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Foreign Relations of the United States

Diplomatic Papers

1941

(In Seven Volumes)

Volume III

The British Commonwealth

The Near East and Africa



United States
Government Printing Office
Washington : 1959

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 6809

HISTORICAL DIVISION
BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

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PREFACE

The principles which guide the compilation and editing of *Foreign Relations* are stated in Department of State Regulation 045 of October 31, 1955, a revision of the order approved on March 26, 1925, by Mr. Frank B. Kellogg, then Secretary of State. The text of the current regulation is printed below:

045 DOCUMENTARY RECORD OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY

045.1 *Scope of Documentation*

The publication *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers*, constitutes the official record of the foreign policy of the United States. These volumes include, subject to necessary security considerations, all documents needed to give a comprehensive record of the major foreign policy decisions within the range of the Department of State's responsibilities, together with appropriate materials concerning the facts which contributed to the formulation of policies. When further material is needed to supplement the documentation in the Department's files for a proper understanding of the relevant policies of the United States, such papers should be obtained from other Government agencies.

045.2 *Editorial Preparation*

The basic documentary diplomatic record to be printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers*, shall be edited by the Historical Division of the Department of State. The editing of the record shall be guided by the principles of historical objectivity. There shall be no alteration of the text, no deletions without indicating where in the text the deletion is made, and no omission of facts which were of major importance in reaching a decision. Nothing shall be omitted for the purpose of concealing or glossing over what might be regarded by some as a defect of policy. However, certain omissions of documents or parts of documents are permissible for the following reasons:

- a. To avoid publication of matters which would tend to impede current diplomatic negotiations or other business.
- b. To condense the record and avoid repetition of needless details.
- c. To preserve the confidence reposed in the Department by individuals and by foreign governments.
- d. To avoid giving needless offense to other nationalities or individuals.
- e. To eliminate personal opinions presented in despatches and not acted upon by the Department. To this consideration there is one qualification—in connection with major decisions it is desirable, where possible, to show the alternatives presented to the Department before the decision was made.

045.3 *Clearance*

To obtain appropriate clearances of material to be published in *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers*, the Historical Division (HD) shall:

- a. Refer to the appropriate policy offices of the Department and of other agencies of the Government such papers as appear to require policy clearance.
- b. Refer to the appropriate foreign governments requests for permission to print as part of the diplomatic correspondence of the United States those previously unpublished documents which were originated by the foreign governments.

The responsibilities of the Historical Division for the preparation of this *Foreign Relations* volume were entrusted, under the general supervision of the Chief of the Division, G. Bernard Noble, to the Foreign Relations Branch, under the direction of the Chief of that Branch (Editor of *Foreign Relations*), E. R. Perkins, and the Assistant Chief of the Branch, Gustave A. Nuernberger.

The compilers of *Foreign Relations*, 1941, Volume III, were N. O. Sappington, Francis C. Prescott, and Kieran J. Carroll.

The Division of Publishing Services is responsible with respect to *Foreign Relations* for the proofreading and editing of copy, the preparation of indexes, and the distribution of printed copies. Under the general direction of the Chief of the Division, Norris E. Drew, the editorial functions mentioned above are performed by the Foreign Relations Editing Branch in charge of Elizabeth A. Vary, Chief, and Ouida J. Ward, Assistant Chief.

For 1941, the arrangement of volumes is as follows: Volume I, General, the Soviet Union; Volume II, Europe; Volume III, The British Commonwealth, the Near East and Africa; Volume IV, The Far East; Volume V, The Far East; Volume VI, The American Republics; Volume VII, The American Republics.

E. R. PERKINS
Editor of Foreign Relations

MARCH 12, 1959.

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THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS UNITED KINGDOM

CONFERENCES AT WASHINGTON BETWEEN PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL, WITH THEIR ADVISERS, DECEMBER 1941-JANUARY 1942

[Prime Minister Churchill came to Washington for conferences with President Roosevelt, December 22, 1941-January 14, 1942, interrupted by trips to Ottawa and Palm Beach.

The Declaration by the United Nations, signed January 1, 1942, was negotiated and issued while this Conference was in progress. Correspondence on this Declaration is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1942, Volume I.

The Free French on December 24 seized the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon. For correspondence on this subject, see Volume II, pages 540 ff. Later correspondence is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1942, Volume II.

This Washington Conference dealt primarily with plans for the military and naval conduct of the war. The records of the Conference are scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume of *Foreign Relations*.]

NEGOTIATIONS FOR A LEND-LEASE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM

841.24/1388

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*¹

I agree with your proposal to stave off our difficulties by sending a warship to Cape Town to collect the gold at our disposal there amounting, I believe, to about 30 million sterling. I ought to let you know that this transaction will almost certainly become known to the world with varying reactions.

Meanwhile I learned with pleasure from Mr. Purvis² of his talk with you and Mr. Morgenthau³ on Monday.⁴ Instructions have been given to furnish you with any further figures about our requirements which you may seek.

¹ Transmitted to the President by Mr. Neville Butler, Counselor of the British Embassy, on January 2, 1941.

² Arthur Purvis, Chairman of the British Supply Council in North America.

³ Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury.

⁴ December 30, 1940.

We are deeply grateful for all your understanding of the problems which will be thrown up in the interval before Congress approves your proposals.⁵ It is not only a question of total amounts but of how we are to live through a period which may perhaps extend to February 15th. What would be the effect upon the world situation if we had to default on payments to your contractors who have their workmen to pay? The idea that in the interval we shall either have to default or be stripped bare of our last resources is full of danger and causes us profound anxiety. I feel sure this will be ever in your thoughts.

Furthermore apart from the general totals and interim period there arises a group of problems about the scope of your plan after being approved by Congress. What is to be done about the immensely heavy payments still due to be made under existing orders before delivery is completed? Substantial advance payments on these same orders have already denuded our resources. We have unceasing need for various American commodities not definitely weapons: for instance raw materials and oil. Canada and other Dominions, Greece and also Poland and Czechoslovakia, have clamant dollar needs to keep their war effort alive. I do not seek to know immediately how you will solve these later questions. We shall be entirely ready for our part to lay bare to you all our resources and liabilities around the world, and we shall seek no more help than the common cause demands. We naturally wish to feel sure that the powers with which you propose to arm yourself will be sufficiently wide to deal with these larger matters, subject to all proper consideration. Without prompt and effective solution of these problems Hitlerism cannot be extirpated from Europe, Africa and Asia.

841.24/1387

Memorandum by President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State

HYDE PARK, N. Y., January 11, 1941.

I think you have seen a copy of this message from Churchill which I got on January second. I really ought to send some answer.⁶

1. The situation in regard to British payments for materials already ordered in this country is not clear.

⁵ The proposals referred to related to President Roosevelt's decision to lease goods to the British rather than demand dollar payment for them. See address by the President, December 29, 1940, Department of State *Bulletin*, January 4, 1941, p. 3.

⁶ No record of an answer is found in Department files. See, however, telegram dated January 16, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill, printed in *F. D. R., His Personal Letters, 1928-1945*, vol. II, p. 1107.

2. The situation in regard to the payment for future orders would be clear if Congress passes the proposed legislation⁷ and follows it up with an appropriation.

In regard to No. 1, the question of total British assets is involved. I do not know who told you that they amount to 18 billion dollars all over the world. In my judgment that figure is altogether too high because what we are referring to are obviously British assets which they cannot either (a) sell or (b) pledge through the Government of Great Britain. My figure would be 9 or 10 billion dollars instead of 18 billion dollars.

Still speaking of No. 1, it seems probable to me that through the investment trust method in New York, and with the aid of Jesse Jones,⁸ perhaps the British can raise about one billion dollars in the next few weeks. I do not think their total assets in this country amount to more than a total of one billion five hundred million—and the last five hundred million dollars is not of a character on which to raise cash quickly except at a very heavy and unwarranted loss.

In regard to British assets outside the United States, it is clear that in many cases they have to be used in the locality in which they exist, i. e., Canada, to pay for munitions and food; Argentina, to pay for beef, wheat, etc., and other South American countries in the same way.

Assets in South Africa are probably already earmarked to pay for things they are getting from South Africa. Assets in India, Straits Settlements, China, etc., may be of some value to them to put up with us as security but there is real doubt as to how much value such assets would have for us ultimately—as, for instance, British property in Shanghai.

In regard to No. 2, i. e., putting up some form of security for the future program of orders, I need not assure you that I am wholly sympathetic in doing something like this in order to get the bill through. But, again, I am skeptical as to the value of British owned properties which could be put up as security.

There is always the possibility of their putting up their sovereignty to and over certain colonies, such as Bermuda, the British West Indies, British Honduras and British Guinea [*Guiana?*]. I am not yet clear in my mind, however, as to whether the United States should consider American sovereignty over these Islands and their populations and the two mainland colonies as something worth while or as a distinct liability. If we can get our naval bases why, for example, should we buy with them two million headaches, consisting of that number of human beings who would be a definite economic drag on this country, and who would stir up questions of racial stocks by virtue of their new status as American citizens?

⁷ Lend-Lease Bill, introduced in Congress January 10, 1941.

⁸ Secretary of Commerce and Federal Loan Administrator.

In the Pacific there are certain small British Islands which not from the population or economic point of view, but from the military and naval point of view, might be a distinct asset, and, at the same time, might be a definite liability. These are the Islands south of Hawaii (Canton, Enderbury, Christmas, the Phoenix group, etc., and down to Samoa) and the Islands southwest of Hawaii and south of the Japanese mandated Islands (the Gilbert and Ellice groups). If we owned them they would be valuable as stepping stones in the control of the central Pacific area, but, at the same time, they would be difficult to defend against Japan or a combination of Japan with some other naval power.

You see the difficulties of all this—the dangerous over-estimates which have been made of British assets and the problem of finding other substitutes.

We might talk it over when I get back on Tuesday.⁹

F[RANKLIN] D. R[ROOSEVELT]

841.24/440

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] January 11, 1941.

Sir Frederick Phillips¹⁰ called at his request. I understood that Secretary Morgenthau had requested him to call to explain to me why the British Government could not put up any collateral, at least any substantial amount, as security for payment in connection with the five and one-quarter billion dollars worth of British orders in this country. Sir Frederick was reticent as to most of the figures I desired. I inquired as to how much cash or its equivalent the British Government expected to pay out in this country for military supplies obtained since the beginning of the war, that is, their estimated total expenditures up to the point where they would cease to make further payment and permit our Government to pay for all British supplies and deliver the same to Great Britain with barter or other arrangements, if any, that might later be entered into in regard to payment in whole or in part. He promptly indicated that he did not know what these figures were, but that they were available somewhere. I made further inquiries about the British financial situation, but with similar scant results.

I then said that this matter has been in the hands of Secretary Morgenthau and the President, and that I had virtually nothing to do with the drafting of the pending bill in Congress to authorize aid to

⁹ January 14.

¹⁰ Adviser to the British Treasury in the United States.

Great Britain; that I had suggested three or four points which I thought would facilitate the passage of the bill and preserve increasingly favorable public opinion in support of the policy of aid to Great Britain; that one of these suggestions was that if the British intend to make any kind of payment during the next twelve months or so for military supplies procured in this country, now is the one accepted time for them to do so in the form of collateral with a minimum of a billion and a half or two billion dollars; that this action would go further to disarm critics and to keep this whole movement on a favorable basis than anything else that might be said or done. I elaborated on this phase. I still got nothing virtually from Sir Frederick in the way of either arguments or facts or figures. I made it clear that my purpose was to help Great Britain most effectively, through the aid furnished by this country, by keeping favorable public opinion behind our Government. I emphasized that every fact and phase of the entire British financial situation would be brought out in the Congressional Committee hearings on the pending bill to aid Great Britain; and I reiterated that the matter was in the hands of Secretary Morgenthau and the President, adding that I was determined to aid Great Britain to the best of my judgment and ability and hence I was making this and certain other suggestions, which were intended to facilitate the passage of the bill and its general support by the country. I made no impression whatever so far as I could see.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

[For statements of the Secretary of State in support of the Lend-Lease Bill before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, January 15, 1941, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 18, 1941, page 85.]

841.24/6081

President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, May 16, 1941.

DEAR CORDELL: I wish you would work out the over-all arrangement between the United States and the British Government relative to the consideration or considerations to be given us by the British in return for the material provided under the Lend-Lease Act.¹¹

I should like to discuss it with you at an early opportunity because I think it is important that we reach an agreement with the British at an early date.

Although I presume the agreement will not provide primarily for a return to us of cash, I think, nevertheless, you should consult with

¹¹ Approved March 11, 1941; 55 Stat. 31.

Secretary Morgenthau in regard to the broad provisions of the agreement.

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

841.24/635½

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson)

[WASHINGTON,] July 7, 1941.

Mr. Keynes¹² called on me at his request to give me the substance of a conversation which he and the British Ambassador¹³ had with the President upon the subject of the considerations to be contained in the Lease-Lend Agreement. Mr. Keynes stated that the President asked him to inform me of the conversation so that we might proceed with the drafting along the lines indicated. Mr. Keynes also showed me a cable which he and the Ambassador sent to the Prime Minister today reporting the conversation and asking for authority to submit to us a draft transmitted by cable, which Mr. Keynes also showed me. He expects an answer on Wednesday¹⁴ or Thursday.

Mr. Keynes reported the President's views as follows:

The President feels that he is not under pressure from Congress for the early publication of a Lease-Lend Agreement with the British. He believes that at the time he requests further appropriations for lease-lend or makes his next report to Congress it would be sufficient for him to report that discussions with the British are entering their concluding phase and are progressing satisfactorily. He believes that if an agreement were published by the first of the year it would be within sufficient time. However, the President believes that there should be some agreement worked out now which can be in the nature of a preliminary agreement and which would be available for publication if that proved to be necessary.

The President discussed with the Ambassador and Mr. Keynes certain ideas which he did not desire to formulate in an agreement at the present time because he believes the situation is not sufficiently clear. These were the possible creation of an international force to preserve peace after the war and also the creation of customs agreements with the West Indies and with the Dutch East Indies after the war. These did not contemplate any territorial concessions, which were not re-

¹² John Maynard Keynes, financial adviser to the British Government.

¹³ Viscount Halifax.

¹⁴ July 9.

garded as in the interest of the United States. For these reasons the President did not think it desirable to formulate at the present time or to crystallize too rigidly the considerations moving from the British.

The Ambassador and Mr. Keynes raised with the President the desirability of negating certain types of consideration, even though it might not be possible to state positively the precise considerations which should be given. They mentioned to the President the importance inherent in the lease-lend idea of not creating a money debt and suggested phrases to indicate that the considerations should not be such as to interfere with the economic and commercial relations between the countries or between either of them and other countries. The President is reported to have believed that this would be possible.

They further discussed with the President the question of separating the obligations growing out of a transfer of warlike articles which were consumed or destroyed and purely civilian articles. They urged that this should not be done and reported that the President concurred in this view.

Mr. Keynes reported also that the President, in discussing the undesirability of crystallizing the considerations to be given, suggested that certain types of consideration might be mentioned under broad headings. These consisted, as I recall them, in an obligation to return unused material, to transfer defense articles when required for the defense of the United States, to transfer defense articles which might be required in connection with any project to preserve international peace, to enter into arrangements for post-war relief and reconstruction, to enter into arrangements for economic organization.

The idea of the conversation, as I gathered it from Mr. Keynes, was that the President was agreeable to something in the nature of a preliminary or skeleton agreement which would negative an obligation by the British to pay for defense articles in cash and which would indicate very broadly the general areas in which the considerations were later to be worked out in detail.

Mr. Keynes said that he hoped to present to me on Wednesday or Thursday the draft which he had sent to London for approval and that he hoped that we might conclude within a couple of weeks a preliminary agreement. I told Mr. Keynes that as soon as we had a draft we would discuss it with the Acting Secretary, who would probably wish to discuss it with the President and that I would reply to him as soon as possible in the light of their comments.

DEAN ACHESON

841.24/617b : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, July 9, 1941—6 p. m.

2483. From Hopkins.¹⁵

"The Lend Lease appropriation may be made more difficult by reports that British are exporting steel manufactured into consumer goods items to South America, Canada and the United States. Have heard rumors of other consumer goods material requiring aluminum. Would it be possible for you to examine the items of British export during recent months and let me know whether there is anything in this criticism and if so what steps, in your opinion, are to be taken to correct it. There are also reports here that American cheese is sold at as much as 90 cents a pound and is unrationed. I have been wondering whether all food sent from here should not be rationed. Obviously our agricultural people will go into this later. My concern now relates to the next lend lease bill and I am anxious to have no unnecessary hurdles to get over. Have seen Woolley."

WELLES

811.20 (D) E. M. D. E./111a : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, July 18, 1941—3 p. m.

2657. For Frank Coe¹⁶ from Secretary Morgenthau. Please take up with Hopkins and Harriman¹⁷ the question as to how Lend-Lease commercial items purchased by Procurement Treasury are distributed in England. Is the English middleman permitted to make a profit on these items? Get authority from Ambassador Winant and Hopkins to investigate this question yourself. Please give me an answer as soon as possible. [Morgenthau.]

WELLES

¹⁵ Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to President Roosevelt, with primary responsibility at this time for Lend-Lease affairs.

¹⁶ Assistant Director of the Division of Monetary Research, Treasury Department, on detail in London.

¹⁷ W. Averell Harriman, Special Representative of President Roosevelt in the United Kingdom, with rank of Minister, to expedite lend-lease aid to the British Empire.

811.20 (D) E. M. D. E./116 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, July 24, 1941—9 p. m.

[Received July 24—6 p. m.]

3189. Personal for Mr. Morgenthau. Delivered message to Coe as your telegram 2657 July 18, 3 p. m. Two weeks ago I asked Sir John Anderson, Lord President of the Council, who has charge of the over-all statistical and accounting services which reach into all the Ministries of the Government to give me information on some aspects of the problem you raise in your telegram. At the same time I went to the Prime Minister and told him it was essential we have information and he promised his support and cooperation.

For your information, I brought to the attention of the Chancellor of the Exchequer¹⁸ and Mr. Keynes before he left for the United States the possible embarrassments that might result from introducing raw material purchased under the Lend-Lease Act into ordinary channels of commercial trade, particularly the export trade. I suggested an independent accounting of such material with return payment. There is also reference to this problem as it relates to food stuffs in a confidential report I forwarded sometime ago to Washington.

Ben Cohen¹⁹ is aware of the conversation and has read the report.

Yesterday I took Coe to meet the Chancellor and Sir John Anderson. The Chancellor has promised us as soon as possible a full report on the distribution of lend-lease articles. Sir John Anderson gave me a short memorandum in answer to my earlier inquiry.

It is substantially similar to Keynes' statement on the re-export problem issued in Washington a fortnight ago. He also answers the inquiry about 90-cent cheese.

Today Coe met other Treasury officials working on the problem and expects by a series of interviews and memoranda from various Departments to obtain a general picture for you in the next few days.

Following is the text of Sir John Anderson's memorandum :

"We fully realize the importance for the appropriation debates of giving a full and clear answer to the suggestions that we are using lend-lease goods to push our export trade to South America, Canada and the United States.

So far as goods containing steel are concerned, individual orders from Canada are carefully examined and steel is not released for their manufacture unless we are satisfied either that they are essential to

¹⁸ Sir Kingsley Wood.

¹⁹ Legal adviser to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom.

the Canadian war effort and cannot be supplied from the United States or Canada, or that they can be produced and shipped without interfering with war production in this country and represent a high conversion value. As for the United States, it is our policy only to export goods containing steel where it is in the interests of both countries that we should do so. The amounts concerned are small. For South America we try to export no goods containing steel in appreciable quantities, except that we have felt bound to maintain in some degree our export trade with the Argentine in view of the necessity of keeping up means of payments for our food supplies from there; but the amount of exports containing steel has rapidly diminished and if it is needed from the Congressional point of view, we are prepared to stop any new orders being accepted with very minor exceptions.

As regards aluminum there is no found action [*no foundation?*] for this criticism. Civilian use in this country and export use together amount to less than one percent of our consumption. Tiny amounts are found 'necessarily in electrical equipment and machinery' and thus a few pounds may have got to South America but that is all.

In general, exports made now which give rise to many of the complaints are in fulfillment of orders placed months ago when the circumstances were completely different. There must always be a time lag [*lag*] where production is involved between policy and its final performance.

Keynes has been taking up all these points in Washington and we have given him the material for a detailed answer which he drafted in consultation with the State Department and the Treasury. He tells us that it seems to have been completely adequate.

The Ambassador also mentioned reports in the United States that American cheese is being sold unrationed at as much as 90 cents a pound. There is no truth in this rumor. There was a small quantity of Argentine cheese which for special reasons as a non-recurring matter we allowed to be sold without restriction and off the ration so that it fetched a fancy price. Probably this is at the bottom of the story."

Thank you for assigning Coe here.

WINANT

841.24/820

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State
(Acheson)*

[WASHINGTON,] July 28, 1941.

Mr. Keynes called at my request in accordance with the instructions of the Acting Secretary. I handed Mr. Keynes a copy of the draft proposal²⁰ for a temporary lease-lend agreement which had been approved by the President and told Mr. Keynes that the President saw no reason why he should change his plans, which contemplated flying

²⁰ See annex.

to England on Tuesday, July 29. I also told him that the President did not regard the draft as final on his part, but that he had given his approval for a discussion of it with the British Government as a basis for a temporary lease-lend agreement.

Mr. Keynes, after reading the draft, inquired whether Article II meant that the United States might require the British to furnish articles, such as tin, rubber, etc., without payment. I replied that Article II was inserted to provide for reciprocal action on the part of Great Britain to the extent that Great Britain might be in a position to take such reciprocal action and in the event that the necessities of our national defense might require us to ask for it; that it did not imply any present intention on the part of this Government to alter existing arrangements, but that no one could foresee the future and that, if the necessities of the future required us to request action by the British comparable to our own lease-lend procedure, Article II meant that the British would take such action, just as we were now taking it, so far as they were in a position to do so.

Mr. Keynes then turned to Article V which requires the United Kingdom to return at the end of the emergency such articles as have not been destroyed, lost, or consumed, and which the President may request to be returned. He pointed out that in his draft the obligation to return had been "so far as practicable", and stated that this phrase had been inserted to cover the situation in which the United Kingdom, with the permission of the President, might have transferred to another Government lease-lend articles, thus placing them beyond the control of the British Government. I replied that this situation might be taken care of at the time of such transfer in one of two ways. Either the President's permission might exempt such articles from the provisions of Article V, or the terms of the transfer might provide that the transferee Government should return them to the United States under the same conditions as provided in Article V. He seemed satisfied with this.

Mr. Keynes then raised Article VII, and stated that very serious considerations were raised by the provision that the final settlement should provide against discrimination in either the United Kingdom or the United States against the importation of any product originating in the other country. He asked whether this provision raised the question of imperial preferences and exchange and other trade controls in the post-war period. I said that it did raise these questions, but that the Article was drawn so as not to impose unilateral obligations, but rather to require the two countries in the final settlement to review all such questions and to work out to the best of their ability provisions which would obviate discriminatory and nationalistic practices and would lead instead to cooperative action in preventing such practices.

Mr. Keynes then spoke for some time quite strongly about this provision. He said that he did not see how the British could make such a commitment in good faith; that it would require an imperial conference and that it saddled upon the future an ironclad formula from the Nineteenth Century. He said that it contemplated the impossible and hopeless task of returning to a gold standard where international trade was controlled by mechanical monetary devices and which had proved completely futile. He said that the only hope of the future was to maintain economies in balance without great excesses of either exports or imports, and that this could be only through exchange controls, which Article VII seemed to ban.

He went on to say that the language used in Article VII had a long history; that it permitted all sorts of cunningly devised tariffs, which were in fact discriminatory and prohibited sound economic monetary controls. Finally, he said that at the end of the war we will probably have a great excess of exports, the British would require a considerable excess of imports, and that the formula provided in Article VII was wholly impossible.

I replied to Mr. Keynes that I thought he was taking an extreme and unjustified position and that it must be clear to him that no one would be less likely to impose a rigid and unworkable formula upon future developments than the President.

I said, and Mr. Keynes agreed, that the proposal made by him had been wholly impossible, inasmuch as it provided merely that lease-lend aid should be extended; that the British should return what was practicable for them to return; that no obligation should be created; and that they would be glad to talk about other matters. I pointed out to him that such a proposal could not possibly be defended in this country. To this he did not demur.

I then said that the purpose of Article VII was to provide a commitment which it should not be hard for the British to give that, after the emergency was over and after they had received vast aid from this country, they would not regard themselves as free to take any measures they chose directed against trade of this country but would work out in cooperation with this country measures which would eliminate discrimination and would provide for mutually fair and advantageous relations. I added that there was nothing narrow or technical about the provisions of Article VII, but that the British should realize that an effort of the magnitude of the lease-lend program on our part imposed upon them the obligation of continuing good will in working out plans for the future and that they must consider our position as well as their own during that future period.

After some further discussion along these lines, Mr. Keynes stated that he would take the proposal back to London and would discuss

it there, and said that the British Government might propose some alteration in the language or might wish to have some further clarification on the Article.

He then said that there was considerable difference of opinion in London about future courses. There were some who believed that Great Britain should return to a free trade policy; there was a middle group, among whom he classified himself, who believed in the use of control mechanisms; and there was a third group who leant toward imperial policies. I said that I realized this and that we hoped that in his discussion of the Article he would not take a narrow or technical view regarding the language as a draftsman's product, to be carefully analyzed in order to see what might or might not be done under it, but would try to direct attention to its major purpose and attempt to get agreement in order that the major purpose should be achieved.

At the end of our talk he seemed more reconciled to the Article, but by no means wholly so. He insisted that he agreed with the broad purpose and believed that it could be worked out.

DEAN ACHESON

[Annex]

*Draft Proposal for a Temporary Lend-Lease Agreement Handed by
Mr. Acheson to Mr. Keynes on July 28, 1941*

Whereas the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland declare that, with self-restraint and sober purpose, they are engaged in a cooperative undertaking, together with every other nation or people of like mind, to the end of laying the bases of a just and enduring world peace securing order under law to themselves and all nations;

And whereas the President of the United States of America has determined, pursuant to the Act of Congress of March 11, 1941, that the defense of the United Kingdom against aggression is vital to the defense of the United States of America;

And whereas the United States of America has extended and is continuing to extend to the United Kingdom aid in resisting aggression;

And whereas the final determination of the terms and conditions upon which the United Kingdom receives such aid and of the benefits to be received by the United States of America in return therefor should be deferred until the extent of the defense aid is known and until the progress of events makes clearer the final terms and conditions and benefits which will be in the mutual interests of the United

States of America and the United Kingdom and will promote the establishment and maintenance of world peace;

And whereas the Governments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom are mutually desirous of concluding now a preliminary agreement in regard to the providing of defense aid and in regard to certain considerations which shall be taken into account in determining such terms and conditions, and the making of such an agreement has been in all respects duly authorized, and all acts, conditions and formalities which it may have been necessary to perform, fulfill or execute prior to the making of such an agreement in conformity with the laws either of the United States of America or of the United Kingdom have been performed, fulfilled or executed as required;

The undersigned, being duly authorized for that purpose, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

The United States of America will continue to supply the United Kingdom with such defense articles, defense services, and defense information as the President shall authorize to be transferred or provided.

ARTICLE II

The United Kingdom will continue to contribute to the defense of the United States of America and the strengthening thereof and, should circumstances arise in which the United States of America in its own defense or the defense of the Americas may require articles, services, or information, will provide such articles, services, or information as it may be in a position to supply.

ARTICLE III

The Government of the United Kingdom will not without the consent of the President transfer title to, or possession of, any defense article or defense information transferred to it under the Act or permit the use thereof by anyone not an officer, employee or agent of the Government of the United Kingdom.

ARTICLE IV

If, as a result of the transfer to the Government of the United Kingdom of any defense article or defense information, it becomes necessary for that Government to take any action or make any payment in order fully to protect any of the rights of a citizen of the United States of America who has patent rights in and to any such defense article or information, the Government of the United Kingdom will take such action or make such payment when requested to do so by the President.

ARTICLE V

The Government of the United Kingdom will return to the United States of America at the end of the present emergency, as determined by the President, such defense articles transferred under this Agreement as shall not have been destroyed, lost or consumed and as shall be determined by the President to be useful in the defense of the United States of America or of the Western Hemisphere or to be otherwise of use to the United States of America.

ARTICLE VI

In the final determination of the benefits to be provided to the United States of America full cognizance shall be taken of all property, services, information, facilities, or other benefits or considerations provided by the Government of the United Kingdom subsequent to March 11, 1941 and accepted or acknowledged by the President on behalf of the United States of America.

ARTICLE VII

The terms and conditions upon which the United Kingdom receives defense aid from the United States of America and the benefits to be received by the United States of America in return therefor, as finally determined, shall be such as not to burden commerce between the two countries but to promote mutually advantageous economic relations between them and the betterment of world-wide economic relations; they shall provide against discrimination in either the United States of America or the United Kingdom against the importation of any product originating in the other country; and they shall provide for the formulation of measures for the achievement of these ends.

ARTICLE VIII

This Agreement shall continue in force from the date on which it is signed until a date agreed upon by the two Governments.

Signed and sealed at Washington in duplicate this day of, 1941.

On behalf of the United States of America :

(Title)

On behalf of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland :

(Title)

811.20 (D) E.M.D.E./118: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, July 28, 1941—9 p. m.
[Received July 28—3:35 p. m.]

3251. For Secretary Morgenthau. Following up your cable 2657, July 18, 3 p. m., I had a conference this morning with the Chancellor of the Exchequer; Sir John Anderson, head of the Privy Council; Lord Portal, the Deputy Minister of Supply; and Lord Woolton, Minister of Food, on the handling of lend-lease articles and also discussed the question of the export of British materials in cases where they are asking us to supplement their own supplies with similar materials from the United States, for which there exists a shortage in the United States.

We were promised a statement within 48 hours. I believe they are making a genuinely sincere effort to meet the situation. I feel that the Anderson statement was so limited in scope that the Chancellor's promised memorandum should be complete. I believe it will be so and that it will be supported by appropriate action.

Coe is assisting me. We will forward their conclusions for your criticism and comment as soon as the information is available.

WINANT

841.24/648;

Mr. J. M. Keynes, Financial Adviser to the British Government, to the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson)

NEW YORK, July 29, 1941.

MY DEAR ACHESON: I should not like it to be thought because of my cavilling at the word "discrimination" that the excellence and magnanimity of the first part of that Article VII and of the document as a whole had gone overlooked.

I will do what I can to interpret the mind of the President and of the State Department to people at home and feel some confidence that a right conclusion will be reached.

The Ambassador comes on leave in about a fortnight and I dare say that the main discussions will await his return. So do not expect a reply in the very near future.

My so strong reaction against the word "discrimination" is the result of my feeling so passionately that our hands must be free to make something new and better of the postwar world; not that I want to discriminate in the old bad sense of that word—on the contrary, quite the opposite.

But the word calls up, and must call up—for that is what it means strictly interpreted—all the old lumber, most-favored-nation clause and the rest which was a notorious failure and made such a hash of the old world. We know also that won't work. It is the clutch of the dead, or at least the moribund, hand. If it was accepted it would be cover behind which all the unconstructive and truly reactionary people of both our countries would shelter. We must be free to work out new and better arrangements which will win in substance and not in shadow what the President and you and others really want. As I know you won't dispute this, we shall be able to work something out. Meanwhile forgive my vehemence which has deep causes in my hopes for the future. This is my subject. I know, or partly know, what I want. I know, and clearly know, what I fear.

Sincerely yours,

J. M. KEYNES

841.5018/714: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, July 31, 1941—noon.

[Received July 31—10:45 a. m.]

3310. Personal for the Acting Secretary for the Secretary of the Treasury. In Mr. Hopkins' message to me 2483, July 9, and in Secretary Morgenthau's message to Coe 2657, July 18, in which I was asked to collaborate and also in a section of Secretary Wickard's²¹ message 2761, July 24,²² inquiries were made as to the distribution of articles under the Lend-Lease Bill. I have made replies to these messages in my messages 3189, July 24; 3251, July 28; and 3278, July 29, to the Secretary of the Treasury and also in my message 3229, July 26,²³ to the Secretary of Agriculture.

Mr. Hopkins asked me to follow this matter up for him as he did not have time to press the importance of the issue himself. Since there seems to be no agreement in principle, I asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer for a statement as I explained in my message 3251, June [*July*] 28.

The statement handed to me this evening by the Chancellor is as follows:

"1. All materials which we obtain under the Lend-Lease Act are required for the prosecution of the war effort. This principle governs all questions of the distribution and use of such goods and His Majesty's Government have taken and will continue to take action to see

²¹ Claude R. Wickard, Secretary of Agriculture.

²² Not printed.

²³ Telegrams Nos. 3278 and 3229 not printed.

that these goods are not in any case diverted to the furtherance of private interests.

Export Policy.

2. No lend-lease materials sent to this country have been used for export.

3. For some time past exports from the United Kingdom have been more and more confined to those essentials (i) for the supply of vital requirements of overseas countries, particularly in the sterling Empire; (ii) for the acquisition of foreign exchange particularly in the Western Hemisphere. His Majesty's Government will now adopt the policy summarized below:

(i) In the future no materials on which the use is being restricted in the United States on the grounds of short supply and of which we obtain supplies from the United States either by payment or on lend-lease terms will be used in exports with the exception of the following special cases:

(a) Material which is needed overseas in connection with supplies essential to the war effort for ourselves and our allies, and which cannot be obtained from the United States. This would enable us (i) to export supplies essential to the war effort to countries within the Empire and to our allies, and (ii) to export such articles as tinsplate for canning to Portugal and the Argentine for our food requirements, if such tinsplate could not be supplied by the United States of America.

(b) Small quantities of such materials needed as minor though essential components of exports which otherwise are composed of materials not in short supply in the United States.

(c) Repair parts for British machinery and plant now in use, and machinery sea plant needed to complete installations now under construction so long as they have already been contracted for.

Steps will be taken forthwith to prevent the execution of existing contracts for the export (except to Empire and Allied territories) of such goods which do not come within the exceptions referred to in (a), (b) and (c) above. (i. a.) Materials which are not in short supply in the United States but which we obtain on lend-lease terms will not be used for export in quantities greater than those which we ourselves produce or buy from any source.

Distribution in the United Kingdom Chancelleries Lend-Lease Goods.

4. The general principle followed in this matter is that the remuneration received by the distributors, whatever the method of distribution, is controlled and will be no more than a fair return for the services rendered in the work of distribution. The arrangements rigorously exclude any opportunity for a speculative profit by private interests from dealing in lend-lease goods. In most cases lend-lease supplies will be distributed through organizations acting as agents of His Majesty's Government in the strict sense of the term and not as principals. Where, for strong practical reasons, this cannot be done a full explanation will be supplied to the United States administration and their concurrence sought beforehand in any alternative arrangements proposed. The justification for retaining existing

channels of distribution operating under strict Government control is that the creation of elaborate new organizations in their place would inevitably result in loss of efficiency and the wasteful use of manpower, and retard the war effort.

5. Food is a special case. Only some 5 or 6 percent of the total British food supply will come from the United States and without great practical complications it would be impossible to have a separate system for the distribution of lend-leased food. Food distribution is carried out in the United Kingdom by wholesalers to whom the Government sells food as principals. In fact the Ministry of Food has established a close control over all district margins so that neither the wholesalers nor the retailers receive any greater remuneration than is adequate to cover the cost of the services performed. No food obtained on lend-lease terms is or will be sold at uncontrolled prices. Thus, the general arrangements as regards the issue of lend-leased food fit into His Majesty's Government's policy of stabilizing the whole price level of foodstuffs, a policy to which the Government contributes pounds 100 millions a year.

6. In some cases direct free distribution is practicable and will be adopted. For example, some milk products (including lend-leased supplies from the United States) are distributed direct and free of charge to children and others in need through schools, clinics and hospitals. The distribution is undertaken by state agencies and the cost of the distribution is borne by the Government.²⁵

The statement handed me by the Chancellor should be read in connection with the public announcement made in the House by the Prime Minister in his address of Tuesday (see message 3278, July 29).

Coe is preparing, with the cooperation of British Treasury officials an exact description of the methods of distribution of all articles under the Lend-Lease Bill which will be forwarded on completion.

I would appreciate your informing the President on this matter as I understand from Mr. Hopkins that he is interested in this situation. It would also be helpful if you would let General Burns²⁴ have copies of this entire correspondence for his own information and for Mr. Hopkins on his return.

I explained to the Chancellor that I was forwarding this statement to you. An early answer would be greatly appreciated.

WINANT

841.24/6433

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Commercial Treaties and Agreements (Hawkins) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson)

[WASHINGTON,] August 1, 1941.

MR. ACHESON: Mr. Keynes' views on the most-favored-nation clause are not very clear from this letter.²⁵ It is apparent, however, that he

²⁴ Maj. Gen. James H. Burns, Executive Officer, Office for Emergency Management, Division of Defense Aid Reports.

²⁵ Letter to Assistant Secretary of State Acheson, July 29, p. 16.

doesn't like it. Taking some of his oral remarks in conjunction with this letter, the main terms of his indictment can be made out. I set them down with my comments:

On one occasion recently Mr. Keynes stated that obviously the most-favored-nation principle did not in fact result in nondiscriminatory treatment since it often happens that a country, despite its most-favored-nation obligations, will apply a generally higher level of duties to the characteristic products of a particular foreign country than those applicable to the characteristic products of another country; hence it discriminates against the former without calling it discrimination. For example, France used to claim that we discriminated against her because our level of duties on her typical products (luxury products) were higher than those on the typical products of other countries.

The answer is, of course, that the most-favored-nation clause does not pretend to insure that a country's policy will be wholly nondiscriminatory or even equitable. It has a much more modest and attainable objective which is simply that *any given product* of a particular foreign country will not be placed at a competitive disadvantage as compared with *the like product* of any third country. It aims to prevent artificial diversion of trade as between foreign supplying countries; to insure that the efficient producer in one foreign country will not, because of discriminatory practices in the importing country, lose his market to less efficient producers in other countries.

Mr. Keynes' argument regarding discriminatory general tariff levels is not an argument against the most-favored-nation clause because that clause does not even profess to cover such generalities. Our tariff rates on silk fabrics may, for example, impose a greater burden on this typically French product than do our rates on Argentine canned beef. The most-favored-nation clause does not even seek to cover such a situation since no diversion of business away from French producers and into the hands of less efficient foreign suppliers is involved.

This leads to another contention of Mr. Keynes which is set forth in his letter to you of July 29, namely, that the most-favored-nation principle is a shelter for reactionaries. There is an element of truth in this. The policy of the United States during the twenties illustrates the point Mr. Keynes has in mind. During that period we insisted on the right to impose any tariff we saw fit for the protection of domestic producers and at the same time insisted on receiving as favorable treatment in each foreign country as that granted to our competitors in third countries. In short, if we could have made this stick, we could have maintained any tariff we chose without danger of paying a stiff price for it by having our export trade diverted into the hands of our competitors. In those days we did in fact what Mr. Keynes suggests;

attempted to take shelter behind the most-favored-nation clause in order to impose exorbitant tariffs without *suffering* the consequences.

It is to be admitted that the most-favored-nation principle alone, without a moderate level of nondiscriminatory rates, is not sufficient of itself to promote a healthy international trade. The United States has since recognized this fact in the enactment of the Trade Agreements Act.²⁶ In the post-war period we should seek to get the widest possible acceptance of both of these principles.

Mr. Keynes argues in this letter to you that the most-favored-nation clause "made a hash of the old world", (presumably meaning the pre-war world). This is a most unwarranted statement. It would be much more accurate to say that the British, and other countries, made a hash of the most-favored-nation clause by negotiating bilateral arrangements and other agreements which resulted in widespread discriminations.

On the whole, the tenor of Mr. Keynes' argument seems to be that we are attaching too much importance to nondiscriminatory treatment of our trade; that discrimination is not after all a matter of such significance as to justify our interfering with the bilateralistic plans which Mr. Keynes has in view. If definite proof were needed that nondiscriminatory treatment *is* important, and important to the British themselves, it could easily be had by suggesting that this obsolete instrument, the most-favored-nation clause, be omitted from the revised trade agreement now under discussion. This would allow us to impose higher duties on British goods than apply to like products from competing sources, and would be our counterpart of the freedom which the British wish to reserve for themselves to discriminate in the application of their exchange control. It would be a perfectly safe experiment, as they would never agree to it.

It seems to me that what Mr. Keynes has completely failed to see and understand is that the idea of nondiscrimination (in the properly limited sense as used above) is not a philosophical concept but rather a matter involving considerations of practical politics and economics. The imposition of high, though nondiscriminatory, trade barriers for the protection by a country of its own producers does and has aroused resentment, but this resentment is mitigated by the fact that a certain degree of preference by a government for its nationals is understandable and tolerable. But discrimination in favor of other foreigners is not so regarded. And above all, he fails wholly to see that after the sacrifices the American people are being called upon to make to help Great Britain in the present emergency (even though we are thereby helping ourselves), our public opinion simply would not tolerate discrimination against our products in Great Britain

²⁶ Approved June 12, 1934; 48 Stat. 943.

and, at Great Britain's instance, in other countries. Mr. Keynes' failure to grasp this humble fact probably explains his failure to understand the impossibility of collaboration between the United States and the United Kingdom in the atmosphere which his kind of policy would create and hence the serious consequences to both countries and to the world which could result from that policy.

841.24/659a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, August 6, 1941—7 p. m.

2994. Personal from Harriman :

"Brendan Bracken²⁷ asked me to report to him misconceptions that America had of Britain. Will you please tell him the belief is prevalent among political and business circles that :

1. Britain is using Lend-Lease materials to foster and retain her commercial export markets.
2. Large profits are being made by commercial interests in processing and distributing Lend-Lease raw materials.

I believe Bracken has an interest in getting the facts and seeing that in future accurate information is released from London so that the Americans will understand the British Government's general attitude and will not be upset by accidental incidents that may occur from time to time even after the understanding which you are now working on is reached."

HULL

841.24/688 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, August 15, 1941—6 p. m.

3165. From Oscar Cox.²⁸

"I am told by the British Purchasing Commission that London is holding up formulation of a definite policy with respect to the re-export and commercial distribution of Lend-Lease articles pending receipt from us of comments on Sir Kingsley Wood's memorandum forwarded by you on July 31, 1941.²⁹ I understand also that on receipt of this memorandum the Treasury cabled you suggesting that Mr. Purvis was familiar with our point of view here and that you might wish to get in touch with him.

²⁷ British Minister of Information.

²⁸ Counsel of the Office of Emergency Management.

²⁹ See telegram No. 3310, July 31, noon, p. 17.

We discussed the problems presented by re-export and commercial distribution of Lend-Lease articles fully with Mr. Purvis, and expressed the policy which would be satisfactory to us in two letters, which Mr. Purvis took with him to London and with which I understand he was in substantial agreement. Mr. Harriman has also been consulted about these letters and has approved them. I am transmitting at the end of this telegram the texts of these two letters with slight modifications recently developed here.

You will see that the only basic difference between our statement and Sir Kingsley Wood's is that his criterion for limitations on re-export is short supply, whereas ours is competition.

Would you be able to find out from Sir Kingsley Wood whether he discussed these letters with Mr. Purvis and whether he approves the policy which they express. If so, we can exchange them with the British here immediately."

Following is the text of a draft letter dated August 14 from General Burns to the Chairman of the British Supply Council:

"In view of current public discussions of British export policy and its relation to the administration of the Lend-Lease Act, it seems timely to set forth in concrete form certain of the principles which have guided this Division in the administration of the Lend-Lease Act and will continue to do so in the future.

As you know, it has been the policy of this Division from the outset to limit the aid rendered under the Lend-Lease Act to that which is essential to the maintenance of the war effort and to refuse consent under Section 4 of the Act to the use of Lend-Lease articles for re-export in commercial trade. To execute this policy we have required a stipulation in the requisitions that Lend-Lease articles which might be available for such export be used in the United Kingdom or in other parts of the Empire and only for needs essential to the maintenance of the war effort.

We appreciate that Great Britain must continue exports in order to obtain imports. However, this Division has urged and will continue to urge upon His Majesty's Government the importance of Great Britain's making every effort to concentrate her exports in the field of traditional articles and to cut down exportation of articles similar to, or made of materials similar to, those being provided through Lend-Lease funds to the irreducible minimum necessary to supply or obtain materials essential to the war effort.

I would appreciate your confirming that the foregoing conforms to your understanding of the basis upon which Lend-Lease articles are being provided and receiving your assurance that every effort will be made to carry out the foregoing policy to the fullest extent."

Following is the text of a draft letter dated August 14 from General Burns to the Chairman of the British Supply Council:

"Section 4 of the Lend-Lease Act requires the consent of the President to any retransfers of lend-lease articles by His Majesty's Government. Distribution through commercial channels in the United Kingdom and in other parts of the Empire of necessity involves a retransfer and Presidential consent.

In the administration of the Lend-Lease Act the President will expect that, insofar as practicable, lend-lease articles will be distributed through Government agencies and, in the case of foods, on the free list. Where such distribution is not practicable, the President will, before granting his consent to commercial distribution, require assurances that:

a. The articles to be distributed commercially, and those into which they are incorporated, are essential to the British war effort.

b. The commercial channels of distribution to be used are the most effective and economical means of assuring the efficient use of the articles or their prompt delivery to the places where they are needed.

c. No profiteering by commercial distributors of the articles will be permitted.

d. There will be no discrimination against American firms.

Since the nature of distribution and ultimate destination of the various articles to be commercially distributed either in their original or in an advanced form naturally varies widely with a particular article, it is impossible for any blanket consent to retransfer to be given and each case must be determined on its own facts. The following, however, are suggested as items of information which would assist the President in determining whether the basic criteria set forth above have been met:

1. Destination of articles—in original and advanced form, e. g. United Kingdom, Dominions, Colonies, etc.

2. Intended use of articles and those into which they are to be incorporated, e. g., military, civilian, etc.

3. Method of distribution to be adopted, showing the channels through which the materials pass to the user.

4. Availability of Government distribution agencies.

5. The status of the distributors, i. e. whether they are acting as agents of the distributing Government or as principals purchasing to re-sell to consumers.

6. The extent to which Government supervision is exercised over distributors to insure that the prices and fees charged by them will be limited to a minimum reasonable remuneration for services actually performed.

7. Details of distribution, e. g. will the recipient Government sell the articles to a manufacturer, or will it deliver them to him gratis for incorporation in a completed article.

More detailed information will be expected in case of distributions in the Dominions and other parts of the Empire than in the United Kingdom in view of the strict controls known to be in force in the United Kingdom.

The foregoing are suggestions only and are not intended to be all-inclusive, as the necessity for further and different information will undoubtedly become apparent in particular cases. I am confident that most cases will fall into more or less standardized patterns, so that a method of presenting the necessary information can be worked out which will avoid useless repetition and complication of requisitions."

841.24/689 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, August 19, 1941—1 p. m.
[Received August 19—10:30 a. m.]

3722. Personal for Oscar Cox. In answer to your 3165 of August 15, I had a long talk with Mr. Purvis the morning of August 14. We discussed at some length the negotiations in regard to the treatment of British exports in relation to the materials received from the United States under Lend-Lease. He was leaving that afternoon at Lord Beaverbrook's³⁰ request for Scotland to take a plane back to the United States without having finished the contacts he meant to make here or completing discussions on important items. He intended to return to London within 4 or 5 days. He told me that he had not as yet taken up with the Chancellor the draft letter from General Burns directed to the chairman British Supply Council. When I called on the banker yesterday afternoon he confirmed this fact. I gave Sir Kingsley Wood a copy of General Burns' letter which he read and after reading said he wanted to take time to consider it. When I saw him the last time in regard to this matter I explained that it would be necessary to wait until Mr. Hopkins returned before reaching a decision. I told Mr. Hopkins this just before he left. Mr. Purvis planned to talk about this situation again with Mr. Hopkins as a result of our conversations. He also took with him a letter to Mr. Hopkins and copies of all exchanges of messages on this subject. This letter was burned with all other documents that Mr. Purvis took with him. I had copies made immediately but due to the delay in arrival of the American transport plane it will probably not leave before Thursday. It should reach Mr. Hopkins the end of the week as I explained to him in my message 3653 of August 15, 3 p. m.³¹

You suggest in your message 3175 [3165], August 15, 6 p. m. "that the only basic difference between our statement and Sir Kingsley Wood's is that his criterion for limitations on re-export is short supply whereas ours is competition". The idea of including short supply as the criterion was suggested by Mr. Hopkins and I insisted on its inclusion in my discussions with the Chancellor.

I found indirectly that a copy of General Burns' letter had been forwarded from the United States to the [apparent omission] here and had at least been discussed by the men who have to deal directly with these problems.

The British would like to export cotton goods and other articles where the raw materials are not in short supply in the United States.

³⁰ Minister of Aircraft Production.

³¹ Not printed.

Your first principle of competition would seem to prevent this but your second principle would seem to allow it. Since the British consider cotton goods exports to be important it would be helpful to receive your interpretation of whether your draft proposals would allow such exports. A decision on this commodity might or might not apply to other commodities. In my discussions with Mr. Purvis he suggested exceptions and said he thought that you had committee machinery in Washington that might deal with these specific problems.

Would you please ask Mr. Hopkins after he has read your cable to me and my reply to you if he would personally take the matter up with Mr. Morgenthau explaining the reasons for delay which trouble me as I realize that a conclusion on the subject in principle at least should be reached promptly.

WINANT

841.24/698 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, August 22, 1941—midnight.

[Received August 22—9:10 p. m.]

3821. Personal for Mr. Hopkins. I would greatly appreciate a reply to my 3722 of August 19 directed to Oscar Cox.

The day before yesterday the Chancellor of the Exchequer asked me if I would have an informal talk with him at the Treasury. He there explained to me that I had asked for a conference on the use of lend-lease materials in the British export trade and that several ministers of the Government had sat in on that conference, that after considerable preliminary investigation and discussion he more than 2 weeks ago had submitted a memorandum³² which I had agreed to forward to the United States for consideration and comment, that simultaneously with my action here a letter covering the same subject was submitted by General Burns in Washington.

The Chancellor suggested that he would be glad to have the discussion undertaken in Washington or in London. He said he would be glad to withdraw the memorandum of his Government which he submitted to me and which I communicated to Secretary Morgenthau and read to you. He then said that after withdrawing his memorandum he would be willing to negotiate on General Burns' letter. He did not feel that to negotiate in London on his memorandum while a counter-negotiation was going on in Washington was particularly helpful.

I asked that he continue to stand on the memorandum as presented to me until you personally could reply from Washington.

³² See telegram No. 3310, July 31, noon, p. 17.

The increasing number of people who negotiate with the British Government often without definite assignment to the Embassy and efforts to reach agreements on both sides of the water at the same time seriously interfere with the work of the Embassy. The more times I uselessly contact government agencies here the less chance I have of making effective contact when action is necessary. I want very much to have our relations with the British both friendly and orderly so that we can build confidence that permits continuing trust and cooperation. Please help me.

WINANT

841.24/698 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, August 28, 1941—7 p. m.

3466. In reply to your 3821 to Mr. Hopkins and 3722 to Oscar Cox, who have both been away. The Chancellor's statement forwarded in your 3310 has been considered by Mr. Hopkins, Secretary Morgenthau, General Burns and representatives of this department. This Government regards it in the main as an admirable statement which would be acceptable if the following modifications could be made:

1. Section "2" to read "Lend-Lease materials sent to this country have not been used for export and every effort will be made in the future to ensure that they are not used for export."

We think it important to establish the principle that actual material furnished under Lend-Lease should not itself be re-exported. We can assure the British that in cases where complete physical segregation of Lend-Lease material is impracticable, we will be satisfied that they have lived up to their undertaking if they consume as much or more of the material in the United Kingdom as they obtain under Lend-Lease.

2. Last sentence of last paragraph of section "3" to read "Where materials being provided through Lend-Lease funds are not in short supply in the United States, the export of similar materials or articles made of similar materials will not be restricted except in cases where such exports compete with American exports. In such cases of competition, every effort will be made to restrict such exports to the irreducible minimum necessary to supply or obtain materials essential to the war effort." This would permit export of cotton, for example, to the extent that such export is necessary to supply Dominion or Allied forces or to obtain foreign exchange for imports essential to the war effort.

3. Add to paragraph "4" the sentence: "In the distribution of Lend-Lease goods there will be no discrimination against United States

firms." We feel that this addition is necessary in the light of reports this Department has received concerning discrimination against American firms.

HULL

841.24/720 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, September 3, 1941—8 p. m.

[Received 8:35 p.m.]

4059. For the Secretary and Under Secretary. The day following receipt of your 3466, August 28, 7 p. m., I discussed the question of the modifications you asked for which required amendments to the Chancellor's statement forwarded in my 3310 and asked for their acceptance. At the Chancellor's request, I sent him a letter containing the amendments and the substance of the Department's interpretative comment. He asked for time for consideration and consultation. On September 2, I received a letter from him which read in part as follows:

"My colleagues and I have considered these amendments and subject to the drafting points which I mention below we are glad to accept them.

On the amendment to paragraph 4, I have no comments to make. We agree with it entirely.

The amendment to paragraph 2 is entirely satisfactory when read together with your comments on it; but, owing to the fact that in the case of some commodities, such as cotton, I regret that segregation is completely impossible, we feel that, unless the qualifications which you propose is incorporated in the text itself we run too near the risk of undertaking the impossible. I therefore suggest that paragraph 2 of the memorandum should run as follows:

'Lend-lease materials sent to this country have not been used for export and every effort will be made in the future to ensure that they are not used for export, subject to the principle that where complete physical segregation of lend-lease materials is impracticable domestic consumption of the material in question in the United Kingdom shall be at least equal to the amounts received under Lend-Lease.'

We accept the essence of the second amendment but it would not be easy for the Board of Trade to administer it unless it were made a little more precise; and the principle which it embodies is so important that I should like to give it rather more emphasis. I suggest, therefore, that we should leave the end of paragraph 3 as it is, but insert between the revised paragraph 2 and paragraph 3 a new paragraph as follows:

'His Majesty's Government have not applied and will not apply any lend-lease materials in such a way as to enable their exporters to enter new markets or to extend their export trade at the expense of the United States exporters. Owing to the need to devote all available capacity and man power to war production, the United Kingdom export trade is restricted to the irreducible minimum necessary to supply or obtain materials essential to the war effort.'

The Chancellor, and particularly Sir Andrew Duncan, President of the Board of Trade, in agreement with other Ministers, felt that it would be far easier from the British point of view and ultimately create less friction as between the United States and Great Britain if the interpretation in paragraph 2 of your 3466 was made a part of paragraph 1 section 2 as amended.

I believe the second suggested change is simply an effort at precision and to facilitate administration. [Apparent omission] no objection to it. The amendment to paragraph 4 is accepted without comment.

In order to set up a possible alternative to the British position and because I realize that the Department had reason for excluding from the agreement the interpretation of paragraph 1 section 2, I suggested an exchange of notes to cover interpretation of this section. The question of publication of the interpretation was raised. The British would accept the Department's decision on the matter.

I feel that Duncan is tough but honest and would like to get the negotiations in exact terms and in the open on a practical working agreement so as to minimize friction and misunderstanding on both sides and that he genuinely accepts the moral and military need of restricting "exports to their irreducible minimum necessary to supply or obtain materials essential to the war effort".

For your convenience I am setting out below the paragraphs under discussion, giving first, the version in the Chancellor's statement forwarded in 3310, secondly, the suggested amendments contained in 3466 from the Department, and thirdly, the amendments contained in the letter of September 2 from the Chancellor, which is quoted above.

1. Paragraph 2.

(a) Chancellor's original statement reads: "No lend-lease materials sent to this country have been used for export".

(b) Amendment suggested by Department: "Lend-lease materials sent to this country have not been used for export and every effort will be made in the future to ensure that they are not used for export".

(c) Chancellor's amended statement: "Lend-lease materials sent to this country have not been used for export and every effort will be made in the future to ensure that they are not used for export, subject to the principle that where complete physical segregation of lend-lease materials is impracticable, domestic consumption of the material in question in the United Kingdom shall be at least equal to the amounts received under Lend-Lease".

2. End of paragraph 3.

(a) Chancellor's original statement: "Materials which are not in short supply in the United States but which we obtain on lend-lease terms will not be used for export in quantities greater than those which we ourselves produce or buy from any source."⁵

(b) Amendment suggested by Department: "Where materials being provided through lend-lease funds are not in short supply in the United States, the export of similar materials or articles made

of similar materials will not be restricted except in cases where such exports compete with American exports. In such cases of competition, every effort will be made to restrict such exports to their irreducible minimum necessary to supply or obtain materials essential to the war effort".

(c) Chancellor's amended statement: The Chancellor proposes that a new paragraph shall be inserted between the revised paragraph 2 and paragraph 3 as follows: "His Majesty's Government have not applied and will not apply any lend-lease materials in such a way as to enable their exporters to enter new markets or to extend their export trade at the expense of United States exporters. Owing to the need to devote all available capacity and man power to war production, the United Kingdom export trade is restricted to the irreducible minimum necessary to supply or obtain materials essential to the war effort".

The Chancellor proposes that the end of paragraph 3 shall remain as in the original draft: "Materials which are not in short supply in the United States but which we obtain on lend-lease terms will not be used for export in quantities greater than those which we ourselves produce or buy from any source."

3. Addition to paragraph 4.

(b) Suggested statement by Department: "In the distribution of lend-lease goods there will be no discrimination against United States firms".

(c) The Chancellor's amended statement: "In the distribution of lend-lease goods there will be no discrimination against United States firms".

An early decision on this matter would help here.

WINANT

841.24/720 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, September 5, 1941—midnight.

3613. In reply to your 4059³³ the changes suggested by the Chancellor are satisfactory, subject to minor drafting changes suggested below to make clear the understanding that references to "Lend-Lease materials" appearing subsequent to Paragraph 1 of Section 2 mean materials similar to those provided under Lend-Lease and not actual Lend-Lease materials themselves. Otherwise there would be an inconsistency with Paragraph 1 of Section 2.

To accomplish this result suggest the following: First sentence of new paragraph proposed by Chancellor for insertion between revised Paragraph 2 and Paragraph 3 to read:

"His Majesty's Government have not applied and will not apply any materials similar to those supplied under Lend-Lease in such a way as

³³ *Supra.*

to enable their exporters to enter new markets or to extend their export trade at the expense of United States exporters.

Subdivision (i) of Paragraph 3 of the Chancellor's original statement to begin "In the future no materials of a type the use of which is being restricted in the United States, etc."

The last sentence of Paragraph 3 of the Chancellor's original statement to read "Materials similar to those being provided under Lend-Lease which are not in short supply in the United States will not be used for export in quantities greater than those which we ourselves produce or buy from any source."

We would like very much to announce this agreement in the President's Lend-Lease report to Congress, planned for September 9. Can you advise at your early convenience if foregoing is satisfactory.

HULL

841.24/741 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, September 7, 1941—5 p. m.
[Received September 7—2: 19 p. m.]

4130. This morning the Chancellor telephoned me to say that his Government was glad to accept the drafting changes asked for in your 3613, September 5, midnight.

He suggested that there be an exchange of letters between Mr. Eden, the Foreign Secretary, and myself to establish formal acceptance. I am sending the texts they suggest to you in a separate message.

You may want to suggest some other method of confirmation.

The British are anxious to have a simultaneous release timed with our release from Washington. Their release will be in the form of a White Paper. They are asking their Embassy at Washington to arrange the timing with the Department.

WINANT

841.24/740 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, September 7, 1941—11 p. m.
[Received September 7—6: 55 p. m.]

4133. My 4130, September 7, 5 p. m. Following suggested drafts of letters for exchange between Mr. Eden and myself just received from the Foreign Office.

"8th September 1941.

My Dear Ambassador: With reference to the conversations about lend-lease material which have recently taken place in London and in which you have participated I enclose an agreed memorandum on the policy which His Majesty's Government intend to follow with regard to exports from this country and with regard to the distribution here of lend-lease material. I shall be glad if you will transmit it to your Government. Yours sincerely, (sd.) Anthony Eden."

"8th September 1941.

Dear Mr. Eden, Thank you for your letter of September 8th, enclosing a memorandum on United Kingdom export policy and on the distribution of lend-lease material. I have caused the memorandum to be transmitted immediately to Washington for the information of my Government. Sincerely yours, (sd.) John G. Winant."

Foreign Office states it is requesting British Embassy at Washington to arrange with you for release of the President's report at 12 noon on Tuesday, Washington time or as near thereto as possible so that the British White Paper may be released at 6 p. m.

See my immediately following telegram⁸⁴ for final text of the memorandum as received from the Foreign Office with the draft exchange of letters.

WINANT

841.24/742 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, September 7, 1941—midnight.

[Received September 7—10:25 p. m.]

4134. My 4133, September 7, 11 p. m. Following text of memorandum on export and distribution of lease-lend material received from Foreign Office together with draft exchange of letters.

"Memorandum.

1. All materials which we obtain under the Lend-Lease Act are required for the prosecution of the war effort. This principle governs all question of the distribution and use of such goods and His Majesty's Government have taken and will continue to take action to secure that these goods are not in any case diverted to the furtherance of private interests.

Export Policy.

2. Lend-lease materials sent to this country have not been used for export and every effort will be made in the future to ensure that they are not used for export subject to the principle that where complete physical segregation of lend-lease materials is impracticable domestic consumption of the material in question shall be at least equal to the amounts received under Lend-Lease.

⁸⁴ *Infra.*

3. His Majesty's Government have not applied and will not apply any materials similar to those supplied under Lend-Lease in such a way as to enable their exporters to enter new markets or to extend their export trade at the expense of United States exporters. Owing to the need to devote all available capacity and manpower to war production, the United Kingdom export trade is restricted to the irreducible minimum necessary to supply or obtain materials essential to the war effort.

4. For some time past, exports from the United Kingdom have been more and more confined to those essential (1) for the supply of vital requirements of oversea countries, particularly in the sterling empire; (2) for the acquisition of foreign exchange, particularly in the Western Hemisphere. His Majesty's Government will not [*sic*] adopt the policy summarized below: (1) In future no materials of a type the use of which is being restricted in the United States on the grounds of short supply and of which we obtain supplies from the United States either by payment or on lend-lease terms will be used in exports with the exception of the following special cases: (a) material which is needed overseas in connection with supplies essential to the war effort for ourselves and our Allies, and which cannot be obtained from the United States. This would enable us (1) to export supplies essential to the war effort to countries within the Empire and to our Allies and (2) to export such articles as tinplate for canning to Portugal and the Argentine for our food requirements if such tinplate could not be supplied by the United States; (b) small quantities of such materials needed as minor though essential components of exports which otherwise are composed of materials not in short supply in the United States; (c) repair parts for British machinery and plant now in use and machinery and plant needed to complete installations now under construction, so long as they have already been contracted for. Steps will be taken forthwith to prevent the execution of existing contracts for the export (except to Empire and Allied territories) of such goods which do not come within the exceptions referred to in (a), (b) and (c) above. (2) Materials similar to those being provided under Lend-Lease which are not in short supply in the United States will not be used for export in quantities greater than those which we ourselves produce or buy from any source.

Distribution in the United Kingdom of Lend-Lease Goods.

5. The general principle followed in this matter is that the remuneration received by the distributors, whatever the method of distribution, is controlled and will be no more than a fair return for the services rendered in the work of distribution. The arrangements rigorously exclude any opportunity for a speculative profit by private interests from dealing in lend-lease goods. In most cases, lend-lease supplies will be distributed through organizations active as agents of His Majesty's Government in the strict sense of the term and not as principals. Where for strong practical reasons this cannot be done, a full explanation will be supplied to the United States Administration and then concurrence sought beforehand in any alternative arrangements proposed. The justification for retaining existing channels of distribution operating under strict Government control, is that the creation of elaborate new organizations in their place would inevitably result in

loss of efficiency and the wasteful use of manpower, and retard the war effort. In the distribution of lease-lend goods there will be no discrimination against United States firms.

6. Food is a special case. Only some 5 or 6 percent of the total British food supply will come from the United States, and, without great practical complications, it would be impossible to have a separate system for the distribution of lend-leased food. Food distribution is carried out in the United Kingdom by wholesalers, to whom the Government sells food as principals. In fact, the Ministry of Food has established a close control over all distributive margins so that neither the wholesalers nor the retailers receive any greater remuneration than is adequate to cover the cost of the services performed. No food obtained on lend-lease terms is or will be sold at uncontrolled prices. Thus, the general arrangements as regards the issue of lend-lease food fit into His Majesty's Government's policy of stabilizing the whole price level of foodstuffs, a policy to which the Government contributes 100 million pounds a year.

7. In some cases, direct free distribution is practicable and will be adopted. For example, some milk products (including lend-leased supplies from the United States) are distributed direct and free of charge to children and others in need through schools, clinics, and hospitals. The distribution is undertaken by state agencies and the cost of the distribution is borne by the Government.

8th September, 1941."

WINANT

841.24/749a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, September 8, 1941.

3656. The President's message to Congress regarding lend-lease has been deferred until Thursday.³⁵ We would accordingly prefer that the simultaneous publication of the text of the exchange of letters be timed on the following basis—namely, no later than Thursday, but even before that time if the changes we have suggested can be cleared and arrangements made for earlier publication. Please telegraph at once if this is agreeable to the British government.

We would like to suggest two changes in the text of the British memorandum as given in your 4134,³⁶ as well as a slight change in the text of Mr. Eden's letter.³⁷ These suggestions will be cabled to you tomorrow morning.

HULL

³⁵ September 11.

³⁶ *Supra.*

³⁷ See telegram No. 4133, September 7, 11 p. m., from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, p. 31.

841.24/742 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, September 9, 1941.

3672. My 3644³⁸ and 3656.³⁹ Further consideration by this Department of the text of the proposed agreement with the British, as contained in your 4134 of September 7, 1941, leads this Department to suggest that an urgent effort be made, before signing, to get the British to agree to the two following changes :

1. Certain changes should, it is felt, be made in the text of section 4 of the memorandum, and also in Mr. Eden's letter, for the purpose of avoiding the implication that the British have been guilty of serious transgressions as regards the matters referred to which they will now undertake to correct. From a publicity standpoint this seems unfortunate, and doubtless the British will be as anxious as ourselves to avoid raising such an implication when it is not necessary to do so.

The changes referred to are as follows :

1. Second sentence of section 4 to be changed to read as follows: "His Majesty's Government has adopted the policy summarized below: (1) no materials", etc., to end of the sentence.

2. The next to the last sentence of section 4 to be changed to read: "Steps have been taken to prevent the export", etc.

3. The first sentence of Mr. Eden's letter to be changed so that the portion which now reads "I enclose an agreed memorandum on the policy which His Majesty's Government intend to follow with regard to exports," etc., will, as revised, read as follows: "I enclose a memorandum on the policy of His Majesty's Government with regard to exports", etc.

2. Section 4, omit the whole of the second sentence under Exception A, which begins "This would enable us", etc.

The reason for this suggestion is the difficulty which arises in connection with the second part of the sentence, pertaining to tinplate. It seems certain that critics will raise the question as to how it is possible, considering the fact that provision has been made for purchase by lend-lease of large amounts of tinplate for the British Empire, that the British can have surplus tinplate of their own production to send to Argentina or Portugal. The specific inclusion of this interpretative provision seems certain to invite criticism which might not otherwise be raised. Furthermore, it seems desirable in a memorandum of this kind to avoid reference to specific commodities and countries.

³⁸ September 8, 4 p. m., not printed.

³⁹ *Supra.*

If the second part of this sentence is omitted, then the first part seems unnecessary, since its meaning is already incorporated in the preceding sentence.

HULL

841.24/751 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, September 9, 1941.

[Received September 9—2: 43 p. m.]

4183. Your 3672, 9th. Thanks helpful suggestions. Seeing the Chancellor early tomorrow morning for final concurrence.

I am also suggesting that in numbered paragraph 6, second sentence, the words "in tonnage" be inserted after "6 percent." This seems essential for clarity in meaning as the percentage in values is greater than 5 or 6 percent. In same sentence I am suggesting that phrase "is coming" be substituted for "will come."

I will include these minor changes in the final document⁴⁰ unless I hear from you to the contrary.

WINANT

841.24/811c : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, September 27, 1941—8 p. m.

4079. On July 28 last, Assistant Secretary Acheson handed to Mr. Maynard Keynes a draft Lease-Lend agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom. Mr. Keynes was to take this draft with him back to London and to place it before the British Government for its consideration. Since that time, we have had no word from the British Government in regard to this proposed agreement. I am sure you realize the importance which we attach to concluding such an agreement at an early date. I hope therefore that you will get in touch with Mr. Eden and ask him to expedite the consideration of this draft by the British Government in order that the negotiations looking to the agreement may be pressed to a conclusion.

HULL

⁴⁰ For text of the final document, together with exchange of letters between Mr. Eden and Mr. Winant, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 13, 1941, pp. 204-206.

841.24/811 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, September 29, 1941—midnight.

[Received September 29—8: 50 p. m.]

4606. Personal for the Secretary. In answer to your telegram 4079, September 27, 8 p. m. I got in touch with Mr. Eden this noon. I asked him to help me expedite consideration of the draft agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom. I explained to him that Mr. Maynard Keynes had been given a copy of this draft by Assistant Secretary Acheson on the 28 of July. He told me that he would get in touch with Sir Kingsley Wood, the Chancellor. This afternoon Mr. Eden telephoned me to say that the Chancellor was sending at once a memorandum to Lord Halifax and that a copy would be forwarded to me this evening. If you want me to pursue this matter further, I will gladly do so.

Since Dr. Penrose⁴¹ arrived I have gone over all the questions that Mr. Acheson discussed with him as well as going through all the trade and economic material that you have forwarded to me.

Before your message 3674, September 9, noon,⁴² and since I have taken every occasion to emphasize our views as set forth in the second paragraph of that message. I believe that we have made some progress.

WINANT

841.24/814 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, September 30, 1941—2 p. m.

[Received September 30—10: 15 a. m.]

4617. Personal for the Secretary. In relation to my message 4609 [4606], September 29, midnight. This morning the Chancellor asked me if I would see him. He explained that Mr. Eden's telephone conversation with me was not exactly accurate in that Lord Halifax had taken with him draft memoranda which he wanted to discuss personally with Dean Acheson. He asked that I not request a copy of the memoranda until Lord Halifax had an opportunity to speak with Mr. Acheson. He further told me that the Dominion Governments were being consulted and that they expected a reply within the next 2 or 3 days.

⁴¹ Ernest F. Penrose, economic adviser to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom.

⁴² Vol. I, p. 372.

It is my guess that the British may ask to make a similar substitution of language (my message 4013, September 1, midnight⁴³) as was suggested by them when we discussed the exception clause "with due respect for their existing obligations" in the fourth article of the Roosevelt-Churchill statement.⁴⁴ In this situation and at this time contrary to the advice I gave in the last paragraph of my message 4013, September 1, midnight, I believe we should insist on articles even of the provisional draft given me when I was last in Washington including the provision against discrimination. I think this can be gotten without open debate in Parliament but if it came to debate on this issue while the Parliament was considering Lend-Lease I believe the majority of the Conservatives, Liberals, and the entire labor block would give their support. I doubt if you will get a better opportunity to press this matter.

For reasons that are good and that you would understand and approve I would particularly ask that this message to you be not given to Lord Halifax or any other British representative.

WINANT

841.24/898

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State
(Acheson)*

[WASHINGTON,] October 3, 1941.

The British Ambassador called at his request after his conversation with the Secretary. He referred to the draft temporary Lease-Lend Agreement which had been given to Mr. Keynes in July and to the conversation which I had had with the Ambassador just before he left for England.

He told me that immediately upon his arrival in England he had spent the weekend with the Prime Minister and had discussed the draft agreement with him. He reported that the Prime Minister had stated that, second only to the winning of the war, the most important thing for the British Empire was to reach a satisfactory economic accord with the United States and that all its other arrangements should fall in line with this paramount matter.

The Ambassador then stated that he had then talked to Treasury Officials. He mentioned Mr. Kingsley Wood, Mr. Keynes, and "others". He stated that they were also sympathetic with the objectives of the agreement and appreciated its generosity. They felt, however, that the clause in Article VII relating to the provisions against discrimination should be clarified in order that there should

⁴³ Vol. I, p. 370.

⁴⁴ Joint statement by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill on August 14, 1941, known as the Atlantic Charter; for text, see vol. I, p. 367.

be no possibility of charges of bad faith or grounds for misunderstanding. He said that the Treasury officials had been working on a suggested clarification which the Ambassador had hoped to bring with him. However, it had not been completed before he left and it will be brought over by Mr. Opie,⁴⁵ who would be coming sometime this week. This suggestion he said was along the lines of the suggestion which Mr. Eden had made to Mr. Winant when Mr. Winant had proposed a clarification of Article IV of the Atlantic statement. (The matter to which the Prime Minister referred was as follows: By cable of August 25,⁴⁶ the Secretary had suggested the following as part of a joint statement—"The fourth point in the statement by the President and Mr. Churchill is a forthright declaration of intention by the British and American Governments to do everything in their power, now and in the post-war period, by means of the reduction of trade barriers and the reduction or elimination of preferences and discriminations, 'to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity.'" The British suggested that the words immediately preceding the inner quotes be changed to read "by means of the reduction or elimination of harmful restrictions as part of a general scheme.") The Ambassador went on to say that he earnestly hoped that we could accept the suggested change, but that before presenting the draft formally he would like to present it to the appropriate officials informally so that he might have their views in such a discussion rather than through the medium of the formal exchange of notes. I replied that I was sure that this could be accomplished, but added that I was doubtful about the language used on account of its vagueness; that a "harmful restriction" was usually a restriction which somebody else proposed and that the reference to a general scheme seemed to contemplate an international conference, the acceptance of which might be very far away. He said that the latter was not the intention, but that the general scheme referred to was a general scheme between the United States and the British Empire.

The Ambassador then went on to say that the draft which the British proposed would contain an additional provision, by which it would be agreed that conversations would immediately ensue in order to amplify the economic provisions of the tentative draft. He said that in the event such discussions occurred the question would arise as to who should conduct them for the British and that, since the Treasury was deeply concerned and as Mr. Keynes carried very considerable weight with the Treasury, it might be desirable for him to return, possibly accompanied by another official. He asked whether Mr. Opie or Sir

⁴⁵ Redvers Opie, First Secretary of the British Embassy.

⁴⁶ Vol. I, p. 369.

Frederick Leith-Ross ⁴⁷ or Sir Frederick Phillips would in my judgment be helpful. I replied that they were all persons for whom we had the highest regard and suggested that it might be worth his consideration having someone who was not also a Treasury official since the considerations involved were not purely financial, but went deeply into the field of commercial policy and political relations.

The Ambassador concluded by saying that as soon as Mr. Opie arrived with the draft he would again get in touch with me.

DEAN ACHESON

841.24/1074

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] October 9, 1941.

The British Ambassador called to see me this afternoon at his request.

Lord Halifax referred to the conversation he had had with Mr. Acheson upon his return regarding the temporary Lease-Lend agreement. He explained to me the divergence of views within the British cabinet with regard to Article 7 and stated that Mr. Churchill strongly supported the position taken by this Government. He said that notwithstanding the very strong opposition on the part of the extreme Tory elements in the cabinet to the policy of this Government he was optimistic that some solution satisfactory to this Government might be found.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

841.24/1019

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State
(Acheson)*

[WASHINGTON,] October 17, 1941.

Mr. Acheson and Mr. Hawkins called on the British Ambassador at his request. Mr. Opie was present with the Ambassador. Mr. Opie had brought from England with him drafts of two papers: One was a draft of temporary lease-lend agreement prepared in London; the second was a draft of communication to accompany the former. The Ambassador stated that the British Government did not wish to transmit any document which was not agreeable to this Government and that he was therefore taking this opportunity to acquaint us in the most informal manner with the tentative proposal so that, after

⁴⁷ Chairman of the Inter-Allied Committee on Post-War Requirements.

considering it with the appropriate officials of the Department, we might transmit to him in an equally informal manner any comments or suggestions, which he would promptly take up with London. He hoped that the Department would find it possible to accept the tentative draft.

The Ambassador then to a large extent repeated the substance of his earlier conversation with me, reported in my memorandum of October 3, 1941. Briefly his comments were that there was general accord in London with the purposes of our draft as explained more fully to the Ambassador in my conversation with him of last August and in Mr. Hawkins's memorandum to the Secretary,⁴⁸ a copy of which was given to him. The purpose of the tentative draft was to provide against the possibility which the British Treasury officials believed existed in our draft that the British Government would be undertaking unilateral obligations which it might be unable to fulfill. He again stated the earnest desire of the Prime Minister to reach an economic understanding with this country. He spoke also of the possibilities of political difficulties within the Conservative Party which might arise from attempting to deal too generally with the matter of imperial preference before the point arrived at which concrete alternatives might be discussed.

The Ambassador stated that the suggestion which was included in the alternative draft that representatives of the British Government should come to this country for the purpose of continuing the development of an economic understanding did not necessarily have to appear in the document itself, but that his Government attached importance to this part of the proposal.

We stated to the Ambassador that we would immediately discuss the documents which he gave us with the Secretary who would undoubtedly wish to discuss them with the President and that as soon as possible we will again communicate with him.

Copies of the documents are attached.

DEAN ACHESON

[Annex 1—Extract]

*Draft of Temporary Lend-Lease Agreement Prepared by the
British Government*⁴⁹

ARTICLE VII

The terms and conditions upon which the Government of the United Kingdom receives defence aid from the Government of the United

⁴⁸ Possibly the memorandum of August 1, p. 19.

⁴⁹ With the exception of article VII, the British draft was substantially the same as that of the American proposed text, p. 13.

States of America and the benefits to be received by the United States of America in return therefor, as finally determined, shall be such as not to burden commerce between the two countries, but to promote mutually advantageous economic relations between them; they shall provide for joint and agreed action by the United States and United Kingdom, each working within the limits of their governing economic conditions, directed to securing as part of a general plan the progressive attainment of a balanced international economy, the avoidance of harmful discriminations, and generally the economic objectives set forth in the joint Declaration made by the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom on August 12th [14th] 1941.

And furthermore it is agreed that at an early convenient date conversations should be begun between the two Governments with a view to discussing the best means of attaining the above objects and generally the better ordering of economic intercourse between nations in future conditions of settled peace.

[Annex 2]

Draft Letter for Lord Halifax To Accompany the Amendments Proposed to the "Consideration" Proposals

DEAR MR. ACHESON: My Government have taken advantage of my presence in London to instruct me in the light of careful thought which they have given to the draft proposals under Section 3 (b) of the Lend-Lease Act which you handed to Mr. Keynes on July 28, 1941.

2. They are very sensible of the generosity of the terms of these proposals and are anxious to accept them in spirit and in substance with the least possible amendment of the form of words proposed. They are no less keenly alive to the magnitude of the question and are most anxious to respond to the broad manner in which the United States Government have invited their collaboration.

3. They are therefore glad to say that apart from some verbal changes of no significance which are set out in a separate paper,⁵⁰ no question arises except in regard to Article VII. My Government believe that their intentions and their hopes for the economic organizations of the post-war world are closely in line with those of the President. They have found that it is not easy to refer to these in precise terms until the two Governments have defined them in their own minds in more detail than is yet possible. Meanwhile H. M. Government are anxious in all candour not to subscribe to phrases which

⁵⁰ Not printed.

might be interpreted hereafter in more than one sense. They also think it better, and in this they feel sure the President will agree, to emphasise that what both Governments have in view is part of a general plan and that the escape from restrictions on one side will only be practicable by their relaxation on all sides.

4. My Government suggest therefore, below, a form of words which better serves—so they feel—the common desire to collaborate. And since, admittedly and inevitably, the bare words themselves carry insufficient content with them, they have added a clause, which is, I think, in conformity with a suggestion you made to Mr. Keynes and which will, my Government hope, commend itself to the President, providing for the initiation of conversations at an early date with a view to giving substance and clarity to the preceding phrases.

5. The Departments chiefly concerned are now at work trying to clear up their own minds, which is none too easy when we know so little about the sort of world we shall have to deal with when the struggle is over; and to prepare concrete proposals. Progress is not so rapid as it would be if our time were less taken up with more immediate preoccupations. But we should be glad to make a start as early as may be found mutually convenient in company with those whom the President may designate to represent him with a view to formulating measures for the achievement of the ends which both Governments have in mind.

841.24/1080

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State
(Acheson)*

[WASHINGTON,] December 2, 1941.

Participants: The British Ambassador, Lord Halifax,
First Secretary of the British Embassy, Mr. Redvers
Opie,
The Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Acheson,
Adviser on International Economic Affairs, Dr. Her-
bert Feis.

Dr. Feis and I called on the British Ambassador at our request. Mr. Opie was present with the Ambassador.

We handed to the Ambassador copies of the redraft of the Temporary Lease-Lend Agreement with the British⁵¹ recently approved by the President, the Secretary, the Economic Defense Board and the Lend-Lease Administration. We explained to the Ambassador that we might wish to insert in Article II, in the 6th line, after the word

⁵¹ Not printed, but see telegram No. 5637, *infra*.

"services", the phrase "the use of facilities," in order to make it clear that the reciprocal obligations of the British would include, if desired by us, such things as the repairs of ships, the use of anchorages, landing fields, etc., in the same manner as similar facilities are being made available to the British in this country. It was pointed out to him that the word "facilities" was used in Article VI and that its use in Article II would make the two articles coextensive. The Ambassador appeared to have no question about this.

We then went over with him Article VII, pointing out in detail the changes which the redraft made both as compared with our original draft and with the British proposal. We explained the reason for eliminating the reference for "joint action" and addition of the phrase "open to participation to all other countries of like mind". The Ambassador said that speaking for himself he regarded our change in this respect as an improvement. We then explained the remainder of the article, pointing out that it was an attempt to reassure the British that many of the fears expressed by Mr. Keynes were unfounded. The article as redrafted, we pointed out, made it clear that the broad policy to be followed in the final settlement was not restricted to matters of commercial or tariff policy but expressly recognized that these matters had to be approached against a background of expanding economic activity in production, employment and the exchange and consumption of goods. This should make it plain that we were not asking the British to agree to move with us in the direction of liberal economic relations without recognizing that common action in other directions was required to enable them to do so.

We then stated that the article was expressed in general terms so as to avoid specific reference to preferential or other arrangements to refer to which might cause political embarrassment to the British Government at this time. We added, however, that all of these matters were included within the scope of the general provisions and that if in the event of the publication of the Agreement, we were asked to explain what did fall within its terms, we proposed to say that it was all inclusive and that nothing was excluded from consideration.

The Ambassador then remarked that among the objectives stated was the "elimination" of discriminatory treatment whereas the reference to tariffs and other trade barriers was made by the term "reduction". He said that he feared critics might seize upon this difference and he wondered whether language could be devised upon for making the objectives similar in each case. To this we pointed out that the two matters were different in kind and that it was the purpose to eliminate discriminations but to reduce tariffs. We added further that the elimination of all forms of discriminatory treatment did not leave open the loop-hole of using tariffs for purposes of discrimination since the objective was all inclusive. We pointed out,

secondly, that the Agreement was a Lease-Lend Agreement and that we hoped the Ambassador would stress to the British Government the necessity of obtaining an Agreement which would definitely further American interests and American policy without imposing burdens upon the British which they could not afford. We dealt at some length upon this aspect of the Agreement which the Ambassador said he would make clear in transmitting it to London.

The Ambassador then asked whether it would be possible to state as an objective "the progressive elimination of all forms of discriminatory treatment", which would indicate that no sudden, drastic or upsetting action was contemplated. We repeated that the second paragraph of Article VII made it clear that the objectives stated in the first paragraph were to be approached "in the light of governing economic conditions" and that the best means of attaining them were to be sought. These provisions we felt recognized amply the latitude which practical necessities required in framing provisions to achieve the broader purpose stated in the first paragraph.

Finally, we impressed upon the Ambassador that in all likelihood it would be necessary for the President sometime in January to ask Congress for a further Lease-Lend appropriation and that by that time it was most essential that an Agreement be entered into between the two governments. The Ambassador said that he fully appreciated this and would urge most expeditious possible consideration in London.

DEAN ACHESON

841.24/1093a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, December 3, 1941—midnight.

5637. A redraft of the temporary Lend-Lease Agreement was handed to Lord Halifax Tuesday evening.⁵² Except for Article 7 the text was the same in substance as the draft which we first gave the British and contained only verbal alterations suggested by them. Article 7 in our new draft reads as follows:

"In the final determination of the benefits to be provided to the United States of America by the Government of the United Kingdom in return for aid furnished under the Act of Congress of March 11, 1941, the terms and conditions thereof shall be such as not to burden commerce between the two countries, but to promote mutually advantageous economic relations between them and the betterment of worldwide economic relations. To that end, they shall include provision for agreed action by the United States of America and the United Kingdom, open to participation by all other countries of like mind, directed

⁵² December 2.

to the expansion, by appropriate international and domestic measures, of production, employment, and the exchange and consumption of goods, which are the material foundations of the liberty and welfare of all peoples; to the elimination of all forms of discriminatory treatment in international commerce, and to the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers; and, in general, to the attainment of all the economic objectives set forth in the Joint Declaration made on August 12, 1941, by the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.

At an early convenient date, conversations shall be begun between the two Governments with a view to determining, in the light of governing economic conditions, the best means of attaining the above-stated objectives by their own agreed action and of seeking the agreed action of other like-minded Governments."

We will telegraph you further giving our views.

HULL

841.24/1093b : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, December 9, 1941—7 p. m.

5789. We have already telegraphed you the text of Article VII of the draft lend-lease agreement which was handed to the British Ambassador on December 2. We have sent you by air mail the complete text of this proposed agreement and of the memorandum of the conversation between Assistant Secretary Acheson and Lord Halifax at the time the draft was handed to him.

While the nature of our draft is such as to preclude in our minds the possibility that there would be any serious objection to it, we nevertheless think it desirable that you approach the Prime Minister with the object of obtaining acceptance of the draft as promptly as possible. Developments in the past few days and the possible developments in the immediate future make it highly important that an agreement between our two governments be completed without delay. There should not be even the appearance of disagreement between the governments. It had been expected that the President would have to go to Congress in January for a further Lease-Lend appropriation. It is possible now not only that that date may have to be anticipated but that other requests for war appropriations must be made. The President has already, since the outbreak of the war with Japan, stressed his determination to continue the Lease-Lend program in full vigor. It is of the utmost importance that no factor such as the absence of a Lease-Lend Agreement between the two governments should operate to cause any reluctance in Congress to furnish the necessary funds or

cause differentiation between appropriations necessitated by the outbreak of hostilities with Japan and those needed in the broad view of the war. It is also highly important that the terms of the Agreement should be kept on the broad plain of our draft and encouragement be not given to narrower conceptions which will not redound to the long range and basic interest of both countries.

The draft of Article VII which was handed to Lord Halifax is general in character and obviously of mutual benefit. Basically it defines the economic objectives of the two governments and provides for the opening of detailed conversations to reach agreement as to ways and means of reaching these objectives. Article VII, in essence, charts a broad course and commits the two governments to collaboration in making headway along that course. The negotiations which are to take place in pursuance of this proposed agreement will, of course, be based upon governing economic conditions. It is hard to see what more could be done to meet the difficulties which have been presented from the British standpoint.

The provision looking to the participation of other nations and the reiteration of the objectives of the Atlantic Charter make the Article a declaration of purpose around which all peoples of like mind may rally.

A speedy agreement is in the interest of both countries.

HULL

841.24/1093b : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, December 9, 1941—8 p. m.

5790. The Department's 5789 of December 9, 7 p. m., outlines the importance which we attach to prompt agreement on the basis of our new draft. You may show a paraphrase to them. The following discussion is for your guidance in rebutting possible arguments which they may raise:

The first sentence of Article VII is self-explanatory in its statement of purpose, to find terms that will not burden commerce between the two nations but rather promote mutually advantageous economic relations between them and between other nations. The balance of the Article provides assurance (1) that the final settlement will be reached by negotiation, and (2) that it will be of such a nature that other nations can join in it as a forward step toward world-wide reconstruction.

On the negative side the Article provides that the final settlement shall not be an incubus upon relations between the British and ourselves but will be an instrument for improving our mutual relations

and our relations with other nations. On the positive side it starts out by recognizing the primary importance of increased economic activity, both national and international, in production, employment and the exchange and consumption of goods. It is against this background and in conjunction with it that the objectives of eliminating discriminatory treatment, reducing tariffs and achieving the other objectives of the Atlantic Charter are added. The Article recognizes explicitly that the liberalizing of commercial policy is a matter requiring action by all participants and that to succeed it requires high standards of productivity and consumption. The Article does not lay down self-executing substantive provisions but points a broad course and commits the two nations to collaborate in making headway along that course. The Governments in collaboration will recognize the governing economic conditions in seeking the best means of making the goals obtainable. There is no attempt whatever to impose a formula which will itself be the touchstone to solve all problems but rather to provide that they shall be solved by consultation and agreement. It is obvious that the problems confronting the two nations, as well as those confronting other nations, will be different. The Article imposes no uniform solution but does provide for common counsel and agreed action rather than the principle that at the end of the war each nation will attempt to carve out a position for itself.

British preoccupations with their current and post-war problems, as imparted to us on numerous occasions, have been prominently in mind in the preparation of this draft. They have been met by providing (1) that whatever is determined under Article VII shall be determined by agreement reached after the conversations provided for; (2) that the determinations shall be reached in the light of governing economic conditions, so that if, for instance, the removal of discriminations and reduction of trade barriers should in fact be found impracticable except by gradual stages, there is nothing in this agreement to prevent adjusting the action to such findings; and (3) that the field of matters to be considered and included in the final settlement shall not be limited to matters of commercial policy only, but shall embrace all measures for promoting increased production, employment, exchange, and consumption of goods. There is thus no ground for the argument that the proposed conversations and the scope of the final settlement would ignore or préjudice the problems of the British post-war position. On the contrary, the agreement furnishes the best possible method of solving them.

The draft is not only moderate in that it confines itself to a statement of objectives, but the objectives themselves are reasonable from the British standpoint. We ask no unilateral commitment from Britain but impose identical obligations on ourselves. Nor do we ask

Britain to join with us in seeking the attainment of objectives which would be beneficial to us but harmful to Britain. On the contrary, what is sought is the creation of conditions in the post-war period which would operate not merely to our advantage but to their advantage and that of all peoples. Indeed it might be argued that since the prosperity of Britain depends to an even larger degree on the condition of international trade than does that of the United States they are even more vitally concerned in the conditions we are seeking. The objectives laid down are those set forth in point 4 of the Atlantic declaration to which the Prime Minister subscribed undoubtedly because he considered them in the best interest of the British as well as of others.

With respect to the provision concerning discrimination, all that we ask is that the British sit down with us to work out the problems which lie ahead so that we may avoid substituting trade warfare in peacetime for the present wartime cooperation.

Article VII lays down a broad program around which all liberal forces in both countries can gather and which, if developed with sufficient vigor, can inspire hope for the future in the British, American, and other peoples.

The points raised in this telegram and also Department's 5789 are the main considerations we wish you to have in mind when you present the American angle to the British authorities.

HULL

841.24/1095 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, December 14, 1941—8 p. m.

[Received December 14—6:35 p. m.]

6049. Personal for Assistant Secretary Acheson. Your 5637, 5789 and 5790⁵³ received. I carried out the instructions given me and took the subject matter up with the Prime Minister. He referred me to the Chancellor of the Exchequer who promised me that he would discuss the matter with Cabinet members and report back to me. I have just received a note from him, however, saying that after talking with his colleagues he had referred it back to Lord Halifax. The Secretary will explain the reason for this to you.

I wanted you to know that aside from the war emergency which has blocked consideration of everything else for the moment the bill conscripting women which created a sharp temporary break in the Labor Party but which was largely overcome in the final vote on this

⁵³ *Ante*, pp. 45, 46, and 47, respectively.

measure by the Government members of the Labor Party temporarily shook the Conservatives in the Government and gave them a new sense of dependency on the Conservative majority. The loss of the *Prince of Wales* and the *Repulse*⁵⁴ added to a reluctance to take any action that might disturb the *status quo*. All this is temporary. I believe if we could have had the issue up 3 weeks ago we would have gotten it through promptly and I am certain that if we patiently hold our ground our position as outlined in the new draft of articles even will be accepted by the British within a reasonable period of time. There will be an effort, however, to try to postpone action on this demand on the wheat agreement and to ask that they be made a part of general economic discussions between the two Governments.

I would especially ask that you show this message only to the Secretary and Under Secretary.

WINANT

841.24/1107 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, December 26, 1941—1 p. m.
[Received December 26—9:15 a. m.]

6223. Personal to the Secretary. In my message No. 6049, December 14, 8 p. m., I explained that I had taken up article VII as amended in the draft Lend-Lease Agreement with the accompanying arguments in your No. 5789, December 9, 7 p. m.; and your 5790, December 9, 8 p. m., and that the Prime Minister had referred me to the Chancellor of the Exchequer. I could not get the Prime Minister himself to seriously consider the issue or the arguments. He was planning to leave the following evening for the United States and wanted to discuss his trip and other things that he felt were of more immediate concern at the moment.

This issue of settlement under Lend-Lease is now being returned through Halifax to the Prime Minister after further consideration by the Cabinet on Wednesday evening⁵⁵ and with certain requests as regards interpretation. I believe it is both wise and necessary to press for final agreement at this time. The drag of it as unsettled business interferes with good relations. In presenting the case to the Prime Minister, I wanted the President and you to know that to my best knowledge he has not either read or seriously considered the arguments presented in your briefs (your 5789 and 5790).

⁵⁴ British warships sunk by Japanese air attack at Singapore, December 10, 1941.

⁵⁵ December 24.

I was not officially informed about the Cabinet meeting or the action taken.

WINANT

841.24/1107

*Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson)*⁵⁶

[WASHINGTON,] December 26, 1941.

The attached telegram⁵⁷ bears on a matter concerning the present status of the lend-lease discussions with the British which I mentioned earlier this week. This was that I had been informed by an official of the British Embassy that the Ambassador with the concurrence of the ranking officers of the Embassy and of other British missions in Washington had sent a very strong telegram insisting that in their view it was most imperative that the British Government accept the proposed temporary lend-lease agreement without further discussion. I was told that the new draft had not received any substantial consideration from the Prime Minister and that, if it were raised during the current discussions, he would receive from his British advisers here unanimous advice to accept and sign it. I was also told that, if this Government should fail to press the matter at this time and allow the proposed agreement to be returned to London for further discussion, it might again become bogged down in the British bureaucracy.

Mr. Winant's telegram seems to bear out the suggestion that the present may be the ideal time for reaching an agreement.

DEAN ACHESON

841.24/1111 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, December 27, 1941—11 p. m.
[Received December 27—8:15 p. m.]

6246. Following up my 6223, December 20 [26]. Yesterday the Chancellor of the Exchequer asked me if I would call on him at 11:00 this morning, which I did. We talked at some length. He told me that he wanted me to know that the Cabinet had asked Lord Halifax to take up with Mr. Churchill while in Washington article VII as amended in the draft Lend-Lease Agreement. The substance of what he said on this subject I reported to you in my 6223. He told me that Halifax was as insistent as I was in trying to get agreement on the article; but he read to me from a draft memorandum which

⁵⁶ Addressed to the Secretary of State and the Under Secretary of State (Welles).

⁵⁷ *Supra.*

Halifax had forwarded for Cabinet consideration in which the latter stated that it was not the wish of Washington to have the British and the Dominions now abandon Empire preference but rather to agree that it would be done in connection with certain tariff reductions on our part at the end of the war. This is not the exact language of the memorandum but is the sense of it as I understood it. The Chancellor plainly did not want to give me the text and only read from it briefly. I told him that no instructions that I had received corresponded with that interpretation and that I personally did not think an agreement on that basis would amount to much, although I wanted him to understand that I had no direct information on the subject other than the instructions and the memorandum which you had forwarded to me at different times and which I had brought to the attention of the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary and himself. You will know the complete story.

The point I wish to make is that Halifax's interpretation was undoubtedly responsible for the Cabinet suggestion that an additional memorandum of explanation be prepared and made a part of the agreement in order that there could be no misunderstanding, either by the Governments or the public in the United States, Great Britain or the Dominions now or hereafter. I agree that the meaning of the language and the degree of the commitment undertaken should be completely clear; but I believe that is as plain as the article as now drawn.

It may be that after Halifax confers with the Prime Minister, this Cabinet proposal may never reach you but I wanted you to have this background.

Because the Chancellor, when I talked to him a fortnight ago, had suggested opposition of the Dominions to abolish Empire preference, I consulted Stanley Bruce, High Commissioner for Australia. He did not agree. Bruce suggested two possible amendments to article VII. One, to place the word "progressive" before the word "elimination" so that that section of the article would read "to the progressive elimination of all forms of discriminatory treatment in international commerce and to the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers" or two, to so amend this section as to read "to the removal of the causes which have lent to discriminatory policies and to the progressive elimination of all forms of discriminatory treatment in international commerce and to the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers". I am forwarding these suggestions. They might be helpful.

There is another phase of this problem which I know you are aware of and which has been very much in the minds of men here. It has to do with the believed necessity of continuing exchange control beyond the war period and of course relates itself to the subject matter of article VII.

I presume arrangements will be made to take up this problem at some later date.

WINANT

841.24/1129

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] December 29, 1941.

The British Ambassador called at his request. I inquired of him as to whether the Prime Minister is considering any action in the way of signing the Lease-Lend agreement. The Ambassador repeated about what our recent cables from London indicate. He added that he had spoken to the Prime Minister and that the Prime Minister replied that he was too preoccupied to take the matter up here and that he would be obliged to wait until his return to London. I then said to the Ambassador that it was very important from our standpoint that some action be taken without much delay for the reason that another Lease-Lend appropriation bill will be up in Congress in January and that this Government will be called upon to explain the cause of the entire delay and non-action on the part of the British Government with respect to signing the proposed Lease-Lend agreement. I brought this up in variations during our conversation. He seemed to be impressed with this and it was understood that I would speak to the President before Churchill returns to Washington from Ottawa and the Ambassador on his part would speak to the Prime Minister.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

AGREEMENT IMPLEMENTING THE DECLARATION OF SEPTEMBER 2, 1940, FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT BY THE UNITED STATES OF NAVAL AND AIR BASES IN AREAS LEASED FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM, SIGNED MARCH 27, 1941⁵⁸

811.34544/423½

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

In his letter of December 13th⁵⁹ regarding the United States bases in Newfoundland, Bermuda and certain other British possessions, the

⁵⁸ For correspondence regarding the negotiations for the transfer of American destroyers to the British Navy and for the establishment of American naval and air bases in British possessions in the Western Hemisphere, see *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. III, pp. 49 ff. The correspondence on the negotiations for the agreement regarding leased naval and air bases was so voluminous that it was deemed necessary to omit much of the detail from *Foreign Relations*. The papers here printed were selected to show the main problems involved and the position taken by the United States with respect to them.

⁵⁹ Not printed.

Secretary of State pointed out that the President was keenly desirous that all of the negotiations in respect of the sites and leases for these bases should be carried to a successful conclusion as soon as possible, and explained that with that in view an informal committee composed of representatives from the interested American Departments had been appointed to handle these negotiations in Washington. It was suggested that it would facilitate the conduct of the negotiations if some members of His Majesty's Embassy were to confer with this Committee. In a subsequent conversation between His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires⁶⁰ and Mr. Dunn of the State Department, the latter explained that the United States Government were of the opinion that the negotiations in connection with the settlement of the terms of the final leases covering the bases should be held in Washington. Mr. Dunn made it clear that the Administration felt that in present circumstances it would not be practicable for American officials with the necessary qualifications to be sent to London to conduct negotiations there.

The substance of the Secretary of State's letter and of Mr. Dunn's statement was at once communicated to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.⁶¹ The latter has now replied, emphasising that His Majesty's Government for their part are equally anxious that final agreement in regard to all matters connected with the bases should be reached as soon as possible and that discussions in regard to the terms of the final leases should be begun with the minimum delay. They are, however, most anxious that these negotiations should be conducted in London. As Lord Lothian⁶² explained on several occasions during the discussions leading up to the conclusion of the agreement of September 2nd,⁶³ and as he stated in his letter of October 14th to the Secretary of the Navy,⁶⁴ His Majesty's Government have consistently held the view that for practical reasons these negotiations should be held in London rather than in Washington. They are fully alive to the difficulties to which Mr. Dunn referred in his conversation with Mr. Butler and in the light of these remarks and of the expressed wish of the United States Government that the discussions should take place in this country they have given further careful consideration to the matter. They have, however, reluctantly come to the conclusion that to hold the negotiations in Washington would present the most formidable difficulties from the point of view of the British authorities.

In view of the complexity of the issues involved and of the number of separate administrations concerned, it will be necessary for the

⁶⁰ Neville M. Butler.

⁶¹ Anthony Eden.

⁶² Former British Ambassador to the United States; he died in Washington, December 12, 1940.

⁶³ For exchange of notes between the British Ambassador and the Secretary of State on September 2, 1940, see *Foreign Relations, 1940*, vol. III, pp. 73 and 74.

⁶⁴ Frank Knox.

British authorities during the discussions to have the advice of representatives from a number of different departments, both civil and military, of legal advisers, and of Colonial experts. A large inter-departmental committee has in fact been sitting in London for some months past to consider the administrative and other questions involved in the leases, and all the necessary personnel is available there. It is, however, feared that it would be quite impracticable for these persons to be spared to visit Washington in present circumstances when so many demands are being made upon their time in connection with the day-to-day conduct of the war.

Furthermore, even if it were possible to send a delegation to Washington, experience has already shown that the number of British Government Departments concerned is so great that it would be inevitable that many of the points which arose during the negotiations would have to be referred to London for further consideration. As it will fall upon His Majesty's Government to make the detailed local arrangements so far as the Colonies are concerned, it seems only appropriate that the discussions should take place in London where experts with knowledge of the various territories are readily available.

Furthermore, it is particularly desirable that Newfoundland and Bermuda and the other colonies should be directly represented during the negotiations leading up to the conclusion of the final leases. Appropriate arrangements to this effect can be made without great difficulty if the negotiations are held in London, but considerable complications would be caused if the discussions were to take place in Washington.

For the foregoing reasons, His Majesty's Government feel convinced that an early settlement of all matters connected with the bases would be greatly facilitated if the necessary discussions were to be held in London. His Majesty's Government are ready to begin such discussions forthwith, and since they are no less anxious than the United States Government that final agreement should be reached with the minimum delay they trust that the United States Government will feel able to arrange for the despatch of appropriate representatives to London in the near future.

WASHINGTON, 3 January, 1941.

811.34544/535

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] January 4, 1941.

The British Chargé d'Affaires called to see me this morning.

Mr. Butler handed me first a letter dated January 4⁶⁵ which he had

⁶⁵ Not printed.

addressed to the Secretary of State by instruction of his Government advising the Government of the United States that the British Government agreed to the lease of the various sites desired by the United States in the seven locations covered by the agreement of September 2 last, and advancing certain considerations with regard thereto.

In regard to the first paragraph of this letter, Mr. Butler stated that in Mr. Hull's letter to him of December 27⁶⁶ certain details were mentioned which were not covered by his present letter, and added that this was due to the fact that the telegram he had sent to his Government covering Mr. Hull's letter of December 27 had not been received by his Government at the time the instruction covered by Mr. Butler's present letter of January 4 had been dispatched from London.

Mr. Butler likewise gave me an *aide-mémoire*⁶⁷ reiterating the desire of the British Government that the final technical conversations covering the drawing up of the final leases for all of the bases involved in the transaction be held in London rather than in Washington.

I told Mr. Butler that further consideration would be given to this question and he would be promptly advised of our decision in the matter.

Mr. Butler then referred to the letter he had received from the Secretary of State⁶⁸ indicating the unwillingness of the United States to offer British naval and military forces free and unhampered use of the bases to be built by the United States in the British islands and colonies covered by the transaction of September 2 last. Mr. Butler stated that this decision placed the British Government in a position of inferiority to all of the Latin American countries, since the other countries had been granted free use of these bases by the United States and that this would be greatly resented by British public opinion and particularly by public opinion in the islands where the bases were to be located. Mr. Butler referred particularly to one of the recent addresses of Prime Minister Churchill in which he had emphasized the drawing more closely together of the British Empire and the United States, and of the original statement made by Mr. Churchill with regard to the destroyer-bases deal in which Mr. Churchill had emphasized the desire of the British Government to do all it could to strengthen the ability of the United States to assure its own security and that of the Western Hemisphere. Mr. Butler stated that the communication sent to him by Secretary Hull would be regarded as in the nature of a dash of cold water.

I said to Mr. Butler that I felt quite sure he would realize that no such implication could justly be drawn from the letter to which he referred. I said that the whole policy of the Government of the

⁶⁶ Not printed.

⁶⁷ *Supra.*

⁶⁸ Note of December 30, 1940, *Foreign Relations, 1940*, vol. III, p. 76.

United States was concentrated upon our desire to assist Great Britain in every possible way short of war and thereby to insure British victory. I was positive that he would recognize that the sentiments expressed by Mr. Churchill were warmly reciprocated by the President and by every other member of the Administration. I added, however, that as he knew, this country had made every effort to line up all of the American Republics in the essential task of assuring the integrity of the Western Hemisphere and of insuring its defense, and that for that reason conversations had taken place with a view towards reciprocal use by the United States and the other American Republics of the naval and air bases throughout the New World. I said it would be manifestly impossible for the United States to insist that this country have the right to use bases within the territories of the other American Republics and not grant them the reciprocal use of bases built and utilized by the United States within the Western Hemisphere. Furthermore, I said, we all of us trusted that this war would not last forever and that some day a sound peace might be found after what I trusted would be a British victory. When the world should come back to normal, it would be very difficult for the United States to justify to the other non-American governments the granting of preferential use by Great Britain of the bases leased and operated by the United States. I said that I wondered whether it would not be possible, since Canada was a power in the New World and would obviously eventually be entitled to make use of the bases to which all of the other American powers had the right, for the British Government to be satisfied with the granting to the Dominion of Canada of the rights accorded to the American Republics. I said, however, that further consideration, of course, would be given the whole problem.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

811.34544/419 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom
(Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, January 11, 1941—1 p. m.

102. Your 60, January 7, 10 p. m.⁶⁹ Please inform the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that his views on the necessity from the British standpoint of having in London the negotiations in connection with the leases for the United States military bases were conveyed to the President. In view of the considerations advanced by Mr. Eden, the President on reconsideration has agreed that these negotiations

⁶⁹ Not printed.

take place in London and has designated the following officials as the American representatives to take part in these negotiations: Mr. Charles Fahy, Assistant Solicitor General, Department of Justice; Colonel Harry J. Malony, Field Artillery, United States Army; and Commander Harold Biesemeier, United States Navy.

These officers will leave New York on the Clipper plane next Friday, January 17th. Please take up with the British Government at once the question of obtaining passage for these officers on the first British plane leaving Lisbon for London after their arrival in Portugal.

We hope that it will be possible for you to provide office space for these officers in the Embassy and to furnish them with such stenographic and clerical assistance as they may require. We also desire that you and the officers of your staff extend such assistance to them in their work as they may desire.

These officers will communicate with you from Lisbon in regard to reserving hotel accommodations for them.

HULL

811.34544/450a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom
(Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, January 17, 1941—8 p. m.

175. Personal for the Chargé d'Affaires. We have encountered several discouraging obstacles in our efforts to get under way at the earliest possible moment with the construction of our proposed military bases in Newfoundland, Bermuda and other places. The present telegram relates to Newfoundland and Bermuda because of the fact that, from our standpoint, those places are the most urgent ones.

In a note dated November 22, 1940,⁷¹ the British Chargé stated that the British Government had no desire to suggest that work on the various bases should be postponed pending the completion of formal leases, and that he had been authorized to state that, so far as the British Government were concerned, they were entirely agreeable that work should be begun by the American authorities without further delay on all the sites the location of which had already been agreed upon. This note related to our proposed bases other than in Newfoundland. In another note the British Ambassador repeated the same assurance in respect to Newfoundland.

In a note dated December 13th last ⁷¹ the Secretary informed the British Chargé as follows in regard to Newfoundland:

⁷¹ Not printed.

"It is my understanding that the British and Newfoundland authorities are in agreement that the United States authorities may commence any works on the proposed bases in Newfoundland at once; that the Newfoundland authorities are prepared to institute immediately such condemnation proceedings as may be necessary to acquire title to privately owned property and subsequently to lease such properties to the United States Government in accordance with the provisions of the basic exchange of notes of September 2, 1940.⁷² Officers of the United States forces in Newfoundland are being instructed to communicate with the authorities in Newfoundland respecting the relative priorities in which they desire condemnation proceedings to be instituted in these areas in order that construction may be commenced at once and prosecuted without delay."

The Secretary's note of December 13th went on to say that the procedure which had been proposed by the Newfoundland authorities for a special board to be constituted to take evidence and advise the Government of Newfoundland regarding payments to be made for dispossessed private owners was agreeable to the American Government subject to the understanding (1) that any compensation for privately owned property would, in accordance with the basic exchange of notes of September 2nd last, be subject to the agreement of the United States Government, and (2) that the United States authorities would freely be afforded facilities to make such investigations as might appear advisable of any recommended payments which appeared to the United States authorities to be excessive. The note then set forth certain classes of information which we hoped would, in the ordinary course of the Board's proceedings, be obtained to demonstrate that the payments recommended were fair and equitable.

We have had nothing from the British Embassy in response to this note other than an acknowledgment, but we have encountered repeated difficulties with the Newfoundland authorities. Some days ago the Newfoundland authorities informed the senior United States naval officer in Newfoundland that, despite the assurances which had been given us the Newfoundland Government was not prepared to move squatters from the Crown lands in the Argientia Peninsula (where our major base will be located) unless the United States Government was prepared to give an undertaking in advance that awards made to these squatters by "an impartial tribunal" would be approved by the United States Government. This, in our opinion, would be absolutely contrary to the basic exchange of notes of September 2nd last. The Navy Department in reply authorized its representative in Newfoundland to say that the Navy Department would advance to the Newfoundland Government such sums as might be necessary to move the squatters now on this land to other locations against a final settlement to be reached

⁷² *Foreign Relations, 1940*, vol. III, pp. 73 and 74.

in accordance with the exchange of notes of September 2nd last. This offer was made because of the reported financial difficulties of the Newfoundland Government in the hope that it would enable us to commence actual construction work at once. The Newfoundland authorities have not accepted this offer and have not, so far as we are advised, taken any steps to move these squatters whose homes are on the Crown land where our base is to be built.

Certain contracts for construction work on the Argentinia Peninsula have been let. The contractors and their equipment are on the way to Newfoundland now and should arrive there by tomorrow. In our opinion it is of extreme importance that the British Government take the necessary steps to implement the assurances which have been given to us that construction work may be started at once. Questions of compensation to these squatters and other private owners can be settled later between the two Governments but the important thing is that the United States be given possession of this site at once so that this construction work can be started immediately.

In a note dated January 4, 1941,⁷⁸ the British Chargé informed us of the British Government's acceptance of our proposals for the sites of bases in Trinidad, St. Lucia and Bermuda. As to Bermuda the note stated in part:

"I have also been instructed to inform you that His Majesty's Government have now been able to consider the proposal of the United States Government that, in addition to the other areas in Bermuda already agreed upon, there should be granted the lease of Morgan and Tucker's Islands. His Majesty's Government are prepared to agree to these Islands being leased to the United States Government for a period of 99 years."

The British Embassy had been informed that we propose to establish a naval patrol station on these two Islands. Yesterday we received a telegram from the representative of the Navy Department in Bermuda to the effect that the local authorities consider the use of Great Sound (that is, the waters in which these two Islands are located) still subject to negotiation and that they are "adhering to every possible means of objection". The telegram further stated that the publication of our decision to send representatives to London to discuss the actual leases had "greatly stiffened resistance of the local people" and that Bermuda was sending a delegation to London at the same time. Immediate possession of Morgan and Tucker's Islands is required so that construction may proceed.

Please see the Foreign Secretary at the earliest possible moment and place the foregoing facts before him. Please say to Mr. Eden that we look to the British Government to take the necessary action with the

⁷⁸ Not printed.

Newfoundland, Bermudan, and, wherever necessary, other Colonial officials to make it possible for us to commence actual construction work at once in accordance with the assurances which have been given us by the British Government. You should add that, in our opinion, public opinion in the United States would be completely unable to understand the attitude which the Newfoundland and the Bermudan authorities are taking, and that it would come as a distinct shock to them if they were to learn of the obstacles which we have encountered.

In view of the impending arrival in Newfoundland of the contractors and the construction materials this matter is extremely urgent, and I hope that you can take action at once and telegraph promptly the result of your conversation with Mr. Eden.

The Secretary of the Navy ⁷⁴ and the Chief of Naval Operations ⁷⁵ expect to have to testify before Congressional Committees in the next few days, and probably not later than next Tuesday, on naval appropriations and they will undoubtedly be asked questions about the status of the proposed bases. It is unnecessary to point out how important it is that they be placed in a position to say that there are no obstacles in the way of the immediate prosecution of construction.

HULL

811.34544/461 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, January 21, 1941—5 p. m.

[Received January 21—1:10 p. m.]

225. Personal for the Secretary. My 212, January 20, 7 p. m.⁷⁶ With reference to my interview yesterday with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and to the memorandum I left with him at that time based on your 175, January 17, 8 p. m., I have just received from the Foreign Office the following memorandum regarding the Newfoundland situation:

“There has been no desire on the part of the Newfoundland Government to adopt other than a helpful attitude with regard to the initiation of construction work on the bases to be leased to the United States in the Island, in spite of the inevitably short time available for making arrangements in regard to the local inhabitants. The memorandum of the 20th January refers to the question of procedure for compensation to those owners who are dispossessed in order to provide sites for the bases. The sole concern of the Newfoundland Government in this connection has been to find a procedure which would be equitable alike to them and to the owners and acceptable to the United

⁷⁴ Frank Knox.

⁷⁵ Adm. Harold R. Stark.

⁷⁶ Not printed.

States Government. The question of procedure is of course one which has to be considered in relation not only to Newfoundland but also to all the colonies concerned and it is proposed to discuss it generally at the forthcoming conference in London. In the meantime, in order that there may be no delay in beginning construction work in the Island, the Newfoundland Government have agreed that, without prejudice to the general discussions, compensation should be paid to a certain number of owners who are being dispossessed immediately in the compensation being provided out of a fund supplied for that purpose by the United States authorities. In order to enable this interim procedure to be rapidly put into effect, they are arranging to provide at once, at considerable expense to themselves, alternative accommodation for the persons concerned.

In the circumstances, the immediate question appears to be satisfactorily disposed of, and it is assumed that the United States Government will not think it necessary to discuss in detail the course of events referred to in the memorandum of the 20th January."

I am seeing an official of the Colonial Office this afternoon regarding Bermuda and will telegraph separately.

JOHNSON

811.34544/464 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, January 21, 1941—10 p. m.

[Received January 21—6:40 p. m.]

228. Personal for the Secretary. My 225, January 21, 5 p. m. I have just had a [apparent omission] at their request with the Parliamentary Under Secretary⁷⁷ (Lord Lloyd⁷⁸ being ill) and several high officials of the Colonial Office. They had received and studied the memorandum I left with Mr. Eden yesterday on the Newfoundland and Bermuda situations and I was given the following memorandum dated today:

"His Majesty's Government have agreed in principle to the lease of Morgan and Tucker Islands for a period of 99 years, and the Governor of Bermuda has been informed of the importance attached by the United States Government to an early start on the seaplane base on these two islands. The Governor has also been urged to arrange for legislation to be introduced as soon as possible to provide for the expropriation of private property which will be required for the purpose of the United States bases in Bermuda."

I told the officials that I would of course be glad to transmit this memorandum at once but that I did not think it was a very definite reply to the representations which I had made under instructions in

⁷⁷ Sir Richard Austen Butler.

⁷⁸ Secretary of State for the Colonies.

regard to Bermuda. The Under Secretary said that he quite realized that, but would like to explain the situation which confronts the Colonial Office. They have sent an urgent telegram to the Governor of Bermuda to do his utmost personally to implement the instructions which have been sent him to arrange for legislation to be introduced and passed which would remedy many of the difficulties. While the Colonial Office is hopeful that the Governor may accomplish their purpose, they are apprehensive that if the backs of the Bermudans are put up too much the legislature will refuse to meet the Imperial Government's views. It was explained that the Imperial Government is in an entirely different position vis-à-vis Bermuda and the Bahamas to any other of the West Indian Island Governments; that the Imperial Government cannot by executive action force the Bermuda legislature to pass any law or to implement any obligation of the Imperial Government. The only machinery for overriding the Bermuda legislature would be an act of Parliament—a last resort which they are most reluctant to invoke as it would arouse extreme hostility in Bermuda and in their opinion would have bad repercussions elsewhere as well as affording material for German propaganda. The Under Secretary and all of his officials most earnestly assured me, and I am sure it is true, that the Colonial Office and the Government in London desire to meet our views as quickly as possible. We will take account of the difficult political situation with which they are faced in Bermuda and not try to push matters to an immediate conclusion. One of the officials present, who was a former Governor of Bermuda, said the single thing that was most alarming the legislature and people now was a clause in the draft lease which would give, in their opinion, blanket authority to the United States to take over in the future any other site on the island they wanted and that they therefore felt that they had no protection; that what they are clamoring for now is some assurance as to where the United States' requests would stop. The Colonial Office hopes that the meeting shortly to take place here with United States officials will be able to eliminate all serious points of difference and many of the minor ones.

I pointed out to the official that while I could understand that the Bermudans would feel upset at such great changes in their way of life, that nevertheless our officials were under the urgent necessity to begin their programs, that the purposes for which they were there were obviously of overriding necessity and that my Government necessarily had to look to the Imperial Government to implement the agreement contained in our exchange of notes of last September. The Colonial Office readily admits that we must look to the Imperial Government for action, but says they hope the statements which have been outlined above will convince the Department that the Government is doing all it can in a practicable way to effect a speedy solution and they hope

we will understand their desire to obtain action through the consent of Bermuda and not through the Imperial Government being forced to override them by an act of Parliament.

They expect an early reply from the Governor and will advise me at once.

I venture to invite your attention to my No. 82 of January 8, 10 p.m.⁷⁹ with reference to Colonial Office views.

JOHNSON

811.34544/481 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, January 25, 1941.

[Received January 26—10:55 a. m.]

294. From President's Base Lease Commission. We arrived today and conferred informally with Sir Alan Burns, Assistant Under Secretary of Colonial Office, who will preside at business meetings. Present plan calls for formal opening meeting Tuesday morning⁸⁰ with first business meeting Tuesday afternoon. Meetings will ordinarily be held twice daily thereafter in attempt to finish in 2 weeks. British have suggested following agenda:

- “1. Form of lease or other document.
2. Provision as to satisfactory use of leased territory.
3. Boundaries of sites. (a) Newfoundland, (b) Antigua, (c) Bahamas, (d) Bermuda, (e) British Guiana, (f) Jamaica, (g) St. Lucia, (h) Trinidad.
4. Questions relating to the services (a) command and policy as to defence, (b) reciprocal use in peace and war of: (1) naval bases, anchorages and dockyards, (2) military airdromes, (c) radio stations, (d) local flying regulations, (e) meteorological stations, (f) hydrographic surveys.
5. Jurisdiction.
6. Apprehension and surrender of offenders.
7. Regulations in areas (e. g., health, gambling, etc.)
8. Immigration and shipping (a) immigration laws; (b) quarantine (including plant quarantine); (c) payment by United States ships of (1) harbor dues, (2) light dues, (3) pilotage dues; (d) nature of lights put up by United States Government; (e) coastwise shipping; (f) harbor facilities in leased areas for British and other shipping.
9. Customs duties.
10. Import and export control in time of war.
11. Financial (a) currency, (b) exchange control.
12. Establishment of businesses and professions by United States citizens and others in leased areas.

⁷⁹ Not printed.

⁸⁰ January 28.

13. Employment of local labor.
14. Use of British and local goods.
15. Postal and telegraph (a) postal facilities, (b) cable, wireless and telephone facilities in leased areas, (c) censorship in time of war.
16. Traffic regulations in leased areas.
17. Particular rights to be reserved in leased areas, e. g., (a) minerals and oil, (b) treasure trove, (c) antiquities, (d) fishing and other local industry.
18. Expropriation of private property.
19. Treatment of colored population.
20. Additional costs of administration due to establishment of United States bases.
21. Additional compensation to Newfoundland and colonies.
22. Civil aviation.
23. Liability of United States contractors to Newfoundland or Colonial income tax, professional fees, etc."

Colonial Office suggests that one lease for each base containing all provisions, separate documents assumedly, viz. (1) a separate lease for each base to contain full description of geographic areas and the usual provisions having to do with occupation and use of land, and (2) a general agreement to cover the administrative and jurisdictional matters for all bases. This agreement would be embodied in an exchange of notes or other agreed form and would be incorporated in each lease by reference. We request your views.

The reason for this as stated to us is the belief that this would facilitate the task of the British Government in persuading possibly obstructive local legislatures to enact necessary legislation without resorting to an act of Parliament. (See Embassy's 228, January 21, 10 p. m.) [Base Lease Commission.]

JOHNSON

811.34544/491 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, January 28, 1941.

[Received January 28—8:05 p. m.]

330. My 294, 25th. From President's Base Lease Commission. Lord Cranborne⁸¹ presided at opening meeting this morning which consisted merely of his address of welcome and replies by Mr. Fahy and the Newfoundland and Bermuda representatives. It was decided that no publicity would be given the discussions until their conclusion and that no verbatim record would be kept of business meetings. This afternoon with Sir Alan Burns presiding the agenda as pre-

⁸¹ Secretary of State for the Dominions.

viously telegraphed was agreed to with addition of following items suggested by us:

(a) Items included in draft leases submitted by United States,
 (b) The right of an official to employ such legal assistance as he may require to defend himself in suits involving acts done under the authority or color of his office. This assistance covers attorneys who are not members of the local bar.

(c) The following paragraphs of the draft agenda require clarification inasmuch as the problem stated is not understood: paragraphs 4 (c), 10, 20 and 21.

(d) Right to make surveys outside leased areas.

(e) Upon the signing of the leases immediate possession of the sites shall be given.

It is understood, as a matter of course, that additional agenda may be included from time to time during the discussions, as questions arise."

We stated that we were prepared to agree to leases as previously drafted, copies of which had been made available. We also stated that agreement on any point during discussion should be considered tentative pending complete final agreement.

Following action was taken on items 1 to 9 of agenda:

1. Discussion deferred pending receipt of reply to our telegram under reference.

2. The Chairman suggested that leased areas revert to British Government if not used. We gave our position as indicated under paragraph (u) of Trinidad draft lease and held there could be no reversion except by formal act of our Government. Admiral Bailey raised question on strategic grounds as to whether we would give reasonable notice of intention to abandon any base. It was agreed in principle that there could be no reversion without formal abandonment by us and that reasonable notice of intention to abandon should be given. Question of notice will be further discussed in connection with item 4.

3. Referred to Boundaries Subcommittee which will meet tomorrow morning. Some colonial representatives expressed opposition to signing leases until exact surveys had been received. We stated that all surveys would presumably not be received in time. Please advise when we may expect to receive them.

4. Discussion deferred.

5., 6. and 7. Referred to Jurisdiction Subcommittee meeting tomorrow morning.

8. (a) Newfoundland delegates questioned possibility of immigration control between bases and adjacent territory unless bases were subject to local immigration requirements. Bermuda representatives raised question of responsibility for laborers brought by private contractors. We maintained United States Government control over both official and private persons should be sufficient. Chairman suggested that this item apparently presented little difficulty and could be left to Drafting Committee.

(b) We agreed that quarantine regulations as strict as those now locally in force would be acceptable.

(c) Discussion deferred.

(d) Agreement in principle was reached that lights be erected in conformity with local navigation rules, and if possible in agreement with local authorities as to position, and that notification would of course be given in notices to mariners.

(e) Colonial Office expressed the hope bases would not be considered American ports within the meaning of our coastwise shipping laws. Discussion deferred. Please instruct.

(f) Discussion deferred.

9. We asked customs provision as given in paragraph (r) of Trinidad lease. Newfoundland, Bermuda and Jamaica representatives expressed strong opposition to free importation of articles of general use on grounds of difficulty of control and of creating specially favored class in community. Chairman suggested free entry on articles for official use but not on those for personal use. Bermuda objected even to free admission of household effects on first entry. Discussion deferred and this item will probably prove troublesome.

Full committee will meet again tomorrow afternoon. [Base Lease Commission.]

JOHNSON

811.34544/491 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom
(Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, January 29, 1941.

303. For President's Base Lease Commission. Your 294, January 25, and 330, January 28. We do not feel in a position to comment on all of the various items proposed for discussion by the British. We are somewhat surprised at their mention of certain items and can only suppose that they have listed some of these for discussion because of the insistence of colonial authorities; and that they will therefore not be disposed to press a number of these matters. Should our estimate of the situation prove to be incorrect, we shall have as you doubtless know very strong views to communicate to you on a considerable number of these points.

The following comments are made either in response to your request for instructions or in a few cases where we feel that we can assist you by giving you our views at this time.

The suggestions regarding the form of the leases set forth in Section 2 of your telegram no. 294 appear to us to be satisfactory.

As regards item 3 mentioned in your two telegrams (boundaries of sites), exact surveys will not be available in all areas for 30 to 60 days. Where exact limits of areas are not available, leases should be signed without awaiting them, subject to the proviso that the exact limits, when agreed upon, will be attached to and made a part of the lease.

With reference to item no. 4, Sections (a) and (b), we believe that questions of command and policy as to defense and reciprocal use in peace and war should be settled by separate agreement when such questions arise on the basis of conditions then existing and in all events should not be included in the lease. Attention is invited to the paragraph of all leases providing that the United States "shall be under no obligation or responsibility under the terms of this lease for the civil administration or defense of (name of area) or any part thereof or for the maintenance of military or naval forces within or without the leased areas".

As regards item 8 (e) we are investigating this situation and will telegraph you as soon as a final decision is reached; it seems unlikely on the basis of our present information that the bases would be considered American ports within the meaning of the United States coastwise shipping laws.

With respect to items 13 and 14, the United States has agreed to use local labor and local material to the maximum extent practicable in the construction of the bases. In view of this we see no necessity for including any provision respecting these matters in the leases.

As regards item 18 we have been discussing the question of expropriation with the British Embassy for some time and the Embassy has telegraphed a tentative formula to London for approval; presumably this would not be included in the leases.

We do not understand the purpose of item (b) in your 330 which you have proposed for discussion since any matter involving action by an American official in his official capacity would be a matter between the two Governments and not one for the local tribunals.

As regards your proposed (e), the British Government has agreed to the immediate possession without awaiting the signature of formal leases. In this connection your attention is invited to the British Embassy's note of November 22, last,⁸² of which you have a copy.

HULL

811.34544/654

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] February 25, 1941.

Lord Halifax⁸³ called to see me at my request.

I expressed to Lord Halifax our disappointment that so much delay was being encountered in the conclusion in London of the negotiations for the naval base leases. I said that now that the Appropriation Committees in the two Houses of the Congress have before them the

⁸² Not printed.

⁸³ British Ambassador.

determination of the appropriations necessary for us to carry out the defense facilities required in these bases, it of course gave rise to a great deal of undesirable conjecture and debate when it had to be admitted that the leases had not yet been agreed upon. I said that the Department of State was going to recommend to the President that he send a personal message to Mr. Churchill expressing his hope that the leases would soon be agreed upon and explaining the serious situation which was developing on the part of American public opinion with regard to the present situation.

Lord Halifax said that he had just received a message from his Government in this regard, and asked very earnestly that the President delay sending any message to Mr. Churchill until his Government's views as just communicated to him could be given consideration.

I told him that I was very glad that action be delayed until we had had an opportunity of studying these views which Lord Halifax told me he would send me tomorrow in memorandum form.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

811.34544/707

The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

WASHINGTON, 26 February, 1941.

DEAR MR. UNDER SECRETARY: As agreed at our conversation yesterday, I enclose herein a memorandum regarding the conversations now going on in London about the bases. This memorandum is of necessity based on rather incomplete information as the Foreign Office have not kept us informed of the details of the negotiations. It is clear, however, from the latest telegrams from the Foreign Office that they are much concerned about the matter and they very much hope that it may be possible for the United States authorities to take action in the sense suggested in the memorandum. I shall be very grateful for any help you may feel able to give.

Believe me [etc.]

HALIFAX

[Enclosure]

The British Embassy to the Department of State

MEMORANDUM

It was provided in the notes exchanged between Mr. Cordell Hull and Lord Lothian on September 2nd, 1940, that,

"His Majesty's Government in the leases to be agreed upon will grant to the United States for the period of the leases all the rights, power and authority within the bases leased, and within the limits

of territorial waters and air spaces adjacent or in the vicinity of such bases, necessary to provide access to and defence of such bases and appropriate provisions for their control.

Without prejudice to the above-mentioned rights of the United States authorities and their jurisdiction within the leased areas, the adjustment and reconciliation between the jurisdiction of the authorities of the United States within these areas and the jurisdiction of the authorities of the territories in which those [*these*] areas are situated shall be determined by common agreement."

In accordance with the foregoing provisions, discussions are now taking place in London with a view to deciding how the necessary "adjustment and reconciliation" between the jurisdiction of the United States authorities and that of the local British authorities can best be arranged.

No question of the transfer of sovereignty arises. This was made clear in the Attorney General's opinion of August 27th,⁸⁵ and has been reaffirmed by the British Prime Minister in the House of Commons. That being so, the question to be solved would seem to be how to arrange that the United States authorities in the various territories shall obtain adequate powers to defend, control and operate their bases with the minimum disturbance to the existing British administrative and jurisdictional arrangements.

There is, of course, no suggestion that the United States Government should be denied any powers which they consider necessary for the proper defence or use of the bases. At the same time, it is felt that it is most important that the fullest consideration should be given to the interests and feelings of the local inhabitants and that the existing administrative and jurisdictional arrangements should only be disturbed if this is really essential for the proper defence of the American bases. While the British authorities are naturally particularly concerned to protect the interests of the local inhabitants for whose welfare they are responsible, it is felt that it is equally to the advantage of the United States authorities to see that the leases are drawn up in such a manner as to reduce to the minimum the possible causes of friction between the various parties concerned. The leases are to run for a period of 99 years, and that being so it is clearly necessary that their long term effect upon the well being of the local inhabitants should be taken into account. It would seem, however, that the instructions sent to the United States Delegates in London make it difficult for the latter to pay due account to the interests of the different territories and their inhabitants, and compel them to put forward demands for concessions or facilities which would not seem to be essential for the defence or control of the bases.

Two examples may be given. In the matter of jurisdiction the British authorities are prepared to allow the United States authorities

⁸⁵ 39 Op. Atty. Gen. 484.

to exercise jurisdiction over American nationals as regards security offences committed anywhere in the territories concerned and over Americans in regard to all offences committed within the leased areas. The American Delegates have, however, been instructed to claim United States jurisdiction over all persons, including British subjects, as regards security offences committed anywhere in the territories concerned, and as regards all offences committed in the leased areas. The exercise by the United States authorities of jurisdiction over all persons, whether Americans or not, in respect of all offences committed within the leased areas would not seem to be essential to the proper defence of the bases. This would not, for example, be prejudiced by an assault by one British subject on another taking place within the leased area.

As regards shipping, the British authorities have proposed that all vessels owned by the United States Government should be granted the same privileges and exemptions from harbour dues, etc. as vessels belonging to the Royal Navy. They have also proposed that the United States coastwise shipping laws should not apply to the leased areas, and that British Merchant ships should therefore not be excluded from these areas and have asked that harbour facilities within the leased areas should be made available to British and other ships under certain conditions. In reply, the American Delegates have it appears been instructed to press for the exemption of United States ships from all dues—which might place them in a more favourable position than ships in the Royal Navy—and have made no proposals to meet the British request in regard to the United States coastwise shipping laws and facilities for British ships in the leased areas.

The exemption of United States ships from all dues and the possible exclusion of British ships from the leased areas would again hardly seem to be essential to the defence or control of the bases.

There are other points on which similar difficulty seems to have arisen; but the broad argument that it is wished to urge is one in favour of the instructions to the United States Delegates being such as to enable them to treat the matters under discussion on a wide basis from the defence aspect and to take fully into account the interests of the various territories and their inhabitants.

WASHINGTON, February 26, 1941.

811.34544/707

The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Halifax)

WASHINGTON, March 1, 1941.

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I have received the Embassy's memorandum of February 26, 1941 on the conversations now proceeding in

London concerning the bases in the outlying territories and islands. I have gone into this matter with great care and I have had drawn up a memorandum of the present position of this Government on the questions you have raised. I have also indicated the tenor of the instructions with respect to these questions which have already been sent to the American delegates in London.

I cannot help but feel that the position this Government has taken with regard to the questions raised in your memorandum will be found entirely acceptable by your Government, and I would urge again, as I have before, that all possible steps be taken to expedite the termination of these negotiations, particularly in view of the current discussions in Congress concerning these bases and the possibility of misunderstandings and questions arising which would be entirely avoided by the prompt settlement and conclusion of the terms of the leases and the agreements under which the bases will be operated.

I am enclosing the memorandum referred to.

Very sincerely yours,

CORDELL HULL

[Enclosure]

The Department of State to the British Embassy

MEMORANDUM

In its memorandum of February 26,⁸⁶ the British Embassy raises the following questions with respect to the negotiations concerning the lease of naval and air bases:

(1) That the United States is demanding jurisdiction over all persons, including British subjects, as regards security offenses committed within the territories concerned, and as regards all offenses committed within the leased areas. It is stated that the exercise by our authorities of jurisdiction over all persons, whether American or not, in respect of offenses committed within the leased areas, would not seem to be essential to the proper defense of the bases.

In a telegram dispatched to London on February 26,⁸⁷ the American negotiators were authorized to say that the Government of the United States would not exercise jurisdiction over British subjects, except as regards offenses committed within the leased area affecting the safety of the area or the security of the United States, that is to say, offenses of a military character, including treason, sabotage, espionage, or any other offense relating to the security and protection of the United States bases, equipment, or other property, or to the operations of the Government of the United States under the power

⁸⁶ *Ante*, p. 69.

⁸⁷ Not printed.

of the lease. This jurisdiction was further limited to offenses committed within the leased areas where the offender is apprehended therein.

It is believed that this undertaking fully meets the views set out in the British memorandum.

(2) The memorandum also raises the question regarding harbor and light dues to be paid by American vessels using the bases. It is contended that American public vessels should not have greater exemption than is now granted to similar ships of the Royal Navy.

As to this, it must be borne in mind (1) that British public vessels of the types corresponding to United States public vessels which it is proposed to charge harbor dues, probably use ports in most of these outlying possessions only on infrequent occasions, and (2) that from the point of view of the British Government, it is largely a matter of taking money out of one pocket and putting it in the other. Consequently, the payment of harbor and light dues would be a matter of little consequence to the British, whereas American public vessels would be using the bases constantly, not only in carrying supplies, but in entering and departing for purposes of maneuver, et cetera. To require these ships to pay dues on an equal footing with ships of the Royal Navy would mean that American public vessels might be paying large sums of money into the local treasury for the use of a leased base which under the agreement they would have a perfect right to use without charge. Moreover, it has been pointed out to the British that the United States will construct and maintain lights, buoys, and other aids to navigation, and that all these facilities will be available to British ships—public and private—without charge.

It is not clear from the British contentions whether some reasonable contribution by American public ships to the upkeep of local aids to navigation is contemplated or whether this is a matter of raising new revenue.

There will be no increased cost in the upkeep of existing navigation facilities due to the use of local waters by American public vessels. If new revenue is the point at issue, it is easy to understand how the expenses involved in the use of these bases would amount to considerable sums annually and to huge sums over a period of 99 years.

No exemption of vessels other than those of the United States Army, Navy, Coast Guard, and Coast and Geodetic Survey is requested. As a matter of fact, there would be an increase of revenue of this type in each territory in which a base is located by reason of the fact that additional American vessels and perhaps foreign vessels will go to those territories with supplies and materials for use in the construction and operation of the bases. This additional revenue

will undoubtedly be considerable and is an additional argument against the taxation of these four categories of public vessels. Moreover, the amounts spent by the United States in supplying increased aids to navigation and harbor improvements will be considerable. These are points which seem to have been overlooked by the British Government.

Furthermore, the British Government seems to have overlooked the statement in the exchange of notes between the Secretary of State and Lord Lothian^{87a} wherein it is stated that:

“His Majesty’s Government will make available to the United States for immediate establishment and use naval and air bases and facilities for entrance thereto and the operation and protection thereof”

and that

“All the bases and facilities referred to . . .⁸⁸ will be . . . free from all rent and charges other than such compensation to be mutually agreed on to be paid by the United States in order to compensate the owners of private property for loss by expropriation or damage arising out of the establishment of the bases and facilities in question.”

No one ever thought of charges on United States Government vessels for the privilege of entering and departing from these bases. The idea of payment of such charges is entirely negated by the statement that the bases shall be “free from all rent and charges other than compensation to private property owners”. Obviously, if there is a requirement for payment every time a ship enters or departs from one of these bases, the use of the bases is not free from charges.

(3) The British memorandum also states that the United States negotiators have made no proposals to meet the British request in regard to the United States coastwise shipping laws and facilities for British ships in the leased areas.

The American representatives in London have told the British negotiators that the United States coastwise laws would not extend to these bases but that under existing law all materials for the use of the army and navy, except under certain conditions, must be carried in American vessels. These excepted conditions are, among other things, lack or non-availability of American vessels, excessive costs, et cetera, under which conditions provisions of the law may be waived by the President.

Concerning the use of the base facilities by British ships, the American representatives in London have stated that such facilities will be available to British commercial vessels on the same terms and conditions upon which they are available to United States commercial vessels.

^{87a} September 2, 1940, *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. III, pp. 73 and 74.

⁸⁸ Omissions indicated in the original memorandum.

(4) It is also stated in the memorandum that the broad argument that it is wished to urge, is one in favor of the instructions to the United States delegates being such as to enable them to treat the matters under discussion on a wide basis from the defense aspect and to take fully into account interests of the territories and their inhabitants.

Throughout the course of the negotiations in London the attitude and spirit of the Government of the United States toward the discussion of the terms of the leases and the agreements under which the bases will be operated have been entirely within the framework of the broad purposes of the Governments of the United States and Great Britain, as expressed in the basic exchange of notes. Every consideration has been given at all times to meet in as far as possible the desires of the local territories, but it must be said that many of the points which have caused delay in the discussions have referred to matters in which apparently it has been the desire of the local authorities to have provisions inserted which would circumscribe the rights considered by the United States Government as necessary and in accordance with the principles laid down in the exchange of notes of September 2, 1940.

The Naval Affairs Committees of the two Houses of Congress, and individual members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives, have already raised the question as to whether the United States will be required to pay any kind of charges in connection with the use of these bases and have been told that the Government of the United States does not anticipate being subjected to any kind of charges. It would be unfortunate if the British Government, by a continuation of the discussion of such matters as customs, harbor, and light dues, should cause these Committees to gain an unfavorable impression at a time when the American Government is doing its utmost in an effort to be of assistance in the world situation.

WASHINGTON, March 1, 1941.

811.34544/703a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, March 4, 1941—6 p. m.

712. For President's Base Lease Commission. Yesterday an officer of the British Embassy telephoned an officer of the Department that a telegram had been received in the Embassy which had crossed on the wires the Embassy's telegram of March 1 transmitting the substance of our reply to their memorandum of February 26 (the complete text of both memoranda was sent you in our 683 of March 1⁸⁰),

⁸⁰ Telegram No. 683 not printed.

requesting the Embassy to get in touch informally with us in regard to certain questions in connection with the base lease negotiations. We inquired what specific questions they had in mind and learned that they were questions of jurisdiction, customs, and light dues. We replied that we found it difficult to understand their desire to discuss these questions in Washington; that all of our views had been communicated to our delegation in London and that the members of our delegation were prepared to deal fully and comprehensively with all of these questions; that on the earnest insistence of the British Government the President had sent a delegation to London to handle these negotiations and that obviously it would be impossible to negotiate simultaneously in two places on the same subjects without considerable confusion. We therefore inquired whether it is the wish of the British Government that the negotiations be transferred to Washington; we stated that if such is their wish we would have to take up the matter with the President. The British replied at once that they were confident that it was not the wish of the British Government to transfer the negotiations to Washington. We therefore stated that any discussions which the British authorities in London wished to initiate with you on any of the subjects would find you ready to deal with them.

It seems obvious to us that the British feel that they would gain from the confusion resulting from trying to carry on negotiations in two places simultaneously. Likewise, they probably feel that Halifax might be able to persuade us to weaken in some of our positions. We hope that we have made it abundantly clear that you are our accredited representatives in these negotiations and that they cannot negotiate with us behind your backs, or otherwise undermine your position.

HULL

811.34544/614 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, March 8, 1941—6 p. m.

777. For President's Base Lease Commission. Immediately upon receipt of your 706, February 24,⁹⁰ in which you stated that in your opinion certain aspects of the negotiations were being unnecessarily delayed and that it would be an opportune time for us to indicate forcibly to the British that the agreement should be concluded without delay, we submitted to the President a draft telegram to the Prime Minister along these lines.

Last night we received a memorandum from the President reading in part as follows: "I held up this proposed dispatch to Churchill

⁹⁰ Not printed.

because I wanted first to talk with Halifax. I explained to Halifax that it is of the utmost importance to us because of the Congressional situation that the matter of the bases be settled quickly. He is telegraphing his Government to that effect."

The President discussed with Halifax various topics of the draft agreement, including light and harbor dues, navigational facilities, the restricted use of the waters adjacent to the bases by British vessels (including fishing vessels), jurisdiction and the exemption from customs and other duties of articles shipped to the leased areas. You will be interested to know that the President fully and forcefully supported the position of [on] all of these subjects which you have taken in the negotiations.

As regards customs duties, after indicating full support for the position which you have taken, the President stated "There should be a solemn undertaking on our part, however, that the resale of any article thus brought to the reservation, and later taken across the line for use anywhere off the reservation, would be severely punished and put an end to."

As regards the use of the waters by British ships, the President stated: "Because these eight bases are definitely military areas, British ships should be excluded from these areas except when authorized to enter them by the United States representative. This applies to local fishing boats, to whom revocable licenses might be given by the American representative, and actually would be given in normal times."

We hope that this will prove helpful to you in obtaining the British agreement to our proposals.

We know that you are doing everything within your power to bring these negotiations to a satisfactory termination as soon as possible.

HULL

811.34544/669 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, March 8, 1941—10 p. m.

[Received 10:50 p. m.]

908. For the President and the Secretary of State. There has been a definite speeding up of the Base Lease negotiations. Apparently the negotiations had been complicated and delayed by overemphasis on Colonial objections without sufficient authoritative recognition by the British of our primary defense needs. I am certain that unnecessary prolongation of negotiations would be no more helpful here than at home. I have been guided by the position and attitude of our Gov-

ernment as stated in paragraph 4 of the Department's memorandum of March 1 to the British Embassy and your confidential telegram to the Commission No. 712, March 4, 6 p. m.

I would like to support the Commissioners' recommendations given in our 853, March 5, midnight,⁹¹ and the recommendation they are making for an exchange of notes stating that the President would recommend to Congress that authority be given to try British subjects apprehended within the leased areas for security offenses by United States courts within such areas if the United States assumes jurisdiction. The Colonials are disturbed by the possibility of distant trials and the British fear that this jurisdictional point would be one of those most likely to block necessary colonial legislation and thus require an overriding act of Parliament. They consider it a fundamental question of civil rights. I am convinced that such an exchange of notes would go far to allay these fears which are particularly troublesome in Bermuda and Newfoundland. The Commission's recommendations on this and other points arising from today's meeting will be telegraphed after a meeting tomorrow on various miscellaneous points.

Three major points will remain under consideration by the Prime Minister and are scheduled for Cabinet discussion Monday:⁹² Article I dealing with rights, article II defense, and article III customs. The first and third seem reasonably near settlement. The second may prove troublesome because the Prime Minister himself attaches great importance to the issues involved. He has himself suggested the following:

"It is recognized that the interest of the United States Government in the defense of the leased areas and the territories in which they lie is physically in harmony with the separate interest of His Majesty's Government and without raising any question of naval or military compacts or assurance it is recognized that the various schemes of defense shall be concerted and adjusted at any moment to provide in the highest degree the security of each of the two contracting parties. For this purpose there will be consultation in accordance with the spirit of the preamble. When the United States is engaged in war or in time of other emergency it shall have all such rights in the territories and the surrounding waters and air spaces as may be necessary for conducting military operations. But in the exercise of these rights full regard shall be had to the said preamble."

The Commission has rejected this draft first on the ground that it is incompatible with the position of our Government and secondly because the last sentence of Mr. Churchill's draft might be construed to qualify our war powers. After the most careful consideration of

⁹¹ Not printed.

⁹² March 10.

the problem and in view of the Prime Minister's very real concern we would suggest breaking article II into two paragraphs reading as follows:

"1. Should any difficulties arise by reason of the physical proximity of the bases and the territories in which they lie regarding respective arrangements for local security they will be settled in accordance with the spirit of the preamble.

"2. When the United States is engaged in war or in time of other emergency, it shall have all such rights in the territories and the surrounding waters and air spaces as may be necessary for conducting military operations."

We forward this for your comment and any suggestions you wish to make, being fully aware of the instructions already given the Commission.

While it may not be possible, I have hoped that agreement on the base leases could be announced simultaneously with passage of the Lease-Lend Bill⁹³ as it would afford an excellent example of practical Anglo-American cooperation and friendship and might minimize possible criticism in Parliament or the Colonies and also help in the United States.

WINANT

811.34544/673: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, March 9, 1941—11 p. m.

[Received March 9—5:58 p. m.]

915. From President's Base Lease Commission. Thank you for your 777, March 8, 6 p. m. Under the impetus of your and the Ambassador's efforts the result of recent meetings including one today gives us some hope of submitting tomorrow night a complete draft of the agreement for your final consideration unless articles I and II are delayed. We must still secure accord on special provisions for Trinidad and possibly Bermuda and some other details which we believe can be quickly settled if the present momentum continues.

The British desire a tripartite exchange of notes with the Canadian and our Government to the effect that nothing in the agreement shall be deemed to conflict with the arrangements relative to defense of Newfoundland already made by the United States-Canada Joint Defense Board.⁹⁴ We have agreed subject your approval.

The Prime Minister attaches great importance to assurance on the jurisdictional point mentioned in the Ambassador's 908, March 8, 10

⁹³ Approved March 11, 1941; 55 Stat. 31.

⁹⁴ See *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. III, pp. 144 ff.

p. m. We feel that the Ambassador's presentation covers the case and are accordingly not making separate recommendation. [Base Lease Commission.]

WINANT

811.34544/679 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, March 12, 1941—3 a. m.

[Received 5:20 a. m.]

942. From President's Base Lease Commission. My 939, 11th.⁹⁵ During 6 weeks of negotiation, we have endeavored to secure all the rights, powers and authorities necessary to assure the effective establishment, operation, control, and defense of the bases. At the same time, we have tried to meet all reasonable contentions of the British Government and the Colonies with a view to the establishment and operation of the bases in an atmosphere of friendly cooperation. Practically every provision has been the subject of exhaustive discussion and we believe that the agreement as given in our 939 achieves both these objectives.

The agreement embodies a number of concessions by the British, particularly with respect to the specification of rights, defense and jurisdiction which they were most reluctant to make. They were finally secured yesterday at a meeting attended by the Prime Minister, Lord Moyne, Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, Chairman of the Chiefs of Staffs' Committee, Sir Alan Burns, the Ambassador and ourselves. The Prime Minister indicated that our requests in some respects went beyond the intent of the exchange of notes of September 2, 1940, but that he had no desire to restrict our necessary military requirements and that in view of the general situation he was prepared to accept our views. He considered, however, that the concessions given represent the maximum which the British could give. He held that any further concessions would probably necessitate an act of Parliament to override Colonial legislatures and would be difficult to defend in Parliament should the need for such an act arise.

The Prime Minister attaches great importance to the fourth clause of the preamble which he considers truly represents the spirit in which the whole base lease project was conceived and should be carried out. Without it he said the agreement would be more of a "capitulation" than a friendly arrangement between great powers. He holds that this clause sets the tone of the whole agreement that the British Gov-

⁹⁵ Not printed.

ernment could agree on the understanding that our rights would be exercised in that spirit to a number of points which they could never otherwise concede and that his presentation of the agreement to Parliament will be based upon the spirit of the preamble.

The references to the preamble in article I, paragraph 3, and article II were inserted by the Prime Minister personally after we had rejected various other suggestions and illustrate his views on this point. He was seriously concerned at the almost unlimited powers in time of war or emergency granted us in article II holding that they gave us unlimited rights, should we wish to use them, as for example the right to declare martial law in the territories at any time, to occupy any areas we wished, to take over British dockyards or other installations, or even to order the evacuation of civilians from the islands. This he realized was far from the intent of either party but would be difficult to defend in Parliament unless he could make clear that our far-reaching rights would be exercised in the spirit expressed in the preamble.

The Prime Minister appreciates your efforts to meet his views on the question of jurisdiction over British subjects. While the British have not raised the point we feel that assurance that British subjects would be tried by United States courts in the leased areas might well be incorporated in the agreement rather than in an exchange of public notes. Do you perceive objection?

In article VII, paragraph 2, you will note that the words "bound to or from" have been replaced by "entering or leaving." We believe this does not differ from the intent of our instructions.

Article IX, immigration, has been altered in language but we believe it follows our instructions.

Article X, customs, was, as you know, one of the most difficult upon which to reach agreement. The British finally agreed to duty free admission of goods for sale at post exchanges, et cetera, only on understanding we would make every effort to prevent abuses and that privilege would extend only as stated. Goods for forces operating outside the leased areas are not specifically mentioned but are covered by subparagraph (a). In view of the several important and difficult concessions made by the British in this article, we would not feel justified in pressing for exemption on automobiles for private individuals.

Article XIII, taxes, has been extended on our suggestion to exempt activities performed for our Government from license or similar taxes.

Article XXI has been difficult due to the British desire for possible continuance of local industries. All reference to such industry has been deleted and we believe you will find paragraph 2 satisfactory.

Article XXII. The special provisions are of a nature which would not ordinarily be incorporated in land leases. We understand that

you have no strong preference either way and the British consider an annex to the agreement the logical place for them. We propose, however, that the fleet anchorage provision will be included in the Trinidad lease.

Article XXIV. The British were reluctant to agree to supplementary areas being leased under the terms and conditions specified in the agreement, holding that additional leases, with the possible exception of small sites for supplementary defense purposes, were not contemplated by the basic exchange of notes and that, while they were prepared to consider requests for essential additional areas, they could not bind themselves for the long term to grant them under the same conditions. We maintained that the lease of additional areas if agreed, as all else, rested on the September notes now implemented by this agreement and that the latter should therefore be the basic approach on terms. The final draft is an accommodation of these two positions.

Lord Moyne told us tonight that the exchange of 78 acres in Bermuda will be granted. [Base Lease Commission.]

WINANT

811.34544/684 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, March 12, 1941—4 a. m.

[Received 8:20 a. m.]

943. Your 796, March 10, 9 p. m.⁹⁸ The Canadian High Commissioner called yesterday afternoon on urgent instructions from Ottawa to suggest that all reference to Newfoundland be deleted from this agreement and a separate Newfoundland agreement be negotiated to recognize Canadian interest. I expect to convince him that any such procedure at this point was out of the question and he agreed to telegraph his Government to ask whether its views could not be met by the suggested tripartite exchange of notes.

WINANT

811.34544/684 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, March 13, 1941.

849. For the Ambassador and the President's Base Lease Commission. Your 943, March 12, 4 a. m. It is our earnest hope that the Canadians will not insist on a separate agreement for Newfoundland.

⁹⁸ Not printed.

We agree that such a proposal at this late date is, as you say, out of the question. It seems to us further that the proposed exchange of notes should meet the situation.

HULL

811.34544/713 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, March 18, 1941.

910. For the Ambassador and the President's Base Lease Commission. Your 1047, 18th.⁹⁷ The Ambassador and the members of the President's Base Lease Commission are hereby authorized to sign for the United States of America the agreement now under negotiation with respect to the use and operation of the bases leased to the United States in exchange for the 50 destroyers.

If the agreement in its entirety has received the approval of this Government your signatures for the United States will be without qualification. If, however, the final text of the agreement has not received the approval of this Government you will sign *ad referendum* as to those articles or clauses which are still subject to the approval of this Government.

You will understand that approval by this Government of the final text entails approval by the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, the Attorney General, and the final approval by the President. Notification to you of approval of the final text, or any part thereof, may be considered as indicating the approval of the President and the Cabinet officers above mentioned.

WELLES

811.34544/713 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, March 24, 1941.

987. For the Ambassador and the President's Base Lease Commission. My 910, March 18. The text of the Agreement set forth in your 1085 of March 19⁹⁷ has been approved by the Government of the United States, subject to the alterations which have been proposed and accepted by telegraph since the receipt of your telegram under reference. You may therefore with the approval of the President sign the Agreement for the United States; your signatures will be

⁹⁷ Not printed.

without qualification. Authorization to sign the Protocol was given in my 977, March 22nd.⁹⁹

It is the President's wish that the Agreement be signed Wednesday.¹ He is sending a message to Congress enclosing the Agreement, the Newfoundland protocol and the notes exchanged in connection with the Agreement for the information of the Congress. He wishes to send this message at 12, noon, Washington time, Thursday, March 27, and we hope that it will be agreeable to the British authorities for the Agreement to be released simultaneously in Washington and London at that hour for immediate publication.

