging.

The Confucian child via the glimpse of the notion of the Chinese, therefore, exceeds the reach of identity-politics that is available for immediate inspection within past/present reasonings, which moves out of material and profane geopolitical category that would demarcate the notion of Chinese. By doing so, this chapter also argues that domains of the Chinese, rather than suffer omittance through total substitution, still bears the mark of their site of production and value systems today.

Chapter Three
Democratizing and Scientizing the Child: Hu Shih, Mr. Democracy, and Science in Postwar Taiwan

The discourses that Hu Shih had accessible for him to imagine the child differed tremendously from those that shaped the modern Confucian child, despite the proximity of time/space. Hu's works fell into a framework of "Chinese Enlightenment" when Chinese civilization experienced enormous changes that compelled people to read Confucianism differently in early twentieth-century China (see Chou,1990). The Chinese civilization prior to the Enlightenment was based on the four cardinal bonds and the eight morals,[16] and this met marginalization due to a series of humiliating defeats in the wars against the West since the nineteenth century. The Chinese Enlightenment, therefore, marks the shift from perceiving the Confucian three bonds to what Hu called "an era of re-evaluation of all values" (Lien, 1965, p.68).

When it comes to the term the Chinese Enlightenment, names such as May Fourth Movement and New Culture Movement automatically come to mind. The former originally refers to the date that the demonstration that took place on the fourth day of May 1919, which was as a reaction to the Beijing war-lordism, Japanese imperialism, and the injustices China underwent in the Paris Peace Conference (Chen, 1970, p. 73). The latter emerged prior to the May Fourth Movement, which was primarily concerned with the question of cultural change. The scope and depth of the May Fourth Movement shifted after the incident from an emphasis of political action to cultural reevaluation as it drew ideas from the New Culture Movement. Many new cultural leaders began to participate in politics in the context of the post-May Fourth time/space that was previously not inherent in the basic spirit of the New Culture Movement.

[16] The four cardinal bonds include ritual, righteousness, integrity, and sense of shame; the eight morals include loyalty, filial piety, benevolence, love, honesty, righteousness, peace, and equality.

The two movements complemented and reinforced each other, which led to "the actual breaking down of the old tradition and the creation of a modern state with true mass consciousness" (Chen, 1970, p.75). They both gave birth to new thought and new literature movements. For the purposes of this chapter, the May Fourth Movement denotes a period extending from 1915 or 1916 to almost 1925 (see Chow, 1955).

It is within such framework that a variety of introduced thoughts from abroad attempted to transform China from a "backward" country to a "modern" industrial state. The term backward signifies an adherence to superstition and feudalism based on submissiveness; the term modern indicates how "individual sovereignty" was built on the underlying ideas of science and democracy. It was through the rewriting of Chinese civilization, political philosophy, humanity, and the literary revolution carved out a discursive space for the child and different analytics of power in Hu Shih's works. As such, the first part of this chapter focuses on the relationship of these concepts regarding Hu's rendition of the child and the new pedagogical techniques they embodied. Despite that fact that Hu Shih himself did not write about education or child-rearing advice, this chapter suggests that his text analyses vividly comport the imagined child figure's qualities in ways that help to make sense of the more direct pronouncement.

Furthermore, I provide analyses of the debates among Hu, Chinese Marxists, and Liang Chi-chao's (later similar to the KMT's) designs of civilization and political philosophical conceptions that appeared in the (post)-May Fourth period. These analyses help me to explain the locale of Hu's child in postwar Taiwan, which is the concern of the second part of this chapter. The debates on issues concerning civilization and political conceptions still reverberate today in postwar Taiwan's time/space.

Rewriting Chinese Civilization through Scientific Power

By the time Hu Shih could write his ideas of wholesale Westernization to regenerate China, the term westernization was not something new for the May Fourth generation. For the Chinese in the nineteenth century, some Chinese became aware that their elegant poetical expression and good calligraphy could never curb the sharp cannon and warship of the "barbarian" that occurred through capitalism and industrialism. Yet, China remained "the world" (tien hsia) of civilization at this time (see Chou, 1990). A restricted notion of Westernization took flight, which referred to technology (e.g., the shipyard, railway, arsenal and so forth) as most of the officials and intellectuals believed that China was only technologically inferior to the West.

At the turn of twentieth-century China, young Chinese intellectuals, impressed by the consequence of the Japanese Meiji Restoration, believed that in addition to learning scientific techniques, China should also model its laws and political institutions after those of the West (Chow, 1955, p.18). The problems of political and social institution remained present, and thus began implantation of the notion of "pien-fa-wei-hsin" (i.e., to change the statutes and to reform) embedded in a constitutional-monarchial system to regenerate China (see Lee, 1974). They still maintained that Chinese philosophy, ethics, and the fundamental principles of the traditional society, which they considered more basic and substantial than laws and institutions, should not be changed (Chow, 1955, p.18). Chang Chih-tung's popular slogan in 1898 promoted Chinese learning for the fundamental principles and Western studies for the practical matters that manifested the situation at this time (see Ayers, 1971).

It was not until the emergence of the May Fourth Movement that Chinese civilization underwent public examination in a sweeping fashion that led to the treatment of Confucianism as "the symbol of feudalism and the single greatest obstacle to modernity, hindering the development of a scientific outlook, class consciousness, and liberal democratic values" (Chaibong, 2001, p.315). For the May Fourth intellectuals, the notion of Westernization was

not only about scientific methods and political reform, but also about the reevaluation of China's philosophy and ethics, social theories, scientific theories, and social institutions that made visible Hu Shih's wholesale Westernization. While Chang Chih-tung's arguments on Chinese learning as substance and Western studies as practical use were still available. In addition, anti-Confucianism was the predominant tool to recreate China during the May Fourth period.

Hu Shih's rewriting of Chinese civilization positioned in the contexts of May Fourth Movement time/space stressed three major techniques that would eventually also facilitate his renditions of political philosophy and humanity: 1) the call for wholesale Westernization; 2) the preaching of literary revolution; 3) the concept of social immortality that brought about individualism.

Civilization, Power, and Westernization

For most May Fourth intellectuals, the emergence of a new republic in 1912 was nominal because China could not change without a social transformation based upon a thought reform. This need corresponds to John Dewey's argument during his trip to China: "the political revolution was a failure, because it was external, formal, touching the mechanism of social action but not affecting concepts of life, which really control society" (as cited in Chow, 1955, p.428-429). The change in concepts of life based on the scientific method became paramount for Dewey and many of the May Fourth Movement leaders who desired for China to become an "advanced" nation.[17]

[17] For instance, Dewey argues that "it is recognized that technology and other branches of applied science are dependent upon science as a method of thought, observation, registration, criticism, experiment, judgment, and reasoning. The idea is gaining ground that the real supremacy of the West is based, not on anything specifically western, to be borrowed and imitated, but on something universal, a method of investigation and of the testing of knowledge, which the West hit upon and used a few centuries in advance of the Orient" (as cited in Chow, 1955, p.429).

It should be noted that the notion of what we call critical thinking or scientific method today was not something new in the May Fourth period. This involved the translation of works such as Thomas Huxley's *Ethics and other Essays* (published in 1899), Adam Smith's *The Wealth of Nations* (published in 1902), John Stuart Mill's *On Liberty* (1903), Herbert Spencer's *Study of Sociology* (1903) and Kropotkin's *Mutual Assistance*. These texts provided the discursive contexts in which humanity would be able to be contoured so differently from Confucianism. Among them, John Dewey's pragmatism as a method of thinking became the dominant discourse for the reevaluation of Chinese civilization during the May Fourth time/space (see Chow, 1955).

Drawing on John Dewey's scientific method and on the interpretation of viewing culture as ensemble, Hu Shih argues for the idea of wholesale Westernization as necessary for the regeneration of China based on "the spirit and method of evidential thinking and evidential investigation" (Lien, 1965, p.78). By doing so, it allows the evaluation of which cultures would remain and which ones belong within the necessary erosion process enacted by wholesale Westernization.

First, three questions came to Hu Shih when thinking about traditional Chinese civilization:

> 1) of the traditional systems and conventions, do they deserve to survive today? 2) of the teaching of sages and philosophers handed down from ancient times, are their words still valid today? 3) of the behavior and beliefs receiving the blind approval of society, is everything that has been approved by the public necessary and correct? Should I do this just because others are doing it? Is there no other way that is better, more reasonable and more beneficial? (Lien, 1965, p.68).

In Hu's view, there is little spirituality in Chinese civilization through the examination of the pragmatic method. Some Chinese practices lacking spiritual value include 1) the parallel

essays, rhythmic poetry, eight-legged essays, and five-generation households that are out-of-date 2) the bound feet, eunuchs, concubinage, memorial arches for honoring chastity that were against human rights, and 3) the hellish prisons, law courts filled with instruments of brutal torture (see Chou, 1974). Hu Shih's case was not a unique one. Wu Yu deploys similar pragmatic methods for examining Chinese civilization. Wu focuses on filial piety and argues that it became a duty for the display of obedience. For instance, offspring' marriages were determined by the parents and if one had no son after that wedding, they took for granted despising the woman, thereby concubinage prevailed. The ethical principle of "filial piety" and the identification of the latter side of the fathers/sons and husbands/wives divide as an inferior form of personhood became the basis for the principle of loyalty to the sovereign and the pretext of despotism (see Wu, 1921). Together, these "defects" of Confucian ethics coined Lu Hsun's arguments about Chinese civilization as "cannibalism"[18] that made "overthrow Confucius & Co." a popular slogan among the Chinese intellectuals amid the May Fourth time/space.

Secondly, for Hu, the interpretation of civilization as an ensemble enabled the articulation of Chinese culture as an inferior form of civilization not only materially, politically, morally, but also in the fields of literature, fine art, and physique (see Chou, 1974).

> After all, culture is usually one, is a whole; and if we take this attitude……that Western civilization is materialistic and Chinese culture is spiritualistic, we may be compelled to drop all steps of modernization…….We must unreservedly accept this modern civilization of the West because we need it to solve our most pressing problems of poverty, ignorance, disease and corruption. These are the real enemies

[18] The term appeared in Lu Hsun's *The Diary of a Madman*. In this short story, he furiously attacked Chinese tradition and civilization that practiced "benevolence, righteousness, and morals" on the surface but had unconsciously practiced cannibalism for four thousand years (see Lu, 1918).

> we are facing, and none of these can be subjugated by the old civilization (as cited in Fan, 1963, p.115).

For Hu, China's inabilities to create cannons, warships, and railways, for example, denote not only technological inferiority but also China's spiritual inferiority to the West. For Hu, China needs to understand that Western civilization is not only material but is highly idealistic and has spiritual values (Fan, 1963, p.115). By transplanting Western civilization, not only can material needs be satisfied, but the human spirit can be "liberated" from ignorance and fatalism. Hu considers the ideas and principles underlying Western technology and political institutions, such as philosophy, ethics, science, literature, and the arts, to be a variety of powers that shape the parameters of a society. Powers under civilization were thereby plural, not unified, and the locations of power that constituted the ensemble of civilization emerged separately. It is also the shifting conceptions of civilization that resulted in the dispute between civilization-as-one and civilization as spiritual/scientific binary.

The debate in question is most noticeable in the debates between Hu Shih and Liang Chi-chao. Liang Chi-chao posits that East/West civilizations are spiritually/scientifically binary per his trip to Europe and his interpretation of Liang Sou-ming's Eastern/Western civilizations. The differentiation of Eastern/Western is based on the following logic about "nature:" The Eastern (Chinese) way of life was to posit personhood as part of nature. Chinese life adjusted to circumstances that manifested in self-sufficiency mentality and the golden mean; Western civilization, on the other hand, tried to emphasize Mr. Science and Mr. Democracy to the conquest of nature (see Liang, 1922). Liang Chi-Chao demonstrates that the scientific power propelled European civilization into danger. The development of scientific power that led to industrialism lacked the means to improve human civilization. Instead, the emergence of scientific power endangered spiritual power. Liang, like other neo-Confucian scholars in the 1920s, refutes an indiscriminate worship of Western civilization. The core of the disagreement

between Liang and Hu lays in that the former suggests an excess of scientific power would cause imbalances in the civilization, while the latter thinks that the absorption of Western civilization's various powers would advance Chinese civilization. As such, Liang's idea indicates that the deployment of Western civilization to supplement Chinese civilization still requires the application of Western methods in the study of Chinese civilization (see Liang, 1960). Hu's holistic view of civilization does not entail the need to carefully study Western civilization, but rather to wholeheartedly accept the various powers set within the Western civilization.

For Hu, the merging of Chinese civilization with the Western, as described in Liang or Sun Yat-sen's *Three Principles of the People*, was an act of compromise that would fail to result in Chinese modernization. Hu discussed this proposed compromise in more detail:

> Compromise is the natural tendency of human indolence; it does not require our advocacy. The majority of people can probably, with effort, walk only thirty or forty li while we go a hundred li. Now if we start talking compromise and go fifty li, then they will not move even one step. Therefore, the duty of the reformer is to set his goal in the right direction and to go forward, not to turn back and talk of compromise. There will inevitably be numerous laggards and cowards in society to come out for compromise (as cited in Lien 1965, p.69).

The strategies of comprehensive Westernization in Hu's cosmology, I argue, indicate the unreserved acceptance of Western values, such as democracy and science, rather than the upholding of Western civilization at the expense of Chinese civilization. The admittance to culture's inertia appears to aid Hu in acknowledging the impossibility of undergoing comprehensive Westernization without the identification of Chinese civilization, and since culture's inertia compelled this comprehensive Westernization to return to a Chinese basis,[19]

[19] Hu Shih argues that "the product of this rebirth looks suspiciously Occidental. But, scratch

compromise will naturally result from even a wholesale effort at Westernization (Hu et al, 1967, p.14).

The difference between Sun Yat-sen's cultural blending and Hu's comprehensive Westernization comes down to their varying outlooks on what is to come of Westernization. Sun Yat-sen desires to fuse traditional Chinese civilization and Western civilization into a new one, a civilization primarily grounded in the notion of compromise. Hu considers the outcomes of the acceptance of Western civilization and by doing so theorizes that competitions and comparisons between the two cultures can partially destroy the resistance and conservatism of a certain culture (see Hu et al, 1967). Westernization eventually resulted in compromise and harmonized into a new Chinese culture (see Hu et al, 1967).

The "new Chinese culture" beheld the concepts of the Confucian thought, such as benevolence, loyalty, filial piety, and compassion, as universal values practiced by other civilizations as well (see Chou, 1974). The new culture also emphasized the investigation of the previously ignored non-Confucian schools.[20] In the process, these aspects of the culture helped to develop a stronger absorption of "the best products of Occidental philosophy and science" (Hu, 1922, p.8). Long-neglected ancient Chinese thoughts could be recovered through the scientific methods and, at the same time, could compete and be compared with the total importation of Western philosophies.

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its surface and you will find that the stuff of which it is made is essentially the Chinese bedrock which much weathering and corrosion have only made to stand out more clearly--the humanistic and rationalistic China resurrected by the torch of the scientific and democratic civilization of the new world" (as cited in Lee, 1974, p. 144).

[20] In Hu's *The Development of the Logical Method in Ancient China,* he argues that "this emancipation cannot be accomplished by any wholesale importation of Occidental philosophies alone. It can be achieved only by putting Confucianism back to its proper place; that is, by restoring it to its historical background. Confucianism was once only one of the many rival systems flourishing in Ancient China. The dethronement of Confucianism, therefore, will be assured when it is regarded not as the solitary source of spiritual, moral, and philosophical authority, but merely as one star in a great galaxy of philosophical luminaries" (Hu, 1922, p.4-5).

Moreover, the processes of competing and comparing one culture with another allowed Hu to articulate that the ideas of civilization and reform came into creation in slow movements of inches and drops. The idea of rewriting civilization thereby needed to deal with concrete problems to reach a gradual bit-by-bit improvement of society through the appeal to scientific power. The use of Deweyan pragmatism seen in the usage of comprehensive Westernization corresponds to Hu's idea of civilization because this idea rejects the ideal of a final perfect society that is reached by long leaps. Instead, Hu's idea dictates an approach that occurs on a gradual and evolutionary path centered around the idea of doubt. Within this framework, the notion of ism is a method to find a solution for a practical problem, not a cure-all for the problems of China. Since the formulation of ism emanated from the study of specific and practical problems, it should be regarded as the tag with which to identify the various solutions (see Hu, 1930a) and to help bring about a concrete plan for "the solving of this or that problem" (Lien, 1965, p.157).

It is also in the discussions of ism, problems, and civilization in Hu's cosmology that marks a radical departure from the Chinese Marxists' view of civilization. For Chinese Marxists, they treat civilization as primarily composed of material power, which one can see from Li Ta-chao's depiction of civilization.[21] The Chinese Marxists draw on dialectic materialism to suggest that all problems relate to one another in an all-embracing structure, thus ism can help achieve a solution to various problems at once. Therefore, the problems China faced did not need separate treatment by finding the corresponding ism, because an ism

[21] For instance, take the relationship between "I" and "the origin of the world," primitive society worships natural objects, such as the sun, the moon, fire, water, the snake or the tiger. In agricultural society, people generally believe in polytheism, with the development of commerce monotheism becomes the dominant form of religion. The advance of industry and science is followed by the rise of theism and antitheism. In other words, the relation between "I" and "the origin of the world" is strictly determined by laws of economic development (as cited in Fan, 1963, p.105).

originates from groups of interrelated ideas that can provide necessary guidance for social reforms, just as a destination is necessary for a voyage (Lien, 1965, p.163). Under this premise, a leading Marxist argues that only when economic power changes can there be major changes in other aspects of a society.

> At this time, I am afraid only a basic solution offers the hope for the solution of individual, concrete problems. Take Russia as an example, before the overthrow of the Romanoff dynasty and before the reform of economic organizations, no problem could be solved. But now they are all solved. According to Marxist materialism, all legal, political, and ethical structures within a society are simply superficial structures. Underneath there is an economic structure which serves as a basis to all of them. Once economic organization is changed, they all have to be changed. In other words, the solving of economic problems is the solving of basic problems. Once economic problems are solved, political, legal, family, and labor problems will all be solved. (Hu, 1930a, p.510)

Addressing the economic power could lead to a solution to the problems China faced and serve as the major factor to reconfigure civilization, per Marxist cosmology. The ism-problem dispute in the treatment of powers in civilization thereby reflects distinctly on the numerous ways to confront the problems China had. Whether China could transform by dealing with specific social problems one by one based on Darwinism, or by an overall ideological reconfiguration accompanied by class struggle and a proletarian dictatorship was the dispute, which became more prevalent during the KMT-CCP conflicts.

In total, the debates between Hu's civilization-as-one and Liang's civilization as spiritual/scientific binary was a product of wider disagreements, which indicates the ruptures between Hu's child and the Confucian child in postwar Taiwan. Further, the Hu Shih-Li Ta-chao debates were no small event, for they suggest ruptures that still reverberated between the

Kuomintang (KMT) and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in postwar Taiwan's time/space. The analyses of Hu's notions of civilization, the KMT's proposal of reconstruction of civilization on a Chinese base, and the ideas of dialectic materialism, therefore, help us locate Hu's child in postwar Taiwan[22].

The Literary Revolution as Transformation of Chinese Civilization

By the time Hu Shih could write his *Some Tentative Suggestions for the Reform of Chinese Literature*, the concept of literary reform had developed at the turn of the twentieth century. The suggestions include: 1) the translations of Yan Fu and Lin Shu, the popular essays of Liang Chi-chao, and the political essays of Chang Shih-chao. Their writings partly drew from foreign writing genres that were adjusted to utilitarian purposes (see Chow, 1955 & Hu, 1924), 2) following the lead of the few scholar-reformers who started to use pai-hua (spoken language) for publishing periodicals and newspapers in early twentieth-century China, 3) abiding by the shift in the field of literary theory suggested by Wang Kuo-wei, under the influence of Nietzsche and Schopenhauer, that literature should be "for the description of life," and that each generation had its own literature (Chow, 1955, p.574), 4) incorporating the new systems for alphabetizing Chinese as developed by scholars (see Hu, 1935), and 5) recognizing the great number of novels in the vernacular were produced but lacked the same attention given to literary works (see Hu, 1929).

Despite the efforts to introduce these unfamiliar writing genres, these genres were located in an unusual and marginal position. The dominant discourses of Chinese literature in the nineteenth century were the Tung-cheng School, the Wen Hsuan School, and the Kiangsi

[22] Hu Shih's decision to come to Taiwan should be understood as his diametric opposition to the CCP's oversimplified explanation of civilization and his relative proximity to KMT's notion of civilization, but not as denoting his affinity to the KMT.

School. For the Tung-cheng School, literature is meant to convey principles (Wen i tsai tao), meaning that the writing must propagate the doctrines of the sages and moral principles (see Chow, 1955). Moreover, literary writings should have their own "mood, rhythm and color," signifying that their diction should be strictly selected and "vulgar" language delimited (see Wang, 1935). Together, these notions embody the "rhetorical principles" (i-fa) that Confucius follows in his writing styles in the *Annals* (see Chow, 1955). For the Wen Hsuan School, most of their writings were "parallel prose (pien wen)," over-burdened with stale rhetoric (Chow, 1955, p. 572), which was nothing new, as they imitated the writing styles of Chinese poetry and prose written between B.C. 246 and A.D. 502. For the Kiangsi School, their writing styles focus on the usages of archaic, obscure, and whimsical words to depict either trifle or ceremonial topics (see Chow, 1955). Most of the poets of the Kiangsi School in early twentieth-century China belonged to the Nan She (South Club), who initiated the 1911 Revolution.

What came with Chinese enlightenment, the conditions it presented, and the shifting of old literary works (parallel prose), in a justifying action, were new categories that replaced the old literary works. Works in the vernacular received consideration as defining what constituted living Chinese literature. These works include love folk-songs, the songs of the dancers, the epic stories of the street reciters, and the drama of the village theatre. Now, the classic literature that has long been the literature for the minority intelligentsia (e.g., the works of the scholars, the men of letters, the poets of the imperial courts) became obsolete. This transition hindered the development of effective and efficient ways to communicate, which consequently could not be spoken by the people. Moreover, it failed to produce a living literature due to its overemphasis on style at the expense of spirit and reality (Lien, 1965, p.320).

For the May Fourth intellectuals, the literary revolution was one of the most important strategies for the recreation of Chinese civilization. Hu Shih believes that dialect, and the

literary style it produced, was the undercurrent of this literary development, [23] which maintained a struggle against the despotic limitations of the classical tradition (Lien, 1965, p.326). In this way, Hu reverses the concepts of the vernacular literature as vulgar and classic literature as decent. It was vernacular literature that produced a new form of literature and furnished new blood and fresh vigor to the literature of the educated classes and rescued it from the danger of fossilization (Lien, 1965, p.326). In comparison, Huang Yuan-yung promotes the new literature to bring "Chinese thought into direct contact with the contemporary thought of the world, thereby to accelerate its radical awakening" (Chow, 1955, p.576). Then, for Chen Tu-hsiu, literature in early twentieth-century China remained in the stage of Classicism and Romanticism, and literary revolution was a means to help Chinese literature usher in the stage of Realism, a stage that Europe reached at the end of the nineteenth century. Within this same context, we can see how Hu's eight principles for writing vernacular works took charge. Wang provides a concise overview of these principles:

> 1) Avoid the use of classical phrases, 2) Discard time-worn literary conventions, and classic illusions, 3) Discard the parallel construction of sentences, 4) Do not afraid of using "vulgar" words and speech, 5) Continue to use the literary grammar. (The above suggestions are for revolutions in the external form), 6) Do not use sickly and over-emotional expressions when you are not really sick, 7) Do not imitate the ancients. Every sentence should reflect one's individuality, 8) The presentation must have content (Wang, 1928, p.126-127).

Hu's proposal for the literary revolution catalyzed the production of fresh writing genres that

[23] The undercurrent of literary development includes the yueh-fu shih poems (Music Bureau poems) in the Han, Wei, and Six Dynasties, with common daily life as themes and in free rhymes, (2) the colloquial poetry and Buddhist "conversational" style of prose in Tang, (3) the tsu (poetry in sentences with irregular length) in Sung, (4) the vernacular fiction and drama in Ching and Yuan, and (5) the five-hundred-year vernacular novel in Ming and Ching (Wei, 1979, p.117).

could manifest in at least four aspects. First, new poetry in the vernacular was widely experimented with by intellectuals such as Shen yin-mo, Liu Fu, Chou Tso-jen, Lun Hsun, Yu Ping-po, Kang Pai-ching, Chen Tu-hsiu, and Li Ta-Chao. Secondly, a new translation technique developed for the reading of modern European literary works. Thirdly, a new essay form surfaced, which usually bore a sarcastic tone to criticize political situations. Finally, this time saw the creation of the modern Chinese short story and a new drama movement (see Chow, 1960). Furthermore, five months after the May Fourth incident in 1919, the overall recommendation was that students should learn the spoken language in the primary schools. It soon became educational policy that students in the first two grades must speak the spoken language in Chinese classes, which accompanied the removal of the classical language written in the textbooks (see Fan, 1963). By the end of 1920, the vernacular (pai-hua) was the national language, both in speaking and writing (Fan, 1963, p.160).

The May Fourth intellectuals' approach to the literary revolution thereby denotes a drastic departure from the Confucian literary style. Classic literature met the most challenges through the reconstruction of the writing style in literary works, which fostered the vivid imagining of a re-conceptualization of personhood and civilization.

Social Immortality, Individualism, and Feminism

During his time, Hu Shih advocated atheism, which he redefined into the notion of social immortality based on two philosophical thoughts. One was pragmatism, as a scientific method, that helped Hu articulate the body/spirit split and thereby the question of the existence of Gods and the supernatural.

> On the basis of our verifiable scientific knowledge, we should recognize that the universe and everything in it follow[s] natural laws of movement and change--"natural" in the Chinese sense of "being so of themselves" -- and that there is no need for the concept of a supernatural Ruler or creator. (Lien, 1965, p.111)

Even though the notion of atheism is not unique to Hu Shih's thought,[24] what he required to incite this version of atheism was made possible through the power of science. One became more able to judge and to question the issues of God and soul after death due to the acquisition of scientific power. The power of science entails the careful study of the ways in which things originate, and how they develop, and to doubt beliefs, that one might take for granted. The new religion grounded in Hu's power of science brought about rationalization, and it differed sharply from the prevailing religions that emphasized more on rituals, which consequently encouraged the emergence of superstition for the May Fourth intellectual leaders. The "new religion" provided different discursive contexts for thinking about Feng-shui,[25] fortune-telling, divination by the Trigrams, disease treatment through drawing, writing, and charms, or incantation for controlling demons that were ubiquitous in the May Fourth time/space (see Chow, 1955).

Another technique that facilitated his rewriting of atheism into social immortality was Leibniz's notion of the universe when considered in terms of human relations. In *The Monadology*, Leibniz determines that the body and the thing respond to each other in the plenum regardless of the distance in time and space. The notion of the plenum, as applied to human relations, means that our actions and thoughts constitute the power to effect somewhere else in the world, and that power to affect will have results somewhere else as "the thing goes" on in infinite time and space (Hu, 1931, p.257).

> We do not see all, but everything is there, reaching into infinity. A man is what he eats, and the work of the Dakota farmer, the California fruit grower, and a million other food providers lives in him. A man is what he thinks, and everyone who has

[24] For instance, Fan Chen's idea of mortality of the soul written in Su-ma Kung's *General Mirror of History* argued for atheist discourses.
[25]It is a geomantic system by means of which sites are determined for graves, houses, or other buildings. It is said that this will influence the welfare of the people concerned.

> influenced him, from Socrates, Plato, and Confucius down to his parish preacher and his nursery governess. A man is also what he enjoys, and the work of numberless artist and entertainers, living or long dead, renowned or nameless, sublime, or vulgar, lives in him (as cited in Fan, 1963, p.88).

Hu's orientation to time and space positions individual power as a product of the past and present. The individual power is also important to the extent that Hu thinks the movements of one affect configurations in another. This "another" might be the one that will be born in the future. The ultimate goal of individual power is to strengthen the larger self, the society, either it the present or in the future, which, for Hu, means the socialization of religion. It enables the individual to show more sympathy to the sufferings of the wretched, which constitutes a religion of highest kind. Hu uses religion as an adjective that denotes an attitude that one may take toward every object and every proposed end of ideal (as cited in Lien, 1965, p. 115). By doing so, religion-as-adjective removes the unscientific and selfish parts[26] of secularized religions. The conception of immortality shows a major shift away from the prevailing religions in terms of the plan of salvation that is devoid in Hu's social immortality. The line of reasoning formulated through social immortality rules out the possibility of the existence of a purely independent individual that will not affect or be effected by others. The individual self is partly the incarnation of the social self[27] and it is the individual that determines the parameters of the

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[26] The individual self is subject to death and decay, but the sum total of individual achievement, for better or for worse, lives on in the immorality of the Larger self, that to live for the sake of the species and posterity is religion of the highest kind; and that those religions which seek a future either in Heaven or in the Pure Land, are selfish religions. (Lien, 1965, p.112)

[27] Hu argues that "It is important to understand that the individual is the result of numerous and varied social forces……..The "best elements" in society are not born that way, nor are they created by individual self-cultivation. They are the result of the fact that among the various forces that contribute to their creation good influences somewhat outnumber the bad……..Ancient social and political philosophy, unwittingly hoping to reform the individual in a vacuum, advocated such methods as setting the mind in order, sincerity of purpose, and attending to one's own virtue in solitude. These are not methods at all, for they provide no starting place. Modern humanistic philosophy…..has gradually ….come to the realization that the place to make a start on social reconstruction is with the improvement of the various forces

social self as well.

The version of social immortality gradually rendered into Hu's refutation and revision of the "Three Immoralities."[28] Hu Shih's social immortality pushes up against the "Three Immortalities," because in it he argues for a more encompassing view that includes the "lowly" and the "insignificant" as well as the heroes and sages, vice as well as virtue, who all could leave indelible marks upon the larger self, Society. Per this line of thinking, the individual will die, but they live on in this immortal great self. Within the framework, a mother whose activities have never gone beyond the trivial details of the home but has a lasting effect on people surrounding her; the other members of Christopher Columbus' crew, the men who built his ships or furnished his tools; the dead body of a beggar that triggered a prince to sublimate into an enlightened one and consequently the establishment of a great religion all manifest social immortality. Everyone's actions interact with others across time and space. Hu later refigures the traditional doctrine of the "Three Immortalities" by turning it into the concept of social immortality.

Moreover, social immortality, in terms of the self/society relationship, denotes a break from the traditional Confucian ethos that tends to "put far more emphasis on the affairs of their immediate concern than on social and national matters at large" (Chou, 1974, p.158). Confucian morality was presented as crushing the "I" and replaced it with the social role of paternal power (see Schwarcz, 1978). The expression of paternal power and the purge of individual power were thus epitomized in the idea of filial piety that intended to create "a big factory for the manufacturing of obedient subjects" (Oie, 1974, p.222). By contrast, the intention behind the position of the "I" in Hu's *No-Heir Philosophy* was to level the effects of

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that together create society- institutions, customs, thought, education, etc. when these forces have been improved, so also will men have been improved" (Grieder, 1970, p.99).

[28] The three kinds of immoralities basically include: of Li-the (the immortality of virtue); of Li-kung (the immortality of service); and of Li-yen (the immortality of wise speech) (Fan, 1963, p.85).

concubinage system, which includes the inferior position of females, offspring, and celibacy. They, to a considerable extent, are the manifestation of the notion of individualism under the banner of "anti-traditionalism" in the May Fourth time/space. The May Fourth intellectuals describe the idea of individualism as a "deliberating mentality" in similar ways. For instance, for Fu Ssu-Nien, individuality is the premise of all morality; whatever force that destroys individuality is the source of all evil. As such, the Chinese family system came to be seen as the greatest force that destroyed individuality (see Chou, 1990). Similarly, Yu Ping Po discusses the "three bonds" (the ethics between prince and subject, father and son, husband, and wife) as an example of how the originally reciprocal ethics became one-sided customs of enslavement (Chou, 1990, p.73).

Further, individual power could spark one's imagination of what they can change, such as women's emancipation, universal education, and suffrage (Chou, 1974, p.129). The "self-emancipation" concept exhibits itself in Hu's *The Big Event in Life* describes the incompatibility between the elder and young generation in regard to marriage.[29] Drawing on the Ibsenian spirit of an independent-minded non-conformist mentality, otherwise known as a rebellion against rotten customs, Hu's works convey the themes of hypocritical morality and the fake public-conscience. Of important note is that the depictions of the rupture of humanity between the two generations in Hu Shih's works corresponded to the May Fourth generation's attempts to depart from classical family rules. In the context of the post-May Fourth time/space, younger women started to join the student movement and its associated social and political activities. Moreover, young women struggling against either family bonds, marriage bonds, or for an education, often obtained public support after the May Fourth period (see Chow, 1955).

The support these young women received does not equate with the idea that society

[29] The mother opposed her daughter's marriage due to the messages from the fortune-teller, gods in the Kuan-yin temple, eventually the young generation managed to rebel the traditional thoughts and chose to elope with her boyfriend (see Hu, 1930b).

unanimously agreed upon individualism or feminism as worthy ideas. The official-scholar gentry and the warlord government in early twentieth-century China still firmly clung to the idea that a helpful wife and wise mother should have a "lack of learning." The phenomenon between the "deliberating mentality" of the May Fourth intellectual leaders and the upholders of "traditionalism" are two seemingly contradictory vectors of forces that competed and incorporated one another, which gradually wove that past into the present. In addition, the discussion of "emancipatory" curricular discourses in 1990s Taiwan seem to emerge out of the conditions that such preexisting individualism afforded in the contexts of the May Fourth time/space.

Rewriting Political Philosophy through Democracy

The appeals to complete a reevaluation of the traditional Chinese worldview and the idea of wholesale Westernization embedded in the scientific method were significant topics for the May Fourth intellectual leaders. The two lines of reasoning proposed by Hu Shih to be the "non-political" categories that constitute the necessary prerequisites for creating political decency (see Hu 1939 & Lien, 1965). Neither reasoning can reach realization without democracy. Science and democracy are constitutive of each other under Hu's cosmology.

Hu advocates for democracy by positioning power within the self-government framework: one possesses power for the articulation of the free thought, free belief, free speech, and free press publication, all which could improve a society and advance a civilization (see Hu Shih et al, 1967). In this model, people could think and speak at will to produce innovative ideas in both the "fields" of social and natural science. If one could not think and speak freely, then how could one envision new thoughts?[30] Power allocated to individual brings the role of the

[30] For instance, Hu argues that "Ever since the Reformation in religion initiated by Martin Luther more than four hundred years ago, the movement to fight for freedom of various kinds has made strides, and has thus ushered in a new world of rejuvenation of learning, pluralism in thought, social reform, and political reorganization. If there had been no freedom of thought, belief, speech, and publication, new theories in astronomy, physics, chemistry, biological

government into a clearer view: the government must be constitutional to prevent the abuse of political authority. The self-government relationship in Hu's political philosophies constitutes what he calls a "good government" (see Eber, 1965).

Hu's Mr. Democracy is thus vastly different from how Confucianism treats the subject-monarch relation: the family is the basic political unit and the father is responsible for the moral education of his family members; the father-son relation can extend to the monarch-minister (subject) relation and by doing so, one is positioned as living harmoniously with society. Moreover, the divine ordains the authority of the monarch, which gains further support from ethical powers, such as the four cardinal bonds and the eight morals. The two different political philosophical conceptions of the self-government relation position power in dissimilar locations, thus leading to shifting concepts of personhood.

However, Mr. Democracy did not replace the Confucian political philosophies after the emergence of the May Fourth Movement. China, in the context of post- May Fourth Movement time/space, tackled warlord politics, conflicts between the Nationalist and Communist parties, and the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945). All these events made democracy a less desirable political discourse (see Yang, 1993). The undesirability of democracy provided a major part of the discursive context that allowed the KMT to institute "political tutelage" (see Eastman, 1974). Democracy, as a "reactionary bourgeois institution," and its inefficiency could not fix the external threats and internal turmoil in China. Democracy, within this framework, became treated as worthy of deferment until one has the opportunity to truly learn it. It is also through such framework that Hu's critique of KMT's "political tutelage" thrived under Sun's *Principle of Democracy.* Hu Shih contends that democracy is simple to the extent that it depends on the

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evolution would not have been seen the light of day, and the new political and social ideas of Locke, Voltaire, Rousseau, Jefferson, and even Marx and Engels, would not have become widely known. This is a self-evident fact in recent world history, and I need not say more" (Hu Shih et al, 1967, p.182).

pooling together of the common sense of numerous ordinary citizens in governing the state (Oei, 1974, p.149). Democracy can expand itself beyond the form of the capitalist economic system. Democracy begins from the "grassroots," not from the government and then "down" to the people. The practice of democracy thereby enables the citizen to take part in discussing state affairs, connecting the individual with the society. Expecting a benevolent ruler versed in Confucianism is not viable for a citizen or country to wait to arrive. A democratic and constitutional government is the elementary political system most suitable for the training of a nation that lacks political experience (see Hu, 1949). By contrast, China's prolonged subjection to autocratic forms of government was complicated because they hinged on a selected few able members of the intelligentsia.

The discussion of the Hu-KMT disputes surrounding the desirability and feasibility of establishing democracy is important, for these disputes still reverberated in postwar Taiwan time/space. Issues included debates on how to shape the necessary conditions for democracy and the necessity to change the people. These issues became two seemingly distinct categories, and thus marks Hu's articulation of the individual power as being a fundamental departure from the reconstituted versions of Sun's *Principle of Democracy* under the KMT's anti-communist discourse in postwar Taiwan time/space.

The Fabrication of Hu's Child

The above section described the conditions that made available a rewriting of personhood and civilization under Hu's treatment: the debates between civilization-as-ensemble and civilization as material/spiritual binary; the concept of literary revolution based on pragmatism as a scientific method; the reconfiguration of humanity and political philosophy, a stark split from Confucian collectivism. Even though Hu Shih does not delineate on the child's nature and pedagogy as his teacher John Dewey did, I perceive the configuration of Hu's child through the interpenetration of such conditions. This section will map the perceived

Hu's child, particularly by comparing it with images of Confucianism.

The Scientific Life of the Child

In his reworking of Chinese civilization, it seems that it was not theological power that was omnipotent for Hu, but scientific power (see Lee, 1974). Hu's power of science is an attitude and method with which to examine social values. Per this current study, the acquisitions of scientific power facilitated the child to see morality and social institutions as dynamic. For example, in re-evaluating Chinese heritage, all inferences and statements must be based on evidence, and anything without proof is subject to doubt. The evidence-based statements, avoid blind obedience, shallow compromise, and help to recreate civilization through scientific power.

The shift toward science power helps me to show the emergence of the difference between Hu's child and the child Confucianism attempted to invent. For Hu, a child must receive training on critical thinking. On the contrary, Confucianism encourages the child "to seek quietude, to stop thinking and worrying, and to accommodate whatever comes" (as cited in Lee, 1974, p. 120). Their distinct views about the desired pedagogy of children derive from different perspectives of knowledge. Knowledge is eternal and unchangeable in Confucianism; thus, ethical power is especially highlighted. For Hu Shih, knowledge is not static and deserves examination via scientific power. The Confucian child is, for Hu, a collection of passively recollected obsolete memories, in contrast to the perceived Hu's child who had influence through creative and active powers. As a result, the perceived Hu Shih child's retreat from "the slaves of the ancients" (Chou, 1974, p. 46) reflects his advice to learn and write vernacular literature, but not to recite and write classic literature.

As noted above, Hu Shih's child's gaining of scientific power allows them to think critically about Chinese social values, literary style. It was also used to the examination of religion, despite the fact that Hu himself argues that Chinese society had a "mentality little inclined to religious superstition" (Lin, 1979, p.98). Scientific power helps to question the

existence of God and the supernatural, thus consequently confirming and reinforcing religious ritual as dispensable. The school, in this historical moment, was not a mere missionary agency, the curriculum contained no religious courses or Chapel services, and the students deserved equal treatment regardless of their religious backgrounds, including atheism (see Oei, 1974).

> The method "right hand with sword and left hand with Koran" of Mohammedanism you Christians do not agree with. "Right hand with bread, and left hand with Gospel" is the act of the Salvation Army, which is laughed at by Bernard Shaw. "Right hand with chalk and left hand with Bible" we do not agree with. To use the school as an instrument to spread the Gospel to an immature adult is a criminal act (as cited in Oei, 1974, p.169).

Religious education is not completely inessential, according to Hu. What he suggests is a delay of religion, only when the child's scientific power fully unfolds could they gain exposure to religious rituals.

In sum, the philosophies behind wholesale Westernization, the literary revolution, and social immortality directly inform one another, and I claim that together they elicit how scientific power mutated and compelled Hu Shih's child into existence. The rewriting of Chinese civilization derived from more than purely scientific results, but also the products of scientific and non-scientific investigations. Hu's child could make observations, cast doubt, and think critically after the acquisition of scientific power. The child received teaching to wholeheartedly refuse classic literature and to assume that the social woes that emerged in China were completely due to the application of Confucianism without using scientific power. The new civilization, as it applies to the child, therefore, constituted a scientific and yet "not-so-scientific" child.

The Challenges of the Confucian Family System

The emergence of Hu's understanding of scientific power, as depicted above, also

connects with his emphasis on individual power. The ability to think critically designates that the child inhabits a condition in antithesis to the types of human relations Confucianism promotes. For instance, we can see this tension through the removal of family and clan system, which allows the growth of individual power and increases the invisibility of paternal power.

> This child did not himself freely propose to be born and live in my family. We, the parents, did not receive his agreement but casually endowed him with life…..How can we claim any merits? How can we pretend to any particular kindness to him? …. I want my son to know that I feel toward him only a certain contrition [pao-chien]; certainly I take no credit for myself, nor do I boast of my own kindness. As far as my son's conduct toward me in the future is concerned, that is his own affair (as cited in Oei, 1974, p.128).

As such, the different views of individual/family relations denote a break between Hu Shih's child and the Confucian child in terms of the weight and location of power each holds in the family system. The ideas of obedience and compromise obtainable in the Confucian child are therefore null in Hu's child.

Reconstitution of Hu's Child in Postwar Taiwan

The present discussion so far has considered Hu Shih's conceptions of civilization, political philosophy, humanity, and the inscription of the child based on those combined trajectories. When the KMT came to Taiwan in 1949, Mr. Democracy and Mr. Science arrived in Taiwan due to the May Fourth intellectuals, and later these two concepts fell under the banner of "liberalism." The notion of liberalism manifested in the publications *The Free China Fortnightly*, *Democratic Ties* magazine, and *The Tribune*. These venues provided the discursive spaces for criticizing the KMT government and propagating desires for a new political party (see Wang, 1988). The organization of the opposing party became a pivotal strategy for the establishment of the democratic politics for people, primarily Lei Chen and Yin Hai-kung, in

postwar Taiwan's time/space. The opposing party was a loyal opposition party based on anticommunist discourse and simultaneously cooperated with local Taiwanese political leaders to build a real "free China" society that would never call for a so-called Taiwanese separationist movement. The differences between the ideas of democracy and science in the May Fourth time/space and the notion of liberalism in postwar Taiwanese time/space rest in that the former emphasized a recreation of civilization based on a transformation of ideas, while the latter focused on the changing of societal parameters through establishing a new political party. The discourses of liberalism were marginally located in postwar Taiwanese time/space, however (see Wang, 1988), analyzing the location of liberalism can help us find inscriptions of Hu's child in the context of anticommunist time/space.

Scientific Power and the Inscribed Hu's Child in Postwar Taiwan

In regards to Chinese civilization and humanity, Hu's thoughts mainly rely on two renditions of power: scientific and individual. In postwar Taiwan, scientific power was also inscribed in the Confucian child, while what this study knows as scientific power was somewhat different depending on its proximity to Confucianism.

As noted previously, the perceived Hu Shih's child underwent fabrication through a wholesale acceptance of Westernization grounded in bringing about a satisfactory adjustment (Hu, 1963, p.1) between the ancient Chinese civilization and the West. How to bring about a satisfactory adjustment in this context hinges on employing scientific power to retain that which is desirable and to remove that which is detestable in both cultures. Moreover, the ancient Chinese civilization here refers to Confucianism and non-Confucianism as well. By making said changes, Hu's notion of Chinese civilization does not privilege Confucian thoughts, but rather evaluates all schools of ancient Chinese thoughts with the aid of scientific power.

However, Hu's revision of Chinese civilization was unable to find a clear discursive space in which to operate in postwar Taiwan. The ancient values of the three bonds and five relationships, for instance, met challenges in Hu's cosmology due to the removals of the relationship between the minister and king, the bonds between father and son, and the bonds between husband and wife had undergone major changes in the contexts of democratic politics. These relationships were, however, intact in postwar Taiwan that privileged Confucianism over non-Confucianism.

In addition, even though KMT governed Taiwan with the aid of the U.S. government and attempted to maintain a friendly relationship between the two countries, wholesale Westernization still met tensions with KMT's political policies. The articulation of the dangers of indiscriminate acceptance of foreign cultures and of the castigation of Chinese culture in the contexts of post-May Fourth time/space was transfigured by the KMT to the exegeses of ethics, democracy, and science within anticommunist time/space. The notion of ethics took precedence over science and democracy, as the KMT generally interpreted ethics as "love for family, clan…reciprocal relationships…. and self-cultivation" (Schwarcz, 1978, p.203). As such, scientific power squeezed into postwar Taiwan to the extent that the KMT picked it up to supplement the lack of scientific precision rooted in Chinese character. The scientific power inscribed in the postwar Confucian child thereby incorporated the May Fourth intellectuals' demand for science, but in a somewhat curtailed fashion.

Hu's challenges to Confucianism concerning its social institution and family system with the aid of scientific power and Ibsenism also brought his rendition of individual power into view. The perceived Hu's child, like the postwar Confucian child, had the individual power to change the fate of the society or the nation, as epitomized in the notion of social immortality and the Confucian idea of the Superior Man. Despite this, Hu's child had more individual power to make their own decisions and to think more freely without regard to his/her family

members.

> A free society and a republican nation demand only that the individual have the power of free choice and that he bears the responsibility for his own education and actions. If this is not the case, then he does not possess the ability to create his own independent character. If society and the nation do not possess man of independent character, they are like wine without yeast, bread without leaven, the human body without nerves. Such a society has absolutely no hope of improvement or progress. (Greider, 1970, p.95)

A man of independent character in Hu's cosmology erases the patriarchal power that positions the individual as a member of their family or clan. The extension of patriarchal power to the individual's loyalty to the emperor is inoperable within the framework of individual power. As a result, Hu accentuates individual power and minimizes patriarchal power, which opens the space for a rewriting and reconfiguration of the child. As I have argued, the perceived Hu Shih child incites a redefinition of self/society and male/female dualism. The individual power inscribed in Hu's child did not have a discursive space to operate in postwar Taiwan, however. The KMT's appeal to Confucianism alongside the anti-communism policy that requested individual submission and obedience contributed to the invisibility of individual power.

Hu's advocacy of vernacular literature is the only exception that one can find directly written into the school textbooks used in postwar Taiwan. However, curricular discourses at the time did not endorse the vernacular literature unequivocally at the expense of classic literature. Rather, classic literature in postwar Taiwan was privileged over the vernacular literature.

Generally speaking, the KMT was not comfortable with the May Fourth youth's call for a new cultural movement symbolized in Hu Shih's child. As noted above, the Confucian child in postwar Taiwan incorporated a curtailed version of Hu's scientific power in the rewriting of Chinese civilization. Hu's scientific power and individual power never served as tools to

correct Confucianism and the KMT's governance. Moreover, the parameters of Hu's child are not so easy to discern because it was also determined by how the CCP in China defined the May Fourth movement (or New Culture movement). For instance, starting in the 1950s the CCP launched a movement aimed to purge Hu Shih's thoughts. This movement actually resulted in the KMT preserving Hu Shih's ideas and for Hu Shih's child to occupy somewhere else in the discursive spaces. The locale of Hu Shih's child remains ambiguous to the extent that every time Hu's child was made static through the KMT interpretations on civilization, humanity, and political philosophy inscribed in the Confucian child, Hu's child reemerged as a weapon with which to counterattack the CCP.

Political Power and the Hu's Child in Postwar Taiwan

> One of the great undertakings of the New Culture movement was the liberation of thought. When we criticized Confucius, and Mencius, impeached Cheng I and Chu Hsi, opposed the Confucian religion and denied God, our purpose was simply to overthrow the canons of orthodoxy, to liberate Chinese thought, and to encourage a skeptic attitude and a critical spirit. But out of the alliance between the Communist Party and the Kuomintang grew an absolute authoritarianism which has brought about the total loss of freedom of thought and opinion. Now you may deny God, but you may not criticize Sun Yat-sen. You need not go to church, but you must not fail to read the Tsung-li's *Last Will and Testament*, nor to observe weekly memorial service (Grieder, 1970, p.231).