It is our understanding that the following notes will be exchanged at the time the agreement is signed :

(1) In regard to the status of Newfoundland (texts of both notes quoted in your 1063, March 18⁹⁹).

(2) In regard to censorship and examination of mail, dealt with in your 1154, March 24,⁹⁹ and a separate telegram which we are sending you today.⁹⁹

WELLES

811.34544/798 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the
Secretary of State*

LONDON, March 27, 1941.

[Received March 27—1:05 p. m.]

1207. For the President and the Secretary of State. The Base Lease Agreement has been signed. I think it contains everything we need to use these bases effectively.

The rights and powers it conveys are far-reaching, probably more far-reaching than any the British Government has ever given anyone over British territory before. They are not used to giving such concessions and on certain points they have fought every inch of the way. While they have intended all along to give us everything we really needed—they could do no less and had no desire to do less—it was a real struggle for them to break habits of 300 years. The Prime Minister has been generous throughout. Certain powers, notably those in article XI, are so sweeping that the British would never have granted them except as a natural consequence of the original agreement and the spirit which it embodies.

It is important that the agreement be carried out in that spirit. The Colonies have been lightly touched by the war, their point of view is local and their way of life will be greatly changed by the bases.

⁹⁹ Not printed.

¹ March 26.

In the main the changes will benefit them but it may take them some time to find it out.

In the negotiations both sides have tried to avoid anything which would wall off the bases from the local communities. Our people and theirs are to live together without even a fence, much less a frontier, between them.

The character of the men in command of the bases is of tremendous importance, especially in the beginning. If they are the right kind and ready to carry out our part of the agreement in a friendly and understanding spirit they can do much to inaugurate 99 years of good neighborliness.

Malony, Fahy and Bieseimer have fought hard and won everyone's respect and friendship. You sent a fine team and they have done a grand job. So did Achilles in assisting them.

WINANT

[For text of the agreement and exchange of notes signed March 27, 1941, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 235, or 55 Stat. (pt. 2) 1560.]

AGREEMENT AND EXCHANGES OF NOTES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM AND PROTOCOL BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND CANADA CONCERNING THE DEFENSE OF NEWFOUNDLAND, SIGNED MARCH 27, 1941

[For text of the agreement, notes, and protocol, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 235 or 55 Stat. (pt. 2) 1560, 1595, 1599. For correspondence concerning the negotiations for transfer of American destroyers to the British Navy and for establishment of American naval and air bases in British possessions in the Western Hemisphere, see *Foreign Relations*, 1940, volume III, pages 49 ff.; see also *ante*, pages 53 ff.]

ANGLO-AMERICAN DISCUSSIONS REGARDING POSTWAR RELIEF AND INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF COMMODITIES²

840.48/4527‡

*The Assistant Secretary of State (Grady) to the Director General, British Ministry of Economic Warfare (Leith-Ross)*³

WASHINGTON, January 2, 1941.

MY DEAR LEITH-ROSS: In the first place let me assure you that I received and read your letter of November 30⁴ with very great in-

² Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. III, pp. 132-142.

³ Transmitted through the American Embassy in London. Sir Frederick William Leith-Ross had been economic adviser to the British Government since 1932.

⁴ *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. III, p. 138.

terest and have been giving it considerable thought, while at the same time during my recent absence from Washington, it has been receiving the attention of officers of Department's staff who are most interested in the general problems covered.

2. On the whole, I find myself in cordial agreement with the general tenor and substance of your comment. The gravity of the surplus problem, both in its immediate aspects and its post-war probabilities, and the need for broad and long-range vision and planning to deal with it, are undeniable. I quite agree with your view that "the surpluses problem should be viewed as a great whole and as a collection of individual surpluses in particular countries." A program of joint Anglo-American cooperation should manifestly serve to increase immeasurably the scope and potentialities of effective action, as contrasted with separate efforts.

3. Before commenting more specifically upon your views regarding methods, it might be useful were I to mention briefly the main aspects of our program of inter-American cooperation so far as they relate to the problem of surpluses, since the late Lord Lothian's⁵ memoranda of July 3 and September 18⁶ appear to have been stimulated in some part by certain proposals of a very general nature discussed in connection with the Habana Conference of last July,⁷ and perhaps the impression conveyed by these proposals has been somewhat different from the actual facts. The original proposals themselves were of very general and broad nature; I think it fair to say that their main immediate effect has been to stimulate discussion and action along more limited and perhaps more realistic lines. As you know, the principal outcome of the Habana Conference, so far as commodity surplus problems were concerned, was a mandate to the Inter-American Financial and Economic Advisory Committee to carry on.⁸ As a result there has already emerged an agreement relating to coffee, with which you are by now doubtless familiar, and which is primarily, from the point of view of producers, an American problem; some work has been initiated also with reference to cocoa and to cotton,⁹ which of course present situations radically different from

⁵ Former British Ambassador to the United States; he died in Washington, December 12, 1940.

⁶ *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. III, pp. 134 and 135.

⁷ See Department of State, *Second Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, Habana, July 21-30, 1940. Report of the Secretary of State* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1941), p. 10.

⁸ See *ibid.*, pp. 25 and 80.

⁹ In April 1941 representatives of the Department of State and the Department of Agriculture participated in informal conversations with officials of the British Embassy and with a representative of the Brazilian Government. The result of these conversations was the preparation of a memorandum outlining the possible bases for an international cotton agreement which was submitted to the cotton subcommittee of the Inter-American Financial and Economic Committee as a proposal of the United States. Correspondence not printed.

that of coffee in that the non-American production is so much more important in their cases. As you have doubtless been informed, steps of an informal nature have already been taken to keep your Embassy here informed of what is going on with respect to cocoa, and to provide a basis for cooperative endeavors, and I think I can say with complete confidence that the desirability of joint Anglo-American action, using the term American in its wide sense to include also the other American Republics, in any international scheme to deal with cocoa, is recognized.

A beginning in another direction has been made in connection with relief distribution of surpluses, or more specifically, the possibility of applying on an inter-American basis arrangements analogous to our domestic scheme for relief distribution of surplus commodities. In this also, however, only rudimentary progress has been made, and I am sure that nothing has been done which would provide any substantial conflict with, or obstacle to, the adoption of a program of joint Anglo-American cooperation.

4. So far as the financial aspect of our inter-American cooperation is concerned, you know of course that subsequent to the Habana Conference the Congress increased by five hundred million dollars the lending authority of the Export-Import Bank.¹⁰ The greater part—though not all—of this assistance is expected to be extended to Latin American countries. The policy thus far pursued in granting such credits has been to direct efforts toward the relief and remedy of the general situation rather than to buy up or to make loans directly against specific accumulations of surplus commodities. Credits have been advanced to the governments themselves to help meet the urgent necessities of their general foreign trade and exchange position and to stimulate and promote new activities designed to improve their general economic stability and their trade prospects with ourselves.

There has indeed been some purchasing and accumulation of stores of strategic materials,¹¹ but this is based on our defense program rather than as a specific remedy for the commodity surpluses problem.

5. Thus we have not, as yet at least, been using financial credits as a direct method of solution of the international surpluses problem in this hemisphere through purchase of or specific loan against particular commodity surpluses (as distinguished of course from our purely domestic surplus relief activities). I would not say, however, that the use of financial assistance as part of sound schemes for solution of international commodity surplus problems would be specifically precluded. The coffee agreement does indeed contain a provision stipulating the assistance of the Coffee Board in arranging

¹⁰ Act of September 26, 1940; 54 Stat. 961.

¹¹ For correspondence concerning plans to acquire adequate stockpiles of strategic raw materials, see *Foreign Relations, 1940*, vol. II, pp. 250 ff.

financial assistance for the storage of coffee surpluses, but this does not commit the United States Government to the provision of such assistance. In connection with any consideration or planning with respect to this aspect of the question, it will certainly be necessary to avoid action which, as you say, would simply take existing surpluses off the hands of producing countries and leave them free to produce more surpluses. I therefore agree fully with your views that any assistance should involve their own internal cooperation and commitments and be part of reasonable sound arrangements to prevent further accumulation of surpluses.

6. I think you will see from the foregoing that our views, in the general approach, are very much in harmony, and that there have been no developments or action here which would in any substantial or serious way prevent or impede a program of joint cooperation between us. While of course the Governments of the other American Republics must be left to speak for themselves, I feel that certainly in concrete cases at least they would recognize the usefulness, if not the necessity of achieving a more substantial international basis through such joint action.

7. As regards the more specific methods discussed in your letter, here again I find no cause for substantial disagreement with you. In the light of our experience, I am inclined to believe that the most effective progress will be made at this time primarily through individual approach to particular commodities. Thus I would suggest continuing the efforts that have been initiated to deal with the cocoa problem, which seems to provide an especially significant instance for approaching the problem on a basis which includes both inter-American and Anglo-American cooperation. We may before long wish to suggest the initiation of parallel action with respect to cotton. Your suggestion that the international wheat committee be revived has been sympathetically regarded here, and I believe that a more definite proposal to this end would without question elicit a favorable response from us.¹²

8. At the same time there are two other lines along which some work might well be initiated in cooperation. I have in mind, on the one hand, an assembly of the pertinent facts, statistics, regarding each commodity which may be, or show prospects of being, a candidate for treatment as a surplus commodity problem. It would be well to be as forehanded as possible in this regard, because it so frequently happens that when a problem does need to be actively taken up, either there is delay while the facts necessary to a clear picture are being assembled, or action is initiated without a clear understanding of what the situation is and what is needed.

¹² See correspondence regarding the participation of the United States in the International Wheat Meeting at Washington, July 1941-April 1942, vol. I, pp. 530 ff.

Secondly, I believe it would be useful at this time to undertake a review of the character of and experience under international commodity control schemes, whether governmental or otherwise, which have in the past been put into operation, and perhaps some of those which have reached a certain stage of agreement but failed to enter into effect.

In suggesting these lines of inquiry, I do not for a moment wish to seem to be detracting from the desirability of current action. On the contrary, such studies should in no wise be allowed to interfere with active endeavor on any specific commodities which are now the subject of consideration or which may for one reason or another be added to these.

9. This brings me, finally, to your suggestion of a joint general committee, which might be initiated on an Anglo-American basis as a means of taking the lead in this field, with a view to extension by adding representatives of other countries as the need and purpose develops. In principle I think your idea of such an agency, to formulate general lines of policy, to initiate action whenever appropriate, and perhaps to become a coordinating body for various committees on individual commodities, is well taken. Just what the constitution and terms of reference of such an agency might best be, however, perhaps ought to be left for further consideration in the light of developments along the lines of current or early activity on specific commodities and of studies of the nature I have suggested.

As you may perhaps already have learned when you receive this reply, I have resigned from my position as Assistant Secretary of State in order to take up the position of President of the American President Lines, one of our principal steamship companies operating principally from the West Coast. This does not mean at all that I shall be discontinuing my interest in these general problems of the international economic order with respect to which I have so much enjoyed our mutual discussions and collaboration. But of course in the circumstances further expression of this Government's interest and views in the subject must be left to the Department. I have desired to take this opportunity to express my own views on the subject at some length, and you may be sure that your further comment will be welcomed here. Perhaps the most useful way to proceed for the time being, if agreeable to you, would be by concurrent exchanges of views through your Embassy here and our Embassy in London. I am accordingly sending this letter to our Embassy for delivery to you, as I know from their telegrams that they have been in touch with you on the subject; and Sir Owen Chalkley²⁸ will be provided with a copy for the information of your people here.

²⁸ Commercial Counselor of the British Embassy.

With kind personal regards and the hope that we may meet again before very long, and under happier circumstances, I am

Sincerely yours,

HENRY F. GRADY

840.48/4844½

The Director General, British Ministry of Economic Warfare (Leith-Ross), to the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson) ¹⁴

[LONDON,] 14 February, 1941.

MY DEAR DEAN: I hope that you have had a chance to read my message to Henry Grady of the 30th November ^{14a} and his reply dated 2nd January about the surpluses problem. At the end of his letter Grady says that my further comments would be welcome and suggests that I send them to the State Department, and I am venturing to interpret this as an invitation to reply to you. It seems to me clear that the prospect of finding any solution of the problem will depend on joint, or at any rate coordinated, action between our two countries and I am anxious, therefore, from the outset, that our policy should be directed on lines which will harmonise with yours. At present my Government have not committed themselves to any hard and fast ideas, but we are doing what we can to think out how the various aspects can best be tackled. My message to Grady was an effort to put down the trend of our thought at that time, and this is a continuation.

2. I was very encouraged to find from Grady's letter that there is no substantial difference between us on the main objectives. We both recognise the importance of the problem as well as the difficulties in the way of any solution. We are in agreement also that the problem has both short-term and long-term aspects. It follows that the short-term policy ought to be framed in such a way as to lead up to or at any rate not to impede the formulation of a long-term policy, and that both aspects ought, so far as possible, to be kept in view in dealing with immediate cases that arise. Putting it concretely, you and we are being forced by circumstances into dealing with urgent cases of particular industries or particular countries which, for political or commercial reasons, we are impelled to help. We may have to improvise remedial measures for such cases but so far as possible, it is surely desirable to frame such measures so as to get the most constructive results, e. g. in connexion with post-war plans for relief in Europe and for stabilisation of commodity prices and for the adoption of saner economic policies all over the world. We feel that it would be

¹⁴ Transmitted to the Assistant Secretary of State by Sir Owen Chalkley, Commercial Counselor of the British Embassy, under covering letter dated March 24.

^{14a} *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. III, p. 138.

a great pity simply to deal with immediate cases by palliative measures without taking every opportunity to further these wider aims.

3. As regards methods of approach, there are two different lines which have to be followed more or less simultaneously. First, the handling of actual commodity surpluses and any arrangements for regulating production, stockholding and marketing must unquestionably be approached by reference to the individual commodities. We are quite prepared to consult with you on this basis and you will be aware that such consultations have already been initiated about wheat, sugar¹⁵ and cocoa. We are also approaching you about sisal, in conjunction with the Netherlands Government, and we have expressed our readiness to discuss cotton, on which we are also working. I fully agree with Grady that discussion of individual commodities affords the most realistic basis for cooperative action.

4. But side by side with this commodity approach, the economic difficulties of producers have also to be viewed geographically and politically, i. e. country by country. Some countries are so dependent on one crop that their position can be safeguarded by appropriate action in regard to this commodity. But such cases are the exception rather than the rule. In most cases the producing countries have some variety of economic activities, part of which may be depressed, others doing well. In such cases, the Government of that country should make the necessary effort to redistribute its national wealth so as to keep any depressed industries of national importance going. They may need some help for this purpose and your policy of financial credits, as explained in Grady's letter (paragraph 4) represents an effort to give them this help.

5. These two different approaches—by commodities and by countries—will, however, at some stage have to be brought together and reviewed as a whole. This was what I meant by the phrase in my letter to Grady (which I am not sure came through correctly in my cabled message) that “the surpluses problem is a great deal more than a collection of problems of individual surpluses in particular countries”. For example, whether or not your financial assistance to the South American countries is directly linked with purchases or loans on particular commodities, the prospect of their ultimate repayment must largely depend on whether the exports of the borrowing country can be maintained at a profitable level. The extension of financial credits therefore does not make it less but more advisable to proceed with arrangements for regulation of production, stockholding and marketing of particular commodities; and it may be a very useful lever for getting agreements of this kind.

¹⁵ For correspondence concerning arrangements for the wartime operation of the International Sugar Agreement, see *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. 1. pp. 948 ff.

6. Moreover, the question of storage for Europe (to which I will refer again later) cannot be treated adequately on the basis of particular commodities. Any programme for this purpose will raise difficult questions of financing on which we are not ready with any specific proposals; but the same questions are bound to crop up in discussing what stock of each particular commodity should be kept and it would appear advisable therefore that they should be examined as a general factor in the whole problem.

7. Another general factor to which Grady refers at the end of paragraph 3 of his letter is the possibility of increasing consumption. So long as the war lasts, this must be a rather theoretical question for us here, but it is one which certainly should be kept in view for the future. The pre-war consumption in Europe of many foodstuffs could certainly have been greatly expanded and the nutrition of the peoples concerned definitely improved if prices to the consumer could have been lowered by reducing protective duties and quantitative restrictions on imports and also by keeping down handling and distribution costs. Personally, I much hope that after the war action on these lines can be secured. This would be the best means of increasing general consumption; but efforts should also be made to encourage the adoption of special measures such as your Blue Stamp scheme, where they can be applied. Possibly both methods can be tried in combination.

8. For all the above reasons, I feel that the policy on surpluses needs to be worked out from a very broad standpoint and that effective action will depend on a strong lead which can only be taken by your Government and mine in cooperation. My idea was that, at the appropriate stage, some small organisation should be created which could speak with authority for our two countries. Norman Davis will bear me out that the International Sugar Agreement was only made possible by the efforts of the steering committee in which he played so large a part.¹⁶

Something of this kind seems necessary to stimulate progress in the detailed negotiations on specific commodities and to coordinate policy on the whole field. It may well be premature to set up such an organisation until we have made more progress on particular commodities, and I have not attempted to work out any constitution or terms of reference for it, but at a certain point I feel that some such organisation will be the most effective means of securing action. Possibly it might be started as a purely consultative body and allowed to evolve into an executive body.

¹⁶ Norman H. Davis was chairman of the American delegation to the International Sugar Conference held at London, April 5–May 6, 1937; the International Sugar Agreement was signed May 6, 1937. See *Foreign Relations*, 1937, vol. I, pp. 931 ff.

9. Grady made two suggestions in paragraph 8 of his letter, to which I would briefly refer. The first suggestion was that the pertinent facts and statistics concerning surplus commodities should be assembled. Last autumn we got together a group of economists here for this purpose and they compiled a general survey of the background data relating both to surplus commodities and individual producing countries. In fact, however, we have found that their work required such continual revision in the light of new developments that it was better to collect information as required rather than to attempt to develop and keep up to date a general survey. Grady's second suggestion related to a review of international commodity control schemes. I agree that this would be useful, and I hope that it will be put in hand, though, in view of the present demands on our supply of qualified investigators (who don't seem to be a surplus commodity!) it will not be easy for us to do much. We should of course be ready to prepare notes on the working of the existing schemes on which we have fuller information than is at your disposal (e. g. rubber, tin¹⁷ and tea¹⁸) and generally to assist on any particular aspects on which you may specially desire our views, and we should be glad to study and comment upon the results of your investigations.

10. My own experience suggests that (apart from technical difficulties) the main obstacle in the way of instituting Governmental control schemes such as we are now considering, is economic nationalism. Parliamentary Governments under pressure from important producers' interests, are often in as bad a position to take long views as any other types of government. Only when the situation gets more or less hopeless are a number of different Governments likely to accept the limitations on their freedom of action inherent in any regulation scheme. Even then, each Government will want to get the maximum benefit for its own producers and to give away as little as possible to the others; so it comes to a horse deal. But I believe that the situation in regard to many commodities will soon be recognised as pretty hopeless, which is the beginning of wisdom. Further, the United States, with its commitments to Latin-America, and the United Kingdom, with its commitments to the Empire, together cover a great part of the field. You cannot speak for the Latin-American countries and we cannot speak for the self-governing Dominions or the Indian Empire; but if we work together, using our joint consuming power as much as our political influence, we can help to build a bridge between the other countries and their competing interests, and cooperation of this kind will, I believe, help to evolve

¹⁷ For correspondence concerning rubber and tin, see vol. I, pp. 492 ff., and pp. 507 ff., respectively.

¹⁸ See International Labour Office, *Intergovernmental Commodity Control Agreements* (Montreal, 1943), pp. 47 ff.

policies which will bring us closer together, whereas otherwise there is a danger that our respective commitments will lead us to drift apart.

11. Our ultimate aim should be a world-wide extension of some of the principals of the A. A. A.¹⁹ schemes applied in the United States. We shall almost certainly not succeed in making them applicable to all important commodities, but if we succeed only in regard to a few important commodities, it will make a great deal of difference to the economic future. If we could succeed in preventing sharp fluctuations in the prices of the chief primary materials, we should have gone a long way towards smoothing out the cyclical depressions of trade in manufacturing countries. This sort of objective seems remote from the troubles of war which now beset us, but economic depressions are the breeding ground of social disturbances and future wars, so I feel no hesitation in urging this aspect of the problem on you. Meanwhile, to get back to actualities, we are most ready to keep you informed of any interim action which we undertake in regard to specific cases and I hope that on your side you will be willing to reciprocate.

12. Finally, I should like to add a few words about the building up of stocks for Europe's post-war reconstruction, for this is an aspect of the surpluses problem upon which I said comparatively little in my message to Grady. As I see it broadly, the major part of this problem is likely to be not the purchasing for storage of supplies which would otherwise be lacking, but of providing for the rapid transfer of existing stocks to consumers in Europe when the time comes and of reducing as far as possible price fluctuations. I am turning over in my mind what proposals can be put forward to provide for this, and I should very much like to have some indication of how your ideas are shaping. Here I will only say that it appears to be in the interests of producers and would facilitate the carrying of stocks, if some arrangement could be made for definite quantities of surplus supplies to be segregated for marketing to Europe if not actually sold in advance. But any such arrangement also presupposes some progress in international regulation schemes, as otherwise surpluses will continue to grow and prices to fall, and no forward commitments can be made on a constantly falling and bottomless market.

13. The above refers to the stocks required to get the economic machinery of Europe restarted—involving large-scale supplies of raw materials as well as food supplies. I recognise that, apart from this, there is also the question of making arrangements beforehand to meet the immediate post-war needs for actual relief of destitute areas. It seems to me that this aspect of the question could appropriately be

¹⁹ Agricultural Adjustment Administration.

handled by private charitable organisations. I have suggested to Mr. Henry Cadbury and Mr. Yarnell, who recently called on me, that their organisation,²⁰ and the Red Cross, should consider preparatory action in this field.

14. I am afraid that this has become almost an essay rather than a letter, but it may be useful to you to have the various general considerations which I have strung together. I hope that I may be able to follow it up before long with more concrete proposals.

I am giving a copy to Loyd Steere, the Agricultural Attaché here, with whom I am glad to keep in touch, and I am mailing a copy to Sir Owen Chalkley, so that he can follow up the discussions at Washington. If there are any points on which you would like further explanations, please do not hesitate to let me know.

With best remembrances

Yours sincerely

F. W. LEITH-ROSS

840.48/4999

The Financial Adviser to the British Government (Keynes) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson)

WASHINGTON, June 4, 1941.

DEAR MR. ACHESON: It may perhaps be useful to both of us if I try to record what seems to me the main upshot of our conversation the other day about surpluses.

1. We agreed that the *de facto* situation was broadly speaking as follows:

(a) Where the financial conditions and other circumstances render outside help essential, Great Britain is looking after the problem in her own Dominions, apart from Canada, and in Africa. The Dutch, being financially strong, have been left to deal with their own problems, as has Canada. The United States has the primary responsibility towards her own surpluses and those of Central and South America.

(b) Where an important commodity overlaps more than one of these areas, preliminary steps are being taken for international conferences with a view to working out a more stable and more permanent policy. Particular examples of such cases are, up to date, wheat, cotton and cocoa.

2. We agreed that there was no particular reason to interfere with the above arrangements so far as the preliminary phase is concerned. But they are likely—indeed it is advisable—that they should lead up to wider and more ambitious programmes. In particular, the surpluses which are being accumulated are well assorted for the purpose

²⁰ Presumably the Friends Service Committee.

of furnishing first aid towards European relief and reconstruction after the war.

3. The international discussions relating to particular commodities, taken in conjunction with the arrangements for carrying and financing surpluses, might naturally lead on to a more ambitious policy for stabilising within reasonable limits the prices of the leading internationally traded raw materials and even for some kind of international holding cartel which would apply the idea of the ever normal granary to the international field.

4. Nevertheless it would be difficult to bring these more ambitious ideas to the practical level in present circumstances, partly owing to shipping difficulties, partly owing to half the world being at war and partly owing to the abnormal concentration of war demand in particular directions. For this reason the most practical measure might be something on a much more modest scale, limited in the first instance to those tasks which cannot be avoided. Those working together on a narrower field and discussing these problems in common might find themselves in a good position for widening their field of interest whenever circumstances might appear ripe for this.

5. I suggested that this more immediate limited field might cover the following ground:—At whatever date the war ends and whatever particular form the political reorganisation of post-war Europe may take, the continent is certain to be denuded of the primary foodstuffs and raw materials. The governments of a number of the occupied areas are represented in London or Washington. My suggestion was that we should invite the representatives of these countries with whom we are in contact to prepare a preliminary list of their probable post-war requirements in order of priority, covering e. g. the first six months after the armistice. These should then be studied by a joint Anglo-American Committee and criticised, since it would be contrary to human nature to suppose that they would not be on the ample side. The results would then be compared with the actual surpluses in hand and the prospective surpluses. In regard to prospective surpluses it would be useful to form some sort of estimate of the raw materials now required for defence and very far from being in surplus, which will suddenly become redundant when the war machine is stopped with little or no notice. It would then be possible to make provisional allocations, taking into account the probable acute shortage of shipping, matching the more urgent demands with what is most readily available. The next step would be to frame some sort of general idea of the appropriate means for financing such supplies.

I should repeat that I should not regard such discussions as the final end and aim. They would be of real practical significance and

they might come to be of value and importance for propaganda purposes. Indeed they would be accomplishing a necessary job of work, which could not be avoided. But they would form habits of association and discussion between individuals of our two countries well qualified in these matters which might well be productive of further constructive developments on more ambitious lines. Meanwhile they would automatically link up our several activities in dealing with current surpluses and would also be of relevance in relation to the discussions of the international conferences treating of particular commodities.

I shall be in Washington next week, but I hope not much longer, and would much welcome a further talk if your group can spare the time.

Yours sincerely,

J. M. KEYNES

P. S. There is one point I mentioned at our meeting, which is omitted above, but of which it is perhaps worth while to make a memorandum. I distinguished three possible approaches to the surplus problem in cases where financial assistance is necessary. The first was that which you have followed in your import-export bank loans, i. e. loans substantially without conditions attached, the surplus country being left free to deal with its own surplus problem with the financial aid thus accorded. Secondly, there was the line which Great Britain had taken in dealing with the Australian wool surplus, namely, an outright purchase of the clip during the war and for one season thereafter without any conditions relating to the Australian financial position as a whole. Thirdly, the assisting country might go into partnership with the assisted country in solving the problem, each providing a portion of the finance and sharing the ultimate profit or loss on winding up the scheme. This course had been adopted by Great Britain in her latest arrangement with the Egyptian Government for dealing with cotton. I expressed the opinion that the third method was the best and might lend itself to a tripartite partnership in appropriate cases. It did not relieve the assisted country of the onus of making adjustments in their output of the surplus commodity. Above all it brought the two countries into partnership at the later and highly important stage of liquidation when the surplus stocks would be in competition with the current output. Even with this method, however, there would remain the overriding importance of treating an assisted country's position as a whole and only giving such measure of assistance in the case of a particular commodity as might be justified, taking all the other elements in the situation into account.

840.48/4988 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, July 7, 1941—midnight.

[Received July 8—8 a. m.]

2887. I have received following letter dated July 4 from Mr. Eden:²¹

[“]With reference to our conversation this afternoon about the proposed inter-Allied meeting to discuss the supply of food and raw materials to European countries when they are free from German occupation, I enclose a copy of a draft note which I am proposing to send to the Allied Governments, and of a draft resolution which will be sent to them for their concurrence.

Before I take action it would be a help to me to know whether you think that the general idea would concord with the views of the United States Government and also whether the United States Government would be prepared to allow anything to be said on their behalf at the meeting which would assist the deliberations.”

Following is the text of draft note:

“1. As the Government are aware, His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom have announced their intention to promote measures for the supply of food and raw materials to the countries of Europe as soon as these countries have fully regained their freedom from German domination. In the view of His Majesty’s Government, this policy can only be achieved with the cooperation of all countries concerned, and accordingly I have the honor to propose that a meeting of the Allied Governments concerned should take place as soon as convenient to consider what steps can best be taken to further this common aim.

2. His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom have already taken some preliminary steps to give effect to this policy. Last autumn Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, Chief Economic Adviser to His Majesty’s Government, with the assistance of a committee of officials and reporting to a committee of ministers under the chairmanship of the Minister without Portfolio was entrusted with organizing the work in connection with surplus commodities. This covered in the first place immediate action where necessary to assist the economies of producing countries whose markets had been closed by the blockade and in the second place plans for the supply of Europe’s post-war needs which is obviously closely related to the disposal of current surpluses. I understand that Sir Frederick Leith-Ross has in fact been in consultation informally with representatives of certain of the governments concerned on the subject of their estimated future requirements and the action which they themselves have in contemplation; but it appears desirable to put these consultations on a more formal basis and to arrange for the work to be more closely coordinated.

²¹ Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

3. It is proposed that the meeting should be opened by an explanation of the policy of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and of the action which they have already set on foot to give effect to that policy; the representatives of the Allied Governments would then be invited to state their views; and finally a general resolution would be submitted for approval. I realize that, at the present stage, it is difficult to formulate concrete propositions, and the resolution must therefore be directed in the main to organizing the preparatory work. It appears to be the common interest of all the Allied Governments to secure that the post-war needs of their respective countries will be effectively provided for. These needs will necessarily vary in accordance with the economic position of each country, and each government would naturally be primarily responsible for the requirements of its own people. At the same time, these different requirements will require to be coordinated and an order of priority established as between the various needs. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would be ready to offer any assistance which they can give in this task of coordination. As a first step, they would suggest that, insofar as this has not already been done, each of the Allied Governments should draw up estimates of the commodities required for its people, on comparable lines, and indicating the order of importance attached to each item. In the next place, shipping will be a common difficulty, and the efficient employment of the tonnage available will plainly require collaboration in the allocation of the resources available. To this question of collaboration in shipping His Majesty's Government attach the utmost importance, regarding it as fundamental to the establishment of any concrete programme. Thirdly, it would appear desirable to establish a control bureau, in order to carry forward the present informal exchanges of views between His Majesty's Government and the Allied Governments and to coordinate their results. In due course, other questions, such as the distribution of stocks, their allocation to particular needs and financial arrangements, will have to be tackled.

4. In order that the business of the meeting may be conducted smoothly and rapidly, it is proposed that the resolution to be adopted should be agreed beforehand. Accordingly, I enclose herewith a tentative draft which we hope will meet with the approval of the Government. Should you have any questions to raise or amendments to suggest on the draft resolution, I should be grateful if you would arrange for the competent authorities to get in touch with Sir Cyril Hurcomb at the Ministry of War Transport insofar as it relates to shipping (paragraph 5) and with Sir Frederick Leith-Ross at the Ministry of Economic Warfare, insofar as it relates to other matters.

5. Accordingly I have the honor to inquire whether the Government is in agreement with the proposal to hold a meeting with the agenda suggested. If so, a date will be fixed and the necessary arrangements made. It is hoped that the meeting can be held in the early part of July." ²²

Following is text of draft resolution :

"The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Governments of Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland and Yugoslavia, agree :

²² The meeting was finally held on September 24, 1941.

(1) That it is the common aim of the Allied Governments to see that supplies of food and raw materials should be made available for the postwar needs of their countries as soon as they are fully liberated from German domination;

(2) That while each of the Allied Governments will be primarily responsible for making provision for the economic needs for its own people, their respective plans should be coordinated, in a spirit of collaboration, for the successful achievement of the common aim;

(3) That they welcome the preparatory measures which have already been undertaken by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom for this purpose and express their readiness to collaborate to the fullest extent of the treaty power in pursuing the action required;

(4) That accordingly, each government should prepare estimates of the kinds and amounts of foodstuffs and raw materials required for the reprovioning of their countries, and the order of priority in which they would desire supplies to be delivered as soon as the blockade can be lifted;

(5) That the reprovioning of Europe as a whole should have prior claim on the shipping resources of each government and thus on Allied shipping resources as a whole and that the method of giving effect to this principle should be worked out between the Allied Governments and the Ministry of War Transport;

(6) That a bureau shall be established by the Government of the United Kingdom under the direction of Sir Frederick Leith-Ross—which the Allied Governments could consult in framing estimates of their requirements and which would collate and coordinate these estimates."

Before speaking to Mr. Eden again about this matter I would appreciate your comments with particular reference to second paragraph of his letter.

WINANT

840.48/4988 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, July 21, 1941—7 p. m.

2703. Your 2887, July 7. Careful thought has been given to (a) the letter from Mr. Eden; (b) the proposed draft note to the "allied" Governments; and (c) the draft resolution.

The question of dealing with the problem of commodity surpluses, actual and potential, has been a subject of discussion in letters exchanged between Leith-Ross and officials of the Department and more recently of some discussion with Keynes. As stated in this correspondence, this Government shares the view that the subject distinctly merits attention as one of great interest to the economies of all countries. In conformity with this belief, it has been maintaining initia-

tive in regard to said prospective surplus problems as illustrated by the discussions on wheat now in progress in Washington.

This question is, of course, very broad in character and steps taken to deal with it, as the effort is carried along, must inevitably involve consideration of production, of export controls, tariff and trade policies of different countries as well as financial policies. All steps taken in this field are, therefore, of interest and significance to the United States.

It is recognized that the matter of provisioning the occupied countries, when and as they may be free of occupation, and ultimately all countries of Europe with foodstuffs and raw materials does to a certain extent, in the immediate present and future, connect with the surplus situation, while by no means being identical with it. Various commodities, for one thing, likely to be desired then are now in short supply rather than the contrary. Any plans worked out and any agreements reached may be of importance to us for any or all of the following reasons: (a) steps taken towards the accumulation of supplies now or in the immediate future may affect the availability of supplies in the American and British defense effort; (b) according to their form or character, they may potentially affect future commercial relations; (c) again, according to their form and character, they might even affect plans for post-war settlements; (d) both currently and in the future, the shipping arrangements may likewise affect all of the foregoing matters.

These are the guiding thoughts and considerations in mind in connection with the following reply which it is suggested the American Embassy make to Mr. Eden.

"I immediately transmitted to Washington your letter of July 4 in regard to the proposed inter-allied meeting to discuss the supply of food and raw materials to European countries when they are free from German occupation. My Government joins in the view that this undertaking is of great prospective usefulness. It understands that the discussions at this stage will be of an exploratory nature and stands ready at the appropriate time to consider in what respects it can cooperate in accomplishing the aims in view.

It has asked me to point out that while this matter is, in some of its aspects, connected with that of present and prospective commodity surpluses, it, of course, has many differentiating elements, among which attention may be called particularly to the following: first, that any steps taken to acquire supplies in the immediate future might affect both the American and British defense effort and should, therefore, be coordinated with them; second, that the form of arrangement which may be executed may affect both commercial policies and relationships; third, it is even possible that the measures which might be undertaken, and the form and manner in which they are undertaken, would affect both the economic and political arrangements of the post-war period. It is quite possible, for instance, that at some stage of

the deliberations the question will present itself as to whether the plans worked out should be restricted to the supplying of the needs of the seven countries, or whether there should also be some plan for the provisioning of the whole of Europe. For all these reasons, my Government requests that it be fully and currently advised, either through this Embassy in London or through the British Embassy in Washington, as to (1) the course of discussions at this meeting, (2) of the work of the Bureau which the United Kingdom contemplates establishing, and that it be consulted regarding any plans that emerge from these exploratory discussions before they are decided upon.

In the opinion of this Government the declaration in paragraph 5 of the draft resolution is too categorical. The reprovisioning of Europe will require the most efficient employment of the shipping resources controlled by each government and of allied resources as a whole and it is desirable that plans to this end be worked out. But such plans would obviously have to be coordinated with other demands upon shipping at the time which cannot now be foreseen nor the degree of their urgency appraised.

In regard to your inquiry as to whether the United States Government would be prepared to allow anything to be said on their behalf at the meeting, my Government suggests that the British representative might make the following brief statement if it is agreeable to the British Government:

"The Government of the United States has been advised of the purpose of this meeting and acquainted with the terms of the draft note which has been distributed and of the draft resolution which is to be presented for consideration. It has requested my Government to state to this meeting its opinion that the undertaking is of great prospective usefulness. It understands that the present discussions will be of an exploratory nature and states that it stands ready at the appropriate time to consider in what respects it can cooperate in accomplishing the aims in view.

It has pointed out that any plans that may be worked out are of great potential interest to the United States for various reasons. They might affect the current American defense effort. According to their substance, form and method they might also affect commercial policies and relationships and even broader post-war arrangements. For these reasons it makes the request that it be kept fully advised regarding the course of these exploratory discussions and that it be consulted regarding any plans that might emerge therefrom."

The Department would appreciate your views as to the advisability and adequacy of all of the foregoing before you communicate a reply to Eden.

WELLES

840.48/5012 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, July 22, 1941—8 p. m.
[Received July 22—4: 05 p. m.]

3137. Regarding your 2703, July 21, 7 p. m., and in answer to last paragraph, I made careful inquiries to make certain that studies suggested would be strictly exploratory and that no position or commit-

ments would be notified without consultation with us. Also that we would be kept currently informed. I very much approve the wording of the reply you suggest be made to Mr. Eden and on confirmation from you will transmit the same to him.

WINANT

840.48/4988

*The Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Director General,
British Ministry of Economic Warfare (Leith-Ross)*

WASHINGTON, July 22, 1941.

MY DEAR SIR FREDERICK: I regret the delay in answering your letter of February 14 in which you add your further thoughts respecting the surplus problems discussed by you and Grady in previous correspondence. My delay in sending this reply must not be taken as indicating any lack of interest in the subject. Quite the contrary, it has resulted from my desire to give my best thought to a matter of first importance, and to the extreme difficulty and complexity of the subject.

In the first place, I cordially agree with your thought that we must coordinate our policies and that we should aim, in so far as practicable, in the direction of joint action. Otherwise, as you say, our commitments may lead us in opposite directions. Furthermore, the need for coordination exists with regard to other aspects of our respective commercial policies and we should have constantly in mind the inter-relationship between action on surplus commodities and the handling of other problems. The thoughts and suggestions which are here set down have been reached after most helpful discussions with Mr. Keynes. I have shown this letter to him and I believe he is in general agreement with its content.

2. The subject has, of course, innumerable aspects and complexities, but our discussions have dealt primarily with certain questions which are dealt with in the following paragraphs and which may be summarized as follows: (1) Whether the emphasis in any plans and steps which may be taken should be on finding a solution of the immediate problems of dealing with present surpluses and of preparing to supply acute European shortage immediately after the war ends, or whether we should concern ourselves primarily with the longer-range problem of bringing about a more orderly marketing of the principal primary products dealt with in international trade with a view to preventing either chronic surplus situation or alternate shortage and glut with consequent wide fluctuations in prices; (2) problems of organization and method, including principally *a*) the question whether the problem should be approached principally by commodities or by countries; *b*) whether the United States and the United

Kingdom as the assisting countries should separately assist different groups of countries, or whether they should both participate in dealing with the problems of each assisted country; *c*) means of preventing arrangements for dealing with surpluses from being thwarted by uncontrolled production in the primary producing countries or by nationalistic economic measures such as trade barriers in the countries of Europe; and (3) the first steps to be taken toward working out a definite solution to all these questions and achieving the desired results.

3. I am inclined to agree with Mr. Keynes that the question whether emphasis should at first be on solving current surplus problems and the problem of supplying Europe's immediate post-war needs, rather than on longer-run arrangements, should be resolved in favor of the former. This view is based on the simple fact that, since these problems will confront us first, the need for finding an answer is most pressing. But while we must place our emphasis there, we cannot ignore the fact that what we do or fail to do with respect to the immediate post-war problem will affect materially our ability to find long-run solutions. I have particularly in mind the fact that our bargaining position vis-à-vis European countries in regard to any contribution we would want them to make toward basic solutions of the surpluses problem will be strongest at the time when their needs which we are offering to meet are greatest. One contribution which they can make to the long-range solution is to avoid the excessive economic nationalism which before the war caused them to erect preposterous trade barriers and otherwise facilitate domestic production of such products as wheat and sugar, to the detriment not only of the more efficient overseas suppliers who depend so largely on disposing of their surpluses by export but to the detriment of consumers in the European countries as well. Cooperation in any other respects which may be important to orderly marketing of primary products internationally should be obtained from European countries when we are in the best position to insist upon it.

4. The question whether the approach to the problem should be by commodities or by countries is one which cannot of course be answered categorically. But I am strongly inclined to the view that the commodity approach will generally be found most feasible for the reason that it will probably be found impracticable to solve a surplus problem for one country unless similar problems in other countries are dealt with simultaneously, and because it will be difficult as a practical matter to deal with all problems of all countries simultaneously. Moreover, if emphasis is to be laid on meeting Europe's immediate post-war needs, the commodity approach will be inevitable as we will have to deal with the products needed, irrespective of source.

5. In the course of our discussions with Mr. Keynes we gave consideration to the manner in which assistance to the various countries in need of it might be allocated between the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom. One suggestion discussed was whether it would be desirable for Great Britain to look after the problem in her own Empire, except Canada, and in Africa, while the United States would have primary responsibility for its own surpluses and in respect of those of Central and South America. I question whether such an arrangement is desirable in principle unless it could be definitely predicated upon the assumption that immediately the war is over, Great Britain and the United States will find themselves able to return to or to maintain a substantially free commercial and monetary system. If the British Government should, unfortunately, not return to a free system, the result of the proposal would be to create enormous balances of blocked sterling throughout the areas of the world outside the Western Hemisphere, with implications of clearing and preferential arrangements in order to utilize the sterling. The parallel implications for dollar balances would exist if this country found the war emergency driving it into similar control devices. It might be preferable, therefore, to have whatever arrangements are taken involve joint (though not necessarily equal) participation by the United States and the United Kingdom. The arrangements with any one raw-material-producing country would then become a tri-partite arrangement involving that country, the United States and the United Kingdom. Something along this line would give the United States and the United Kingdom a joint stake in every program and would be in line with the ideas we have expressed regarding joint action.

6. Means of controlling production are an essential part of any scheme for dealing with surplus problems, and really effective means are extremely difficult to devise and get adopted. In some cases, the solution may lie in a multilateral commodity agreement, involving a general program with respect to exports, stocks and production. Where the approach is that of financial assistance, perhaps the basis for a solution is to be found in Mr. Keynes' suggestion regarding the arrangements between the assisting and the assisted country. His suggestion is that the assisting country go into partnership with the assisted country in solving the problem, each providing a portion of the finance and sharing the ultimate profit or loss on winding up the scheme. He mentions by way of illustration the course followed by Great Britain in her latest arrangement with the Egyptian Government for dealing with cotton and points out that such a scheme does not relieve the assisted country of the onus of making adjustments in its output of surplus commodity.

7. I have already mentioned in another connection the fact that nationalistic economic policies as expressed in promoting domestic production by tariff protection or subsidies to relatively inefficient producers represents a serious obstacle to any long-range solution of the surplus problem and one which will have to be dealt with at the early stage when the greatest possible pressure can be brought against such policies. I need only remark at this point that trade barriers are one of the basic causes of surplus problems and that there should be no slacking up in our efforts in the direction of reducing such barriers. This applies, of course, not only to the European countries whose ill-advised efforts to be self-sufficient are injurious to overseas producers, but to trade barriers elsewhere, since the European countries who seek self-sufficiency at home have done so in part because their efficient producers have been faced with closed or restricted markets abroad. Moreover, the extent of the burden of financing European needs for primary products will be reduced to the extent that Europe can export and thereby finance its own purchases.

8. Conscious of the tremendous difficulty and complexity, and at the same time of the importance, of the subject with which we are dealing, I share the view expressed in your first letter to Mr. Grady, and frequently mentioned in our discussions here, that these problems can only be solved if at the outset we set up some machinery for working them out. I agree with your suggestion that it would be desirable to set up, probably for the present on an entirely informal basis, a joint United States-United Kingdom committee to study further the general lines of policy and later to act as a coordinating body for committees or agencies dealing with various specific projects. Indeed, I consider it essential to making progress toward solutions that we should immediately get organized for the job. I believe that your correspondence with Mr. Grady and with me will contain many ideas and suggestions which will serve as a starting point for the committee's work.

9. Mr. Keynes has suggested, and I agree, that the first job of such a body would be immediately to invite the Governments of occupied areas which are represented in London and Washington to prepare a preliminary list of their probable post-war requirements in order of priority, for, say, the first six months after an armistice. The Anglo-American committee would then study and criticize these data, compare the results with surpluses on hand and prospective.

10. To summarize, the practical steps which we might proceed to take appear to be as follows:

(a) To continue our study of marketing agreements between the producing and stock-holding countries with respect to cocoa, wheat and cotton and to initiate such studies with respect to any other com-

modities where such agreements appear to offer the possibility of successful action.

(b) To initiate a study of the immediate post-war needs of Europe, in the first instance by the Governments of the European countries now resident at London.

(c) To initiate a study of potential supplies available to meet these needs.

(d) To study ways and means of financing the holding of stocks for European needs.

(e) To establish an informal joint committee to coordinate these activities.

Meanwhile we should keep each other informed through such channels as may be most convenient of any action which either Government may take in this general field and pool any experience thus acquired which may be of assistance in connection with any of the numerous aspects of the problem.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON

840.48/5046 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, August 13, 1941—9 p. m.

[Received 9: 05 p. m.]

3615. Your 2703, July 21, 7 p. m. and 2780, July 25, 4 p. m.²³ The letter was delivered to Mr. Eden on July 25 and dated the same day. The following is text of a letter in reply from Mr. Eden dated August 12 and received today:

“Thank you for your letter of 25th July about the proposed Allied meeting.

I am most grateful to you for your help and I am very glad to know that the United States Government consider the proposal to be of prospective usefulness.

In order to explain more fully what we have in mind I should perhaps add that if the proposed Allied meeting produces satisfactory results we hope to approach the United States Government in due course with a view to establishing jointly with His Majesty's Government and later with the other producing or stock holding countries an organization to examine the problem of the re-provisioning of Europe from the point of view of arranging for supplies to be made available. We also hope that eventually information and views might be exchanged between this organization and the proposed Allied bureau. Nor have we overlooked the needs of neutral and enemy countries which might well require consideration and also the needs of countries outside Europe, such, for instance, as China.

²³ Telegram No. 2780 (840.48/5016) authorized the Ambassador to deliver to Mr. Eden the Department's reply which was transmitted in telegram No. 2703, July 21, 7 p. m., p. 100.

I trust that this additional explanation of our ultimate intentions will help to meet to some extent the points which you make in your letter but I am, of course, very ready to give you the necessary assurances in regard to all the matters which you raise. We shall in particular bear in mind the points enumerated in the fourth paragraph of your letter and our intention is to keep the United States Government fully informed of the course of the discussions at the forthcoming meeting and of the work done by the proposed bureau. You can also assure your Government that we will consult them before any concrete plans are decided on.

I have altered paragraph 5 of the resolution to meet the point raised in the fifth paragraph of your letter and I enclose an amended draft for the information of the United States Government. I should be grateful if you would let me know as soon as possible whether they have any further comments on this point.

Finally, I should say that His Majesty's Government are most grateful to the United States Government for authorizing a statement to be made on their behalf at the meeting. The interest shown by the United States Government in these plans will certainly be a source of great satisfaction to allied representatives as it is to His Majesty's Government."

Following is text of amended draft resolution communicated to me with Mr. Eden's letter.

"The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Governments of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, the U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia and the representatives of General de Gaulle, leader of Free Frenchmen agree:

(1) That it is their common aim to see that supplies of food and raw material should be made available for the post-war needs of their territories.

(2) That while each of the Allied Governments and authorities will be primarily responsible for making provision for the economic needs of its own territories, their respective plans should be coordinated in a spirit of collaboration for the successful achievement of the common aim.

(3) That they welcome the preparatory measures which have already been undertaken for this purpose and express their readiness to collaborate to the fullest extent of their power in pursuing the action required.

(4) That, accordingly, each of the Allied Governments and authorities should prepare estimates of the kinds and amounts of foodstuffs and raw materials required for the re-provisioning of its territories and the order of priority in which it would desire supplies to be delivered as soon as circumstances permit.

(5) That the re-provisioning of Europe will require the most efficient employment after the war of the shipping resources controlled by each government and of allied resources as a whole, as well as of those belonging to other European countries and that plans to this end should be worked out as soon as possible between the Allied Governments and authorities, in consultation as and when appropriate with other governments concerned.

(6) That a bureau shall be established by the Government of the United Kingdom under the direction of Sir Frederick Leith-Ross which they could consult in framing estimates of their requirements and which would collate and coordinate these estimates.”

WINANT

840.48/5046 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the
United Kingdom (Winant)*

WASHINGTON, August 20, 1941—11 a. m.

3240. Your 3615, August 13, 9 p. m. and 3637, August 14, 6 p. m.²⁴ Please inform Mr. Eden that we have taken note of the revised language of paragraph number 5 relating to shipping, that it seems adequately to cover the point made in our earlier comment, and that we have no further comment to make.

HULL

840.48/5115 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the
Secretary of State*

London, September 23, 1941—2 p. m.
[Received September 23—10:06 a. m.]

4471. Embassy's 4458, September 22, 7 p. m.²⁵ The Foreign Office informs me that the Allied meeting tomorrow morning will open in private for organization purposes and then be opened to the public with journalists present.

There has been no substantive change in the draft resolution quoted in my No. 3615, August 23 [13], 9 p. m., except in paragraph 6 which now provides that the bureau to be established by the British Government will report to an Inter-Allied committee under the chairmanship of Leith-Ross.

The draft resolution will be proposed in a speech by Mr. Eden during the course of which he will make the statement authorized on behalf of the United States. Mr. Maisky²⁶ will deliver a statement of the policy of the Russian Government. There will be a resolution by the Allied Governments to adhere to the Atlantic Charter.²⁷ The Polish and Czech representatives will separately state their views of the application of the Charter to their countries but according to the Foreign

²⁴ Latter not printed.

²⁵ Not printed.

²⁶ Ivan Maisky, Soviet Ambassador in the United Kingdom.

²⁷ Vol. I, p. 367.

Office these are not in the nature of reservations. The Polish and Czech representatives will also make a joint statement of solidarity. Minutes of the meeting will be supplied to the Embassy.

WINANT

[A report of the Inter-Allied Meeting of September 24, 1941, is printed as British Cmd. 6315, Miscellaneous No. 3 (1941): *Inter-Allied Meeting Held in London at St. James's Palace on September 24, 1941, Report of Proceedings.*]

840.48/5144 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, October 3, 1941—6 p. m.

[Received October 3—2:15 p. m.]

4700. My 4522, September 25,²⁸ and previous regarding meetings of Inter-Allied Council now taking place in London, with particular reference to Mr. Eden's statement²⁹ in telegram above cited regarding Committee of Allied Representatives under chairmanship of Sir Frederick Leith-Ross.

I have received the following letter dated September 27 from Sir Frederick Leith-Ross.

"You will no doubt have seen that the Allied Governments at their meeting on the 24th instant agreed *inter alia* to set up an Inter-Allied Committee under my chairmanship which would consider proposals relating to the estimates of postwar requirements presented by the respective governments and collated by the bureau established for that purpose.

In the message which you authorized Mr. Eden to announce to the Allied Meeting, the United States Government requested that 'it should be kept fully advised regarding the course of these exploratory discussions and consulted as regards any plans which might emanate therefrom'. This statement was warmly welcomed by the Allied representative[s] and Mr. Eden informed them that he had given you an assurance that the United States Government 'will be kept fully informed of the discussions at and arising out of this meeting and of the work accomplished by the bureau and the Inter-Allied Committee and that they will be consulted before any concrete plans are decided upon'.

In pursuance of this assurance, I should be glad to know whether you would see your way to nominate a representative to attend the meetings of the Inter-Allied Committee as an observer on behalf of

²⁸ Not printed; it contained a brief report of the Inter-Allied Meeting of September 24 (840.48/5135½).

²⁹ For text of Mr. Eden's statement, see British Cmd. 6315, Misc. No. 3 (1941), p. 18.

the United States Government. I hope that this may be possible as it would appear to afford the simplest means of insuring that you are kept fully informed as to the discussions which may take place. But if for any reason you cannot fall in with this suggestion, I should be glad to consider any alternative proposal which you may feel able to make in order to provide an appropriate means of consultation.

I may add that it is contemplated that a preliminary meeting of the Committee should be held in the near future to consider the form in which estimates of requirements can most conveniently be drawn up and other technical questions relating to the organization of the preparatory work of the bureau. Thereafter it is not anticipated that the Committee should be required to meet until the estimates of requirements have been received and collated which may take a considerable time."

If the Department approves of Leith-Ross' suggestion that an American representative attend the meetings of the Committee as an observer I shall designate Second Secretary Alan Steyne unless the Department has other wishes in the matter.

WINANT

840.50/2534

The Director General, British Ministry of Economic Warfare (Leith-Ross), to the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson)

[LONDON,] 3 October, 1941.

[Received October 17.]

DEAR MR. ACHESON: I was very glad to get your letter of 22nd July last, dealing with the policy and procedure which might be followed in dealing with the question of export surpluses and post-war European needs. I have submitted it to my Ministers here, who have considered it carefully and authorised me to send you the following reply. They feel that some of the points of principle raised in the earlier paragraphs of your letter need a good deal of further consideration, as they raise issues or have implications extending beyond the field of surpluses and European relief, but they are in full agreement with the practical steps proposed in paragraph 10 of your letter and they welcome the suggestion that these questions should be the subject of further joint study. They believe that the best course would be for me to go over to Washington for a visit in order to explore these questions further, if and when convenient to you. His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington has been requested to approach you on the matter and to ascertain whether you agree, and if so, what date would be convenient to you. From my point of view, it would probably be best that I should not go over for some weeks at any rate, so as to give further time for discussion here of some of

the issues involved, and to enable me to bring over fuller data about prospective European requirements.³⁰

Yours sincerely,

F. W. LEITH-ROSS

840.48/5144 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, October 4, 1941—10 p. m.

4263. Your 4700, October 3, 6 p. m. Department approves American representative attending meetings of the Committee as observer and considers Steyne excellent choice.

HULL

840.50/3828 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, December 29, 1941—5 p. m.

6053. Your 6149, December 19, noon.³¹ Murray³² may attend meetings of agricultural subcommittee until Steere³³ returns. Steyne may participate actively as a member of the committee. In so advising Leith-Ross you should indicate this Government's understanding that any plans elaborated by committee are merely advisory until they have been fully considered by the respective governments.

HULL

DISCUSSIONS REGARDING NEGOTIATION OF A SUPPLEMENTARY
TRADE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE
UNITED KINGDOM; EXTENSION OF DISCUSSIONS TO AUSTRALIA,
NEW ZEALAND, AND THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA³⁴

611.4131/2523

*The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt*³⁵

WASHINGTON, December 16, 1940.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The British mission which is now in the United States investigating means of maintaining British exports

³⁰ In November a reply to this letter was drafted, but it was not sent. The visit of Sir Frederick Leith-Ross to Washington was delayed until the summer of 1942.

³¹ Not printed; it reported the first meeting of the Inter-Allied Committee on Post-War Requirements and asked instructions as to American participation on the agricultural subcommittee.

³² Alton T. Murray, Assistant Agricultural Attaché in the United Kingdom.

³³ Loyd V. Steere, Agricultural Attaché in the United Kingdom.

³⁴ For correspondence regarding the Reciprocal Trade Agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom, signed November 17, 1938, see *Foreign Relations*, 1938, vol. II, pp. 1 ff. For previous preliminary discussions regarding trade agreements with New Zealand and Australia, see *ibid.*, 1937, vol. II, pp. 203 ff., and *ibid.*, 1939, vol. II, pp. 325 ff., respectively.

³⁵ Returned to the Secretary with the notation in margin, "O. K., F. D. R."

to this country has suggested the negotiation of a supplementary trade agreement with the United Kingdom.

At the present time, when our domestic production of commodities likely to be included in such an agreement is at an abnormally high rate, the British are finding it more and more difficult to maintain even the present level of their exports to the United States, owing to the increased British cost of production and other factors.

The supplementary trade agreement envisaged would provide reductions in our duties terminable on short notice at the end of the war, and terminable or adjustable during the war, if unforeseen developments resulted in material harm to any industry affected by the proposed agreement.

Concessions by the British Government, as required under the Trade Agreements Act,³⁸ might take the form of a guarantee of some specific minimum imports of American agricultural products during the war, and reductions of Imperial duty-preferences which would not become fully effective until the end of the war. Such concessions would not impair the value of our duty reductions as a means of helping the British finance their wartime purchases in this country.

I believe that such an agreement would help to implement the general policy of economic assistance to the United Kingdom and also constitute another significant step tending towards the liberalization of world trade.

It would be appreciated if you would inform me as soon as possible whether you approve of our going forward with conversations with the British Government looking towards the immediate negotiation of an agreement along the lines indicated.

Faithfully yours,

CORDELL HULL

611.47H31/116

The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State

No. 289

His Majesty's Ambassador presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and has the honour, at the instance of His Majesty's Government in New Zealand, to inform Mr. Hull that the New Zealand Government propose to send two Ministers to the United States in the near future. The Honourable F. Langstone, Minister of Lands, proposes to visit the United States of America for the purpose of initiating and promoting trade negotiations, particularly as regards the sale of dairy products, meat and other primary products. It is proposed that he should travel by air, leaving Auckland

³⁸ Approved June 12, 1934; 48 Stat. 943.

on May 17th. He will be accompanied by departmental officers in charge of Customs, supply and marketing matters.

The Right Honourable J. G. Coates, a member of the War Cabinet and former Prime Minister of New Zealand, also proposes to visit the United States at the same time for the purpose of organising and expediting arrangements for the supply of munitions necessary to the defence of New Zealand. Both Ministers will be accompanied by personal secretaries.

His Majesty's Government in New Zealand trust that the proposed action will be fully acceptable to the United States Government. They desire to point out that this mission is not a diplomatic one. It is contemplated that the Prime Minister of New Zealand on his return journey through the United States will have an opportunity for discussing the establishment of a permanent Legation in Washington. Mr. Langstone would also be in a position to discuss this question.

WASHINGTON, May 9, 1941.

611.4731/432

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson)

[WASHINGTON,] May 12, 1941.

Participants: The Right Honorable Robert G. Menzies, Prime Minister of Australia; ⁸⁷The Right Honorable Richard G. Casey, Australian Minister; Mr. Acheson

During the course of an evening at the Australian Legation with the Prime Minister I said to him that I hoped before he left Washington we would have an opportunity to discuss the improvement of trade relations between Australia and the United States. Pursuant to that conversation, Mr. Casey made an appointment, and he and the Prime Minister called upon me this afternoon.

I opened the talk by referring to a question which had been asked the Prime Minister at the Press Club luncheon as to whether or not he favored economic collaboration with the United States. The Prime Minister had answered that he not only favored such a policy but suggested that during the war we lay the foundation for closer trade relations by actual experiments.

I said to the Prime Minister that, as he had doubtless learned in conversations with the Secretary, it was the Secretary's view that if nothing were done now there was a serious possibility of the degeneration of trade relations after the war and that only by earnest efforts

⁸⁷The Prime Minister had arrived in Washington on May 9 for a series of conferences with President Roosevelt and other high officials of the Government.

at the present time and a wise handling of the lease-lend arrangements could we avoid a return to extreme nationalism. The Prime Minister stated that he shared this view and believed that the time to undertake discussions was now rather than to wait for the end of the war.

I said that the Department had given considerable thought to the possibility of informally exploring at once by discussions between Australia and the United States, as well as the other British dominions and the United States, whether specific items could be found upon which mutual concessions might be made. I said to him that these discussions ought to be undertaken with the view of having each arrangement stand upon its own feet and that later, and before any formal discussions were announced, the collateral effects upon other members of the British Commonwealth could and should be considered.

The Prime Minister said that he was most interested in this and most sympathetically inclined. He referred to the possibility that as a result of pending election in Australia his term of office might be limited and said that if it were not and he continued in power he would be willing to explore the possibilities immediately and would send to this country responsible people for this purpose, although they might ostensibly come on some other mission.

He asked whether the Department had sufficiently crystallized its ideas to make it possible to give him even the roughest memorandum indicating the direction of our thought, which he might study on the way home. I told him that I would discuss this with the Secretary and that if it were possible we would do so.

He again reiterated his conviction that now was the time to begin such discussions and, if possible, put something practicable into effect, as he shared the fear that at the end of the war it might be very difficult to do so.

DEAN ACHESON

611.4731/427b

The Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Australian Prime Minister (Menzies)

WASHINGTON, May 14, 1941.

MY DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: I was very pleased to have the opportunity on May 12 to discuss with you the desirability of utilizing the present favorable situation for placing our commercial relations on a more permanently satisfactory basis.

I feel strongly that every effort should now be made to work out a mutually beneficial plan which, in addition to contributing to the solution of certain wartime economic problems, would also help to

stabilize conditions after the war and avoid the extremes to which proponents of excessive national self-sufficiency, and perhaps of discriminatory policies, may attempt to go. In this connection I mentioned to you the possibility of negotiating a trade agreement. In compliance with your request, I shall briefly outline the possible general scope of such an agreement and some suggestions regarding procedure.

Cooperation between the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada made possible the negotiation of the mutually satisfactory agreements signed on November 17, 1938,²⁸ involving, among other things, the modification of certain tariff preferences accorded by Canada to the United Kingdom and certain tariff preferences accorded by the United Kingdom to Canada. We envisage a similar approach at this time. An agreement between the United States and Australia would naturally require schedules of concessions by both parties. The Government of Australia doubtless would be interested in the possibility of obtaining reductions in United States duties on Australia's important export products. My Government would be interested in obtaining reductions in the margins of tariff preferences accorded by Australia to certain products of various parts of the British Empire, and the reduction of the absolute level of the Australian tariff on a few products such as lumber. While it is realized that Australia has made commitments to other British Governments to maintain various margins of preference, it is believed that the United Kingdom Government, for example, might be willing to waive its preferences in Australia to the extent of making possible a satisfactory United States-Australian trade agreement, if Australia likewise agreed to such reductions of preferences accorded its products in the United Kingdom market as would make possible a satisfactory supplementary trade agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom.

In negotiating trade agreements during wartime, account must of course be taken of wartime conditions and the uncertainty regarding the post-war economic situation. However, provision can be made for various contingencies by incorporating suitable "escape" clauses in an agreement. For example, under the "wartime escape clause" in the United States-United Kingdom agreement, the United Kingdom has introduced temporary import restrictions on American products included in the agreement without contravening the terms of the agreement. Any United States-Australian agreement would of course

²⁸ For correspondence regarding reciprocal trade agreement negotiations between the United States and the United Kingdom and the United States and Canada, see *Foreign Relations*, 1938, vol. II, pp. 1 ff., and *ibid.*, pp. 164 ff., respectively. For texts of agreements, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 164, or 54 Stat. (pt. 2) 1897; and No. 149, or 53 Stat. (pt. 3) 2348

contain a similar clause. As another example, some provision would probably have to be made to permit action necessary in order to meet foreign-exchange emergencies. Possibly the best way to provide for the adjustment of the agreement to changing conditions would be to set up for the purpose a mixed commission on which both governments would be represented.

Preliminary study in the State Department suggests that a basis might be found for the negotiation of a significant trade agreement between our two countries. I believe that the most satisfactory way of verifying this and of making progress toward possible negotiations is for both parties to get together in confidential exploratory conversations and examine together the detailed facts involved. Formal exchanges of views between the two Governments, in the absence of such conversations, probably would be so general that they would not be very helpful. In contrast, a joint factual examination might well result in a fairly simple solution of problems which in the abstract appear to be extremely complex. While informal exploratory talks would naturally have to be on an *ad referendum* basis so as to insure that the highest quarters in both Governments are in agreement with the possible content of an agreement, I feel certain that both our Governments would be in a better position to judge the situation after exploratory talks had reduced the generalities into comparatively definite terms.

It is therefore suggested that you designate officials of your Government to explore the possibilities of a trade agreement with American officials at Washington. It must be emphasized that such exploratory conversations would have to be highly confidential. It would be extremely unfortunate for there to be any intimation that our Governments are even considering the possibility of a trade agreement, until there is the maximum possible assurance that negotiations for such an agreement would be promptly and successfully concluded. I should also mention that United States trade-agreement procedure requires that public notice be given of intention to negotiate and that an opportunity be given to all interested parties to express their views in writing and at public hearings prior to the undertaking of any definitive negotiations or any definite commitments.

On a previous occasion when similar exploratory discussions of a highly confidential character were undertaken, they were handled for your Government by the Australian Trade Commissioner, Mr. Macgregor,³⁹ who was already here and whose frequent visits to the Department could easily be accounted for on other grounds. If, however, you consider it preferable to send representatives from

³⁹ Lewis Richard Macgregor.

Australia, it is suggested that the mission should have some other stated purpose so as to minimize publicity.

In view of the scope of the Empire preferences and their relation to a possible United States-Australian agreement, it seems obvious that such an agreement could be considerably more comprehensive if the United States negotiated simultaneously with other British Empire Governments, such as the Governments of the United Kingdom, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa. However, there appears to be no reason on this account for delaying confidential exploratory talks between representatives of our two Governments. In fact, concrete progress in United States-Australian exploratory conversations would tend to expedite and facilitate possible simultaneous negotiations with other British countries. You know, of course, that confidential discussions regarding the possibility of a supplementary trade agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom have been in progress for some time.

In closing, I should like to emphasize again my concern regarding the basically unsatisfactory state of commercial relations between the United States and Australia and my conviction that the present uniquely favorable conditions for rectifying the situation should not be allowed to pass without the most serious efforts being made to reach an understanding. It would have been most unfortunate if the acrimony engendered by the state of virtual "trade war" between our countries during 1936 and 1937 had not subsided prior to the outbreak of the present war.

I wish to express my pleasure at having had the opportunity of meeting you and discussing questions of mutual interest. Mr. Hull has requested that I take this opportunity to reiterate his, as well as my own, best personal wishes.

I am [etc.]

DEAN ACHESON

611.47H31/115 : Telegram

The Consul at Wellington (Cox) to the Secretary of State

WELLINGTON, May 15, 1941—7 p. m.

[Received May 15—10:30 a. m.]

My May 10, 11 a. m.⁴⁰ I yesterday suggested to the Acting Prime Minister⁴¹ desirability of amplifying New Zealand Government's objectives in despatching a trade mission to the United States and have today received a statement bearing his approval which states that the intention of the delegation is to resume the trade conversations undertaken by Nash with the Department in July, 1937.

⁴⁰ Not printed.

⁴¹ Walter Nash, Minister of Finance and Customs.

The statement continued "it is considered that the discussions held at that time made useful progress although it was found necessary to defer further negotiations until an agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom had been reached. This agreement having since been finalized New Zealand Government is of the opinion that immediate resumption of negotiations might well prove mutually advantageous.

In view of the understanding then reached and of Mr. Hull's subsequent suggestion in reply to a proposal from New Zealand that the discussions might be usefully continued when the time was considered by both Governments to be opportune, New Zealand Government is hopeful that it may now be possible to agree upon a procedure for the extension of trade between the two countries.

New Zealand Government is also of the opinion that in the special circumstances brought about by the war it is desirable that there should be the maximum consultative cooperation between the United States and the Dominions in the economic field and that trade between the two countries should be facilitated and increased to the greatest possible extent.

It is therefore considered, after consulting with the British Ambassador to Washington, that an opportune time for continuing the discussions which have already taken place has now arrived.

The memorandum ends with the statement that the delegation is expected to arrive Washington May 24th.

There are indications of some official anxiety concerning the abrupt press announcement and members of the mission have informed me they hope that it has not caused [apparent omission]. I am sure the announcement was made through inadvertence due to increased work caused by the departure of the Prime Minister.

The following additional members of mission are Lieutenant Colonel Williams, Technical Adviser to Coates and Messrs. Officer and Turner, private secretaries.

Cox

611.4131/2560

The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, May 16, 1941.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: You will remember that soon after the initiation in November of the informal discussions which have been proceeding on the possibility of a supplementary trade agreement between our two countries certain suggestions as to a basis of negotiation were made. It was proposed *inter alia* that, as a counter-part to certain named concessions to be made by the United States, the

United Kingdom should reduce the margins of Imperial preference on raisins, prunes, canned peaches and pears and fresh apples and pears. It was also proposed that the United Kingdom should undertake to reduce the existing margin of preference on tobacco in 1942.

2. The United Kingdom Government, who are most anxious to maintain and expand their trade with the United States, have carefully considered these proposals. As a contribution to a satisfactory agreement they would be prepared to entertain the suggestion for a reduction in the tobacco preference on the expiration of their existing obligation to maintain it until August 1942, and they trust that you will share their view that the present informal discussions should be continued with a view to finding as soon as possible a mutually satisfactory basis of negotiation.

3. With regard to the preferences on the dried, canned and fresh fruits mentioned above, the United Kingdom Government asked me to point out that they are not free to reduce the margins of preference which are guaranteed to the other Empire Governments concerned without the consent of those Governments. Nor are they in a position to compensate those Governments for the loss of valuable trade in the United Kingdom market which any waiver of their contractual rights would inevitably involve. If, however, the United States Government were disposed to enter into negotiation with some or all of those Governments, the way would be open for a series of arrangements analogous to those made in 1938 between the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada, with results which the United Kingdom Government believe to have been satisfactory to all the parties. Should the United States Government be prepared to consider negotiations on such a basis, the United Kingdom Government would for their part be glad to do everything in their power to contribute to a successful consummation.

4. They feel that a series of agreements covering the widest possible range of trade between the United States and the various parts of the British Commonwealth would make a contribution of vital significance not only to the solution of some of the difficulties created by the war but also to the reconstruction of world trade after the war on a sound and liberal basis. Subject to the views of the United States Government, they would suggest that the wider possibilities envisaged above should be kept prominently in mind in future discussions on the feasibility of a supplementary agreement between the United Kingdom and the United States.

5. Should you see no objection, the United Kingdom Government would like to communicate copies of this letter to the Governments of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, India, Burma, Southern Rhodesia and of the Colonial Empire.

Believe me [etc.]

HALIFAX

611.4131/2560

The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Halifax)

WASHINGTON, May 21, 1941.

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I refer to your note of May 16, 1941, regarding the possibility of negotiating a supplementary trade agreement between our two countries. I share your view that a series of agreements between the United States and various British Empire Governments, on the lines proposed, would make a contribution of vital significance not only to the solution of some of the difficulties created by the war but also to the reconstruction of world trade on a sound and liberal basis. Furthermore, I feel strongly that, if world trade is to be reconstructed on a sound basis, the fundamental problems must be attacked now while circumstances are perhaps uniquely favorable for a reasonable solution.

While it would not be feasible to enter into simultaneous negotiations with all the Governments of the British Empire, the United States Government would be prepared to commence immediately confidential exploratory conversations with the Governments of Australia, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa. I propose therefore to communicate in the very near future with those Governments suggesting that they designate officials to explore in detail with American representatives the feasibility of undertaking the negotiations of the suggested trade agreements.

I have no doubt your Government will agree with me that it is very important that confidential exploratory conversations should precede any formal negotiations. Under present circumstances, it would be particularly undesirable to commence formal negotiations without the maximum possible assurance that such negotiations would be concluded successfully in the shortest possible time. I thus concur in the view that exploratory talks between our two Government[s] should be continued most actively.

As regards the desire of your Government to transmit to the various British Empire Governments copies of your note to me of May 16, 1941, I have, of course, no objections to such procedure.

I am [etc.]

[File copy not signed]

611.4731/432a

The Secretary of State to the Australian Minister (Casey)

WASHINGTON, June 11, 1941.

SIR: I have the honor to refer to a note of May 16, 1941, sent to me by the British Ambassador regarding the possibility of negotiating a supplementary trade agreement between the United States and the

United Kingdom. It is understood that a copy of this note has been transmitted to your Government.

I share the view expressed in the Ambassador's note that a series of agreements between the United States and various British Empire Governments, on the lines proposed, would make a contribution of vital significance not only to the solution of some of the difficulties created by the war but also to the reconstruction of world trade on a sound and liberal basis. I feel strongly that if world trade is to be reconstructed on a sound basis, the fundamental problems must be attacked now while circumstances are perhaps uniquely favorable for a reasonable solution. Furthermore, it is believed a trade agreement between the United States and Australia could, in itself, provide important benefits to both our countries.

This Government envisages discussions between the United States and the various British Empire Governments along the lines of those which culminated in 1938 in trade agreements between the United States and the United Kingdom and between the United States and Canada. It appears, however, that it would be inadvisable to undertake formal negotiations for a trade agreement between the United States and Australia prior to a detailed confidential examination of questions bearing on the practical feasibility of successful negotiations. Under present circumstances, it would be particularly undesirable to commence formal negotiations without the maximum possible assurance that such negotiations would be concluded successfully in the shortest possible time. I should also mention that United States trade-agreement procedure requires that public notice be given of intention to negotiate and that an opportunity be given all interested parties to express their views in writing and at public hearings prior to the undertaking of any formal negotiations or any definitive commitments. While exploratory talks would naturally have to be on an *ad referendum* basis so as to insure that the highest quarters in both Governments are in agreement with the possible contents of a trade agreement, and also in order to conform with procedure required in the United States, I feel certain that both our Governments would be in a better position to judge the situation after exploratory talks had reduced the generalities involved into comparatively definite terms.

This Government has already begun the necessary statistical and other work in preparation for such detailed exploratory discussions and hopes that the Government of Australia, if it is favorably inclined toward the general project, will initiate without delay such similar preparatory work as it considers necessary. It is hoped that at the appropriate time your Government will find it convenient to designate officials to carry on the proposed exploratory discussions at Washington.

For your information, notes similar to this are being sent at once to the Governments of New Zealand ⁴² and the Union of South Africa. ⁴³
Accept [etc.]

CORDELL HULL

611.47H31/119a

The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Halifax)

WASHINGTON, June 11, 1941.

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I refer to your note of April 4, 1941 ⁴⁴ transmitting a communication which you received from the Prime Minister of New Zealand relative to the possibility of increasing the outlet in the United States for export products of New Zealand. Reference is made also to your note of May 16, 1941 regarding the possibility of negotiating a supplementary trade agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom, a copy of which, it is understood, has been transmitted to the Government of New Zealand.

I would appreciate it if you would inform the Government of New Zealand that it appears that the negotiation of a trade agreement between the United States and New Zealand would be the best practical manner of increasing the export of New Zealand products to the United States. As I have previously informed you, in reply to your note of May 16, 1941, I share your view that a series of agreements between the United States and various British Empire Governments, on the lines proposed, would make a contribution of vital significance not only to the solution of some of the difficulties created by the war but also to the reconstruction of world trade on a sound and liberal basis. I feel strongly that if world trade is to be reconstructed on a sound basis, the fundamental problems must be attacked now while circumstances are perhaps uniquely favorable for a reasonable solution. Furthermore, it is believed a trade agreement between the United States and New Zealand could, in itself, provide important benefits to both countries.

This Government envisages discussions between the United States and the various British Empire Governments along the lines of those which culminated in 1938 in trade agreements between the United States and the United Kingdom and between the United States and Canada. It appears, however, that it would be inadvisable to undertake formal negotiations for a trade agreement between the United States and New Zealand prior to a detailed confidential examination of questions bearing on the practical feasibility of successful negotia-

⁴² See *infra*.

⁴³ Note to the Government of the Union of South Africa was the same, *mutatis mutandis*, as the note here printed.

⁴⁴ Not printed.

tions. Under present circumstances, it would be particularly undesirable to commence definitive negotiations without the maximum possible assurance that such negotiations would be concluded successfully in the shortest possible time. I should also mention that United States trade-agreement procedure requires that public notice be given of intention to negotiate and that an opportunity be given all interested parties to express their views in writing and at public hearings prior to the undertaking of any formal negotiations or any definitive commitments. While exploratory talks would naturally have to be on an *ad referendum* basis so as to insure that the highest quarters in both Governments are in agreement with the possible contents of a trade agreement, and also in order to conform with procedure required in the United States, I feel certain that both Governments would be in a better position to judge the situation after exploratory talks had reduced the generalities involved into comparatively definite terms.

This Government has already begun the necessary statistical and other work in preparation for such detailed exploratory discussions and hopes that the Government of New Zealand, if it is favorably inclined toward the general project, will initiate without delay such similar preparatory work as it considers necessary. It is hoped that at the appropriate time the Government of New Zealand will find it convenient to designate officials to carry on the proposed exploratory discussions at Washington.

For your information, notes similar to this are being sent at once to the Governments of Australia and the Union of South Africa.

Sincerely yours,

CORDELL HULL

611.47H31/138

The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Acting Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, July 7, 1941.

MY DEAR MR. ACTING SECRETARY: With reference to the Secretary's letter of the 11th June, in which he asked me to inform the Government of New Zealand that the negotiation of a Trade Agreement between the United States and that Dominion would be the best practical manner of increasing the export of New Zealand products to the United States, I am writing to inform you, at the instance of H. M. Government in New Zealand, that they will be very glad to take part in the discussions suggested in Mr. Hull's letter under reference.

They also ask me to inform you that the delegation under the Honourable F. Langstone, which is at present visiting the United States with a view *inter alia* to initiating negotiations for a Trade Agreement between the United States and New Zealand, includes Mr. J. D. P. Johnsen, an officer of the New Zealand Customs Depart-

ment, which is normally responsible for conducting such negotiations. They hope, therefore, that the United States Government will find it convenient to arrange for discussions at an early date. They add that the preparatory work has been completed by the New Zealand representatives to enable exploratory discussions to commence.

Believe me [etc.]

HALIFAX

611.4731/435 : Telegram

The Chargé in Australia (Minter) to the Secretary of State

CANBERRA, July 15, 1941—2 p. m.

[Received July 15—9:47 a. m.]

33. Department's No. 22, June 25.⁴⁵ Delegation sailing July 25 on SS *Monterrey* consists of Edwin McCarthy and J. Richardson of Commerce and Jacob Fletcher, A. C. Nolan and A. C. B. Edwards of Customs. Please request customs courtesies at Los Angeles.

McCarthy carries authority to discuss shipping supply and the like. This constitutes the ostensible reason for the visit.

Air mail report follows.

MINTER

611.4731/436

The Australian Minister (Casey) to the Secretary of State

No. 143/41

WASHINGTON, July 18, 1941.

SIR: With reference to your note of June 11th 1941, concerning the possibility of negotiating a trade agreement between the United States and the Commonwealth of Australia, I have the honour to inform you that a copy of your communication was forwarded to my Government, which has now instructed me to convey to you the following reply.

The Commonwealth Government greatly appreciates the invitation of the United States Government to designate Australian officials to carry out exploratory trade discussions in Washington. The Commonwealth Government shares the view of the United States Government that a trade agreement between the United States and Australia, as part of a series of agreements between the United States and the various British Empire Governments, would not only be of direct and substantial assistance in resolving special difficulties of exchange and commerce created by the present war, but would also be an important element in the reconstruction of world trade after the war on a liberal and mutually beneficial basis.

⁴⁵ Not printed; it stated that the Department would be ready for discussions about August 1, 1941 (611.4731/433).

The Commonwealth Government believes that nothing but good can result from the examination now of some of the fundamental questions which it is already apparent will arise in connection with the problem of the restoration of international commerce after the war. It is, therefore, particularly gratified with the proposal that detailed trade discussions should take place, as these will provide an opportunity for the exchange of ideas in this general direction. Moreover, the Commonwealth Government believes, in common with the United States Government, that a trade agreement between the United States and Australia concluded on such a basis would be to the mutual advantage of both countries.

In accordance with the invitation of the United States Government and in conformity with the procedure suggested, the Commonwealth Government, therefore, has designated for the exploratory conversations in Washington an official of the Australian Department of Commerce and an official of the Australian Department of Trade and Customs. It is proposed that these officials should reach Washington towards the end of August, provided this suggested date of arrival is convenient to the United States Government.⁴⁶ In the meanwhile, the preparatory work necessary from the Australian side for the contemplated conversations is being undertaken.

I have [etc.]

CASEY

611.48A31/84 : Telegram

The Minister in the Union of South Africa (Keena) to the Secretary of State

CAPETOWN, September 5, 1941—5 p. m.

[Received 7:05 p. m.]

87. Referring to the Department's telegram No. 50, August 22, 8 p. m.⁴⁷ A delegation consisting of Dr. P. R. Viljoen, Secretary for Agriculture and Forestry and John D. Heddon, former Commissioner of Customs, 1930-1940, with two or three assistants, will proceed to the United States by the first available steamer according to a Government decision taken yesterday.

They will probably sail from Capetown within the next few days. Details regarding route and probable date of arrival in the United States will be telegraphed as soon as possible.

KEENA

⁴⁶ Mr. Alan S. Watt of the Australian Legation, who drafted this note of July 18, telephoned the Department of State that the phrase "provided this suggested date of arrival is convenient" was merely rhetorical, as the Legation had been previously informed that it was all right. He also stated that he did not consider that the note called for any reply from the Department.

⁴⁷ Not printed; it indicated the readiness of the United States Government to commence exploratory talks regarding a trade agreement (611.48A31/82).

611.4731/443a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Australia (Johnson)

WASHINGTON, September 10, 1941—9 p. m.

38. Exploratory trade-agreement discussions with the Australians are proceeding and as any leakage of information regarding details of the discussions would arouse such domestic opposition as might seriously jeopardize the whole project, please contact immediately the Prime Minister personally and emphasize in the strongest possible terms the importance of avoiding any such leakage.

HULL

611.48A31/86

The South African Minister (Close) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 11 September, 1941.

The Minister of the Union of South Africa presents his compliments to the Honourable the Secretary of State and has the honour, with reference to the confidential discussions held between members of the Legation and the State Department in connection with a proposed Trade Agreement between the Union of South Africa and the United States of America, to state that the Government of the Union of South Africa has decided to send a delegation to the United States to conduct preliminary discussions in connection with the matter with representatives of the United States Government.

The delegation will be constituted as follows:—

Delegate: Dr. P. R. Viljoen, Secretary for Agriculture and Forestry, and member of the External Trade Relations Committee of the Union of South Africa.

Advisers: Mr. J. von Eden, Chief Clerk and Statistician in the Department of Customs and Excise;

Dr. A. J. Beyleveld, Economist in the Department of Agriculture and Forestry;

and

Mr. D. G. Malan, Economic Adviser in the Department of Commerce and Industries.

Mr. A. T. Brennan, Commercial Counsellor-designate to the South African Legation, Washington, should his services be required by the delegation.

The delegation will be under the general supervision and control of the Minister, and will not engage in any activity other than that indicated in the preceding paragraphs.

The delegation sailed for the United States from Cape Town on September 10th, 1941, by the S.S. *President Grant* and should there-

fore arrive at New York towards the end of the current month, or early in October, 1941.

It is hoped that the particulars given above will, under the special circumstances, be held to be a sufficient compliance with the requirements outlined in the Note of August 19th, 1941, from the State Department.⁴⁸

The Minister would be grateful for such courtesies and free entry privileges as can be extended to the delegation upon their arrival in New York.

[These trade agreement exploratory discussions were carried on for some time but did not lead to the opening of actual negotiations, apparently because of critical war conditions and the handling of wartime trade through lend-lease operations.]

⁴⁸ Not found in Department files.

CANADA

OPPOSITION OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO PROPOSAL FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CANADIAN MILITARY MISSION IN WASHINGTON

842.20/192

*The Canadian Legation to the Department of State*¹

1. The Canadian Government desire to establish a Canadian Military Mission in Washington, and wish to secure the approval of the Government of the United States for this course.

2. The proposal has already been communicated to the United Kingdom Government, and has been discussed with the representatives of the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff who are now in Washington.

3. The Canadian Government feel very strongly that the recommendations concerning their representation in Washington which were made in the ABC² Report (Western Hemisphere Defence Plan No. 1) are inadequate. They consider that problems of joint action in the western Atlantic, and possibly in the eastern Pacific, can best be handled by the establishment of a separate organization rather than by any method of Canadian representation on the United Kingdom Mission. The activities of a Canadian Mission would be primarily directed towards these problems.

4. The Canadian Government would consider the possibility of appointing as members of a Canadian Military Mission the Service members of the Canadian Section of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence.

5. The Canadian Government would be most happy to receive a similar United States Military Mission in Ottawa.

6. The Canadian Government are intimately concerned in any questions affecting the defence of Newfoundland, and hope that consideration of any such questions as between the United Kingdom Mission and the United States authorities will be deferred until adequate Canadian representation has been arranged. It will be recalled that these matters are covered by the Protocol between the Governments of the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States of March 27, 1941,³ and are under consideration by the Permanent Joint Board on Defence.

¹ Handed to Mr. John D. Hickerson, Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs, by Mr. Hume Wrong, Minister-Counselor of the Canadian Legation, on July 1.

² American, British, and Canadian.

³ See bracketed note, p. 85.

7. Pending the approval of the United States Government for the establishment of a Canadian Military Mission, and in the interim period before the Mission can be established, the Canadian Service Attachés in Washington will maintain the closest possible liaison with the British Mission. It is hoped that the United States authorities will agree that they should attend joint meetings between the British Mission and the United States Service Departments. If this is acceptable, it will be understood that the Canadian Service Attachés are acting in their capacity as such, and not as members of the British Mission.

842.20/196

The Secretary of the Navy (Know) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, July 21, 1941.

SIR: The Navy Department has given careful consideration to the procedure to be followed in effecting cooperation between the military authorities of Canada and the United States, both in the preparation of plans and in the conduct of operations in which military cooperation is involved.

As the result of the Ogdensburg Declaration of 17 August 1940⁴ there now exists the Permanent Joint Board on Defense which is the established agency for consideration of matters pertaining to the joint defense of the two nations. Matters of a purely military nature are handled through the military, naval and air attachés in Ottawa and Washington. In addition to the foregoing, it may be desirable at times to arrange conferences between special representatives of the Chief of Naval Operations and of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff concerned on military matters of sufficient importance to require special representation. The ease of travel between Ottawa and Washington facilitates the holding of such conferences.

In the opinion of the Navy Department the foregoing methods of military consultation are adequate to present needs, and the establishment of a Military Mission is unnecessary. Moreover, its establishment would offer a precedent for the establishment of similar Military Missions by certain other British Dominions and by the American Republics. For the last named reason the establishment of a Canadian Military Mission is not desirable.

The presence of the appropriate Canadian representatives at conferences between the Navy Department and the British Joint Staff Mission in which Canadian interests are involved is agreeable to the Navy Department.

⁴The Canadian Prime Minister, Mackenzie King, and President Roosevelt, meeting at Ogdensburg, New York, on August 17, 1940, issued a joint statement, released to the press the following day, of their agreement to set up a Permanent Joint Board on Defense. For text of the statement, see *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. III, p. 146.

The Navy Department intends to be represented in Canada only by its Naval Attaché,⁵ plus Despatch Officers who may be charged with liaison duties with respect to shipping. However, if the Canadian Government should insist on a stronger military representation in Washington, the Navy Department will offer no objection to the establishment, in Washington, of permanent offices for the Canadian military members of the Canadian-United States Permanent Joint Board on Defense. Under this plan, military cooperation between the United States Chief of Naval Operations⁶ and the Chief of Staff,⁷ and the Canadian Chiefs of Staff, would be effected through the medium of this Board.

The Canadian Government can be assured that it will be consulted before the United States takes any action on matters which may affect Canadian responsibilities with respect to the defense of Newfoundland.

Respectfully,

FRANK KNOX

842.20/198

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Hickerson)

[WASHINGTON,] July 25, 1941.

Mr. Wrong, Minister Counselor of the Canadian Legation, called at the Department today at my request to discuss the Canadian proposal which was informally put forward on July 1⁸ to establish a Canadian Military Mission in Washington.

I explained to Mr. Wrong that we had immediately upon receipt of his proposal taken it up with the War and Navy Departments; that in so doing we had commented that from the standpoint of general policy the Department of State would welcome the establishment of such a Canadian mission in Washington but that recognizing that this was primarily a military matter we would be disposed to defer to the judgment of the Service Departments in it.

I then told Mr. Wrong that replies had now been received from the War⁹ and Navy Departments,¹⁰ the latter one having just reached me. I explained that the War and Navy Departments had collaborated with one another in studying this question and in preparing their replies; that the replies were, although identical in substance, different in the amount of details that were set forth regarding the reasons for an adverse decision. I stated that for purposes of discussion it therefore seemed to me desirable to use as a basis the Navy Department's letter of

⁵ Capt. Oliver M. Read.

⁶ Adm. Harold R. Stark.

⁷ Gen. George C. Marshall.

⁸ *Ante*, p. 129.

⁹ Not printed.

¹⁰ *Supra*.

July 21, 1941. I then went over the Navy Department's letter of July 21 with Mr. Wrong sentence by sentence and he took a number of notes concerning it. I told Mr. Wrong it seemed to us that the Navy Department had made out a convincing case against the desirability of establishing a Canadian Military Mission in Washington.

Mr. Wrong said that he would send a report along these lines to the Canadian Government. He expressed appreciation for the friendly and informal way in which we had dealt with this matter and inquired whether if his Government had further observations to make we would be disposed to give consideration to them. I replied that of course we would give the fullest consideration to any further observations or representations which the Canadian Government might wish to make.

J[OHN] D. H[ICKERSON]

842.20/197 : Telegram

The Minister in Canada (Moffat) to the Secretary of State

OTTAWA, August 18, 1941—noon.

[Received 1:38 p. m.]

218. For Secretary and the Under Secretary. Department's mail instruction No. 574 of July 30.¹² The Prime Minister, in saying good-by before starting for London tomorrow, told me that there is only one matter in the field of Canadian-American relations that is seriously troubling him at the moment: namely prolonged refusal to allow Canada to have her own military mission in Washington. Mr. King felt that our decision was probably based on service considerations but in his opinion much more is involved. I have sensed for some time here the feeling that Canadian contacts with American military and naval authorities are more and more being funneled through British channels coupled with an unfortunate suspicion that the British in Washington had been consciously sidetracking the Canadians.

In any event Mr. King believes that Canadian relations both vis-à-vis the United States and the United Kingdom would be on a sounder basis if a Canadian military mission were accepted in Washington and that public opinion in Canada would have greater confidence if Canadian military mission representation in the United States were on as direct and as independent a basis as would be implicit in the sending and receiving of such a mission. He urged with great earnestness that the American Government reconsider its rejection of the Canadian request and that in the reconsideration at least as much weight be given to the political considerations involved as to service considerations.

MOFFAT

¹² Not printed.

842.20/203

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Minister in Canada (Moffat)

During a talk with Mr. Pearson¹³ on another matter, he brought up the question of the Canadian desire to have a military mission in Washington. He said that at the meeting of Council last Tuesday where the War Cabinet and the three Chiefs of Staff (Army, Navy and Air Corps) were present, a memorandum had been read from Mr. Keenleyside¹⁴ in which he quoted me as indicating that probably we were further apart on nomenclature than we were on substance. Some discussion had then arisen as to whether a mission could be set up as a permanent office of the Joint Defense Board. The decision was adverse, partly on the ground that they did not feel that the matters for discussion properly belonged to the Permanent Joint Defense Board, but more particularly on the ground that the personnel involved would not suit them at all. There was a good deal of discussion as to making us some other proposition and although no decision was reached the idea was to suggest calling it by some name which would contain the word "technical" which, given our special supply situation, would probably not create a precedent that would come home to plague us.

All of this Mr. Pearson was telling me by way of background and in a measure off the record. The formal decision reached was to do nothing until the United States Government had replied to Mr. King's informal request through me for reconsideration. I told him that that reply would not be given for eight or ten days as our people wished to explore the ground further, and notably as Hickerson wished to talk the thing out in greater detail with Keenleyside in New York next week.

OTTAWA, September 5, 1941.

842.20/204

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Minister in Canada (Moffat)

At lunch today I discussed with Mr. Robertson¹⁵ the question of Canada's desire to have a Military Mission in Washington. I explained that our Services saw a great disadvantage in having at one and the same time the Permanent Joint Defense Board and a Military Mission, unless the latter were merely a name to cover the Service members of the Permanent Joint Defense Board who would reside

¹³ Lester B. Pearson, Canadian Assistant Secretary of State for External Affairs.

¹⁴ Hugh L. Keenleyside, Secretary of the Canadian section of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense.

¹⁵ Norman A. Robertson, Canadian Under Secretary of State for External Affairs.

permanently in Washington. We had always understood that if the United States became a full belligerent the Permanent Joint Defense Board would go into abeyance, to be resurrected at the end of the war, but this stage had not yet been reached. Look at it as they would, our people could not see the advantage of two separate bodies with different personnel discussing the same subjects with the United States Government. I had been forced to conclude that Canada's interest in the Mission was largely psychological and that for domestic reasons she attached importance to the title of "Mission" and to having constant interchanges between our respective Services rather than occasional meetings plus intermediate telephone conversations. I then told Mr. Robertson that I continued to feel that the Canadian request had never been made very specific either as to personnel or as to the functions of the Mission.

Mr. Robertson said that this conversation put a somewhat different light on the matter and that he would see that it was rediscussed in Cabinet and a definite statement given us of Canadian desires. Personally, he felt that since in effect we had passed amicably from stage one to stage two in the matter of Naval Command, there was no longer the same urgency as formerly for a Mission. But that opinion should not be taken as reflecting either the Cabinet or the Service Chiefs of Staff.

OTTAWA, September 25, 1941.

842.20/203

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Canada (Moffat)

No. 677

WASHINGTON, October 16, 1941.

SIR: I refer to your telegram no. 218 of August 18, noon, reporting your conversation with the Prime Minister in which he requested a reconsideration by the Government of the United States of the Canadian proposal to send a military mission to Washington.

This matter was, upon the receipt of your telegram, taken up again with the Secretaries of War and Navy in formal communications in which the Prime Minister's views and your own comments in the telegram under reference were fully set forth.

I now enclose a copy of a letter from the Secretary of the Navy dated September 30, 1941 and from the Secretary of War dated October 8, 1941¹⁰ in reply to the request of this Department that the Canadian proposal be reconsidered in the light of Mr. King's request.

¹⁰ Neither printed. Both Secretaries requested that ". . . the State Department make a formal proposal to the Canadian Government for the early establishment in Washington of permanent offices of the Canadian military members of the Canadian-United States Permanent Joint Board on Defense." (842.20/-200, 201)

Before these letters from the War and Navy Departments were drafted, officers of those Departments conferred at length informally with officers of the Department of State in regard to this matter. As a consequence of Mr. King's request, the matter again was given the most careful study in the three Departments.

You will observe that both the War and Navy Departments, after a careful reconsideration of this question, suggest that a counter proposal be made to the Canadian Government for the early establishment in Washington of permanent offices of the Canadian military members of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense. You will note that the War and Navy Departments state that the work of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense has been most valuable and that this work should not be interrupted nor weakened by the establishment of any additional agency having an overlapping cognizance of military matters as would necessarily be the case were a separate military mission to be established. The War and Navy Departments further feel that if the military members of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense were frequently present in the same city a far better and more direct liaison would be established and the value of the Board's work would be enhanced; they further express the view that the Permanent Joint Board on Defense actually would accomplish all that a separate military mission could accomplish, and even more.

The War and Navy Departments, you will note, further point out that an acceptance of this counter proposal by the Canadian Government would avoid creating a precedent which might be cited by other members of the British Commonwealth and foreign governments for the establishment of military missions in Washington.

You are requested to take up this matter informally with the Prime Minister, or if you deem it desirable, with Mr. Robertson, the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, along the lines of the letters from the War and Navy Departments. You should point out that the Department of State has again given the most careful consideration to this whole question but that it is inclined to the view that the Secretaries of War and the Navy make an excellent case for the counter proposal that the Canadian military members of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense establish offices in Washington.

You may add that should it be found desirable by the Canadian Government to send to Washington, permanently or from time to time, alternates to the Canadian service members of the Board, there would be no objection to this procedure on the part of the United States authorities; indeed the practice of alternates to the service members attending meetings of the Board has on several occasions in the past already been employed.

Similarly, if the Canadian Government should feel that it would be desirable for the Canadian service members of the Permanent Joint

Board on Defense to have a working title to distinguish their activities in Washington from the proceedings of the entire Board, no difficulty is anticipated on that score.

The Navy Department's letter of September 30 suggests that if this counter proposal is acceptable to the Canadian Government, it would appear desirable that most of the formal meetings of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense be held in Washington. In an informal discussion of this suggestion with an officer of the Department of State, it has been further suggested that a regular monthly meeting in Washington of the entire Board might well be found desirable.

It is our hope that this counter proposal will be found acceptable by the Canadian Government.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:
SUMNER WELLES

**ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA
RESPECTING VISITS IN UNIFORM BY MEMBERS OF DEFENSE
FORCES**

[For text of arrangement between the United States and Canada respecting visits in uniform by members of defense forces, effected by exchange of notes August 28 and September 4, 1941, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 233, or 55 Stat. (pt. 2) 1551.]

**ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA
RESPECTING COMMITTEES ON ECONOMIC COOPERATION**

[For text of arrangement between the United States and Canada respecting committees on economic cooperation, effected by *aide-mémoire* dated March 17, June 6, and June 17, 1941, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 228, or 55 Stat. (pt. 2) 1444.]

**EFFORTS OF THE UNITED STATES TO SECURE FAIR PARTICIPATION
WITH BRAZIL IN THE CANADIAN COTTON MARKET**

561.321D1 Advisory Committee/64 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Brazil (Caffery)

WASHINGTON, September 15, 1941—11 p. m.

804. 1—The decline in exports of American cotton to Canada during the past 2 years is viewed with serious concern by the Government of the United States, and it is considered necessary to adopt appropriate measures to restore the Canadian market for American cotton.

2—Accordingly, the Department of Agriculture has decided to inaugurate at an early date an export program designed to revive the exportation of American cotton to Canada.

3—This decision is based primarily on the following considerations:

The United States has traditionally supplied practically all of the requirements of Canadian cotton mills. In the marketing season ending July 31 this year it supplied less than one-half. In view of the present disparity in prices between United States and Brazilian cotton it seems certain that, failing action by the United States Government, the United States share of the market in the current marketing year will be negligible.

4—While it is necessary to proceed at once with the program indicated, this Government is prepared to discuss with representatives of the Brazilian Government the immediate problem of fair participation by both countries in one of the few cotton markets still open to them. At the same time it continues to believe that a joint approach to the world cotton problem by the principal countries concerned offers the only likely prospects of reaching ultimately a satisfactory solution. It is encouraging to note in this connection that the Brazilian Government is participating through its representation on the cotton subcommittee of the Inter-American Financial and Economic Advisory Committee as well as through the International Cotton Advisory Committee in discussions looking toward the negotiation of an international cotton agreement.¹⁷ Such agreement would represent a marked advance toward improvement of basic economic conditions in this Hemisphere as well as other parts of the world.

5—You are requested to communicate the substance of the above to the appropriate Brazilian authorities and to say that this Government is prepared to enter immediately into discussions regarding the matter. We would be glad to send a competent officer to Rio for this purpose but it might be preferable, in view of the interest of the Canadian Government in the subject, for the Brazilian Government to send here a competent official who is familiar with the problem. Since Mr. Garibaldi Dantas on his previous visit here discussed this subject informally with our officials and in view of the fact that he is Brazil's representative on the International Cotton Advisory Committee, the Brazilian Government may wish to detail him for this purpose.

¹⁷ In April 1941 representatives of the Department of State and the Department of Agriculture participated in informal conversations with officials of the British Embassy and with José Garibaldi Dantas, Brazilian representative on the International Cotton Advisory Committee. The result of these conversations was the preparation of a memorandum outlining the possible bases for an international cotton agreement which was submitted to the cotton subcommittee of the Inter-American Financial and Economic Advisory Committee as a proposal of the United States.

For Your Background Information:

A—In the past the United States has provided virtually all of the Canadian market for cotton, supplying during the 5 years ending 1939–40 an average of approximately 300,000 bales a year. Since the fall of 1940 the spread between prices of cotton in the United States and in Brazil has been such as to encourage large shipments of Brazilian cotton into Canada with the result that in the last marketing year, ending July 31, the United States shipped only 194,000 bales of cotton to Canada, whereas Brazil appears to have shipped approximately 450,000 bales to Canada. Thus far in the current marketing year, beginning August 1, there have been virtually no sales of United States cotton to Canada, whereas substantial sales of Brazilian cotton to Canada have been reported.

B—At the present time the price of American cotton laid down in Canada is approximately 19.25 cents a pound, whereas it is understood that Brazilian cotton is being laid down in Montreal for 12.5 cents. While it is believed that Canadian spinners are willing to pay a slight premium for American cotton over Brazilian, it is evident that they are unwilling to pay such a difference as indicated by the above figures. The price of United States cotton laid down in Montreal a year ago was 10.75 cents.

C—The Department of Agriculture proposes to put into effect two programs. It is proposed first of all to announce that cotton owned by the Commodity Credit Corporation as a result of loans on the 1937 crop will be offered for sale for export at its cost to the United States Government. This represents approximately 12½ cents a pound. It is proposed secondly to announce from time to time rates of payment on cotton moving for export calculated to be sufficient to bring United States cotton laid down in Canada on a par with Brazilian.

D—As an indication of the seriousness with which the loss of the Canadian market for American cotton is regarded in this country reference may be made to a Bill, S-1831,¹⁸ now pending on the Senate calendar which prohibits the use of Federal funds for the acquisition of any raw cotton of foreign origin or of any articles containing such cotton and would make void any existing contract for the acquisition thereof with such funds. Its practical effect would be to prevent the use of defense funds for the purchase of any article manufactured in whole or in part from Brazilian cotton.

E—In view of the increasing pressure on ships for essential Brazil-United States services, it is becoming increasingly difficult to explain the use of space for carrying cotton to Canada from such a far-distant source.

HULL

¹⁸ *Congressional Record*, vol. 87, pt. 6, p. 6963, and *ibid.*, pt. 7, p. 7115.

561.321D1 Advisory Committee/64

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Canada (Moffat)

No. 629

WASHINGTON, September 16, 1941.

The Secretary of State transmits, for the information of the Legation, a copy of a telegram which is being sent to the American Ambassador to Brazil¹⁹ regarding the provision which is being made in the cotton program of the United States for the exportation of cotton to Canada.

The Legation is requested to communicate to the appropriate Canadian authorities the substance of the first four paragraphs of the telegram.

561.321D1 Advisory Committee/64 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Brazil (Caffery)

WASHINGTON, September 16, 1941—5 p. m.

808. Department's 804, September 15, 11 p. m. Department of Agriculture will release to press for afternoon papers of Wednesday, September 17, announcement of decision to make available for export cotton owned by Commodity Credit Corporation. See paragraph C of telegram under reference.

HULL

561.321D1 Advisory Committee/64 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Brazil (Caffery)

WASHINGTON, September 25, 1941—midnight.

856. Department's 804 September 15 and your 1314 September 19.²⁰ Please advise appropriate Brazilian authorities that the Secretary of Agriculture has approved and will announce by not later than October 1 the export payment part of the program referred to in paragraph (C) of the telegram under reference.

Please ascertain when Brazilian representative, if his appointment is approved, might arrive in Washington to discuss the question of the sharing of the Canadian market during the current marketing season for American cotton.

HULL

¹⁹ *Supra.*

²⁰ Latter not printed.

561.321D1 Advisory Committee/66 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Brazil (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

RIO DE JANEIRO, September 26, 1941—noon.

[Received 1:02 p. m.]

1359. Department's 856, September 24 [25], midnight. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been informed. It has decided to send Dantas to Washington at the earliest possible date. He expects to arrive there not later than October 15 and earlier if plane reservations can be obtained. Presidential approval for his trip has not yet been obtained but is regarded as merely a formality.

The Brazilian authorities have evidenced concern with respect to the possible effects of the program. They may ask that, in view of their willingness to discuss division of the Canadian market, the part of the program referred to in Department's telegram No. 856 of September 24 be deferred pending discussions with Dantas in Washington. The Embassy assumes from the Department's telegram No. 804, September 15, 11 p. m., and the obvious possibility of hurried Brazilian sales to Canada if this part of the program becomes known to the trade, that such a request would be fruitless, and has so told the Brazilian authorities informally.

Dr. Dantas, who is now in Rio de Janeiro conferring with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning the program, doubts whether it will have much immediate effect on Brazilian cotton sales to Canada as Canadian mills are understood to have heavy stocks of raw cotton and he believes no important sales of Brazilian cotton are currently being made to them although some appreciable quantities remain to be shipped from past sales.

The Brazilian authorities are exceedingly hopeful that as a result of Dantas' trip a fair arrangement with respect to the Canadian market and possibly with respect to other markets can be worked out. They have taken steps to prevent unfavorable press comment which might arise from the program.

Inform Agriculture.

CAFFERY

561.321D1 Advisory Committee/70 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Brazil (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

RIO DE JANEIRO, October 2, 1941—10 p. m.

[Received October 2—3:30 a. m.]

1416. Embassy's telegram No. 1359, September 26, noon. The Embassy has this afternoon received a note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated September 29 stating that the Brazilian Government agrees in principle with the proposal of the United States

Government submitted September 17 that the Brazilian Government send to Washington a representative to study jointly the bases of an agreement for the equitable distribution in the Canadian market of Brazilian and American cotton. The note states also that José Garibaldi Dantas has been selected to represent the Brazilian Government for the above purpose and that he will proceed to Washington by plane where he should arrive about the middle of October.

As anticipated in the Embassy's telegram No. 1359 of September 26 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs requests at the same time that until the agreement is reached the export subsidy program which it understood would be put into effect on October 1 be withheld. The Embassy believes that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs transmitted a similar request to the Brazilian Embassy in Washington on or about September 25 after the Embassy informed the Ministry that the export payment program had been approved and would be announced but not later than October 1st.

It is believed not unlikely that if the export payment program which the Embassy understands was put into effect on September 29 were suspended the Brazilian Government would take advantage of the occasion to raise its minimum export prices on cotton. (See the Embassy's telegram No. 601, June 6, 9 p. m.)²¹

CAFFERY

561.321D1 Advisory Committee/70 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Brazil (Caffery)

WASHINGTON, October 9, 1941—11 p. m.

928. Your 1416, October 2. With reference to the Brazilian request that the export subsidy be withheld, you may reply to the Foreign Ministry's note along the following lines:

1. At the time that the cotton export program was decided upon, the Canadians had already purchased enough cotton from Brazil to supply a large part of their cotton needs during the current marketing year for American cotton and, since it appeared that such purchases would continue and that the deferring of action pending the proposed discussions would result in still fewer market opportunities in Canada this year for American cotton, the Brazilian authorities were informed at the time discussions were proposed (Paragraph 4 of Department's 804, September 15) that it would be necessary to proceed at once with the program.

2. The subsidy part of the program, which the Brazilian authorities were informed (Department's 856, September 25) would be announced not later than October 1, was announced September 27, prior to your receipt of the request under reference. Although a member of the Brazilian Embassy informed an officer of the Department on the

²¹ Not printed.

day of this announcement by the Department of Agriculture that it would be convenient if this Government avoided putting into effect the export subsidy which, his Government was informed, would go into effect on October 1, postponement was not considered feasible for the reasons indicated above.

3. An additional reason for not now suspending the program would be that such suspension, resulting in uncertainty and confusion, would cause serious disturbance to our cotton export trade.

For your information. The Brazilian Ambassador has recently urged that, pending the arrival of Dantas, discussions regarding the supplying of the Canadian market be entered into with the Embassy and has called on officials of the Department of Agriculture requesting that they present to him our proposal in that regard. It was explained to him that no proposal could be formulated until all the facts were ascertained, including the quantity of Brazilian cotton sold to Canada since August 1. He indicated that he would attempt to obtain information regarding such sales, but it appears that there will be little opportunity for further discussion with the Brazilian Embassy in view of limited time before Dantas is scheduled to arrive.

HULL

561.321D1 Advisory Committee/64 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Brazil (Caffery)

WASHINGTON, October 23, 1941—7 p. m.

1000. In view of decrease in price of Brazilian cotton the subsidy on exports of United States cotton to Canada has been increased to 3 cents in accordance with the plan referred to in last sentence of Section C, our telegram no. 804 of September 15, 1941.

Repeat to São Paulo.

HULL

561.321D1 Advisory Committee/67 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Brazil (Caffery)

WASHINGTON, October 29, 1941—10 p. m.

1045. Reference your telegrams no. 1564, October 23, no. 1512, October 16, and no. 1470, October 10.²² In view of Mr. Dantas' imminent departure for discussions on sharing the Canadian cotton market,²³ there follows for your background and such use as you may consider appropriate a summary of the Department of Agriculture's attitude toward the cotton subsidy program.

²² None printed.

²³ Mr. Dantas was scheduled to leave for Washington by air on November 3.

There is strong feeling in the United States against relinquishing the Canadian market. Logically, by reason of location, and historically, the United States has been the source of supply for Canadian cotton mills. During the decade 1929-1939 the United States supplied almost 98 percent of Canada's imports of raw cotton. In 1939-40 American cotton supplied 92 percent of total consumption. In 1940-41 Brazil supplied more than half of the Canadian market but prior to that year Brazil had supplied less than 2 percent of Canada's cotton imports.

In view of the fact that assistance to domestic cotton producers has temporarily upset normal price relationships between American and foreign growths the subsidy on exports is the natural concomitant of the program of domestic assistance. It is directed toward the maintenance of the *status quo* in export markets, and cannot be looked upon as undercutting or unfair competition, since it is designed to bring about a situation as nearly as possible like that which would have obtained had there been no government support of domestic prices. For this reason any competitive advantage which may have been enjoyed by other producers before the subsidy was put into effect should be considered by them as a windfall resulting from temporary maladjustment between the domestic and foreign aspects of this Government's cotton program. The short period during which American cotton was deprived of its competitive position in Canada cannot be regarded as having created a special privilege for other growths.

The retention of customary markets is especially important in view of the very heavy carry-over and the extremely low level of exports last year. American exports in 1940-41 were 82 percent below the 1939-40 level, while Brazilian exports increased 38 percent. At best, exports of American cotton this season will not materially exceed 1.1 million bales. And carry-over has risen from 4.4 million bales in 1937-38 to about 12 million bales at the beginning of the current season.

It is recognized that other producers face a serious problem in finding outlets for their cotton under war conditions, and an equitable solution is sincerely desired. In the case of the Canadian market, demand has increased from an annual average of about 270,000 bales for the decade 1929-38 to about 500,000 bales in 1940-41, and it is expected to exceed this during the current year. This Government is prepared to share equitably with other producers any increases in demand resulting from the war but the Department of Agriculture insists that pending the conclusion of a world cotton agreement the proposed division of the Canadian market must be on a year to year basis. The Brazilian Government may be assured that we shall welcome Mr. Dantas for the proposed discussions and that on

our part there will be the greatest good will to attain a practicable solution acceptable to both governments.

Another factor which may be mentioned is the present acute shortage of shipping space. The war effort of this country and of all countries with a stake in the defense of democracy make it imperative to utilize available tonnage to the maximum efficiency. If cotton can be supplied to Canadian mills overland, valuable cargo space is freed for the transportation of material essential to the defense program, in which Brazil has a vital stake. While there is no intention to advance the shipping argument in behalf of the cotton subsidy policy, this is an example of questions raised by the authorities in charge of shipping routes and cargo space allocations when assigning tonnage to Brazilian-United States trade.

For your own information only, it is understood that the Surplus Marketing Administration expects to increase the subsidy as necessary to meet any fall in the price of Brazilian cotton.

HULL

561.321D1 Advisory Committee/79 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Brazil (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

RIO DE JANEIRO, October 31, 1941—4 p. m.

[Received 7:05 p. m.]

1622. Department's 1045, October 29, 10 p. m. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Dantas informed.

Embassy's 1564, October 23, 5 p. m.²⁴ The Brazilian Government is expected to announce shortly²⁵ that it will make advances against cotton of the 1941-42 São Paulo crop at approximately 15 milreis per arroba (15 kilograms) on seed cotton equivalent to type 5, or at 50 milreis per arroba on type 5 lint cotton.

It is expected that the advances will be for 6 months' periods with renewal privileges and will be subject to deductions at time of granting for interest, warehousing and insurances charges, which are equivalent to about 2 milreis 500 reis to 3 milreis per arroba on lint cotton. The advances will probably be graduated in accordance with distance from São Paulo of storage points.

No financial assistance beyond that now accorded (see Embassy's telegram No. 601, June 6, 1941²⁴ is likely to be granted on stocks remaining from 1940-41 crop as they have now passed beyond farmers' hands.

²⁴ Not printed.

²⁵ The announcement made to the press on November 2 was transmitted to the Department in the Ambassador's telegram No. 1650, November 3, 10 p. m. (561.321D1 Advisory Committee/81).

As reported in Embassy's telegram 1564 the Government is understood to have been reluctant to engage in financing measures with respect to the new crop without some form of crop control but reluctance of merchants and other private sources of credit to finance farmers in face of uncertain export outlook for next season will apparently make foregoing assistance necessary.

CAFFERY

561.321D1 Advisory Committee/85

The Minister in Canada (Moffat) to the Secretary of State

No. 2182

OTTAWA, November 15, 1941.

[Received November 17.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to the Department's air mail instruction No. 629 of September 16, 1941, and to subsequent telephonic conversations with the Department on the basis of which I communicated to the appropriate Canadian authorities the substance of the Department's telegram of September 6 [15]²⁶ to the Embassy at Rio de Janeiro regarding the provision which was being made in the cotton program of the United States for the exportation of cotton to Canada.

I have received no reply in writing to my note addressed to the Under Secretary of State.

Thus far only two comments have been made to me in connection with the United States program. The first was a mild expression of regret that no sooner had Canada found a way of getting some dollar exchange (the Department will recall that Canada and Brazil had come to an agreement whereby Brazil would sell back to Canada for sterling one-half the American dollars spent by Canadians for Brazilian cotton purchases) than the American Government found itself obliged to take measures that in effect dried up this method of obtaining hard currency.

The second observation was to the effect that Canada had no particular objection provided the new American program did not result in raising the price of cotton to Canada. This angle has assumed particular importance since the Government has placed a ceiling on all prices; henceforth if the price of an imported component of an article rises the Canadian Government will have to take measures, either by way of tax remission, duty remission, or even Government purchase with subsequent re-sale to the manufacturer at a loss, in order to keep the price of the finished article from rising.

Respectfully yours,

PIERREPONT MOFFAT

²⁶ Telegram No. 804, p. 136.

561.321D1 Advisory Committee/94

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Commercial Policy and Agreements (Hawkins)

[WASHINGTON,] November 28, 1941.

I phoned Mr. Wheeler²⁸ this morning regarding the status of the cotton discussions with Brazil with particular reference to Mr. Carr's memorandum of November 27 on the procedural aspects.²⁹

I told Mr. Wheeler that I felt considerably disturbed about the manner in which these discussions are being handled; that obviously the Department of State is much concerned in any international negotiations of this sort which have a bearing on other questions coming within its responsibilities. I said further that any such agreement, before it could be made effective, would have to be approved by this Department; and that in order to obtain such approval it is essential that this Division participate closely in the formulation of such agreements. Mr. Wheeler replied that he understood this fully; that the draft which Dr. Dantas telegraphed to his Government was merely in the nature of a report on the present status of the discussions and that the Department of Agriculture still has questions to raise in regard to that draft. He said that the plan was to discuss the substance of the proposed agreement with us at the appropriate stage and see whether we fully agreed with it.

I also said that obviously the Canadian Government would have to be consulted in regard to any proposals on this subject and its acquiescence would have to be obtained. I asked whether Dr. Dantas also understood this. Mr. Wheeler replied in the affirmative.

Mr. Wheeler said that his present plan was to send Dr. Norris, who is the officer of the Department of Agriculture principally concerned with the discussions, over to see us, at which time the substance of the proposed arrangement can be gone into exhaustively and questions of procedure, including the form which any agreement might take and the manner and time for consultation with the Canadians would be gone into. I told Mr. Wheeler that as soon as we in this Division reach conclusions regarding a substance and procedure which we think are tenable, we would then take the matter up with other interested Divisions and officers of the Department.

²⁸ Leslie A. Wheeler, Director of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Department of Agriculture.

²⁹ Memorandum not found in Department files. Robert McDill Carr was Assistant Chief of the Division of Commercial Policy and Agreements.

[Annex]

Tentative Draft Agreement for Sharing the Canadian Cotton Market

(1) The Governments of the United States of America and the United States of Brazil will regulate the annual exports of raw cotton from their respective countries to the Dominion of Canada on the basis of an estimated total annual Canadian requirement of Upland cotton of 258,120,000 pounds, or 540,000 bales of 478 pounds net weight, of which the United States will export 129,060,000 pounds, or 270,000 bales of 478 pounds net weight and Brazil will export 129,060,000 pounds, or 270,000 bales of 478 pounds net weight. At least 90 days prior to the expiration of each marketing year, as provided in this agreement, the Joint Cotton Committee shall review the estimate of the total Canadian requirement of Upland cotton and make such revision as it deems necessary. In the event the revised estimate exceeds 258,120,000 pounds or 540,000 bales of 478 pounds net, the additional quantity shall be shared equally between the United States and Brazil. In the event the estimate is less than 258,120,000 pounds, or 540,000 bales of 478 pounds net weight, the reduction shall be shared equally between the two countries, provided that the share of the United States shall not be reduced below a quantity of 119,500,000 pounds, or 250,000 bales of 478 pounds net weight.

If the Joint Committee determines that the importation of cotton into Canada from countries outside this agreement is in such volume as to affect materially the agreement, then it shall notify the Governments of Brazil and the United States and the two Governments may re-examine the situation with a view to taking such joint measures as they deem necessary.

(2) During the life of this agreement the Government of the United States will adjust the export payment on cotton exported to Canada to such a degree as to maintain a difference of not more than one cent (1) and not less than one half ($\frac{1}{2}$) cent per pound between the spot price of Brazilian (São Paulo official Type 5. 28/29 M. M.) cotton at São Paulo, plus the cost of delivery and handling charges to Montreal and the price of released Commodity Credit Corpt Middling $1\frac{5}{16}$ inch cotton at Memphis, Tennessee, plus the cost of delivery and handling charges to Montreal. If the difference between the price of Brazilian cotton and United States cotton, as defined above, becomes less than one half ($\frac{1}{2}$) cent per pound, the United States Government will withdraw the export payment on cotton exports to Canada.

It is understood that the rate of exchange used in converting the price of Brazilian cotton to U. S. cents per pound shall be the export rate of exchange established by the Bank of Brazil for exporting cotton.

(3) A joint cotton committee composed of equal representatives from each country shall be formed for the purpose of supervision and administration of this agreement. The committee shall elect its officers and make all necessary provisions for carrying out its duties. It shall hold an annual meeting and make an annual report to the signatory governments not later than April 1. It may hold other meetings and make other reports as it deems necessary. The date and place of all meetings shall be fixed by the committee but its annual meeting shall be held not later than April 1 following the end of the marketing year. The committee shall make an estimate of the annual Canadian requirement for Upland cotton and report its findings to the signatory governments not later than January 10. The signatory governments shall supply the committee with data and statistical material, when requested, regarding the sales, arrivals, movements, and consumption of cotton in their countries. All such data shall be kept in strict confidence and shall not be released without the permission of the government supplying the data. The expenses of the members of the committee shall be borne by the government they represent, but the expenses of the committee in connection with its duties shall be paid according to a plan mutually agreed upon before such expense is incurred.

(4) This agreement shall take effect on March 1, 1942, and remain in effect for two years thereafter, unless, one of the countries signatory thereto notifies the other in writing of its intention to terminate the agreement at the end of any year. Such notice must be received by such other country not later than 90 days prior to the end of the year. This agreement may be extended for additional periods by mutual agreement of the signatory countries.

561.321D1 Advisory Committee/94a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Brazil (Caffery)

WASHINGTON, December 2, 1941—6 p. m.

1249. Dantas has telegraphed his Government a tentative draft agreement for sharing the Canadian cotton market. Please point out to the appropriate Brazilian authorities that this draft, a copy of which is being sent to you by air pouch,⁸⁰ should not be considered as anything more than a report on the present status of the discussions, and that both the Department of Agriculture and this Department have further questions to raise with regard to it.

HULL

⁸⁰ Draft printed *supra*; copy was transmitted in instruction No. 1854, December 4, 1941.

561.321D1 Advisory Committee/95 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Brazil (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

RIO DE JANEIRO, December 4, 1941—5 p. m.

[Received 11 : 13 p. m.]

1907. Department's 1249, December 2, 5 [6] p. m. Ministry of Foreign Affairs which was informed November 30, 5 : 30 p. m., had apparently been under the impression that the tentative draft agreement as telegraphed by the Brazilian Embassy represented definite and complete proposals. The Ministry says that the draft was discussed with the President by Aranha³¹ on December 2 but the President's reaction thereto was not known at the Ministry yesterday.

The Ministry was displeased with the information contained in the Department's telegram number 1249. The Embassy believes that the Brazilian Government is beginning to be concerned with the delays in reaching an agreement but cannot say whether this concern will be translated into more willing and effective collaboration with respect to the cotton problem than has heretofore been evidenced. The Agricultural Attaché believes on the basis of information from well-informed trade sources and first-hand observation in limited areas in São Paulo last week that if favorable growing conditions continue, the new crop in that state will at least equal last season's and may exceed it by 5 to 8 percent. The loan levels for the 1941-1942 crop with privilege sale to the Government at the end of the initial financing term of 6 months reported in the Embassy's telegram number 1650, November 3,³² are unquestionably well above average production costs. The São Paulo Cotton Growers Association recalled to the President when he visited São Paulo last week the Government's promises with respect to financing and purchase of the coming crop. No regulations have yet been issued for the implementing of this program and it is not known how large scale Government purchases would be financed.

CAFFERY

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA REGARDING THE GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE WATERWAY, SIGNED MARCH 19, 1941³³

711.42157 SA 29/1843

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Minister in Canada (Moffat)

A few hours after my return from Washington this afternoon I called on the Prime Minister³⁴ and told him that I had seen the

³¹ Oswaldo Aranha, Brazilian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

³² Not printed.

³³ For previous correspondence, see *Foreign Relations, 1940*, vol. III, pp. 148 ff.

³⁴ W. L. Mackenzie King, Canadian Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs.

President as he requested and had given him the full story of Mr. King's difficulties in connection with the St. Lawrence agreement.

I explained that the President, after considering all the factors involved, was glad to meet his preoccupation, at least in major part.

He asked me to say that he agreed with the Prime Minister's suggestion that we proceed at once with the International Section, which we both recognize as an immediate war necessity in view of the growing demand for power for Canada's war industry and for our defense industry. He would have liked to go ahead with the Seaway now, because it would tap a wide area in the Great Lakes where we could build shipping, both merchant shipping, and under our new interpretation of the Rush-Bagot Agreement,³⁵ naval shipping. But the President deferred to Mr. King's judgment that that can't be done at the moment. He deferred to his judgment that it would be hard for him to answer the questions of whence the men? whence the money? and how does this fit into the all-out effort that Canada is making? He deferred to his judgment that it might even endanger the political situation in Quebec and bring about an accumulation of political developments in Canada that would be regrettable. He would not wish to subject Mr. King to this type of strain, even though he would have liked to keep matters as in the present draft, and thinks that events may prove that both were mistaken in making any alteration. He therefore was ready to withdraw the present articles dealing with this question, and to substitute others which are based on a postponement of the building in the Canadian National Section of the Seaway until after the war. This met the Prime Minister's essential preoccupation.

But Mr. King's memorandum went even further and implied a suggestion that we postpone any "consideration of obligation" to go ahead with the Canadian National Section until after the war. But here we run into our American problems which are as acute as Canada's. These fall under four heads:

1. The President's commitment in his message to Detroit.³⁶
2. The interest in the Lake states in the Seaway.
3. Moral obligation flowing from the Ogoki Diversion Agreement.³⁷
4. Necessity of retaining in the present draft some future leverage on Quebec in order to justify present expenditures in the International Section.

³⁵ Signed at Washington, April 28-29, 1817, Hunter Miller (ed.), *Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America*, vol. 2, p. 645.

³⁶ President Roosevelt's message to the Great Lakes Seaway and Power Conference at Detroit delivered by Assistant Secretary of State Berle, December 5, 1940; for text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 7, 1940, p. 518.

³⁷ Effected by exchange of notes signed October 14 and 31, and November 7, 1940; for texts, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 187, or 54 Stat. (pt. 2) 2426.

To summarize: We feel that within reasonable limits we can agree to latitude as to time if we have a post-war commitment. We can probably accept various formulae to gild the pill and help with Canada's political problems, provided our Great Lake states can know that the Seaway will eventually come. If Mr. King considers that an explanatory exchange of letters with the President would help, this could undoubtedly be arranged, though such letters would have to be phrased on an entirely different basis from the one he had discussed last week, which was to justify at this moment the immediate war need for the Seaway.

I had come back not with any formula for drafts of substitute articles, because one can't change negotiators in the middle of a negotiation. Bringing in a new man invariably complicates a situation. But if the Prime Minister agreed with us that the compromise suggested, with necessary drafting safeguards, meets the issue, we are prepared to send up our negotiators with plenary powers, who can agree if a meeting of minds is reached, to clinch matters then and there. I thought we were all in accord that from this point on speed is essential, both politically and in order to get the work started on the power dam with the least delay.

Mr. King said that this picture of our position was most helpful. He had hoped to be able to postpone any commitment on the seaway, but he had not realized our difficulties, and of the four reasons I had advanced for the need of a post-war commitment the one that he seemed to fasten on was the moral obligation arising out of the Ogoki diversion.

After again reciting a long tale of woe about opposition to any move on the St. Lawrence in Quebec,—where Mr. McConnell, owner of the *Montreal Star*, was on the point of joining the *Gazette* in an editorial attack on the Government on this issue,—he finally said he personally thought we could now go ahead, though he could do no more than express a personal opinion until after he had consulted Cabinet. He would do this at the earliest moment possible and would let me know as soon as they approved in order that I could send for the American negotiators.

When I used the expression "clinch matters then and there" did I mean by any chance that we would be ready to sign the agreement? I said that we would be ready to sign if Canada were.

He then said that he had forgotten to raise a very important point with me last week,—namely his preference for a Treaty as opposed to an agreement. I went over the familiar arguments with him, but found that he was much less interested in our Constitutional niceties, than he was in finding an argument to explain why the United States, being presumably so eager for the agreement, should be seeking a short

cut or an easier way to bring it into force. Wouldn't this give rise to an ugly suspicion that it was really Canada that was pushing the St. Lawrence accord, rather than the United States? If this impression should ever prevail, it would be most serious for him. Could I not give an explanation he could use in public as to why we preferred to proceed by way of legislation rather than by way of treaty ratification. I said that he could emphasize the time element: that after a Treaty had gone through the Senate, it would be necessary in any event to introduce an appropriation bill in the House of Representatives and see this through both Houses; this double procedure might well take up so much time that we would not be able to start work until the spring was well advanced. If, however, we could sign an agreement, we could forego one lengthy legislation step. The Prime Minister said that from his point of view, this time-table argument was decidedly helpful and he no longer pressed this phase of the problem.

I then brought up the question of where the agreement should be signed and explained our reasons for preferring Ottawa. Again he said that his one objection to signing in Ottawa was that it might look as though it were a Canadian initiative that was resulting in the agreement rather than an American initiative. The question of asking for new full powers did not disturb him at all. He asked us, however, to let this point lie over for the moment.

Next we took up the Rush-Bagot letters. He said he was agreeable to making them public at an opportune moment. He thought that to do so at the time of signing the St. Lawrence agreement was an excellent idea.

At this point, Mr. King sent for Norman Robertson, the new acting Under Secretary of State, and John Read, the Department's Legal Adviser, and summarized the entire conversation for their benefit.

Norman Robertson had no observations to offer, but John Read was inclined to be obstructive. He asked if we were prepared to exchange letters justifying the immediate war need of work on the International Section. I said that heretofore we had gone on the assumption that additional power was a direct and self-evident war need; only the war need for work on the seaway had been under discussion, but if such an exchange of letters would be of help, I was sure we would raise no difficulties whatsoever. He then reminded the Prime Minister that even the International Section, although the bulk of the work would be done by the United States, would cost Canada about \$20,000,000, of which relatively little would have to be budgeted for this year, but a lot for next year. I asked what proportion of the cost this would represent, and he admitted that it was a very small percentage. The Prime Minister did not seem im-

pressed. John Read then said that he could not see that we had gone very far to meet Mr. King. I answered that I had read the Quebec papers carefully, and that the burden of their attack was that Canada would have to begin work on the seaway, and spend money on the seaway during the course of the war. We were prepared to substitute for the present article 2b one agreeing to a postponement of this work in the Canadian National Section until after the war, and it seemed to me there was all the difference between an article that Mr. King considered politically unacceptable, and one that he would find politically acceptable.

The next and final point to arise was the agreement between the Dominion and Ontario, which logically should be signed just before the St. Lawrence agreement. Mr. King had a letter from Premier Hepburn,^{37a} saying that other things being equal he would prefer to await signing this agreement until Mr. Hogg³⁸ had recovered from his accident, say around March 15th, but that if Mr. King felt the matter urgent he could probably find ways to go ahead anyway. Mr. Hogg will be out of the hospital in a little under a fortnight and then plans to go to Nassau for a month's convalescence. I explained that if matters were put off for that length of time, we would lose at least a month out of the short construction season.

In conclusion: Mr. King said that he was most appreciative of the President's understanding of his difficulties, and would push matters as hard and as fast as he could.

[OTTAWA,] February 6, 1941.

711.42157 SA 29/1820

*The Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mackenzie King) to the American Minister in Canada (Moffat)*³⁹

No. 39

OTTAWA, March 5, 1941.

SIR: I have the honour to refer to certain questions which have arisen in the course of the St. Lawrence Waterway negotiations, and which we have discussed recently.

2. As you are aware, my colleagues and I have been giving prolonged consideration to the problems presented by the St. Lawrence Waterway project. We have noted the progress made in the preparation of the engineering plans for the international section and in the drafting of the general agreement. There is, however, one con-

^{37a} Mitchell Frederick Hepburn.

³⁸ T. H. Hogg, Chairman and Chief Engineer of the Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario.

³⁹ Copy transmitted to the Department by the Minister in Canada in his despatch No. 1211, March 19; received March 21.

sideration of a fundamental character to which we desire to call attention.

3. The growing intensity of the war operations and the apprehensions that still more serious perils will have to be faced in the very near future, necessitate the most careful examination of any proposed expenditure from the point of view of public need and in the light of war requirements.

4. In existing circumstances, the Canadian Government desires to know whether the Government of the United States is of the opinion, in view of the position in Canada, and, of course, the position in the United States as well, that the project, as outlined in the State Department's proposals of 1936⁴⁰ and 1938,⁴¹ and under consideration since that time, should now be proceeded with.

5. We have, of course, been fully aware of the desire of the Government of the United States to have a treaty or agreement respecting the St. Lawrence Waterway concluded at as early a date as possible, and negotiations, which have been carried on more or less continuously for some time past, have had in view the desire on our part to arrive, at the earliest possible date, at terms of agreement which would be mutually advantageous. We are also aware of the pronouncements, which have been made from time to time by the President, respecting the added emphasis given by the war to the importance alike of power and navigation developments in the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Waterway project. We are also duly appreciative of the agreement recently reached between our respective Governments, whereby the Province of Ontario has obtained the right to the immediate use of additional power at Niagara, and the diversion of the waters of the Ogoki and Long Lac Rivers into Lake Superior, in consideration of which, authority was given for the immediate investigation by United States engineers of the project in the international section of the St. Lawrence River in Ontario, in order to enable work of future development to proceed with the least possible delay, once an agreement between the two Governments, respecting the St. Lawrence development was concluded.

6. We would naturally be prepared to give every consideration to power or navigation developments which the United States may deem necessary to the prosecution of measures calculated to aid Great Britain, Canada and other parts of the British Commonwealth of Nations in the present war, or to further the security of the United States itself against possible future events, which, at the moment, cannot be foreseen, but of which in times like the present full account must be taken. We realize that the Government of the United States

⁴⁰ See *Foreign Relations*, 1936, vol. I, pp. 834 ff.

⁴¹ See *ibid.*, 1938, vol. II, pp. 177 ff.

will be as solicitous as our own Government to appraise the project at the present time in terms of its contribution to the efforts which are being put forward by our respective countries to preserve and to restore freedom.

7. It is from this point of view and in this spirit that we would ask that the St. Lawrence project be again reviewed by the Government of the United States before an agreement or treaty be finally entered into.

Accept [etc.]

W. L. MACKENZIE KING

711.42157 SA 29/1820

*The American Minister in Canada (Moffat) to the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mackenzie King)*⁴²

No. 303

OTTAWA, March 10, 1941.

SIR: I lost no time in bringing to the attention of my Government your note of March 5 in regard to the St. Lawrence waterway negotiations. In view of the importance of the question you raised, the matter was laid before the President, and I have been instructed by way of reply, to transmit the following personal message from him to you:

"I have given careful consideration to your recent request that in view of the growing intensity of current war operations and the apprehension over perils which may have to be faced in the near future, the Government of the United States review the St. Lawrence project and give you an indication of its views as to whether, in the existing circumstances, this project as outlined in the State Department's proposals of 1936 and 1938 should now be proceeded with.

"May I say at the outset that I am aware of Canada's increasing war effort and I readily agree that it must have first call upon your country's resources and man power. I also agree that in view of the existing situation the most careful examination of any proposed expenditure is necessary from the point of view of the public need and in the light of defense requirements.

"With these considerations in mind, the Government of the United States has as you requested reviewed the St. Lawrence project. We have welcomed this occasion to review the project because of the fact that our own defense program renders it desirable that all public expenditures in the United States be weighed in the light of considerations similar to those set forth in your communication. The Government of the United States is engaged in a great defense program. It is determined to supply such aid in matériel to Great Britain, the members of the Commonwealth and their allies as may be necessary to enable them to bring the war to a successful termina-

⁴² Copy transmitted to the Department by the Minister in Canada in his despatch No. 1211, March 19; received March 21.

tion. Simultaneously our own defenses are being strengthened to the extent necessary to prevent any foe from menacing the security of this hemisphere. It is indispensable that all public projects contemplated by the Government of the United States be considered from the standpoint of their relationship to these supreme objectives.

"The Government of the United States regards the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence basin project as directly associated with the accomplishment of the foremost national objectives of this Government. It believes that the project should be proceeded with and that construction should commence at the earliest possible moment. It regards the construction of this project as a matter of vital necessity.

"You refer to the engineering investigation now being conducted in the international section of the St. Lawrence River. I need hardly say that I directed the release of \$1,000,000 from the special defense fund for this purpose only because of my conviction that the completion of this project by 1945 might prove of vital importance to our defense effort. It is gratifying that there has been sufficient progress to make possible the initiation of construction this spring.

"I am sure you will agree with me that, while our countries must put forth the maximum immediate defense effort, we must also prepare for the possibility of a protracted emergency which will call upon the industries on both sides of the border to meet constantly expanding demands. The combination of advantages offered by the St. Lawrence project makes it imperative that we undertake it immediately.

"In terms of the time factor, the St. Lawrence project as a part of our defense program is not exceptional, since we are today appropriating money for construction of vessels of war which will not be ready for service until the completion of the St. Lawrence undertaking.

"I am convinced of the urgent need for the large increment in low cost electric power which the St. Lawrence project will provide. Already the demand for power is running ahead of expectations. In fact one of the most serious handicaps to the rapid expansion of airplane production is the difficulty of finding the large supplies of high-load factor power required for aluminum production. We are of course expanding our electric facilities for this purpose as fast as practicable but by the time the St. Lawrence power is available other sources of cheap power will have been largely allocated.

"The St. Lawrence project offers by far the soundest and most economical provision for the power requirements of certain portions of our long-range defense program, more particularly for certain high-load factor defense industries. Furthermore the manufacturing facilities and skilled labor available for the construction of steel turbines and electric equipment will be needed to meet the requirements of the vast areas of our continent where water power is not so economically available.

"I am also convinced that the opening of the St. Lawrence deep waterway to afford an outlet for naval and cargo ships constructed in Great Lakes shipyards, far from representing a diversion of funds and resources from the defense effort, would have the opposite effect. Our shipbuilding program, to meet the requirements of defense, will call for a great expansion of shipyards with their associated machine shops and adequate supplies of skilled labor. The extent to which intensified submarine and air attacks on convoys may necessitate an

expansion of the program is still unknown. If the war is protracted however it seems certain that the number of shipyards required will have to be several times those at present available. In terms of our present industrial arrangements, many of these can be most readily and economically available in the Great Lakes area.

"If the full burden of our expanding ship construction must fall on seaboard shipyards the time required to complete the vessels themselves must, in many instances, be increased by the period necessary to construct new shipyards and facilities. With this in mind it is apparent that the deep waterway could be completed in time to provide an outlet to the sea for many of the new vessels included in the present program.

"In the light of these facts it is my belief that the funds and man power required for the earliest possible completion of the St. Lawrence project could not be better spent for our joint defense effort, including aid to Great Britain. It is my feeling that failure to take advantage of the possibilities of this project would be short-sighted, in no way contributing to an increase in our immediate defense effort, while limiting our defense program in the difficult years which lie ahead."

Accept [etc.]

PIERREPONT MOFFAT

711.42157 SA 29/1850a

The Secretary of State to the Attorney General (Jackson)

WASHINGTON, March 13, 1941.

MY DEAR MR. ATTORNEY GENERAL: I enclose for your consideration a memorandum prepared by the Legal Adviser of this Department, together with a copy of a proposed agreement⁴³ between the United States and Canada regarding the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Deep Waterway Project. It is hoped that an agreement may be signed within the next few days.

I should appreciate it if you would advise me whether you agree that the arrangement may be effectuated by an agreement signed under the authority of the Executives of the two countries and approved by legislative enactments by the Congress and the Canadian Parliament.

Sincerely yours,

CORDELL HULL

[Enclosure]

*Memorandum by the Legal Adviser (Hackworth)*⁴⁴

For several years the United States and Canada have had under consideration the feasibility of a joint undertaking for the improvement of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Basin so as to make these

⁴³ Not attached to file copy of this document; for text of agreement as signed, see p. 159.

⁴⁴ Reprinted from Department of State *Bulletin*, March 29, 1941, p. 364.

waters available to sea-going vessels, the development of hydro-electric power, etc. The Legal Adviser of the Department of State, in a memorandum dated February 10, 1939,⁴⁵ expressed the opinion that an arrangement between the United States and Canada concerning the project could be effected by a simple agreement between the two countries and approval of the agreement by legislation in the United States and in Canada. The negotiations have progressed to the point where an agreement is about ready to be signed, but before proceeding to signature it is thought desirable to ascertain whether the Attorney General concurs in the view that the purposes may be accomplished in this fashion.

It is not necessary here to enter into a discussion of the treaty-making power or of the power of the President to enter into executive agreements with foreign countries. It is sufficient to say that a very large number of such agreements on various subjects have been entered into from time to time throughout the history of this country. Some of them have been specifically authorized by acts of Congress; others, though not specifically authorized, have been within the framework of acts of Congress; and still others have been concluded without enabling legislation on the subject.

Following the failure of the Senate to approve a treaty for the annexation of Texas,⁴⁶ the annexation was accomplished by a joint resolution approved on March 1, 1845 (5 Stat. 797), after passage by a simple majority vote of the two houses of Congress. Likewise, in the case of Hawaii, a treaty of annexation had been signed on June 16, 1897,⁴⁷ and approved by the Hawaiian Legislature, but there was not sufficient support in the United States Senate to obtain approval by a two-thirds vote. Thereafter Congress passed a joint resolution to accomplish the same purpose, which was approved July 7, 1898 (30 Stat. 750).

Of interest in this connection is action by Congress with respect to the construction of bridges across the international boundary—United States and Canada, subject to similar authorization by Canada. For example, Public Resolution No. 117, 75th Congress, 3d session, created the Niagara Falls Bridge Commission and authorized it to construct and operate bridges across the Niagara River, subject to “the approval of the proper authorities in the Dominion of Canada.” (52 Stat. 767.)

On November 11, 1927, President Coolidge issued a presidential license to the Detroit–Ontario Subway, Inc., authorizing the company to construct, operate, and maintain a tunnel from a point in or near Brush or Randolph Street in the City of Detroit to a point on the international boundary line under the Detroit River. It is under-

⁴⁵ Not printed.

⁴⁶ Signed April 12, 1844, Miller, *Treaties*, vol. 4, p. 697.

⁴⁷ Senate Document Executive E, 55th Cong., 1st sess.

stood that corresponding authorization was given on the part of Canada by an Order in Council.

The improvement of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Basin for navigation and other purposes would seem clearly to fall within the commerce clause of the Constitution, giving the Congress the authority to regulate interstate and foreign commerce. Where the undertaking with respect to interstate and foreign commerce involves boundary waters over which this country does not have exclusive jurisdiction, there would seem to be no reason why the Congress should not within its Constitutional power enact legislation, contingent upon a like legislative enactment in the other country, signifying its approval of a joint undertaking signed by both Governments. The signing of an agreement by the two Governments would be but a convenient way of bringing about in advance of legislative enactments a joint understanding by the two Governments on a complicated question which could hardly be handled without such advance understanding. The agreement would contain provisions which might otherwise be incorporated in a treaty, but would not take the treaty form or follow the treaty process. It would not constitute a binding international agreement until Congress and the Canadian Parliament had indicated their approval.

GREEN H. HACKWORTH

711.42157 SA 29/1834

The Attorney General (Jackson) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, March 14, 1941.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have your letter of March 13 and concur in the conclusion reached by your Legal Adviser that it is legally unobjectionable so far as this country is concerned for the executives of the United States and Canada to enter into an agreement regarding the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Deep Waterway project conditioned for its effectiveness upon the subsequent enactment of necessary legislation by the Congress and by the Canadian Parliament.

If an agreement is executed and approved in this manner, its provisions would be binding upon the United States as respects Canada.

Respectfully,

ROBERT H. JACKSON

711.42157 SA 29/1821

Unperfected Agreement Between the United States and Canada Regarding the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Waterway Project, Signed at Ottawa, March 19, 1941

The President of the United States of America and His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British dominions beyond

the Seas, Emperor of India, in respect of Canada, have decided to conclude an Agreement in relation to the utilization of the water in the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Basin and to that end have named as their respective plenipotentiaries:

The President of the United States of America:

Jay Pierrepont Moffat, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to Canada;
Adolf Augustus Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State;
Leland Olds, Chairman of the Federal Power Commission;

His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, for Canada:

The Right Honourable W. L. Mackenzie King, Prime Minister, President of the Privy Council and Secretary of State for External Affairs;
The Honourable Clarence D. Howe, Minister of Munitions and Supply;
John E. Read, Legal Adviser, Department of External Affairs;

Who, after having communicated to each other their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following Articles.

PRELIMINARY ARTICLE

For the purposes of the present Agreement, unless otherwise expressly provided, the expression:

(a) "Joint Board of Engineers" means the board appointed pursuant to an agreement between the Governments following the recommendation of the International Joint Commission, dated December 19, 1921;

(b) "Great Lakes System" means Lakes Superior, Michigan, Huron (including Georgian Bay), Erie and Ontario, and the connecting waters, including Lake St. Clair;

(c) "St. Lawrence River" includes the river channels and the lakes forming parts of the river channels from the outlet of Lake Ontario to the sea;

(d) "International Section" means that part of the St. Lawrence River through which the international boundary line runs;

(e) "Canadian Section" means that part of the St. Lawrence River which lies wholly within Canada and which extends from the easterly limit of the International Section to Montreal Harbour;

(f) "International Rapids Section" means that part of the International Section which extends from Chimney Point to the village of St. Regis;

(g) "Governments" means the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Canada;

- (h) "countries" means the United States of America and Canada;
- (i) "Special International Niagara Board" means the board appointed by the Governments in 1926 to ascertain and recommend ways and means to preserve the scenic beauty of the Niagara Falls;
- (j) "deep waterway" means adequate provision for navigation requiring a controlling channel depth of 27 feet with a depth of 30 feet over lock sills, from the head of the Great Lakes to Montreal Harbour via the Great Lakes System and St. Lawrence River, in general accordance with the specifications set forth in the Report of the Joint Board of Engineers, dated November 16, 1926.⁴⁸

ARTICLE I

1. The Governments agree to establish and maintain a Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Basin Commission, hereinafter referred to as the Commission, consisting of not more than ten members of whom an equal number shall be appointed by each Government. The duties of the Commission shall be:

(a) to prepare and to recommend plans and specifications for the construction of works in the International Rapids Section in accordance with and containing the features described in the Annex attached to and made part of this Agreement, with such modifications as may be agreed upon by the Governments;

(b) upon approval of the plans and specifications by the Governments, to prepare a schedule allocating the construction of the works in the International Rapids Section on such a basis that each Government shall construct the works within its own territory or an equivalent proportion of the works so approved;

(c) to approve all contracts entered into on behalf of either Government for the works in the International Rapids Section;

(d) to supervise the construction of the works and to submit reports to the Governments from time to time, and at least once each calendar year, on the progress of the works;

(e) upon satisfactory completion of the works, to certify to the Governments that they meet the plans and specifications drawn up by the Commission and approved by the Governments;

(f) to perform the other duties assigned to it in this Agreement.

2. The Commission shall have the authority to employ such persons and to make such expenditures as may be necessary to carry out the duties set forth in this Agreement. It shall have the authority to avail itself of the services of such governmental agencies, officers and employees of either country as may be made available. The remuneration, general expenses and all other expenses of its members shall be regulated and paid by their respective Governments; and the other expenses of the Commission, except as provided for under Article III, paragraph (b) of this Agreement, shall be borne by the Governments in equal moieties.

⁴⁸ *Report of Joint Board of Engineers on St. Lawrence Waterway Project*, November 16, 1926 (Ottawa, F. A. Acland, 1927).

3. The Governments agree to permit the entry into their respective countries, within areas immediately adjacent to the Niagara River and the International Section to be delimited by exchange of notes, of personnel employed by the Commission or employed in the construction of the works, and to exempt such personnel from the operation of the immigration laws and regulations within the areas so delimited. In the event that the Commission, pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 1 (b) of this Article, allocates to either of the Governments the construction of works, any part of which is within the territory of the other Government, the latter Government shall make provision for the according, within the area in which such a part is situated, of such exemption from customs, excise and other imposts, federal, state and provincial, as may be reasonably practicable for the effective and economical prosecution of the work. Regulations providing for such exemptions may be settled by the Governments by exchange of notes.

4. The Governments shall, by exchange of notes, prescribe rules and regulations for the conduct of the Commission. They may by the same means extend or abridge its powers and duties; and reduce or after reduction increase the number of members (provided that there must always be an equal number appointed by each Government and that the total number of members shall at no time exceed ten); and, upon completion of its duties, the Governments may terminate its existence.

ARTICLE II

The Government of Canada agrees:

(a) in accordance with the plans and specifications prepared by the Commission and approved by the Governments, to construct the works in the International Rapids Section allocated to Canada by the Commission; and to operate and maintain or arrange for the operation and maintenance of the works situated in the territory of Canada;

(b) to complete, not later than December 31, 1948, the essential Canadian links in the deep waterway, including the necessary deepening of the new Welland Ship Canal and the construction of canals and other works to provide the necessary depth in the Canadian Section of the St. Lawrence River; provided that, if the continuance of war conditions or the requirements of defence justify a modification of the period within which such works shall be completed, the Governments may, by exchange of notes, arrange to defer or expedite their completion as circumstances may require.

ARTICLE III

The Government of the United States of America agrees:

(a) in accordance with the plans and specifications prepared by the Commission and approved by the Governments, to construct the

works in the International Rapids Section allocated to the United States of America by the Commission; and to operate and maintain or arrange for the operation and maintenance of the works situated in the territory of the United States of America;

(b) to provide, as required by the progress of the works, funds for the construction, including design and supervision, of all works in the International Rapids Section except (1) machinery and equipment for the development of power, and (2) works required for rehabilitation on the Canadian side of the international boundary;

(c) not later than the date of completion of the essential Canadian links in the deep waterway, to complete the works allocated to it in the International Rapids Section and the works in the Great Lakes System above Lake Erie required to create essential links in the deep waterway.

ARTICLE IV

The Governments agree that:

(a) they may, in their respective territories, in conformity with the general plans for the project in the International Rapids Section, install or arrange for the installation of such machinery and equipment as may be desired for the development of power and at such time or times as may be most suitable in terms of their respective power requirements;

(b) In view of the need for co-ordination of the plans and specifications prepared by the Commission for general works in the International Rapids Section with plans for the development of power in the respective countries, the Commission may arrange for engineering services with any agency in either country which may be authorized to develop power in the International Rapids Section;

(c) except as modified by the provisions of Article VIII, paragraph (b) of this Agreement, each country shall be entitled to utilize one-half of the water available for power purposes in the International Rapids Section;

(d) during the construction and upon the completion of the works provided for in the International Rapids Section, the flow of water out of Lake Ontario into the St. Lawrence River shall be controlled and the flow of water through the International Section shall be regulated so that the navigable depths of water for shipping in the harbour of Montreal and throughout the navigable channel of the St. Lawrence River below Montreal, as such depths now exist or may hereafter be increased by dredging or other harbour or channel improvements, shall not be injuriously affected by the construction or operation of such works, and the power developments in the Canadian Section of the St. Lawrence River shall not be adversely affected;

(e) upon the completion of the works provided for in the International Rapids Section, the power works shall be operated, initially, with the water level at the power houses held at a maximum elevation 238.0, sea level datum as defined in the Report of the Joint Board of Engineers, for a test period of ten years or such shorter period as may be approved by any board or authority designated or established under the provisions of paragraph (f) of this Article; and, in the event that such board or authority considers that operation with the water level at the power houses held to a maximum elevation exceeding 238.0 would be practicable and could be made effective within the limitations prescribed by paragraphs (c) and (d) of this Article, the Governments may, by exchange of notes, authorize operation, subject to the provisions of this Article, and for such times and subject to such terms as may be prescribed in the notes, at a maximum elevation exceeding 238.0;

(f) the Governments may, by exchange of notes, make provision for giving effect to paragraphs (c), (d) and (e) of this Article;

(g) during the construction of the works provided for in the International Rapids Section, facilities for 14 ft. navigation in that Section shall be maintained.

ARTICLE V

The Governments agree that nothing done under the authority of this Agreement shall confer upon either of them proprietary rights, or legislative, administrative or other jurisdiction, in the territory of the other, and that the works constructed under the provisions of this Agreement shall constitute a part of the territory of the country in which they are situated.

ARTICLE VI

The Governments agree that either of them may proceed at any time to construct, within its own territory and at its own cost, alternative canal and channel facilities for navigation in the International Section or in waters connecting the Great Lakes, and to utilize the water necessary for the operation of such facilities.

ARTICLE VII

The High Contracting Parties agree that the rights of navigation accorded under the provisions of existing treaties between the United States of America and His Majesty shall be maintained notwithstanding the provisions for termination contained in any of such treaties, and declare that these treaties confer upon the citizens or subjects and upon the ships, vessels and boats of each High Contracting Party, rights of navigation in the St. Lawrence River, and the Great Lakes System, including the canals now existing or which may hereafter be constructed.

ARTICLE VIII

The Governments, recognizing their common interest in the preservation of the levels of the Great Lakes System, agree that:

(a) each Government in its own territory shall measure the quantities of water which at any point are diverted from or added to the Great Lakes System, and shall place such measurements on record with the other Government semi-annually;

(b) in the event of diversions being made into the Great Lakes System from other watersheds lying wholly within the borders of either country, the exclusive rights to the use of waters which are determined by the Governments to be equivalent in quantity to any waters so diverted shall, notwithstanding the provisions of Article IV, paragraph (c) of this Agreement, be vested in the country diverting such waters, and the quantity of water so diverted shall be at all times available to that country for use for power below the point of entry, so long as it constitutes a part of boundary waters;

(c) if any diversion of water from the Great Lakes System or the International Section, other or greater in amount than diversions permitted in either of the countries on January 1, 1940, is authorized, the Government of such country agrees to give immediate consideration to any representations respecting the matter which the other Government may make; if it is impossible otherwise to reach a satisfactory settlement, the Government of the country in which the diversion of water has been authorized agrees, on the request of the other Government, to submit the matter to an arbitral tribunal which shall be empowered to direct such compensatory or remedial measures as it may deem just and equitable; the arbitral tribunal shall consist of three members, one to be appointed by each of the Governments, and the third, who will be the chairman, to be selected by the Governments;

(d) the Commission shall report upon the desirability of works for compensation and regulation in the Great Lakes System, and, upon the approval by the Governments of any such works, shall prepare plans and specifications for their construction and recommend to the Governments an equitable allocation of their cost; the Governments shall make arrangements by exchange of notes for the construction of such works as they may agree upon.

ARTICLE IX

The Governments, recognizing their primary obligation to preserve and enhance the scenic beauty of the Niagara Falls and River, and consistent with that obligation, their common interest in providing for the most beneficial use of the waters of that River, as envisaged in the Final Report of the Special International Niagara Board, agree that:

(a) the Commission shall prepare and submit to the Governments plans and specifications for works in the Niagara River designed to distribute and control the waters thereof, to prevent erosion and to ensure at all seasons unbroken crest lines on both the American Falls and the Canadian Falls and to preserve and enhance their scenic beauty, taking into account the recommendations of the Special International Niagara Board; the Governments may make arrangements by exchange of notes for the construction of such works in the Niagara River as they may agree upon, including provision for temporary diversions of the waters of the Niagara River for the purpose of facilitating construction of the works; the cost of such works in the Niagara River shall be borne by the Governments in equal moieties;

(b) upon the completion of the works authorized in this Article, diversions of the waters of the Niagara River above the Falls from the natural course and stream thereof additional to the amounts specified in Article 5 of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909⁴⁰ may be authorized and permitted by the Government to the extent and in the manner hereinafter provided:

(1) the United States may authorize and permit additional diversion within the State of New York of the waters of the River above the Falls for power purposes, in excess of the amount specified in Article 5 of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, not to exceed in the aggregate a daily diversion at the rate of five thousand cubic feet of water per second;

(2) Canada may authorize and permit additional diversion within the Province of Ontario of the waters of the River above the Falls for power purposes, in excess of the amount specified in Article 5 of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, not to exceed in the aggregate a daily diversion at the rate of five thousand cubic feet of water per second.