Hu Shih's scientific power aids the discussion about a lack of rationality and reasoning in traditional Chinese culture, while his espousal of political power is not ostensibly in line with the KMT's claim of democracy that was actually being marginalized. The opening quote cited above helps us to glimpse the discursive space that the perceived Hu Shih's child occupied in the face of Sun and later the KMT's treatment of democracy in postwar Taiwan.

As noted previously, Hu Shih conceives democracy in a somewhat unique way from Sun Yet-sen in terms of their different understandings of political power and their definitions of individual power. For Sun, democracy is arranged via a schedule: the three-stage progression from military unification through a period of political tutelage to the ultimate goal of democracy, in which individuals learn democracy. Democracy only becomes meaningful when the people attain a level of education and political experience, per Sun. On the contrary, the individual's power to exercise free will and political power is equally distributed to every individual in Hu's cosmology. Hu Shih thereby refutes Sun and reiterates the importance of establishing a constitution. Without a constitution, there could only be a dictatorship. The idea of Sun Yat-sen's three-stage democracy gained wide circulation in postwar Taiwan, while Hu's idea of an immediate implementation of democracy became almost invisible at this same time.

On the topic of democratic ideals, it is important we remember that Hu's utopian vision of democracy includes the interpretation of political power as needing a constitution, the rule of law, and the cultivation of desirable ideas and disposition such as the development of critical thinking. Before the arrival of democracy, Hu's notion of good government, that claims to show an apathetic attitude to political affairs and to focus on non-political powers, is actually a much less democratic movement when we compare it to Sun's three-stage of democracy. As such, if one takes together his notion of good government, as based on the development of cultural power and his utopian vision of democracy, it seems that Hu's democracy is almost no different from Sun's. The shift from a good government to democracy means, for Hu, the development of non-political powers. Although, for Sun the shift from military unification to constitutional democracy refers to the development of individual power to master the idea of democracy.

When the KMT retreated to Taiwan, even though the KMT viewed Sun's *Principle of Democracy* as a sacred text, there were discontinuities between Sun and KMT's understandings of democracy. Sun's democracy never developed into practice under the martial law

enforcement in postwar Taiwan, not to mention Hu's democracy. Only do we see democracy in postwar Taiwan practiced at the local level under the control of the KMT, which today we call a pseudo-democracy.

Hence, the locale of Hu's child can only be sensed as something that furtively emerged as it was embodied in the *Free China Fortnightly* magazine. The fact that Hu Shih's espousal of democracy and his criticisms of the KMT were absent from curriculum discourses did not entail a total neglect of Hu's call for liberalism and freedom. For example, Hu lent his name as an "honorary" publisher for Tzu-Yu Chung-Kuo (*Free China Fortnightly*), a periodical that played a significant role among intellectuals in the 1950s. Hu's action and the publication represent that the so-called American democracy departed from Hu's notion of good government (i.e. the development of non-political powers based on a stable political situation, and even authoritarian rule would suit) deviated from the KMT's political discourses in postwar Taiwan.

> First, we want to proclaim the true virtue of freedom and democracy to all citizens, and we want as well to monitor and encourage all levels of government to take practical steps toward the reformation of our political economy and the building of a free and democratic society. Second, to make every effort in resisting the totalitarian regime of the Communist Party, which behind an iron curtain strips away all liberty. Third, we want to do the utmost possible to help support our compatriots now fallen into enemy hands, and to assist them in the early restoration of their freedom. Fourth, our ultimate objective is to make all of the Republic of China a "Free China" (Ying, 2000, p.70).

There were other prominent figures that contributed to the founding of the *Free China Fortnightly.* They include the founder, Lei Chen, Mao Zishui (professor of Chinese at National Taiwan University), Hang Liwu (former Minister of Education), Yin Hai-Kung (a professor of

logic in the Department of Philosophy at NTU). Until *Free China* halted publication, due to the KMT arresting Lei Chen in 1960, the liberal magazine affected many of those who called for democracy in Taiwan in the 1960s. These readers obtained momentum through both *Free China Fortnightly* and Hu Shih's thoughts. The perceived Hu Shih's child inscribed in *Free China* in postwar Taiwan slightly differs from Hu's thoughts in China. The former stresses the democratization of Taiwan more and therefore is the reconstituted version of Hu's thoughts.

Hu Shih's political power under KMT governance in postwar Taiwan remained marginalized for a while but later came to the fore due to the shifting global discourses. These discourse include the international changes in political situations and fluctuations in the global capitalist market that led to the problematizing of KMT's political control over Taiwan in the 1970s. Under these circumstances, a series of movements and protests occurred both abroad (mainly initiated by students overseas) and at home.

The political power inscribed in Hu Shih's child subtly came to the surface and inspired Taiwanese intellectuals including historians, lawyers, literary critics, professors, and writers, to articulate Taiwanese nationalism (see Hsiau, 2000). This significantly and subtly turned into a pursuit for localization in the political arena and later in the field of education. Another trajectory that Hu's political power incited was the pursuit of democracy in the 1980s, which consequently led to new imaginings of democratization, humanization, multiculturalism, and globalism that was inscribed in the child in the 1990s educational reform discourses. As such, in the 1990s, the perceived Hu's child in postwar Taiwan (the reconstituted version of Hu's thoughts) underwent a tremendous shift, so large that democratization at the time not only rendered Hu's political power into view but also brought Hu's rewriting of civilization and the reconfiguration of humanity into being. The fabrication of the ideal child in the 1990s is a by-product of Hu Shih's child.

Conclusion

The chapter has laid out several routes that developed into Hu's thoughts of civilization, political philosophy, and individualism. These thoughts helped to map his analytics of power and consequently the contents he gave to the child. Hu Shih's child, as it was written, does not directly regard what education-rearing advice Hu Shih offers. Rather, the perceived Hu Shih's child provided an icon by which to render the ideas in-formation through his notion of pragmatism implanted in the May Fourth "deliberating mentality." As such, the chapter did not elaborate on each of these vectors and corresponding interpenetrations of Hu Shih's idea of pragmatism as singular, otherwise known as focal sites in May Fourth history, as though words such as democracy and science have historically been spoken in relation to such sites. Nor did the chapter outline a simple extension of focus to terms such as democracy and science within a restricted locale. Rather, it was my aim through this chapter to elucidate how modes of thought, such as democracy and science, drew on ideas that are anterior to its most obvious effects, as well as generate their own effects from within such a framework. The image of the child silhouetted against the horizon is therefore ambiguous to the extent that its production is due through the comparison between civilization-as-one and civilization-as-scientific/spiritual debate. This debate generated a series of differentiation, juxtaposition, and nuance that gave shape and attributes to the child. This double space of images of May Fourth individualism and Confucian ethics is not binary, and the debates that I speak of are intersecting forces in the same phenomenon in process of inscribing the child. Under such circumstances, Hu Shih's child did not completely disappear from the perceived notion that pragmatism opposed. The legacy of Confucianism formulated as a modern Confucian child in postwar Taiwan absorbed some of Hu's ideas, and vice versa, some facets of Confucianism inspired Hu Shih. The emergence of Hu Shih's child, therefore, is part of a process of dialectic interplay with Hu's

ideas and Confucianism.

The mapping of Hu Shih is crucial because the differentiation on notions of personhood between May Fourth intellectuals and modern Confucianism reverberated between Taiwanese consciousness/Confucian ethics and the educational reform discourses/ Confucian ethics. It is especially important to analyze the ways Hu's thoughts hid in postwar Taiwan within the process of dialectic interplay with the Confucian child that later catalyzed the emergence of localization and democratization discourses in the political arena. Together, they forged the educational discourses that Ye Shitao and Lee Yuan-zhe's child epitomize. To bring to light what was hidden therefore bears connotations of alterity and nonrepresentational sense, the autonomous domain being unearthed here: 1) helps establish new methodological possibilities that the identification of modifications, that affected mode of thoughts, could be captured (see Foucault, 1973), and 2) by doing so, this strategy implies criticism and negation[31] without trying to replace it with a new grand narrative that falls into a binary formula. The role of Hu's child, therefore, activated the surfacing of what 1990s education reform discourses seemed to take for granted. As a result, the perceived Hu Shih's child partly remains as the perceived Ye Shitao and Lee Yuan-zhe's child emerged in the late-twentieth century Taiwan. In addition, the given parameters of Lee Yuan-zhe's child of the late-twentieth century Taiwan express Hu's thoughts. Ye Shitao and Lee Yuan-zhe's child is a partial offspring of Hu Shih's child. To this end, the parameters of Hu's child offer readers a different and more nuanced springboard into the contemporary claims made about modern educational reform discourses and its ongoing debates.

[31] The strategy I use here comes from Baker. For Baker (2009a), the notion of alterity that politics of negativity brings about suggests "not just a secret and volatile life of objects and subjects" (p.29) but that negativity "cannot be ontologised as some veiled or marvelous Other for which no adequate conceptual schema or vocabulary (yet) exists, despite the seductiveness of the fantasy and occasional gestures in this direction by its dreamers" (p.29). The term negativity, therefore, gains its strategy from its opposition to the positive, yet is not simply negation.

Chapter Four
"Taiwan Must Be Taiwanese's Taiwan:" the Construction of Localization Discourses

The conceptions of power in the writings of Yeh Shihtao manifested the shift in the location and weight of power's theorization from Chinese-ness to Taiwanese discourse. In 1977, Yeh Shihtao's *Introduction to the History of Taiwan's Nativist Literature* was published, which brought the debates over *hsiang-tu* literature (the term *hsiang-tu* literally means "country-soil") and the *hsiang-tu* and the mainland writers[32] into focus. This same text helped build Taiwanese nationalism in the second half of the 1980s, which fairly departed from Yeh's notion of Taiwan consciousness (the reconstitution of Yeh's nativism, as this chapter details).

The occurrence of Yeh's Taiwan consciousness did not suggest that the positing of Taiwan as the center was initiated by him, as the notion of Taiwan consciousness can be traced back to the Japanese colonial period. Nor did it mean that the Chinese consciousness, as rooted in the notion "the Chinese are the descendants of the Yellow Emperor," gave way to Taiwanese nationalism whose adherents' political jurisdiction incorporated Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu. Hence, the first part of this chapter considers the interpenetrations of the different discursive conditions that assisted Yeh in writing about Taiwan consciousness and the inscription of the child in 1990s curriculum discourses. The discursive conditions include: (1) the emergence of Taiwanese nationalism alongside the advent of Chinese-ness and Japanization in the Japanese colonial period (1895-1945), (2) the shift from Taiwanese consciousness to Taiwanese independence that arose in the decades immediately following the KMT's arrival in Taiwan, and (3) the international and economic factors that pushed Yeh and his contemporaries to write *hsiangtu* literature. These sections of the chapter focus specifically on the political

[32] The mainland writers refer to those who came to Taiwan with the KMT government after the KMT was defeated by the Chinese Communist Party.

mobilizations and cultural identifications of Taiwanese consciousness that do not directly discuss what capacities or roles the child possessed. Yet, these factors became extremely important to the rendition of the child that came to the fore in 1990s curricular discourses.

The second part of the chapter studies Yeh's conceptions of Taiwan consciousness. Contrary to what one might think, these conceptions were not founded on a complete reversal the Confucian child's thought about Chinese-ness, but on a partial separation of Taiwan from China. The move from positing Taiwanese culture as the offshoot of Chinese culture to that of a complete separation of Taiwan from China received echoes from the *hsiang-tu* writers and the *tangwai* group of the 1980s that constituted the reconstitution of Yeh's nativism. The two trajectories of Taiwan consciousness in Yeh and the reconstitution of Yeh's nativism worked together to shape new curricular discourses in the 1990s. However, Yeh's concept of Taiwan consciousness that was more influential than the modified Yeh's child that contoured the figure of the child in the 1990s.

Taiwanese Nationalism, Chinese-ness, and Japanization

> Taiwanese consciousness is a product of a specific social and economic development……. Before the middle of the nineteenth century, when Taiwan had not yet established an island-wide economy, the society remained at a stage characterized by a localized and self-sufficient economy. At that time, there were only strong "Zhangzhou consciousness (*Zhangzhou yishi* 漳州意識)," "Quanzhou consciousness (*Quanzhou yishi* 泉州意識)"or "Hakka consciousness (*Kejia yishi* 客家意識)." After Japan occupied Taiwan, to help develop the colonial empire, capitalism-style construction was carried out and, as a result, island-wide enterprises were expanded. An initial integration of Taiwan's society and economy was achieved, and the productive relationships of the people on the island were also properly aligned. Consequently, an island-wide interlocked Taiwan (yizhong

quandaoxing xiuqi-yugong de Taiwan 一種全島休戚與共的台灣) was formed. (Song, 1986, p.230)

By the time Yeh wrote his *Introduction to the History of Taiwan's Nativist Literature*, the nascent Taiwanese nationalism had emerged during the Japanese colonial period (1895-1945). Wu (2003) reasons that "the notion of modern Taiwanese nationalism did not come into being until 1919 when the Japanese had completely eliminated local armed resistance..., and when the first generation of Taiwanese intelligentsia who received the Japanese-style modern education" (p.164). While armed resistance was still going on after 1919, it was a sociopolitical movement that was the principle way of expressing who "we" are vis-à-vis Japanese colonialism. The advent of the Movement for the Establishment of Taiwan Parliament (METP), for instance, lead to the inception of a sociopolitical movement, manifested the disillusionment with the assimilation movement[33] of the 1914, and developed the quest for self-determination in post-World War I time/space. The nascent Taiwanese nationalism came into being through two trajectories, the Wilsonian doctrine of national self-determination and the democratic thoughts of Japan's Taisho Democracy (Wu, 2003, p.204) that later solidified the "principle of nationality" in the 19th century and the notion of "personalism" (see Hobsbawm, 1992). The concept of "nation" endured a major shift from being the identification with larger national groups to becoming a principle applicable also to "weaker and smaller nations" (Wu, 2003, p.178).

The personality of Taiwanese developed its contours through the demonstration of a form of cultural and political particularity. The argument of the METP discourse in terms of cultural particularity was made possible through the ideas that "we" have "our" own history, social conditions, manners, customs, "our" own thoughts, and "our" own culture (see Lin,

[33] The assimilation movement here means that the inhabitants on the island were to be treated with "impartiality and equal favor," and that does not mean that they had to associate themselves with Japanese society or culture per se (see Lamley, 1970-1971).

1920). This could be glimpsed through observing Taiwanese schooling in which until about 1918, many of the parents who sent their children to common school made sure their children spent their after-school hours studying the Chinese classics with a native scholar (Sadayoshi, 1915, p. 635). The cultural particularity that derives from the southeastern part of China, therefore, does not evaporate or simply transform into Japanese customs through gradual assimilation. Since it is impossible to implement assimilation that can completely erase the history and customs of "colonized others" (Taiwanese), then "we" need a special right to political participation that is not based on assimilation (see Wu, 2003). The linkage of "our" own cultural particularity with China is not meant to suggest that the Han people living on the island still believed themselves to be Chinese, however. Wu (2003) maintains that political abandonment from the old motherland (China) and discrimination from the new motherland (Japan) aided the constitution of an embryonic Taiwanese nationalism that was Han culturally, but not Chinese politically, nor authentically Japanese. The emergence of nascent Taiwanese nationalism seems unimaginable during the first two decades of Japanese rule as the dominant discourse that included the loyalty of the islanders to the Ching dynasty, nor does it even appear to be a thinkable conception in the era of the assimilation movement that stressed liberty, equality, and fraternity.

It is important to note that the assimilation movement and the gradual assimilation ordered by the Japanese Governor-General are quite different. The former suggests that the Han people living in Taiwan wanted to receive "the same rights and treatments as the metropolitan Japanese" (Wu, 2003, p.167), whereas the latter emphasizes cultural and educational inclusion to incorporate the people living in Taiwan to ultimately become Japanese, which the Han people of Taiwan rejected. The rejection of gradual assimilation here does not suggest that the Japanese "neo-traditional modernization" was completely disdained, however. The positioning of Japanese rule as "neo-traditional modernization," when compared with the more "advanced

Western modernization,[34]" let Taiwanese people[35] feel more comfortable in absorbing the Japanese modernization that the Taiwanese deemed to be a Western legacy (see Wu, 2003). By doing so, the Taiwanese inevitably assimilated into Japanese civilization. In fact, according to Wu (2003), the Taiwanese reacted to the assimilation by paying attention more to the absorption of "modernization" than resisting to colonial assimilation and the preservation of "our" own culture. In this example, modernization refers to the construction of north-south roads, railways, telecommunications, electricity, radio, unified monetary, and measurement systems, running water, and sanitation which featured inoculation, quarantine, and anti-rodent campaign, and more (Chang, 2000 & Tsurumi, 1979). By contrast, the identification of "our" own culture became ambiguous to the extent that Chinese schools declined remarkably in popularity by 1920.

To say "our" own culture is the unusual and marginal position does not mean that a native culture of Han people was not established vis-à-vis colonialism. The establishment of the Taiwan Cultural Association, for instance, is fundamental to the cultural imagination of Taiwanese nationalism in relation to the MEPT's political imagination of Taiwanese nationalism. Drawing on the concept of the Kantian individual self-determination and Wilsonian collective self-determination, as the Taisho Democracy symbolizes (see Chen, 1988 & Wu, 2003), we can see how the new subjectivity proposed by the Taiwan Cultural Association appears through the imagination of cultural reconstruction. The highlight of individual self-determination, or personalism, in Taisho Democracy, resembles Hu Shih's proposal for individualism. Both "Taisho liberals" and Hu emphasize the development of personality as the catalyst for the articulation of cultural reasonings, which ultimately made

[34] This does not mean that the people living on the island welcome wholeheartedly the western ideas, such as science, for these drew the youth away from the traditional preoccupation with literary refinement and moral virtue (Tsurumi, 1979, p.620).
[35] The term "Taiwanese" as used in this section, refers specifically to the registered inhabitants of Chinese descent who comprised approximately 96 percent of the colonial population.

thinkable a new nation-state. Under this reworked worldview, the island inhabitants suffered through regard as victims of "mental malnutrition," and the only cure was to take more cultural movement vis-à-vis colonial rulers (see Chen, 1972). The cultural movement included summer schools and night schools that taught courses such as the Chinese language, Chinese literature, Chinese history, Chinese geography, sociology, journalism, astronomy, public health, and European intellectual history (see Chen, 1972). By doing so, the reconstitution of Taiwanese humanity grew with the power to the critique of the Japanese governance that inhibited personal development, confront colonial rulership, and address the oligarchic economy. In addition, the process of "enlightenment," as enriched in individual self-determination, sparked the emergence of an "independent culture of Taiwan's own" (Wu, 2003, p.282). The "purely cultural movement" indicates power's shift from a possession owned by the colonial authority to a distributed form allocated evenly to the people; this shift mutated into a nationalistic movement.

Moreover, the May Fourth Movement, that took place in China in the late 1910s, is another trajectory that made possible the imagination of a new culture (anti-Confucianism) and the usage of a new linguistic tool (vernacular Chinese, or *pai-hua-wen*). By doing so, the history of the cultural reconstruction accentuates the difference between "we" and the colonial governance. Before the introduction of the new culture and literary genre, the Taiwanese and the colonial rulers shared the same Confucian cultural heritage. The attack on ones' own tradition, in this case, was also an attack on the tradition of the most immediate other (Japan) (Wu, 2003, p.300). However, the unavailability of institutional support and the failure to take the situations of Taiwan into consideration created contentious debates among Taiwanese intellectuals and made it impossible for the ideas of anti-Confucianism and vernacular Chinese (*pai-hua-wen*) to create a "unique Taiwanese culture" (Wu, 2003, p.308). Therefore, the fabrication of "our' own unique culture in the early 1920s was relatively ambiguous vis-a-vis

the political discourses of Taiwanese nationalism at the time.

It was not until the second half of the 1920s, when the debates between the political "left" and "right" wings emerged, did a relatively concrete imagination of cultural Taiwanese nationalism blossom in the early 1930s, just as the Japanese Government-General destroyed almost all the political activities in Taiwan. The two trajectories of sociopolitical and cultural discourses to imagine Taiwanese nationalism, therefore, have a symbiotic relationship, as each directly/indirectly enriched the other.

There are other facets of the symbiotic relationship between the sociopolitical and cultural imagination of Taiwanese discourses that reflect the respective positions they each occupied. As noted above, the sociopolitical movement was the dominant discourse in the post-World War One time/space, in comparison to the cultural discourse of Taiwanese nationalism's marginal position. This emphasis on the sociopolitical movement proves to be especially true in the second half of the 1920s when the discussion about cultural discourses among nationalist went relatively mute and Leninism enriched the focus on the political movement (see Wu, 2003). Communism was now the new lens through that both "left-wing" and "right-wing" supporters directly or indirectly drew on it to articulate Taiwanese nationalism. The emergence of left-wing/right-wing debates within the Taiwan Cultural Association became achievable through (1) the sharp contradiction between the Japanese financial capitalists, who held 80 percent of the entire capital as opposed to the considerable non-capitalist famers and proletariats in the villages. This contradiction led to the deepening of the class structure between capitalist landlords and peasants/workers (see Hsiao & Sullivan 1983); and (2) the debates between the Chinese Nationalist (KMT) government and the CCP on how to reconstruct China, which triggered left and right-wing's debates on the reconstruction of Taiwan (see Wu, 2003). The major difference between the two groups rests in the left wing's serious take-up of class struggle debates, while the right wing did not subscribe fully to that

idea. The competition between the two groups expresses a struggle of "which class should assume the leadership" (Wu, 2003, p.259).

For the left-wing groups, the twofold class and national oppression from the group of bureaucrats and metropolitan capitalists resulted in the idea that class movement equaled national movement into view. The "liberation" of the oppressed (Taiwanese), under the leadership of the proletarian and labor groups, became necessary and only by doing so can "a member of the oppressed weak and small nations of the colonial world" (Wu, 2003, p.231) reach rescue. The left-leaning Taiwan Cultural Association favored Communism at the time when the left-wing (Leninism) overwhelmed the right-wing (Wilsonism) in 1927.

On the other hand, the right-wing groups, such as members before the breakup of the Taiwan Cultural Association in 1927 and the Taiwan People's Party, drew on Sun's Yat-sen's idea of *the Principle of People's Livelihood* to organize all Taiwanese and to embark on national movement and class movement to fight against Japanese colonialism. These movements ultimately realized the liberation of "the whole of Taiwanese" (Wu, 2003, p.236). The right-wing group incorporated some of the left-wing group's ideas, mainly class movement, to achieve colonial liberation. Hence, in this history, the left-wing/ right-wing divide is not rigidly exclusive. In fact, the right-wing group refers to the "left-of-rightists," those who occupied the dominant discourses in the late 1920s in the right-wing group under the leadership of Chiang Wei-shui. In short, the left-wing/right-wing groups of the 1920s generally followed the notion of Leninism; the difference being that the former followed orthodox Leninism, while the latter followed the Sun Yat-senized Leninism that opposed "class struggle and communism in favor of compromise of the interests of different classes" (Wu, 2003, p.240). The belief of a "Taiwanese nation," as a member of the oppressed nations of the colonial world, gained reinforcement through left-wing and right-wing discourses. Thus, the imagined reality of Taiwanese began to crystallize.

The center/ margin position of the sociopolitical imagination of Taiwanese nationalism vis-à-vis the cultural imagination of Taiwanese nationalism, reversed after both the left/right wing political groups experienced disbandment from the Taiwan Government-General in the early 1930s. The does not mean that political activities were not existent, as evidenced by the existence of Association for Taiwan's Local Self Government[36], but rather that cultural activities were predominantly being used as a way of articulating Taiwanese nationalism in the 1930s. However, we should be careful to treat the shift from the sociopolitical to the cultural imagination of Taiwanese nationalism as a linear process. As noted above, the initial submergence and ambiguity in the discourse of Taiwanese cultural subjectivity in the late 1920s is a crucial precursor that led to the inevitable emergence of cultural nationalism after the dismantlement of official political activities in the early 1930s.

The political debates of left-wing/right-wing about which class should assume the leadership of Taiwanese nationalism in the late 1920s, I suggest, found themselves transplants into the native literature debates over which linguistic form is most fitting for literary works. Huang Shih-Hui, for instance, proposes the use of vernacular Taiwanese, but not classic or vernacular Chinese to write about the reality of Taiwan. Huang desires to write relevant literature for the workers and peasants, as he says:

> Do you want to write literary work that can move and motivate the broad masses of the people? Do you want the broad masses of the people to echo with how you feel? If you don't, then I have nothing more to say to you. But you do, then whether you are the spokesperson of the ruling class or a leader of the toiling masses, you should always create literary works with toiling masses on your mind, you should rise up and advocate the native literature,

[36] According to Wu (2003), the Association for Taiwan's Local Self-government could not be counted as a nationalist group for it had given up self-determination for the goal of local self-government (p.327).

you should rise up and construct the native literature (Liao, 1979, p.490-491).