(c) upon completion of the works authorized in this Article, the Commission shall proceed immediately to test such works under a wide range of conditions, and to report and certify to the Governments the effect of such works, and to make recommendations respecting diversions of water from Lake Erie and the Niagara River, with particular reference to (1) the perpetual preservation of the scenic beauty of the Falls and Rapids, (2) the requirements of navigation in the Great Lakes System, and (3) the efficient utilization and equitable apportionment of such waters as may be available for power purposes; on the basis of the Commission's reports and recommendations, the Governments may by exchange of notes and concurrent legislation determine the methods by which these purposes may be attained.

⁴⁰ Convention Concerning the Boundary Waters Between the United States and Canada, signed at Washington January 11, 1909; for text, see William M. Malloy (ed.), *Treaties, Conventions, etc., Between the United States of America and Other Powers, 1910-1923* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1923), vol. III, p. 2607.

ARTICLE X

The Governments agree that:

(a) each Government undertakes to make provision for the disposition of claims and for the satisfaction of any valid claims arising out of damage or injury to persons or property occurring in the territory of the other in the course of and in connection with construction by such Government of any of the works authorized or provided for by this Agreement;

(b) each Government is hereby released from responsibility for any damage or injury to persons or property in the territory of the other which may be caused by any action authorized or provided for by this Agreement, other than damage or injury covered by the provisions of paragraph (a) of this Article;

(c) each Government will assume the responsibility for and the expense involved in the acquisition of any lands or interests in land in its own territory which may be necessary to give effect to the provisions of this Agreement.

ARTICLE XI

This Agreement shall be subject to approval by the Congress of the United States of America and the Parliament of Canada. Following such approval it shall be proclaimed by the President of the United States of America and ratified by His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, in respect of Canada. It shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of the instrument of ratification and a copy of the proclamation, which shall take place at Washington.

In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed this Agreement in duplicate and have hereunto affixed their seals.

Done at Ottawa, the nineteenth day of March, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and forty-one.

(SEAL)	JAY PIERREPONT MOFFAT
(SEAL)	ADOLF A. BERLE JR
(SEAL)	LELAND OLDS
(SEAL)	W. L. MACKENZIE KING
(SEAL)	C. D. HOWE
(SEAL)	JOHN E. READ

Annex

CONTROLLED SINGLE STAGE PROJECT (238-242)
FOR WORKS IN THE INTERNATIONAL RAPIDS SECTION
(See Article 1, Paragraph 1 (a))

The main features of the Controlled Single Stage Project (238-242), described in detail with cost estimates in the report of the

Temporary Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Basin Committees dated January 3, 1941, are as follows:

- (1) A control dam in the vicinity of Iroquois Point.
- (2) A dam in the Long Sault Rapids at the head of Barnhart Island and two power houses, one on either side of the international boundary, at the foot of Barnhart Island.
- (3) A side canal, with one lock on the United States mainland to carry navigation around the control dam and a side canal, with one guard gate and two locks, on the United States mainland south of Barnhart Island to carry navigation from above the main Long Sault Dam to the river south of Cornwall Island. All locks to provide 30 ft. depth of water on the mitre sills and to be of the general dimensions of those of the Welland Ship Canal. All navigation channels to be excavated to 27 ft. depth.
- (4) Dykes, where necessary, on the United States and Canadian sides of the international boundary, to retain the pool level above the Long Sault Dam.
- (5) Channel enlargement from the head of Galop Island to below Lotus Island designed to give a maximum velocity in the navigation channel south of Galop Island not exceeding four feet per second at any time.
- (6) Channel enlargement between Lotus Island and the control dam and from above Point Three Points to below Ogden Island designed to give a maximum mean velocity in any cross-section not exceeding two and one-quarter feet per second with the flow and at the stage to be permitted on the 1st of January of any year, under regulation of outflow and levels of Lake Ontario.
- (7) The necessary railroad and highway modifications on either side of the international boundary.
- (8) The necessary works to permit the continuance of 14 ft. navigation on the Canadian side around the control dam and from the pool above the Long Sault Dam to connect with the existing Cornwall Canal.
- (9) The rehabilitation of the towns of Iroquois and Morrisburg, Ontario.

All the works in the pool below the control dam shall be designed to provide for full Lake Ontario level but initially the pool shall be operated at maximum elevation 238.0.

[On March 21, 1941, President Roosevelt transmitted the text of the Agreement of March 19 to Congress for its information, and stated that he expected to request in due course the introduction of legislation to make it effective. Accordingly, on June 5 he recommended to Congress that it authorize the construction of the Seaway and Power Project pursuant to the terms of the Agreement. During June a bill was introduced but no action was taken on it before Congress adjourned.]

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA REGARDING TEMPORARY RAISING OF LEVEL OF LAKE ST. FRANCIS DURING LOW-WATER PERIODS

[The agreement was effected by exchange of notes signed at Washington, November 10, 1941, and extended by exchange of notes signed at Washington, October 5 and 9, 1942. For texts of notes, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 291, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1833, 1832.]

ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA FOR DIVERSION OF WATERS OF THE NIAGARA RIVER FOR POWER PURPOSES

[For text of arrangement between the United States and Canada for temporary diversion for power purposes of additional waters of the Niagara River above the Falls, effected by exchange of notes signed May 20, 1941, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 209, or 55 Stat. (pt. 2) 1276. For a supplementary arrangement providing for additional temporary diversion of waters, effected by exchange of notes signed October 27 and November 27, 1941, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 223, or 55 Stat. (pt. 2) 1380.]

PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION AND RELATED NOTES EXCHANGED BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA RELATING TO THE ALLOCATION OF TARIFF QUOTA ON HEAVY CATTLE DURING THE CALENDAR YEAR 1942

[For Presidential proclamation and related notes exchanged between the Governments of the United States and Canada pursuant to the reciprocal allocation of tariff quota on heavy cattle during the calendar year 1942, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 225, or 55 Stat. (pt. 2) 1387.]

INDIA

EXCHANGE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND INDIA

701.4111/1235

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

His Majesty's Government are proposing to attach to the British Embassy in Washington an Indian official with the rank of Minister. It is proposed that he should be designated Agent General for India in the United States if the United States Government have no objections to this title. His functions will be to advise the Embassy on Indian affairs and to deal with non-political questions in Indo-American relations.

WASHINGTON, April 17, 1941.

701.4111/1235

The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Halifax)

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the British Ambassador and has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the Embassy's *aide-mémoire* of April 17, 1941, advising the Department that His Majesty's Government is proposing to attach to the British Embassy in Washington an Indian official with the rank of Minister to be designated Agent General for India if the Government of the United States has no objection to that title.

The Secretary of State entertains no objections to the assignment of such an official with the rank of Minister to be designated by the title of Agent General for India in the United States and perceives in the proposal of His Majesty's Government a recognition of the need for the establishment of an adequate basis for the effective representation of the interests of the Government of India in the United States and of the Government of the United States of America in India.

The desirability of establishing such a basis of representation is illustrated particularly by the present inadequacy of American representation in India occasioned by the unwillingness of the Government of India to permit representatives of the Government of the United States to reside or to maintain offices in the capital city of Delhi,

which is approximately one thousand miles distant from Calcutta, where the principal American consular officer in India is stationed. American representatives so distinctly removed from the seat of government at Delhi experience numerous and prolonged delays in the transaction of official business as a result of the necessity of relying primarily upon the use of the mails in the conduct of their relations with the Government of India. At this time when India is assuming a position of increasing importance as a source of materials essential to the implementation of the coordinated programs of the Government of the United States for national defense and the extension of aid to the British Empire, it is considered a matter of regret that delays of this character should occur. In view of existing policies of close cooperation between the Government of the United States and his Majesty's Government, it appears to be obviously in the mutual interest of both governments to consider means of providing facilities for the establishment of closer personal relationships between representatives of the Government of the United States in India and officials of the Government of India.

The Secretary of State, therefore, proposes that an American Foreign Service Officer with the rank of Minister, to be designated by the title of either Commissioner or Diplomatic Agent of the United States of America, be permitted, together with secretarial and clerical members of his staff, to reside and maintain offices in Delhi.

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1941.

125.0045/35

*The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

1736/7/41

WASHINGTON, 28 June, 1941.

MY DEAR WELLES: I am writing to confirm our conversation on 26th June when I told you that the Government of India gladly agree to the proposal made by the State Department that a member of the United States Foreign Service should reside at Delhi or Simla. The Government of India would prefer that this officer should have the title of Agent General, rather than that of Commissioner or of Diplomatic Agent as suggested in the Department's note of 28th May, since owing to the constitutional position the reception of a Diplomatic Minister in India, or the establishment of direct diplomatic representation between India and the United States is not possible at this time. The Government of India also suggests that in order to avoid embarrassment with other countries it would be preferable not to make any reference to the officer's personal rank in announcing his appointment.

2. The Government of India suggests that the appointment of a United States Agent General at Delhi and of an Indian Agent General at Washington might in due course be embodied in the draft Treaty now under consideration.¹ They will, however, be glad to receive the United States Agent General forthwith in advance of the conclusion of the Treaty negotiations, and suggest that the two appointments should be announced simultaneously and as being reciprocal in character.

3. The Government of India hope that the United States Consulate General at Calcutta will continue to be maintained, in addition to the new office at Delhi.

4. The Government of India are anxious to appoint as their Agent General in the United States Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, K. B. E., C. I. E. He is aged 50, is a member of the Indian Civil Service and a member of the Governor-General's Executive Council. I should be very grateful if you will let me know whether this appointment would be acceptable to the United States Government.

V. sincerely

HALIFAX

125.0045/35

The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to the British Ambassador (Halifax)

WASHINGTON, July 2, 1941.

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I refer to your confidential communication No. 1736/7/41 of June 28, 1941, in which you confirm our conversation on June 26, when you stated that the Government of India gladly agrees to the Department's proposal that an American Foreign Service Officer should reside at Delhi or Simla. It is noted, however, that the Government of India prefers that this officer bear the title of "agent general" rather than that of "commissioner" or "diplomatic agent", as suggested in the Department's note of May 28, 1941, because the constitutional position does not permit the reception of a diplomatic minister in India, or the establishment of direct diplomatic representation between India and the United States at the present time.

The title of "commissioner" or "diplomatic agent" was suggested in view of the provisions of section 24 of the Act of February 23, 1931,² constituting a part of basic legislation relating to the establishment and organization of the American Foreign Service, which is quoted as follows:

"Sec. 24. That within the discretion of the President, any Foreign Service Officer may be assigned to act as commissioner, chargé d'affaires, minister resident, or diplomatic agent for such period as

¹ See pp. 189 ff.

² 46 Stat. 1210.

the public interests may require without loss of grade, class, or salary: Provided, however, That no such officer shall receive more than one salary."

Under the provisions of this section the President is empowered, without additional legislative authorization, to appoint a Foreign Service officer to act in the capacities enumerated therein, including those of "commissioner" or "diplomatic agent". It may be noted, however, that this section does not provide for the assignment of a Foreign Service officer as "agent general". To obtain authority, therefore, for the appointment of an agent general, it would be necessary to seek Congressional legislation either creating such an office or appropriately amending section 24 of the Act of February 23, 1931. In order that the proposed appointment of an American representative to Delhi might be made within the framework of existing legislation and in order to avoid delay in seeking additional legislative authority, the titles of "commissioner" and "diplomatic agent" were suggested. It was not the Department's intention that a representative designated by a title other than that of "agent general" should in fact enjoy a status or perform duties other than those he would perform if designated as "agent general". It would be appreciated, therefore, if His Majesty's Government would indicate whether, in view of the foregoing statements, the constitutional position would permit the Government of India to reconsider the Department's suggestion that an American Foreign Service officer assigned to Delhi bear the title of "commissioner".

In accordance with the desires of the Government of India, the Government of the United States, in announcing the appointment of a representative to Delhi, will make no reference to the personal rank of minister to be accorded to such officer.

The Department concurs with the suggestion of the Government of India that the appointments of an Indian agent general at Washington and of an American representative at Delhi be made the subject of a provision in the draft treaty between India and the United States now under negotiation, it being understood that the exchange of representatives would occur forthwith in advance of the conclusion of the treaty negotiations and that the appointments would be announced simultaneously as being reciprocal in character.

The Government of the United States desires to assure the Government of India of its intention of maintaining its consular establishment at Calcutta after the opening of an office in Delhi.

The Government of the United States perceives no objection to the appointment by the Government of India of Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, K. B. E., C. I. E., as Agent General for India in the United States and will be pleased to receive him in that capacity.

Very sincerely yours,

SUMNER WELLES

124.45/5

*The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Under Secretary
of State (Welles)*

WASHINGTON, July 15, 1941.

MY DEAR WELLES: I have now had from the Foreign Office a reply to the telegram which I sent them as a result of your letter of July 2nd about the appointment of an American Foreign Service Officer to reside at Delhi or Simla. The Foreign Office inform me that the Government of India gladly agrees to the American representative being styled "Commissioner", as suggested in your letter. I hope therefore that we shall be able to agree on a simultaneous announcement of the two appointments shortly.

Very sincerely yours,

HALIFAX

124.45/14

Press Release Issued by the Department of State, July 21, 1941

The Government of the United States and the British Government, in consultation with the Government of India, have agreed to an exchange of representatives on a reciprocal basis between the United States and India.

It is expected that an American Foreign Service Officer will be designated to represent the United States in the capacity of Commissioner at Delhi, the capital of India.

The representative of the Government of India in the United States appointed by the Governor General is Sir Girga Shankar Bajbai, who will bear the designation of Agent General for India in the United States and who, it is understood, will assume his duties in Washington in the early autumn.

123W694/360 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, September 16, 1941—6 p. m.

3838. Referring Department's 2932, August 2, 10 p. m.,^{2a} there have arisen certain questions relating to form and procedure in connection with Mr. Wilson's appointment as Commissioner to India with the rank of Minister. These have had our careful consideration and in the light of the situation which is peculiar to India we have arrived at the following conclusions:

^{2a} Not printed.

(1) The office at Delhi will be known as "The Commission of the United States of America".

(2) Mr. Wilson will present a letter of credence to the Viceroy and the usual ceremonial procedure in connection with such presentation will be observed. Following language is suggested, subject approval British authorities: "To His Majesty, George VI, etc., Great and Good Friend: I have made choice of Mr. Thomas M. Wilson, a citizen of the United States, as Commissioner of the United States of America to India, with the personal rank of Minister, to reside at New Delhi, and have charged him to conduct the affairs of his post in a manner to foster the friendship which has so long subsisted between the Government of the United States and that of Your Majesty. Paragraph May God have Your Majesty in His wise Keeping. Your Good Friend (signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt. (Countersigned) Cordell Hull". Urgent that immediate reply be received on this point.

(3) The subordinate officers will be designated as "Secretary of the Commission".

(4) The officers assigned to Delhi will retain their consular commissions as of Calcutta and no change will be made in the Calcutta consular district. This is proposed in order that the officers may be properly documented to perform consular services at the same time avoiding the technical adjustments that would be involved in consular assignments to Delhi with the resultant necessity for establishing a new consular district.

Before issuing definitive instructions to Mr. Wilson, we desire that you discuss these several propositions with the appropriate British authorities with a view to ascertaining whether this procedure is agreeable and if it is not, we should be glad to have alternative suggestions. Our primary interest, of course, is the establishment of effective representation in complete accord with the wishes of the British Government and the Government of India. This telegram has been repeated to Mr. Wilson at Calcutta.

HULL

123W694/371 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, September 30, 1941—11 p. m.

4128. Your 4615, September 30.^{2b} Mr. Wilson is severing his connection with the Consulate General at Calcutta and as indicated in Department's 3840, September 16,^{2b} he has been succeeded by George R. Merrell, who has been assigned Consul General at Calcutta.

We are in complete accord that the Consulate General remain as a separate entity, but it is our desire that the subordinate officers at Delhi shall be qualified to perform consular functions as of Calcutta.

^{2b} Not printed.

We are entirely agreeable to the proposal that neither Mr. Wilson nor Sir Girja Bajpai shall present letters of credence and as suggested, Mr. Wilson will be provided with an informal letter of introduction addressed by the President to the Viceroy.^{2c}

HULL

CONSIDERATION BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE OF ADVISABILITY OF APPROACHING THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WITH RESPECT TO GRANTING FULL DOMINION STATUS TO INDIA

845.00/5-541

*Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)*³

[WASHINGTON,] May 5, 1941.

Considerable thought given to the Near East in the past few days indicates that the Indian problem is now brought to the fore. India is contributing little to the present problem and if it remains in this status may well become an active danger to the whole situation in the not distant future. The British seem to be doing nothing about it. They have asked that we accept an Indian Agent General near this Government; meanwhile, they rather indignantly resent any attempt of ours to have effective representation at Delhi.⁴

I think the question ought to be dealt with broadly. From all the information I could get, at least a provisional settlement of the Indian problem has to be got as a preface to getting any solid help, although the Indians in general realize that if the British Empire falls their next fate will be worse than their present fate.

The attached *Aide-Mémoire* indicates the line that I rather feel ought to be considered. If it seems sensational, all I can say is that this is no time for half measures.

Mr. Wallace Murray⁵ and the Near Eastern section are of the same mind.⁶

A. A. BERLE, JR.

^{2c} President Roosevelt's letter was presented by Mr. Wilson to the Viceroy on November 21.

³ Addressed to the Secretary of State and the Under Secretary of State (Welles).

⁴ United States interest in having consular representation at Delhi was embodied in article X of the draft of the proposed treaty of commerce and navigation which had been under discussion between the United States and the Government of India since 1939; see p. 190. For correspondence regarding the establishment in 1941 of an American Commission at Delhi, see pp. 170 ff.

⁵ Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs.

⁶ Attached is a note of May 8 by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Alling) which states: "I understand nothing is to be done on this and that Mr. Welles feels it would be undesirable to do anything which might upset the Indian apple cart at this critical juncture."

[Enclosure]

Draft Aide-Mémoire

The Government of the United States has been giving earnest thought to certain problems corollary to the joint effort in which this Government and His Majesty's Government are now engaged. Among the greatest of these problems must be included the part which may be played by the Indian Empire in the coming months.

It would seem that considerations of principle as well as of policy converge to suggest that a solution be reached in respect of certain questions outstanding. India of necessity exerts a vast influence upon the affairs in the Middle East. Her status is of interest to all of the surrounding nations, and the degree to which and the methods by which she becomes integrated into a common cooperative effort of free peoples undeniably will affect the attitude of the Middle East countries.

Were there no other compelling reasons, it would suffice that India is a vast reservoir of manpower, and occupies a dominant position in supplying certain strategic war materials; and that her resources permit the development of additional supplies which in certain contingencies might well prove crucial. Converted into an active, rather than a passive, partner in the attempt to preserve a system of free cooperation among nations, her participation might well become of first importance.

To that end the Government of the United States hopes that His Majesty's Government will promptly explore the possibility of bringing India into the partnership of nations on terms equal to the other members of the British Commonwealth. Were this to be done, the Government of the United States would consider favorably receiving a diplomatic mission in Washington representing India as then constituted, and making provision for like representation of the United States at India.

The Government of the United States disclaims any desire to intervene in the relations existing between His Majesty's Government and the Indian Empire, but feels it appropriate to point out that under existing circumstances it can express concern over the tangible results, in the light of a common effort, which the British policy in India in fact produces.

The pressure of events in the Middle East leads this Government to hope that the matter may be promptly considered. It believes that the more rapidly a settlement of certain outstanding questions there prevailing can be arrived at, the greater will be the accession of strength to our common interest.

890F.6363 Standard Oil Co./131

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conversation With the
British Ambassador (Halifax)*

[WASHINGTON,] May 7, 1941.

[For the first part of this memorandum, regarding financial assistance to Saudi Arabia, see page 632.]

I then said that in going over conditions in Iraq and Iran and British problems in that part of the world, it occurred to me to inquire of him about conditions in India and whether the British found it feasible to consider further acts of liberalizing the relations of the United Kingdom to India. He said that the conditions in India were really very good; that Gandhi⁷ with his opposition to war found himself unable to sympathize with Hitler and later refused to go along in support of the British because that too involved the use of force. He added that sentiment in India towards the British situation and towards Great Britain at this time was very good. He especially pointed out the fact that the Indians have self government in the provinces of British India, which included some areas larger than France or Germany; that the Federal Government controlled primarily by the British only handled national defense, foreign affairs and general finance; that a short time ago they proposed that a committee of Indian officials might make up an eligible list from which the British Government would appoint an official committee to deal preliminarily and in the matter of recommendations with important phases of relations between the general government and the provinces or states and their governments to the extent that the general government has to do with the affairs of the provinces, but he added that the two religious sects, the Moslems and the Hindus, were unable to get together on this proposal, but that it still stands and has made a good impression. He added that it was not deemed feasible or even necessary now to make further liberalizing concessions.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

740.0011 P.W./371 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary
of State*

LONDON, August 1, 1941—11 p. m.

[Received August 1—6:47 p. m.]

3365. To the Acting Secretary for the President. There will be a problem that will come up shortly for discussion. It will have to do with a matter that Fraser, the Prime Minister of New Zealand,

⁷ Mohandas K. Gandhi, leader of the Indian National Congress and of a passive resistance movement.

broached with me the other day. The Australians in particular and the New Zealanders also are disturbed by the Japanese encroachments. They want very much to have the British work out with us some arrangement under which the British and ourselves could join in recognition of their situation with the object of furthering their security.

It occurred to me that when this matter was called to your attention it might permit a reference to India. I have thought for some time that the charge of imperialism against England in the United States largely focused on the Indian situation. This sentiment hinders support to Britain.

I remember very clearly the effort in the Far East to work out understandings among the Asiatic peoples—China, India and Japan—and that Japan blocked the way.

If we can count on a friendly India with China already as an ally the future problem in the Far East will be in large measure solved as well as bridged to the western world.

The British have always emphasized the problem of minorities in India, and the practical difficulties of securing an agreement on a constitution in which protection was given to the minorities and under which a stabilized state could be established. It can be argued that the war period does not permit the time and attention necessary to solve the issue, but it is also true that failing to solve it disturbs large groups both within the British Empire and elsewhere in the world and handicaps the support of the war in India itself.

It might be possible at least to get agreement on the right of Dominion status for India so as to eliminate that major issue now, while at the same time giving a further pledge to implement this status within a stated period following the cessation of hostilities.

Among other considerations I believe this action would have a sobering effect upon the Japanese.

In my opinion a number of the Cabinet would favor such a plan. When the Indian question was up at a Cabinet meeting some time ago the Prime Minister⁸ was opposed to taking action. Unless the idea was suggested by you I doubt if this subject would again be pressed for further consideration.

WINANT

845.01/1163

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

[WASHINGTON,] August 5, 1941.

MR. WELLES: Attached is a draft cable which might be sent to London if you think well of it.

⁸ Winston S. Churchill.

At the time when the negotiations were presented for the appointment of an Indian diplomatic agent here, and of the corresponding appointment of a United States representative in India, Mr. Murray and I considered the situation and recommended to the Secretary that he take up with Lord Halifax the possibility of getting an agreement on Dominion status for India.

The Secretary did suggest this matter to Lord Halifax, but received a pretty plain indication that they were quite satisfied with the situation as it stood; and accordingly nothing further was done.

The applicable considerations appear to be:

(1) From the point of view of the United States public opinion, the elevation of India to Dominion status would be very helpful.

(2) From the point of view of the political situation in India, NE^o believes that the position of the Nationalist movements, their fear of German or Russian domination, and their desire to retain such advances as they have made, makes this a more opportune time to propose Dominion status than has yet existed.

(3) From the economic point of view, it would appear that India has developed resources and industries which in conjunction with Australia, New Zealand, and, if possible, China, present the opportunity for building up a pretty formidable military machine. Having ample man power, political impetus would thus be given for the nucleus of a Far Eastern alliance capable of giving a good account of itself as against Japan, or possibly even Germany.

A. A. BERLE, JR.

[Annex]¹⁰

*Draft of a Telegram to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)¹¹*

WASHINGTON, August 5, 1941.

The President has considered the proposal made in your 3365, August 1, 11 p. m. From your telegram it is assumed that the primary question is a recognition by the United States of the special position of Australia and New Zealand in the Far East, and that you have in mind the suggestion of a plan by which (a) India is raised to Dominion status; (b) India, Australia, New Zealand, and China enter into a defensive alliance; (c) that the United States indicates in an appropriate manner that it would be prepared to give assistance to such an alliance.

Your suggestion is further understood to mean that we proceed towards this plan in steps, first proposing the raising of India to

^o Division of Near Eastern Affairs.

¹⁰ Filed separately under 740.0011 Pacific War/371.

¹¹ Telegram not sent.

Dominion status, and thereafter working out the relationship between the four powers in question.

The President and the Department believe that the time is favorable for proposing such a plan, and authorizes you to present it to the Prime Minister and to the Foreign Office.

845.01/114½

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] August 6, 1941.

MR. SECRETARY: I think you will wish to give very careful consideration to this suggestion.¹² In my own judgment this Government is not warranted in suggesting officially to the British Government what the status of India should be, but were the President disposed to take the matter up I should imagine that he would wish to discuss it in a very personal and confidential way directly with Mr. Churchill.¹³

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

740.0011 European War 1939/16251: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, November 1, 1941—6 p. m.

4906. Please report to the Department by telegraph upon the significance of the visit to London of the Prime Minister of Burma¹⁴ and any development arising therefrom.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/16403: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, November 4, 1941—midnight.

[Received November 5—5:10 a. m.]

5253. For the Secretary and Under Secretary. In reply to Department's 4906, November 1, 6 p. m. I thought this background might be helpful. After article 3 of the eight points of the Roosevelt-Churchill joint statement¹⁵ was published, many people here and in the United States, I understood, felt that in broad language it cleared the principle. On September 9, the day the Prime Minister

¹² See memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State, August 5, p. 179.

¹³ Marginal notation: "I agree—CH".

¹⁴ U Saw.

¹⁵ Statement of August 14, 1941, known as the Atlantic Charter, vol. I, p. 367.

spoke in the House,¹⁶ he sent me over a copy of his speech as there were definite references to the United States.

I also found a paragraph which I asked him to eliminate. The following is a résumé of that paragraph and is contained in my despatch number 1497, of September 10, 1941.¹⁷

"The Prime Minister declared that questions had been asked as to exactly what was implied by certain points of the declaration but that it was a wise rule that one party to an agreement should not without consulting the other seek to put special or strained interpretations on specific passages and that he was therefore speaking today only in an exclusive sense. With this proviso (and with obvious reference to this Government who have inquired how paragraph 3 of the declaration—regarding 'the right of all peoples to choose the form of Government under which they will live'—applies to certain areas under British rule) he went on to say that the joint declaration did not qualify in any way the various statements of policy which had been made from time to time about the development of Constitutional Government in India, Burma or such parts of the Empire. He recalled that the British Government was pledged by its declaration of August 1940,¹⁸ to help India obtain free and equal partnership in the British Commonwealth, and that it was also the Government's considered policy to establish Burmese self-government. Mr. Churchill asserted that what had primarily been in mind at the Atlantic meeting was the revocation of the sovereignty of the European nations now under the Nazi yoke and the principles governing any alterations that might have to be made in their agreement. This was 'quite a separate problem from the progressive evolution of self-governing institutions in the regions and peoples who owe allegiance to the British Crown' on which he said the British Government had made separate and complete commitments entirely in harmony with the concepts of freedom and justice inspiring the joint declaration."

I thought it ran counter to the general public interpretation of the article and that I thought it would have little support here and elsewhere and would simply intensify charges of Imperialism and leave Great Britain in the position of "a do nothing policy" so far as India and Burma are concerned. We talked up to a few minutes before he actually had to appear in Parliament to make the address. He told me that a vote of the Cabinet was in support of that passage, and he took the position that it was a matter of internal British politics. I was not able to change his determination to use this section of his statement.

Since then I have found that Amery¹⁹ had pressed the matter and the timing leads me to believe that not only because of questions in

¹⁶ For text of speech, see *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 374, col. 67.

¹⁷ Despatch not printed.

¹⁸ British Cmd. 6219: *India and the War: Statement issued with the authority of His Majesty's Government by the Governor-General on August 8, 1940.*

¹⁹ Leopold S. Amery, British Secretary of State for India and Burma.

regard to the application of article 3 to India but also the request of the Burmese Prime Minister to come on here to discuss Burma's future policy were responsible for the statement. I had luncheon with Amery and Minister U Saw last week. U Saw asked if he might call on the President on his way home. I hope this may be possible. He rather naively suggested that he felt it proper for the Prime Minister of a democracy to call on the head of the greatest democracy. U Saw had just left the King and described his interview, which lasted some 20 minutes, with him. He said that he had promised to support the British war effort. He made one brief official call on Eden,²⁰ his contact during his stay here has been through Amery. I found through Cadogan²¹ that he himself initiated his visit here. He had planned to discuss the future status of Burma and to inquire as to the effect of article 3 on this question.

Two of the morning papers, the *Daily Express* and the *News Chronicle*, carry articles stating his disappointment in the results of his visit. The following direct quotation appears in the *Daily Express*:

"I have not been able to get an assurance about self-government to take back to Burma now that my visit here is ended.

I know the Government and the British public are very busy at the moment with the war; I only want a definite assurance that Burma will be placed on the same level as the other members of the Empire.

The British Government has given an assurance to India and Burma that they will give those countries self-government one day, but when that day will come is another question."

A further quotation taken from the *News Chronicle* follows:

"My only request was that before they free the countries under Hitler they should free the countries within the British Empire," he said.

"I was anxious to find out from Mr. Churchill how the Atlantic Charter affected the future of Burma.

Burma has been unconditionally co-operating with Britain in her war effort, and yet when I come to Britain I cannot be taken into the confidence of the War Cabinet in the same way as the Dominion Premiers, because Burma has not Dominion status.

I came here to deliver a message of goodwill from my people, but I do think it is the duty of the leaders of this country to see that each and every part of the Empire taking its share of the war effort is contented.

I cannot foresee what the attitude of my people will be when I explain the response of the British Government to my request."

This morning I again brought up this subject together with U Saw's press comments with Mr. Eden. The latter called up Mr. Amery and got his permission to give me the text of a letter sent to the Bur-

²⁰ Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

²¹ Sir Alexander Cadogan, British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

mese Prime Minister with the understanding that it be treated as secret and confidential. The text reads as follows:

"Your visit to this country has provided an opportunity for you to state your views as to the method of approach to the constitutional problem in Burma which will arise for discussion after the war, and for me to make clear, as I hope I have succeeded in doing, the sincerity of the intentions of His Majesty's Government on this subject. I feel that the opportunity thus afforded for an exchange of information and ideas has been of great benefit in the midst of the life and death struggle in which this country and Burma, and indeed the whole cause of free government in the world, are involved, it is not possible, as I the past few days realize, either to enter upon the detailed examination of and discussion required for the solution of these important problems or to anticipate of conclusions which must themselves be affected by that examination and by the situation at the end of the war.²²

The general aim of the policy of His Majesty's Government has, however, been made clear in a number of declarations in recent years, the last of which was that made by Sir Archibald Cochrane²³ to the Burma Legislature on 26 August 19[40] in the course of which he stated that His Majesty's Government will continue to use their best endeavors to promote the attainment of Dominion status as being the objective of Burma's constitutional progress and that immediately the war is brought to a victorious end they will be willing to discuss the problems to be solved in Burma.

It is the intention of His Majesty's Government that this discussion, to be conducted in collaboration with representatives of Burma, should cover all questions relevant to the methods by which the attainment of this declared aim can be facilitated and expedited, with a view to removing to the fullest extent that may be found practicable such limitations as stand in the way of the assumption by the people of Burma of complete self-government within the British Commonwealth.

I may add that His Majesty's Government consider that conclusions reached on the questions to be discussed should be based on the merits of those questions themselves as affecting Burma and her relations with His Majesty's Government, and will not allow them to be prejudiced in any way by the position in regard to the solution of similar problems elsewhere.[²⁴]

WINANT

845.01/120

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs
(Murray)*^{23a}

[WASHINGTON,] November 7, 1941.

Reference is made to Ambassador Winant's telegram no. 5253 of November 4, midnight, concerning Prime Minister Churchill's in-

²² This sentence is apparently garbled.

²³ Governor of Burma.

^{23a} Addressed to the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle), the Under Secretary of State (Welles), and the Secretary of State.

terpretation of Article 3 of the "Roosevelt-Churchill Atlantic Declaration." It may be recalled that Mr. Churchill informed the House of Commons on September 9, 1941 that this article, dealing with "the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live", is applicable only to European nations under Nazi occupation and does not relate to "the development of constitutional government in India, Burma or such parts of the Empire", which may be regarded as a separate problem to be handled in accordance with previous declarations in regard thereto.

It was Article 3 of the Declaration which prompted the Premier of Burma to visit London in order to ascertain the applicability of this article to Burma and discuss the future of Burma with British officials. Upon being informed of the inapplicability of Article 3 to Burma and of the unwillingness of the British Government to enter into detailed discussions of the future status of Burma at the present time, the Premier of Burma expressed his keen disappointment and is quoted in the press as stating "I cannot foresee what the attitude of my people will be when I explain the response of the British Government to my request."

It is to be expected that the attitude of the British Government, as expressed in Mr. Churchill's address to Parliament and by the nature of the reply to the inquiry of the Prime Minister of Burma, will have repercussions in India, which may be of a serious character and which may serve to impede further India's contribution to the war.

The Prime Minister of Burma has expressed a desire to call upon the President while passing through the United States on his return to Burma. In this connection, reference is made to Mr. Welles' memorandum of August 6, 1941 to the Secretary in which it was stated that "this Government is not warranted in suggesting officially to the British Government what the status of India should be, but were the President disposed to take the matter up I should imagine that he would wish to discuss it in a very personal and confidential way directly with Mr. Churchill." In view of the fact that Mr. Churchill has now offered an interpretation of the Roosevelt-Churchill Declaration, and, in view of the possible forthcoming call of the Premier of Burma upon the President, it is considered that there may be greater justification than there has been heretofore of an effort on the part of this Government to assist in a solution of problems involved in the political status of India and Burma.

It is suggested, therefore, that it may not be inopportune at the present time to submit this matter to the President for his consideration, with possible reference to Mr. Winant's telegram no. 3365 of August 1, 11 p. m., recommending that a suggestion be made to the British Government to grant dominion status to India. As has been indicated by the Division of Near Eastern Affairs in memoranda

dated August 12, and October 16, 1941,²⁴ the political situation in India appears to be deteriorating rapidly. It is considered inevitable that such a deterioration will prevent India from putting forth its best effort to help win the war. In view of the expressed views of the President regarding the policy of this Government in assisting Britain to defeat Hitler, it is believed that the President may wish to consider what steps may be taken to check the uncooperative movement in India in order that India may make a greater contribution to the prosecution of the war. Accordingly, the attached letter to the President²⁵ has been prepared for the signature of the Secretary.

WALLACE MURRAY

845.01/120

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] November 15, 1941.

THE SECRETARY: This suggested letter for you to send to the President raises, it seems to me, some very important considerations.

Naturally, if point three in the joint declaration of the Atlantic has any real meaning, it should be regarded as all-inclusive and consequently applicable to the peoples of India and of Burma.

But it seems to me that this Government, in regard to this problem, at least at the present moment, is facing a question of expediency. The British have been governing India in one form or another for well over a hundred years. The highest caliber organization of the entire British civil service is that which has been built up by the British Government over the years in the Indian service. From the information which Lord Halifax has personally given to me—and I think it is generally conceded that he has probably been the most liberal viceroy that India has ever had—it is the consensus of opinion of the British civil servants most experienced in Indian affairs that any immediate change in the status of India would immediately create internal dissension in India on a very wide scale and in all probability would give rise to a situation with which the meager number of British now in India could not cope. In other words, the immediate granting of dominion status would create a situation in India exactly the opposite of that which Mr. Murray and those who join him in their recommendation to you forecast.

²⁴ Neither printed.

²⁵ Not printed; the draft letter reviewed the Indian situation and suggested that President Roosevelt might feel justified in taking this question up in a personal way with Mr. Churchill (740.0011 European War/16403).

Deeply as I sympathize with the objective which is sought in this proposed letter, I cannot believe that any officials in our own Government are sufficiently familiar with Indian affairs to make it possible for their judgment and recommendations to be put up against the judgment and recommendations of the competent British authorities themselves.

The status of India is an issue that has been used against the British Government by the extreme fringes of the Left Wing in this country, particularly during the time that the Communist Party was opposing Great Britain, and by the extreme groups among the Irish in this country. I have never yet found that this issue meant very much to public opinion in general in the United States. For that reason it would not seem to me a matter which has immediate political significance so far as public opinion in the United States is concerned. I also have the strong feeling, in view of Mr. Churchill's well-known and frequently published attitude concerning the status of India, that he would inevitably feel, should this Government intervene even in the informal manner suggested, that the United States was taking advantage of Great Britain's present situation and her dependence upon this country in order to try to force Great Britain to take an immediate step which he personally has consistently opposed, and to which the overwhelming majority of the British authorities, civil and military, are likewise opposed.

For all of these reasons I recommend against the intervention of this Government at this time in the manner proposed unless we are convinced that some step of this character is imperatively required from the standpoint of our own national policy, and of our national defense.²⁶

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

740.0011 European War 1939/16960a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Commissioner in India (Wilson)

WASHINGTON, November 25, 1941—8 p. m.

16. The American press has given considerable prominence to a resolution adopted on or about November 18th by the Council of State recommending that the Viceroy convey to the British Government the discontent of that body over Prime Minister Churchill's statement to the House of Commons on September 9th to the effect that the Atlantic Charter is inapplicable to India. It is understood that this resolution

²⁶ Attached to this memorandum is a note by Cecil W. Gray, assistant to the Secretary of State, for Mr. Murray which states: "The Secretary said he didn't care to send this out now; that, if you wished, you could take it up again with [Under Secretary]."

embodied an expression of opinion that the Prime Minister's statement is likely to be prejudicial to India's war effort.

You should report to the Department by telegraph concerning the significance of this resolution and various Indian reactions to the Churchill statement. This report should indicate whether such reactions are likely to result in a further deterioration in the India political situation prejudicial to India's contribution to the war.

As of course you realize one of the reasons for the establishment of the Office of the Commissioner at New Delhi was to enable the Department to receive timely and complete reports on just this type of thing.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/16961 : Telegram

The Commissioner in India (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

NEW DELHI, November 28, 1941—3 p. m.

[Received November 29—1:32 p. m.]

26. Reference Department's No. 16, November 25, 8 p. m. The resolution referred to was passed by the Council of State on November 18th by a vote of 10 to 6 with Government remaining neutral and the Government leader, Sir Akbar Hydari, stating that in any case the report of the debate would be transmitted to His Majesty's Government. One member who opposed the resolution declared that it was "the height of hypocrisy" to say that Mr. Churchill's statement would adversely affect India's war effort. The "considerable prominence" which the American press gave to the passage of this resolution has most certainly not been reflected by any section of the Indian press and editorial comment has been notably lacking.

Although as yet it is much too early to make a prophecy as to the ultimate success of the recent action whereby the Province of Orissa has formed a Ministry emphasizing its purpose to "contribute to the war effort", it would be more profitable to feature such an occurrence than to give prominence to a resolution considered in India as of little significance by journalists and public as well.

It is true the Atlantic Charter has been adversely commented on editorially by many sections of the press in India and that from time to time President Roosevelt's name has been drawn in (reference my despatch No. 10 of November 7th²⁷) but this appears to me to be inconsequential as Mr. Roosevelt's popularity and press in India are almost universally excellent from which it is reasonable to deduce that unfavorable criticism of the President is for the purpose of (1) keeping prominently before the world India's position and (2) to try to

²⁷ Not printed.

force from Mr. Roosevelt some sort of statement which might be construed as repudiation of the Prime Minister's statement of the inapplicability to India of the Atlantic Charter. I believe it would be a grave error to give any great weight or reply to such comment which after all is of infrequent occurrence (reference also in this connection my despatch No. 5 of October 30, and No. 207, Calcutta, May 22, 1941²⁸).

If an effort is made to confine under one heading that which is prejudicial to India's war effort it would be well not to lose sight of the fact that India does not consider herself as fighting in this war for India's interests as a nation and feels that she is being called upon to defend an Empire in which she is not received as an equal partner.

Despite the prominence given to it by the American press I regard the resolution of November 18 as just another resolution and without significance.

I shall regard as irrelevant the closing paragraph of the Department's cable under reference but if I am at variance with the Department by doing this I shall appreciate a further elaboration of the Department's view by air mail.

WILSON

NEGOTIATIONS REGARDING A TREATY OF COMMERCE AND
NAVIGATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND INDIA²⁹

711.452/33

The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Lothian)

WASHINGTON, April 10, 1940.

EXCELLENCY: With reference to my note to you of October 10, 1939³⁰ transmitting a draft of a Treaty of Establishment, Commerce, Navigation, and Consular Rights between the United States of America and India, the Department has been giving further consideration to that draft and has decided to propose to revise and expand it in certain particulars.

In view of the fact that the draft submitted with the note of October 10, 1939 makes no provision for exemption from military service it would appear appropriate to propose an article on that subject in substantially the form of the fourth paragraph of Article I of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation between the United States and Siam signed November 13, 1937.³¹ A copy of that treaty is enclosed herewith. Should it be decided to include such an article, the following terms may prove acceptable:

²⁸ Neither printed.

²⁹ Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. II, pp. 349-364.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 352.

³¹ Department of State Treaty Series No. 940, or 53 Stat. (pt. 3) 1731.

“Nationals of either country shall be exempt in the territories of the other country from compulsory military service on land, on sea, or in the air, in the regular forces, or in the national guard, or in the militia; from all contributions in money or in kind, imposed in lieu of personal military service, and from all forced loans or military contributions. They shall not be subjected, in time of peace or in time of war, to military requisitions except as imposed upon nationals.”

Such an article might be appropriately inserted between Articles I and II of the present draft treaty.

Article V, paragraph 1, of the draft treaty reads as follows:

“1. Vessels of the United States of America shall enjoy in India and Indian vessels shall enjoy in the United States of America the same treatment as national vessels or vessels of the most favored third country.”

It is believed that it would be desirable in the interest of precision and clarity to redraft the quoted article to read as follows:

“1. Vessels of the United States of America shall enjoy in India and Indian vessels shall enjoy in the United States of America the same treatment as national vessels. In no case shall vessels of either country be accorded treatment less favorable than the vessels of the most favored third country.”

Paragraph 1, Article X, of the present draft reads as follows:

“1. Each country will receive from the other country, consular officers in those of its ports, places and cities, where it may be convenient and which are open to consular representatives of any third country.”

It is suggested that the word “or” be substituted for the word “and” appearing at the end of line 3 of this paragraph. This Government attaches considerable importance to the right to establish a consular office at Delhi in order to facilitate the conduct of problems of mutual interest. It is hoped that your Government may be in a position to aid in preparing the way for the establishment of such an office.

It would seem to be advisable to include an article relating to the acquisition of land and buildings for governmental purposes which customarily appears in treaties of friendship, commerce and consular rights and consular conventions of the United States. The provision would be in the following terms:

“1. The Government of the United States of America and the Government of India, respectively, shall have the right to acquire and own land and buildings required for diplomatic or consular premises in the territory of the other country and also to erect buildings in such territory for the purposes stated subject to local building regulations.

"2. Lands and buildings situated in the territory of the United States of America or India, respectively, of which the Government of the other country is the legal or equitable owner and which are used exclusively for governmental purposes by that owner, shall be exempt from taxation of every kind, National, State, Provincial and Municipal, other than assessments levied for services or local public improvements by which the premises are benefited."

If the provisions of the foregoing article are found acceptable, the article may well be inserted between Articles X and XI of the present draft treaty.

Finally, I have the honor to propose provisions relating to the inviolability of archives and related matters. These provisions, also, are standard in the treaties of the United States now in force with a number of countries. It is suggested that a new article, to be included after Article XI of the present draft might read as follows:

"Article—

"The quarters where consular business is conducted and the archives of the consulates shall at all times be inviolable, and under no pretext shall any authorities of any character within the country make any examination or seizure of papers or other property deposited with the archives. When consular officers are engaged in business within the territory of the country where they are exercising their duties, the files and documents of the consulate shall be kept in a place entirely separate from the one where private or business papers are kept. Consular offices shall not be used as places of asylum. No consular officers shall be required to produce official archives in court or testify as to their contents."

The insertion of the three foregoing articles, if agreed upon, will require the renumbering of the articles of the draft except Article I. While my Government desires to proceed to the conclusion of the treaty with India as soon as may be practicable, it is of the opinion that the time required for the negotiation of the three additional articles would not materially delay the successful conclusion of the negotiations.

Accept [etc.]

For the Secretary of State:
R. WALTON MOORE

711.452/40

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs
(Murray) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson)*

[WASHINGTON,] April 3, 1941.

MR. ACHESON: On March 30, 1941, Sir Firoz Khan, High Commissioner of the Government of India in London, accompanied by Mr. W. H. Mather of his office and Sir Nevile Butler of the British Em-

bassy in Washington, called at the Division of Near Eastern Affairs to discuss matters relating to the draft of a proposed "Treaty of Establishment, Commerce, Navigation and Consular Rights Between the United States of America and India."

The reasons for the desirability of such a treaty with India and the history of the preparation of the draft may be summarized briefly as follows: Following reports from the Consulate General at Calcutta regarding mounting resentment in India at restrictions imposed by our immigration laws against the entry of Indian business men into the United States, it was decided to negotiate a treaty with India in order that Indian nationals, like those of most other Oriental countries, would be accorded "treaty merchant" status under Section 3 (6) of the Immigration Act of 1924.³² It was considered desirable also to have a new treaty of commerce and navigation to replace the obsolete provisions relating to India in the American-British Convention of Commerce and Navigation of July 3, 1815.³³ Accordingly, when the British Ambassador subsequently took up the question of restrictions upon the entry of Indian business men, the Department proposed the negotiation of a treaty of establishment and commerce. The British Embassy stated that the Government of India was agreeable to the proposal and suggested that the Department prepare a draft of such a treaty, which was duly submitted to the Embassy on October 10, 1939.³⁴

The purpose of the visit of Sir Firoz Khan, who arrived in the United States a little over a week ago, is to submit the proposals of the Government of India for changes in the draft. Although most of these proposals present only minor problems for which it is believed solutions can be found, two issues have been raised which concern matters relating to the general foreign policy of the Government. These issues and the matters to which they relate are discussed briefly as follows:

1. *Mineral Resources Article*

It has been proposed that Article VIII (copy attached³⁵) consist only of the first sentence thereof and that the second and third sentences be deleted. Such a deletion would result in our acquiescence in the continued enjoyment by British oil companies of exploratory and extractive privileges in India not accorded to American firms by virtue of legislation existing in India since 1885 forbidding corporations controlled by foreign interests to engage in the extraction of petroleum. A similar situation prevailing in Great Britain was al-

³² 43 Stat. 155.

³³ Hunter Miller (ed.), *Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America*, vol. 2, p. 595.

³⁴ For the draft, see *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. II, p. 354.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 360.

tered by the British Petroleum (Production) Act, 1934, under which oil-extracting rights were granted to foreign corporations on a reciprocal basis. This legislation opened the door to similar concessions in certain other parts of the British Empire, notably New Zealand, Papua, and New Guinea. In the United States, in accordance with the provisions of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920,³⁶ foreign nationals may own stock in American corporations exploiting the oil resources of the public domain provided the countries of which they are nationals accord similar rights to American nationals. Sir Firoz Khan took the position that reciprocal treatment with respect to extractive and mining rights by the Governments of the United States and of India would constitute only theoretical reciprocity, because Indian corporations lack the capital to exploit American resources, and that such a concession would have an unfortunate effect upon public opinion in India. However, it may be said in reply to his contention that the petroleum industry in India is almost entirely in the hands of British, rather than Indian, firms and that the British Petroleum Act of 1934 grants American corporations only theoretical rights in the United Kingdom, where there is no oil to be extracted. Therefore, a provision in the proposed treaty between the United States and India would amount in fact to actual reciprocity on the part of Great Britain for privileges granted to British corporations under the terms of the American Mineral Leasing Act of 1920.

2. *Definition of Most-Favored Nation Clause*

It was also proposed that the words "including the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland" be deleted from Article XVI, Section 3, which is quoted as follows:

"The term 'most-favored nation' as used in this Treaty shall be construed to mean the most favored third country, *including the United Kingdom of Great Britain, and Northern Ireland.*"

Sir Firoz Khan states that the clause which it is proposed to delete is in contravention of an agreement between Great Britain and India whereby preferential tariff treatment is accorded to importations of a large number of commodities from the United Kingdom and British colonies. It is also his opinion that by deleting the clause British dominions would not be included in the term "third countries". The effect of such a deletion, therefore, would be to accord recognition in a treaty to preferential tariff treatment now accorded certain British and Colonial products, and it would open the door to the extension of the principle of preferential treatment to goods of the Dominions.

In the Trade Agreement between the United States and Great Britain, signed November 17, 1938,³⁷ this Government recognized the sys-

³⁶ 41 Stat. 437.

³⁷ Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 164, or 54 Stat. (pt. 2) 1897.

tem of Empire preferences, but the British Government made a substantial reduction of the differences between standard and preferential rates. In this connection it may be stated that, although recognition was given to the system of imperial preferences, a material concession was granted in return for such recognition. Moreover the recognition of imperial preferences in a treaty is a recognition of a more formal character and the initial compulsory period is for a much longer time. It appears that the issue raised by the definition of "most-favored nation" is that of the attitude of the Government of the United States toward the entire system of Empire preferences.

WALLACE MURRAY

711.452/42

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Trade Agreements (Hawkins)

[WASHINGTON,] April 4, 1941.

Participants: Sir Firoz Khan—High Commissioner of the Government of India in London
 Mr. W. H. Mather of Sir Firoz's office in London
 Mr. Acheson
 Mr. Hawkins

Sir Firoz Khan and Mr. Mather called pursuant to an appointment made at their request to discuss certain aspects of the proposed Treaty of Establishment, Commerce, Navigation and Consular Rights between the United States and India, a draft of which was submitted by this government in October 1939.

Sir Firoz Khan stated that his government is anxious to conclude the treaty as soon as possible in order that Indian nationals who desire to come to this country on business may enjoy the "treaty merchant" status under Section 3 (6) of the Immigration Act. He pointed out that the granting of these privileges is as much in our interest as in theirs since it would facilitate business contacts between individuals and companies in the United States and in India which would result in an increase in the sale of American products in the Indian market. He went on to say, however, that the draft treaty which we presented raises questions which are difficult to settle and which if not surmounted will prevent the extension of privileges to Indian merchants which are of benefit to both countries.

The difficulties presented are (a) those created by the definition of most-favored-nation treatment (Article XVI, Section 3) which would require the abolition of preferences by India to the United Kingdom and (b) the mineral resources article (Article VIII) which would

accord to nationals of each country reciprocal rights with respect to the exploration for and exploitation of petroleum and other mineral resources in the other.

With respect to (a), India is faced with the situation created by its contractual obligation under its trade agreement of 1939 with the United Kingdom³⁸ whereby preferences to the United Kingdom are guaranteed.

With respect to (b), Sir Firoz Khan was less explicit with respect to the difficulties from India's standpoint but indicated that the granting of privileges for the exploitation of petroleum and other mineral resources, in Baluchistan, would be very difficult for the Government of India to accord and it is in this area that American interests particularly desire to operate. With respect to other parts of India, he said there is nothing to interfere with American enterprise. Mr. Acheson pointed out that as matters now stand there is a notable absence of reciprocity as between British and American interests; that the British enjoy rights of exploitation in the United States and while reciprocal rights are accorded American citizens in the United Kingdom these rights are of little practical value; that in India, where opportunities for mineral development exist, American enterprise is excluded; and that accordingly he felt that American nationals in all fairness should be permitted to share with the British in India opportunities such as the British share with American nationals in this country.

Sir Firoz Khan expressed the hope that in the interest of facilitating closer commercial relations with India this Government would be willing to conclude immediately a simple commercial treaty sufficient only to extend to Indian nationals "treaty merchant" status under Section 3 (6) of the Immigration Act and that other controversial issues such as those above mentioned would be excluded for the present and left for future adjustment. He supported this proposal by repeating his contention that the granting of such status to Indian merchants is as much in our interest as in the interest of India. It was pointed out to him that under the law a treaty of commerce and navigation is necessary in order to grant such rights and that in formulating the draft of the proposed treaty we sought to effect the adjustment of other issues which we consider of at least equal importance, such adjustment being the function of such a treaty. However, Mr. Acheson said that we would study the matter carefully in the light of the discussion.

Sir Firoz Khan said again that he was very anxious to expedite the conclusion of an arrangement which would settle the treaty merchant

³⁸ British Cmd. 5966: *Trade Agreement between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of India, London, March 20, 1939.*

matter, and expressed the hope that we could reach some decision within the next week or two. He said he was going to New York but that he could be reached there and would be ready for further discussion at any time.

711.452/41

The Acting Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Halifax)

WASHINGTON, June 25, 1941.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to this Government's note of October 10, 1939,³⁹ to your predecessor transmitting a draft of a treaty of establishment, commerce, navigation and consular rights between the United States and India, and to recent conversations at Washington between Sir Firoz Khan Noon, High Commissioner for India at London, and officers of this Department with respect to the draft treaty.

The conversations indicate that there is substantial agreement as to the various articles of the draft treaty, except as to the article on mineral resources. As pointed out in the note under reference, this article provides for most-favored-nation treatment in respect of the exploration for and exploitation of mineral resources. It also provides, on a basis of reciprocity, for national treatment in the ownership of stock in domestic corporations engaged in the exploration for and exploitation of a specified list of resources, including oil.

This Government is of the opinion that the article concerning mineral resources is of considerable importance in the proposed treaty with India and requests that further consideration be given to its inclusion as originally drafted. This Government will be pleased to receive the expression of the views of His Majesty's Government.

It is understood that the Government of India desires that a specific condition of reciprocity be added at the end of Article I. The major effect of such a provision probably would be to limit the operation of the most-favored-nation clause contained in paragraph 2 of that Article. This Government would prefer the most liberal possible construction of the most-favored-nation provisions of the Article. However, should the Government of India insist upon the addition of the condition of reciprocity, and should all other outstanding questions be satisfactorily settled, this Government would agree to the following stipulation:

"9. Nothing in this Article shall be construed to require the United States of America to grant Indian nationals rights greater than those received by American nationals in India, or to require India to grant American nationals rights greater than those received by Indian nationals in the United States of America".

³⁹ *Foreign Relations, 1939*, vol. II, p. 352.

This Government further understands that it is the desire of the Government of India to define coasting trade in paragraph 2 of Article V so as to include trade between India, on the one hand, and Burma, Ceylon and Persian Gulf ports on the other hand. While this Government is prepared to agree to a definition of the coasting trade of India which will include trade with Burma and Ceylon, it would find it difficult to place trade between India and the Persian Gulf ports in the same category. It is proposed, therefore, that paragraph 2 of Article V read as follows:

“The coasting trade of the two countries, including trade between India and Burma and Ceylon, shall be exempt from the foregoing provision and from the other provisions of this Treaty, and shall be regulated according to the laws of each country in relation thereto. It is agreed, however, that with respect to the coasting trade, vessels of either country shall enjoy within the territory of the other country the most-favored-nation treatment.”

The provisions of Article XII relating to exemption from internal taxation of officials of the Government of one country within the territory of the other country are understood to meet with some objection on the part of the Government of India on the ground that it infringes upon the freedom of action of some of the subdivisions of the Government of India. This Government is prepared to agree to limit this Article so as to apply only to internal taxes imposed by the central governments. This Government would be pleased to receive a redraft of Article XII.

You will recall that this Government has proposed that the last sentence of the first paragraph of Article XVI read as follows:

“The present Treaty shall apply, on the part of India, to India, including the Indian States.”

It appears that the inclusion of the Indian States within the scope of the treaty is not acceptable to His Majesty's Government. In view of the great difficulties of administration in the United States of a treaty applicable to India but not to the Indian States, and in view of the fact that at least one other treaty, namely, the convention concerning the tenure and disposition of real and personal property of March 2, 1899,⁴⁰ has been made applicable to India including the Indian States, this Government hopes that His Majesty's Government may be able to include the Indian States within the purview of paragraph 1 of Article XVI.

⁴⁰ William M. Malloy (ed.), *Treaties, Conventions, etc., Between the United States of America and Other Powers, 1776-1909* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1910), vol. I, p. 774.

In connection with the term "most-favored-nation" in paragraph 3 of Article XVI it appears that the definition proposed by this Government is not acceptable. This proposal was as follows:

"3. The term 'most-favored-nation' as used in this treaty shall be construed to mean the most favored third country, including the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland."

It is appreciated that the inclusion of the reference to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland raises the whole problem of the conditions of trade between two component parts of the British Commonwealth of Nations. While it is my hope that these conditions may embody the most liberal principles of international trade, this Government, in view of present unsettled world conditions will refrain from raising the question at the present time. It, therefore, proposes the following wording for paragraph 3 of Article XVI:

"3. The term 'most-favored-nation' as used in this treaty, except Articles II, III and IV shall be construed to mean the most favored third country including the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The term 'most-favored-nation' as used in Articles II, III and IV shall be construed to mean the most favored foreign country."

In view of the fact that the proposed treaty as concluded, would leave a number of problems without definitive rules for their solution, it is suggested that the initial term of the treaty specified in paragraph 1 of Article XVII be three years in lieu of five years.

It is understood that the Government of India would agree to the establishment of an American consular establishment at Delhi, such agreement to be in the form of an exchange of notes. In the event Agents General or Commissioners are received at Washington and Delhi pursuant to this Department's memorandum of May 28, 1941,⁴¹ it will, of course, be unnecessary to conclude the previously mentioned exchange of notes.

There are a number of small refinements in language which this Government desires in the proposed treaty, particularly in the provisions relating to foreign exchange control, but such changes may be discussed at some later time.

In view of the substantial progress made in the negotiations hitherto conducted it is my hope that, despite the pressure of other problems, it may be possible to bring these negotiations to a speedy conclusion.

Accept [etc.]

SUMNER WELLES

⁴¹ *Ante*, p. 170.

711.452/43

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. W. L. Parker of the Division
of Near Eastern Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] June 30, 1941.

Participants: Sir Firoz Khan Noon, High Commissioner of the
Government of India at London,
Mr. Mather, of the High Commissioner's Office.
Mr. Alling⁴²
Mr. Turkel⁴³
Mr. Parker

Sir Firoz Khan Noon, accompanied by Mr. Mather, called again this morning at the Division of Near Eastern Affairs to discuss matters pertaining to the proposed treaty between India and the United States. Sir Firoz stated that the Government of India desires that the limitrophe countries, Iran, Afghanistan, and Nepal be outside the purview of the treaty because of the special position which they occupy in relation to India. He was informed that no objection was perceived to this proposal.

There was also discussed the question of inclusion in the treaty of a provision according American nationals and corporations the same rights and privileges in the exploitation of mineral resources as those of other nations, particularly the United Kingdom. Sir Firoz was informed that the Department still desires the inclusion of such a provision, and Sir Firoz stated that he would take the matter up with his Government. A discussion then ensued as to whether this provision, as well as certain other provisions in the treaty, should be upon a "reciprocal" or "most-favored-nation" basis. Sir Firoz was inclined to favor the "reciprocal" point of view; whereas the Department prefers a "most-favored-nation" basis.

At the conclusion of the conference it appeared that substantial agreement had been reached in regard to most matters involved in the treaty and that remaining controversial problems were capable of solution. Just prior to his departure Sir Firoz indicated that he considered it probable that agreement on all points could be reached eventually and that prospects are good for the conclusion of a treaty embodying substantially the provisions desired by the Department.

⁴² Paul H. Alling, Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs.

⁴³ Harry R. Turkel of the Division of Commercial Policy and Agreements.

711.452/44

*The High Commissioner of the Government of India at London
(Noon) to the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs
(Murray)*

WASHINGTON, July 1, 1941.

DEAR MR. WALLACE MURRAY: It was a great pleasure to have met you this morning and to have discussed the trade treaty with your officers, Messrs. Ayling [*Alling*], Parker and Turkel. During these discussions, it was informally agreed that the point of view of the Government of India regarding a special treatment to be accorded to limitrophe countries was in accordance with the usual practice and that the State Department will have no objection to this principle being incorporated in this treaty.

The second point we discussed was the exploitation of mineral resources. In this respect, your officers were keen that the U. S. A. citizens should have an equal treatment with the United Kingdom subjects. I am passing this information on to my own Government and I hope that before long the two countries will be able to come to a final decision.

Assuring you [etc.]

FIROZ NOON

711.452/44

*The Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson) to the British Chargé
(Campbell)*

WASHINGTON, October 3, 1941.

MY DEAR MR. CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES: I enclose a copy of a letter dated July 1, 1941⁴⁴ from Sir Firoz Khan Noon, K. C. S. I., relating to certain matters under consideration in connection with the proposed treaty between the United States and India. In view of the recent appointment of Sir Firoz to a post in India, it is not known whether Sir Firoz is still engaged in the consideration of questions relating to the proposed treaty. For this reason it is considered appropriate to communicate to you the attitude of the Department concerning the following matters referred to by Sir Firoz in his letter.

It is noted that it is the desire of the Government of India that the terms of the proposed treaty provide for special treatment to be accorded to the limitrophe countries of Nepal, Afghanistan and Iran. In view of the special factors affecting the trade between India, on the one hand, and Nepal and Afghanistan, on the other, the Department perceives no objection to the incorporation within the treaty of a provision recognizing the special position of these two limitrophe

⁴⁴ *Supra.*

countries and placing them outside the purview of the treaty. It is the opinion of the Department, however, that India's trade relations with Iran, and Iran's trade relations with other countries, are not such as to warrant the inclusion within the treaty of such a provision with respect to Iran. In this connection it may be mentioned, furthermore, that, whereas Nepal and Afghanistan are land-locked countries with extensive frontiers over which pass their principal arteries of trade, Iran is a maritime nation engaged in direct sea-borne trade with various countries, including the United States.

It is noted also that Sir Firoz has stated that he is informing his Government of the Department's desire that there be incorporated in the treaty provisions according to American nationals and corporations the same rights and privileges in the exploration and development of mineral resources as accorded to those of other countries, including the United Kingdom.

It would be greatly appreciated if you would kindly make known the foregoing views of the Department either to Sir Firoz Khan Noon or to the appropriate authorities of the Government of India.

I am [etc.]

DEAN ACHESON

[In a letter from the Indian Agency General, December 15, 1942, it was stated that the Government of India, after most carefully considering the matter, "are disposed to feel it wiser, in view of the changed situation in India, to defer the conclusion of the negotiations until conditions are more settled". (711.452/49)]

REPRESENTATIONS BY THE UNITED STATES REGARDING IMPORT RESTRICTIONS BY INDIA AND BURMA AFFECTING AMERICAN MISSIONARY ORGANIZATIONS; REQUEST FOR FREE ENTRY PRIVILEGES FOR AMERICAN MISSIONARIES

645.116/48

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Calcutta (Wilson)*⁴⁵

WASHINGTON, March 24, 1941.

The Secretary of State encloses for the attention of the Consular Officer in charge a copy of a letter dated March 12, 1941, together with an enclosure thereto, from the American Baptist Foreign Mission Society, 152 Madison Avenue, New York, New York,⁴⁶ concerning the desire of the Society that shipments of certain types of medical and educational supplies made to its representatives in India and

⁴⁵ The same instruction, *mutatis mutandis*, March 24, to the Consul at Rangoon.

⁴⁶ Not printed.

Burma be exempted from import control restrictive measures and prohibitions in view of the fact that they are financed entirely by American funds.

The American Baptist Foreign Mission Society states in its letter that, for the past twenty years, it has been shipping medical and school supplies to its missions in India and Burma and that most of these articles consist of contributions and gifts from affiliated religious organizations in the United States. It appears that some of the materials, such as bandages and certain medical supplies, are prepared by church women and that monetary contributions equivalent to the value of such articles can not be obtained. It is pointed out that these shipments are not financed by mission funds in India and Burma and that they involve no exchange transactions for the purchase of dollars.

From the information available to the Department it is understood that shipments of the type referred to are subject to import control measures and that no provision exists exempting them from restrictions and prohibitions generally applicable to ordinary commercial goods purchased with rupee funds. Since it is the Department's understanding that the ostensible purpose of existing regulations controlling imports is to conserve exchange, it is desired that you ascertain from the appropriate local authorities what exemptions may be made with respect to importations by all American missionary organizations in India of supplies of this character which do not involve foreign exchange transactions, pointing out that such supplies represent the voluntary contribution of materials for use in philanthropic enterprises. The list of articles submitted by the American Baptist Foreign Mission Society as an enclosure to its letter may, of course, be regarded as illustrative and not as a complete list of the articles which the Mission Society desires to import.

The Department desires that you submit a report on the subject by air mail.

A similar instruction has been sent to Rangoon.

645.116/71b

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Calcutta (Wilson) ⁴⁷

WASHINGTON, May 5, 1941.

SIR: The Department desires to ascertain the attitude of the Government of India toward granting free entry to importations of equipment and supplies consigned to American missionary organizations,

⁴⁷ The same instruction, *mutatis mutandis*, May 5, to the Consul at Rangoon.

including educational, medical, and philanthropic institutions maintained by them, as well as to importations of clothing, foodstuffs, and professional equipment by the American personnel thereof.

These missionary organizations provide educational and medical facilities which would not otherwise be available to the communities they serve unless their entire cost were borne by governmental agencies. As is well known, these organizations derive their support from voluntary contributions of materials and funds made by interested persons in the United States. In view of these circumstances it is considered that the use of such funds for the payment of customs duties in countries for the benefit of whose peoples they are contributed is not in consonance with the purpose for which these funds are donated and results in their diversion from the philanthropic enterprises they are intended to foster. By making substantial contributions to the education and medical care of the people of India, the American people are rendering material assistance to the Government of India in meeting these social problems. It does not appear to be inopportune, therefore, to inquire as to the extent to which that Government may be willing to cooperate in facilitating the conduct of this philanthropic work through customs-duty exemptions.

It is desired that you discuss the matter with the appropriate authorities in order to ascertain their reactions, stating that you are acting upon specific instructions to do so and emphasizing the fact that the Department attaches considerable importance to the question involved. A report of your discussions, together with your comments, should be submitted promptly to the Department.

For your information and assistance there follows a brief discussion of the nature and extent of free-entry privileges accorded by certain countries to missionary organizations engaged in philanthropic enterprises:

Egypt—The Government of Egypt grants free entry to supplies, except building materials, imported by religious, educational, and charitable institutions, and to importations by clergymen and missionaries of clothing and provisions not exceeding a total value per person of twenty Egyptian Pounds a year.

Iran—Under a procedure involving theoretical refunds from "Government Credit", the Iranian Government in actual practice exempts from payment of customs duties official supplies imported by American and British hospitals and schools within rather liberal valuation limits.

Liberia—The Government of Liberia permits duty-free importations not exceeding a total annual value per person of \$150 of goods for the personal use and consumption of "all persons regularly employed as Missionaries, Professors, Tutors and Instructors engaged by and giving full time service in Missionary and Philanthropic Institutions within the Republic and who are actually engaged in educational and/or medical work".

Palestine—The Government of Palestine provides in general, with certain minor exceptions, for free entry for supplies and equipment imported for places of worship, schools and institutions maintained by religious communities, hospitals, asylums, and dispensaries operated by charitable societies, as well as for importations of clothing, furniture, and devotional objects by “persons leading the religious life”.

Syria—Upon the basis of an exchange of notes between the Governments of the United States and of France,⁴⁸ the Government of Syria grants unlimited free entry to “articles intended to be used in conducting religious worship” and restricted free entry within fixed annual valuation limits to importations of a wide variety of enumerated supplies imported “by religious communities and evangelical missions for the support of their members”, as well as by schools, colleges, hospitals, dispensaries, and orphanages. Duty-free importations by educational, medical, and similar institutions are based upon annual valuation allotments per pupil or inmate, colleges and universities receiving substantially larger allotments than primary and secondary schools.

A similar instruction has been sent to Rangoon.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

A. A. BERLE, JR.

645C.116/7

The Consul at Rangoon (Brady) to the Secretary of State

No. 446

RANGOON, May 19, 1941.

[Received June 5.]

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the Department's instruction of March 24, 1941,⁴⁹ transmitting a copy of a letter dated March 12, 1941, and an enclosure thereto, from the American Baptist Foreign Mission Society, concerning the desire of that Society that shipments of certain types of medical and educational supplies made to its representatives in India and Burma be exempted from import control restrictive measures and prohibitions in view of the fact that they are financed by American funds. The Department instructed me to ascertain from the appropriate local authorities what exemptions might be made with respect to importations by all American missionary organizations in Burma of supplies of the character stated, and it pointed out that the list of articles submitted by the American Baptist Foreign Mission Society as an enclosure to its letter might be regarded as illustrative and not as a complete list of the articles the Society desired to import.

⁴⁸ February 18, 1937; see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 107, or 51 Stat. 279.

⁴⁹ See footnote 45, p. 201.

In reply I have to report that on the receipt of the Department's instruction I personally interviewed the Controller and the Deputy Controller of Supplies in Burma in regard to the question of exempting from control restrictions the types of medical and educational supplies shipped to American missions and mission schools in Burma by missionary organizations in the United States, and financed entirely by American funds, and later I confirmed the statements made to them in a letter to the Controller of Supplies, to which I attached a copy of the list submitted by the American Baptist Foreign Mission Society, as illustrative of the types of materials that have been shipped to Burma. Under date of May 5, 1941, I received a letter from the Deputy Controller of Supplies enclosing an order which he informed me was being issued by the Import Trade Controller, and concerning which he said:

"It is hoped that this order will enable free supplies of medical and educational requisites to be continued without hindrance and I am to suggest that you will be so good as to request the American Baptist Mission Society in Rangoon to communicate with the Import Trade Controller on this matter."

The order enclosed with the Deputy Controller's letter reads as follows:

"The American Baptist Mission Press are hereby permitted to import without license until further notice the undernoted articles of United States of America origin, provided they certify on the bill of entry that the articles, including cost of freight, duty and shipping charges, are being supplied as free gifts by the Baptist church in the United States of America for free distribution to American Baptist Missions in Burma."

As the order refers only to the American Baptist organization and specifies only the articles listed by it as illustrative of the types of materials shipped to Burma, I again took up with the Deputy Controller the question of the exemption applying to shipments made by other American missionary organizations to their missions in Burma, and to materials of the types mentioned which might not be found in the list submitted, and he has assured me that the exemption granted will apply to any shipments of the same character made by other American missionary organizations having missions in Burma, and that medical and educational supplies furnished as free gifts for free distribution will not be arbitrarily restricted to those included in the list in question.

The American Baptist Mission Press, which is the organization in Burma which receives and distributes supplies shipped from the United States by the American Baptist Foreign Mission Society, is in possession of a copy of the order issued by the Import Trade

Controller, and the Acting Mission Treasurer and Attorney has been informed of the assurance given by the Deputy Controller of Supplies with respect to supplies.

Respectfully yours,

AUSTIN C. BRADY

645.116/73

The Consul General at Calcutta (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

No. 258

CALCUTTA, July 2, 1941.

[Received July 25.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to the Department's airmail instruction of March 24, 1941 (File No. 645C.116/1 [645.116/48]) instructing this Consulate General to request the Government of India to relax its current import restrictions in favor of shipments of supplies to American missionary societies and philanthropic institutions in India.

This request has now been granted. A copy of the communication to this effect just received from the Government of India is enclosed.

It is requested that the Department take steps to inform the appropriate American organizations of this change in procedure, as this Consulate General is not in a position to determine which of the local establishments may be eligible for the benefits accruing under the new ruling.

Respectfully yours,

T. M. WILSON

[Enclosure]

The Under Secretary to the Government of India (Pringle) to the American Consul General at Calcutta (Wilson)

No. 350 (44)-(I. T. C.)/41

SIMLA, 25 June, 1941.

SIR: With reference to your letter No. 660 dated the 7th May 1941,⁵⁰ I am directed to say that, having regard to the special circumstances of the case, the Government of India have been pleased to sanction the issue of special licences for such goods as may be imported by American Missionary Societies, and philanthropic institutions, and are free gifts from the United States of America and which, therefore, involve no transfer of foreign exchange. The licences will accordingly be marked "Custom Licence: Not valid for transfer of foreign exchange".

⁵⁰ Not printed.

2. Necessary instructions are being issued to the Import Trade Controllers and the organizations in question may be instructed to apply for the licences, when required, to the Import Trade Controller concerned giving full details (e. g. description, value, etc.) of each importation.

I have [etc.]

R. J. PRINGLE

645C.116/10

The Consul at Rangoon (Brady) to the Secretary of State

No. 471

RANGOON, July 15, 1941.

[Received July 30.]

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the Department's instruction of May 5, 1941,⁵¹ in regard to the Department's desire to ascertain the attitude of the Government of Burma toward granting free entry to importations of equipment and supplies to American missionary organizations, including educational, medical, and philanthropic institutions maintained by them, as well as to importations of clothing, foodstuffs, and professional equipment by the American personnel thereof.

In reply I have to report that, in compliance with the Department's instruction, I have discussed this matter with the appropriate authorities of the Government of Burma in order to ascertain their reactions. These have included the Financial Commissioner of Burma, who is an adviser to the Ministry in matters affecting Government finances and revenue; with the Minister of Commerce and Industry, whose department includes customs administration; with the Minister of Lands and Revenue, who was formerly in charge of customs administration; and with the Governor of Burma. It is my opinion, as a result of these discussions, that there is a possibility of some concessions being granted, but only a possibility. I have to explain, however, that the matter would have to be placed before the Government of Burma in a formal manner, for examination and consideration, before there could be anything of a definite nature, and I should like to have the Department's authorization to do this, by cable if there is no objection.⁵² I feel that nothing would be lost by carrying the matter to a decision, and something might be gained.

[Here follows discussion of attitude of several Burmese officials.]

Respectfully yours,

AUSTIN C. BRADY

⁵¹ See footnote 47, p. 202.

⁵² No further correspondence on this subject has been found in Department files.

645.116/93

The Commissioner in India (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

No. 17

NEW DELHI, November 28, 1941.

[Received February 10, 1942.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to the Department's instruction of May 5th, 1941, by which I was directed to ascertain the attitude of the Government of India toward granting free entry to importations of equipment and supplies consigned to American missionary organizations including educational, medical, and philanthropic institutions maintained by them, as well as to importations of clothing, foodstuffs and professional equipment by the American personnel thereof.

The delay in replying to the Department's instruction, which was of course received by me in Calcutta before my change of status⁵⁸ and departure for New Delhi, has been occasioned by 1) the desirability of discussions with the appropriate authorities rather than by taking the question up at once in official correspondence, and 2) the fact that as Government was in Simla it became advisable to await their return to New Delhi without going to the expense of making a special trip to Simla for this purpose.

I have now discussed this question with the appropriate officials in two interested departments namely: External Affairs Department and the Finance Department (Central Board of Revenue) with definitely negative results. The attitude displayed by the official in the Department of External Affairs although appreciative of much good that was accomplished by medical missionaries and certain others of purely philanthropic purposes, was distinctly unsympathetic to the question from a general point of view; to allow the concessions suggested would also not be in line, according to this official, with the tariff policy towards organizations of the same category which are situated in Great Britain and elsewhere in the Empire.

My talks with the member of the Central Board of Revenue did not disclose any attitude unsympathetic to missionary organizations as such, but definitely confirmed what the first official had told me was the tariff policy of Government with added emphasis that "Government cannot possibly cater to charity as such. To do so would tend to destroy the integrity of the Tariff." He went on to tell me of the stand Government was taking in refusing a request of this character from those concerned with the importations from England of red poppies which are sold on "Poppy Day." No exemption from tariff duty is accorded these importations in spite of strong pressure

⁵⁸ i. e., from Consul General at Calcutta to Commissioner at New Delhi; see pp. 170 ff.

upon Government to bring this about, and all countries are, according to him, treated alike in this matter with discrimination shown toward none.

This Central Board of Revenue Official called my attention to the fact that professional persons (medical missionaries, educationalists and the like) are allowed to bring in free of duty their instruments, books and tools of their profession. Further than this he was very certain Government would not be willing to go.

I do not feel that any request for reconsideration of the Government's policy would be productive of results at this time.

Respectfully yours,

T. M. WILSON

**REPRESENTATIONS TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT REGARDING
GENERAL BAN ON ADMISSION OF AMERICAN LUTHERAN MIS-
SIONARIES INTO INDIA**

345.1163/84

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State
(Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] September 16, 1941.

Sir Ronald Campbell⁵⁴ came in today, at his request.

I took occasion to mention the protest which had been made to this Department by representatives of the Lutheran Church against the ruling of the British Foreign Office denying entrance to Lutheran missionaries to India.

I pointed out that the Lutheran Church in America is not a branch of the German state church of the same name. On the contrary, some seventy-five years ago they had broken away. Further, the church was composed of some five million people of varied extraction, many of them Scandinavian in origin—Norwegians, Swedes, Danes, and so forth. I noted that in this particular matter they had enlisted the interest of one of their foremost members, Mr. William S. Knudsen.⁵⁵

I said it seemed wholly unnecessary to antagonize as large a group of Americans as this, particularly in view of the fact that the Lutheran Church had supported the American defense effort up to the hilt; that it had many distinguished army officers and government servants in its ranks; and that blanket rulings of this kind would, I thought, if publicly known, create a painful impression. I said of course that there was no intent to defend the activities of any individuals who might have been objectionable or embarrassing, but that the ruling was distinctly placed not on these grounds but on a general objection

⁵⁴ British Chargé.

⁵⁵ Director General of the Office of Production Management.

to the Lutheran Church. I hoped, accordingly, that Sir Ronald could take the matter up with his Government and get the ruling reversed.

Sir Ronald made note of the fact and said he would endeavor to do something about it.

ADOLF A. BERLE, JR.

345.1163/78 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Calcutta (Wilson)

WASHINGTON, September 16, 1941—10 p. m.

The Board of Foreign Missions of the United Lutheran Church in America states that the British Passport Control Office in New York has refused visas for India to two of the Board's missionaries, Leila R. Van Deusen and Esther Eleanor Bacon on grounds that visas are being denied to all Lutherans.

Miss Van Deusen and Miss Bacon are native-born American citizens and according to information furnished to the Department both parents of each were born in the United States. Miss Van Deusen has previously served with the United Lutheran Mission at Kodai-kanal, South India.

The Board states that the United Lutheran Church in America was founded in the United States in 1820 and has conducted missionary work in India for 99 years; that all the Board's missionaries are instructed to refrain from political discussions and that neither the Church, Board, or its missions receive any financial aid from Germany.

Please bring the foregoing information to the attention of the appropriate authorities and report their decision to the Department by telegraph. You may add that representations have been made by the Department to the British Embassy who are taking up the matter at London.

HULL

345.1163/91

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Atherton) to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] October 28, 1941.

THE SECRETARY: I asked Sir Ronald Campbell to call today and referred to the protest which had been made by this Department against the denial of entrance visas to Lutheran missionaries for India. I referred to Mr. Berle's conversation on September 16 and continued to point out that this could not be considered but a reflection on a

group of loyal Americans belonging to the Lutheran Church which for over 75 years had had no affiliation with the German State church of this name.

Sir Ronald informed me that the ruling had been made by the India Office and had nothing to do with the British Foreign Office; however, the India Office had the matter under advisement and had informed the British Foreign Office that they were no longer refusing visas for Lutheran missionaries to India, but that visas were being "held in suspense" pending final deliberations. Sir Ronald undertook immediately to send a further message to London and likewise trusted Ambassador Winant might be requested to take the matter up with the British Foreign Office. A telegram to London in this sense is being prepared.

RAY ATHERTON

345.1163/86b : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Commissioner in India (Wilson)

WASHINGTON, October 28, 1941—3 p. m.

4. With reference to the Department's September 16, 10 p. m., and October 16, 8 p. m.,⁵⁶ to Calcutta, please report by telegraph immediately on action taken with respect to alleged refusal of Government of India to grant visas to Lutheran missionaries.

HULL

345.1163/88c : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, October 29, 1941—7 p. m.

4815. The British Passport Control Officer in New York has informed the Board of Foreign Missions of the Lutheran Church of America that he has received instructions that Lutheran missionaries are not to be admitted to India and on the basis of these instructions he has refused to grant visas to the Board's missionaries desiring to proceed to India. This ruling is severely handicapping the Board's work in India.

On September 16 in a telegram to the Consulate General to Calcutta and in a conversation with the British Chargé d'Affaires in Washington it was pointed out that the Lutheran Church in America is not a branch of the German Lutheran Church and that neither the Church, Board, or its Missions receive any financial aid from Germany. The

⁵⁶ Latter not printed.

Consulate General, and subsequently the Commissioner at New Delhi, were instructed to take the matter up with the Government of India and the British Chargé d'Affaires stated that he would take the matter up with his Government in London. However, the Department has received no indication that the ruling has been changed.

Please inquire of the British authorities as to the present status of the case. If no decision has been reached, please take appropriate steps to obtain permission for American Lutheran missionaries to enter India in order to carry on the work of the Board which has been conducted in India for 99 years.

Please report developments in the matter to the Department promptly by telegraph and continue to keep me advised. Time is important.

HULL

345.1163/96

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] October 29, 1941.

The British Ambassador ⁵⁷ called at his request. I called attention to the discriminatory attitude taken either by the Indian Office or the Government of India against American citizens who are Lutherans in the matter of the refusal of passport visas to India. I most earnestly urged that this policy of thus excluding missionaries of one of our important churches was impossible to explain here. I presented a number of facts and arguments in opposition to this sort of discrimination against an outstanding church composed of such fine people. The Ambassador said he would give the matter attention. I stated that Sir Ronald Campbell on last evening had promised to telegraph his Foreign Office about the matter and my later information is that he had done so.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

845.111/240

The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, October 30, 1941.

DEAR MR. HULL: You spoke to me yesterday about the question of the grant of visas for India for members of the American Lutheran Missionary Societies. I am glad to inform you that on my return to the Embassy I found a telegram from Mr. Eden ⁵⁸ asking me to let

⁵⁷ Viscount Halifax.

⁵⁸ Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

you know that, after further consideration and consultation with the Government of India, it has been decided to withdraw the general ban on the admission of members of the American Lutheran Missionary Societies into India. The Government of India will proceed forthwith to reconsider the applications of individual missionaries to whom visas have recently been refused, and hope very shortly to make known their decision in each case.

The Government of India for their part have requested that missionaries selected for work in India will bear in mind that war conditions make the situation there delicate, and will therefore be very careful to avoid any speech or action that might be used by unfriendly elements to embarrass the Government of India. I should be most grateful if you could give the Societies an indication of the Government of India's feeling in this matter.

Yours sincerely,

HALIFAX

345.1163/82

The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Halifax)

WASHINGTON, November 1, 1941.

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I have received your communication of October 30, 1941, stating that it has been decided to withdraw the general ban on the admission of members of American Lutheran missionary societies into India and that the Government of India will proceed forthwith to reconsider the applications of individual missionaries to whom visas have recently been refused. I am very grateful to you for the interest you have taken in the matter and appreciate being informed of the action which has been taken.

In accordance with your request, the interested Lutheran missionary societies in the United States have been informed of the desire of the Government of India that missionaries in India bear in mind that war conditions make the situation there delicate and that they avoid any speech or action that might be used by unfriendly elements to embarrass the Government of India.

Sincerely yours,

CORDELL HULL

345.1163/93: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, November 4, 1941—1 p. m.

[Received November 4—9 a. m.]

5231. Your 4815, October 29, 7 p. m. With reference to the admission to India of Lutheran missionaries an informal note has been re-

ceived from the Foreign Office dated yesterday stating that the ban recently imposed by the Government of India was due to the appearance in a publication issued in Philadelphia by the United Lutheran publication house of material constituting anti-British propaganda.⁵⁹ The publication had been sent to the United Lutheran Church Mission in India and the Government of India felt that this confirmed suspicions they had already felt regarding the attitude of certain Lutheran missionary bodies in America. In consequence, however, of explanations received from His Majesty's Embassy at Washington, from which it would seem that the bulk of the Lutheran Church in the United States has no connection with the State Lutheran Church in Germany, the Government of India have now agreed to withdraw the general ban on the admission of members of American Lutheran Missionary Societies into India on the understanding that no grounds will be given for suspicion that the Societies are encouraging any anti-British propaganda in connection with their activities in India. The Government of India will proceed forthwith to reconsider the applications of the individual missionaries to whom visas have recently been refused and it is hoped very soon to make known their decision in each case.

WINANT

⁵⁹ According to information furnished subsequently by the Ambassador in the United Kingdom and the Commissioner in India, the offending article was one which appeared in the October 24, 1940, issue of the *Lutherischer Herald*, entitled "England's Wars."

IRELAND

DISCUSSIONS WITH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT RELATING TO PURCHASES IN THE UNITED STATES AND IRELAND'S NEUTRALITY POLICY

740.0011 European War 1939/7522 : Telegram

The Minister in Ireland (Gray) to the Secretary of State

DUBLIN, January 7, 1941—5 p. m.
[Received January 8—8: 58 p. m.]

7. President's broadcast of January 6¹ prominently displayed in Dublin newspapers. No editorial comment except in pro-British *Irish Times* and that denatured. We get the impression that the speech is widely resented as a slap at Ireland. My I. R. A.² friends denounce it and this extremist opinion generally colors moderate majority opinion in controversial matters relating to Great Britain. The Republicans are certain that British airplanes did the recent bombings and a general majority appear to think it probable. Will report later on reaction to speech in Government circles. One gets better information by not asking questions.

In interview with Prime Minister³ on Monday⁴ at his request he said that he was hoping to get 5 or 6 American ships of a lot which he had been informed were to be sold. I said that I had no knowledge of the matter but felt it might be helpful if I expressed my personal opinion frankly about his Christmas broadcast in which he asked his friends to get him arms and wheat; that it appeared to be an attempt to put the pressure of the Irish-American vote on the Government; that he knew that he would resent such an effort on our part to go over his head in Ireland. He disclaimed any such intention and said he would not have done it before election. I said that I viewed with personal regret and foreboding the diverging courses of American and Irish sympathies as regards aid for Great Britain. I said that it was not so much the fact of Irish neutrality as the attitude of Irish opinion reported by American newspaper correspondents which aroused regret in the United States. He said that this attitude was a natural consequence of the past. I said that while that was so he had capitalized on hatred of Great Britain for political reasons and so

¹ *Congressional Record*, vol. 87, pt. 1, p. 44.

² Irish Republican Army.

³ Eamon de Valera.

⁴ January 6.

must take some responsibility for existing popular state of mind. I told him that I had never had any information direct or indirect suggesting that Great Britain would seize the ports but I asked him whether if a situation developed in which their use meant the [apparent omission] England's survival and of Ireland and all the Allied Nations now overrun he would consent to cede them. He said that he considered his duty to Ireland not to cede to be paramount. He would go down with the Allies rather than give them. I am not wholly sure that there is not some element of bluff in this stand as I have heard from the Belgian Minister that the Premier expressed the view that if we came in it might make a difference. Memorandum of conversation by pouch.⁵

GRAY

841D.51/345: Telegram

The Minister in Ireland (Gray) to the Secretary of State

DUBLIN, January 17, 1941—5 p. m.

[Received 6:32 p. m.]

11. For the Secretary and Under Secretary of State. The Vice Premier,⁶ who is also Minister of Finance, had lunch with me yesterday. He told me in confidence that England had told the Irish Government it could no longer supply allotments of various sea-borne goods by reason of lack of tonnage nor could they longer supply dollar exchange. Consequently it was necessary to make an American loan for purchase in America of ships, foodstuffs and he hoped, arms. He asked me confidentially if I would unofficially feel out the situation with National City Bank as he did not want to make proposals which would be turned down.

In our opinion, if Great Britain is not defeated, Ireland is a good risk. National debt at present about £35,000,000 with 3,000,000 population. Politically, an American loan would increase our influence here as would procurement for them of ships and other supplies for I believe that the time is ripe for demanding as a condition precedent to granting Irish requests, definite undertaking that in no circumstances whatever would Irish Government take an anti-American attitude.

The present situation is likely to educate Irish opinion as to its essential basic unity of economic and defensive interests with England. The amount of the loan would be under \$50,000,000. William Burrill Hoffman, Vice President of the National City Bank, has been the officer in charge of previous Irish loans. I would suggest that he be

⁵ Not printed.

⁶ Sean T. O'Kelly.

sounded as to the proposals. It will strengthen our position here if we can get a prompt reply.

The Finance Minister told me that the Premier was glad I had spoken so frankly of the American position in my conversation of January 6 reported in my telegram No. 7, January 7. He hinted that the Premier's position, as expressed to me, might be subject to change. It is evident that at last the significance of the President's policy is beginning to be felt in Government circles.

GRAY

740.0011 European War 1939/7908 : Telegram

The Minister in Ireland (Gray) to the Secretary of State

DUBLIN, January 25, 1941—5 p. m.

[Received 7 p. m.]

14. For the Secretary and Under Secretary. Situation generally unchanged except for indications of undercurrent of bitter resentment against the President for his references to Ireland and for our attitude of aid to Great Britain.⁷

January 22 had a conversation with the Prime Minister at this [*his*] request. He told me he now was convinced that Germans would invade Ireland and he intended to tell his Cabinet that they must face this situation realistically. He thanked me for copy of memorandum of conversation of January 6, reference my telegram No. 7 January 8 [?], which I had sent him and explained that he had not communicated with me by mail about it. I stated that I understood that he was the responsible head of a state and his written word went on record whereas what I said or wrote if beyond my Government's instructions or tending to make mischief could and would be disavowed. He replied that I expressed my thoughts in the memorandum rather than his which he supposed was natural but that the purport was to make himself out wrong and me right. I answered "If you had recorded the conversation it would have made me wrong and you right". We both laughed. The only specific objection he made was to my making him say that he wished for the downfall of Hitlerism as much as I did. He denied that he ever used even in such "propaganda words" lest they should slip out and into public addresses. He repeated that they were going to need wheat and arms intimating that he would like to get them from us and declared that the British were very foolish not to arm them as it would make Britain's rear safe. I answered that I had never heard that the British withheld arms except because they needed them for themselves but I added that in view of my im-

⁷ Reference here is to address of President Roosevelt delivered December 29, 1940, Department of State *Bulletin*, January 4, 1941, p. 3.

pression of majority feeling in Ireland if I was approached about arms from Washington in the absence of instructions to the contrary I would not recommend that he get them without undertakings beyond what I understood that he had given. He declared that he had promised Britain that her arms would at no time be used against her unless she were an aggressor. I replied that was not enough and said to the Premier "suppose the Germans invade and you ask for British aid and together you expell the enemy. Your neutrality has been violated. You are in the war. The British have saved you and wish to remain and to use air and naval bases undertaking to withdraw at the end of hostilities. If you refuse to grant these facilities and they insist on staying, do they become aggressors against whom you would use their arms?"

He replied ["the British have never asked for such an undertaking and I would not make any promise as to what I would do if such a situation arose."] He made the point that the United States entered the last war not as an ally but an associate. I commented that I thought that this was a distinction without a difference and that we saw the war through to a victorious end; that he naturally could act as he pleased but unless he gave some undertaking to meet a situation of such a nature as I pictured I personally could not take the responsibility of recommending his getting arms from the United States.

He then began to talk about his rights. I told him that the way I saw [it?] at present the only right that [he?] and myself enjoyed was to believe in our religion and to be burned for it if need be. Every other right depended upon force to maintain it and that he was steering a very [apparent omission] course if he thought otherwise. He called my views the greatest exponent of force he has ever met. I made it clear that it was a case of facing realities.

Curious but almost friendly, I grow fond of Mr. de Valera as we argue. I said to him I would be glad to cooperate with him on any specific proposal that was reasonable. Memorandum of talk by pouch.⁸

GRAY

841D.24/29 : Telegram

The Minister in Ireland (Gray) to the Secretary of State

DUBLIN, February 24, 1941—7 p. m.

[Received 9:06 p. m.]

23. Saturday afternoon, February 22, I had an interview with the Prime Minister at his request. He informed me that his Government had decided to send a special representative to Washington to explore the possibility of obtaining arms and other supplies; that it was

⁸ Not printed.

thought desirable that he should be of Cabinet rank and that Frank Aiken, Minister for the Coordination of Defense had been selected. I said I thought it very advisable to send such a representative, as he would have his Government's viewpoint clearly in mind and would be able to bring back authoritative information as to the American position. I said I understood that Mr. Aiken had the Premier's complete confidence and was in unconditional sympathy with his policy regarding the existing crisis. I added that I understood he represented Leftist opinion in the Cabinet, but the Prime Minister said "not left, but center". I said that in any case he was a man not likely to become influenced either by blandishment or pressure. Mr. Aiken took part as a boy in the Black and Tan War⁹ and in the Civil War¹⁰ opposed the treaty. He became Chief of Staff of the Irish Republican Army and is reputed to have been of great service to the Government in influencing the Republican veterans organization to join with the Government in their recent defense measures. The Premier told me that he believed the most important service Ireland could render the Allied cause was to organize a quarter of a million highly trained and fully equipped fighting men who would protect England's flank. I said that this was highly desirable but again raised the question as to what undertaking he would make that American arms and munitions would not be used against the British. He said that it was obvious that this could never occur unless the English came as aggressors, since if they came as an enemy they put themselves on the same plane as the Germans. I asked him if he still felt that he could not give undertakings conditioned on the events of German invasion. He said it was evident that they would wish to see the thing through but that he would not bind himself as to conditions which might arise and which he could not foresee. I said that this was the same reason that made the British unwilling to promise that no matter [apparent omission] situation arose they would not seize the ports; that it created a vicious circle from which men of good will should try to escape by mutual compromise. I asked him if it was true that as I am informed that a defensive front against Ulster had been organized? He replied that unfortunately it was a fact; that his Government had been forced to this measure by the effects upon the public mind of the British Prime Minister's reference to the ports in a public statement. He deplored the fact that as a result of this action Anglo-Irish [relations?] had steadily deteriorated.

He talked with great frankness and parried no questions. I was impressed with his good faith and sincerity though not subscribing to all conclusions expressed.

GRAY

⁹ Conflict between the Irish Republican Army and British forces, 1920-21.

¹⁰ Conflict between the Irish Republican Army and the Free State Army, 1922-23.

841D.24/29 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Ireland (Gray)

WASHINGTON, February 28, 1941—6 p. m.

11. Your No. 23, February 24, 7 p. m.

(1) Your telegram contained the first intimation which we had received that the Irish Government was contemplating sending such a mission to this country.

(2) Although we have received no inquiry from the Irish Government as to whether the arrival of such a mission would be agreeable to this Government, we have received a telegram from the Embassy, London, requesting that we arrange clipper passage for Aiken and Nunan, and we are endeavoring to comply with this request.

(3) In discussing this matter with the Prime Minister, you should make it clear that the production of the American munitions industry for periods varying from several months to more than a year is already preempted under orders received from our own Army and Navy, and from the British, the Canadian, the Chinese, and other governments that are engaged in resisting aggression. Therefore, although the mission may be able to place some few orders for delivery within a reasonable length of time, it must not expect if it acts alone without the assistance of the British Purchasing Commission to be able to place substantial orders for munitions for immediate delivery. We shall, upon arrival of the mission, be glad to place Aiken in communication with the authorities of this Government who will be in a position to assist him so far as the situation will permit. The work of the mission would, of course, be greatly facilitated if it were instructed to cooperate with the British Purchasing Commission. The latter has placed extensive orders and it might be possible for it to arrange to turn over to the Irish a portion of the munitions which will be delivered in the near future in exchange for others to be delivered later under contracts entered into by the Irish Mission.

(4) This proposed mission was brought up during Brennan's¹¹ visit to the Department yesterday.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/8740 : Telegram

*The Minister in Ireland (Gray) to the Secretary of State*DUBLIN, March 3, 1941—4 p. m.
[Received March 3—2: 37 p. m.]

25. For the Under Secretary. On February 26 at my request the Prime Minister received me. I set forth the substance of the Under

¹¹ Robert Brennan, Irish Minister.

Secretary's letter to me dated December 26, 1940, with memorandum of conversations with Brennan enclosed.¹² I pointed out I had left with the Prime Minister a copy of the paraphrased text of the Under Secretary's instructions to me dated November 19¹³ when he received me on November 22 and that this text would obviously be conclusive as to what Mr. Welles said. The paraphrased text was produced from the files and he suggested that a misunderstanding must have arisen as between Brennan and his office. I made no comment on this point. He did not suggest that I had attempted to alter the text in conversation and accepted without objection the letter which I handed him and which he read in my presence giving my view of the transaction.

GRAY

841D.24/46

The Irish Prime Minister (De Valera) to President Roosevelt

DUBLIN, March 4, 1941.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: This will introduce Mr. Frank Aiken, Minister for Co-ordination of Defensive Measures in our Government. He will give you first hand information on our position and explain to you our need for defensive equipment and for certain other supplies which we wish to purchase in the United States. The things we want are unfortunately those in general demand at the present moment, but in amount they are such a small fraction of your total production that I am hopeful they can be obtained. May I once more ask for your kindly intervention on our behalf.

With all good wishes for you and for the United States and with warm regards

I am [etc.]

EÁMON DE VALÉRA

841D.24/32 : Telegram

The Minister in Ireland (Gray) to the Secretary of State

DUBLIN, March 7, 1941—1 p. m.

[Received 3 : 23 p. m.]

26. Your 11, February 28, 6 p. m. Aiken on his way to Washington. On March 3 I called on Prime Minister and transmitted your views as to existing priority situation for obtaining American arms and munitions and your suggestion that the envoy be instructed to cooperate with British Purchasing Commission to ensure quick deliveries. I subscribe wholeheartedly to the implications of this sugges-

¹² The memoranda referred to are those of November 9 and December 9, *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. III, pp. 166 and 173, respectively; Under Secretary's letter not printed.

¹³ Telegram No. 77, November 19, 6 p. m., *ibid.*, p. 171.

tion. Last summer I endeavored to enlist your good offices to procure arms for Irish Government direct from America.¹⁴ I wish formally to recede from this position in view of changed conditions and fuller knowledge. This is not to be taken as an alarmist warning but as common prudence in view of unfortunate possibilities. If, as I suspect, you believe the decision to arm Ireland to be primarily a British responsibility I agree entirely . . .

GRAY

740.0011 European War 1939/8921 : Telegram

The Minister in Ireland (Gray) to the Secretary of State

DUBLIN, March 10, 1941—4 p. m.

[Received 6:10 p. m.]

27. Colonel Donovan¹⁵ spent 4 hours in Dublin Saturday.¹⁶ His mission very helpful though apparently obtaining no intimations [as] to change of Irish policy. I have written the Prime Minister thanking him on the part of Colonel Donovan for his courtesy and recording gist of Colonel Donovan's talk with me as follows:

In my short talk with Colonel Donovan on the way to the airport he explained to me that beyond reading to you the special message with which he had been entrusted he had endeavored to make it clear that he was not expounding the policy of the American Government, but seeking information and suggesting the trends of American majority opinion. The purport of this appears to be that the United States assumes in no wise to criticize the policy of the Irish Government, but sorrowfully regrets that we do not see eye to eye and stand shoulder to shoulder in this struggle for the survival of Christian civilization and the rights of small nations. They regret that the Irish Government does not agree with them in the conviction that the safety of Ireland as also the importation of all sea-borne supplies including arms depends upon British sea power. And they regret that the Irish Government is unable to find any formula that would contribute to the security of the ocean lanes.

GRAY

¹⁴ See *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. III, pp. 160 ff.

¹⁵ Col. William J. Donovan, Personal Representative of the Secretary of the Navy on special mission in Europe.

¹⁶ March 8.

740.0011 European War 1939/9530

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] March 20, 1941.

The Irish Minister brought in the Irish Minister of Defense, Mr. Aiken, to see me tonight.

The purpose of Mr. Aiken's visit was to communicate to me orally the desire of the Irish Government to purchase arms and munitions in this country, as well as to obtain ships to be transferred to the Irish flag.

Mr. Aiken started the conversation by complaining that the steamer *Oklahoma*, which the Irish Government desired to purchase, had not, as yet, been transferred to the Irish Government and that no reply had been received to the request of the Irish Government for the sale of the steamer *Scot*.

I replied that I was unfamiliar with these questions but that I would look into them and discuss the matter further with Mr. Aiken and Mr. Brennan next week.

I said that I should be glad to receive in writing any requests for arms and munitions and other matériel which Mr. Brennan or Mr. Aiken cared to give me and that they could be assured that these requests would receive every consideration. I said, however, that I must make it emphatically clear that assistance to Great Britain came first and foremost in our program, in complete harmony with our own efforts at rearmament, and that a request of this character received from other governments could only be considered in the light of the policy which I had made clear to them. I agreed to have a further conversation with Mr. Aiken and Mr. Brennan early next week.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

841D.24/44

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson)

[WASHINGTON,] April 2, 1941.

Participants: Mr. Aiken, the Irish Minister of Defense;
Mr. Devlin, the Secretary of the Irish Legation;
Mr. Acheson;
Mr. Curtis.¹⁷

Mr. Aiken called upon me at the request of the Under Secretary to discuss the request recently made by the Irish Government to purchase arms and munitions in this country. Mr. Aiken said that as a result of talks which he had had since his arrival here, he would wish

¹⁷ Presumably Charles P. Curtis, Jr., Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State.

to amend his application in the event that this Government found it possible to sell the Irish Government arms and munitions. The amendment would chiefly relate to a different type of anti-tank gun which could also be used for anti-aircraft purposes.

Mr. Aiken then reviewed the Irish situation and the need of his Government for munitions in a manner similar to his discussions with the Under Secretary.

In effect he stated that the continuance of Irish neutrality was a fixed factor in the situation which must be accepted by governments dealing with the Irish Government. He stated that the Irish people were united upon this policy; that even if he so wished, Mr. De Valera could not change it and that any attempt to do so would produce disunity and possibly civil strife in Ireland. He referred to this policy as "the crown and symbol of Irish independence." He said that the Irish had 50,000 men under arms and with additional equipment could put a quarter of a million men in the field in the event of attack upon Ireland by Germany. These men would be worth in their determined resistance three or four times that number of foreign troops.

When I pressed him as to the efficacy of selling arms to Ireland, in the event that it should be found possible, without close and prior arrangements with the British for the defense of Ireland, he stated that in his opinion any invasion of Ireland would not occur as a part of an invasion of England, but as independent action designed to cut British communications. He believed it would occur first by air and submarine transportation, later supported by troops coming on surface craft. He thought that the Germans might be able to land in the neighborhood of 100,000 men by air and submarine. He thought that the first objective would be the Shannon estuary. Although he conceded that the critical period would be the first four or five days, he insisted that armed Ireland could deal with the situation until British help arrived. He insisted that if British troops were admitted into Ireland before attack it would produce civil disturbance in Ireland. He also insisted that the British had greatly exaggerated the utility of Irish ports, since the convoy routes were around the north of Ireland instead of the south of Ireland as had been the case in the last war.

I told Mr. Aiken that, as he knew, the policy of this Government was to furnish as extensively as possible aid to the nations which were fighting aggression; that the Government was engaged in a vast program of production which was being further extended in view of the recent legislation; that we had requests from other nations to whom the war had not yet come and that these requests were being reviewed by the military authorities to determine to what extent

they could be integrated with the production program without delaying or defeating the first objective. I said that his request was being and would be carefully considered in the same way. Mr. Aiken said that he was most anxious to return home because of the critical conditions; that he earnestly hoped that we could arrive as soon as possible at a decision one way or the other.

D[EAN] A[CHESON]

841D.24/40 : Telegram

The Minister in Ireland (Gray) to the Secretary of State

DUBLIN, April 8, 1941—2 p. m.

[Received 3 : 50 p. m.]

36. For Secretary and the Under Secretary. The Irish Government is exploiting Aiken's mission as American approval of its policy at the same time making political capital out of inciting anti-British sentiment. Unless Aiken has made undertakings of cooperation of which we are ignorant I believe the time has come for a firmer attitude and the demand that de Valera clarify definitely his position. If you instruct me to do it I would tell him that I must report to you the significance of his statements in his American broadcast which charges Great Britain with blockading Ireland equally with Germany and of the implied charge that Great Britain was engaged in an imperial adventure rather than a defense of democratic liberties.

Also, the meaning of the Minister of Supplies'¹⁸ statement that he was not satisfied with the explanation of the British Government regarding the reduction of the tea allotment. This is generally understood as charging Britain with responsibility for supply shortages. The facts of course are that all imports which are still considerable come from England; Ireland makes no contribution to the safety of Allied shipping and has stopped the export of butter and some other foods.

I would further tell the Prime Minister that in as much as he is anxious to get supplies from America it is desirable that we be informed whether he is prepared to adopt a policy of sympathetic cooperation in our stand against dictatorships. I would point out to the Premier the economic difficulties which lie ahead of him according to his own statements and the opportunity that hunger and unemployment will create for German agents, that he will then need our help and that unless he makes it impossible for us to extend it to him we shall do what we can but that we must help those who help us. If he is allowed to go on playing both ends against the middle I fear he will get into a position from which he cannot withdraw.

GRAY

¹⁸ Sean Lemass.

841D.24/40 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Ireland (Gray)

WASHINGTON, April 10, 1941—5 p. m.

17. The Department approves the first paragraph of your 36, April 8, 2 p. m. and instructs you in the sense of this first paragraph.

You should lose no opportunity generally to impress upon your Irish contacts the scope and determination with which this Government is pursuing its policy against the forces of aggression and you may emphasize the profound belief of the President, backed by public opinion in this country, that the democratic forces of the world will win through to final victory.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/10391a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Ireland (Gray)

WASHINGTON, April 25, 1941—6 p. m.

18. Please call as soon as possible upon the Prime Minister and make to him a statement along the following lines:

The Government of the United States regards with very real sympathy the situation in which the Irish people find themselves as a result of the curtailment of shipping which has resulted in a material scarcity of normal food supplies for the population. In the early weeks of this year before the shipping question had reached its present acute stage, in discussing the developing Irish situation with Mr. Brennan, he was advised to bring all phases of the problem to the immediate attention of the appropriate United States authorities. Mr. de Valera of course understands fully the need of the United States for the utmost volume of shipping, not only for its own requirements, but also in order to make it possible for it to furnish additional shipping facilities for the British Government. Nevertheless, because of its full realization of the situation in Ireland, and because of the very close and traditional friendship between the Irish and American peoples, the Government of the United States is willing now to negotiate with the Irish Government for the acquisition by the latter, either through purchase or through charter—preferably the latter—of two freight vessels which could be utilized in the transportation of food supplies from the United States to Ireland.

At this point you should make it very clear that this offer is being made by instruction of your Government directly to the Prime Minister. You should say that your Government has seen with regret, as a result of the conversations which various officials of your Government have had with General Aiken, that the point of view of the latter . . . would appear to be utterly lacking in any appreciation of the

fact, which seems to your Government completely clear, that the future safety and security of Eire depends inevitably upon the triumph of the British cause. As Mr. de Valera fully realizes, the Government of the United States believes that the future security of democracy and liberty in the world depends upon the ultimate victory of the British Government and of the other nations which are defending themselves against the aggression of the Axis powers, and the Government of the United States is pledged to do everything practicable, in accordance with its announced policy, to assist those nations in achieving success in their present struggle. Any policy on the part of Ireland which was opposed to this objective on the part of the United States would naturally offer no ground for helpful and fruitful cooperation between our two countries. It is for that reason that your Government has instructed you to make this offer directly to Mr. de Valera.

You may further state very definitely that under the existing policy of the American Government, all military and naval matériel now produced in the United States which is not required by the national rearmament program will continue to be made available to the British Empire and to the other nations resisting aggression. It cannot therefore be made available to the Irish Government as requested by General Aiken unless and until the Irish Government is prepared to adopt a more cooperative attitude in the war endeavor of those nations. The Government of the United States does not question the right or the determination of the Irish people to preserve their neutrality but there is a clear distinction between such a policy and a policy which at least potentially provides real encouragement to the German Government.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/10391a

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] April 26, 1941.

Sir Gerald Campbell,¹⁹ in the absence of Lord Halifax,²⁰ came to see me this morning at my request.

I told Sir Gerald that this Government wished the British Government to know of the step which had been taken relating to Ireland. I gave him to read the Department's instruction of April 25, 6 p. m. to the American Minister in Dublin.

Sir Gerald expressed his appreciation of the information given and said he believed that this Government was doing everything that was

¹⁹ British Minister.

²⁰ British Ambassador.

practicable and feasible and which would be helpful at this time. He asked if the Department would keep the Embassy informed of further developments in this regard and I said that it would be glad to do so.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

740.0011 European War 1939/10391a

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary
of State (Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] April 29, 1941.

The Irish Minister called to see me this morning at my request. I communicated to him orally the contents of the Department's instruction No. 18, April 25, 6 p. m. to Minister Gray in Dublin.

When he had heard the instructions communicated to Mr. Gray, Mr. Brennan seemed to be torn between two separate emotions—one of deep satisfaction at the decision to permit the Irish Government to obtain two ships to transport food supplies to Ireland, and the other of great annoyance at . . . the expression of the unwillingness of the United States to make available to Ireland munitions and military matériel so long as Ireland persisted in its present policy of non-cooperation with Great Britain and the other nations resisting aggression.

He said that if the British Government would only make a commitment that Great Britain would not invade Ireland, which it had steadily refused to do, Ireland could withdraw all of the troops now on its northern frontier and use them to great advantage in the southern part of the island in making plans to resist a threatened German invasion.

The Minister then asked what this Government meant by "a more cooperative attitude towards Great Britain and the other nations resisting aggression". Since the tenor of his remarks at this stage made it clear to me that Mr. Brennan was under the misapprehension that the instructions to Mr. Gray had been sent after consultation with the British Government, I told him specifically that the phraseology used was solely that determined by the officials of this Government and that there had been no discussion of the matter with the British prior to the sending of this instruction, nor had there been any indication from the British Government that it hoped that such an instruction would be sent. Having made this clear, I said that the view of many of our own military and naval experts was that when a German attempt to invade Great Britain took place, the first step would be the invasion of Ireland. I asked the Minister in that connection and as in the nature of a reply to his inquiry, whether the Irish authorities

had ever discussed cooperative measures with the British to go into effect should Germany attempt to invade Ireland. To this the Minister answered that Mr. de Valera had publicly stated that should Germany attempt to invade Ireland the Irish Government would request the British to come in and help them. I asked whether this meant that any definite plans for cooperation had been discussed or worked out. The Minister replied that no such conversations had taken place because if they had taken place, it would at once have become known to Germany and would probably result in an accelerated invasion of Ireland by Germany. I remarked that this seemed to me exactly the point of view which had been taken by all of the European governments now occupied by Germany, namely, that they would not agree to preliminary decisions as to the measures of cooperation to be undertaken in the event of an invasion and that, consequently, when actual invasion took place, no plans had been worked out and complete confusion resulted. I said we had seen the results of this policy only a few days ago in the case of Yugoslavia whose previous government had refused to discuss any form of military cooperation with Greece or Turkey or Great Britain and consequently the present government, when the invasion took place, was left to fight alone without any means of effective cooperation from its allies. Mr. Brennan replied that any other policy on the part of the Irish Government would result in disunity among the Irish people, which he felt was the greatest evil which Ireland could confront. I said that I believed that the conversation we had just had made it clear that the Irish Government was determined, when and if an attempted invasion of Ireland by Germany took place, to meet that crisis without any previous preparation or consultation with other nations opposed to Germany. To that Mr. Brennan made no reply.

The Minister told me that he expected that Mr. de Valera would send him a message immediately with regard to the negotiations for obtaining the merchant ships mentioned in the Department's instruction to Mr. Gray and that as soon as he received such word, he would communicate with me personally.

S[UMNER] W[ELLIES]

740.0011 European War 1939/10546 : Telegram

The Minister in Ireland (Gray) to the Secretary of State

DUBLIN, May 1, 1941—7 p. m.

[Received 10:10 p.m.]

42. For the Secretary and the Under Secretary. April 28 I had a conversation with the Irish Prime Minister pursuant to your telegram No. 10 [17?], April 10, and your telegram 18, April 25. I told him that I had been instructed some days ago to transmit certain views

and to make inquiry as to certain statements of his and that before I carried out this instruction I had received a further one so that I would now discuss both matters. I then read what I entitled "Notes for Conversation with the Prime Minister". The first part of this impressed upon him our policy of aid for Great Britain and the determination of the American people and their Government to carry out this policy to the end of defeating the aggressors. The second part is as follows.

"The information which I am instructed to request from you relates to a statement in your St. Patrick's Day broadcast recorded as follows 'that both sides in blockading each other were blockading us.' This statement, according to the official report December 16 debates in the Dail, was repeated by you in debate on April 3, 1941, and in substance was reiterated by the Vice Premier in the Senate on March 19th. It appears therefore to be a considered statement. If in fact it be such a considered statement is my Government to understand that it is the policy of the Irish Government to represent to the American people that Britain is blockading Ireland? The facts as known to the American Government appear not to support this view. Available statistics indicate that the value of Irish imports from Britain for the calendar year 1939 was generally speaking a normal average, although the war began in September; that for the calendar year 1940 the value of imports from Britain instead of diminishing actually increased to the extent of several hundred thousand pounds over 1939; that in spite of extremely adverse conditions created by British shortages and the German blockade Irish imports from Britain during the early months of the present year remained at approximately three quarters of the value of those for the corresponding months of the previous year. Furthermore from the best sources of information available substantially all imports that you have been receiving for a considerable period have come from England or in British ships or neutral ships convoyed by British sea power although you have made no contribution to the safety of British sea-borne commerce. It is further on record that your Government has announced the sinking by Germany of various Irish vessels and of attacks on others but no charge has been made that Britain has attacked your shipping."

At this point he flushed angrily and shouted that it was impertinent to question the statements of a head of a state. I said that I would not argue that but that I wished to point out that he had made his statement at a time of tense feeling in America when anti-British elements to whom he chiefly appealed had attempted to defeat the present administration, the Lend and Lease Law, and was now engaged in sabotaging our Aid for Britain policy; that he could not expect that support given these elements could be ignored. I then continued from my "notes":

"Unless therefore there is some interpretation of your statement other than its plain meaning it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that in omitting to state these pertinent facts in the course of a broadcast purporting as head of the Irish Government to inform the American people of conditions in Ireland and in framing your statement as you

did you intended to put a responsibility on Great Britain for Irish privations equal to that imposed on Germany and to withhold credit from Great Britain for her services in supplying you in the measure that she has. The effect of creating such an impression on your American audience as you must see, whether or not it was so intended, could only be to excite antagonism against that nation which it is our national policy to aid, and thus to weaken popular support in America for that policy. It is obvious that in the present emergency policies antagonistic to the British war effort are antagonistic to American interests."

He then calmed down and said that the plain meaning of the statement showed that there was no intent to incite anti-British sentiment.

I proceeded to read a paraphrase of your telegram No. 18 which I entitled Memorandum for Conversation with the Prime Minister. At the end he said . . . that Aiken like himself realized that a German victory would be a calamity for Ireland though he could not do more about it than he [apparent omission] doing. A long discussion followed on this line. He stated that Under Secretary and Churchill's reference to the ports excited anti-British sentiment. He also said that he had evidence from high Irish civil servants that Great Britain was preparing to shut down on supplies and that he had made the statement in the broadcast because he wanted to show Great Britain that he knew they were contemplating a blockade. This seems at variance with his contention that no anti-British significance attached to the broadcast statement. He asked me what we wanted him to do about the statement. I said we had no wish to embarrass him and that I would report that I was assured that he had no intention of inciting American sentiment against Great Britain and that would be the end of it. He said that certain of his friends thought that I was more British than the British and would do better to mind American interests. I replied that for the duration of the present emergency I considered British interests the same as American interests. He said that he understood that though others did not. I asked him to send for me when he had come to a decision about the two views and handed him a copy of the memorandum I had read.

I think the effect of a stiff attitude will be sobering. It is the only way to impress him that there are realities closing in upon him. No one has ever taken this line with him. He always outmaneuvered Chamberlain.^{20a} I no longer hope to get anything from him by generosity and conciliation. He must be made to realize that it is possible that a situation is approaching in which if it be essential to survival his ports will be seized with the approval of the liberal sentiment of the world, that he will have only the choice of fighting on the side of Great Britain or Germany.

^{20a} Neville Chamberlain, British Prime Minister, May 28, 1937, to May 10, 1940.

The Under Secretary's memorandum of conversation with Aiken just received. Very helpful here. Full report by mail.

GRAY

740.0011 European War 1939/11291

The Irish Legation to the Department of State

WASHINGTON, May 15, 1941.

The following is the text of the reply:

On April 28th, the American Minister, under instructions from his Government,²¹ read to Mr. de Valera a memorandum which he subsequently left with him.

[Here follows a summation of the contents of the memorandum read by Minister Gray to Mr. de Valera.]

The Irish Government appreciates the frank recognition by the Government of the United States of Ireland's right and determination to preserve its neutrality. They have never felt that the United States would adopt any other attitude. They are consequently at a loss to understand what it is intended to convey by the statement "there is a clear distinction between such a policy and one which at least potentially affords real encouragement to the Government of Germany". They can only assume that there is some fundamental misunderstanding as to Ireland's neutrality and her attitude towards Great Britain at the present time. The fact is that notwithstanding difficulties inherent in situation by partition, the relationship between Ireland and Great Britain had steadily improved down to the beginning of the war. A considerable degree of co-operation exists between the two Countries and the resulting friendliness, so far as Ireland is concerned, has continued to the present moment.

As early as 1935 the Irish Government had declared it to be their firm policy not to allow their territory to be used as a basis of attack on Britain. In consequence of this and for the first time in several centuries, Britain whilst engaged in a continental war has not had to reckon with a hostile Ireland. In fact in a number of ways Ireland has given Britain very real help. Our neutrality has been a benevolent one, and consequently we have leaned on the side of helpful and sympathetic understanding.

The Irish Government intends to maintain their attitude of friendliness to Great Britain, but their primary duty—like that of all Governments—is to provide for safety of their own nation and people. Participation in the present war, or acts likely to lead to involvement in war, are inconsistent with that duty and are therefore out of the question.

²¹ See telegram No. 18, April 25, 6 p. m., to the Minister in Ireland, p. 226.

With a Christian civilization nearly 2000 years old, and with a consistent record of fighting for freedom longer perhaps than that of any other nation, Ireland has long proved her devotion to the cause of justice and freedom of the human spirit, and no one can deny she has contributed her share to the moral foundation on which the laws of men and of nations are built. But at this moment Ireland's survival as a nation and the safety of the remnant of her long persecuted people depends on the maintenance of her neutrality. The Irish Government believe that the American Government would not lead their people into war or into the risk of war if America were in the same defenseless position as Ireland is, and they feel that it is hardly just to urge Ireland to a course which other nations, in similar circumstances, would be quick to reject. The Irish people have made no attempts to dictate to any other people what their national policy should be, and they do no more than claim themselves the same absolute right to judge and decide the manner best calculated to safeguard their own vital interests.

The Irish Government are grateful for the reference to the traditional and intimate friendship between the American and Irish peoples, and for the offer of negotiations with a view to the acquisition of two cargo ships. Ireland's needs for the ships is great and possession of them might well mean the difference between extreme hardship and a hardship which would be tolerable. The manner, however, in which the offer is made and the suggestion of certain implied conditions render it impossible for the Irish Government to accept. They cannot agree that the estimate of Mr. Aiken's attitude and the criticism directed against him is just. Nor have we had any communication which would support the contention that prior to Mr. Aiken's arrival negotiations in regard to food and ships had been proceeding satisfactorily. In the view of the Irish Government based on long experience and intimate knowledge of Mr. Aiken as a colleague, he is not less well-disposed to Great Britain than the other members of the Irish Government, although of course like them he regards it as his duty to place the interests of his own country first. The Irish Government regards it as a matter for deep regret that officials of the United States Government concerned should have come to a different conclusion.

740.0011 European War 1939/11035 : Telegram

The Minister in Ireland (Gray) to the Secretary of State

DUBLIN, May 17, 1941—4 p. m.
[Received May 17—3 : 13 p. m.]

46. I received last night a transcript of the message which the Prime Minister sent to Brennan to deliver to you as an answer to my in-

structed conversation with him on April 28 as reported in my telegram No. 42, May 1, 7 p. m. After a few introductory sentences I today made acknowledgment to Mr. de Valera in the following manner:

I have received a copy of the memorandum²² which you have instructed your Minister in Washington to read to the Secretary of State in reply to our conversation of April 28 last. Thank you for your courtesy in sending me this. It is of course beyond my province to comment upon your reply or to forecast the impression that it may make upon my Government but it makes clear to me the tragedy of the divergence of our national viewpoints and of our mutual misunderstanding of each other's position. Unless I misinterpret American public opinion the great American majority fail to appreciate the political difficulties that would confront you were you to take a more anti-Axis position and also the sacrifices of civilian life and property which German reprisals would probably impose.

On the other hand Irish public opinion seems not to realize that the American people are engaged in a conflict for survival as a free nation, a conflict which they are as reluctant to enter as are the Irish people. In the view of American public opinion Irish survival depends upon the outcome of this conflict equally with American survival and the circumstance that Ireland would benefit by American sacrifices yet withhold not merely help but sympathy engenders a regrettable bitterness and a tendency in the American newspapers to question rights under international law claimed by those who disclaim responsibility for contributing to the maintenance of international law. We have discussed these points repeatedly and with great frankness. I touch upon them again because, unless some formula of reconciliation of the two views be found, I fear our traditional relation is imperiled. Personally I refuse to believe that any situation is hopeless to men of good will.

I am informed most confidentially that an Irish opposition leader has delivered a memorandum to the Prime Minister demanding Aiken's recall and warning him that the opposition will not support a policy that antagonizes America.

GRAY

740.0011 European War 1939/11202 : Telegram

The Minister in Ireland (Gray) to the Secretary of State

DUBLIN [undated.]

[Received May 22, 1941—3: 35 p. m.]

52. For the Secretary and the Under Secretary. There is still no editorial or Government comment on the President's offer of two ships and wheat.

²² *Supra.*

Informed authoritatively that Duff Cooper's²³ statement regarding respect of Irish neutrality was made without the knowledge of the Cabinet.

I am also informed confidentially from Irish sources conscription is likely to be applied to Northern Ireland this week and that Irish Government anticipate serious trouble both in the North and South when Irish Catholic Nationalists are drafted. Have checked this information with British sources and hear conscription is likely to be imminent.

This is likely to have reactions here that might create political embarrassment to us in the present phase of the situation. It is possible that this Government would exploit them to the full. Can discover no reason why Ulster conscription should not wait for several months. It will also seriously hamper the opposition on which we must rely.

GRAY

740.0011 European War 1939/11272 : Telegram

The Minister in Ireland (Gray) to the Secretary of State

DUBLIN, May 24, 1941—1 p. m.

[Received 2:50 p. m.]

54. For Secretary and Under Secretary. I am confidentially informed that Mr. Churchill^{23a} intends on Friday next to announce the operation of conscription in Ulster. The Irish Nationalist Conference in the North yesterday adopted this pledge:

"Denying the right of the Churchill Government to enforce compulsory conscription in Ireland we pledge ourselves solemnly to one another to resist conscription by the most effective means at our disposal consonant with the law of God."

Eire Government leaders yesterday conferred with leaders of both opposition parties. This is the news leader this morning.

Opposition leaders yesterday informed me that conscription without a conscientious objector's escape clause for minority Catholic nationalists will constitute a major irretrievable and probably fatal political blunder at this time and play directly into de Valera's hands with grave possibilities for American interests. They predict draft riots, the escape of draft dodgers to Southern Ireland who will be acclaimed as hero martyrs by three-quarters of the population and the fomenting of trouble by Republicans and Fifth Columnists. The clearest headed leader predicts that de Valera will seize the opportunity to escape from economic and political realities by proclaiming himself the leader of the oppressed minority and with the blessings of

²³ Alfred Duff Cooper, British Minister of Information.

^{23a} Winston S. Churchill, British Prime Minister.

the Cardinal will rouse anti-British feeling and call a Holy War. I think it a very likely prediction. All classes of opinion here unite in condemning the move as calamitous. It appears to be a repetition of the same fatal blunder made during the last war. The weak and failing Ulster Government is probably seeking to sustain itself by provoking a crisis. Unless Great Britain is prepared from a military point of view to seize the whole country it appears to be madness. So little can be gained and so much lost.

Eighty thousand Irish volunteers in British Army will be disaffected, there will be no material number of Nationalist conscripts, a government, a popular majority and an army inclined to be friendly to Great Britain rather than to the Axis will become definitely hostile, possibly giving active aid to Germany and most important of all the pro-British opposition will be helpless and the opportunity for dividing the country on the question of the ports will be lost for the duration [apparent omission]. The effect on Irish-American opinion at this juncture is not for me to estimate. This is a grave situation.

I talked with Winant²⁴ last night. He had heard no discussion of the matter. I shall probably acquaint the Irish Prime Minister with the purport of this telegram and ask him for constructive suggestions. However justified our complaints of Irish-American pressure group methods opposing our aid for Britain policy I believe our interest and Irish interests the same in this matter.

If the Secretary and Under Secretary are not immediately available please rush this to the President.

GRAY

740.0011 European War 1939/11291

The Department of State to the Irish Legation

MEMORANDUM

The Secretary of State has read the memorandum which the Irish Minister left at the Department on May 15, 1941 and notes the interpretations placed upon the memorandum which the American Minister at Dublin left with Prime Minister de Valera on April 28 and the divergence of views which the Irish Minister apparently believes exists between the Irish and American Governments.

The offer of the American Government made through the American Minister in Dublin on April 28 to enter into negotiations with the Irish Government for the acquisition by the latter of two freight vessels was made unconditionally and based only upon the close and traditional friendship between the American and the Irish peoples. It was made, despite an acute shipping shortage, through a sincere

²⁴ John G. Winant, American Ambassador in the United Kingdom.

desire on the part of the United States to aid in the transportation of essential food supplies to Ireland and to alleviate the situation of the Irish people in their present difficult circumstances.

It is needless to repeat here that the United States has no desire to attempt to influence the Irish Government in the direction of its national policies, including measures looking to the safety of the Irish nation and people. In a like manner the American Government feels certain that, with regard to the question of arms, munitions, and war supplies, the Irish Government does not question the policy of the American Government in retaining these articles for its own defense or sharing them with those nations now defending themselves against aggression and whose defense is deemed vital to the defense of the United States.

The American Government reaffirms its desire at all times to give every consideration to the needs of the Irish people and to the requests of the Irish Government.

WASHINGTON, May 24, 1941.

740.0011 European War 1939/11288 : Telegram

The Minister in Ireland (Gray) to the Secretary of State

DUBLIN, May 25, 1941—8 p. m.
[Received May 26—1:06 a. m.]

55. For the Secretary and Under Secretary. Reference my telegram No. 54, May 24, 1 p. m. After sending this telegram yesterday I sent the Prime Minister the purport of the three recent telegrams on this subject, obviously reserving certain details. I said that if he were interested I would be glad to receive constructive suggestions by telephone. At 5 o'clock he telephoned apparently grateful for my good offices. He said it was exactly such a presentation of the subject as he would make if he were himself dealing with it objectively. He had no suggestions. I said I would be glad to work with him and would keep him informed if I had word from my Government.

His friendly tone pleased and surprised me as only last Tuesday I am informed he told an opposition leader that I had misrepresented Ireland to you, that if the situation were not so tense and if I were not a friend of the President he would ask for my recall. At 8 o'clock he telephoned asking me to call him. I called him at 11:30. His tone had changed, he said that I had asked for constructive suggestions and he wished now to make it clear that my proposal of a so-called escape clause for Catholics would not be satisfactory, that he could not accept conscription for Irishmen. I said, "Do you mean that Orangemen cannot conscript each other?" He evaded this point

saying that public opinion in the South would not consent to it. I said that I refuse to take any part in a controversy that raises the issue of partition at this time and will so advise my Government. If you refuse any compromise that offers a temporary avoidance of a conflict without prejudice to either party you are taking a very dangerous course. I am concerned primarily for American interests, secondarily for Irish interests, and thirdly for British interests as they coincide with ours but in each case it is to the end of avoiding precipitating a situation which may well become irremediable. I am deeply disappointed that I cannot work with you except on these lines. We closed on a note of tension. I felt that he had shifted his ground as is characteristic of him when he felt an advantage offered.

This morning Maffy, British representative, came to see me. He told me he thought the revival of conscription came as the result of local conditions following the Belfast air raids. Volunteers have not come forward for the needed local services and manpower from Great Britain is lacking. He agreed that the situation should be handled with regard to the American political situation, the protection of the Irish opposition, and thirdly of the military needs in Ulster.

Later Mr. Cosgrave²⁵ called and asked if we could help. I read to him the same digest of telegrams that I had sent the Prime Minister. He expressed gratification and said he would accept the escape clause as a temporary way out, but predicted that the Prime Minister would not, as he was looking for a political issue. At this moment Mr. de Valera telephoned to say that he realized that our talk last night had been unsatisfactory and would like to send me a note. This has just arrived. It is temperate and conciliatory, but states that for historic reasons his Government cannot accept less than the suspension of conscription.

I am writing him to the effect that I appreciate the friendly tone of his communication, that without instructions I can make no commitments, that recent information makes it appear that no decision has been taken in Westminster and that if he makes a statement Monday indicating his position before the event and calculated to excite anti-British feeling it will increase the difficulties of my Government in case they feel their interests are concerned.

I think a clash with this man is probably inevitable, but he should [not]²⁶ be allowed to choose the issue and the time.

GRAY

²⁵ William T. Cosgrave, leader of Fine Gael.

²⁶ Minister Gray inserted the word "not" on file copy of this telegram on July 28, 1943.

740.0011 European War 1939/11314 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 26, 1941—midnight.

[Received May 26—7:12 p. m.]

2123. Personal for the Secretary. Thanks messages. Your telegram 1800, May 24, midnight²⁷ received Sunday at noon. I made appointment with the Prime Minister for 4:30 p. m. and discussed Irish situation with him for 2 hours. Monday I met Mr. Eden^{27a} at 12:30 and we went over the same ground. This evening I dined with the Prime Minister and we agreed that I should send you the following message:

“The Ulster Government has weakened considerably over the weekend and in consequence the Cabinet is inclined to the view it would be more trouble than it was worth to go through with conscription. No immediate decision will be taken and in the meantime, the less made of the affair the better.”

WINANT

841D.48/57

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] July 15, 1941.

The Irish Minister called to see me this morning at his request.

The Minister said that while the Irish Government greatly appreciated the generous attitude of the United States in making possible the acquisition and purchase of two ships in this country, the shipping requirements of Ireland were becoming rapidly more acute as a result of the world situation and that the Irish Government earnestly hoped that the United States might find it possible to sell or charter to the Irish Government four or five additional ships. I said to the Minister that I was sure he realized what our own shipping requirements were and that I feared, consequently, that it was out of the question for this Government to take the action suggested. I said, however, that I would be glad to take the matter up with the Maritime Commission and find out definitely what the attitude of the Maritime Commission would be.

²⁷ Not printed; it informed the Ambassador of the President's desire to have him discuss with Mr. Churchill the question of conscription in Northern Ireland in the light of reports from the Minister in Ireland (740.0011 European War 1939/11239).

^{27a} Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Minister then said that the matter of the payment for the ships already acquired by the Irish Government had run up against certain obstacles. The Minister reminded me that the Irish Government had informed this Government that it could only make payment for these ships in goods and that some delay in settling this question had now apparently arisen between the Maritime Commission and the Federal Reserve Bank in New York. I said that I would be glad to look into the matter and find out what the difficulties might be. The Minister handed me a memorandum²⁸ containing a table showing the food imports into Ireland in the last year and the food imports this year as an indication of the serious situation with which the Irish Government is now confronted as a result of shipping shortages.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

740.0011 European War 1939/19390

The Irish Minister (Brennan) to the Acting Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, July 15, 1941.

The Minister of Ireland presents his compliments to the Honourable the Acting Secretary of State of the United States and has the honour to refer to the statement made by President Roosevelt on the 27th of June 1941²⁹ to the effect that he had received no definite assurance that the Irish would defend themselves against an attack by Germany.

This statement has caused astonishment and speculation in Ireland where it has given rise to a debate in Dail Eireann in the course of which the Administration was subjected to criticism for having, as alleged, left President Roosevelt under a misapprehension.

The Minister is at a loss to understand President Roosevelt's statement in view of the following facts:

On the 9th November 1940 he handed in to the State Department a copy of Mr. De Valera's speech delivered in Dail Eireann on the 7th November 1940 in which the following passage occurs:

"Now, as I have said, we want friendly relations with the people of Britain as we want friendly relations with all other peoples but we naturally want them with Britain because Britain is the nearest country to us on the globe. We have many relations of various kinds which make it desirable that the two peoples should live in friendship. It was partly for that reason and partly because I knew perfectly that it was a condition of neutrality that years before we came into office and several times since we came into office, I announced it that it would be our policy to use our strength to the utmost to see that this island was not going to be used as a base of attack upon Britain. We have never swerved in the slightest from that declaration. Every-

²⁸ Not printed.

²⁹ *New York Times*, June 28, 1941, p. 5, col. 3.

thing that we could do has been done to make it sure that that policy would be made as effective as it was within our power to make it."

In a statement by the Minister, a copy of which he handed in at the same time,³⁰ there is the following passage:

"Mr. De Valera asserted on the 7th November that Ireland would resist by force any attempt to occupy the ports or to impair Ireland's sovereignty by any of the belligerents. That is the determination of the government and of the people. Under no circumstances will this policy be departed from."

In the Memorandum which the Minister handed to Mr. Welles on the 2nd June 1941³¹ the following statement is made by the Irish Government:

"But they, the Irish Government, must express the earnest hope that the United States Government will find it possible at a later stage to make arms and equipment available for purchase by the Irish Government since it is the declared policy, frequently re-iterated, of that Government to use the arms exclusively in defence of the Irish people against aggression."

Moreover, the Minister would like to point out that General Aiken and himself gave the assurance that Ireland would defend her shores against any aggressor in personal interviews with President Roosevelt, Vice-President Wallace, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Navy, the Undersecretary of State, and several other officers of the State Department.

The Minister is further informed that Mr. De Valera gave the same assurance to the American Minister at Dublin on various occasions.

Apart from these direct representations the Minister would like to point out that the position of his Government has been made clear on numerous occasions. In a speech delivered in Dail Eireann on May 28, 1935 Mr. De Valera stated:

"We are going to get our independence of Britain but we are not going to allow our territory under any conditions whatever to be made use of by some foreign power as the base of attack against Britain."

Mr. De Valera made a speech broadcast to America over the Columbia Broadcasting System on St. Patrick's Day, 1941, in the course of which he said:

"The situation is then that the Irish Government and an overwhelming majority of the Irish people have decided that they will not be involved in the War. Some American publicists have said that they fear that our country may be used as a base of attack against Britain. We have pledged ourselves that this shall not be. We are

³⁰ *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. III, p. 167.

³¹ Not printed; the memorandum related to negotiations for the purchase of two freight vessels by Ireland from the United States.

determined that no one of the belligerents shall use the territory of our State as a base of attack upon another. For us to permit such a thing to be done would be to involve ourselves in the War."

The Minister handed in to the State Department a copy of General Aiken's speech delivered at Boston on April 14, 1941. The following is a passage from that speech:

"Long before the European War appeared likely to you on this side of the Atlantic, in fact in 1935, De Valera declared that in the event of war we would not allow our territory to be used as a base of attack against England. That declaration was confirmed at the beginning of the War by our declaration of neutrality, and it has been faithfully kept to the certain knowledge of the British Government, if not to the knowledge of certain short-sighted, trouble-making journalists."

General Aiken, in a broadcast over the Columbia Network on June 21, 1941, said:

"Again our leader, Eamon De Valera, declared as far back as 1935, that we would not allow our territory to be used as a base of attack against England . . .³²

"When they have said that we are likely to be overwhelmed, we have pointed out that we are organising all our home resources of men and material and that we are prepared to spend our considerable fund of foreign assets in order to purchase the arms and equipment we need to make our defences more effective. We have unfortunately been unable to purchase these arms here in the United States, and so if we are attacked we will have to defend ourselves as best we can against our aggressor with the arms we have. This we will do. And we will do so vigorously as a United people confident of the justice of our cause. And with God's help our defence will be successful.

"Recently the fear was expressed that Ireland might be a pillar in the bridge over which America might be invaded from Europe. I don't know how deep this fear is. But I can assure the American people that we are very much more vitally concerned that our country should not be used as a bridge or as a base of attack against any country in America or Europe—more concerned than the people of any other country could possibly be."

The Minister would further like to point out that in every public statement he has made on this matter he has left no doubt as to Ireland's attitude. For instance, in a speech at the United Irish Counties Annual Feis at Fordham University, New York, on June 22, 1941, he said:

"We have always stood for the ideals of democracy. Today even with our own small resources and in a land whose population was reduced by one-half in the last century, we stand ready as ever to defend them against any aggressor who comes to our shores."

³² Omission indicated in the original note.

Since the President's statement appeared, Mr. De Valera has dealt with this matter. Speaking at Ennis, County Clare, on Saturday, June 28, 1941, he stated :

"We have pledged to defend ourselves against attack no matter from what quarter it comes. That is our duty from the point of view of neutrality. It is to our interests to do that and nobody can have the slightest doubt that it is our intention to defend ourselves to the utmost against attack no matter from whom it comes."

In the course of a statement in Dail Eireann on Tuesday, July 8, 1941, Mr. De Valera said :

"Our determination to resist attack in all circumstances had been frequently repeated and made abundantly clear."

In a debate in Dail Eireann on the same day members of the Opposition commented on President Roosevelt's statement and also referred to Ireland's determination to resist attack from any quarter.

General Mulcahy, a leader of the Opposition, said :

"We could not afford to allow such a misunderstanding. The Taoiseach (Mr. De Valera) should tell President Roosevelt that our policy was complete neutrality and that we intended to resist all aggressors."

Mr. James Dillon, another Opposition leader, said :

"Opportunities should be taken to express to President Roosevelt the firm resolution of this country to meet with all the resources at its disposal aggression whence ever it might come."

Mr. De Valera in replying to this on Wednesday, the 9th July 1941 said :

"If one fact were universally known it was that the nation was neutral and had organized all means at its disposal to defend itself against attack coming from any quarter. That was known to every State represented here and to every State in which we were represented."

In view of the foregoing the Minister finds it difficult to understand how the President could have made a statement so much in conflict with the repeated declarations of the Irish Government on this matter and, in view of the embarrassment caused to his Government, he is instructed to inquire how President Roosevelt's statement is to be interpreted.

841D.24/70 : Telegram

The Minister in Ireland (Gray) to the Secretary of State

DUBLIN, July 21, 1941—8 p. m.

[Received 11 : 40 p. m.]

75. Saturday, July 18, I called upon the Prime Minister at his request.

He asked me if I could explain the meaning of the remark attributed to the President to the effect that he had no proof that arms supplied to Ireland would be used against the Germans. Mr. de Valera had intimated in the Dail the day before that I must know of his repeated public assurances that Ireland would resist any aggressor. I told him that the reported text of all his pronouncements on this subject had been sent to Washington with the comment that there was no doubt that he meant what he said. Further, that I had never in my despatches to you discussed the subject of undertakings except as I had discussed them with him relative to my personal change of position regarding obtaining arms for Ireland as set out in the memorandum of my conversation with him on January 22,³³ a copy of which he has. I said that I had no knowledge as to whether the President made the observation in question and that if he had made it I had no information as to its having any special significance beyond its plain meaning. He stressed the point that it seemed unreasonable to³⁴ further undertakings he had repeatedly made in public think there is a possibility that if there were arms available and the condition of obtaining them was an explicit agreement to be in the war full associate affording purpose of facilities except expeditionary forces, the moment was attacked by Germany he would [?]

I suggested that without [apparent omission] but judging from the unfolding of events it looked as if the British with American technical employees intended to make a fortress of Ulster and not to concern themselves further about Ireland, that the help that we mentioned was not infantry for the defense of the island but air and sea bases for the battle of the Atlantic. He asked me if I thought we contemplated taking over base in Ulster. I said that all I knew was what I read in the papers attributed to Mr. Willkie,³⁵ but that I would not say that it might not be a possibility. He said that in that case his Government would be concerned since, although they recognized the *de facto* occupation of the six counties by Great Britain, they could not waive their right of sovereignty over that territory. I said that this was a suggestion which I could not entertain and one which he must take up with you through his own Minister. I took occasion to try to impress upon the Prime Minister, what I have tried to impress upon other members of his Government and opposition without success, that the Irish extremists in America along with other anti-British groups were creating the impression that Ireland was anti-British and that Mr. Aiken's addresses to them had strengthened this impression and that he must prepare himself for

³³ Not printed, but see telegram No. 14, January 25, 5 p. m., from the Minister in Ireland, p. 217.

³⁴ The remainder of this sentence is apparently garbled.

³⁵ Wendell Willkie, Republican candidate for President in 1940.

a very general loss of American sympathy if nothing worse. He appeared unaware of the possibilities latent in an investigation of these subversive groups.

GRAY

841D.24/70 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Ireland (Gray)

WASHINGTON, July 31, 1941—7 p. m.

40. Your 75, July 21, 8 p. m. Department received note dated July 15 from Irish Legation on this subject and on July 30 made the following reply :

“The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable the Minister of Ireland and refers to the Irish Legation’s note dated July 15, 1941 concerning a statement understood to have been made by the President on June 27, 1941 on the attitude of the Irish Government in the event of an attack by Germany. The Irish Minister states that he has been instructed to inquire how the President’s statement is to be interpreted.

The American Government has been aware of the firm policy of the Irish Government, proclaimed by Prime Minister De Valera as early as 1935, not to allow its territory under any conditions whatever to be used as a base of attack against Great Britain. The American Government has also been aware of the determination of the Irish Government, repeatedly declared by Mr. De Valera since the outbreak of hostilities, to defend itself against aggression from any quarter.

The American Government realizes fully the strategic position which Ireland occupies and the constant danger of an attack from Germany either against Ireland alone or as a part of a broader campaign against the whole British Isles. In these circumstances, and in view of the close and traditional friendship between both the peoples and Governments of the United States and Ireland, the American Government has desired at all times to assist in every feasible way the building up of the defenses of Ireland.

The President, however, while not doubting that Ireland would use the means at its disposal to resist any German invasion, has not felt with certainty that Ireland unassisted could successfully repel a determined German attack. In such event, arms provided to Ireland would not only reduce the available supplies so urgently needed by the United States and Great Britain but would in all probability fall into the hands of Germany. The American Government has, therefore, to contemplate the possibility that any effort on its part to assist Ireland by the provision of arms might in the end merely add to the power of the very nation in whose defeat the United States has pledged its full material assistance.

The President has been all the more impressed with this possibility since, according to his understanding, no arrangements have been completed between the Irish and the British Governments, in the way of staff talks or otherwise, for cooperation between their respective forces

in repelling any attempted invasion of Ireland by Germany. It is perhaps unnecessary to refer to the long list of countries in Europe which, in the hope of remaining neutral, have neglected their defense plans only to fall victims, one after another, of wanton German aggression.

The Irish Government is already aware of the conclusion reached by the American Government that all military and naval matériel now produced in the United States and not required by the National rearmament program must continue to be made available to the British Empire and to nations engaged in resisting aggression. The American Government perceives no grounds on which it can reach a different decision at this time."

WELLES

841D.48/57

The Secretary of State to the Irish Minister (Brennan)

[WASHINGTON,] August 23, 1941.

SIR: I have the honor to refer to your conversation of July 15 with Mr. Welles in which you expressed the hope of the Irish Government that the United States might find it possible to sell or charter to the Irish Government four or five ships in addition to the two ships for which the Irish Government is now negotiating.

The Department of State in consultation with other appropriate agencies of this Government has given very thorough and sympathetic consideration to your request. I deeply regret, however, that under present conditions and in view of the shipping requirements of the United States, it has not been found possible to make available to the Irish Government additional vessels either through sale or charter. As the Department stated in its memorandum of May 24, 1941, the offer of the American Government to make available to the Irish Government two freight vessels was made in the face of an acute shipping shortage in the United States and only because this Government desired to aid in the transportation of essential food supplies to Ireland and to alleviate the situation of the Irish people in their present difficult circumstances.

This Government desires now, as always, to give every consideration to the needs of Ireland and it is a matter of regret that the present shipping situation makes it impossible to go further in meeting the request presented in behalf of the Irish Government. I hope, however, that the delivery of the two vessels mentioned above may be completed at an early date and that they will help appreciably in the solution of Ireland's supply problem.

Accept [etc.]

For the Secretary of State:
SUMNER WELLES

841D.48/72

The Irish Minister (Brennan) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 22 September, 1941.

The Minister of Ireland presents his compliments to The Honourable the Secretary of State, and has the honour to refer to the proposed purchase by the Irish Government of two ships from the American Government, which matter has been handled in such an extraordinary manner that it has now, after four months negotiations, reached an impasse to the bitter disappointment of the Irish Government.

On May 20th, President Roosevelt made a public statement to the effect that the United States Government would make available by sale or charter two cargo ships to the Irish Government.

The State Department at once showed active interest in the matter and throughout the subsequent negotiations they maintained that interest, and gave considerable help.

The Minister in his first interview with the Maritime Commission made it clear that the Irish Government desired to purchase these ships.

As a result of various interviews in which Mr. Joseph Brennan, Irish Vice Consul in New York acted for the Legation, the Commission agreed on June 9th to sell to the Irish Government two ships, the *West Neris* and the *West Hematite*, which were then being reconditioned at New Orleans, at a price not exceeding \$70 per dead weight ton.

On the strength of these arrangements the Irish Government had the vessels inspected, and sent from Ireland two crews to man them. These crews arrived at New Orleans before the repairs were finished. Also the Irish Government had incurred the expense of degaussing the ships. Meanwhile the method of payment had been the subject of prolonged discussions between the Legation and the State Department on the one hand, and between the State Department and the Maritime Commission on the other, but these discussions did not hold up matters because the ships were not yet ready.

On August 23rd, a contract for the sale of the two ships was submitted by the Maritime Commission to the Legation for signature. This contract mentioned no price but stated that the ships were to be paid for in dollars or Irish currency. The Irish Consul General who had been authorized to sign on behalf of Irish Shipping Limited raised the points that there was no warranty of seaworthiness in the contract, and that the price of \$70 per ton should be included.

While these points were being discussed it transpired that the Maritime Commission discovered the contract was illegal and that they could not sell except by competitive tender or by Lease Lend. They offered to deal with the matter under the provisions of the Lease Lend

Act.³⁶ This presented a new angle which had not been discussed with the Irish Government, and it was necessary to get their instructions. This was on August 29th.

On September 3rd, before final instructions had arrived from the Irish Government, the Minister learned that the ships were being requisitioned for a voyage to the Canal Zone. The Minister protested against this procedure, and ultimately the requisitioning was cancelled. The Minister on September 5th saw the Maritime Commission and agreed to purchase under Lease Lend at the figure originally agreed upon, viz., \$70 per ton. The Minister signed the necessary documents on the following day. The Maritime Commission on the same day arranged that we should take over the ships at noon on Monday, the 8th of September. Mr. Joseph Brennan travelled to New Orleans and signed on the crews on that date. He also signed a receipt as custodian for the ships pending the execution of the formal agreement. The Irish Government effected insurance on the ships on the same day.

On the 17th of September the Minister was informed by the State Department that the President had refused to sign the necessary directive to the Lend Lease authorities, and had directed the Maritime Commission to charter the ships to an American shipping company for charter to the Irish Government.

This news came as a bitter disappointment to the Irish Government who had come to the conclusion that the deal was at last satisfactorily concluded. In fact the Minister for Industry and Commerce had expressed in the Dail a few days before his appreciation of the action of the Government of the United States in transferring the ships.

Under these circumstances the Minister would be glad if the Secretary of State would intervene so as to have the original plan carried out, and instructions issued for the immediate transfer and release of the ships in accordance with the arrangements previously agreed to.

841D.48/73

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Robert B. Stewart of the
Division of European Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] September 25, 1941.

Participants: Mr. Sean Nunan, Counselor, Irish Legation;
Mr. John D. Hickerson, Eu;³⁷
Mr. Robert B. Stewart, Eu.

Mr. Nunan called at the Department in connection with the Irish Legation's note of September 22 concerning the proposed purchase by the Irish Government of two ships from the Maritime Commission.

³⁶ Approved March 11, 1941; 55 Stat. 31.

³⁷ Division of European Affairs.

Mr. Nunan was informed that the questions raised in the Legation's note had been referred to the authorities of this Government who had been dealing with the matter and that we would pass on to him any further information of interest which might be received by the Department.

841D.48/69

*Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. E. S. Maney of the
Division of European Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] September 26, 1941.

Mr. Cates³⁸ telephoned that the agreement has been signed with the Irish. He said that the agreement was substantially in accordance with the Irish Vice Consul's letter to the Maritime Commission of September 23 except that the question of \$20,000 expended on each vessel at the instance of the Irish authorities would be settled Monday next.³⁹ Mr. Cates said they had assured the Irish that they would allow the Irish to offset this sum against charter payments, reimburse the Irish for the amounts expended, or assume responsibility for the accounts. I asked Mr. Cates if he would send Mr. Stewart a copy of the charter party and he said that he would as soon as he had some copies made.

841D.48/68a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Ireland (Gray)

WASHINGTON, September 27, 1941—7 p. m.

54. Department's 53, September 24.⁴⁰ Department has not yet received any further reaction from the White House on the matter of sale of vessels. Meanwhile negotiations have been proceeding between the Irish Legation and the Maritime Commission for charter of vessels. Arrangements now completed and signed for sub-charter of these ships to Irish Shipping Limited through United States Lines for 6 months, with provision for renewal of sub-charter for such time as parties may agree. Ships will be under Irish registry and carry Irish flag. This charter arrangement would not prevent outright sale at later date if this should appear feasible though we are unable at present to express any opinion on this possibility.

HULL

³⁸ A. M. Cates of the Maritime Commission.

³⁹ September 29.

⁴⁰ Not printed.

740.0011 Pacific War/757 : Telegram

The Minister in Ireland (Gray) to the Secretary of State

DUBLIN, December 8, 1941—4 p. m.

[Received 6:02 p. m.]

132. Indications are that Irish majority sympathies are strongly with us against Japan. I called on External Affairs and had a very friendly reception as regards our war participation. I advanced the suggestion that Irish extremist elements in America opposed to American defense and support for Britain would henceforth exert little influence and that we might look forward to a more sympathetic understanding between our two Governments; that without any instructions from you I would be glad on my own responsibility to explore again the question of arms for Eire in the hope that some common ground might be found for proposals that I could forward to you. I [apparent omission] however the probabilities that the difficulty of supplying armament was likely to be much enhanced by our entry into war.

During the last month there have been indications of a growing realization of the realities on the part of both Irish Government and people and a definite improvement of attitude toward America. I believe this should be followed up always of [on?] the basis that Ireland needs us more than we need Ireland.

GRAY

740.0011 European War 1939/17852

The Irish Minister (Brennan) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, December 16, 1941.

SIR: I have the honor to transmit to Your Excellency the following extracts from the speech delivered by Mr. de Valera, Chief of the Government of Ireland, at Cork on December 14th, 1941:

"Since this terrible war began our sympathies have gone out to all the suffering peoples who have been dragged into it. Further hundreds of millions have become involved since I spoke at Limerick a fortnight ago. Its extension to the United States of America brings a source of anxiety and sorrow to every part of this land. There is scarcely a family here which has not a member or near relative in that country. In addition to the ties of blood there has been between our two nations a long association of friendship and regard, continuing uninterruptedly from America's own struggle for independence down to our own. The part that American friendship played in helping us to win the freedom that we enjoy in this part of Ireland has been gratefully recognized and acknowledged by our people. It would be unnatural then if we did not sympathize in a special manner with the people of the United States and if we did not feel with them in

all the anxieties and trials which this war must bring upon them. For this reason strangers who do not understand our conditions have begun to ask how America's entry into the war will affect our state policy here. We answered that question in advance: The policy of the State remains unchanged. We can only be a friendly neutral. From the moment this war began there was for this State only one policy possible, neutrality. Our circumstances of History, the incompleteness of our national freedom through the partition of our country made any other policy impracticable. Any other policy would have divided our people, and for a divided nation to fling itself into this war would be to commit suicide. Of necessity we adopted the policy of neutrality but we have been under no illusions about it. We have been fully alive to the difficulties and dangers which it brought: We are fully aware that in a world at war each set of belligerents are ever ready to regard those who are not with them as against them, but the course we have followed is a just course. God has been pleased to save us during the years of war that have already passed. We pray that He may be pleased to save us to the end but we must do our part."

Please accept [etc.]

ROBT. BRENNAN

740.0011 European War 1939/17853

The Secretary of State to the Irish Minister (Brennan)

WASHINGTON, December 22, 1941.