The passage reveals the leftist position of a writing style whose audiences were the toiling masses who constituted the majority of the Taiwanese population. From the class position, the argument is that literature should serve to identify with the Taiwanese people. Unlike Huang's focus on class consciousness in writing Taiwanese literature, Yeh Jung-chung's formulation of "Third Literature," expressed in *Nan-yin* magazine (Southern Voice), shows his attempt to incorporate the experiences of all Taiwanese based on the unique culture and social situation of Taiwan (see Yeh, 1932 & Wu, 2003). We can see that the formulation of "Third Literature" almost directly aligns with the cultural realm of the right-wing discourse of Taiwanese nationalism, who argued for the liberation "the whole of Taiwanese in politics, economy and society" (as cited in Wu, 2003, p.342).

The major effect of the leftist and rightist literature debates is, I suggest, otherwise than the question over which class should assume the leadership in establishing a national literature. The major effect seems to be the issue of deciding upon the best fitting linguistic form for the writing of national literature. On the one hand, the positing of vernacular Taiwanese in parallel with vernacular Chinese, or even putting the former in a superior position, fueled support for using vernacular Taiwanese as the written form to achieve a vision of "Taiwanese National Literature" (Wu, 2003, p.340). On the other hand, the idea of creating a national literature based on vernacular Taiwanese met contention by those who proposed to use vernacular Chinese to write Taiwanese literature, because they believed that by using vernacular Taiwanese to write Taiwanese literature, readers across the Taiwan Strait would not understand the resulting literature (see Fong, 1993). In this climate, the parameters of Chinese culture were gradually kept away from Taiwan, such that the vernacular Taiwanese written in Chinese characters replaced the vernacular Chinese (see Wang, 1979).

This does not mean that vernacular Taiwanese was the mainstream written form at the time.

The marginalization of the linguistic nationalism based on vernacular Taiwanese occurred during the *Kominka* movement[37] time/space, as Taiwan confronted the Irish-style nationalism of cultural hybridity based on the appropriation of Japanese (Wu, 2003, p.347). Within such a framework, expressions of Japanese culture extended to a variety of "fields—social, religious and linguistic— that was to facilitate the rapid learning of Japanese ("virtues"). These fields included the positioning of traditional religious practices as "unscientific" or "superstitious," the abandoning ancestor worship in favor of Japanese Shintoism, and replacing Chinese surnames with Japanese ones, the production of literary works that eulogize the participation in "holy" warfare and the nobility of sacrifice, and the banning of Chinese was banned entirely in print (see Chang, 2000). The appropriation of the Japanese culture to create a new Taiwanese subjectivity that fused and hybridized Chinese, Japanese, and indigenous elements, therefore, was no longer purely Taiwanese linguistic nationalism since it was also "baptized by Japanese culture" (Fix, 1993, p.141).

Under the *Kominka* movements' worldview, the overarching assumption was that power was unevenly distributed among people, not available to all. This assumption means that the "enlightenment" that the Taiwan Cultural Association promulgated could not operate because power became the colonial ruler's product. People thus existed inside a cosmology of hierarchical relations within which one's superiority/inferiority relationship shifting depending on their proximity to the Japanese culture and colonial authority. It was the Japanese culture entrenched in the Taiwanese cultural subjectivity that the KMT government strived to eradicate when they came to Taiwan in post-World War II time/space.

Taiwanese Nationalism and the KMT as Others

After the crude baptism of 228, Taiwanese were forced to finally realize that

[37] It literally means "imperialization of subject peoples" that entailed wartime duties imposed upon the Taiwanese.

> Taiwanese is Taiwanese. Except being a Taiwanese who belong to Taiwan, itself, from the past, till present, and to the future, Taiwanese will never be an adopted son. The awareness is obtained after paying a great and shocking cost (Lee, 1989, p.110-111).

In the context of post-World War II time/space, despite the arrival of the declaration of Taiwan self-determination as not being a "colony" of the Republic of China (see Phillips, 2003), the dominant discourse that remained was Taiwanese nationalism, under Japanese rule, that merged with Chinese consciousness into a discourse claiming that "we" have returned to the motherland, the source of our culture and the home of our ancestors[38]. As a result, the majority of Taiwanese people welcomed the return to the motherland and believed that "we," like the mainlanders, are Chinese; this occurred before the Taiwanese independence movement that was spawned in nations like Japan and the U.S.

The transferal from the concept of "we," the mainlanders, are Chinese to "we" Taiwanese (*Ben sheng ren*), as opposed to "them" the mainlanders (*Wai sheng ren*), soon emerged after the Chen Yi administration took over Taiwan. The mainlanders portrayed Taiwanese as "defective because of their Japanization, which was often discussed in terms of enslavement" (Phillips, 2003, p.57). Therefore, the Taiwanese needed re-education to eradicate their "defective" ideas. Furthermore, a Taiwanese person's ability to speak Mandarin fluently increasingly became a symbol of one's "Chinese-ness," while speaking Japanese became a "political problem" (Phillips, 1999, p.285). The mainlanders, or rather the Chen Yi administration, primarily looked upon Taiwan in the same manner as the British treated India (Phillips, 2003, p.60). This viewpoint can be exemplified in political discrimination against the Taiwanese. For example, we can see this discrimination through the discrepancies in salary and

[38] It can be shown from the situation that most Taiwanese had voluntarily and fervently tried to study Mandarin by every possible means in the early months following the retrocession (see Hsiau, 1998).

in the unfair competition for the acquisition of high-ranking jobs between the Taiwanese and mainlanders.

On the other hand, for the Taiwanese, the depiction of the mainlanders as "backward" also helped forge the dualism of Taiwanese vis-a-vis mainlander. First of all, as can be epitomized in mainlanders' corruption. For instance, this corruption is evident when we consider the embezzlement of public funds, the extortion of protection money from wealthy Taiwanese, and the shipping of goods back to China by the Chen Yi administration, which led to hyper-inflation, declining production, and widespread unemployment in Taiwan (see Hung, 2000& Shu, 2005). Secondly, the mainlanders were "backward" because they highlighted the nepotism that was a legacy of feudal Chinese society and apparently was incompatible with "our" advanced society that respects the law. Thirdly, they were "backward" for not emphasizing orderliness, which led to a chaotic social order in Taiwan. The psychological impacts among the Taiwanese and the animosity between Taiwanese and the mainlanders mirror the tensions underscored in the saying that "we" sent away the dogs (Japanese) and welcome in the pigs (mainlanders). The dog is a metaphor for a loyal but unwise follower, while the pig represents greediness and laziness in the Chinese folk tradition (Lin, 2005, p.68).

As a result, the conflicts between the Taiwanese and the Chen Yi administration in political, economic, social (declining sanitation and public health), and cultural fields (language gap) made the 228 incident[39] inevitable (see Chen, 1991). Thus, the 228 incident is much more than a historical event that occurred on February 28, 1947, and in the following several weeks. More importantly, the 228 incident serves as a pivot catalyst for the emergence

[39] On the evening of February 27, 1947, an illegal female cigarette vendor suffered beatings from the Taipei City Monopoly Bureau agents, the angry crowd gathered, and violence broke out after an officer killed a bystander. The next day, the protesters marched to the Monopoly Bureau Headquarters and Chen Yi's office. In the afternoon, a soldier at the Chen Yi's office fired into the crowd, triggering an island-wide "uprising." Violence against the mainlanders and the KMT administration soon spread beyond Taipei.

of the concept of the Taiwanese (*Ben sheng ren*) that produced a psychological splitting from the Chinese (*Wai sheng ren*) and thereby resulted in asking for the political pursuit of Taiwan independence (see Hung, 2000). The tensions and paradoxes that fused together to create the configuration between "we" Taiwanese and "them" mainlanders results from no single specific person or event, but, I suggest, operated in a convoluted discursive space. It is within such framework that "the feelings of anguish, rage, dread, horror, silence, and hatred were prevalent among Taiwanese and this rage toward the army or the KMT government was often transferred and projected to the mainlanders or those who used Mandarin" (Hung, 2000, p.109). For the Taiwanese, even though some mainlanders were victims in the 228 incident, the mainlanders and the KMT government, like the Dutch, Spanish, and Japanese, were still the "outsider invaders" (Hung, 2000, p.38).

The sentiment of the 228 events transferred to the political pursuit of Taiwan independence. However, the discourses of the Taiwan independence movement did not have enough discursive space to operate in Taiwan in post-World War II time/space. As we can glimpse from members of the Taiwan independence movement's hiding out in countries such as Japan and the U.S.

There are three chief lines of reasoning that constructed the parameters of Taiwan independence in the postwar Taiwan time/space. First, the inception of the overseas Taiwanese Independence Movement began in the early 1950s in Japan (see Mendel, 1970) and later blossomed in the U.S. in the 1960s (see Shu, 2005). For instance, in Japan, there were groups such as the Provisional Government of the Republic of Formosa and Taiwan Chinglian Associates.[40] In the U.S., new groups took hold as well, such as Formosans' Free Formosa, later renamed the United Formosans for Independence in 1958, and United Formosans in

[40] Taiwan Chinglian Associates later underwent renaming to became the Formosan Association in 1963 and further changed to be the United Young Formosans for Independence (UTFI) in 1965.

America for Independence (UFAI). Canada saw the rise of groups like League for self-determination of the Formosans, later renamed the Committee for Humans Rights in Formosa (CHRF) in 1965. In Europe, there was the Union for Formosa's Independence in Europe (UFIE) (see Shu, 2005). In 1968, the UYFI in Japan, the UFAI in the U.S., the CHRF in Canada, and the UFIE in Europe declared that the two magazines, *Taiwan Youth* and *The Independent Formosa*, were their joint organizations (see Shu, 2005). The contents of Taiwanese independence were taken to have different political implications among its proponents, ranging from Taiwanese as a mixed race[41], rather than being the "descendants of the dragon" or "descendant of the great Chinese Yellow Emperor," entrusting the small island to the United Nations, to becoming part of Japan or the US (see Shu, 1997-98). Their central assumptions were unsurprisingly and unmistakably anti-KMT.

Secondly, the abovementioned does not suggest that similar discourses like Taiwanese independence movement that was not available in postwar Taiwan. For instance, the emergence of "A Declaration of Formosan Self-salvation," as drafted by Peng Ming-min, Hsieh Tsung-min, and Wei Ting-chao, signifies the huge differences between the KMT government and Peng in the mapping of an imagined community.

> A country is only a tool to provide welfare for its people, and any people with common destiny and shared interests can constitute a country. During the past upward of ten years, Taiwan had become a de facto country. In terms of population, productivity and cultural level, Taiwan ranks in the thirties among the more than one hundred numbers of the United Nations. In fact, people in smaller countries enjoy much more welfare and cultural benefits. The Scandinavian countries,

[41] Most local Taiwanese are believed to have aboriginal ancestry because it was common for their forefathers, who emigrated from southern China to Taiwan in the 17th and 18 centuries, to marry Taiwanese aboriginal women (Chen, 2012, p.852).

> Switzerland, Uruguay of South America are good examples. We should face reality to cease imagining ourselves to be a big power, establishing a small but democratic and prosperous society (Peng, 1984, p.137)

The establishment of a small country here manifests that "our" Taiwan is separate from China, and that Taiwan is not a part of China, but rather a de facto country (Peng, 1984, p.137). For Peng, he believes these formations should never occur on "on the basis of biological origins, culture, religion, or language, but on a sense of common destiny and a belief in shared interests" (Peng, 1994, p.144). There are quite a few examples that illustrate that people of similar cultural backgrounds and biological origins constitute separate nation-states. Similarly, people of diverse backgrounds can constitute a single nation-state because of a common destiny. As such, the constitution deserved a complete re-writing and following the "we" must participate in the U.N. under a new name, rather than as the Republic of China. The concept of "we' here refers to the people living on the island regardless of their origins, including the mainlanders, Taiwanese, Hakka, and aboriginals[42] that could form a coalition to overthrow Chiang Kai-shek's KMT government. These events show a major departure from the KMT's claim to represent China and the KMT's regarding of Taiwan as a part of China under the jurisdiction of the Republic of China. For Peng, the KMT has no right to claim sovereignty over a territory based on some biological, cultural, religious, or linguistic affinity with the inhabitants of the territory in disregard of the will of the people themselves (Peng, 1994, p.244). Peng's proposal implies an abandonment of the concept that "Recovery of the Mainland," and that Communist China should deserve recognition as a government. The shift from the viewing of Communist China as rebellious groups inscribed in the Confucian child to the concept of "one Taiwan, one China" here was enormous.

[42] Taiwanese include both the Hoklos and the Hakkas. They are both Han Chinese but differ owing to mutually unintelligible languages and customary differences.

Moreover, the democratic society here showcases the minor difference between Japanese rule and the KMT rule. In either case, “we” Taiwanese remained second class. “We” wanted governance from neither the Nationalists nor the Communist, but from ourselves. Within that self-interest and self-preservation “we” must replace the KMT regime by a government freely-elected by and responsive to the public welfare (Peng, 1994, p.127). In this historical moment, the notion of Taiwanese incorporated four ethnic groups from which anti-mainlander sentiments became null under Peng’s cosmology. The discourse of Taiwanization, therefore, builds on the seeing of Taiwan as a “nation,” in contrast to being Chinese under the jurisdiction of the PRC, or rather than as an “ethnic group,” in contrast to mainlanders. Peng’s discourse of Taiwanization is crucial to the extent that it reappeared in the *Tangwai* political movement of the late 1980s and became written into the 1990s textbooks by rephrasing it under the concept of “a new Taiwanese.”

Thirdly, the way of imagining Taiwan as an independent state arose through a theological line of reasoning. Drawing on Calvinist theology, the Westminster Confession of Faith, and democratic church government, the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan (PCT) already adopted a more “liberal” lifestyle than the Han practices in the nineteenth century. Under the PCT’s ethics, for instance, both sexes must practice monogamy and schooling, as requirements. By contrast, these same ethics abandoned the practices of concubinage and foot-binding (see Amne, 2007). In the context of postwar time/space, Shoki Coe’s notion of contextualization reconstituted the more “liberal” teaching by positing the relationship between Bible texts and the human community in a dynamic interaction. Through this dynamic interaction, participation and salvation came to the fore, meaning that God-power endowed the people with the role to be agents of innovative changes (see Hwang, 1968). The notion of contextualization reflects the content of the curriculum and the mission statement of a theological seminary. Within this context, Taiwanese should not be oppressed and be deprived of their rights by any groups or

governments (Amae, 2007, p.138-39). Rather, Taiwanese should have the power to think about issues, including Taiwanese independence that was ordained by God just like Jesus can build friendships with tax collectors and prostitutes, who should never be "political prisoners." The theme of Exodus, God's saving the Jews out of mistreatment in Egypt that led them to the Promised Land, is another line of reasoning crucially placed within this Taiwanese context, that is, if we keep the faith and continue to believe in Taiwanese independence, we will reach the Promised Land (Taiwan as a sovereign state) someday in the future; God gifted Taiwan as the homeland.

The overseas Taiwan independence movement, Peng's *A Declaration of Formosan Self-salvation*, and the PCT's theological concepts of Taiwanese independence, as noted above, developed in a more nuanced manner than just three parallel lines. For instance, the activities of overseas Taiwan independence movements gained enrichment after Peng sought political refugee in Europe and later expressed his ideas in the U.S. Moreover, Peng's ideas and PCT's theological reasoning inspired *Tangwai* people (this literally means people outside of the KMT) to seek political democratization and localization in the second half of the 1980s. Through the intersection of reasonings among the three categories of imagining Taiwan independence, a new subjectivity in the post-War time/space forged as did the marginal position vis-à-vis the KMT's anti-communist and Chinese nationalism discourses embodied in the Confucian child.

In addition to these intersecting events, some "less radical" arguments that began in postwar Taiwan time/space, in comparison to the claims of Taiwanese independence discourses, directly or indirectly helped generate Taiwanese consciousness. For example, the idea of organizing of an opposition party by members of the *Free China Fortnightly*; their goal was not to take on the Taiwanese consciousness as a rallying point, but rather to challenge autocratic governance (see Shu, 1997-1998). In addition, various discourses came together to provide the discursive space for the *Tangwai* movement in the 1980s to develop Taiwanese consciousness.

One discourse was the socioeconomic disparity based on ethnic differences that favored mainlanders in aspects such as subsidies for education, medical care, and occupations (see Chen, 2012). A second discourse was the KMT's monopolizing of political resources, which, in turn, shifted into the controlling hands of the Mainlanders. Furthermore, the GDP's growth led to social inequalities, conflicts between capitalists and laborers, conspicuous consumption, and cultural alienation (Yip, 1996, p.32). Diplomatically, the conflict with Japan over the *Taio-yu Tai* islands in 1970 and the expulsion of the R.O.C. from the U.N. and the Olympic Games directly helped the Taiwanese reassess the relationships between people on the island and China. The economic and international forces, when combined, pushed the Taiwanese to turn inward, "entering a period of self-reflection and national soul-searching" that exhibited in the facets of a "renewed interest in indigenous cultural traditions, and a general heightening of social consciousness" (Yip, 1996, p.34).

In sum, revised versions of Taiwan and Taiwanese identity developed through multiple forces, including the political autocracy of pre and post-World War II time/space, economic disparity, and international isolation. The multiple forces also incited Yeh Shitao's articulation Taiwanese consciousness and later brought Yeh's child into the localized curricular discourses of the 1990s. It is imperative to note that Yeh Shihtao's concept of *Hsiangtu* literature in the 1970s inherited little from the three related discourses for imagining Taiwan independence, as the late 1980s *Tangwai* group did. Rather, the abovementioned socio/economic and international forces influenced the labeling of Taiwan as the center, as embodied in Yeh Shihtao's concept of *Hsiangtu* literature that grew visibility from the partial separation between Taiwan and China.

Yeh Shitao, Taiwanese Consciousness, and Power

The availability of Taiwanese consciousness in the Japanese period, its ensuing shift from

Taiwanese consciousness to the Taiwanese Independence movement, and the multiple forces that derived from political, economic, social, and cultural facets in postwar Taiwan brought to the fore nativist consciousness. These same forces and events offered Yeh the opportunity to articulate his native soil (*hsiang-tu*) literature in the 1970s. As noted above, the notion of *hsiang-tu* movement in literature is not an original term of Yeh's time/space. The *hsiang-tu* is rooted within the heritage of Taiwan's anti-Japanese period, particularly in its adoption of the idiom of dichotomy that helped create the "native" and the foreign "other" (see Yip, 1996). The parameters of 1970s *hsiang-tu* literature were, however, more convoluted because it had to deal with KMT cultural discourses and with international forces (see Yip, 1996).

It is within such contexts that the *hsiang-tu* literature appears ambiguous; it could mean either the "autonomy" of Taiwan literature vis-à-vis Chinese literature in a broad sense or an independent course of development that worked against the various "suppressions." Yeh Shitao, for instance, begins with a description of suppression of the inhabitants of Taiwan that traces back to pre-modern times.[43] By historicizing literature, the influence of "outside rule" experienced by the inhabitants of Taiwan grew with emphasis within the literary development and consequently spark attention toward the burdens of an economy of feudalism and colonialism. It is important to note that for the *hsiang-tu* writers the notion of "suppression" existed in the colonial period and continually emerged in postwar Taiwan time/space, as evident through the KMT rule that "replicated the nightmare of colonialization under the Japanese Occupation" (Chiu, 1993, p.162) and the US and Japan presence through military and economic alliances that brought about "modernization.[44]"

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[43] In his *Introduction to the History of Taiwan's Nativist Literature*, Yeh defines the *hsiang-tu* literature from the Dutch rule (1624-1662), and followed by Cheng Chenggong (1662-1683), the Ching dynasties (1684-1894), and finally the Japanese period (see McArthur, 1999).

[44] It had often been argued that in the guise of "modernization," the model of industrial society as crafted by the western nations will necessarily be achieved. It is, however, another form of "colonization" for both the Japanese and American capitalism models that have penetrated Taiwanese society (see Yip, 1996).

The association between the land and its inhabitants in *hsiang-tu* literature is fundamental because it demonstrates that nativism simultaneously corresponded to the theory of realism in this history. The terms nativism and realism are exchangeable for the *hsiang-tu* writers. They used each to question the official "combat literature" and "the literature of nostalgia[45]" promoted by the KMT. My examination of the complexities of Taiwan's sociopolitical reality embedded in nativism (realism) here further institutes a sharp discontinuity from the Taiwanese modernist writers

One of the things that differentiate nativist writers from modernist writers is their proximity to the "political." The modernist writers gained inspirations from Western modernist icons, such as Joyce, Baudelaire, Eliot, Kafka, Lawrence, Faulkner, and Hemingway. Similar to these authors, the Taiwan-focused modernist writers adopted a "horizontal transplantation," that helped them to "explore the secret, dark corners of the human psyche, often in an abandon of existential nihilism" (Lin, 1992, p.8). The modernist writers wrote works relevant to Taiwan or Taiwanese identity by maintaining an atmosphere of disengagement with issues such as anti-communist songs and the territorial dispute with Japan.[46] By contrast, the *hsiang-tu* theorists allude to those "sensitive" issues, and their stories depict the poverty-stricken lives of Taiwan's lower classes--peasants, street peddlers, prostitutes, and laborers. This literary genre could never find easy alignment with the modernist's solipsism and their "abdication" of social and political responsibility. Furthermore, their differences reflect larger questions about how to

[45] The dominant literary scene in the 1950s was combat literature and the literature of nostalgia that expressed the nostalgic anti-communist literature. Composed by the expatriate mainland writers whose literary scenarios mainly happened in China and whose "transit passenger" mentality made them unable to identify themselves with the piece of land (Taiwan) that was regarded as "ossified" and "alienated from reality" by the *hsitan-tu* writers (see Lin, 1992& Yip, 1996).

[46] The U.S. announced in the spring of 1971 that it would hand over the Taio-yu Tai and the related islands to Japan. This announcement spurned widespread protests in Taiwan (see Lin, 1992).

depict Taiwanese culture, wholesale Westernization or localization awareness. For the *hsiangtu* theorists, their critique of Taiwanese modernist writers is due to their "adulation of the West and exaltation of the foreign" (Yip, 1996, p.63) and their infatuation with Western notions of individualism, alienation, Freudianism, and existentialism. The question of representing Taiwanese culture and the *hsiangtu* theorists' critiques exemplify that the modernist writers' attention to the exploration of the inner-self holds little promise to centralize Taiwan. For the modernist, however, the Western ideas can enrich the spiritual realm of the Taiwanese people. Wholesale Westernization versus cultural colonialization resembles the discussion of writing Chinese civilization that occurred during May Fourth movement in relation to how Chinese civilization should be rewritten (see Chapter Three). It is important to note that the focus on the interior world of individual psyches, rather than on the public external world of social reality, is not the sole aim of modernist writers. Rather, the modernists' approach is an indirect response that expresses frustration with political affairs. The responses from both nativists and modernists are the articulation of literary genres as in opposition to the KMT cultural accounts at the time (see Yip, 1996).

The association of realism to nativism in Yeh's "*Introduction*" allows me to further assess the relationship between Taiwan-centered literature and Chinese literature or rather Taiwan's location in regard to Chinese culture. Firstly, *hsiang-tu* literature for Yeh is composed of Taiwan's special characteristics, namely, Taiwan's geopolitical and socioeconomic separation that set it apart from China, which deserves more reflection in Taiwan's literature. Further, for Yeh, Taiwan's long separation from China and its exposure to multiple cultures created the possibility of a different literary genre. Thus, "we" must talk about the quotidian reality on this island, but these happenings are different from those of mainland China. During this context of Yeh's claims, the Han culture in Taiwan is still an offshoot of the Chinese culture because Taiwan has never developed an independent language or script (Yu, 1978, p.71). Even though

the Han people in both China and Taiwan speak the same language, both sides should be able to utilize different genres, and accordingly, Taiwanese literature should not simply be assimilated into Chinese literature. In opposition to assimilation, Taiwanese literature must address the specificity of "Taiwanese consciousness."

> Taiwan's Nativist literature should be works that have "Taiwan as center," in other words, these works should stand on the side of Taiwan to give a perspective of world literature. Taiwanese writers are free to pick their subject matter and have no restrictions in their selection, they can write their interest and whatever they like, but they should have a deep-rooted "Taiwanese consciousness" Otherwise, wouldn't Nativist literature simply become a kind of "exile" literature. (Yu, 1978, p.72)

The equation of nativism to realism was echoed and reworked by *hsiang-tu* theorists, such as Wang To. For Wang To, the use of Taiwanese dialect to depict issues like anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism in the *hsiang-tu* literature is a vital tactic to feature the different cultural backgrounds in postwar Taiwan. The native tongue Wang To uses in his writings is one factor that brought the perspective of ordinary Taiwanese life into the wider public sphere and conveyed freshness to the Chinese language, as did the inhabitants/land relationships Yeh depicts in the *hsiangtu* literature (see Wang, 1978).

Overall, the tying of Taiwanese works to Taiwanese consciousness, rather than to a place of origin, encourages writers outside of Taiwan to write Taiwanese literature and that can be viewed as Taiwanese writers, just as African works are "works written by Africans, and also works written by those who have shared the same levels of spiritual and psychological experiences of Africans" (McArthur, 1999, p.23). The claiming of Yu Yonghe, by Yeh in his "*Introduction*," as Taiwan's first nativist writer illustrates that one needs not to be Taiwanese to write Taiwanese literature. Yu Yonghe was a mainland bureaucrat who volunteered to go to

Taiwan on a sulfur-seeking expedition in 1696 and subsequently wrote a travelogue describing Taiwan's beautiful natural scenes.

The debates between the *hsiangtu* writers and the modernist writers concerning the location of nativist culture in proximity to western cultures further inadvertently transformed the opposition between the *hsiangtu* writers and the mainland refugee writers. What makes the difference between the two groups is their different conceptions about realism and their vicinity to Chinese-ness. For the mainland writers, the realism in *hsiang-tu* literature typifies proletarian literature due to the depictions of the toiling mass. For the mainland writers, proletarian literature is the literature of the workers and peasants that desire to initiate a "class struggle," exactly like Chinese communist party had preached in mainland China (see Yip, 1996 & Hsiau, 1998). For Yeh and other *hsiang-tu* theorists, however, the communist conception of class struggle fails to encompass the symbolism of the inhabitant/land relations that composed a part of the realism genre. These theorists also contend that the emphasis on Taiwan based on anti-imperial mentality does not equate to a necessary distancing from China. Lin (1992) contends that "Nativism, therefore, carried within itself two consciousnesses: China consciousness and Taiwan consciousness" (p.9). The mainland writers' viewpoints that link the working class-focus with class struggle and treated a centralized Taiwanese culture as separatism follow the same tenets found engraved within the Confucian child.

On the other hand, despite the fact that the *hsiangtu* literature of the 1970s focuses on the former side of the Taiwanese/mainlander, native/foreign, urban capitalism/rural agrarianism, colonized/colonizers and tradition/modernization divides. The ideologies represented by former sides of these binary pairs inevitably encouraged narrow-minded regionalism, and induced self-indulgent nostalgia (Tang, 1999, p.388). It is through the strategy of splitting power from Han Chinese, urban, and foreign to native soil, rural, and the grassroots organization that other binaries in the rhetoric of Taiwan nationalism were constructed and a

different location of power for child's ontology was glimpsed.

Yeh's *Introduction to the History of Taiwan's Nativist Literature* (1977) and the *hsiangtu* and mainland writers' debates generated little excitement in comparison to the localization movement that was initiated either from the cultural or political field in the late 1980s. However, Yeh's work became influential as it underwent modifications and incorporations into the works of others, such as Chen Fengming and some *hsiangtu* writers, who share similar ideas with the *Tangwai* group.

Reconstituting Yeh Shihtao's Nativism through Democratization

> All Formosans are firmly united in demanding the recognition of their right to self-determination of their political future. The real issue is not whether or not Formosa should be an independent state, but rather whether or not those more than fourteen million Formosans are entitled to say something about their own future. The fact is that for the past 400 years these people have been kicked around. We have heard enough about what Peking says about Formosa. We have heard enough of what the Nationalist government, which represents no one, says about Formosa. We have heard enough about what the United States government says about Formosa. All of those who gathered for the meeting came to ask in substance just one question, "what about the Formosan?" (Peng, 1972, p.259)

Ever since the 70s, the expansion of Taiwanese consciousness had been substantially represented by the democracy movement in politics and the nativization movement in literature. The former used Taiwanese consciousness as a guiding principle in its pursuit of a future direction for the island; the latter centered on Taiwanese consciousness and used a literary format to reflect Taiwan's

> historical experiences and reality. The two movements did not necessarily dovetail with each other. However, there was no doubt that they were mutually supportive (Shi, 1985, p.6).

The reconstitution of Yeh's nativism that blossomed in the 1980s is chiefly the byproduct of democratization. The Formosan Incident of 1979 is a crucial event that secured democratization with nativization in Taiwan. The Formosan Incident protesters opposed one-party rule and asked for political reforms that would secure their rights, such as the lifting of martial law and the removal of old delegates in the national assembly who were elected in 1940s China. These protests later inspired Taiwanese intellectuals, including historians, lawyers, literary critics, professors, and writers to each vocalize Taiwanese nationalism (see Hsiau, 2000). One cannot underscore the importance of the Formosan Incident, yet the labeling of this event as democracy's originating point that incited nativization minimizes the historical complexity of this process. Before the Formosan Incident, various catalysts came to together, including the diplomatic setbacks and economic crises of the 1970s, the increase in societal pluralism and autonomy, the Chungling incident of 1977, and the Taiwanese independence movement from abroad and at home. The Formosan Incident, therefore, reaches beyond the time/space in which it became audible.

The Formosan Incident's accompanying discourse rendered the political democratization, the expression of Taiwanese consciousness, and the visibility of Taiwan's independence (see Lin, 1998). These events and discourses further promoted the arrival of de-Sinicization that deviated from Yeh's attempt to merge local consciousness with Chinese national identity (see Hsiau, 1998). At the same time, de-Sinicization generated a different subjectivity that both were inspired by and departed from Yeh's nativism.

The modified version of Yeh's nativism became influential in the post-Formosan Incident, which we can see most notably in Chen Fangming's works and by the *Tangwai* groups in the

late 1980s. In *Taiwan Literature's Present Problem of Localization,* Chen builds a heavy theoretical framework to delineate three major themes of concern in Taiwanese literature: (1) for Taiwanese literature to go forward, writers have a duty to familiarize themselves with Taiwan's history, and this familiarization with history must go beyond the previous thirty years in order to understand Taiwan; (2) writing should express the people's voice, so writers must become familiar with Taiwanese society; and (3) writers should not be pessimistic and think that what they write is a mere offshoot of China's literature, but also should not be overconfident of Taiwan's literature; they should look closely at the conditions of Third World nations, including China (Chen, 1984, p.37). Yeh's endeavors to historicize literature and to side with the people were echoed by Chen and other *hsiangtu* writers of the 1980s. Yet, Chen's thoughts demonstrate a more "de-Sinicizing" stance through his claim that the politicization in literature, literature that treated the KMT as a second colonizer, dramatically breaks from Yeh's desire to view Taiwanese culture as the offshoot of Chinese culture. The combination of "de-Sinicization" and the politicization in literature enlarged in visibility in the late 1980s by the *tangwai* groups.

The centrality of theories of power to Chen Fangmin and the *tangwai* groups, as understood in the post-Formosan Incident, are worth noting for the advancement of my arguments. For Chen, the "de-Sinicizing" stance requires placing power into a juxtaposition between China and Taiwan to ensure that what Chianan (*Jianan* 嘉南)[47] is for "us" Taiwanese is like what Jiangnan (*Jiangnan* 江南)[48] is for the mainlander (see Chen, 1989). Chen did not incorporate Yeh's notion of Taiwanese culture as the offshoot culture subsuming into the Chinese culture, which reverses the core/margin relation of Chinese/Taiwanese culture. This reversal was especially crystalized in the *tangwai* groups' and post-Formosan Incident *hsiangtu*

[47] Jiangnan refers to the southern part of the Yangtze River in China. (see Shu, 2005)
[48] Chianan refers to the Chianan Plain in south Taiwan. (see Shu, 2005)

writers' bids to increase the visibility of the equation Taiwan-center = de-Sinicization.

The equation of Taiwan-center=de-Sinicization surfaced across cultural, historical, and linguistical "fields" in the late 1980s. Culturally, the availability of such imagining includes the additions of aboriginal literature, Han folk literature, classic Chinese literature, modern literature from the Japanese colonial period, and postwar literature (see Chang, 1996 & Hsiau, 1998). The depiction and preservation of aboriginal culture helped demonstrate that "we" have our own culture and will not suffer assimilation into Chinese culture. In the later 1980s, the reconstruction of a new Taiwanese literary culture carried with it the "four great ethnic groups," those being the Hokolo, Hakka, Mainlanders, and aborigines, and "a community of fate," meaning both the Taiwanese and mainlanders suffered under the one-party rule after 1949 (see Hsiau, 1998). The two terms saw scarce use at the time, but they became popular, even as clichés that appear in present-day school textbooks.

Using these concepts, the *tangwai* groups argued that "our" Taiwanese culture was flexible, modern, progressive, and democratic (Hsiau, 1998, p.190).

> In the past we always lived with fear under Chinese culture, completely controlled by its patriarchal authority and feudalism. But today our Taiwanese culture, like a young and strong man, in a semiconscious condition, would break through the nets in a moment and stand firm on the global agenda. (as cited in Hsiau, 1998, p.193)

The "modern" and "progressive" culture still faced issues, mainly the social problems of corruption and inequality in Taiwan, which resulted from the immersion in Chinese culture. The demarcation between Taiwanese culture and Chinese culture and in the post-Formosan Incident period, therefore, witnessed a modified Yeh's notion of Taiwanese consciousness that erased the vestiges of Yeh's Chinese consciousness. Furthermore, to view Chinese culture as a part of Taiwanese culture in the post-Formosan Incident period, the *hsiangtu* writers'

demonstration of different power analytics shaped alternative boundary lines of Taiwanese/Chinese culture between the KMT, Yeh, and the modified Yeh's notion of Taiwanese culture.

Historically, both Yeh and the *tangwai* groups traced the Taiwanese history back to the Dutch, the Manchurian, and the Japanese rules that lasted for over three hundred years. Through this tracing, they tried to depict the history from the point of view of the ruled population, that is, "the construction of historical explanations for Taiwanese from the perspective of the Taiwanese" (Chen, 1994, p.711). The disparity between Yeh and post-Formosan Incident writers in their rewritings of Taiwanese history was again through the (de)emphasis of de-Sinicization and politicization in related historical events. For instance, the depiction of "our" ancestors' intermarriage with Dutch, Spanish, Han Chinese, and the "plains aborigines" (*ping-pu-tsu*) resulted in the heterogeneous origins of the Taiwanese (see Lin, 1984& Wu, 2007). The aforesaid anthropological depiction marks no difference between Yeh and post-Formosan Incident *hsiangtu* writers. While the post-Formosan Incident *hsiangtu* writers claim that the constant intermarriage between our ancestors and other groups on the island showed that "we" are not ethnic Chinese and should not be called "the sons of the Yellow Emperor," these types of claims are absent in Yeh's Taiwanese consciousness discourses. The anthropological depiction of de-Sinicization further fueled the refutation that "Taiwan was historically an integral part of China" (Hsiau, 1998, p.284).

Another peculiar feature of post-Formosan *hsiangtu* writers' uptake was the politicization of the literature. For instance, Taiwanese writers strategically arrayed the memories of the 228 incident and life under the one-party rule to challenge the KMT's Sinicization discourses.

> I found that the history education in Taiwan had been deceiving. Even a Taiwanese disciple working in the field of history research did not know clearly what the May 4 movement was, and was unaware of the February 28

> incident. In the Russian textbook, nowhere were Marxism and Leninism to be found, and in Chinese modern history, there was no trace regarding the establishment and the ideological background of the Chinese Communist Party. As for Taiwanese history, it was banished to a distant place (Chen, 1998, p.45).

The discussion of the 228 incident, therefore, constitutes a facet that represents the idea that "our" history has to be recounted by ourselves, not by the rulers, who have been trying to gloss over these historical events. The strategy of de-Sinicization through the depictions of the omitted events in the Sinicization discourses aligns with the cultivation of a resistance mentality against the KMT, suggests the shaping of "who we are" and the resolve to be "who we should be" (Hsiau, 1998, p.301).

Linguistically, the equation Taiwan-center=de-Sinicization seeped into the usage of Hoklo language in both politics and literature, especially in the political arena in the 1980s. For instance, the Taiwanese folk song *Gloomy Hometown* surfaced into creation during the Japanese period; the song bemoans the island's cession to Japan and the islanders' inability to change the situation. The loneliness of the Taiwanese in their isolated homeless condition finds expression within *Gloomy Hometown* and at the same time attempted to plead for sympathy from their motherland (Lin 2005, p.90). Taiwanese people in the postwar era continued to sing the song, but they shifted its reference from China to Taiwan itself. The subtle transferring of the concept of motherland implies that the Taiwanese saw the KMT as an alien regime. By singing a Hokolo song such as *Gloomy Hometown*, "we" mobilized together, and this heightened the major ethnic group's sense of Taiwanese identity. Furthermore, the availability of imagination in the juxtaposition between Taiwanese culture and Chinese culture developed the capacity to imagine the differences between Hoklo and Mandarin Chinese.

> It is wrong that we treat it [Hoklo] as a dialect, not as a language, simply

> because it is an offshoot of ancient Chinese. This can be compared to the fact that English, French, German, Spanish, Russian, and even Hindustani are branches of an ancient Indo-European language. No one would say that Hindustani is a dialect of English, though English has become an international language. If Hindustani is not a dialect, why should Hoklo or Hakka be one? (Hung, 1992, p.61)

The contrast between Hoklo and Mandarin Chinese was also transposed to the literary works of the late 1980s, and this scope even extended to other "dialects."

> To use Taiwanese native languages (including Hoklo, Hakka and aboriginal languages) to create "orthodox" Taiwanese literature; 2) to promote the writing of Hoklo and develop written Hoklo suitable for literature; 3) to depict the reality of life and society and voice the distress and aspiration of oppressed peoples and the toiling masses; 4) to create a new Taiwanese literature that displays a spirit of Taiwanese nationalism (Hsiau, 1998, p.237).

The parameters of Taiwanese literature shifted from Yeh's Taiwanese consciousness subsuming into Chinese culture, to Chen Fangming's juxtaposition between Taiwanese culture and Chinese culture, and then to the establishment of Taiwanese nationalism written in Hokolo, Hakka, or aboriginal languages. The localized curriculum discourses in the 1990s resulted from a process of including/excluding the above overlapping and/or contradictory elements.

It is important to note that the emergence of Taiwanese nationalism did not mean that the "specters" of Sinicization and Sinicized curriculum discourses became immediately absent, nor did it mean that what today is taken for granted as normal (Taiwanese nationalism) was "a principled or ordered result of any single ideology or action " (Baker, 2001, p.351)

Organizing Localization Education and the Child

> My daughter is now in a high school. She has to memorize all the cities, al the agricultural products, industrial products of every province of [of China], the weather, the rivers, and the natural resources. Everything. We had to memorize all this before, thirty years ago. I forgot everything. Now, my daughter has to memorize what I memorized and we know so little about Taiwan. We are forbidden to learn. We have no access, no resources. Some people get into trouble when they began to learn about Taiwan. When you begin to identify with Taiwan, people feel you are associated with independence movement of the opposition. (Wachman, 1994, p.40)

> The current curriculum reform brings a new subject, teaching local studies, into classrooms. Now, I assert that we need to teach children about Taiwan, including Taiwan's history, geography, and their native roots. Over the past four decades, teachers did not teach children about Taiwan and exclusively taught them about mainland China. The kind of education is really ridiculous! (Lee, 1994, p.476)

The KMT government responded to de-Sinicization and localization movement by holding supplementary elections for the members of the three national representative organizations and recruited more Taiwanese people into the cabinet during the 1970s-1980s. The depictions Taiwan in the school textbooks' contents gave priority to its economic development, prosperity, democracy, and freedom, which the KMT believed that Communist China failed to provide. Akin to the relationship between China and Taiwan, the textbooks argue that historically, Taiwan was part of China and that geographically, it served as a military base to recover mainland China.

It was not until the emergence of the Taiwanese KMT[49] and the ascendance of the DPP in the Legislative Yuan after the lifting of martial law that the localized curricula entered the educational policies. First of all, the termination of the Period of Mobilization for the Suppression of Communist Rebellion shows us that Taiwanese government no longer viewed the PRC as a rebellious group that created the discursive space for rewriting China-Taiwan relation as represented in textbooks. Within this framework, the ROC's sovereignty extended neither to the mainland nor to Outer Mongolia.[50] The sharp contrast between the reality of the CCP-ruled mainland and the school textbook version of a KMT-imagined mainland undermine the discourses that view the ROC as the sole legitimate government of China. As such, the discourses of anti-Communism and mainland recovery underwent replacement with that of unification within the curriculum standard. In this same revised discourse, political figures such as Sun yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek were no longer introduced as frequently (see Chou, 1999).

Taiwan nationalism began to spread more as the instruction of native language became a benchmark for the implementation of the localization curriculum. After the DPP won the local election in 1989, the native language education began as the counties of I-lan and Taipei requested that students receive one hour per week of language instruction in Taiwanese, Hakka, or an aboriginal language (Chou, 1999, p.117). We can see a major shift from the past, for Taiwan no longer saw the association of native language with "backwardness and vulgarity," nor did a student receive punishment if they spoke the native language in school. Native language education as a part of the national curriculum was due to the advent of the political

[49] The term Taiwanese KMT meant that there would be an emphasis on Taiwan as a priority. As a result, unlike his predecessors, President Lee Teng-hui asserted that the mainland was under the jurisdiction of the People's Republic of China (PRC). He claimed that China and Taiwan are two different political entities. Under his term, the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and Mainland Affairs Council MAC were established to negotiate with China.

[50] The CCP had redefined its territory after 1949 and recognized the sovereignty of Outer Mongolia as being separate from the PRC's. By contrast, the KMT insisted that Outer Mongolia remain part of the ROC (see Chen, 2003).

democratization in the 1990s, in which speaking native languages became a trend (see Chen, 2003). Native language instruction proposes a new relationship between the land and the people and a reconfiguration of an imagined community, each which depart from the Sinization discourses.

The localization curricula in the 1990s did more than simply implement the reasoning of Yeh or the *hsiangtu* writers in the post-Formosan Incident. The Confucian conceptions of obedience, patriotism, and the love of Chinese culture remained the goals of elementary and secondary education (see Chou, 1999 & Ou Lee, 2007). The notion of patriotism cultivated the students' love of their home (Taiwan) and their country (China). The equation of patriotism with recovering mainland China, as written into the Confucian child, had therefore shifted to a mentality to love the island and still "cherish ambitious aspirations toward *da-lu* (the mainland China)" (Ou, 1995, p.46). The role of Taiwan was heightened, as for mainland China, if it becomes a democratic society under Sun's *Three Principles of the People*, we will be able to reunify under the name of R.O.C. Within this framework, geographically, the location of Taiwan remains described as "located off our country's (China's) eastern coast" (NICT, 1993, *Social Studies Text*, Vol.7, p.6). Culturally, the idea held that Chinese was an ethnic group and that "we" are the sons of Yellow Emperor, and these ideas remain printed in textbooks (see Chou, 1999).

As such, the localization curricula in the 1990s did not reject Chinese culture (nationalism), nor did it embrace Taiwan culture (nationalism) wholeheartedly, but rather, it "view[ed] culture as a series of concentric circles, radiating outward from individual communities, to the entire Taiwanese nation, but also beyond to include the greater Chinese cultural sphere and global culture as well" (Friedman, 2005, p.28).

> If we look at things from the point of view of the textbook structure, a student book must start learning from the immediate environment, then extend the

> scope step by step to local culture and the main ethnic groups of the society, extending it then to the knowledge of the culture of all ethnic groups that compose the territory and the nation. Only then can one understand the world's culture. Consequently, primary and secondary programs are being reformed following a strategy consisting of standing on Taiwan, having consideration for China, opening eyes on the world (as cited in Friedman, 2005, p41).

Most importantly, Friedman's description of the juxtaposition between Taiwan and China does not feed into the binary idea that simply each of them occupied a neat 50% of the textbook content. National education in the 1990s was still Sino-centric (see Law, 2002). The scope of Taiwanese culture in these concentric circles occupied only a small portion.[51] The education program avoided the emergence of Taiwanese culture grounded especially in Hoklo culture, but rather promotes equality and harmony among ethnic groups over group hierarchies. The coexistence of Hokolo, Hakka, Mainlander, and aboriginal cultures followed the advent of "*Gemeinschaft*" (*shengming gongtong ti*; literally "an entity of shared lives") (see Lin, 2005). The concept of *Gemeinschaft*, therefore, led to the phrase "New Taiwanese." Minnan, Hakka, aborigines, and mainlanders were all incorporated into the category of new Taiwanese, from which we are willing to strive or sacrifice for Taiwan, regardless of our ethnic origins. *Gemeinschaft* resembles Peng Ming-min's idea of common destiny, the difference being that the former treats Taiwanese culture as periphery vis-à-vis the core position of China, the latter wants to erect a culture that belongs specifically to the island that ultimately helped to establish of a new nation.

The strategy of the distillation of Sinicization and an emphasis on Taiwanization, based

[51] According to Chen (2003), the localization curricula were primarily "oriented to a geographically hometown-based instruction that emphasized only the history, geography, customs and folklore of a particular city/county in contrast to a culturally Taiwan-centered pedagogy as found in opposition discourses" (p.164)

on a Sino-centric view, appears again in the rewriting of Taiwanese history. School textbooks had long met criticism "for being a political socialization tool helping to promote the grand-Han ideology" (Corcuff, 2002, p.84). The textbooks in the 1990s, therefore, attempted to de-emphasize this Han chauvinism. For instance, the linkage between the sufferings from colonization and the recollection of the motherland (China) had shifted. The texts placed less emphasis on the national commitment and loyalty of Taiwan's residents to their motherland (China) during the Dutch rule. By the same token, there was less emphasis on the recovery of a Taiwan dependent on "the consolidation of Mainland China and the success of Chinese Revolutionaries led by Dr. Sun Yet-sen" (Su, 1998, p.167). Furthermore, these textbooks included the deletion of attributing Taiwan's economic and political achievement in the postwar time/space to KMT rule and Sun Yet-sen's concepts of *Three Principles of The People* (see Su, 1998). Another facet of de-Sinicization is the restriction on suggestions of Han viewpoints and the emphases of plural historical backgrounds taking place on the island. For instance, further removals include the idea that the aborigines must eliminate the "uncivilized" custom of headhunting under the Confucian conceptions (see Chou, 1999). This idea became replaced with a brief overview of aboriginal economic activities and lifestyles. The textbooks depict the aborigines as "the first, original inhabitants" who arrived in Taiwan before the early Chinese settlers (Su, 1998, p.159). The highlight of a plurality of historical experiences, therefore, allowed the discursive shift from "we were all from Mainland China[52]" to "we were mainly from Mainland China" (Su, 1998, p.159).

The reconstruction of the history, as based on plural historical experiences does not suggest that Yeh's idea of "Taiwan as Center" had been fully realized, however. Chou (1999) disputes that despite the increasing emphasis on Taiwan history, the textbooks still presented a

[52] The textbook explained that all people living on this island originated from China, including Taiwanese aboriginal tribes, who came from southern China. In fact, Taiwanese aborigines belong to the Pacific family of Austronesian or Malayopolynesian languages.

Sino-centric interpretation. Thus, we see the frequent retellings and depictions of the association of colonization with oppression and the uprisings of the Taiwanese people in the textbooks. For instance, Taiwanese people suffered from economic exploitation and religious conversion under Dutch rule and finally received rescuing from Cheng Cheng-kung (see Su, 1998). Under Japanese rule, the oppressive acts included: (1) The arresting of large numbers of Taiwanese with atrocious acts; (2) The punishment of the families of anti-Japanese Taiwanese; and (3) The economic exploitation and the attempts to assimilate Taiwanese to be Japanese to weaken the Taiwanese connection to China (see Su, 1998). Taiwanese resistance surfaced through anti-Japanism: a movement that attempted to maintain our Han Chinese culture and language, in the uprising led by the aboriginal leader, Mo na lu tao against the Japanese, and in the fruitless establishment of "The Republic of Taiwan" (see Su, 1998).

A different strategy was used to depict the Han Chinese rules (including the Ching period) in Taiwanese history. Under the rules of the Cheng Cheng-Kung family, for instance, Taiwan ushered in a significant stage of development. The encouragement of Chinese settlements, the introduction of Chinese culture, and the establishment of the first Confucian temple and Chinese school (Su, 1998, p.164) were accomplished by the Cheng family. The picture of "the Surrender of the Dutch to Cheng Cheng-Kung," as shown in the textbooks, highlights the "legitimacy" of Cheng's rule over Taiwan and posits Taiwan as being historically an integral part of China. Under the rule of the Ching dynasty, Taiwan became the most modernized province in China, characterized by the development of railroad, mining, and agricultural construction under the effective leadership of two government officers, Sher Pao-Chen and Liu Ming-Chun (see Chou, 1999 & Su, 1998).