SIR: I have received your communication dated December 16, 1941 transmitting extracts from a speech delivered by Prime Minister de Valera at Cork on December 14. Your communication was immediately forwarded to the White House where it has been considered by the President. The President now requests that the following message, with which I also desire to associate myself, be cabled, as a personal message, to Mr. de Valera:

"I have received, through Mr. Brennan, the Irish Minister in Washington, certain extracts from your speech delivered at Cork on December 14.

"I note with particular interest your reference to the long association of friendship and regard between our two countries, your expressions of sympathy with the people of the United States in the present conflict and your declaration of friendly neutrality on the part of the Irish Government.

"I fully understand the strong desire of Ireland, and the desire of every nation not at war, to avoid active participation in the present struggle. Unfortunately, as the experience of so many nations, including our own, has so clearly demonstrated, the desire to avoid the wave of conquest provides little guarantee of national safety. On the contrary it merely gives to the aggressor the opportunity to choose the moment and manner of attack, sometimes carried out most treacherously.

"I cannot let this opportunity pass without repeating what has now become the obvious, namely, that Axis aggression is now being waged on a world-wide scale, that until this aggression has been stopped by force of arms there is no security for any nation, great or small.

"These are stern facts which the Irish people may well ponder today, and I feel that the American Government would be failing in its duty of deep friendship if it did not, with the wisdom of its recent experience, underline their vital significance to the Irish Government.

"We do not minimize the task before us but I need scarcely tell you of the absolute confidence of the American Government and the American people in the final triumph of the cause for which we are now fighting and our determination to carry the fight through to complete victory. Happily the vast majority of mankind and the preponderance of resources are on our side. The assistance which any nation or any people may give in this struggle merely speeds the day of victory and peace and security for all nations.

"Your expressions of gratitude for the long interest of the United States in Irish freedom are appreciated. The policy of the American Government now as in the past contemplates the hope that all the free institutions, liberties and independence which the Irish people now enjoy may be preserved for the full enjoyment of the future. If freedom and liberty are to be preserved, they must now be defended by the human and material resources of all free nations. Your freedom too is at stake. No longer can it be doubted that the policy of Hitler and his Axis associates is the conquest of the entire world and the enslavement of all mankind.

"I have every confidence that the Irish Government and the Irish people, who love liberty and freedom as dearly as we, will know how to meet their responsibilities in the present situation."

Accept [etc.]

CORDELL HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/17823 : Telegram

The Minister in Ireland (Gray) to the Secretary of State

DUBLIN, December 23, 1941—4 p. m.

[Received 5:19 p. m.]

145. Reference my letter to Welles dated December 17.⁴¹ Since our entry into the war and the disbanding of the Friends of Irish Neutrality the attitude of the Irish Government has become notably more friendly although there is no suggestion of recession from neutrality. They are anxious to acquire even token amounts of armament by purchase in order to maintain the morale of their defense forces. I believe danger of action by anti-British elements in the event of a German invasion now to be negligible. I suggest, therefore, as the most profitable course, token allotments of material attended with the greatest possible publicity stressing the need to defend Ireland against Germany. Special legislation similar to that pending now in the

⁴¹ Not printed.

Senate for the sale of the two ships would have excellent effect here and be likely to facilitate whatever course may have to be taken as regards the ports. A dozen defense airplanes would be especially useful to this end as they would compel training of pilots in England or America, the establishment of needed landing fields and the co-ordination of patrol intelligence with the RAF.⁴²

The British and Canadian representatives personally approve this policy in principle as promising the best chance of profitably capitalizing the course of future events especially in view of the economic pressures now imminent. The Irish Government forbid exports of all articles they regard needful for Irish welfare and propose no sacrifices. They cannot justly complain of reciprocal treatment sweetened with tokens of good will.

De Valera continues to assert that he will attack the first aggressor and invite help from that aggressor's enemy. He undoubtedly means this and would order fire on British or American invader. Whether the Army would obey order against Americans and the country support it I cannot say. Very much would depend on the manner of approach and preparation.

The program suggested in no way relieves the Allies of responsibility for the defense of the Island.

GRAY

⁴² Royal Air Force.

THE NEAR EAST AND AFRICA

AFGHANISTAN

INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS REGARDING POSSIBILITY OF MORE COMPREHENSIVE TREATY ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND AFGHANISTAN

711.90H/69

*The Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Murray) to the Minister in Iran (Dreyfus)*¹

WASHINGTON, January 28, 1941.

DEAR LOUIS: We presume that you will travel to Kabul to present your letters of credence as soon as you find it possible and expedient to do so, but it is hardly to be supposed that you will make the journey before spring brings on improvement in traveling conditions.

When you are in Kabul, we should like you to explore the ground with a view to ascertaining whether, in your judgment, it would be worthwhile to consider entering into negotiations with the Afghans with a view to concluding a more formal and more comprehensive arrangement than the Provisional Agreement of 1936. Before proceeding, you will doubtless desire to familiarize yourself with the history of the negotiations² leading to the signature at Paris on March 26, 1936, of a Provisional Agreement of Friendship and Diplomatic and Consular Representation.³ Reference in this connection is made to the Department's instruction No. 1 (Afghan series) of August 26, 1935, and to instruction No. 5 (Afghan series) of February 21, 1936.⁴ For further background there is enclosed a copy of an informal letter of February 13, 1936, from the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs to the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim at Paris.⁵ There is also enclosed a copy of a memorandum dated February 12, 1936, from the Division of Near Eastern Affairs to the Legal Adviser, and a copy of the latter's comments dated February 14, 1936.⁴ Please take note also of Baghdad's despatch No. 570 of January 2, 1936,⁵ entitled: "Afghan Minister for Foreign Affairs visits Baghdad", a copy of which was apparently sent to your Legation.

¹ The Minister in Iran was accredited also to Afghanistan.

² See *Foreign Relations*, 1936, vol. III, pp. 1 ff.

³ For text, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 88, or 49 Stat. (pt. 2) 3873.

⁴ Neither printed.

⁵ Not printed.

While it is assumed that the Legation has a copy of the Provisional Agreement of March 26, 1936 (Executive Agreement Series, No. 88), two additional copies are enclosed for convenience of reference.

From an examination of this material, it will be evident that the conclusion of a somewhat more far-reaching agreement in 1936 was prevented: (1) by the discovery that the text first proposed to the Afghans did not take account of their ineligibility to American citizenship and the legislative structure based thereon; and (2) by the refusal of the Afghans to enter into an agreement providing for reciprocal and unconditional most-favored-nation treatment in regard to commercial and customs matters.

The question arises whether, in spite of past difficulties, it would now be possible to enter into a more comprehensive and more formal agreement with the Afghan Government.

The Afghans themselves are naturally the best judges of what they desire from this country. It may be surmised, however, that their wants include: the establishment by the United States of a diplomatic mission in Kabul; the development of Afghanistan by American enterprise and American capital; American teachers and experts to advise and to work with the Afghan authorities; an assured supply of American automobiles and accessories; treaty alien status for Afghan merchants who travel to the United States on business; continued fair treatment of Afghan exports to this country.

You are doubtless aware of the reasons why an American diplomatic mission has not been established in Kabul up to the present time, and realize the unlikelihood that one will be established in the future so long as our interests in Afghanistan continue to be slight. However, the Afghan officials are likely to have much to say on this point, and it is suggested that you review the conversations on the subject which your predecessor, Mr. Hornibrook, had in Kabul.

We understand that the Afghans are disposed to give a favorable reception to American enterprise and capital, but it is for American private interests themselves to determine whether or not Afghanistan is a suitable field for their endeavors.

Nevertheless, we should like to know whether the Afghan Government would consider giving general assurances regarding the treatment which would be accorded to American interests of the kind entering Afghanistan.

The furnishing of American civilian experts is of course not a suitable subject for a treaty stipulation, nor is the supplying of automobiles.

It would be possible to provide treaty alien status for Afghan merchants coming to this country on business, but if the treaty were to deal not merely with entry, but also with establishment and sojourn, due account would have to be taken of the ineligibility of Afghans

for American citizenship and consequently the more limited rights which may be granted in connection with the tenure and disposition of real property. In the proposed treaty between the United States and India, which is now being considered by the Government of India, where the same question arose, these matters are dealt with in Article I. For your information there is attached a copy of our note of October 10, 1939,⁸ and its enclosure, as well as a copy of our supplementary note of April 10, 1940, to the British Ambassador.⁹

Obviously, the reservations which we are compelled to make in a brief instrument (see the Treaty of Establishment and Sojourn with Turkey, signed on October 28, 1931,¹⁰ a copy of which is enclosed) would stand out in bold relief and be very difficult to explain to the satisfaction of the Afghans. One alternative would be to make the treaty very brief indeed, giving Afghan merchants treaty alien status, i. e. dealing solely with entry, and to say nothing about establishment and sojourn. The other alternative would be to insert provisions relating to establishment and sojourn in a treaty of larger scope in which our reservations would be less noticeable.

Assurance of continued equitable treatment for Afghan exports to this country is, of course, a matter with which we are fully prepared to deal in a treaty.

So far as we are concerned, there would be no objection to entering into a treaty comprising a considerable range of subjects, such as the proposed treaty with India, in so far as its provisions are applicable to Afghanistan. In your conversations at Kabul you should not, however, allude to the fact that treaty negotiations are pending between your Government and the Government of India. The provisions relating to navigation would naturally be eliminated. It would also be desirable to postpone entering into detailed stipulations relating to diplomatic and consular establishment until there are definite prospects therefor.

We assume that the Afghans are unwilling to permit American eleemosynary activities in their country. As to archeological work, your attention is invited to the Legation's despatch No. 366 of February 27, 1935, to the Department's instruction No. 112 of April 4, 1935, and to the Legation's despatch No. 131 (Afghan series) of January 23, 1940.¹¹ From this correspondence and from the text of the French archeological monopoly (see "A Report on Afghanistan", by Cornelius Van H. Engert, Washington, 1924, pp. 48 and 211-212), it is noted that although the French archeological monopoly will not expire until 1952, British archeologists were recently engaged in ex-

⁸ *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. II, p. 352.

⁹ *Ante*, p. 189.

¹⁰ *Foreign Relations*, 1931, vol. II, p. 1042.

¹¹ None printed.

plorations. It is suggested that when in Kabul you inquire informally whether, and, if so what, sites could be made available to American archeologists under Article 11 of the Franco-Afghan Agreement of September 9, 1922,¹² or on any other basis.

For the rest, it would seem to be mainly a question of what commitments the Afghans can make. We have the impression that Afghan reluctance to grant us most-favored-nation treatment in trade and customs matters is not due to a desire to place our goods at a disadvantage, but is to avoid affording certain other countries of whom the Afghans entertain suspicions, an opportunity to press for equal advantages which could be used for political ends. There is the added difficulty that a foreign trade monopoly system exists in Afghanistan as in Iran, and that Afghanistan, like its western neighbor, has entered into certain compensation arrangements. We, however, do not know whether the Afghans feel disinclined or unable to give us most-favored-nation treatment in respect to all matters, or whether their disinclination is confined to a few subjects.

In sum, we are disposed to enter into a treaty giving the Afghans national or most-favored-nation treatment, with certain exceptions, in various matters. In granting such treatment, we ordinarily obtain reciprocal treatment from the other party, and we should be glad to be informed as to those subjects in respect of which the Afghans feel able to accord it. In cases where they cannot, we should like to know in a general way what compensatory advantages they can offer.

The Afghans are probably unaware of the disabilities to which they are unfortunately subject in this country, references to which have been made in the course of this letter. They are bound to learn of them sooner or later, but you should refrain from bringing the matter up.

Your conversations in Kabul should of course be purely informal and exploratory in character. While we hope that they will lead to concrete results, we believe that your inquiries will in any case serve the purpose of convincing the Afghans of the good will of this Government.

Sincerely yours,

WALLACE MURRAY

124.90H/54: Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, June 27, 1941—10 a. m.

[Received 7: 55 p. m.]

65. Following preliminary report on results of Afghan mission. Our reception was unusually cordial due to traditional Afghan spirit

¹² League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cv, p. 153.

of hospitality, to the obvious friendly disposition of the people toward Americans and to the desire of the Government to have us open a Legation at Kabul. The Afghans have a sincere and deep rooted desire in the absence of a friend or neighbor to whom they can turn to have a disinterested third-power friend to assist and advise them and they have always hoped that the United States would be willing to fill such a role. This desire on their part is not opportunistic because of the war although war conditions have made it more acute. I venture to recommend the immediate opening of a Legation at Kabul for the following reasons—first and most important the United States should accept the hand of friendship offered it by this small and independent nation in keeping with its world responsibilities; secondly this is an opportunity which should not be missed of establishing ourselves solidly in a strategic position in Asia; thirdly our interests in Afghanistan should increase since negotiations are now under way to bring a number of American teachers and technical advisers, and many more are contemplated if all goes well. It may be pointed out that Germany has established herself well in Afghanistan as a result of the good work of her more than 100 citizen advisers there and to the economic assistance and advice she has given.

As to administration of justice in Afghanistan my opinion after considerable investigation on the spot is that while justice is administered exclusively by [apparent omission] on the basis of Islamic law and there is no legal or constitutional guarantee of treatment according to western standards. In practical application foreigners are accorded suitable treatment and the Government is most anxious to avoid incidents involving them. There have been no cases in recent years of harsh or unusual treatment of foreigners and in a number of cases those accused of serious crimes have been turned over to their Legations for deportation rather than delivered to the vagaries of the Shariat.

The Afghan Government has expressed willingness to sign a more comprehensive treaty including most-favored-nation clause with certain reservations. Their rough draft of a suggested treaty¹³ is being forwarded by mail.

The Afghans are willing to waive visa fees through exchange of notes. I should appreciate instructions if Department wishes me to proceed therewith.

A series of despatches on political and economic subjects covering the Afghan mission will be prepared and forwarded as time permits.

DREYFUS

¹³ *Post*, p. 261.

711.90H/73

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

Afghan Series No. 7

TEHRAN, July 5, 1941.
[Received December 8.]

SIR: Referring to a communication of January 28, 1941, from the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, and my telegram No. 65 of June 27, 1941, concerning my journey to Kabul and the presentation of my letters of credence to the King of Afghanistan, I have the honor to report that, after the termination of the protocol formalities, one of the first matters taken up informally with the Minister for Foreign Affairs was that of exploring the ground to ascertain whether it would be worth while to consider entering into negotiations with the Afghan Government with a view to concluding a more formal and more comprehensive treaty than the Provisional Agreement of 1936.

When this subject was first broached by me to Ali Mohammad Khan, the Foreign Minister, he appeared to be quite interested and receptive and informed me that he would be much pleased if something could be done along these lines. He stated that he would consult the Prime Minister and would then let me know the decision of his Government. On a subsequent visit several days later he informed me that he regretted very much not to have been able to discuss the question of the treaty with the Prime Minister as the latter had been confined to his bed by a slight illness. On that occasion Ali Mohammad Khan went on to say that he could not see any reason why Afghanistan should not enter into an agreement providing for reciprocal and unconditional most-favored-nation treatment in regard to commercial and customs matters as his country was quite free in this respect, not having through treaty or otherwise given any special advantages to any particular country. Thereupon I inquired whether his Government was disposed to give favorable reception to American enterprise and capital and whether it was prepared to give general assurances regarding the treatment which would be accorded to American interests entering Afghanistan. To this he replied emphatically in the affirmative.

No reference whatever was made in the conversation by either side to the ineligibility of Afghans to American citizenship and the more limited rights which may be accorded them in connection with the tenure and disposition of real property. I doubt if the Foreign Minister is aware of the disabilities suffered by Afghans in this respect, although his draft of the treaty would indicate that he had it vaguely in mind. I am of the opinion, in any event, that this hurdle can be surmounted in the same manner as contemplated in

the proposed treaty between the United States and India, a copy of which was enclosed with Mr. Murray's communication.

The day before my departure from Kabul, the Foreign Minister informed me that he had been able finally to go over the matter with the Prime Minister and they had gone so far as to prepare an informal draft of a treaty comprising a considerable range of subjects. Unfortunately, this draft was in the Persian language and it was not possible in the time at our disposal to examine carefully each of the articles. However, the Minister explained that this draft had been prepared only with the view of giving an idea of some of the subjects his Government felt might be included in such a treaty and he went on to say that he would be glad to receive from the American Government a counter-draft with its proposals. Throughout the conversation his attitude seemed to be that there should be no difficulty in arriving at a formal agreement between the two countries.

During my talks with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, he mentioned only on one or two occasions that Afghanistan is desirous of having a permanent American Minister in Kabul. The reason for his not having stressed this is undoubtedly due to a certain sensitiveness on this subject which I feel is developing. However, in my conversations with the Minister of Public Works, that official repeated several times how helpful it would be in the furtherance of Afghan-American commercial relations to have a permanent Legation in Kabul. In my telegram of June 27th, I ventured to recommend the opening of a permanent Legation at Kabul. I respectfully commend to the Department's earnest consideration the arguments therein adduced for this stand as well as those more fully set forth in Despatch No. 6, dated June 29, 1941, on American-Afghan relations.¹⁴

A translation of the Afghan draft of the proposed treaty is enclosed.

Respectfully yours,

LOUIS G. DREYFUS, JR.

[Enclosure—Translation]

Afghan Draft of Treaty of Friendship Between the Royal Government of Afghanistan and the Government of the United States of America

His Majesty the King of Afghanistan and the President of the United States of America, desiring to extend the friendly relations between the Royal Government of Afghanistan and the Government of the United States of America, found it necessary, in order to attain this end, to conclude a Treaty of Friendship in lieu of the Provisional Accord concluded on March 26, 1936, between the Royal Government

¹⁴ Not printed.

of Afghanistan and the Government of the United States of America, and in order to conclude the said treaty they designated as their Plenipotentiaries:

For His Majesty the King of Afghanistan,
, and

For His Excellency the President of the United States of America,

The above-mentioned plenipotentiaries, after communicating their letters of credence (full powers), which they found correct and authentic, agreed on the following articles:

ARTICLE I

There shall be a firmly established and lasting peace and sincere friendship between His Majesty the King of Afghanistan, his descendants and subjects on the one hand, and the United States of America and her citizens on the other, in all their territories and dominions.

ARTICLE II

The Diplomatic Representatives of each country in the territory of the other shall enjoy all privileges under public international law. The Consular representatives of each country shall have exequaturs and may reside in the territory of the other, and enjoy the honorary privileges granted to all representatives by virtue of general international usage, and they shall be treated like the Consular representatives of any other country.

ARTICLE III

The citizens of the United States of America, her dominions and possessions, in the Kingdom of Afghanistan, and the subjects of His Majesty the King of Afghanistan in the United States and her dominions and possessions, will be admitted (into the territories of the other) in accordance with the general principles of international law as generally known. (These principles) shall apply to their persons, their property and rights. They shall enjoy the protection of the laws and the authorities of the country. As to their persons, property, rights and interests, the treatment accorded will not be less favorable than that accorded the nationals of any other country.

ARTICLE IV

In commercial and customs matters the Royal Government of Afghanistan shall receive the rights and facilities given by the United States of America, her dominions and possessions to a third foreign Government or to be given in the future. Similarly the Government of the United States of America, its dominions and possessions, in commercial and customs matters shall receive the rights and facilities

given by the Royal Government of Afghanistan to a third foreign Government or to be given in the future.

ARTICLE V

The provisions of this Treaty concerning the most favored nation clause do not apply to the following:

(1) Concessions and facilities granted by each of the High Contracting Parties to a third Government or to be granted in the future, on a reciprocal basis.

(2) Privileges and advantages given or to be granted in the future by each of the High Contracting Parties to a neighboring Government to afford frontier trade facilities.

(3) Concessions granted or to be granted in the future by one of the High Contracting Parties to a third Government by virtue of separate treaties for the purpose of preventing double taxation.

ARTICLE VI

The High Contracting Parties, desiring to extend trade between Afghanistan and the United States of America, will in the future conclude a separate commercial convention for the purpose of regulating and extending the trade relations between the two countries.

ARTICLE VII

This treaty will be put into effect after it goes through the proper stages and after the exchange of ratifications. It will be in force for a period of five years. If at the end of the fourth year one of the parties should not communicate to the other party its desire to terminate this treaty, this treaty will, after the termination of the first five years, become automatically operative for five more years.

ARTICLE VIII

From the date this treaty goes into effect the Provisional Accord concluded on March 26, 1936, becomes invalid.

ARTICLE IX

Therefore the undersigned placed their signatures on this treaty in two copies, in Persian and English, both languages being of equal force.

This the (date)

[Consideration of a treaty between the United States and Afghanistan apparently was in abeyance during the war.]

EGYPT

IMPACT OF THE EUROPEAN WAR ON EGYPT; PROBLEMS ARISING REGARDING EFFICIENT USE OF UNITED STATES EQUIPMENT SENT TO BRITISH FORCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST¹

740.0011 European War 1939/9813

The Chargé in Egypt (Hare) to the Secretary of State

No. 2361

CAIRO, March 3, 1941.

[Received April 10.]

SIR: I have the honor to report that on the occasion of Minister Fish being received by King Farouk on February 26th prior to the Minister's departure for his new post at Lisbon the conversation turned, I was informed by the Minister, to various problems which had confronted His Majesty since his accession to the throne and particularly to the subject of Egypt's policy in respect of the war.

In this connection the Minister remarked to the King that he had been given to understand at one time that Aly Maher Pasha, the Prime Minister at the time of the outbreak of the war, had assured the British in the early days following the beginning of hostilities that Egypt would declare war and had even gone so far as to state as much in writing but that he had subsequently changed his mind and reversed his position.

King Farouk confirmed the accuracy of the Minister's understanding and added that Aly Maher Pasha had actually assured the British on three separate occasions that Egypt would declare war against Germany. However, the King said that when he became aware of what was happening he advised Aly Maher that he was unalterably opposed to such a course of action and that Aly Maher, when he saw that the King's position had the full support of public opinion, had realized his mistake and had come around to the King's point of view. The King gave the Minister clearly to understand, however, that, had it not been for his personal intervention, Egypt would certainly have been drawn into the war. Furthermore, the King went on to say that, not only had he taken a strong hand in this matter with Aly Maher, but he had also exacted promises from the two succeeding Prime Ministers, Hassan Sabry Pasha and Hussein Sirry Pasha, when

¹ For previous correspondence on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. III, pp. 465 ff.

they took over the premiership, that they would not permit Egypt to be drawn in the war.

In relating the foregoing to me the Minister added that after taking leave of the King he happened to be talking to Hassanein Pasha, Chief of the Royal Cabinet, who entirely confirmed the King's account of the role he had played in opposing Egypt's entry into the war. How consistently the Egyptian Government has adhered to this policy of non-involvement in the war has been brought out in numerous reports submitted by the Legation. That such remains its unswerving policy was clearly evidenced in a speech delivered by Hussein Sirry Pasha, the Prime Minister, at Minia on February 26th, the day of Minister Fish's audience with the King, when he (the Prime Minister) made the following statement (in translation) in the course of a declaration on general Government policy:

"The world is today being shaken by important events. There is no country which is sheltered from this war and its misfortunes or which is completely beyond its reach . . .² Nevertheless, your Government, always awake and on guard, is doing its best to ward off these misfortunes from you. Inspired by the wisdom of our Beloved Sovereign and looking only to the general interest, it is exerting every effort to shield you from this terrible war."

Respectfully yours,

RAYMOND A. HARE

740.0011 European War 1939/9658 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, April 4, 1941—4 p. m.
[Received April 5—4: 55 p. m.]

189. The Legation's 184, April 4th.³ According to informal British circles the original campaign by the British against Bengazi had the twofold and immediate purpose of cutting off and destroying the retreating Italian forces and acquiring use of the port. The first objective was attained completely but the second was not realized because the harbor was found littered with sunken Italian ships and also because of heavy bombing particularly by German planes.

Having captured Bengazi it would have been highly desirable to push on and occupy Tripolitania but that project had to be abandoned owing to the necessity of sending troops to Greece⁴ and it was therefore decided to hold Cyrenaica lightly. British strength in that area was also reduced owing to the necessity of sending back for repairs much of the mechanized equipment used in the Libyan advance. Consequently when the Italo-German forces began their recent advance

² Omission indicated in the original despatch.

³ Not printed.

⁴ For correspondence on this subject, see vol. II, pp. 635 ff.

General Wavell⁵ who is an exponent of mobility in desert tactics flew personally to survey the scene of action (in fact he was about the last person to leave at the time of the evacuation of Bengazi) and decided to fall back to a defense point of his choosing. In fact it is likely that in accordance with this plan still further withdrawal is in prospect but the British military maintain, albeit none too convincingly, that enemy forces now available are not sufficient for an attack directed against Egypt. They admit, however, that adverse effect of the move from a propaganda point of view and the distinct advantage to the enemy of the acquisition of advance air bases, but doubt whether it will be possible to utilize Bengazi port owing to its encumbered condition.

News of the capture of Bengazi and especially the admission in the communiqué of the part played by German troops came as a definite shock to the Egyptian public which, although originally perturbed by the reports of German troops in Libya, had been reassured by optimistic press releases of the military authorities. Correspondents had also been kept in the dark as regarded the seriousness of the situation, when advised that a special communiqué was being issued last night are said to have expected the announcement of the fall of Massawa.⁶

As matters stand at the moment the general Egyptian reaction is one of certain apprehension but not serious alarm owing to the reputation which General Wavell enjoys for mastering difficult situations. However, if as seems likely the Italo-German advance should continue for some distance beyond Bengazi the Egyptians will undoubtedly take a much more serious view of the situation and reassuring statements are already being issued by the British to calm public fears.

KIRK

740.0011 European War 1939/9904 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, April 11, 1941—9 a. m.

[Received April 12—11:05 a. m.]

237. Referring to my telegram No. 230, April 10, 10 a. m.,⁷ according to an account of an interview yesterday with the Egyptian Prime Minister published by this morning's *Journal d'Egypte* and reproduced in *Al Ahram*, the Prime Minister's attention was called by a

⁵ Gen. Sir Archibald P. Wavell, Commander in Chief of the British Forces in the Middle East.

⁶ For correspondence regarding Ethiopia and Italian East Africa, see pp. 341 ff.

⁷ Not printed.

correspondent to prevailing apprehension in Egypt following recent developments in the international situation and it was observed that a report was current that the British Ambassador ^{7a} had presented a dark picture of the situation to the Prime Minister 3 days before as a result of which an urgent meeting of the Cabinet had been called.

The Prime Minister replied that on the contrary the Ambassador had given a reassuring account of the military situation, that other political and financial matters had been discussed and that there had been nothing alarming about the Cabinet session which followed. The Prime Minister went on to say that as a result of information which had come to him from Egyptian diplomatic sources and conversations with Eden ⁸ and Egyptian and British military authorities the Egyptian Government had been forewarned of the turn which events have now taken and that he was fully confident as to the outcome.

The Prime Minister went on to say that British reinforcements are arriving in increasing numbers and that this movement should increase following recent successes in East Africa; that the British High Command has maintained its forces intact and has full knowledge of the terrain over which operations were being conducted and where previous important strategic successes had been achieved, and that in taking a confident view of the situation he felt that the opinion of experts should prevail over that of civilians.

In the circumstances the Prime Minister advised the public not to become overwrought, to have confidence in the military authorities, to proceed calmly with the tasks of the day and to place faith in the Government for the protection of public interests. The Prime Minister added that compared with other countries Egypt occupies a fortunate position and that even though the situation might necessitate certain sacrifices they would be small compared to those elsewhere and Egypt should give the world and particularly the Orient an example of firm moral balance, of perfect discipline and of faith in the future.

KIRK

740.0011 European War 1939/9946 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, April 13, 1941—11 a. m.

[Received April 14—8:40 a. m.]

253. The prevailing opinion in informed circles here regarding developments in Cyrenaica seems to be that the situation has stabilized somewhat but that it is still a question whether the British will be able

^{7a} Sir Miles W. Lampson.

⁸ Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

to maintain their present positions. Tobruk is still being held but enemy forces are reported to be operating between Tobruk and Sollum. Forces formerly engaged in East Africa have already begun to arrive and others are being sent from Palestine. The shortage of armored equipment is understood to be of great concern.

An encouraging feature of the situation is the heavy losses inflicted on German planes and particularly the effectiveness of fire by ground troops on dive bombers. Thus as a result of this toll on enemy planes and the alleged transfer of some German planes to the Balkans it is said that for the time being at least German aviation is not presenting as serious a problem as had been anticipated. On the other hand British air strength is still considered to be distinctly inadequate to meet existing requirements and the fact that many American planes shipped to this area have developed troubles rendering them unserviceable for immediate use has undoubtedly constituted a serious drawback in this respect.

KIRK

740.0011 European War 1939/9980 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, April 14, 1941—9 p. m.

[Received April 16—3:10 a. m.]

265. The Legation's 264, April 14, 8 p. m.⁹ The Legation has been informed by an [a British?] Embassy source that in the conference between General Wavell and the Prime Minister this morning the former outlined the situation in the western desert and stated that although the tactics being employed by the enemy were such that small forces might turn up at unexpected places the situation as a whole was well in hand. In reply to the Prime Minister's question regarding the possible necessity for the use of Egyptian troops General Wavell is said to have stated that Egyptian forces would not be required on the western desert but that their cooperation in maintaining internal security and guarding the Suez Canal would be helpful. This is presumably the agreement submitted in secret session to Parliament mentioned in the Legation's telegram under reference.

The leading editorial of the paper in question appeals for confidence in Wavell and stresses the points that the RAF¹⁰ and the Fleet are the incontestable masters of the air and seas of Libya and that a battle in the real sense of the word has not yet taken place.

KIRK

⁹ Not printed.

¹⁰ Royal Air Force.

740.0011 European War 1939/10020 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, April 15, 1941—5 p. m.
[Received April 16—9:55 p. m.]

273. The Legation's 253, April 13, 11 a. m., and 258, April 14, 10 a. m.¹¹ Informed circles here now appear to be more reassured regarding the situation in the western desert in view of the decisive repulse of attacks on Tobruk, continued successes of the RAF and evidence that the German-Italian drive shows signs of having spent its force. Latest reports indicate sharp fighting in the Sollum area but thus far no advance beyond that point has been reported. While admitting that further surprises may still be anticipated, responsible sources apparently feel that the immediate situation has improved in the past 48 hours and that the probability of the present operation developing into a serious attack on Egypt is for the moment less likely.

KIRK

740.0011 European War 1939/10038½ : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]

LONDON, April 16, 1941—11 p. m.
[Received April 16—10:16 p. m.]

1515. Personal for the President from the Former Naval Person.¹²

3. I am personally not unduly anxious about the Libyan-Egyptian position. We estimate Germans have one colonial armoured division and perhaps the whole of one ordinary armoured division comprising say 600 to 650 tanks of which a good many have already been destroyed or have broken down. There are no German infantry in Cyrenaica except the few battalions comprised in the German armoured divisions. Difficulties of supply of petrol, food, water, and ammunition must be severe and we know from prisoners of the strain under which these audacious formations are working. We are naturally trying to bring our own armoured forces which were largely refitting at the time of the attack into action and are reinforcing Egypt from all parts of the Middle East where we have nearly half a million men. Tobruk I regard as an invaluable bridgehead or sally port. We do not feel at all outmatched at present in the air and are growing stronger con-

¹¹ Latter not printed.

¹² Code name for Winston S. Churchill, British Prime Minister.

stantly. The whole power of the Mediterranean Fleet which is being strongly reinforced will be used to cut the sea and coastal communications. There are of course Italian forces besides the Germans and we believe the Germans are now sending or trying to send a third armoured division from Sicily.

4. The repulse of the German attacks on Tobruk on the 14th and 15th seems to me important as this small fierce fight in which the enemy lost prisoners, killed, and tanks, together with aircraft, out of all proportion to our losses, is the first time they have tasted defeat and they are working on very small margins.

Meanwhile our efforts to turn off the tap have met with a noteworthy success in the Mediterranean. Our destroyers from Malta in the early hours of this morning, 16th, caught a German-Italian convoy of 5 large ships loaded with ammunition and mechanical transport and escorted by 3 Italian destroyers. The whole convoy and all its escort were sunk. We lost one destroyer in the fight. We are keeping the strength of our forces secret for the present. [Churchill.]

WINANT

740.0011 European War 1939/10288 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, April 23, 1941—11 a. m.

[Received April 24—12:44 p. m.]

319. For the Secretary and Under Secretary. From tentative information available to me the following is a brief estimate of the material immediately essential for the defense of Egypt and the Canal Zone.

(1) In addition to the 170 Tomahawks now in Takoradi but at present grounded owing to mechanical defects, 100 fighter planes and 100 checker bombers;

(2) 350 cruiser 12-ton tanks.

An amplification of this estimate may be obtained from the reports to the War Department of the Military Attaché to this Legation.

It is impossible to determine whether Hitler's next move will be against Egypt and the Canal or whether he will first intensify his attacks against Britain. Furthermore, conjectures are profitless as to whether this move will develop as a direct attack from Tripoli or whether it will be preceded or attended by attacks on Turkey or even against Gibraltar. The fact remains that, whatever other action Hitler or the Governments aligned with him may take in other parts, it is only logical to consider that this area is positively threatened and the threat must be regarded as immediate. Although since my arrival here I have endeavored in every possible way to satisfy myself that measures are under way to meet the essential requirements in

material for the defense of Egypt and the Canal I must reluctantly admit that I have been unsuccessful. It is on that account that I am now submitting the foregoing brief and incomplete estimate of requirements and urge with all vigor that if everything possible is not already being done the Government of the United States take the initiative in determining what material should and can be sent here immediately and see to it that deliveries are made without delay either by air or by sea.

KIRK

740.0011 European War 1939/10358 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, April 25, 1941—2 p. m.

[Received April 27—7:45 a. m.]

330. The Legation's telegram No. 101, June 12, 5 p. m. 1940, and its despatch No. 2257, November 23, 1940.¹³ Since the beginning of April when the advance of the Italo-German force toward Egypt began, a wave of rumors and false information of a subversive nature has swept over Cairo and consequently the Egyptian authorities have been obliged to issue two warnings to the public against the spreading of false rumors and divulging military information. In this connection, the Legation has received a note from the Foreign Office transmitting a copy of a decision reached by the Council of Ministers on April 7 defining "territorial defense secrets" of which the substance has been published in the press and attached to the note was a copy of the penal laws upon which the decision was based.

The Legation has received a confidential report to the effect that the Egyptian authorities intend to follow up the warnings to the public by active measures and are preparing lists of aliens and Egyptians who are to be arrested. These lists include a small number of Hungarians, Bulgarians and Rumanians who are to be arrested within a few days, as well as a fairly large number of German and Italian women. Personnel and facilities for interning women are now lacking but should be ready within a short time. The arrest of Egyptians presents a more knotty problem than in the case of most aliens and apparently there exists considerable difference of opinion as to the advisability of arresting certain Egyptians whose names have been placed at least tentatively on the list of dangerous persons. According to the report no serious cases of sabotage have been committed thus far in Egypt and apparently the Italian and German fifth columns in this country are believed to be organized primarily for propaganda purposes.

KIRK

¹³ Neither printed.

740.0011 European War 1939/10388 : Telegram

*The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State*CAIRO, April 27, 1941—11 a. m.
[Received April 28—6:30 a. m.]

349. My 319.¹⁴ It is impossible to exclude the possibility that developments may at any time produce conditions endangering civilians in this area. On May 19, 1940, a circular warning was sent to Americans in Egypt urging them to leave the country but a certain number including women and children have remained consisting almost exclusively of persons or families who decided that they could not or should not leave their occupations here. As the Department has been informed both the Egyptian and British authorities have adopted every possible measure, in view of the recent aggravation of the threat to Egyptian territory, to allay any panic among the native population and accordingly I have not considered it advisable to reissue written warnings to Americans here which could not escape broad publicity. As a compromise measure, however, I have informed orally the leaders of the American colony and all others who have approached me that all Americans who are not prepared to meet any eventuality at any moment should avail themselves immediately of the meager transportation facilities still available to leave the country and I have instructed all officers in Egypt to make the same statement to all inquiries.

KIRK

740.0011 European War 1939/10483 : Telegram

*The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State*CAIRO, April 29, 1941—1 p. m.
[Received April 30—9:07 a. m.]

364. My 363, April 29, noon.¹⁵ Although the advance into Egypt is reported to have halted a short distance over the frontier I understand that it has already served to give the German and Italian forces control of two important advance airfields and the passes down the escarpment at Halfaya and Sollum.

In the course of my latest conversations with the highest military authorities here the comment has been only general and to the effect that critical times are ahead.

KIRK

¹⁴ Dated April 23, 11 a. m., p. 270.¹⁵ Not printed.

740.0011 European War 1939/10388 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk)

WASHINGTON, April 30, 1941—8 p. m.

108. Your 349, April 27. Department approves of your action in this matter.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/10896 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, May 12, 1941—9 p. m.

[Received May 14—2:40 a. m.]

472. My 465, May 12, noon.¹⁶ In taking note of the certain recent relaxation of tension in respect of the situation in the western desert I have gained the impression that, although it would appear that confidence may be based to a certain extent on factors of doubtful weight such as the effect of summer heat on desert operations, considered opinion in certain quarters finds reason for slightly increased confidence in the fact that from available information the enemy do not appear to have been able to strengthen their forces to the extent which had originally been feared and in the further consideration that the British have in fact improved their defensive position in that area. There is no intention however to minimize the continued preoccupation as to possible developments in that area.

KIRK

740.0011 European War 1939/11256 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, May 23, 1941—10 a. m.

[Received May 24—5:47 p. m.]

566. My 319, April 23, 11 a. m., and my 428, May 7, 5 p. m., last paragraph.¹⁷ The following is what I regard as an authentic statement of some of the deficiencies with which the British forces in the western desert have been and are contending as revealed by expert observation during the most part in that area :

(1) Lack of sufficient armored firing vehicles of the cruiser and infantry type tank with experienced operators.

(2) Lack of sufficient artillery of all categories.

(3) Lack of airplanes and failure on the part of the Royal Air Force to cooperate with the armored units and artillery.

¹⁶ Not printed.

¹⁷ Latter not printed.

- (4) Insufficient spare parts for maintenance of vehicles in the field.
- (5) Defective operation of field telephone and wireless systems.
- (6) Defective repair of road used by supply columns.
- (7) Practice of committing forces in combat without holding out reserve troops.
- (8) Lack of proper intelligence as to the enemy's strength and capabilities.

As a result of the foregoing deficiencies the attitude among the commanding British officers in the field was to remain on the defensive and not take the offensive.

For what it may be worth, I add that a German officer who was taken prisoner during the latest operations in the western desert stated that the mission of the Axis forces in North Africa was to take Egypt in 80 days but did not divulge the date of expiration of the time limit.

KIRK

740.0011 European War 1939/11459 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, May 29, 1941—11 a. m.

[Received May 30—7 p. m.]

607. The fact that Aziz al Masri Pasha and the other political offenders mentioned in my 532, May 19, 4 p. m.,¹⁸ still remain at large continues to preoccupy the Egyptian authorities who are said not only to be intensifying their efforts to apprehend these fugitives but also to be taking steps to combat fifth column and general subversive activities which are said to have increased noticeably of late as a result of German successes in Greece, Libya and Crete and the extension of their activity into Syria and Iraq with the consequent internal repercussions. Significant developments along these lines may be seen in the transfer of . . . and efforts which are being made by the Prime Minister to establish the right of the Government to take legal action against members of Parliament in derogation of their constitutional immunity.

As regards the general question of fifth column activity in Egypt British sources state that although there is a considerable amount of defeatist talk and pro-Axis propaganda emanating from both foreign colony sources and certain elements of the Egyptian population including the Turkish aristocracy and highly placed officials, there is little evidence of the organization of such activity on an important scale, a circumstance which the British are inclined to attribute largely to the effectiveness of measures taken to round up persons regarded as key enemy agents at the time of the entry of Germany and

¹⁸ Not printed.

Italy into the war and the subsequent internment of a large number of suspects.

On the other hand while disposed to minimize the importance of this locally conducted propaganda the British stress the considerable effect of radio broadcasts in Arabic from Bari and Berlin, particularly the latter which is admitted to be far more effective than British broadcasts for Near Eastern listeners owing partly to the manner of presentation but more particularly to the fact that Axis propagandists are in a better position to play on local prejudices such as anti-British and anti-Jewish feeling and also have a completely free hand to make the most extravagant promises irrespective of their intention or ability to fulfill them. In this latter connection it is known that it is being strongly urged in certain quarters that the British immediately make a declaration in respect of the national aspirations of the various countries of the Near East with a view to countering Axis propaganda and rallying the countries of the Near East to the cause of the democracies. It is understood, however, that those responsible for directing British Near Eastern policy while favoring such a declaration in principle are opposing its delivery until such time as the British may achieve a military success which would obviate the implication that it was being made under duress. In the meantime the question is being mooted as to whether the same results might not be attained by the delivery in secret of assurances to responsible leaders destined to satisfy the Nationalist aims among the people of this area and in this conception the role of the United States is envisaged as the one country whose ascendancy will be unchallenged when the foundations are laid for a durable peace.

In summary it may be said that although there are certain evidences of loosely organized Axis propaganda in Egypt and although recent German successes have tended to accentuate defeatist and fifth column activity and to necessitate the taking of more stringent restrictive measures by the Egyptian Government, the situation here is not regarded as critical for the moment. It is generally believed, however, that the situation might quickly become ominous should subsequent developments make it.

KIRK

841.24/5604 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, June 3, 1941—2 p. m.

[Received June 3—9 : 33 a. m.]

2252. Personal for the President from the Former Naval Person.

"I am finding it necessary to build up a much stronger organization

of the rear ward services in the Middle East to sustain the large forces now gathering in and about the Nile Valley and an important mission is going out by air, comprising high military and civilian experts. We must consider the formation of a well-equipped base, either at Port Sudan (as your son suggested) or/and at Massawa near which lies the town of Asmara with its fine buildings in order to arrange for the reception of American materials which you are sending to us in increasing quantities. American tanks and American aircraft require a good sprinkling of American civilian volunteer personnel to instruct us in their use and help keep them serviceable. I should be grateful if you would allow Averell Harriman¹⁹ to go out with the mission as independent observer, taking with him one or two of his own assistants. He would then be able to advise upon the best measures to be taken to ensure the most efficient use of all that you are sending. He is quite willing to go; indeed, he would like it. The trip might take him 6 weeks but it would be well worth it."

JOHNSON

841.24/5604: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, June 3, 1941—4 p. m.
[Received June 3—2:30 p. m.]

2255. Personal for the President from Harriman. The Prime Minister has cabled you today requesting your approval my accompanying British group being sent to Middle East to deal with supply problems there. He wants to avoid delays in connection with American equipment and have plans made for facilities and enough American personnel to insure proper use and maintenance. He is familiar with the way we have been working out similar problems with the British Ministries and services here.

It is my fear, and I believe well grounded, that unless the matter is taken in hand now there will be congestion at the ports and delays in all other ways which will minimize the value of the supplies you are sending.

In addition, the Prime Minister is desirous of getting an independent view of the transportation and supply problems there.

I am ready and anxious to go as there is an essential job to be done. The work of this office is so organized that it can carry on. I would expect to arrange that final responsibility during my absence be di-

¹⁹ W. Averell Harriman, Special Representative of President Roosevelt in the United Kingdom, with the rank of Minister, responsible for expediting lend-lease aid to the British Empire.

vided between the Military and Naval Attachés. We have been working so closely together that they are familiar with the activities of this office.

I would plan to take with me General Royce on aviation and Colonel Green on tanks and motor vehicles. I can cover details of the transportation problems myself. It is my opinion that on balance my next 6 weeks could be more productive on this trip than in London. [Harriman.]

JOHNSON

841.24/560 $\frac{1}{2}$: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom
(Johnson)

WASHINGTON, June 3, 1941—11 p. m.

1937. For Johnson and Harriman from Hopkins.²⁰ President approves your accompanying British group to the Middle-east. Good luck. [Hopkins.]

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/11748 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, June 6, 1941—10 a. m.
[Received June 8—1:05 p. m.]

663. The lull in military activity following the termination of the Crete campaign has given rise to speculation as to when and where the next major action in this area may take place and attention in this connection is now centering particularly on the possibility of an early attempt of the British to occupy Syria in advance of the Germans.²¹ It is pointed out, however, that in the absence of a stronger and better equipped Allied invading force decision in the matter is rendered difficult by apprehension as to the attitude of the French Army and the native population in Syria as well as to the opposition which the Germans might be able to bring to bear. Although the preparations in process point to an immediate action in this direction the delay which has already occurred has given rise to the fear that if it is further postponed while awaiting a propitious moment the consequences will be the entire loss of such initiative as the British and Free French may now have in the matter. In the meantime the Germans are believed to have been able to increase their already

²⁰ Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to President Roosevelt, with primary responsibility at this time for Lend-Lease affairs.

²¹ For correspondence on this subject, see pp. 725 ff.

strong forces in the western desert and only to be waiting for a favorable occasion to launch an attack on Egypt which in the opinion of many observers will probably be timed to coincide with activity in Syria and with intensive German air activity directed particularly against the British Fleet and the Canal Zone.

In any candid appraisal of the present situation here mention should also be made of the apparent recent deterioration in British morale which manifests itself in widespread criticism of decisions of responsible officers; recrimination between the various service branches directed particularly at the R. A. F. for alleged failure to cooperate; intense bitterness on the part of New Zealanders and Australians, many of whom feel they were uselessly sacrificed in Greece and Crete and say openly that they have had enough of fighting under the British and want to go home; a feeling of defeatism which seems to have its principal asylum in the new generally accepted belief that the [apparent omission] by the British in Libya, Greece, Crete were largely the result of inadequacy of equipment and that further combat under similar circumstances will only yield the same result. Furthermore, this deterioration in morale has not been without effect on the Egyptians and has increased seriousness of problem of British resistance here in the face of possible defection among the population and even highly placed Egyptians, returns of which may well become articulate under increased Nazi pressure.

It is, of course, conceivable that Hitler's plans may exclude an extension of action in this area or that he will postpone it for a matter of weeks. It is illogical, however, to assume that the threat is not immediate and in view of the gravity of the far-reaching consequences of an easy German success in the Middle East not only from the point of view of prestige but also from the more practical considerations of oil supplies, communications and the maintenance of strategical position essential for the prosecution of the war in this general area there would appear to be no other choice than to strengthen immediately the will and capacity to resist further Nazi aggression in the Mediterranean and Near East. The deterioration in morale, both British and Egyptian, would be counteracted by a more open participation in the war on the part of the United States and the capacity to resist would be immeasurably increased by the speedy development of more inspired and courageous leadership here and by the immediate arrival of needed war material. As regards the first two factors higher questions of policy are involved than can be evaluated from this point but in spite of all possible probing I am not satisfied that the immediate increase of equipment, particularly airplanes, is physically impossible and there is every reason to believe that with the arrival here by air in the immediate future of two hun-

dred bombers and the hundred fighters with supplies, an air superiority would accrue to the British which alone could give the advantage against the Germans.

KIRK

740.0011 European War 1939/11750 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, June 7, 1941—1 p. m.

[Received 4:10 p. m.]

670. For the Secretary and Under Secretary. My 663, June 6, 10 a. m. I have just been informed by highest aviation authorities here that greatest contribution that the United States could now make towards successful prosecution of the war would be immediate delivery by air direct or via carriers of bomber and fighter planes to the west coast of Africa for use there as well as at points further east and that such a delivery within 2 or 3 weeks might well prove crucial to the British stand in this area.

I am told that a matter of great but secondary importance is the transport by air of experts from airplane works in the United States to assist in the assembling and conditioning of American planes already delivered to RAF Middle East or to arrive.

KIRK

740.0011 European War 1939/12384 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, June 22, 1941—5 p. m.

[Received June 23—11:45 p. m.]

796. For the Secretary and Under Secretary. From the standpoint of the potentialities of this area in the further prosecution of the war, I hope that the German attack on Soviet Russia will be regarded merely as furnishing a possible temporary respite during which the military machine here may be strengthened with all speed both for the purpose of resistance as well as for an eventual striking force against Nazi power in the Mediterranean, the Balkans and the Middle East. To that end the measures already adopted should continue unabated and no additional effort, both in the United States and in the British Empire, should be spared.

By the same token British air action against Germany should be accentuated and every advantage should be taken of the present Nazi concentration to the east without relying upon the strength, the duration and even the sincerity of Soviet resistance or without taking com-

fort from the thought that this last venture of Hitler's may bring his downfall. It is certain that no reliance can be placed on the continuity of Soviet policy for in the last analysis Stalin is no more the friend of democracy than is Hitler and his ultimate aim is that neither side win.

KIRK

841.248/930 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, June 25, 1941—7 p. m.
[Received June 28—3:35 p. m.]

822. Personal for Hopkins from Harriman. British plans for reorganization here recommend in cable to Prime Minister appointment of senior officer to coordinate and control supply for three services, including transport and maintenance facilities, etc. If approved we will be asked to have here man to deal with this officer and a committee working with him from three services and War Transport Ministry. He can be either competent civilian or high ranking officer.

This set-up would give opportunity to insure better handling of American equipment and as we have increasing investment this area I would strongly recommend complying with request if made. Although I do not suggest representatives of our services and Maritime Commission should report to this man, he should be senior in standing and available to help them get results and also coordinate their activities.

Robinson, representative of Maritime Commission, I like and he is considered competent, but naturally his effectiveness on major matters is limited because he is a British subject.

The Army should have a representative charged with responsibility to cooperate with British in use and maintenance of American equipment separate from normal function of Military Attaché. Consider Lieutenant Colonel E. W. Piburn now observer here thoroughly competent to fill this position.

General Royce's ^{21a} comments on Air Corps representatives follows which please pass on to General Arnold: ²²

"It is believed that insufficient officers of Air Corps are now in Egypt. Captain Perrin is now performing normal intelligence work with air force agencies and gives practically no time to maintenance activities. Major Duke is engaged in making a survey in the Egyptian Army. Two junior officers Meng and Momyer are trying to be

^{21a} Presumably Gen. Ralph Royce, Assistant Military Attaché, American Embassy, London.

²² Maj. Gen. H. H. Arnold, Chief of the Army Air Forces.

of some help to R. A. F. units erecting American aircraft. No officers here of sufficient rank properly to contact the higher R. A. F. officers and no one who has any direct communication with you except through M. I. D.²³ Loss of Brower,²⁴ who did a great work here, is very much felt and he should be replaced by an officer of similar ability as soon as possible. Also recommended that at least two officers of bombardment, pursuit, observation and maintenance be sent as additional observers who may also help with American equipment."

I know Air Marshal Tedder²⁵ would greatly appreciate acceptance Royce's recommendations.

Please discuss substance this cable and advise reactions and if acceptable in principle whether it should be carried out in form of a special Lend-Lease mission or a set-up similar to line in London or through strengthening the service attachés' offices and expanding their duties. [Harriman.]

KIRK

740.0011 European War 1939/12384 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk)

WASHINGTON, June 26, 1941—4 p. m.

244. Your 796, June 22, 5 p. m. You may be sure that this Government has fully in mind the points mentioned in your telegram under reference, and that everything is being done to provide effective assistance to the British forces in the Middle East at the greatest rate possible.

I appreciate your message and hope you will continue to send me your views and recommendations as to the general situation.

WELLES

740.0011 European War 1939/12523 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, June 26, 1941—4 p. m.

[Received 8:30 p. m.]

819. My 812, June 24, 6 p. m.²⁶ This morning's press reports that in the course of a debate [in?] the Senate yesterday on air raid measures the Prime Minister stated that he had discussed with the British authorities the matter of declaring Cairo an open city and

²³ Military Intelligence Division.

²⁴ Col. Gerald E. Brower, former air observer and Assistant Military Attaché in Egypt, who was killed at El Obeid, April 20, 1941.

²⁵ Air Marshal Arthur W. Tedder, commanding the Royal Air Force in the Middle East.

²⁶ Not printed.

that he hoped to be able to report at an early date the successful conclusion of these negotiations.

The Legation understands in this connection that plans were in an advanced stage about a month ago for the transfer of British general headquarters from Cairo to the canal area but that the project was allowed to drop owing to events taking a less immediately critical turn. It may be noted in this connection that aside from such benefit as might accrue to the British by meeting Egyptian wishes in respect to declaring Cairo an open city, the opinion prevails in certain quarters here that a considerable improvement in the efficient functioning of British general headquarters might be effected by its removal from Cairo to a place where social amenities would impinge to a lesser degree on professional activity.

KIRK

740.0011 European War 1939/12838 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, July 2, 1941—10 a. m.

[Received July 6—8:10 a. m.]

858. My 819, June 25 [26], 4 p. m. The Legation is confidentially informed that the British Ambassador has recently been approached indirectly by the Wafd²⁷ regarding the declaration of Cairo and other places in Egypt as open cities. Although the move is regarded essentially as a political maneuver of the Wafd to regain political prestige the British appear to be somewhat perturbed owing to the serious consequences which might result if the Wafd deviated from its policy of inactive opposition and undertook a campaign of active opposition to the Government and the British on an issue so potentially inflammable as the open city question. As a consequence the Embassy is understood to be consulting with the British military on the matter but as far as is known no decision has as yet been reached. It is understood in this connection that certain British circles would prefer the maintenance of the policy of attempting to avert an attack on Cairo by threatening to bomb Rome in retaliation but that it is a question whether under existing circumstances such a threat would be as effective as in the past in respect to Cairo or as it was believed to have been in assuring the protection of Athens.

As regards the general question of agitation for return of the Wafd to power the following are reasons which the British [apparent omission] for opposing such action at this time: (1) the desire to avoid giving offense to the palace which is anti-Wafdist; (2) the disruptive

²⁷ Egyptian Nationalist Party.

effect of holding elections under present disturbed conditions; (3) hesitancy to dispense with the services of Sirry Pasha²⁸ who has been cooperating satisfactorily with the British; (4) the tactical advantage of withholding consent to the return of the Wafd as a trump card to be played only as a last resort to meet a particularly serious situation. In this latter connection it may be noted that the British authorities realize full well that the Wafd as the only political party in Egypt having an important national following is definitely a factor with which to reckon and consequently the British have exerted a constant effort to maintain friendly relations with its leaders in order to avoid immediate difficulty and also in anticipation of the probable return of the Wafd one day to power. This policy of temporization has thus far been fairly successful, but it involves, nevertheless, a certain risk owing to the difficulty of Wafd leaders to acquiesce there and at the same time maintain their following.

KIRK

740.0011 European War 1939/12745 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, July 2, 1941—11 a. m.

[Received July 3—9:11 a. m.]

859. Reference my number 627, May 31, 4 p. m.²⁹ This morning's press announces the appointment of General Wavell, Commander-in-Chief Middle East, as Commander-in-Chief India, replacing General Claude Auchinleck who becomes Commander-in-Chief Middle East. The appointment is also announced of Captain Oliver Lyttelton as member of the War Cabinet which he will represent in the Middle East.

KIRK

740.0011 European War 1939/12800 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, July 2, 1941—2 p. m.

[Received July 5—6:57 a. m.]

862. My 670, June 7, 1 p. m., and previous. I have been given to understand that the feasibility of supplying the required aircraft to Middle East by air routes is being exhaustively considered in London. In the meanwhile the chief urgent requirement is for United States vessels to carry to Red Sea ports the aircraft and motorized vehicles

²⁸ Egyptian Prime Minister.

²⁹ Not printed.

which are now ready for shipment in the United States and furthermore there is continued insistence on immediate necessity of sending American experts and ferry pilots to assist in the preparation and handling of American material at Takoradi and elsewhere.

KIRK

740.0011 European War 1939/12811 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, July 2, 1941—7 p. m.

[Received July 6—2:50 p. m.]

867. My 859, July 2, 11 a. m. I am confidentially informed that the following are the terms of reference under which Captain Lyttelton will assume office here.

As Minister of State and member of the War Cabinet he will act as the representative of the War Cabinet, carry out its policy and use its authority. He will be fully informed of the approved policy of the British Government. He will refer to the War Cabinet for guidance if necessary and in any event will report constantly to it through the British Embassy here and the Secretary of the War Cabinet. He may also communicate personally with the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense.

His principal task will be to ensure the successful conduct of operations in the Middle East by: (a) relieving commanders-in-chief of extraneous responsibilities with which they have hitherto been burdened; (b) giving political advice not hitherto available locally; (c) settling indeterminate matters within the policy of the British Government which involve local authorities such as relations with the Free French, relations with the Emperor of Abyssinia, administration of occupied territory, propaganda and subversive warfare, financial and economic warfare, general supervision of the activities of the [apparent omission] are all general including matters locally connected with American supplies [apparent omission] and prisoners of war. On all such matters he will report to London and receive directives on important issues. He will preside over meetings of commanders-in-chief whenever urgently necessary.

On the diplomatic and political side he will cooperate with British representatives in Egypt and the Sudan, Palestine and the Trans-Jordan, Iraq (which for operational purposes will remain under the Indian command), Abyssinia, British Somaliland [apparent omission], Syria when occupied, and Cyprus. It is specified that the maintenance of relations with such officials does not in any way detract from their existing responsibilities or affect their official relationships with departments in London.

With the implementation of the foregoing mandate together with the development of the activities of General Haining as Intendant General and the expected injection of new spirit as a consequence of the change in the Commander in Chief, Middle East, it is hoped that the lack of coordination, direction, initiative and accelerated action in the war effort in this area which has been heretofore marked may be corrected.

General Auchinleck arrived here several days ago and Captain Lyttelton is expected tomorrow.

KIRK

740.0011 European War 1939/12852 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, July 3, 1941—7 p. m.
[Received July 7—3:50 a. m.]

877. My 885 [858], July 2, 10 a. m. The Legation is confidentially advised that following a conference of British Embassy and British military representatives yesterday it was decided to suggest to London that no action be taken to meet Egyptian [apparent omission] in respect to the declaration of Cairo or other places in Egypt as open [cities?]. It is understood that this recommendation was made in the thought that any concession of the sort would merely constitute an opening wedge for more extensive demands. According to the same source the British Ambassador has strongly advised the Egyptian Prime Minister to discontinue further [apparent omission] in the matter.

KIRK

811.20 (D) E. M. D. E./103 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, July 3, 1941—10 p. m.
[Received July 4—4:12 p. m.]

881. For Hopkins from Harriman.

"With approval of others involved General Haining, newly appointed Intendant General, requests American representative on material aid problems as outlined in cable No. 822, June 25, 7 p. m.

Recommend immediate appointment of Lieutenant Colonel Piburn³⁰ at least for present. He should remain in his present status attached to Legation but authorized to cable you with copies to me

³⁰ In telegram No. 282, July 9, 6 p. m., Minister Kirk and Mr. Harriman were informed that the War Department had approved this appointment.

when London is involved. Funds for clerical, cable, travel, and other expenses should be placed at his disposal.

Would greatly appreciate quick reply as am planning leave for London shortly."

KIRK

851.002/518 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, July 5, 1941—9 a. m.

[Received July 6—11 p. m.]

896. Personal for the President from Harriman.

"Supplementing 880, July 3.⁸¹

1. Lyttelton's appointment provides means for better understanding by War Cabinet status of resources here. Previous misunderstandings have led to resentment and questionable decisions in both places.

2. Lyttelton though not involved in military tactics will have overall responsibility as representative War Cabinet. He is instructed to attain coordination in command of the services which has been so sadly lacking. Method of accomplishment, however, has not yet been worked out. I will have to report further on this before I leave.

3. He will relieve service commander of extraneous duties of civil, political and supply nature.

4. General Haining's appointment as Intendant General under Lyttelton will improve and coordinate transportation, supply and maintenance and provide more adequate forward planning.

5. Lyttelton has been specifically charged with the responsibility to see that lease-lend questions are worked out satisfactorily here and requests that suggestion contained my 881, July 3, to Hopkins asking for appointment of Lieutenant Colonel Piburn to work with himself and General Haining to this end be approved.

6. New Commander-in-Chief of Army is, I believe, more forceful and better organizer.

7. Deficiencies such as inadequate intelligence, insufficient training of personnel, and wastage of equipment through lack of supervision will, I hope, be corrected by new and better officers now taking hold in certain key subordinate positions.

8. Improved communication between London and Cairo is considered essential and three B-24 B's have been requested to provide frequent direct high altitude overnight service.

The morale of the British officers and men is still high and they will give a good account of themselves if provided with proper equip-

⁸¹ Not printed.

ment under properly coordinated command. Our observers report in the highest terms of the individual competence and resourcefulness in combat of the subordinate commanders and the coolness and gallantry of the troops which perhaps saved the recent unsuccessful engagement from becoming a serious disaster.

Our Army and Navy officers and men on duty here are to be commended for their work in receiving, erecting and maintaining our equipment and instructing English personnel. As an example no small part of present success of Tomahawks and Marylands is due to their fine efforts. First tanks are now being unloaded and school is starting to function."

KIRK

740.0011 European War 1939/13059 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, July 9, 1941—6 p. m.

[Received July 12—3:40 p. m.]

920. My number 867, July 2, 7 p. m. The Legation is advised that Lyttelton is setting up a coordinating body which he will head and on which the commanders-in-chief of the three services and the British Ambassador will have seats. The council will meet daily and in the event any of the members are unable to attend they will delegate representatives to sit in their places. It is understood that the High Commissioner in Palestine and the British Ambassador in Iraq will also be entitled to a seat on this council but it is not yet clear whether in their absence they will be represented by substitutes.

KIRK

740.0011 European War 1939/12919 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk)

WASHINGTON, July 14, 1941—10 p. m.

292. A paraphrase of your 663, June 6, 10 a. m., was forwarded to the Secretary of War. A communication from him dated July 8 has been received in substance as follows:

A much stronger air force could without doubt be used to advantage by the British in the Near East. The existence of a surplus of equipment which could be made available for use in that area would be opportune. Such a surplus controlled by us does not, however, exist.

The War Department considers, in reference to the message from the Minister, that the threatened danger to the military forces in Egypt has been materially reduced by the combat situation in Europe, and that the urgency of the situation has thereby been relieved.

The British Chiefs of Staff are essentially responsible for furnishing the British forces in the Near East with reinforcements, equipment and supplies.

About 50 percent of all combat airplanes made in this country are allocated to the British under existing schedules. It is not considered practicable at the present time further to reduce deliveries to our own forces, as provision for the minimum requirements of our Air Force program would be adversely affected by such a course.

WELLES

740.0011 European War 1939/13269 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, July 17, 1941—9 a. m.

[Received July 18—9: 15 a. m.]

968. I appreciate very much the comments contained in Department's 292, July 14, 10 p. m., but I must point out that I am unable to concur in the view of the War Department that the urgency of the situation in this area should be regarded as having been relieved by the Russo-German conflict.

I still believe, as stated in my 796, June 22, that from the point of view of defense, strong reinforcements are essential in this area until it is proved that Hitler will be stopped in the East or that if victorious there he will not move in this direction and I submit that, from the point of view of offense, increased strength in Egypt would enable the British to deal an immediate and effective blow to the Axis by extending their military action along the North African coast. It is on the foregoing account that I urge that any curtailment in the shipment of equipment to this area be based solely on the actual and insuperable deficiency of that material and not on the assumption that it may not be needed here.

KIRK

740.0011 European War 1939/14166 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, August 19, 1941—noon.

[Received August 20—1: 27 p. m.]

1184. My 968, July 17, 9 a. m. The opinion is being circulated here that owing to the present lack of trained personnel and of mechanized equipment the British will not be in a sufficiently strong position to undertake large scale operations in this area until November. If, therefore, it is in fact necessary to delay action until that time or even

until later, the possibility should be envisaged that the strength now calculated for an offensive to the west may not be adequate even for defensive purposes in the face of the situation which may develop.

It is conceivable that Hitler may decide not to pursue the Russian campaign in the face of continued resistance and in that event he could at a given moment cease the offensive in the East. Thereupon after a reasonable time for recuperation and preparation the German command could undertake a movement southwest through Turkey or Iran to synchronize with an attack by the Axis forces on the Canal Zone not only through the western desert but also from the sea.

Speculation may be indulged in indefinitely as to the various contingencies which might alter the manner of the execution of such an undertaking or even eliminate it altogether but as long a[s it l]ies within the realm of possibility the situation with which the British forces in this area may be confronted as a consequence thereof must be taken into consideration. The fact presents itself therefore that if it is true that it is impossible to build up at once adequate striking power in the Middle East to undertake a successful offensive against the Axis Powers while the Russian campaign is at its height, the measure of preparedness to be effective a few months hence should not be based on the scale of an eventual campaign in the western desert now, but on the necessity of withstanding a possible Axis attack on Egypt on two or three fronts with forces surpassing those previously encountered.

KIRK

841.24/717 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, September 2, 1941—5 p. m.

[Received September 3—8:22 a. m.]

1274. The numerous telegrams from Colonel Piburn, Lend-Lease representative here, have described the conditions affecting the discharge of American vessels at Red Sea ports and although improvements in those conditions have been effected and constant efforts are apparently being exerted with a view to further amelioration I feel that the general situation is far from satisfactory with special reference to the speedy and efficient discharge of cargo and quick turnabout of the vessels in question. I urgently recommend therefore that the Maritime Commission send here immediately a ranking representative of American nationality with expert knowledge of all problems relating to the carriage of material on American vessels proceeding from United States ports to this area in order that an intensive study of those problems from this angle may be made and on the basis thereof recommendations be submitted for a more effective supply of much-needed equipment to Middle East.

KIRK

740.0011 European War 1939/14922: Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, September 9, 1941—5 p. m.

[Received September 10—9: 55 p. m.]

1312. My 877, July 3, 9 p. m. [7 p. m.] The Legation is confidentially advised by a British Embassy source that the British authorities here are somewhat concerned by a recent recrudescence of underground agitation for the declaration of Cairo as an open city and that the British Ambassador has drawn up a memorandum for submission to the Egyptian Prime Minister in which the following arguments are adduced for not making such a declaration:

1. Past experience demonstrates that German policy is based entirely on expediency and that the Germans only observe agreements as long as it is in their interest to do so.

2. Cairo is the nerve center of Egypt particularly from the standpoint of communications and the withdrawal of British headquarters therefrom would seriously impede the war effort.

3. Even though the British military personnel now in Cairo were withdrawn there would still remain numerous installations such as telephone and telegraph centrals and railway facilities which although non-military in character would constitute legitimate military objectives.

4. Precedent in the Canal Zone and in Alexandria reveals that Axis air attacks are often made in areas where no military objectives exist in order to terrify the population and disrupt normal life.

5. Agitation for declaring Cairo an open city diverts attention from the necessity of taking adequate air raid precaution measures.

6. Agitation of this type constitutes an ideal opening for Axis propaganda designed to stir up trouble between the British and the Egyptians.

In reporting the foregoing, I may add that leaving aside the question of the safety of the inhabitants of Cairo and the propaganda effect of the open city issue, the view is held in certain circles, including some British military, that from the standpoint of military efficiency it was an initial mistake to establish British headquarters in Cairo and that even at this late date its transfer would be desirable.

It may be noted in this connection that an air alarm in Rome during the night of September 6-7 is reported in today's local press in such a way as to suggest a connection between that event and the recent bombing of a suburb of Cairo (see Legation's 1285, September 4, 5 p. m.³²) and reference was made to the warning said to have been given the Axis at the beginning of the Greek campaign that if Athens or Cairo were attacked Rome would be bombed.

KIRK

³² Not printed.

740.0011 European War 1939/15216 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, September 17, 1941—10 p. m.

[Received September 19—9:55 a. m.]

1410. My 1312, September 9, 5 p. m. I am confidentially informed that the air raid on Cairo during the night of September 15-16 has given rise to increased agitation for the declaration of Cairo as an open city and that this matter was again taken up by the Prime Minister with the British Ambassador yesterday. When the latter expressed himself as opposed to such a declaration the Prime Minister is said to have requested a formal statement of the views of the British Government in the matter and it is believed that, should it be decided to furnish such a statement, it will probably follow the lines of the memorandum recently submitted by the Embassy to the Prime Minister of which the contents were summarized in my telegram under reference.

In discussing this general question with the Foreign Minister ^{22a} this morning he told me that in a recent off the record discussion with members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee he had expressed the opinion that it would be inexpedient to declare Cairo be [*an?*] open city because of its being the transportation and communication center of the country but that a good case could be made for attempting to obtain recognition of Cairo as a holy city. I may add in this connection, although the Foreign Minister did not so inform me, that the Egyptian Government is said to have recently approached certain Near Eastern countries including Turkey and Saudi Arabia with the suggestion that they urge upon the German Government the taking of appropriate measures for immunizing Cairo from bombing. Similar overtures are said to have been made through the Swedish Government which is in charge of German interests in Egypt.

It may be further noted in this respect that the local press is said to have been requested by the censorship authorities to refrain from sensational display or treatment of news of the recent raid and that it has also been intimated to correspondents that reference to possible retaliatory bombing of Rome would be inopportune since this is a matter of high policy depending for decision on London. On the other hand it is understood that the press is being encouraged to use this event as a means of stimulating greater public interest in air raid precaution measures.

KIRK

^{22a} Salib Samy.

740.0011 European War 1939/15218 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, September 18, 1941—4 p. m.

[Received September 20—12: 50 a. m.]

1421. For the Secretary and Under Secretary. Since the month of June I have on several occasions called attention to the fact that the achievements of the armed forces of Britain in the Middle East have been restricted and the efficacy of the war effort has been impaired by the lack of coordination among the various services and the absence of a unified command. During the interval attempts have apparently been made from London to remedy these defects.

The Commander-in-Chief has been changed, a Minister of State has been established here and minor alterations in system and personnel have been effected. In so far as can be observed, however, no real improvement has ensued and although it might be assumed that sufficient time has elapsed to produce apparent results the changes up to the present seem to constitute makeshift measures which have merely duplicated mechanism without improving efficiency.

It is true that the Russian campaign relieved this area of the threat of immediate attack. The possibility must be faced, however, that from one cause or another the German concentration on that front may in a few weeks be reduced and judging from the past Hitler, so long as the war lasts, must direct elsewhere his armies or his air force or portions thereof and the timing for such a move would be determined by the necessity of preparation for renewed effort which as regards the air force might be accomplished in a brief interval. There is no intent to determine the point to which that effort may be directed but the fact cannot be ignored that this area is at least indicated and that it would constitute a favorable theater for winter operations. On that assumption the strengthening of the war machine in the Middle East is essential for even if it may not be required to withstand a major attack it can serve as an offensive instrument to assault the enemy over an extended radius.

The strengthening of the machine through the increase in men and the accelerated flow of material especially from the United States is, it must be assumed, progressing within the limits of capabilities. That however is not enough. Those men and that material must be used to the maximum advantage. The record of past months proves that such has not been the case and many supplies have been wasted and much time has been lost. It would be useless to attempt to enumerate all the causes of this failure and futile to place the blame. The constructive step is to seek a remedy and I can only say that the most flagrant defects in administration here which have come to my atten-

tion and to the attention of those associated with me could have been cured and even avoided if there had been a unified high military command with recognized authority from London and with broad responsibility for operations in this area. I am convinced therefore that there must be established in this theater of war and established immediately a supreme British military command with jurisdiction and authority over all operations in this area, over all services involved in those operations and over all installations, maintenance and tributary organizations affecting supplies, transportation and communications connected with the prosecution of the war in the Middle East. In this way and in this way only can coordination and leadership be obtained.

The natural reaction to the foregoing observations is that even if the cursory statement of the case is true and if a remedy lies along the lines indicated it is not for us to interfere. I personally, however, am unable to accept that argument as final. In the broadest sense we know that the entire existence of our country has been staked on victory and on a victory that is not too long deferred. In particular we are pouring into this area material that is hard earned and that can ill be spared from other fields. Both of these elements are being jeopardized by defective organization which could be cured or at least improved by courageous and drastic reorganization.

I submit that it is our right and our duty to make this situation clear to the British and to urge with all vigor the necessary reforms. If those reforms are not effected and effected immediately it is my profound conviction that all our efforts here will prove futile and all our material aid sheer waste.

KIRK

740.0011 European War 1939/15254: Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, September 18, 1941—5 p. m.
[Received September 20—8:40 a. m.]

1422. My 1410, September 17, 10 p. m. I am confidentially informed that the British Ambassador yesterday furnished the Egyptian Prime Minister at the latter's request a written statement to the effect that the declaration of Cairo as an open city would be contrary to the successful prosecution of the war. The Ambassador is said to have added that he trusted that the Prime Minister shared this view and would so express himself in any further discussion of the matter in such a way as to make it clear that he was expressing his own opinion rather than merely communicating the British view.

The Ambassador is also understood to have informed the Prime Minister that the matter of bombing Rome in reprisal for the raid on

Cairo during the night of September 15-16 had been taken under advisement, but that it was deemed inadvisable to take retaliatory action at this time in the light of certain other considerations affecting the war effort. The Prime Minister is said to have replied that under the circumstances he would not press the matter further. It may be observed that news reports from London appearing in today's press here give the impression that the bombing of Rome is contemplated.

KIRK

740.0011 European War 1939/15218 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk)

WASHINGTON, September 27, 1941—6 p. m.

516. Your 1421, September 18, 4 p. m., is being considered with great care. Please furnish urgently a summary statement of the principal types of wastage of supplies and loss of time, traced as definitely as possible to causes.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/15597 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, October 1, 1941—7 p. m.

[Received October 4—11:55 a. m.]

1503. Department's 516, September 30 [27]. In stating the conviction that in the absence of a unified command in this theater our aid will prove a waste, I had especially in mind the belief based on results in the past and conditions at present that when the time comes to make use of the material which we are sending and propose to send in apparently ever-increasing quantities that material will be wasted if the present state of disorganization continues and is allowed to prevail, especially in an action undertaken under the divided responsibility which now marks the military direction in this area.

In reply to the Department's request for a summarized statement of wastage of American supplies, I find certain instances which are to be included in a separate telegram.³³ I wish to point out, however, that the principal significance of these instances in the present consideration is that they may be regarded as symptomatic of a state of affairs wherein a defective organization impedes attempts to make preparations for future eventualities and jeopardizes the chance of success in prospective operations. In fact the lack of coordination

³³ Telegram No. 1512, October 3, noon, not printed.

and unified direction has in the past not only reduced the effectiveness of all planning but has adversely affected the procurement of supplies as well as transport, installations and maintenance of material in this area with the consequent impairment of the scope and quality of preparedness. It is true that the situation here is complicated owing to the restrictions inherent in operating on the territory of Egypt, a sovereign state which is not technically a belligerent, but those considerations are not of the essence. The gravity of the situation here lies in the fact that lack of coordination among the various services operating in this theater have impaired and continue to impair the effectiveness of the war machine and the assumption is that only a single responsibility will galvanize that machine into a positive force.

I should profoundly deplore any impression which might be created by any consideration or derived from any source which would result in a decrease in the flow of material to this area for not only should that flow be maintained but it should be increased. The vital importance of strengthening the Middle East theater needs no further emphasis. We cannot know for certain that the next move will be in this direction but we do know that successful operation from this base could turn the scales in favor of the Allies throughout the entire Mediterranean area. At present the extent of our aid is the supply of essential material to this base and we must continue that aid. There are clear indications that the defective organization here is jeopardizing that aid and that advice is needed to avoid that danger. I submit therefore that we shall prove derelict in our war effort if we do not proffer that counsel and so take the initiative in helping the British to help themselves.

KIRK

740.0011 European War 1939/156234 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, October 5, 1941—8 a. m.

[Received 8 : 43 a. m.]

4730. Personal for the President from the Former Naval Person.

"1. I have heard from Halifax³⁴ of his talks with you and Harry³⁵ about the Middle East. I take a favourable view of the near future there. I am sending Mr. Attlee,^{35a} the Lord Privy Seal, to represent us at the International Labour Office Convention to be held on 27th instant, at which I understand you will be present. He will bring

³⁴ Viscount Halifax, British Ambassador in the United States.

³⁵ Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to President Roosevelt.

^{35a} Clement R. Attlee.

you a long letter from me³⁶ dealing with matters of the utmost secrecy and importance, which I cannot trust to the cables. He will also be able to give you full information about our organization in Cairo. Meanwhile you should know that I arranged some time ago that General Auchinleck should have complete authority over the air as well as over the Army whenever major operations are impending or in progress. The Lord Privy Seal will start by air around 23rd, and I trust you will be able to see him on arrival. I can only spare him for a fortnight on account of Parliamentary business.

2. Max and Averell³⁷ seem to have had great success at Moscow,³⁸ and now the vital thing is to act up to our bargain in early deliveries. Hitler evidently feels the draught. We made almost exactly 2,000 aircraft in September, and I think our first line strength tonight is slightly ahead of the Germans. Besides this the Russian Air Force is still very formidable.

3. All my best wishes and kindest regards. How I wish we could have another talk.”

WINANT

841.24/1035 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, November 28, 1941—9 a. m.

[Received November 30—12: 35 a. m.]

1856. My 1821, November 22, 4 p. m.³⁹ An American military observer who has just returned from the western desert confirms reports that had reached the Legation through other sources regarding the satisfactory performance of American tanks which are said not only to have stood up remarkably well from a mechanical point of view but also to have given a good account of themselves in encounters with heavier German tanks.⁴⁰

Military Attaché is sending detailed reports.

KIRK

³⁶ Dated October 20, 1941; for text, see Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War: The Grand Alliance*, p. 544.

³⁷ Lord Beaverbrook, British Minister of Supply, and W. Averell Harriman, Special Representative of President Roosevelt in the United Kingdom.

³⁸ See vol. I, pp. 825–851, *passim*.

³⁹ Not printed.

⁴⁰ Telegram No. 5596, November 21, 10 p. m., from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, transmitted a message from Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt reporting on the success of British tank forces, including one brigade with all American tanks, against German and Italian tank forces in the western desert (740.0011 European War 1939/16797%).

740.0011 European War 1939/17476 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, December 12, 1941—5 p. m.

[Received December 13—5:35 p. m.]

1948. For the Secretary and Under Secretary. I fully realize that the principal concentration of our efforts must be in the Far East. The fact still prevails, however, that this theater is an essential factor in connection with operation either defensive or offensive in the area extending from West Africa to the Black Sea, that as such it must be held at all costs and that the next few months offer on the one hand the probability of attacks by the Axis Powers against this base and on the other an opportunity for effective action against Axis objectives by specialized forces established at the base. I must, therefore, urge not only that priority be maintained for the further development of the military strength of this sector either for defensive or offensive purpose but that consideration be given to the possible operation of American Units in West and North Africa against Axis territory and forces within striking distance.

KIRK

740.0011 European War 1939/17883 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, December 22, 1941—5 p. m.

[Received December 23—12:39 p. m.]

1999. For the Secretary and Under Secretary. My 1948, December 12, 5 p. m. The protracted process of liquidating the situation in Cyrenaica has given rise to the conjecture that the occasion is thereby afforded for a possible counter-move on the part of the Axis in the Mediterranean and Middle East areas and in so far as this particular theater is concerned the view is being expressed that the most plausible form which any such move might take would be a mass air attack supported by naval units based from Axis territories in the Mediterranean. In this view the intent would be disorganize and paralyze the British force in Egypt and so contrive a victory of both practical and psychological importance.

From information available here there is nothing tangible to show that such a move is in preparation. Reports are circulating that Nazi air units have been withdrawn from the Russian front and it is said that extensive ground organizations are being prepared in Italy and adjacent territories to receive increased air force at a moment's notice. Furthermore within the past few days attacks have been made by

stealth on four British naval vessels including two battleships in the harbor of Alexandria which were carried out by members of the crews of Axis submarines operating offshore and which have been interpreted as preliminary to more extensive operations against that port.

The foregoing considerations have created a certain impression on a limited number of ranking officials in Cairo and it has even been suggested that air and naval operations against Egypt might well be initiated by Hitler in the immediate future while the British forces are occupied in Cyrenaica.

It is only in London that the complete evaluation of any such contingency may be obtained. I urge therefore that inquiries be made there to ascertain if from information available or obtainable that contingency may be excluded and if not that all possible steps be taken to reinforce the air arm in this theater in preparation to meet whatever assaults may be in prospect.

KIRK

740.0011 European War 1939/18844½

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs
(Murray) to the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] December 23, 1941.

MR. SECRETARY: In response to your wish to obtain accurate information regarding the size of British forces in the Near and Middle East, I have obtained from the War Department the following data.

There are at present in Syria and Palestine 145,000 British troops under the command of General Wilson, in Iraq and Iran, 100,000 under the command of General Wavell. In all of North Africa, including Egypt and Libya, there are 377,000 troops under the command of General Richie. General Auchinleck is in supreme command of the troops in North Africa, as well as those in Syria and Palestine. The actual combat troops in Libya are stated to be no more than 100,000. The remaining forces comprise the service of supply, reserves, et cetera.

We yesterday telegraphed to our Legations in Baghdad and Tehran⁴¹ to obtain further information regarding British forces in that area.

I shall keep in touch with the War Department regarding this matter and if there is any further information available I shall communicate it to you without delay.

WALLACE MURRAY

⁴¹ Telegrams Nos. 194 and 162, not printed.

EFFORTS TO FACILITATE TRADE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND EGYPT; EXTENSION OF LEND-LEASE AID TO EGYPT

740.00111A Combat Areas/430 : Telegram

*The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State*CAIRO, April 12, 1941—11 a. m.
[Received April 13—9:50 p. m.]

244. My April 12, 10 a. m.⁴² As indicated in my telegram under reference the reports concerning the prospective reopening of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden to American vessels have caused widespread satisfaction among local importers. Since the entrance of Italy into the war last June when the fortnightly service between New York and Alexandria of the American Export Lines had to be suspended, shipping communications between the United States and Egypt have been very inadequate. The situation has grown worse in recent months owing to Egypt's increasing dependence upon the United States for import products as a result of the increasing preoccupation of English manufacturers with the war effort and the limited space available on British and other available vessels for commodities entering into normal commerce.

Since the closing of the Mediterranean to commercial shipping and the cessation of all American shipping communications between American and Egyptian ports importers in Egypt who placed orders in the United States have been forced to depend for shipping space upon the irregular sailings of Egyptian, Greek, Norwegian, Panamanian and Peruvian flag vessels between New York and Suez via the Cape of Good Hope. The impossibility of obtaining shipping space promptly on vessels plying between United States and Egypt caused many American manufacturers, particularly in the iron and steel, chemical and paper trades, to refuse to execute orders from Egypt on any terms of payment other than irrevocable letters of credit in New York payable against certificate of manufacture or warehouse receipt in New York. This has worked a great hardship on Egyptian importers because Egyptian exchange regulations do not permit local banks to issue letters of credit calling for payment on any basis other than presentation of clean ocean bill of lading with the result that in addition to being under the necessity of having to pay in advance for his goods the Egyptian importer has been frequently obliged to pay a middleman in New York a commission of 3 percent for advancing the funds which the American manufacturer insisted upon receiving the moment his goods were warehoused in New York, the middleman subsequently reimbursing himself when the goods in question were loaded upon a

⁴² Telegram No. 243, not printed.

ship bound for Egypt and the letter of credit with covering bill of lading could be presented at a New York bank for encashment.

The establishment of regular sailings of American flag vessels between New York and Egyptian ports should immediately put an end to the above difficulty and increase trade between Egypt and the United States. In addition to automotive vehicles, automobile tires, lubricating oils, tobacco, radios, cinema films, office appliances, medical preparations, which in normal times were the principal imports from the United States, Egypt is now in urgent need from the United States of large quantities of iron and steel, tinplate, cotton piece goods, fertilizers and industrial chemicals, and paper.

Regular sailings between New York and Suez of American flag vessels should also greatly benefit Egypt's export trade with the United States. In normal times Egypt's leading exports to the United States are cotton, wool, cottonseed oil, rags and scraps of textile materials, onions, beeswax, hides and skins, works of art and articles for collection, and henna. Due to the cutting off of the Continent of Europe from trade with the rest of the world there are commodities that Egypt could export profitably to the United States at the present which in normal times do not find their way to the American market. At the present time there are between 25,000 and 30,000 tons of high-grade Egyptian manganese ore in the vicinity of the Red Sea awaiting transport which should readily find a market in the United States. In addition there are readily available from 200,000 to 300,000 tons low-grade manganese ore which could probably be marketed successfully in the United States if ocean freight rates were not excessive.

Before the war the United States bought appreciable quantities of phosphate from Central Europe and this source of supply is now closed to us. Egypt has important phosphate deposits, mining between 400,000 and 500,000 metric tons of phosphate rock per annum in normal times. Egyptian phosphate rock should be able to find a market in America of sufficient size to justify a considerable increase in phosphate mining in this country. Among other important minerals mined in Egypt which should find a ready market in the United States under present conditions are tungsten and wolfram. Before the outbreak of war tungsten was being mined in Egypt in important quantities but at the present time the mines have had to close down because of the lack of shipping space. More than a thousand tons of this mineral are said to be lying piled up at the mine-heads awaiting the chance to be transported to the world markets. Small quantities of wolfram are already available and production could be expanded if a market were assured.

In submitting the foregoing to the Department I realize fully that in connection with the regular passage of vessels between the United

States and Egypt either by the Cape of Good Hope, or possibly via the Pacific, precedence must be given to urgent shipments of war material. I believe, however, that any project which would result in the immediate interchange of essential commercial products between the United States and Egypt would constitute at this time an important stabilizing element in this country, both political and social as well as economic, and would furthermore establish a basis for the acquisition in the future of extensive markets for American goods not only throughout the Near East but also in the Mediterranean area. It is in view of those considerations that I urge that the Department investigate the possibility of advocating the inclusion in cargoes of vessels from the United States to Red Sea ports of shipments, even in small quantities, of commodities required by Egyptian importers and the carriage in vessels returning to the United States of Egyptian exports now in demand in American markets.

KIRK

811.20 Defense (M)/1792a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk)

WASHINGTON, April 21, 1941—6 p. m.

93. For Kirk from Feis.⁴³ Much interested and will follow matter through vigorously. An arrangement might be facilitated if estimates were transmitted at once of immediately available supplies particularly of manganese, tungsten and wolfram, with particulars as to grades.

You are much in our thoughts. [Feis.]

HULL

811.20 Defense (M)/1799 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, April 27, 1941—9 a. m.

[Received April 28—6:36 a. m.]

347. The Department's 93, April 21, 6 p. m. For Feis. Many thanks for your message. From preliminary information available manganese is reported to be approximately as follows: 40,000 metric tons 28% manganese, 190,000 tons 45 to 50%, and 300 tons 80%, the bulk of which is at the port of Abouzenima on the eastern side of the Gulf of Suez which has pier accommodations to load 10,000 ton vessels at the rate of 500 tons per hour. It is also reported that about 300 tons of higher than 80% manganese are available near Kosseir on the west

⁴³ Herbert Feis, Adviser on International Economic Affairs.

side of the Red Sea which would have to be loaded from barges at a distance of 1500 metres off shore.

Tentative reports indicate that there is no tungsten actually available and only a few tons of wolfram concentrate as the mines have been closed because of the lack of a market. The existing mines, which are estimated to be able to produce about a hundred tons monthly with existing machinery, produce wolfram concentrate the better grades of which are said to run as follows: WO_3 70%, FeO 10%, MnO 9%, CaO 2½%, SiO 25%.

Reports indicate that there are about 200,000 tons phosphate rock averaging 62% tri-calcium phosphate, the bulk of which is stored at Kosseir and Sofaga on the west side of the Red Sea. Twelve thousand ton vessels can moor at the latter port but loading at the former must be done from lighters. These phosphates may be needed in South Africa.

There are available for immediate shipment 12,000 tons of gypsum 98%, sulphate of calcium at Rasmaelap on the east side of the Gulf of Suez where loading from barges is necessary.

There is an enormous quantity of Egyptian cotton available for shipment if a decision is made, as mentioned in my telegram number 338, April 25 [26], 10 a. m.⁴⁴ to ship it to central points in the Western Hemisphere. Its transport would require approximately 824,000 measured tons of shipping space.

KIRK

811.20 Defense (M)/1888 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, May 1, 1941—5 p. m.
[Received May 2—8:20 a. m.]

379. Personal for Feis. In continuation of my 347, April 27, 9 a. m. If you are interested in making the operation of vessels pay, it looks as if we might supply a couple of cargoes of American citizens from this part of the world if ships would carry passengers and if we had advance notice of return sailings.

KIRK

811.20 Defense (M)/20523 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, May 2, 1941—5 p. m.
[Received May 4—9:53 a. m.]

390. Local importers are being advised by their American suppliers that shipping space to Egypt is at present unobtainable and therefore

⁴⁴Not printed.

future orders will not be executed unless accompanied by letter of credit calling for payment against railway bill of lading or warehouse receipt New York. As Egyptian exchange regulations do not permit banks to issue letters of credit payable on this basis commercial shipments from the United States to Egypt threatened with complete stoppage. If American vessels with space for commercial cargo were available this difficulty would disappear. Would appreciate information on existing shipping situation as importers here greatly perturbed. Inform Commerce.

KIRK

883.24/12

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State
(Long)*

[WASHINGTON,] May 2, 1941.

The Egyptian Minister ⁴⁵ called today ostensibly to present Mr. Anis Azer, the new Counselor. The Counselor then spoke of the general situation existing in Egypt. They had no army because under the policy and practice since the Egyptian occupation they had not developed an army of any considerable strength and they had no equipment. Consequently the army was not of much value and they could not be of much military assistance to the British. However, he said that all the assets and resources of the country, including public, private industrial and financial organizations, were devoted to the service of the British and all were engaged practically exclusively in that service even to the exclusion of some of the needs of Egypt. But the Minister and Counselor were having difficulties in getting permits to export certain materials which were essential for Egypt, not only for its own use, but for the continuing aid it was rendering to Britain. And they hoped that the American Government under its policy to help Britain should be able to take into consideration the fact that Egypt was helping the British and needed certain articles which they would import from America in order to further that aid. They said they were to discuss this situation with the British authorities in Washington. I told them that those questions were economic as well as policy questions and suggested that they see the appropriate officers of the Government, including Dr. Feis. I said that we would always be glad to hear what they had to say and to consider any proposals that they might make.

B[RECKINRIDGE] L[ONG]

⁴⁵ Mahmoud Hassan Bey.

811.20 Defense (M)/1935 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, May 8, 1941—5 p. m.

[Received May 9—1:55 p. m.]

434. Following for Feis: In continuation of my 379, May 1, 5 p. m., please see my telegram 390, May 2, 5 p. m. It seems that in view of this exchange difficulty it is highly important that a system be adopted whereby some regularity may be observed in the sailings of American vessels to Red Sea ports thus enabling American exporters readily to accept letters of credit payable against ocean bill of lading, since Egyptian Government firmly refuses permission to local banks to open letters of credit in New York payable on any other basis due to its fear of a possible flight of capital should this restriction regarding letters of credit be relaxed.

KIRK

811.20 Defense (M)/1976 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, May 12, 1941—10 a. m.

[Received May 14—4:30 a. m.]

463. Personal for Feis. Continuing my 434, May 8, 5 p. m. I happen to know that the Egyptian railways are in urgent need of trucks and engines and that this shortage of rolling stock and locomotives is regarded as particularly serious in view of the expected increase in shipping including American to the Red Sea ports. I have been told in high Egyptian as well as British circles that tenders from American firms for the sale to the railways here of railroad equipment might be welcome and I pass this on to you in order to see if anything can be done along this line. I am also wondering if any such deals could be facilitated under some provision of the Lease and Lend Bill.⁴⁶ Incidentally I firmly believe that any such contemplated deals by American manufacturers should be accompanied or preferably preceded by a proposal to the Egyptian Government to send here American transportation experts to suggest improvements in the transportation system here and that the quicker this can be done the better.

Of course this all may be an excess of zeal on my part but I do hope that you will agree that it is worth trying out. I must add that in all such matters I can only emphasize the fact that anything that we can do to further trade between the United States and Egypt now will serve the dual purpose of opening up for the future important markets for American goods in this area which has hitherto dealt

⁴⁶ Approval March 11, 1941; 55 Stat. 31.

largely with Central Europe and, what is of more immediate concern, will give concrete encouragement to this country which is looking more and more to the United States to save it from the Nazis.

KIRK

740.00111A Combat Areas/430: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk)

WASHINGTON, May 15, 1941—11 a. m.

148. Your 244, April 12, 11 a. m. and subsequent telegrams. It has been decided to allot a substantial amount of shipping tonnage for service in the future between the United States and the Red Sea. The determination of what outbound cargo is to be carried in this space is to be under the control of the British Purchasing Commission in this country. It is to be expected that priority will be given to shipments needed for British military effort in the Near East but that space may also be available for shipments to Egypt of commodities not directly related to British military effort.

If the Egyptian Government wishes to try to obtain allocation of part of this space, the Department suggests that the most promising procedure would be to have its Legation in Washington discuss with the British Purchasing Commission the commodities it desires from this country and the relative priorities which it attaches to the commodities in its lists. The Egyptian Commercial Counselor has already been in touch with the Department regarding commodities which the Egyptian Government desires to obtain and has promised to furnish a list of such commodities in as much detail as possible. However no such list has yet been received. He states that the Egyptian Legation has arranged for many of these purchases to be handled on behalf of the Egyptian Government by the British Purchasing Commission.

With respect to return cargo, some space should certainly be available for transporting products from Egypt to the United States although the demands on this space have not been fully analyzed and there will be a desire for prompt turn around of the ships.

Of the commodities which you mention, the Metals Reserve Company (a Government agency) would definitely be interested in buying all available tungsten and is prepared to make an offer on manganese as soon as it knows that shipping will be available. If ordinary commercial arrangements can be made for the sale of other commodities, such as phosphate, gypsum, calcium sulphate, it is possible that some arrangement could be made for shipping space for them although with a lower priority rating than for other commodities of greater strategic importance to this country.

For Kirk only: Considering the many difficulties surrounding the whole matter of providing shipping facilities for cargo moving from

the United States to the Red Sea it would appear that the chances of successful execution of Egyptian desires would be much increased if the Egyptian representation in this country had the steady assistance of the British Purchasing Commission.

HULL

740.00111A Combat Areas/456: Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, May 23, 1941—3 p. m.
[Received May 25—8:30 a. m.]

571. Department's telegram 148, May 15, 11 a. m. I brought to the personal attention of the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs ^{46a} the appropriate portion of the instruction under reference and I am now in receipt of the following list of commodities to which the Egyptian Government wishes to be accorded priority in the allocation of shipping to and from the United States and Egypt (list 1—priority list of imports; list 2—priority list of exports):

[Here follows list 1; this list, with amounts added, is contained in telegram No. 744, June 17, noon, page 309.]

List 2: (1) Onions; (2) Cotton seed oils; (3) Rice; (4) Beans, lentils and garlic; (5) Natural phosphates of lime; (6) Manganese; (7) Epsom.

Note: With regard to cotton the Government of the United States of America will be notified of its grading later.

The Prime Minister states that the Egyptian Legation in Washington has been furnished with the foregoing list and asks that the Government of the United States "give the utmost help for securing the necessary shipping space". He adds that as regards the question of the purchase of all quantities of manganese instructions have been given to the competent Egyptian officials to examine the question and notify me of the conditions and specifications.

KIRK

883.24/12a: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk)

WASHINGTON, May 26, 1941—7 p. m.

174. Department's 148, May 15, 11 a. m., and your 463, May 12, 10 a. m., and previous. The Department has been looking into the many questions which present themselves in connection with the

^{46a} Sirry Pasha, Prime Minister, acting also as Minister for Foreign Affairs at this time.

desired purpose of exchanging supplies with Egypt. Existing war conditions and the defense controls in this country present many problems for which definite solutions must be found before the exchange can be arranged. The primary ones are as follows:

(1) Since the ordinary channels of commercial representation are no longer active or available, the arrangements for the actual placing of orders, supervision of their production and arrangement for their shipment requires close contact and discussion here with American producers and different branches of the American Government concerned.

(2) For commodities subject to export licenses the issuance of the necessary licenses must be arranged.

(3) For commodities the production of which is determined under a priorities system, arrangements must be made for the securing of priority permits.

(4) The provision of shipping space must be worked out in consultation with the governmental authorities which now so largely control that space.

(5) Methods of payment must be determined (including possible relation to the lease-lend legislation).

These problems are so many-sided and have so many technical elements in them that it seems plain to the Department that if the Egyptian Government is serious in its wish it would (a) have to despatch to this country a mission possessing full and detailed knowledge of what Egypt wishes to buy, and full technical knowledge; (b) have to convey the necessary authority to someone here to place orders, accept the goods, help to arrange the shipments, and make the payments.

The work of such Egyptian representatives could be enormously facilitated if it were carried on with the help of the British Purchasing Commission in this country, and this Commission now has vast experience in such arrangements and a very large staff equipped to handle it. For that reason the whole matter has been discussed by the Department with the British Purchasing Commission which expresses itself as entirely agreeable to render all possible assistance to the Egyptian representatives if it is so instructed from London. The advantages of such an arrangement are numerous. The Purchasing Commission has now wide technical knowledge of manufactured products; they know where orders for such commodities can be placed; they are experienced in procedures necessary for obtaining priorities for export licenses; they are familiar with details of getting commodities shipped from interior points and loaded on shipboard. In addition, as indicated in the Department's 148, they have a very large voice in determining what outbound cargo is to be transported in the shipping tonnage available between the United States and the Red Sea.

It is suggested that you explain the situation as outlined above to the Egyptian Government and pass on our suggestion regarding the utilization of the facilities of the British Purchasing Commission, suggesting at the same time that the way to effect this arrangement would be to have the Egyptian Government approach the British Government.

The Commercial Counselor of the Egyptian Legation supplied the Department yesterday with the list of commodities⁴⁷ referred to in the Department's 148. The specifications set forth in this list as regards the particular commodities are too general to serve as the basis for placing orders with American producers and manufacturers, and in many instances also too general to permit decision by the American Government as regards priorities. For example, it is not enough to know that Egypt desires to buy plates, rods, et cetera, of aluminum alloys. The Egyptian representative must be in a position to specify precisely what sizes, kinds, and other technical descriptions are required, and also what substitute articles might fill the need if aluminum is not available. A summary of this cable is being given to the Egyptian Minister in Washington.

HULL

883.77/58 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, June 16, 1941—4 p. m.

[Received June 17—11:02 a. m.]

737. For Feis. With the arrival Ldyslaus, the Maritime Commission representative, we should shortly know where we stand as to port facilities for discharge of American ships but I am still much troubled by question of railroad facilities for transporting goods after unloading (see my 463, May 12, 10 a. m., paragraph 1). As provisions outlined in your 174, May 26, 7 p. m., may be slow in results and as matter is extremely urgent if we want to make immediately available supplies sent to Middle [East?], I am wondering if, on the basis of the American interests involved, you could not cause an approach to be made to the Government of the Union of South Africa as the nearest neighbor to Egypt [to?] make a proposition to the Egyptian Government for the immediate supply of railway transportation experts as well as some rolling stock which we might subsequently replace to the Union with our own products. In this way it might be possible to institute a speedy improvement in the efficiency of the Egyptian railways which would serve our purpose in the present emergency.

KIRK

⁴⁷ Not found in Department files.

883.24/13 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, June 17, 1941—noon.

[Received June 19—9:24 a. m.]

744. Department's 174, May 26, 7 p. m., penultimate paragraph. Egyptian Government has been unable so far to furnish information regarding commodities in its priority list in sufficient detail to serve as basis for placing orders with producers and its present basis to leave the procurement of these commodities to the usual commercial channels. It has, however, supplied the Legation with its estimates in metric tons of the minimum requirements from the United States during the next year of the commodities named in its priority list as contained in the Legation's 571, May 23, 3 p. m. as follows:

Chemical fertilizers 300,000, medicine and medicinal preparations 5,000, chemical agricultural insecticides 1,000, chemicals and products for photography and fumigation 180, lubricating oils 26,400, caustic soda 4,000, fatty substances and greases 16,000, tanning substances 2,500, artificial indigo 80, coal tar dyes 320, cables, ropes, copper wires not insulated 360, nails and galvanized wires for nails, bolts and cants 6,000, spare parts for motor cars and agricultural machines 2,500, rubber and manufactures thereof 2,000, newsprint and magazine paper 4,800, cigarette paper 400, packing paper 8,000, machine belts 16, motorcars and motorlorries courthouse [*sic*] and iron bars 12,000, sheets of steel or iron 20,000, pipes 4,000, boilers 260, pumps 200, engines, stationary steam or internal combustion 2,000, tractors 600, generators, motors, electric, 800, hoops, iron or steel, 9,000, structural iron or steel 4,000, copper and brass and manufactures thereof 400, manufactured sheet iron or steel 800, timber 80,000.

KIRK

841.24/595 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, June 20, 1941—9 p. m.

[Received June 20—3:54 p. m.]

2572. For Hopkins⁴⁸ from Harriman⁴⁹ Office. Referring to carriage by Middle East truck ships of other cargo obtained on lend-lease terms for ultimate civilian consumption in Egypt or other

⁴⁸ Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to President Roosevelt, with primary responsibility at this time for Lend-Lease affairs.

⁴⁹ W. Averell Harriman, Special Representative of President Roosevelt in the United Kingdom, with rank of Minister, responsible for expediting lend-lease aid to the British Empire; at this time on a special mission to the Middle East.

Middle Eastern countries, British have instructed the Chairman of their Middle East supply center at Cairo to consult Harriman. From information given us it is apparent that he is having difficulty in complying with section 4 of the Act. We have had no instructions from you on the subject but understand from British that, as a practical matter and without commitment, the United States Government will not object to distribution through ordinary commercial channels, at least in the United Kingdom, where the British Government retains control of price and conditions of sale. We presume that if this advice be correct, you would apply the same rule to Egyptian and other Middle Eastern Governments, but we are advised that throughout that region further special difficulty arises that governments have no machinery comparable to control. We would appreciate guidance from you on these questions. [Harriman Office.]

JOHNSON

883.24/22

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Adviser on International Economic Affairs (Stinebower)

[WASHINGTON,] June 21, 1941.

Participants: The Egyptian Minister
Mr. Anis Azer, Commercial Counselor, Egyptian
Legation
Mr. Feis
Mr. Stinebower

The Egyptian Minister and the Commercial Counselor came in to pursue further the question they had brought up with various officers of the Department some time ago regarding the facilitation of exports from the United States to Egypt of commodities of which Egypt has great and pressing need.

Mr. Feis began by referring to the suggestion which had been previously made both to the Commercial Counselor and to the American Legation in Cairo to the effect that the most satisfactory method of expediting delivery of goods would be for the Egyptian Government to request the British Government to instruct the British Purchasing Commission in this country to be of assistance to the Egyptian representatives, and that in addition the Egyptian Government send technically qualified representatives to this country with specific and detailed knowledge of the commodities which it is desired to obtain.

The Minister replied that he had been informed by Sir Arthur Salter and by Captain Coventry that the British Shipping Ministry and the British Purchasing Commission, respectively, have received

instructions from London to be of assistance, and that they have in a general way been of such assistance. Mr. Azer complained however that this assistance was always rendered primarily with a view to the British military needs and to Egyptian military needs strictly interpreted, and that it was difficult to get assistance on purchases which were not obviously directly related to war effort even though they might be indirectly related. Except for war equipment, shipping on the one hand was primarily administered with regard to the bulkiness of the articles required and it was possible to get shipping space allocated for articles in packages or bags that would "fit in" around other cargo whether the articles were directly related to war effort or not. As it had worked out, it frequently happened that if they could get assistance for purchasing they could not make satisfactory arrangements for shipping the products involved, whereas if they could get shipping allocation they would not get purchasing assistance. The question of shipping allocation was easing somewhat, though.

Mr. Feis referred to the latest list of Egyptian desiderata which had been received from the Legation at Cairo,⁵⁰ and again pointed out that this was so lacking in specific detail that there seemed to be very little which this Government could do with such a list by way of helping to arrange for priorities or export licenses or finding manufacturers with available capacity for producing the desired commodities. He again stressed the need for technical experts from Egypt to work closely with the British Purchasing Commission.

The Minister agreed to go over the problem again and to get off a telegram to his Government recommending this course of procedure, perhaps discussing it with the Department before sending it.

Mr. Feis undertook to get off another telegram of instruction to the American Minister, and to show this to the Egyptian Minister before it was despatched.

841.24/595 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, June 25, 1941—midnight.

2294. From Hopkins. Your 2572⁵¹ regarding shipments of articles for civilian consumption referred to your cable June 20th President consents to such methods of distribution as deemed most practicable by you. [Hopkins.]

WELLES

⁵⁰ See telegram No. 571, May 23, 3 p. m., from the Minister in Egypt, p. 306.

⁵¹ Dated June 20, 9 p. m., p. 309.

883.77/59 : Telegram

*The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State*CAIRO, August 16, 1941—6 p. m.
[Received August 17—7: 10 a. m.]

1164. My 737, July [June] 16, 4 p. m. for Feis. Delighted to learn of orders placed for rolling stock for Egypt. Be sure not to forget necessity for sending transportation experts and the sooner the better. Greetings.

KIRK

883.24/13

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk)

No. 46

WASHINGTON, September 5, 1941.

SIR: Little progress has been made in solving the problem of American supplies for Egypt. This is due partly but by no means entirely to the difficulty encountered in getting the Egyptians to state their needs in terms specific enough to allow analysis in the light of our own defense needs as well as those of others we are helping. The list of requirements filed in May⁵² by the Egyptian Commercial Counselor has been under examination by the proper government offices. The case for approval has been prejudiced by the absence of specific information as to exact types, sizes, and quantities of supplies wanted, by the lack of information as to the uses to which they would be put, and by failure to coordinate Egyptian needs with those of the British in Egypt.

In discussing the problem with the British it has developed that they, too, have been pressing the Egyptians for a proper authenticated list of Egypt's essential requirements. Moreover, it develops that a discussion of proper programming and allocation of Egypt's requirements to the best source of supply can be done, according to the British Supply Council, only through a single channel which they think should be the British Government. The Department is not informed about the views of the Egyptian government on this point.

The problem is more than a procedural one, however. It raises questions of financing which are directly related to the whole matter of financing the British war effort in the United States. While the Egyptian government's offer to pay cash for these supplies still holds, so far as the Department is aware, it is not impossible that a substitute proposal to acquire the supplies through lend-lease may be made. Egypt is part of the sterling area. If the British in their efforts to conserve dollar assets assume the function of allocating exchange to

⁵² Not found in Department files.

Egypt, the Egyptians may be forced involuntarily to go along with the other parts of the sterling area and use lend-lease for meeting the bulk of the needs which can be supplied from the United States. In such a situation a system of controls would probably have to be instituted by the Egyptian government which would enable it to meet conditions fixed by the President as necessary to gain his approval for the re-transfer of lend-lease goods to commercial firms for distribution. The determination of criteria underlying these conditions is now being made by the British and ourselves as regards distribution of goods lend-leased to the British and it is certain that identical conditions would govern in the Egyptian case.

So far as the British Supply Council is concerned, their position is set forth in the following excerpt from a letter of August 6, 1941, from Mr. M. W. Wilson, Deputy Director, to Mr. Philip Young, assistant executive officer of the Division of Defense Aid Reports:

"The question is complicated by other considerations which have recently arisen. We have been supplying a part of Egypt's requirements from the United Kingdom, but this is becoming more and more difficult for shipping and other reasons. We are, therefore, being forced to consider whether the supplies hitherto sent from the United Kingdom will not have to be obtained from the United States, insofar as they are available. As Egypt forms part of the Sterling Area, the cost of such supplies obtained in the United States would fall on the common dollar pool of the Sterling Area. We shall have in due course to report this situation to the Joint Clearing Committee which meets under Mr. Morgenthau's⁵³ chairmanship. If the U. S. Government found it possible to supply any part of these requirements on Lend-Lease terms, it would of course reduce the new dollar charge which is likely to arise. We cannot however bring this matter forward until we have a suitable concrete case to submit to Mr. Morgenthau's Committee, or until we have at least the promised list of essential Egyptian requirements as a basis for preliminary consideration of the question by the Committee.

"There may be obstacles in the way of the provision of Egypt's essential requirements on Lend-Lease terms in the fact that Egypt has at present no import control, while the control over prices, or profits of commercial distributors, may not be sufficient to satisfy the U. S. Government that the conditions (now under discussion) regarding the transfer of Lend-Leased goods to commercial agencies for distribution will be fulfilled. If you saw your way to say something to the Egyptian Commercial Counselor which might convince him of the necessity of an import licensing control and a full control over distribution of any goods which may be made available on Lend-Lease terms, it would be of great assistance."

Your attention is directed particularly to the final sentence in the above excerpt. In view of the Egyptian government's offer to pay cash and, moreover, to our basic desire of keeping trade channels open

⁵³ Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury.

and as free as possible, the Department is not accepting Mr. Wilson's suggestion that it take the initiative in attempting to convince the Egyptian Commercial Counselor "of the necessity of an import licensing system and a full control over distribution of any goods which may be made available on Lend-Lease terms."

If, in the circumstances already mentioned with reference to conservation of dollars in the sterling area, Egypt's purchases were in the future to be confined mainly to lend-lease goods, then some arrangements of the sort mentioned with reference to import control would presumably be necessary, for the reasons stated. Even should that situation develop, however, it is felt that it would be unwise for this Department to take any initiative toward persuading the Egyptians to set up such a system; rather, that the initiative in regard to this matter should rest with the British and the Egyptians themselves.

The substance of this despatch is not being communicated to the Egyptian Minister.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:
A. A. BERLE, JR.

883.24/19 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, October 15, 1941—3 p. m.

[Received October 16—10:13 p. m.]

1591. Personal for Feis. Is the possibility being explored of extending to Egypt the provisions of the Lend-Lease Act? After all this country is a war theater and I can see large benefits from the political, economic and financial standpoints of developing American-Egyptian relations on those bases not only for the purpose of the actual war effort but also as a possible impetus to a larger postwar trade in this entire area. I have not discussed this matter here but it is also possible that direct dealings between the United States and Egypt in the supply of defense materials might be acceptable to the British as well as to the Egyptians.

KIRK

841.24/837 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk)

WASHINGTON, October 25, 1941—10 p. m.

603. Your 737 of June 16, 1164 of August 16, and 1487 of September 29.⁵⁴ Hopkins advises as follows:

"The War Department is sending two military missions to the Middle East as of November 1, 1941, one to be headed by General

⁵⁴ Telegram No. 1487 not printed.

R. L. Maxwell and to be stationed in Egypt, and the other to be headed by General R. A. Wheeler and to be stationed in Iran.⁵⁵ They will be supported by three railroad experts, as follows: John A. Gillies, Ralph E. Knapp, J. P. Johnson. They will be available for railroad work both in Egypt and the regions farther east. They should arrive in the Middle East in early November. It is not believed that any commitments as to the utilization of the Union of South Africa to assist in railway transportation should be made until after these officers have had an opportunity to review the situation."

In regard to the possibility of securing rolling stock from South Africa, there seems only a limited possibility in view of the fact that deliveries of mineral products to the ports in South Africa are being retarded now by conditions on their railways, and we are trying to find out now whether we can move the South African and the Rhodesian Governments to deal with this situation, possibly with some assistance on our part in the light of our desire for the products in question.

Please inform Teheran of the quoted portion.

HULL

883.24/21 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk)

WASHINGTON, October 25, 1941—11 p. m.

604. Your 1591 of October 15, 3 p. m. Hopkins has advised as follows:

"With reference to giving aid to Egypt under Lend-Lease, it is not believed that any commitment should be undertaken at this time. The situation is complex and the attitude of the British will have to be ascertained. Furthermore, all available shipping and supplies are badly needed by the British, the Russians and the Chinese."

HULL

867.24/204 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, December 4, 1941—9 a. m.

[Received December 5—4:45 p. m.]

1896. Personal for Hopkins. With reference to Department's 604, October 25, 11 a. m. [p. m.], containing your message about lend-lease for Egypt, I am wondering if the reported extension of lend-lease to Turkey⁵⁶ indicates an intention to adopt similar measures as regards Egypt. If so is there any data that I can furnish you from this end?

KIRK

⁵⁵ With regard to the military mission to Iran, see bracketed note, p. 477.

⁵⁶ For correspondence on this subject, see pp. 814 ff.

841.24/1089a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk)

WASHINGTON, December 10, 1941—5 p. m.

757. Mr. Hopkins has asked the Department to forward to you as further reply to your 1896, December 4, the following text of a letter from the President to Stettinius, Lend-Lease Administrator:

“For purposes of implementing the authority conferred upon you as Lend-Lease Administrator by Executive Order No. 8926, dated October 28, 1941 and in order to enable you to arrange for Lend-Lease aid to all nations already receiving aid in such manner as I shall have directed, whether directly or by way of retransfer, I hereby find that the defense of the following countries is vital to the defense of the United States:

1. India, Burma, the Dominions of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa, (including mandated territories under Dominion mandate), Newfoundland, Southern Rhodesia and the British colonial dependencies (including mandated territories under British mandate).
2. The Kingdom of Yugoslavia.
3. The Kingdom of Egypt.”

HULL

841.24/1099 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, December 17, 1941—9 a. m.

[Received December 18—3:13 a. m.]

1972. Your 757, December 10, 5 p. m. Am I authorized to inform the Egyptian authorities that lend-lease has been extended to Egypt and if so, is there any pertinent information which I should convey at that time?

KIRK

883.24/25 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk)

WASHINGTON, December 24, 1941—8 p. m.

809. Your 1972, December 17 and 1997, December 22.⁵⁷ The Lend-Lease Administrator makes the following reply to your inquiry:

“As you know, the President has found that the defense of Egypt is vital to the defense of the United States. Egypt is therefore eligible to make application for any type of lend-lease aid, which may be rendered either directly to that Government or by way of retransfer from the United Kingdom.

⁵⁷ Latter not printed.

The latter method was followed with respect to 300,000 bags of flour which the President on October 1, 1941 authorized to be distributed in whole or in part by the British in Egypt to the Egyptian civilian population. This has been the only aid extended to the Egyptian people as such up to this time.

In addition, however, very large quantities of defense articles such as planes, guns, tanks and ammunition have been supplied to the British forces in Egypt, which have undoubtedly contributed greatly to the defense of that country."

HULL

EGYPTIAN PROTESTS CONCERNING CERTAIN ARTICLES IN AMERICAN PUBLICATIONS CONSIDERED DEROGATORY TO EGYPT

883.00/1167: Telegram

The Chargé in Egypt (Hare) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, March 18, 1941—5 p. m.

[Received March 20—7 a. m.]

125. The Prime Minister,⁵⁸ acting in the capacity of Minister for Foreign Affairs, asked me to call at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs this morning and registered a protest regarding an article entitled, "Britain in the Near East", which appeared in the January 1941 issue of *Foreign Affairs* and in which certain references are made to King Farouk and Egypt regarded by the Egyptian Government as derogatory. He cited a number of passages, particularly the second paragraph of page 377 in which reference is made to the King as a Quisling, and requested that I transmit a protest to the American Government.

I replied that I deeply regretted that references regarded by the Egyptian Government as offensive to Egypt and the King should have appeared in an American publication and said that I would transmit the protest of the Prime Minister to the Department in accordance with his request. However, I pointed out that although the American Government deplored any action by private American citizens or organizations which might give offense to the people of other friendly countries there are no laws or regulations in the United States providing for Government control of the press, the freedom of which is guaranteed by the Constitution. I added that given the long and well-established ties of friendship and respect existing between the United States and Egypt it was obvious that any such occurrence as this could only be regarded as an isolated incident.

The Prime Minister said that he realized that American law was such but that he felt convinced that some means could be found for

⁵⁸ Sirry Pasha.

the prevention of such incidents. I thereupon repeated along similar lines my previous explanation of the inability of the American Government to exert control in such matters.

I may add that although the Prime Minister gave the impression of feeling that the matter was sufficiently serious to call for formal protest he did not ask that anything be done other than to transmit the protest to the American Government, nor was there evidence of strong resentment in his attitude except in referring to the author of the article. The Prime Minister said he was convinced that the article was not written by the person under whose name it was published but by a certain person known to him who was very familiar with Egypt and the Near East.

HARE

883.00/1167 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Egypt (Hare)

WASHINGTON, March 24, 1941—7 p. m.

61. Your 125, March 18, 5 p. m. You are requested to inform the Prime Minister that the Department has carefully examined the article in *Foreign Affairs* to which exception has been taken by the Egyptian Government, and is in full agreement as to the regrettable and untrue nature of certain passages therein. You should state that the general position in which this Government is placed with respect to a matter of this kind is precisely as was explained to the Prime Minister by the Chargé d' Affaires ad interim on March 18, and that it is desired to approve and to confirm the latter's remarks on that occasion. You should add that this particular incident is a source of especially deep regret to this Government in view of the prevailing respect and admiration in which His Majesty is held in the United States, and the ties of sincere friendship and the cooperative relations which have long existed between the two countries.

The attitude of the Egyptian Government and the Department's views regarding the article are being brought forcefully to the attention of the editor of the publication in question.

WELLES

883.00/1173 : Telegram

The Chargé in Egypt (Hare) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, March 28, 1941—3 p. m.
[Received March 29—4 : 52 p. m.]

156. Referring to the Department's telegram No. 61, March 24, 7 p. m., in the absence of the Prime Minister from Cairo I advised the

Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs yesterday in the sense of the Department's telegram. The Under Secretary appeared to be pleased by the message and immediately and in my presence telephoned its substance to the Chief of the Royal Cabinet with favorable comment.

On the return of the Prime Minister the matter will also be taken up with him by the Minister who presents his letter of credence tomorrow.

HARE

883.00/1176 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, March 30, 1941—3 p. m.

[Received March 31—8:30 a. m.]

160. Referring to the Legation's telegram No. 156, March 28, 3 p. m. I have today received a letter from the Prime Minister expressing hearty appreciation of the Department's views regarding the article in *Foreign Affairs* as expressed to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on March 27 and asking that I convey to the Department the grateful thanks of the Egyptian Government for bringing the views of the Egyptian and American Governments strongly to the attention of the editor of *Foreign Affairs*.

KIRK

740.0011 European War 1939/13225

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Long)

[WASHINGTON,] June 30, 1941.

The Egyptian Minister⁵⁹ came in this afternoon at his own request. He handed me the attached response which he had written⁶⁰ to an article which appeared in *PM* and which he described as being very detrimental to the good reputation of Egypt, its Royal Family and its Government. He asked me for advice because the article had not been published.

I replied that I was sorry to say that the Department could not be of any particular help to him and that each newspaper had printed what it saw fit. The Department had no control over the newspapers or of any article they might publish. I told him that the same newspaper had been very critical of officers of the Department of State, referring to several articles, and told him that I thought that he had done all that he could first, by consulting officers of the Department,

⁵⁹ Mahmoud Hassan Bey.

⁶⁰ Not printed.

second, by writing the article in response to the critical matter, and third, when the newspaper failed to publish his reply, to be able to state to his Government that he had again approached the Department of State on the subject, but that the Department was unable to be of assistance.

B[RECKINRIDGE] L[ONG]

898.00/1201

*Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. Gordon P. Merriam
of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] July 1, 1941.

Responding to my question whether he had seen the article by Judge Crabites⁶¹ entitled "Britain's Debt to King Farouk", published in the July 1941 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, the Minister said that he had and that he considered it a very fine article. He was, he said, sending two copies of the review to his Government, and he informed me that another article by Judge Crabites was about to appear in another magazine. The Minister had sent for some copies and promised to loan me one.

I then asked the Minister whether anything had happened with reference to his difficulties with *PM* and *Life*. Hassan Bey said that he had discussed the matter with Mr. Long, who had advised him to forget about it, pointing out that *PM* had also attacked both Mr. Long himself and Mr. Berle.⁶² The Minister said laughingly that he was therefore prepared to follow Mr. Long's advice and to drop the matter, and that he would so inform his Government. He had not even received an acknowledgment of his communications to these publications, but whereas last week he had spoken of their discourtesy with considerable umbrage, today he dismissed the matter with a laugh.

The Minister appeared to appreciate my calling him to tell him of the *Foreign Affairs* article.

**REPRESENTATIONS TO THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT REGARDING
PROPOSED RESTRICTIONS ON AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL INSTITU-
TIONS IN EGYPT; LIST OF AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS IN EGYPT**

783.003/381

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Egypt (Hare)

No. 537

WASHINGTON, March 7, 1941.

SIR: Reference is made to the Legation's despatch No. 2282 of December 21, 1940,⁶³ and to previous correspondence concerning the list

⁶¹ Pierre Crabites, American judge on the Mixed Courts in Egypt, 1911-36.

⁶² Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State.

⁶³ Not printed.

of American institutions to be transmitted to the Egyptian Government in accordance with the exchange of letters of Montreux on May 8, 1937.⁶⁴

The Legation's action in transmitting a tentative list to the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is approved.

As regards furnishing the Egyptian Government with supplementary information concerning American educational, medical and charitable institutions in Egypt, the Department's instruction No. 470 of June 6, 1940,⁶⁵ authorized the Legation in its discretion to forward such information to the Foreign Office. However, it is not clear what purpose the Egyptian authorities have in mind in desiring information under certain headings such as properties and curricula. It may be desirable to consider this matter in connection with the fact that foreign, including American, educational institutions in Egypt have recently been under pressure from Egyptian officials with respect to the character and methods of teaching.

Accordingly, the Legation is requested to consult discreetly with American educational leaders and British Embassy officials with a view to submitting to the Department a recommendation as to whether or not the supplementary information, when compiled, should be accompanied by a note embodying an interpretation of the letters exchanged at Montreux. If the Legation considers that a note of this character would be desirable, it is requested to forward a suggested text for the Department's consideration and approval.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

A. A. BERLE, JR.

383.0063/22 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, April 24, 1941—9 a. m.

[Received April 25—9: 15 a. m.]

323. My 194, December [April] 5, 3 p. m.⁶⁵ As reported in Legation's despatch no. 2332 [2322] of January 30, 1941,⁶⁵ a series of conferences was instituted last October between the Ministry for Education and certain foreign educational groups, including the American University and the American Mission, regarding certain aspects of instruction in foreign educational institutions. According to American participants in the conferences, agreement was reached on a number of points including Government inspection and examinations and special studies for Egyptian nationals. Although misgivings developed at times during the conferences regarding an

⁶⁴ See Department of State Treaty Series No. 939, p. 69, or 53 Stat. (pt. 3) 1705.

⁶⁵ Not printed.

apparent disposition of the Government to interfere unduly with foreign schools the only points on which the views of the Egyptian and foreign representatives were so divergent as to necessitate the submission of minority reports were in respect of personnel and religious instruction.

The meetings terminated on March 11 with a general conference at which a report was submitted setting forth the views of the Government as constituting the findings of the various committees and ignoring the dissenting views of the foreign representatives. This brought forth a joint note signed by 9 of the 11 foreign institutions represented, including the afore-mentioned American organizations, to the Minister of Education⁶⁶ on March 14th protesting particularly against the following recommendation of the committee: "No religion other than their own shall be taught to students, not even with the formal consent of their parents; this principle is of public order."

However despite this protest articles obviously originating from Government sources appeared in the press indicating that complete agreement had been reached between the Government and foreign school representatives. The schools attempted to counteract these reports by sending letters of denial to the press but Dr. Watson⁶⁷ states that the Arabic press refused to publish these letters.

Since the representatives of the various foreign schools felt that the foregoing developments indicated an attitude which deliberately ignored the considerations set forth by them they prepared a further protest challenging the basic status of the conferences, maintaining that the meetings had been for confereutial purposes only, that the delegates of the foreign schools had no representative status and claiming unimpaired their rights under the Montreux Convention.⁶⁸ Furthermore the foreign schools professed to see their fears further justified when on March 21 announcement was made in the press of certain regulations being prepared by the Ministry of Education to amend Law 40 of 1934 governing private schools. The representatives of American schools profess to find these regulations even more objectionable than the unfavorable report of the general committee.

Although it is probable that certain of the objections which the representatives of American educational institutions entertain in respect of the proposed draft amendments might be difficult to support it would nevertheless appear that some of the amendments as drafted might be construed as infringing certain of the rights guaranteed American schools under the Montreux Convention. Following conferences between the Legation and the heads of the leading American

⁶⁶ Mohamed Hussein Heikal.

⁶⁷ Charles Roger Watson, Chancellor of the American University.

⁶⁸ Convention regarding the abolition of the capitulations in Egypt, signed at Montreux, May 8, 1937; Department of State Treaty Series No. 939, or 53 Stat. (pt. 3) 1645.

institutions it is therefore recommended that I be authorized at this time to invite the attention of the Prime Minister to the fears of the American institutions in this respect and express the hope that in any legislation bearing on foreign schools due regard will be taken of the rights guaranteed American institutions under the Montreux Convention freely to carry on their activities, at least during the period of transition provided in the Convention.

The British Embassy was also approached by British educational institutions in this matter and requested instructions from the Foreign Office in London. It is understood that the Embassy has now received a reply directing it to protest against the proposed legislation on the ground in so far as curriculum and personnel are concerned that it would contravene the guarantees given at Montreux and in so far as the religious issue is concerned to maintain that there is no reasonable basis for the proposed restrictions but in so doing to refrain from placing such objections on legal grounds or citing Montreux.

KIRK

383.0063/23 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, May 1, 1941—6 p. m.

[Received May 2—7:47 a. m.]

380. The Legation's telegram No. 323, April 24, 9 a. m. The British Embassy made representations on April 28. I believe that the effectiveness of our representations and those of the British would be enhanced if the Legation could be authorized to communicate with the Foreign Office on the matter as soon as possible.

KIRK

383.0063/22 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk)

WASHINGTON, May 12, 1941—8 p. m.

144. The Department communicated the substance of your 323, April 24, 9 a. m. to Lum⁶⁹ of the American University, to Reed⁷⁰ of the United Presbyterian Board, and to Warnshuis⁷¹ of the International Missionary Council, with a request for comments. Thus far only Lum has replied. However, we had previously discussed the matter at length with Lum, McClenahan and Reed, and in view of your 380, May 1, 6 p. m. it appears undesirable to delay instructions any longer.

⁶⁹ Hermann A. Lum.

⁷⁰ Glenn P. Reed.

⁷¹ A. L. Warnshuis.

You are authorized to bring the question of restrictive legislation to the attention of the Prime Minister in the sense of the recommendation contained in your no. 323, and to express the additional hope that apart from any question of rights involved, nothing will be done which might be regarded as a backward step.

You may also state that the Department has closely followed the course of the matter and cannot but feel that if the American educational institutions are placed in the defensive position of having to justify their work continuously and in detail, their effectiveness and the enthusiasm of the personnel will be bound to suffer, with adverse results to their contribution to Egyptian education. Sooner or later, these institutions would be bound to consider whether the contribution they are permitted to make is sufficient to justify its continuance. It is hoped that their work will go forward under reasonable conditions in a spirit of mutual respect and confidence.

HULL

383.0063/34

*The American Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Egyptian Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs (Sirry)*⁷²

CAIRO, May 24, 1941.

MY DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: I am taking the liberty of transmitting to Your Excellency herewith an informal memorandum, setting forth certain views in regard to the status of foreign educational institutions in Egypt with special reference to reports which have been received regarding a project of law governing such institutions in this country.

The interest which Your Excellency has been good enough to manifest in the keen efforts of foreign educational institutions to contribute to the cultural life of Egypt encourages me in the belief that the observations contained in the enclosed memorandum setting forth a statement of the broader aspects of the question as affecting American institutions in Egypt may receive your sympathetic consideration.

I am [etc.]

ALEXANDER KIRK

[Enclosure]

The American Legation to the Egyptian Ministry for Foreign Affairs

MEMORANDUM

American educational, scientific, medical and charitable institutions carry on their activities in Egypt in accordance with assurances given

⁷² Copy transmitted to the Department by the Minister in Egypt in his despatch No. 82, August 8; received December 9.

at Montreux by the President of the Egyptian Delegation to that convention in a letter dated May 8, 1937, addressed to the President of the Delegation of the United States of America, under which such institutions existing in Egypt on the date of the signing of the Montreux Convention "may continue freely to carry on their activities in Egypt, whether educational, scientific, medical or charitable" subject to certain conditions set forth in that letter.

For some months those institutions, together with other alien institutions of a similar character, have, as a result of conferences with officials of the Ministry of Education and items appearing in the local press, had cause to fear that steps are being taken to have enacted certain amendments to Law 40 of 1934 governing the activities of the private schools in Egypt which would be in derogation of the aforementioned assurances and conditions. The Legation has, therefore, been authorized to invite the attention of the Egyptian Government to the fears of the American institutions in this respect and to express the hope that, in the enactment of any legislation bearing on foreign schools due regard will be taken of the rights guaranteed American institutions under the Montreux Convention freely to carry on their activities, at least during the period of transition provided in the Convention.

The Legation has also been authorized to express the additional hope of the Department of State that, apart from the question of the rights involved, nothing will be done which might be regarded as a backward step from the position taken by the Egyptian Government at Montreux. The Department of State and the Legation have closely followed the course of this matter and cannot but feel that, if American educational institutions are placed in the defensive position of having to justify their work continually and in detail, their effectiveness and the enthusiasm of the personnel will be bound to suffer with severe results to their contribution to Egyptian education. Sooner or later, if the questions of educational restrictions are constantly agitated, these institutions would be bound to consider whether the contribution which they are permitted will be sufficient to justify its continuance. It is hoped, therefore, that their work will be permitted to go forward under reasonable conditions consistent with the assurances given at Montreux and in a spirit of mutual respect and understanding.

CAIRO, May 24, 1941.

383.0063/34

*The Egyptian Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs
(Sirry) to the American Minister in Egypt (Kirk)*⁷⁸

[Translation]

No. 38.106/2

CAIRO, 12 June, 1941.

No. 63

MY DEAR MR. MINISTER: Having discussed with H. E. the Minister of Education the subject referred to in Your Excellency's letter of the 24th May concerning the American educational institutions in this country, we have come to the conclusion that the apprehensions referred to in the note accompanying the letter are groundless. On the contrary the American institutions in Egypt, like all foreign institutions, receive from the Egyptian Ministry of Education due regard and appreciation. The provisions made in the Treaty of Montreux concerning these institutions are carefully observed, and the Egyptian Ministry of Education gives all non-government educational institutions all the assistance they need to enable them to carry out their work within the limits of law and order.

The project of law for the amendment of Act 40, 1934 need not arouse any apprehension whatsoever. This project has been drawn after long and detailed discussion between the Ministry of Education and those in charge of the various foreign institutions, amongst whom of course were those in charge of the American institutions, with Dr. Watson, Chancellor of the American University, at their head.

The text of the Treaty of Montreux regarding this subject was carefully taken into consideration when the amendments were proposed, and the whole project, besides, is now before the Legislative Committee of the Egyptian Government, who will make sure that its items conform strictly to the provisions of the Treaty.

In fact, the amendment of Act 40, 1934 as laid down in the aforesaid project was a matter of absolute necessity, and should arouse no opposition whatever. Furthermore, the amendments affecting foreign institutions had the full consent of those in charge of the institutions themselves, with the possible exception of the item dealing with religious teaching about which there was a slight difference of opinion.

This difference, however, was limited to some of the details and did not affect the principle itself; and on this point the Ministry of Education was as tolerant as it could possibly be. It is a fundamental principle that the pupil should be taught no religion other than his own. No infringement of this principle is permissible either by

⁷⁸ Copy transmitted to the Department by the Minister in Egypt in his despatch No. 82, August 8; received December 9.

public morality or public order. Acting on this principle, the Ministry of Education has justly refused to be bound by any declaration to the contrary made by the pupils' parents or guardians. By so doing the Ministry has no other intention than the protection of the pupils' creeds and it has therefore accepted the proposal submitted by Dr. Watson, Chancellor of the American University, as it was in no way contradictory to the above principle. It was formally laid down in the explanatory note attached to the project that this new article prohibits only the teaching of any religion to the pupil except his own. But the teachers are free to make any reference to the history or the moral principles of other religions in the classroom during the lessons of philosophy, ethics, and the like, provided they are not intended to tamper with the pupils' religion either directly or indirectly.

The Ministry of Education is therefore convinced that the project of law for the amendment of Act 40, 1934 is quite natural and in agreement with the letter and spirit of the Treaty of Montreux, a fact which will be further taken into consideration by the Legislative Committee of the Egyptian Government.

This being the case, there is, we believe, no ground for the apprehensions referred to in the note accompanying Your Excellency's letter. When put into effect, the law will have the same aim in the future as it had during the past School-Year, namely full and explicit cooperation between the Ministry of Education and all non-government Educational Institutions for the welfare of the pupils, the teaching authorities and education as a whole. No complaint has been made to the Ministry of Education against its inspection of the foreign schools, which may arouse any apprehension about the future. On the contrary the Ministry is sure that the projected amendments and the way in which Act 40, 1934 is now carried out are the natural preparation for the future evolution of the institutions, enabling them in the meantime to go through the transition stage, and the subsequent stages as well, in such a way as will make the cooperation between this country and the foreign institutions fruitful for all concerned.

Your Excellency, therefore, need have no apprehensions on this subject, and you may rest assured that our country's desire to safeguard her sovereignty will in no way make her forget the valuable educational and cultural services rendered to her by the foreign institutions.

It is her earnest desire to help these institutions to perform their duties, to enjoy in full their educational independence, and preserve their special characteristics intact, subject only to the restrictions of public morality and public order.

I am [etc.]

H. SIRRY

383.0063/34

*The American Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs (Samy)*⁷⁴

No. 74

CAIRO, July 12, 1941.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to the Royal Ministry's note no. 63, file no. 38.106/2 of June 12, 1941 in reply to my communication of May 24 transmitting a memorandum setting forth certain considerations regarding the prospective effect on American educational institutions in Egypt of legislation reported to be under consideration with a view to the amendment of Law 40 of 1934 governing the activities of private schools.

I have noted with pleasure the assurances given in the Royal Ministry's note in respect of the favorable disposition of the Egyptian Government toward foreign educational institutions in general and American institutions in particular and the statement of the Royal Ministry that any legislation framed affecting such institutions would be in accordance with the engagements given by the Egyptian Government under the Montreux Convention and appended instruments. In order, however, to avoid any possible misunderstanding in this connection I venture to invite the attention of the Royal Ministry to a point mentioned in its note under reference which does not accord with information available to me on the subject. I refer to the statement to the effect that "the amendments affecting foreign institutions had the full consent of those in charge of the institutions themselves, with the possible exception of the item dealing with religious teaching about which there was a slight divergence of opinion". It is my understanding in this connection that in addition to the matter of religious instruction there were certain other subjects on which the representatives of the foreign schools, including the representatives of the American schools, failed to agree in whole or in part with the representatives of the Ministry of Education and that certain of these differences of opinion were set forth in letters addressed to the Minister of Education by these representatives, copies of three of which, dated March 14, 1941, March 21, 1941 and March 26, 1941, respectively, are transmitted herewith.⁷⁵ The contents of these memoranda are deemed to be self explanatory.

Another aspect of this matter to which I would invite Your Excellency's attention is the informal character of the conferences held between the representatives of the Ministry of Education and of foreign institutions. It is my understanding that the activity of the

⁷⁴ Copy transmitted to the Department by the Minister in Egypt in his despatch No. 82, August 8; received December 9.

⁷⁵ None found in Department files.

representatives of foreign institutions, including the American, in this connection was confined exclusively to personal consultation on the invitation of the Minister of Education with a view to the benefit which might accrue from a free exchange of ideas on matters of mutual interest and that the representatives of the foreign institutions were not empowered officially to make any commitments in respect of the organizations with which they were identified and to which they had not submitted the proposals, nor were they authorized in any way whatsoever to speak for American institutions whose representatives did not attend the conferences. Reference is made in this connection to the letter dated March 21, 1941 addressed to the Minister of Education by the representatives of certain schools, already mentioned above as an enclosure herewith.

I should be most appreciative if Your Excellency would be so good as to use your good offices to bring these considerations to the attention of the appropriate authorities with a view to removing such misunderstanding on the subject as now apparently exists. At the same time, I would add that upon consultation with representatives of American educational institutions since the receipt of the Royal Ministry's note under acknowledgement I find that upon the basis of information available to them they are still apprehensive that the proposed legislation would be prejudicial to their status as guaranteed under the Montreux Convention and in this connection I wish to reiterate to Your Excellency the hope of my Government that no action will be taken by the Egyptian Government in derogation of such formal guarantees or of the generally cooperative position taken by the Egyptian representatives at Montreux in respect of foreign educational institutions.

I wish to assure Your Excellency of my readiness to furnish any further information in the premises which you may require or to discuss the matter with you personally should you so desire.

Please accept [etc.]

ALEXANDER KIRK

383.0063/34

*The Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs (Samy) to the American Minister in Egypt (Kirk)*⁷⁶

[Translation]

No. P. 2—38.106/2

CAIRO, July 24, 1941.

No. P 12167

MR. MINISTER: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's letter No. 74 of July 12, 1941 in regard to the proposed

⁷⁶ Copy transmitted to the Department by the Minister in Egypt in his despatch No. 82, August 8; received December 9.

legislation for the elaboration and modification of Law No. 40 of 1934 concerning the activities of private educational institutions.

I have not failed to transmit the contents of this letter to the competent authorities and to request them to make a detailed examination of the question in the light of the assurances given by this Ministry.⁷⁸

I avail myself [etc.]

SALIB SAMY

783.003/383 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, August 7, 1941—7 p. m.

[Received August 9—9:29 a. m.]

1097. The Department's mail instruction No. 537, March 7, 1941. The compilation of the supplementary information regarding American institutions is virtually complete and the Legation contemplates forwarding this material to the Foreign Office at an early date. It is not believed, however, that any useful purpose would be served by the submission of an interpretation of the exchange of letters at Montreux as suggested in the Department's instruction under reference in view of the fact that meanwhile [apparent omission] the Department's telegraphic instruction No. 144 of May 12, 8 p. m., on the basis of which representations have been made twice to Egyptian Government with regard to the matter of foreign schools as reported in my 998, July 22, noon.⁷⁹ In the circumstances it is believed that further discussions at the time would serve only to complicate the issue. This point has been discussed with the British Embassy which is in entire agreement and which expects shortly to submit the supplementary information regarding British establishments as a routine matter without comment.

The list of American institutions is the same as that enclosed with the Legation's despatch No. 2281 [2282] of December 21, 1940⁷⁹ with the omission of the Rockefeller Foundation as authorized by the Department's instruction No. 521 of December 26, 1940,⁷⁹ with the listing of the Peniel American Mission, Port Said, as a religious institution, and addition of the following schools: (1) The three schools of the Pentecost Faith Mission mentioned in the despatch under reference; (2) an American Mission sub-primary school at Quesna; and (3) a primary school of the Church of God Mission at Alexandria.

The Department's telegraphic approval of the above is requested.

KIRK

⁷⁸ There is no indication in the Department files that any further negotiations took place on this issue.

⁷⁹ Not printed.

783.003/383 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk)

WASHINGTON, August 18, 1941—8 p. m.

384. Your 1097, August 7, 7 p. m. In view of the exchange of views between the Legation and the Egyptian Government which has taken place since the Department's mail instruction of March 7, 1941 was drafted, the Legation is authorized to forward to the Foreign Office without comment the compilation of supplementary information respecting American institutions.

The list of American institutions as amended by the Legation's telegram under reference is approved.

HULL

783.003/384

*The American Legation in Egypt to the Egyptian Ministry for Foreign Affairs*⁸⁰

No. 195

The Legation of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has the honor to refer to the Legation's Note No. 16 dated April 19, 1941,⁸¹ and previous correspondence relative to the American educational, medical and charitable institutions in Egypt which were the subject of an exchange of letters between the Egyptian and American delegations at the Montreux Conference.

The information requested by the Royal Ministry with respect to the American institutions has now been compiled and is transmitted herewith.⁸¹ It will be observed that the material relates to ten establishments, namely:

- The American Mission in Egypt
- The American University at Cairo
- The Assemblies of God Mission School, Shubra
- The Assiut Orphanage
- The Egyptian Expedition of the Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York
- The Epigraphic and Architectural Survey of the Oriental Institute, the University of Chicago
- The International Committee of Young Men's Christian Associations of the United States and Canada
- The Joint Expedition of Harvard University and the Museum of Fine Arts (Boston)

⁸⁰ Copy transmitted to the Department by the Minister in Egypt in his airmail despatch No. 141, November 13; received November 27.

⁸¹ Not found in Department files.

The Peniel American Mission School, Port Said
 The Pentecost Faith Mission Orphanage at Alexandria and
 Schools in Girga Province.

There is attached a revised list of the American institutions in Egypt, superseding the list enclosed with the Legation's note No. 870 of December 14, 1940.⁸³

The Legation of the United States of America avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs the assurances of its high consideration.

CAIRO, November 13, 1941.

[Enclosure]

List of Institutions Referred to in the Letter of the President of the Egyptian Delegation to the President of the American Delegation At Montreux dated May 8, 1937

A. EDUCATIONAL (Total 49)

1. The Joint Expedition of Harvard University and the Museum of Fine Arts (Boston), Harvard Camp, Pyramids P. O. Cairo (Archaeological).
2. The Epigraphic and Architectural Survey of the Oriental Institute, the University of Chicago, Luxor (Archaeological).
3. The Egyptian Expedition of the Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York, Luxor (Archaeological).
4. The American University at Cairo.
5. The following 40 schools are maintained by the American Mission in Egypt:⁸⁴

Secondary:

Assiut College for Boys
 Assiut College for Girls (P. M. I.)
 Ezbekia, Cairo, Boys
 American College for Girls, Cairo
 Tanta Girls College
 Ezbekia, Cairo, Girls

Sub-Secondary:

Luxor, Girls
 Fayoum, Girls
 Alexandria, Girls
 Zagazig, Girls

⁸³ Enclosure to despatch No. 2282, December 21, 1940, from the Minister in Egypt, not printed.

⁸⁴ In a note of December 15, 1941, the American Legation informed the Egyptian Ministry for Foreign Affairs that the Zagazig Sub-Secondary School for Girls and the Zagazig Primary School for Boys, listed below, were at that time being operated by the Egyptian General Mission, a British institution (783.003/385).

Primary:

Luxor, Boys
 Beni Suef, Girls
 Benha, Girls
 Mansura, Girls
 Alexandria, Boys
 Minet El Gamh
 Estanha
 Mehella Kubra
 Dessouk
 Sombat
 Birket Es Saba
 Mit Yaish
 Benha, Boys
 Mansura, Boys
 Karmuz, Alexandria, Girls
 Sheblanga
 Zagazig
 Kafr Sheikh
 Tamia
 Simbellawein, Girls

Sub-Primary:

Ashment
 Abshawai
 Zerbe
 Luxor Village, Girls
 Abbassia Orphanage, Cairo, Girls
 Quesna, Girls

Special Schools:

Alexandria Commercial
 Experimental Village School, Edmu
 Bible Women's Training School, Tanta
 Schutz School for Missionary Children, Alexandria (now temporarily at Assiut)

6. The following school is affiliated with the Apostolic Church of God in Egypt (Assemblies of God):

American Primary School for Girls, 192 Sharia El Teraa El Bulakia, Cairo.

7. The following school is maintained by the Peniel American Mission:

Primary School for Girls, Sharia Kitchener, Port Said.

8. The following three schools are maintained by the Pentecost Faith Mission:

Sohag
 Girga
 Kom Budar

B. MEDICAL (Total 3)

The following three medical institutions are maintained by the American Mission in Egypt:

Assiut Hospital
Tanta Hospital
Husseineya Welfare Center, Cairo

C. CHARITABLE (Total 8)

1. The following five charitable institutions are maintained by the American Mission in Egypt:

Fowler Orphanage for Girls, Abbassia, Cairo
Community Center, Benha
Community Center, Beni Suef
Community Center, Mansura
Community Center, Tanta

2. The following charitable institution is affiliated with the Apostolic Church of God in Egypt (Assemblies of God):

Assiut Orphanage, Assiut

3. The International Committee of Young Men's Christian Associations of the United States and Canada (Corporate name: International Committee of Young Men's Christian Associations), 60 Sharia Ibrahim Pasha, Cairo.

Note: The listing of the International Committee of Young Men's Christian Associations of the United States and Canada relates only to the American Interest in the organization.

4. Pentecost Faith Mission Orphanage, Bulkeley, Ramleh, Alexandria.

D. RELIGIOUS (Total 9)

1. The American Mission in Egypt, Ezbekia, Cairo.

2. Pentecost Faith Mission, Bulkeley, Ramleh, Alexandria.

3. Apostolic Church of God in Egypt (affiliated with "The Assemblies of God" in America, Headquarters at Springfield, Missouri), Villa Almaz, Assiut.

4. Egyptian Mission of the Arabic Union Mission of Seventh-Day Adventists, 16 Avenue de Koubbeh, Heliopolis.

5. The American Church, Ezbekia, Cairo.

6. Church of God Mission, 1 Naucratis Street, Camp de Cesar, Alexandria.

7. American Bible Society, Bible Lands Agency South, 62 Sharia Ibrahim Pasha, Cairo.

Note: This organization is jointly administered by the American Bible Society and the British & Foreign Bible Society and the listing relates only to the American joint interest in the organization.

8. American Mission Cemetery, Old Cairo.
9. Peniel American Mission, Sharia Kitchener, Port Said.

**INFORMAL REPRESENTATIONS BY THE UNITED STATES REGARDING
EGYPTIAN PROCLAMATION REQUIRING A DECLARATION OF HOLD-
INGS OF DOLLAR CURRENCY OR SECURITIES**

883.5151/39 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, September 8, 1941—8 p. m.
[Received September 9—2:20 p. m.]

1306. Tonight's *Bourse Egyptienne* carries a military proclamation signed by the Prime Minister reading in translation as follows:

(Begin translation) : We Hussein Sirry Pasha in view of the Decree of September 1, 1931 [1939], declaring a State of Siege on all Egyptian territory and by virtue of the powers conferred upon us by the Decree of November 16, 1940, order the following:

Article 1. Whoever possess or holds dollars in Egypt or abroad in any form whatsoever, whether they be in currency or other forms of payment, or whether in some form of credit, or whoever possesses or holds stocks or other negotiable securities in United States dollars must declare them within a certain period and under such conditions as shall be established by a regulation of the Ministry of Finance.

The Declaration in question may be required by a regulation of the Ministry of Finance in respect of the funds previously defined which were possessed or held in any form whatsoever at dates to be fixed by the regulation on the condition, however, that they refer to no period prior to September 1, 1931 [1939]; in the latter case, the declarant must indicate every transaction effected subsequent to the periods in question.

Article 2. The funds mentioned in the preceding Article shall not be the subject of any transfer or operation without previous authorization from the Minister of Finance.

Article 3. The Ministry of Finance may by regulation extend the measures provided for in the preceding articles to funds in other foreign currencies.

Article 4. Without prejudice to the application of more severe penalties provided for in the penal code the revealing of information on the part of officials or any other person charged with the responsibility of performing work connected with the Declarations provided for by the foregoing articles shall be punished by imprisonment not exceed[ing] 6 months or a fine not exceeding pounds Egyptian 20 or both.

Article 5. The failure to make a declaration during the prescribed time or the making of false declaration shall be punished by a fine not exceeding pounds Egyptian 20.

If the violation has been knowingly committed with the view to concealing funds that have been declared, the penalty shall be im-

prisonment for not more than 3 months or a fine of not more than pounds Egyptian 200 or both. Signed, Hussein Sirry. Cairo, September 7, 1941. (End translation.)

The Official Journal containing the foregoing is not yet available. The matter is being investigated.

KIRK

883.5151/40 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, September 9, 1941—11 a. m.
[Received September 10—6:01 a. m.]

1311. My 1306, September 8, 8 p. m. According to a British Embassy source, the proclamation under reference is the result of informal representations recently made by the British Embassy in conformity with instructions from London with the immediate view to having the Egyptian Government ascertain the exact amount of dollar funds held abroad by persons residing in Egypt. This source states that at the time the representations were made, it was suggested that an endeavor should be made also to ascertain the amount of all non-sterling holdings abroad but that the proclamation was prepared and issued without further consultation with the Embassy and before it was expected.

The same source has stated that the ultimate aim of the proclamation possibly is to oblige persons here holding dollar funds abroad to exchange them for Egyptian or possibly British securities and that such action is necessitated owing to the fact that the greatly increased demand for dollars in Egypt for the purchase of American goods is causing a considerable drain upon the British exchequer especially since Egypt now sells practically no goods to the United States. He states further that although the Bank of England is endeavoring in various ways to curtail dollar expenditures in Egypt and although the British desire that the Egyptian Government establish an import licensing system, they are somewhat reluctant for political reasons to insist thereon lest they should be further criticized for interfering in internal affairs in Egypt. Nevertheless, he added, such a system may prove necessary in the near future, particularly in view of the large dollar expenditures now in Egypt for the purchase in the United States of nonessential goods such as beer, toilet articles, and certain clothing as silk stockings which can be sold at highly speculative prices and accordingly have greatly increased the pressure for dollar credits on the part of local merchants.

In discussing this matter with the British Embassy it was pointed out that the fact that the proclamation singles United States dollars

out alone for declaration gives it the appearance at least of a discriminatory measure.

KIRK

883.5151/41 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, September 10, 1941—11 a. m.

[Received September 12—6 a. m.]

1318. My 1311, September 9, 11 a. m. Although the proclamation under reference has aroused considerable speculation in Cairo particularly among business circles as to the ultimate aim of the Government in endeavoring to ascertain the extent of dollar holdings here and abroad it is being generally interpreted in commercial and banking circles as the first step toward obliging at least Egyptian and British nationals if not all holders resident in Egypt to exchange their United States securities for Egyptian or British securities. Several prominent American businessmen have interpreted the proclamation in this light and have expressed the view that if such a drastic measure were applied to them they would prefer to liquidate their affairs here rather than comply therewith.

Since the proclamation has been instigated by London and is presumably in line with general British policy for safeguarding British exchange control concerning the nature of which this Legation possesses information of only a general nature but in respect of which the Department is doubtless fully informed and may have had the occasion to form a policy, the Legation feels that it should refrain from taking a definite position in the matter unless so instructed by the Department. Any directives therefor which the Department may care to furnish in the premises would be appreciated.

KIRK

883.5151/39 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk)

WASHINGTON, September 12, 1941—7 p. m.

459. Your 1306, September 8, 8 p. m., 1311, September 9, 11 a. m., and 1318, September 10, 11 a. m. You are requested to discuss the text of the proclamation informally with the appropriate Egyptian authorities, pointing out that in cases where similar regulations have been enacted in other foreign countries American nationals have been relieved, under certain stipulated conditions, from the obligation of declaring or offering for sale to the pertinent authorities their securities and foreign currency holdings, and that it is the earnest hope of

this Government that the Egyptian regulations will be applied in an equally liberal manner to American citizens residing in Egypt.

For use in your discretion, it may be stated that the British Government has granted broad exemptions in favor of American nationals (not also possessing British nationality) residing in the United Kingdom from the requirement under the Defense (Finance) Regulations of declaring or surrendering foreign currency balances and securities. Similar exemptions have been extended to American nationals in all British colonies and mandates, and have been granted, wherever the question has been raised, in British Dominions.

HULL

883.5151/44 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, September 17, 1941—8 p. m.
[Received September 19—5:27 a. m.]

1405. I have discussed with the Minister for Foreign Affairs ^{84a} in the sense of the Department's 459, September 12, 7 p. m., the proclamation relating to the declaration of holdings of dollar currency or securities and was assured of a speedy reply.

An announcement has been made that the declaration provided for in the proclamation must be made before September 30th.

KIRK

883.5151/50 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, September 30, 1941—6 p. m.
[Received October 2—5:10 p. m.]

1496. My 1405, September 17, 6 [8] p. m. In view of the fact that the Ministry of Finance issued an order published in the *Journal Officiel* of September 15 setting September 30 as the date before which the dollar holdings of persons residing in Egypt should be declared I repeatedly requested the Minister for Foreign Affairs at least to exempt American citizens and companies from making such declarations pending a final decision on the matter. Today the Minister for Foreign Affairs telephoned me to say that the Minister of Finance had prolonged the period in which the declaration might be made until a solution of the matter had been attained.

The Legation understands that the Egyptian authorities with the view to following a procedure similar to that of the British had requested the British Embassy here to furnish them detailed informa-

^{84a} Salib Samy.

tion on the legal exemptions granted to American citizens residing in the United Kingdom in respect of this matter, that the British Embassy had received such information only yesterday and that accordingly the Egyptian authorities were not in the position to reach a decision prior to the date on which the declarations should have been made.

KIRK

883.5151/49 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, October 1, 1941—1 p. m.

[Received October 2—4: 33 p. m.]

1500. My 1496, September 30, 6 p. m. The Legation has received a note from the Foreign Office confirming the telephone message mentioned in the Legation's telegram under reference to the effect that pending a final decision on the matter American nationals and firms in Egypt will be exempt from declaring their dollar holdings in Egypt and abroad.

KIRK

883.5151/50 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk)

WASHINGTON, October 8, 1941—9 p. m.

543. Your 1496, September 30, 6 p. m., and 1500, October 1, 1 p. m. For your guidance in possible future discussions with the Egyptian authorities⁸⁵ concerning the requirements for declaring holdings of dollar currency and securities, the following is the Department's understanding with respect to the exemptions granted to American nationals residing in the United Kingdom:

American nationals residing in the United Kingdom and not also possessing British nationality are exempt from declaring their securities whether acquired before or after the date on which the Defense (Finance) Regulations became effective. This does not include securities which were acquired after that date from a person affected by the regulations, or those which were acquired from or in place of balances which are not exempt from surrender according to the regulations hereinafter defined. If it is desired to export from the United Kingdom any securities, it is necessary to obtain permission to export in the usual way and the authorities must be assured that the applicant has been exempted under the arrangement permitting American

⁸⁵ No record of further discussion of this subject has been found in the Department files.

citizens to retain their securities. American nationals are also not required to surrender foreign currency balances which they acquired before the date on which the regulations were made effective, nor balances which they acquired after that date provided (a) that the acquisition of these balances has not been in contravention of the Defense (Finance) Regulations, and, particularly, that it was not the result of the sale of sterling balances for which permission is necessary, and (b) that the foreign currency balances were not acquired in the course of current trade or similar transactions.