The contrast between Han Chinese rules=superiority [53] and non-Han Chinese

[53] Sher Pao-chen and Liu Ming-Chun were both Han Chinese. The contributions they had achieved did not necessarily mean that Ching dynasty under the Manchus rule was equally acclaimed. The Manchus were regarded as "barbarian" by the Han people.

rules=inferiority written in the textbooks in the 1990s, as we can see, was departing from Yeh's conception of Taiwan consciousness, which claimed the importance of siding with the people (Taiwan as Center) to write Taiwanese history. The textbook contents of the 1990s were further in contradiction to some of the *hisang-tu* writers or pro-independence scholars' historical perspectives that acclaimed the Japanese rule and compared it with the Han rule periods. In sum, the child produced under such a framework, then, would implicitly reconcile a more Taiwanization comportment with a desire to be Chinese. For the *hsiang-tu* writers in post-Formosan Incident time/space, the child under such a system is nebulously Taiwanese, attached to the greater shadow of Han Chinese culture and nationalism.

Conclusion: A Transformation from Mr. Democracy to Yeh's Child?

The analysis in this chapter suggests how the construction of educational programs that marked a transition between the Confucian and Yeh's child had shifted. The contours of Yeh's child shifts concerns away from a restricted focus on localization discourses of the 1990s toward the mode of thought and the logic that both precedes it and continues after, that which surrounds localization discourses, rather than simply tracking its most obvious effects.

In the conjuncture of reasonings that enabled localized educational programs to become plausible, the localization curricular discourses in the 1990s did not echo the characteristics of Ye Shitao's conceptions of Taiwanese consciousness, nor was it a complete abandonment of what the Confucian child had embodied. Instead, it resulted from the competition between Chinese and Taiwanese consciousness (including Yeh and the *hsiangtu* writers in the second half of the 1980s), which that suggests this is a new moment that would see the constitution of

the child. The child would develop in these configurations, and the children would themselves inform and temper each other between the leverage of Chinese and Taiwanese culture, nationalism, and identity. The child produced under the 1990s curriculum discourses, therefore, carries the scripts of being able to speak "dialects" and to know Taiwanese history, culture, and geographical characteristics from a Sinocentric perspective.

The shift of power and their respective competitions with each other had truth effects beyond simply what one might do within the pedagogical activities or what could be meant by the child. As Hu Shih's conceptions of Mr. Democracy took shape, directly and indirectly bringing localization curriculum into view, it also fostered an educational reform campaign in the 1990s, which encouraged the child to adopt the initiation of critical thinking. Within the framework, the educational goals that enabled both the teacher and the student to question Taiwanization and Sinicization suggested that the child was more than an inert object ready to be taught either localization or Sinicization discourses. It was the educational reform campaign that makes the locale of Yeh's child reach beyond the specificity of what the textbooks depicted, and it is these educational reforms that personified Lee Yuan-zhe's child that the next chapter traces.

As such, it is vital to return to Foucault's notion of rarity and exteriority in the discursive analyses, because Foucault's ideas bring to light the circularity of the shifting parameters from one episteme to another that processed in a complex and non-linear fashion. It is not until Yeh's child can be more fully separated from the Confucian child that there is such a "thing" attributed to the idea of Mr. Democracy (a strategy of rarity) that allows for the conversation between these two "children." Thus, this inability to neatly separate one child from another makes the localization discourses less amenable to developmentalist gradation and via a strategy of rarity, points to present whose borders are unstable and at times difficult for us to discern. In addition, I contend that the contours of democracy in the 1990s (the version of

exteriority) constitute part of the specific ways in which reflexivity and circularity of the "child" can be achieved and mobilized in the social projects of (multiple) modernities.[54] It (the notion of the child) is at times so rigid that questioning it can become dangerous.

[54] I borrow the terms such as reflexivity, circularity and (multiple) modernities from Baker as she deploys these terms to analyze the shifting knowledge-production in term of Renaissance, classical, and modern epistemes in Foucault's *The order of things* (see Baker, 2009a)

Chapter Five
Lee Yuan-Tseh and the Educational Reform Discourses: The Construction of the Modern Citizen

Just a year before the lifting of martial law in Taiwan, Lee Yuan-Tseh, a professor at the University of California-Berkeley, won the Nobel Prize in Chemistry. As the first Taiwanese Nobel Prize laureate, he immediately became legendary. His role as a celebrated scientist gave him tremendous accountability and credibility to recommend and advise education reform in Taiwan. When Lee came back to Taiwan in 1994, he not only served as the president of the Academia Sinica but received an invitation from the KMT government to be the convener of Commission of Educational Reform (CER). For Lee, a "modern" education is to establish a humanized, democratized, pluralistic, technologized, internationalized, and nativitized education.

> To achieve the goal of modernization of education, there are several imperative objectives. While these objectives may sound abstract, there are with concrete goals. We hope to construct a "humanized" education in which each and every student should be respected. When going to schools, students should be happy not frustrated. Education should be "democratized" through which students should be respected in schools in order to learn how to respect others when they graduate. Education should be "pluralistic" through which the differences in all students should be recognized. This is similar to Confucius' notion of "individually configured education" to fit the child's unique needs. Education should be "technologized" to meet the challenges of future technologies. Education needs to be "internationalized" and "nativitized." These are not empty slogans. We shall believe in these goals strongly as an essential part of our serious efforts to do educational reforms to achieve these goals. (as cited in Lee, 2006, p.110)

Terms such as humanism, democratization, and pluralism that embody modernization education are not something new, however.[55] The educational reform discourses, per depictions in Lee's texts, are an effect of things coming together from disparate time/space and beyond any individual, including Lee himself. The callings for modernization in curriculum discourses that reached its culmination in the 1990s Taiwan, therefore, refused a neat an orderly progression of events emanating from the Confucian, Hu's and Yeh's child onwards. These reforms never gained perspectives that saw them as markers of "progressive education" that was good or useful for the rescue of the nation and therefore for the child. Lee's suggestions on educational reform are of interest, then, not in terms of whether they tell the truth about how the "educational ailments" should be cured, but in terms of the broader discourses available to construct what enabled the articulation of schooling to a belief in the centering of child that called itself modern.

There are at least three discursive conditions that made such renditions of educational reform discourses seemingly plausible at the time. These contain: 1) a culture of globalism that was linked inextricably to the U.S. and/or Americanization that tracks back to the 1950s, 2) a set of liberal democracy discourses, bourgeoning in late 1980s Taiwan, that also underwrote localization discourses, 3) and the emergence of social pluralism that mainly grew from globalism and liberal democracy discourses. This chapter, therefore, first details the specificity of these three discursive conditions. Then, based on the interpenetration of such conditions, I

[55] For example, on April 10, 1994, a demonstration was held to call for a modernization of education. Huang Wuxiong, the leader of the demonstration and also a professor at National Taiwan University, mentioned that the contents of modern Taiwanese education should include a) respect for autonomy, the invention of individuality and an emphasis on the education of autonomy of all ethnic groups and minority groups through which multicultural education can be developed; and b) the idea that the main goal of education is not to categorize, to rank, or to classify people. Conversely, its goal is to perfect educational environment, to provide educational resources, to allow everyone to pursue the best inner development to the utmost through one's free choice. All advanced, modernized countries encourage the majority of their citizens to receive as much higher education as possible but not to restrain it (Huang, 1997, p.14).

address how the educational reform discourses came to call themselves modern. Next, I delineate the changing relationship between the political authority (absolutist/democratic forms of governance) and the teachers. Following this, the chapter describes the resulting different theory of power through the "empowerment" of the students, and the "deregulation" of textbooks that mapped the "modern" child in educational reform discourses.

It should be noted that notions such as empowerment and deregulation discussed in the chapter are not something that are fit for all interest groups, but would produce psychological confinement in certain population groups. Likewise, "modern" is by no means a neutral concept. For example, both the KMT government and Hu Shih appeal to notions of modern or modernization to make social changes. The meanings of modern embedded in a specific discursive matrix, therefore, need to nuance and disentanglement via power-as-effects in the Foucauldian sense. By doing so, there is nothing intrinsically modern about the appeal to social changes or educational restructuring. The child of educational reform discourses is a byproduct of Hu Shih's conception of Mr. Democracy. The educational reforms mark a signification shift, as mediated by globalism's strong focus on economic well-being. Therefore, the reforms and resulting child are not taken-for-granted beliefs that became immersed in an objective discursive space, but rather constituted a rupture in ways of thinking about schooling as well as ruptures in ways of reasoning the children.

That a different way of thinking about schooling and children does not necessarily suggest that it would in turn bring about a purely different kind of children and thus the previous discourses pertaining to the children who were marginalized. This chapter suggests that educational reform discourses that have mainly linked the international trading conception of globalism, liberal democracy, and social pluralism to the production of modern child is not an essentialist conception, but rather an ongoing set of processes through which the three vectors of globalism, democracy, and pluralism could inform and contradict one another. It is also a

lens through which the previously "backward" belief could be glimpsed.

The Culture of Globalism

A common general framework that alters the definitions of capitalist economy, the role of the nation-state, administrative institutions, ways of thinking, and in turn frames the inscription of the child in the 1990s Taiwan is the impact of a global mentality symbolized by the term globalism. Globalism here refers to the circulation in the form of capital, goods, information, and travel of people occurring since the 1950s. Globalism made possible the ideas of worldwide interdependence in multiple ways that culminated in the 1990s (see Chiang, 2002). It is within such context that stagist and developmentalist assumptions about nationhood (first/third world), political economy (capitalist/communist), and personhood (civilized/primitive) are to be categorized in calibrating the condition of proof for the assessment of "progress" or "success." Globalism thereby expresses economic and intellectual "reality" of restructuring the nation that would significantly reorient conceptions of humanity and consequently, the child. The parameters of globalism discourses in the 1990s Taiwan are familiar to us when compared to Hu's concern for notions of Mr. Democracy and Mr. Science as intellectual quality. What is less familiar is the resort to categories believed to be "economic" as ways of rescuing the nation and the child.

One major imagining of articulating a sense of "superiority" in globalism is the necessity to become a member of international trading systems such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), World Trade Organization (WTO), World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). By doing so, products made in Taiwan do not suffer discrimination from other trading partners. These trading systems also promise to ensure that competition is maintained, and conflicts are negotiated in the contexts of a global economy; a global economy characterized by the expansion of markets, the emergence of a transnational organization of work, and a new

international division of labor (see Chiang, 2002). The concept of globalism operates in a manner that ties itself automatically to a transnational market economy, which in this case, thereby informed new political and pedagogical projects that in turn led to the incorporation of "normalcy" and the exclusion against the "others."

The notion of the others not only denotes third world nations, as opposed to their Western counterparts, but it also implies a fear of maintaining the status quo, which means that "higher" living standards are not attainable. An export-oriented market economy based on labor-intensive industries like Taiwan, therefore, must think about "upgrading" itself to a capital-intensive market economy that is confronted with international trade competition from nations that provide cheaper labor and land costs. Moreover, most assembly-line manufacturing jobs disappeared by the early 1990s (National Commission on Teaching and America's Future, 1996, p.10). The two lines of reasoning interpenetrated that became of paramount importance in the 1990s Taiwan, given that the popularity of the notion "no economy, no Taiwan" served not only as "psychological compensation for its ostracization and invisibility in international community" (Wang, 1999, p.192), but also as part of Taiwan experience: the articulation of Taiwan's "miraculous" economic achievement in both media and textbooks.

In the market economy, the R.O.C found its salvation, conditions within which fashioned the hope for a better nation (like the West) and fear of falling behind. The salvation discourses in economic terms quickly morphed into images and narratives of collective national belonging and became a lens for thinking about the nature of the child. The salvation discourses devised fears of not providing the correct pedagogical strategies to rescue the child, and of unable to "upgrade" Taiwan through educational reform to prepare its future citizens to have problem-solving capabilities like their Western counterparts.

It is important to note that the emergence of the transnational market economy, the pursuit of further national advancement via capital accumulation, and the linkage of industrialism with

the educational policy are not so unique that they then are directly attributable to the globalism discourses of the 1990s, however. The concerns within the market economy framework that existed in the globalism discourses of the 1990s Taiwan can found, more or less, in postwar U.S.-Taiwan relations. Postwar U.S.-Taiwan relations existed in the transnational division of labor relations, and the political, diplomatic, and military alliance within the broader U.S.-Russia confrontation framework that produced an interest in Americanization. The scope of Americanization existed in four foremost domains. Firstly, in the market economy, there was the U.S. financial aid of 100 million-per-year from 1951 to 1965 (see Lee, 2007), and the emergence of a three-ring division of labor relations among Taiwan, Japan, and the U.S. Secondly, in the military alliance, there was the mutual defense treaty drafted in the 1950s and the Taiwan Relations Act passed in 1979. Thirdly, American pop culture displayed itself in the forms of films, TV programs, videos, and music, foods (Coca-Cola, McDonald's), clothing, and other commodities. Fourth, in academia, young Taiwanese intellectuals, who received degrees from American universities, formed a "new knowledge class" (Hsiao, 2002, p.59) in different social institutions. They became "the "carriers" and "localizers" of many western/global values" (Hsiao, 2002, p.59). Together, the lines of reasoning interpenetrated one another and shaped a mentality referred to as Taiwanese, which helped measure how much Taiwan deviated from or advanced Americanization.

The construction of globalism in the 1990s Taiwan intersected with notions of Americanization since the 1950s. In response, I suggest that the lines between Americanization and globalism are not always so unambiguous. The reduction of what accompanied globalism's popularity in 1990s Taiwan to an available economic framework, such as WTO/GATT is, then, an oversimplification that ignores the untidy nexus of the historical trajectories of what made it (globalism) possible.

A similar approach to (re)reading globalism history proves to be useful for analyses of

civil society, which some people believe to be part of globalism discourses. However, the emphasis on globalism discourses' influence does not in itself explain other important arguments that facilitated the uptake of civil society, The construction of a civil society characterized by the emergence of NGOs, human rights groups, labor union, and anti-nuclear power plant protesters could already be found in postwar Taiwan, even while most of them occupied a marginal discursive space under the statist framework. The advent of communication devices, such as e-mail and the Internet, made the acquisition of knowledge and information, including liberal democracy discourses, more accessible. These new forms of communication also helped bring light to previously submerged discourses in 1990s Taiwan. The relationship between the nation-state and its citizens therefore shifts; the nation-state is no longer a controller but a "platform builder" (Chiang, 2002, p.94) within which the citizen is an active participant. Therefore, an individual is likely to challenge arguments about schooling, the family, political systems that are the legacies of a statist framework.

Interestingly, the capability for independent thinking is found within globalism and liberal democracy discourses, which allowed criticisms of the phenomena of globalism itself. The localizing effect, for instance, is probably the most prominent issue that allows interrogating what the culture of globalism had engendered. Local forces had been largely concerned with the reduction of globalism to McDonaldization in the consumer market, the homogenization of popular culture via cross-border flows of capitals and transnational monetary systems, and the "denationalization" that blurred state sovereignty. By raising this theme, I do not mean to set "the global" and "the local" against each other as if they are two mutually exclusive concepts. Rather, the existence of the two forces placed in the leverage of global and local indicates that the position of globalism as "doing good" for the nation really means "doing" good for certain members of our group or for some specific context. It is also here that the culture of globalism and local force or forces from discrete locales subliminally intersected. The culture of

globalism, thus, should not be understood as a one-directional process or framework that manages to constrain or exclude the local tendency, but in its place as "an intertwined process between the global and the local" (Kuo, 2005, p.26).

The multiple lines of reasoning that constitute globalism and other forces that position themselves in "oppositional" location to globalism thereby affect educational policy and curricular reform. Educational reform discourses became a peculiar site in that, for instance, processes of competition under the label globalism reinforce the requirement of English proficiency, but also reinforce learning local languages and history to foster "Taiwanese identity" that shapes national characteristics as significant "counterarguments" against both Mandarin Chinese and English "hegemony."

Explaining Democratization through Power

Together with the globalism discourses, another line of reasoning that enabled the articulation of a different conception of state-citizen relations and therefore a different orientation of the child in the 1990s educational reform discourses is the advent of liberal democracy. As Chang (1993) argues, the emergence of the waves of social movements that proliferated in the 1990s Taiwan cannot be divorced from their political context. Diverse ways of seeing and discussing the child in 1990s Taiwan also embody such connections.

The idea of liberal democracy in 1990s Taiwan is not new, however. It had already developed through Hu Shih's conception of Mr. Democracy. In postwar Taiwan, the idea of democracy grew through three main aspects: 1) the publication of *Free China Fortnightly* in 1950s Taiwan, 2) the changing diplomatic relations in the 1970s that impacted the legitimacy of the KMT governance, including the R.O.C.'s exclusion from the U.N., and the U.S. ending its formal diplomatic relations with the R.O.C., 3) and the emergence of industrialism and urbanization that produced the concept of a "middle-class group" being primarily a capitalist economic category, which made available the concept of "intellectual enlightenment" in U.S

images of democracy and freedom when one reached a better socioeconomic level. The multiple lines of reasoning that either operated in isolated space or intersected with each other are the effects of power that muddied the relational places between the lines of "democracy" and "authoritarianism" under a statist framework. As such, the attribution of the democratization process to an easy or any single point, like the establishment of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) or the lifting of martial law does, overlooks the multiple strands of historical trajectories that are the effects of power.

In 1990s Taiwan, the assortment of powers that previously reached beyond the domain of a statist framework came to the fore due to changing political contexts. These contexts include 1) the retirement of life-long parliamentary members, who took power on the Chinese mainland in 1947 and who still controlled the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan in postwar Taiwan, 2) the abolition of Temporary Provisions effective during the Period of Communist Rebellion, within which the president could serve more than two terms and take emergency measures without requiring the approval of the Legislative Yuan, and 3) the eradication of the Punishment Statute on Rebellion and blacklist, and the revision of Article 100 of the Criminal Code (see Wang, 1992; Yu, 1995 & Lin, 1998). These factors combined to help build a platform that cultivated the reversion of *Fa tong,*[56] and shifted state-citizen relations through holding the direct elections of central level governors (see Yu, 1995). It should be noted that it did not mean that the vestiges of *Fa tong* were therefore abandoned, and that people began to perceive democracy thereafter. It meant that the changing political structure enabled a reorganization of state/citizen relations that, in turn, produced a somewhat different discursive matrix that

[56] Based on the *Fa tong* Constitution drafted in 1947, the KMT declared itself the sole legitimate government of China while treating the CCP as a rebel group. Taiwan was thus viewed as a province of China and as a temporary site of the ROC state apparatus for the mission of mainland recovery given that the civil war had not been terminated. In addition, elections for the National Assembly, the Legislative Yuan and the Control Yuan were suspended under the framework of *Fa tong* (see Chen, 2003).

allowed one to see and say differently.

One of the effects that the framework produced is the shifting relationship between Taiwan and Communist China and the ensuing debates about the state boundary that also brought up Taiwanization discourses. The abolition of The Temporary Provision in 1991, for instance, insinuates that the P.R.C. was no longer an illegal political group in the eyes of Taiwan, but a political entity that effectively ruled China. Nonetheless, Taiwan was under the jurisdiction of the R.O.C. and political reunification was the ultimate goal between the two political entities once the P.R.C practiced a democratic political system. The revision of the Constitution in Taiwan shifted from one China (R.O.C) principle to the concept of "R.O.C. on Taiwan," that is, the identification of Taiwan as a *de facto* state while leaving the name R.O.C. unchanged. This didn't suggest the emphasis of the political/cultural connections with China so much as a framework within which the idea of democracy was practiced. It was also within this framework that the course of democratization and the national/cultural imagination embedded in Taiwan consciousness explicitly and implicitly intersected. The concept of "R.O.C. on Taiwan" morphed into two antagonistic beliefs. It can be either a territorial term that will eventually reunify China under the name "Republic of China" or a political term that will be replaced with "Republic of Taiwan" in the future. Interestingly, despite the irreconcilability of the two theories, textbook contents in the 1990s tried to contain them all, as symbolized in the saying "Rooted in Taiwan, Mindful of the Mainland, Looking out into the World" (see Chen, 2003).

Another effect of the changing political framework is the redistribution of the effects of power that relocated from a centralized style of teaching and pedagogy to the able-izing effects of schools/teachers/parents, which some called "empowerment" or "deregulation." Through this structure, participation, flexibility, and multiple solutions served as evidence of how to practice "progressive" educational discourses. As a result, what was previously undesirable in

the field of education now gained prominence. Examples of these new promoted aspects include the discussion of vestiges of *fa tong*, the exclusion of local language (see Liao & Yang, 1986), the imposition of the KMT's political beliefs (see Ou, 1985), and the perpetuation of sexism and Han ethnocentrism in textbooks (see Hsieh, 1990 & Sun, 1994).

The Emergence of Social /Cultural Pluralism

The discussion of issues such as language policy, Sinicization education, Han chauvinism, and gender stereotypes gained influence from and had impact upon factors beyond the field of education. Chen, for instance, also uses similar terms to describe the literary works of post-martial law time/space.

> Once the martial law system collapsed, all the subjects that used to be considered taboo in thought, one after another, appear in literary writings. Taiwanese consciousness literature, aboriginal literature, juancun literature (*juancun wenxue* 眷村文學)[57], female consciousness literature, gay and lesbian literature (*tongzhi wenxue* 同志文學), environmental literature (*huanbao wenxue* 環保文學), etc. all appear in great quantity, demonstrating that the time of multi-faceted thinking has come, and the harvest time of literature is about to be realized. ……. The fact best representing the richness of this phenomenon is that many writers, without consulting each other, turn out to challenge the existent hegemonic discourse. To subvert Chinese chauvinism (Zhonghua shawen zhuyi 中華沙文主義), which has long been in a controlling position, is the primary goal of Taiwanese consciousness

[57] Juancun literally means "residential military community." After 1949, at a time of defeat and rapid evacuation, the KMT simply lacked the ability and the heart to provide better care for the families of the servicemen and veterans. Most of them were mainlanders who came with the KMT from mainland China. Temporary villages formed by the families of servicemen and veterans naturally emerged. People with similar backgrounds, situations, and goals lived together, and a village culture with an intense sense of self-identity naturally took shape. In the Taiwanese context, Juancun literature thus can be understood as a sort of Mainlander literature.

> literature. To show a complete suspicion of biased Han chauvinism (Hanren shawen zhuyi 漢人沙文主義) is the major concern of aboriginal literature. To worry about the continuous expansion of Hoklo chauvinism (Fulao shawen zhuyi 福佬沙文主義) is the prominent issue of juancun literature. To urgently question the arrogance and violence of male chauvinism is the primary mission of female consciousness literature. To resist the centralism of heterosexuality is one of the major tasks for gay and lesbian literature at this moment. No matter what kind of literary format is used for presentation, decentering is the common trend for all creative writers (Chen, 2000, p.41-2).

The notions of empowerment and deregulation in the educational field that coined notions of a decentering of the dominant discourses in the literary works in 1990s Taiwan, therefore, could be understood as effects of wider ruptures allied to the emergence of democracy and globalism discourses. Power's new role and location in 1990s Taiwan had a leveling effect by reversing the master/obedient citizen framework under the statist political philosophies. Furthermore, power's new role and location created the filtering effects that helped shape different human-to-human and human-to-land relations based on ideas such as multiculturalism, diversity, and pluralism.

The phenomenon of pluralism shows itself in the wider societal level as well. These signs of pluralism include: the Journey of Justice--Demythologizing Wu Feng[58] in 1987; the Declaration of Indigenous Rights in 1988; the Land Rights Movements in 1988; the Indigenous Constitution Movements in 1991 and 1992; the Consumer Movement; Women's Movement;

[58] The story stated that in the Ching ruling period, a Han Chinese explorer name Wu-Feng, who was highly esteemed by the Taiwanese aborigines, sacrificed his life to prevent the "cruel" religious rite of headhunting. After the incident, aborigines then gave up their own customs, opting instead to assimilate into Han Chinese society and thus became "civilized." However, some researchers of indigenous aborigines argued that according to their records, the person Wu-Feng never existed. (see Su, 2007)

Student Movement; Labor Movement; Farmers' Movement; Movement for Teachers' Rights; Protest for the Welfare of the Handicapped and Disadvantaged; Protests for the Welfare of Veterans; Political Victims' Human Rights' Movement; Hakka-Rights Movement; and Non-Homeowner's Movement (see Mao, 1997; Roy 2003 & Wang 2003). Many of the above noted were translated into institutionalized organizations, for instance, the establishment of the Hakka Civil Rights Advocacy Group in 1987, and the Return My Ancestral Tongue Movement in 1988 (Liang, 2009, p.25). Furthermore, anti-pollution protests, the natural conservation movement, and the anti-nuclear-power movement also offered a different discursive space from which developmentalist conceptions of culture given under a capitalist economy faced questioning.