It will be noted that the exemptions apply only to individuals and not to business enterprises.

HULL

ETHIOPIA

LIBERATION OF ETHIOPIA AND CONQUEST OF ITALIAN EAST AFRICA BY THE BRITISH; EXCHANGE OF MESSAGES BETWEEN PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND EMPEROR HAILE SELASSIE

740.0011 European War 1939/7921 : Telegram

The Consul at Aden (Timberlake) to the Secretary of State

ADEN, January 25, 1941—8 p. m.

[Received January 27—5 a. m.]

6. Immediate objectives fighting around Kassala are Asmara and Massama. I have reason to believe that British are preparing early general attack on Abyssinia from three sides, principal thrust from Kassala through Lake Tana region which has never submitted to Italians and diverting attacks from Kenya and from Aden at British Somaliland. I am reliably informed British officers have for some time been active and successful in Abyssinia organizing guerilla warfare, very large amounts of war material, particularly planes, light tanks, and troops have recently passed here destined for Port Sudan from which point railway is now clear to Kassala which is expected to be used as a base of operations.

Preliminary Eritrean campaign launched to prevent possible flank attack on eventual Ethiopian venture should also clear up Red Sea within a month and release many warships on Red Sea convoy.

The Italians are reported to have total armed strength of 250,000, mostly natives, in Abyssinia but plan defense only at two or three strategic positions near Addis Ababa where lines of communication are short. Serious shortage of gasoline, especially aviation, reported in Abyssinia.

On the basis of continuing reports, native uprisings, low morale and general supply shortage, and in view of heavy British preparations, I believe main offensive which will probably start within 6 weeks likely to produce capitulation Italian East Africa early in spring.

TIMBERLAKE

740.0011 European War 1939/8156 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State

ROME, February 6, 1941—noon.

[Received February 6—11:15 a. m.]

167. There is deep concern apparent in Italian circles with regard to the situation of Italian women and children in Italian East Africa

now unable to leave the country. This fear will presumably become acute with advance of British forces and probable native uprisings. In the circumstances it occurs to me that it would be in line with our tradition and would at the same time be a highly important gesture for us to make at this moment if, acting on my own initiative and yet with your approval, I could discuss the situation at the Foreign Office intimating that we might be able to be of assistance in evacuating the women and children. Already I have heard it said that the Japanese might undertake this task. In event that Italian Government should welcome my suggestion we should of course have to explore the possibility of chartering a vessel immediately available in those waters.

PHILLIPS

740.0011 European War 1939/8156: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Italy (Phillips)

WASHINGTON, February 7, 1941—6 p. m.

68. Your 167, February 6, noon. For reasons of policy the Department does not desire you to undertake any arrangements personally or on behalf of this Government looking toward the chartering of a vessel or other active participation in the evacuation of Italian nationals in Italian East Africa. However, the Department regarding with humanitarian concern the situation of Italian women and children there, authorizes you informally to discuss their situation with the appropriate Italian authorities and to offer your good offices in an informal approach to the British authorities for safe conduct and such other facilities as those authorities may be able to extend to the Italian authorities in evacuating Italian women and children and other noncombatants from the area in question. Formal approach to the British authorities in the matter would, of course, have previously to be made through the Brazilian Embassy at Rome inasmuch as it is understood that the representation of Italian interests in Great Britain have been undertaken by the Brazilian Government. The Department is glad to have had you bring the matter to its attention and in view of its sympathetic interest in it, will appreciate prompt word from you as to further developments.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/8229: Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State

ROME, February 8, 1941—5 p. m.

[Received February 8—3 p. m.]

181. Department's 68, February 7, 6 p. m. This morning in conversation with Anfuso who is in charge of the Foreign Office I men-

tioned my concern over the possible fate of the Italian women and children in Ethiopia who might in certain eventualities be in danger of native uprisings, et cetera, and who were now unable to leave the country. I said I desired to offer my services in an informal approach to the British authorities in this matter if the Italian Government desired me to do so. I added that the Department of State knew of the step which I was taking and that it had their sympathetic interest.

Anfuso assured me that he would communicate at once with Mussolini and he hoped that he would be able to give me an expression of views tomorrow or the day after.

PHILLIPS

740.0011 European War 1939/9122 : Telegram

The Chargé in Egypt (Hare) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, March 17, 1941—3 p. m.
[Received March 18—6:30 a. m.]

121. It has been learned from a British official source that Berbera¹ was captured as a result of a fleet operation at 7 a. m., March 15, but thus far news of the event has not been released. Control of this port will give the British a much better supply line for their East African forces than from Italian Somaliland ports and will also facilitate planned utilization of air bases in British Somaliland and East Central Abyssinia as soon as advance troops are able to occupy those areas.

HARE

365D.1163/168 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk)

WASHINGTON, March 31, 1941—4 p. m.

67. You are requested to advise the British military authorities through appropriate channel, for their information and the extension of such protection and courtesies as may prove possible, of the presence in Addis Ababa of the following American Mission personnel who are American citizens unless otherwise indicated:

Seventh-Day Adventist: Mr. and Mrs. Herbert Hanson, Miss Mae Mathews, Balle Nielsen (Danish), Rasmina Hofstad (Norwegian), Lisa Johannesson (Swedish). United Presbyterian: Mr. and Mrs. Duncan Henry and two children.

HULL

¹ In British Somaliland.

740.0011 European War 1939/9581 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, April 2, 1941—3 p. m.
[Received April 3—8:50 a. m.]

173. The Legation's telegram No. 169, April 1, 6 p. m.² Today's press announces the capitulation of Asmara and concludes that it marks the final collapse of the Italians in East Africa. A confidential military source reveals that the British are sending a brigade to Massawa which they expect to take without difficulty.

The Legation has also received a confidential report that Addis Ababa could only be defended at the Hawash River and that the Italians possess practically no means of defense even at that point. Consequently the British consider that Addis Ababa will fall without resistance and that some troops will enter that city within a short time. According to this report South African troops, advancing rapidly west of Diredawa, have reached Deder and probably are now beyond that point. The report adds that excellent results from bombing and machine gunning have been reported in the Dessie and Alomata districts.

KIRK

865D.1163/170 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, April 3, 1941—4 p. m.
[Received April 5—5:40 p. m.]

180. Department's 67, March 31, 4 p. m., concerning American mission personnel at Addis Ababa. The British Embassy states that this matter has been brought to the attention of the appropriate military authorities.

KIRK

740.0011 European War 1939/9686 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, April 6, 1941—1 p. m.
[Received April 7—3:02 a. m.]

202. The Legation is informed that the report has just been received of the fall of Addis Ababa but that the report has not yet been released.

KIRK

² Not printed.

740.0011 European War 1939/9741 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, April 7, 1941—10 a. m.

[Received April 8—9:20 p. m.]

205. Press this morning likens the fall of Addis Ababa to that of Asmara in that surrender was by the civilian authorities after passage of retreating army through the city. The Duke of Aosta and staff are reported to have left with these troops which are supposed to be moving toward Dessie in which direction the Italian forces formerly in Eritrea are also retreating. In both cases it is stated the spirit of resistance of the Italian troops appears to be broken.

Royal Air Force communiqué published this morning states that Addis Ababa was heavily bombed prior to entry of the British troops and that direct hits were hangars, aerodrome buildings and barracks. In addition aircraft on ground were machinegunned.

According to the press the next objective of the British is Dessie which is junction on the road supplying the Italian force in the Gondar region and also commands the road to Assab and indirectly to French Somaliland.

The civil Governor of Massawa is reported to have refused to surrender despite the plea of the civil Governor of Asamara in order to relieve food shortage in the latter place. According to most recent information released to the press a free French patrol was within 8 miles and French and Indian troops within 10 miles of Massawa.

KIRK

740.0011 European War 1939/9797 : Telegram

The Consul at Aden (Timberlake) to the Secretary of State

ADEN, April 7, 1941—2 p. m.

[Received April 9—3:05 p. m.]

17. Two squadrons Air Force left here yesterday for Egypt.

I am informed British were requested by the Italians to enter Addis Ababa Saturday to help stem massacres by Abyssinians. Native troops deserted the Italians wholesale during the past week. Only remaining points of resistance Massawa, Gondar region and Assab.

French Somaliland stated to have less than 1 month's food supply.

I can secure permission if so instructed to visit Addis Ababa, Berbera and Djibouti on grounds of American property interests and have close personal relations with a very well-informed local businessman who knows that country thoroughly who is leaving within the next few days and whom I could accompany. I believe I can obtain information of sufficient interest to justify the trip. Less than 3 weeks

would be necessary, telegraphic communication with the Department could be maintained and if circumstances warrant I could return to Aden by Royal Air Force plane. \$150 ample.

TIMBERLAKE

740.0011 European War 1939/9797 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul at Aden (Timberlake)

[Extract]

WASHINGTON, April 12, 1941—7 p. m.

10. For Timberlake. You are instructed to proceed Addis Ababa, Berbera and Djibouti for the purpose indicated in your 17, April 7, 2 p. m. . . .

HULL

365D.1163/172 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, April 25, 1941.

[Received April 26—1:37 p. m.]

335. Department's 67, March 31. Legation is informed by British military authorities that following members American mission at Addis Ababa with other names to follow are safe and will be given all assistance necessary: Mr. and Mrs. Duncan, Henry W. Henry, H. Hanson and Mae Matthews.

KIRK

740.0011 European War 1939/10360 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, April 26, 1941—noon.

[Received April 27—11:25 a. m.]

340. Commenting on information just released in London regarding armistice negotiations with the Duke of Aosta, informed circles in Cairo are reported in today's press to have observed that while a large proportion of the Italian civilian population in East Africa had been concentrated in Asmara and Addis Ababa there remained a number of small groups at outlying stations who had repeatedly appealed for British protection. It is emphasized that the Abyssinians had themselves shown great restraint and that there had been no evidence of their deliberately attacking Italian civilians but that native soldiers deserting from the Italian Army had formed marauding bands which were a source of potential danger to civilians. The British felt, however, that it was unreasonable that they should be required to protect civilians who had already been given an oppor-

tunity to leave since the principal object of the British was to finish the war in East Africa as soon as possible. As a consequence, armistice negotiations had been initiated although it is still not clear which side made the original overture. Continuing to cite Cairo informed sources, the press indicates that the Italians were prepared to accept the British terms but that they were constrained to adopt their present delaying tactics under pressure by the Germans who desired to see the British forces tied up as long as possible.

KIRK

365D.1115/13 : Telegram

The Consul at Aden (Timberlake) to the Secretary of State

ADEN via NAIROBI, May 8, 1941.

[Received May 9—7:45 a. m.]

Following Americans with citizenship now safe in Abyssinia. Elizabeth Fargo and four children, passport 2155 issued Rome, December 14, 1939, and D. C. Henry, wife, two children, American Hospital Mission. Herbert M. Hanson, wife, and Mae Matthews, Seventh-Day Adventist Mission. Marion H. P. Dusmot, passport 44922 issued Washington, August 23, 1939, two children. Mission Hospital being used by British with complete agreement Henry. General Officer Commanding Cunningham and Brigadier Lush, Chief Political Officer, Addis Ababa, desire use American ships assist evacuation Italian civilians numbering about 40,000 from Berbera to South Africa during next few months starting immediately, also anxious Red Cross ambulance with medical staff but [and] medical supplies necessary for field work this area over next year. Suggest Ford or Chevrolet since repair parts other vehicles unobtainable. I have received personal invitation from Haile Selassie and General Cunningham be present at Ceremony May 5th triumphant entry Emperor Addis Ababa. Outside British no other foreign representative invited. Suggest congratulatory message would be appreciated by Emperor. Telegraph in clear will reach headquarters Addis Ababa if addressed Political Officer Addis Ababa via Aden too. 1815 Thi 0635/GMT/8.

TIMBERLAKE

884.001 Selassie I/371 : [Telegram]

*The Emperor of Ethiopia (Haile Selassie I) to President Roosevelt*³

[Undated.]

At this time of trouble and distress for all peoples who love liberty of conscience and justice to small nations, I know that you and the

³ Received under covering letter from the British Embassy dated May 9, (not printed), stating that the message was received by telegram from the British Ambassador at Cairo.

people of the United States of America will share joy in the restoration of freedom to Ethiopia. The greed of stupid brutality which has destroyed the liberties of Europe and now seeks to spread its cancerous growth through all lands, has met here in Ethiopia its first decisive defeat, when neither I nor my people have ever accepted the immoral conquest nor ceased to appeal to the judgment of God and the conscience of the world by offering of lives for our freedom. It was fitting that the first victim of the Axis greed should be the first to be delivered, that the cynical disregard of the verdict of fifteen Assembly Nations should first be punished. The unrebuked aggression of 1935 proved the forerunner of all later aggressions and the herald of world war, and since this first offence began the train of disaster. May its atonement prove the beginning of deliverance for all who love righteousness and the first among these stands England who, fighting alone, valiantly defends the liberties of all of us. In the midst of cruel attacks this brave nation found means to come to the aid of the Ethiopian forces still fighting alone in mountain strongholds, and in happy unity of effort drove the enemy from our borders. It was a source of joy to me that I was able before the final assault to take the field at the head of my own forces and reconquer all my territory lying west of the Nile. Elsewhere other patriots helped forward the brilliant advance of British Forces which in Eritrea destroyed the enemy's sure stronghold, while from the South they drove him with a speed unequalled in the history of war from his defended frontier through his capital and beyond. It remains now for us to labour first to recompense our great ally by releasing his forces and helping his defences, and secondly to build here a State founded on the fear of God, liberty of conscience and Democratic institutions not by might or by power, but by spirit *said the Lord*.

865D.01/599

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

No. 498

LONDON, May 16, 1941.

[Received June 9.]

SIR: In continuation of my despatches No. 6641 of January 25 and No. 6719 of February 10, 1941,⁴ I have the honor to report that, despite the return of the Emperor to Addis Ababa, the British Government still considers his restoration to the throne as in the nature of an experiment. In this connection there are quoted below two questions addressed to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the House of Commons on May 14, 1941 together with Mr. Eden's replies:

⁴ Neither printed.

"Mr. Mander asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether, in view of the official entry of the Emperor Haile Selassie to his capital, it is now proposed to extend to him full recognition with appropriate diplomatic status and representation?"

"The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Eden): While all aspects of our relations with Ethiopia are being carefully considered, military operations in that country are still in progress, and I have therefore nothing at present to add to the statement of policy which I made on 4th February.⁵ Hon. Members will have read with gratification the exchange of messages between the Prime Minister and the Emperor of Ethiopia on the occasion of the entry of the Emperor into Addis Ababa.

"Mr. Mander: In view of the messages addressed to His Majesty Haile Selassie, surely it is not possible any longer to speak of him as merely having a claim to the throne. He is well seated upon it.

"Mr. Eden: I think I made the position clear last February, when I pointed out that while military operations are going on in Abyssinia parts of the country will require temporary measures of military guidance and control, and I must adhere to that."

In a recent conversation at the Foreign Office the official concerned re-emphasized that the British Government had no territorial ambitions with respect to Ethiopia but that it did have a strong interest in the maintenance of order throughout East Africa. It is intended that the Emperor's authority must be used for this purpose in such areas of Ethiopia as may prove obedient to it and that the remainder of the country will be kept under military occupation for such time as may be necessary. In view of the continuing military operations the areas which will require occupation have not yet been determined.

A political office for occupied enemy territory has been set up in Cairo under General Wavell with Sir Philip Mitchell as Chief Political Officer and Mr. M. S. Lush as Deputy Chief Political Officer. It is understood that Sir Philip is at present in Cairo but that Mr. Lush is in Addis Ababa as the Emperor's principal "adviser".

The text of the telegrams exchanged between the Emperor and the British Prime Minister on the occasion of the former's return to

⁵The statement was as follows: "His Majesty's Government would welcome the reappearance of an independent Ethiopian State and recognise the claim of the Emperor Haile Selassie to the throne. The Emperor has intimated to His Majesty's Government that he will need outside assistance and guidance. His Majesty's Government agree with this view and consider that any such assistance and guidance in economic and political matters should be the subject of international arrangement at the conclusion of peace. They reaffirm that they have themselves no territorial ambitions in Abyssinia. In the meanwhile the conduct of military operations by Imperial forces in parts of Abyssinia will require temporary measures of military guidance and control. These will be carried out in consultation with the Emperor, and will be brought to an end as soon as the situation permits." *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 368, col. 804.

Addis Ababa, as printed in the *Manchester Guardian*, is enclosed.⁶
 Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:
 HERSCHEL V. JOHNSON

884.001 Selassie I/372

*The Minister-Counselor of Embassy in the United Kingdom
 (Johnson) to the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs
 (Murray)*

LONDON, May 16, 1941.

DEAR WALLACE: I note from your letter of March 25th⁷ that Mr. Eden's statement in the House of Commons on February 4th seemed to you to present a marked contrast to the previous policy of the British Government as reported in our despatch No. 6641 of January 25th.⁷ I think the only contrast is that between a public statement in Parliament and a confidential statement by a responsible Foreign Office official. That official stated, as reported in my despatch under reference, that the Emperor's mission was considered an experiment but one which exceeded expectations. As reported in my despatch No. 498 of today's date, the Foreign Office still considers the Emperor's restoration in the nature of an experiment. It desires to use the Emperor as an instrument of authority in a part of Ethiopia and has accordingly given his government a measure of recognition but is making clear to the Emperor that he must act only by and with British consent. The British Government is far from being prepared to admit the Emperor's government to the status of an ally or to state when it might again recognize Ethiopia as a fully independent state.

In view of the popular interest in the Emperor on the part of a "vocal minority" in England, public statements on this question are naturally somewhat guarded.

Sincerely yours,

HERSCHEL JOHNSON

740.0011 European War 1939/11104 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, May 18, 1941—1 p. m.
 [Received May 20—3:44 a. m.]

522. It is reported but not yet officially announced that the Duke of Aosta has surrendered with 7,000 men.

KIRK

⁶ Not reprinted.

⁷ Not printed.

884.001 Selassie I/370 : Telegram

President Roosevelt to the Emperor of Ethiopia (Haile Selassie I)

WASHINGTON, May 20, 1941.

I have received Your Majesty's message informing me of your return to Addis Ababa, and I assure you of the satisfaction with which I have received these tidings. On behalf of the people and Government of the United States I have great pleasure in extending to Your Majesty my most sincere felicitations on this notable occasion and my best wishes for Your Majesty's health and happiness.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

365D.1115/13 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul at Aden (Timberlake)

WASHINGTON, May 24, 1941—11 p. m.

14. That portion of your telegram May 8 via Nairobi as concerns medical aid to Ethiopia was communicated to American Red Cross which states that while it has at various times given much thought to possibility of supplying some medical aid to Ethiopia and might eventually be able to render a measure of assistance it would not seem feasible for the American Red Cross at this time to undertake an operation along such pretentious lines as requested by the British authorities there. A similar reply has been made through Legation Cairo to memorandum received from British Ambassador.

HULL

365D.1115/13 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul at Aden (Timberlake)

WASHINGTON, May 24, 1941—midnight.

15. Your telegram May 8. It is extremely unlikely that American vessels can be made available for the movement of Italian civilians from Berbera to South Africa. The only American vessels operating in the area referred to are cargo vessels which, of course, could not handle any great number of passengers. Also, the vessels which might come into position for this purpose are urgently needed for the transportation to the United States of materials required for the national defense.

HULL

IRAN

REPRESENTATIONS BY THE UNITED STATES REGARDING NON-PAYMENT OF OLD ACCOUNTS OWED TO AMERICAN EXPORTERS; FINAL SETTLEMENT IN PRINCIPLE BY THE IRANIAN EXCHANGE COMMISSION

891.5151/204

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

No. 21

TEHRAN, January 23, 1941.

[Received March 29.]

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of the Department's instruction No. 527 of October 1, 1940,¹ stating that the Department is not, as a rule, instrumental in attaching, for the supposed benefit of American firms, funds located in the United States belonging to a foreign government; and instructing that this Legation continue its efforts to have dollar payments effected.

In a *Note Verbale* dated December 12, 1940, of which a copy is enclosed,² the Legation informed the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the Legation knew of no instance where dollar payments had been made to American creditors through the procedure outlined in the Ministry's Note of September 4, 1939,³ and requested that the Ministry ascertain whether or not the approved procedure will, in fact, enable American creditors to recover the sums due on old accounts.

On January 11, 1941, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied that all possible assistance had been given to American creditors, and that in the future, no doubt, the official Exchange Commission would lend its assistance in any possible way. A translation of the note in question is enclosed.²

The present procedure for repayment has been in effect for about sixteen months—a period which would appear to be ample for a trial of its efficacy. Although it is not possible to say that no account has been paid through this procedure, the Legation knows of none; while it knows of many accounts which were owed to American exporters before the enactment of the Foreign Exchange Control Law of March 1, 1936, and which are still unpaid.

¹ *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. III, p. 684.

² Not printed.

³ *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. IV, p. 544.

The Consulate estimates the total of the old accounts owed to American firms at about \$50,000. There is attached to this Despatch as an enclosure a list of the American firms ⁴ known to have such accounts outstanding, together with the names of the debtors and a statement of the sums involved. Despite the professed helpfulness of the Iranian authorities, no considerable part of these accounts has been liquidated.

On the other hand, the accounts of the Legation show that \$99,336.44 in official drafts were sold to the Imperial Bank of Iran for the account of the Exchange Commission during the period from March 1, 1936 to December 31, 1940. The corresponding sales for the Consulate during the same period were \$27,314.24.

It scarcely seems equitable that the Legation and the Consulate should continue to sell their official drafts to the Iranian Government each month while that Government not only fails to make possible payment to American creditors of accounts some four years old, but also has refused to permit the purchase of trifling sums in foreign (sterling) exchange by the Legation and Consulate for the payment of official expenditures outside Iran.

The Legation therefore respectfully suggests that the Department consider the advisability of devising a plan whereby the dollars to be converted into rials for the official use of the United States Government could be utilized for the liquidation of these old accounts.

Such a plan would involve the purchase of rials from American firms having Iranian currency, rather than from the official Exchange Commission; and it would necessarily be contingent upon the willingness of the American firms to accept the rate for rials obtainable at the bank, currently about 49 rials to the dollar. Thus, it would utilize a rate similar to that specified in the procedure already approved by the Iranian authorities, and would simplify and facilitate the conversion of rials into dollars for the payment of old accounts. It would not, of course, affect the responsibility of the American firm for the collection of its outstanding accounts—neither would it touch upon losses due to the lower value of the rial which will have to be borne by the American exporter or the Iranian importer, or both.

If the entire transaction with any firm were carried out in Iran, it would doubtless constitute a violation of the third paragraph of Article 2 of the Iranian Foreign Exchange Law of March 1, 1936 (quoted in a Report from the Consulate at Tehran dated March 2, 1936 and entitled "Iranian Foreign Exchange Control Law of March 1 1936" ⁴.) Further, if the purchase were to occur in Iran and an official draft were delivered to a local bank or to the local agent of an Ameri-

⁴ Not printed.

can firm, the bank or agent would not be able to send the draft outside Iran without becoming liable to the punitive provisions of the Law cited above.

If the purchases were arranged by the Department, however, and if dollar payments were made to the seller of rials in the United States, such transactions would not be clear violations of the Iranian law since the foreign exchange involved would never enter Iran.

It would therefore appear that the most practicable plan—if any is practicable—would be for the Department to arrange with the American firms owning blocked funds for the delivery of such funds at such times and in such amounts as the Legation or the Consulate may require, and for the Department to reimburse the seller in dollars on receipt of a statement from the Legation showing the sums received and the rate prevailing on the date when the rials were delivered.

Respectfully yours,

LOUIS G. DREYFUS

891.5151/204

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Iran (Dreyfus)

No. 20

WASHINGTON, April 17, 1941.

SIR: Reference is made to the Legation's despatch No. 21 of January 23, 1941, suggesting the advisability of considering a plan whereby dollars to be converted into rials for the official use of the United States Government could be utilized for the payment of old accounts owing to American firms for goods delivered prior to the enactment of the Iranian Foreign Exchange Law of March 1, 1936.

While the Legation's suggestion is appreciated, the Department considers it advisable as a matter of general policy to confine the financial transactions of its offices abroad to the usual banking and commercial channels. Although the plan suggested by the Legation technically might not be in violation of Iranian exchange regulations, it would be likely to be regarded by the Iranian Government as an evasion of such regulations. It is desired, therefore, that the Legation continue its policy of pressing for the release of blocked funds of American firms by following up, where practicable and advisable, individual cases and pointing out to the appropriate authorities specific difficulties encountered by American firms endeavoring to effect the release of such funds.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:
A. A. BERLE, Jr.

891.5151/211 : Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, December 17, 1941—noon.
 [Received December 18—9:52 a. m.]

258. Referring to Department's instruction No. 31, August 12,⁶ the Iranian Exchange Commission has agreed in principle to the settlement of old accounts owed to American exporters and offers to authorize individual remittances at prevailing official rate of about 35 rials to the dollar. It has been learned informally that \$50,000 have been set aside for this purpose.

The Department may wish to give appropriate publicity to the facilities now offered. American firms known to the Department or to the Department of Commerce might be advised that their Iranian debtors should apply directly to the Iranian Exchange Commission for exchange permits. In addition to the firms named in Legation's despatch No. 21, January 23, 1941, and in the instruction above cited, the Consulate has learned that the Imperial Bank of Iran holds rial deposits for the credit of (1) Vulcan Spring Company, Chicago (2) McCord Radiator and Manufacturing Company, Cleveland (3) Neatherhead Company, Cleveland and (4) Perrine Quality Products Company, Waltham, Massachusetts.

Where a rial deposit is now held by an attorney or a bank the creditor should signify his willingness to accept payment at the official rate, preferably by wiring the Consulate here.

The Consulate will circularize known local debtors while the Legation will supply a list of known old accounts to the Exchange Commission to facilitate the issuance of exchange permits.

American creditors should take advantage of such favorable terms without delay since it has been intimated that present facilities will continue no longer than deposit.

DREYFUS

IRANIAN REQUESTS FOR AID IN FACILITATING SHIPMENT OF WAR SUPPLIES TO IRAN; BRITISH OPPOSITION TO THE EXPORT OF AIRPLANES TO IRAN FROM THE UNITED STATES⁷

891.24/165

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Controls (Green)

[WASHINGTON,] January 4, 1941.

The Iranian Minister⁸ called me by telephone half a dozen times the day before yesterday requesting urgently that arrangements be

⁶ Not printed.⁷ For previous correspondence on the subject of Iranian requests for aid from the United States, see *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. III, pp. 638 ff.⁸ Mohammed Schayesteh.

made to permit the departure by the SS *Utahan*, scheduled to leave New York yesterday, of the machine guns referred to in my memorandum of January 2.⁹

Pursuant to the Secretary's oral instructions that nothing should be done at this time to permit the shipment by American vessels of the arms mentioned in my memorandum of January 2, I called the Iranian Minister by telephone this morning and told him that his request had been given the most careful consideration but that, in view of the provisions of Section 2 (a) of the Neutrality Act,¹⁰ it had not been found possible to grant his request.

The Minister expressed great disappointment. He said that he was particularly distressed because if Section 2 (a) of the Neutrality Act were interpreted to prevent shipments of arms by American vessels to a neutral port via a belligerent port, his Government would not be able to obtain the airplanes which it had recently purchased in this country. He argued at some length that we were misinterpreting Section 2 (a) of the Neutrality Act.

I told the Minister that there seemed to be some room for alternative interpretations of Section 2 (a) but that the interpretation which we had been constrained to adopt prevented us from complying with his request. I suggested that he should investigate the possibility of shipping arms to Basra by neutral or belligerent vessels.

The Minister said that he would adopt my suggestion but that his Government had already investigated the matter and that as far as he knew the only vessels sailing from American ports to Basra were American vessels following the Atlantic route and touching at Cape-town and American vessels following the Pacific route and touching at Bombay.

JOSEPH C. GREEN

891.248/117

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

No. 23

TEHRAN, January 24, 1941.

[Received March 29.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to my telegram No. 276 of December 24, 4 p. m.,¹¹ the Department's telegram No. 125 of December 30, 9 a. m. [p. m.],¹² and previous correspondence regarding the desire of the Iranian Government to purchase aviation material in the United States and to establish an airplane factory in Iran.

⁹ Not found in Department files.

¹⁰ 54 Stat. 4. Section 2 (a) reads: "Whenever the President shall have issued a proclamation under the authority of section 1 (a) it shall thereafter be unlawful for any American vessel to carry any passengers or any articles or materials to any state named in such proclamation."

¹¹ *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. III, p. 658.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 659.

It was with the greatest reluctance on my part that I injected myself into this matter, knowing full well that it was being handled in Washington. I did so only because of the persistence of the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs¹³ in stressing to me the paramount importance to the Iranian Government of securing the desired material which is needed in connection with the preparations for the national defense of this country against possible military aggression. Mr. Amery urged me to such an extent to take up the matter with the Department that I considered it best to do so if only to keep him from getting the idea that I might be unwilling to cooperate with him.

On each occasion that I have seen the Acting Minister, he has brought up this same question and, notwithstanding that he has been confined to his home by illness for the past ten days, only a day or so ago he telephoned the Legation from his sick bed to say that he would like to see Interpreter Saleh. When the latter called upon him at his home, Mr. Amery explained that he had gained the impression from the telegrams of the Iranian Minister in Washington that the Curtiss Wright Aviation Corporation was willing to go ahead with this matter, but that the Department was still holding out and that without its authorization it was impossible to obtain the desired material. Mr. Saleh, thereupon repeated to Mr. Amery as I had done previously, the present great need of the United States for aviation equipment for defense purposes and the necessity of making war material available to the British in these critical times. Notwithstanding all these explanations, today a further note has been received from the Foreign Office renewing the request. As soon as the Acting Foreign Minister recovers from his illness I will call upon him and reiterate the existing difficulties which make it virtually impossible to obtain aviation material from the United States at this time.

From Mr. Amery's insistence, it is evident that he is being forced to act by some higher authority, and this can only be the Shah¹⁴ himself who has in mind the great necessity for Iran to have sufficient planes for its defense in the event of war.

I realize full well that the Iranian Legation in Washington has had the question constantly before the Department and that therefore there is no excuse whatever for any participation on the part of this office. I do feel however, that it is of interest to the Department to know of the indefatigable efforts made by the Iranian Government at this end to bring to a successful conclusion the negotiations with American firms of war material.

Respectfully yours,

LOUIS G. DREYFUS, JR.

¹³ Djevad Amery.

¹⁴ Reza Shah Pahlavi.

891.24/166

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Controls (Green)

[WASHINGTON,] March 19, 1941.

The Iranian Minister called at my office this morning by appointment. He referred to our conversation on January 4 in regard to the desire of his Government to ship arms, ammunition, and implements of war from New York to Iran on vessels stopping at belligerent ports en route. He asked whether the passage of the Lease-Lend Act¹⁵ had altered the situation of which I had informed him in that conversation.

I replied in the negative, inviting his attention to Section 2 (a) of the Neutrality Act.

The Minister urged that in its administration the law be relaxed in the interests of Iran.

I endeavored to explain that this difficulty arose not by reason of the administration of the law but by reason of the terms of the law itself which could not be altered except by act of Congress.

JOSEPH C. GREEN

811.20(D) Regulations/2447a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Iran (Dreyfus)

WASHINGTON, May 10, 1941—7 p. m.

30. As of assistance in consideration of export license applications for commodities and materials desired by Iranian Government agencies ostensibly for reconstruction activities and for communications and transport the Department desires your opinion whether there is danger of re-exportation of such supplies to Germany via Russia or to Russia. Please telegraph reply promptly.

HULL

611.9131/144 : Telegram

The Chargé in Iran (Moose) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, May 16, 1941—3 p. m.

[Received May 18—11 a. m.]

45. The Iranian Government's urgent need for structural steel, rolling stock and rails makes it probable that purchases of such materials are intended for use and not for re-export. The Legation would be in a better position to express an opinion on other materials if the items under consideration were specified.

MOOSE

¹⁵ Approved March 11, 1941; 55 Stat. 31.

891.248/120

Memorandum by Mr. W. L. Parker of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

[WASHINGTON,] May 20, 1941.

Mr. Hiss ¹⁶ (A-A) telephoned this morning to say that the Department of Commerce, with the approval of the Department of Justice, has modified the navigation and clearance regulations to permit American vessels stopping for fuel at a belligerent port en route to carry war supplies to Persian Gulf ports.

The Iranian Minister was informed of the substance of the foregoing by telephone this morning.

811.20 (D) Regulations/2781 : Telegram

The Chargé in Iran (Moose) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, June 16, 1941—2 p. m.
[Received June 16—1:35 p. m.]

59. The Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs requests that the Department assist in obtaining export permit for aluminum valued at about 7,000 pounds sterling and 110 tons of copper tubing which he states are intended solely for the Iranian Army and not for sale nor re-export.

The Iranian Minister in Washington is being instructed to pursue the request and to supply details.

MOOSE

811.20 (D) Regulations/2781 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Iran (Dreyfus)

WASHINGTON, June 20, 1941—5 p. m.

43. Your no. 59, June 16, 2 p. m. Supplies of aluminum and copper in this country are scarcely adequate to meet the essential defense requirements of the United States and of those countries which we are assisting in resisting aggression. Therefore, their exportation and domestic use have been severely curtailed. Under these circumstances, it is extremely unlikely that aluminum or copper could be found available for exportation to Tehran.

Department's no. 30, May 10, 7 p. m. Please endeavor to verify Acting Foreign Minister's statement that desired aluminum and copper tubing are not for sale nor re-export and to ascertain purposes for which the Iranian Army desires these materials.

HULL

¹⁶ Donald Hiss, apparently on duty in the office of Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson (A-A).

811.20 (D) Regulations/2942 : Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, June 23, 1941—11 a. m.

[Received 11:55 p. m.]

61. Referring to the Legation's telegram No. 59, June 16, 2 p. m., the Shah is pressing the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs to secure permission to export from the United States eight more orders of equipment for the Iranian Army, including tires, wire cables, chemicals, spare parts for airplanes, et cetera, and the Acting Foreign Minister insists that the Legation request the assistance of the Department in these matters as well as in the fulfillment of an alleged contract by the United States Steel Export Company to supply tin plate. Suggestions that the Iranian Government act through its Washington Legation produce no visible impression.

It would be appreciated if the Department would indicate whether or not it can help the Acting Minister. Duplication of effort might be avoided if the Legation were authorized to inform the Foreign Minister that such requests may not properly be transmitted by this Legation.

DREYFUS

891.248/125

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] July 8, 1941.

The British Ambassador¹⁷ called to see me this morning at his request.

The Ambassador requested, by instruction of his Government, that the Government of the United States refuse to grant further export licenses for the shipment from the United States of aircraft to Iran. The British Government, he said, had received information which led it to believe that airplanes sent to Iran might be utilized, in view of changing developments in the Near East, against the British forces there, and the British Government therefore was hopeful that we would prohibit any further export of aviation matériel to Iran for the time being. I said that I would have immediate attention given to this request.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

¹⁷ Viscount Halifax.

891.248/125

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs
(Murray) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)*

[Extract]

[WASHINGTON,] July 14, 1941.

MR. WELLES: Co¹⁸ has interpreted your attached memorandum of a conversation with the British Ambassador on July 8¹⁹ regarding the granting of further export licenses for the shipment from the United States of aircraft to Iran as an instruction to terminate forthwith all such further shipments, and oral instructions have already been given to revoke certain licenses issued to the Curtiss-Wright Corporation authorizing the export of aircraft parts to Iran.

Would you please let me know whether you intended that such drastic action, including a ban on the exportation of aircraft parts, should be taken without further investigation of the situation existing at present in Iran.²⁰

WALLACE MURRAY

811.20 (D) Regulations/3305 : Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, July 14, 1941—10 a. m.

[Received 7 p. m.]

72. Referring to the Legation's telegram No. 61 of June 23, 11 a. m. The Prime Minister^{20a} also has now urgently requested me to ask the Department's assistance in obtaining the export license for tin plate and accessories ordered from the United States Steel Export Corporation largely for the Shah's factories.

DREYFUS

891.248/125

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs
(Murray) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] July 16, 1941.

MR. WELLES: In accordance with your suggestion I took up with Mr. Butler²¹ yesterday the matter referred to in the attached memorandum.²²

¹⁸ Division of Controls.

¹⁹ *Supra*.²⁰ Marginal note: "You may wish to explore this with the British Embassy—SW".^{20a} Ali Mansur.²¹ Neville Butler, Minister-Counselor of the British Embassy.²² Memorandum of July 14, printed above.

Mr. Butler explained that as far as he knew when the Ambassador spoke to you recently about the desire of the British Government that further aircraft exports to Iran be held up, the latter had in mind the general unsatisfactory Iranian attitude toward Great Britain rather than any particular new development.

Mr. Butler went on to describe the well known traditional anti-British attitude of the Iranians and expressed the opinion that in view of the present German drive into Russia and the possibility that German armies might reach the Caucasus in the near future, it was only natural that the British authorities should wish to meet as far as possible the inevitable pressure which Germany may bring to bear on Iran once she had reached the Iranian frontier in the Caucasus.

I told Mr. Butler that in my opinion these precautionary steps of the British seemed entirely reasonable and that I very much doubted that any further requests of the Iranian Government for the purchase of aircraft in this country would get any favorable consideration. I felt, however, that the matter of the small order of aircraft parts for Iran could be placed in a separate category. The Iranians had ordered these spare parts a long time ago, had paid for them and the parts were now ready for shipment. If the parts were shipped at once it would of course take several months for them to reach Iran. If, meanwhile, there were further developments growing out of the Russo-German hostilities indicating that it would be unwise to entrust even this small shipment of spare parts to the Iranians the shipment could easily be held up by the British between here and the Iranian port in the Persian Gulf where they will expect to land. Mr. Butler agreed that this was true.

Continuing our discussion I reminded Mr. Butler of growing resentment of the Iranians against us because of the almost continuous rejection of all their requests for purchases, however small, in this country. The Iranian Minister was of course under heavy pressure from the Shah and had during the recent months been telephoning us on an average of twice a day regarding these rejected orders. While it would be a simple matter to turn him down on future aircraft orders, it might be difficult and cause bitter resentment if we turned him down on this small order of aircraft parts which, in any case, would not add greatly to the efficiency of Iranian aviation. In conclusion I remark[ed] that it might be decidedly in the British interest for our own relations with Iran in times like these to remain as friendly as possible since it appeared not unlikely that Anglo-Iranian relations would be subjected to serious strain and possible disintegration in the not too distant future. Mr. Butler said he fully agreed.

As a result of our conversation Mr. Butler agreed to clear this question through the British Purchasing Commission and to avoid, if possible, the delay in referring it back to London. He promised to let me have an answer as soon as possible.

I hope you will agree with me that it may be greatly in the British interest for us to avoid as far as possible losing our present none too firm hold on the Iranians. . . .

WALLACE MURRAY

811.20(D) Regulations/2942 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Iran (Dreyfus)

WASHINGTON, July 17, 1941—11 p. m.

53. Your no. 61, June 23, 11 a. m. and no. 72, July 14, 10 a. m. Please inform the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs that the Department is disposed to facilitate the shipment of such articles and materials to Iran as are not urgently required by this Government for the carrying out of its own defense program and for the needs of those governments which we are assisting in resisting aggression. In view, however, of the situation described in the Department's no. 43, June 20, 5 p. m., the Iranian Government should understand that it cannot count upon the United States as a complete source of supply during the present emergency.

You may inform the Acting Minister that the Iranian Legation here is handling these matters efficiently in close cooperation with the appropriate officers of the Department and that requests of the character contained in your telegram under acknowledgment should be taken up through the Iranian Legation here and not through our Legation in Tehran.

WELLES

811.20(D) Regulations/3305 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Iran (Dreyfus)

WASHINGTON, July 24, 1941—8 p. m.

59. Your 72, July 14, 10 a. m. Application of June 10 was rejected July 21 but United States Steel Export Corporation has now been invited to submit new application which will be considered in connection with Prime Minister's recommendation.

WELLES

891.248/125

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division
of Near Eastern Affairs (Alling)*

[WASHINGTON,] July 29, 1941.

Participants: Mr. Nevile Butler, Minister-Counselor of the British
Embassy
Mr. Murray
Mr. Alling

Mr. Butler said he would recall that about two weeks ago Lord Halifax had requested the Acting Secretary of State to restrict the shipment of American airplanes to Iran. He said that he would like now to give some of the background of this request.

Mr. Butler pointed out that the Iranian Government airplane factory located a few miles outside of Tehran was manned to a large extent by British mechanics. He did not know their exact number, but he thought it was twenty or thirty. For a long period the British Government had attached considerable importance to keeping these mechanics in Iran with a view to preventing their displacement by mechanics from Axis Powers. At the same time the British Government, realizing the dangers of a German occupation of Iran, wished to prevent so far as possible any appreciable number of airplanes going to the Iranian Government. The British Government feared that in the event of an Axis occupation of Iran these planes would be used against Allied forces. It was for this reason that the British Government had requested this Government to restrict airplane shipments to Iran.

At the same time the British Government had to keep the Shah "sweet" and it had therefore been necessary to agree that certain British airplanes be shipped to Iran for assembly in the above-mentioned factory. At present, therefore, it is contemplated that during the next year parts for twelve Hurricane planes would be shipped to Tehran to be assembled by British mechanics.

Mr. Murray inquired why, if the British were permitting the shipment of such modern planes as Hurricanes to the Iranian Government, there should be any objection to the American Government permitting the shipment of such antiquated models as the Iranians desired to purchase in this country. Mr. Butler reiterated the arguments mentioned above, that is, that it was necessary to keep the Shah in good humor and also to furnish material for the factory so that the British mechanics could continue to work and operate in Iran. At the same time he admitted that from the point of view of equity it was perhaps illogical to ask the American Government to refrain from shipping planes to the Iranian Government. . . . In any case he

agreed that spare parts for American planes in Iran should certainly go forward, and he felt it particularly desirable that spare parts ordered from Canada and now in transit through the United States should be granted American export licenses.

It was pointed out to Mr. Butler that the Iranian Government had been refused export licenses on numerous products such as tinplate, automobile tires, etc., and that this Government, too, had to bear in mind the desirability of retaining the good-will of the Shah. The only answer Mr. Butler had to make to this statement was that Iranian good-will was of more importance to the British and that in case we felt that something had to go to Iran the British Government would much prefer to see tinplate and rubber shipped than airplanes.

Mr. Murray said that we would go into the matter further and let Mr. Butler know the eventual decision.

891.248/125

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs
(Murray) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] July 30, 1941.

MR. WELLES: In my memorandum of July 16, 1941, I referred to my conversation of the preceding day with Mr. Butler in which I suggested the advisability of permitting the shipment to Iran of a small order of spare parts for obsolete planes in order to retain the good will of Iran in view of the possibility of a deterioration of Anglo-Iranian relations in the near future. Mr. Butler agreed to clear this question with the British Purchasing Commission, to avoid the delay of communicating with London, and to provide me with an answer as soon as possible.

A reply from Mr. Butler, however, was not forthcoming, and the Iranian Legation, meanwhile, exerted considerable pressure upon the Department to have the shipment cleared. When it became clear that the suspicions of the Iranian Legation were becoming aroused, it was considered that action could be delayed no longer pending Mr. Butler's reply. On July 28, therefore, two weeks after the request made to Mr. Butler, the matter was referred to Mr. Acheson,²⁸ who issued appropriate instructions for the clearance of the small shipment of spare parts, and for the exportation of a few other pending shipments of a similar kind.

In the course of a conversation today, I informed Mr. Butler of the action which had been taken, and Mr. Butler agreed that spare parts for American planes already in Iran should go forward, as well as

²⁸ Dean Acheson, Assistant Secretary of State.

spare parts ordered in Canada now in transit through the United States. (A copy of a memorandum of my conversation with Mr. Butler is attached.²⁴)

It is expected that there may be a few more small shipments of the type referred to above, and the suggestion is made for your approval that these shipments be allowed to go forward.

WALLACE MURRAY

[This particular issue of American aid to Iran ended with the Soviet-British occupation of Iran in August 1941; see pages 383 ff.]

**PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS FOR A TRADE AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AND IRAN**²⁵

611.9131/139

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Cecil T. White of the Division
of Commercial Policy and Agreements*

[WASHINGTON], January 21, 1941.

Participants: The Iranian Minister;²⁶
Mr. Amerie, the Iranian Trade Representative;
Mr. Deimel, TA;²⁷
Mr. Merriam, NE;²⁸
Mr. Lary, Finance Division, Bureau of Foreign and
Domestic Commerce;
Mr. Goldberg, Division of Regional Information,
Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce;
Mr. Shaw, Division of Foreign Tariffs, Bureau of
Foreign and Domestic Commerce;
Mr. White, TA.

The Iranian Minister recalled that in reaching agreement with respect to a basis for trade-agreement negotiations two problems appear to present particular difficulty, namely, the Iranian exchange control and government monopolies. The Minister said that in view of Mr. Amerie's long experience with Iranian domestic and foreign trade, he had brought him to the Department to clarify the Iranian position in those respects.

²⁴ Reference is to memorandum of July 29, *supra*.

²⁵ For previous correspondence on this subject, see *Foreign Relations, 1940*, vol. III, pp. 663 ff.

²⁶ Mohammed Schayesteh.

²⁷ Henry L. Deimel, Jr., Assistant Chief of the Division of Commercial Policy and Agreements.

²⁸ Gordon P. Merriam, Division of Near Eastern Affairs.

The Minister read Article 6 of the Iranian draft agreement handed the Department on September 3, 1940,²⁹ which provides with respect to means of international payment that each country shall extend to the other treatment no less favorable than that accorded the products of third countries, "excepting those with which it has barter agreement". Mr. Amerie stated that Iranian trade with Germany and the Soviet Union is practically impossible except on a commodity basis. He indicated that while those two countries each have some foreign exchange, necessity requires that it only be used for the purchase of commodities essential to their respective economies. In this connection, the Minister and Mr. Amerie stated it as their opinion that Iran would be very unlikely to enter into clearing or barter agreements with countries other than Germany or the Soviet Union.

In reply, Mr. Deimel pointed out that the Iranian draft left the door open to any further special arrangements Iran might wish to make. He went on to explain that the standard general provisions previously given the Iranian Government are not necessarily the provisions this Government must have in a trade agreement with Iran, and that this Government has been trying to find a formula which would meet the exigencies of the Iranian Government and at the same time give us the assurances we consider necessary. Mr. Deimel suggested that an exploratory discussion of the Iranian trade control system would be of assistance in the search for such a formula.

In the ensuing discussion the Iranian representatives made the following assertions:

(1) German and United States exports to Iran are not competitive and, therefore, the clearing arrangement with Germany does not adversely affect United States trade with Iran.

(2) Germany pays twice as much as other countries for Iranian merchandise and the application of the exchange certificate system to non-German countries merely offsets the artificial value of the mark. (Mr. Lary pointed out in this connection that, as in the case of Turkey and certain other countries, by buying large amounts of Iranian goods at artificially high prices, Germany could force Iran to buy abnormal amounts of German goods at correspondingly high prices).

(3) With respect to export monopolies, it was stated that they are used primarily for the purpose of standardizing products for export and that they have not, nor would be, used to discriminate against the United States.

(4) With respect to import monopolies, it was stated that they are applied to all countries, including Germany and Russia, and have not been, nor would be, used to discriminate against the United States.

Mr. Deimel thanked the Minister and Mr. Amerie for their kindness in answering questions, and said that he felt that we had a much

²⁹ Not found in Department files, but for draft submitted by the Iranian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, see *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. III, p. 675.

clearer picture of the Iranian position than before. It was agreed that in a few days Mr. Amerie would come in to discuss possible items for inclusion in the list of products for publication in the event public notice of intention to negotiate with Iran should be issued.

611.9181/141 : Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, April 1, 1941—3 p. m.

[Received April 2—6:50 a. m.]

21. Reference Department's telegram No. 119, November 19;³⁰ and Legation's despatch No. 8, December 23.³¹ Prime Minister and Acting Foreign Minister³² are pressing me for information as to Department's attitude concerning the commercial agreement. They state that Iran is anxious to go ahead with negotiations and is willing to bind itself to purchase 15 to 20 million dollars worth of American goods during next few years.

It seems clear that their anxiety to complete the agreement is based on hope that they will be able to obtain from the United States much needed goods which they are finding it increasingly difficult to obtain from Europe.

I should appreciate an indication of the Department's opinion as soon as its study is completed.

DREYFUS

611.9181/143

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Cecil T. White of the Division of Commercial Policy and Agreements

[WASHINGTON,] April 10, 1941.

Participants: The Iranian Minister;
The Iranian Trade Representative (Mr. Amerie);
Mr. Hawkins;³³
Mr. White.

After a brief review of previous discussions regarding the proposed trade agreement between the United States and Iran, the Minister said that he and Mr. Amerie had called to ask whether the draft agreement submitted on September 3, 1940³⁴ would be acceptable to this Government.

³⁰ *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. III, p. 689.

³¹ Not printed.

³² Ali Mansur and Djevad Amery, respectively.

³³ Harry Hawkins, Chief of the Division of Commercial Policy and Agreements.

³⁴ See footnote 29, p. 367.

In reply, Mr. Hawkins explained that certain parts of the Iranian proposal are not acceptable, particularly the general exception permitting discrimination in favor of Germany and Soviet Russia with which countries Iran has clearing agreements. He went on to say that the trade-agreements organization has been studying the difficulties presented by the Iranian requirements with a view to finding a formula which would meet the necessities of the Iranian Government and still be acceptable to us. Also, studies are being made regarding possible schedule items and soon we would be able to present these data to the Trade Agreements Committee for its consideration. He pointed out in this connection that announcement of public notice of intention to negotiate might be expedited if we could receive the Iranian request list.

In reply to a question by the Minister regarding the time a reply could be expected, Mr. Hawkins indicated that although he could not give a precise date he thought it would be a matter of weeks and not of months. He went on to say that the work on general provisions is far advanced and, in fact, a set of draft provisions had been prepared in the Division which he felt would be acceptable to the Iranian Government. The Minister requested and was given a copy of the draft⁸⁵ (marked "Tentative and Unofficial"). Mr. Hawkins stated that the draft as yet had not been considered by the trade-agreements organization and is subject to change.

The Minister wished to know in what respects the draft just given him differed from the Iranian draft of September 3, 1940. Mr. Hawkins pointed out that the provisions in the Iranian draft were very detailed and comprehensive in character and that they provided for certain automatic responses to certain stipulated conditions; because of the specific character of these provisions, the Iranian Government had felt it necessary to include certain reservations, which would be difficult for us to accept. We had attempted to avoid the necessity for such reservations by drawing up a very short agreement, loosely drawn and general in nature, in which the objectives of the agreement would be stated, but the operation of which would be worked out between the two Governments when specific problems should arise. Mr. Hawkins noted that the exchange article merely required that exchange controls should not be operated so as to divert trade from the other contracting country and that the monopoly article called only for fair and equitable treatment. He then called attention to the consultation and termination article and pointed out that under it specific problems would be dealt with as they arose. He expressed the belief that the termination clause is not in practice

⁸⁵ Not printed.

likely to be invoked, since it would be to the interest of both parties to work out problems arising under the agreement rather than have the agreement terminated, with the consequent loss of the advantages provided for therein.

The Minister and Mr. Amerie indicated that, in their opinion, if a proposal along the lines of our tentative draft should be made, it would be acceptable to their Government.

611.9131/141 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Iran (Dreyfus)

WASHINGTON, April 11, 1941—6 p. m.

17. Your 21, April 1, 3 p. m. The Department in conjunction with other interested agencies of the Government is endeavoring to expedite its studies in connection with the proposed trade agreement. Meanwhile, it would be helpful if the Department could receive at an early date the list of items which the Iranian Government would wish included in the list of products for publication in the event public notice of intention to negotiate with Iran should be issued. It is understood that the recommendations of the Iranian Trade Representative in that regard have been transmitted to Tehran for the consideration of his Government.

Memorandum of a conversation of April 10⁸⁶ with the Iranian Minister is being transmitted to the Legation.

HULL

611.9131/147

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

No. 62

TEHRAN, April 26, 1941.

[Received July 2.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to the Legation's telegram No. 33 of April 26, 1941,⁸⁷ informing the Department that a list of products which Iran wishes to have included in the list of products to be published in case public notice is given of intention to negotiate a trade agreement was being forwarded by pouch and air.

There is now enclosed a translation of a Note dated April 24, 1941, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which gives a list of items which the Iranian Government desires to have included.

Respectfully yours,

LOUIS G. DREYFUS, JR.

⁸⁶ *Supra.*

⁸⁷ Not printed.

[Enclosure—Translation]

The Iranian Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs (Amery) to the American Minister (Dreyfus)

No. 539

[TEHRAN,] April 24, 1941.

MR. MINISTER: In reply to your Note No. 58 dated April 18, 1941, I have the honor to transmit herewith a list of merchandise exported to the United States during the last twenty years, and necessarily to explain that the Imperial authorities concerned are of the opinion that in case the American Government should accord these commodities privileges and facilities, the amount of their export to the United States would increase and the commercial relations between the two countries would be enhanced.

A copy of this list has also been sent to the Imperial Legation in Washington.

I avail myself [etc.]

In place of the Minister of Foreign Affairs:

DJEVAD AMERY

[Subenclosure—Translation]

LIST OF MERCHANDISE EXPORTED FROM IRAN TO AMERICA DURING THE
LAST [TWENTY] YEARS

1. Rugs and carpets
2. Animal casings
3. Dried fruits, pistachio nuts, almonds and shelled almonds, walnuts and shelled walnuts, kernels of nuts, dates and quince seeds
4. Various skins and leathers, soft skins (furs) for clothing, raw skins, tanned skins, sheep and goat leather
5. Gum tragacanth, gum of wild almond, cherry tree gum, gum arabic and other gums
6. Oxide of iron
7. Kalamkar (printed calico)
8. Silk cloth, raw silk and coarse silk
9. Asafetida
10. Opium
11. Earthenware, chinaware, and imitation chinaware, antiquities, objects of art and (objects) for collection, postage stamps, mosaic articles, engraved silverware and brassware, niello work or simple.
12. Tobacco, cigars and cigarettes
13. Raw wool
14. Turquoise

891.248/123

*Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. Cecil T. White of
the Division of Commercial Policy and Agreements*

[WASHINGTON,] April 28, 1941.

Mr. Davallou³⁸ telephoned to inquire further as to when the Legation could expect a reply to its draft proposal of September 3, 1940. Mr. Davallou indicated that Tehran is anxious to receive our reply as soon as possible.

Mr. Davallou was informed that the Department is trying to expedite its reply and that we expect it will be ready soon. In the course of the conversation his attention was called to the pressure of defense work on the personnel of certain agencies in the trade-agreements organization. I repeated the substance of telegram no. 33, April 26, 1941, from Tehran,³⁹ which reported that the Iranian request list has been supplied by the Foreign Office and is being forwarded to the Department by air mail. I assured Mr. Davallou that its receipt would be very helpful and pointed out that announcement of intention to negotiate might be expedited thereby.

Mr. Davallou wished to know whether we would delay our reply until after we received the request list. In reply, I indicated the belief that we would not.

A short while after the conclusion of the conversation, Mr. Davallou called back to say that the Minister wished to express his appreciation of our efforts in this regard.

The report of the Country Committee on Iran was delayed in the first instance in order to obtain needed information from Tehran. That information has been received, but recently the representatives on the Country Committee from the Department of Commerce and the Tariff Commission have been prevented from completing their studies, in part, because of the reorganization in the Department of Commerce, and, in part, because of assignment to defense work.

However, the Chairman of the Committee has been informed that preliminary work probably will be completed by about May 7 and it is expected that a report can be made to the Trade Agreements Committee in the near future.

³⁸ H. Hadjeb-Davallou, First Secretary of the Iranian Legation.

³⁹ Not printed.

611.9131/145

*Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. Cecil T. White of
the Division of Commercial Policy and Agreements*

[WASHINGTON,] May 10, 1941.

The Minister ⁴⁰ telephoned to inquire whether we could give him our answer to the Iranian draft proposal of September 3, 1940.

I replied in the negative, but informed the Minister that the basic studies now have been completed and I thought it likely that our reply would be ready within the next two weeks.

611.9131/159

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern
Affairs (Murray)*⁴¹

[WASHINGTON,] November 5, 1941.

Reference is made to Tehran's despatch No. 115, of September 10, 1941, with which there is enclosed a copy of instructions to the Iranian Economic Mission to the United States.⁴² These instructions, which came into the possession of the Legation, indicate that the Mission will press for the conclusion of a trade agreement. It may be recalled that such a trade agreement was under consideration prior to the occupation of Iran by British and Russian military forces,⁴³ but discussions pertaining thereto were discontinued shortly before the occupation because of the uncertainty and apparent instability of conditions obtaining at that time in the Near East. The Economic Mission has now arrived in the United States, and it may be assumed that the Mission will revive the question of the trade agreement.

It is the recommendation of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs that these trade agreement negotiations be resumed for reasons of political expediency and in order to safeguard American trade interests in Iran during the post-war period.⁴⁴

A large area in northern Iran is now under Russian occupation. It has been established in reports received by the Department that the Russians in that area have engaged in political activities inconsistent with assurances given to respect the political independence and territorial integrity of Iran. These assurances, as you will recall, were referred to by the President in his telegram of reassurance to the

⁴⁰ Iranian Minister Mohammed Schayesteh.

⁴¹ Addressed to the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson) and the Secretary of State.

⁴² Neither printed.

⁴³ See pp. 383 ff.

⁴⁴ The Secretary of State, the Assistant Secretary of State, and the Chief of the Division of Commercial Policy and Agreements agreed with the recommendation.

Shah at the time of the occupation.⁴⁵ It is considered that the conclusion of a trade agreement with Iran would be consistent with this message of reassurance in that it would serve as a restraining influence upon possible Russian attempts in the future to dominate the economy and foreign trade of Iran. In view of these circumstances it is believed that a trade agreement with the United States would be welcomed by the Iranians and that, for this reason, the present time is propitious for the negotiation of a trade agreement favorable to American interests.

It may be assumed that both the Russians and the British will seek to utilize the occupation as a means of strengthening their economic ties with Iran. The occupation, therefore, might well provide an opportunity for either Russia or Britain, or both, to enter into trade agreements with Iran which would prove harmful to American trade in the post-war period. The conclusion of a trade agreement between the United States and Iran would anticipate such moves and would serve to safeguard American trade with Iran after the war.

Mr. Saleh, the head of the Iranian Economic Mission, is a high-ranking Iranian official of ability and integrity, and he is well known to the Division of Near Eastern Affairs. He was educated in American mission schools in Iran and is favorably disposed toward the United States. In view of his pro-American attitude it is considered fortunate that it is he who has been selected by the Iranian Government to conduct trade agreement negotiations.

WALLACE MURRAY

ENCOURAGEMENT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE OF THE RESUMPTION OF AMERICAN MISSION SCHOOLS IN IRAN;⁴⁶ IRANIAN REQUEST FOR AN AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL MISSION

391.1163/123

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Gordon P. Merriam of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

[WASHINGTON,] October 10, 1941.

Participants: Mr. Herrick Young, Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions, New York, N. Y.

Mr. Murray⁴⁷

Mr. Alling⁴⁸

Mr. Merriam

⁴⁵ Dated September 2, p. 446.

⁴⁶ For previous correspondence regarding the expropriation of American missionary schools in Iran, see *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. III, pp. 693 ff.

⁴⁷ Wallace Murray, Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs.

⁴⁸ Paul H. Alling, Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs.

Mr. Murray observed that the abdication of Reza Pahlavi⁴⁹ and other developments in Iran resulting from the international situation,⁵⁰ had recently given rise to an entirely different state of affairs, and that it appeared desirable to discuss them in a purely informal and preliminary manner with a view to determining whether the Board's educational work in Iran might not be resumed.

The following were advanced by Mr. Murray as some of the principal factors for consideration:

1. The sum of \$300,000 has been paid by the Iranian Government toward acquiring the Board's educational properties. While this is a substantial amount, it nevertheless falls far short of the total amount of \$1,200,000 agreed upon as the purchase price. It is unlikely that the Iranian Government will repudiate the remainder of this debt as the installments fall due, but it is highly improbable that further payments can be made. The new Government is weak, the tribal districts have risen, and the Soviets occupy the richest provinces, in which it will doubtless be impossible for the Iranians to collect taxes in any appreciable amount. In other words, the sum already received is all that can or will be paid.

2. With the disappearance of the authoritarian régime of Reza Pahlavi, which was highly nationalistic and had a strong element of xenophobia, a more liberal attitude toward foreign institutions is to be anticipated. The present Shah received education abroad, and the present Cabinet was chosen with a view to appeasing the British and the Soviets.

3. An important negative element in the situation is the fact that the Iranians would hardly readmit American schools if to do so would entail the opening of Russian schools. One of the major reasons for the elimination of the American schools was the fact that so long as they were in Iran the Russians could claim an equal right to have schools. With the Russians actually occupying large areas in Iran, the Iranians are bound more than ever to refrain from giving the Russians any excuse to establish schools. In consequence, it might be advisable as an interim measure for the Americans to operate ostensibly under the control of the Iranian Government.

4. A second negative factor is the possibility of a military debacle in Russia, in which case the British might not find it possible to make a stand in Iran to the north of, say, Isfahan. In such an event the Presbyterian teachers, should they return, would find themselves in German-occupied areas and in a difficult position in view of the progressive worsening of German-American relations. On the other hand, the Iranians might be eager to hand back the educational properties to the Americans because under the American ownership the chances of preserving them in the face of either Russian or German occupation would be enhanced. The fact was brought out that at the present time the Russians are using for their headquarters the Board's former educational properties at Tabriz.

⁴⁹ Shah of Iran, who abdicated September 16, 1941.

⁵⁰ See pp. 383 ff.

5. A small number of American hospital workers are still carrying on in Tabriz, and the arrival of teachers would reinforce them. Moreover, their special and continuing relationship to students and parents would enable the teachers, in the light of their long experience of Iran, to obtain intimate and accurate knowledge of what is going on. In short, the resumption of American educational work in Tabriz, in particular, would have a marked restraining influence upon Soviet separatist and ideological activities in that area, of which much has already been heard.

By way of comment on the foregoing, Mr. Young said that he and his colleagues had been thinking along somewhat the same lines. The Iranians had cut up into building lots the property lying between Alborz College and the main avenue on which it fronted. This land was extremely valuable and he was inclined to consider it even an offset to the amount of \$300,000 which had been paid in.

Mr. Young thought the main question which the Board would have to answer would be whether the prospect would justify the necessary investment in personnel. The educational personnel formerly employed in Iran was now pretty well scattered, but a small nucleus was still present in Iran. He thought there might be a disposition on the part of the Board to wait until March when the next payment became due. If it was not paid, the Board might feel justified in making a move looking to the repossession of the properties.

Mr. Murray stated that in his opinion it was desirable to look at the matter in a much broader way. Iran had now fallen upon evil days. The Presbyterians in the United States had a long record of help and friendship to the people of Iran, and the question now was whether the Presbyterians would not wish to be of assistance in Iran's hour of need, provided further exploration of the matter should make it clear that a resumption of educational assistance was feasible at the present time. Iran badly needed education, the existing white-collar class was likely to be hard hit, and there was excellent human material in the tribes which had never been properly developed.

Mr. Young said that he would be glad to discuss these questions with his colleagues and that for the purpose of further discussions in the Department he would like to bring Dr. Dodds⁵¹ with him.

It was agreed that any formal step in the matter should take the form of a request from the Iranian Government.

⁵¹ J. L. Dodds of the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions.

391.1163/124

*Memorandum by the Acting Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Alling)*⁵²

[WASHINGTON,] October 15, 1941.

Attached is a memorandum of a recent conversation⁵³ held in the Near Eastern Division with Mr. Young of the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions, at which the possibility and desirability of the resumption of the Board's educational work in Iran were discussed. The matter is now being considered by the Board, and we expect to hear from it in the near future.

Mr. Murray has discussed this matter orally with Mr. Berle⁵⁴ and stated that the idea of the re-entry into Iran of this American educational mission, which up to June 1940 had been active for more than a century, has Mr. Berle's enthusiastic endorsement.

It will be recalled that the President's message of September 2 to the former Shah⁵⁵ took note of the British and Soviet declarations that they have no designs on the independence or territorial integrity of Iran, and stated that this Government maintained its traditional attitude with respect to the basic principles involved. It is our understanding that the President signed this message, which was drafted in the Department, in a spirit of thoroughgoing approval.

As you are aware, the actions of the Russians in the Iranian territories which they occupy have given rise to distrust on the part of this and the British Government which has already been made known to the Soviet Government. This Division considers that the re-entry of our educationalists into Iran would afford an additional clear indication of our desire and intention to support free institutions in that country.

PAUL H. ALLING

891.42/84 : Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, October 15, 1941—11 a. m.

[Received 1:16 p. m.]

190. The Minister of Education informs me that he has invited Doctor Paul Monroe of Columbia University to come to Iran as head of a commission to make a survey of Iran's educational problem. He

⁵² Addressed to the Under Secretary of State (Welles) and the Secretary of State.

⁵³ *Supra.*

⁵⁴ Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State.

⁵⁵ *Post*, p. 446.

stated that he would appreciate the Department's assistance in enlisting Doctor Paul's cooperation.

I am of the opinion that such a commission would have a good effect on American-Iranian relations and that the idea should be encouraged if the Department feels such a course is wise under present conditions.

DREYFUS

391.1164/173a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Iran (Dreyfus)

WASHINGTON, October 29, 1941—8 p. m.

126. Anticipating the probable inability of the Iranian Government in its present impaired financial position to make further installment payments to the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions in compensation for the school properties which that Government has taken over, the Department recently inquired of the Board whether it would consider a resumption of its educational work in Iran as a means of meeting the situation which would arise in the likely event of non-payment.

In making this inquiry the Department was actuated primarily by the belief that a resumption of this work and the presence of American teachers in the Russian-occupied zone, in addition to the hospital workers now in Tabriz, would exert a restraining influence upon Russian attempts to Sovietize that area. Such attempts have been evidenced by Soviet activities which are inconsistent with Russian assurances to respect the political independence and territorial integrity of Iran. You will recall that those assurances were noted by this Government and referred to by the President in his message of reassurance to the Shah (Department's 80, September 2, 6 p. m.⁵⁶). As a measure likely to contribute to the preservation of Iranian customs and institutions during the Russian occupation, it was considered that a suggestion contemplating a return of the properties to the Board might be welcomed by the Iranian Government and regarded as a manifestation of American friendship. However, in order to accomplish the ends in view, it may be necessary to consider a temporary arrangement whereby the Mission would operate under the ostensible control of the Iranian Government so that the Russians will not be provided with an excuse to open their own schools in the occupied area.

Responding favorably to the Department's suggestion, the Board decided to investigate the possibilities of re-establishing its schools

⁵⁶ *Post*, p. 447.

under its control and of repossessing its educational properties in Iran. With this in view the Board sent the following cable to its Iranian Mission:

"Inquire Government attitude toward reopening schools on Christian basis under Mission control. Suggest adjustment whereby payments made be available for operating schools over defined period thus conserving Mission appropriations and ensuring smaller enrolments, more effective work. If conditions favorable and Mission approves authorize negotiations. If conditions or judgment unfavorable cable advice future payments (and security property)."

The project under consideration by the Board has been discussed by the Department with the Iranian Minister in Washington who has telegraphed his Government regarding it.

You should assist and cooperate closely with the Board's representatives and in this connection familiarize yourself thoroughly with the history of the taking over of the Board's properties and with the Department's instructions to the Legation in regard thereto. In assisting the Board's representatives by discussions with Iranian officials you should indicate clearly to the latter that the proposal of the Board meets with the approval of your Government, but you should be careful to point out that the Board's proposal is made in order to assist Iran during a difficult period rather than from any desire on the part of the Board or this Government to take advantage of the present situation in order to further American interests.

Although the Board has informed the Department that it assumes that a change in the operation of the schools would not be contemplated before the beginning of the next academic year, it is the opinion of the Department that time is of the essence of the undertaking and that the change should occur as soon as practicable. In order that no unnecessary time may be lost in the process of negotiations you should follow the matter closely and exercise your good offices in assisting to formulate a plan acceptable to both the Board and the Iranian Government which will accomplish effectively the purposes contemplated by the Board and the Department.

The matter referred to in your 190, October 15, 11 a. m., bears a close relation to the Board's proposal and that which the Department has in mind. Dr. Monroe is endeavoring to obtain personnel for a commission of the type suggested by the Minister of Education but he has indicated to the Department that it is unlikely that such a commission can depart for Iran before spring.

Please keep the Department fully informed of developments regarding matters referred to in this telegram.

HULL

391.1163/125

*Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. Gordon P. Merriam
of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] November 10, 1941.

Mr. Young asked to speak to Mr. Parker,⁵⁷ who was out of the office, so I offered to take the message.

Mr. Young said that he and Dr. Dodds had just concluded an interview with Mr. Schayesteh, the Iranian Minister. The interview had been far from momentous. The Minister first informed them that following his conversation with Mr. Murray, he had cabled to Tehran stating that American help in educational matters might again be forthcoming and that perhaps Iran could again profit thereby. He had received a reply from Tehran to the effect that all American educators had now left Iran, and that if they now desired to return, the Iranian Government desired to know who would be going back and what their plan was.

Mr. Young said that this response of the Iranian Government tended to put the matter on an undesirable footing. He said that he and Dr. Dodds told Mr. Schayesteh that the Presbyterian Board had no idea whatever of pressing the matter, of taking any advantages of Iran's present position, or even of making any request to be permitted to return. Before going back they would want a clear indication that their return was desired and requested by the Iranian Government. In view of what had happened before, the Iranians would have to convince the Board that its educators would be welcomed.

The upshot of the interview was, according to Mr. Young, that Mr. Schayesteh said he would again telegraph to his Government stating that the Presbyterian Board would be receptive to a proposal that it resume educational work in Iran, that some of its educators were still on the ground in Iran, and suggesting that the Iranian Government enter into negotiations with the American Mission in Iran, which was empowered to enter into such negotiations.

891.42/89 : Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]

TEHRAN, November 25, 1941—8 a. m.

[Received 7:15 p. m.]

237. Referring to the Department's telegram No. 117 of October 17, 11 p. m.⁵⁸ The Minister of Education informs me that the Council

⁵⁷ W. Leonard Parker, Division of Near Eastern Affairs.

⁵⁸ Not printed.

of Ministers has now authorized him to extend an official invitation to American educators to come to Iran to make an educational survey.

DREYFUS

391.1164/175 : Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, November 26, 1941—3 p. m.

[Received 3:33 p. m.]

241. Referring to the Department's telegram No. 126, October 29, 8 p. m. The Mission Board in Tehran has now made formal request to the Minister of Education for an indication of the attitude of the Iranian Government toward the possible reopening of the American schools under mission control on a Christian basis. The question will have to be considered by the new Cabinet which will shortly be formed since the present Cabinet will present its resignation tomorrow.

Three Cabinet Ministers have expressed to me their desire to effect a return of the properties and numerous newspaper editorials have agitated strongly for this procedure.

DREYFUS

891.42/92 : Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, December 15, 1941—4 p. m.

[Received December 15—1:39 p. m.]

257. Reference my No. 157.⁵⁹ There are indications of growing opposition in reactionary circles to the Educational Mission. A deputy speaking in the Majlis on December 11 attacked the mission stating that it was coming to proselytize. If this opposition continues it is probable that the mission would produce negative or even harmful results. Therefore, and because in my opinion the mission would be unwise, under existing war conditions, I recommend that the Department suggest to Dr. Monroe the inadvisability of coming to Iran. I should appreciate telegraphic advice as to Dr. Monroe's decision.

DREYFUS

391.1163/125a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, December 20, 1941—7 p. m.

5972. With the full approval of the Department, the American Presbyterian Mission recently has taken up with the Iranian Govern-

⁵⁹ Despatch No. 157, November 25, not printed.

ment the question of a return to the Mission of school properties in Iran taken over by that Government a few years ago. It is considered that such a return of the properties would avoid difficulties likely to arise in the event of the probable financial inability of the Iranian Government to continue payments for the properties; that it would be a desirable influence in the northern-occupied zone through the presence there of American teachers; and that it would be instrumental in bolstering the educational system of Iran during this difficult period.

Dr. Issa Sadiq, former Iranian Minister of Education, has extended on behalf of the Iranian Government a formal invitation to Dr. Paul Monroe, President of the World Federation of Educational Associations at Garrison-on-Hudson, New York, to form a commission of American educators to conduct an educational survey in Iran. Dr. Monroe has virtually completed the formation of his mission and plans to depart for Iran about March 1, 1942.

The Department has cooperated fully with the American Presbyterian Mission and with Dr. Monroe in the belief that the undertakings which they contemplate will strengthen cultural ties between Iran and the United States and will prove of benefit to Iran and its people.

Please seek an early opportunity to express to the Foreign Office the sympathetic interest of this Government in the two proposed educational undertakings in Iran and state that it would be greatly appreciated if appropriate British officials in Iran might be specifically instructed to lend their support thereto.

Please inform the Department by telegraph of the nature of the British response to your request.

HULL

391.1163/125b : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Iran (Dreyfus)

WASHINGTON, December 20, 1941—8 p. m.

161. The Department has transmitted to the Embassy at London a telegram⁶⁰ setting forth background information concerning steps taken by the American Presbyterian Mission to resume its educational work in Iran and concerning the invitation extended by the Iranian Government to Dr. Monroe to conduct an educational survey. This telegram contained the following paragraph:

“Please seek an early opportunity to express to the Foreign Office the sympathetic interest of this Government in the two proposed educational undertakings in Iran and state that it would be greatly appreciated if appropriate British officials in Iran might be specifically instructed to lend their support thereto.”

⁶⁰ *Supra.*

You should inform your British colleague of the nature of the request being made to the British Government and discuss with him preliminary steps which might be taken in regard to the matter.

HULL

[The British Minister in Iran was instructed on January 9 by the British Foreign Office to support the United States position in Iran with respect to both of these projects. Although the Iranian Cabinet on January 10 "approved in principle" the return of the mission properties, the Mission Board at Tehran, after one formal approach to the Iranian Government, decided not to proceed further with the matter. The Monroe mission failed to get to Iran because of the problem of wartime air transport priorities. (391.1163/126; 891.42/99, 105, 111)]

**ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD THE BRITISH-SOVIET
MILITARY OCCUPATION OF IRAN**

862.20291/14a : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Iran (Dreyfus)

WASHINGTON, June 23, 1941—5 p. m.

46. The Department has received information from a reliable source that the Germans have established a skeleton General Staff in the German Legation at Tehran with branches located in German business firms throughout Iran. Please endeavor to ascertain the authenticity of this report.

WELLES

862.20291/14a : Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, June 28, 1941—11 a. m.

[Received 10:36 p. m.]

67. Department's 46, June 23, 5 p. m. Neither this nor British Legation has been able to obtain reliable information concerning internal setup of German fifth column organization. It is known, as frequently reported to Department, that the organization is large, strategically placed, and well-prepared and it is said that 500 tough and well-armed men can be placed on the streets of Tehran within a few hours. While it is possible that a skeleton general staff exists in the German Legation it is more likely that the organization is the routine Nazi fifth column type with agents and branches in important German business concerns throughout the country. Its activities have increased since the beginning of the German-Russian war particularly among White Russians, Americans, and disaffected elements in

the north. While Iranian police have been fully aware of fifth column activities and have placed agents under surveillance and restricted movements their police action has been too desultory and weak to prevent the building up of an efficient organization which is ready to strike at the proper moment. It is considered not unlikely that this moment will arrive when German forces penetrate into Caucasus.

DREYFUS

862.20291/14a : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Iran (Dreyfus)

WASHINGTON, July 24, 1941—7 p. m.

58. With reference to the Department's telegram No. 46 of June 23, 5 p. m. and your No. 67 of June 28, 11 a. m. the Department desires that you continue your endeavors to obtain authoritative, definite and specific information regarding the character and extent of alleged German fifth column activities in Iran and what measures if any the Iranian Government is adopting to combat them.

WELLES

740.0011 European War 1939/13497 : Telegram

The Minister Resident in Iraq (Knabenshue) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, July 28, 1941—4 p. m.

[Received July 29—5:15 a. m.]

215. British Chief [of?] Staff informed me this morning that British have in effect sent ultimatum to Iranian Government to deport all German tourists, numbering it is estimated 2500. He says that British Army otherwise intends to move into Iran during first week of August and to occupy primarily Abadan and neighboring oil fields and perhaps bomb Tehran. Similar action against Afghanistan contemplated because of their acceptance as Minister of Von Hentig, Germans' Colonel Lawrence of Persia during last war. Ennis⁶¹ requests inform War Department.

Sent to Tehran.

KNABENSHUE

740.0011 European War 1939/13523 : Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, July 29, 1941—6 p. m.

[Received 11:50 p. m.]

82. Reference Baghdad's No. 215, July 28, 4 p. m. While I have definite information that the British Minister⁶² and Soviet Ambas-

⁶¹ Maj. Riley F. Ennis, Military Attaché in Iraq.

⁶² Sir Reader W. Bullard.

sador ^{62a} are putting joint pressure on the Iranian Government to obtain the deportation of Germans in Iran, I have obtained no substantiation of the allegation that anything resembling an ultimatum backed by either military or [or] economic threats has been delivered. The British Minister, who is cooperating fully with me, denies the report but informs me in confidence that he and the Soviet Ambassador are exerting strong pressure on the Iranians to effect the deportation of four-fifths of the Germans in Iran although he does not hope to accomplish this full goal. Although the Prime Minister ^{62b} informed me personally that to accede to the British demands would be in his opinion unneutral, the British Minister informed me today that he has already obtained the promise of the departure of 13 German nationals at once and 11 next week including those employed in the radio station. Rumors are current of imminent British attack on Iran and while I do not consider this out of the realm of possibility, I am convinced that nothing in the form of an ultimatum has been given.

Referring to the Department's No. 58, July 24, 7 p. m., neither this Legation nor the British Legation intelligence officer has obtained information that a skeleton general staff exists in the German Legation and the Prime Minister believes it does not.

It is known that storm troopers Gamotta and Mayer, who are ostensibly employed by Shenkers Transport Company, head an efficient Nazi party organization with branches throughout the country and with members strategically placed and instructed as to their part when the day of action arrives. However, the view is held by the Turkish Ambassador and some other well-informed observers that the size and strength of German fifth column organization have been exaggerated through propaganda. The Prime Minister places the number of Germans in Iran as 700, the British at 2 to 3 thousand and some others at 1200 to 1500. Many of them are honestly employed by the Government or business concerns while others have ostensible employment in various German companies: few if any are strictly speaking tourists.

The Prime Minister assures me that the danger of fifth column work has been brought repeatedly to his attention and that the police are keeping Germans under strict surveillance, restricting their movements within the country and examining closely new applications for admission. He added that any persons found to be engaged in illegal activities would be immediately deported.

Copy sent to Baghdad.

DREYFUS

^{62a} A. S. Tehernikh.

^{62b} Ali Mansur.

862.20291/16

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division
of Near Eastern Affairs (Alling)*

[WASHINGTON,] July 29, 1941.

Participants: Mr. Nevile Butler, Minister-Counselor of British
Embassy.

Mr. Murray⁶³

Mr. Alling

Mr. Butler said that a few days ago Mr. Maisky, the Soviet Ambassador at London, suggested to Mr. Eden⁶⁴ that the British and Soviet Governments make joint representations to the Iranian Government urging it to get rid of between 5,000 and 10,000 German agents operating in Iran. Mr. Butler said that Mr. Eden had agreed to this proposal and that the joint representations had been made in Tehran a day or two ago. He said that the Iranian reply was non-committal.

740.0011 European War 1939/13630 : Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, August 1, 1941—noon.

[Received August 2—8 p. m.]

84. The official Iranian news agency issued a statement yesterday in answer to foreign press and radio reports concerning the danger to Iran from Germans residing in this country. The statement says that such reports are not based on fact and exaggerate the number of Germans in Iran, that the Government has a list of all foreigners and keeps surveillance over them, that the actions by and with foreigners are known and none will be permitted to commit illegal acts and that the Government is still guardian of the legal rights of the inhabitants.

This statement is much milder and more conciliatory than former strong and bellicose statements that Iran will defend her neutrality at all costs against any foreign power. Iran's policy of strict neutrality has been made difficult as a result of the new combination of Great Britain and Russia. There are growing indications in the last few days that Iran is being forced into closer cooperation with the British. As indicated in the Legation's number 82,⁶⁵ the British have obtained the promise of the departure of 24 Germans and there is widespread rumor that many more are preparing to leave.

⁶³ Wallace Murray, Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs.

⁶⁴ Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

⁶⁵ Dated July 29, 6 p. m., p. 384.

It is probable that the British warning to Iran is part of a war of nerves as a prelude to continued stronger measures if Iranian cooperation is not obtained. The local situation is confused and further reports will be made as clarifying developments occur.

DREYFUS

740.0011 European War 1939/13645 : Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, August 2, 1941—noon.

[Received August 3—3:53 p. m.]

86. Referring to the Legation's No. 84 dated Aug. 1, noon, I had last evening an extended and frank conversation with the Prime Minister who began by saying that he is most anxious to make the Iranian viewpoint clear to the American Government and hence will keep me informed of developments. He confirmed that strong pressure is being exerted by both the Russians and the British to require the expulsion from Iran of 80% of the Germans. This pressure he said is strong but formal and not backed by military or economic threat although he added that he fears it is the prelude to greater demands. The Iranian Government cannot be declared in view of its policy of strict neutrality and its desire to be faithful to its treaty with Germany accede to this extraordinary request. He characterized the demand which he thought originated solely with the British as extremely unfair and unjust. He informed the British and Russian envoys that he could not accede to their demand but that he would expel any German from Iran upon submission of evidence of his having engaged in illegal activities. The Germans, he states, have threatened to break off relations with Iran if the British demands are complied with.

Although the Prime Minister is bitter and obdurate there are signs that he is weakening. For example, he stated that in an endeavor to find a solution he has promised the British that he will gradually get rid of Government employed Germans whose services can be spared. It is doubtful if the Iranians can withstand further strong pressure by their two powerful neighbors. Whether the country will submit gracefully or offer a gesture of resistance was declared a matter of conjecture.

The *Ettelaat* of yesterday carried a leading editorial denouncing the Free French news agency in bitter terms for its false news as to the activities of Germans in Iran and its endeavor to embroil a peaceful country in war. The Prime Minister who was probably responsible for the article expressed the same sentiments to me in his conversation.

DREYFUS

740.0011 European War 1939/13803 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, August 8, 1941—10 p. m.

[Received August 8—9:55 p. m.]

3511. For the Secretary and the Under Secretary. Mr. Eden asked me to see him this afternoon and gave me the text of a message which is being sent to the British Minister at Tehran instructing him on August 16 to present to the Iranian Government a lengthy memorandum dealing with the presence of Germans in Iran and the urgent necessity for their removal from the country. The British Minister is also requested to hand a copy at the same time if possible to the Shah⁶⁶ himself or at least to insure that the Shah receives a copy without delay.

The text of the memorandum to be presented to the Iranian Government after references to continued affirmation on the part of the Iranian Government of its desire to maintain an attitude of neutrality and to remain outside the zone of hostilities in the present war, points out that this desire had been equally felt by other states who have since been attached or overrun by German armed forces. In light of this incontestable fact the British Government feels it is obliged to put forward in the most friendly spirit certain observations to which the Iranian Government's most serious attention is invited.

The British Government emphasizes the fact that it accepts and endorses the Iranian Government's policy of neutrality and declares that it has no designs against Iran's political independence. It points out that with the development of the war, however, a serious danger to both Iran and to British interests has become manifest. It recalls that as long ago as January last the British Government brought to the notice of the Iranian authorities its grave concern in regard to excessively large numbers of German nationals who had been permitted to reside in Iran. This concern of the British Government has on subsequent occasions been reaffirmed to the Iranian Government. The Iranian Government appears to have recognized the wisdom of the advice given by the British Government that the number of Germans should be drastically reduced and has indicated that it is taking steps to insure that Germans whose residence permits have expired, whose conduct is suspected or who can be replaced by Iranians should leave the country as soon as possible. The Iranian Government has also admitted its obligation to keep the activities of such Germans as remain under strict control. The number of

⁶⁶ Reza Pahlavi.

Germans who have in fact left the country is, however, very small and the British Government observes that the Iranian Government has still failed to realize the urgency of the problem and the gravity with which it is regarded by the British Government. In these circumstances the British Government repeats in the most formal and emphatic manner its recommendation that the German community in Iran should be required without further delay to leave the country. If the Iranian Government should wish to retain temporarily a few German technicians now engaged on important work in connection with Iranian industry it is requested that a complete list of the names of these technicians whom it is desired to retain and the exact nature of the work on which they are employed should be communicated to the British Minister at Teheran. The British Government would expect this list to be kept as small as possible. None of the German technicians to be so retained should be employed on work connected with the Iranian system of communications, railroads, roads, telegraphs, telephones, wireless or where their harmful activities during a period of crisis might paralyze the national life of Iran. It is requested that similar steps be taken to control the activities of refugees who fled from Iraq⁶⁷ and it is pointed out that the Iranian Government is under clear obligation to take effective measures to prevent the use of Iranian territory by these refugees for intrigues directed against Iraq and its allies.

A separate telegram sent to the British Minister at Tehran following the foregoing informs him that in discussing with Iranian Government the suggestion that certain German technicians be allowed to remain in Iran he should keep clearly in mind that the British object is to obtain reduction of Germans by four-fifths. It is pointed out that no time limit has been inserted in the memorandum as it is not desired to give it the character of an ultimatum. The British Minister is told, however, that he should make it clear in conversation that the British Government hopes for an immediate assurance from the Iranian Government that the reduction of 80 percent will have been made by August 31.

Mr. Eden informed me that the Soviet representative at Tehran is being instructed to make the same representations, and he said that it would be of great help if the American Minister at Tehran might be authorized to say to the Government that in his opinion the British and the Russian point of view is a right and necessary one and that the Iranian Government should meet it. He said that both the British and the Russians are going to emphasize that they have no territorial ambitions whatever in Iran and he said the Russian Government had

⁶⁷ After suppression of the anti-British military coup in Iraq, April-May 1941. For correspondence on this subject, see pp. 486 ff.

recently given clear assurances to the British Government that they have no territorial ambitions whatever in Iran—they simply want to get the Germans out.

The Turks have been informed of this move in Iran and Mr. Eden says that they do not like it because of their apparent suspicion of Russian aims in Iran. He hopes that our Ambassador at Ankara may be authorized to express approval of the move as a necessary one and one not designed to impair the political status of Iran.

In order to further allay if possible Turkish suspicions of Russia the British and Russian Governments have agreed to make a unilateral secret declaration to the Turkish Government which goes a very long way for Russia, as it disclaims any aggressive intentions or claims to the Straits.

They think here that the Russian declaration may be given greater weight at Ankara by the fact that it is to be paralleled by a similar British declaration, as the Turks do not suspect Great Britain of any ulterior designs on the Straits.

The following is the English text of the proposed Soviet Government's declaration to Turkey which was given me by Mr. Eden:

"The Soviet Government confirm their loyalty to the Montreux Convention⁶⁸ and assure the Turkish Government that they have no aggressive intentions or claims whatever with regard to the Straits. The Soviet Government as also his Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are prepared scrupulously to observe the territorial integrity of the Turkish Republic.

While fully appreciating the desire of the Turkish Government not to be involved in war the Soviet Government, as also his Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, would be prepared to render Turkey every help and assistance in the event of her being attacked by any European [power?]."

Eden says that his Government hopes above all that it will not be necessary to take direct action in Iran, they must envisage the possibility, however, that the Germans may reach the Caucasus and the borders of Iran and cannot allow the dangerous nucleus of German technicians and political agents now in Iran to remain there. I gather from him that the Russians share these views.

If the Department should feel it can go any way to meet Mr. Eden's desire for American action at Teheran and Ankara, I would appreciate being advised by telegraph.

Full text of memorandum will be forwarded by next airmail pouch.⁶⁹

WINANT

⁶⁸ Convention regarding the Regime of the Straits, signed at Montreux, July 20, 1936, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CLXXIII, p. 213.

⁶⁹ Not printed.

740.0011 European War 1939/13821 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, August 9, 1941—5 p. m.
[Received August 9—11:10 a. m.]

3532. For the Secretary and the Under Secretary. My 3511, August 8, 10 p. m. Mr. Eden informs me that the date of August 16th mentioned in first paragraph has been changed to August 14th.

WINANT

740.0011 European War 1939/13857 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, August 11, 1941—5 p. m.
[Received August 11—4 p. m.]

3550. My 3511, August 8, 10 p. m. Reference English text of proposed Soviet Government's declaration to Turkey. Mr. Eden gave me today the following text of a declaration which has been made by the British Government to the Turkish Government:

"(Oral preamble.) In view of anti-Russian propaganda by the Germans, His Majesty's Government and the Soviet Government have considered it right to reaffirm categorically their attitude towards Turkey in order that the Turkish Government may be under no delusion in the formation of their policies towards Great Britain and the Soviet Union.

(Written declaration.) His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom affirm their fidelity to the Montreux Convention and assure the Turkish Government that they have no aggressive intentions or claims with regard to the Straits. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, as also the Soviet Government, are prepared scrupulously to observe the territorial integrity of the Turkish Republic.

While fully appreciating the desire of the Turkish Government not to be involved in war, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, as also the Soviet Government, would nevertheless be prepared to render Turkey every help and assistance in the event of her being attacked by any European power.

His Majesty's Ambassador⁷⁰ has at the same time addressed a note to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs⁷¹ stating that, as far as His Majesty's Government are concerned, the proposed declaration is intended to be merely a repetition of our undertaking towards Turkey as set out in article 1 of the Anglo-Turkish treaty of the 19th October, 1939.^{72a} The declaration does not in any way modify, extend or detract from the Anglo-Turkish treaty."

⁷⁰ Sir H. M. Knatchbull-Hugessen.

⁷¹ Sükrü Saraçoğlu.

^{72a} League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cc, p. 167.

Following is text given me by Mr. Eden of the declaration made by the Soviet Government to the Turkish Government.

“(Oral preamble.) As late as March, 1941, that is to say during the period of well-known treaty relations between the U. S. S. R. and Germany, the Soviet Government exchanged assurances with the Government of the Turkish Republic in connection with reports that were then being spread to the effect that if Turkey were compelled to enter the war Russia would take advantage of Turkey’s difficulties to attack her. It will be recalled that the Soviet Government for their part considered it necessary at that time to declare that such reports in no way corresponded to the attitude of the U. S. S. R. and that if Turkey were in fact attacked and compelled to enter the war for the defence of her territory she could count on full understanding and neutrality of the U. S. S. R. on the basis of the nonaggression pact between the two countries.

It is known that after the treacherous attack of Nazi Germany on the U. S. S. R., the Germans conducted and are still conducting a malicious propaganda against the U. S. S. R. intended *inter alia* to bring about discord between the U. S. S. R. and Turkey.

In view of the fact that this propaganda, which is being intensively conducted by the German Government, has become even stronger at present and considering that in the present international situation it is opportune that an exchange of views should take place between the Soviet Government and the Turkish Government on the subject of relations between the U. S. S. R., Turkey and Great Britain, the Soviet Government have instructed me, M. le Ministre, to make to Your Excellency the following declaration.

(Written declaration.) The Soviet Government confirm their fidelity to the Montreux Convention and assure the Turkish Government that they have no aggressive intentions or claims with regard to the Straits. The Soviet Government, as also His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom, are prepared scrupulously to observe the territorial integrity of the Turkish Republic.

While fully appreciating the desire of the Turkish Government not to be involved in war the Soviet Government, as also His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom, would nevertheless be prepared to render Turkey every help and assistance in the event of her being attacked by any European power.”

When he gave me these two papers Mr. Eden said they had not hoped here for so quick a response from Russia to the suggestion that a Russian declaration be made to Ankara and that they are much gratified by the quick action. The British Ambassador in Ankara has reported that the Turkish Government is greatly pleased by the Soviet declaration and has expressed the wish that both the British and the Soviet declarations be made public. The British agree and Mr. Eden believes that the Russians will also although no reply to the request has yet been received.

WINANT

740.0011 European War 1939/13858 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, August 11, 1941—8 p. m.
[Received August 11—3:55 p. m.]

3559. My 3532, August 9, 5 p. m., and 3511, August 8, 10 p. m. Mr. Eden informed me today that at the time the British memorandum is delivered to the Iranian Government on August 14 a separate communication will also be handed over in which the British Government undertakes to guarantee the territorial integrity of Iran. This guarantee will, of course, be in addition to the declaration contained in the memorandum that Great Britain has no designs against Iran's political independence. Mr. Eden stated that he has suggested to the Russians that they also accompany their parallel representations at Teheran with a guarantee of Iran's territorial integrity along the line of the British action. No word has been received from Moscow but Mr. Eden believes the Russians should accept his suggestion.

WINANT

891.00/1904

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Murray)

[WASHINGTON,] August 11, 1941.

The Iranian Minister called on me by appointment this afternoon and discussed at some length what he regards as the critical situation of his country as a result of the pressure now being brought upon Iran by both London and Moscow because of the alleged presence in Iran of several thousand German nationals suspected of seditious activities. Mr. Schayesteh seemed to be deeply troubled and declared that the present developments had an ominous resemblance both to the situation leading up to the partition of Persia in 1907 between Czarist Russia and Great Britain and to the callous disregard of Persia's declared neutrality during the last World War by the same two countries.

Insisting that the number of Germans now in Iran was grossly exaggerated, the Minister went on to explain that the Iranian Government, as the Department must be aware, has during recent years exercised the greatest precaution in granting visas to any foreigners entering that country. He reminded me that the Iranian Legation in Washington had to refer to Tehran, and receive its approval, any requests for visas, even for American Consular officers proceeding to Iran. Such being the case, the Minister said he was convinced that the present accusations leveled at Iran by Moscow and London were merely

a pretext preparatory to aggressive measures against his country—Iran was cast for the role of the lamb in Aesop's fable of "The Wolf and the Lamb".

The Minister said he greatly feared that a situation was developing in which Iran might become a victim of British and Soviet aggression and he added that, in such an eventuality, his country would certainly expect to receive moral support and even material assistance from this country. The Minister then launched into a recital of the tragic history of Iran during the past century or more, when she had been subject to constant threats and menaces of both Russia and Britain, rivals for a position of supremacy in the ancient kingdom. This struggle had led to the practical extinction of Iran as a sovereign power in 1907 and the total disappearance of Iran was only avoided by the defeat of Czarist Russia in 1917 and the new orientation in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union assumed in the Soviet-Persian Treaty of 1921.⁷² The Minister felt that the Shah had really been divinely sent to rescue Iran from her hopeless situation and that his accomplishments during the last twenty years in providing Iran with self-respect and reestablishing her position in the society of nations had been little short of miraculous. All of this would be threatened with destruction if the present developments continued.

I asked the Minister whether he believed the Shah would consent to a request from either Great Britain or Russia for the passage of troops across his territory. The Minister said the Shah's pride and character was such that he would be incapable of accepting any such demand, even though a refusal might mean disastrous defeat. When I questioned the Minister as to whether he believed the Shah would permit the passage of arms and munitions over the new Iranian railroad from the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea, he said he was not able to answer that question.

Returning again to the question of the alleged thousands of "tourists" and agents in Iran, I asked the Minister whether he had any precise figures in that regard. He said his impression was that there were not more than six or seven hundred in all. I then suggested that it might be helpful if he would obtain exact information from his Government on that subject. I also expressed an interest in being informed of the substance of the recent communications exchanged between Tehran and London and Tehran and Moscow on this subject. The Minister said he would not fail to acquaint himself with the facts without delay.

In departing the Minister said he was hoping and praying that this present crisis might be alleviated at an early moment but that, if this did not occur, he contemplated seeking an occasion to present the viewpoint of his Government on this subject to the Secretary of State.

⁷² League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. ix, p. 383.

740.0011 European War 1939/13915 : Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, August 12, 1941—10 a. m.

[Received August 13—7 a. m.]

89. The British Minister has informed me that British troops in Iraq have taken up positions nearer the Iran frontier. He also stated that the Foreign Minister told him yesterday that the Iran Government was aware of such troop movements.

The war of nerves continues with increasing force in the form of daily broadcasts from Ankara, Baku, and other stations. Baku, the Prime Minister informs me, has been particularly objectionable in broadcasting false news of intensified German activity and sabotage in Iran. I have been able to obtain no confirmation of a broadcast yesterday from Boston regarding disturbances and arrests in the Iran Army. The Iran Government is maintaining an admittedly stubborn attitude concerning the deportation of Germans but there are signs that the war of nerves is having an effect. For example the Foreign Minister yesterday asked the British Minister informally whether the deportation of Mayer and Gamotta mentioned in the Legation's No. 82 of July 29, 6 p. m., would satisfy the British. In spite of widespread rumors of the impending departure of large numbers of Germans the Turkish Ambassador informs me that no more than a normal number have been obtaining visas for transit through Turkey which is the only possible exit.

It is considered not unlikely that the situation here will soon enter a more critical stage.

DREYFUS

740.0011 European War 1939/13883 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, August 12, 1941—11 a. m.

[Received August 12—8:53 a. m.]

3569. Embassy's 3511, August 8, 10 p. m., 3550, August 11, 5 p. m., and 3559, August 11, 8 p. m. The statement in sixth paragraph of my 3511 that the Turks have been already advised of the Anglo-Russian *démarche* to be made at Tehran on August 14, due to a misunderstanding is incorrect. Sir Orme Sargent⁷³ informed me yesterday afternoon that Mr. Eden has been discussing with the Soviet Ambassador the manner and time of informing the Turkish Govern-

⁷³ British Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

ment of this move. Following a talk today with M. Maisky, Mr. Eden has telegraphed the British Ambassador at Ankara along the following lines:

"Mr. Eden is discussing with the Soviet Government the proposal that the two Ambassadors should inform the Turkish Government on August 14 of the substance of the memorandum which is to be addressed to the Iranian Government on that date and that when doing so they should give the Turkish authorities, *mutatis mutandis*, assurances in the following terms:

'H. M. Government (the Soviet Government), as they have informed the Iranian Government, fully accept and endorse the Iranian policy of neutrality. They have themselves no designs against Iran's political independence or territorial integrity. It is their sincere desire to maintain that policy of friendship and cooperation with Iran which they believe to be in the best interests of both Iran and the British Empire (Soviet Union).'

Mr. Eden has asked Ambassador Knatchbull-Hugessen to arrange with his Soviet colleague ^{73a} how best to make their communications to the Turkish Government, assuming that the Soviet Government agrees. The British Ambassador has been told that Mr. Eden sees no objection to the communication being made jointly if he and his Soviet colleague think this would be the best procedure.

Sargent said that Mr. Eden hopes (my 3511, August 8, sixth paragraph) Mr. MacMurray ⁷⁴ may be authorized to express approval of the Iranian move with a view to facilitating Turkish acceptance and realization that Anglo-Russian aims are not directed at the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran. Mr. Eden hopes also that Mr. MacMurray may if the Department approves of the foregoing be authorized to discuss the matter with both the British and Russian Ambassadors before he determines way of approach to the question.

Maisky has not received word from Moscow of approval for this action at Ankara on August 14 but Mr. Eden thinks there is no doubt it will come as the Russians have shown every indication of a sincere and enthusiastic desire to calm Turkish anxiety and suspicions. It was on Russian initiative that the declarations to the Turkish Government reported in my 3550, August 11, 5 p. m. were made.

WINANT

740.0011 European War 1939/13916 : Telegram

The Minister Resident in Iraq (Knabenshue) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, August 13, 1941—1 p. m.
[Received 6:50 p. m.]

232. British Ambassador informs me that acting under instructions, he has urged Iraq Government to make representation to Iranian Gov-

^{73a} Sergey Alexandrovich Vinogradov.

⁷⁴ John V. A. MacMurray, American Ambassador in Turkey.

ernment, invoking Saadabad Pact,⁷⁵ to take action against German tourists and Iraqi political refugees who are using Iran as a base of political intrigues against Iraq. He has warned Iraq Government that those German tourists and Iraqi refugees are undoubtedly trying to do in Iran what they endeavored to do in Iraq, namely, to bring about a *coup d'état* which would put a pro-Axis group in power and thus become a menace to Iraq. Rumors of such *coup d'état* actually having taken place are circulating in Baghdad but are unconfirmed.

I gather that British will continue to use pressure to gain their point with the Iranians and that they are prepared to use force if necessary—British military dispositions are actually in progress in Iraq with that object in view. Baker⁷⁶ requests inform War Department.

KNABENSHUE

740.0011 European War 1939/14005 : Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, August 15, 1941—8 a. m.

[Received August 16—5 a. m.]

92. The British Minister informs me that he and the Soviet Ambassador will deliver parallel notes to the Iranian Government tomorrow afternoon. These notes will express the dissatisfaction of the two Governments that Iran has not seen fit to heed the warning given a month ago as to the danger to this country from Germans residing here and will make further insistent demands that a large part of them be expelled. The Iranians will be asked to furnish a list of Germans whom they wish to retain because their services are indispensable and the two Governments will offer their assistance in replacing them with nationals of other countries. They will stress that Great Britain and Russia have no designs against the territorial integrity or sovereignty of Iran.

Verbally on the occasion of the presentation of the notes the Iranian Government will be told that about four-fifths of all the Germans in Iran should be expelled by the end of August but certainly not later than the middle of September and that an answer to the notes will be expected within 3 days.

The verbal demands and the implied threat of military action make the notes a virtual ultimatum although the British Minister stresses that they are not intended as such. The British Minister left no

⁷⁵ Treaty of Non-Aggression signed at Saadabad Palace, Tehran, July 8, 1937, by Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and Turkey, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cxc, p. 21.

⁷⁶ Maj. Joseph K. Baker, American Military Observer with the British forces in Iraq.

doubt in my mind that unless the demands are complied with the Russians will occupy the north of Iran and the British the remainder.

My British colleague believes that the British in case of invasion will have the situation so soon in hand that the question of representation of British interests by this Legation will not arise.

Although predictions are dangerous it would seem likely that the demands will be refused, that the country will be invaded and that the Iranians will put up a weak gesture of resistance. Iranian troops and equipment have for some time been moving to the north and more recently to the south. The Shah is reported to be near the Turkish frontier inspecting troops.

I consider it not unlikely that if invasion comes the Shah will lose his throne. . . .

I have laid up supplies of necessary articles and have taken all possible precautions for the protection of our citizens in case of necessity.

DREYFUS

740.0011 European War 1939/13803 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, August 16, 1941—7 p. m.

3182. Your 3511, August 8, 10 p. m. Please inform Mr. Eden that this Government appreciates being informed of the nature of the memorandum to be delivered to the Iranian Government, and that our Minister in Tehran has been informed of this action.

You may say to Mr. Eden that while we do not wish our Minister to participate in the joint representations being made in Tehran, he will bear them in mind in his conversations on this subject with the Iranian Government.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/13883 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Iran (Dreyfus)

WASHINGTON, August 16, 1941—9 p. m.

64. The American Embassy in London has been advised by the Foreign Office that the Governments of Great Britain and the Soviet Union are about to make formal demands upon Iran for the expulsion of four fifths of the Germans in that country. Reports of this step are figuring prominently in the American press which is engaged in speculation as to possible further action which may be taken against Iran by Great Britain and the Soviet Union in case a satisfactory answer is not returned to the joint demands.

You should, of course, keep in close touch with your interested colleagues and with the competent Iranian authorities in order that you may keep the Department promptly and fully informed of developments in the present situation.

You should also seek an early occasion to discuss the situation with high Iranian officials, and, without associating yourself with the present representations of your British and Soviet colleagues, unless the Department later instructs you to do so, express the earnest hope of this Government that the Iranian Government is taking all necessary measures to avoid a spread into Iran of Nazi activities which could not fail to result disastrously for that country. The examples of Iraq and Syria⁷⁷ are, of course, pertinent in this connection and might be cited in support of the above observation.

Meanwhile, in order that the Department may be in a position to evaluate properly all phases of the situation, it is necessary that we should be provided as soon as possible with specific and reliable data regarding the character and extent of any Nazi activities in Iran. In reporting on these subjects please be precise in your statements, differentiating between fact and rumor, and, unless you consider it harmful, you should indicate the sources of information. As you probably realize the information thus far received from your Legation on this subject has been somewhat vague and contradictory and insufficient for the needs of the Department in the present situation.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/14116

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, August 18, 1941—1 p. m.

[Received 8 p. m.]

95. The British and Russian notes, referred to in the Legation's No. 92,⁷⁸ were delivered Saturday. Other than a fresh surge of rumors and increasing nervousness among foreigners there are no important developments to report. There is no indication yet as to any new Iranian Government order. The British Minister's impression is that the Iranians are still seeking a magic formula which will satisfy parties. Developments are expected soon.

DREYFUS

⁷⁷ For correspondence on the anti-British military coup in Iraq, see pp. 486 ff.; for correspondence on the British occupation of Syria, see pp. 725 ff.

⁷⁸ Dated August 15, 8 a. m., p. 397.

740.0011 European War 1939/14121 : Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, August 19, 1941—midnight.

[Received August 19—3 p. m.]

96. The British Minister was called to the Foreign Office yesterday to receive the Iranian counterproposal to the British demands: The Iranians would deport the three principal Nazi leaders, Mayer, Gamotta, and Eilers, and would continue their program already begun of expelling about 30 Germans a month as they can be spared. Although the British Minister transmitted the proposal to London by telegraph he informed the Foreign Minister that in his opinion it would be rejected since more than a year would be required to realize the departure of an appreciable number of Germans.

I gained the distinct impression in a long conversation yesterday with the Foreign Minister that the Iranians are temporizing and parrying without realizing the seriousness of their situation. Unless they abandon their search for a magic formula and face immediately the realities of the situation they will perhaps within the next few days find it is too late.

DREYFUS

740.0011 European War 1939/14205 : Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, August 20, 1941—1 p. m.

[Received August 21—8:45 p. m.]

98. The Shah at the graduation exercises of the Military Academy made a brief address which is significant because it is his first public statement in the present emergency and since it indicates his appreciation of the gravity of the situation. He declared that officers' leaves of absence have been canceled and that they will soon understand the reason therefor. He stated that it is necessary for the Army and its officers to take interest in the present situation and if need be to be prepared to sacrifice their lives.

DREYFUS

740.0011 European War 1939/14201 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, August 20, 1941—7 p. m.

[Received August 21—9:13 a. m.]

305. British Ambassador now informs me that August 11 he and his Soviet colleague jointly waited upon Turkish Minister for Foreign

Affairs and read him for his information similar although not identical statements (Russian one being considerably more full and of harsher implications) as to representations which their respective Governments had made to Iranian Government as to necessity of removing German fifth columnists. Apparently Minister's only reaction was to question number and importance of those constituting such element. (British now estimate them at 2,000 excluding families but in key positions such as communications and oil industry.)

2. When I asked Minister's views on Iranian situation and possible developments yesterday he was conspicuously noncommittal but did eventually acknowledge that Turkey regards with apprehension any possible military activity there. While he made no specific reference to it there can be no doubt that Turks are particularly apprehensive of having Russia come into occupation of Iranian territory bordering their undefended and apparently less easily defensible boundary with Iran.

Repeated Moscow, Tehran.

MACMURRAY

740.0011 European War 1939/14121 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Iran (Dreyfus)

WASHINGTON, August 20, 1941—8 p. m.

67. From your 96, August 19, midnight, it would not appear that the Department's 64, August 16, 9 p. m., had been received at the time of your conversation with the Foreign Minister on August 18. You are requested to telegraph whether you have received the Department's 64 as well as a full report of your conversation with Iranian officials pursuant thereto.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/14278 : Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, August 21, 1941—4 p. m.

[Received August 22—9:50 p. m.]

99. Reference to Department's No. 64, dated August 16, 9 p. m. The Department will undoubtedly have received the Legation's No. 92, August 15, 8 a. m., concerning the new British and Russian demands. The Legation is indeed in close and harmonious contact with diplomatic officers and Government officials and as a result was able to obtain so promptly the information contained in its No. 92, which was in the nature of a local scoop. The Department must realize

that actions of this kind originate in London and hence it is not unnatural that our diplomatic or press representatives there are able to obtain advance information.

I appreciate the Department's position as stated in the last sentence of its telegram and will make every endeavor in the future as I have in the past to forward prompt, precise and full information.

I am in daily contact with the Prime and Foreign Ministers who make it a point to keep me informed of the Iranian viewpoint. I have called to their attention on several occasions the danger to Iran of German fifth column activities and have mentioned Iraq as a specific example. Their replies which faithfully present the Iranian viewpoint have always been that the Germans came here at Government request, that they have proper employment, that they are committing no illegal acts, that they are under close surveillance and that their movements within the country are restricted. The Foreign Minister told me yesterday, to show how close is this surveillance, that there is an agent to watch every German.

The Department must realize the difficulty of obtaining reliable information as to Nazi activities in Iran. The British Intelligence officer with whom we are working closely has been unable through his agents to obtain information as to the internal setup of the fifth column organization. The Legation has, however, obtained the following reliable facts: There are in Iran between 2,000 and 2,500 Germans including families of whom perhaps 1,000 are heads of families and of whom about 700 are in Government employ. Almost none of these are tourists or recent arrivals. Most of them have legitimate employment although a few are doing propaganda and organization work under cover of employment by German commercial concerns. Fifth column activities are directed from the German Legation. Two of the leaders are Storm Troopers Mayer and Gamotta who have responsible employment with Shenkers. Propaganda is largely directed by Eilers, an archaeologist who has lived many years in Iran and who is co-author of a tract on German propaganda in the Near East. Germans are strategically placed in the radio station, railways, and other public services and are scattered through the country as agents of commercial organizations such as Shenkers and Ferrostahl. Thus there are German agents in all important public services and in all parts of Iran. Their organization centers in a Nazi club in Tehran known as the Brown House. This club formerly went in for military drilling and target practice but this has been stopped by the Iranian authorities. The organization is said to be disciplined and efficient with each man trained as to his duties either for sabotage or as an adjunct to invading German forces. An experienced American radio expert who is installing radio equipment for the Government

is convinced that the Germans at the governmental radio station have set up special equipment which they are using to direct jamming operations originating in Berlin and directed against Allied broadcasts to this entire area. The above just has been brought to the attention of the British Minister who was not previously informed.

The British propaganda campaign against Iran abetted by private individuals and newspapermen has reached an intense pitch. This has resulted in the discrimination [*dissemination?*] of distorted or false news as, for example, a report from Delhi that a trainload of Germans had arrived in Iran, that from Cairo as to rebellion in the Iranian Army, report of tribal uprisings and distorted news as to the activities and movements of Germans in Iran. Newspapermen have assisted the campaign by accepting such British inspired news as true. For example the American representative of the Associated Press informs me that most of the news sent by press men in Ankara comes directly from the British Legation. The Iranian side of the story has never been told.

I do not minimize the fifth column danger and have frequently called it to the attention of the Department and local officials. I am convinced, however, that the British are using it as a pretext for the eventual occupation of Iran and are deliberately exaggerating its potency as an isolated arm. I have come to the conclusion that the British and Russians will occupy Iran because of overwhelming military necessity no matter what reply the Iranians make to their demands. I must add emphatically to avoid misunderstanding that I am in full agreement with the British action and believe it to be vitally necessary for the furtherance of our common cause.

The written reply of the Iranians to the British and Russian notes has not yet been delivered. The British Minister informs me that his conversation with the Prime and Foreign Ministers make it clear that the reply will be unacceptable to the British. I am of the opinion that invasion by both the Russians and British will come within a few days.

In view of the bitter feeling among the masses against the British and the Shah and considering that the Germans may be of assistance as agitators and directors it is not unlikely that there will be civil disturbance and rioting until the British and Russians gain control. The temper of the Army is increasingly uncertain and the danger of a coup cannot be excluded. In case of necessity I will bring our citizens into the Legation compound where I have no reason to fear for their safety.

I hope to have more specific news of the British reactions to the Iranian counter-proposal and of their immediate intentions within the next 48 hours.

891.00/1769½

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs
(Murray) to the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] August 21, 1941.

MR. SECRETARY: The Iranian Minister has an appointment to see you tomorrow, August 22, at 11 o'clock, when he will explain to you, under instructions from his Government, the present situation in Iran. He proposes at that time to leave with you the original of the attached *aide-mémoire*⁸⁰ which has been telegraphed to him by his Government and which contains the Iranian reply to the recent British demands made upon Iran for the ostensible purpose of bringing about the expulsion of most of the German nationals now in that country.

During a call from the Iranian Minister on August 19, when he requested the present appointment to see you, he read to me the full text of a long telegram he had just received from his Government, the substance of which is contained in the attached *aide-mémoire*. As you will recall, I inquired of the Iranian Minister, during an earlier conversation⁸¹ regarding the present crisis in his country, what the attitude of his Government would be in case of a British demand to permit the passage of British troops through Iran to Russia, and also what the attitude of his Government would be in case a demand for the passage of arms and munitions through his country were made. On that occasion the Minister stated as his opinion that his Government would not under any circumstances permit the passage of troops through his country. As for the passage of arms and munitions, he was not in a position to reply to me. During the Minister's last call on me on August 19, he said he was now in a position to tell me, under instructions from his Government, that no passage of foreign troops through his country would be permitted under any circumstances. While the Minister did not reply specifically to my inquiry regarding the passage of arms and munitions, he pointed out that the Iranian railway was not equipped to carry heavy arms such as the tanks, et cetera.

Commenting on the possibility of an attempted occupation of the country by the British and Bolshevik troops, the Minister said he thought it was unthinkable that Britain would take any aggressive action against his country. As for the possibility of an attempted Bolshevik occupation, the Minister observed that Russia seemed to have her hands full at the present time, and that in any case Iran would put up a desperate and, he thought, successful resistance to any attempt of the Bolshevik Army to invade Iran.

⁸⁰ *Infra*.

⁸¹ See memorandum of conversation, August 11, p. 393.

The Minister again emphasized that his Government would count heavily upon American sympathy and assistance in case of any acts of aggression against his country.

WALLACE MURRAY

740.0011 European War 1939/14394

The Iranian Legation to the Department of State

MEMORANDUM

The British Minister in Teheran has called many times during recent weeks at the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He has spoken of the so-called exceedingly large number of Germans in Iran and the danger which might result, and the anxiety of the British Government concerning that situation.

The Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs ^{sia} has explained to him the whole situation. He has asserted that, first of all, the number of Germans resident in Iran is not so great as is pretended, and it scarcely touches the figure of 700 in all Iran. No entrance visas have been accorded to German tourists. Those who are in Iran are there only for industrial and commercial purposes. Their places and occupations, and all their goings and comings are under the surveillance of the Governmental authorities. Therefore the Iranian Government feels sure that they could not foment any fifth column activities. Moreover, as the policy of the Iranian Government is to reduce the number of foreign specialists and employees and to replace them with Iranians, even the actual number now in Iran will be decreased. As a proof of this, a certain number has already left.

The Iranian Government presumes that if, in reality, the objective of the British Government is only to reduce the number of Germans in Iran, that will be realized in this way, and a careful surveillance by the Iranian authorities will remove all doubts concerning their activities. But the Iranian Government believes that the expulsion of Germans from Iran without any logical reason is against the neutrality of its country.

The Iranian Prime Minister has, personally, given every assurance about this matter to the British Minister in Teheran, but it seems that the British Government is not willing to accept the Iranian point of view, and the British Minister repeated his demands more forcibly last week.

The Government of Iran has worked for a long time with assiduity to create and maintain safety in the interior of its country, and has provided means of living peacefully in the country to the Iranians themselves as well as to foreigners. Iran believes that this great

^{sia} Djevad Amery.

work which has been accomplished should be admired and respected by her neighbors. Unfortunately, however, it seems that they wish to disturb that tranquility. They make harmful propaganda, and try to terrify the Iranians by their pressure.

Relying upon the spirit of international justice and equity of the United States Government, and especially in view of the sentiments which the United States shows toward the British Government and the British people during their present struggle, the Iranian Government would like to keep the United States Government informed of this situation.

It is perhaps useful to make known to the United States Government that Iran has always pursued the good neighbor policy, and even in the present situation, she is willing to make every effort to create an atmosphere of mutual confidence and understanding, but such an effort will be limited to the extent which will not be against her prestige and sovereignty.

The Iranians remember with sorrow the great misfortunes of the last war, the unbelievable number of the population which died as a result of famine and epidemics caused by foreign interference in Iran. A repetition of those tragic scenes will never be permitted.

WASHINGTON, August 22, 1941.

740.0011 European War 1939/14394

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] August 22, 1941.

The Minister of Iran called at his request. He handed to me the attached memorandum⁸² relative to serious differences between his Government and the Government of Great Britain. The Minister then proceeded orally to refer to this threatened invasion by the British and requested my views as to what the attitude of this Government would be in the event of such invasion. He dwelt at length upon the principles governing normal peaceful international relations which I and other officials of this Government often refer to and proclaim, and he concluded his statement with an inquiry as to what this Government would be disposed to do in the way of preventing the threatened British invasion.

I replied that the British military authorities, of course, plan all of their strategy without any consultation or discussion with any official of this Government, that there seems to be a possibility of invasion of that general area of the world by the Germans and of the

⁸² *Supra.*

necessity of defensive activities to be taken against them by the British. I then said that no one could tell when or just where such invasion would finally develop if it should develop, and that, of course, this Government could not define any new policy, if it should have in mind any such policy in a contingent way, upon a purely theoretical military situation to which the Minister referred. I said that our two countries are on thoroughly friendly relations and we feel most kindly towards the people of Iran, but that I think the Minister must realize that I am not in a position to discuss contingent or theoretical cases in advance. I added that while Iran is neutral, as the Minister states, the Germans have no respect whatever for neutrality, but counsel a neutral nation to remain perfectly quiet and neutral until Hitler gets well ready to invade and conquer it in short order and throw it into a state of serfdom or semi-slavery; and that the British aided by us and others are struggling desperately to prevent the Hitler conquest from reaching Great Britain and thereby most seriously endangering the Western Hemisphere.

The Minister repeatedly talked as though his country would fight if the British undertake by force to occupy it for any purpose. I indicated that the British, of course, have nothing against Iran, but on the contrary have extensive trading relations with them. They are only striving to defend themselves successfully against German invasion. The Minister did not press further for a promise on the part of this Government to interfere, except to say that if this Government would say but one word to the British, he believed that they would not invade Iran.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

740.0011 European War 1939/14280 : Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, August 22, 1941—10 a. m.

[Received August 23—10:30 a. m.]

101. Reference Department's No. 67, August 20, 8 p. m., Department's No. 64⁸³ was received after my 96⁸⁴ was sent and information requested therein as to fifth column was given in No. 99, August 21. Telegrams from Washington are taking from 2 to 3 days to reach Tehran. I have just had another conversation with the Prime Minister during which I again called to his attention the fifth column danger. His reply was almost identical with the Iranian viewpoint outlined in paragraph 3 of my No. 99 and I called his attention particularly to the danger to them of agitation from Germans employed there and

⁸³ Dated August 16, 9 p. m., p. 398.

⁸⁴ Dated August 19, midnight, p. 400.

informed him of the jamming operations mentioned in my 99. He expressed surprise at this information and promised to take action. I further mentioned the danger to the railways to which he replied that he has an agent watching each bridge and strategic point. My opinion previously expressed in No. 67 is that the Iranians are doing everything they can to control fifth column activity but that their action is too weak and desultory to offer effective check to the efficient Germans.

The official Iranian viewpoint in the present crisis as frankly given to me by the Foreign and Prime Ministers is that while the Iranians will agree to expel Germans gradually from Iran they deeply resent the peremptory nature of the demands and do not at all like "being pushed around by the British". Further they are resentful of the campaign of false and distorted news being waged against them by the British and Russians. The Prime Minister told me in strictest confidence that he feels the British are not basing their action on the merits of the case but rather are seeking a pretext to occupy the north of Iran because of the military necessity of making contact with the Russians. The Foreign Minister informed me that the British have proceeded in a highhanded rather than a friendly way never having approached Iran to suggest closer cooperation or the forming of an alliance. In short the Iranians are willing to cooperate in what they consider a reasonable program for the expulsion of Germans but refuse to be cowed into accepting the arbitrary British-Russian demands.

The Iranian answer to the British and Russian notes was delivered last night. In almost identical terms to both the answer consisted of nine points couched in general and vague language. It was notable in omitting any reference to the word German using instead the term foreigner. The first four points are of little importance being confined largely to profession of friendship and other formalities. The fifth declares it to be the policy of the Government to discharge all foreigners when their services can be spared while the sixth states this policy is being accelerated due to present conditions so that large numbers of foreigners will soon leave. The seventh is to the effect that Iran alone will determine which foreigners will leave, while the eighth states there will be equal treatment for all foreigners. The ninth declares that the Government, while it is willing to carry out any plan to help a neighbor is unwilling to do anything [omission?]. Both the Russian and British envoys told me they consider the answer as wholly unsatisfactory.

It is considered almost certain in well-informed circles here that the British and Russians will invade Iran. The only speculation is as to whether an ultimatum will first be delivered.

DREYFUS

740.0011 European War 1939/13803 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Iran (Dreyfus)

WASHINGTON, August 23, 1941—5 p. m.

71. A United Press despatch from London was received in this country on August 21 stating that the President "has approved whatever action Great Britain and Russia deem necessary to purge Iran of Nazi influences." It is further stated in this despatch that the question of Iran was dealt with thoroughly at the conference between the President and the British Prime Minister.⁸⁵

You should inform the Foreign Office without delay that the President has denied the accuracy of the despatch above mentioned. The Secretary has informed the Iranian Minister that the despatch is untrue.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/13803 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, August 23, 1941—5 p. m.

3352. A United Press despatch from London was received in this country on August 21 and has been given publicity stating that according to "an authoritative source" the President "has approved whatever action Great Britain and Russia deem necessary to purge Iran of Nazi influences." It is further stated in this despatch that the question of Iran was dealt with thoroughly at the conference between the President and the British Prime Minister.

You are requested to ascertain if possible the identity of the source above mentioned and to report by telegraph.

The President and I have both denied the accuracy of the despatch in question. You should so inform the Foreign Office and voice the regret of this Government that such a report should have been circulated. You should also state that there has been no change in the position of this Government in the matter of Iran from that indicated in the Department's 3182, August 16, 7 p. m.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/13803 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray)

WASHINGTON, August 23, 1941—5 p. m.

147. 1. On August 8, the British Foreign Secretary informed our Ambassador at London that the British and Soviet representatives at

Known as the Atlantic Conference, August 9-12, 1941; see vol. I, pp. 341 ff.

Tehran would deliver parallel notes to the Iranian Government on August 16 insisting that most of the Germans in Iran be expelled from that country without further delay. Mr. Eden stated to our Ambassador that it would be of great help if the American Minister at Tehran were to be authorized to say to the Iranian Government that in his opinion the British and Russian point of view is a right and necessary one and that it should be met by the Government of Iran. The British Foreign Secretary also expressed the hope that our Ambassador at Ankara might be authorized to express approval of the move as necessary and one which is not designed to impair the political status of Iran.

2. The Department thereupon instructed the Minister at Tehran on August 16 not to associate himself with the representations of his British and Soviet colleagues, in the absence of instructions to do so, but to express to the Iranian Government the earnest hope of this Government that all necessary measures were being taken to avoid a spread into Iran of Nazi activities which could not fail to result disastrously for that country. The Minister was authorized to cite the examples of Iraq and Syria in that connection.

3. On the same date our Ambassador at London was authorized to inform Mr. Eden that we do not wish our Minister to take part in the joint representations being made in Tehran, but that in his conversations on the subject with the Iranian Government he would bear them in mind.

4. A United Press despatch from London was received in this country on August 21 and has been given publicity stating that the President approved whatever action may be considered necessary by Great Britain and Russia to purge Iran of Nazi influences. It was further stated in this despatch that the question of Iran was dealt with thoroughly at the conference between the President and the British Prime Minister.

5. The President and I have both denied the accuracy of the press despatch above mentioned.

6. You are authorized to make free use of the foregoing information in your conversations with Turkish officials.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/14275 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, August 23, 1941—midnight.

[Received August 23—8:20 p. m.]

3840. Personal for the Secretary of State. This morning I talked with Mr. Eden. He wanted you to know how seriously they view the

German agents in Iran. The British are certain that their negotiations with the Iran Government are being directed by the Germans. I felt Mr. Eden was simply asking for a sympathetic understanding of their problem.

WINANT

740.0011 European War 1939/14281 : Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, August 24, 1941—9 a. m.

[Received 8:55 p. m.]

102. The Shah last night sent the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to the British Legation to assure the British Minister that the Germans in Iran will be expelled with accelerated tempo. The assurance was immediately sent to London. The growing willingness on the part of the Iranians to expel appreciable numbers of Germans from the country has been evident in the conversations between British and Russian envoys and high Iranian officials. The attitude is, however, at variance with the written and formal record, for example, with the unbending tone of the written reply to the notes, the tenor of the Shah's speech reported in my No. 98⁸⁶ and with the tone of last night's editorial in *Etapent* [*Ettelaat?*], which in referring to the Shah's speech called the people to action and sacrifice to save their honor. Thus the Iranians while maintaining a defiant attitude for face-saving purposes and for the record are in fact willing to make concessions. The first general expulsion order was, it is reliably reported, given yesterday when 16 Germans, mostly barbers and unimportant persons, were directed to leave Iran within 2 weeks. It is understood that the German Legation has protested against the order.

There are no other local developments of importance. The situation this morning may be described as one of marking time awaiting the next British-Russian move.

DREYFUS

740.0011 European War 1939/14306 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, August 24, 1941—noon.

[Received 9 p. m.]

311. I learn that some days ago Iranian Ambassador requested advice of Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs as to course which his Government should pursue in face of demands of British and Russians that it expel alleged German fifth columnists. He said his Govern-

⁸⁶ Dated August 20, 1 p. m., p. 400.

ment was in fact getting rid of a number of them but that demands were so exigent as to suggest ulterior motives. While stating that he could not undertake to answer on behalf of Turkey until he had consulted with his governmental colleagues Saracoglu recalled that in making to him formal communication as to intentions of their Governments (my 305, August 20, 7 p. m.) British and Soviet Ambassadors had given assurances that they would fully respect independence and integrity of Iran and said that for his own part he had complete confidence in that assurance.

I understand that after few days temporizing he received Ambassador and informed him that while Turkish Government had no concrete suggestions to offer it nevertheless hoped that Iranian Government might find amicable means of settling difficulty.

2. I construe this as a somewhat guarded intimation that Turkey would prefer to have Iran yield to demands. Such attitude would accord with Turkish desire to avoid occasion for Russian occupation of adjacent Persian territory. But it is to be noted that Turkish press is in general hostile to idea of coercing Iran in this matter.

Repeated to Tehran.

MACMURRAY

740.0011 European War 1939/14299 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the
Secretary of State*

Moscow, August 24, 1941—2 p. m.
[Received August 25—9:20 a. m.]

1567. For the President, the Secretary and Under Secretary. In a conversation with the Iranian Ambassador ⁸⁷ yesterday he said that his Government had replied to the Soviet and British notes demanding the expulsion of all Germans with a flat rejection on the grounds that the subject was distinctly the internal affair of the Iranian Government and that the demand constituted an infringement of the sovereignty of Iran. He described the Soviet and British notes as "impertinent". He said that notwithstanding the formal rejection the Soviet and British Governments had been orally informed that the Iranian Government was taking measures to expel the Germans.

The Ambassador then went on to state: (1) that Soviet participation in the joint demand had been at British "instigation"; (2) that after castigating Germany for having sacrificed the Baltic States in 1939 in order to curry favor with the Soviet Union, Britain was about to sacrifice Iran in order to curry favor with the Soviet Union; (3) that the present attitude of the British Government towards Iran was a poor reward for having sided with Britain and safeguarded its interests during the past 2 years; (4) that Iran would defend itself as

⁸⁷ M. Saed.

best it could against any attempted violation of its sovereignty by either the Soviet Union or Britain or both; (5) that the Soviet-British demand to immediately expel all Germans from Iran was a poorly concealed pretext for occupying Iran inasmuch as the expulsion of all Germans, and transit rights through Iran if desired, "could have been amicably discussed and arranged" without offending the *amour propre* of the Iranian Government and people.

The Ambassador concluded his remarks, after referring to "blundering diplomacy", with the comment "we have been the loyal friends of the British for many, many years. If what they wanted was the expulsion of all Germans from Iran, the fullest transit rights and a military base of operations from which to protect the Soviet oil fields and the Caucasus, why did they not propose an open formal military alliance between the Soviet Union, Britain, and Iran. Even now it may not be too late although my Government has been seriously offended."

In view of the Ambassador's influence in Tehran and his pronounced pro-British sympathies of which I have had personal knowledge for over 2 years I attach considerable importance to the views expressed by him.

STEINHARDT

740.0011 European War 1939/14298 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, August 24, 1941—5 p. m.

[Received 6:45 p. m.]

3843. Your 3352, August 23, reached me this morning. I have just been able to get in touch with Mr. Eden. He knew nothing of the United Press despatch from London and asked me to state his very real regret that such a report had come out of England.

I do not think the statement appeared in the British press.

I reread to him the Department's 3182, August 16, which he told me he had had in mind and which he had appreciated some days ago.

He also told me he had been disturbed by other releases from London that have either appeared in the press in England or elsewhere.

He will immediately investigate and report to me on his findings. He also is going to take action to prevent the repetition of similar situations.

The man who collects this information for the United Press is Fred Kuh. He came in to see me on the 18th to discuss the Allied Economic Conference. He asked me if I was free to give him information on the subject and I told him no, I was not. He then said he would have no

trouble getting it and would like to come back and discuss it at a later date. On leaving my office he made some reference to Iran and the British and Russian notes but we had no conversation on the subject beyond his saying that he hoped England would be hardboiled in taking action if necessary.

On the 22d he returned ostensibly to discuss the Allied Economic Council business and had in the interim gotten complete information on the subject. His object in coming, however, was to discuss Iran. I told him I had very little information on the subject beyond what he had already told me and which was generally known here, namely, that the Iran Government had made an unfavorable reply to the British. He then said that he thought it would be a great mistake if troops were sent into Iran and that he had hoped that the United States might offer to replace the German technicians there. I made no comment but felt that he had come to plant this idea. I was curious because of his reversal of opinion within 3 days as he is intelligent and too well informed. These conversations only lasted a few minutes.

When I saw Eden that evening on another matter I asked him if there had been any suggestion about American technicians going into Iran. He told me yes the Turkish Ambassador ^{87a} had made that suggestion that afternoon. Eden plainly gave it no weight.

In the light of your message I feel that the report may have been sent as a deliberate effort to confuse the situation. Where the alleged statement as quoted in your message to me came from I do not know. I am making further investigation.

WINANT

740.0011 European War 1939/14282 : Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, August 24, 1941—10 p. m.

[Received August 25—2:55 a. m.]

103. The British Minister informs me that he will hand to the Iranian Government at 8 a. m., Monday morning,⁸⁸ a note which will (1) express disappointment that the Iranians have not heeded the British requests, (2) express regret that the British are now forced to take matters into their own hands to protect their interests, (3) reiterate that they have no designs against Iran's integrity or sovereignty, and (4) express the hope that Iran will not resist since the British have no desire to cause harm to the country or its citizens.

Verbally the Minister will state that as soon as the British have taken steps to safeguard their interests they will wish to continue full cooperation with Iran.

^{87a} Tevfik Rüstü Aras.

⁸⁸ August 25.

I learn from the British Military Attaché that British troops will cross the Iranian frontier at dawn tomorrow. British planes will drop leaflets over the principal Iranian towns explaining the British position.

DREYFUS

740.0011 European War 1939/14327 : Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, August 25, 1941—9 p. m. [*a. m.*]
[Received August 25—4 p. m.]

104. The British note mentioned in my No. 103⁸⁹ and a similar note from the Russian Government were delivered to the Prime Minister at 4 a. m. today. The hour of delivery was advanced in view of the instructions of the Soviet Ambassador to deliver his note without delay.

The Shah has asked to see the Russian and British Envoys at [apparent omission] a. m. this morning. I shall report the results of their conversation immediately thereafter.

All is quiet in Tehran this morning.

DREYFUS

740.0011 European War 1939/14282

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] August 25, 1941.

The Minister of Iran⁹⁰ called to see me this morning at his request.

The Minister was not acting under instructions and had not as yet heard of the fact that British and Russian forces had actually entered Iran.

The Minister spoke for a very considerable time of the past history of Iran and the difficulties experienced by the country as a result of Russian pressure in the North and British pressure in the South, of its desire to maintain its neutrality, et cetera.

The Minister stated specifically that there were less than 700 Germans in Iran and that in view of the willingness expressed by the Iranian Government to get rid of these Germans over a period of a relatively short time, it was obvious that the presence of these Germans in Iran was merely a pretext for the desire of Great Britain and Russia to occupy the country.

⁸⁹ *Supra.*

⁹⁰ Mohammed Schayesteh.

The Minister expressed the particular hope that the President would be kept fully informed of developments. I said that the President was personally following very closely the whole course of events but that, as I knew the Minister realized, this Government was committed within the limits of its announced policy to do what it could to assist in the defeat of the Hitlerite Government of Germany and that, bearing fully in mind the traditional friendship between our two countries, I trusted that, whatever situation might develop in Iran, the outcome would be the eventual maintenance intact of the independence and integrity of Iran and the avoidance of any danger that Germany might, directly or indirectly, extend its influence over Iran. I said I felt sure that the policy of the British Government would be one of eventual restoration of the liberties of the Iranian people, no matter what temporary measures might be undertaken, whereas if Germany acquired any form of domination over Iran, that domination would never be relinquished were Germany to find herself in a position of world domination.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

740.0011 European War 1939/14282

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Murray)

[WASHINGTON,] August 25, 1941.

The Turkish Ambassador ⁹¹ called on me at his request this afternoon and expressed his deep concern over the developments leading to the invasion of Iran by British and Bolshevist troops. The Ambassador said he had received no instructions from his Government in this matter and was speaking only personally but he was convinced that this action would have grave repercussions in the Moslem world and even among "atheistic" Turks, to say nothing of the pious ones.

The Ambassador seemed deeply depressed and disillusioned. He said he was sure his Government would be greatly perturbed over an extension of the Soviet frontier along the eastern frontier of Turkey, which was not fortified, and purposely so because of the friendly relations existing between Turkey and Iran as symbolized by the Saadabad Pact. The Ambassador added he had no confidence in British promises and feared that the whole of Iran and perhaps even Turkey would be turned over to Soviet Russia as a price of continued Soviet resistance.

Continuing in a pessimistic and rather cynical strain, the Ambassador said he was disappointed in the Eight Points evolved at the

⁹¹ Mehmet Münir Erteğün.

Atlantic Conference⁹² and felt they were not a proper basis for future peace. He also added that he was somewhat disappointed at the manner in which this Government was following British leadership rather than itself assuming leadership in these perilous times.

I tried to reassure the Ambassador that the situation was not as bad as he seemed to believe and that the moral authority of this Government would make itself felt more and more as time went on, but he only replied that he feared the mistakes committed after the last war would again be repeated after the present war, with equally disastrous results. "You blamed the Kaiser then for everything and now you blame Hitler. The troubles go much deeper than the actions of any one man."

I was somewhat surprised at this state of mind of the Ambassador as I had not experienced it before. He has in the past repeatedly emphasized his belief that the only hope of the world lay in the moral leadership of this country which he felt sure would be brought to bear at an appropriate moment. Today, however, he seemed obsessed with the idea that our Government is only endeavoring to rescue the British Empire without regard for the welfare of other countries and to preserve the ruling caste of England, for which he said he had only contempt because of their utter selfishness and readiness at all times to sacrifice others for their own interests.

While the above remarks of the Ambassador may be only indicative of his present depressed state of mind, it may on the other hand possibly indicate a renewed disposition on the part of the Turkish Government to withdraw further into its present seclusion, if not actually to adjust itself to a policy of collaboration with Germany.

WALLACE MURRAY

740.0011 European War 1939/14344 : Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, August 25, 1941—2 p. m.
[Received August 26—9:10 a. m.]

105. In continuation of my No. 104⁹³ the British and Russian envoys have just finished their conversation with the Shah. The British Minister informs me that the Shah, calm and collected, began the conversation somewhat as follows:

"What is this? I have given my assurance that most of the Germans will be expelled from Iran. I find this morning that you have attacked both the north and south of my country and have seized 8 Axis ships in the Gulf. It seems that the Germans want to take all of Europe and now the Russians and British want to take Iran."

⁹² For text of the Atlantic Charter, August 14, 1941, see vol. I, p. 367.

⁹³ Dated August 25, 9 a. m., p. 415.

The British Minister explained to the Shah the background of the affair and stressed the necessity of the present action since the Iranian Government had in fact failed to give adequate assurances that the Germans in Iran would be expelled. The Shah then gave unequivocal assurance that all of the Germans in Iran except a number of technicians whose services are urgently required would be expelled from the country within 1 week. He further promised to furnish the list which officials have hitherto refused to give of the Germans who would remain in Iran. He urged the two envoys to endeavor on the basis of these assurances to obtain an immediate cessation of hostilities and inquired pointedly as to what Russia and Britain would offer in return. The Shah's proposal was immediately transmitted to London and Moscow and answers are expected before tomorrow morning.

The British Minister gained the distinct impression that the Shah had been kept badly informed by his ministers as to the status of negotiations with the Russians and British.

Although it is known that British troops crossed the frontier this morning there is as yet no reliable news of the fighting. Six British planes flew over Tehran a few minutes ago dropping leaflets.

Calm prevails in Tehran with business and comparatively normal life continuing. Most of the British colony and some Allied nationals have taken refuge in the British Legation as previously arranged. Several Czechs and others have requested refuge in this Legation but I have not consented thereto since there are no signs of disorder or peril at the moment. I am watching the situation closely in collaboration with our citizens and will not hesitate to take them into the compound should the situation require.

DREYFUS

740.0011 European War 1939/14326 : Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, August 25, 1941—6 p. m.

[Received August 26—6 : 20 a. m.]

106. The Director General of the Iranian Foreign Office just called personally to urge the Legation to communicate to the Department of State the official request of the Iranian Government that the President of the United States use his good offices with the British and Russian Governments to bring about the immediate cessation of hostilities looking to an amicable settlement of [apparent omission] dispute. He stated that the Iranians are willing to give assurances that most of the Germans in Iran will be expelled. In this connection please see my No. 105.⁹⁴

DREYFUS

⁹⁴ *Supra.*

740.0011 European War 1939/14641 : Telegram

The Shah of Iran (Reza Shah Pahlavi) to President Roosevelt

[Translation]

TEHRAN, [August 25, 1941—10 p. m. ?]

[Received August 25—10: 51 p. m.]

Your Excellency has surely been informed that the Russian and British forces have crossed brusquely and without previous notice the boundaries of this country occupying certain localities and bombarding a considerable number of cities which were open and without defense. The old pretext which the Russian and English Governments raised consisted in the concern which those countries claimed to feel because of the sojourn of certain Germans in Iran, despite the assurances given by my Government that those Germans will soon leave Iran. No subject for concern could longer exist and I no longer can see for what reason they have proceeded to those acts of aggression and to bombarding without reason our cities. I consider it my duty, on the basis of the declarations which Your Excellency has made several times regarding the necessity of defending principles of international justice and the right of peoples to liberty, to request Your Excellency to be good enough to interest yourself in this incident, which brings into war a neutral and pacific country which has had no other care than the safeguarding of tranquillity and the reform of the country. I beg Your Excellency to take efficacious and urgent humanitarian steps to put an end to these acts of aggression. Being assured of the sentiments of good will of Your Excellency, I renew to you the assurance of my sincere friendship.

REZA PAHLAVI

740.0011 European War 1939/14326

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs
(Murray)*

[WASHINGTON,] August 26, 1941.

At the conference in the Secretary's office this morning, the rush telegram no. 106 of August 25, 6 p. m. from Tehran was discussed. This telegram contains the official request of the Iranian Government that "the President of the United States use his good offices with the British and Russian Governments to bring about the immediate cessation of hostilities, looking to an amicable settlement of the present dispute."

There was a diversity of opinions as to the best procedure to follow in this matter in the realization, as the Secretary put it, that we are

handling "a red-hot iron." I strongly advanced the viewpoint that even at this late hour we should make every endeavor to induce the British to negotiate with the Iranians with a view to obtaining their friendly collaboration and, if possible, to make an alliance with them for the common defense of their territory. I emphasized that it would be far better for the British in a situation of this kind to be surrounded by a friendly, cooperative Iranian people than to have to face dogged opposition, sabotage and, perhaps, guerrilla warfare.

Mr. Welles took what was perhaps the most extreme view, that we should avoid at all costs using our good offices in this matter and that we should confine ourselves to informing the British Government of the present Iranian request, and inquiring of the British Government whether we could be helpful in any way to the British in this matter.

After considerable further discussion it seemed to be agreed that it might be well to do three things,

(1) to reply to the Iranian Government suggesting that they make every effort to come to an amicable settlement with the British Government in this matter, and adding that we on our part would keep in close touch with the British with a view to being as helpful as possible to the Iranians;

(2) to notify the British Government at once without comment in a separate telegram that we have received the present request from the Iranian Government; and

(3) to take up separately with the British Government the larger aspects of this question. In this telegram we would point out that the present Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran has aroused nation-wide attention and discussion in this country; that the situation is a delicate one politically; and that we desire to be informed by the British Government without delay along the following lines:

(a) The Iranian Government has complained bitterly that the British and Soviet demands upon that Government were based entirely on the alleged presence in Iran of subversive German agents. The Iranian Government furthermore maintains that at no time has the British Government approached the Iranian Government with a view to obtaining its friendly collaboration in this matter or to suggest an Anglo-Iranian alliance in the common cause. This Government desires to be informed at once as to the accuracy of the Iranian claims in this matter.

(b) While this Government is informed that the British Government has given the Iranian Government assurances as to the safeguarding of its integrity and sovereignty, we are not informed of the precise measures envisaged by the British Government in order to give effect to these assurances. What guarantees, for instance, are the British preparing to give the Iranians in order to protect Iran against Nazi aggression that may result from the present Anglo-Soviet invasion? What assurances furthermore have been given the Iranians as to indemnification for damages and losses that may be suffered as a result of this occupation?

(c) What are the intentions of the British and Soviet Governments with regard to the extent of occupation of Iranian territory?

(d) What assurances are the British in a position to give the Iranians that in the territory occupied by the Soviets there may not be widespread oppression, persecution and purge of upper-class Iranians, and confiscation of their property?

(e) In case the Iranians show the disposition to meet all the demands of the British and are willing even to negotiate an alliance with Britain, would the British be in a position to take over such occupation of the country as may be necessary for their purposes and to bring about a withdrawal of Soviet forces?

The British will doubtless bear in mind in replying to these questions the importance of our being able to reassure American public opinion as to all phases of the present operation.

740.0011 European War 1939/14326

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs
(Murray) to the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] August 26, 1941.

MR. SECRETARY: The Iranian Minister came to see me urgently this morning without appointment and told me that he has been instructed by his Government to deliver an important message to you this afternoon. I have spoken with your office and they are to let me know whether you will be able to see the Minister after your return from lunch. During my visit with the Minister this morning he informed me that his Government urgently hopes that the President will communicate with the British, Soviet, and Iranian Governments urgently requesting them to cease hostilities at once and to engage in conversations looking towards a settlement of the present dispute. I assume that this communication is identical with that which we received this morning from Mr. Dreyfus and which we discussed in your office earlier in the day.

In discussing the present *démarche* of his Government the Minister said that in his opinion the request was both in the interest of Iran as well as of the United States. In explanation of this statement he emphasized that on every previous occasion of aggression in the world this Government had raised its voice in violent condemnation and protest. The world had come to regard the conscience and idealism of America as an established fact and expected that our voice would be raised on every such occasion regardless of the offender. If, in the present case of British and Soviet aggression, we sit passively by, and

by our silence appear to condone these acts, the Minister feels that we will suffer a great loss in moral authority in the world.

Without commenting on the above observations of the Minister, I told him that I wanted to offer a purely personal suggestion. I was not in a position to advise him officially as to what his Government should do in this matter, but that in my own entirely personal opinion it would be advisable to face the present situation realistically. Nazi aggression is of course a fact and the British are quite naturally afraid of its spread into Iran and other parts of the Near East in the same manner as it spread earlier into Iraq and Syria. Such a situation would of course constitute a grave danger for British interests in that part of the world. Iran could not of course alone defend herself against Nazi aggression in case the Germans reached the Caucasus. Such being the case and with the reality of British and Soviet troops starting to occupy the country it seemed to me that it would be in the best interest of Iran to initiate forthwith negotiations direct with the British with a view to working out some system of collaboration for the common defense of the country. Such collaboration might even partake of the nature of an alliance as had been the case in the collaboration between the Turks and the British.

The Minister seemed much shocked and disappointed with my suggestion and said he had expected a more sympathetic attitude from me. I replied that we were not dealing with a situation in which an ideal solution was easy to find but were dealing with hard facts and endeavoring to bring about a solution that would cause the Iranian people the least harm. In making the above observations to the Iranian Minister I made it clear that I was not speaking for the Department but was merely voicing my own personal suggestion.

During the further course of our conversation I made reference to the possibility of Turkey acting as a friendly intermediary in this matter between the Iranians, the British, and the Soviets. The Turks were, I suggested, in a favorable position to assist all parties concerned in view of their treaty of alliance with Great Britain.

The Minister returned again and again to the point that this Government could not and should not allow a brutal act of aggression such as the present one to go by without some expression of condemnation or some effort to stop it. I tried to make clear to the Minister that we regard the British cause as our cause and that in the common effort to put down aggression we necessarily had to take account of the undoubted dangers of aggression spreading into areas of the Near East vital to the defense of the British Empire.

WALLACE MURRAY

740.0011 European War 1939/14375 : Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, August 26, 1941—8 a. m.

[Received August 27—5:25 a. m.]

107. In continuation of my No. 106⁹⁵ the Foreign Minister has just called personally to see me again to urge the American Government to endeavor to stop hostilities. He said that the Iranian Government in its anxiety to arrive at a settlement is willing not only to deport the Germans but to meet any reasonable British request such as possible Cabinet changes. While I was moved to pity the Foreign Minister in his agitation and dejection I cannot but remark that the Iranians have arrived at this predicament by their failure to recognize and face realities. They now awaken to find the perennial bogey of Russian invasion has become a terrible reality.

The Prime Minister in a speech to the Majlis yesterday afternoon requested the deputies to refrain from making statements and asked the people to be calm and dignified. In reviewing the situation he called attention to Iran's honest policy of neutrality and stressed that there was no danger to her neighbors from Germans here. He declared that in spite of Iranian assurances and actual action taken to reduce the number of Germans the British and Russians have invaded the country. He added that measures were being taken (he referred obviously to the Shah's proposal mentioned in my No. 105⁹⁶) and that clarification was expected soon.

News of military action are meager. The Prime Minister stated that the British attacked Bandarishahpur and Khoramshah and took over Iranian ships; that bombs were dropped on Ahwaz and that British mechanized forces were approaching Kermanshah. Invading forces are being resisted he said wherever encountered. The Foreign Minister told me that the Russians have bombed many open towns in the north including Pahlevi, Ardebil, Astara, Maku and Shapur. Neither the Russian nor British Diplomatic Missions here have news of actual operations.

Although the situation in Tehran remains outwardly calm this morning a food shortage has developed because of hoarding and the already serious wheat shortage (see my despatch No. 27⁹⁷) is resulting in a bread crisis. This situation is potentially dangerous and may well result in disorder and rioting if there is the slightest breakdown in police control. Automobiles are being requisitioned but there has as yet been no general mobilization.

⁹⁵ Dated August 25, 6 p. m., p. 418.

⁹⁶ Dated August 25, 2 p. m., p. 417.

⁹⁷ Not printed.

The leaflets dropped yesterday warned the people in the Persian language of the danger from Germans and informed them the British and Russians were coming as friends to save them from this danger.

DREYFUS

740.0011 European War 1939/14412 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 26, 1941—5 p. m.

[Received August 27—12:26 p. m.]

1580. The Moscow newspapers today publish the full text of the note handed by Molotov⁹⁸ to the Iranian Ambassador in Moscow on the morning of August 25 announcing that by virtue of article 6 of the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 1921,⁹⁹ Soviet troops were temporarily entering the territory of Iran for the purpose of self-defense. It is presumed that the full text of this lengthy note has been published in the American newspapers or has otherwise been brought to the Department's attention.

A brief Tass despatch from Tiflis is also published stating that on the morning of August 25 Soviet troops crossed the frontier and advanced 40 miles toward Ardebil and Tabriz and that the advance was continuing. No reference was made in the despatch to opposition by Iranian forces.

STEINHARDT

740.0011 European War 1939/14388 : Telegram

The Chargé in Germany (Morris) to the Secretary of State

BERLIN, August 26, 1941—6 p. m.

[Received August 26 [27?]-7:55 a. m.]

3293. The German press and radio today profess, as expected, moral indignation at what they call the unprovoked aggression against Iran and represent most of Europe and particularly Turkey as sharing this feeling. While it is now stated that the main purpose of the British and Soviet's action is to establish communications through Iran and to safeguard the oil fields, the main weight of German criticism is still directed against British "hypocrisy" rather than "Bolshevist imperialism." Emphasis is placed on reports of the determination of Iran to resist. The semi-official *Dienst Aus Deutschland* while still refraining from commenting on the consequences for

⁹⁸ V. M. Molotov, Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

⁹⁹ Signed at Moscow, February 26, 1921; for text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. ix, p. 383.

Germany, points out that diplomatic contacts still exist between Berlin and Tehran, but states that the German Government refuses to confirm or deny what it calls the trial balloon put out by London to the effect that Germany has given certain assurances to the Iranian Government in case of effective resistance by it. It expresses interest in the "excitement as well as criticism aroused in the Turkish public by the action of the two powers" but denies that Papen¹ has either been recalled to Berlin or been instructed "to take any special steps" in Ankara.

MORRIS

740.0011 European War 1939/14389 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State

ROME, August 26, 1941.

[Received August 27—9:30 a. m.]

1275. Following lead of German propagandists Italian press strongly condemns Anglo-Russian entry into Iran. British objectives are described as occupation of Persian oil fields and creation of Anglo-Russian Caucasus front but there is no discussion of possible repercussions on Axis strategy.

Together with England and Russia the United States is generally held jointly responsible for "this typical case of unjustified aggression". The Balkan correspondent of *Stampa* says "American diplomats, agents and businessmen headed by Roosevelt's enterprising representative in Cairo" are seconding Anglo-Russian maneuvers in Ankara as well as move against Iran. Number of writers present Anglo-Russian move as second concrete application of Atlantic Declaration, the first having allegedly been "Roosevelt's partnership with Stalin". Describing recent American statements on Iran as merely for domestic consumption press affirms that present move is unmistakable evidence of what Anglo-Saxons mean by freedom and sovereignty of nations.

PHILLIPS

740.0011 European War 1939/14306 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray)

WASHINGTON, August 26, 1941—7 p. m.

149. Your 311, August 24, noon. Please keep Department promptly informed on Turkish reaction to Anglo-Russian invasion of Iran, and what effect, if any, this is likely to have on Turkey's future attitude toward Britain and the Axis.

HULL

¹ Franz von Papen, German Ambassador in Turkey.

740.0011 European War 1939/14384 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, August 26, 1941—midnight.

[Received August 26—7:50 p. m.]

3894. Personal for the Secretary of State. This morning Mr. Eden telephoned me to thank you for your statement in the press yesterday.² He wanted you to know that the military operations had been successful and without serious incident. The word he got from the Shah led him to believe that he would try to negotiate before attempting serious hostilities. The British Minister reported that it was the opinion [apparent omission] the market place of the Capital that the show of opposition was for effect and that the entire business had been pre-arranged with the Shah's knowledge and consent.

WINANT

740.0011 European War 1939/14469 : Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, August 27, 1941—noon.

[Received August 28—2:57 p. m.]

110. The calm which has prevailed in Tehran is rapidly giving way to nervousness and fear. Contributory causes are the Russian bombing of open towns particularly nearby Kazvin yesterday and growing realization that the Shah may not after all be able to settle matters amicably with his alleged good friends, the British. The drone of Iranian airplanes overhead, the surge of rumors, shortage of food, fear of Tehran being bombed, and the dread of the advancing Russians are also playing their part. The food situation continues unimproved and near riots are developing in food and kerosene cues. The Imperial Bank closed for a short time yesterday due to a run. *Gendarmerie* police are still in full control and there have yet been no important incidents [apparent omission] is potentially dangerous and may degenerate into rioting.

Our citizens in Tehran are well and calm and those in outlying section are believed to be safe. Arrangements have been made for our missionaries throughout the country to get in touch with the Legation through the mission headquarters in Tehran in case of danger or

² Apparently a reference to Secretary Hull's remark at the press conference that he had no more details regarding Iran but that he understood that the one immediate question was the fighting between the Germans and the British and Russians.

harm to them. Mr. Boyce³ has just informed me that Hamadan and others are in touch with the mission on routine matters and have reported no difficulties.

About 800 Germans have taken refuge in the German Legation and some 350 British Indians and Allied nationals have been taken into the 2 British compounds. Our American staff and citizens in Tehran have not yet considered it necessary to accept my offer to grant them refuge in the Legation compound and I consequently continue to refuse to take in numerous Czechs and other nationals who are applying for admission.