It is important to note that, again, the emergence of notions of pluralisms' blossoming in 1990s Taiwan does not necessarily mean that they replaced the previously dominant discourses. Nor does it mean that the notion of developmentalism in the 1990s Taiwan and pluralism were two mutually-exclusive terms. The former contends that the role of humanity/society as changing from barbarism/poor to a civilized/rich stance should not be understood as "the stable, the eternal, the identical and the constant" (Yip, 1996, p.334), nor should the notions of pluralism be situated beyond the domain of developmentalist discourses. Rather, pluralism and developmentalism inform each other through multi-dimensional and multi-directional flows under a democratic political framework. For 1990s Taiwan, what resulted was the blurring of the either-or schema and the production of "in-between" cultural discourses.

As such, the reorientation of curriculum, for instance, from the Confucian child to the child of the educational reform discourses veered away from strictly nationalist ideals. Thus, we see a shift from curriculums that advocate becoming the righteous Chinese who was subjected to patriarchal authority into curriculums that prepare the child of the future with "a cosmopolitan identity which shows tolerance of race and gender differences, genuine curiosity

toward and willingness to learn from other cultures, and responsibility toward excluded groups within and beyond one's society" (Hargreaves, 2003,p.xix). This process was made possible through the restructuring of textbooks, teacher education, and entrance examinations under the banner of deregulation and empowerment. The making of the child, therefore, complicates a homogeneous version of education by a refutation to read the textbook contents as a "factual site." Even when the textbooks attempted to do so, they would produce more than one kind of cosmology in the context of pluralism.

Making Educational Reform Discourses Available

> And I don't say that humanity does not progress. I say that it is a bad method to pose the problem as: "How is it that we have progressed?" The problem is: How do things happen? And what happens now is not necessarily better or more advanced, or better understood, than what happened in the past (Foucault, 1980, p.49-50).

The previous section explained the conditions that developed the educational reform discourses in 1990s Taiwan. These conditions were mediated by the rise of a culture of globalism in particular in of the economic and intellectual categories, the ideas of liberal democracy that also incited the localization discourses, and the social/cultural pluralism that was primarily a byproduct of globalism discourses and democracy. The educational reform discourses of the 1990s in Taiwan related itself to modernization, then, based on the interpenetration of such conditions. The ways of seeing the child, to a substantial extent, also represent such discursive conditions. The educational reform discourses separated itself dramatically from the traditional curricula based predominantly on *fa tong*, and therefore is "a movement that had identifiable 'actors,' basic concepts, theories, and research interests that distinguished it from other movements" (Baker, 2001, p.467).

For instance, the April 10 movement (410 movement), probably the most prominent

educational protest that occurred in 1994 Taiwan, is more than an educational alliance that revealed educational issues embedded in the above noted wider societal discursive conditions; the April 10 movement also cooperated with other reform organizations such as labor groups, women's groups, and ethnic groups to call for the modernization of education in 1990s Taiwan.

> First, implementation of small classes and smaller schools; second, building more general high schools and more universities and colleges; third, modernizing schooling (pluralization of teacher education and instructional methods; incorporating a sense of community into secondary and primary schooling to encourage parents' participation; the liberalization of government control over private schooling, etc.); and finally, instituting a fundamental law of education to incorporating the spirit of educational modernization as the basis for the reform of Taiwan's education. (Laih, 1996, p.2-3)

Two years after the 410 educational movement, Lee Yuan-Tzeh and the members of the CER[59] (the Commission on Educational Reform) responded to the 410 alliance by suggesting that the educational modernization process include 1) deregulating the field of education, 2) protecting the right to learn 3) preserving parental choice in education, 4) and maintaining the teacher's professional autonomy (Lee, 2006, p.67)

The concerns of the 410 movement and the suggestions of the CER could be understood as a bottom-up (decentralization) educational restructuring together with a governmental top-down (centralization) change, which helped fabricate the modernized child. The uneven distribution of statist power levels and the shifting role of the government thereby arose in the

[59] In 1996, the Executive Yuan responded to the 410 Alliance's desires concerning changes in the field of education by finding and commissioning a special committee on educational reforms. The committee was headed by Lee Yuan-Tzeh. The members included the university presidents, the administrative representatives, the Academicians of Academia Sinica, the local governments' representatives, the commercial enterprise representatives, the school administrative representatives, and the Normal Educational System representatives (Liu, 2000, p.136)

field of education. Their concerns and suggestions entail: 1) The questioning of the absolute authority of governmental power relations embedded in the production of national curricula/spirit. As such, the belief is that the restructuring of the Ministry of Education from an educational bureaucracy to a participatory structure benefited the cultivation of a modernized child. 2) Appealing to decentralization or deregulation as a platform could empower people to have more influence within that framework. Thus, parents, teachers, and the principal could have the opportunity to hire personnel and choose teaching materials to satisfy teachers' professional autonomy and parents' expectations (see Chen, 2003). Through the confluence of these two lines of reasoning about "power," modernization in the 1990s educational reform discourses made explicitly clear the shifting role and the definition of schooling and the child.

The discussion of the 410 educational movement and the CER's comments on modernization education serves to explain how each produced profound education outcomes, not to claim they are the origin of educational reform discourses. To this, Hsueh (1996) informs us that the educational reform movements in Taiwan can be divided into five periods: burgeoning (1983-1987), organization (since 1987), promoting bills (since 1990), prospering (the first half of 1994), and diversification (the second half of 1994). The 410 educational movement and CER's comments thus do not come out of a cultural vacuum, but rather out of an already existing observational lens (such as an anti-authoritarian mentality) that had taken various forms in the context of the one-party governance. It is therefore inappropriate of us to view Hsueh's dividing of educational reform movements into five stages as five discrete locales that flow smoothly from one to another. As such, when speaking of the educational reform discourses in 1990s Taiwan, they stretch elsewhere outside of the time/space in which they became audible. The educational reform discourses, to be discussed below, then, are both a discrete movement frequently reviewed in 1990s Taiwan and a discourse network that comes

from disparate social/political contexts.

Moreover, to view the educational reform discourses as a modernization movement since it positioned the latter side of the traditional (patriarchal)/ modern (democratic) or centralization/decentralization divide as a superior form of schooling is to oversimplify the convoluted routes that forged the educational reform discourses. Although it the reforms appear to be positively liberating, vestiges of the *fa tong* pedagogy still haunted. Interestingly, what had emerged was the blurring of the evolutionary idealist conception of historical change in the context of educational reform discourses from which the modernized child became a coherent symbol, while at the same time, it was decentered or excluded from the parameters of modernized education. These discourses will be discussed below regarding the fluctuating role of the teachers, the students, and the contents of the textbooks that inscribed the child.

New Template for Judging Teachers: Teacher as Curriculum Maker

> Teachers should encourage students to participate in classes. Three approaches are provided here: first, teachers praise children when they express their opinions verbally or non-verbally; secondly, teachers should create a climate where children feel comfortable to express their opinions (i.e., if the teacher does not agree with children's opinions, the teacher should not directly criticize their opinions as wrong. Instead, the teacher should say something like: "Why do you think so?" "What would be the result if you did it in such way?"); third, teachers should frame questions so as to arouse children's thinking. Teachers do not necessarily always tell students correct answers; rather, teachers should ask questions to guide students to think and leave them alone to find answers for themselves. (Ministry of Education, 1993, p.177)

The cultivation of independent and reflective teachers, as the above passage demonstrates, gained support through the appeal to a democratic political system. Under such a framework, the shifting role of the teacher took hold through making distinctions between a teacher authority versus child-centered curriculum divide. The lines between them are not so unequivocal. The suggestion of the child-centered curriculum as a superior teaching technique was sometimes a fad or myth in 1990s Taiwan. However, some still supported select vestiges of *Fa tong* pedagogy, such as the "fairness" of the entrance examinations and a tendency toward a centralized way of teaching. It was the belief that these aspects of *Fa tong* pedagogy were a more efficient way of learning for the students. Then, a different conception of a political system provided a distinctive discursive ground for attributing coherent symbols under the educational reform discourses. The subjects (e.g., the students and the teachers) were constituted as different and not so different. It is therefore indispensable that we explore what the roles of the teacher meant prior to the educational reform discourses. The examination of this history can help us locate the rupture that educational reform discourses produced in response to the question of how one can interpret a "teacher."

Liu (2000) views the teacher education programs from 1949-1987 as a "national spirit defense." Teachers were viewed as civil servants and were appointed to schools according to the needs of the state (p.112). It is within this framework that the Normal Teachers' University and the Teachers' College became important sites for teacher training education in Taiwan. By doing so, these organizations ensured the formation of a hierarchy of roles, such that a teacher abides by the school principal's advice and the principles follow the governmental authority. In the classroom, the formula of teachers as transmitters and students as receivers mimics Freire's (2000) banking model of education, which is a theory of the hierarchical relations between teachers and students. This hierarchical teacher/student relation is not the sole effect of *fa tong* pedagogy, however, as much as the Confucian conception that views the teachers as

not only a "knowledge teacher" (*qinshi*) but also a "moral teacher" (*renshi*). The former focuses on knowledge transmission, the latter concerns the cultivation of well-rounded human beings that embodies the Confucian *Hao Jan Chih Chi*.

The partial separation of nation-state and education via the notions of deregulation and empowerment built a different discursive ground for attributing meaning to the role of teachers in 1990s Taiwan. First, the Teacher Preparation Law underwent revisions to meet the demand for "pluralizing teacher education" in 1994. The revised Teachers' Preparation Law stated that allowed educational programs to be set up in general universities so that the Normal Teachers' Universities and the Teachers' Colleges were no longer the only system for conducting teacher education. Other MOE-approved universities and colleges' programs were also eligible to grant primary school teacher licenses (Liu, 2000, p.115). In 1995, there were 32 comprehensive universities/colleges whose proposed teacher education programs got approval from the Ministry of Education, based on the recently-passed Teacher Training Act (Tai, 1998, p.3). No longer was it the view that teacher education is a cog that promotes the "cultivation of the spirit of the people" but rather as the "cultivation of democratic and law-abiding thinking" (Tai, 1998, p.33). Secondly, deregulation allowed primary and high schools to have more autonomy for hiring teachers. The establishment of the Teachers' Assessment and Evaluation Council (TAEC) in K-9 at each school became the new system to decide the appointments of teachers. The roles of the Bureaus of Education changed, therefore, from the role of controller to one of being counselors (Liu, 2000, p.144).

The advent of empowerment that emerged in the context of the democratic political system is an additional aspect that facilitated the changed role of the teacher. Terms such as empowerment, professionalization, and teacher autonomy were popular, even interchangeable in usage in the educational reform discourses of 1990s Taiwan. These terms materialized through developing curriculum goals, designing textbook content, monitoring learning

processes and instructional strategies, evaluating learning results, and creating individualizing curricula for the teachers to decide what they should include in their classroom from "community knowledge" (see Bloch & Tabachinick, 1994). Within this basis, teachers' familiarity and proficiency with textbook contents seems less important than their interactions with children in the classroom. The -isms in the textbooks are not so much "neutral" concepts as the processes of truth-production within specific contexts. It is therefore necessary to have a healthy dose of skepticism and problem-solving actions, which the teachers and students maintained; they ultimately came to think of themselves as lifelong learners. Hence, a "good" teacher refers to a less tiered teacher-student relationship, fewer explicit rules of sequencing and pacing, and more diffuse and multiple criteria for evaluation (Yang, 1997, p. iii). As Popkewitz argued (2008), the cosmopolitanism of the teacher is no longer an explicator of knowledge, but rather now a coach/facilitator (p.124).

The educational reform discourses created a new observational lens through which the good and progressive teachers would receive recognition, yet this did not always map onto all classrooms. The disjuncture between the centered child of the educational reform discourses and the constitution of the good student in the face of entrance examinations, for example, made it difficult to determine what constituted good teachers. The role of the teacher under the educational reform discourses that allowed teachers to be "empowered" to design curriculum, to arrange pedagogy, and to assess performance on his/her own was to a large extent motivated, informed, excluded, and decentered by the existing system of entrance examinations, which inadvertently twisted what constituted a good teacher in 1990s Taiwan. The spread of new discourses on the role of the teacher in the 1990s was therefore both a rupture and a continuity. This rupture lead to emphasis on the teachers' differences based on the heterogeneous renditions of the cosmology of personhood, and a continuity that reworked the centralized pedagogical systems. Within such a context, one of the most important missions for the teachers

remained to be whether they could help students achieve high scores on examinations (see Lee, 2010). The determination of the roles of teachers in context of the 1990s educational reform discourses, then, does not offer smooth narratives that transfer linearly from the so-called "traditional teacher" to the "progressive" one, but rather are surrounded by a slew of theories of power which inform and are informed by others that in turn produce the coherence and incoherence of the teacher identity we see in the 1990s educational reform discourses.

The Lifelong Learner in the Educational Reform Discourses

In 1990s Taiwan, the answers to what to do with children in an open, knowledge-based society became an issue of the utmost importance in the educational reform discourses. The notion of "open" here refers to the positioning of the student as an active learner in a child-centered curriculum that has the rights to learning the correspond to the 1991-1992 constitutional reform; the design of the reforms purposefully aligns with human rights discourses. It thereby stands in contrast to the closed coordination of teaching recommendations aligned with the basic national policies of anti-Communism and counter-Russian discourses in postwar Taiwan (see Pai, 1995). A "knowledge-based society" promotes life-long learning in the face of internationalization. This process entails a significant move away from a subject-based routine learning system to a child-centered, competency-based one, which was therefore considered to be necessary in order to fulfill the narrative of a learning society. Several educational "ailments" in Taiwan's educational system appeared again, as a reinforcement of the current system's inappropriateness and inferiority, as defined by overregulation, a test-oriented school culture, subject-centered curriculum, learning materials unrelated to daily life, and the ossification of traditional teaching practices (Lee, 2010,p.17). Within this structure, three major discursive conditions came together to make new roles of students seem plausible at the time. These conditions include the pursuit of lifelong learning in the context of an international trading system, the cultivation of independent and critical

thinking as opposed to the traditional "ossified" curricula, and developing cultural sensitivity through teamwork as opposed to the competition among children that constant exams produced. These three discursive conditions bring the modern child, and I will further discuss them in detail below.

1. Do not let your child get behind at the beginning: There is an assumption that there has been no previous time in history that the success/survival of the nation and its citizens has been so tightly tied to the ability to read and to reason mathematically. One's ability to read and reason mathematically indicates a higher probability of income, and impacts whether or not the nation outperforms others and maintains its competitive edge in an international trading system. The delineation of good/bad society as defined by ability to read and reason mathematically became construed as an economic category that became particularly important for Taiwan, given its isolation from the international community since the 1970s.

Several attempts made in the field of education that many people thought of as ways of reshaping humanity that would ultimately restructure relations deemed "economic." These attempts involve enrollment in the greatly expanded tertiary level, adjusting the student ratio of senior high schools over senior vocational school from 3:7 to 5:5, upgrading technical colleges to universities upon a certain scale or good performance, and encouraging universities to organize their own operating funds that also gives them more autonomy in managing funds from non-state/private resources (see Lin, 2000 & Chen, 2007). By doing so, these attempts imply a belief that they will produce a hearty labor force with research and development capabilities that corresponded to the Executive Yuan's *Statute for Upgrading Industries.* The *Statute* encourages research and development in general, with the goal of introducing innovative products and services (see Wang & Mai, 2001 & Chen, 2007). Also, the emphasis on research capability gained more prominence through readjusting the ratio between senior high schools and vocation schools and the increasing number of universities and colleges that

taught mathematics, physics, and chemistry. Further, the Taiwanese government put a distinct weight on learning English that they believed would make its citizens more competitive in the international marketplace. The positioning of Taiwan as an Asian Pacific learning center enabled some local governments to teach English at primary schools as early as 1993. In 1998, nearly half of the Taiwan's primary schools offered English on a voluntary basis. It should be noted that the emphases on learning English or the positioning of the senior high school as a superior form of schooling were not new in Taiwan. What was new was the tendency to situate education around the scope of the international marketplace and its shifting teaching techniques. It is within such frameworks that the discourse regarding innovation abilities as hard to cultivate under an exam-oriented, centrally-controlled educational system emerged, as did an emphasis on reading for pleasure. The "ideal" child is therefore not "restricted" or "trapped" by any specific parochialism and localism embedded in the cultural or political discourses. Instead, it is the child who embodies "global perspectives." The cultivation of innovation and reading for pleasure became categorized into pedagogical levels that ultimately morphed into an economic category. The failure for doing so is largely due to its exclusion from being "modern" or "progressive" pedagogy. To follow, the child would also seem to be "falling behind" or "at risk" and therefore not "competitive" enough in the globalized era.

2. Independent and critical thinking: Another effect that the educational reform discourses' child brings is the assumption that an empowered problem-solver is capable of critically reasoning the solutions to problems. The empowered problem-solver's skills gained large attention as being "emancipatory" and "liberating" procedures under a participatory democratic framework. For educational reform enthusiasts, this stands in opposition to "ossified" education. The critique of such ossified education, first, is that the exam contents legitimate the rote memorization of KMT political and social goals that enable students to "reason" in the guise of "neutral, unbiased arguments" (see Strawn, 1999). Second, the entrance exams

function as a social inclusion/exclusion system that makes possible the constitution of "good" and "bad" student in psychological discourses. In addition, these exams promote the regimentation of both the content (textbooks) and form (exams), which obstructs challenging the accepted or the "right" answers the exams desire.

The partial separation of politics and education promised by deregulation leads us to consider the shifting roles of students. No longer was the top priority the regulation of student behavior and the development of their values and ideas under the banner of national solidarity and social stability. In its place, we see ideal teaching techniques under educational reform discourses that resembles Hu Shih's conception of individualism. These new techniques and reforms "investigate teaching/learning methods to inspire children to explore the truth; analyze moral matters to help children to face themselves; give sufficient respect and love to make children depend on themselves to grow and become energetic, brave, self-respecting and respecting others, loving others and self-loving, and able to pass through any challenges" (Yang, 1997, p. 32). It is within this context that saw the rising visibility of previously taboo issues or "negative" events, such as the 228 Incidents, Han-centrism, sexism, and ethnicity discourses. It is also the means through which the cultivation of independent thinking allowed the removal of all possible "artificial pressure" that *fa tong* pedagogy[60] had produced.

The image of independent thinking in the child here is an outcome of the shifting discursive ground that permitted educational reform discourses to make "facts" of what a child is and how to secure the new image of the child by contrasting it to another value system in its "modernization" guise. The position of the child with independent thinking is far away from the traditional child under "ossified" education, but aspects of the previous system still existed.

[60] The results of *fa tong* pedagogy included physical punishment, tests and competitions, socially-expected disciplines, a dictatorship climate, and stereotypical curriculum and instruction (Hu, 1998, p.7).

For one, the national entrance exams still function as the "objective and fair" tracking mechanisms which to a large extent make independent thinking a debatable issue. The new teaching method in mathematics, for instance, the so-called constructivist approach that professors in teacher education believe to be an excellent way for cultivating independent thinking, were now not recommended, for it led to low academic performance that incurred huge resistance from parents and communities (see Ke, 2005). Educational reform discourses thereby claim for themselves the "true" conception of the child in the modernized and globalized norms, but not without contestation.

3. Social involvement, participation, and cooperation: The educational reform discourses in 1990s Taiwan led to the disarticulation between the notion of obedience/group unity and national survival. In postwar Taiwan, the connection between obedience/group unity (*taunjie*) and national survival/security was widespread, especially in the face of a Chinese Communist Party military threat and under the slogan of re-unification with China. The term obedience refers to the practice of filial piety in family circles and the expansion of it to the larger nation-state that will ultimately foster a harmonious relationship (see Chun, 1994). Within the framework, the ideas of obedience/group unity (*taunjie*) became inextricably linked ideas that were converted to the elimination of "familial/social chaos." This elimination of "chaos" refers to the sacrifice of personal desires if they conflict with familial interests, the censorship of the media and literature, and the restriction of political dissent. Schooling, as an intermediate role between the family and nation-state, was now an important locale for the intensification of familial values and a microcosm of what the nation-state required. The emphasis of obedience to authority or group unity (*taunjie*) in schooling in the four decades before the lifting of martial law include: 1) the instillation in students of a taken-for-granted understanding of Taiwan as part of China in the textbook, 2) the superiority of Chinese culture over Taiwanese culture and language, 3) the shaping of docile student bodies/minds in the Foucauldian sense that were to

be rendered in part through “behavior management” such as the stipulation of the length of the hair, the style of uniforms and the abiding by the rules that came from the principal, teachers or student leaders, 4) and the concrete arrangement of a school physical layout and the scheduled timetable for specific courses that made possible the emergence and penetration of the gaze to everywhere in schooling (see Strawn, 1999). The above notes are of interest not in terms of whether they are bad or not useful about what is happening in or out of schooling in light of the 1990s educational reform discourses, but in terms of the discourses made available to construct what was seen and asserted as truths.

The multiple lines of reasoning from globalism, democracy, and pluralism highlight the partial separation of education from nation-state, therefore, made possible a different concept of human-human relations in the 1990s educational reform discourses. In result, the main concern is no longer the notion of group unity that operates in the concentric models of the family, school, and the nation and that maintains a one-sided evolutionary idealist concept of economic and cultural change. Rather, the teachers, students, parents, school, and the community are given the power to understand and respect the different points of views that one groups can negotiate through collaborative practices.

> One of the core spirits in the modernization of education is to provide more opportunity for our citizens to choose… The essence of modernization of education is to illuminate a perspective of liberal/open education. Shifting from an agricultural to an industrialized society, the demand for a complete and comprehensive education had been raised for our citizens. The modernization of education is a non-stoppable trend; however, with weak collaboration from the civil society to push for education reforms, today’s education in Taiwan is filled with flaws….Our country should try our best to provide better and more comprehensive education for our citizens. The more well-educated our citizens are,

> the better our country will become……Accompanied by the modernization of education, the current centralized educational system needs to be re-adjusted with the devolution of educational power from the central government to local communities and individuals. ….The characteristics of modern schools are the ones with community autonomy and parental involvement (Huang, 1996, p.158-160)

The shift from centralized teaching recommendations to decentralized ones serves to help us locate the child in diverse, autonomous, and dynamic surroundings that are "perpetually constituted by one's own practice in communities of learning that seem to have no boundaries or internments" (Popkewitz, 2008, p.130). Curriculum guidelines and textbook contents are therefore not inert or unchanging, but instead as the platform that allows different stakeholders (e.g., the teachers, the parents, and the community) to structure the base of the child's learning. Through thus, the collaborative practices in the democracy can question the more centralized system of school governance. As such, for example, the possibilities of questioning the rules of dress and hair is to some extent allowed; student protests and the discussion of energy issues in Taiwan were no longer taboos, and one could challenge Sun's *The Three Principles* that has become part of the warp and weft of political discourses in Taiwan

The above claims are not an indication that the collaborative learning practices simply replaced the centralized school governance system. The obedience to authority in the 1990s, for instance, saw reconstitution in a relatively "softer" form that focused on the Confucian conception of excellence in literary and martial skills rather than on the charisma of the political leaders and a recovery of mainland China (see Strawn, 1999). Further, we must consider the dilemma between the constant paper-based testing and the attempts to cultivate of a shared decision-making atmosphere. The latter promises to benefit the child for the cultivation of innovation but detrimental to the getting of high scores. Educational reform discourses' child

was thereby not just a radical move away from traditional schooling based on recitation, formal examination, and Sinicization curricula, nor was it a smooth transition to the centering of "modernized" children.

As a result, the emergence of the educational reform discourses and the importance of the discursive ruptures do not suggest that the meanings could encode a coherent symbol of the "modernized" child. In sum, the child of the educational reform discourses does not "automatically indicate the texture of what he would be accepted to do, how he would live, what he would look like, and how he would think. It merely suggests how these became possible as questions and concerns" (Baker, 2001, p.507).

Textbook Deregulation in Educational Reform Discourses

The notions of "deregulation" and "empowerment" rooted in the role of the teachers and the students could not be achieved without the reconstitution of textbooks in 1990s Taiwan. Textbook deregulation symbolizes democracy within which it was no longer a concern that the National Institute of Compilation and Translation (NICT) acted as the only institutional agency for editing and screening primary and junior high school textbooks. Nor did the curriculum standard operate as the production of truth that predominantly governed which subject areas to teach, what goals and objectives to achieve, what teaching materials to use, how many hours for every single subject per week by grade level, how to teach and evaluate, etc. (see Yang, 1997). Textbook deregulation, as based on the emergence of anti-authoritarian idea that facilitated the opposition to NICT and to China-centered education in Taiwan, further linked itself with notions such as Taiwanization, multiculturalism, and marketization. Within such frameworks, the curriculum underwent four revisions to the then current reforms.

> The flexible Curriculum Outline replaces the rigid Curriculum Standard. Secondly, there is less emphasis on the Sino-focused history and culture, with more attention being devoted to Taiwan-focused history as well as world topics. Thirdly, the new

> curriculum has been switched from subject-based to field-based. Last, the new curriculum is on learning abilities that are adaptable all setting of life, and not just classroom settings, thus making these abilities transportable. This cannot be achieved through memorization (Liu, 2000, p.206).

The positing of the latter side of the curriculum standard/curriculum outline, Sino-focused/Taiwan-focused, subject-base/field-base divides as a superior form of schooling through textbook deregulation cannot be understood as the unique invention in the educational field, but rather as the indirect product the political restructuring that indicated the deployment of perspectives or strategies from multiple locales. In addition, we should not view this attribution of superiority as producing an immediate outcome in the educational field, which I will exemplify through my analysis in three main aspects. First, the so-called seven learning domains composing the integrated curriculum did not smoothly transition from a subject-based curriculum to an integrated one.[61] For example, a disjuncture existed between the training of teacher education (subject-based) and the reorganization of curricula (i.e., the integrated 1-9 Curricular Guidelines). This disjuncture obstructed the development of different teaching techniques, which created new cooperative teaching practices. Further, the synonymous meanings between the seven learning domains/ traditional subjects and competency-oriented learning capabilities/fragmented learning style produced under textbook deregulation discourses did not suggest that the lines between superior and inferior ways of schoolings were therefore delineated. The school's effectiveness and teacher's ability remained judged per how many students pass entrance exams and qualify for well-known high schools or universities (see Lee, 2010). Textbook deregulation provides a different way of seeing and describing the child around the concept of progressive/ traditional pedagogy, while the traditional training

[61] The seven learning domains include language and literature, health and physical education, social studies, art and humanities, mathematics, the natural sciences and technology, and integrated activities.

remained. This training involves practices such as lecturing on the content of textbooks, supplementing lectures with related materials, having students memorize facts, giving frequent tests and quizzes, lengthening the school day for extra teaching, and reviewing materials (see Yang, 1997).

Secondly, one of the most important effects that textbook deregulation brought about is the transformation of value orientation, which Taiwanization symbolizes. The transformation of value orientation occurred through the teaching of Taiwanese history/geography, and in part through the establishment of community-based schooling that bound the trinity of the community/school/parent relationship. Within this trinity, participants could address issues such as the school structure, budget, and the culture and history of the community (see Commission on Educational Reform, 1996). These combined two lines of reasoning, as I have articulated, is not meant to assume that the teaching of Taiwanese history/geography was based on a Taiwanese lineage, but rather on a Chinese lineage. A reference to cultural China became implicitly incorporated into the compromised measure of "ROC on Taiwan" and explicitly addressed in the re-contextualizing rule of "Rooted in Taiwan, Mindful of the Mainland, Looking out into the World" (see Chen, 2003). Consequently, a new way of seeing and describing the imagined community embedded in Taiwanese nativism that was predicated on the premise of Chinese cultural discourses emerged. Because textbook deregulation embodies Taiwanization, therefore, this constituted both a rupture and continuity. This rupture made the cultural identity move toward the community through a new political restructuring and the continuity is the positioning of local cultures as the offshoot of a "Chinese (Han) tradition culture."

It is important to note that the notions of Taiwanization and Chinese culture afforded by the textbooks never completely produce coherent images among textbooks, teachers, and students, but it did organize the analytical space for the expression of doubts. Within a context

of multiculturalism, one could speak and think about discourses pertaining to indigenous peoples, women, and disability both in and out of the classroom setting. The process of curriculum development is no longer a neutral concept, but rather a series of struggles and operations that came out of different "political ideologies."

> The scope of textbook studies was not within schools or teaching materials but covered the whole of our lives. "The field of life world" referred to an ongoing process that was shaped by students, textbook, instruction, society, economic conditions, political factors, and cultural phenomenon. The theoretical continuum was very broad, from Marxism, phenomenology, and ethnography, to Western perspectives. Ideology was no longer [viewed as] value free from a positivist perspective. [We] must examine the relations between it [ideology] and the textbook within the political, economic, and cultural context (Shi, 1995, p.9).

Thirdly, textbook deregulation did not lead to a more market controlled project fully replacing the state-controlled textbook production. Instead, this process consisted of an uneven and slowly drawn-out educational deregulation process, competition, confrontation, and compromise surface among the Ministry of Education (MOE), the Commission of Educational Reform (CER), and private textbook publishers. These debates include textbook production, the designation of the curricula, textbook prices, state concerns over equality in education, and intellectual property right concerns. Together, these factors indicate that the deregulation of textbooks in Taiwan did not automatically simplify into just free market mechanisms (see Chen, 2003).

> Although a free, competitive "educational market" may rule out educational products of poor quality, the harm received by the disadvantaged in education is regarded as unacceptable [from the perspective of] social justice. Human beings are after all not commercial products. No [governmental] arrangements can

> compensate for the harm that education of poor quality can give rise to in [an individual] life. Therefore, when [we] talk about [educational] deregulation, it is inappropriate to completely follow the model of economic deregulation. […] Some common elements in compulsory education should be provided to the learners. […] As a result, educational deregulation cannot pursue the goal of extremist liberalization (as cited in Chen, 2003, p.235)

Through the intersection of reasonings on social justice and partly through educational marketization, the potential to guarantee the right to education and maintain a relatively "better" educational quality through textbook marketization was supposedly now more achievable (see Commission on Educational Reform, 1995). Textbook deregulation became, rhetorically speaking, less regulated by the state and more privatized by the emergent textbook market. Under such frameworks, the NICT was not removed. Rather, it undertook the task of textbook authorization. Moreover, the entrance exam is another facet that made the seeming absence of distinction between textbook marketization and centralized educational system. Within the entrance-exam system, multi-enrollment initiatives and the autonomy in the selection of textbooks, for instance, were not positive pursuits. For more choice under educational deregulation discourses for many students, teachers, and parents primarily meant heavier reading loads and would also generate more uncertainty or unfairness. The "fairness" of Taiwan's entrance-exam system, therefore made the discerning of the parameters of textbook marketization difficult. By "fairness" I mean "the test is the best available method of tracking students into appropriate educational paths without regard to economic background, political connections, or social factors" (Strawn, 1999, p.70).

In sum, textbook deregulation did not deliver every dimension of the child to local, multicultural, and privatized images, but rather operates as the observational lens for the conferral of the two states of educational centralization and deregulation. The dducational

reform discourses that traversed the curriculum standard/curriculum outline, Sino-focused/Taiwan-focused, state controlled/marketization divide via textbook deregulation therefore involve incoherent and paradoxical processes.

Conclusion: Modernization and the Child of the Educational Reform Discourses

The preceding writings described the shifting roles of the teachers, the students, and the textbooks, built on the premises of globalism, pluralism, and liberal democracy. All these roles and premises are interrelated with changes in economy, culture, and politics that may already have emerged in older forms. Together, they constituted the modernization of education in 1990s Taiwan. As in the Hu Shih' period and in postwar Taiwanese time/space, the educational reform discourses linked modernization to the notion of national survival/development, through which the boundary between advancement and backwardness was delineated. For Hu Shih, something called modernization demarcated the boundary between backwardness and advancement. This demarcation is based on the ability to reason about "scientific arguments" in the guise of a scientific investigation and to practice it in a democratic life. In postwar Taiwan, modernization ties to Sinicization, as grounded on the premise of anti-communism and Americanization that incorporated industrialization and mechanization while excluding what we today call liberal democracy. Modernization in the educational reform discourses of the 1990s contain vestiges of Hu's conceptions of "Mr. Science" and "Mr. Democracy" and the postwar time/space's mechanical inscriptions embedded in the notion of Americanization. It is therefore impossible to think of the parameters of modernization in 1990s Taiwan without invoking the already existing observational lens between backwardness and advancement. Nor does it mean that modernization held a constant meaning leading up to the educational reform discourses of 1990s Taiwan.

Part of what makes the educational reform discourses in 1990s Taiwan unique is the connection between the modernization of education to terms such as Americanization *and* globalism that the international trading systems produced. Through the intersection of Americanization and globalism, modernization became an examinable quality that one can see reflected in capital accumulation, such as a nation's GDP. This, in turn, affects the structure

and practices of educational discourses, because they must be compatible with the capital-intensive industry and transnational commerce. It is also such criteria that delineate the discursive linking between progress, industrialism, and civilization as opposing the "backward" and "conservative" agriculture-based economies. The images of the West, particularly from the U.S., paint the "being civilized" as something we all should desire. While images from the West frame agriculture-based economies as "less developed" on the scale of modernization, thus, something we should all fear. Within such a framework, educational reform discourses could encode these cultural imaginations that view the U.S. as "the civilized" and "the rescuer" through the importation and transplant of its educational institutions to Taiwan (see Huang, 1999).

The articulation of modernization in educational reform discourses emerge more than in contexts of industrial or commercial globalism, however. The practices of democracy and pluralism interrogated the concepts about nationhood (first/third world) and personhood (civilized/primitive) afforded by the synthesizing images of commercial globalism and/or Americanization. There are, therefore, discursive spaces reserved for critiques of the consequences of Americanization and commercial globalism, which fosters discussions and practices of pluralism. For example, subaltern studies emanated as a response to the "hegemonic discourse" such as English as a second language acquisition or the "transplantation" of almost everything from the U.S. into Taiwanese academia; indigenous studies and related educational practitioners implemented democracy and pluralism in indigenization curricula to call into question the China-centric curriculum (see Chen, 2002)

The scope of modernization of educational reform discourses was not reducible to the notion of commercial globalism or Americanization. When speaking of modernization, even though the previously existing observational lens of civilized/ backward image remained the dominant discourse in educational reform discourses in 1990s Taiwan, one could deploy

pluralism to inform and contest the parameters of globalism that simultaneously made modernization of education in 1990s Taiwan a dynamic term. Modernization, therefore, should be understood as the platform through which terms such as globalism, Americanization, and pluralism inform each other. This platform also hosts the incessant processes of incorporation, exclusion, and compromise, which among one another helped shift educational reform discourses in a manner oftentimes known as “educational chaos” in Taiwan at the turn of the 21st century.

Chapter Six
Creating "Postmodern Child"? The Changing Configurations of the Child in Early Twenty-First-Century Taiwan

In late twentieth-century Taiwan, state apparatuses of centralized systems were replaced with decentralized strategies, which brought about new mediating institutions and social relations and through which the configuration of educational institutions was rewritten. Drawing on neo-liberal discourse [62] and democracy, educational reform, as a way of decentralization, gained positive status for it promised an emancipatory potential of humanity. The educational reform efforts depended upon decentralization (deregulation), which produces concepts such as progressive pedagogy, child-centered teaching, empowerment, localization, and diversity in the name of emancipation in pedagogy. These new and revived concepts of educational reform are anything but a one-directional route or an either-or dichotomy. Rather, they should be understood as circulating within an array of multiple power relations through which we can see the undertaking of the complicated processes of reform and the plural dimensions about the child.

The first part of this chapter briefly illustrates the discursive formation of localization-multiculturalism-globalization nexus that the notion of deregulation generated in educational policy and curriculum discourse in early twenty-first century Taiwan. This nexus operated automatically as the incarnation of modernization education and at the same time faced critiques and seepage. The second part of this chapter, in particular, focuses on the "chaos of educational reform" to discuss how teacher's everyday practices fabricate a "progressive" conception of reform while the hidden contradictions that reforms produced are exposed; the

[62] In Taiwan, the term neo-liberal discourse refers to the market mechanism of decentralization. Under the label of decentralization, the notions of open market, free trade, reduction of the public sector, and decreasing state intervention in the economy became dominant discourses. This in turn was introduced to regulate education and have been appropriated as a framework for educational decision-making (see Chang & Mao, 2006)

child-centered pedagogy, sanctioned by the reformers, is in a jarring relationship with the exam-oriented conception of ideal personhood, which troubles the progressive undertone of educational reform discourses. This final chapter is, therefore, not trying to evaluate the outcomes of the educational reform in terms of "success" or "failure," nor is it a concern to correct an "abnormality" or to foster a new standard. Rather, this dissertation has aimed to map a history of the present that Foucault's *Discipline and Punish* demonstrates. By doing so, the social formation of a discursive unity would not be based upon any particular subject, object, or form; rather, it represents a complex web of relations among techniques, mechanisms, and methods conducted by different actors, on different objects, and through different strategies (Chou, 1990, p.21).

Strategies of Modernization-Forming: Deregulation-Multiculturalism-Localization-Globalization as Horizons of Enactment

The weight of state regulations caused the "educational ailments" since the period of 1990s Taiwan, in the general eyes of the corresponding society. Thus, if we are to desire "progress," the system needed de-rooting from the state through deregulation. The epistemological assumption of "deregulation" techniques favor the latter side of the homogeneity/multiculturalism, Greater China/native, localization/globalization, *fa-tong* pedagogy/child-centered curriculum divide. These same preferences embody the hope of getting "ahead" while simultaneously reinforce perceptions of what "behind" means. The alliance of multiculturalism, localization, and globalization under the name of deregulation reminds of what Popkewitz calls a populist discourse in traditions of critical U.S. educational research (see Popkewitz, 1991). Within the framework, an imagined space of "structure" or "fixed point" became a tool to legitimate itself with reference to a meta-discourse and to critique the past from the current perspective. Power, within the definition of this framework, is a consolidated and homogenous domination of one group over another and educational

reforms discourses become normalizing technologies through which the desire to become "progressive" appears to be a "universal" regulatory practice, which risks supporting a restrictive perception of a normative discourse (see Cannella, 1997).

It is through a strategy of detachment from Greater China/*Fa-tong* pedagogy that deregulation theories came into perspective. The detachment of *Fa-tong* pedagogy, from consideration in analytical discourses, facilitated the subsequent closure, flattening, and self-referential finitude of post-*Fa-tong* pedagogy approaches to the social and conceptual. This laid the groundwork for deregulation theories today, whose obsession with flows and compactness are effects, rather than analyses of, such detachment. As such, nationalizing movements and the accompanying compulsory schooling edicts have been weighed explicitly and implicitly via the finitude promoted and elaborated within developmentalized gradations and deregulation, from which cosmological visions "contract primarily to human-centered relationships rooted in nationalist soil, whereas such new modes and possibilities for sequencing, comparison, and normativity are unfolded" (Baker, 2009a, p.27). These same forces also create a logic of perpetual differentiation, integration, and dynamic renewal both supported and inspired by deregulation. The *Fa-tong* pedagogy which holds an overt presence as the solidification of nation-state structures previously provided an "out" or "others" thus always in reserve and in interplay with the deregulation-multiculturalism-localization-globalization nexus. It, therefore, helped fabricate what constitutes a legitimate approach to urgent contemporary problems through the attachment to new zones of belonging such as "Western," "human," "Taiwanese," "teacher-pupil relationship", and "education" that have left their mark as misguided "superiority effects."

Under the label of deregulation, this moment saw the localization discourses as a way of deviating itself from China-centric consciousness. We see less emphasis on the notions of Chinese either in terms of the political sense (i.e., a future reunification with China) or of the

ethnic sense (i.e., the Hans, the Manchus, the Mongols, the Mohammedans, and the Tibetans). In contrast, the more popularized discourse became Taiwanese, including the four ethnic groups of Hoklo, Hakka, Mainlanders, and aboriginal peoples. Moreover, localization discourse transformed from a de-colonization quest against a Sino-centric perspective into a type of Taiwanese nationalism against the PRC's claim to sovereignty over Taiwan (see Lin, 2010). The domain of de-colonialization includes the period during which the Dutch and Spanish ruled is not an "occupation," but an era of "international competition;" the positing of the Cheng Chenggoing governance in the seventeenth century lacks being viewed as dynasty rule but instead as familial governance; likewise, the Japanese colonial period in Taiwan is not Japanese "occupation" but Japanese "rule" (see Hughes & Stone, 1999). Multiculturalism accompanied the practice of indigenization curriculum. The linkage between multiculturalism and indigenization curriculum shows an attempt to dilute the Hoklo framework of indigenization (see Mao, 2008). But yet, multiculturalism went beyond the recognition of differences of local and ethnic languages and cultures to emphasize the cultivation of a different personhood embedded in the child-centered curriculum. For instance, textbooks do not have to be full of Confucian beliefs but can be written in a fashion that uses a high amount of slang and trendy expressions to attract students (see Wang, 2012); teachers are not obligated be restricted to the Confucian conception of "knowledge teacher" (*qinshi*) or "moral teacher" (*renshi*), but can be "hot and spicy teachers," which means they dress up in funky, unusually arousing, ways and/or to use unconventional, sometimes provocative pedagogies (in the name of innovation) to teach in the classroom (Wang, 2012, p.72).

Compared to an indigenization or multicultural curriculum, the new education practices gave more attention to the subjects of science, computer technology, and English (see Mao, 2008). The reduction of globalization to English learning assumes that English would advance the country to a higher level of competitiveness within the international trading system and in

turn, makes oneself more attractive in the job market. For these reasons learning English became almost a sacrosanct discourse in early twenty-first century Taiwan.

Together, it is in the rewriting of human ontology that the implications of a deregulation-localization-multiculturalism-globalization nexus become most notable. At first glance, the facets of this text may appear to sit on opposite sides of the epistemological spectrum to which the effects of Confucian child lend support. The shift in the location of the subject from Confucian child to educational reform discourses in early twenty-first-century Taiwan, however, did not entail a change that is naturally "there." The distinction between Confucian child and what educational reform had embodied is therefore not mutually exclusive. Those facts of the nexus engrained in educational reform discourses and the Confucian child figuratively rushed toward each other, colliding with a fullness of force that created a catchword called "chaos of educational reform" in early twentieth-century Taiwan. What emerged in the educational research, therefore, was not the shaping of a rhetoric unity. Rather, the phenomenon of "chaos of educational reform" told us that what deregulation had expressed was not a recommendation of one-directional inclusion, but the recognition of hybridity and in-between conditions. This suggests that the subtle and more overt ties between "new" and "old" style of schooling need more thorough unpacking beyond the extant and obvious enactment of the multiculturalism-localization-globalization horizon that provides parameters for what could become a matter of concern and yet can never entirely shored up.

Provincializing Educational Reform Discourses

What educational reform discourse promised and what it attempted to eradicate resists de-coupling by splitting the analytical vector simply between the two vistas of "backward" and "modernized" or by specific explanations of place, time, and power. The "chaos of educational reform" illustrates how the two "different" conceptualizations interlinked and diverged from

one another in early twenty-first-century Taiwan. Now, I briefly explain how the chaos of educational reform manifested in two parts. First, for some people, deregulation in a democracy that proposes a laissez-faire attitude, diversity, and individualism, directly and indirectly, reshapes the roles of the teachers, which presupposes the disappearance of morals and ethics. The notions of morals and ethics here mean the incarnation of traditional Confucian beliefs. Furthermore, the phenomenon of moral indifference also led to a "decline" in school discipline and the disenchantment of the teachers for not being able to fulfill their traditional educational commitments, those being moral teaching, ability teaching and solving puzzles (see Lin, 2006).

Second, after textbook marketization, the opportunity to choose which textbooks to read increases students' reading loads because there are several versions of textbooks to read in order to get a high grade in Joint Entrance Exams. Many identified the rhetoric of "open-up-textbooks-increase-students'-burden" as the major "obstacle" confronted with demands textbook marketization. Further, educational reform discourses failed to change the phenomenon of educational fanaticism (see Wang 2002 & Chiu 2003). This fanaticism refers to a person passing exams in order to gain both upward mobility and perhaps most importantly, the social status of one's family. Confucius did not initiate this concept, but many regard it as the combination of a Confucian concept with the civil service exam tradition.

Inside this agenda, mixed ability classes endorsed by members of the CER became something negative in the eyes of some parents and teachers (see, Lin, 2006). The illustration of the "chaos of educational reform" is not meant to pillory any single member of the CER for correcting their "abnormality." It seems more meaningful to see how the interplay of these conditions are "competing within partially shared intellectual and symbolic worlds, defining themselves in conversation with one another and against one another" (Sells, 1994, p.5). Addressing the shifting concept of the child in early twentieth-first-century Taiwan lacks merit if one confuses it with an absolute sense, as promoted by historical and analytic framework to

consider the assemblies that govern definitions of "our" very humanity. Moreover, the seemingly contradictory discourses such as individualism in the school is not necessarily incompatible with familism or collectivism (see Lin, 2006). The making of multiplicity and inconsistency of values have overlapping boundaries and territories of belonging (Popkewitz, 2008, p.175). The "chaos" in educational reform therefore is a "postmodern scene" in the educational field in early twentieth-century Taiwan (see Wang, 2012). As a result, the appeal to such dichotomies as tradition/modern and Taiwanese/Chinese practice enables a rhetorical turning back that either reinforces (Taiwan/China dualism) or implodes (progressive/Confucian) them. The borders of the child, therefore form and re-form, undermining and interrogating claims to purity in educational reform discourses.

The multitude of ways in which the word deregulation became inflected in discourses of democracy and globalism formed in the 1990s suggests that an easy or absolute reference to deregulation as an automatic moral high ground requires deeper reflection. In particular, the reflection would meet ambiguities and aporia around the issue of *Fa-tong* pedagogy and whether this issue had been left behind by a nation-state formed as a democracy out of previously monarchical heritages. Further, the reflection would face the question of whether tendencies toward the multicultural pedagogy were reconstituted by virtue of the state of globalization strategies available within a specific market framework. The we/others distinction "allows" "difference" to be made and remade, but the eventual blurring of the slash secures a kind of system closure as it takes the form of diffusion" (Baker, 2013, p.346).

Furthermore, the abovementioned strategy facilitates us to think about a reorientation to the concepts of power. By power, I refer to more than the linkage of a power situation or a certain distribution in power at a given time to a political structure, the government, the army, and the police. As Baker (2001) argues "Although power congeals in an ascending analysis at 'economic interests' or 'more general powers' it must firstly be understood at local sites in the

extremity of its reach, as a relationship not just between human and human but a relationship between techniques and logic that constitute human relationships" (p. 615). Power is therefore not owned or given once and for all, but rather exercised to examine how it circulates and functions. In short, it is the analysis of the "relationship of power" that enables the dual positing of power as both a centered mover in itself and yet as being dispersed, relational, and shifting in local sites (Baker, 2001, p.614).

By doing so, for instance, this study did not see the KMT government's educational discourse in postwar time/space as the totality of knowledge that implied static power relations. Rather, my focus depicted how the modern Confucian child develops through a multiplicity of organisms and forces and how it exercises the processes of inclusion and exclusion. It is through such processes that allow power "at the local level" (Hu's concepts of "Mr. Democracy and "Mr. Science") to come to the fore. The mapping of the dispersal of the concepts of Mr. Democracy and Mr. Science and their connections to localization discourse in the 1970s (Yeh's child) and educational reform discourses in the 1990s also revealed previously "intangible" expressions as important underlying assumptions that were part of the causal explanation and assemblage of the localization and educational reform discourses. Thus, this promotes opening ourselves to description and interruption in ways that possibly could not have arisen within mainstream methods of reading a history of the child.

The constitution of the "child" becomes a different and "not-so-different" vision of the subject. Firstly, individuality gains structure through "cultural theses whose changing configurations and overlapping principles intern and enclose about what is seen, talked about, acted on and felt as natural and unquestionable" (Popkewitz, 2008, p.183). Yet, and secondly, the child appears to be a mobile subject that is not "a point of its application but as a vehicle to its circulation" (Baker, 2001, p.598). Such an interrelated reading enables the child's construction as playing in a "space" to understand 1) what educational reform discourses look

like, but not to what extent they had been implemented, which alert us to how the processes of its assemblages and connections function at the level of conditions of possibility, and 2) how educational reform discourses paradoxically create discontinuities and disparate systems of reasoning that generated productive complexities. On one side, they produced the synergic effect of deregulation-multiculturalism-localization-globalization nexus in curriculum discourses. On the other side, the reduction of such educational alignment to a specific border faced interrogation, thus making the identification of the child as familiar, but also at once losing its recognizability.

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