There is little reliable news in Tehran of the actual military situation and Iranian communiqué number 1, issued last night covering the first day gives no news of value. While reinforcements continue to move towards the frontiers and while general mobilization has not been ordered additional soldiers are being drafted.

Military resistance is being offered but I am of the opinion that it is so impotent that it will collapse within a few days unless foreign assistance is received.

DREYFUS

740.0011 European War 1939/14413 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, August 27, 1941—1 p. m.

[Received 11 : 55 p. m.]

314. Foreign Minister informs me Turkish Government regrets that Russo-British action makes it impossible for friendly neighbor Iran to remain outside war but it has no alternative but to accept situation and maintain its own neutrality.

2. He has just been requested by Iranian Ambassador to use his good offices with British and Russians to effect their withdrawal upon Iran's undertaking to expel Germans in question. While undertaking to use his best endeavors he has frankly informed Ambassador he has little if any hope of success as he personally considers that real reason for Russo-British action was strategic one of effecting junction of their forces rather than any question of German agents in Iran.

3. In response to question he indicated feeling that situation in Iran did not increase but would perhaps even tend to diminish any danger of German action against Turkey.

Repeated to Tehran.

MACMURRAY

³ Arthur C. Boyce, representative of the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions.

740.0011 European War 1939/14417 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 27, 1941—6 p. m.

[Received 9 p. m.]

1586. For the President, the Secretary and Under Secretary. The Turkish Ambassador ^{3a} called on me this afternoon and, at the request of the Iranian Ambassador, whom he had just left, delivered to me a copy of a note which the Iranian Ambassador sent to Molotov this morning.

The Ambassador stated that he had called on the British Ambassador ⁴ yesterday to discuss the occupation of Iran by Soviet and British troops and that in the course of their conversation Cripps had said that if the Germans were at once expelled from Iran the British and Soviet Governments would stop the advance of their troops and withdraw them. To his inquiry as to whether Cripps was authorized to make this suggestion the Ambassador said Cripps had replied that while he had not been specifically authorized by his Government to make the suggestion he was "sure" that the British Government would approve.

The Turkish Ambassador reported his conversation with Cripps to the Iranian Ambassador who thereupon on his own initiative prepared the note to Molotov and filed a telegram to his Government setting forth this action.

On learning that the Soviet authorities had failed to transmit his telegram to Tehran the Iranian Ambassador requested the Turkish Ambassador to see Cripps again last night and to seek his advice. The Turkish Ambassador states that after reading the proposed note to Molotov, Cripps had found it "entirely satisfactory" and had advised the Turkish Ambassador to send the text to Ankara with the request that it be repeated immediately to the Iranian Government in Tehran which he had thereupon done.

The Turkish Ambassador added that in addition to transmitting the text of the note to Ankara for repetition to the Iranian Government he had also transmitted the recommendation of the Iranian Ambassador to his Government that it seek the good offices of Turkey and the United States in an endeavor to carry out Cripps' suggestion.

A translation of the note delivered by the Iranian Ambassador to Molotov follows as Embassy's 1587, August 27, 7 p. m.

STEINHARDT

^{3a} Ali Haydar Aktay.

⁴ Sir Stafford Cripps.

740.0011 European War 1939/14453 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State*⁵

1587. Moscow, August 26 [27], 1941—7 p. m.
[Received August 28—9:55 a. m.]

“Moscow, August 26, 1941

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the note of the Soviet Government dated August 25, 1941.

The Government and the people of Iran have always held feelings of the most sincere friendship toward the Government and the peoples of the Soviet Union.

The relations of friendship and good neighborhood between the two countries have always found their expression in the actions and the acts of the two Governments.

Iran has always highly appreciated and appreciates the sincere fraternal and friendly policy of the Soviet Republic, a policy which has found its outward expression in the moral and material support at the most difficult times of its political life. The divers circumstances enumerated in the note which have occurred in the friendly relations between the two countries correspond entirely to the reality both as to the point of view of places and of times.

The development of mutual friendly relations between Iran and the Soviet Union has been founded on the basis of mutual understanding and confidence.

Article VI of the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 1922 [1921] is a proof of the mutual confidence of the two Governments and of the peoples of Iran and of the Soviet Union, and that article presents in principle a guarantee of the territorial inviolability of Iran.

The circumstances foreseen by article VI of said treaty are specified by its spirit and by its text. Thus until August 25, 1941, no armed forces of a foreign country have attempted by armed invasion to carry out on the territory of Iran a policy of conquest or to transform the territory of Iran into a base from which to launch a campaign against the Soviet Union. Iran, being a neutral power and a friend of the Soviet Union, has taken all measures to keep without the bounds of Iran the dangers which could have been created, according to the definition of the note which has been handed me, by certain foreign elements now in Iran whose activity has been judged by the Soviet Government as menace to the interests of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and of Great Britain.

⁵ This telegram transmits the translation of the Iranian note referred to in last paragraph of the Ambassador's telegram No. 1586, *supra*.

The representations of the Soviet Government of June 26, July 19 and August 16 had the purpose of directing the attention of the Iranian Government to the situation created and constituted a preliminary step to the formal warning of August 6, 1941. The Government of Iran, notwithstanding the nonconformity of the forms of these representations with the diplomatic relations customary between sovereign states, urgently took effective and extraordinary measures in view of the friendly relations with the Soviet Union, measures which without doubt would have given results satisfactory to the two countries.

By the careful study of all measures taken by the Government of Iran, I have personally arrived at the conclusion that on September 15, 1941, the last contingency of dangerous persons from the point of view of the Soviet Union would have left the boundaries of Iran.

It is to be regretted that the Soviet Government has not awaited the results of effective and urgent measures by the Iranian Government taken in conformity with its status as a neutral power.

The assurances of respect for the sovereign rights of neutral Iran, its territorial integrity, its inviolability and its independence have been given by the Soviet Union and by Great Britain and the Government of Iran has had entire confidence in these assurances. In view of the preceding as Plenipotentiary Ambassador of Iran, Mr. People's Commissar, I beg you to be so good as to stop the advance of armed forces on the territory of Iran with a view to an amicable settlement of the question and by respect for the sovereign rights and neutrality of Iran to make possible the reasonable carrying out of the measures taken by the Government to expel from Iran the foreigners designated in the note of August 25th in the shortest time possible.

At the same time having full confidence in the assurances of the Soviet Government that the Soviet troops will be withdrawn from Iran after overcoming the danger I beg you in return for the expelling from the territory of Iran of the foreigners dangerous to the Soviet Union and Great Britain to take measures to the end that the units of the Red Army be recalled to the frontier of the Soviet Union where they may have passed the frontiers of Iran with as little delay as possible and to suspend contact with Iranian troops which defended the inviolability of their territory.

Making a record of my personal disagreement expressed above with respect to the incorrect interpretation of article VI of the Treaty of Friendship of 1921 and my protest against the temporary entry of Soviet troops into the territory of Iran, I have the honor to assure you, Mr. People's Commissar, that in the event that the sovereign rights, inviolability, and territorial independence of the territory of Iran are fully respected my Government will take all measures in

this case to reinforce the friendly and economic relations between Iran and the Soviet Union.

I avail myself of this occasion, Mr. People's Commissar, etc.
Signed: M. Saed, Iranian Ambassador"

STEINHARDT

740.0011 European War 1939/14428 : Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, August 27, 1941—7 p. m.

[Received August 28—6 a. m.]

111. The Ali Mansour Cabinet resigned at Prime Minister's request at 5 p. m., allegedly because of inability to arrive at a satisfactory settlement with the Russians and British.

The Under Secretaries have been instructed by the Shah to carry on until a new Cabinet is formed.

The British Minister informs me that no reply has been received yet to his telegram to London transmitting the Shah's proposal mentioned in my telegram 105.⁶

Tension is increasing hourly in Tehran. Newspapers and posters tonight are giving the people information as to air raid precautions and how to get in touch with hospitals.

DREYFUS

740.0011 European War 1939/14585

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] August 27, 1941.

The Minister of Iran called at his request. He said he desired to get before me the contention of his Government to the effect that in the present war going on in Europe his country is neutral; that it is entitled to live peacefully, free from outside interference or intervention with respect to the autonomy, the liberty and the independence of his country; that despite this right to so live, British and Soviet forces for the purpose of aggression and in pursuit of that policy have recently invaded Iran; that in doing so the Soviet forces have bombed some undefended cities and towns and have killed some of the civilian population where there was no military establishment of any kind; and that, therefore, they appeal to this country to carry out its preachments of the eight principles⁷ underlying peaceful and free nations and to take any possible steps to aid Iran in securing relief from military occupation.

⁶ Dated August 25, 2 p. m., p. 417.

⁷ Principles of the Atlantic Charter, printed in vol. I, p. 367.

I replied that I had nothing to say now except that I was assembling the pertinent facts relating to the entire matter, including the opposing viewpoints, in part at least, of the Government of Iran on the one side and of the British and the Soviet Governments on the other; that it would not be possible to discuss the matter intelligently until such facts were assembled; that I commenced to assemble them as soon as I was notified of the incident referred to and that my Government in this case did not have the pertinent and relevant facts in its possession prior to the occupation of Iran by military forces during the past few days. Then I said that it would have been much better from his standpoint if his Government had come to us many days ago and stated to us that Europe, of course, was being overrun by Hitler, and his movements of conquest will continue until some military force stops him and that certain countries such as Great Britain and Russia were defending themselves against attacks by Hitler in pursuance of his movements and plans of military conquest and destruction generally; that either of these opposing military forces may seek to prevent the other from overrunning peaceful neutral countries in connection with the general fighting that is going on, and, therefore, they desire to confer with third countries in sufficient time in advance of any possible military occupation to have the whole situation dealt with to the best possible advantage from the standpoint of the Government of Iran and that of other interested governments. This was no criticism but merely illustrates the extreme importance of every country visualizing the entire breadth and depth of what is happening in Europe, especially in a military way, so that every possible precaution can be taken by innocent neutral countries against being seized and destroyed by an aggressor as, for example, Hitler in his seizure and destruction largely of some fifteen sovereign independent nations in Europe. I said it was evident that he will occupy all of the European and other continents of the world unless he is stopped by military force and that it was well for all to recognize this fact in looking out for their own protection from outside conquest; that everyone knows that Hitler is bent on the conquest of the world and the control of the high seas; that it will be as suicidal as it was for Belgium, Holland and other countries that have been swallowed up by Hitler not to take into view and into consideration this whole movement of conquest and destruction in almost every way known to savagery and barbarism.

The Minister sought to come back each time to the *ex parte* or unilateral view of himself and presumably of his Government that, without regard to whether they recognized the broad situation and took steps in ample time to deal adequately with it from the standpoint of preserving their sovereignty and independence, they had been interfered with by the British and the Soviet forces and that this Government, as a champion of the rights and sovereignty of small nations

and of the principles which underlie world order under law, should have something done about the matter without delay.

I frequently reiterated to the Minister that this Government as an ancient friend of Iran was deeply sorry to learn about their present difficulties; that we are spending thirty to fifty billions of dollars just as one item in our broad movement of direct military aid to nations both large and small that have been attacked by the worst despot and human fiend within the history of the human race and that even though all other countries may fail or fall by the wayside, this country will be found to the very end dedicating all of its strength and its resources in defense of the basic principles of liberty, independence, non-intervention, law, justice and morality, wherever any aggressor like Hitler continues to conquer and destroy them. I again repeated that I had nothing to say at present about the situation in Iran except that we were getting the facts.

The Minister became more quiet and composed and expressed more appreciation of the broader view which I had sought to get before him. I said to the Minister that my Government recognizes the broad view of the situation and the significance of Hitler's movement to conquer all of Europe and seize persons and property; that this would include Iran particularly on account of her oil supply as much as it did Belgium or Norway, as well as the remaining free countries in the continents of Asia and Europe, and that I hoped his country would take the same broad view in appraising the situation. I said that I must be frank to say that my country has no notion of sitting still and listening to the siren voice of Hitler discussing the merits of neutrality while he conquers all other areas and gets around to the point of attacking us just as he has some fifteen countries in Europe. I said I must warn Iran against Hitler's stealthy approach, which is always based on a pledge of his supposed honor that he would not for the world attack a neutral country.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

740.0011 European War 1939/14716

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Atherton)

[WASHINGTON,] August 27, 1941.

I called Mr. Johnson⁸ at noon today and informed him I had just come from talking with the Secretary and wanted to point out that our moral support of the British position in Iran was constantly being raised here and, in this connection, of course full information was necessary. To date this had not been received. The Department

⁸ Herschel V. Johnson, Minister-Counselor of Embassy in the United Kingdom.

desires information not only as to factual data from the British but a full statement of their purposes. I then stated the Secretary was seeing the Russian Ambassador⁹ and the British Chargé d'Affaires¹⁰ today and would raise with them the question of their respective Governments issuing a statement to all peaceful nations resisting aggression that while these Governments' action in Iran was necessary to meet the menace of Hitler across Europe, they had no intention of permanently infringing the sovereignty of Iran and that as soon as the necessity for the occupation had passed their Governments would unconditionally withdraw all occupying forces from Iranian territories. Mr. Johnson replied that some statement in this sense had already been made which he was reporting to us by air mail. I said that, unfortunately, this was not at hand—would he look into it and see that the information was made immediately available together with some light on how far the British had attempted preliminary negotiations with Iran to obtain their cooperation or support under British guarantees, should they throw in their lot with the British and Soviet effort.

I then went on to point out that today, of course, the occupation of Iran was not a purely British affair and this again, without due information, was bound to cause some speculation in this country, particularly since reports were reaching here already of bombings and destruction in and about Tabriz. I then asked Mr. Johnson if the statement issued by the British, to which he referred to above as having been dispatched to us by air mail, did not cover details of any Soviet-British agreement, that we would be very interested in having specific information as to what mutual arrangement or agreement had been made between the British and Soviet Governments not only as to the present but also as to the future of Iran and Iranian integrity. I then continued to stress the importance of this whole situation and that we should be kept informed by London. Johnson said that they would raise the question with the British and that he would report my conversation with him to Ambassador Winant.

R[AY] A[THERTON]

861.24/586

Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conversation With the Soviet Ambassador (Oumansky)

[Extract]

[WASHINGTON,] August 27, 1941.

I then referred to the military occupation of Iran by the Russian and British forces during the past few days and particularly to the

⁹ Constantine Alexandrovich Oumansky.

¹⁰ Sir Ronald Campbell.

assurances given by these two Governments to the Government of Iran that they were in that country solely on account of the war with Hitler and that they had no purpose to infringe on their sovereignty in any other sense and only to this extent so long as the military necessity existed. I said to the Ambassador that Soviet Russia and Great Britain should repeat this same assurance to all peaceful nations and all other nations opposed to aggression. I stated that such a statement would have a very healthy and wholesome effect on the entire Moslem world as it would be stimulating to the peoples of small countries everywhere. He seemed very much interested in the idea and said he would send it to his Government at once. I said that I expected today to bring this same idea to the attention of Great Britain.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

740.0011 European War 1939/14632

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] August 27, 1941.

The British Chargé d'Affaires called at his request and I brought up the same question I had brought up with the Russian Ambassador this morning ¹¹ to the effect that Great Britain and Soviet Russia could well make a joint statement about the temporary occupation of Iran and their purpose to abandon such occupation as soon as war conditions permit and address it to all peaceful nations and other nations opposing or opposed to aggression. He seemed to receive this very favorably and said he would take it up with his Government.

I said to the Chargé that we had been unable to get anything like the full facts relating to the occupation of Iran, that I did hope that we might be able to secure the essential facts and points in the situation, and that we are undertaking to do this and would welcome any cooperation on the part of his Government. He said he knew exceedingly little about the situation, and he seemed to take no special interest in the matter.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

740.0011 European War 1939/14472 : Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, August 28, 1941—10 a. m.

[Received 11:50 p. m.]

113. The Prime Minister ^{11a} in presenting the new Cabinet to the Parliament this morning made the important announcement that since

¹¹ See memorandum by the Secretary of State, *supra*.

^{11a} Mohammed Ali Foroughi.

Iran is a peace-loving nation, orders have been given for Iranian forces to cease all resistance to the British and Russians.

DREYFUS

740.0011 European War 1939/14442 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, August 28, 1941—1 p. m.

[Received August 28—9 : 56 a. m.]

3918. My 3916, August 27, and air mail despatch 1359, August 26.¹² Foreign Office has given me the following account of the course of events at Tehran following the presentation of the British memorandum of August 16 (my 3511, August 8, 10 p. m., and air mail despatch 1184, August 9¹³).

“On the 19th August the Iranian Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs gave Sir R. Bullard¹⁴ an oral reply to His Majesty’s Government’s memorandum of August 16th. He explained that 3 Germans who were understood to have engaged in undesirable activities would leave within a week and at least 100 would leave within a month, after which time the removal of Germans would be accelerated on the basis of schemes being prepared in all Ministries. The Iranian Government were not willing to provide lists of the Germans whose departure was required. The written reply would follow.

This written reply was received by Sir R. Bullard on August 21. It was in very general terms stating that the Iranian Government regretted to observe in the British memorandum of August 16, matters incompatible with their policy of neutrality; nevertheless, the Iranian Government’s policy had from the first been to require superfluous foreigners to leave the country and this policy was now being carried out with greater care and speed. The number of foreigners in Iran had lately been specially reduced and the numbers would soon show a remarkable diminution. The Iranian Government could not put into practice in respect of the nationals of one state steps which would be incompatible with their arrangements and contrary to their treaties and which would lead to the abandonment of their neutral course. The Iranian Government added that they could not accept any proposal whatsoever which was contrary to their policy of neutrality or to their rights of sovereignty.

This unsatisfactory reply was supplemented by an oral message from the Shah conveyed to Sir R. Bullard by the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs on August 23. The Shah stated his desire that Sir R. Bullard and his Government should have no cause for anxiety and repeated personally the assurance already given. He had already given orders for the Iranian Government’s programme to be put into execution and he assured Sir R. Bullard that it would be accelerated

¹² Neither printed.

¹³ Latter not printed.

¹⁴ British Minister in Iran.

and that he would soon see a great reduction in the number of Germans, particularly in large centers of the population.

It is clear from these communications that the Iranian authorities have no intention of adequately meeting our requirements. There is, moreover, clear evidence to show that the Shah and his ministers have been influenced in taking their decision by the view that the Russo-German campaign is bound to end in a German victory. Sir R. Bullard has also reported that the Iranian Government's policy has been drawn up in consultation with the Germans and there is reason to believe that this is the case.

Sir R. Bullard has therefore been instructed to communicate to the Iranian Government on August 25 the communication of which a copy is attached. He has been authorized to make it clear orally that in the view of His Majesty's Government there is no reason why the measures taken by them should lead to any material alteration in the financial, economic, and other relations normally existing between Iran and the British Empire. There is for instance no reason, if the Iranian Government cooperate in such ways as they can, why the oil royalties should not continue to be paid as hitherto. His Majesty's Government also have no wish to interrupt supplies to Iran of vital economic needs from British Empire sources."

Following is text of the communication which the British Minister at Tehran was authorized to make to the Iranian Government on August 25:

"The attention of the Imperial Iranian (Persian) Government has frequently been drawn to the need for taking action to secure the removal from Iran of the German community. The presence of German technical experts and advisers throughout Iran, employed in factories and in public works as well as on roads and railways and in many other important posts where their activities might constitute a serious danger, is regarded by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom as a matter of the utmost gravity which closely affects their own interests. His Majesty's Government have therefore repeatedly urged that a drastic reduction should be made in the number of these Germans. These friendly representations to the Iranian Government culminated in the memorandum communicated to them on the 16th August, in which the Iranian Government were urged once again to take steps to arrange for the German community to leave Iran without any further delay. This communication of the 16th August contained a proposal devised in order to meet Iran's special needs, by which a few German technicians engaged on important work in connection with Iranian industrialization projects be retained temporarily and it was suggested that a list of those German nationals whom it might be desired to retain for essential work should be communicated to His Majesty's Minister without delay. His Majesty's Government also offered in this communication of the 16th August to assist the Iranian Government by endeavoring to find suitably qualified British or neutral experts to replace the German technicians who had left and they added that they would gladly concert with the Iranian Government measures to alleviate any temporary hardships that might be caused by the simultaneous departure of large numbers of trained personnel.

2. It is regretted that the Iranian Government have not seen fit to return a satisfactory reply to the memorandum of the 16th August. It is evident that the Iranian Government attach greater importance to retaining these German nationals in Iran than they attach to meeting the wishes of His Majesty's Government in a matter which is becoming one of increasing urgency as a result of developments in the war situation. The Iranian Government must bear the fullest responsibility for the consequences of their decision.

3. In these circumstances His Majesty's Government now feel themselves obliged to take appropriate measures to safeguard their own vital interests and to deal with the menace arising from the potential activities of the Germans in Iran. The Iranian Government may be assured that these measures will in no way be directed against the Iranian people. His Majesty's Government have no designs directed against the independence of Iran or her territorial integrity. Any military measures which British forces may be obliged to take are of a temporary nature only, and will not outlast the present emergency, since they are directed solely against the Axis Powers."

WINANT

740.0011 European War 1939/14473 : Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, August 28, 1941—1 p. m.

[Received 11 : 30 p. m.]

116. The British Minister and Russian Ambassador were separately summoned at noon today by the new Foreign Minister^{14a} and told that the Iranian Government has given orders to cease all opposition and is prepared to meet any terms.

The two envoys are telegraphing the foregoing to London and Moscow respectively and are requesting instructions.

The Russian Ambassador has stated that the Russians are making such rapid headway that advanced forces should reach Tehran within the next 24 hours.

DREYFUS

740.0011 European War 1939/14490 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, August 28, 1941—4 p. m.

[Received 9 : 15 p. m.]

318. In course of conversation referred to in my next previous telegram¹⁵ President Inonu expressed to British Ambassador his regret that British had not settled Iranian question by friendly negotiation; and Hugessen¹⁶ maintained that since January his Government had

^{14a} Ali Soheily.

¹⁵ No. 317, August 28, 3 p. m., p. 898.

¹⁶ Sir H. M. Knatchbull-Hugessen, British Ambassador in Turkey.

been making every possible effort to settle matter amicably with Iranian Government but had made no progress whatever and had been compelled to conclude that force was only solution. President also expressed regret that even if this action were necessary British had associated Soviets with them rather than undertaking operation alone; and Ambassador pointed out that if for no other reason it would be manifestly impossible for British in view of their manifold commitments elsewhere to involve themselves to possible extent of having to occupy whole of Iran, to which President assented.

2. During this friendly and intimate conversation Hugessen took occasion to state his understanding of present position of terms of a long-term policy of association with Britain concurrently with a short-term policy of conciliation of Germany and President fully acquiesced in this general statement.

Repeated to Iran.

MACMURRAY

740.0011 European War 1939/14463 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, August 28, 1941—4 p. m.
[Received August 28—1:25 p. m.]

3925. My 3918, August 28, 1 p. m. The Foreign Office has emphasized orally the extremely vague and unsatisfactory nature of the Iranian Government's written reply of August 21 to the British memorandum of August 16. The written reply was even more evasive and unsatisfactory than the oral statements which had been made by Iranian officials in the interval before the receipt of the note. The British, therefore, felt that the situation was too critical and dangerous for them to delay together with the Russians any longer in taking such measures as they considered necessary to forestall German action. The Foreign Office is satisfied from its own sources of information that the number of dangerous Germans in Iran is somewhere between 1,000 and 3,000. It was stated that this estimate comes from British sources and has been entirely uninfluenced by Russian estimates of the numbers which are said to be greater. Mr. Eden had felt that his public statement published on August 26 (my 3916, August 27¹⁷) had made clear that Great Britain had no designs on Iranian sovereignty or territorial integrity and that this intention has been made emphatically clear both by the British and the Russians in their declarations to the Iranian Government. The Foreign Office also emphasized its

¹⁷ Not printed.

conviction that the consistently evasive attitude of the Iranian Government to the British and Russian request for the expulsion of dangerous German nationals had been based on the belief of the Shah and his Government that the Germans would soon be at the frontiers of Iran and that they were determined to be on good terms with Hitler when that day arrived.

The British have no intention of keeping their military forces in Iran longer than necessary to insure themselves against any possibility of Hitler's gaining a foothold in Iran and access to Iranian oil fields. It was stated they have no reason to believe that Russian intentions are any different and that there are absolutely no private understandings between the British and Russian Governments which would give Russia any sort of free hand in Iran or any tacit acquiescence in Russian troops remaining in Iran any longer than military necessities require.

In a secret telegram received on August 26 from the British Ambassador at Angora, Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen reported a meeting he had with the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs on August 25 at which he had handed him a memorandum setting forth the reasons for the British-Russian action in Iran and declaring that the British Government had no designs whatever against Iran's political independence or territorial integrity. The British Ambassador reported that the Turkish Foreign Secretary was most friendly but had remarked that he thought it right as a friend and ally of Great Britain to explain his reasons for disagreeing with the policy which had been adopted in Iran. As reported by Sir Hughe these reasons were as follows: If the war ended in a draw or if Russia defeated Germany, the Foreign Minister saw no reason why the presence of Germans in Iran should be a danger to the British. If Russia was defeated by Germany a military problem would then arise on which the Minister did not feel competent to express an opinion but he said that even in that event he would have dealt with the matter differently; he did not say how. Sir Hughe explained in detail the dangers which the British wished to avoid, namely German military penetration into Iran with resulting disorder, sabotage and all sorts of fifth column work and in particular the necessity for securing the safety of the Iranian oil fields and refineries. The Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs did not press his views further and is reported to have been particularly convinced by the necessity for insuring the safety of the Iranian oil fields. Sir Hughe asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs whether he was satisfied with Anglo-Soviet assurances already given and the Minister said that he was.

Is it the Department's view that the final paragraph of Mr. Eden's public statement reported in my 3916, August 27,¹⁸ sufficiently covers the future position and Great Britain's pledge that she has no designs against the independence and territorial integrity of Iran?

WINANT

740.0011 European War 1939/14466 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, August 28, 1941.

[Received August 28—1: 30 p. m.]

3946. Press sheet published by the Soviet Embassy in London gives full English text of note said to have been handed by M. Molotov on August 25 to Iranian Ambassador in Moscow. Final paragraph of note as published reads as follows:

"These measures are in no way directed against the people of Iran. The Soviet Government has no intentions whatever against the territorial integrity or national independence of Iran. The military measures taken are solely against the danger created by the hostile activities of Germans in Iran. As soon as this danger, which threatens the interests of Iran and the Soviet Union are averted, the Soviet Government will immediately withdraw its troops."

WINANT

740.0011 European War 1939/14537 : Telegram

The Chargé in Iraq (Farrell) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, August 29, 1941—2 p. m.

[Received August 30—3: 03 p. m.]

249. Following views are held in high Iraqi circles having close Turkish contacts and may be of interest as background to recent events: Turkey invoking Saadabad Pact at German instigation prevailed on Iranian Cabinet to temporize in face of British demands on Iran and use position to bargain for commercial advantages as Turkey herself had done. Turkey could thus play for time with the Axis

¹⁸ Not printed; the last paragraph of Mr. Eden's statement reads as follows:

"It is now clear that further friendly representations to the Iranian Government on the same lines as hitherto would serve no useful purpose and that His Majesty's Government and the Soviet Government must have recourse to other measures to safeguard their essential interests. These measures will in no way be directed against the Iranian people; His Majesty's Government have no designs against the independence and territorial integrity of Iran and any measures they may take will be directed solely against the attempts of the Axis Powers to establish their control in Iran." (740.0011 European War 1939/14415)

until a final showdown was inevitable. British and Russians in consequence postponed date of planned penetration of Iran originally set for about August 15 pending intensified negotiations with Turkey to bring latter into line. Iranians encouraged by the delay were the more inclined to follow the Turkish lead and now confronted with *fait accompli* of rapid invasion are furious with the Turks for ill-timed intervention. Also held that Axis is furious at Turkey's failure to influence Iran to temporize or offer more serious resistance and is preparing attack on Turkey as soon as Black Sea coast positions can be consolidated after capture of Odessa.

FARRELL

740.0011 European War 1939/14519 : Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, August 29, 1941—7 p. m.

[Received August 30—6:45 a. m.]

118. The local political situation has tonight deteriorated into a state of confusion. This is due to two facts: (1st) the Russians have continued to bomb open towns including Kazvin in spite of the Iranians having ceased resistance; and (2nd) neither the British nor Russian Envoys have received word from their Governments as to their intentions or terms. Nervousness in Government circles has increased enormously.

The Shah and the new Cabinet take a most serious view of the new situation and the Prime Minister has so informed the British Minister. The Shah sent Ebrahim Ghavam, the father of his son-in-law, to the British Minister to express his anxiety at the delay and the continuance of hostilities. Some advisers are counselling the Shah to renew resistance while others are advising him to take flight. Ghavam also sounded out the British Minister on the possibility of the Shah taking asylum in the British Legation because of his fear of the Russians but received little encouragement on this score. The British Minister strongly advised the Government to remain in Tehran to facilitate negotiations.

The Iranian Government after having done all possible to appease the invaders and facilitate a peaceful settlement have been placed in a most difficult position. In this regard please see the penultimate paragraphs of my No. 92 of August 15, 8 a. m., and No. 99 of August 21, 2 [4] p. m. I consider important developments such as a coup or the flight of the Shah to be imminent.

DREYFUS

740.0011 European War 1939/14565 : Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, August 30, 1941—1 p. m.
 [Received September 1—10:35 a. m.]

122. The British Minister has given me the following outline of the British terms which have just been received from London and which will be presented to the Iranian Government as soon as the Russian Ambassador receives his terms and instructions:

1. The Russians will withdraw north of the following line: From the Iraq frontier to Ushnu [*Ushnuyyeh*] thence in an easterly direction through Miandoab [*Miyanduab*], Zenjan, and Kazvin; northeast to Khorrnabad [*Khurramabad*] (on the Caspian); east to Baboisar [*Babul Sar?*], south to Semnan [*Samnan*], northeast to Sharud [*Shahrud*], and north to the Russian border.

2. British will withdraw west and south of following line: Khanekin [*Khanaqin*] eastward to Kermanshah; in southeasterly direction through Khorramabad [*Khurramabad*] (Luristan), Meidanenaft [*Maidan-i-Naftun*], Haft Kel, and Gach Saran; southwest to Bandar Dilam (on the Gulf).

3. Occupation of both these zones will be temporary.

4. Germans in Iran will be expelled within 1 week although a few technicians will be allowed to remain.

5. Iranian Government will give full facilities for transit through Iran of war supplies and munitions but not troops.

6. Iran will maintain a policy of strict neutrality.

7. British and Russians will maintain friendly relations with Iran.

8. British will continue to pay their oil royalties.

The terms do not seem to be as severe as had been expected and will no doubt be accepted without rejections by Iranians. It will be noted that the entire oil fields are included in British zone.

DREYFUS

740.0011 European War 1939/14567 : Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, August 31, 1941—9 a. m.
 [Received September 1—10:40 a. m.]

123. At my first meeting with the Foreign Minister yesterday he informed me that the Shah was most disappointed that his request through this Legation and his Legation at Washington for American good offices had received no reply.

DREYFUS

740.00115 European War 1939/1367 : Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, August 31, 1941—10 a. m.
 [Received September 1—10 : 55 a. m.]

124. The German Minister^{18a} approached me yesterday to request my good offices with the British and Russian authorities to insure humane treatment of the 900 Germans who have taken refuge in the German Legation. He seemed honestly to fear for the lives of Germans on the arrival of the Russian troops and stated that he much preferred to have them turned over to the British rather than the Russians. I took the liberty of assuring him that American Government would look with great disfavor on any mistreatment of Germans here and he seemed relieved at my promise to take up the matter informally. British and Russian Envoys with whom I took up the matter informally later in the day assured me that they would do their utmost to see that the Germans are treated humanely and in accordance with international usage. I do not intend to press the matter further since it now appears that Russian troops will not come to Tehran.

DREYFUS

740.0011 European War 1939/14568 : Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, August 31, 1941.
 [Received September 1—3 : 55 p. m.]

126. Referring to my No. 122,¹⁹ the Russian and British terms were presented to the Iranian Government at 5 p. m. yesterday. The Prime Minister informed Russian and British Envoys a short time ago that the Iranian Government accepts terms in principle. The Prime Minister informed the Majlis this morning that negotiations with the British and Russians have reached an advanced stage. In calling on the deputies and people to be more calm he said that the attitude of panic shown by the Iranians had done great harm.

About 9 a. m. today 8 Russian planes over Tehran dropped a number of bombs. Our Military Attaché examined the craters of 2 which fell about a mile from the airport but did no damage. I have definite knowledge that 2 men killed and 1 injured by a bomb which fell in the south of the city and it is possible there were other casualties. Russian planes are at this moment again overhead. It is difficult to understand why the Russians have bombed Tehran after the Iranians have ceased resistance and after terms have been presented. It is

^{18a} Erwin Ettl.¹⁹ Dated August 30, 1 p. m., p. 443.

possible that it was a reprisal for the incident mentioned in my No. 21 [121].²⁰ If their purpose was to create terror among the Iranians they have succeeded. Some of the leaflets dropped today were addressed to peasant farmers of Iran and stressed how much Russia has done to assist them.

DREYFUS

740.00115 European War 1939/1369 : Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, September 1, 1941—2 p. m.
[Received September 2—10:05 a. m.]

129. Referring No. 124,²¹ I have consented at request of British Minister and with approval of Foreign Minister to act solely as transmitting agent in negotiations between British and German Ministers for disposition of Germans in Iran. The British Minister has offered following suggestion which he feels if accepted by all parties would offer a solution and prevent Germans falling into Russian hands: The German Legation and community would be free to arrange for sending all Germans to Ahwaz without interference by British, Russians, or Iranians; they would there be taken over by British military authorities for ultimate internment in India; certain Germans would be permitted to remain in Iran; the British would reserve liberty of action in case Germans did not carry out the arrangement faithfully and honestly; German Legation would remain in Tehran.

I have communicated the above to German Minister who will make reply as soon as he has consulted his Government and Iranian Foreign Minister. The British and Russians have no immediate intention of expelling any other Axis nationals.

DREYFUS

740.00115 European War 1939/1370 : Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, September 1, 1941—9 p. m.
[Received September 2—11:58 a. m.]

130. Referring to my No. 129.²² The Turkish Chargé d'Affaires informs me his Government has instructed him to give to Germans refuge in the Turkish city and country embassies in Tehran with a

²⁰ August 30, noon, not printed; the incident referred to was the firing on a Soviet plane over Tehran followed by the dropping of two bombs on the airport, probably from that plane (740.0011 European War 1939/14554).

²¹ Dated August 31, 10 a. m., p. 444.

²² *Supra*.

view to facilitating their eventual departure for Germany. This step if carried out may have serious consequences for Iran since it would interfere with the British plan for the disposition of the Germans and might cause a severe revision of British terms. It may also [apparent omission] occupation of Tehran by the Russians who have already established headquarters at Kazvin and might have the unfortunate consequences of aggravating the Iranian problem at a time when it is well on the way to satisfactory solution.

Repeated to Ankara.

DREYFUS

740.00115 European War 1939/1371 : Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, September 2, 1941—1 p. m.

[Received September 3—10:15 a. m.]

132. The Turkish Chargé d'Affaires informs me he received this morning new instructions from his Government authorizing him to grant refuge to Germans only in occupied parts of Iran. This would preclude the granting of asylum to Germans here and avoid the complication mentioned in my number 130.²³

This relieves a situation which was being viewed most seriously by the Iranian Government and the British Legation replies to Ankara.

DREYFUS

740.0011 European War 1939/14641 : Telegram

President Roosevelt to the Shah of Iran (Reza Shah Pahlavi)

WASHINGTON, September 2, 1941.

I have received Your Imperial Majesty's communication regarding the recent entry of British and Russian forces into Iran.²⁴ I have been following the course of events in Iran with close attention and have taken careful note of Your Majesty's remarks.

I am persuaded that this situation is entitled to the serious consideration of all free nations including my own, and Your Majesty may rest assured that we are giving it such consideration and are maintaining our traditional attitude with respect to the basic principles involved.

At the same time I hope Your Majesty will concur with me in believing that we must view the situation in its full perspective of present world events and developments. Viewing the question in its entirety involves not only vital questions to which Your Imperial Majesty re-

²³ *Supra.*

²⁴ Dated August 25, 10 p. m., p. 419.

fers, but other basic considerations arising from Hitler's ambition of world conquest. It is certain that movements of conquest by Germany will continue and will extend beyond Europe to Asia, Africa, and even to the Americas, unless they are stopped by military force. It is equally certain that those countries which desire to maintain their independence must engage in a great common effort if they are not to be engulfed one by one as has already happened to a large number of countries in Europe. In recognition of these truths, the Government and people of the United States of America, as is well known, are not only building up the defenses of this country with all possible speed, but they have also entered upon a very extensive program of material assistance to those countries which are actively engaged in resisting German ambition for world domination.

Your Imperial Majesty's Minister at Washington is fully informed of this Government's views on the international situation, and of the great effort on which this country is engaged, and I am certain that he has transmitted this information, based on his discussions here, to Your Majesty's Government.

My Government has noted the statements to the Iranian Government by the British and Soviet Governments that they have no designs on the independence or territorial integrity of Iran. In view of the long-standing friendship between our two countries, my Government has already sought information from the British and Soviet Governments as to their immediate as well as long-range plans and intentions in Iran, and has suggested to them the advisability of a public statement to all free peoples of the world reiterating the assurances already given to Your Majesty's Government.

I desire to assure Your Imperial Majesty of my good will and to renew to you the assurance of my sincere friendship.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

740.0011 European War 1939/14326 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Iran (Dreyfus)

WASHINGTON, September 2, 1941—6 p. m.

80. For your information, the following is the text of a message from the President to the Shah dated September 2, 1941 in response to a message which the President received from His Majesty. It should also be considered as a response to the message of the Iranian Government transmitted by your 106, August 25, 6 p. m.

[Here follows text of telegram printed *supra*.]

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/14648 : Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, September 3, 1941—9 a. m.

[Received 11 p. m.]

134. The Iranian Government in its reply to the British and Russian notes accepts the terms offered (see my No. 122²⁵) with only one important exception: They request that the British zone be altered to exclude Dizful and Khorramabad [*Khurramabad*] and that Russian zone be amended to exclude Kazvin, Semnan [*Samnan*], and Sharud [*Shahrud*]. In addition, they make following observations: they hope that Iranian independence and right to administer the entire country will continue, that the police will immediately resume their duties, that they will not be expected to pay expenses of occupying forces, that to avoid conflicts the forces will have as little contact as possible with the people, that the Allies will buy the goods formerly bought by Germany, that arms and ammunition which have fallen into Allied hands will be returned, that compensation will be made for lives and property lost after Iranian resistance ceased, that prohibition on entry of Germans will last only for the duration of the war, and that the Allies will withdraw their forces when the situation permits. They agree to the expulsion of the Germans but expect the Allies to arrange for their safe conduct.

The Iranians, I understand, have asked for revision of the Russian zone since they fear the Russians, if so near Tehran, may seek a pretext to occupy the capital. Confidentially the British Minister expresses the same fear.

The British and Russian Envoys are still awaiting instructions concerning expulsion of Germans who continue their refuge in German Legation.

DREYFUS

740.0011 European War 1939/14730 : Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, September 4, 1941—8 a. m.

[Received September 5—3 p. m.]

137. The British Minister informs me he has received his instructions as to expulsion of Germans but since his Russian colleague has not they cannot yet be divulged. He told me in strict confidence however that the matter has taken a more serious turn since British terms were presented August 30 and that it now appears other Axis nationals will be expelled and that the German, Italian, Bulgarian

²⁵ Dated August 30, 1 p. m., p. 443.

and perhaps other Legations will have to leave Iran. He intimated this change last night to Foreign Minister who was of the opinion that the entire Cabinet might resign rather than submit thereto.

In my opinion this drastic change is the result of the complications brought on by the offer of asylum by the Turks (see my No. 130²⁶) and the highhanded attitude the Germans in Tehran have assumed since their first sigh of relief that their necks were temporarily safe from the dreaded Russians.

DREYFUS

740.0011 European War 1939/14842

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] September 4, 1941.

The Soviet Ambassador called at his request. He referred to the suggestion of this Government that Russia and Great Britain proclaim to the general public the temporary nature of their occupation of Iran, et cetera, et cetera, and indicated that he thought they were doing so to a sufficient extent. I replied that, of course, what my Government had in mind was intended for the benefit of public opinion both in Iran and especially in the Moslem world, and that I still thought it would be very helpful for this simple declaration to be made. I then said that the President had made an appropriate statement on this subject in reply to a request for mediation by this country made by Iran. I then repeated to him the substance of my conversation with the Rumanian representative here on yesterday.²⁷ He seemed very much gratified to learn this. I also emphasized the point that, of course, this Government, in replying to the Iranian Government, had taken care of the entire situation for Great Britain and Russia so far as it was at all consistent. He was very appreciative of this.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

740.0011 European War 1939/14463 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, September 4, 1941—2 p. m.

3563. Reference is made to the telephone conversation on August 27 between the [Acting] Chief of the European Division and the Minis-

²⁶ Dated September 1, 9 p. m., p. 445.

²⁷ No record of such a conversation on September 3 found in Department files, but see memorandum by Mr. Cavendish W. Cannon, September 4, 1941, vol. I, p. 326.

ter Counselor, and to the last paragraph, Section 2 of the Embassy's no. 3925, August 28, 4 p. m., regarding Iran.²⁸

In a reply dated September 2, 1941, to a message received from the Shah, the President has stated in part as follows:

"My Government has noted the statements to the Iranian Government by the British and Soviet Governments that they have no designs on the independence or territorial integrity of Iran. In view of the long-standing friendship between our two countries, my Government has already sought information from the British and Soviet Governments as to their immediate as well as long-range plans and intentions in Iran, and has suggested to them the advisability of a public statement to all free peoples reiterating the assurances already given to Your Majesty's Government."

You are requested to discuss this matter further with the Foreign Office as early as practicable in the light of the President's message to the Shah quoted in part above and you should express the hope that sympathetic consideration may be given to our suggestion regarding the advisability of a public statement to all free peoples reiterating the assurances already given to the Government of the Shah by the British and Soviet Governments. Please also state that we desire to be kept informed of developments in the matter.

A communication similar to the foregoing is being sent to the Soviet Government.²⁹

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/14729 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, September 5, 1941—8 p. m.

[Received September 5—5:40 p. m.]

4102. [Your] 3563 September 4, 2 p. m., has been taken up with Sir Horace Seymour³⁰ at the Foreign Office and has been brought to Mr. Eden's personal attention. Seymour has promised a reply as soon as possible. Seymour said that Sir R. Bullard had been instructed to keep Mr. Dreyfus fully informed of all negotiations and moves at Tehran. He said that they are faced with a serious practical difficulty at the moment as those Germans whom they particularly desire to get out of Iran have taken refuge in the German city and country Legations—about 700 altogether. The Shah is endeavoring to force their

²⁸ Reference is to last paragraph of the telegram.

²⁹ Telegram No. 1026, September 4, 2 p. m., to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, not printed. The first paragraph referred to conversation of August 27 with the Soviet Ambassador; see memorandum, p. 434.

³⁰ British Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

consent for the return of these Germans to Germany. The British on the other hand are determined to decide themselves which ones may be allowed to return to Germany and Seymour says that there are some of them whom they would not under any circumstances permit to return.

Mr. Eden in a speech at Coventry last Saturday in which he made a general survey of the present war position reinforced the statement he had previously given out (my 3916, August 27³¹) regarding British action in Iran. He said "meanwhile let me make plain once again our general attitude. We have no territorial claims against Iran. We covet no square inch of Iranian territory. We have no design nor have our Russian allies any design to annex any part of the areas which our forces have now occupied. His Majesty's Government and the Soviet Government have repeatedly assured the Iranian Government of their determination to respect the political independence and the territorial integrity of Iran. We have repeated that pledge to the Government of our ally Turkey and to the Governments of neighboring states. That pledge stands. We shall as soon as military conditions permit withdraw our forces from Iranian territory."

Full text of this speech has been forwarded by air mail.³¹

WINANT

740.0011 European War 1939/14641 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray)

WASHINGTON, September 5, 1941—8 p. m.

155. The following is the text of a telegram sent by the President on September 2, 1941, to the Shah of Iran in response to a message received from the latter:

[Here follows text as printed on page 446.]

You are requested to furnish the Foreign Office informally with a copy of the foregoing message for the confidential information of the Turkish Government.³²

With reference to the penultimate paragraph of the President's message to the Shah, you should inform the Foreign Office that our representatives at London and Moscow were instructed on September 4 to express to the British and Soviet Governments respectively the hope of this Government that sympathetic consideration will be given

³¹ Not printed.

³² In telegram No. 336, September 9, 7 p. m., the Ambassador in Turkey informed the Department that owing to the absence and illness of Turkish officials he had not been able to carry out this instruction until that day (740.0011 European War 1939/14867).

to the suggestion previously made regarding the advisability of a public statement to all free peoples reiterating the assurances already given to the Iranian Government by the British and Soviet Governments.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/14752 : Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, September 5, 1941—8 p. m.
[Received September 6—11: 07 a. m.]

138. The British and Russian notes on the expulsion of Axis nationals were delivered to the Iranian Government at noon today. As indicated in my No. 137³⁴ they are more severe than the original demands and will require the expulsion of the German, Italian, Hungarian, Bulgarian and Rumanian colonies. The private citizens will be required to proceed to Ahwaz to await transportation to Indoid [*India?*] for internment. The Legations of these countries will also be required to leave Iran. In addition the Russians are demanding that certain named persons are turned over to them. The British reply to other Iranian suggestions regarding terms is expected from London tomorrow.

The Foreign Minister is appealing to the British to grant safe conduct to Turkey en route to Germany for the women and children and to intern the men of military age near Shiraz under British control. He urges this concession because he feels the Government is so weak that it could not survive the bad effects the Allied action would have on public opinion. The British Minister is however standing firm because he was reprimanded by London for suggesting more liberal terms at the time of the incident referred to in my 130.³⁵

The Foreign Minister who has just left the Legation sees no ray of hope for the Government or the people. He feels that the Cabinet will have to resign, that the situation will become chaotic, and he even fears Tehran may be occupied by Allied troops.

The Government is, as Foreign Minister indicates, in a precarious position. The Shah's prestige sinks ever lower and the tide has so turned against him that his disappearance from the scene is probable.

Conditions in Tehran are quiet with martial law and curfew at 9 p. m. continuing.

DREYFUS

³⁴ Dated September 4, 8 a. m., p. 448.

³⁵ Dated September 1, 9 p. m., p. 445.

740.0011 European War 1939/14763 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 6, 1941—2 p. m.

[Received 5:55 p. m.]

1632. Department's 1026, September 4, 2 p. m.³⁶ Inasmuch as Dekanosov³⁷ was placed in charge of Near Eastern affairs upon his return from Berlin, and as I understand he reports directly to Stalin,³⁸ I conveyed to him yesterday the substance of the Department's telegram under reference and expressed the hope that sympathetic consideration would be given the suggestion regarding the advisability of a public statement to all free peoples, reiterating the assurances already given to the Government of the Shah by the Soviet and British Governments. I also expressed a desire that my Government be kept informed of developments in the matter and requested him to inform me of the present position.

Dekanosov, who appeared to be anxious to place the Soviet position before me in the most favorable light, discussed the matter with complete frankness.

He commenced with an outline of the Soviet position which in effect constituted a summary of the note of August 25, from the Soviet Government, to the Iranian Ambassador in Moscow, adding that his Government had over a considerable period of time endeavored to persuade the Shah of the dangers inherent in the presence of a large number of German agents in Iran, and had requested him to take the necessary steps to put an end to the work of these agents as much to protect the interests of Iran as those of the Soviet Union. He stated that the Soviet Government had never been able to extract a satisfactory or reassuring response and that the Iranian Government had stubbornly refused to expel the German agents. He said that it was not until then that the Soviet and British Governments had found it necessary to take positive action.

Dekanosov then stated that the present position is "not as dangerous as before," but that he could not say that all pending questions could be settled without difficulty. He gave "merely as an example" of some of the present difficulties the fact that several Iranian "officer aviators" had refused to obey orders of the Iranian Government not to resist the Soviet and British troops and had bombed Tehran. He expressed the opinion that Iran was "not yet peaceful enough" to permit of the withdrawal of the Soviet troops and that a final solution "was not simple".

³⁶ See footnote 29, p. 450.

³⁷ Vladimir Georgevich Dekanosov, formerly Soviet Ambassador in Germany.

³⁸ Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, President of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union.

He added that he thought the area that must be occupied would "not be so big—along the frontier" and that the Soviet Government thought it necessary for the time being to keep its troops in the country but that this would not affect the sovereignty or independence of Iran and that he was convinced a solution could eventually be found. He said it is "now more and more clear" that danger from German agents remains, not necessarily only from agents of German nationality who may now be expelled by the Iranian Government but from agents in the employ of the German Government who may be of other than German nationality.

With respect to the Department's suggestion regarding a public statement, Dekanosov referred to the closing paragraph of the Soviet Government's note of August 25 to the Iranian Ambassador³⁹ and pointed out that the note had received the widest possible publicity. He said in consequence it should not be regarded as would be an unpublished diplomatic document and that through it the Soviet Government had put its assurances regarding the territorial integrity and national independence of Iran before the world. He said that in his opinion a reiteration of the Soviet Government's position so soon after the publication of the note affirming its intentions might be misunderstood, but that he would take the suggestion under advisement and discuss it with his Government. In this connection he added that the work of the German agents "cannot be undone at once" and that he hoped the American Government would understand that, since it had been found necessary to send Soviet troops into Iran, it would not be possible to withdraw them "at once". At this point he repeated that he thought it was "too soon" to reaffirm the Soviet Government's assurances of eventual withdrawal but added "the assurances that were given in the note will be kept scrupulously". At the close of our talk he again expressed the hope that the American Government understood the position of the Soviet Government, and its ultimate intentions as expressed in the note to the Iranian Ambassador Zahiniu [Saed].

STEINHARDT

740.0011 European War 1939/14807 : Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, September 7, 1941—8 a. m.
[Received September 14—12:26 p. m.]

139. I was summoned to the palace last evening by the Shah and received in special audience. While ostensible purpose in calling me was to request me to convey his thanks to the President for his friendly

³⁹ See telegram No. 3946, August 28, from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, p. 441.

telegram of September 2, I feel that his more important reason was to make known to the American Government through me, his present viewpoint. He began by requesting me to transmit to the President first, his thanks for the declaration of good will and friendship; second, his appreciation of the President's statement that he is following the course of events in Iran and, third, his satisfaction at the knowledge that American Government has noted the British and Russian statements that they have no designs on the territorial integrity or independence of Iran.

He then stated most clearly that he has no sympathy for the Germans with whom he has had serious difficulties on several occasions and that he is prepared to engage in a common effort to resist them. He added that the Russians and British could have obtained all they wanted in Iran by friendly negotiations. In reply to my suggestion that his statements would be of great interest to the British Government, he declared that he wanted the British to know his views and had no objection to my bringing the above to the British Minister's attention.

I told the Shah frankly that I thought harm had been caused by the inability of foreign diplomats to obtain audience with him to which he replied that he has always been willing to receive them, a statement which is not in accordance with the facts and perhaps represents a change of attitude.

I conveyed it to the British Minister, who seemed pleased and said he will telegraph Dondoq [*London?*] for permission to seek audience to bring certain facts including the poverty and exploitation of the people to the Shah's attention. If the Shah is willing to cooperate fully with the British and correct some of his more serious shortcomings which have lost him the support of both the Iranians and the British, I believe he may still be able to save his throne.

DREYFUS

740.0011 European War 1939/14808 : Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, September 7, 1941—11 a. m.

[Received September 8—5:15 p. m.]

140. With reference to my No. 138⁴⁰ the British Minister has informed me of the following developments:

1. Because of Russian insistence the Bulgarians will be allowed to remain in Iran;
2. The Russians have refused the Iranian request for alteration of their occupied zone but the British have approved the stationing of Iranian troops in Dizful and Khorramabad;

⁴⁰ Dated September 5, 8 p. m., p. 452.

3. The Foreign Minister still urges a plan for the internment of Axis nationals at Shiraz under British-Iranian control and at Meshed under Russian-Iranian control. The British Minister has telegraphed this proposal to London at the risk of further reprimand.

DREYFUS

740.0011 European War 1939/14764 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 7, 1941—5 p. m.

[Received 7:45 p. m.]

1638. For the President, the Secretary, and the Under Secretary. My 1632, September 6, 2 p. m. The Iranian Ambassador called on me yesterday evening and gave me the following information concerning the status of the Anglo-Soviet-Iranian negotiations.

Recent notes of the Soviet and British Governments to the Iranian Government specify the area of Iranian territory to be occupied by their respective troops and require the expulsion of the Germans as well as an undertaking by the Iranian Government to facilitate railroad transportation through Iran.

The territory which it is proposed shall be occupied by Soviet troops is as follows: an area including all of Iranian Azerbaijan from Ouchaia[?] on the Turkish-Iranian frontier passing through Rezaye [*Rizaiyeh*], Heydarabad [*Haidarabad*], Meyandoal [*Miyanduab*], Zendjon [*Zenjan*], Kazvin and Amul to a point on the Caspian Sea and including Meshed at which place the Soviets desire to station 12,000 troops and 50 planes.

The area which it is proposed shall be occupied by British troops is to include Khaneghein [*Khanaqin?*], Kaszy, Chirin [*Qasr-i-Shirin*], and Kermanshah including the Port of Deylam [*Dilan*] on the Persian Gulf.

The Soviet advance has been stopped at Kazvin and the British advance at Hamadan.

In order to avoid even the appearance of any infringement of Iranian sovereignty, the Soviet and British Governments will not insist on the departure of the German and Italian diplomatic missions.

The Ambassador stated that he does not anticipate any difficulty with respect to the demand for the expulsion of the Germans or the facilitating of railroad traffic as the former would be completed "within a week" and the latter was agreeable to the Iranian Government. In so far as concerns the area which Britain proposes be occupied by its troops, he said it appeared to be reasonable as it was obviously limited to the protection of the oil fields and the facilitating

of railroad transportation, in addition to which the Iranian Government does not fear the British occupation. In consequence, he was satisfied that his Government would have no objection to the acceptance of the terms of the British note.

Insofar as concerns the area proposed to be occupied by Soviet troops, however, he said that it is "five times great" as that proposed to be occupied by the British and constitutes an unreasonably large area of occupation. He added that as the Iranian Government fears the Soviet Union and communism and is by no means persuaded that the Soviet Government will ultimately withdraw its forces, he is seriously concerned lest the Shah refuse to accept the Soviet proposal. The Ambassador then said that he is endeavoring to persuade the Soviet Government to reduce the area which it proposes to occupy. Should the negotiations threaten to break down, he said he was considering returning immediately to Tehran, as he believed he could persuade the Shah to accept the Soviet and British proposals subject to modification along the lines described above.

In connection with the possibility that it might be necessary for him to proceed to Tehran to discuss the matter with the Shah he said he was anxious not to be absent from Moscow during the Anglo-American-Soviet conference ^{40a} and that he would appreciate being informed as to whether the conference was imminent. As I understand that our Government is desirous of a speedy and satisfactory settlement of the Iranian matter and as I believe that the presence in Tehran of the Ambassador and his personal presentation to the Shah of his point of view might effectively contribute to that end, I felt justified in saying to him that if, as he had stated, he contemplated an absence from Moscow of only about 2 weeks, I did not think the Anglo-American-Soviet conference would begin within that time.

STEINHARDT

740.0011 European War 1939/14815 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, September 8, 1941—6 p. m.

[Received 7:30 p. m.]

331. Your 155, September 5. Iranian Ambassador just called to say he had 3 days ago received from his Government, but had on account of illness been unable sooner to carry out, instructions to bring to my attention disappointment of his Government at the apparent

^{40a} W. Averell Harriman, Special Representative of President Roosevelt, and Chairman of the Special Mission to the Soviet Union, with a British counterpart led by Lord Beaverbrook, held conferences in Moscow, September 29–October 1, 1941. For correspondence, see vol. 1, pp. 825–851, *passim*.

tacit acquiescence of our Government in the Anglo-Russian action in Iran which was so clearly contrary to the principles enunciated by the President and to express the hope that some assurance might be given that the United States Government would interest itself in the restoration of complete independence and integrity of Iran. I informed him of the falsity of the reports, that first our Government had given its approval to the action in question and, second, I had myself indicated such approval to the Turkish Foreign Office. I also acquainted him with the text of the President's telegram of September 2 to the Shah. He expressed great relief and gratification but added that he hoped that the substance of this message which would otherwise remain in the archives might be made public in some statement or interview by either the President or yourself. I do not know why this matter was taken up with me in this way but I consented to [apparent omission].

2. Saying then that he had carried out his instructions and ventured to speak further on a purely personal basis he expressed his regret that the British had not arranged with his Government for passage of their troops through Iran. He said he was not informed as to what had taken place but that he was inclined to believe such arrangements could be made amicably if only it had been understood that the Russians were not to be brought into the situation. He said that he had complete confidence in good intentions of the British and even if (in a matter which he realized was one of life and death for them) they had felt forced to send troops into Iran, he would nevertheless have confidence in their ultimate restoration of country's integrity if only they were unencumbered by commitments to the Soviet Government. As it is there are reports that the Russians are establishing their political commissars in the districts occupied by them and beginning subversive agitations. He hoped that the British if only in their own ultimate interests would take steps to restrain such activities on the part of their associates.

Repeated to Tehran.

MACMURRAY

740.0011 European War 1939/14816 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 8, 1941—6 p. m.

[Received September 8—4:03 p. m.]

1645. The Iranian Ambassador told me this afternoon that the Soviet and British Governments have now requested the surrender to them of the German agents in Iran rather than their mere expulsion and that the Iranian Government in reply is suggesting that the wom-

en and children be sent to Germany via Turkey and that the men be placed in a concentration camp in Iran under British supervision.

STEINHARDT

391.1115/12: Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, September 9, 1941—8 a. m.

[Received September 10—9:35 a. m.]

142. Although communications have still not been reestablished throughout the country I have had indirect word from all places where we have citizens and believe it safe now to state that all Americans in Iran are safe.

Please inform Presbyterian Mission Board.

DREYFUS

740.00115 European War 1939/1393: Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, September 12, 1941—4 p. m.

[Received September 13—2:21 p. m.]

147 [149]. The first trainload of about 200 Germans will leave tonight for Ahwaz to be turned over to the British military authorities. Some 50 selected by the Russians by name will also leave by train for Kazvin to be delivered to the Russian military authorities. The British are threatening to deliver over to the Russians any Germans who fail to cooperate or try to escape. No decision has been reached as to when or how the Legations will leave or as to the disposition of other Axis nationals.

DREYFUS

701.0091/34: Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, September 13, 1941—noon.

[Received 2:15 p. m.]

151. The Foreign Minister has requested me to assign the Military Attaché or some other member of staff, in case the British and Russians consent to such procedure, to accompany the Axis Legations and nationals to the Turkish frontier. The present plan is to send Legations and nationals including German women and children to Turkey through the Russian-occupied zone. The Bulgarian Legation and nationals are also to be expelled, the Russian Government having withdrawn its request that they be allowed to remain. Since their departure from Tehran is planned for September 17, I should appreciate

Department's urgent instructions as to whether I may comply with the Foreign Minister's request.

The first of Germans referred to in my No. 149 ⁴¹ left only this morning and was limited to 72 for Ahwaz and 8 for Kazvin. The Foreign Minister told me that he attributed the delay and limited numbers to the difficulties encountered by the Iranian police in rounding up the Germans listed by the British and Russians because of lack of cooperation on the part of Germans.

DREYFUS

701.0091/34 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Iran (Dreyfus)

WASHINGTON, September 14, 1941—noon.

90. Your 151, September 13, noon. The Department has no objection to your assigning a member of your staff for the purpose indicated provided that such a course meets the approval of the British and Soviet authorities concerned and the Axis Legations.⁴²

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/15229

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] September 17, 1941.

The British Chargé d'Affaires, Sir Ronald Campbell, came in to see me this morning at his request. He first handed me a memorandum of an oral communication, which is hereto attached,^{42a} to the effect that the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had received my suggestion that the British and Soviet Governments might very well consider emphasizing the temporary nature of the measures they have taken in Iran and their determination to restore full sovereignty and independence to that country after the war. In this confidential memorandum the British Foreign Secretary points out that while it has become necessary for the British and Soviet Governments to advance farther into Iranian territory than had been contemplated, the present projected military movements in no way run counter to the statements already made by the British and Soviet Governments regarding their intentions to respect the integrity and independence of Iran. The British Government again takes occasion to emphasize their firm intention to respect the assurances which they have given.

C[ORDELL] H[HULL]

⁴¹ *Supra.*

⁴² In a memorandum enclosed with despatch No. 144, November 1, from the Minister in Iran, it was stated that this plan was not put into effect because of last-minute objections of the Soviet Ambassador, who was of the opinion that it would be a reflection on Soviet justice (740.0011 European War 1939/17008).

^{42a} Not printed.

891.00/1778 : Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, September 19, 1941—noon.
[Received September 21—10:30 a. m.]

158. The British Minister informs me that he and Soviet Ambassador have now received instructions from their Governments agreeing to succession of the new Shah ⁴³ to throne. This approval is contingent in both cases on Shah's future good conduct. Iranian Government has been notified both of the approval and contingency on which it is placed.

The Majlis has expressed informal approval of the Cabinet and undoubtedly will give a vote of confidence when it is formally presented.

Shah has issued a firman which grants a general amnesty under existing law and promises special legislation for cases not covered by law. The former Acting War Minister ⁴⁴ (see my 133 ⁴⁵) has already been released.

The ex-Shah is being held at Ispahan for negotiations as to disposition of his properties.

The Majlis has announced that it is taking steps to revise the laws on monopolies.

The British Consul at Tabriz informs his Legation that Russians there are giving at least sympathy to Armenians and others in separatist movements. It is significant in this regard that the Soviet Ambassador has recommended to Foreign Minister that new elections for the Majlis be held and that there should be a greater degree of local Government throughout Iran.

British Minister is pressing Iran Government to curtail or cancel pouch and telegraph privileges of the Japanese Legation which he has reason to believe are being abused to assist Axis Powers.

DREYFUS

740.0011 European War 1939/15477

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

[WASHINGTON,] September 23, 1941.

The British Chargé d'Affaires, Sir Ronald Campbell, called to see me this morning at his request.

Sir Ronald stated that Mr. Eden desired Secretary Hull to be informed, in response to the latter's inquiry concerning the situation in

⁴³ Mohammed Riza Pahlavi.⁴⁴ Admad Nakhjiv.⁴⁵ September 2, 2 p. m., not printed.

Iran, that the British Government had decided to support the new Shah and to recognize his government because of the wishes expressed with regard thereto by the Iranian Government itself. Mr. Eden said . . . the new Shah . . . had given assurances that the Iranian Constitution would be observed, that the properties taken by his father would be restored to the nation and that he would undertake the carrying out of all of the reforms considered necessary by the British Government. Mr. Eden further stated that he believed that the reports alleging violence and brutality on the part of the Soviet troops had been deliberately started by ousted Iranian officials. He said further that while the situation in eastern Iran was by no means clear as yet, all of the reports received by the British Government indicated that discipline among the Soviet troops was good.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

891.00/1778 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Iran (Dreyfus)

WASHINGTON, September 25, 1941—7 p. m.

96. Your 158, September 19, noon.

1. Since the British and Soviet Governments have recognized the new Shah, the Department perceives no reason why this Government should not do so. You are authorized in your discretion to take appropriate steps to indicate that this Government accords recognition to him.

2. Please keep the Department fully informed regarding extent of Russian sympathy toward Armenian and other separatist movements, and whether there are indications that Soviet activities in this direction are inconsistent with Soviet assurances regarding the territorial integrity of Iran.

HULL

891.00/1783a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt)

WASHINGTON, September 25, 1941—7 p. m.

1078. The Legation at Tehran has informed the Department of reports that Russians in occupied zone in Iran are at least lending sympathy to Armenians and to others in separatist movements. Please keep the Department fully informed concerning information you may obtain on this subject and whether there are indications of Soviet activities inconsistent with assurances respecting the territorial integrity of Iran.

HULL

891.00/1784 : Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, September 26, 1941—noon.

[Received September 27—11:25 a. m.]

167. The British Minister is much perturbed about the difficult position in which Iran has been placed by Russian occupation of the north. In telegrams to London and Moscow he has described Iran's present economic situation as very bad, cut off as it is from revenue and food and other necessary products formerly supplied by the rich northern provinces. He told me frankly that he does not see how present unsatisfactory condition can continue much longer. In addition to remarking on the harm being done to Iran, he stated "furthermore I do not see how the British can utilize the railways and transportation facilities efficiently until conditions in Iran are restored to normal". In support of this statement he mentioned interference in connection with a recent shipment of jute by the British to Russia, when the Soviet soldiers in the north of Iran confiscated the gasoline the trucks were carrying. Factories, he said, are closing for want of raw materials, food is short and many businesses are at a standstill. Although Russian forces entered Iran a month ago, no effort seems to have been made by them to reopen communications or reestablish commerce. The Minister said for example that although there are four telegraph lines to Tabriz and Russian military are using only two no one can explain why communications have not been reestablished on the other two. There appears to be no coordination between Russian civil and military and dealings with either are a complete enigma. The British Consul at Tabriz in a series of reports shown me by the Minister paints a sorry picture of conditions in that area, including opening of jails, requisitioning of houses and crops, political intrigue, looting by rabble and sympathy on the part of Russians to separatist movements. I must point out, however, that Dr. Cochrane, an American missionary doctor who was in Tabriz until a few days ago gives much more moderate report. While admitting there was looting by Armenian and Turkish rabble at the beginning, mainly of premises of Germans and fleeing Iranians, he reports that public security on the whole is good and the troops well disciplined.

He confirms, however, what other observers report—namely widespread intrigue and open sympathy on the part of the Russians to aspirations of Armenians and others in separatist movements. In this regard as reported in my No. 158 ⁴⁶ the Russian Ambassador has

⁴⁶ Dated September 19, noon, p. 461.

recommended to the Iranians that elections be held and that a greater amount of local autonomy be granted.

My own impressions based on investigations which are still continuing are that Russian forces are well disciplined and that public security is being adequately maintained. Iranian sources report numerous cases of looting and violence on the part of Russians at Kazvin but I have been unable to confirm them. From the political and economic angles, however, there is much to cause worry. By their political intrigue and failure to reestablish communications, and commerce, the Russians are not only doing great harm to Iran but are failing to live up to their pledge to respect the territorial integrity and independence of the country. The Iranians are willing to accept the pledged word of Great Britain referred to in the Department's No. 95⁴⁷ but they have serious reason to doubt the parallel promise of Russia. How little confidence the British have in the promises or intentions of their ally may be judged from the above views of the British Minister.

The Department may wish to urge Russia at the Moscow Conference to cease interfering in the political life of this unfortunate country and to cooperate in or, at least, to refrain from obstructing a return to normal communications and commerce.

DREYFUS

891.00/1787 : Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, September 28, 1941—noon.
[Received September 29—2:25 p. m.]

171. Reference my No. 167⁴⁸ and Department's 96.⁴⁹ Foreign Minister yesterday expressed to me his great preoccupation at present unsatisfactory political and economic position of this country. Iran, he says has willingly met every demand only to be presented with new ones. Deputies and others are asking when will the Allies stop making demands and do something concrete to help Iran out of its difficulties. Since this conversation British Minister has informed me his Government is presenting to the Iranians a draft of a treaty of alliance, which will make definite guarantees and give substantial assistance. In addition Wavell⁵⁰ is here discussing among other things the withdrawal of troops from Tehran. Telegraph service has

⁴⁷ Not printed.

⁴⁸ *Supra.*

⁴⁹ Dated September 25, 7 p. m., p. 462.

⁵⁰ Gen. Sir Archibald P. Wavell, Commander in Chief of the British Armed Forces in India.

been reestablished with almost all points in the north including Tabriz.

While British indicate their desire to assist Iran and live up to their formal assurances Russian propaganda continues. A Russian newspaper printed in Persian called "Thoughts of the People" is disseminating Russian propaganda. In a recent number it refers to high prices in Iran and asks when will the people stop living an impoverished life and begin to live like human beings. It prints a caricature of the former Shah, it criticizes the Foroughi⁵¹ Government and it calls attention to the happy state of the United States [*sic*], begs [*sic*] now that they are Sovietized.

While public security is being adequately maintained by occupying forces in the cities it is degenerating in the rural areas. There are widespread and apparently true reports of restlessness and disorder among the tribes particularly the Kurds and Lurs who have obtained arms abandoned by Iranian forces. The benefits of the ex-Shah's greatest achievement, that of subduing the tribes, may be lost unless energetic action is taken by the Iranians who will probably in view of their present weak condition require assistance from occupying forces.

DREYFUS

891.00/1789 : Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, September 30, 1941—11 a. m.

[Received October 1—8:57 a. m.]

173. The British Minister informs me that Eden has informed Maisky⁵² that he considers any undue interference in Iranian affairs or sympathy towards separatist movements by Russian forces in north of Iran would be most harmful. The Ambassador promised to communicate this information to his Government.

DREYFUS

801.001 P 15/220

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Murray)^{52a}

[WASHINGTON,] October 1, 1941.

I called on the Iranian Minister last Saturday afternoon to get his reaction to the recent events in Iran leading to the abdication of Reza Shah Pahlavi.

⁵¹ Mohammed Ali Foroughi, Iranian Prime Minister.

⁵² Ivan Maisky, Soviet Ambassador in the United Kingdom.

^{52a} Addressed to the Secretary of State, the Under Secretary of State (Welles), and the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle).

The Minister stated that, in his opinion, the British had committed a great blunder in forcing the abdication of Reza Shah and that the results of this blunder would soon come home to plague them. He said he referred to the rearming of the native tribes of Iran. It had taken Reza Shah twenty years to disarm effectively these tribes and to start integrating them into the civilized life of the country. Before they were disarmed, the tribes had rendered travel in Iran precarious by reason of the pillaging, plundering and kidnapping expeditions along the main routes of travel. (It may be recalled in this connection that the Lurs captured three American consular officers and held them for ransom in the mountains some years ago, and only by a miracle and, in fact, inadvertently were they rescued by the Iranian military.)

The name of Reza Shah, continued the Minister, had been a magic one in Iran in preserving law and order and, whatever the temptation to banditry, the tribal population had such a fear of the Shah that they dared not move. The Minister claimed that, in subduing the tribes, the Shah had not pursued a merciless policy of killing the leaders but had brought several of them to Tehran and kept them under surveillance in comfortable quarters.

Expressing the opinion that Iran had been thrown back forty years in her latter day reforms and progress, the Minister said he believed the British may have created a situation which would require a far larger occupying force in the country than they had anticipated. If this were the case, the British might, he said, use this argument for any failure to evacuate the country at the termination of their present hostilities with Germany.

Of interest in the above connection is the following comment made by Mr. Dreyfus in the concluding paragraph of his telegram no. 171, September 28, noon:

[Here follows concluding paragraph of telegram printed on page 464.]

WALLACE MURRAY

891.00/1784 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, October 3, 1941—11 p. m.

4218. The Legation at Tehran has submitted to the Department telegraphic reports substantiated by information supplied by the British Minister to Iran that the Russians in the occupied zone are engaging in political intrigue, disseminating Soviet propaganda, and are displaying open sympathy toward Armenian and other separatist

movements. Russian Government support of this activity has been indicated by a recent suggestion of the Russian Ambassador in Tehran to the Iranian Government that special elections should be held and a greater degree of autonomy granted to certain areas in Iran.

According to the Legation at Tehran Mr. Eden has informed the Soviet Ambassador in London that he considers most harmful any Russian interference in Iranian affairs or sympathy toward separatist movements. Please telegraph to the Department a detailed report on this conversation.

You should inform Mr. Eden at the earliest opportunity that the Department is gratified that he has taken up the matter with the Soviet Ambassador. During your conversation with him you should state that, in view of British and Soviet assurances that the political independence and territorial integrity of Iran will be respected and in view of the President's message of reassurance to the Shah (Department's 3563, September 4, 2 p. m.), this Government views with concern Russian political activities in Iran and is extremely apprehensive of the effect upon Turkey of any display of Russian sympathy toward an Armenian separatist movement in Iran. You should express to Mr. Eden the hope of this Government that he will continue his endeavors to implement the assurances which he and the Soviet Government have given to respect the political independence and territorial integrity of Iran.

Please inquire of Mr. Eden whether it would prove helpful if this Government made representations of a similar character to the Soviet Government.

HULL

891.00/1792 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*⁵³

LONDON, October 4, 1941—8 p. m.
[Received October 4—7:55 p. m.]

4724. Personal for the Secretary and Under Secretary. Your 4218, October 3, 11 p. m., just received. I communicated with Mr. Eden at once. I have followed this situation in all its detail and know for a fact that Mr. Eden has considered Russian interference in Iran affairs or efforts towards separatist movements by them as harmful and unwarranted.

He told me some time ago that he had taken up this situation with the Soviet Ambassador and has pressed the matter since. He also has pointed out to the Russian Ambassador that political activities on the

⁵³ Repeated to the Minister in Iran in Department's telegram No. 104, October 8, 1 p. m.

part of his country in Iran will inevitably have harmful effects in Turkey. It is his intention to continue "his endeavors to implement the assurances which His Majesty's Government and the Soviet Government have given to respect the political independence and territorial integrity of Iran".

He asked me to tell you that he is deeply grateful for your interest in this matter.

In regard to the last paragraph of your message Mr. Eden suggests that you might instruct me to take up with Mr. Maisky the interest of our Government in supporting the political independence and territorial integrity of Iran. This might enable us to coordinate our efforts with greater precision.

My conversation was carried on with Mr. Eden on the telephone over "the scrambler" as he is not in London today.

I await your wishes.

I am attaching hereto Mr. Eden's cable to Sir Stafford Cripps (Moscow) of September 23, 1941.

"Sir,

When the Soviet Ambassador came to see me this afternoon I spoke to His Excellency about the position in Iranian Azerbaijan. I understood that there had been a movement, especially among the Armenian minority, in favor of the separation of that province from Iran and its eventual federation with the Soviet Union. Considerable apprehension appeared to exist lest these separatist tendencies should be encouraged by the Soviet military authorities in Tabriz. It appeared that, on their first arrival, the Soviet forces had armed many Armenian irregulars to keep order in Azerbaijan, but that these Armenians had since been disarmed. About first September a large open air meeting had been held at Tabriz which was chiefly attended by Armenians, who demanded independence for Azerbaijan and its federation with the Soviet Union; but the Soviet military authorities had wisely prevented a second public meeting from being held with the same object in view. A petition had, however, been circulated in the same sense. It seemed to me most important that no encouragement should be given to the movement for autonomy in Azerbaijan by the Soviet Government. The effect of any such action on Turkey and on the Moslem population in other parts of Iran would be deplorable.

2. The Ambassador replied that he felt sure that the Soviet authorities had no such intention. Indeed, I myself had told him that the Soviet military authorities had prevented the second meeting. I replied that though this was so, I attached so much importance to the matter that I hoped that the Ambassador would telegraph to his Government reporting what I had said. M. Maisky undertook to do so.

I am, et cetera. Anthony Eden."

WINANT

891.00/1792 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*⁵⁴

WASHINGTON, October 8, 1941—1 p. m.

4298. Your 4724, October 4, 8 p. m. In accordance with Mr. Eden's suggestion, you may discuss with the Soviet Ambassador the interest of this Government in the preservation of the political independence and territorial integrity of Iran, explaining the attitude of this Government as set forth in the Department's 4218, October 3, 11 p. m.

You should thank Mr. Eden for his helpfulness, state that you are complying with his suggestion that you discuss the matter with the Soviet Ambassador, and inform him that our Embassy at Moscow has been instructed to take the matter up there directly with the Soviet authorities.

For your information there is repeated the following telegram which has been sent to Moscow by the Department:

[Here follows text of telegram printed *infra*.]

HULL

891.00/1792 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Steinhardt)*

WASHINGTON, October 8, 1941—1 p. m.

1124. Subsequent to the Department's 1078, September 25, 7 p. m., the Legation at Tehran has submitted to the Department further telegraphic reports, substantiated by information supplied by the British Minister to Iran, that the Russians in the occupied zone are engaging in political intrigue, disseminating Soviet propaganda, and are displaying open sympathy toward Armenian and other separatist movements. Russian Government support of this activity has been indicated by a recent suggestion of the Russian Ambassador in Tehran to the Iranian Government that special elections should be held and a greater degree of autonomy granted to certain areas in Iran.

Mr. Eden has taken this matter up with Ambassador Maisky in London, pointing out that Soviet political activities in Iran will inevitably have harmful effects in Turkey, and he has informed Ambassador Cripps by cable of this conversation.

You should seek the earliest opportunity to inform the Foreign Office that this Government views with concern reports which have been received concerning Russian political activities in Iran and is ex-

⁵⁴ Repeated to the Minister in Iran in telegram No. 104, October 8, 1 p. m.

tremely apprehensive of the effect upon Turkey of any display of Russian sympathy toward an Armenian separatist movement in Iran. In this connection you should refer to the assurances that the territorial integrity and political independence of Iran will be respected, contained in the Soviet Government's note of August 25 to the Iranian Ambassador and you should refer also to Dekanosov's reaffirmations of these assurances reported in section 4 of your 1632, September 6, 2 p. m.⁵⁵ Referring to the President's message of reassurance to the Shah (Department's 1026, September 4, 2 p. m.⁵⁶) you should state that this Government is confident that the Soviet Government will make sure that effective measures are being taken to implement the assurances which it has given to respect the territorial integrity and political independence of Iran.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/15733 : Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, October 9, 1941—4 p. m.

[Received 7:10 p. m.]

182. I was received in audience by the Shah at his revue [*sic*] yesterday at 5 p. m. We conversed alone in French for 2 hours.

Shah began by expressing his belief in Allied victory and added that he voluntarily espouses democratic cause because he is strongly against totalitarian doctrine.

He regretted delay in signing treaty of alliance which he attributed to lack of understanding between the two allies which he added prevented him from beginning to prepare his army for vigorous defense against Germany.

He stated that while he does not object to British occupation, he does seriously object to that by the Russians which is having a disastrous effect on Iran. He repeated some of the numerous stories of Russian atrocities and political connivance which now form the main topic of conversation here. He added that if there is much more delay in signing the alliance and if the present Russian conduct continues the Majlis and the people may refuse to support Russia as an ally.

Shah accused Turkey of lack of loyalty to the Allies in their negotiations with Germany.

After remarking that his father had been unfortunate in being surrounded by bad advisers, he said he would govern constitutionally and look after welfare of his people. He closed the conversation by refer-

⁵⁵ Reference is to last paragraph of the telegram.

⁵⁶ See footnote 29, p. 450.

ring warmly to the United States which he thought would play an important role in the peace. He said he would be very happy to be an ally of America.

DREYFUS

740.0011 European War 1939/15734 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, October 9, 1941—midnight.

[Received October 9—6: 54 p. m.]

4820. Your 4298, October 8, 1 p. m., was communicated orally to Mr. Eden this afternoon. He expressed his appreciation and pleasure at the action the Department has taken, which he believes will have useful results.

He requested that the Department be informed in the strictest confidence that he had suggested to the Soviet Government through Mr. Maisky that either at the time of signing the tripartite treaty with Iran or as soon thereafter as possible the British and Soviet military forces be taken out of Tehran and back to their original line of occupation. To his surprise the Soviet Government indicated its assent almost immediately although he said he had not yet received any Soviet reaction to the draft tripartite treaty.

WINANT

891.00/1794 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 11, 1941—1 p. m.

[Received 4: 50 p. m.]

1788. Department's 1124, October 8, 1 p. m. I called on Vyshinski⁵⁷ this afternoon and conveyed to him the substance of the Department's telegram under reference. He stated that reports that the Soviets in the occupied zone of Iran were engaged in political activities or propaganda or were displaying open sympathy toward Armenians or other separatist movements must be of German origin and were not in accordance with the facts. He added that the Soviet Government has no knowledge of any such activities by agents of the Soviet Government and that all that the Soviet authorities in the occupied zone of Iran are interested in is "the maintenance of law and order". I stressed

⁵⁷ Andrei Yanuarievich Vyshinsky, Soviet Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

the harmful effect upon Turkey of any display of Soviet sympathy toward an Armenian separatist movement in Iran to which Vyshinski replied that he "quite understood" this viewpoint.

STEINHARDT

740.0011 European War 1939/15972a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Iran (Dreyfus)

WASHINGTON, October 11, 1941—6 p. m.

109. The Department desires that Moose⁵⁸ visit Tabriz and such portions of the Tabriz area as you and he may deem it desirable and possible for him to visit for the following purposes:

1. To ascertain discreetly the nature of the Soviet occupation with particular reference to separatist movements and to the treatment of the local population.

2. To ascertain the present state of construction and condition of the railway line between Kazvin and Tabriz as well as plans for completing and improving it, with particular reference to the future transport thereon of lease-lend supplies.

3. To discuss with American citizens in Tabriz their problems and prospects.

4. To make a preliminary and discreet investigation of the availability of consular office and living quarters in Tabriz. For the strictly confidential information of the Legation and the Consulate, the Department is considering the reestablishment of a consulate at Tabriz and sending an additional officer to Iran for that purpose.

The Department deems it highly desirable that this visit be made without unnecessary delay, and you should take every appropriate step to facilitate it. Upon Moose's return, reports on the above matters are desired by telegraph.

The entire journey should occupy about 10 days, but unavoidable delays may occur en route and the actual time consumed must of course depend upon circumstances. An exhaustive investigation of conditions cannot of course be expected in the time at Moose's disposal, but the Department does desire to receive without loss of time an accurate general statement of conditions with such detailed information as can be readily obtained.

Moose is authorized to direct an employee of the Consulate to accompany him. Transportation expenses and per diem of Moose and employee chosen and travel by automobile authorized under Notes 6 and 20, Section V-44 of the Foreign Service Regulations.

HULL

⁵⁸ James S. Moose, Jr., Second Secretary of Legation in Iran.

891.00/1795 : Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, October 13, 1941—1 p. m.

[Received 1:47 p. m.]

187. With reference to the Department's 104,⁵⁹ there has been improvement in the situation in the north of Iran. The Soviet authorities have prevented further meetings of Armenian separatists; relative free road communication between important cities has been reestablished; the British Minister reports better cooperation on the part of the Soviet authorities in transportation matters; the British Consul at Tabriz reports an improvement in the general conduct of the Russians; and the Foreign Minister informs me the Iranian police are being rearmed. In addition, the British Minister advises me confidentially that the forces occupying Tehran will be withdrawn, a fact which when made known will have a favorable effect.

This improvement may be attributed to representations made by the British and American Governments. My opinion, however, is that reports of substantial improvements in situation should be accepted with reserve. Russians continue to spread Communist propaganda as for example the following was printed on a Soviet invitation to sporting events held yesterday in Tehran "Proletariat of all countries unite". Foreign Minister informs me that an article in *Ettelaat* of October 9 which described the Soviet occupation of Iranian towns in the most favorable light was published under pressure from the Soviet Ambassador.

The above was written before receipt of Department's No. 109, October 11. Moose is leaving at once.

DREYFUS

891.00/1787 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Iran (Dreyfus)

WASHINGTON, October 16, 1941—11 p. m.

114. Department's No. 104, October 8, 1 p. m.⁵⁹ The following telegram has been received from Moscow.

[Here follows text of telegram No. 1788, October 11, 1 p. m., from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, printed on page 471.]

In spite of the Soviet reaction described in the foregoing telegram it is hoped that the representations of the Embassy in Moscow will have a salutary effect upon the Russians in so far as their political activities in Iran are concerned.

⁵⁹ See footnotes 53 and 54, pp. 467 and 469, respectively.

Please keep the Department currently and fully informed of all ascertainable facts regarding conditions in the Russian-occupied Zone.
HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/15896 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, October 17, 1941—midnight.
[Received October 17—7:40 p. m.]

4964. My 4820, October 9, midnight. Foreign Office informed the Embassy this afternoon that some days ago the Soviet Government had indicated its approval of the draft tripartite treaty between Great Britain, Russia and Iran without any suggestion for changes and with apologies for the delay in answering. The Soviet Ambassador at Tehran is said to have received appropriate instructions and negotiations between the three Governments on the the British draft treaty are said to be practically under way.

WINANT

740.0011 European War 1939/16232 : Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, October 29, 1941—3 p. m.
[Received 7:18 p. m.]

210. Reference Department's 109, October 11, 6 p. m. Moose returned here Sunday evening after having visited Tabriz, (Rezaieh?), and Resht and is now preparing a report on his trip which includes the following: All evidence obtained tends to show that Soviet discipline has been uniformly good and that minor disturbances which have occurred were caused by local people. Open separatist movements were early discouraged by the Soviet military authorities though Communist propaganda continues to be spread by word of mouth, motion pictures and in Tabriz by the theater and the registration of Soviet sympathizers.

The railway has been completed from Kazvin to a point beyond Zenjan and some work has been done all the way to Tabriz. Construction stopped completely at the time of Soviet invasion and much equipment and material has been carried off by Soviet forces and by villagers. The Governor of Eastern Azerbaijan (Tabriz) states that the equipment and material are now being collected and that Iranian Government has ordered prompt resumption of work. Though no definite decision has yet been reached the British military transport

authorities are considering immediate completion of line as far as (Kafankuh?) a few miles short of Mianeh and eventual completion of entire line.

Seven missionaries in Tabriz are American citizens. They dislike submitting their passports to the Consulate in Tehran each 6 months for validation and fear loss in their regular Iranian mails. While Tabriz is now quiet they fear local disturbances following withdrawal of Soviet troops. They likewise fear possible German invasion of Azerbaijan. In either event they would like to have a consular officer in Tabriz to inform them when the last possible moment for evacuation arrives and to afford maximum protection to mission property. They plainly indicated that they considered Moose's visit as preliminary to reopening of Tabriz Consulate. He neither denied nor confirmed their belief.

Consulate and residence quarters can be had in Tabriz though probably it would take some weeks to find a suitable place, agree on terms and carry out inevitable alterations and repairs. Rents are relatively low. Combined quarters should cost \$1000 a year or less. Heating would be more expensive than in Tehran.

A full report follows by mail.⁶¹

DREYFUS

891.51A/515 : Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, November 5, 1941—noon.

[Received November 5—10:26 a. m.]

218. The Minister of Foreign Affairs informs me he will shortly request the assistance of the American Government in obtaining for Iran American finance, health, municipal and perhaps other advisers and missions. His delay in making formal proposals is probably due to fact that Majlis which expired October 31 will reassemble November 31 at which time Government will be reconstituted.

Iran is looking more and more toward United States for assistance and guidance and we should not, I feel, miss the opportunity to improve our position. I suggest in case formal overtures are made on this score that Iranian requests be sympathetically received. We must of course bear in mind growing possibility of German invasion of Iran which may prevent actual selection and arrival of such advisers. Even in event of invasion the preliminary steps taken now would facilitate the resumption of conversations after the war.

DREYFUS

⁶¹ Not printed.

740.0011 European War 1939/17364 : Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, December 11, 1941—4 p. m.

[Received 5 : 45 p. m.]

255. The British Minister informs me in strictest confidence that he will leave Monday by air to meet Mr. Eden at Kuibyshev. While he did not divulge purpose of meeting I believe it may have to do with poor relations existing locally between Russians on one hand and British and Iranians on other. The atmosphere of mutual distrust in the contacts of these three creates confusion and disharmony thus obstructing carrying out of affairs of common interest. British and Iranians accuse Russians of lack of cooperation and of continuing to spread Communist propaganda in north while Russians accuse other two of lack of cooperation and in the case of Iranians of inventing stories to discredit the Soviets. The latest and most aggravated incident is the murder of several Turks and others in Tehran and Tabriz apparently for political reasons which the Iranians and some others lay at door of Bolshevik agents. Russians deny any part therein and as result are demanding that Iran Government reduce police force in Tabriz, withdraw Colonel Safe, Iranian police chief, and close newspaper *Voice of Azerbaijan*.

My opinion is that all three parties are to blame for this situation which I feel is detrimental to our common cause.

DREYFUS

741.9111/21 : Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, December 19, 1941—11 a. m.

[Received 4 : 35 p. m.]

260. The Foreign Minister informs me the Iranian Government would like to have the United States adhere after signature to the Iranian-Russo-British treaty which has been initialed and which will be presented to Majlis in a few days. American adherence would, he says, increase the value of the treaty in Iranian eyes by tenfold. He added that he has not considered it opportune to broach the matter to the Allied representatives. I will forward a copy of the final draft by air mail.

DREYFUS

741.9111/22 : Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, December 20, 1941—1 p. m.
 [Received December 21—10:20 a. m.]

261. Reference my No. 260.⁶² Prime Minister reiterated to me today desire of Iran Government to have United States adhere to treaty. He explained that the Government's situation is precarious because of widespread dissatisfaction created by Russian occupation. He stated that Soviet propaganda, political activity and interference continue and that Russians seem to feel they have a sphere of influence in Iran as I note [apparent omission]. He expressed opinion that Iran's position vis-à-vis the Allies might be improved were United States to adhere to the treaty.

DREYFUS

741.9111/21 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Iran (Dreyfus)

WASHINGTON, December 29, 1941—10 p. m.

165. Your 260, December 19, and 261, December 20. Although it is unlikely that the Department would be able to fall in with this suggestion in its present form, we shall be glad to study the matter, with a view to making such helpful suggestions as may be possible, as soon as the text of the treaty is received.

In your discretion you may so inform the Iranian Government.

HULL

AMERICAN AID IN IMPROVING IRANIAN FACILITIES FOR TRANSPORTING WAR MATERIAL TO THE SOVIET UNION; ESTABLISHMENT OF AN AMERICAN AIRPLANE ASSEMBLY BASE IN IRAN

[Following the British and Soviet action in Iran described in correspondence printed on pages 383 ff., that country became an important supply route to the Soviet Union both for British and American material. In response to an inquiry of September 4, 1941, as to whether American assistance was visualized in developing transportation through Iran, the British Government asked for railroad equipment. Later the need for additional railroad construction was reported. A telegram to the Embassy in the United Kingdom on October 8, 1941, stated that Brigadier General R. A. Wheeler, an outstanding military engineer officer, assisted by railroad experts, would head an American military mission to Iran (891.20/128a).

⁶² *Supra.*

As the Department of State played only a secondary role in the arrangements described above, which were the responsibility of other agencies and primarily operational rather than diplomatic, the Department's correspondence on the subject is not included in *Foreign Relations*.]

861.248/164

The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, November 24, 1941.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Appropriate action is requested in securing the cooperation of the British as well as the Russian Government in carrying out the delivery of American aeronautical aid to the Russian Government, which has already been agreed upon in our mutual assistance plan. A study of the possible methods by which airplanes and allied equipment may be speedily shipped to the Russian Government by the American Government has resulted in the decision that the most practical and immediate route is by means of surface vessel delivery to Basra, Iraq, with ferry flight to Russia.

In order to accomplish this, it is necessary that the British and Iraqi Governments make the necessary arrangements to permit the establishment of an assembly point under American military control and command at Shaiba, which is in the southwest suburbs of Basra and at which point there exists a suitable airdrome now used by the British for the assembly of aircraft. This is to be a purely American operation; and so it will be necessary that the British agree to our having airdrome and hangar space, as well as dockage space, and authority for the establishment of all the necessary housing and other facilities to assemble at least two hundred Fighter and Bomber airplanes per month at this point. An estimated maximum of twelve ships per month of approximately the 10,000 ton size would be the peak shipping requirement to be unloaded at the port of Basra. Dockage is preferred in the city rather than further down toward the mouth of the river, due to its relative proximity to the erection airdrome at Shaiba; and it will probably permit the shipment of deck-loaded airplanes, which upon unloading would be rolled directly to the assembly point. At the same time, it is desired to secure authorization to accomplish exactly the same thing at Karachi, India, as an immediate support point in case Iran becomes untenable.

Our preference is to make delivery to the Russians at a point as near the unloading and assembly area (Basra) as may be suitably arranged. This indicates consideration of Basra and Tehran in preference to any point within Russia. American personnel will be provided by us, at point of delivery to the Russians, to meet all technical

requirements. It will be necessary for the Soviet Government to provide sufficient 100-octane fuel and oil for their operations at the delivery point, as well as hangar space and the working facilities required.

It is desired that agreement of the British and Russian Governments be secured to the effect that planes be assembled at Basra and be accepted at an adequately defended point in Iran, acceptable to the American Government. The point to be agreed upon should afford a satisfactory landing field, ample fueling facilities, and living and working accommodations for the personnel involved.

We propose to send approximately one hundred thirty-five Officers, fifty enlisted men, and eight hundred technicians or enlisted men. We will require storage and handling facilities for the total project of at least 665,000 gallons of 100-octane fuel and 15,000 gallons of oil.

It will also be necessary for the British Government to provide protection for this facility and any necessary staging points against enemy action. In addition, it is desired that they provide the required staging airdrome points to the place of delivery and improve the existing airdrome facilities so as to have at least 5,000-foot all-weather runways at Shaiba (Basra) and at Tehran. The Soviet Government will have to provide sufficient 100-octane fuel and oil for their operations at the delivery point, as well as hangar space and the working facilities required.

In view of the urgency of this project your immediate cooperation is requested with the Air Corps to whom this project has been assigned for accomplishment.

Sincerely yours,

HENRY L. STIMSON

861.248/161a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, November 25, 1941—9 p. m.

5426. The following is a paraphrase of a letter dated November 24 from the Secretary of War. Begin paraphrase:

[Here follows paraphrase of letter printed *supra*.]

Please advise the British Government immediately of the foregoing, emphasize the urgency of the project and the necessity of proceeding with the preliminary steps at the earliest possible moment. You should urge the British to indicate their agreement in principle to this project without delay, and to approach the Governments of Iran, Iraq and India, and to undertake, with the approval and assistance of those Governments, to furnish the requisite facilities. I may add that this Government considers it essential for practical reasons of

efficiency that this project be undertaken as a purely American operation.

Please telegraph the British decision at the earliest possible moment in order that the necessary preparations may go forward here.

HULL

861.248/162 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, November 29, 1941—4 p. m.
[Received November 29—10:20 a. m.]

5752. Department's 5426, November 25, 8 [9] p. m. Matter being promptly dealt with. Agreed in principle. A committee is being set up here to study location suggested as well as other sites. We will be asked to appoint some one to sit in and discuss relative merits and other matters of concern. Wiring again on Monday when I will receive a more detailed written communication.

WINANT

861.248/162 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, December 9, 1941—9 p. m.

5791. Your 5752, November 29, 4 p. m. More detailed communication urgently awaited.

HULL

861.248/169 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, December 11, 1941—11 p. m.
[Received 11:28 p. m.]

6011. Department's 5426, November 25, 8 [9] p. m., Department's 5791, December 9, 9 p. m., Department's [*Embassy's*] 5752, November 29, 4 p. m. After calling many times at the Foreign Office the following message reached me this afternoon. Upon receiving it I immediately asked for a verbal explanation why there was no reference to the Iraqi Government. I have been promised an explanation tomorrow morning.

Begin Foreign Office message: "On the 26th November Your Excellency communicated to the Secretary of State a message from the United States Government containing certain proposals for effecting

the delivery of United States aircraft to the Soviet Union. You will remember that Mr. Eden⁶³ informed you that these proposals were acceptable in principle to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom but that a number of questions of detail including the exact location of the proposed assembly point would require examination by the departments concerned.

This examination has revealed that there are certain objections to the choice of Basra or Karachi as the site for the assembly point. At Basra the port facilities are limited and are expected to be increasingly strained by the growing amounts of military and civil supplies which it will be essential to import for our forces and for the civil population in Iraq. At Karachi the necessary port facilities exist but all Royal Air Force [apparent omission] is required for the needs of the Royal Air Force in India and such further capacity as can be provided will be needed to meet Far Eastern commitments.

Two alternative sites which have been suggested are Khosrowabad, which is some 15 miles below Abadan, and Umm Qasr which is located on the west side of the Persian Gulf below the entrance to the river. From information at present available it would appear that Khosrowabad, which is reported to have some facilities in the way of a deeper anchorage than Basra, light and water, may be particularly suitable.

I understand that these two sites are now being examined by representatives of the Royal Air Force and of General Wheeler's mission and that a report may be expected shortly.

[Apparent omission] the site chosen for the assembly point to be operated under United States military command and control it is to be expected that some time will elapse before it is ready to receive aircraft.

His Majesty's Government suggest that in the meantime your Government should deliver the United States bombers for the Soviet Union to Basra where the load on the port is not expected to reach its peak for some little time and where the Royal Air Force can for the time being provide the necessary erection and airdrome facilities.

I understand that the United States fighter aircraft for the Soviet Union are, at the request of the Soviet Government, at present being delivered to Archangel. Should it be decided that they should be diverted to the Persian Gulf, I am glad to be able to inform you that these aircraft also could be received at Basra for the time being.

I am sorry that the need for careful investigation of the complicated question of port facilities has delayed this reply until now." End of Foreign Office message.

Since your original message Harriman⁶⁴ from the Air Ministry and the Ministry of War Transport has in his messages 5914, December 6th, 5 [3] p. m., and 5962, December 9th, 11 p. m.,⁶⁵ reported to Hopkins⁶⁶ and Stettinius.⁶⁷

WINANT

⁶³ Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

⁶⁴ W. Averell Harriman, Special Representative of President Roosevelt in the United Kingdom, with rank of Minister, to expedite lend-lease aid to the British Empire.

⁶⁵ Neither printed.

⁶⁶ Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to President Roosevelt.

⁶⁷ Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Lend-Lease Administrator.

861.248/172 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, December 12, 1941—11 p. m.

[Received December 12—8:23 p. m.]

6027. Supplementing my 6011, December 11, 11 p. m., Foreign Office has just forwarded to me the following message:

"It was suggested in your original message that His Majesty's Government might approach immediately the Governments of Iraq, Iran and India for their approval and assistance in furnishing facilities which might be required for the project. As stated in Law's letter of the 11th December⁶⁸ our authorities consider that of the various alternatives Karachi would not be a suitable site for the assembly base in view of the heavy call upon the facilities there to meet the needs of the Royal Air Force in India and in the Far East. The choice of a site therefore seems to lie between places in Iraq and in Iran in which case there will be no need to bring the Government of India into the matter.

As regards Iraq we are satisfied that the interim arrangements suggested in Law's letter for the unloading and assembly by the Royal Air Force of United States aircraft at Basra would be covered by the terms of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance,⁶⁹ article IV of which provides that in the event of war Iraq shall furnish to the United Kingdom all facilities and assistance in its power including the use of railways, rivers, ports, aerodromes and means of communication. As a matter of courtesy it may, however, be expedient to inform the Iraqi Government of what is proposed and we will gladly send the necessary instructions to our Ambassador at Baghdad as soon as we learn that these interim arrangements are satisfactory to the United States Government.

We consider that the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty would similarly cover the long term project for an assembly base, purely American in character if the site eventually selected were in Iraqi territory as would be the case if it were located at Umqasr. The position would be that His Majesty's Government were in effect subletting to the United States Government part of a site made available to them by the Iraqi Government under the treaty and we should not consider it necessary to do more than notify the Iraqi Government of this development when the time came to establish the base. This again we gladly undertake to do.

Your Excellency will remember that the alternative suggested in Mr. Law's letter of December 11th was that the permanent base should be established at Khosrowabad in Iran. If, as we believe will shortly be the case, the Anglo-Iranian Treaty of Alliance goes through the position would be exactly parallel to that described above in the case of Iraq. In that case we would, of course, send our Minister at Tehran

⁶⁸ Apparently a reference to the message quoted in telegram *supra*.

⁶⁹ Signed at Baghdad, June 30, 1930, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cxxxii, p. 363.

the necessary instructions. If the draft treaty with Iran failed to materialize we should probably not consider it necessary even to notify the Iranian Government and we should simply assist the United States authorities to establish the base by virtue of our being in military occupation of that part of the country.

The other question on which I understand Your Excellency is anxious to have the opinion of His Majesty's Government is that of the delivery point at which the assembled United States aircraft are to be delivered to the Russians. We note that the United States Government are anxious that this point shall be situated in Iran, that they consider that it would most conveniently be situated at Tehran and that they expect arrangements to be made for its defense. On further consideration it might be best that your Government should consult the Soviet Government on this question of the exact point of delivery and make arrangements with them direct. For our part, however, we consider that it would be preferable to locate the delivery point at some place such as Kazvin within the area occupied by Russian troops. There are no longer Allied troops at Tehran and to bring them back would raise a difficult political question. Practical difficulties might arise if the delivery point were situated in the southern part of Iran which is occupied by British troops.

There is one further point which I think I ought to mention at this stage. Your message of the 26th November did not specify the arrangements which the United States Government contemplates for providing ferry crews and communication aircraft for the return of the crews from the delivery point to the assembly base. His Majesty's Government assume that in view of the purely American character of the project these will be furnished by the United States Government and we should be very grateful to have confirmation of this. We fear that it would be quite impossible for the Royal Air Force to undertake this commitment."

WINANT

861.248/172: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, December 30, 1941—8 p. m.

6066. Department's 5426, November 25, 9 p. m. and your 6027, December 12, 11 p. m. War Department has received report from General Wheeler that agreement has been reached with Commander-in-Chief, India, and Air Officer commanding Royal Air Force in Iraq to establish aircraft assembly plant at Abadan for delivery to the Russians of 200 planes per month and that the British are starting necessary construction work immediately.

You are requested to obtain the definitive approval of the British Government to establishment of this project as a purely American operation as indicated in the Department's 5426.

We are glad to accept the British offer to assemble planes temporarily at Basra and the first contingent of planes is being delivered there. Future consignments will, however, be delivered to Abadan.

Please also request that the British send the necessary instructions to their Minister at Tehran and advise you of the nature of those instructions for our information. We are advising our Legation at Tehran but instructing Dreyfus not to approach the Iranian Government until his British colleague has been appropriately instructed.

We are instructing the Embassy at Kuibyshev⁷⁰ to advise the Soviet Government of these plans and to take up with it the question of a suitable delivery point. General Wheeler is also seeking a conference with the Russian authorities in Iran to discuss details.

HULL

861.248/173b : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Steinhardt)*

WASHINGTON, December 30, 1941—8 p. m.

1317. After thorough study of various methods by which aircraft may be delivered to the Soviet Government it has been decided that the most practical and expeditious route is to send the planes by sea to the Persian Gulf for assembly and flight to Russia. Agreement in principle has been reached with the British Government for an American assembly plant to be erected at Abadan, Iran, and construction of the necessary facilities at Abadan is being undertaken immediately. Pending completion of the American assembly project, planes are being shipped to Basra where they will be assembled by the British.

Please advise the Soviet authorities of the foregoing and discuss with them the point at which they wish to take delivery of the planes. We prefer a point in Iran to any point in Russia. Kazvin has been suggested. The War Department will provide adequate American personnel at the delivery point to meet all technical requirements. The Soviet Government is expected to supply hangar space and working facilities there as well as adequate quantities of 100-octane fuel and oil. The point selected should have a satisfactory field with ample fueling facilities and working and living accommodations for the necessary personnel. It should be adequately defended by the Russians.

General Wheeler is endeavoring to get into contact with the Russian authorities in Iran to discuss details.

HULL

⁷⁰ Because of the German drive toward Moscow most of the Soviet Government had moved to Kuibyshev and the American Embassy had followed.

861.248/173a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Iran (Dreyfus)

WASHINGTON, December 30, 1941—8 p. m.

166. Agreement has been reached in principle with the British Government and between General Wheeler and the appropriate British officials in India and the Near East for the establishment at Abadan of a plant to assemble planes brought by sea for delivery by air to the Soviet Government. The project will be exclusively under American military control and command. Construction is being started immediately to provide the necessary facilities and accommodations for 135 officers, 50 enlisted men and 800 civilians. Hangars and housing expected to be completed by January 15. Pending completion of the assembly plant crated planes will be delivered at Basra for assembly by the British.

The Embassy at Kuibyshev is taking up with the Soviet Government the point in Iran at which the planes are to be delivered. Kazvin has been suggested. General Wheeler is also seeking to establish contact with Russian officials in Iran to discuss details. The British Foreign Office states that if the Anglo-Iranian Treaty of Alliance goes into effect the arrangement at Abadan would be covered by the terms of the alliance and that the British Minister at Tehran would be instructed merely to notify the Iranian Government as a matter of courtesy. The position would be that the British Government was in effect subletting to this Government part of a site made available to it by the Iranian Government under the treaty. If the draft treaty with Iran fails to materialize the British state they would probably not consider it necessary even to notify the Iranian Government and that it would merely assist us to establish the base by virtue of being in military occupation.

The foregoing is for your information. You should not make any approach to the Iranian Government until your British colleague has received his instructions and you have received further instructions from us.

HULL

IRAQ

ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD ANTI-BRITISH MILITARY COUP IN IRAQ¹

711.67/105 : Telegram

The Minister Resident in Iraq (Knabenshue) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, January 2, 1941—5 p. m.

[Received January 2—1:41 p. m.]

1. Referring to my telegram No. 120 of December 17, 7 p. m.² The Turkish Minister^{2a} called today to inform me that his Government after receiving his full mail reports of the situation in Iraq, instructed him to inform the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs that Turkish Government was glad to receive from the Iraq Minister at Ankara the assurance that the information received by the Turkish Government regarding the unhappy relations between Iraq and Great Britain was unfounded and to say to the Iraqi Foreign Minister that Turkey, faithful to its pact of Ankara with Great Britain³ and the Saadabad Pact with Iraq,⁴ would be happy to see relations between Great Britain and Iraq established on a basis of friendship and mutual welfare and understanding.

KNABENSHUE

711.67/106 : Telegram

The Minister Resident in Iraq (Knabenshue) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, January 3, 1941—7 p. m.

[Received January 3—4:16 p. m.]

2. The Department's *démarche* of December 3⁵ and British and Greek victories against the Italians, and the Turkish *démarche* culminating as reported in my telegram No. 1, January 2, were undoubtedly the deciding factors in averting a serious crisis between

¹ For previous correspondence relating to this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. III, pp. 703 ff.

² *Ibid.*, p. 722.

^{2a} H. Cavad Üstün.

³ Treaty of Mutual Assistance, signed October 19, 1939, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CC, p. 167.

⁴ Treaty of Non-Aggression, signed July 8, 1937, by Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, and Turkey; for text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CXC, p. 21.

⁵ See telegram No. 56, December 3, 1940, 5 p. m., to the Minister Resident in Iraq, *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. III, p. 716.

Iraq and Great Britain. The President's radio address of Sunday last ⁶ has been a further important contribution to the same end. The Regent ^{6a} is reported to be withholding his signature to practically all documents sent to him by the Cabinet.

However, the Prime Minister,⁷ supported I am told, by the Mufti ⁸ is still persisting in his efforts to remain in power, while the Minister of Defense ^{8a} who is also acting as Minister of Economics is reported to be endeavoring to defeat British refusal to provide dollars by seeking authority to force Iraqi exporters to turn over their dollar exchange to the Government for dinars in order to provide the Government with the dollars necessary for their purchases of war materials in the United States. This would, of course, adversely affect our normal trade with Iraq.

KNABENSHUE

711.00111 Armament Control/2550

The British Embassy to the Department of State

His Majesty's Ambassador in Baghdad ⁹ recently reported that he had received reliable information to the effect that Bond Brothers and Company, 310 California Street, San Francisco, were offering to sell to the Iraq Government miscellaneous war material, much of which was of types specially suited for "gangster" warfare or fifth column activities. Two persons named Selim Zibundi and Wagner were understood to be acting on behalf of Bond Brothers.

In addition, the Iraq Minister of Defence had stated that he had placed orders in the United States for 500 Johnson .303 automatic rifles costing \$200,000, raw materials for the manufacture of 15,000,000 rounds small arms ammunition costing \$280,000, and various miscellaneous stores including telephone cable. The Minister also stated that as Japan declined to supply anti-aircraft guns to Iraq he would endeavour to obtain them in the United States. Sir Basil Newton added that he presumed that all the transactions to which the Minister of Defence had referred were being carried out by the Iraq Purchasing Mission in New York.

Sir Basil Newton went on to refer to certain reports to the effect that the Iraq Government were contemplating obtaining arms from Japan. The Ambassador expressed some doubts whether any such project was likely to materialise, but he added that the possibility

⁶ Address by President Roosevelt, December 29, 1940, Department of State *Bulletin*, January 4, 1941, p. 3.

^{6a} Emir Abdul Ilah, maternal uncle of the boy King, Faisal II.

⁷ Rashid Ali al-Gallani.

⁸ Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husseini, a political refugee from Palestine.

^{8a} Gen. Taha al-Hashimi.

⁹ Sir Basil Cochrane Newton.

of the present Iraq Government purchasing arms in order to give them to the Palestinian insurgents could not be ignored. He suggested that this possibility would be largely diminished and the situation greatly improved if the United States Government were to find it possible to prohibit or prevent the export of all arms to Iraq, at all events until a new and more friendly government had taken office in Baghdad.

His Majesty's Embassy has been instructed to inform the State Department of Sir Basil Newton's report and to enquire whether it would be possible for the United States authorities to take any action on the lines suggested. In making this enquiry His Majesty's Embassy has been directed to emphasise the fact that the intrigues of the present Iraq Prime Minister with the Axis powers are known to have reached such a state that he might well have arranged with them to hand over arms to the Palestinian insurgents in order to enable the latter to renew the disorders in that country.¹⁰

[WASHINGTON,] January 6, 1941.

890G.248/47: Telegram

The Minister Resident in Iraq (Knabenshue) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, January 8, 1941—2 p. m.

[Received January 8—1:50 p. m.]

5. Referring further to the last paragraph of my telegram No. 2, January 3, 7 p. m., the Minister of Defense informed me in reply to my inquiries at an official reception this morning that there is not sufficient dollar exchange available in Iraq to pay for the armament ordered for their Douglas planes or for other war material under orders in the United States and that the British are continuing their refusal to supply the necessary exchange. Obviously the British are awaiting a more sympathetic implementation of Iraq's contractual obligations.

KNABENSHUE

890G.24/19: Telegram

The Minister Resident in Iraq (Knabenshue) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, February 19, 1941—5 p. m.

[Received February 20—4:40 a. m.]

32. Confidentially informed Iraqi Government negotiating with Robert Morgan and Company through Iraqi Arms Inspector Ali

¹⁰ In a memorandum dated January 7, the Under Secretary of State stated that he informed the British Chargé that he saw no reason why this Government should not be glad to comply with the request made by the British Government with regard to the shipments of arms to Iraq.

Ghalib now in America for purchase 50 million rounds of small arms ammunition and 10,000 rifles for which that company claims it can secure export permits. Respectfully suggest it would seem inconsistent with our aid to Britain policy for such permits to be issued at this juncture when it is still uncertain whether this war material may not be used to assist Germany.

KNABENSHUE

890G.24/19 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister Resident in Iraq (Knabenshue)

WASHINGTON, March 1, 1941—10 p. m.

17. Your 32, February 19, 5 p. m. For your strictly confidential information, licenses for the exportation to Iraq of war materials and equipment are currently being denied, except with respect to spare parts for planes already delivered.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/8900 : Telegram

The Chargé in Egypt (Hare) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, March 8, 1941—4 p. m.

[Received March 9—12:50 p. m.]

107. The Iraqi Foreign Minister¹¹ arrived in Cairo day before yesterday accompanied by the Counsellor of the British Embassy at Baghdad. The [apparent omission] Secretary of the Embassy here [apparent omission] me confidentially that the Foreign Minister came here at the suggestion of the British to consult Eden¹² who was unable to go to Baghdad but desired to discuss with the Iraqis the general subject of the uncooperative attitude of the Iraqi Government in respect of the British war effort and particularly the interference of certain military leaders in politics and the desirability of discontinuing diplomatic relations with Italy. According to my informant who himself participated in the conversations, the Iraqi Foreign Minister gave the impression of being sympathetic to the British suggestions but pointed out the difficulty of precipitate action in such matters and made no definite commitments. My informant added that the Iraqi Foreign Minister took the occasion to raise the question of the return of political refugees from Palestine without however discussing the case of the Mufti specifically.

Repeat to Baghdad.

HARE

¹¹ Towfiq as-Suwaidi, appointed February 6, 1941, by Gen. Taha al-Hashimi, who had become Prime Minister February 1, 1941.

¹² Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

740.0011 European War 1939/8951 : Telegram

The Minister Resident in Iraq (Knabenshue) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, March 11, 1941—11 a. m.

[Received 2:30 p. m.]

42. British Ambassador confirms information Hare's number 107.¹³ Eden stressed rupture relations with Italy and told Suwaidi he would expect hear something definite this regard on his return London and intimated British help Iraq if action favorable. If not favorable Ambassador says further economic pressure will be exerted.

KNABENSHUE

740.0011 European War 1939/9328 : Telegram

The Minister Resident in Iraq (Knabenshue) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, March 25, 1941—11 a. m.

[Received 11:30 p. m.]

51. On March 19 Suwaidi, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, made an official statement regarding his talk with Anthony Eden at Cairo. It abounded in platitudes and diplomatic clichés without disclosing the matter actually discussed. During a talk with him yesterday he gave me an account of his talk with Eden which corresponded substantially with Hare's telegram No. 107¹⁴ and my 42, March 22 [11], 11 a. m. The particular specific point raised by Eden was rupture of diplomatic relations with Italy. Suwaidi agreed in principle but refused to promise accomplishment within a fixed time limit because, as he explained, of strong local opposition which will take time to overcome. He acknowledged that this opposition was in fact the Army leaders. I spoke freely and frankly to Suwaidi along the lines of the Department's telegraphic instruction No. 56 of December 3, 5 p. m., and 60, December 14, 5 p. m.¹⁵ I am inclined to believe that if he does not succeed in bringing about a rupture with Italy within a reasonable period of time he will resign.

As an illustration of the power and influence of the Army leaders the following is related: The British community organized a British war charities fete for March 27 to be held under the auspices of the British Ambassador and the Mayor of Baghdad in the large municipal entertainment hall placed at the disposal of the fete by the Mayor. The Mayor and other Iraqis serving on the committee commenced

¹³ *Supra.*

¹⁴ Dated March 8, 4 p. m., p. 489.

¹⁵ *Foreign Relations, 1940, vol. III, pp. 716 and 721, respectively.*

to receive threatening letters protesting against the use of the hall by the British. Then rumors were circulated that the Iraq Air Force would bomb the hall if so used. Then the Arab broadcaster at Berlin threatened the long arm of the German Air Force in similar action. The pressure on the Mayor became so great that he has now withdrawn permission to use the hall and compelled the fete to be held only in the garden thereof. There is speculation as to whether the fete will pass without a serious incident.

KNABENSHUE

740.0011 European War 1939/9402 : Telegram

The Minister Resident in Iraq (Knabenshue) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, March 28, 1941—11 a. m.

[Received 12: 15 p. m.]

52. Referring to my telegram No. 51 of March 25. The Minister for Foreign Affairs also said that he had told Eden that the Iraqi Government desires the British to implement the White Paper in respect to Palestine¹⁶ but in view of present world conditions would be satisfied to leave the time of implementation to the discretion of the British.

As regards Syria he told Eden that Iraq would raise no objection to the occupation of Syria by the British¹⁷ if for strategical or other reasons the British should deem such a step necessary—Iraq having faith and confidence that after the war the British would find a satisfactory solution for the Syrian problem on the basis of Syrian independence. In answer to a question in the Chamber of Deputies he expressed Iraq's sympathy with the Syrians in their present attitude towards the French.

KNABENSHUE

890G.00/535 : Telegram

The Minister Resident in Iraq (Knabenshue) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, April 2, 1941—7 p. m.

[Received April 3—8: 40 a. m.]

54. This morning 8:45 the Regent came to me in native woman's dress covering dressing gown and pajamas to seek refuge in Legation, having been forewarned of attempt by the four army leaders to force

¹⁶ British Cmd. 6019: *Palestine, Statement of Policy, May 1939.*

¹⁷ For correspondence on this subject, see pp. 725 ff.

resignation of Prime Minister and reinstatement Rashid Ali Gailani as Prime Minister, decrees for which he would have been forced sign. In consequence of consultation at Legation between Regent, British Ambassador and myself I took Regent, accompanied by my wife as camouflage, to British air base at Habbaniya in my car with Regent lying on floor at back covered by rug. We passed unchallenged units of Army stationed along road which were stopping and searching other cars.

Movement is primarily against Regent whom army leaders fear and not having been able to find him it is expected they may make attempt stage *coup d'état* within next 24 hours and establish military dictatorship.

KNABENSHUE

890G.00/539 : Telegram

The Minister Resident in Iraq (Knabenshue) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, April 3, 1941—6 p. m.

[Received 11:07 p. m.]

58. Military have established new "national defense government" with the Rashid Ali Gailani at its head. Not yet clear whether Regent to be deposed and Gailani given power of Fuehrer. Regent being flown today from Habbaniya to Basra from where will attempt form new constitutional government and by proclamation call upon people of country for support which he told me he expects receive from practically all tribes and possibly part of army. Civil war now within bounds possibility.

Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, new British Ambassador, arrived last night. Told me today he has informed his Government he will have no relations with present unconstitutional government. I will follow similar action pending Department's instructions and Turkish Minister tells he will do likewise.

KNABENSHUE

890G.00/545

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

On April 3rd His Majesty's Ambassador in Baghdad reported to the Foreign Office that Rashid Ali had taken control of the Government Offices earlier that day. A proclamation was expected to be issued to the effect that the army had assumed the responsibility for the Government of Iraq and had nominated Rashid Ali to take charge of the administration.

Sir Kinahan Cornwallis added that he proposed to have no official relations with this new government.

His Majesty's Embassy has now been instructed to inform the State Department that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are not prepared at present to recognize the new regime in Baghdad. This administration has installed itself without any semblance of legality by a Military Coup and appears to be anti-British and pro-Axis. His Majesty's Government hope that the United States Government will share their views in the matter and will similarly withhold recognition of the new government. In that case appropriate instructions would no doubt be issued to the United States representative in Baghdad who it is understood has already been in touch with the British Ambassador on the subject.

His Majesty's Embassy has been instructed to add for the confidential information of the State Department that the Regent of Iraq has left Baghdad and is understood to be safe. Furthermore the attitude of the Provinces, particularly in the south, seems to be definitely hostile to the new regime.

WASHINGTON, April 5, 1941.

890G.00/544 : Telegram

The Minister Resident in Iraq (Knabenshue) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, April 6, 1941—6 p. m.

[Received April 7—3 a. m.]

63. British Ambassador tells me Regent now aboard British cruiser at Basra. That Iraqi Army has control of country, that attempt of Regent to establish new constitutional government has collapsed. He has informed his Government of situation and set forth following alternative considerations: (1) crush present government by force of arms, (2) recognize present government, (3) not recognize and withdraw Ambassador leaving Chargé d'Affaires.

The first he believed would be decided on basis of military strategy in respect to whole Near East.

The third would result immediately in reestablishment of Iraq's relations with Germany, the inrush of several thousand German tourists from Iran and arrival of technical and other German troops by air transport resulting in complete control of country by Germans.

The second might stabilize situation for the present but control of country by Germans would follow as above indicated whenever Germans are ready for it.

His staff is today preparing evacuation plan for British and Americans and will submit tomorrow. Evacuation will be effected before

application armed force or non-recognition be decided upon because it is obvious that all British would be placed in concentration camps soon after arrival of Germans for rumors to this effect have been spread. In any case obvious situation critical and dangerous.

He and I believe present coup timed to coincide German attack on Yugoslavia and Greece.

KNABENSHUE

890G.00/545

*Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. Gordon P. Merriam
of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] April 7, 1941.

Participants: Mr. Nevile Butler, Counselor of the British Embassy
Mr. Murray¹⁹

Mr. Murray referred to the British Embassy's *aide-mémoire* of April 5, 1941, in which the hope was expressed that this Government would withhold recognition from the new Gailani Government in Iraq and so instruct its representative in Baghdad. Mr. Murray stated that we had just received a telegram from our Minister in Baghdad,²⁰ apparently based upon a somewhat different view of the situation from that which had prompted the Embassy's *aide-mémoire*, to the effect that in the opinion of the British Ambassador there, a formal decision by the British Government either to recognize or not to recognize the Gailani regime was open to serious objections. It therefore seemed undesirable for us to take a step which in the opinion of Sir Kinahan Cornwallis it would be unwise for his own Government to take at this time.

Mr. Butler agreed.

390G.1115/12: Telegram

*The Minister Resident in Iraq (Knabenshue) to the Secretary
of State*

BAGHDAD, April 7, 1941—noon.

[Received 11:20 p. m.]

64. Referring penultimate paragraph my 63.²¹ Plans evacuation reported despatch 1400, October 9, 1939,²² visualized only mob violence but present situation involves possible mob violence in respect both British and Americans and military action in respect British. All

¹⁹ Wallace Murray, Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs.

²⁰ *Supra.*

²¹ Dated April 6, 6 p. m., p. 493.

²² Not printed.

means communication blocked by military and British subjects attempting go to Habbaniya turned back. As result Embassy protest Iraqi Government will permit British subjects go Habbaniya only under police escort. Embassy fears even this would be refused if mass evacuation British attempted.

British Embassy inquires whether in emergency British subjects near American Legation might take refuge here offering refuge at British Embassy for Americans residing near there, the number of which constitutes more than half American colony. I replied as per our regulations respecting asylum. Please instruct whether and what extent I may go further in matter asylum especially in view circumstances and fact present regime is not legally constituted government.

Egyptian Minister just informs me he is instructed by his Government not to have relations with the Gailani regime.

KNABENSHUE

890G.00/546 : Telegram

The Minister Resident in Iraq (Knabenshue) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, April 7, 1941—5 p. m.
[Received April 8—7:09 a. m.]

65. British Ambassador informs me that Gailani today sent him through Edmonds²³ following proposals:

1. Taha²⁴ be permitted to see Regent and present his formal resignation as Prime Minister.
2. Regent then receive Gailani and entrust to him formation of new constitutional government.
3. Regent then leave country on 4 months' leave absence.
4. Emir Hussein another uncle of King be appointed Acting Regent.

In consideration above, Gailani undertakes (1) he will make frequent broadcasts denying he is pro-German (2) will take steps to bring about early rupture relations with Italy (3) will allow Palestine and Syrian question to remain in *status quo* until after war.

Ambassador considers proposals outrageous and unacceptable and has so reported to his Government, but sent reply to Gailani merely acknowledging receipt of proposals. He interprets proposals as sign of weakness believing Gailani now realizes danger of attempting carry on with unconstitutional government and difficulty if not impossibility of forming government with responsible persons enjoying respect of people. He believes also that after first shock is over there will be revulsion of feeling among Iraqi people which might bring

²³ Cecil John Edmonds, British Adviser at the Iraqi Ministry of Interior.

²⁴ Gen. Taha al-Hashimi, appointed Prime Minister of Iraq February 1, 1941.

about Gailani's downfall. Therefore and because economic pressure to be exerted Ambassador proposes to stall for time believing satisfactory result may be realized without using force. He is willing to risk possibility German penetration as outlined in my number 64, even date, to gain above solution.

KNABENSHUE

890G.00/544 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister Resident in Iraq (Knabenshue)

WASHINGTON, April 7, 1941—6 p. m.

35. Your 63, 6 p. m.,²⁵ and previous telegrams regarding current developments in Iraq.

In view of the rapidity with which events have been occurring, it is obvious that in some cases there may not be time to consult the Department before decisions are required. In such instances the Department relies upon the good judgment you have already manifested.

In view however of the considerations set forth in your telegram under reference, the Department does not desire at this time to take a position on the recognition or non-recognition of the Gailani Government.

With reference to the British Ambassador's pessimistic estimate of the situation, the thought has been expressed here that Gailani can hardly expect immediate German military assistance in force and that by permitting German infiltration he would invite British occupation.

It would be valuable at this juncture to obtain, if possible, information as to the actual intentions of Gailani. It is realized that the British Ambassador is hardly in a position to make an approach for this purpose in view of the attitude of the Embassy toward the previous Gailani Government. The Department believes that you are freer in this respect and suggests that you consider approaching Gailani informally, and without instructions on the question of recognition, with a view to ascertaining his intentions. Anxiety over the outlook for American interests in Iraq might form the basis of your visit.

Please continue to maintain close contact with your British and Turkish colleagues and keep the Department informed of developments as heretofore.

With reference to your 61, April 5, 10 a. m.,²⁶ authority to evacuate Mrs. Knabenshue and Mrs. Mattison in your discretion is granted. Detailed instructions regarding the exercise of this authority follow by telegram via Bern.

HULL

²⁵Dated April 6, p. 493.

²⁶ Not printed.

890G.00/547 : Telegram

The Minister Resident in Iraq (Knabenshue) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, April 7, 1941—7 p. m.

[Received April 8—7:45 a. m.]

66. Mardam,²⁷ ex-Prime Minister Syria, is acting as intermediary on behalf Gailani to seek compromise agreement with British Ambassador for solution present crisis. He came to me today to enlist my sympathy and advice. He made some proposals substantially as reported in my 65, of today. Summing up I expressed the following: (1) a constitutional government should be established, (2) this should be accomplished in full accord with the British inasmuch as the best interests of Iraq were entirely dependent upon unequivocal cooperation with the British in present world crisis, (3) if to accomplish these two desiderata individuals would have to be sacrificed, such sacrifices should be made for good of state (he knew I meant Gailani himself).

During conversation I made it clear American people do not view with sympathy regimes which seize powers of government by force.

I suggested he talk with someone at British Embassy. He said he had appointment this evening with Oriental Secretary, a fact I already knew. He volunteered that he is dining with Gailani tonight.

KNABENSHUE

890G.00/552 : Telegram

The Minister Resident in Iraq (Knabenshue) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, April 9, 1941—11 a. m.

[Received 2:13 p. m.]

70. Referring section 1, Department's 35,²⁸ thanks for second paragraph and as regards fourth, British Ambassador's estimate was based on thesis of nonrecognition without use of force to readjust and stabilize situation and I agreed with him. Subsequent activities of military, their treatment of British subjects—holding them virtually as hostages—jamming of British-Arabic broadcast while permitting unhindered German-Arabic broadcasts, with strategic dispositions of army units throughout the country, particularly in threatening positions in respect to British air bases, may now justifiably characterize the Iraq Army estimated at 50,000 as a hostile force which invites British occupation even before German infiltration or nonrecognition

²⁷ Jamil Mardam Bey.²⁸ Dated April 7, 6 p. m., p. 496.

and withdrawal of Ambassador. Fifth paragraph already reported in telegrams 65 to 68²⁹ inclusive.

Part 1 Department's 35 received 8 p. m. yesterday, part 2 not yet received.

KNABENSHUE

890G.00/556 : Telegram

The Minister Resident in Iraq (Knabenshue) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, April 10, 1941—1 p. m.

[Received 2:41 p. m.]

71. Section 2 Department's 35 received 8 p. m. yesterday. No useful purpose would be served by talk with Gailani. His public statements during past week and his proposals to Ambassador through Edmonds and to me through Mardam have made known all that he might say to me and through Mardam he has my views. His hasty assembly Parliament today, his political history which reveals him as intriguer, unreliable, unscrupulous, ruthless, backed at first and now dominated by group with same characteristics, the fact British have documentary evidence his secret relations with Germans, together with other miscellaneous facts known to me, give background for following conclusions: (1) his proposals not accompanied by adequate guarantees and his assurances alone are valueless; (2) his hasty assembly Parliament is for purpose deposition of Regent and enactments giving superficial appearance legality his regime; (3) his proposals to British were for purpose of playing for time preparing way for the Germans; (4) the present crisis intended as embarrassing distraction for British at this critical time.

KNABENSHUE

890G.00/558 : Telegram

The Minister Resident in Iraq (Knabenshue) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, April 10, 1941—7 p. m.

[Received April 11—9 a. m.]

73. Iraqi Parliament today voted dismissal of Abdullah [*Abdul Ilah*] from the Regency and elected Al-Sharif Sharaf as Regent. Latter is member of Hashimite family and acted as Regent during brief absence of Faisal in 1925.

KNABENSHUE

²⁹ Telegrams Nos. 65, April 7, 5 p. m., and 66, April 7, 7 p. m., pp. 495 and 497, respectively; Nos. 67 and 68 not printed.

890G.00/563 : Telegram

The Minister Resident in Iraq (Knabenshue) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, April 11, 1941—9 p. m.

[Received April 14—1:40 p. m.]

74. New Regent called upon Gailani to form new government and his Cabinet will probably be announced tomorrow. British legal adviser to Iraq Ministry of Justice tells me that inasmuch as the King or Regent or Council of Ministers only are authorized to assemble Parliament the Assembly yesterday called by a group which had seized power was unconstitutional but that the measure taken by Parliament after assembly, although open to some question, followed constitutional procedure.

KNABENSHUE

890G.00/564 : Telegram

The Minister Resident in Iraq (Knabenshue) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, April 11, 1941—10 p. m.

[Received April 14—3:20 p. m.]

75. British Ambassador informed me tonight that his Government has ordered the despatch of one battalion troops from India arrival commencing April 13th at Shaibah British Air Base near Basrah with about a division to follow by ship arriving about April 20th accompanied by cruisers and other naval units. In meantime he had informed his Government that Gailani in an announcement accepting to form new government stated his intention to fulfill Anglo-Iraq treaty.³⁰ He therefore recommended advisability putting onus on Gailani by informing him that in view military situation in Near East, British Government has intention of transporting troops through Iraq. If Gailani accepts, landing can be effected peacefully, otherwise because of Iraq's refusal to fulfill treaty, troops might have to be landed by force because Iraq troops are already disposed in portions to repel such landing. He has taken steps to postpone troop arrivals on 13th pending reply from London.

KNABENSHUE

890G.00/560 : Telegram

The Minister Resident in Iraq (Knabenshue) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, April 12, 1941—5 p. m.

[Received 10:35 p. m.]

78. Received today note from Foreign Office giving names new Cabinet Ministers who are predominantly pro-German. Mousa Sha-

³⁰ Signed at Baghdad, June 30, 1930, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CXXXII, p. 363.

banda, Foreign Affairs, served Iraqi Legation, Berlin; Naji Showkat, Defence, Gailani special envoy to Von Papen³¹ last summer; Naji Suwaidi in Gailani's last Cabinet.

The others no particular importance. I will not acknowledge the receipt of note pending Department's instructions and I recommend delay until further advised. British Ambassador anticipating demand of Gailani for British recognition as consideration for permission transit British troops, telegraphed for instructions on this point last night to have it in hand in case of need.

KNABENSHUE

890G.002/149 : Telegram

The Minister Resident in Iraq (Knabenshue) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, April 13, 1941—10 a. m.

[Received 11:49 p. m.]

79. Foreign Office telegraphed [*telephoned?*] today saying Minister for Foreign Affairs would receive visits of congratulations from chiefs of diplomatic missions tomorrow morning. British, Turkish, Egyptian, Iranian, French and American will not attend leaving only the Japanese and Italian.

KNABENSHUE

890G.00/570 : Telegram

The Minister Resident in Iraq (Knabenshue) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, April 16, 1941—5 p. m.

[Received April 17—9:31 a. m.]

84. British Ambassador's recommendations as reported in my 75,³² have been approved by Cabinet and he will see Gailani today. This might result in peaceful landing British troops especially in view strength of accompanying naval units.

It is possible my telegrams are not being sent and I therefore asked Ambassador to request Foreign Office, London, to keep our Embassy informed.

KNABENSHUE

890G.00/577

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] April 18, 1941.

The British Ambassador³³ called at his request and handed me a copy of a telegram from his Foreign Office relative to developments in

³¹ Franz von Papen, German Ambassador in Turkey.

³² Dated April 11, 10 p. m., p. 499.

³³ Viscount Halifax.

Iraq. I thanked him and said that we naturally are very much interested in the disquieting developments of the past few days in Iraq.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

[Annex]

Copy of Telegram From the British Foreign Office to the British Embassy in Washington, Dated April 17, 1941

Please inform United States Government that Rashid Ali has agreed to a request for opening line of communications through Iraq in accordance with provisions of Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance and that Imperial troops are due to reach Basrah immediately. His Majesty's Government regarded this as test case and His Majesty's Ambassador accordingly informed Rashid Ali on April 16th that provided unconditional cooperation was forthcoming for opening line of communications, His Majesty's Government for their part would be prepared to enter at once into informal relations with his Government, and accord full recognition to new regime as soon as there has been sufficient time to judge whether new regime is capable of acting up to Rashid Ali's own assurances.

In any case we consider presence of Imperial troops in Iraq can hardly fail to act as stabilizing factor in the situation.

You should conclude by again expressing to the United States Government my thanks for their welcome cooperation in this question and say that His Majesty's Ambassador at Baghdad will of course keep in close touch with their representative there.

740.0011 European War 1939/10087: Telegram

The Minister Resident in Iraq (Knabenshue) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, April 18, 1941—9 p. m.
[Received April 19—12:03 a. m.]

87. Sea-borne British troops arrived Basrah and air-borne at Shaiba today without incident.

KNABENSHUE

890G.00/576: Telegram

The Minister Resident in Iraq (Knabenshue) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, April 19, 1941—3 p. m.
[Received April 21—9:50 a. m.]

89. With arrival British troops tension relaxed but not dispelled. Gailani has requested (1) recent arrivals be despatched out Iraq

within few days, (2) no further arrivals until (1) accomplished, (3) further arrivals be notified reasonably in advance, (4) size of British forces here never to exceed present number, namely, about 8,000. Gailani informed Cornwallis Iraq garrison at Basrah will be increased to one division. In view many evidences hostile attitude of Iraq Army it is obvious Gailani hopes retain Iraq military superiority pending signal and help from Germany.

Cornwallis tells me Gailani's request will not be complied with. Additional troops due about 2 weeks. Communications will then be taken over by British troops and garrisons established also at Baghdad and Habbaniya. Excuse if necessary will be protection of Iraq in accordance with treaty.

Cornwallis calling on Gailani today to tell him his Government has intimated he may have informal relations with him; that official recognition will follow depending upon satisfactory future developments. He has asked London text of communication he should send Gailani re informal relations. I recommend that I be instructed to follow similar policy but in my case perhaps written communication unnecessary, sufficient if I call on Foreign Minister [apparent omission] time of day and if question of official recognition arises merely say I am as yet uninstructed.

My estimate of situation follows: Upon arrival and planned distribution additional British troops, teeth of four Army leaders will be drawn. Many of their own officers and the politicians will not [*then?*] cease to fear them. Politics will then follow usual course and result in fall of Gailani government. Another government probably headed by Midfai [*Madfai*] will take power and Abdul Ilah will return to regency—present Regent having been unconstitutionally chosen. Hence, full recognition of present government should be withheld pending further developments.

KNABENSHUE

890G.00/578 : Telegram

The Minister Resident in Iraq (Knabenshue) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, April 21, 1941—7 p. m.

[Received April 22—4:30 a. m.]

90. British Ambassador has received note from Iraq Foreign Office formally demanding immediate assurances of fulfillment Gailani's four requests reported first paragraph my 89, April 19. Gailani has told Edmonds, who has been acting as intermediary between Gailani and Cornwallis, that British refusal these demands will be interpreted as nonfulfillment treaty and that Iraq will consequently re-

pudiate treaty. Cornwallis intends play for time until next arrival troops.

British are on lookout for possible German infiltrations from Iran or German troop arrivals by transport planes.

KNABENSHUE

890G.00/576 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister Resident in Iraq (Knabenshue)

WASHINGTON, April 22, 1941—6 p. m.

43. Your 89, April 19, 3 p. m. The Department agrees that a written communication to the Foreign Minister is unnecessary at this time. However, there is no objection to your establishing informal contact without instructions on the question of official recognition.

HULL

890G.00/587 : Telegram

The Minister Resident in Iraq (Knabenshue) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, April 28, 1941—5 p. m.

[Received 8 : 30 p. m.]

103. Referring my 97, April 24.³⁴ Saw Foreign Minister today informing him I had been authorized establish informal contact with him. He did not press for anything further at this juncture.

KNABENSHUE

890G.00/590 : Telegram

The Minister Resident in Iraq (Knabenshue) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, April 29, 1941—10 p. m.

[Received April 30—7 : 30 a. m.]

108. British Ambassador informed me this afternoon that he gathers from his long conversation with Gailani yesterday that the Iraq Government may rupture diplomatic relations with Britain on grounds of violation of treaty.

With established air bases in Iraq and presence of troops which are to be further reinforced middle May the result of such action by Iraq Government would be obvious—crushing of present government and army by the British and restoration of legal Iraqi Government and return of Abdul Allah [*Ilah*] to resume regency. In view of illegality of present government and its hostile attitude interfering with

³⁴ Not printed.

British war effort it would seem British would be justified in such action. Moreover, most better Iraqi politicians and public would welcome it. Total evacuation of British women and children has alarmed Iraqis. It shows British mean business and it might have salutary effect.

KNABENSHUE

390G.1115/15 : Telegram

The Minister Resident in Iraq (Knabenshue) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, April 29, 1941—11 p. m.

[Received 11:23 p. m.]

109. Referring my 107 of even date.⁸⁵ All American women and children left Baghdad this afternoon, with one exception, who refused to leave.

KNABENSHUE

740.0011 European War 1939/10502 : Telegram

The Minister Resident in Iraq (Knabenshue) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, April 30, 1941—5 p. m.

[Received 10:30 p. m.]

110. Midnight last night mobile units Iraqi Army including tanks, armored cars, field guns, cavalry and infantry commenced passing Legation from their nearby base. I sent for British intelligence officer, my neighbor. He went to Embassy and from there notified British Air Base at Habbaniya. This was first notice they received of the event. This Iraq Army proceeded to Habbaniya arriving before dawn and took up commanding positions on heights overlooking the air base. The commander of the base was then informed that the army was engaged in exercises and that if any British planes should leave the ground the army would attack. The reply was that the British Air Force was also under instructions to exercise and that if Iraqi Army should interfere it would be considered an act of war. British Air Force believe they can dispose of Iraqi Army in short order.

Iraq Government has issued notice informing public they have offered British all facilities in accordance with treaty but that British have made demands which infringe Iraq's sovereignty and consequently the army has taken charge and will defend sovereign rights of country.

A mixed lot of Americans and miscellaneous foreigners and some Iraqi subjects numbering about 100 fearing mob violence have taken refuge in Legation.

KNABENSHUE

⁸⁵ Not printed.

740.0011 European War 1939/10587 : Telegram

The Minister Resident in Iraq (Knabenshue) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, May 4, 1941.

[Received May 4—8:30 p. m.]

113. Diplomatic missions are not permitted send code telegrams. Radio transmitting sets in all diplomatic missions have been taken over by the Government. One hundred and sixty men, women, and children of various nationalities have taken refuge in the Legation since April 30th. The Government has placed a strong police guard around the Legation for its protection and has kindly permitted the delivery of food to the Legation. I have given a personal guarantee to the Government that no British subjects who have taken refuge in the Legation will leave the Legation compound until the situation is clarified. American women who went to Habbaniya under safe conduct given by Government reached there safely. I know that some of the women reached Basrah from Habbaniya safely but have no information regarding the rest of them including my wife and Mrs. Mattison. I have no knowledge regarding situation more than I have seen British bombers operating over Baghdad and Rashid camp near the Legation and have received an official note from the Foreign Office informing me that a hospital at Rashid camp hit and one person killed and two wounded.

KNABENSHUE

740.0011 European War 1939/10630 : Telegram

The Minister Resident in Iraq (Knabenshue) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, May 4, 1941.

[Received May 5—10:50 a. m.]

115. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs in an official note requests me to inform the Department that on May 3rd a British plane tried to bomb a Mosque situated at Falujah at the time tribesmen were making their prayers.³⁶ The Ministry points out that this horrible action which is not based on any human principles caused public disturbances and consternation and that this action will show the civilized world what the British forces are doing now against all rules of war of the civilized world.

This morning at 11:00 the Ministry for Foreign Affairs informed me that the commanding officer of the British forces in Iraq sent an

³⁶ In later telegrams (No. 118, undated, No. 119, May 20, and No. 120, May 22) the Minister Resident in Iraq reported further Iraqi protests against alleged British bombing or machine gunning from the air of hospital cars and places inhabited by civilians (740.00116 European War 1939/384, 388; 740.0011 European War 1939/11117).

ultimatum to the Iraqi Government demanding the withdrawal of the Iraq Army from the neighborhood of Habbaniya within 4 hours the time limit of which would expire at 12:00 noon today and that failure to comply with the terms of the ultimatum would result in the bombing of the public buildings of Baghdad by the British Air Force. The Iraqi Government sent a counter ultimatum to the effect that if the British bombed the public buildings of Baghdad the Iraq Government would bomb British subjects wherever they might be found. About an hour later I was informed by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that the Iraqi Government demanded that I should deliver to the appropriate Iraqi authorities, who would call at the Legation, all British subjects who had taken refuge at the Legation. I agreed to comply with this request immediately upon receipt of an official note from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs guaranteeing the proper treatment due to the British subjects in the present circumstances in accordance with the accepted principles of international law. I was informed that an official note making the demand and giving the guarantees I demanded would be handed to me when the appropriate authorities would call at the Legation for delivery of the British subjects. I have since been informed that the British subjects will be removed from the Legation when a suitable internment camp has been prepared for them.

KNABENSHUE

740.0011 European War 1939/10693 : Telegram

The Minister Resident in Iraq (Knabenshue) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, May 5, 1941—7 p. m.

[Received May 6—3:27 p. m.]

116. Department's telegram via London³⁷ stating my 110³⁸ last received. My 115, May 4 the last sent. No. 114 was canceled. Americans at Legation are well. I am informed by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that the Jesuit Fathers of the Jesuit College and Dr. and Mrs. Staudt of American Boys School who elected remain at their respective schools are well, and also that one American Jesuit Father and a Miss Adams at the British Embassy are presumably still there. The Ministry Foreign Affairs will inquire and report to me regarding whereabouts and welfare of the Willoughby family at Mosul. Referring to my 113,³⁹ I suggest that Department make inquiries through other channels regarding American women who left here for Basra via Habbaniya and also regarding Americans at Basra. I have been and am continuing to be absolutely correct

³⁷ Telegram No. 1484, May 2, 7 p. m., not printed.

³⁸ Dated April 30, 5 p. m., p. 504.

³⁹ Dated May 4, p. 505.

in the matter of the persons of various nationalities who have taken refuge in the Legation and in all other respects thus endeavoring to retain the confidence in me of the Ministry Foreign Affairs and thereby receive their cooperation to ensure the protection of the people who have taken refuge here and the inviolability of the Legation in accordance with the accepted principles of international law. I have nothing further to report at this time. Please acknowledge in plain language receipt of this and previous telegrams.

KNABENSHUE

124.90G6/40 : Telegram

The Minister Resident in Iraq (Knabenshue) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, May 7, 1941—1 p. m.

[Received May 9—6:08 p. m.]

117. Ministry Foreign Affairs now informs me that code telegrams may be sent to and received from their governments by diplomatic missions. As certain circumstances compelled me to destroy all my codes and confidential files on May 4th I can now send and receive only in plain language. All is well with us all at the Legation. I beg the Department not to give anything to the press or radio broadcast about the Legation. I have nothing further to report at this time.

KNABENSHUE

740.0011 European War 1939/10893 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, May 13, 1941—noon.

[Received 10:05 p. m.]

143. For Secretary and Under Secretary. Iraqi War Minister Naji Shawket (formerly Minister here) who arrived 5 days ago has evidently sought to obtain this Government's assistance in formulating acceptable basis of understanding with British.

Turkish Foreign Office officials in course of conversations made plain to him their conviction that Iraq had violated its treaty of alliance with Britain and taken course whose successful outcome could only place it and Moslem world at mercy of power far less indulgent and more oppressive.

(2) Upon being informed by Turks of tenor of Naji's suggestions for accord British Ambassador asked Foreign Minister to advise him that his Government still intends to respect independence of Iraq to fullest extent compatible with rights under treaty of alliance but cannot accept limitation or qualification of its discretion as to

landing or movement of military forces in Iraq under that treaty. Approving this preliminary reply London added it could not trust to any understanding with Rashid Ali known to be not only hostile but in active communication with Germans and that it would advise this Government to discontinue any efforts towards mediation with Nazis [*Nazi?*] since he is known to have intrigued with Von Papen on his visits to Turkey last summer.

(3) I understand Iraqis have similarly sent emissary to Ibn Saud ⁴⁰ despite latter's previous statement he would not be welcome.

(4) I am also informed thru [*that?*] Iraqi Legation Kabul asked support of Afghan Government first proposing that it take up case as matter of common interest under Saadabad Pact but receiving reply that questions at issue might better have been taken up by Iraq with its associates in that pact before instead of after starting armed quarrel with British and then making and being rebuffed in the suggestion that Afghanistan take initiative in calling Jihad ⁴¹ against Britain.

(5) Minor official of Iraq Legation here (whose Minister is brother of Rashid Ali) has naively requested official Anatolu news agency to publish such call to holy war.

(6) From most confidential source I am informed that Turks (particularly military) have rather bluntly expressed to British their conviction that only way latter can extricate themselves from difficulties into which they have got themselves in Iraq is by quick and drastic military action.

(7) British colleague assures me his Government while of course finding unwelcome implied recognition of Rashid Ali is inclined to regard recent Soviet establishment of relations with Iraq as only casually inopportune and not significant of special Russian attitude towards present situation.

MACMURRAY

740.0011 European War 1939/11512 : Telegram

The Minister Resident in Iraq (Knabenshue) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, May 31, 1941.

[Received May 31—8: 55 p. m.]

125. Yesterday at 2: 30 p. m. Mayor Baghdad telephoned informed me Gailani and Axis group had left Iraq and that he headed temporary Government to bring conflict to end. He invited chiefs diplomatic missions his office 3 o'clock. I went first accompanied by Commandant Police to see British Ambassador and thence with his Coun-

⁴⁰ King of Saudi Arabia.

⁴¹ Holy war against infidels or heretics.

seller to the Mayor's office. Also there was new Chief Staff and new Governor Baghdad *Liwa* who with Mayor formed Committee Three to negotiate terms peace. I accompanied Committee to discuss matter with Ambassador but did not take part general discussion only beforehand with Ambassador privately. Ambassador agreed communicate armistice proposal to commander British forces immediately. Gunfire audible late last night.

All radio sending sets returned to Embassy and Legation.

All Americans, British and others who took refuge at Legation are safe and well but still at Legation. Full reports covering interesting past months will follow.

KNABENSHUE

740.0011 European War 1939/11513 : Telegram

The Minister Resident in Iraq (Knabenshue) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, May 31, 1941.

[Received June 1—5:35 p. m.]

127. Armistice signed this afternoon. Terms will be communicated to Embassy London by Foreign Office. I have confidence that new Government arranged but not yet announced will establish situation as it should be.

KNABENSHUE

740.0011 European War 1939/11576 : Telegram

The Minister Resident in Iraq (Knabenshue) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, May 31, 1941.

[Received June 3—9:18 a. m.]

128. Following summary outstanding events respecting Legation during last month:

- (1) American women evacuated April 29 as reported.
- (2) American, British, and other nationalities, number 162, commenced taking refuge at Legation on April 30.
- (3) Hostilities began morning May 2.
- (4) Legation radio transmitting set delivered on demand to Iraqi authorities May 3. Demand for search of Legation refused.
- (5) At 11 a. m., May 4, telephone demand from Foreign Office for immediate delivery Iraqi subjects at Legation to police guard reason stated in order Iraqi subjects be removed from danger as Legation would probably be bombed within an hour because British had threatened bomb public buildings Baghdad and Iraqis intended

retaliate by bombing British subjects wherever found such as British Embassy and American Legation. See my 115, May 4. Committee British subjects suggested asking for safe conduct to British Embassy in order save Legation. Posed hypothetical question Foreign Office but it was refused. British nevertheless offered to leave but I refused. All went to cellars against threatened bombings. Hour later Foreign Office demanded surrender British subjects at Legation. See my 115, May 4.

(6) Following is my 114, May 4, which Foreign Office cancelled after reading:

"I have just been informed by the Iraqi Ministry for Foreign Affairs that the American University at Beirut has given notice to Iraqi students at the University that they must leave the University within 48 hours, the time limit of which expires at 12:00 noon, May 5. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs has asked me to inform the United States Government that if the demand of the American University for the evacuation of its Iraqi students is carried out all American citizens in Iraq, including myself and the Legation staff, will be interned and then expelled from the country.

I am sending a telegram to our Consul General at Beirut informing him of the above and suggesting that the University postpone action until receipt of instructions from the Department.

I have tried to impress the Ministry for Foreign Affairs with the fact that their demand is a most extraordinary one, contrary to all principles of International Law and relations between states and have pointed out that the University at Beirut is a purely private institution over which the Government of the United States has absolutely no control."

(7) May 19 Foreign Office refused permit me send diplomatic courier to Aleppo or elsewhere abroad.

(8) Thereafter received several nasty notes from Foreign Office but otherwise no further developments.

(9) My policy with Foreign Office was tact and appeasement where expedient without relinquishment of established diplomatic immunities in order to continue protection those who had taken refuge at Legation.

(10) All refugees at Legation are in good health and spirits and will leave Legation safely tomorrow or when public order is definitely assured.

(11) When new Government formed I will make necessary reservation respect to physical and moral damages to American citizens and property and the Legation.

KNABENSHUE

740.0011 European War 1939/11558 : Telegram

*The Minister Resident in Iraq (Knabenshue) to the Secretary
of State*

BAGHDAD, June 1, 1941.

[Received June 2—3: 15 p. m.]

130. Abdul Illah returned Baghdad today and resumed regency. Senior Iraq military and civil officials and notables and British Ambassador and myself met him several miles outside Baghdad and drove with him to his palace where he received other members Diplomatic Corps and other welcoming personages. Regent expressed sincere appreciation to me personally. New government will be formed tonight.

KNABENSHUE

890G.01/381 : Telegram

*The Minister Resident in Iraq (Knabenshue) to the Secretary
of State*

BAGHDAD, June 3, 1941.

[Received June 3—8: 02 p. m.]

133. New government formed by Jamil Madfai as Prime Minister and Interior with Ali Jawdet [*Jawdat*] Ayoubi, Minister Foreign Affairs.

KNABENSHUE

390G.1115/36 : Telegram

*The Minister Resident in Iraq (Knabenshue) to the Secretary
of State*

BAGHDAD, June 4, 1941.

[Received June 4—9: 05 p. m.]

137. British Embassy informs me that report just received British Consulate Basrah states all Americans that area safe and well. Thus all Americans in Iraq now safely accounted for.

According previous arrangement with British Embassy their Consuls at Mosul and Basrah extended protection facilities to Americans their districts same as British while Embassy did same for Americans near Embassy and American Legation likewise for British and Americans near Legation.

Acting under martial law the military and police have suppressed rioting in Baghdad and have situation in hand. Casualties chiefly among Jews number several hundred. All persons who took refuge at Legation second time left this afternoon.

KNABENSHUE

740.0011 European War 1939/11819 : Telegram

*The Minister Resident in Iraq (Knabenshue) to the Secretary
of State*

BAGHDAD, June 5, 1941—3 p. m.

[Received June 8—8 p. m.]

140. On basis of advice of British Army and Air Force officers the British Ambassador assumed that the Iraqi Army would be subdued within 3 days. Our plans for the protection of American citizens and British subjects were based on that assumption and contemplated protection solely against mob violence. The sudden move of Iraqi Army to Habbaniya upset calculations. We then had to deal for more than 1 month with a hostile gangster fifth column illegal government under the direction of Grobba, the former German Minister to Iraq. The police guard which was first placed around the Legation solely for our protection afterwards made us prisoners within the compound. At my request, I was allowed telephone communication but only with the Foreign Office. The threat to bomb the Legation should not have been made. They should have demanded the surrender of British subjects. When that demand was subsequently made I agreed subject to official guarantees for their proper treatment. The Iraqi government did nothing further in the matter, leaving the refugees at the Legation and treating it as a concentration camp. I was permitted to send only plain language telegrams to the Department through the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The most outrageous threat was to arrest all Americans including myself and staff and expel us because of the dismissal of Iraqi students from the American University at Beirut. I received two nasty notes accusing me of holding myself aloof from the Gailani government. This was true to a certain extent because we had not recognized that government although I had established informal contact with the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

They denied that there was need for my protective measures against mob violence in spite of the arrest of two Americans who were kept in protective custody for one week before being turned over to the Legation and also in spite of the government's declaration of Jihad. The mob violence which took place subsequently is what I expected in the beginning but the military activity held the tension in check until the end. I maintained an attitude of correctness and tactful acquiescence to all legitimate demands and made no demands myself which might have embarrassed our position and thus I believe prevented our molestation. My protection of British subjects residing near the Legation was a *quid pro quo* for the Embassy's offer to protect American citizens in their area and for British Consuls at Mosul and Basra

to protect American citizens in their areas where I had no means for doing so. Plans made in previous years provided for the evacuation by British Air Force of both British and American nationals and on the present occasion they actually evacuated American women with their own. While my action may have caused the Department some anxiety and even embarrassment, I feel that the circumstances warranted it and that there was no honorable alternative.

British troops numbering less than 1,000 today, June 5, occupied the camp in Baghdad which had previously been prepared for the transit of British troops through Iraq in accordance with the Anglo-Iraq Treaty. The column of British troops en route from Basra will reach here within a week.

It is my considered opinion that most of the Iraqi Army and Iraqi people are anti-British and that if the Germans make an appreciable thrust in this direction the Iraqi Army will arise against the British unless the British maintain here a force adequate to stop a German thrust and at the same time keep Iraq under control. It appears that the British have arranged for the stationing in Iraq of four divisions. This might prove adequate, but in any case I consider that developing events will create an increasingly dangerous situation for Americans and I am therefore intending to use all my persuasive powers to influence all Americans to leave the country as soon as possible.

KNABENSHUE

741.90G11/48 : Telegram

The Minister Resident in Iraq (Knabenshue) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, November 25, 1941—4 p. m.
[Received November 26—11 : 54 a. m.]

328. Nuri ⁴² has just published in the local press his letter of December 15th, 1940, to Rashid Ali, translation of which was sent to the Department with my despatch of January 7th, 1941.⁴³ With the letter was published an explanatory statement by Nuri in [apparent omission] case he stresses particularly the desirability of establishing an Iraqi Legation in the United States because, as he states, such representation has been essential for Iraq in consequence of international developments and because of the intermingling of Iraq's political, economic and educational interests with those of the democratic front. He adds that this diplomatic representation will ensure for Iraq the sympathy and support of American public opinion in the efforts that are being made for the solution of national questions particularly

⁴² Gen. Nuri as-Said, appointed Prime Minister of Iraq October 9, 1941.

⁴³ Not printed, but for summary, see telegram No. 127, December 29, 1940, 8 p. m., *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. III, p. 725.

the Palestine issue and assures the importation of essential commodities for Iraq. He concludes with the statement that the United States is today a power to be reckoned with in the determination of the fate of the world, both from the material and moral aspects and that its aid to the democracies will be a fundamental factor in the victory of the principles of liberty and that its word will, after the end of the war, be very effective in determining the world order which will be based on the freedom and independence of nations.

KNABENSHUE

741.90G11/47: Telegram

The Minister Resident in Iraq (Knabenshue) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, November 25, 1941—5 p. m.
[Received November 26—5:37 a. m.]

329. Referring to my 328, November 25, 4 p. m. Subsequently Nuri has told me that he wishes to extend American influence in Iraq itself. He wants, with the consent of the British, American headmasters in secondary schools instead of British and he wishes to create a chiefly volunteer mechanized division with American equipment and American instructors. This would be a contravention of the Anglo-Iraq treaty and in my opinion we should not agree to it unless or even if the British were to agree. I gather that the British have agreed to a mechanized Iraqi division but with the delivery of equipment thereof unduly delayed. The British have also agreed to assign the Iraq Army for protection a certain section of their northeastern frontier. Nuri is showing signs of still wishing to press for a Palestinian settlement without waiting until end of war. This will tend to keep anti-British feeling alive and may lead to further difficulties.

KNABENSHUE

LIBERIA

REPRESENTATIONS TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT REGARDING UNWARRANTED INTERFERENCE WITH AMERICAN INTERESTS IN NEUTRAL LIBERIA

740.00112 European War 1939/2545 : Telegram

The Minister in Liberia (Walton) to the Secretary of State

MONROVIA, April 16, 1941—1 p. m.

[Received 2: 45 p. m.]

33. British Chargé d'Affaires¹ has recommended that Bank of Monrovia and United States Trading Company be put on statutory list. Reasons given to Firestone representatives are (1) in March United States Trading Company sold merchandise valued at 19 pounds sterling to P. C. Parker, a Liberian. Delivery was made c. o. d. through Bank of Monrovia; (2) that Liberian facilitated P. C. Parker obtaining goods shipped via Barber Line by delivery documents and collecting payment in Monrovia.

Bank claims shipments were made in good faith by American firms after obtaining navicerts in New York and the Bank was acting as agent of shipper.

Firestone subsidiaries assert if they do not deal with Liberians they are acting in contravention of Liberia's neutrality proclamation.

In recent weeks the attitude of British representative toward American concerns has been increasingly unfriendly and dictatorial.

Today after its refusing navicert for gold shipment to the United States the British Legation finally issued one at bank manager's insistence.

I recommend that the Department confer with the British Government with a view to clarifying what is becoming a delicate and serious situation to both American and Liberian interests.

WALTON

740.00112 European War 1939/2631

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division
of Near Eastern Affairs (Villard)*

[WASHINGTON,] April 21, 1941.

Mr. Calvert² called at my request in regard to the apparent difficulties in Liberia between the Bank of Monrovia and the British

¹ Augustus C. Routh.

² A. S. Calvert, First Secretary of the British Embassy.

Chargé d'Affaires, as described in telegram no. 33 of April 16, 1 p. m., from the Legation at Monrovia. I explained to Mr. Calvert that, according to our information, the British Chargé d'Affaires had recommended that the Bank of Monrovia and the United States Trading Company, which were subsidiaries of the Firestone Plantations, should be put on the statutory list because the Trading Company had sold merchandise worth nineteen pounds sterling to a Liberian named P. C. Parker. The bank had facilitated the shipment and delivery of documents and had thus been placed in the same category as the Trading Company.

Having previously inquired of Mr. Walter F. Walker, Liberian Consul General in New York, as to his knowledge of Mr. P. C. Parker, I told Mr. Calvert that Parker was a small merchant who had possibly permitted the use of his name as a blind for German trading firms in Monrovia. However, according to the Bank of Monrovia's statement, the shipment in question had been given a navicert by British officials in New York, and both the bank and the Trading Company were therefore acting in good faith when they accepted and sold the goods. I pointed out also that the bank and company were neutral concerns operating in a neutral country and that attempts of this kind on the part of the British to dominate or dictate transactions in Liberia were naturally resented. I explained that we had received no word from the Firestone organization on this subject, but that, in view of the importance of this American interest, as well as the difficult economic position in which Liberia found itself as a result of the war, we were naturally disposed to take an interest in these developments.

I also described to Mr. Calvert the information we had received some months ago to the effect that the British Chargé had demanded that the Bank of Monrovia cease handling the accounts of German firms or nationals. I said that, while I understood the matter had been locally settled, the attitude displayed by the British Chargé had caused great surprise. In this connection, I went on to say that we had received word from several sources that the particular individual now in charge of the British Legation in Monrovia was tactless, to say the least, and that his assignment to that post had not been welcomed by the Liberians. I further cited the statement in the telegram from Monrovia under discussion that the British Legation had declined to issue a navicert for a gold shipment to the United States and had only agreed to do so upon the insistence of the bank management, which apparently constituted another example of the difficulties between the Legation and the bank.

I said I hoped the British Government would do what it could to restore better relations between the Firestone officials in Liberia and the British Legation. I said that, in view of the very small trade

which might still be left to the Germans in Liberia, the attitude adopted by the British Chargé seemed to be causing a great deal more trouble and ill feeling than it was worth. If the Legation could approach the matter in a more reasonable and friendly spirit, it seemed to me that the Firestone subsidiaries would be inclined to give consideration to British policy, in as much as this policy, in the long run, coincided with our own. At present, however, I could see that the British Legation's attitude was causing considerable ill feeling and that the Chargé d'Affaires seemed to be exceeding his authority.

Mr. Calvert said that he would be very glad to look into the situation at once and that he would let us know promptly as soon as he had anything to report.

740.00112 European War 1939/2639 : Telegram

The Minister in Liberia (Walton) to the Secretary of State

MONROVIA, April 30, 1941—10 a. m.

[Received May 1—2:45 p. m.]

38. Firestone Plantations Company General Manager in second request for navicert for gasoline-kerosene shipment from Lagos, informed British representative investigation discloses charge that subsidiaries trade with German firms an exaggeration based on misinformation. British Chargé d'Affaires in a letter recommending blacklist referred further to American Minister storing cement in Azormann warehouse and has made disparaging remarks thereto. Cement landed during a heavy rainfall. Accommodations first requested of Paterson Zochonis. Bank manager unfairly accused of being pro-German for neutral stand.

To suppress enemy trade it is not necessary that Chargé d'Affaires adopt dictatorial methods, strangle Liberian trade and cripple American shipping. William Dennis, most potential Liberian competitor and dealing in American products, sent a \$6,000 order to New York in September. British stopped delivery. Navicert policy chiefly responsible for decrease in 1941 customs revenues. English and German firms continue to transact business. Syrian companies, acting as agents of former, compelled to take orders from British Chargé d'Affaires; reports discussed with them subject of blacklisting subsidiaries. Last week he publicly boasted to other nationals of his actions against bank and United States Trading Company.

Please advise if it is the prerogative of other Legations to issue instructions peremptorily to American nationals regarding their affairs without the knowledge of the American Legation.

Only intervention of our Government will put an end to an intolerable situation needlessly occasioned.

WALTON

740.00112 European War 1939/2884

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Henry S. Villard and Mr. Charles W. Lewis, Jr., of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

[WASHINGTON,] May 13, 1941.

Participants: Mr. Helm³ and Mr. Calvert of the British Embassy
Mr. Harvey S. Firestone and Mr. Larabee of the Firestone Company
Mr. Murray⁴
Mr. Villard
Mr. Lewis

Mr. Firestone opened the conversation by stating that his company had become very much concerned over the recent action of the British Chargé d'Affaires at Monrovia in recommending that the Bank of Monrovia and the United States Trading Company, subsidiaries in Liberia of the Firestone Plantations Company, be placed on the British Statutory List. He said that the British Chargé d'Affaires had for some months been endeavoring to force the Bank and the trading company to cease transacting business with German firms in Liberia and with neutral firms on the Statutory List and had, during last November, prevailed upon the manager of the Bank to acquiesce in writing to the British demands. Mr. Firestone said that this action on the part of the Bank manager was done without the authority of the company and that, in any case, whatever the understanding reached between the manager and the Chargé d'Affaires it should not have been put in writing, since, if the agreement became known to the Government of Liberia, the company and its subsidiaries might be liable to serious penalties, the terms of the agreement being in violation of the Liberian Proclamation of Neutrality. He continued by stating that, as Mr. Helm knew, it was the policy of the Firestone interests throughout the world to cooperate in every practicable way with the British Government, and that naturally all steps were being taken to see that the operations of the company did not in any way benefit the Germans. However, in Liberia the Government's Proclamation of Neutrality, and the determination of the Government to enforce it, made it extremely difficult for the Bank of Monrovia and the United States Trading Company to comply with the demands of the Chargé d'Affaires.

Mr. Helm said that he had written, in April, to the Ministry of Economic Warfare concerning this matter and had been assured, in

³ A. K. Helm, First Secretary of the British Embassy.

⁴ Wallace Murray, Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs.

reply, that adjustments would be made to meet this particular situation.

Mr. Murray remarked that while Mr. Ponsonby was Chargé d'Affaires at Monrovia the question at issue was being handled fairly satisfactorily but that the present Chargé d'Affaires, Mr. Routh, gave the impression of being anti-American, which was out of step with present Anglo-American relations. Mr. Murray continued by saying that while Mr. Routh was probably not in actual fact anti-American it was nevertheless evident that his methods were bringing on a serious situation. He thought that Mr. Routh was magnifying the problem unnecessarily, and in doing so he was placing the Firestone interests in a dangerous position and was, at the same time, antagonizing the Liberian Government. He added that Mr. Routh, by lack of tact, had during his previous tour of duty at Monrovia caused the Liberians to regard him unfavorably and that the available evidence seemed to indicate that he was doing nothing to improve his relations with the Liberians during his present tour of duty; on the contrary, his aggressiveness toward the American companies in question, upon which the Liberians were dependent for banking facilities and, in large measure, for merchandise, was having very unfavorable repercussions and was further impairing his already strained relations with the Government.

Mr. Helm commented at length on the policy of his Government with reference to the economic blockade, pointing out that while admittedly the economic and financial considerations at stake in Liberia were small, it was nevertheless the desire of the Ministry of Economic Warfare to strike at the enemy wherever results, large or small, could be achieved. He added, however, that he felt sure that an understanding could be reached in the questions at issue with respect to Liberia.

It was then decided that Mr. Helm and Mr. Firestone should discuss the matter further in a conference between themselves, and should endeavor to eliminate written agreements or conditions from the record as much as possible. This would apply in particular to the conditions enumerated by the British as being precedent to the granting of navicerts for shipments to the Firestone Plantations. The arrangements under which such navicerts were to be granted would be worked out by oral agreement in so far as possible. Moreover, Mr. Firestone would consider it a favor if the British could expunge from the record the correspondence signed by the General Manager in Liberia without authority of the Home Office, an action which Mr. Firestone was now repudiating.

740.00112 European War 1939/2760 : Telegram

The Minister in Liberia (Walton) to the Secretary of State

MONROVIA, May 22, 1941—2 p. m.

[Received May 23—12:22 p. m.]

47. Bank of Monrovia's application for navicert to ship 419 ounces of gold refused on the ground that bank has not agreed not to transfer funds for Germans. British Chargé d'Affaires has instructed traders not to ship gold through Bank of Monrovia but through two British firms.

British Chargé d'Affaires in the presence of prominent Liberian and two Europeans today avowed he was out to get Harvey Firestone and that he paid no attention to Liberian neutrality because Liberia was not strong enough to enforce it.

Please advise this Legation if the British Chargé d'Affaires is acting under instructions of his Government; also should this Legation refuse British applicant consular invoices for gold shipments.

WALTON

740.00112 European War 1939/2886

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Villard)

[WASHINGTON,] May 24, 1941.

I telephoned to Mr. Helm in regard to the most recent telegram from the Legation at Monrovia regarding the aggressive and unfriendly attitude of the British Chargé d'Affaires toward the Firestone subsidiaries in Liberia. Mr. Helm said he would come down to discuss the matter, which he did later in the morning.

I told Mr. Helm that our latest information was to the effect that the British representative had notified clients of the Bank of Monrovia that he would refuse to grant navicert facilities for gold shipments made by the bank; that he would refuse a navicert application by the bank for 419 ounces of gold on the ground that the bank had not agreed to refrain from transferring funds for Germans; and that he had instructed traders to ship their gold not through the Bank of Monrovia but through two British firms. In addition, according to a report from our Minister, the British Chargé d'Affaires had stated in the presence of two Europeans and a prominent Liberian that he was out to get Harvey Firestone, and that because Liberia was not strong enough to enforce it he would pay no attention to Liberian neutrality.

I said this indicated that far from modifying his attitude the British Chargé d'Affaires was becoming more insolent and apparently

hostile both to Liberia and the United States. I said that in my view this might warrant a request from our part that the British Government change its representation in Monrovia, in order that amicable relations might be restored. I reminded Mr. Helm of our traditional interest in Liberia and intimated that if, in the opinion of the British Chargé d'Affaires, Liberia was not strong enough to maintain its neutrality the Government of the United States might have to extend its informal advice and assistance.

Mr. Helm replied that he agreed entirely with everything I had said, and that in his opinion the tactlessness of the British Chargé had gone far enough. Mr. Helm said that he had sent a detailed report to London on the subject of our conference with Mr. Firestone on May 13, but that the pouch which carried the report had not yet arrived in England. He said that he had also sent a carbon copy of the report by Clipper to an official in the Foreign Office with the urgent request to look into the situation at Monrovia and to transfer all negotiations relating to Firestone to the British Embassy in Washington for the present. Mr. Helm said that he felt a change would be made in the British representation at Monrovia, but that in the meantime it would be very helpful if our Embassy in London would support our views by direct conversations with the appropriate officials.

Mr. Helm urged that we telegraph instructions to London as soon as possible in order that his report and our own message would arrive simultaneously. I said that we were on a point of doing so and that a telegram would go forward forthwith.

740.00112 European War 1939/2760 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1941—2 p. m.

1836. We have been concerned recently at the attitude of the British Chargé d'Affaires in Monrovia toward the Firestone Plantations Company and its subsidiaries in Liberia. Apparently on his own initiative the Chargé d'Affaires has persistently endeavored to compel the Bank of Monrovia and the United States Trading Company, both owned by Firestone, to cease transacting business with German firms in Liberia and with neutral firms on the British statutory list. On the other hand, the Liberian Secretary of State has warned the Manager of the Bank that to deny facilities to a belligerent or neutral national in the ordinary course of banking business would be a tacit violation of the Proclamation of Neutrality issued by the Government of Liberia

and might also subject the bank to action at law for damages. Incidentally the Bank of Monrovia is the official repository of Liberian government funds.

On May 14 the British Chargé d'Affaires in writing demanded a "solemn undertaking" from the Bank that it would transfer no more funds abroad for German interests. He is also reported (1) to have written to clients of the bank that he will issue no navicerts for gold shipments made through that institution, (2) to have refused the bank's navicert application for 419 ounces of gold on the ground that the bank had not agreed to refrain from transferring funds for Germans, and (3) to have instructed traders to ship their gold through two British firms. On a previous occasion the Chargé d'Affaires sought to have the bank placed on the statutory list, but is understood that no action was taken on this recommendation following informal representations made by the Department to the British Embassy.

The American Minister in Monrovia reported by telegraph on May 22 that the British Chargé d'Affaires on that date in the presence of a prominent Liberian and two Europeans had stated he was "out to get" Harvey Firestone and that he paid no attention to Liberian neutrality because Liberia was not strong enough to enforce it.

While the Department has on several occasions suggested to officials of the British Embassy that the aggressive attitude of the Chargé d'Affaires seemed wholly unwarranted in the light of the small amount of trade in Liberia still in German hands, the friction and irritation caused by his apparently unfriendly approach to existing problems now seems to have reached a point where there may arise the question of his further usefulness in Liberia. For your confidential information much of the trouble seems to lie in the tactlessness of the Chargé d'Affaires, whose return to Monrovia for a second assignment was far from welcome to Liberians.

Please seek an early opportunity to discuss this situation with the appropriate officials of the Foreign Office, pointing out the traditional interest which the United States Government has in the economy and welfare of Liberia and the great importance from the defense standpoint which we attach to the legitimate operations of Firestone in that country. In the latter connection it would appear singularly inappropriate that Firestone should encounter difficulties with the British representative in Liberia when his organization everywhere is endeavoring to cooperate with the British war effort to the fullest possible extent. We are confident that an amicable informal understanding can be reached on all problems arising in Liberia, given the proper amount of good will and a reasonable attitude on the part of the British Legation.

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/2887

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles W. Lewis, Jr., of the
Division of Near Eastern Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] June 4, 1941.

Participants: Mr. Harvey S. Firestone and Mr. Larabee of the Firestone Company
Mr. Villard
Mr. Lewis

Mr. Firestone referred to the discussions which took place in the Department on May 13, 1941, with regard to the demands of the British Chargé d'Affaires that the Firestone subsidiaries in Liberia cease banking and commercial relations with German firms and with neutral firms which have been placed on the British Statutory List. He stated that under date of May 20 his company had written a letter to Mr. Helm, of the British Embassy, setting forth the position of the company with reference to the Liberian Proclamation of Neutrality, which, whatever the personal preferences of the management and employees of the company and its subsidiaries, circumscribed the operations of the subsidiaries in Liberia and made it impossible for them to comply with the demands of the British Chargé d'Affaires, Mr. Routh. A copy of this letter is attached.⁶ Mr. Firestone added that under date of May 23 the company received an acknowledgment of this letter from Mr. Helm, who stated that he was transmitting the letter to the Minister of Economic Warfare, who, he knew, appreciated the cooperation of the Firestone Plantations Company. A copy of Mr. Helm's letter is also attached.⁶

Mr. Firestone then stated that under date of May 22 his company had received a telegram ⁶ from Mr. Seybold ⁷ which indicated that the Chargé d'Affaires was still pressing his original demands and, in addition to refusing to issue navicerts, was now demanding that the Bank of Monrovia relinquish certain of its agencies in Liberia.

A further and even more surprising telegram was received by the company from Mr. Seybold under date of May 26,⁶ Mr. Firestone continued. This telegram indicated that the British Embassy in Washington had submitted to the British Chargé d'Affaires in Monrovia a list of the company's navicert applications and that Mr. Routh had stated that he would cable his consent to the issuance of the navicerts on condition that the Bank of Monrovia would agree to the con-

⁶ Not printed.

⁷ G. H. Seybold, General Manager of the Firestone Plantations Company in Liberia.

ditions stated in the letter quoted above. The telegram further added that Mr. Routh had also submitted as conditions an undertaking involving the company's responsibility for goods reaching German firms through intermediaries.

Mr. Firestone said that he could not understand why the Embassy had taken the action indicated, especially in view of the verbal assurances given to him by Mr. Helm that he would cooperate in an effort to bring about a more satisfactory situation at Monrovia. He then asked Mr. Villard's advice as to what action should be taken, if any, toward bringing this matter to the attention of the British Embassy.

Mr. Villard at this stage reviewed his conversation with Mr. Helm on May 24 and also informed Mr. Firestone of the substance of the Department's telegram of May 28 to the Embassy at London dealing with this subject. Mr. Villard then said that he thought it might be desirable for the Department, rather than Mr. Firestone, to take up with Mr. Helm the matter mentioned above. Mr. Firestone requested that he be informed by telephone at Akron as soon as that action had been taken.

740.00112 European War 1939/2888

Memorandum of Telephone Conversations, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Villard)

[WASHINGTON,] June 10, 1941.

I telephoned to Mr. Helm in regard to the latest information we had received from Mr. Firestone, to the effect that navicert applications of the Firestone Plantations Company had been referred by the British Embassy to the British Chargé d'Affaires in Monrovia, who had indicated he would give his consent to the issuance of navicerts provided that the Bank of Monrovia would agree to the conditions set forth by the Chargé d'Affaires in a letter to the bank dated about May 16. I told Mr. Helm that the Department was at a loss to understand this report in view of the assurances which he had given in respect to the handling of Firestone navicert applications at the conference which had taken place in the Department on this subject.

Mr. Helm denied emphatically that there was any truth in this report. He suggested that a misunderstanding had arisen because of a proposal to introduce in Liberia the "inverted navicert system", which provides that navicert applications should, in the first instance, be made by the importer and permission ultimately transmitted to the country of origin. This proposal, which had not gone into effect as yet, specifically exempted the Firestone Plantations Company from any of its provisions. The position with respect to Firestone ship-

ments remained the same, namely, that all applications would be treated on the basis of general automatic approval.

Mr. Helm invited the Firestone Company to submit a specific example of any navicert which had been forwarded to Monrovia for approval. He said that if any concrete evidence were offered on this subject he would be glad to have it investigated at once.

Mr. Helm went on to say that the British Government had taken steps to curb the activities of Mr. Routh, the Chargé d'Affaires at Monrovia. He read to me a copy of a telegram which London had sent to Mr. Routh, cautioning him in strong language in respect to his reported attitude toward the Firestone Company and its subsidiaries and instructing him to refer all matters on which there was the slightest misunderstanding to London for forwarding to the British Embassy in Washington. Mr. Helm said that it would be the policy of the British Government to have any such matters affecting Firestone discussed here in Washington or in Akron, rather than in Monrovia.

Mr. Helm also said that he would telegraph his Government again on the subject, at the same time mentioning the latest report to the effect that the British Chargé d'Affaires at Monrovia was intimating that navicert applications were submitted by the Embassy in Washington to him for approval.

In accordance with Mr. Firestone's request, I then telephoned to him at Akron and conveyed the above information. Mr. Firestone said that he would immediately radio his general manager in Liberia to ascertain whether there was any specific case of a navicert application being held by the British Legation for its approval. He said he would let us know as soon as a reply had been received.

740.00112 European War 1939/2889

Memorandum of Telephone Conversations, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Villard)

[WASHINGTON,] June 12, 1941.

Mr. Firestone telephoned from Akron to say that the following radiogram had been received from his resident manager in Liberia:

"British Consul supplied us with copy of telegram from British Embassy in Washington which listed all our applications."

Mr. Firestone said that he took this to mean that in spite of the denial by Mr. Helm, the British Embassy had in fact cabled the list of Firestone navicert applications to Monrovia for approval by the Chargé d'Affaires.

I subsequently telephoned to Mr. Helm at the British Embassy and read him the text of the radiogram quoted above. Mr. Helm explained that this report was probably due to the fact that all navicert applications, from whatever source, were always transmitted as a matter of course by London to the British representative in the country of destination for his information. Mr. Helm said that this had probably occurred in the case of the Firestone Plantations' navicert applications, but there was no intention whatever to submit them for the approval or consent of the British Legation in Monrovia. If the Chargé d'Affaires had utilized this list of applications in order to induce the manager of the Bank of Monrovia to give him written assurances on one point or another, he was not authorized to do so.

Mr. Helm reiterated his statement of the previous day to the effect that the British Chargé d'Affaires had been instructed to discontinue his attempts to obtain undertakings of any kind from the Firestone subsidiaries in Liberia. Mr. Helm was confident that in view of these instructions no further difficulties need be anticipated.

740.00112 European War 1939/2890 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, June 17, 1941—11 p. m.

[Received June 17—6:15 p. m.]

2511. My 2410, June 12, 7 p. m.⁸ Sir Alexander Cadogan⁹ has informed me that he has looked into the question of the relations between the British Chargé d'Affaires at Monrovia and the Firestone subsidiaries in Liberia. He says he finds that as a result of the representations made to the British Embassy at Washington by the Department of State, the Foreign Office recently telegraphed to Mr. Routh impressing on him the importance of maintaining on this as on other questions the closest relations with his American colleague. The Foreign Office also instructed Mr. Routh that if any further points arose concerning the application of British economic warfare procedure to the Firestone companies he should refer them to the Foreign Office so that they might be taken up with the head office of the Firestone Company. Sir Alexander says that from evidence available here he feels sure that Mr. Routh never intended to be obstructive to American interests and he hopes that the Foreign Office instruction will help to prevent further friction.

JOHNSON

⁸ Not printed (740.00112 European War 1939/2853); the Chargé reported on effort requested by the Department to expedite a reply on the matter presented in Department's telegram No. 1836, May 28, 2 p. m., p. 521.

⁹ British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

740.00112 European War 1939/2858 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Liberia (Walton)

WASHINGTON, June 20, 1941—2 p. m.

36. Referring to your despatch no. 618 of May 20,¹⁰ please submit by mail details in support of your statement that British firms continue to do business with German firms in Monrovia and that Routh has been taking advantage of the prevailing situation to further the interests of British trade in Liberia to the detriment of American and Liberian trade.

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/3170

The Minister in Liberia (Walton) to the Secretary of State

No. 646

MONROVIA, July 10, 1941.

[Received August 13.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to Department's telegram no. 36, June 20, 2 p. m., and to enumerate instances reported to this Legation by reputable persons vis-à-vis business transactions between British and German firms in Monrovia and endeavors to promote British trade at the expense of American and Liberian trade with the acquiescence of the British Legation.

It is common knowledge that diplomatic and consular representatives of the British Government at this capital have given tacit approval to furthering the interest of British trade to the disadvantage of American and Liberian trade. For example, in 1940 the former British Chargé d'Affaires refused to grant navicerts to Liberians to export piassava which the Germans had stored in large quantities at Bassa, Cape Palmas and other sections of the country. A Syrian merchant was blacklisted for exporting a shipment of piassava to the United States bought of a German firm. But the blacklist was later lifted and he was allowed to ship piassava to England, the excuse given—it was to British interests for him to do so. While this piassava was not purchased by a British firm from the Germans, it was purchased from Germans on behalf of British trade through an intermediary.

During the first of the year the salt shortage became acute in Liberia and unobtainable in various stores including those operated by German traders. Shortly after a British vessel delivered a large consignment of salt to British firms one German store in particular replenished its stock. To verify the charge circulated that a British firm was supplying German traders with salt, an American clerk employed by the Bank of Monrovia took a picture of a truck leaving the warehouse

¹⁰ Not printed.

of a British firm loaded with salt which was delivered to the warehouse of a German firm.

Some time in April an African clerk in the employ of a Syrian firm was sent to a store operated by a British firm to purchase ten cases of Scotch whiskey. When informed that it was not available, he visited various stores and was finally accommodated at a German store. To his great surprise he noted that the case markings bore the name of one of the British firms. When making the purchase at the German store he was informed it would be possible to get any amount of whiskey he desired.

One of the largest Syrian firms in Liberia, a subsidiary of a British firm, is known to supply Germans with goods with the consent of the British firm in question.

The manager of a German firm in talking with the General Manager of the Firestone Plantations Company last April stated that the stock in his store was valued at eight thousand pounds sterling. Three-fourths of which was British. Most of the stock has been received since the outbreak of war in Europe.

A Liberian of unquestioned veracity, and who is on friendly terms with French nationals in Liberia, informed the American Minister that during the first conversation the French Chargé d'Affaires had shortly after his arrival in April with the German Consul General he had been informed by the German Consul General that British traders had been very helpful in supplying goods to German traders.

There are three sources of gasoline and oil supply in Liberia, namely the Firestone Plantations Company, a British firm, and a French firm. The manager of the French firm is openly anti-German. The Firestone Plantations Company has been consistent in its policy not to sell gasoline to other firms or to the public. Nevertheless, one German firm carries for sale a large stock of gasoline and oil. Germans have sufficient supplies of gasoline and oil for their motor cars and trucks. The rumor persists that the gasoline and oil is supplied by British traders.

I desire to refer again to the treatment accorded Mr. William E. Dennis, No. 1 Liberian trader and potential competitor, who, although not on the British blacklist, was for six months unsuccessful in his efforts to induce the British Legation to facilitate the shipment of a large consignment from the United States to Liberia. The excuse given by the representatives of the British Legation was weak and unconvincing. It was obvious that British interests in Liberia were secretly working to embarrass Mr. Dennis as much as and as long as possible. The Dennis consignment was finally received here the middle of June. The Oost-Afrikaansche Compagnie, a Dutch trading company, has met with a similar experience, but not as extended as that to which William E. Dennis & Company was subjected.

When complaint is made to representatives of the British Legation or when informed of these reported charges, they either profess ignorance or, as in the case of the piassava shipment and in the case of the surf boats purchased by Paterson Zochonis & Company, from the Woermann Line, they maintain it was to British interests that transactions were consummated.

As pointed out in Legation's despatch no. 618 of May 20,¹¹ the Vice Consul of the British Legation and the manager of Paterson Zochonis & Company, who is local agent of the Barber-West African Line, married sisters and the latter was instrumental in securing appointment of the former as member of the British Legation. The manager of Paterson Zochonis & Company and the British Chargé d'Affaires are personal friends.

I am pleased to report that the situation has changed for the better and the British Legation is exhibiting a more sympathetic, cooperative attitude in granting navicerts to traders other than British for purposes of importation. However, the policy of the British Legation with respect to granting navicerts to Liberians to export piassava from Liberian ports to the United States has not materially changed. It is reported that approximately five hundred thousand tons of piassava are ready for shipment but cannot be exported because of the inability of Liberians to secure navicerts.

Respectfully yours,

LESTER A. WALTON

740.00112 European War 1939/3170 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Liberia (Walton)

WASHINGTON, August 28, 1941—8 p. m.

51 [bis]. The contents of your despatch 646 of July 10 have been received with great interest. Please inform the Department by telegraph whether any of the trade practices referred to, excluding the matter of navicerts, are still in effect. You should in the future report incidents of this kind by telegraph.

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/3300 : Telegram

The Minister in Liberia (Walton) to the Secretary of State

MONROVIA, September 2, 1941—10 a. m.

[Received 1 p. m.]

80. Department's No. 51, August 28, 6 [8] p. m. If practices have not been discontinued no incident has recently come to public notice.

¹¹ Not printed.

American goods sent parcel post to Liberia by individuals and mail order houses are taken from outward Barber Line vessels at Freetown and held without justification for weeks. The vessels are usually detained for days and packages should be returned by sailing time. Instead, packages are held for next outward Barber Line vessel. The S. S. *Zaremba* arrived at Monrovia August 12 and was 9 days in Freetown. The next ship due from New York will arrive at Monrovia late in September.

The impression prevails here that British traders are selling some American goods which have been secured under lend-lease provisions and then reexported.

Liberian traders are experiencing much difficulty because of latest American Government export restrictions which, like the navicert, are adversely affecting Liberian customs receipts.

WALTON

740.00112 European War 1939/3170 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Liberia (Walton)

WASHINGTON, September 4, 1941—5 p. m.

50 [bis]. Your 80, September 2, 10 a. m., first paragraph. The Department desires that you ascertain by thorough investigation whether the practices referred to in your despatch no. 646¹² have actually been discontinued. If any such practices still exist, you should submit by mail full particulars, including names of parties involved.¹³ The Department also desires specific information in support of your statement that the British Legation is refusing to grant export permits for shipments of piassava from Liberia to the United States while granting permits for shipments to England.

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/3600

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Villard)

[WASHINGTON,] October 6, 1941.

Mr. Firestone telephoned from New York to say that he had further information in regard to the difficulties of the Oost-Afrikanische Company in accepting a transfer of funds from the Bank of Monrovia for the account of the German firm of Woermann and Company. It

¹² Dated July 10, p. 527.

¹³ In despatch No. 665, September 17, the Minister in Liberia reported that a thorough investigation on this subject was not productive of tangible results (740.00112 European War 1939/3667).

appeared that the British Consul at Monrovia had threatened to blacklist the Oost-Afrikanische Company if it accepted these funds, whereas the Liberian Government had advised the Dutch firm it would lose its license if it failed to accept this business. The Liberian position was based on the Government's neutrality proclamation, which required that no discrimination be shown to the nationals of belligerent countries.

Mr. Firestone further said that a provision of Liberian law dating back to January 26, 1916 provided penalties for violation of Liberian neutrality, or for any act which would subject Liberia to reprisals for such violation. The Firestone Company was therefore disturbed at the possibility that the Government of Liberia would take action against the Bank of Monrovia if it failed to transfer the German funds to the Oost-Afrikanische Company. Moreover, according to Mr. Firestone, the Bank of Monrovia would lose its agency in the Oost-Afrikanische Company in any event unless some action were taken to settle the controversy; if the Government acted under its neutrality proclamation the Oost-Afrikanische Company would lose its license, and if the British Consul carried out his threat the Oost-Afrikanische Company would be placed on the blacklist.

Mr. Firestone said that according to reports from his resident manager, the American Legation was disinclined to take up the matter. Mr. Firestone thought it would be helpful if a telegram could be sent in order that the British Consul might be fully informed as to our interest in the matter. I agreed that this would be helpful and said that the Department would instruct the Legation accordingly.

740.00112 European War 1939/3600 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Liberia (Walton)

WASHINGTON, October 6, 1941—9 p. m.

58. Department is informed by Firestone that British Consul intends to blacklist Oost-Afrikanische Company if it accepts transfer of funds from the Bank of Monrovia for account of Woermann Company, and that Liberian Government has ordered Oost-Afrikanische to accept this business under government's neutrality proclamation or lose its license.

You should discuss this matter with your British colleague, reminding him of the Department's understanding that controversies involving Firestone or its subsidiaries in Liberia should be referred through the British Foreign Office to the British Embassy in Washington. The Department is taking up the case with the latter in this instance.

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/3610 : Telegram

The Minister in Liberia (Walton) to the Secretary of State

MONROVIA, October 8, 1941—10 p. m.

[Received October 9—1:33 p. m.]

90. British Chargé d'Affaires has recommended Foreign Office to suggest to Netherlands Government that Oost-Afrikaansche Compagnie be instructed to continue as Bank of Monrovia agents. Detailed report by mail.

Shortly before receipt of Department's No. 58, October 6, 9 p. m., British representative had called to discuss the matter and had been reminded of Department's understanding. I maintained there was no difference between Oost-Afrikaansche Compagnie acting as Bank of Monrovia agents and Paterson Zochonis and Company acting as Barber Line agents and delivering goods consigned to German traders.

Evidently British Chargé d'Affaires now realizes that he has unnecessarily provoked another controversy and affects air of injured innocence.

During the conversation British Chargé d'Affaires suggested we recommend to our Governments that Liberia be requested to expel all German nationals.

WALTON

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE ACQUISITION OF AIR BASES IN LIBERIA; AMERICAN RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROTECTION OF LIBERIA

811.34582/5 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Liberia (Walton)

WASHINGTON, June 21, 1941—3 p. m.

37. Your mail despatch 544, November 14, 1940¹⁴ and your telegram no. 14, March 15, 1939.¹⁵ Please seek an immediate interview with President Barclay¹⁶ and, referring to earlier discussions concerning the defense of Liberia, inform him that this Government is now prepared to give immediate and favorable consideration to any request he may make for the establishment of an American air base in Liberia. Explain that this suggestion is put forward in the light of the traditional relations of close friendship between the United States and Liberia which have existed for more than one hundred years. Add that such a base, if established, would of course be with full recognition on the part of the United States of the sovereign and independent

¹⁴ Not printed.¹⁵ *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. iv, p. 558.¹⁶ Edwin Barclay.

status of Liberia and that American military personnel would of course be withdrawn from Liberia as soon as the emergency had passed. We would envisage implementing the plan by sending to Liberia at an early date a small force of say 500 United States Marines, who would prepare the way for the construction of the air base. Necessary details, including assurances with respect to full recognition of Liberian sovereignty and regarding the withdrawal of troops upon the termination of the emergency, could be worked out subsequently. These arrangements might well be along the lines of those which have been made in regard to the establishment of American bases in British territories in the Western Hemisphere.

The President attaches the utmost importance to the establishment of the proposed base and you will therefore spare no effort in endeavoring to induce President Barclay to make a request in the sense desired. In view of the need for absolute secrecy you will refrain from discussing the matter with anyone except President Barclay.

HULL

811.34582/6 : Telegram

The Minister in Liberia (Walton) to the Secretary of State

MONROVIA, June 25, 1941—5 p. m.

[Received June 26—6 a. m.]

62. Department's No. 37, June 21, 3 p. m. President Barclay has favorably received suggestion. Before committing himself he requests clarification:

1. Regarding withdrawal of troops upon termination of emergency. He feels there should be a full definition of the term "emergency".
2. President Barclay's only information with respect to arrangements made in British territories in Western Hemisphere has been from radio broadcasts and desires to be more fully apprised.
3. Is the sending of Marines essential for the preparation of air base as might likely be established.
4. Question as to location of air base or bases should be fixed in advance.

President Barclay posed the question: If America eventually became a belligerent would it involve a departure from Liberian neutrality or would arrangements be similar to those regarding British naval bases in Egypt? President Barclay's attitude toward Marines can be attributed to reports of alleged reprehensible conduct in Central America.

My conviction is that all points can be settled to the mutual satisfaction of the two Governments.

WALTON

811.34582/6 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Liberia (Walton)

WASHINGTON, June 30, 1941—9 p. m.

40. Your 62, June 25, 5 p. m. Please express to President Barclay the President's sincere appreciation of his friendly understanding of our suggestions.

In reply to the various questions which President Barclay has raised you may offer the following clarifications :

1. We would propose that the "end of the emergency" should be considered to be the date of the ratification of a peace treaty terminating the war in which Germany is now engaged.

2. Arrangements with Great Britain regarding bases in British territories in the Western Hemisphere cover such matters as a general description of our rights in those bases, jurisdiction over American military personnel, etc. The text of the agreement with Great Britain will be found beginning on page 387 of the Department of State *Bulletin* for March 29, 1941, a copy of which you have presumably received. The proposed arrangement with Liberia need not of course be in such detail.

3. The sending of marines would be a necessity since they would have to prepare the way for construction units, guard supplies, assist in construction of barracks, et cetera. At the same time they would be available to assist in repelling any attack that might be made upon Liberia. President Barclay need have no apprehensions concerning the conduct of American marines. They are one of the most highly disciplined bodies in the American armed forces and have had long experience in dealing with and living among peoples outside the United States.

4. The location of one or possibly two bases could probably be agreed upon in advance. With these exceptions we anticipate that it would be necessary to undertake surveys in order to determine suitable locations. From among such locations we would propose that sites for bases be arranged by mutual agreement.

5. If the United States should become a belligerent the status of Liberia would of course be a matter for the Liberian Government to determine. The steps contemplated by this Government will of course make it possible for Liberian independence and integrity to be preserved and this Government is confident that a satisfactory arrangement can be worked out which would give the United States full power to protect the bases selected and yet leave Liberia free to determine her own status in the light of what she considers to be her best interests.

As this whole matter is of great urgency please endeavor to see President Barclay at once and use the above arguments to obtain a definite request from him for the establishment of American bases. As soon as this request is received we shall telegraph further instructions.

WELLES

811.34582/7 : Telegram

The Minister in Liberia (Walton) to the Secretary of State

MONROVIA, July 3, 1941—4 p. m.

[Received July 4—2:30 p. m.]

67. Department's number 40, June 30, 9 p. m. President Barclay is generally agreeable to the suggestion and feels it is now necessary to meet with trust [*trusted?*] advisers before giving a definitive reply which will be forthcoming within the next 2 days. I am confident it will be along lines desired by our Government.

President Barclay points out that it is not made clear by what parties "ratification" will be brought into effect.

The Liberian Government will leave to the American Government the question of compensation for use of property leased under proposed arrangement.

WALTON

811.34582/8 : Telegram

The Minister in Liberia (Walton) to the Secretary of State

MONROVIA, July 7, 1941—1 p. m.

[Received July 9—5:20 p. m.]

68. Department's No. 37, June 21, 3 p. m., and No. 40, June 30, 9 p. m. In a conversation today between the President of Liberia and the American Minister it was indicated that the Government of Liberia agrees to lease to the Government of the United States areas required for the establishment on Liberian territory of two or more air bases on the following terms:

[1.] A formal declaration of the Government of the United States guaranteeing the territorial integrity and political independence of Liberia during the life of the lease or leases under the arrangement.

2. That the full sovereign rights of the Government of Liberia over and upon the leased areas shall be reserved and respected, subject to such special arrangements as to American rights in those places including jurisdiction over the personnel of the American military establishments, et cetera, as may be worked out by the two Governments; that the United States military personnel requisite to protect the bases shall be limited to 500 men, but in the event it be deemed necessary to increase this number this shall be done upon subsequent agreement of the two Governments.

3. That the leased areas or rights incident thereto which may be guaranteed to the United States Government shall terminate on the date on which a peace treaty terminating the war in which Germany is now engaged is ratified by the democratic powers or any one of them, and that the military or naval personnel stationed and employed at these bases be withdrawn as of the same date, and all special rights granted the United States on and in the leased areas be simultaneously terminated.

4. That in the event the Government of Liberia be forced in consequence of action taken in this arrangement to defend its land and sea frontiers from attack, the Government of the United States will, upon the request of the Government of Liberia, at once accord protection to the Government of Liberia by granting it all aid and military equipment and matériel which will be requisite to insure an effective defense.

5. That this agreement be understood as in no way affecting the policy of neutrality which the Government of Liberia now maintains or may hereafter continue to maintain or adopt.

6. That in the event the United States Government becomes a belligerent in the present conflict the Liberian Government be left free without coercion as to what status it will assume in the circumstances. It is of course expected that with the landing of the naval or military personnel required for the construction of the air bases, all measures to protect the country from reprisals will be simultaneously taken.

Personally I am not entirely satisfied with paragraph 3 which seems too indefinite in regard to ratification of peace treaty and too exacting in regard to date of withdrawal of troops.

WALTON

811.79682/23a : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Liberia (Walton)

WASHINGTON, July 9, 1941—7 p. m.

42. Pan American Airways representative in Liberia is being instructed to proceed immediately with the signing of its initialed contract for commercial services.¹⁷ You should offer your good services in this connection if it should appear necessary.

WELLES

811.79682/37

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Villard)

[WASHINGTON,] July 16, 1941.

Mr. Firestone telephoned from Akron to say that he was sending a radiogram to his resident manager in Liberia approving a site selected for a landing field for Pan American Airways. This site had been chosen after a survey by the resident manager and embraced a piece of territory located just outside the leased land of the Firestone Plantations. Mr. Seybold, the resident manager, was being instructed to negotiate with President Barclay for a lease of this new land in the name of the Firestone Plantations, which would then sublet the property to Pan American Airways.

¹⁷ Contract signed on July 14, 1941.

Mr. Firestone said that he felt that it was preferable to handle the matter of the landing field in this way and that he hoped it would not interfere with any negotiations which the Department was at present conducting with the Liberian Government. I said that as far as I could see there would be no objection to this procedure. Mr. Firestone said that it was an advantageous matter to have the landing field located outside of the Firestone Plantations, as this would make it easier to negotiate with President Barclay for the use of the land.

The only reservation in Mr. Firestone's mind was that the site which had been chosen by Mr. Seybold was within two miles of the Firestone factories and machine shops. In the event of hostile operations or bombing attacks against the landing field, the Firestone buildings were therefore likely to suffer, but this was a risk which Mr. Firestone was nevertheless prepared to take. He said that no other site appeared to be readily available for a landing field in Liberia.

Mr. Firestone asked whether it would be possible for us to instruct the Legation at Monrovia to support the efforts of his representative to negotiate for the landing field with President Barclay. I said that we would send a telegram to the Legation along these lines and suggested that Mr. Seybold should be instructed to keep the Legation closely informed of his moves.

811.79682/37: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Liberia (Walton)

WASHINGTON, July 16, 1941—8 p. m.

44. The Firestone representative in Liberia is being instructed by Akron to open negotiations with President Barclay for the lease of land to be used by Pan American Airways. You are authorized to lend such support to Mr. Seybold as may appear necessary.

WELLES

811.79682/38: Telegram

The Minister in Liberia (Walton) to the Secretary of State

MONROVIA, July 19, 1941—11 a. m.

[Received July 23—9:50 p. m.]

71. Department's telegram No. 44, July 16, 8 p. m. On July 17, I secured appointment for Pan American Airways representative with President Barclay. President agreeable to Liberian Government leasing direct to Pan American Airways proposed site in Farmington River, Fish Creek section at 50 cents an acre. Contract must be

made between Liberian Government and Pan American Airways. Firestone general manager had suggested that his company lease land and sublet to Pan American Airways. President Barclay insistent all negotiations be conducted between Liberian Government and Pan American Airways.

WALTON

811.34582/8 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Liberia (Walton)

WASHINGTON, July 25, 1941—7 p. m.

45. Your 68, July 7, 1 p. m. In view of the manner in which the general situation has developed since you were first instructed to broach the question of air bases to President Barclay, it is now felt that this matter might appropriately be held in abeyance for the time being. At the present juncture, the establishment of a landing field in Liberia by Pan-American Airways would appear to be adequate for all immediate purposes and would afford a satisfactory basis on which to proceed further should that be necessary.

Please convey the foregoing to President Barclay and at the same time express the deep appreciation of this Government for the readiness which he has displayed in cooperating with plans for the mutual defense of the two countries. You may say that Liberia's interests are being constantly kept in mind in this matter and that President Barclay will be advised promptly of any change in the situation.

WELLES

811.34582/15 : Telegram

The Minister in Liberia (Walton) to the Secretary of State

MONROVIA, October 22, 1941—9 p. m.

[Received October 22—12: 57 p. m.]

98. Secretary Simpson¹⁸ has confided that President Barclay is at a loss to understand why, if published reports also rumors emanating from Firestone Plantations are authentic, our Government has not directly informed the Liberian Government that Pan American Airways base is constructed at the instance of the United States to facilitate ferrying planes to Middle East.

President Barclay is telling legislators that from personal knowledge he cannot state authoritatively whether base is for commercial or military purposes as only information received is from general manager of Firestone Plantations.

¹⁸ Clarence L. Simpson, Liberian Secretary of State.

On several occasions the President has inquired whether base is in any way related to June and July conversations. I could not give definite reply as anything I might say would be conjectural. This Legation has received no official advices regarding Pan American Airways varied activities in Liberia.

WALTON

811.79682/30

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Villard)

[WASHINGTON,] October 27, 1941.

Colonel Taylor¹⁹ said that while it was correct at the present time to say that Liberia would not be used for the ferrying of aircraft to the Middle East, the situation was likely to change at any moment. He said that the War Department had, in fact, every intention to use the airport at Monrovia as an emergency landing field or as an alternative to the Atlantic terminal points at Bathurst and Freetown as soon as the construction in Liberia was sufficiently far advanced to permit takeoffs and landings.

Colonel Taylor also said that it would be necessary to install a garrison in Liberia to defend the landing field when completed. He said we could not afford to let the Germans take the field with parachute troops or by other means. It would be necessary to bring in aircraft guns and similar equipment for defense.

I explained to Colonel Taylor the very great interest which this Department had in the political situation in Liberia, particularly in regard to the relations between the Liberian Government and the Firestone Company. Colonel Taylor said that the War Department would approach the State Department in order to obtain the permission of the Liberian Government for the use of its territory in ferrying military aircraft, and that the War Department realized the political implications of this. He said that it was up to the State Department whether to take President Barclay into its confidence at this stage of developments, or to await a formal request by the War Department.

811.34582/15 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Liberia (Walton)

WASHINGTON, October 27, 1941—6 p. m.

65. Your 98, October 22, 9 p. m. You may inform President Barclay that the construction of a landing field in Liberia by Pan Ameri-

¹⁹ Col. J. G. Taylor, Army Air Force Intelligence, War Department.

can Airways may in a sense be regarded as a substitute for the plan under consideration in June and July, the development of which is not considered necessary at the present time. The War Department is interested in the Pan American airfield to the extent that it might serve as an emergency landing field, or as a possible alternative to the use of Bathurst or Freetown in the ferrying of aircraft from the United States to the Middle East. There is, however, no present intention to use the Liberian airport for the latter purpose and if events should subsequently make such a step desirable, the Liberian Government would of course be approached with a request for the necessary permission.

Pan American Airways has been authorized to inaugurate a commercial service from Miami to Leopoldville via San Juan (Puerto Rico), Trinidad, Belem, Natal, Monrovia, and Lagos, and the current activities of the company in Liberia are directly related to that project. It is understood that both seaplane and land plane services are under consideration in this connection. If any changes occur in the situation you will be advised.

HULL

811.79640/1249 : Telegram

The Minister in Liberia (Walton) to the Secretary of State

MONROVIA, November 1, 1941—10 a. m.

[Received November 3—7:43 a. m.]

101. Does the Department desire telegrams concerning current negotiations for leasing of land by Pan American Airways? Department's despatch No. 223, July 21²⁰ referred to Seybold's keeping Legation closely informed of his moves. This has not been done. Within the last 10 days important communications have been exchanged, counterproposals made, and Seybold has visited Monrovia on several occasions to confer with authorities. He has neither written me nor called at the Legation to discuss the matter since October 11. My information comes from Liberian sources. Difficult to comply with Department's telegraphic instructions No. 42, July 9, 7 p. m., and No. 44, July 16, 8 p. m.

Present indications are that immediate legislative approval of Pan American Airways agreement unlikely.

WALTON

²⁰ Not printed.

811.79682/26 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Liberia (Walton)

WASHINGTON, November 8, 1941—6 p. m.

67. Your 100 [101], November 1, 10 a. m. Recent developments indicate that in addition to the commercial purposes for which the Pan-American airport is intended, it may be necessary to use this landing field as an alternative to Bathurst or Freetown in the ferrying of aircraft from the United States to the Middle East. If the danger of an Axis attack appears imminent as a result thereof, precautions would undoubtedly be taken to insure the security of Liberia and the War Department might even desire to station defensive forces and equipment in Liberian territory for that purpose. It may also be desired eventually to use the Liberian airport as an intermediate point in the transportation of American officials, mail and personnel between points in Africa and Europe.

While permission for these operations would in due course be requested of the Liberian Government, it is believed that President Barclay should at this time be informed of the above possibilities in the strictest confidence. You are therefore authorized to bring these considerations to his attention, pointing out that such developments would automatically obtain for Liberia the protection of the United States Government during the course of the present war, the alternative to which might be a threat to the independence and integrity of Liberia.

In view of the interest which the War Department has in the speedy construction of the airport, it seems highly desirable to bring the present negotiations for the Pan-American lease to an early conclusion. Mr. Firestone has described the desire of the Liberian Government to obtain compensation for the lease, as well as the inability of Pan-American to consider rental payments because of the precedent which this would set in other cases. It appears that Pan American has offered as partial compensation to provide a local amphibian airplane service in Liberia for passengers and mail over a certain period of years, with payments of \$2,000 per annum for the remaining term of the contract if the venture proves unprofitable and is withdrawn. The Department believes that such a service would result in an important advantage for Liberia by knitting the country together in accordance with modern methods of transportation, facilitating trips of Liberian officials and making medical services quickly available in emergencies. You are requested to stress the benefits of this proposal and to urge its acceptance without the conditions reported to be attached by President Barclay such as free mail carriage and guarantee of a minimum customs revenue for Pan American supplies, neither of which suggestions appears to be practicable.

You may also state to President Barclay that the Department is giving consideration to means by which additional compensation may be made available to Liberia, possibly in the furnishing of assistance to the country's road building program. Further details in this connection will be sent to you shortly, but in the meanwhile you should express the earnest hope of this Government that the lease negotiations will soon be concluded.

The Department is again requesting Firestone to have its representative in Liberia keep in close touch with you. All developments should be reported by the Legation by telegraph.

HULL

811.79682/27 : Telegram

The Minister in Liberia (Walton) to the Secretary of State

MONROVIA, November 19, 1941—1 p. m.

[Received November 20—8:50 p. m.]

108. Seybold called today following talk with British Chargé d'Affaires regarding question of British utilization of Firestone airport as emergency landing field for British military aircraft. Seybold declines to take up matter with President Barclay as had been suggested, asserting that this is the duty of the British Government. I knew nothing of this matter until today.

It is highly probable that an embarrassing situation would arise [if] Britain pressed its request. I am aware of Liberia's pronounced opposition to British planes landing in Liberia. Moreover, Liberia's neutrality would be involved.

WALTON

811.79682/26 Suppl. : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Liberia (Walton)

WASHINGTON, December 17, 1941—3 p. m.

83. Department's 67, November 8, 6 p. m. In view of the fact that the United States is now a belligerent, the importance of the Pan American airport has been greatly increased and it becomes essential to conclude the construction in the shortest possible space of time. President Barclay will realize that because of its geographical position Liberia may occupy a strategic position in the war and may develop into a leading center of air operations. It is therefore necessary to urge prompt ratification by the Liberian Government of the Pan American Airways contract of July 14, as well as the immediate execution of the leases for the Pan American airport at Harbel and the seaplane terminal near Cape Mount.

In return for the speedy accomplishment of these acts by the Liberian Legislature, which the Department understands is to adjourn within the next few days, the United States War Department has agreed to assist Liberia in the enlargement along modern lines of its main arterial road system, to an extent to be determined by consultation upon completion of the airport. Moreover, the War Department will undertake to turn over to Liberia without cost, after the termination of this assistance, a substantial amount of equipment for use in maintenance of the Liberian road system. It is believed that as a result of this offer Liberia would acquire a valuable extension of its highways of great benefit to the country as a whole.

The undertaking by the War Department would of course be in addition to such other compensation as Pan American Airways is offering to the Liberian Government in return for the airport lease. Please bring this matter urgently to the attention of President Barclay and inform the Department by telegraph as to the results of your interview. You should also inform Seybold of the contents of this instruction.

HULL

811.79682/29 : Telegram

The Minister in Liberia (Walton) to the Secretary of State

MONROVIA, December 17, 1941—3 p. m.

[Received December 18—9:46 a. m.]

127. Message sent me today from authoritative source at Cape Mount that German agents are watching Pan American Airways development where a considerable quantity of petroleum products are stored. A. Kirstein, who arrived from Germany on Vichy plane December 2, is known to be German agent and suspected of operating clandestine radio transmitter at Cape Mount. Kirstein, formerly a trader at Robertsport, had been in Germany for 1 year. He is in ill health and is said to be well to do. Any business he might transact at Cape Mount would be negligible. Kirstein brought a letter to Doctor Younge sent by latter's wife which indicates that Younge is somewhere in Africa although generally thought to be in Germany. Younge, former superintendent of hospital conducted by American Episcopal Church at Cape Mount, was also in charge of Liberian Government leper station overlooking Fisherman's Lake and is well acquainted with that area.

The foregoing and other information regarding German activities in Fisherman's Lake area are grounds for justifiable apprehension concerning possible overt action against Pan American Airways

project and I recommend that precautionary measures be taken immediately to forestall sabotage or surprise attack.

WALTON

811.79682/29 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Liberia (Walton)

WASHINGTON, December 20, 1941—6 p. m.

85. Your 127, December 17, 3 p. m. You should discuss the contents of your 127, December 17, 3 p. m. with President Barclay at the earliest opportunity, pointing out the need of supervising the activities of the German agent in question. If the Liberian Government is not in a position to take proper measures in the circumstances, President Barclay might consider the possibility of bringing about his expulsion from Liberia or at least denying to him permission to reside in the Cape Mount area.

HULL

811.79682/33 : Telegram

The Minister in Liberia (Walton) to the Secretary of State

MONROVIA, December 22, 1941—2 p. m.

[Received December 23—noon.]

131. Department's 84, December 17, 4 p. m.²¹ While in conference with President Barclay today he transmitted Pan American Airways contract for legislative approval by joint action of Senate and House.

At today's conference, President Barclay made the following statement:

"The offer made by the War Department to assist Liberia in the construction of an arterial road system will be accepted by the Liberian Government when formally made. In consideration of this offer the question of rent from Pan American Airways for lands on which air fields are established will be waived by the Liberian Government. There are, however, some questions which will arise if, as and when, as now appears, these proposed air fields will be used by the United States for military purposes.

The strategic importance of the airfields being established in Liberia is not only recognized by the War Department but indeed is strongly emphasized in the message you were good enough to read to me. This fact gives force to the views advanced, in our last conference and gives point to my claim that the Liberian Government is by every reasonable consideration entitled to some substantial assistance should these air fields be put to military and probably belligerent uses by the Government of the United States. In such an event this country and its inhabitants without any doubt will be liable to retaliatory

²¹ Not printed.

action by the enemies of the United States if, while nominally neutral, the Liberian Government should grant the United States the use of its territories for belligerent purposes.

If again the Liberian Government should assume openly a belligerent status and range itself as it would without question do beside the United States and its Allies, the situation for Liberia would be equally if not more serious. Your Government naturally would defend the bases it establishes. It however will rest under no obligation unless it has expressedly and formally undertaken so to do, to protect and defend the whole of Liberia. It could not reasonably be expected to undertake this defense in the absence of any formal obligation.

The duty of the Liberian Government to equip its self-defense is obligatory and unavoidable. Even should the United States Government formally undertake the obligation defending Liberia from enemy attack, it surely would expect the fullest cooperation of such forces as Liberia could mobilize for the purpose. Such cooperation would be as obligatory on Liberia as the duty self-defense. This possibility of attack inevitably requires preparations to meet it and would impose upon the Liberian Government the enlargement of its defensive forces, the training, arming, equipping, and subsisting them, the laying out of strategic roads and the increasing of communication facilities at a cost not at present within the unaided financial capacity of the Liberian Government.

I shall appreciate it if you could impress the appropriate authorities at Washington with the importance to Liberia of a favorable consideration of this question of assistance in the circumstances mentioned above."

WALTON

811.79682/34 : Telegram

The Minister in Liberia (Walton) to the Secretary of State

MONROVIA, December 23, 1941—3 p. m.

[Received December 23—12:42 p. m.]

133. Department's 85, December 20, 6 p. m. President Barclay and I have already discussed subject and Legislature will enact law enabling him to deal effectively with situation along lines suggested by Department.

WALTON

882.20/537

Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Villard)

[WASHINGTON,] December 31, 1941.

THE PROTECTION OF LIBERIA

Under an arrangement with the War Department, Pan American Airways in July 1941 began the construction of an airport in Liberia

to provide an alternate landing point in the ferrying of bombing planes across the South Atlantic to the British forces in the Near East. This airport, planned along the most modern lines and equipped with high-speed refueling equipment, was designed to be used instead of present African terminals at Bathurst and Freetown in the event that weather conditions or wartime reverses should make the two latter bases untenable. Being already extensively engaged in rubber-growing operations in Liberia, the Firestone Company was commissioned by Pan American Airways to undertake the construction of the airport at Harbel (about 40 miles from Monrovia) and the work has been proceeding on an emergency basis ever since.

Although a tentative and secret approach was at first made to the President of Liberia in regard to the establishment of an American military or naval air base in that country, it was found that the purposes in mind could be served by negotiations then taking place for a commercial contract between Pan American Airways and the Liberian Government. The contract was signed on July 14, 1941, and while it has not yet been ratified by the Liberian Legislature, Pan American has already inaugurated a Clipper service linking Liberia with Brazil on the one hand and the Belgian Congo on the other. This service is carried on with seaplanes which land and take off at Fisherman Lake, some 55 miles from Monrovia. One of the uses to which it is being put today is to return to the United States the pilots and crews of the bombing planes being ferried across Africa to the Near East. After the new landing field at Harbel is completed, it is probable that the Clipper seaplanes will gradually be withdrawn from commercial use and stratosphere airliners introduced instead. These advanced stratosphere planes would land at the Harbel airport instead of on the water, in addition to which the bombing planes of the Ferry Command and a Pan American coastal shuttle service now operating between British possessions on the West Coast of Africa would make use of this important terminal. Owing to the interruption of communications via the Pacific, it is probable that all Pan American air traffic with the Far East will also shortly be routed through Liberia.

It is obvious that the development of airplane facilities in Liberia is becoming a major factor in connection with the war, and is thus exposing Liberia to the possibility of attack by hostile powers. Such an important link in air communications as provided both by the seaplane base at Fisherman Lake and the landing field at Harbel is not likely to be overlooked by the enemy. It is therefore logical to expect that an attempt may be made to destroy or damage both land and sea bases and their equipment, as well as to inflict injury on Liberia itself for assisting the Allied war effort in this manner.

Another consideration is the fact that Liberia is now producing 10,000 tons of rubber per annum, all of which comes to the United

States and enters into our defense materials. The American firm producing the rubber has extensive buildings, a large American personnel and considerable rubber-growing equipment. It also maintains a powerful radio station affording direct communication with its headquarters in Akron, Ohio, which would be of the greatest service to this Government in the event that other communications were cut. The Company's hydro-electric plant and its radio station are located close to the airport at present under construction and would be very vulnerable to air attack. As construction engineers for Pan American Airways, the Company also has a great deal of valuable machinery engaged in operations connected with the planting and growing of the essential war material of rubber.

The question urgently arises, in view of the vital strategic position now occupied by Liberia in the war and the likelihood that it will develop into a leading center for air operations, how the installations in that country are to be protected. With the approval of President Roosevelt, President Barclay of Liberia was informed in November 1941 that if the Pan American Airport were used as an alternate landing field in the ferrying of aircraft to the Near East, precautions would undoubtedly be taken to ensure the security of Liberia. It was also intimated that it might be desirable to station defensive forces in Liberian territory for that purpose. President Barclay was further informed that the protection of the United States Government would automatically be extended to Liberia during the course of the present war if the developments described above should take place, and officials of the War Department at that time stated orally that in the event of an impending Axis attack appropriate measures would be taken to defend Liberian territory.

While no actual threat to Liberia has yet arisen, several instances may be cited to show that the possibility of hostile action may not be remote. On October 21, 1941 the American Minister at Monrovia pointed out the need of affording Liberia protection from possible invasion from Vichy-French territory along the southern Liberian border, where troop movements are rumored to have occurred. A short time previously, word had been received of the improvement and development of Vichy-French airports in French Guinea, not far from the Liberian border. Moreover, a German national has within the last two weeks returned to Cape Mount, near the seaplane base at Fisherman Lake, where he had been engaged in trade for many years; this individual has no known reason to be in Liberia at this time and he is in an excellent position to report upon or sabotage the Pan American Clipper base at Fisherman Lake.

Owing to the extreme difficulty of landing supplies through the surf along the Liberian Coast, much time is consumed in such operations. Because of the danger they might incur in such an interval,

two vessels chartered by Pan American Airways, at present unloading gasoline and other necessary materials, have been afforded temporary protection by a British naval vessel stationed at Freetown, Sierra Leone. The British Chargé d'Affaires at Monrovia, as well as members of the Liberian Cabinet, has expressed serious concern over the possibility of a surprise attack by the Germans in the near future against the Pan American development and the rubber plantations, and the problem of protecting ships engaged in delivering supplies will require serious attention in the immediate future.

It is understood that the United States War Department does not consider itself in a position to take military action in the matter of protecting American interests in Liberia, and has suggested to the Senior Member of the British military mission in Washington, that the matter should be handled by the British Government. While it is true that the British in July 1939 gave an oral commitment to the Liberian Minister in London²² that Great Britain could not remain indifferent if Liberia were the victim of unwarranted aggression, the terms of that agreement are not believed adequate to cover the situation today. Moreover, any action by the British to take over or even to participate in the land defenses of Liberia would be certain to arouse the deepest resentment on the part of Liberians. Owing to the past British record in Liberia, no confidence is placed in Great Britain by Liberia, and it is even believed that many Liberians might prefer German protection if there were no other alternative.

The Navy Department has not yet been consulted in this matter, but for obvious reasons it is considered that the naval protection of Liberia is fully as important as that which could be offered by the War Department.

In view of the fact that the stake in Liberia is predominantly American, and since the airport and its attendant operations are wholly an American enterprise, it would seem highly desirable that the protection of Liberia, or at least the land protection, should be undertaken wholly by American forces. It may be recalled in this connection that when the idea first arose of using Liberia as a landing point in the ferrying of bombers across Africa, President Roosevelt had in mind the sending of a force of approximately 500 Marines to prepare the way for the construction of an American air base in Liberia. It has recently been suggested that suitable protection might be afforded by stationing a number of American Navy bombing planes at Fisherman Lake for the purpose of patrolling the Liberian Coast. In addition, it would seem desirable to supply anti-aircraft guns, machine guns, reconnaissance planes and fighting aircraft for the

²² See telegram No. 956, July 8, 1939, 6 p. m., from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. iv, p. 601.

defense of the airport at Harbel. The question of recruiting and arming a Liberian defense force might also have to be taken into consideration.

These questions are given urgent importance by the reply delivered by President Barclay (paraphrase of which is attached) under date of December 22, 1941²³ to a proposal made by the War Department to assist Liberia in the construction of an arterial road system in return for the land lease of the airport. President Barclay has stressed the view of the Liberian Government that should the air bases be put to military or belligerent uses by the Government of the United States, the Liberian Government should be entitled to substantial assistance to protect its territory and its inhabitants against retaliatory action by the enemies of the United States. It is pointed out by President Barclay that while the United States might naturally defend its own bases in Liberia, it would rest under no obligation to protect the whole of Liberian territory unless a formal undertaking had been made to do so. Related questions such as the increase of communication facilities and the laying out of strategic roads, are also emphasized in this connection, and an answer on this subject is obviously due to President Barclay before he can be expected to cooperate in the plans of the Government.

In view of its vital importance to the defense of the United States, it is believed that the entire question of protecting Liberia from possible enemy attack calls for the fullest and most careful consideration at the earliest possible moment.

²³ See telegram No. 131, December 22, 2 p. m., from the Minister in Liberia, p. 544.

MOROCCO

RESERVATION OF AMERICAN TREATY RIGHTS IN THE TANGIER ZONE; INFORMAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE DIPLOMATIC AGENCY AND SPANISH AUTHORITIES REGARDING TANGIER AND THE SPANISH ZONE OF MOROCCO¹

740.0011 European War 1939/6623 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Weddell)

WASHINGTON, January 8, 1941—6 p. m.

16. Your 635, November 12, 1 p. m.² Please seek an early occasion to discuss with the Foreign Minister^{2a} the situation at Tangier and recall to him the contents of your note of November 11, 1940.³ Point out that although this Government is not a party to the Tangier Statute⁴ it not only has extensive rights in Morocco, based upon treaties, custom and usage, but also, as an important naval power, it has an inescapable interest in any developments taking place in Tangier which would be likely to alter the neutral character of that port and district. Add that in view of recent developments at Tangier, which your Government has observed with some misgivings, the attention of the Spanish Government is again invited to the above-mentioned American rights and interests in Tangier, in order that there may be avoided any future misunderstanding which might hinder the progress of those friendly relations which we are anxious to develop with Spain.

Please leave with the Foreign Minister an *aide-mémoire* in the sense of the foregoing and report the results of your conversation by telegraph.

Repeat to Tangier.

HULL

¹ For previous correspondence regarding the Spanish occupation of the Tangier Zone and reservation of American treaty rights, see *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. III, pp. 783 ff.

² *Ibid.*, p. 792.

^{2a} Ramón Serrano Suñer.

³ For text, see Department's telegraphic instruction No. 297, November 9, 1940, 6 p. m., to the Ambassador in Spain, *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. III, p. 789.

⁴ Convention regarding the organization of the statute of the Tangier Zone, signed at Paris, December 18, 1923, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. XXVIII, p. 541; agreement of July 25, 1928, revising this Convention, *ibid.*, vol. LXXXVII, p. 211.

740.0011 European War 1939/7731 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, January 19, 1941—2 p. m.

[Received January 20—1:05 a. m.]

50. Department's No. 16, January 8, 6 p. m. The absence from Madrid of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and his subsequent illness have as yet prevented me from bringing to his attention the contents of the telegram referred to, but I am hopeful of seeing him in the next few days.

However, this morning the British Ambassador ^{4a} asked me if I would not postpone for a few days speaking to the Foreign Minister on the subject of Tangier.

In explanation of this request the Ambassador said that he had received written guarantees "better than he expected" concerning the fortification of the port named but that due, as he believes, to poor administrative practice he still awaits formal assurances covering capitulations and fears that action on my part at this time might be construed and resented as "pressure" which might delay formal fulfillment by the Spanish Government of its verbal promises. The Ambassador said he would at once communicate with Washington through London with a view to fully informing the Department on this point.

In a personal message just received the Ambassador asks me to make clear to the Department that his suggestion is not due to any weakening on their side but rather to his conviction that there is a good chance of securing a reasonable *modus vivendi* that will assure a due respect for international interests and non-fortification of the zone. He adds that any agreement made will be provisional and all juridical rights will be safeguarded.

In all the circumstances I perceive no objection to the course suggested and shall accordingly defer action.

WEDELL

740.0011 European War 1939/7731 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Weddell)

WASHINGTON, January 25, 1941—5 p. m.

38. Your 50, January 19, 2 p. m. In view of the changed situation which you report, and particularly since the Foreign Minister has now given apparently satisfactory guarantees regarding the non-fortification of Tangier, the Department considers that it might be preferable to present to the Spanish Government in another form the considerations outlined in its 16, January 8, 6 p. m.

^{4a} Sir Samuel Hoare.

In order to afford an opportunity for the presentation of our views it would appear desirable for you to endeavor to have the Spanish Government communicate to you a copy of the written guarantees which have been furnished to the British Ambassador. Such an arrangement would be similar to that followed in June 1940 when Beigbeder⁵ transmitted to you a copy of the note which had been sent to the British Ambassador concerning the occupation of Tangier (your 192, June 14, 1 p. m.⁶). The receipt of a copy of the guarantees regarding the non-fortification of Tangier would afford this Government an opportunity in reply to draw attention for the record to certain of the points outlined in its 16, January 8, 6 p. m. Please comment on this method of procedure.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/8003: Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, January 29, 1941—6 p. m.
[Received January 30—6:40 a. m.]

78. Department's No. 38, January 25, 5 p. m. The British Ambassador today informed me that he had had a long but unsatisfactory conversation with the Foreign Minister yesterday in the course of which he endeavored to obtain from him in writing "the verbal assurances already given concerning the capitulations at Tangier." He said that this request was resisted by the Foreign Minister who declared that Britain's attitude affected "the independence" of Spain and that he should be satisfied with what he had already obtained.

The Ambassador feels that this intransigent attitude of the Foreign Minister is due to pressure from Germany whose representative he believes has been informed of commitments already made. The Ambassador reiterated to me that he had obtained formal written assurances concerning the non-fortification of the area. He also said that he did not regard the situation "as by any means hopeless", that the whole matter was now before London for its action and earnestly implored me to delay presenting my note concerning Tangier or discussing the subject for a few days longer when he would have London's reaction to the matter.

In the circumstances I think that no harm would be done in deferring approaching the Foreign Office for a copy of written guarantees which have been furnished the British Ambassador.

WEDDELL

⁵ Juan Beigbeder, then Spanish Foreign Minister.

⁶ *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. III, p. 783.

740.0011 European War 1939/8228 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, February 9, 1941—11 a. m.

[Received 4: 55 p. m.]

98. Department's 16, January 8, 6 p. m., my 78, January 19 [29] 6 p. m. The British Minister informed me last night that in a long interview with the Chief of State yesterday he discussed with him the general subject of Anglo-Spanish relations and left with Franco a memorandum of his Government's views on these relations.

The Ambassador also told me that having failed in his repeated efforts to obtain from the Minister for Foreign Affairs written confirmation of his verbal promises concerning capitulations at Tangier he intended to write him a letter setting forth his understanding of these engagements and assurances and would then let the matter rest there.

I told the Ambassador that in these circumstances I felt I should no longer delay making known to the Spanish Government the view of my Government on the Tangier situation something which I had deferred doing at his request. He expressed his thanks for this consideration adding that it would seem useless to wait further.

I am therefore seeking an early opportunity to carry out instructions contained in the Department's telegram under reference.

WEDDELL

740.0011 European War 1939/8501 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, February 19, 1941.

[Received February 19—10: 22 p. m.]

133. Department's 16, January 8, 6 p. m., and my 98, February 9, 11 a. m. This morning discussed with the Foreign Minister the situation at Tangier recalling to him my note of November 11, 1940,⁷ and emphasizing the various points brought out in the Department's telegram under acknowledgment. I also left with him an *aide-mémoire* in the sense indicated.

The Minister made no comment at the moment beyond saying that he would give the memorandum attention. He also promised to send me a copy of the note recently addressed to the British Embassy concerning the fortification of Tangier, et cetera, as desired in the De-

⁷ For text, see Department's telegraphic instruction No. 297, November 9, 1940, 6 p. m., to the Ambassador in Spain, *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. III, p. 789.

partment's 38, Jan. 25, 5 p. m. Translation of the text will be telegraphed when received.⁸

WEDDELL

881.00/2014

The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State

No. 184

TANGIER, May 1, 1941.

[Received May 28.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to my despatch No. 164 of April 14, 1941⁹ reporting the appointment of Lt.-Col. Don Luis Carvajal Arrieta as Interventor Regional de la Region de Tanger (District Commissioner of the Tangier Region).

Under date of April 15, 1941 I received from Colonel Carvajal an announcement of his appointment, in an unsigned third person communication, a copy and translation of which are enclosed.¹⁰ Similar communications were addressed to my consular colleagues. My Netherlands, Belgian and British colleagues took umbrage at the fact that they were addressed as Consuls, and replied to the District Commissioner in third person notes in which the Netherlands and Belgian Consuls General described themselves as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in charge of the Consulate General, while the British Consul General described himself as Counselor of Embassy and His Britannic Majesty's Consul General in charge of the Consulate General. In view of our special relations, I made no acknowledgment of the communication.

In a further communication, dated April 25, 1941, I received an invitation from Colonel Carvajal, along with my consular colleagues, addressed to me as "Excmo. Sr. Ministro de los Estados Unidos" (His Excellency, the American Minister) inviting me to attend the inauguration of the Municipal Library on April 27.

I took advantage of this last mentioned invitation to call on Colonel Carvajal on April 29, along with Mr. Shillock, Second Secretary of the Legation, to thank the District Commissioner personally and unofficially for his invitation. I stated to Colonel Carvajal, through Mr. Shillock who speaks fluent Spanish, that I had received his kind invitation too late in order to be present, but that even had I received it in

⁸ Anglo-Spanish provisional agreement regarding Tangier was effected by an exchange of notes, dated February 21, 1941. English texts of the notes were transmitted to the Department by the Chargé at Tangier in his despatch No. 128, March 7, 1941, not printed.

⁹ Not printed.

¹⁰ Not attached to file copy.

time, I would not have been able to take advantage of his kindness. I stated that, as Colonel Carvajal was doubtless aware, the United States had never recognized the Tangier Zone and that, for that reason, Mr. Blake, as Minister, had never had formal and official relations with the International officials of the Zone. That had not prevented, I observed, the maintenance by Mr. Blake of very pleasant unofficial relations with those officials.

I continued by stating that I could not, for similar reasons, have official relations with the District Commissioner, but that I saw no reason why we might not enjoy pleasant unofficial relations. Colonel Carvajal assured me very cordially that he was of the same opinion, and stated that I could count on his very favorable disposition.

Respectfully yours,

J. RIVES CHILDS

123 C 436/408 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, June 13, 1941—7 p. m.

[Received June 14—11:40 a. m.]

545. The British Ambassador told me today that his Consul General at Tangier had just informed him that in a conversation held by the Consul General with Orgaz, Spanish High Commissioner, the latter had expressed irritation at the failure of Childs to call on him and also remarked that with regard to the visit desired to be paid by Bentley, "Military Attaché at Tangier", he could not receive him in this capacity but only as an officer of the American Army.

The Ambassador added that he apologized for mentioning the matter since he did not consider it his affair but that inasmuch as Orgaz was favorably disposed [to] assist him it was their policy to placate him especially having in mind the provisional situation existing which subsequent events might be expected to alter.

I told the Ambassador that I was not sufficiently posted to have an opinion on the matter but that I felt that an officer of Childs' experience was without doubt acting in accordance with our policy and being careful to do nothing which could compromise our rights.¹¹

Repeated to Tangier.

WEDDELL

¹¹ In despatch No. 221, June 19, Mr. Childs explained at length his relations with Spanish officials at Tangier. He reported that informal relations had been satisfactorily developed. The principal difficulties had arisen with respect to absence of the American officials from ceremonial functions of the Spanish authorities. He stated that "these officials are now reasonably familiar with our position and it is believed that the hope may be reasonably entertained that they are not likely to misinterpret it in the future." (881.00/2023)

781.003/302

The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State

No. 227

TANGIER, June 24, 1941.

[Received July 12.]

SIR: I have the honor to report to the Department that as a result of energetic action by the Legation the extraterritorial position of American citizens in Tangier appears to have obtained fuller recognition by the Spanish authorities administering the city than they were disposed previously to accord.

The Department will recall that in the case of Mr. Winthrop Buckingham, an American citizen who on two occasions was arrested and detained (see the Legation's despatches Nos. 37 and 44 of September 24 and October 3, 1940 respectively¹²), the Spanish authorities proceeded in a manner which gave indication that they did not entirely comprehend our extraterritorial treaty position with respect to the protection of American citizens within the jurisdiction of the Legation. In those instances the individual in question was placed under arrest and the Legation was only subsequently informed.¹³

In April, 1941 shortly after my arrival, an American citizen, Frank Ney Illischer, was illegally detained and transported to Tetuán by the Spanish police, as I informed the Department in my despatch no. 157 of April 11, 1941.¹⁴ This was the third violation of our extraterritorial jurisdiction in the relatively short period of Spanish occupation of Tangier, and I deemed it essential to endeavor to remove all doubt in the minds of the Spanish of our intention to uphold firmly our treaty rights. I therefore pressed this case with particular energy and transmitted a telegram direct to the Spanish High Commissioner at Tetuán explaining our position. This action was successful in obtaining Illischer's release.

The firm attitude assumed by the Legation has brought satisfactory results. In two subsequent cases of individuals alleged to have committed violations of local law, the Spanish *Interventor*, the head of civil administration in the Tangier Zone, has taken no action but has informed me in a personal note of the circumstances surrounding the case with the request that the Legation take any necessary steps to secure respect for the laws by the American involved. There is transmitted herewith a translation of a communication received from the *Interventor* concerning an alleged violation of a traffic regulation by Mr. Walter B. Boyce, an American, and a copy of the Legation's reply

¹² Neither printed.

¹³ Mr. Buckingham was released after vigorous protests by the Diplomatic Agency.

¹⁴ Not printed.

thereto.¹⁵ The procedure thus established gives the Legation an opportunity to make an investigation of the case, admits the jurisdiction of the Legation over its citizens and secures them from illegal molestation by the Spanish authorities.

Respectfully yours,

J. RIVES CHILDS

881.00/2082

The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State

No. 236

TANGIER, July 1, 1941.

[Received July 23.]

SIR: I have the honor to report that on June 30, 1941 I called on Colonel Manuel Granado Tamajon, commanding the Spanish troops in Tangier and left with him a memorandum,¹⁶ copies of which are enclosed, setting forth our treaty rights with respect to the restrictions imposed by the Spanish military authorities on my movements between Tangier and Cape Spartel.

Some months ago, following the Spanish occupation of Tangier, Spanish troops were posted in the vicinity of Cape Spartel and orders were issued to them to prevent the movement of foreigners over certain roads in that immediate neighborhood, including access to Cape Spartel. My British colleague informs me that soon after the restrictions were imposed he made them the subject of certain observations to Colonel Yuste at that time serving in the capacity both of Delegate of the Spanish High Commissioner as well as Commander of the Spanish forces in Tangier. This intervention having been without any result, the British Consul General took up the question with the newly arrived Spanish High Commissioner who is stated to have taken note of the former's observations. I am informed also that the question has been the subject of representations on the part of the British Embassy in Madrid with the Spanish Foreign Office, all so far without any positive result. The British action was based on the provision of the Anglo-Spanish Agreement of February 21, 1941 relating to Tangier assuring British subjects "freedom of movement in the Tangier Zone" (see Legation's despatch No. 128 of March 7, 1941).¹⁷

Shortly after my arrival in Tangier I requested my Spanish colleague to issue me a *laissez-passer* for the Spanish Zone and, on the strength of this document, I have never experienced until recently any difficulty in passing to and from Cape Spartel.

With the recent replacement of Colonel Yuste by Colonel Granado the Spanish troops stationed in the vicinity of Cape Spartel were replaced by Moorish troops and apparently were given stricter orders

¹⁵ Neither printed.

¹⁶ *Post*, p. 565.

¹⁷ Not printed.

concerning the movement of foreigners in that neighborhood. Some days previous to the incident recited in the enclosed memorandum Major Bentley, Military Attaché of the Legation, was turned back in his automobile when endeavoring to proceed to Cape Spartel and on June 22nd I encountered a like experience.

When I saw Colonel Granado on the subject he was most apologetic but stated that his troops were only carrying out the orders given them which he had received in return from higher authorities. He regretted the necessity of imposing such restrictions but referred to the need of taking measures for the security of Tangier. He raised the question whether the matter in dispute could not be adjusted by the issuance on his part to me of a permit whenever I desired to visit Cape Spartel.

I informed him that he had, of course, his responsibilities to discharge and that I had mine, one of which was the defense of American treaty rights. If I had occasion to go again to Cape Spartel I would request a permit of him, but it would be understood that my application for a permit and acceptance of it would not in any way prejudice the treaty rights of the United States as I had set them forth to him.

Colonel Granado asked if I would leave him a copy of the memorandum which I had prepared and from which I translated when setting forth our position to him. As the memorandum had been prepared with this contingency in mind I left a copy with him which he stated he would be glad to forward to the High Commissioner in Tetuán and that he hoped to obtain some amelioration of the terms of the restrictions.

Before taking leave of Colonel Granado I mentioned that the non-commissioned Moorish Officer who had turned me back had been very rude to the soldier from the Legation accompanying me. Colonel Granado expressed his great regret and stated that he would take immediate orders to mete out appropriate punishment to the officer and thanked me for having brought the incident to his attention.

So far as I have been able to determine the restrictions which were the subject of my conversation with Colonel Granado have been imposed in order to give freedom for the manoeuvres of the Spanish troops posted in the vicinity of Cape Spartel rather than to conceal any works in progress on the extreme northwest coastline of Morocco.

The plea put forward in defense of the restrictions, namely, that they are measures introduced for the security of the forces of occupation, is one which it is difficult for us to contest as a practical matter. It has seemed to me, however, eminently desirable that the Spanish authorities be kept constantly reminded of our treaty rights in order that they should have no grounds for misconception concerning our intention to safeguard those rights.

Respectfully yours,

J. RIVES CHILDS

881.512/155

The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State

No. 258

TANGIER, July 14, 1941.

[Received August 7.]

SIR: I have the honor to inform the Department that, as a result of the seizure by the Spanish of the Customs at Tangier reported in my No. 191 of May 9, 1941,¹⁸ the various tariffs and charges in force in the Spanish Zone over and above the treaty duties, on imported products, are now also applied in Tangier. These taxes and charges are: a social relief tax (*auxilio social*), consumption taxes and stamp taxes.

Social Relief Tax

On all imported products, a levy of five percent ad valorem is made for the benefit of the local Spanish relief organization known as "Auxilio Social".

On the complaint of several American *ressortissants* in respect of an attempt to levy this irregular charge on goods imported by them, and acting under my instructions, Mr. Shillock¹⁹ of the Legation staff visited the Spanish Chief of Customs shortly after its introduction and verbally protested this levy as being contrary to the provisions of the Moroccan treaties, and at the same time explained to him the position in the premises of the United States. The Chief of Customs stated that he was not competent to make any deviation from instructions which he had received from his superiors, but he informed Mr. Shillock that he would bring the question to the attention of the Director General of Customs who happened to be visiting Tangier the next day, and that the Legation would be informed of the result of his consultation with that authority. No further news, however, has been received by the Legation on the subject, notwithstanding reminder telephone calls to the Chief of Customs.

At the time of the visit the Chief of Customs was informed by Mr. Shillock that in view of the American treaty position, American nationals and protégés would be instructed to pay the social relief tax under protest, if such levy was demanded upon goods imported by them, and inform the Legation of the amounts improperly collected from them. Accordingly, American *ressortissants* were advised to adopt this procedure, should they find themselves unable to obtain clearance of their goods without payment of the charges in question. Copy and translation of a note of protest addressed by an American *ressortissant* to the Chief of Customs in this connection is annexed hereto. (Enclosure No. 1.¹⁸)

¹⁸ Not printed.

¹⁹ John Christopher Shillock.

Consumption Taxes

The consumption taxes introduced in the Spanish Zone are now levied by the Spanish Customs Administration in Tangier, in lieu of the taxes of the same character which were in force under the International Administration of Tangier prior to the Spanish occupation of the Customs house in this city.

Annexed hereto will be found a comparative table (Enclosure No. 2²⁰) showing the respective schedules of the two groups of consumption taxes above mentioned. It will be noted that, in general, the Spanish Zone consumption taxes (now levied in Tangier) are considerably heavier than those which were previously levied in virtue of legislation of the former International Administration of the Tangier Zone.

*Legal position in regard to these taxes**Tangier Zone*

With the exception of the taxes on the articles indicated by an asterisk on the enclosed list (perfumery, beer, glucose, saccharine, molasses, spices, chocolate), all the consumption taxes listed in the enclosed comparative table which were levied by the authorities of the Tangier Zone, are applicable to American nationals and protégés in as much as these taxes had received the assent of the Department given on the formal application of the French Resident General, as the Sultan's Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The consumption taxes in the Tangier Zone to which we did not give our assent, were imposed by dahir of May 15, 1925 which was embodied in the Tangier Statute (Article 33 of the Convention signed at Paris, December 18, 1923) and, as reported in Mr. Blake's despatch No. 17 of September 5, 1925,²¹ an application for the Department's assent to the consumption taxes in question was made by the Mendoub at Tangier.

The Department's instruction No. 364 of December 1, 1925 (881.512/48)²² replying to that despatch, reads as follows:

"Pending the settlement of the position which this Government may deem it proper to take with reference to the Statute of Tangier, it is not in a position to assent to the imposition in the Tangier Zone of any taxes upon American nationals or protégés through the action of the legislative body at Tangier, and upon request of the Mendoub. If it should be necessary for American nationals or protégés to pay any of these taxes in order to carry on their proper business in Tangier, you will, in accordance with the suggestions made in your despatch under acknowledgment, instruct American citizens to pay these taxes under protest and report the amounts thus paid to the Consulate General.["]

²⁰ Not printed.

²¹ *Foreign Relations*, 1925, vol. II, p. 600.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 601.

No subsequent application through the proper diplomatic channel, (i. e. through the Sultan's Minister for Foreign Affairs) has been made for the Department's assent to these particular consumption taxes, and they have thus remained legally inapplicable to American nationals and *ressortissants*. Few if any among the latter appear, at the time, to have been engaged in trade in the commodities in question, since no protests relative to the payment of the taxes have been filed at the Legation.

Spanish Zone

The question of the levy upon American nationals and protégés of consumption taxes in the Spanish Zone first came under discussion in the year 1923, as a result of the imposition in that Zone of taxes on sugar, tea and coffee, by dahir of February 27, 1922.

The Spanish Ambassador in Washington²³ requested the Department's assent to the levy of these taxes upon American *ressortissants*. The assent was given subject to the refund of taxes levied, prior to the Ambassador's request, on a shipment of sugar to Tetuán imported by an American *ressortissant*.²⁴ The refund was effected and the Legation was then instructed to notify American nationals and protégés that their refusal to pay the taxes in question would thereafter not be sustained. Validation was thus given to the Spanish Zone dahir of February 27, 1922 which provided for the levy of consumption taxes on the following articles and at the following rates:

Articles	Taxation unit	Rate pesetas	Present day
			rates as indicated in annexed comparative table Pesetas
Sugar.....	100 kilos.....	10	30
Coffee:			
raw.....	“ “.....	20	60
toasted or ground..	“ “.....	25	70
Tea:			
green.....	“ “.....	50	75
black.....	“ “.....	60	150

These particular taxes, at the rates established by the above mentioned dahir of February 27, 1922, are the only consumption taxes levied by the authorities of the Spanish Zone which have been made applicable to American nationals and *ressortissants*.

In February 1930 the Spanish Ambassador in Washington again approached the Department with a view to obtaining its assent to the enforcement upon American nationals and protégés of some thirteen decrees of the Spanish Zone, but the Department refused to give

²³ Juan Francisco Cárdenas.

²⁴ See instruction No. 260, May 8, 1923, to the Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Tangier, *Foreign Relations, 1923*, vol. II, p. 587.

consideration to any such request until the American Government had consented to accord formal recognition to the Spanish position in Morocco (Mr. Castle's note to the Spanish Ambassador of November 28, 1931,²⁵ forming enclosure to the Department's instruction to the Legation at Tangier, No. 667 of November 28, 1931 (file 881.512/101).²⁶ (See also the Legation's despatch No. 995 of November 30, 1934.)²⁶

It follows therefore that none of the Spanish Zone consumption taxes, as they appear in the enclosed comparative table, are legally applicable to American nationals and *ressortissants*. This observation extends equally to the consumption taxes on sugar, tea and coffee, in as much as the present rates of these articles exceed those established by the dahir of February 27, 1922, a renewal of the Department's assent being requisite in respect of any increase in Moroccan taxes previously assented to on the basis of their original tariffs.

There remains one other point to be dealt with in connection with the Spanish Zone consumption taxes. It relates to the difference between the rate of the tax on imported alcohol (170 pesetas per hectoliter) and that on alcohol manufactured in the Zone (130 pesetas per hectoliter). As a result of this discrimination in favor of a domestic product, the consumption tax becomes in effect a protective import duty, which violates the treaty principle of "economic liberty without any inequality". An analogous discrimination was protested by the Department in the case of a Gate Tax law of the former International Administration of Tangier which exempted from the tax certain building materials manufactured in the Tangier Zone. (See Department's instruction No. 472 [742] of May 24, 1933—file No. 881.512/112.)²⁶

Stamp Tax

Translation of a schedule of stamp taxes applicable to certain classes of imported goods and levied by the Customs at the time of importation, is annexed hereto. (Enclosure No. 3.²⁶) Incidentally the Spanish Customs administration was unable to comply with the Legation's request for a copy of this stamp tax schedule; but the Chief of Customs was kind enough to lend the Legation a fly-soiled type-written sheet, faded almost beyond legibility, which was the sole copy to be found in the Customs offices.

These stamp taxes on imported goods are likewise in fact additional import duties not provided for in the Moroccan treaties.

No such stamp taxes on imported merchandise existed in Tangier under the former International Administration.

Importers state that they would be indifferent to the payment of the small increase in the legal customs duty rates as represented by

²⁵ *Foreign Relations*, 1931, vol. II, p. 753.

²⁶ Not printed.

the stamp tax, but they seriously object to the costly loss of time and expense in labor incurred by the process of affixing the stamps upon every bottle or packet, required to be effected within the precincts of the Customs house, as part of the clearance procedure. To obviate this inconvenience, some importers have suggested that they be allowed to purchase the stamps and send them to their shippers to be affixed on the containers at the time of the packing of the goods, but this proposal has been rejected by the Customs officials.

Representations

As previously set forth, none of the Spanish Zone taxation measures dealt with in this despatch are legally applicable to American nationals and *ressortissants* in as much as they have not received the assent of the American Government. However, it seems very unlikely that on these grounds representations, whether made informally by the Legation to the Spanish authorities in Morocco, or officially by the American Ambassador to the Spanish Foreign Office, would have any but academic value at the present time.

I have therefore addressed to Colonel Carvajal, Civil Governor of Tangier and representative here of the Spanish High Commissioner at Tetuán, a note setting forth the treaty position in regard to the various Spanish Zone taxes above reviewed. A copy of this note is attached hereto as Enclosure No. 4.

A copy of this despatch is being forwarded to the Embassy at Madrid for use by the Ambassador, should the Department consider it advisable to take up the question formally with the Spanish Foreign Office. In such event it may be of interest to recall that the Foreign Office in a note addressed to Ambassador Laughlin under date of January 22, 1930,²⁷ recognized that the levy of taxation, such as that under reference, upon American nationals and *ressortissants* without the Department's previous assent was illegal, and it admitted that claims for refund of such illegal levies were valid and beyond discussion.

Respectfully yours,

J. RIVES CHILDS

[Enclosure]

The American Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Representative of the Spanish High Commissioner at Tangier (Carvajal)

TANGIER, July 14, 1941.

DEAR COLONEL CARVAJAL: After the direction of the Tangier Customs House had been taken over by officers of the Spanish Zone Administration, my attention was called to the fact that a "Social Relief Tax" of five per cent ad valorem was being levied on imported goods by the new Customs Authorities.

²⁷ *Foreign Relations*, 1930, vol. III, p. 608.

In as much as there is no provision in the Moroccan treaties for such a charge, it is not legally applicable to American nationals and protégés, in the absence of the specific assent of the Government of the United States. Consequently, I directed Mr. Shillock of this Legation to visit the local Chief of Customs and to explain to him that, for the reasons above indicated, the Legation was constrained to protest the said tax in so far as concerned American nationals and *ressortissants*. The Chief of Customs informed Mr. Shillock that he would bring the matter to the attention of the Director General of Customs of the Spanish Zone, and that the Legation would eventually be advised of that authority's consideration of the question. However no communication on the subject has yet reached the Legation.

In the meantime, we have had under examination the position in regard to the Spanish Zone consumption taxes now being levied by the Tangier Customs House, in lieu of taxes of the same nature which had been established under the International Regime. Most of the latter taxes had received the assent of the American Government, as required by the treaty position, whereas the Spanish Zone taxes have not, and these are therefore not legally applicable to American nationals and *ressortissants*.

Identical conditions extend likewise to the Stamp Taxes of the Spanish Zone collected on certain classes of imported articles.

In view of the foregoing considerations, I am obliged to formulate the fullest reservations in regard to the levy upon American nationals and protégés of all the taxes herein above referred to.

For your information I may add that the Spanish Government has recognized the treaty position above set forth in regard to the introduction of Moroccan taxation not provided for in the treaties, as appears from a Note dated January 22, 1930 addressed by the Spanish Foreign Office to the American Ambassador in Madrid, which admitted the validity of claims for the refund to American nationals and protégés of consumption taxes levied on them in the absence of the American Government's prior assent.

In view of the foregoing, it is hoped that appropriate measures will be taken to exempt American nationals and *ressortissants* from the application to them of the taxes under reference.

Sincerely yours,

J. RIVES CHILDS

881.00/2049

The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State

No. 325

TANGIER, September 2, 1941.

[Received September 17.]

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the Department's instruction no. 74 of August 7, 1941²⁹ in which reference is

²⁹ Not printed.

made to the absence from my despatch no. 236 of July 1, 1941 of a memorandum setting forth our treaty rights with respect to the restrictions imposed by the Spanish military authorities on my movements between Tangier and Cape Spartel, to which reference was made in my despatch mentioned.

I now enclose a copy of the memorandum in question and very much regret its omission from my previous despatch.

My British colleague informs me that in a conversation a few days ago with Colonel Granado, the latter informed him that he was happy to be able to state that the restrictions previously imposed by the Spanish military authorities on the movements of foreigners between Tangier and Cape Spartel had been removed.

Respectfully yours,

J. RIVES CHILDS

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the Chargé at Tangier (Childs)

On June 22, 1941 the American Chargé d'Affaires drove in the direction of Cape Spartel by way of the Caves of Hercules and was ordered to halt by a Moorish sentry. Accompanying the Chargé was a native member of the staff of the Legation who explained the former's identity but without overcoming the refusal of the sentry to permit him to pass. At the request of the American representative, the sentry was invited to enter the car and to accompany the Chargé to the post occupied by the sentry's superior officer distant a few hundred yards. There a Moorish sergeant was found in command who peremptorily refused to permit the American representative to pass to the Cape Spartel Lighthouse.

Under the Moroccan treaties in force applicable to the Government of the United States of America, there is no provision which places any restriction upon the movements of American nationals in Morocco. Article 14 of the Treaty of 1836 between Morocco and the United States³⁰ provides that:

"The citizens of that country shall have full liberty to pass and repass our country and seaports whenever they please, without interruption."

If there is no warrant under the treaties in force for the placing of restrictions upon the movements of American nationals generally, it follows that there is the less justification for the interposition of restrictions upon the free movements in the territory of Morocco of the diplomatic and consular representatives of the Government of the United States.

³⁰ Signed at Meccanez, September 16, 1836, Hunter Miller (ed.), *Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America*, vol. 4, p. 33.

The action of the Spanish military authorities in the present instance is even more particularly open to objection in that access to Cape Spartel Lighthouse was denied the American Chargé d'Affaires in Tangier who is a member of the International Cape Spartel Commission which oversees the functioning of the Lighthouse, the cost of the upkeep of which is shared by the American Government.

TANGIER, June 28, 1941.

881.512/155

The Secretary of State to the Chargé at Tangier (Childs)

No. 83

WASHINGTON, September 11, 1941.

The Secretary of State refers to the Legation's despatch no. 258 of July 14, 1941, concerning the application to Tangier by the Spanish authorities of the social relief, consumption and stamp taxes in force in the Spanish Zone of Morocco, and approves the text of the note which the Legation has sent to the Civil Governor of Tangier and the Spanish High Commissioner at Tetuán setting forth the treaty position of the United States with respect to these taxes.

The Department agrees with the Legation that probably no useful purpose would be served at this time in making formal representations to the Spanish Government at Madrid against the taxes in question and therefore does not propose at the moment to pursue the matter further.

881.111/50

The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State

No. 345

TANGIER, September 12, 1941.

[Received September 26.]

SIR: I have the honor to inform the Department that, on September 10, 1941 I called on General Orgaz, the High Commissioner of the Spanish Zone at Tetuán by appointment with a view to removing difficulties and delays encountered by American citizens, in connection with the issuance of Spanish Zone transit visas for travel between French Morocco and Tangier. The Department will be pleased to note, from the account given below of the conversation, the assurances given by General Orgaz of his personal intervention to remedy this situation.

The particulars of the complaints, which occasioned the interview, will be found in the annexed copy of an *aide-mémoire* which I left with the High Commissioner. He was assisted by the Chief of his Diplomatic Cabinet and I was accompanied by an interpreter of the Legation.

At the outset of the conversation, I placed the *Aide-Mémoire* on the table around which we were seated, and told General Orgaz that I would not burden him with a detailed exposition of the contents of the memorandum, which his competent services would no doubt examine, but I would limit myself to requesting his kind consideration of measures destined to remove the difficulties and reduce the delays of which American *ressortissants* were complaining. For the purpose of giving General Orgaz an illustration of the nature of the complaints, I undertook to outline briefly the case of Mr. Stewart of the Socony Vacuum Company, when he interrupted me and said: "That must not be; that has got to be changed", and when I went on to refer to the case of Mr. Stewart's wife, he seized upon the *Aide-Mémoire*, and after reading it through himself, he turned to me and said: "Mr. Minister, you have my personal assurances that I will take up this situation and that everything will be done to eliminate these inconveniences. If in the future there should be any appearance of their recurrence, or in fact if there are any other difficulties, you have at your disposal the Chief of my Diplomatic Cabinet. You have only to telephone to him and the matter will be given immediate attention."

I thanked General Orgaz for his cordial comprehension of the reasons for my visit to him, namely the desire to promote the closest possible cooperation between us in exceptional and trying circumstances, and said that I had fully anticipated receiving the kind assurances which he had just given me.

Señor Temes, the Chief of the Diplomatic Cabinet, then explained that the difficulties would not have arisen if, as was formerly the case, the applications for transit visas had passed through the High Commissariat on their way to the Bureau of Native Affairs, which now was receiving them direct from the Spanish Consulate at Casablanca. There were, of course, some unavoidable delays due to the unsatisfactory conditions of ordinary means of communication, and the pouch service operated only at intervals of a week or ten days between the Spanish Consulate at Casablanca and the Bureau of Native Affairs at Tetuán. In cases where the travel was of an urgent character, the Spanish Consulate at Casablanca should be requested by the applicants to transmit their applications by telegraph. In any particular case, which the American Legation desired to support, or in connection with which difficulties might be apparent, a telephone call from the Legation to the Diplomatic Cabinet, as General Orgaz had just said, would insure immediate attention to the matter.

As regards the statement of the official of the Tangier Visa Bureau to the effect that questions concerning American *ressortissants* were complicated by the failure of the American Government to recog-

nize the Spanish Zone, General Orgaz said that no notice should be taken of the observations of an irresponsible employee, when even he, the High Commissioner himself, was without authority to make such a declaration. He said he would be obliged if I would identify and make known to him the person who had made the observation in question.

I left General Orgaz with the impression that I could rely on his personal good will and desire for friendly cooperation and I felt convinced that he was genuinely disturbed at the inconveniences which had been occasioned to American travelers by the Spanish visa authorities, and that he will fulfil his promise to take measures to eliminate such difficulties in the future.

Another phase of my conversation with the High Commissioner, bringing into relief the cordial character of the interview, is reported in a separate despatch.

Respectfully yours,

J. RIVES CHILDS

[Enclosure]

The Diplomatic Agency at Tangier to the High Commission of the Spanish Zone of Morocco

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

Mr. Childs explained to His Excellency General Orgaz that the object of his visit was to bring to the latter's attention the difficulties and delays which have occurred in the issuance of transit visas for American citizens desiring to transit the Spanish Zone in journeying from the French Protectorate to Tangier. He cited several instances of such delays causing inconvenience and prejudice to the interests of American citizens, as follows:

1. *Case of Mr. Stewart*

Mr. James Cargill Stewart, assistant director of the Socony-Vacuum Oil Company, filed an application at the Spanish Consulate at Casablanca for a visa to Tangier on July 31, 1941, which was not issued until September 1.

It was not until two weeks after the application had been filed that Mr. Stewart was informed that it would not be given consideration by the authorities at Tetuán unless supported by a request from the American Legation at Tangier. This request was made by the Legation through Colonel Carvajal, by a letter dated August 15. Nevertheless, the grant of the visa was still delayed and on August 25 Mr. Stewart was notified by the Spanish Consulate at Casablanca that, in addition to the request from the American Legation, the authorities at Tetuán required a letter from the head office of the Socony-Vacuum

Oil Company specifying in detail the reasons necessitating Mr. Stewart's journey to Tangier, notwithstanding that in the original application form the reasons had been indicated ("*pour affaires de la Compagnie*").

The letter, under date of August 27, was, however, furnished to the Spanish Consulate at Casablanca which assured the Socony-Vacuum Oil Company that it had been forwarded to Tetuán the same day. Later it transpired that this was not the case, in as much as the Spanish Consulate informed Vice Consul Mayer of the American Consulate at Casablanca, two days later, that the letter would only go forward in a week or ten days by the next courier. However, at Mr. Mayer's urgent request the contents of the letter were communicated by the Spanish Consulate to Tetuán by telegraph. The visa for which Mr. Stewart had applied on July 31, was finally received on September 1.

2. *Case of Mrs. Stewart*

Mr. Stewart's wife, Mrs. Audrene Stewart, applied for a visa on July 28, 1941, two days prior to the application made by her husband. By letter dated August 18 the Legation requested Colonel Carvajal's assistance in obtaining expedition of this visa by the Tetuán authorities. When, therefore, Mr. Stewart was advised that his visa had been authorized, both his own and Mrs. Stewart's passports were presented to be visaed at the Spanish Consulate at Casablanca, but the latter then unexpectedly stated that no mention had been made in the authorization from Tetuán of a visa for Mrs. Stewart which, therefore, could not be issued. The Consulate further stated that it had no record of the transmission to Tetuán of Mrs. Stewart's application. She was therefore unable to accompany her husband on a visit to Tangier which, as indicated on her visa application form, was for reasons of health.

3. *Case of Mrs. Lambert*

An application was made to the Spanish Consulate at Casablanca by an American citizen, Mrs. Lambert, for a transit visa for the Spanish Zone, on July 22, 1941, but it was not until some five weeks later, on August 27, 1941, that she finally obtained her visa, and then only after several fruitless visits made on appointment to the Spanish Consulate at Casablanca, and after intervention on three separate occasions of the American Consul in that city.

4. *Case of Mr. McGaffin*

At Tangier, on September 3, 1941, Mr. William McGaffin, an American journalist, well and favorably known to the American Legation, applied for a departure and return transit visa for French Morocco, which has been refused by the Tetuán authorities. When imparting

this information to Mr. McGaffin, the official of the Tangier visa office added that the question in regard to American travelers was complicated by the fact that the United States had not given recognition to the Spanish Zone.

In informing His Excellency General Orgaz of the foregoing, Mr. Childs said he was loath to believe that that statement expressed the views of the Spanish Zone authorities. Mr. Childs added that he felt confident he could rely upon the good will of General Orgaz in remedying the situation outlined above involving long and unaccountable delays to American citizens applying for Spanish visas.

TANGIER, September 10, 1941.

881.512/156

The Secretary of State to the Chargé at Tangier (Childs)

No. 90

WASHINGTON, September 27, 1941.

SIR: Reference is made to your despatch no. 300 of August 12, 1941,⁸¹ regarding the extension to Tangier of the fiscal régime of the Spanish Zone of Morocco through a decree issued June 30, 1941 by the Commissioner of Finance of the Spanish Zone.

The Department concurs in the opinion you express that it would be best not to make representations to the Spanish authorities with regard to the new taxes imposed by this decree, and agrees that a decision by the American Consular Court in a concrete case would be a more effective means of bringing home to the authorities the American position with regard to such taxation. You are, therefore, authorized to follow the policy outlined in the last paragraph on page 12 and first two paragraphs on page 13 of your despatch under reference.⁸²

As regards advice to be given American *ressortissants* who may be called upon to pay the new taxes, the Department questions the desirability of advising payment even of those which might seem justified as being based on the Act of Algeciras⁸³ or as compensation for services rendered. It is felt that this Government's position would be stronger if the American *ressortissants* concerned were merely informed of the situation and their treaty rights and left to make for themselves the decision as to payment or refusal of any one or all of the taxes in question. In this connection it would appear to be helpful to ascertain the position taken by other governments concerned.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

A. A. BERLE, JR.

⁸¹ Not printed.

⁸² Paragraphs mentioned are summarized in the preceding sentence.

⁸³ Signed April 7, 1906, *Foreign Relations*, 1906, pt. 2, p. 1495.

881.50/37

The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State

No. 422

TANGIER, October 29, 1941.

[Received November 19.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to my despatch no. 403 of October 19, 1941³⁴ and to report that Colonel Carvajal, Spanish District Administrator, paid me a visit on October 23, 1941 for the purpose of acquainting me with the endeavor of the local authorities, under his direction, to keep down the cost of living in Tangier. He said that a Controller of Prices had been appointed to check abusive speculation detrimental to the welfare of the community and in this connection, he added, some difficulty has been encountered by the administration when considering the activities or requiring the testimony of American *ressortissants* whose extraterritorial position placed them beyond the ordinary local jurisdiction. He therefore appealed to me for whatever cooperation was possible, by restraining American nationals and protected persons in Tangier from obstructing the operation of the system of regulations and control put into force by the administration for the purpose of keeping within reasonable bounds the rising cost of living in the district.

Colonel Carvajal then referred to an instance in which a stationer and American *ressortissant* had sold recently to the Spanish High Commissioner in Tetuán writing paper at 10 francs per hundred sheets, but on a repeat order only a week later had invoiced the same quality of paper at 10 pesetas per hundred sheets which represented, within the space of a few days, an increase in the price of over 300 per cent, the exchange on the peseta being about four to one against the franc.

Although a case of speculation in stationery articles did not appear to be the most appropriate example to illustrate the threat of a rise in the general cost of living in Tangier, it seemed obvious to me that the instance was quoted by Colonel Carvajal only to point to a case in which an American *ressortissant* had actually been detected in charging exorbitant prices, and out of an apprehension on his part that other American *ressortissants* dealing perhaps in articles of prime necessity, might avail themselves of their extraterritorial privileges to defy the measures taken by the local authorities for the protection of the community at large.

Colonel Carvajal stated that dealers had abusively availed themselves of recent violent exchange fluctuations to raise their prices extravagantly but that, with a return to stabilization of the local exchange market, merchants had been warned, by a decree of October 21, 1941, that they must readjust their prices accordingly if they desired

³⁴ Not printed.

to avoid the infliction of penalties. A translation of the decree is enclosed.³⁵

A further measure taken by the administration with a view to eliminating the factor of exchange as a pretext for the increase of prices, has been the requirement that goods of Spanish origin or those purchased in pesetas must obligatorily be sold in Spanish currency.

Finally, Colonel Carvajal referred to a further decree issued on October 21, 1941 reviving the application of a law of November 2, 1939 passed by the Tangier Legislative Assembly under the international regime, which regulated the exportation of products, materials and articles of prime necessity, and required the constitution of security stocks.

Colonel Carvajal then reiterated his request for my assistance in causing American *ressortissants* to conform with all these regulations. He explained that he had given instructions to his administrative officers that if, in the course of their investigations, they found themselves confronted with American *ressortissants*, their action was to be suspended and the matter reported to him personally. He would himself then bring the matter to my attention.

I explained to Colonel Carvajal that the American consular courts have no power to enforce upon American *ressortissants* Moroccan decrees or regulations, unless these are brought into the *corpus juris* of those courts through previous validation of the said decrees or regulations by the American Government. The latter would have difficulty in giving its approval to such measures as those referred to by Colonel Carvajal which were at variance with fundamental treaty principles concerning the liberty of commerce in Morocco. I added, however, that that did not imply the American Government's indifference to difficulties which might arise from temporary special conditions and, as an illustration of the Department's attitude in such circumstances, I outlined to Colonel Carvajal the Department's directions to the Legation as contained in instruction no. 1063 of March 4, 1940 (file no. 681.006/73) ³⁶ in regard to the law of November 2, 1939 of the Tangier International Administration which, as the Colonel himself had just said, he had brought into force by decree of October 21, 1941. I explained to him that in reply to the Moroccan Government's request for the American Government's validation of that law, the Department had stated that while it was unable to give its approval to the application to its *ressortissants* of legislation in derogation of American treaty rights, it had however directed the Legation to examine with the Moroccan authorities concerned, and to report to the Department, suggestions designed to avoid special difficulties prejudicial to

³⁵ Not printed.

³⁶ *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. III, p. 780.

the interests of the Tangier community which might result from the failure of the American Government to give its approval to legislation enacted as the result of the present exceptional circumstances. I told Colonel Carvajal that I was prepared to extend to him a similar regime of cooperation. I added that I considered that American *ressortissants* as members of the Tangier community should cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the welfare of that community and, moreover, I did not anticipate any difficulty in persuading them voluntarily to do so.

In conclusion, the Department will share my gratification at the manifestation, renewed on this occasion by Colonel Carvajal, of the intention of the Spanish authorities to respect our extraterritorial position in Tangier.

Respectfully yours,

J. RIVES CHILDS

881.512/158

The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State

No. 443

TANGIER, November 11, 1941.

[Received December 10.]

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the Department's instruction no. 90 of September 27, 1941 and to report in this despatch, in accordance with the Department's instruction, the attitude of the Powers toward the extension to Tangier of the fiscal regime of the Spanish Zone of Morocco, through a decree issued June 30, 1941 by the Commissioner of Finance of the Spanish Zone.

Mr. Gascoigne, the British Consul General in Tangier, has informed me that he has been instructed to advise British subjects not to pay any of the new Spanish Zone taxes introduced in Tangier; he has also been instructed to advise British subjects not to pay any of the increases introduced by the Spanish authorities in the taxes levied by the International Administration in the Tangier Zone. In the event of any persecution of British subjects as a result of their failure to pay these taxes, the British Consul General has been instructed to approach the Spanish Administration in Tangier and to state that the British Government does not admit any of the legislation by an alien law, and that the whole question must be discussed between the two Governments.

Mr. Polain, the Belgian Minister in charge of the Belgian Consulate General, informs me that his Government has given him no instructions in regard to the new taxes or the increase of old taxes formerly imposed by the International Administration in Tangier. Mr. Polain stated that his political position is so weak that he has felt it unwise to make any representations to the Spanish authorities

since their taking over of the administration of Tangier. He stated that at that time a protest had been made, and he considers that that protest is sufficient to cover all subsequent illegal acts of the Spanish authorities.

Mr. Triat, the French Consul, stated that he had informed his Government of the introduction of the taxes but had received no instructions with regard to them. I asked if any of his nationals had requested his advice as to the attitude to be taken toward their payment. He replied in the negative. He did state that he knew of a case in which one of the judges of the Mixed Tribunal had refused to pay the ten percent tax assessed by the municipality on electric light bills, in the knowledge that the Mixed Court would throw out any suit brought by the Company or by the authorities to compel payment of the tax, and would no doubt entertain a suit for damages brought by a consumer against any attempt of the Electric Light Company to cut off the electric current as a consequence of a failure to pay the tax. Mr. Triat added that the Electric Light Company, so far as he knew, had made no attempt to dispute the refusal to pay the tax.

I have not thought it advisable to consult my Italian colleague on the subject, and I have not consulted my German colleague for the reason that I have never made his acquaintance. The position of the Netherlands Minister, in charge of the Netherlands Consulate General, is believed to be similar to that of my Belgian colleague.

I would, however, point out to the Department that as the American Government alone enjoys extraterritorial rights in Tangier, our position is quite different from that of my colleagues of the non-capitulatory Powers.

I would also add that the recommendations made by me with respect to the advice to be given to American *ressortissants* in connection with the new fiscal regime, were based on informal conversations had by me in the Department before my departure for this post. At that time it was suggested that as the situation in Tangier is to a certain extent analogous with that of the American Government's position in Manchukuo, our attitude toward the fiscal regime in Tangier might follow the attitude taken by the American Government in respect of the assessment of taxes in Manchukuo. I therefore discussed this question with the officials in the Far Eastern Division, and the recommendations contained in my despatch no. 300 of August 12, 1941³⁷ were made in the light of those conversations, as a result of which it appeared that American nationals in Manchukuo were being advised to pay taxes imposed for services but to refrain, in their discretion, from the payment of other fiscal measures.

Respectfully yours,

J. RIVES CHILDS

³⁷ Not printed.

881.00/2061 : Telegram

The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State

TANGIER, November 28, 1941—1 p. m.

[Received 7:30 p. m.]

372. Following the appointment of Colonel Uriarte as delegate of the Spanish High Commissioner in Tangier I have received a communication from him reading in translation as follows:

"I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that when His Excellency the High Commissioner appointed me as his Delegate in the Tangier Zone, it was decided that my official relations with Your Excellency in respect of all such matters as appertain to the interests of the country which you so worthily represent, shall be conducted through the medium of the Consulate General of Spain in this city, which has received appropriate instructions in this sense.

I have to importune Your Excellency that under this arrangement you may be assured, on my part, of the fullest understanding and assistance for the effective maintenance of the commercial regime enjoyed by this zone in recent years.

I avail myself of this occasion to reiterate to Your Excellency, Mr. Consul General, the assurance of my distinguished consideration."

It appears that all of my consular colleagues so far as can be determined have received a similar communication. There is some thought that the new arrangement may represent a desire of the Spanish authorities in the midst of their difficulties to effect a back door and informal return to the committee of control system. However, the most general opinion is that it represents an effort of the Spanish Consul to project himself more importantly into the local picture from the obscure background to which he was relegated upon the occupation of Tangier by the Spanish authorities. Colonel Uriarte has himself told me that the Spanish Consul would serve as his Diplomatic Cabinet so to speak.

The British Consul General is merely acknowledging the communication. He has expressed dislike of the arrangement as it interposes obstacles in the way of direct access by him to the principal Spanish authorities in Tangier.

For us the situation is of course different in view of our position. The proposal actually represents a return to the *modus vivendi* which obtained until 1934 (see the Department's instruction 780 of February 16, 1934³⁸); it is not believed however in view of our particular position that an ordinary acknowledgment would be appropriate. The following is suggested as an acknowledgment which I might be authorized to make.

"I have to thank you for your kind communication of November 21, 1941, from which I note that our relations in regard to official matters

³⁸ Not printed.

concerning American interests are to be conducted through the Consulate General of Spain in Tangier, which has received instructions to this effect from His Excellency, General Orgaz.

This is an arrangement which is very agreeable to the Legation in as much as it resumes a *modus vivendi* under which relations were formerly conducted by the Legation with the Spanish authorities in Morocco.

I am particularly gratified to note that it is your intention to maintain the commercial regime enjoyed by the Tangier Zone during recent years. This regime in Tangier would, of course, in our view necessarily be that which is defined in the treaties to which the United States Government is a party.

Please be assured, my Dear Colonel Uriarte, that on my part you will find reciprocally all possible friendly cooperation in my informal endeavors to adjust the problems which may confront us in the exceptional circumstances of these times."

Repeated to Madrid.

CHILDS

881.00/2079

The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State

No. 468

TANGIER, December 3, 1941.

[Received December 26.]

SIR: In reference to the Legation's despatch no. 452 of November 24, 1941³⁹ respecting the appointment of Colonel Uriarte as Delegate in Tangier of the Spanish High Commissioner in Morocco, and to the Legation's telegram no. 372 of November 28, 1941, 1 p. m., which drew particular attention to the statement of Colonel Uriarte that all official matters should be presented to him through the Spanish Consulate General in Tangier, I now have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of a complaint which, according to this arrangement, I have addressed to my Spanish colleague, concerning the excessive delays attending the issuance of Spanish transit visas for American *ressortissants* desiring to proceed from French Morocco to Tangier.⁴⁰

The details of the several individual cases involved are sufficiently set forth in the copy of the above mentioned communication to the Spanish Consul, but the Department will observe, from its general terms, that in regard to the excessive delays in the issuance of the Spanish visas in question, there is a relapse into or rather perhaps a continuation of the irritating situation for American *ressortissants* which, as reported in the Legation's despatch no. 345 of September 12, 1941, General Orgaz gave me his personal assurances would be remedied.

³⁹ Not printed.

⁴⁰ Enclosure not printed; it gave the details on three cases of excessive delays.

These circumstances appear to confirm the apprehension suggested in the Legation's despatch no. 452 above referred to, that Spanish inefficiency, or worse, in Morocco is so fundamental as to leave little or no hope of improvement, and that such measures as the mere multiplication of delegates of the High Commissioner or even the latter's own personal intervention, may be but the illusory devices of a basically incoherent administration.

In any event, it would appear that the communication addressed by the Legation to the Spanish Consulate General in Tangier on the matter under discussion represents the exhaustion of all local remedies. Therefore, if no satisfactory response is made thereto and unless the inconvenience occasioned to American *ressortissants* in Morocco by the dilatory procedure of the local Spanish visa authorities are promptly and permanently removed, it is believed that there will be no other alternative than to request the American Embassy at Madrid to take up the question with the Spanish Government.

Respectfully yours,

J. RIVES CHILDS

881.512/159

The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State

No. 471

TANGIER, December 8, 1941.

[Received December 26.]

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of a note which I have addressed to my Spanish colleague concerning a ten percent municipal tax included in bills of the local Electric Light Company on electric current consumption.

It is believed that the enclosed note will be found self-explanatory. I shall not fail to inform the Department as soon as a reply has been received.

My British colleague informs me that he has also objected to the collection of the tax from the British Consulate General.

Respectfully yours,

J. RIVES CHILDS

[Enclosure]

The American Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Consul in Charge of the Spanish Consulate General at Tangier (Soriano)

TANGIER, December 8, 1941.

MR. CONSUL AND DEAR COLLEAGUE: The Legation recently had occasion to object to the inclusion of a ten percent municipal tax in the receipts presented by the Compañía Eléctrica Hispano Marroqui for the electric current consumption of the American Legation. This

objection was taken on the grounds of exemption from taxation under the provisions of the Moroccan treaties. Reference is here made to Article 3 of the British-Moroccan Treaty of 1856,⁴¹ to Article 3 of the Spanish-Moroccan Treaty of 1861,⁴² and to Article 2 of the Madrid Convention of 1880.⁴³

I have received a letter, dated December 6, 1941, from the Electric Light Company in which it is stated that Colonel Uriarte had directed them to inform the Legation that, in including the charge for the ten percent tax on the latter's accounts, the company was carrying out orders to that effect, and that any petition for exemption from the tax must be addressed to Colonel Uriarte.

I am confident that a mere reference to the treaty provisions above referred to will be sufficient indication that no petition for exemption can be required of the Legation whose treaty immunity from the taxation in question is already established, and in such circumstances I cannot but anticipate that instructions will be given to the Electric Light Company to discontinue a charge for the tax in accounts presented to the Legation.

It will be observed that, in virtue of the terms of Article 2 of the Madrid Convention of 1880, immunity from the tax in question also extends to the Legation's interpreters and other employees, whatever may be their nationality.

Moreover, the Legation makes full reservations in respect of the treaty immunity of American *ressortissants* from payment of this tax.

In requesting you to be good enough to bring this matter to the attention of Colonel Uriarte, please accept [etc.]

J. RIVES CHILDS

881.00/2061 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé at Tangier (Childs)

WASHINGTON, December 16, 1941—10 p. m.

159. Your 372, November 28, 1 p. m. In view of the apparent uncertainty of the precise purpose of the Delegate's note, the Department feels that the first and last paragraphs of your proposed reply constitute an adequate acknowledgment and offer of cooperation. However, it is suggested that in the last paragraph the word "adjusting" be substituted for the phrase "my informal endeavors to adjust".

HULL

⁴¹ Signed at Tangier, December 9, 1856, *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. XLVI, p. 188.

⁴² Signed at Madrid, November 20, 1861, *ibid.*, vol. LIII, p. 1089.

⁴³ Signed at Madrid, July 3, 1880, *Foreign Relations*, 1880, p. 917.

881.00/2086

The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State

No. 515

TANGIER, December 23, 1941.

[Received January 13, 1942.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to the Legation's despatch no. 468 of December 3, 1941 which transmitted copy of a note to the Spanish Consul in Tangier complaining of the excessive delays in the issuance by the Spanish Consulate at Casablanca of visas for American *res-sortissants* who desired to proceed from French Morocco to Tangier in transit through the Spanish Zone.

The Department will be pleased to note from the enclosed copy of a communication just received from my Spanish colleague,⁴⁴ that proper attention now appears to have been given to the Legation's complaint, the Spanish Consul at Casablanca having been instructed telegraphically from the High Commissariat at Tetuán to grant the visas in question. It is therefore hoped that the suggested intervention in the matter, of the Embassy in Madrid, will not now be necessary.

Respectfully yours,

J. RIVES CHILDS

881.00/2082

The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State

No. 517

TANGIER, December 24, 1941.

[Received January 13, 1942.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to my telegram No. 372, 1 p. m. of November 28, 1941, and to the Department's reply No. 159 of December 16, 1941, 10 p. m. and to report that, in accordance with the Department's instructions I have addressed the enclosed communication to Colonel Uriarte, Delegate in Tangier of the Spanish High Commissioner. There is likewise enclosed a copy and translation of Col. Uriarte's communication to me.⁴⁵

In view of the developments which have taken place since a draft acknowledgment to Col. Uriarte was submitted to the Department the Legation is of the opinion that the changes suggested by the Department in the draft are admirably adapted to the changed circumstances with which we are now confronted.

Respectfully yours,

J. RIVES CHILDS

⁴⁴ Not printed.⁴⁵ For content of enclosures, see the Chargé's telegram No. 372, November 28, 1 p. m., p. 575.

881.512/159

*The Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Murray) to the
Chargé at Tangier (Childs)*

WASHINGTON, December 29, 1941.

DEAR RIVES: I have received your despatch no. 443, November 11, 1941 in further explanation of your views on the imposition of the Spanish Zone fiscal regime in Tangier. I entirely understand your views regarding the possible advisability of payment by American *ressortissants* of such taxes imposed under the new regime as may be justified as compensation for services rendered or as being based on the Act of Algeciras, and you are of course correct in pointing out that the Department's policy in Manchukuo was to advise payment of taxes imposed for services.

In drafting the instruction of September 27⁴⁶ on this subject, our thought was, as expressed by Mr. Ward, that there is a certain undesirability in advising Americans to pay taxes to a regime which has usurped authority in Tangier by force of arms, even though we might not be disposed to oppose the payment of some of those taxes. That is, we did not wish to appear to give our approval to a measure whose application to our *ressortissants* is not legally justifiable. Possibly we should have indicated, however, that we did not intend to lay down a hard-and-fast rule. From a practical point of view, I think that you should feel free to use your own judgment in particular instances. I can imagine that a case might arise in which an arbitrary refusal to pay a tax normally and necessarily imposed in all countries for services rendered would stir up an entirely futile and harmful controversy.

Consequently, I should like to clarify the instruction of September 27 by saying that we are willing to leave you free to modify its terms, within the limits suggested in your despatch of August 12,⁴⁷ whenever in your judgment one of our *ressortissants* is likely to adopt an attitude not morally justifiable and possibly harmful to the relations of the Legation and the American colony with the Spanish authorities. In other words, while making it clear that this Government does not give its approval to the imposition of taxation on American *ressortissants* by an unrecognized authority, you may, when you consider it necessary, point out to inquirers that taxes are essential to the functioning of any administration and that, as a practical matter, it might be wiser to pay them. I have in mind, of course, the particular taxes which you mention in paragraphs "a") and "b"), pages 13 and 14 of your despatch of August 12.

Sincerely yours,

WALLACE MURRAY

⁴⁶ Instruction No. 90, p. 570.

⁴⁷ Despatch No. 300, not printed.

PROTEST BY THE UNITED STATES REGARDING SPANISH SEIZURE
OF CAPE SPARTEL LIGHTHOUSE

881.822/198 : Telegram

The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State

TANGIER, July 3, 1941.

[Received July 3—11:45 a. m.]

237. There has just been delivered a note dated July 2nd from the Spanish District Commissioner of Tangier reading in translation as follows:

"The Consul of the United States of America at Tangier.

My distinguished friend:

For your information I take pleasure in transmitting you herewith an order of His Excellency, the High Commissioner for Spain in Morocco, which proves [*provides?*] that on the fifth instant the lighthouse at Cape Spartel like all others in the Khalifian Zone will be confined to the direction and administration of the technical services of the Spanish Zone and consequently at 11 o'clock on the said day an engineer designated for the purpose will present himself to take charge of all the services of the lighthouse.

I avail myself of this occasion Mr. Consul to reiterate to you the assurances of my distinguished consideration. (Signed) Luis Carvajal."

The following is a translation of the enclosure:

"When after the Spanish Moroccan war of 1859-60 the Spanish Moroccan Commercial Treaty of 20th November 1861⁴⁸ was concluded in consequence of the Treaty of Peace, Spain in article 43 of that treaty obtained from the Sultan the engagement to construct a lighthouse at Cape Spartel and to supervise its conservation. Subsequently the Sultan not having kept this engagement, various nations, amongst them Spain, substituted themselves for the Sultan in this action and constituted what is known actually as the International Commission for the Maintenance and Conservation of the Lighthouse of Cape Spartel but without ceasing at any moment to recognize the absolute Moroccan character of this lighthouse. Now with the incorporation of the zone of Tangier within the protectorate of Spain in Morocco and it being shown that Spain was the first power to interest itself in this lighthouse and the international regime which governed the city of Tangier having disappeared and all the lighthouses existing in its zone having fallen under the dependency of the Khalifian Government, there is no reason to preserve the lighthouse at Cape Spartel under a special regime which for all these reasons lacks sense and purpose. In view of all the foregoing I have the honor to inform you that as from July 5 the lighthouse at Cape Spartel will be confined like all other lighthouses of the Khalifian Zone of the protectorate to the exclusive direction and administration of the com-

⁴⁸ *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. LIII, p. 1089.

petent technical services of the Spanish Zone which shall likewise be entrusted with the maintenance of the lighthouse."

Repeated to Madrid.

CHILDS

881.822/199 : Telegram

The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State

TANGIER, July 3, 1941—noon.

[Received 2:55 p. m.]

238. My 237.⁴⁹ The following communication has been made today to Colonel Luis Carvajal, Tangier.

"Sir:

I have received your letter of July 2, 1941, and enclosure with reference to the intention of the Spanish authorities to take possession, on July 5, 1941, of Cape Spartel Lighthouse which is now administered by an international commission under the terms of the Convention as to Cape Spartel Lighthouse of May 31, 1865⁵⁰ to which my Government as well as the Spanish Government are parties.

I have of course communicated the terms of your communication to the Department of State at Washington which will no doubt have a communication to make on the subject to the Spanish Government.

In the meanwhile, however, I must protest in the strongest possible terms against this unilateral decision of the Spanish authorities, which is in flagrant violation of the treaty engagements of the Spanish Government.

I am, sir, very truly yours,

Signed J. Rives Childs, American Chargé d'Affaires ad interim."

Repeated to Embassy at Madrid.

CHILDS

881.822/200 : Telegram

The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State

TANGIER, July 3, 1941—3 p. m.

[Received July 4—11:20 p. m.]

239. My 237 of July 3, and 238 July 3, noon. A meeting of the International Commission for Cape Spartel Lighthouse was held at noon an hour after the receipt of the communication quoted in my 237. I took part together with representatives of Belgium, France, Great Britain, Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden. The representatives of Italy and Spain were absent, the last named having excused himself on the grounds that he was too occupied to attend. I had

⁴⁹ *Supra.*

⁵⁰ William M. Malloy (ed.), *Treaties, Conventions, etc., Between the United States of America and Other Powers, 1776-1909* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1910), vol. I, p. 1217.

with me copies of the reply which I proposed to make to the Spanish communication. Those present agreed to make a substantially similar protest individually and at the same time agreement was reached on the French text of a reply to be made by the President of the Commission. The following is a translation of this text dated today :

“Mr. Administrator.

I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter of July 2, 1941, and I have not failed to convoke immediately the members of the International Cape Spartel Lighthouse Commission.

There have participated the representatives of Belgium, United States, France, Great Britain, Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden which unanimously have taken note of your communication and have decided to refer it to their respective Governments.

Moreover they have charged me to address you their protests against the unilateral decision taken by the Spanish authorities in violation of engagements resulting from treaties and to express the most formal reserves concerning the rights and responsibilities of the governments which they represent and of the Commission itself.

Please accept, Mr. Administrator, the assurance of my high consideration. Signed the Minister Plenipotentiary in charge of the Portuguese Consulate General, President of the International Cape Spartel Lighthouse Commission.”

CHILDS

881.822/201 : Telegram

The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State

TANGIER, July 3, 1941—4 p. m.

[Received July 4—11 : 55 p. m.]

240. My 239.⁵¹ In addition to agreeing upon the text of the note quoted in my 239 the Cape Spartel Commission unanimously agreed on the following pending instruction which may be received by the members of the Commission :

1. Archives to be retained by the Commission and delivery to the Spanish authorities refused in case a request for them is made.

2. Inventory to be made of all materials belonging to the Commission now on hand at the lighthouse.

3. No payments to be made from the funds belonging to the Commission except those for which engagements have been made prior to June 4 midnight. Another meeting of Commission will be held as soon as the members have received relevant instructions from their governments.

As the Department realizes, the Cape Spartel Lighthouse is the most important lighthouse within the vicinity of the Straits of Gibraltar and its proper functioning is highly important and often essen-

⁵¹ *Supra.*

tial to the safe navigation of these Straits. The members of Commission present this morning in informal discussions among themselves felt very strongly that the high-handed decision of the Spanish authorities was taken most probably under pressure of the German Government, which may wish to install its own personnel or one subject to its control at the lighthouse in order to interfere with Allied shipping and to provide a means of communication with Axis shipping.

Repeated to Madrid.

CHILDS

881.822/202 : Telegram

The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State

TANGIER, July 10, 1941—11 a. m.

[Received July 10—11 a. m.]

250. My telegram No. 237, July 3. Cape Spartel Lighthouse has been taken over by the Spanish authorities in accordance with the notification given.

The British Foreign Office has expressed the view to my British colleague that the failure of the Spanish Government to consult with the British Government prior to taking action with reference to Cape Spartel Lighthouse is considered to be a violation of the verbal assurances given to the Foreign Minister incident to the Anglo-Spanish Agreement of February 21, 1941,⁵² that no change would be made in Tangier without such prior consultation.

It is understood that the Foreign Office has instructed the Embassy at Washington to consult with the Department concerning the action to be taken in the light of the Spanish action.

Repeated to Madrid.

CHILDS

881.822/199 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé at Tangier (Childs)

WASHINGTON, July 12, 1941—7 p. m.

85. Your 238, July 3, noon. Your action approved. A note is being telegraphed to the Embassy at Madrid for presentation to the Spanish Government the text of which the Embassy will repeat to you.

WELLES

⁵² Effected by exchange of notes; English texts of notes were transmitted to the Department by the Chargé at Tangier in his despatch No. 128, March 7, 1941, not printed.

881.822/203 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Weddell)

WASHINGTON, July 12, 1941—8 p. m.

357. Reference telegrams dated July 3 from Legation at Tangier concerning Spanish action in regard to Cape Spartel Lighthouse. You should seek an immediate appointment with the Foreign Minister and, unless you perceive some compelling objection, deliver to him the following note:

“My Government has learned with surprise that the Spanish High Commissioner in Morocco, presumably acting under instructions of the Spanish Government, has issued orders for taking over the direction and administration of the lighthouse at Cape Spartel as of July 5, 1941, and for maintenance of the lighthouse thereafter by the technical services of the Spanish Zone in Morocco. The action in question, taken on a scant 3 days notice, dismissed in a most summary manner the fact that the lighthouse is actually administered by an International Commission under the terms of the Cape Spartel Lighthouse Convention of May 31, 1865, to which the Government of the United States, as well as the Spanish Government, is a party.

My Government declines to admit the right of the Spanish Government unilaterally to terminate an international agreement, in accordance with the provisions of which the Spanish Government specifically engaged itself to cooperate with the representatives of other nations in the care and management of a service designed to protect an important world shipping route. The abrupt decision of the Spanish authorities, by which they have taken upon themselves the sole responsibility for terminating this international engagement of long standing, was made without prior consultation with those governments whose rights are affected and without regard for the terms and conditions of an existing treaty.

The Government of the United States is informed that the President of the International Commission has already protested the action of the Spanish High Commissioner in Morocco and has expressed the most formal reservation of the rights and responsibilities of the governments represented on the Commission and of the Commission itself. The American Chargé d’Affaires at Tangier has likewise delivered a strong written protest to the Spanish District Commissioner in that city. I am now instructed by my Government to associate myself with those protests and to urge upon the Spanish Government the importance and desirability, in the interest of international relations, of the prompt annulment of the order of the Spanish High Commissioner and the resumption of administration of the Cape Spartel Lighthouse by the International Commission exclusively authorized to perform that function under a valid subsisting international agreement which the United States and Spain and all other signatories have a clear obligation to respect.”

Please repeat to Tangier.

WELLES

881.822/205 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, July 21, 1941—10 p. m.

[Received July 22—2:11 p. m.]

666. Department's telegram No. 357, July 12, 8 p. m. Note dated July 15th delivered personally to Foreign Minister today.

Repeated to Tangier.

WEDDELL

[No reply to the above-mentioned note has been found in the Department's files, and apparently a settlement of the issue was left in abeyance.]

CONSENT BY THE UNITED STATES, WITH RESERVATIONS, TO THE APPLICATION OF CERTAIN DECREES IN THE FRENCH ZONE OF MOROCCO TO AMERICAN NATIONALS AND PROTÉGÉS⁵³

881.512/157

The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State

No. 364

TANGIER, September 30, 1941.

[Received October 22.]

SIR: I have the honor to inform the Department that by note of June 25, 1941 the French Resident General has made formal application for the Department's assent to the application to American *ressortissants* in the French Zone of Morocco of dahirs and vizirial decrees concerning an income tax, and the "patente" tax (license tax on trades and professions) and a supplement of the "patente" tax.

The delay in transmitting the translation and analyses of these decrees is due to pressure of work in respect of more urgent matters.

The following are the taxation measures above referred to:

Income tax

Vizirial decree of December 7, 1940 modifying a similar decree of December 19, 1939 concerning the application of the dahir of October 30, 1939 which instituted an exceptional and temporary levy upon public and private salaries, pensions, annuities, etc. (Enclosure no. 1);⁵⁴

Dahir of May 20, 1941 modifying the dahir of October 30, 1939 concerning the levy on salaries, etc. (Enclosure no. 2).

⁵³ Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. III, pp. 823-829.

⁵⁴ Enclosures mentioned in this despatch not printed.

Supplement to the "patente" tax

Dahir of April 12, 1941 instituting a supplement to the "patente" tax. (Enclosure no. 3);

Decree of the Director of Finance dated April 15, 1941 concerning the application of the last mentioned dahir. (Enclosure no. 4);

Decree of the Director of Finance dated April 15, 1941 fixing the percentage coefficients to be applied to business turnovers for the purpose of assessing the supplement to the "patente" tax. (Enclosure no. 5).

"Patente" tax

Dahir of December 19, 1940 modifying and completing the dahir of October 9, 1920 which created a "patente" tax (license tax on trades and professions). (Enclosure no. 6).

A brief analysis of the dahirs and vizirial decrees above mentioned is given below and reservations, as their provisions may seem to require, are suggested in regard to each decree.

Income tax

Enclosure no. 1 consists of a vizirial decree of December 7, 1940 which modifies a similar decree of December 19, 1939 concerning the enforcement of a dahir of October 30, 1939 which created a levy on public and private salaries, pensions and annuities. The modifications involve minor amendments of the original text. The only clause of any note is Article 2 which adds two articles to the original decree, namely, Article 8 bis and 8 ter, under which commercial representatives or sales agents who are exempted from the payment of the "patente" tax are made liable for the payment of the income tax on emoluments derived from their operations in French Morocco.

Enclosure no. 2 comprises a dahir of May 20, 1941 exempting from taxation allowances and other indemnities granted in respect of family burdens.

In the case of neither of the above decrees do the modifications which they contain affect the substance of the law in such a manner as to require reservations other than those set forth in the Department's instruction no. 12 of November 1, 1940 (file no. 881.512/151)⁵⁵ which assented to the original legislation. The Legation is therefore of the opinion that the Department's assent may be given to the dahir of May 20, 1941 and to the vizirial decree of December 7, 1940 under the same conditions, namely, that in as much as the taxation is exceptional and temporary, the American Government's assent thereto is temporary in character and subject to withdrawal.

It may be stated here that in its note of November 25, 1940 which, in pursuance of instruction no. 12 above mentioned, notified the Resi-

⁵⁵ See *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. III, p. 828, footnote 79.

dency General of the position taken by the Department concerning these income tax measures, the Legation added the following observation which it is presumed will meet with the approval of the Department:

"As regards the taxation on public and private salaries provided for in the dahirs of October 30, 1939 and December 19, 1939, the above assent does not imply any derogation from the treaty provisions concerning the immunity from taxation of consular officers and their personnel."

Supplement to the "patente" tax

While Enclosure nos. 1 and 2 relate to a tax on salaries, pensions, annuities and income of a like nature, a dahir of April 12, 1941 introduces a "supplement to the Patente Tax" which is, in effect, an income tax on the profits of commercial and industrial concerns and on professional incomes which is the subject of the following comments:

The dahir of April 12, 1941 (Enclosure no. 3) above referred to, abrogates and substitutes a dahir of October 30, 1939 (see Enclosure no. 6 to the Legation's despatch no. 1546 of July 5, 1940⁵⁶) which increased the "patente" tax rates by 50 percent, and a dahir of December 22, 1939 (Enclosure no. 7 to the same despatch) which imposed a limitation on profits operated by means of levies on the gross amount of public contracts and similar levies on the turnover of specified concerns. These two last mentioned dahirs, remarks the preamble to the dahir of April 12, 1941, did not adequately meet the situation, the one falling partially but severely on the profits of certain enterprises, and the other failing to take into account the veritable activities of the tax payers. For these reasons they have been substituted by the "Supplement to the Patente Tax" which purports to provide a more equitable basis of taxation.

The "Supplement" is levied on the tax payers' profit which is to be represented by certain decreed percentages of the previous year's turnover. Any taxpayer may, however, demand that his assessment be effected on the basis of his net profits. Profits calculated on either basis below fifty thousand francs are exempt from the tax. Between fifty thousand and five hundred thousand the tax rate proceeds in ascending scale from two to five percent.

Taxpayers' complaints as to the basis on which they are assessed, are referred to a commission composed of the President of the Court of First Instance, the Chief of the Direct Taxation Service, and a representative of the Claims Bureau of the Protectorate Government. If the taxpayer is a native Moroccan, a representative appointed by the Grand Vizir also sits on the commission in an advisory capacity,

⁵⁶ For despatch No. 1546, see *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. III, p. 823; enclosures not printed.

and a similar advisory representative, on the demand of a non-Moroccan taxpayer, may be added from the Federated Chambers of Commerce (American Chamber of Commerce not included in the Federation) or from the particular professional board governing the profession of the taxpayer concerned. There is no appeal from the decisions of this commission.

These are the basic lines of the taxation measures in question.

In view of the fact that instruction no. 12 of November 1, 1940 above referred to has created a precedent for the temporary and withdrawable assent to Moroccan income tax measures, the Legation perceives no objection to a similar conditional assent to the dahir under reference instituting a "Supplement to the Patente Tax", which the text of the law also declares to be an exceptional and temporary measure.

However, in addition to the usual reservations the Legation suggests a further proviso that the question of the justice and equity of amounts assessed on American *ressortissants* in respect of the tax shall be exclusively within the competence of the American consular courts in Morocco. This suggestion is made in as much as the functions of the Claims Commission created under the terms of Article 10 of the dahir of April 12, 1941 appear to involve an encroachment upon American extra-territorial jurisdiction. It may be pointed out that a reservation in the same terms as that above suggested was made by the Department in regard to a dahir of November 30, 1927 which instituted a tax on city building sites. (See instruction no. 483 of June 27, 1928, file no. 881.512/59⁵⁷).

Such a reservation would mean that, contrary to the terms of the dahir, the decision of the commission above mentioned in regard to assessments on American *ressortissants* is not final and, if an American taxpayer be sued by the tax authorities for payment of his "patente" supplement, the assessment by the said commission may be revised by that court. It would also follow that American *ressortissants* may not be compelled to submit their complaints to the commission, but may contest with the tax authorities the justice of their assessment and, if no agreement is reached, leave it to those authorities to seek a final decision of the matter through prosecution of the taxpayer in the American consular court. In other words, in so far as concerns American *ressortissants* the effect of the proposed reservation would be the substitution of that court for the commission.

Enclosure no. 4 represents a decree dated April 15 [25], 1941 of the Director of Finance which sets forth the procedure to be followed in the administration of the law. It defines net profit as the excess of the turnover over the aggregate charges and expenses

⁵⁷ Not printed.

engaged in the operation of the business and enumerates these charges as rent, taxes, normal interest paid to partners, and reserve funds to meet specified losses rendered probable by present circumstances. It calls for no comment or reservation.

Enclosure no. 5 comprises a decree dated April 15, 1941 of the Director of Finance which defines the term turnover as the sum made up of the aggregate amounts of sales, gross receipts, brokerages, commissions, insurance premiums collected, or other items of revenue of the various classes of taxable businesses. The decree also fixes the coefficients applicable to the turnover of the businesses for the purpose of computing their taxable profits. A table of these coefficients which vary according to the character of the concerns and the nature of the businesses in which they are engaged, is annexed to this decree. Owing to the pressure of work a translation of this table consisting of some 500 items has not been made, but some examples are given below of the coefficients applicable to businesses in which American *ressortissants* are engaged in French Morocco:

<i>Item No. in table</i>	<i>Business</i>	<i>Decreed percentage of turnover which represents net profit</i>
51	Wholesaler (exporter) of offal, tripery, guts, etc	8
116	Wholesaler of lubricating oils, petroleum and gasoline	10
138	Retailer of ditto	20
222	Wholesaler of raw hides and skins	8
302	Wholesaler of rubber tires	10
308	Manufacturer of de luxe cars and automobile bodies	12
314	Dealers in automobiles, spare parts and accessories	15
316	Dealer in typewriters	20
330	Dealer in phonographs and records	20
331	Dealer in radio goods	20
378	Steamship agent	40
387	Purchase and sale of real property	25
397	Commission agent	60
399	Commercial sales agent	60
407	Innkeeper	20
465	Dentist	50

There would appear to be no necessity to enter into the question as to whether or not the decreed percentages on turnover represent equitably or reasonably the net profit of any given business. This is a matter for the consideration of each taxpayer who, in any event, has the option to demand the assessment of his tax upon his actual net profits. American *ressortissants* would be protected in this re-

gard by the reservation discussed in the final paragraphs of the comments on Enclosure no. 3.

No other special reservations are suggested in respect of this decree.

"Patente" tax

Enclosure no. 6 consists of a dahir of December 14 [19], 1940 which modifies and completes the dahir of October 9, 1920 which instituted the "patente" tax. The modifications are as follows:

Article 1 adds to professions exempted from payment of the "patente" tax, commercial travelers, representatives and canvassers provided they effect no transactions for their own account and that their relations with their principals are duly defined by contracts in writing.

Article 2 of the dahir provides that supplementary taxes will be applied to concerns which, in the course of a tax year, become liable to higher rates of taxation incidental to change or enlargement of business or to removal to other districts.

The tables annexed to the dahir embody a general revision of the ratable classification of professions and occupations.

Subject to the usual reservations and subject to the remarks contained in the succeeding paragraph, there would appear to be no objection to the Department's validation of the application to American *ressortissants* of the dahir and annexes under reference.

In as much as under Table B (second class) furniture removal contractors are to pay a tax of 15 francs per horse power unit on their motor vehicles, an additional reservation should be included from the Department's instruction no. 19 of November 29, 1940 (file no. 881.512/153)⁵⁸ to the effect that consent is not given to the variable taxes in the tariffs which involve assessment on the basis of the horse power of motor vehicles, in as much as this basis of taxation is deemed to be discriminatory against American manufactured automobiles.

The taxation referred to in Enclosure no. 6 is of a normal and permanent character. Consequently the Department's assent thereto would not be temporary or withdrawable as in the cases of the income tax and supplement to the "patente" tax.

Respectfully yours,

J. RIVES CHILDS

881.512/157

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé at Tangier (Childs)*⁵⁹

No. 106

WASHINGTON, December 2, 1941.

SIR: The Department has received your despatch no. 364 of September 30, 1941, informing the Department that the French Resident General has made formal application for the Department's assent to

⁵⁸ *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. III, p. 829.

⁵⁹ A note in accordance with this instruction was addressed to the French Resident General, January 22, 1942; not printed.

the application to American *ressortissants* in the French Zone of Morocco of various taxation dahirs and decrees, these relating to an income tax, the "patente" tax, and a supplement to the "patente" tax.

You may inform the French Resident General that, subject to the reservations suggested by the Legation, which should be embodied in your note to that official, this Government consents to the application of these dahirs and decrees to American nationals and American protected persons as of the date this Government's consent is conveyed to the French Resident General, provided that they are applied also, of course, to all other nationals without discrimination.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

A. A. BERLE, JR.

**ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES CONCERNING ANTI-JEWISH
LEGISLATION IN THE FRENCH ZONE OF MOROCCO**

881.4016/11

*The Secretary of the American Jewish Committee (Morris D.
Waldman) to the Secretary of State*

NEW YORK, March 31, 1941.

[Received April 2.]

DEAR SIR: On behalf of my fellow-officers and the Executive Committee of the American Jewish Committee, I beg leave to call your attention to the following subject, which we regard as one of concern to the government of the United States.

According to a decree of the present government of France, published in the *Journal Officiel* of October 18, all persons "descended from three grandparents of the Jewish race, or descended from two grandparents of the same race and married to a Jewish consort" are denied access to and exercise of public functions and commissions which cover practically all branches of the public service, civil and military, as well as participation in all publishing, motion picture, and radio broadcasting enterprises. Article IX of this decree states: "The present law applies to Algeria, the colonies, protectorates and mandated territories."

One of the territories to which this law applies is the Protectorate of Morocco, which, according to the census of 1936, had a Jewish population of 161,312 persons in a total population of 6,298,528. You will recall that, on the occasion of the Algeciras Conference in 1906, at which the Government of the United States was represented by Mr. Henry White, he was instructed by Elihu Root, then Secretary of State, to urge upon the Conference "the consideration of guarantees of religious and racial tolerance in Morocco." *Foreign Relations of*

the United States for 1905, p. 680.) In the official protocol of the Conference, of April 2, 1906, Mr. White is quoted as saying: "The American Delegation urges the Conference to be willing to propose the vote, that H. Shereefian Majesty continue in the good work inaugurated by his father and maintained by His Majesty himself in reference to his Jewish subjects, and that he see to it that his government does not neglect any occasion to make known to its functionaries that the Sultan maintains that the Jews of his Empire and all his subjects, without distinction of faith, should be treated with justice and equality." Representatives of all the Powers participating in the Conference supported the proposal of Mr. White and the resolution offered by him was unanimously adopted by the delegates of the Powers. (*Nouveau Recueil Général de Traités*, II Series, Vol. 34, Pt. 1, pp. 229-230.)

It is respectfully submitted that, regardless of the present status of the General Act of the International Conference at Algeciras,⁶⁰ the Government of the United States, in proposing the resolution which was adopted unanimously by the Conference, assumed a moral responsibility for the equal treatment of all subjects of the Protectorate of French Morocco. This equal treatment is obviously violated by the extension to Morocco of the anti-Jewish discriminatory decree already referred to.

My colleagues and I express the hope that, should a favorable opportunity present itself, the Government of the United States will make appropriate representations to the French Government on the basis of the resolution adopted at the Algeciras Conference upon the initiative of the Government of the United States.

Respectfully yours,

MORRIS D. WALDMAN

881.4016/13

The Secretary of State to the Secretary of the American Jewish Committee (Morris D. Waldman)

WASHINGTON, October 17, 1941.

MY DEAR MR. WALDMAN: In your letter of March 31, 1941, you raised certain questions regarding anti-Jewish legislation in the French Zone of Morocco. In the Department's reply of April 11, 1941,⁶¹ you were informed that the American Legation at Tangier had been requested to submit a report on the matter. This report⁶¹ has now been received and, together with the relevant documents in

⁶⁰ Signed April 7, 1906, *Foreign Relations*, 1906, pt. 2, p. 1495.

⁶¹ Not printed.

the Department's archives, has been given careful study. As a result of this study the following facts have been developed:

1. The proposal of the American delegation at the Algeciras Conference, referred to in your letter of March 31, 1941, was in no sense a demand or requirement that the Sultan of Morocco should give a guarantee of equality of treatment of Jews and other subjects in Morocco, but was merely an expression of a wish or trust that the Sultan continue the good policy which he had carried on after the reign of his father with respect to such persons in Morocco. In this connection it may be noted that the word "Voeu" appearing in the resolution does not mean "vote", but "wish", "desire", or "trust".

2. At the Algeciras Conference Mr. White was directed to urge "the consideration of guarantees of religious and racial tolerance in Morocco" (*Foreign Relations*, 1905, page 680) as you suggest. A subsequent instruction (*Foreign Relations*, 1906, [pt. 2], page 1487) cancelled that instruction; and this cancellation was apparently due to the express request of representative Jews in Morocco who expressed themselves as satisfied with their treatment by the Sultan. The text of the telegram which Secretary Root sent to Mr. White on March 28, 1906, was as follows:

"In view of the statement in your dispatch of January 30⁶³ and Mr. Einstein's report and Mr. Pimienta's suggestion, we do not consider it necessary or desirable that you should present the subject of the treatment of Jews in Morocco to the conference as directed by the special instructions to you on that subject. You need not present the subject to the conference at all. You are, however, at liberty to ask for an expression in the sense of your dispatch of January 20,⁶⁴ and in general conformity to the views of Mr. Pimienta, if, upon further consultation, you are of the opinion that it would be of practical benefit."

In the circumstances, as outlined above, I believe you will agree that the proceedings of the Algeciras Conference and the instructions given the American delegate, which are, of course, public knowledge, do not provide a satisfactory basis for action by this Government along the lines suggested in your letter of March 31, 1941.

So far as the general question of religious freedom is concerned, the attitude of this Government is well known to all the European Powers through numerous authoritative statements which have been made. A further statement at this time, as you will readily understand, is not likely to accomplish any useful result, and it seems probable that any real progress in this direction must await a general solution of the European problem.

⁶³ *Foreign Relations*, 1906, pt. 2, p. 1471.

⁶⁴ Not printed.

For the present, bearing in mind particularly the situation in the French Zone of Morocco, it seems clear that all that can be done is to see that all practicable measures are taken for the proper protection of American interests should any American citizen or protégé be affected by the legislation to which you referred in your letter of March 31. I should add that up to the present the Department has not been informed that any American *ressortissants* have been affected by the legislation in question.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:
ADOLF A. BERLE, JR.
Assistant Secretary

PALESTINE

ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD ZIONIST AND ARAB AGITATION REGARDING BRITISH POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE FUTURE STATUS OF PALESTINE¹

867N.01/1740

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs
(Murray)*²

[WASHINGTON,] April 10, 1941.

While calling on another matter a day or two ago, Mr. Nevile Butler, Counselor of the British Embassy, inquired what we knew of the American-Palestine Committee which had recently been formed in this country. I explained that we understood it to be a committee made up of senators, congressmen, two or three Cabinet members, and other prominent citizens, which had been organized by certain Zionist interests in this country. In that respect it was similar to, if not a continuation of, a committee of the same name formed some years ago to influence American opinion during one of the crises in Palestine. Mr. Butler said that from their point of view he felt that the formation of this committee was particularly unfortunate at this time and that if the Embassy had not been so occupied with other matters it would have made an effort to talk to some of the prospective members of the committee and explain to them some of the dangers inherent in such an organization. In explanation of this statement, Mr. Butler said that he was most fearful that the formation of this committee would be broadcast by the Germans and the Italians throughout the Arab world and would serve further to stir up difficulties with the British in Iraq and other Arab countries. Mr. Butler added that he hoped as occasion arose officials of the Department could explain this to any members of the committee with whom it was possible to discuss the question.

In this general connection I believe you will be interested in certain information which Mr. Harold Hoskins of FC³ has recently obtained during discussions in New York. Mr. Hoskins went to New York to discuss with the leaders of certain Syrian organizations there their

¹ For previous correspondence on this general subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. III, pp. 830 ff.

² Addressed to Assistant Secretary of State Berle, Under Secretary of State Welles, and the Secretary of State.

³ Division of Foreign Activity Correlation.

attitude toward this country and toward the war, and I quote below the pertinent section of his report:

"From talks with the heads of all three organizations listed above, as well as with various individual Syrians, it is evident that this group is extremely loyal to the United States, anxious in every way to cooperate with the Government, and welcomes the idea of any request by the Government for their active efforts.

"None of these organizations is asking the United States Government to do anything for the Arabs, but all appear equally anxious that the United States Government should not take any position officially in support of the Zionist movement that calls for a political Jewish state in Palestine when, even today, 80 per cent of Palestine's population is Arab, not Jewish.

"The leaders in these organizations would not, for instance, be interested in supporting short wave broadcasts from the United States to the Near East unless they had assurances that no pro-Zionist position was contemplated by the United States Government.

"Most Syrians, particularly the members of the Arab National League, favor the development of some form of independent federated Arab state in the Near East along the lines perhaps of the Iraq and Egyptian states, and they realize that such an Arab federation would require the backing of some foreign power. Naturally they would prefer this supporting power to be the United States, but since this seems unlikely they definitely prefer British to German support.

"In fact, the only fear expressed by any of the Syrians interviewed was that the British, by being too pro-Zionist in Palestine, would antagonize the 70,000,000 people of the Arab-speaking world and would thus give the German propaganda its opportunity to gain the support that it could not otherwise obtain."

I believe it is impossible to overemphasize the difficulties which can be caused the British through the Arab-speaking world by propaganda issued by the Axis Powers to the effect that Great Britain and the United States are supporting the Jewish National Home in Palestine to the detriment of the Arab peoples.⁴

WALLACE MURRAY

867N.01/1729½

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)⁵

[WASHINGTON,] April 14, 1941.

We have been revolving the Arabian problem. The salient facts seem to be:

⁴ Assistant Secretary Berle made the following observations on April 29: "Mr. Neville Butler made this same observation to me the other day. About the only thing to be done now is to play the matter down a little. I have spoken to Senator Wagner's office (he himself was in Florida). I have likewise suggested to the White House that the President do not send a message of greeting to the American Palestine Committee dinner."

⁵ Addressed to the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Murray) and Under Secretary of State Welles.

(a) There is now a pro-German government in Iraq which has control of the army.⁶

(b) There is a Nationalist Government in Syria which probably will not do very much to resist German infiltration.

(c) The position of Ibn Saud⁷ is still in doubt.

(d) Palestine is garrisoned by British troops.

The heart of the anti-British, anti-American propaganda and the consideration which prevents Arabs either here or in Arabia from backing the Allies is their fear of increased political dominion by the Zionist groups.

The British cannot detach a force sufficient to take care of all these situations. They need that force for defense of Egypt on the west, for the Balkan campaign and for the defense of Singapore. The Persian Gulf-Tigris and Euphrates line of communication into Turkey is thus pretty well cut, unless there is some major reversal of Arab sentiment.

It seems to me that we can only attack this by an attempt to resolve the Zionist controversy, and when that is done, to put ourselves into a position to make certain effective promises to the Arabian groups. We can easily get our case stated in Arabia, partly through our missions and still more through interested Arabian groups here once we have something definite to say.

The head of the Zionist movement, Dr. Weizmann, is in the United States now. He ought to be able to see the main desideratum, namely, that if the Mediterranean is closed, the extermination of the Zionists in Palestine is only a question of time. If he does see this, it might be possible to get him to take a more reasonable attitude than has been taken heretofore, namely, that the British ought to put enough force into Arabia to guarantee the Zionist political dominion.

It seems to me that it would be pertinent, in any event, to have Dr. Weizmann in and put the situation up to him. I propose exploring this further with the Near Eastern Division and establishing at least tentative contact with Weizmann with a view to possibly taking the matter up with him should it seem possible that we can do anything.

867N.01/1739

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State
(Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] April 15, 1941.

Dr. Emanuel Neumann⁸ came in to see me. I had intimated that I should be glad to see someone representing Dr. Weizmann, informally.

⁶ See pp. 486 ff.

⁷ Abdul Aziz ibn Saud, King of Saudi Arabia.

⁸ Secretary to Dr. Chaim Weizmann.

Dr. Neumann explained that Dr. Weizmann would have come himself, but that he was not well.

I said that I had nothing particular in mind, except that I wanted to go over the situation of the Zionists in Palestine in the light of the present unfavorable moves. Many of these people were American citizens, or of American origin, and we have had a very considerable interest in the Zionist situation.

I said that while we had every hope that it would not occur, we had at least to consider the possibility that the British might be so hard beset that they did not have force available to defend Palestine. There had been a more or less pro-German *coup d'état* in Iraq; and the Germans were, of course, attacking Egypt.

I said I thought it would be the part of statesmanship for the group Dr. Weizmann represented to consider what they might do in that situation. They would then be face to face with the Arabs, without any screen of protecting force. It would seem that some sort of understanding with the Arabs might at that time become a crucial necessity. I did not presume to suggest whether, or how, it could be done—but merely expressed the personal hope that they would consider the matter and possibly consult a little with Mr. Wallace Murray, in the event that they had any tangible ideas.

Dr. Neumann said he appreciated our interest in the matter, and was glad we were thinking about it. They themselves were canvassing various ideas.

867N.01/1729½

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs
(Murray) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] April 16, 1941.

MR. WELLES: I concur in Mr. Berle's views as expressed in the attached memorandum.⁹ Certainly it could do no harm to explore the situation with Dr. Weizmann. However, I am doubtful whether he would agree to any modification of Zionist policy. Moreover, I am doubtful whether any offers or promises which Dr. Weizmann might make at this eleventh hour would be acceptable to the Arabs. Doubtless the Arabs now believe that they have a whole loaf within their grasp in the shape of the expulsion of the Jews from Palestine or their extermination. Why, therefore, should they accept half a loaf in the shape of a commitment from the Jews that the latter would abandon in whole or in part their plan for a National Home in Palestine?

⁹ Dated April 14, p. 597

Nevertheless, it is no solution merely to point out the difficulties. Therefore, provided it is practicable from a domestic viewpoint, I believe some useful purpose might be served by exploring the situation with Dr. Weizmann with a view to seeing whether something can be done to salvage the situation in the Middle East.

WALLACE MURRAY

867N.01/1741

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] April 21, 1941.

Mr. Butler of the British Embassy called on me this afternoon at the request of Lord Halifax.¹⁰

Mr. Butler first spoke of the great concern occasioned the Embassy by the announcement of the dinner which was to be held in Washington on April 30 under the aegis of Senator Wagner and some other equally prominent Senators and of Mr. William Green of the American Federation of Labor at which Doctor Weizmann is due to speak in behalf of the Zionist movement in Palestine. The British Embassy feels that German propaganda is now directed in the Arab world towards making it appear that the British Government is completely under the domination of the United States and that the United States would force Great Britain at the end of the war, if Great Britain is victorious, to open up all of Palestine to Jewish resettlement. The British Government believes that this is an exceedingly dangerous form of propaganda and that if speeches are now made in the United States by prominent persons high in the Government advocating the immediate opening up of Palestine to the Jewish resettlement planners in the event of a British victory, very great unrest will be created in the Arab world, particularly in Iraq, where a highly critical situation already exists. The British Government urged that the Executive branch of this Government do what it could to make this situation clear to the sponsors of the dinner.

I said that I would be very glad to look into the matter and that I would let Mr. Butler know in the immediate future what steps, if any, could be taken in that direction.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

¹⁰ The Ambassador had called on the Secretary of State on April 19 regarding this pro-Jewish activity and had been told that it would be difficult to deal with the matter.

867N.01/1735

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division
of Near Eastern Affairs (Alling)*

[WASHINGTON,] April 22, 1941.

While calling today on another matter the Turkish Ambassador¹¹ said that he had been rather disturbed by a newspaper report to the effect that seventy United States Senators had joined in making a declaration calling for "every possible encouragement to the movement for the restoration of the Jews in Palestine". The Ambassador said that in his opinion such activities were particularly harmful to the British cause in the Near East and might also be expected to have unfavorable repercussions for the Jews themselves. The Ambassador added that his Government had had long experience in dealing with the Arabs and knew their mentality thoroughly. There was not the slightest question in his mind that activities in the United States favoring further Jewish immigration into and control of Palestine were used by the Axis Powers in their propaganda with the Arab countries. Every such activity as that of the American Palestine Committee only further inflamed Arab opinion and increased the difficulties of the British in the vital area of the Near East. I told the Ambassador that of course the Senators and Members of Congress were quite free to join any committee which they pleased and that obviously the executive branch of the Government had no control over such activities. The Ambassador said he fully realized this fact, but he wondered whether the Senators themselves realized that in foreign countries their activities on behalf of the Jewish National Home could only be interpreted as representing the policy of the United States Government. He said that people abroad were generally quite aware of the importance and influence of the United States Senators and attached great importance to declarations such as that which had been recently made by the seventy Senators. The Ambassador went on to say that any activities which served to inflame the Arabs in the Near East and to add to the difficulties of the British were naturally of great interest to his own Government, which was in alliance with Great Britain. He added that the question indeed went beyond the Arab countries and affected India as well. He said that he had many close friends among the Indian Moslems and that he could give me his solemn assurance that the Moslem group in India upon whom Great Britain depended for support in that country could be only adversely affected by statements such as that made by the seventy

¹¹ Mehmet Münir Erteğin.

Senators. He said that it was unnecessary for him to stress the importance to Great Britain of the loyal Moslems of India and the unfortunate repercussions that might ensue if they felt that their co-religionists in Palestine were not being given equitable treatment.

I asked the Ambassador if he desired me to make a memorandum of this conversation for the information of the executive officers of the Department, and he said he would be very glad to have that done.

367N.1115/218 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Steger) to the Secretary of State

JERUSALEM, May 1, 1941—3 p. m.

[Received May 2—10:25 a. m.]

63. Recent war developments have resulted in considerable uneasiness, though not panic, among Americans, particularly Jews, who fear that in the event of German occupation those of their race would not only receive especially harsh treatment from the Germans but might also be menaced by a recrudescence of Arab terrorism.

British officials while somewhat perturbed profess confidence that Palestine is not immediately menaced. Chief Secretary in conversation with me yesterday declared British have no thought of evacuating Palestine. When I mentioned tentative plans made in compliance with Department's instruction of August 31, 1936¹² for protection of Americans in case of emergency he stated that no such plans, even tentative, had been prepared with respect to British civilians. He then added in reply to my question that should an emergency arise making advisable such evacuation the Government would be pleased to lend the Consulate General such assistance as might be possible in evacuating Americans.

In view of numerous recent inquiries I should appreciate receiving as soon as it may be available to the Department information as to passenger facilities on American vessels which, it is understood, may shortly be reaching Egypt via the Red Sea.

Since drafting above I have been informed by Military Intelligence officer that persistent rumors yesterday and today report landing of air-borne German troops in Syria.¹³ These reports are not from British agents, are unconfirmed, and the officer in question does not credit them, although he said that London considers it not impossible that such an attempt may be made.

STEGER

¹² Not printed.

¹³ For correspondence on this subject, see pp. 686 ff.

867N.01/1778

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs
(Murray) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] May 3, 1941.

MR. BERLE: We have given very careful consideration to your suggestions regarding possible action with Ibn Saud with a view to preventing outbreaks in Palestine. As we see it the situation is as follows:

At the present time the British are supposed to have 20,000-30,000 troops in Palestine. This should be sufficient to prevent any outbreaks between the Arab and Jewish populations. The dangerous period would come if the Axis powers succeed in reaching Suez and then push on to Palestine, driving the British before them. In the event of such an operation there would probably be a period of two or three days before the Germans had consolidated their positions when attacks upon Jews by Arabs would be likely to take place. Unless there is an immediate break-through in Egypt, therefore, it would not seem that the Jews are in imminent danger. However, it must be admitted that such danger may not be far off. The question is how Ibn Saud can best be used to avert a possible massacre in Palestine. It is our view that a political approach such as you had in mind would take some time to prepare. It would presumably involve discussions with the British, whose interests are directly affected, and it would of course also be necessary to consider what reactions and repercussions such a proposal might have upon other Arab leaders, for example, those of Egypt, Palestine, Trans-Jordan, Syria and Iraq. Our preliminary view is that this political proposal has so many possible repercussions which could not be foreseen that it would be rather dangerous to follow at this time. Furthermore, if our understanding is correct that you envisaged that Ibn Saud should offer physical protection to the Jews in Palestine, there are these considerations: First, he is in an extremely weakened economic position at the present time and it is doubtful whether he would have the forces to accomplish any such task. This is entirely aside from the question whether he could, as the outstanding leader in the Arab world, assume the job of protecting the Jews without losing face with his coreligionists in the neighboring Arab countries. Moreover, in order to reach Palestine it would be necessary for Ibn Saud to march across Trans-Jordan, which, as you will recall, is governed by the Emir Abdullah, a member of the Hashimite family, with whom the Saudis have long been at enmity. In these circumstances we would suggest an approach along the following lines:

I believe that a message from the President to Ibn Saud transmitted through our Legation at Cairo would be the first step. In such a

message I would propose that the President appeal to Ibn Saud's sense of chivalry to use his influence with his coreligionists in Palestine toward preventing any widespread massacres. We would be justified in making such an approach because of the large number of American nationals of the Jewish race actually living in Palestine. In this message we could point that it would be a tragedy for the Arab world if the Arab race should permit outbreaks in Palestine against defenseless Jews. This theme could be enlarged upon and developed, and I am attaching hereto a rough draft of such a message.¹⁴

In this same message I believe we could also inform Ibn Saud that the unsatisfactory economic conditions in his country have been brought to our attention and that we are examining what steps we may be able to take to be of assistance to him. We could then consider within the next few days whether it would be desirable and feasible to extend Ibn Saud assistance under the terms of the Lend-Lease Act, possibly in conjunction with the proposal which Mr. James Moffett recently made to the President.¹⁵ This proposal, you will recall, involved the purchase of petroleum products from Saudi Arabia for the use of the Navy. The funds paid for this petroleum would be turned over to Ibn Saud at the same time the British would be requested to increase the subsidy which they are now paying to him.

A further possibility exists in the matter of according immediate aid to Ibn Saud. You will recall that one of the ships, the S. S. *Kassandra*, bearing supplies to Greece was stopped in the Mediterranean just at the time of the Greek collapse and brought back to Port Said. The Red Cross is now considering what should be done with these supplies. I have no doubt that many of them would be of immediate value and usefulness to Ibn Saud. In addition two or three more Red Cross shipments are now en route, originally being intended for Greece. Our Legation at Cairo has proposed that these vessels put in at Aden and await instructions. No doubt some of the supplies on these vessels could also be released to Ibn Saud. I might add that these supplies were, according to my understanding, purchased with the funds appropriated by Congress for relief abroad and they are therefore presumably at the disposition of this Government.

It seems to me that these two lines of approach to Ibn Saud, one appealing to his sense of chivalry, honor and justice, and the other intended to assist in solving his present desperate economic situation, would afford a realistic method of obtaining his great influence in preventing a catastrophe in Palestine.

WALLACE MURRAY

¹⁴ Not printed. No indication has been found in Department files of further action on this draft.

¹⁵ For correspondence on this subject, see pp. 624 ff.

367N.1115/218 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul at Jerusalem (Steger)

WASHINGTON, May 7, 1941—7 p. m.

Your 63, 1st. It is anticipated that such vessels as may be sent to the Red Sea will not be suitable or available for the transportation of passengers.

Suggest you keep in touch with Legation Cairo concerning availability transportation facilities for returning Americans.

HULL

867N.01/1743

The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to the British Ambassador (Halifax)

[WASHINGTON,] May 8, 1941.

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: On May 6 Rabbi Stephen S. Wise telephoned to me and made a very earnest request that we urge the British Government to permit the Jews to form a regiment and a home guard in Palestine.

Rabbi Wise gave as the reason for his plea the unstable situation in the Near East and his fear that the Jews in Palestine are in imminent danger.

I desire simply to acquaint you with Rabbi Wise's approach to me regarding the matter.

I am, my dear Lord Halifax,
Sincerely yours,

SUMNER WELLES

367N.1115/219 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Steger) to the Secretary of State

JERUSALEM, May 10, 1941—noon.

[Received 2:20 p. m.]

86. As indicated in my telegram dated May 8, 5 p. m.,¹⁶ there is a distinct possibility that Syria may in the near future become the scene of hostilities; and in that event, I am informed, nearly 200 Americans of the American University of Beirut will probably desire to proceed to Palestine. In that case also it may become necessary to evacuate Americans from this country at very short notice.

While as previously reported the total number of American citizens in Palestine is about 6,000, not more than 2,000 are "bona fide citizens" as defined in section 3 of the Department's telegram of January 25,

¹⁶ Not printed.

2 p. m.¹⁷ Of these about 400 are Arabs, most of them minor children, who will not desire to leave the country. Some 1,500 are Jews, of whom probably 1,000 will wish to leave, and less than 500 have sufficient funds. The remaining 100, native citizens of Anglo-Saxon stock, largely missionaries, can in almost all cases defray their own expenses.

In view of these facts and of the fact that, travel by way of Iraq being now impracticable, departure from Palestine is possible only via Egypt, I have taken the following precautionary measures: acting upon a request of the President of the American University of Beirut ^{17a} I have arranged with the Director of Migration that in case of emergency special facilities will be granted to the foreign staff of the university for entry into Palestine.

The same official has promised to approach the Governments of India and South Africa requesting authority to issue visas immediately in his discretion to American citizens should they find it necessary to evacuate Palestine and desire to travel through those countries en route to the United States.

The Consul General of Egypt has promised to forward for the consideration of his Government my suggestion that he be authorized in his discretion to grant visas to Americans who in an emergency might wish to enter Egypt—or that in case of acute crisis Americans might even be permitted to enter without visa. He is of the opinion that should such authorization be granted some assurances would be required that the persons in question would leave Egypt within a reasonable time and that they would not become public charges.

I have reported the foregoing to the American Legation, expressing the hope that it might see fit to recommend to the competent Egyptian authorities a favorable consideration of the above suggestion. I have also asked him, in case assurances as above indicated should be required, that he inquire as to the Department's attitude in this respect.

I have not failed to note carefully the Department's general policy regarding emergency assistance to Americans as set forth in its telegram of January 25, 2 p. m. At this time, when the situation appears to hold definite elements of menace, I should greatly appreciate receiving such further instructions as the Department may wish to furnish. Especially I should be glad to know whether I may properly hold out to local American residents any reasonable hope that the Government may be able to assist them should this country be in more imminent danger of invasion.

STEGER

¹⁷ *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. III, p. 887.

^{17a} Bayard Dodge.

383.1115/53 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, May 10, 1941—4 p. m.

[Received May 12—3 : 10 p. m.]

455. The Legation's 349, April 27, 11 a. m., and the Department's 108, April 30, 8 p. m.¹⁸ In view of the situation now developing in the Near East the Consul General at Beirut and the Consul at Jerusalem are soliciting the assistance of this Legation for the purpose of evacuating to Egypt a large number of Americans residing in their consular districts pending ultimate transportation to the United States. The immediate assistance requested, which would only be a beginning of other requests for housing, feeding, et cetera, in an already overcrowded city, is that the Legation endeavor to persuade the Egyptian Government to relax its immigration requirements so that those Americans necessarily without prior arrangements for through transportation to the United States could come to Egypt until transportation is arranged. The Egyptian Government is not likely to relax its requirements unless the American Government is prepared to guarantee that Americans arriving under such an arrangement will not become public charges which undoubtedly some of them would become.

The situation here in Egypt is also fraught with dangerous possibilities and in view of that circumstance and of the almost complete lack of passenger transportation facilities, except occasional passages by air and alien steamers, I am strongly opposed to the evacuation of Americans to Egypt from nearby areas except for those individuals who can purchase or otherwise arrange through transportation in the places where they are residing. As indicated in my telegram under reference Americans in the Near East have had ample warning and ample time to depart, presumably prepared to meet any eventuality. They fall in that category of people who become worried when the situation in their areas begins to worsen but who, when arrangements are made for their evacuation and repatriation, would likely refuse to leave if the tension relaxed in the slightest degree. I feel that, except for isolated cases which would be largely accidental, Americans who have chosen to remain in the Near Eastern area would now be better off remaining at their present places of residence to face eventualities than attempting at this late date to rush to Egypt or any other nearby Near Eastern area, excepting in strict transit, and so complicate the war effort by evacuation proceedings.

If the Department does not agree with my conclusions, I invite instructions. The only suggestion that I can make in that contin-

¹⁸ *Ante*, pp. 272 and 273, respectively.

gency is that the Department arrange to rush with all speed to Egyptian waters sufficient vessels to transport approximately 1,400 Americans to the United States, of which 100 would be from Syria, 300 from Egypt, 1,000 from Palestine (900 Jews), and possibly some from Turkey. This suggestion, however, is offered with every reserve as in addition to the obvious technical difficulties involved it offers the very real objection of attempting to concentrate a large number of Americans in Egypt, an actual theater of war.

KIRK

383.1115/53 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk)

WASHINGTON, May 16, 1941—8 p. m.

154. Your 455, May 10, 4 p. m. Your views are entirely approved. Countries, like Egypt, to which Americans might be evacuated from other countries would, of course, expect that provisions would be made by this Government for the support of such Americans to prevent them from becoming public charges. Neither the Department nor the Red Cross is in a position to maintain Americans abroad. With respect to repatriation, the Red Cross considers repatriation a matter of governmental concern while the Department, in the absence of authority and the necessary funds from Congress for repatriation, must take the position that each individual must provide his own transportation expenses, from his own resources or from those obtained from relatives, friends or employers in the United States whom the Department, if desired, will approach in their behalf for the necessary funds.

It may be added that even were the Department in a position to further the evacuation of Americans from one locality to another that would be inadvisable in the present uncertainties of the war situation and in view of the possible necessity resulting therefrom of moving them to another place again and again.

Please communicate your 455 and this reply to the Consuls at Beirut and Jerusalem and elsewhere, if necessary. In advising Consul at Jerusalem, refer to his 86, May 10, noon to Department.

HULL

367N.1115/219 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul at Jerusalem (Steger)

WASHINGTON, May 16, 1941—9 p. m.

Your 86, May 10, noon. Department has replied to telegram no. 455, May 10, 4 p. m. from Minister, Cairo, on subject of evacuation of Americans and has requested Minister to inform you.

HULL

867N.55/239 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Steger) to the Secretary of State

JERUSALEM, May 22, 1941—noon.

[Received May 23—11: 55 a. m.]

117. A notice issued May 19th under the Palestine immigration ordinance states that Government has decided not to prescribe a quota of immigration certificates for the 3 months April 1, to June 30, 1941. The controlling reasons are the same as those given in my telegram No. 188 of December 30, noon,¹⁹ which reported that no immigration quota would be prescribed for the semester which ended March 31st last.

The notice states that the position will be reviewed in respect of the succeeding quarter June 1st to September 30th in the light of future circumstances.

Against the 75,000 certificates available under the White Paper policy of May 1939,²⁰ 19,601 authorities were granted during the period April 1, 1939, through March 31, 1941. Actual arrivals during that period were 32,868 of which 14,678 were legal immigrants and 18,190 illegals. Of the latter figure 16,100 have been deducted from quotas and 2,090 are to be deducted. The balance of account on April 1, 1941, is therefore 75,000 less 32,868 or 42,132.

Replacement immigration certificates in a strictly limited number will continue to be granted during the period April to June in special cases.

STEGER

740.0011 European War 1939/11258 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, May 23, 1941—4 p. m.

[Received May 25—2: 35 p. m.]

572. For the Secretary and Under Secretary. In discussing the general situation in this area with various representative persons both Egyptian and foreign I have repeatedly heard reference made to the failure of British policy in the Arab world and its deleterious effect on the position of the British not only in the Arab countries but also in the Islamic world in general which has greatly facilitated the extension of Nazi influence in this area. Recent developments in Iraq and Syria including the arrival of German military forces and accompanied by disquieting indications in Turkey and Iran have served to throw the seriousness of this situation into high relief and even

¹⁹ *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. III, p. 856.²⁰ British Cmd. 6019: *Palestine, Statement of Policy*.

raise the question of whether the British will be able to maintain their armies in the Middle East. The serious effect of such an eventuality on the course and duration of the war needs no emphasis.

Although reasons contributing to this situation are many and varied, I find in discussing the angle of the subject that the major factor which inevitably emerges is the problem presented by Zionism in Palestine. There lies the basic disorder whatever may be the immediate and [apparent omission] symptom and should it be that the Axis is temporarily successful in this area no very apparent fact will probably have contributed more to their success than the dissension sown in the Arab world by the Zionists. In the face of this state of affairs, I have not infrequently heard surprise expressed that the responsible heads of world Jewry have not apparently been brought to realize the great contribution which they could render not only to the cause of democracy but also to their co-religionists by admitting that despite the noble sentiments which may have characterized the idea of the Jewish national home at its inception the project in its present form has not only failed in the past but is incapable of realization in the future unless imposed by force on an unwilling native population.

In making mention of the foregoing I need not add that I have not sufficient information or special experience which would warrant definite suggestions on my part as remedies for the adverse reaction to the Zionist issue in the Arab world. It may be that some declaration could be made which would tend to mitigate the state of animosity prevailing among Moslems as a result of certain factors of this issue in Palestine which are regarded as offensive by the Arabs. It may also be possible that some fundamental realignment of the idea of a Jewish national home may be effected with a practical reorganization of the project on a basis different from that prevailing at present and in this connection reference has been made to the part which the Vatican might play in such a plan. These suggestions are naturally vague and in no way deemed as exhausting the possibilities. The problem is so grave, however, and the potential consequences so far reaching that I venture to bring very critical impressions to the Department's attention in the belief that the essential fact should be appreciated that the maintenance of present concepts in respect of Zionism constitutes a major obstacle to the successful prosecution of the war in this area and that those who have knowledge of this situation and power to act should exert every effort toward finding a solution. In the matter of initiating any such efforts the American Government is generally regarded as in the most favorable position to act.

KIRK

740.0011 European War 1939/11258

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs
(Murray) to the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] May 27, 1941.

MR. SECRETARY: We understand that a copy of the attached telegram of May 23 from our Minister at Cairo,²¹ which we regard as very important, has been sent to the White House.

It is our feeling that conversations on the subject between officers of the Department and non-Zionists would have no result, because the latter have no influence with the Zionists. It is not likely that the Zionists can be influenced by anyone except the President himself.

If you feel like discussing the matter with the President, we shall of course be glad to prepare any additional material which you may desire.

WALLACE MURRAY

867N.01/1755½

*The British Minister (Butler) to the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

Ref. 555/31/41

WASHINGTON, May [June] 4, 1941.

DEAR MR. UNDER-SECRETARY: You may recollect that on May 8th you passed to the Ambassador a message from Rabbi Stephen S. Wise containing a request that the Jews in Palestine be permitted to form regiments and a Home Guard. We have now received from London a statement of His Majesty's Government's attitude in this connexion. They realise of course that the Jewish desire for the means of self-protection in Palestine is natural, and have been considering how best to meet it.

2. We have now been authorized to inform you in confidence that they have approved the following proposals submitted by the High Commissioner: ^{21a}—

(1) Expansion of the Jewish settlement police to its former strength during the disturbances, with the possibility of future expansion if this is successful.

(2) More intensive training of the special rural constabulary.

(3) Expansion on a more restricted scale of the urban special constabulary.

(4) Continued equal opportunity for enlistment into the Palestine Infantry battalions for both Jews and Arabs, and completion of the accepted recruiting programme on the Jewish side irrespective of the rate of enlistment of Arabs.

²¹ *Supra.*^{21a} Sir Harold A. MacMichael.

3. In addition, the possibility is not excluded, provided equipment and assistance are available, of expanding the above on the following lines:—

(1) Conversion of Jewish settlements into strong points.

(2) Training Jewish settlement police (*a*) to deal with parachute troops and minor air borne landings (*b*) to engage in tank hunting (*c*) to adopt guerilla tactics against enemy detachments and lines of communication (*d*) to protect without assistance from British troops or police the Jewish settlements against rebellious Arab bands.

4. The above have been communicated in strict confidence to Dr. Namier of the Jewish Agency, who has expressed much satisfaction. It is not however intended to make any public announcement, since apart from giving valuable information to the enemy this might have the worst possible effect upon Arab opinion in the Middle East. It will be appreciated that with the present situation in Iraq and Syria any precipitate arming of the Jews might lead to deterioration in the internal security in Palestine, which could only be restored by the diversion of the British troops from more vital operations.

5. Even if arms were available for general distribution, such action would not in the judgment of His Majesty's Government contribute to local security and would have little military value against trained troops. They feel that the military authorities must be left full discretion to use the equipment available to them to the best advantage.

6. We are arranging to inform Rabbi Wise orally and in confidence that the question of the Jews forming regiments and a Home Guard has been under active consideration by His Majesty's Government who have approved certain proposals for action submitted by the High Commissioner, and that the gist of these steps has been communicated in strict confidence to Dr. Namier in London and Mr. Shertok^{21b} in Jerusalem, both of whom have expressed their satisfaction. The details of the proposals are not being disclosed to Rabbi Wise.

Yours very sincerely,

NEVILLE BUTLER

740.0011 European War 1939/12842 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, June 28, 1941—noon.

[Received July 7—3: 55 a. m.]

840. My 574, May 23, 8 p. m.; 630, May 31, 6 p. m., and 747, June 17, 5 p. m.²² Since Eden's^{22a} May 29 statement on Arab unity²³

^{21b} Moshe Shertok, head of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency in Palestine.

²² None printed.

^{22a} Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

²³ British Cmd. 6289, Misc. No. 2 (1941): *Speech by the Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden . . . delivered at the Mansion House on May 29, 1941.*

the Legation has endeavored to learn representative opinion here on that subject with the following result.

British Embassy sources profess to be greatly pleased with the general local reaction to the statement and say that in the circumstances the Embassy has indicated to the British Foreign Office that a further declination on the subject would be helpful.

Egyptians consulted have usually expressed the opinion that the Eden statement marks a solidarity but almost invariably qualify their approbation by citing certain people very strongly notably the following: that certain Arab leaders have for years been advising and urging the British to make a statement in respect of Arab aspiration and feel that had their advice been followed the effect would have been much more convincing than now when a declaration on the subject not only savors strongly of political expediency but also comes so late as to make it difficult to follow it up with appropriate measures in time to meet the present critical situation in the Near East.

That the British have given so many unfulfilled assurances in the past in respect of Egypt and the Arab countries that further expressions of good intentions do not carry conviction.

That the Eden statement is extremely vague and should be followed up by a more detailed declaration containing *inter alia* a specific assurance in respect of Palestine.

That in deciding on such matters the British tend to act unilaterally rather than in consultation with Arab leaders with the result that action taken is not always appreciated at its full value.

In connection with the foregoing it may be of interest to the Department to know that in discussion of this I have repeatedly heard it suggested that the United States is in a particularly favored position to contribute to a solution of the Arab problem and I have frequently heard the following reasons adduced in support of this view.

That since it appears that the United States Government is disposed to assist Great Britain to the full in the prosecution of the war it would seem logical to assume that the American Government might find it possible to collaborate politically with British in the Near East particularly in respect of the Arab cause which is regarded as falling within the purview of the policy of the democracies as regards the rights of small nations.

That the United States is in a peculiarly favored position to lend a helping hand in the East where it has no unhappy past to live down nor political ambitions to further and where as a consequence any assurances given would be accepted in good faith.

That the greatest obstacle to a satisfactory settlement of the Arab question is the Zionist issue and that the United States could make a particular contribution in this respect since rightly or wrongly the impression prevails in the Arab world that the influence of Ameri-

can Jewry is one of the principal deterrents to a resolution of the Palestine question.

That the Arab countries would like to see the traditional American economic principle of the open door in good standing in the Near East which, in the past and despite commitments to the contrary, has been subject to British and French exploitation to detriment of the local population.

Needless to say there are obvious weaknesses in the case for Arab unity such as disagreement among Arab leaders as to specific objectives, unreconciled dynastic and nationalistic rivalries which would militate against effective cooperation and the assiduity that agitation for Arab unity is to no small extent carried on by a group of professional politicians animated largely by personal motives.

On the other hand there is no doubt that regardless of such negative considerations the Arab unity concept does have a wide appeal as at least a symbol of the common aspiration of all Arab peoples to achieve complete independence from the foreign control to which they have so long been subjected and in that sense and to that extent the movement is regarded as one of which due account should be taken particularly in view of the growing tendency of certain of its proponents to look to the United States for support.

In presenting the foregoing I am appreciative of the fact that there may well be compelling reasons for the American Government's not making a declaration of policy in respect of the Arab peoples at this time. It is submitted, however, that in view of the importance of current developments in the Near East it would be highly advisable to undertake without delay the formulation of such a policy as a basis to be used eventually for either a public statement or for confidential communications to Arab leaders and as a working plan for such concrete support as in the meanwhile may be given to Arab countries in implementation of that policy.

In the meantime, as was pointed out in my telegram 572, May 23, 4 p. m., and as mentioned above, it is considered significant that in any discussion of this subject a recurrent theme is the conflict of Zionism with Arab aspirations and the effect attributed in that connection to the influence of American Jewry. Any steps therefore which might be taken either officially or privately to bring Zionist leaders in the United States to revise their views on the Palestine problem in the light of the demonstrated impracticability of the present policy would in my opinion constitute one of the most efficacious immediate steps which could be taken on American initiative for alleviating prevailing unrest and counteracting Axis influence in the Arab world.

740.0011 European War 1939/12842 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk)

WASHINGTON, July 15, 1941—10 p. m.

294. Your 840, June 28, noon, and previous telegrams mentioned therein. The Department does not consider that it would be desirable, in present circumstances, for this Government to issue a statement designed to give political satisfaction to the Arabs, or to endeavor to induce Zionist leaders in the United States "to revise their views on the Palestine problem in the light of the demonstrated impracticability of the present policy." Some of the principal reasons for the Department's attitude are as follows:

1. The areas inhabited by the Arabs are, as among the Allied and pro-Ally powers, of primary interest and importance to Great Britain, by whom they are for the most part controlled or dominated politically or militarily. It is entirely natural and appropriate, therefore, that the British should take the lead in the issuance of political statements having reference to those areas, and, if they consider a modification of Zionist aims necessary or desirable, that they should be the first to take steps to that end.

2. From the Department's observation of the views and aims of Zionists in this country, they do not admit and could not be brought to admit that "the project in its present form has not only failed in the past but is incapable of realization in the future." They do not grant that the movement is a handicap to the British war effort in the Near East, but hold it to be a source of strength if the British will but use it.

3. The political strength of Zionists in England is offset to a greater or less extent, depending on circumstances, by considerations of Empire involving the Arabs and the Moslems generally. In the United States there is no such offset which is in any degree comparable. This country, consequently, can hardly be expected to adopt an attitude or policy which is more pro-Arab than the British. In this connection it is noted that Eden's statement of May 29 omitted all reference to the highly charged question of Palestine.

4. Well-informed Arabs are quite aware that the Zionists play a far more important part in American politics than do Arab sympathizers. The Arabs are constantly apprehensive lest this circumstance be translated into pressure brought to bear by this Government upon the British Government to weigh the balance in Palestine in favor of the Zionists. If, therefore, this Government should issue a pro-Arab declaration, intelligent Arabs would probably regard it as purely war-connected, and place even less reliance upon it than upon a similar declaration from the British who, as above stated, are obliged to take Arab and Moslem opinion into careful account. Thus the Arabs themselves would be likely to value an American declaration of this character as a mere self-conveniencing statement.

5. Up to the present time, it has not been feasible to apply the Wilsonian principle of self-determination to Palestine. Should the

situation change in such a way as to make it possible to expect or to hope for its application, the question of a declaration could be re-examined.

WELLES

867N.01/1760 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, July 24, 1941—8 p. m.

[Received July 24—1:10 p. m.]

3187. Mr. Eden gave me the other day the following notes of measures the Government has taken in regard to the Jewish population of Palestine:

"The Jewish settlement police are being more than doubled.

The rural special constabulary are being given more intensive training and arms are being made available for them.

The urban special constabulary are also being expanded on a more restricted scale.

The recruitment of Jews by the Palestinian infantry companies of 'the Buffs' is proceeding up to the full approved program.

Considerable numbers of Jews have been recruited from Palestine for service in the Middle Eastern theatre generally in the RE, RASC,^{23a} et cetera, and *alter* technicians in the RAF.

Extremely small Palestine volunteer force has been formed for which Palestinians as well as British can volunteer."

WINANT

867N.01/1762 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*²⁴

WASHINGTON, August 5, 1941—10 p. m.

2982. According to a Jewish Telegraphic Agency report from London, Prime Minister Churchill on July 30 is said to have reaffirmed in the House of Commons the British Government's adherence to the policy of establishing a Jewish National Home in Palestine and to have said that this policy would be taken into consideration during discussions in Cairo on the formation of an Arab Federation.

The agency report alleged that discussions of a private nature were being held in Cairo between Arab leaders of Syria, Iraq, Palestine and Transjordan. Moshe Shertok, head of political department of Jewish Agency in Palestine, visited Cairo recently and may have met Arab representatives there, it was said.

^{23a} Royal Engineers and Royal Army Service Corps, respectively.

²⁴ A similar telegram on the same date was sent to the Minister in Egypt as No. 353.

Recent public statements by Dr. Weizmann and Dr. Judah Magnes indicate they are not opposed in principle to an Arab federation including an autonomous Palestine.

The Department would appreciate any confirmation you may have or comments regarding the above.

HULL

867N.01/1763 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, August 7, 1941—6 p. m.

[Received August 7—1:45 p. m.]

3473. Department's 2982, August 5, 10 p. m. In the House of Commons July 30 in reply to the question of whether the British Government still adheres to the policy of the Balfour declaration of 1917,²⁵ the Prime Minister replied "There has been no change in the policy of His Majesty's Government in regard to Palestine". To the further question "if full account will be taken of that answer in any discussions which may take place", he replied, "Yes, sir, certainly."

It will be noted that the reply did not refer to any specific discussions. The Foreign Office states that it has no information concerning alleged discussions in Cairo between Arab leaders and does not believe the news agency report. It understands that Moshe Shertok visited Cairo recently but has received no reports of his activities there.

It adds that the views of Dr. Weizmann and Dr. Magnes are stated correctly in the Department's telegram.

WINANT

867N.01/1772

Rabbi Stephen S. Wise to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

NEW YORK CITY, August 7, 1941.

[Received August 8.]

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Supplementing the recent meeting which Dr. Emanuel Neumann on behalf of the Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs had with you, I have the pleasure of submitting herewith the memorandum which he undertook to submit on your behalf. We hold ourselves in readiness for a conference with you touching this problem, should you find it necessary further to discuss the matter with us.

I am [etc.]

STEPHEN S. WISE

²⁵ Declaration contained in a letter of November 2, 1917, from the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Balfour, to Lord Rothschild. See *Foreign Relations*, 1917, supp. 2, vol. 1, p. 317, footnote 1.

[Enclosure]

*Memorandum Submitted to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)
by the Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs*

1. It has been generally assumed that British policy with regard to Palestine would undergo no important modification during the progress of the war. In Zionist circles it was hoped that no further steps would be taken toward implementing the White Paper of 1939 and it was believed that there would certainly be no basic change in the status of Palestine or of the Palestine Mandate.

2. A recent address delivered by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Anthony Eden, made specific reference to a coming change in the status of Syria and Lebanon and promised support by the British Government for a scheme of federation in the Middle East as yet undefined.

Dr. Stephen S. Wise and Dr. Nahum Goldmann^{25a} conferred with you shortly thereafter, and you were kind enough to state that in your view it was extremely improbable that the British Government would take any steps involving the status of Palestine either by the inclusion of Palestine in a federation or otherwise, without prior consultation with the Government of the United States; and furthermore, that if proposals affecting the status of Palestine or of the Jewish National Home were forthcoming, the American Government would accord the representatives of American Zionism adequate opportunity to present their views before taking any position on such questions.

We take this occasion to express our profound appreciation of these statements made by you at the time to our representatives.

3. Since the interview referred to took place, signs have been multiplying that the question of new political dispositions in the Middle East has been occupying the attention of important British circles following the termination of the Syrian campaign. There is in our considered judgment reason to believe that the possibility of effecting a political reorganization in the Middle East is being considered in British official quarters. This has given rise to a certain apprehension lest under the pressure of war and of military developments in that region, steps may be taken or commitments made which involve the status of Palestine and of the Jewish National Home in a manner and direction we can not foresee or judge at this distance. Such steps or commitments, if made either publicly or privately, may conceivably lead to the result that the Mandate for Palestine would be materially affected at a time when neither the League of Nations nor its permanent Mandates Commission are in a position to function. A further consequence would be that such international settlement as may be

^{25a} Prominent leader in the Zionist Movement.

expected to take place at the end of the war may be prejudged by such commitments or by the creation of accomplished facts.

4. We would therefore respectfully suggest that it would be most helpful if the American Government would elicit from the British Government authentic information on this subject as well as an assurance that it does not intend to carry on negotiations or make commitments involving a change in the legal and political status of Palestine or a derogation of the position of the Jewish National Home, whether by promoting a union between Palestine and other territories, or otherwise; and that no steps will be taken without previous consultation with the government of the United States.

We wish to record our gratitude to you for so kindly offering to act promptly in this matter, and to express the hope that we may be informed of the result in due course.

867N.01/1764 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, August 8, 1941—5 p. m.

[Received August 11—2 a. m.]

1102. Department's No. 353, August 5, 10 p. m.²⁶ The statement of the British Prime Minister in the House of Commons on July 30 regarding Palestine²⁷ was carried very inconspicuously in Cairo press and only one local paper appears to have mentioned possible discussion of the matter in Cairo. In that instance *Almisri* carried an item in its special service under a London date line to the effect that the Prime Minister had answered in the affirmative when asked whether the British Government's position in respect of Palestine would be maintained in the event that the question came up for discussion in Cairo. As reported in this item there was no indication of any reason for such discussions in Cairo nor was mention made in that connection of Arab Federation. Furthermore when questioned in that regard a British Embassy source stated that the Embassy had no knowledge of discussions held recently or in prospect in Cairo regarding either Palestine or Arab Federation issues nor did it have any confirmation of reports regarding Arab Federation conversations elsewhere (see my 977, July 18, 7 p. m., and 1073, August 4, 2 p. m.²⁸). In this connection the Legation has been informed confidentially by the Embassy on several occasions recently that the initiative in the

²⁶ See footnote 24, p. 616.

²⁷ See telegram No. 3473, August 7, 6 p. m., from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, p. 617.

²⁸ Neither printed.

Arab Federation matter is at present being left entirely to the Arabs since it is held that in accordance with Eden's May 29 speech (see my despatch [*telegram*] No. 630, May 31, 6 p. m.; No. 747, June 17, 5 p. m.;²⁹ and 840, June 28, noon) it is up to the Arabs to work out some plan on which they are in general agreement as a basis for discussion of the matter with the British. Embassy sources add that in view of the many complexities of the situation it is not anticipated that the Arab leaders will find it possible to arrive at an agreement in the early future and the British refer particularly to the vague present status of Syria which they state would require clarifying as a preliminary step to Syrian participation in any Arab Federation scheme. Such clarification it is pointed out would be effected by the negotiation of the proposed treaty between the Syrian and the Free French but this matter is being complicated on the one hand by Syrian hesitancy to enter into negotiations and on the other hand by Free French apprehension that Syria may be drawn from French to British influence through Syrian participation in Arab Federation (see my 982, July 20, 9 a. m.³⁰)

As regards the recent visit of Moshe Shertok to Cairo, he informed a member of the Legation staff while he was here that the purpose of his visit was to discuss with the British authorities the more extensive use of Jews in the military service but he added that he had not received any particular encouragement in that respect. He made no reference to meeting Arab representatives here and the Oriental Secretariat of the British Embassy here states that no information has reached it which would indicate that such conferences were held.

It may be noted however that in discussing the possibility of Jewish-Arab cooperation with the aforementioned member of the Legation staff Shertok stated that he was not particularly optimistic in that respect. He said that in his opinion agreement could only be reached on the basis of Jewish "self-determination as a nation" which would permit the Jews and Arabs to "separate and then unite as partners". He particularly emphasized the prime necessity of acceding to Jewish demands regarding immigration into Palestine and strongly maintained that the Jews are in no way interested in obtaining immigration privileges in any other area of the Near East than in Palestine proper. A memorandum covering Shertok's remarks has been mailed to the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs in a letter dated August 1.²⁹

KIRK

²⁹ Neither printed.

³⁰ Not printed.

867N.55/243 : Telegram

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Pinkerton) to the Secretary of State

JERUSALEM, August 18, 1941—10 a. m.

[Received 2:12 p. m.]

244. My telegram No. 117, May 22, noon. Under an order issued August 16 Palestine Government has prescribed immigration quota of 850 certificates in all categories for the quarter ending September 13th, and such additional certificates as may be needed for wives and children under the age of 18 years of principal immigrants covered by the order and of principal immigrants who arrived before the beginning of the present quarter.

The present quota provides for the admission of 100 non-Jewish immigrants and their wives and children.

PINKERTON

867N.01/1780

Rabbi Stephen S. Wise to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

NEW YORK CITY, September 26, 1941.

[Received October 1.]

DEAR MR. WELLES: Since writing you on August 7th on the subject of possible changes in the political structure of the Near East, additional confidential information has reached us tending to confirm earlier reports that serious conversations are in progress in Cairo and other centers. Whether or not commitments are being made, which would affect or involve the status of Palestine is not yet clear, but there are indications that plans are contemplated which would affect the position of Transjordan and draw it into association with Syria rather than with Palestine. Transjordan is of course historically, and in many other ways, a part of Palestine, and is administered under the same Mandate as is Western Palestine. We must therefore regard any change in the status of Transjordan as seriously affecting vital Jewish interests in Palestine as a whole.

During your absence I have received from Assistant Secretary Berle an acknowledgment³¹ of the letter and memorandum I sent to you, but we have as yet no information regarding any action in this matter; though we assume, of course, that you have taken the action you so kindly offered to take in your last conversation with Dr. Neumann.

Respectfully yours,

STEPHEN S. WISE

³¹ Not printed.

867N.01/1780

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs
(Murray) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] October 3, 1941.

MR. WELLES: It would be very helpful to us in preparing a reply to Dr. Wise if you could let me know whether, in point of fact, you made to Dr. Neumann the offer referred to in the last paragraph of Dr. Wise's letter.

The nature of the alleged offer is set forth at the end of a memorandum which Dr. Wise transmitted with his letter to you of August 7, in the following language:

"We would therefore respectfully suggest that it would be most helpful if the American Government would elicit from the British Government authentic information on this subject as well as an assurance that it does not intend to carry on negotiations or make commitments involving a change in the legal and political status of Palestine or a derogation of the position of the Jewish National Home, whether by promoting a union between Palestine and other territories, or otherwise; and that no steps will be taken without previous consultation with the government of the United States.

"We wish to record our gratitude to you for so kindly offering to act promptly in this matter, and to express the hope that we may be informed of the result in due course."

This Division does not appear to have any information as to whether any commitments were made in the course of the conversations which Drs. Wise, Goldmann and Neumann had with you.

WALLACE MURRAY

867N.01/1780

*Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) to the Chief
of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Murray)*

[WASHINGTON,] October 4, 1941.

MR. MURRAY: I have upon repeated occasions told Dr. Wise that I would discuss the questions in which he is interested with the British Ambassador or directly with the British Government in order that we might be informed as to what steps, if any, are being taken by the British Government with regard to these questions.

So far as "commitments" are involved that is the extent of any assurances I have given Dr. Wise. At the present time Dr. Wise and his associates are peculiarly perturbed because of their belief that the British Government is moving rapidly towards the creation of a federation of Arayan [*Arab*] states and that the creation of such fed-

eration, perhaps even involving Syria, would mitigate against the success of the Palestine experiment and might even prejudice the results already achieved.

For reasons of policy as well as for reasons of expediency, I consider it in the highest degree important that everything be done by this Government to prevent Jewish groups within the United States from opposing the British war effort, or from adding in any way to the obstacles already confronted by the British Government in the Near East. For that reason I shall continue to keep in close touch with Dr. Wise and his associates with the hope that misunderstandings between the Zionist movement in this country and the British Government can be at least minimized, if not altogether avoided.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

867N.01/1780

The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to Rabbi Stephen S. Wise

[WASHINGTON,] October 8, 1941.

MY DEAR DR. WISE: I wish to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of September 26, 1941. I have noted your remarks regarding the possibility of political changes in the Near East, and I shall be glad to send you information on the subject as soon as possible.

Sincerely yours,

SUMNER WELLES

SAUDI ARABIA

UNWILLINGNESS OF THE UNITED STATES TO EXTEND FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO SAUDI ARABIA¹

890F.51/48½

Mr. James A. Moffett² to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, April 16, 1941.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Referring to the interview which you so kindly granted me on Wednesday, April 9th, and in line with your request, I am attaching hereto a memorandum covering the existing situation in Saudi Arabia. Also a proposal which we hope will be acceptable as a means of providing funds for the Saudi Arabian Government.

Our representatives have had numerous conferences with the King. His financial situation is desperate. The British Government has advanced him four hundred thousand pounds and he is endeavoring to have this increased to nine hundred thousand pounds. His budget requirement is conservatively estimated at \$10,000,000.

You referred to the four Danish tank steamers which might be utilized to transport finished petroleum products. If the United States Government will advance to the King of Saudi Arabia \$6,000,000 annually for the next five years, the Calarabian Standard Oil Company³ will agree to deliver to the United States Government, for account of the King:

	<i>F. O. B. Ship Persian Gulf</i>
1,800,000 bbls. of Gasoline	at 3½¢ [per gallon]
2,660,000 bbls. of Diesel Oil	at 75¢
3,400,000 bbls. of Fuel Oil	at 40¢

¹ For additional material relating to this subject, see *Hearings Before a Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, Part 41, Petroleum Arrangements With Saudi Arabia*, U. S. Senate, 80th Cong., 1st sess., on S. Res. 46 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1948).

² Chairman of the board of directors of the Bahrein Petroleum Co., Ltd. (incorporated in Canada) and of its subsidiary, the California Texas Oil Co., Ltd. (incorporated in the Bahamas). Mr. Moffett, at this time, was acting in the interests of the California Arabian Standard Oil Co. (incorporated in Delaware), which was developing an oil concession in Saudi Arabia. All of these aforementioned companies were jointly owned by Standard Oil Co. of California and the Texas Corp. (name of the latter company changed to the Texas Co. late in 1941).

³ Abbreviation for the California Arabian Standard Oil Co.

totalling approximately \$6,000,000 worth of petroleum products annually.

The King's normal revenue (from pilgrimage and customs) has practically disappeared. His expenses have very materially increased, not only on account of the war, but due to the drought this past year, so that he has been forced to feed two or three hundred thousand of his subjects.

I sincerely trust that some way may be found under existing legislation to provide King Ibn Saud financial assistance, which he so urgently needs in order to maintain his government in a stable condition. We believe that unless this is done, and soon, this independent kingdom, and perhaps with it the entire Arab world, will be thrown into chaos.

Yours very sincerely, (Original signed by J. A. Moffett)

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by Mr. James A. Moffett for President Roosevelt

[WASHINGTON,] April 16, 1941.

King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia formerly depended largely on the revenue from the pilgrimage and customs duties to finance his government. Due to the war, this revenue has been reduced to a negligible amount.

The only economic resources of any substantial value of Saudi Arabia are its oil resources, the development of which has been seriously interfered with on account of the war.

The King has privately expressed himself, and we believe sincerely, as strongly pro-Ally. No other man in the Arab countries, nor among Moslems the world over, commands prestige equal to his. In order to feed and maintain control of his people, which is essential to maintain his prestige in the Arab world elsewhere and to prepare, even in a moderate way, for equipping his own soldiers for service, he estimates that he will require \$10,000,000 per annum until the emergency has passed and he recently demanded that the California Arabian Standard Oil Company supply him with \$6,000,000 during the year 1941. In addition to this, the British have promised him 400,000 pounds sterling during 1941, which he hopes to increase to 900,000 pounds.

Based on the best information which we have been able to obtain, it is our opinion that the King's estimate of \$10,000,000 for this year is moderate and close to a minimum figure for essential expenditures.

The California Arabian Standard Oil Company owns an oil concession in Arabia consisting of approximately 162,000,000 acres and

embracing all the probable oil territory of the country. This area is approximately equal in size to the states of California and Oregon. The original concession was acquired in 1933 and runs until 1993; the remaining area was acquired in 1939 and runs until 1999. The company is of American nationality and 50% is owned by the Standard Oil Company of California and 50% by the Texas Corporation. These two companies between them have approximately 160,000 American stockholders.

The development work commenced in 1933 and to date the company has discovered on three structures an estimated 750,000,000 barrels of crude oil reserves and there are many other structures of considerable promise on this concession. The Calarabian Standard Oil Company has so far spent approximately \$27,500,000 on this development. In addition, the company has advanced to the King against future royalties \$6,800,000. It has now come to a point where it is impossible for the company to continue the growing burden and responsibility of financing an independent country, particularly under present abnormal conditions. However, the King is desperate. He has told us that unless necessary financial assistance is immediately forthcoming, he has grave fears for the stability of his country.

PROPOSAL

1. We propose that the United States Government purchase from the Saudi Arabia Government finished petroleum products to the value of six million dollars annually for a period of five years.
2. The Company will contract with the King to produce, manufacture and load such products for his account at a Persian Gulf port.
3. The King will waive royalty on an amount of crude oil corresponding at current royalty rate to \$6,000,000.
4. The Products taken under this arrangement, except that taken for use by the U. S. Navy or other U. S. Government purposes within the area, would have to be moved outside an area approximately defined as follows: Egypt, the east coast of Africa, South Africa, Australasia, India, the Straits Settlements, China, Japan and possibly the Philippines.
5. We suggest that for the purpose of determining the quantity of products due under this arrangement an agreement be reached as to the prices of certain products to be supplied over an agreed period.
6. We suggest that our State Department approach the British not only to increase the amount of money which the British have been advancing to the King, amounting to 400,000 pounds sterling per year, but also to request the British to continue to make such advances in sufficient amount, which, added to those made by the United States Government, plus any other revenue received by the King, will total approximately \$10,000,000 per year.

Any British advances should be on a political and military basis and should not involve their getting any oil from this concession, the British at the present time being well supplied from Iran, Iraq, and Bahrain, etc.

890F.51/48;

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs
(Murray) to the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] April 21, 1941.

MR. SECRETARY: In the attached papers ⁴ Mr. Moffett states that unless King Ibn Saud receives financial assistance at once there is grave danger that this independent Arab Kingdom cannot survive the present emergency. Mr. Moffett therefore proposes:

(1) That we urge the British Government to increase from £400,000 to £900,000 the payment which they are making to the King in 1941.

(2) That the United States Government agree to purchase from King Ibn Saud petroleum products to the value of \$6,000,000 annually for the next five years.

(a) Mr. Moffett believes that some of this petroleum could be consumed by the United States Navy or other Government agencies.

(b) However, that part of the oil not used by the Government would have to be marketed outside the Pacific area, presumably through private channels. In practice this would mean that, as conditions are at present, the only marketing area would be the Western Hemisphere.

Comment:

Although our own information regarding the financial situation in Saudi Arabia is not precise (we have no representative permanently resident in Saudi Arabia), we do know that the King's finances have been severely strained. Ordinarily the chief revenues of the Kingdom come from the Moslem pilgrim traffic, from customs revenues and from oil royalties. The first two sources have been effectively dried up by the existing situation. The oil royalties paid by Mr. Moffett's company, plus advances on those royalties in the amount of \$6,800,000, have apparently been insufficient to meet the financial needs. The annual budget of \$10,000,000, estimated by Mr. Moffett, appears to be reasonable in the existing situation.

Political Background

King Ibn Saud is unquestionably the outstanding figure in the Arab world today. He has long had intimate relations with the British and has been friendly with them despite the fact that during the last war

⁴ *Supra.*

the British supported his rival, King Hussein, as their candidate for the proposed Arab Empire. All of our recent reports from our own officers and from the British indicate that the King favors the Allied cause. He has some complaints against the British, particularly their policy of supporting the Jewish National Home in Palestine. The only political dealings we have had with him were on the same subject when, about two years ago, he addressed a letter to the President^a objecting to this Government's alleged activities in favor of the Jewish National Home and against Arab interests. There seems little reason to doubt, however, that fundamentally Ibn Saud is anti-Axis. (It is pertinent to remark that about three years ago he refused to grant oil concessions to German and Japanese interests and instead accepted a less favorable concession agreement with Mr. Moffett's company.) Since Ibn Saud's influence is great in the Arab world a good case can be made out in favor of granting him financial support. The question arises how this support can best be given. The following comments are submitted on Mr. Moffett's proposals, as outlined at the beginning of this memorandum:

(1) No objection is perceived to discussing with the British the question of their increasing by £500,000 their 1941 payment to the King. This would be a small price for them to pay for Ibn Saud's support and influence in this vital Near Eastern area.

(2a) It would presumably be possible for the Navy to use in the Pacific area some, or possibly all, of the extra oil which Mr. Moffett proposes to produce. This question would have to be discussed with the Navy Department, and would involve consideration of such points as whether the Navy is obligated by law to obtain its oil by competitive bid, the extent to which the Navy is restricted by current contracts, et cetera.

(2b) Whether it would be possible for the Government to sell, through commercial channels, that part of the proposed Arabian new production which it could not consume raises various considerations. Mr. Moffett makes the condition that the proposed production in excess of United States Government requirements "would have to be moved outside" of the Pacific area. This probably means that in practice it would have to be sold in the Western Hemisphere since there is no available market in Europe or West Africa. Why this excess oil could not be sold in the Pacific area through commercial channels Mr. Moffett does not make clear. One is perhaps justified in the speculation that such sale would be contrary to marketing agreements among the large oil companies or merely that there actually is no ready market in that area except Japan. The further question arises whether this excess oil could find a market in the Western Hemisphere unless the Government was prepared to sell it at a loss to marketing companies. Consideration might also have to be given whether the charge might not be made that the commercial part of Mr. Moffett's proposal was of direct benefit to the California Ara-

^a *Foreign Relations*, 1938, vol. II, p. 994.

bian Standard Oil Company and that the proposal was designed to relieve that company from the difficult situation in which it has been placed. All in all the commercial part of the proposal seems open to some objections, although these might be overcome upon more intensive investigation.

An Alternative Proposal

If it is decided that action should be taken to give financial support to Ibn Saud, and there appear to be sound reasons in favor of such a proposal, possibly an arrangement might be worked out combining part of Mr. Moffett's proposal with action under the Lend-Lease Act.⁶ Mr. Moffett feels that Ibn Saud needs approximately \$6,000,000 from our side. It might be feasible for the Navy to purchase \$3,000,000 to \$4,000,000 worth of oil for use at bases in the Pacific. Even more might be used, but it is not clear from Mr. Moffett's statement whether it would be possible to produce more refined products than he has suggested. (Nearly one-half of the proposed production of \$6,000,000 consists of gasoline which might not be required by the Navy. In this connection it is understood that the gasoline produced in the Saudi Arabian field is of low octane content which, even when leaded to the maximum, does not exceed 85-87 octanes.) Assuming, however, that the Navy could use all of the heavy products amounting to something over \$3,000,000 in value, the balance of the \$6,000,000 might be made up by furnishing supplies to Saudi Arabia under the Lend-Lease Act. Such help might be extended in return for satisfactory political assurances and commitments by Ibn Saud.

Negotiations covering these matters might appropriately be undertaken by Mr. Kirk, our Minister in Egypt, who in any case should be proceeding shortly to Jidda to present his credentials to Ibn Saud, to whom he is also accredited.

WALLACE MURRAY

890F.6363 Standard Oil Co./129

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Alling)

[WASHINGTON,] April 29, 1941.

Mr. Thornburg⁷ opened the conversation by saying that the company had been receiving reports recently from its representative in Bahrein indicating a rapidly worsening of the situation in that part of the Near East, particularly in Iraq. Mr. Thornburg said that their General Manager, from whom these reports were received, was a person of great calm and judgment and therefore they had been

⁶ Approved March 11, 1941; 55 Stat. 31.

⁷ Max W. Thornburg, vice president, Bahrein Petroleum Co.; appointed Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State, July 7, 1941.

considerably worried, not to say alarmed, by his reports. I asked Mr. Thornburg what sort of communications they had with their representative, and he said that they had two methods of sending telegrams, one through the usual commercial company which went through London and was usually delayed five or six days in transit and also was subject to censorship. The other method was by direct communication between a radio station which the company had on a motor launch and the Mackay Radio Company in New York. This channel was not subject to censorship and messages came through at once, being only occasionally delayed by weather conditions.

Among the suggestions which their General Manager had made in his recent reports was one that an American naval vessel should visit Bahrein and other Persian Gulf areas. The General Manager felt that such a visit might go far toward stabilizing the situation.

Mr. Thornburg then turned to a discussion of the situation in Saudi Arabia and asked what action had been taken on the proposal of Mr. Moffett for an advance of funds to King Ibn Saud. Mr. Thornburg stated that although Ibn Saud had been loyal to the British and would doubtless continue so as long as he felt that his interests lay in that direction, there could be no doubt that his own interests came first and that if he saw it was to his advantage to play along with the Axis powers he would undoubtedly do so. Certainly he would probably have to do so unless funds were forthcoming to enable him to feed his people in the patriarchal economic structure which had been set up in the country. I told Mr. Thornburg that all we knew of the matter was that this Division had been asked to prepare a memorandum for the use of the Secretary^s and that that had been done last week. Since then I had heard nothing about the matter and I assumed that any information regarding developments would have to be obtained from the White House. For background purposes I inquired whether the company had in mind that the extra oil which it proposed to produce would be consumed entirely by the United States Navy. Mr. Thornburg said that that was their idea, and that even if the Navy had to obtain bids, as he understood was the case, the price at which this oil was being offered was so low that the purchases would undoubtedly be made from his company. I asked him if he felt that the Navy could absorb all of the oil which they proposed to produce, and he said there was no question at all about that. As a matter of fact the Navy used petroleum products far in excess of the proposed production. However, Mr. Thornburg felt that the Navy might wish not to take these products immediately but to have them kept as a reserve for future requirements since it was well known that oil supplies and reserves on the Pacific Coast of the United

^s *Supra.*

States were definitely limited and would within the next few years be entirely exhausted.

I told Mr. Thornburg that the practicability of his proposal was of course not a matter for this Department to decide; that it was up to the Navy Department and other agencies. I added, however, that in the event it should be decided that financial support ought to be given to King Ibn Saud another method by which that support might be given would conceivably be under the terms of the Lend-Lease Act. I explained that as conditions were at present the mere granting of financial aid often did not solve the problem in a country suffering economic distress since the matter of obtaining supplies was also difficult even if the money was available. Mr. Thornburg said he appreciated that point and that so far as he could see the situation in Arabia might be handled by a combination of the two methods, that is, part financial aid and part direct shipment of supplies under the Lend-Lease Act.

Mr. Thornburg said that he felt he should also mention that his company had had in mind that any financial or other aid granted might necessitate the appointment of a financial control officer of American nationality, probably under the title of Financial Adviser. Mr. Thornburg said that this probably would be a difficult matter to handle with Ibn Saud, but that if large sums were going to be granted certainly some financial control should be established. He said that his own company had endeavored to find out what use was made of the advances on royalties which the company had made. It had been impossible, however, to obtain any definite and satisfactory information since money was paid out to a large extent by subsidies to the various tribal leaders and sheiks through the various wakfs. I told Mr. Thornburg that this was the first intimation we had had that a financial adviser was envisaged. He replied that the company had even gone so far as to try to locate possible candidates, and among such candidates suggested was the name of Mr. McCaskey,⁹ who had been with the Millspaugh Mission in Persia.¹⁰ I told Mr. Thornburg that subsequently Mr. McCaskey had also served as financial adviser in Liberia, but that he had had to retire largely because of his health. I also pointed out that in a country where no language but Arabic was spoken it would seem to be essential to obtain the services of a man who had a thorough knowledge of that language. Mr. Thornburg agreed and added that this presented obvious difficulties.

In leaving Mr. Thornburg said he hoped that the Department might be in a position to ask the Navy Department to endeavor to expedite

⁹ Charles I. McCaskey.

¹⁰ For correspondence regarding the Millspaugh Mission, see *Foreign Relations*, 1927, vol. III, pp. 523 ff.

the arrival in Bahrein of Commander Grove, the new naval observer at that post. He said that Commander Grove had sailed yesterday from San Francisco but that unless he could be intercepted at Honolulu and induced to continue by air he might arrive in Bahrein too late to be of great service to this Government. I told Mr. Thornburg that we would be glad at least to make inquiries of the Navy Department.

890F.6363 Standard Oil Co/131

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[Extract]

[WASHINGTON,] May 7, 1941.

The British Ambassador ¹¹ called at his request.

I brought up the Moffett oil matter in the Arab kingdom of Saudi Arabia and read to him the substance of the memorandum prepared by Mr. Murray of the Near Eastern Division.¹² The Ambassador agreed that his Government should show real interest in the question of keeping the King in a proper state of mind, and said he would take the matter up with his Government. He incidentally remarked that he hoped that this Government would keep in mind any possible methods of cooperation in this and related respects.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

890F.51/31

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs
(Murray) to the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] May 10, 1941.

MR. SECRETARY: Mr. James A. Moffett telephoned to me yesterday afternoon with further reference to the proposal to accord financial assistance to King Ibn Saud through the purchase by the United States Government of petroleum products which Mr. Moffett's company would produce and process. Mr. Moffett outlined at some length the history of this proposal. He began by pointing out that the financial and economic situation in Saudi Arabia was becoming more and more desperate. Only within the past week his company had been obliged to advance a further sum of \$500,000 to Ibn Saud's Government. This made a total advance of \$7,300,000 to be recouped from future oil royalties.

¹¹ Viscount Halifax.

¹² Dated April 21, p. 627.

Mr. Moffett stated that his original proposal to the President was that this Government advance funds to King Ibn Saud, security for such a loan being oil in the ground in Saudi Arabia. According to Mr. Moffett, the President told him that this Government could not buy "oil in the ground", but that it would be willing to consider the purchase of finished products which could presumably be brought from the Persian Gulf in Danish tankers under the control of the Government and used to build up supplies in our new naval bases. Mr. Moffett said that at the President's request he had drawn up the memorandum¹³ which subsequently was sent over here by the White House.

It was Mr. Moffett's understanding that the President was greatly interested in this proposal, which Mr. Moffett described as similar to the Tung oil arrangement made with China.¹⁴ Mr. Moffett seemed to feel, however, that the proposal in regard to Saudi Arabia was more sound than the Tung oil arrangement since there would be one hundred percent security.

Mr. Moffett also pointed out that his proposal to the President involved our urging upon the British that they increase the subsidy which they were granting to Ibn Saud. For his strictly confidential information I told Mr. Moffett that I understood that you had recently mentioned this aspect of the matter to the British Ambassador, who would presumably pass the suggestion along to his Government.

Mr. Moffett then requested that I bring this whole matter urgently to your attention with a view to reaching a decision as soon as possible. He said that it had been his understanding that if the proposal was approved in principle the President would then ask him to work out the details with the Navy Department and with the Treasury or the Lend-Lease organization.

I am at your disposal to discuss this question whenever you desire. Mr. Moffett hoped that we could give him a reply at an early date, and he stressed the fact that his company could no longer continue to make these large advances to the Government of King Ibn Saud.

WALLACE MURRAY

890F.51/31

Memorandum of Telephone Conversations, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Alling)

[WASHINGTON,] May 13, 1941.

Mr. Moffett telephoned today to inquire whether any action had been taken with respect to the proposal he had made to the President for the purchase of oil from Saudi Arabia and the advance of funds to

¹³ Dated April 16, p. 625.

¹⁴ See *Foreign Relations*, 1938, vol. III, pp. 568-590, *passim*.

the Saudi Arabian Government. I told Mr. Moffett I understood that the Secretary had taken a memorandum which this Division had prepared¹⁵ covering a conversation which he had last Friday with Mr. Murray to the White House for discussion with the President, but that we had no information as yet as to the results of this discussion. Mr. Moffett asked that as soon as we had word we telephone to him.

Mr. Max Thornburg, another Vice President of the Company, then came on the wire and said that Sir Vivian Gabriel, a member of the British Air Mission and a British official of long service in the Near East, had recently discussed with him certain problems relating to Saudi Arabia. Sir Vivian had mentioned particularly the interest which he and Mr. Nevile Butler¹⁶ were taking in the activities of Dr. Chaim Weizmann¹⁷ in this country. Sir Vivian told Mr. Thornburg that he and Mr. Butler were apprehensive that Dr. Weizmann's activities would have a most unfortunate repercussion in Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries. From there the discussion led to Mr. Moffett's proposal concerning the advance of funds by this Government to King Ibn Saud against the production of oil. Sir Vivian had shown a great interest in this proposal, and only this morning Mr. Thornburg had received a letter from him regarding it. Mr. Thornburg said that on his next visit to Washington he would like to bring Sir Vivian to the Department to meet some of the officials here.

Later in the morning the Secretary's Office telephoned to say that as a result of the conversation which the Secretary had had with the President in regard to the matter referred to in the first paragraph of this memorandum it had been decided to take no action until it was seen what the British Government was prepared and willing to do. This information was passed on to Mr. Moffett, who said that he and his associates would endeavor to see whether they could not induce the British Government to take some action.

890F.51/31

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Alling)

[WASHINGTON,] May 15, 1941.

Mr. Thornburg came in today to say that, as he had told us yesterday, Mr. James Moffett had an interview with Secretary of the Navy

¹⁵ *Supra.*

¹⁶ Minister-Counselor of the British Embassy.

¹⁷ President of the Jewish Agency for Palestine.

Knox yesterday afternoon in regard to the plan of financial assistance to Saudi Arabia. Secretary Knox, according to Mr. Thornburg, expressed the opinion that the plan was purely a political matter and one in which the Navy would not be interested one way or the other at this point. Secretary Knox felt, however, that if the plan was approved as a political matter there was no reason why the Navy Department could not proceed with discussions regarding methods of putting the plan into effect. Apparently Mr. Moffett pressed Secretary Knox to take some further action, and as a result the latter agreed to discuss the matter with Mr. Jesse Jones.²⁸ That discussion, so I understand, is to take place today.

Mr. Thornburg went on to say that the company's representatives in Saudi Arabia had taken up informally with King Ibn Saud the question of sending a message to the President requesting financial aid. Apparently the King was willing to send such a message provided he received some measure of assurance that his request would be acted upon favorably. Mr. Thornburg asked whether I felt that now was the time for such a message to be sent. I told him it was my personal view that it would be better to have the situation explored further here so as to determine whether there actually was some possibility of carrying out the plan. If there did seem to be some possibility of putting the plan into effect then it might be in order for his representatives to advise the King to send such a message.

Mr. Thornburg indicated that he was going to discuss this whole question with some of his British friends with a view to seeing what, if any, action they proposed to take with a view to extending further assistance to Ibn Saud. In this connection Mr. Thornburg stated that it was his understanding that the British Government had agreed about a year ago to grant the Saudi Arabian Government a credit of £400,000, one-half of which was to be used at once and the balance in the autumn of 1940. More recently, so he understood, the British had agreed to open a similar credit for use during the calendar year 1941.

890F.51/31

*Memorandum by the Secretary of the Navy (Knox) for
President Roosevelt*

WASHINGTON, May 20, 1941.

Recently you sent me a memorandum concerning the matter of giving some financial assistance to King Ibn Saud through the medium

²⁸ Federal Loan Administrator.

of purchasing \$6,000,000 annually of petroleum products for the next five years.

I have had an investigation made of the oil produced in Saudi Arabia and find that its quality is not suitable for Navy use. The gasoline has a very low octane number, about 70, which corresponds to a second grade gasoline. It could not be used in airplanes and normally could not be used for ordinary purposes.

The Diesel fuel oil has an octane number of 55, but on account of its high sulphur content Navy men say it is inadvisable to use it and do not recommend it. The sulphur content runs between 1.5 and 1.9%. Navy specifications have a maximum limit of sulphur of 1%. I am told the sulphur would have a very deleterious corrosive effect on the exhaust system.

This high sulphur content also operates against the use of the fuel oil for Navy purposes. In the case of fuel oil, the sulphur content is 3.9% and the Navy specifications have a limit of 1%.

I appreciate the gravity of the situation in the Middle East and if needful, would be glad to see the small sum of money under question devoted to securing the military support of King Ibn Saud. I do not believe, however, there is any sound business reason for mixing that help up with the purchase of the type of oil produced in that field.

FRANK KNOX

890F.51/21

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Murray)*¹⁹

[WASHINGTON,] May 29, 1941.

Mr. Butler, Minister-Counselor of the British Embassy, called today with regard to the situation in Saudi Arabia. Mr. Butler recalled that several days ago the Secretary had mentioned to Lord Halifax the apparent financial difficulties in Saudi Arabia and had intimated that the British Government might wish to look into the matter to see whether it would be desirable to afford King Ibn Saud financial assistance. Subsequently the British Embassy had learned of Mr. Moffett's proposal for the purchase of petroleum products from Saudi Arabia for the use of the American Navy. The Embassy had gained the impression that if the British Government were willing to make a further contribution to Ibn Saud's finances, the American Government might then be willing to give consideration to the

¹⁹ Addressed to the Secretary of State and to Assistant Secretary of State Berle.

purchase of these petroleum products, the proceeds of which would be turned over to King Ibn Saud with a view to further supporting his regime.

Mr. Butler stated that a telegram had now been received from the Foreign Office stating that the British Minister at Jedda fully agreed that King Ibn Saud's financial situation was bad and that he greatly needed assistance. The British Minister at Jedda also expressed the view that King Ibn Saud had been perfectly loyal to the British and deserved support. Accordingly, the British Government had taken steps immediately to increase the grants which had been previously made to King Ibn Saud. These grants, which had amounted to £300,000, were to be increased by £200,000. The British Government expressed the hope that it would now be possible for this Government to give further consideration to the possibility of granting financial support to King Ibn Saud. Mr. Butler said that he understood that the proposal which had been made by Mr. Moffett was more or less of a commercial proposition but that, although he had no direct instructions to say so, it was the hope of the British Embassy here that financial aid could be extended even if not on a commercial basis. In this connection Mr. Butler strongly stressed his belief that, with the international situation as it was, the financial position of Saudi Arabia should be considered entirely as a political matter and not a commercial matter.

I stated that I would bring the foregoing to the attention of the appropriate officers in the Department.

In as much as the British Government has now increased its subsidy to King Ibn Saud the question arises whether we may not wish to pursue with Mr. James A. Moffett the proposal which he made to the President some weeks ago. A recent memorandum from the Secretary of the Navy to the President²⁰ indicates that the oil produced in Saudi Arabia is not up to the standards required by the United States Navy. However, we have gathered in informal discussions with officials of Mr. Moffett's company that his organization probably would be willing to furnish oil from American production fields to build up naval supplies in the West Indies, turning over the proceeds to King Ibn Saud. The company would eventually obtain a reimbursement by taking royalty free oil from its fields in Saudi Arabia. In the event you desire to have us pursue this matter further we can get in contact with Mr. Moffett or some of his associates. Possibly you may wish to discuss the matter with the President.

WALLACE MURRAY

²⁰ *Supra.*

890F.51/32

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Alling)

[WASHINGTON,] June 18, 1941.

Mr. Hamilton ²¹ telephoned to me at my home last night to say that he had just learned that Mr. James A. Moffett, Vice President of the Standard Oil Company of California,²² had had a talk yesterday with Mr. Harry Hopkins.²³ Mr. Hopkins said that he had discussed with the President the question of extending financial assistance to King Ibn Saud and that the President had given him the "green light". It was Mr. Moffett's understanding that Mr. Hopkins would now discuss the matter with Mr. Jesse Jones. Mr. Hamilton said he was passing this information along to us for our use and so that we might take such steps as we thought necessary or desirable.

890F.51/32

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Alling)

[WASHINGTON,] June 19, 1941.

Mr. Hamilton telephoned today to say that Mr. James Moffett had seen Mr. Jesse Jones yesterday in regard to the proposed financial assistance to King Ibn Saud. Mr. Jones had told Mr. Moffett that the President had approved the project but that he (Mr. Jones) did not see as yet how it could be handled under the Lend-Lease Act. Mr. Jones said, however, that he would try some other way in taking care of the matter. He asked Mr. Moffett numerous questions regarding the organization of the company, the situation in Saudi Arabia and the need of the King for financial assistance. Mr. Hamilton concluded by saying that he expected to obtain additional information either tonight or tomorrow which he would pass on to us.

890F.51/23 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, June 26, 1941—5 p. m.
[Received July 1—3 : 32 a. m.]

826. My 825, June 26, 4 p. m.^{23a} I hope the Department will see its way clear to exploring exhaustively the possibility of extending finan-

²¹ Lloyd Hamilton, general manager of the California Arabian Standard Oil Co.

²² Mr. Moffett apparently held no official position in the Standard Oil Co. of California.

²³ Special Assistant to the President.

^{23a} Not printed; it contained a message from the Saudi Arabian Government requesting a credit of \$10,000,000 (890 F. 51/22).

cial aid to Saudi Arabia and to giving its encouragement and support to any feasible project to that end. The importance of insuring the sympathy of the Arab world at this time cannot be too strongly emphasized and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the logical field for American endeavor in that regard. I am convinced that immediate financial assistance to that Government should be regarded as a profitable investment over and above all actual business considerations.

I have noted from the Department's confidential instructions Nos. 13 and 14 of May 9,²⁴ that the question of the extension of economic assistance to Saudi Arabia by the United States has been brought to the Department's attention and that proposals have been made envisaging both increased oil purchases as well as financial advances through the Export and Import Bank. I made no mention of these possibilities to the Secretary of the Legation of Saudi Arabia when he handed me the note transmitted in my telegram under reference but merely asked him to inform his Minister for Foreign Affairs that I would communicate at once with my Government and that I would be glad to be notified for my personal information if any representative of Saudi Arabian financial interests was now in the United States who might be qualified to facilitate any preliminary investigations that might be found possible to initiate. He replied that he knew of no such individual but would make inquiries of his Government.

As the matter of extending financial aid to Saudi Arabia is regarded as one of urgency I shall appreciate telegraphic advice at the earliest possible moment as to the nature of the preliminary reply I may make to the Saudi Arabian Government in the premises.

KIRK

890F.51/34

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Aling)

[WASHINGTON,] July 2, 1941.

Participants: Mr. Butler, Minister-Counselor of the British Embassy
Mr. Murray

While calling today on another matter, Mr. Butler said that he had just had word from his Government that the ten million rials which the British Government was minting in India for King Ibn Saud would be given to the King without charge. Previously it had been expected that the Saudi Arabian Government would be asked to pay for these coins. Mr. Butler said that the bullion value of the coins was somewhere between one and a half million and two million

²⁴ Neither printed.

dollars. He pointed out this was a further evidence of the desire of the British Government to assist the King and it was hoped of course that the United States Government could also see its way clear to offer financial assistance to Saudi Arabia.

890F.51/29 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, July 23, 1941—1 p. m.

[Received July 24—2:45 p. m.]

1004. Personal for the Acting Secretary. My 827, June 26, 6 p. m., and Department's 287, July 11, 10 p. m.,²⁵ last paragraph. I feel I must again emphasize the importance of a favorable and prompt action on the matter of financial aid to Saudi Arabia. The Saudi Arabian Legation here has again approached me with a view to expediting a reply to the King's request for a loan and it is clear that further delay will detract from the beneficial effect of whatever we may ultimately do. I realize that there must be technical difficulties involved but it seems that they have been overcome in other instances and if my word counts I can only state categorically and emphatically that a failure to make this gesture at this moment will constitute a disregard of realities in an area where we are constantly confronted with the success of such tactics when employed by the other side. It is not merely a question of buying support but chiefly one of preventing a recourse to other sources of support and that we should try to prevent everywhere regardless of the relative insignificance or geographical remoteness of the factor involved. In my opinion a great deal of unnecessary damage has resulted here from a deplorable absence of a realistic sense on the part of the democracies and I am ready to go to the limit in advocating a step which in the present scheme of things is so little and holds such beneficial potentialities within its limited context.

KIRK

890F.51/35

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Alling)

[WASHINGTON,] July 24, 1941.

Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Davies²⁶ called yesterday. Mr. Hamilton said that he would like to inform the Department of the most recent developments in connection with the proposal of extension of financial assistance to King Ibn Saud. He stated that about a week ago he

²⁵ Neither printed.

²⁶ Fred Davies, president of the California Arabian Standard Oil Co.

and Mr. Davies had gone to New York to discuss this whole question with officials of the company. As a result of that discussion a letter had been drafted to Mr. Jesse Jones setting forth the company's viewpoint. Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Davies had taken this letter over the past weekend to discuss with Mr. James A. Moffett at his summer home at White Sulphur Springs. At that conference it was agreed that Mr. Moffett, accompanied by Mr. Rogers,²⁷ President of the Texas Oil Company, would present the letter to Mr. Jesse Jones. This was done in a conference on Monday lasting about two hours. Mr. Jones pointed out that he had up to the present been unable to find any way by which he could extend direct financial assistance to Saudi Arabia. He thought it might be possible, however, to extend such assistance provided collateral could be arranged. Apparently both Mr. Moffett and Mr. Rogers felt that such collateral could be forthcoming in the shape of deliveries of petroleum products for the use of the American Navy. Both Mr. Rogers and Mr. Moffett, however, expressed the view to Mr. Jones that it would be undesirable to handle this matter on a purely commercial basis in such a way that the funds to be turned over to Saudi Arabia would be handled by the Standard Oil Company rather than by the United States Government. In other words, they both attached great importance to a direct extension of credit to King Ibn Saud but agreed that such credit should be secured by deliveries of petroleum products. According to Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Jones said that he would be glad to explore this suggestion and let Mr. Moffett know his decision within the next two or three days.

Later in the day I saw Mr. Moffett and he confirmed all of the foregoing statements and added that from his own conversations with the President he was certain that the latter desired something to be done in the way of working out financial assistance for Saudi Arabia.

890F.51/29 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk)

WASHINGTON, July 29, 1941—9 p. m.

333. Your 1004, July 23, 1 p. m. The Department thoroughly appreciates the desirability of extending aid to Saudi Arabia and the question is receiving every attention: Legal difficulties apparently make impossible an unsecured loan, from this Government to that of King Ibn Saud, but the Reconstruction Finance Corporation is considering means whereby credit may be extended against collateral

²⁷ W. S. S. Rodgers.

in the form of future deliveries of petroleum products. A decision is expected very shortly.

In your discretion you may informally advise the Saudi Arabian Legation that its request is receiving the closest attention of this Government and that a reply will be made at the earliest possible moment.

WELLES

890F.51/37

*Memorandum by the Federal Loan Administrator (Jones) to the
Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, August 6, 1941.

You will recall that James A. Moffett, Chairman of the Board of the California-Texas Oil Company, Limited, New York, which is jointly owned by the Texas Corporation and Standard Oil Company of California, appealed to the President for assistance to be furnished by the United States Government to the King of Arabia since his normal source of income has been cut off and his demands continue beyond the ability of the oil company to make further advances toward the payment of future oil royalties.

It is represented by Mr. Moffett that the oil companies have advanced the King of Arabia some \$6,000,000 or \$7,000,000 to pay the royalties on future production. The royalty is at the rate of 20¢ a barrel.

The President referred the matter to you and later to the Secretary of the Navy in the hope that the Navy could buy oil, but it developed that the oil produced there is not suitable for the Navy and, furthermore, that not enough of it could be gotten to the Navy to be of any use.

Mr. Hopkins sent the file to me some weeks ago with the statement that the President would like to be of some assistance in the situation if a way could be found; that he did not feel that he had a right to use Lend-Lease money for this purpose.

The RFC has no authority to give money to the King of Arabia or to buy oil in the ground in Arabia in the expectation that it could ever be delivered to the RFC.

When I spoke to you about the matter, you told me that you had requested the British to look after the King and that they had been advancing him funds. Prior to our closing the loan of \$425,000,000 to the British Government,²⁸ I spoke to Lord Halifax on two occasions about this matter, also to Sir Edward Peacock,²⁹ Sir Frederick Phillips,³⁰ and Mr. Carlyle Gifford.³¹ The President wrote me the

²⁸ See pp. 1 ff.

²⁹ Director, Bank of England.

³⁰ British Treasury representative in the United States.

³¹ British Treasury official.

following note, which I showed to Sir Frederick Phillips, with the request that the British Government furnish the King of Arabia with whatever funds it felt were desirable and necessary; that the United States Government was not in a position to make any advances whatever to the King of Arabia, or to buy any oil in the ground in Arabia:

"7/18—41

"Jess—

Will you tell the British I hope they can take care of the King of Saudi-Arabia. This is a little far afield for us!

F. D. R."

JESSE JONES

890F.51/38

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John D. Jernegan of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

[WASHINGTON,] August 7, 1941.

Participants: Mr. Fred Davies } Standard Oil Company of
 Mr. Lloyd Hamilton } California
 Mr. Murray
 Mr. Jernegan

Mr. Davies and Mr. Hamilton said they had heard nothing further on the subject of the proposed loan to King Ibn Saud since their conversation with Mr. Alling on July 24. They felt quite sure that Mr. Jesse Jones had not yet given any answer to Mr. James A. Moffett.

Mr. Hamilton said it was his understanding, following the last conversation between Mr. Moffett, (with Mr. Rodgers of the Texas Co.) and Mr. Jesse Jones, that Mr. Jones considered a direct loan under Lease-Lend or through the Reconstruction Finance Corporation as impracticable but that he was thinking of the possibility of making the money available to Great Britain under Lease-Lend, leaving it to the British to deliver the funds to King Ibn Saud. Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Davies feel, however, that if we put up the money we should get the credit. Mr. Murray agreed with this point of view.

The entire subject was gone over at some length, and Mr. Hamilton repeated the conviction of his company that a loan by the United States to Saudi Arabia at this time is very important from a political standpoint. He emphasized that King Ibn Saud is anxious to have American assistance because he does not fear our intervention in his affairs. The British, in Mr. Hamilton's opinion, are also anxious to have the United States join in aiding the King because they do not want him to feel himself too much in their debt, a feeling which might some day influence him to throw in his lot with Britain's opponents.

They also want to avoid compromising his standing as an independent leader of the Arabs.

Mr. Murray said that he could understand the attitude both of the King and the British, but he pointed out that Saudi Arabia lies in an area in which British interests are much greater than ours and that the British are therefore more directly concerned. He further said that the British have a long background in the field of political loans, are used to advancing money without any great expectation of getting it back, whereas the United States does not have any tradition of that sort.

Mr. Murray explained that he fully appreciates the advantages of extending assistance to King Ibn Saud but that we must take into consideration the natural reluctance of Mr. Jesse Jones to embark on a purely political loan in an area where we are not directly concerned to any great extent. Mr. Murray said he is inclined to feel that it might be best to present the proposition first and foremost as a sound commercial operation, based on collateral, with the political advantages put forward only as a "plus value." He asked whether Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Davies would be willing to see Mr. Jones and discuss the matter with him on that basis. Mr. Hamilton replied that he understood Mr. Moffett did not wish to take the initiative in calling on Mr. Jones again and that he would probably not approve of any such action by Mr. Davies and himself. Mr. C. E. Olmsted, vice president of the Texas Company and vice chairman of the California-Arabian Oil Co., is expected to arrive in Washington tonight, and Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Davies expect to talk with him about the situation. They think he may want to consult Mr. Rodgers regarding the advisability of again approaching Mr. Jones at this time. They asked, however, if the Near Eastern Division could not call to the attention of Mr. Jones the political factors involved and explain that the Department "would not be unhappy" if a loan were granted.

Mr. Hamilton said that in his initial conversation with the President Mr. Moffett had suggested that his company could supply oil for the United States Navy as security for the loan, and that the President had seemed to fall in with the idea, suggesting that certain Danish tankers might be used to transport the oil. Mr. Davies said that although the Navy Department does not feel that the Arabian oil is up to its standards, the British Navy is using it with satisfaction and that its high sulphur content is not so much of a drawback as might appear.

In order that we might have a better understanding of the proposal, Mr. Hamilton explained that the Standard Oil Company's thought is that the American Government could make the loan direct to King Ibn Saud, against security in the form of petroleum products, which

the King would deliver to the United States as needed. The California-Arabian would provide the oil for the King and would be repaid over a period of years by being permitted to export free of royalty a quantity of petroleum sufficient to make up for the value of the products supplied the United States. Essentially, but indirectly, the company would make an advance of royalties to the King, in the form of oil rather than in the form of cash.

Mr. Davies suggested that if the United States Government wanted to have the oil delivered immediately, the company could produce it up to the value of \$500,000 per month (the suggested rate of the loan) but that additional tankers would be needed to transport it. He suggested that it might be used to fuel the American merchant ships now sailing to the Red Sea and Indian Ocean.

The California Standard's New York attorney, Mr. Klein, has drawn up a legal opinion showing that a loan by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation on the basis outlined above would be practicable. A copy of this opinion was given to Mr. Jones about a month ago, and Mr. Davies promised to supply the Department with a copy as well. (This opinion is attached herewith.)²²

In the course of the conversation, Mr. Murray mentioned, in confidence, King Ibn Saud's direct appeal for a loan. Both Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Davies said they had not known of this before and were quite sure that this appeal had not been inspired by anyone connected with their company. They said the suggestion had been made to the King some time ago but that he had said he would not make any such move unless he were sure it would be favorably received. They had then dropped the matter.

Explaining why the King complains of the shortage of his oil royalties, Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Davies said that the export of oil has not decreased substantially but has not increased as the King had expected. This is due primarily to disruption of world markets by the war and secondarily to shortage of transportation facilities.

890F.51/29 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk)

WASHINGTON, August 22, 1941—8 p. m.

399. Your 1004, July 23, 1 p. m., and previous telegrams on the question of extending financial assistance to Saudi Arabia. The Department has examined this matter from every angle and it has received the consideration of the President, the Secretary of the Navy,

²² See *Hearings Before a Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, Part 41, Petroleum Arrangements With Saudi Arabia*, pp. 25436-25438.

the head of Lend-Lease, and the Federal Loan Administrator. The sum and substance of the conclusions reached are that this Government is not in a position to make any advances to the Saudi Arabian Government or to buy any Arabian oil whether produced or in the ground. The President requested Mr. Jesse Jones to inform the British of his hope that the British could take care of the financial needs of King Ibn Saud. Mr. Jones did so and made the request that the British Government supply to the King such funds as it should feel are desirable and necessary.

In replying to the note of the Saudi Arabian Minister of Foreign Affairs transmitted by your 825, June 26, 4 p. m.,³³ you are authorized to state in substance as follows:

This Government fully realizes that the existing international situation has affected Saudi Arabia in a manner to cause financial problems. As the Saudi Arabian authorities are doubtless aware, the United States Government and the British Government are currently extending economic and financial assistance to certain countries, and this country is affording assistance to Great Britain on a very large and comprehensive scale.

The question of furnishing a credit to Saudi Arabia has been given the most earnest and sympathetic consideration by the President and high-ranking officials. However, it is felt that owing to the large number of countries and the vast extent of the areas included in the program of economic assistance, it is impracticable for this Government to cover the entire field, and a division of effort is necessary. In this connection, it is understood that the British Government has already afforded financial assistance to Saudi Arabia.

Needless to say, the continued independence of Saudi Arabia and the well-being of its people are considered to be of great importance, and the Government of the United States has the highest appreciation of the achievements of King Ibn Saud in unifying and developing his country and maintaining its liberties. On the other hand, the Saudi Arabian Government will doubtless appreciate that it is natural and logical for this Government to devote its main efforts toward assisting those countries which are actively resisting external aggression, or which for geographical reasons are important to the national defense.

The Saudi Arabian Government may feel that there are other ways in which this Government could be of assistance, in which case they could be discussed with the American Minister on the occasion of his forthcoming visit.

HULL

³³ See footnote 23a, p. 638.

S90F.51/30 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, August 30, 1941—4 p. m.

[Received August 31—11:45 p. m.]

1260. From a perusal of Department's 399, August 22, 8 p. m., I gather that there are factors other than the actual merits of the case which are regarded as precluding the extension of American financial aid to Saudi Arabia. It may be presumed that the Saudi Arabian Government will so infer and that no explanation will negative that impression or mitigate the repercussion of the refusal to respond to its appeal especially after the lapse of time during which it has apparently been under consideration.

With reference to the Department's specific suggestions as to a reply to the Saudi Arabian Government I wish to submit the following observations.

1. The reference in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the suggested reply to the division of effort between the American and British Governments would almost certainly suggest a division of hemispheres of influence under which the United States would appear to be resigning to the British all initiative in the Near East generally and in Saudi Arabia particularly. Given the unhappy position in which the British have been placed by identification with the system of colonies, mandates and protectorates not to mention the Palestine issue I believe that the conveying of such an impression whether intended or not would be most unfortunate.

2. The reference in paragraph 3 of the draft reply to the inactive role of Saudi Arabia in respect of the war and its lack of geographical importance might well be regarded by Ibn Saud as gratuitously offensive if incorporated in the reply. Not only has Saudi Arabia stood out as the one Moslem country which has not given cause for anxiety or worse in respect of the prosecution of the war but it has consistently exerted a stabilizing influence on neighboring Moslem countries. Given the position of prestige which Ibn Saud holds among his co-religionists by virtue of being the custodian of the holy places of Islam as well as by virtue of his personality, the situation in the Middle East at this time might well be worse than it is if he had fallen under the Axis spell as have most Moslems in Iraq, Iran, Syria and Egypt. The fact that Saudi Arabia was one of the countries which the British deemed it desirable to notify regarding developments in Iran is not without significance in this connection. Finally, as regards the geographic importance of Saudi Arabia, both in the present and in the face of future developments, its central position in the Arab world as well as on world trade routes, particularly sea and air, would hardly seem to require emphasis.

I suggest, therefore, that I be authorized to submit a reply merely explaining that despite the earnest and sympathetic consideration given this matter by the President and high-ranking officers of the American Government it has been found impossible to formulate a plan within the framework of existing financial legislation and policy by which the American Government can at this time give financial assistance to the Government of Saudi Arabia. It would be added, however, that the American Government fully realizes the adverse effect caused in Saudi Arabia by the existing international situation and that under the circumstances the American Government in expressing its regret in not being able to accede to the present request of the Saudi Arabian Government desires to give assurance of its willingness and disposition to cooperate with the Saudi Arabian Government in any way possible within the framework of existing laws and regulations. In this way it would appear that the sensibilities of the Saudi Arabian Government would be spared insofar as possible and the record would not be clouded if and when it should be decided that it is worthwhile for the American Government to manifest interest in Saudi Arabia in the only way which apparently its Government wishes and understands.

KIRK

890F.51/30 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk)

WASHINGTON, September 10, 1941—9 p. m.

453. Your 1260, August 30, 4 p. m. The decision not to grant a credit to Saudi Arabia was based on the actual merits of the case and notwithstanding the hope expressed by the British that such a credit would be made by this Government. It was the considered view of the President that financial assistance to Saudi Arabia would take us too far afield and that the British have more reason than ourselves to look after its financial needs.

The reply suggested by the Legation would not give the real reason underlying the decision and would therefore be lacking in frankness. Moreover, it does not seem convincing. The Saudi Arabians would perhaps feel, with some reason, that we could place the matter inside our framework of legislation or policy if we felt it necessary or strongly desired to do so. The Legation's suggested reply is brief and might be considered curt, particularly by Arabs.

It would be undesirable to convey an impression that a subsequent request for financial assistance, in existing circumstances, would result more favorably than the present request.

There is no objection to the Legation's final formula relating to the possibility of other requests not along strictly financial lines, but it

appears to be somewhat more restrictive than the one proposed by the Department.

We doubt whether an interpretation such as mentioned in your numbered paragraph 1 is justified by the language used in the first two paragraphs of our draft, which is intended to be a polite statement of the decision and of the reasons underlying it and means exactly and no more than what it says.

As regards paragraph 3 of our draft, Saudi Arabia certainly cannot be criticized for not fighting so long as it is unattacked. On the other hand, the Saudi Arabians should not find it difficult to realize that our aid must be concentrated upon those countries which have been attacked and are actually fighting, and upon non-belligerents which are geographically important to us for reasons of national defense. The fact that Saudi Arabia is of more political and strategic importance to the British Empire than to this country has long been understood by the Saudi Arabians, and was perhaps the main consideration in the granting of oil concessions to an American company.

You are authorized to draft and forward what you consider a suitable reply to the Saudi Arabian Government, but, in the formulation of the response, consideration should be given to the foregoing remarks which are advisory in character and are transmitted in the thought that they may prove helpful. Telegraph text of reply when made.

HULL

890F.51/39 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, September 23, 1941—1 p. m.
[Received September 24—8:23 a. m.]

1454. Department's 453, September 10, 9 a. m. [*p. m.*]. In view of the directives given in Department's telegram under reference I have addressed a reply to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia drafted as closely along the lines of the Department's 399, August 22, 8 p. m., as safeguarding of the codes permitted.

KIRK

890F.515/14

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) to the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Murray)

[WASHINGTON,] September 26, 1941.

MR. MURRAY: Please let me have your judgment as to the desirability of my attempting to make a further effort towards obtaining credits

for the Government of Saudi Arabia. I understand that Jesse Jones has finally and definitely refused to agree to enter into any arrangement with the British whereunder the British would undertake such financing as at the request of this Government.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

890F.515/13

Memorandum by the Acting Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Alling) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

[WASHINGTON,] September 27, 1941.

MR. WELLES: In reply to your memorandum of September 26 to Mr. Murray, who is on leave, I may say that by a memorandum of August 6 from Mr. Jesse Jones to the Secretary, we were informed of the President's disinclination to afford financial assistance to Saudi Arabia. Mr. Jones' memorandum is attached,^{33a} and you may wish to read the President's brief communication on the subject to Mr. Jones which is quoted on page two thereof.

It is not clear from Mr. Jones' memorandum whether the President was informed of the fact that we received a formal request for financial assistance from the Saudi Arabian Government, as distinct from the suggestions of the oil companies and the British. The record shows that this fact was communicated to Mr. Jones by Mr. Berle on July 3.

It would appear, in any case, that if the matter is reopened it will be necessary to take it up with the President.

The Legation at Cairo has been informed of the adverse decision in the matter and recently communicated it to the Saudi Arabians.

You will doubtless recall that on September 26 we sent a telegraphic instruction to Cairo³⁴ designed to lessen King Ibn Saud's disappointment and to overcome any feeling he may have that we are abandoning him completely, by informing him, when Minister Kirk visits Jidda, that we would be glad to look into the possibility of sending the King an agricultural mission³⁵ should the idea of such a mission be agreeable to him. In view of Ibn Saud's known anxiety to settle his nomads on the land and to discover and develop the water and agricultural resources of Saudi Arabia, we have every reason to believe that a mission of suitable government experts would please him highly.

We feel strongly that to produce the best results, such a mission should be offered to Ibn Saud without any "ifs" and "buts". However, a request for the money would apparently have to be made through the Bureau of the Budget, from the President's Emergency

^{33a} *Ante*, p. 642.

³⁴ Telegram No. 507, p. 658.

³⁵ For correspondence on this subject, see pp. 651 ff.

Fund. We can, of course, present a stronger case if Ibn Saud's wishes in the matter are first ascertained.

In view of Ibn Saud's importance and influence in the critical Middle Eastern area, it would be most regrettable if we should let him down completely. The cost of the official mission contemplated would be moderate and would assist him in a field in which our experts are particularly well qualified and in which British assistance, even if available, would probably be unacceptable to Ibn Saud.

PAUL H. ALLING

890F.51/43

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Alling)

[WASHINGTON,] November 4, 1941.

Mr. Hayter³⁶ said that, in response to a question which I had raised with him a few days ago, he now had telegraphic advice from London concerning the payments being made to Ibn Saud by the British Government. Mr. Hayter stated that the British Government had made all the payments due for the year 1941. He said that we were aware from previous discussions with Mr. Nevile Butler what these payments were. Ibn Saud had, however, appealed for additional aid for the year 1942, and consideration was now being given to what assistance might be accorded to him.

REQUESTS BY SAUDI ARABIA FOR A LOAN OF ROAD ENGINEERS AND FOR A MISSION OF AGRICULTURAL AND IRRIGATION EXPERTS FROM THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

890F.154A/1

Mr. K. S. Twitchell³⁷ to the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Murray)

NEW YORK, November 12, 1940.

[Received November 13.]

DEAR MR. MURRAY: I wish to confirm our conversation regarding the verbal request to me of His Majesty King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud asking if it would be possible for our Government to loan him the services of competent road engineers.

King Ibn Saud would like to know also the conditions of salary and payments required.

³⁶ W. G. Hayter, First Secretary of the British Embassy.

³⁷ Consultant for the American Smelting and Refining Co., which had a minority interest in the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate, and informal representative in the United States for King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia.

I had the pleasure of meeting Thos. MacDonald, Commissioner of Public Roads Administration, 515 14th St., N. W. Washington, and discussed this matter with him. He said that he had engineers available. For the proposed expedition a resident engineer at a salary of \$500. per month and all expenses with an assistant engineer at \$350. to \$400. and all expenses would be visualized. Salary payments would be required to be made monthly in a U. S. A. bank.

Mr. MacDonald said that above arrangements could be made but only if the State Department so requested.

The work proposed and desired by King Ibn Saud is the construction of a road over which 10-ton trucks can travel from Jizan to Abha, and from Abha to Nejran, Asir. This spring I made trips in which I found practicable routes for these roads. The length of the route from the seaport Jizan to Abha, Elevation 7,000 ft., is 175 miles (283 kilometers), but the precipitous mountain section is only 2850 ft. vertical distance.

The route from Abha, Elevation 7,000 ft., to Nejran, Elevation 4300 ft., is 196 miles (317 kilometers).

As soon as the war is over His Majesty wishes these roads to be constructed. He would have American road building equipment purchased similar to some I have already bought on behalf of his Government.

I shall be glad to give all details I possess when you or Mr. MacDonald may so desire.

I know that His Majesty will very greatly appreciate all you may be able to do and I shall be very glad to forward your communications to him.

Yours sincerely,

K. S. TWITCHELL

890 F. 154A/1

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk)

No. 510

WASHINGTON, November 15, 1940.

The Secretary of State transmits copies of correspondence exchanged between the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs and Mr. K. S. Twitchell, of 3 Handy Court, Burlington, Vermont, who has recently returned to this country from Saudi Arabia.

The American Minister is requested to inform the Saudi Arabian Government through the appropriate channel that his Government will be pleased to cooperate with the Saudi Arabian Government with a view to facilitating the obtainment of the services of American road engineers when they may be desired.

When communicating with the Saudi Arabian Government the Minister may make available a copy of the enclosed letter from Mr. Twitchell.³⁸

102.64/100

The Secretary of the Interior (Ickes) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, May 21, 1941.

SIR: Mr. K. S. Twitchell, acting informally on behalf of the King of Saudi Arabia, has recently studied various operations upon Indian reservations and reclamation projects in our Southwestern States, and has made note of various agricultural and engineering techniques which have been developed by the bureaus of this Department, and which he believes to be very applicable to the needs of Arabia. The particular questions which he was asked by the King of Arabia to inquire into seem, in fact, to call for the presence of technical men upon the ground in Arabia. It occurs to me that it might be helpful, even important, especially at the present time, if the United States should send an Agricultural Mission to Arabia. Commissioner Page, of the Bureau of Reclamation, and Commissioner Collier, of the Office of Indian Affairs, would, if you consider that such an undertaking would be helpful, be glad to discuss the subject with your staff.³⁹

Very truly yours,

HAROLD L. ICKES

890F.61A/4

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Alling)

[WASHINGTON,] June 20, 1941.

Participants: Mr. Neville Butler, Minister-Counselor of British Embassy.
Mr. Murray
Mr. Alling

Mr. Butler stated that about two weeks ago Mr. K. S. Twitchell had called on him and had outlined his plan, which he had presented to the Department, to send agricultural and reclamation advisers to King Ibn Saud. Mr. Butler said that he had sent an account of Mr. Twitchell's conversation by telegraph to London and that he was now in receipt of a reply.

The Foreign Office stated in this reply that it had referred the matter to the British Minister at Jedda, who was distinctly in favor of

³⁸ *Supra*. Reply of the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, dated November 15, 1940, not printed.

³⁹ In his reply of May 29, the Secretary of State said that the Department of State would avail itself of the offer to pursue the discussions on the subject with officers of the Department of the Interior.

the proposal. The British Government added that it also would welcome the sending of such a mission to King Ibn Saud and proposed that it be headed by Mr. Twitchell and that he be assisted by competent experts.

The instruction from London went on to say that although the British Government favored this agricultural mission, it was obvious that it would bring benefits to King Ibn Saud only over a long term. Meanwhile the King was in desperate need of financial assistance. The instruction added that the payment to Ibn Saud by the British Government had been increased recently, and it was expected that another substantial payment to him would be made in the near future. The British Government expressed the hope, however, that this Government would find it possible also to extend financial assistance to Ibn Saud and in that way to support his régime.⁴⁰

It was indicated to Mr. Butler that word had come to us that some means was being sought to carry out the plan proposed by the California Arabian Standard Oil Company for the purchase of oil by the United States Government, the money used in payment to go to the King. It was indicated that this matter was now in the hands of Mr. Jesse Jones,⁴¹ who, it was understood, was trying to find some means of carrying it into effect. Mr. Butler indicated his appreciation of the efforts which were being made to find some solution for this problem.

123K632/400 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk)

[Extract]

WASHINGTON, June 20, 1941—8 p. m.

231. . . .

The suggestion has been made that as a gesture of good will of eventual benefit to Saudi Arabia which would be distinctly appreciated by Ibn Saud, we might, at his request, place a small group of Government experts on agriculture, irrigation and roads at Ibn Saud's disposal for so long as would be necessary to investigate possibilities along the lines of their specialties and to make recommendations to the Saudi Arabian Government. During the period of this mission's work, its head might be designated as Agricultural Attaché to your Legation. Such a project would constitute a gesture without the establishment of an office in Jeddah which political considerations might make it difficult to withdraw if the reasons for its establishment should cease to be of importance. Should you think well

⁴⁰ For correspondence on this subject, see pp. 624 ff.

⁴¹ Federal Loan Administrator.

of this suggestion, the Department will investigate its feasibility from the legal and financial viewpoints so that you may be in a position to discuss the matter with the King in a concrete manner.

HULL

890F.154A/2 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, June 27, 1941—5 p. m.

[Received July 1—12:30 a. m.]

837. Department's mail instruction 510, November 15, 1940. The Legation is in receipt of a note, dated April 10, from the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Foreign Affairs conveying King Ibn Saud's appreciation of the offer of the American Government to cooperate in obtaining the services of American road engineers but stating that the Saudi Arabian Government deems it advisable to hold the matter in abeyance for the duration of the present international crisis.

KIRK

890F.51/25 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, July 3, 1941—10 p. m.

[Received July 6—8:20 a. m.]

878. Department's 231, June 20, 8 p. m. I thoroughly endorse the suggestion that some practical gesture of good will towards Saudi Arabia be made by our Government but in view of the King's apparent reluctance to use the services of American road engineers as stated in my telegram 837, June 27, 5 p. m., I have no assurance that he would appreciate an offer to place Government agricultural experts at his disposal. Furthermore even if such experts should be found acceptable I doubt whether their purposes could be fully accomplished without assistance of a Foreign Service Officer established near Saudi Arabian Government at Jedda and I therefore revert to my previous recommendation that a consular officer be sent there even before I may have an opportunity to present my letters. In this connection I personally do not foresee the difficulties envisaged by the Department in an eventual withdrawal of such an officer in view of fact that Jedda is not a place where foreign officials can be expected to remain for a long time without leave of absence and in the case of an American consular officer such leave might at any time be availed of and protracted to such a length that to all intents and pur-

poses the office might be regarded as having closed itself. The real difficulty as I see it is in the choice of a suitable officer for he should have a knowledge of this part of the world as well as of Arabic, should possess sound judgment and must have no family ties.

I wish to add that I consider that the best manner in which good will might be shown to Saudi Arabia would be a favorable reply to the request contained in my 825, June 26, 4 p. m.,⁴² and to this might well be joined an offer of the services of a financial adviser. I repeat however that in the event that the presence of a consular officer in Jeddah would seem essential as a condition precedent.

KIRK

890F.00/66

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Gordon P. Merriam of the
Division of Near Eastern Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] September 18, 1941.

Participants: Mr. K. S. Twitchell, Consultant, American Smelting
and Refining Company

Mr. Alling

Mr. Merriam

Mr. Twitchell called to discuss the Department's letter to him of September 11, 1941.⁴³ He expressed his disappointment that it had been decided not to grant financial aid to the Saudi Arabian Government and his opinion that it would have been wise to have done so. He intimated that he hoped it was yet possible to take favorable action. It was explained to him, however, that the decision had been taken by the President, and that full opportunity had been given to all those interested to express their views. As matters stood, there appeared to be nothing more that could be done as to that particular matter.

Mr. Twitchell conceded that this was the case, and then reverted to his proposal that a mission of experts be sent to Saudi Arabia. He was told that it would be difficult for us to press this matter actively in view of the President's decision and the view of the Legation at Cairo that there seemed to be no use in pursuing it because Ibn Saud would probably not be interested. It was explained that we could not lead Ibn Saud to have any definite hopes or expectations regarding the project, because in the end an adverse decision might be taken similar to that reached on the question of financial assistance. Moreover, the Legation's view had to be taken into account.

⁴² See footnote 23a, p. 638.

⁴³ Not printed.

It was suggested to Mr. Twitchell that he again call at the Departments of Agriculture and the Interior to ascertain whether some of their experts could still be made available for such a mission. If so, we would telegraph to the Legation at Cairo a suggestion that when the Minister made his visit to Saudi Arabia he ascertain whether the Saudi Arabian Government would welcome a mission provided we should find it possible to send one. If so, and particularly if the Minister should recommend that one be sent, we would have a good basis on which to go to work.

Mr. Twitchell gave it as his opinion that the mission would be most welcome to Ibn Saud, and that it would be a fine and much appreciated gesture if one could be offered to him forthwith. He emphasized the great difference between merely offering to help find engineers, all of whose expenses would have to be met by the King, and an offer of Government experts whose services would be a free gift, except to a minor extent.

890F.00/67

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Gordon P. Merriam of the
Division of Near Eastern Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] September 19, 1941.

Mr. Twitchell said that yesterday he had talked with Mr. John Collier, Commissioner of the Office of Indian Affairs, Department of the Interior, with Mr. Donald F. Christy, Assistant Director of the Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Department of Agriculture, and with Mr. M. A. McCall, Assistant Chief of the Bureau of Plant Industry, Department of Agriculture, regarding the proposed mission to Saudi Arabia of United States Government experts on water resources, agriculture, and roads.

According to Mr. Twitchell, all of these gentlemen considered it improbable that any of the regular Departments of the Government have ordinary appropriations which could be used to finance such a mission. On the other hand, they stated that appropriations were available to the President under the title of "Emergency Funds for the President" which, under the circumstances, it would be proper to allocate for the mission to Saudi Arabia.

Mr. Twitchell was informed that an appropriate procedure would be for the Secretary of State to address a memorandum to the President requesting that the necessary funds be allocated to the State Department, for the purpose of reimbursing necessary expenditures incurred by the various Federal agencies which would furnish personnel.

Mr. Twitchell stated that all of these officials had informed him without hesitation that the men were to be had to send to Saudi Arabia and that they would gladly be made available. Mr. McCall, in particular, said that quite apart from the question of helping King Ibn Saud, the information and experience which an agricultural expert obtained in Saudi Arabia would be very valuable to the Department of Agriculture.

890F.51/29 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk)

WASHINGTON, September 26, 1941—5 p. m.

507. Department's 399, August 22, 8 p. m.⁴⁵ We of course desire to do anything that can be done to lessen King Ibn Saud's inevitable disappointment over this Government's decision not to extend financial assistance to Saudi Arabia. In this connection, upon the occasion of your forthcoming visit to Saudi Arabia, you may desire to state informally that, in case the Saudi Arabian Government would welcome a mission as described in the Department's 231, June 20, 8 p. m., you would be glad to inquire of your Government whether one could be sent.

For your information, officials of the Departments of the Interior and Agriculture state informally that official experts on ground water resources, irrigation and agriculture are to be had for such a mission and would be made available if desired. It appears that the salaries and traveling expenses of the experts could not be paid from ordinary appropriations, but a request could be made for a grant from the "Emergency Fund for the President" the purpose of which is in part "to provide for emergencies affecting the national security and defense and for each and every purpose connected therewith."

We have been informed by the British Embassy here that the British Minister at Jidda strongly supports the project.

Mr. K. S. Twitchell, who is doubtless well known to the Legation, and who represents Ibn Saud informally in this country on various matters, states that the King's decision to defer employing American road engineers until after the war was not unexpected in view of the expense involved and Twitchell's own recommendation that no actual construction be undertaken until after the war because of the difficulty of obtaining machinery.

It is understood that Twitchell, in submitting a telegraphic report of his activities on behalf of the King, is suggesting that, if the King

⁴⁵ *Ante*, p. 645.

approves of the idea, the Saudi Arabian Government inform the Legation that an official mission of experts would be welcomed if it can be sent.

HULL

[In telegram No. 1963, December 15, 4 p. m., the Minister in Egypt transmitted a summary of the Saudi Arabian Government's request for experts (890 F. 51/44).]

SYRIA AND LEBANON

REPRESENTATIONS BY THE UNITED STATES REGARDING GERMAN REQUEST THAT FRANCE CANCEL THE ORIENTAL INSTITUTE ARCHAEOLOGICAL CONCESSION IN SYRIA

890D.927/124 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Palmer) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, August 9, 1940—1 p. m.

[Received 2:58 p. m.]

73. Reference my despatch No. 440, dated January 3, 1940.¹ Annulment of Oriental Institute concession has been demanded by German Government. This demand was first formulated in *note verbale* addressed on June 19, 1940, by German Legation at Bern to Swiss Political Department, Division of Foreign Interests, and presented on July 25 to the French High Commission by the Swiss Consul representing German interests here. It has now been brought again to the attention of the High Commission by a telegram received from Vichy on August 7. This telegram cites article 10 [*sic*] of Convention De Rethondes² as basis for German claim that rights of Baron Oppenheim antedating Oriental Institute concession be protected and orders cessation of excavation under this later concession.

I have discussed the situation with Field Director McEwan of the Oriental Institute Expedition, Director General of Antiquities Seyrig, and the High Commissioner.^{2a} McEwan holds an export permit issued by Seyrig under date of July 25 for objects found before that date and is taking them immediately to Baghdad for shipment to the United States when opportunity offers. Seyrig and the High Commissioner both feel that there is little chance of maintaining the Oriental Institute concession in opposition to German insistence on rights derived from Oppenheim's Turkish Firman the validity of which was recognized by the High Commission in 1927 and confirmed in a letter to the German Consul General here in 1930 and again as late as June 2, 1939, in a letter addressed to Oppenheim by Seyrig at the direction of the High Commissioner with specific reference to Tell Fakhariyah as well as to Tell Halaf.

¹ Not printed.

² Armistice agreement between France and Germany, signed June 22, 1940, *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, series D, vol. ix, p. 671.

^{2a} Gabriel Puaux.

The Commissioner who originally considered this German concession forfeited upon the outbreak of war is now holding to the argument that Oppenheim's rights to the Tell Fakhariyah site have lapsed because of his failure to develop this site. He tells me that he has advanced this argument in his reply to Vichy, but that he fears that the French Government will instruct him to cancel the Oriental Institute concession and order McEwan to cease work immediately while removing any objects [apparent omission] found. He considers that in the event of cancellation of the concession the Oriental Institute might properly claim from the High Commission reimbursement of expenses incurred prior to receipt of the German protest; and he has agreed that pending an order to cease work McEwan may continue excavation with the understanding that no claim for reimbursement of expenses incurred since the receipt of the German protest will be considered and that no objects found during this period will be removed from the site.

Please inform the Oriental Institute.

PALMER

890D.927/124 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Beirut (Palmer)

WASHINGTON, August 31, 1940.

57. Your 73, August 9, 1 p. m. If you have not already done so you should forward to the Department by air mail a detailed report containing all pertinent facts with reference to the contemplated action in respect to the Oriental Institute concession, including the text of the German concession, the text of the reported confirmations of that concession by the French authorities, as well as any available information concerning the grounds on which the German concession was declared forfeited.

Please keep the Department informed by telegraph of pertinent developments.

HULL

890D.927/126 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Palmer) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, September 6, 1940—10 a. m.

[Received September 7—7:56 a. m.]

87. Reference Department's 57, August 31. High Commission copy of Turkish firman granting Oppenheim archaeological concession for general area in which Tell Fakhariyah is situated has not been found for several years past but I have been promised copies of correspondence in which High Commission recognizes concession.

Am informed General Huntziger³ has been instructed to maintain that German failure to develop this site justified withdrawal of High Commission recognition; but situation remains essentially as reported in my telegram of August 9.⁴ While the High Commissioner has little hope that final decision will be favorable for Oriental Institute he has not yet been instructed to cancel its concession and does not seem to consider it inadvisable for expedition to continue work already under way.

Objects found up to July 25 have been taken to Baghdad for shipment to Chicago. High Commissioner's previously reported suggestion that expenses incurred prior to receipt of German protest might properly be claimed if the concession should be canceled would seem to offer reasonable guarantee in such an eventuality for recovery of greater part of expenses for this season. Accordingly field director desires to resume and complete work stopped 2 weeks ago under instruction from Chicago which appeared to indicate that Oriental Institute considered its concession already canceled.

As matters now stand and in view of attitude of High Commissioner and opinion of the Department of Antiquities that expedition's program for current season should be completed, if possible the Oriental Institute may wish to reconsider its recent instructions to expedition and authorize continuation of work throughout September. Since urgent action is necessary it is suggested that any telegram in this regard be addressed to the Consulate General for immediate communication to expedition and information of the High Commissioner who assures me that he does not anticipate that American members of the expedition will suffer any serious inconvenience if they remain until next month.

PALMER

890D.927/144

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Alling)

[WASHINGTON?] December 26, 1940.

While I was in Chicago over the Christmas holidays I saw Dr. John Wilson⁵ at the Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago. Dr. Wilson mentioned the difficulties the Institute had had in regard to its Syrian expedition, particularly the proposed withdrawal of the concession by the French authorities. This action was taken on the ground that a prior concession had been granted to the German

³ Gen. Charles Huntziger, French Minister for National Defense.

⁴ Telegram No. 73, p. 660.

⁵ Director of the Oriental Institute.

archaeologist, Baron Max von Oppenheim. Dr. Wilson said that perhaps the Institute had been at fault in not making certain that a prior concession for the dig had not been granted to the Germans. I said that I did not feel that the Institute need blame itself in this respect, that the French authorities had in fact invited the Institute to undertake the dig and had granted a special concession. I added that in my opinion it was not the duty of the Institute to go behind this French offer to see whether it had been made in good faith and whether it could legally be made. I stated that any such effort and investigation by the Institute would undoubtedly have caused displeasure to the French officials concerned. Dr. Wilson seemed to agree and said if that estimate of the situation was correct the question arose in his mind whether, in order to protect the Institute and possibly with a view to establishing a legal claim against the French authorities in Syria, it might not be desirable for this Government to take some official action. Dr. Wilson seemed to have in mind a possible reservation by the Department of the rights of the Institute in regard to the concession. I told Dr. Wilson that upon my return to Washington I would be glad to bring the matter up for discussion in the Department.

890D.927/138 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, January 24, 1941—8 p. m.

[Received January 25—11 a. m.]

20. Consulate General's despatch No. 608, September 24, 1940.⁶ After consultation with McEwan and the French Director of Archaeology, I feel very strongly that we should make an attempt to defend and to reserve the Tell Fakhariyah concession for future use even if the Oriental Institute does not wish to continue excavations at the present time. To acquiesce in the cancellation and to accept indemnity would of course imply waiver of all claims to the site and surrender of objects and records of the evacuation [*excavation*]. Incidentally French authorities would probably insist that indemnity be spent in Syria. Please inform the Oriental Institute of the above.

German agent von Hentig (see my telegram No. 13, January 17, 2 p. m.⁶) sent for McEwan a few days ago and suggested to him continuation of Fakhariyah excavations jointly with the German Archaeological Institute. I have told McEwan that I personally considered such cooperation most undesirable and doubted whether the Oriental

⁶ Not printed.

Institute would find it acceptable. I did not however tell him I had good reason to believe that von Hentig is attempting to introduce as many German agents as possible and that archaeological excavations would furnish innocent looking means—to which the French could not well object—of spreading propaganda and spending money among the Bedouins. This is the reason why I believe we should contest the German claim to Fakhariyah.

ENGERT

890D.927/118

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. George V. Allen of the
Division of Near Eastern Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] February 25, 1941.

Participants: Dr. John A. Wilson, Director, The Oriental Institute,
University of Chicago
Mr. Murray⁸
Mr. Alling
Mr. Allen

Dr. Wilson said that his purpose in calling at the Division was to have a general discussion of the question of the concession for archeological excavations at Tel Fecheriya,⁹ Syria, granted by the French authorities at Beirut on January 1, 1940, for a period of six years.

Dr. Wilson said that three weeks ago he had instructed Mr. McEwan, his representative in Beirut and the person in whose name the concession was actually granted, to turn over to Mr. Engert, American Consul General there, the responsibility for protecting the rights of the Institute, and to return to the United States. Dr. Wilson wanted to know specifically whether the Department perceived any reason why Dr. McEwan should remain in Syria. Mr. Murray said that, while the decision regarding Mr. McEwan's movements was of course one to be decided by the Oriental Institute or Mr. McEwan himself, he could see no reason, offhand, why the Department would have any basis for suggesting that Mr. McEwan remain in Beirut. Mr. Murray pointed out, however, the limitations of American consular officers in representing the interests of private American firms or institutions. He said that the Department had frequently extended its facilities to American philanthropic or cultural institutions to a somewhat greater extent than to American firms engaged in business for profit, and recalled the extent to which the Department had participated on behalf of the Oriental Institute in the negotiations concerning Per-

⁸ Wallace Murray, Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs.

⁹ Variation of spelling for Tell Fakhariyah, presumably based on French transliteration.

sepolis,¹⁰ but he informed Dr. Wilson that, even though well established American cultural organizations such as the Oriental Institute might be involved, the Department's representatives abroad could not assume the position of agents.

Dr. Wilson said that he had not been aware of this limitation but could appreciate the reasons therefor, and said that he would probably appoint some reputable private American citizen in Beirut, such as President Dodge of the American University, to act as its representative in the absence of Dr. McEwan.

Regarding the demand of German interests that the Institute's concession be cancelled, Dr. Wilson said that the results of the first season's excavations had been very satisfactory and that both the Oriental Institute and the other American institutions which had supplied money, including notably the Boston Museum, would prefer to keep the objects and records which they had obtained from the season's work rather than to surrender them for an indemnity. He said that Mrs. McEwan had brought out to America in two suitcases the best objects found, but that the bulk of the finds and records was in cases stored at the American Legation in Baghdad. He said that he had intended leaving the remaining cases in Baghdad for an indefinite period, until shipping facilities were available.

It was suggested to Dr. Wilson that, in view of the uncertain conditions in the Near East, it would be advisable for him to arrange for the shipment of these cases from Baghdad as soon as possible, and the opinion was expressed that shipping facilities were available. Dr. Wilson said that he would act on this suggestion.

Dr. Wilson said that no American institution would send an archeological expedition to the Near East at the present time, but that he thought additional money could be raised for further work at Tel Fecheriya, based on the findings of the first season, at such time as a resumption of digging should become feasible. He said that if the Syrian archeological law, with which he was not familiar, provided that concessions must be operated each season in order to be held, he felt confident that the Institute could arrange for sufficient digging each season to satisfy the requirements of the law. He thought two weeks' work might be sufficient.

On leaving, Dr. Wilson stated specifically that the Oriental Institute desired the American Government to make a full reservation of the rights of the Institute to the concession at Tel Fecheriya. In stating this general position, however, he wished it understood that if a reservation of these rights should involve the acceptance of an indemnity and the return of the finds, the Institute would prefer to forego the indemnity.

¹⁰ Concession for reconstruction of Persepolis, 1930; no correspondence printed.

890D.927/141 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, February 27, 1941—9 a. m.

[Received February 27—9 a. m.]

52. My 20, January 24. McEwan has been instructed by the Oriental Institute to uphold its right to the concession. In support of this contention I have addressed a brief note to the High Commissioner^{10a} in which I reserve all rights on behalf of the Institute until it becomes possible to resume excavation on that particular site.

Director of Archaeology has expressed to me much satisfaction at our decision and will recommend to the High Commissioner that nobody be permitted to excavate in that area for the duration of the war. This will keep the Germans out too unless Vichy should specifically instruct to the contrary. To forestall this, if possible, I venture to suggest that our Embassy at Vichy likewise reserve all rights of the Institute.

I have also talked to the Turkish Consul General who states that his Government is interested because it would like to avoid having German archaeologists operate so near the Turkish frontier at the present time. He believes Ankara would want to tell the Vichy Government that and I therefore suggest our Embassy in Ankara be informed if the Department decides to mention the validity of the American concession at Vichy.

ENGERT

890D.927/141 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Beirut (Engert)

WASHINGTON, March 11, 1941—5 p. m.

32. Your No. 52, February 27, 9 a. m. The Embassy at Vichy is being instructed by mail to make a formal reservation of the rights of the Oriental Institute and to express the confidence of the American Government that the Government of France will not accede to the German Government's request that the contract be cancelled.

HULL

890D.927/141

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Leahy)

No. 57

WASHINGTON, March 11, 1941.

SIR: On January 5, 1940 the French authorities in Syria granted a concession to the Oriental Institute, Chicago, for archaeological excavations at Tel Fecheriya, Syria. The concession contract pro-

^{10a} Gen. Henri-Fernand Dentz.

vided for a period of duration of six years. The Oriental Institute sent an expedition to the site in April 1940, and excavations were continued uninterrupted until August 1940, when the French authorities in Syria informed the American archaeologist in charge of the expedition, Dr. Calvin McEwan, that the German Government had demanded the cancellation of the concession, on the grounds that a previous concession covering this area had been granted to a German archaeologist, Baron Max Von Oppenheim, and that the continuing validity of Baron Von Oppenheim's concession had been recognized by the French authorities in Syria as late as June 2, 1939.

Dr. McEwan was permitted to continue his excavations for several weeks, in order to permit him to bring to a conclusion the work immediately in hand. On August 25, 1940, his expedition is said to have been ordered off the site by French police authorities.

The Department has not been informed that the French Government has formally cancelled the concession granted to the Oriental Institute. In anticipation, however, that such action may be taken, the Oriental Institute has requested the Department of State to enter a full reservation of the rights of the Institute in connection with the concession contract. In as much as the American institution accepted the contract from the French authorities in good faith and has, as far as the Department is aware, fulfilled in every respect the obligations thereof, the Department is of the opinion that there are no justifiable grounds on which the French Government may cancel the contract at this time, prior to its expiration. The Oriental Institute proceeded promptly to the development of the site, and maintained full operations during the first season, at an expenditure of some \$18,000.

You are requested to point out the foregoing considerations in a formal note to the French Government, reserving the full rights of the Oriental Institute under the concession and expressing the confidence of the American Government that the Government of France will not accede to the German Government's request that the contract be cancelled.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:
A. A. BERLE, JR.

890D.927/143 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, May 10, 1941—3 p. m.
[Received 3:50 p. m.]

533. Department's 369, April 29, 6 p. m.,¹¹ Oriental Institute of Chicago. A note drafted on the basis of the Department's instruc-

¹¹ Not printed.

tion¹² was delivered to the Foreign Office on April 8 and has remained unanswered.

We have had a talk with Lagarde,¹³ however, and he has pointed out confidentially that whatever the rights and wrongs of the matter the concession has been retroceded to the Germans. At a moment when the French Government is bracing itself to resist increasing German pressure in matters pertaining to Syria, he is reluctant to reopen a question which the Germans consider settled. He requested that we do not press the matter, adding that any application made by the Oriental Institute for a new concession anywhere in Syria would be acted upon promptly and favorably.

In the absence of political considerations of which we in Vichy are unaware we are inclined to agree that it would be wise not to press the matter at this time.

LEAHY

890D.927/145 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Beirut
(Engert)*

WASHINGTON, July 24, 1941.

145. Following from Oriental Institute:

"Please ask present Government Syria¹⁴ confirm Fakhariyah concession."¹⁵

WELLES

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES REGARDING THE IMPACT OF THE EUROPEAN WAR UPON SYRIA AND LEBANON¹⁶

I. Representations by the United States Regarding British Economic Blockade of Syria and Lebanon

740.00112 Navicert/227 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Palmer) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, December 4, 1940—noon.

[Received December 5—7: 52 a. m.]

140. The British Consulate General presented to the French High Commission on November 27 a "notice" that His Majesty's Government had decided to extend the system of navicerts and certificates of

¹² *Supra.*

¹³ Ernest Lagarde, Chief of Africa-Levant Section in the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

¹⁴ Established after the occupation of Syria by the British-Free French forces; for correspondence on this subject, see pp. 725 ff.

¹⁵ Concession confirmed, April 14, 1942.

¹⁶ Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. III, pp. 890-926.

origin to the French mandated territories of the Levant (Syria) as from November 18. According to it:

(1) imports into Syria from a number of countries including the United States will be covered by cargo navicerts;

(2) an exporter from Syria to any country may apply to the British Consulate General for a certificate of origin and interest;

(3) any ship sailing from a port in Syria will require a ship's navicert in order to avoid liability for seizure, which will not be issued to a ship carrying mails unless the master undertakes to drop the mails for examination at a specified British port and unless passenger list is submitted for consular approval;

(4) no certificate will be issued for territories regarded as under enemy occupation or control; France occupied and unoccupied, French Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, French Somaliland, or any other territory deemed to be under enemy occupation or control.

My British colleague¹⁷ wrote me confidentially on November 28:

"I understand that the policy of His Majesty's Government is to exercise as much economic pressure as possible on Syria and that in consequence they are most unfavorably disposed towards such trade (between the United States and Syria) and would in fact abstain from granting any navicerts in connection with it. I understand further that they have under review the question of tightening up the blockade on the Persian Gulf and it is likely that control in that area will be increased."

He informed me verbally yesterday for [*that?*] he has received subsequent instructions to the effect that every application made to him must be referred to London for decision. He thinks that the decision will be uniformly negative unless London authorities are requested from an outside source to favor a particular item of trade or shipment of goods. While Syria has not been formally listed as territory under enemy control, Consul General Havard thinks that the measures taken amount to practically the same thing and that trade between the United States and Syria as well as Iraq will be made most difficult if not impossible. He said that from the instructions he has received he can only deduce that London's policy is to asphyxiate economically this territory until "they decide to come around".

Havard has informed the High Commission only in the sense of the first paragraph. He is purposely keeping it uninformed of further instructions; he says that it will find out soon enough. The Chief of the Political Section of the High Commission in conversation on November 28 did not appear to think the "notice" of outstanding importance, nor did he think that the territories could be deprived of essential goods to such an extent as to influence the political situation.

¹⁷ Godfrey T. Havard.

However, the High Commissioner ^{17a} today expressed to me doubt as to whether the British would apply the navicert regulations fairly and envisages an increasingly difficult situation within this country in such an eventuality. In my estimation the *ravitaillement* organization is going from bad to worse and appears to be headed for a fiasco; supplies of essential goods such as coal, gasoline, kerosene, sugar, rice, automobile parts are obviously insufficient and irregular.

Inquirers at Beirut concerning the possibilities of Syrian-American trade will be answered with the above information in mind. While Havard wants it kept confidential in Beirut, he stated that he saw no objection to the information being disseminated in America.

This obviously puts an end to all the efforts made by the British Consul General and the French High Commissioner to work out some local economic arrangement between Syria and Palestine.

Copies of cabled text will be forwarded by pouch to Jerusalem, Cairo, Baghdad, Tehran and Ankara.

PALMER

741.90D/2

The British Embassy to the Department of State

SYRIA

We are trying to exercise the maximum economic pressure on Syria. This does not mean that we desire or expect an immediate uprising. A weak Syria is, however, a safeguard against any possibility of hostile French action of some kind against us. This seems to us essential in view of the strategical importance of Syria and of the unreliability of the Vichy Government. This seems to His Majesty's Government to involve less danger than any other course, and does not amount to their working for the collapse of Syria.

In order to give the local French authorities some tangible advantage from the continued presence at Beirut of the British Consul General, His Majesty's Government propose to allow Syrian exports in rare and isolated instances where the Consul General is able to certify that there is no question of metropolitan French origin or interest.

Should the United States Government be very anxious to continue any particular Syrian exports or imports, His Majesty's Government would be ready to give sympathetic consideration to particular applications. They hope, however, that this will not be the case as they wish to relax their pressure as little as possible.

[WASHINGTON,] 17 January, 1941.

^{17a} Gabriel Puaux.

741.90D/2

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division
of Near Eastern Affairs (Villard)*

[WASHINGTON,] January 17, 1941.

Mr. Helm¹⁸ left the attached informal memorandum¹⁹ in regard to the British position in respect to trade with Syria. The policy in this respect was summed up in the first sentence, namely, that the British Government is endeavoring to exercise "the maximum economic pressure on Syria". While consideration would be given in very exceptional cases to the continuance of certain types of American trade with Syria, the Government of Great Britain hoped that this would not be necessary since it was desired to maintain the pressure as fully as possible.

I asked Mr. Helm whether his Government had given consideration to the possibility that such a policy might force Syria into the arms of the Germans, that serious uprisings might take place, and that bitterness might be aroused against the British Government. Mr. Helm said that the different courses which might be pursued were certainly debatable but that it appeared the policy of his Government was to endeavor to create dissatisfaction with the Vichy regime in Syria and thus win the inhabitants over to the British side. Sufficient pressure would be applied to bring the country to the point of economic collapse, when inducements would be held out by the British for economic rehabilitation. The swinging over of the country to full support of the British would then follow.

I said to Mr. Helm that we had considerable doubts on this score, as he knew by our previous conversations in regard to trade with North Africa. Mr. Helm said that he could only speak personally on the latter subject since he had received no final word from London as to its policy in this area, but he believed that the blockade against the French African colonies was more likely to be tightened than relaxed. He said that he did not desire to discuss the matter without further information from London, but at this time he felt that it was the intention of his Government to pursue a policy in North Africa similar to that in force with respect to Syria. In this connection it was also his opinion that the British Government would endeavor to hamper the trade between Martinique and French Africa or metropolitan France as much as possible.

¹⁸ A. K. Helm, First Secretary of the British Embassy.

¹⁹ *Supra.*

740.00112 European War 1939/2131½ : Telegram

*The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State*BEIRUT, January 24, 1941—5 p. m.
[Received January 24—1 : 30 p. m.]

19. Consulate General's telegrams Nos. 140, December 4, 1940, and 16 and 17 of January 22, 1941.²⁰ I am informed by the British Consulate General that it has received a communication from the Ministry of Economic Warfare stating that in pursuance of its general economic policy toward the French mandated territories of the Levant it is desirous that no Syrian goods shall be exported via Basra unless covered by a navicert or a certificate of origin issued at Beirut after reference to London. The British Consulate General is instructed to report to the Ministry and to the British Consul at Basra any case which may come to its notice of local merchants or others attempting to export Syrian products via Basra without having obtained the relevant documents.

The communication from the Ministry gives no indication of the principles on which it is granting or refusing applications referred to it by the British Consul General here and the latter believes from his experience that it is treating each application on its own merits.

In view of the last sentence in paragraph 2 of my telegram No. 16, January 22, could the Department inform me for my guidance whether American ships loading at Basra are in fact accepting cargo for the United States without navicerts?

Repeated by mail to Baghdad.

ENGERT

740.00112 European War 1939/2131½ : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Beirut (Engert)

WASHINGTON, January 28, 1941—5 p. m.

9. Your 19, January 24, 5 p. m. The Department has been informed by the British Embassy here that all exports originating in Syria, Turkey or other countries to which the British control system has been extended must be covered by certificates of origin, in order to assure non-interference, regardless of whether the goods are loaded at Basra or elsewhere and regardless of whether they are carried on American or other vessels. The American Eastern Corporation informs the Department that American vessels loading at Basra are requiring certificates of origin for cargoes originating in such countries.

HULL

²⁰ Telegrams Nos. 16 and 17 not printed.

740.00112 European War 1939/2132½ : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, January 31, 1941—3 p. m.

[Received February 1—9 a. m.]

24. Department's 9, January 28, 5 p. m. In view of the fact that the British Ministry of Economic Warfare has recently declined to permit several shipments of Latakia tobacco to the United States but has authorized a shipment of olive oil, I believe it would avoid confusion and uncertainty if the Department could informally and confidentially bring to the attention of British authorities the desirability of encouraging in principle all Syrian exports to the United States. We have usually taken much if not most of Syria's wool, tobacco, hides and skins, casings, et cetera, and we may want silk and olive oil as well. Now that the Franco-German clearing agreement is being applied to Syria—see my 21, January 27²¹—Germany is making a desperate attempt to obtain all these commodities from Syria herself, to supply pharmaceutical goods and chemicals urgently needed in Syria even though shipment via Turkey is expensive and subject to much delay. Unless, therefore, normal exports to America are facilitated it may confidentially be expected that they will be diverted to Germany. The only alternative would be for the British to buy up these commodities themselves which seems absurd as they can apparently find a ready market in the United States and the British do not want them.

I have talked very frankly with my British colleague in the above sense and he is making similar representations to his own Government.

ENGERT

740.00112 European War 1939/2209½ : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, February 11, 1941—8 a. m.

[Received February 12—10:10 a. m.]

32. My 24, January 31, 3 p. m. British Consul General has received a reply from his Ministry of Economic Warfare to the effect that it would not object to the export to the United States of total stocks on hand of Syrian wool estimated at not less than 3,000 tons and for which the French authorities are now willing to resume issuing export permits. The import of foodstuffs and newsprint would be permitted by the British in return.

The British would likewise have no objection to the export of Syrian silk to the United States. I believe Latakia tobacco and casings

²¹ Not printed.

should also be included in authorized exports and my British colleague agrees.

Please see in this connection also my next telegram number 33.²²

ENGERT

890D.48/108 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, February 11, 1941—9 a. m.

[Received February 12—10:15 a. m.]

33. I have received an official request orally and in writing from the French High Commissioner ^{22a} to use my good offices with the British authorities with a view to obtaining permission for the importation into Syria in 1941 of some 1200 cases of Nestle's sweetened and unsweetened milk from the United States. He states this is urgently needed to prevent serious undernourishment of children both native and foreign. He adds that distribution will be closely supervised under medical certificates and he offers to give guarantees regarding such distribution.

I have informally promised to submit the matter to the Department to discuss it with the British Consul General.

ENGERT

740.00112 European War 1939/22098 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, February 12, 1941—10 a. m.

[Received 2:15 p. m.]

34. My 32, February 11, 8 p. m. [*a. m.*], and 33, February 12 [11], 9 a. m. Both telegrams should of course be considered in the light of British policy which is to bring pressure to bear on the French authorities in Syria. My British colleague has therefore been instructed to obtain from the High Commissioner an undertaking that if certain exports to the United States are authorized no surplus stocks will be sold to Axis Powers or to countries from which they might reach the Axis.

Considering the possible imminence of a German move which may involve Turkey it is of paramount importance that we should assist in creating a situation here which would prevent any local decisions inimical to British strategic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. I have recently discussed with Colonel Donovan ²³ in Jerusalem all phases of the problem and have told him that the French in Syria

²² *Infra.*

^{22a} Gen. Henri-Fernand Dentz.

²³ Col. William J. Donovan, unofficial observer for the Secretary of the Navy in the Near East and Southeast Europe, December 1940–March 1941.

need outside encouragement if they are to become reconciled to the British blockade. With Von Hentig²⁴ a certain amount of German infiltration has already begun which is making prodigious efforts to win the native Syrians over to Germany's cause. He is known to have discussed details regarding possible German Syrian economic collaboration and seems intent on eliminating British and American trade and influence from Syria.

The French here are going through a distressing moral crisis which requires careful and sympathetic handling. The High Commissioner is in a very paradoxical position as he is personally opposed to any abject subservience to Germany but dreads the thought of disobeying Marshal Pétain.²⁵ On the other hand he knows that the British Government is pledged to the full restoration of the integrity and independence of France even without French help, and the brilliant British victories in North Africa have had a cheering effect in French political and military circles. I therefore believe this an opportune moment to assist the High Commissioner in such matters as those referred to in my numbers 32 and 33. I think he would understand that in return honor and interest alike would seem to point to a conciliatory and accommodating spirit on his part in dealing with British interests.

Repeated to Vichy.

ENGERT

740.00112 European War 1939/2132½ : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, February 13, 1941—11 p. m.

477. The following telegram dated January 31, 1941, has been received from the Consul General at Beirut :

[Here follows text of telegram No. 24, January 31, 3 p. m., printed on page 673.]

The general question of American trade with Syria was discussed last December with Mr. Helm, First Secretary of the British Embassy here.²⁶ He submitted our views to London and about 3 weeks ago gave us an informal reply to the effect that it was the British policy to apply strong economic pressure to Syria, but that the British Government would give sympathetic consideration to authorizing individual shipments in which we might be particularly interested.

We are skeptical of the desirability of applying strong economic pressure to Syria, not only because such a policy would be likely in

²⁴ Georg Werner Otto von Hentig, German diplomat and agent.

²⁵ Henri Philippe Pétain, French Chief of State.

²⁶ See memorandum by Mr. Henry S. Villard, December 18, 1940, *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. II, p. 632.

the long run to create internal disorders with repercussions in neighboring Arab countries, but also because Syrian trade is likely to be diverted to Germany.

Please take up this matter in whatever manner you consider best with the appropriate British authorities and urge the desirability of Syria being permitted sufficient trade to obviate the unfortunate results referred to in the immediately preceding paragraph. You may point out that this Government is able to, and will, control the export of goods to Syria through the issuance of licenses for the use of balances built up in this country.

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/2209g : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, February 17, 1941—2 p. m.

[Received 2:20 p. m.]

38. Department's 14, February 15, 7 p. m.²⁸ Referring to the last sentence of my 34, February 12, 10 a. m., I am glad to be able to report that the High Commissioner has now restored to the British Consul General in Beirut the privilege of a diplomatic pouch service which had been withdrawn last October, see Jerusalem's 151, November 4, 9 a. m. to the Department.²⁸ In return the British Government has permitted French transport *Providence* to leave for Marseilles without first calling at Haifa. General Dentz is giving personal assurance that no de Gaulle sympathizers will be sent to France for trial.

It is this kind of give and take I had been advocating ever since my arrival and I believe we are in a position to help matters along in connection with Syrian exports and imports. All indications of the American attitude and purpose are being followed with the closest attention. Being entirely cut off from normal intercourse with the west the authorities here find it increasingly difficult to cope with the problems of national provisioning and the whole economic system is undergoing a severe strain. But being accessible to British sea power Syrian merchants would like to broaden and improve the bases of their trade relations and any overtures in that direction would find a strong echo also in responsible French opinion in Syria. For many of the bolder elements want to follow their instincts of patriotic Frenchmen and express the hope that the United States may yet help France to become herself again.

Repeated to Vichy.

ENGERT

²⁸ Not printed.

740.00112 European War 1939/2209‡ : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, February 18, 1941—10 a. m.

[Received 12:30 p. m.]

40. My 38, February 17, 2 p. m. President of Silk Spinners Association called on me yesterday and told me that about 150 tons of raw silk and about 50 tons silk waste were now available for export and inquired whether all or a portion of it could be disposed of in the United States. Could the Department telegraph me as soon as possible names of firms who may express interest and to whom local exporters should make offers. Also specifications.

He added that the Germans are making every effort to obtain the entire supply for the manufacture of parachutes but that the French authorities would much prefer to see it go elsewhere. It occurs to me that in view of the uncertain situation in the Far East this source of supply might be useful to us.

ENGERT

740.00112 European War 1939/2345 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, March 13, 1941—11 a. m.

[Received March 14—5:10 p. m.]

74. My 70, March 11.³⁰ The following are typical examples of instructions received by the High Commissioner from Vichy.

(1) Although the SS *Providence* referred to in the first paragraph of my telegram No. 38, February 17, left Beirut March 1 the French Government refuses to restore to the British Consul General his pouch service unless the British Government agrees to a monthly sailing between Beirut and Marseilles without stops at Haifa.

(2) The High Commissioner has been instructed to facilitate in every way all exports to Germany as Berlin has been complaining that the local authorities have recently been showing reluctance to grant export permits for goods destined for Germany. Please see in this connection my telegram 34, February 12, second [apparent omission] my 39 [38], February 17, my 40, February 18, my 63, March 7.³¹ As a result of German pressure some 50 tons of silk have just been shipped to Bulgaria apparently without encountering difficulties or delays in Turkey.

³⁰ *Post*, p. 690.³¹ Telegram No. 63 not printed; it dealt with the amount of Syrian wool available for export to the United States and with possible purchases by Germany (740.00112 European War 1939/2303‡).

(3) Vichy has given orders that the defenses of Syria be immediately strengthened. Numerous new earthworks and gun emplacements are being prepared all along the coast and on the Palestine border which can only be directed against England. There is also a rumor that Germany has demanded the use of ports and landing fields (see paragraph 3 of my 49, February 26³²). I feel that the situation will soon require some such action on our part as suggested in the last paragraph of my telegram 49 if it is not to deteriorate still further.

Repeated to Vichy.

ENGERT

740.00112 European War 1939/2344: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the
Secretary of State*

LONDON, March 14, 1941—8 p. m.

[Received March 14—4: 42 p. m.]

998. Department's 477, February 13, 11 p. m., and 501, February 15, 6 p. m.³³ Information and representations in reference cables relating to Syrian trade promptly conveyed to higher officials Ministry Economic Warfare who received them sympathetically and indicated that although questions would have to go before a committee dealing with questions pertaining to French territory an early reply was anticipated. In conversation reference was made to two schools of thought among Government officials, one favoring strong measures strictly applied and others favoring greater elasticity in dealing with particular situations. Officials with whom matter was discussed seemed disposed to go along with line of policy supported in Department's telegrams and Ministry of Economic Warfare was reported as expressing his [*its*] own willingness agree to export of Syrian goods to the United States provided there was no objection to control through navicerts on return imports to Syria. Aside from the controversial question as to desirability of continued pressure on French Syrian authorities the opinion was expressed that increased exports to the United States of Syrian products should benefit all concerned; also the willingness expressed by Department to control exports of United States of America goods to Syria through license system was regarded as assisting the case for favorable reply to Department.

³² *Post*, p. 688.

³³ Latter not printed; it summarized telegrams Nos. 32, February 11, 8 a. m., 33, February 11, 9 a. m., and 34, February 12, 10 a. m., from the Consul General at Beirut, and stated that the Department concurred in the Consul General's view that in return for relaxation of British pressure the High Commissioner would adopt a more conciliatory and accommodating spirit in dealing with British interests (740.00112 European War 1939/2209%).

It was indicated, however, that it was necessary to take into consideration views of the Free French and particularly of Catroux³⁴ who has been firm in his insistence on strong economic pressure on Syria and whose views are respected. It was necessary to communicate with Catroux in Cairo; but it was thought unlikely he would oppose a clear indication of British wishes.

Unfortunately, unexpected delay was caused by the departure of the Foreign Secretary for the Near East, which would naturally affect consideration of matter involving delicate questions of policy in French territory, particularly in view of recent developments southeastern Europe. Ministry Economic Warfare keenly regrets continued delay of decision and Embassy was informed today that a further cable has been despatched to Cairo pressing for a decision which will enable appropriate reply to Department's telegrams.

WINANT

740.00112 European War 1939/2392

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] March 15, 1941.

The Ambassador³⁵ called at his request. He said that health conditions in Syria were very bad and that his Government desired that this Government request the cooperation of Great Britain to permit medical products from the United States to be sent to Syria and Lebanon. I replied that I would be glad to take this matter up with the British.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

890D.48/110 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, March 19, 1941—9 a. m.

[Received March 20—7 a. m.]

82. The French Director of Foreign Commerce, M. Soule came to see me last night on behalf of the High Commissioner to ask if a decision regarding the milk products mentioned in my 33, February 12 [11], 9 a. m., could be obtained in the near future. He states that unless they arrive before the end of May infant mortality during the hot summer months will greatly be increased.

³⁴ Gen. Georges Catroux, Free French representative in the Middle East; after overthrow of Vichy regime in Syria, he was appointed French Delegate General and Plenipotentiary in Syria and Lebanon.

³⁵ The French Ambassador, Gaston Henry-Haye.

He then referred to the subject of my 34, February 12, 10 a. m.; 40, February 18, 10 p. m. [*a. m.*]; and 63, March 7, 9 a. m.,³⁶ and said that the British were making a great mistake if they thought Syrian products could not reach Germany because Turkey would delay or obstruct transit. Turkey seemed to be giving all necessary facilities and some wool, silk and casings had already reached Germany. He confirmed the information I had obtained from another source—see second paragraph of my 74, March 13, 11 a. m.—and said Germany was demanding more and more and in return would gladly send pharmaceutical products, hospital equipment and chemicals urgently needed in local industries. He assured me that all Frenchmen in authority here wished to avoid trading with “the enemy” but that unless stocks of wool and silk were immediately purchased by England or the United States they would surely go to Germany.

I am, of course, informing my British colleague of the above conversation but I venture to suggest that the Department too bring matter to the attention of the British Government.

Repeated to Vichy.

ENGERT

890D.00/805 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, March 19, 1941—3 p. m.
[Received March 19—12:13 p. m.]

84. My 73, March 13³⁷ and last paragraph of my 70, March 11.³⁸ Situation in Damascus continues somewhat tense and is being used by Nationalists to embarrass the French. High Commissioner has again gone to Damascus to discuss possible concessions with Syrian leaders.

Inasmuch as one of the propaganda arguments used by the Germans here has been that the British blockade was responsible for the present economic plight of Syria it occurs to me that in connection with my 82, March 10, 10 p. m. [*March 19, 9 a. m.*], the British Government might be well advised for purely political reasons to grant certain trading facilities. The blockade has not so far succeeded in forcing the French authorities in Syria to throw in their lot with the British and is not likely to do so in any foreseeable future. As repeatedly intimated in these telegrams the best policy would seem to be to take advantage of the increasingly articulate local hope for a British victory and to foster a friendlier attitude on the part of the authorities irrespective of instructions from Vichy. Greater leniency in the application of the blockade might therefore not only create a happier atmosphere but

³⁶ Telegram No. 63 not printed, but see footnote 31, p. 677.

³⁷ Not printed.

³⁸ *Post*, p. 690.

would be particularly appreciated by the French at this juncture as a means of counteracting German propaganda strengthening their position vis-à-vis native agitators who are trying to exploit the specialists.

Repeated to Vichy.

ENGERT

740.00112 European War 1939/2350 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Beirut
(Engert)*

WASHINGTON, March 19, 1941—8 p. m.

37. Your telegram No. 47, February 24, 1941³⁹ and subsequent telegrams regarding Syrian trade, you are authorized to advise the French authorities in Syria that the Treasury Department is presently prepared to issue licenses under Executive Order No. 8389,⁴⁰ as amended, whereby the proceeds of the sale in the United States of silk and wool exported from Syria, aggregating not in excess of 1 million dollars, may be utilized for the purchase in the United States, its territories and possessions, other countries in the Western Hemisphere or in the Netherlands East or West Indies of newsprint and foodstuffs, including sugar, to be exported from such countries to Syria for consumption therein.

WELLES

740.00112 European War 1939/2376 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, March 20, 1941—1 p. m.

[Received March 20—9:59 a. m.]

1087. Our 998, March 14, 8 p. m. Department's 477, February 13, 11 p. m., and 501, February 15, 6 p. m.⁴¹ Letter dated March 19 from Ministry Economic Warfare, after apology for delay in reply to Embassy's representations regarding trade with Syria, reads as follows:

"After a consideration of all the factors involved, including the arguments put forward by the United States Government, it has been decided to relax the restrictions on Syrian trade. Accordingly, His Majesty's Consul General in Beirut is being authorized to issue certificates of origin for Syrian tobacco, casings, olive oil, hides and skins, to be exchanged against harmless imports from the United States of

³⁹ Not printed.

⁴⁰ 5 *Federal Register* 1400.

⁴¹ Telegram No. 501 not printed, but see footnote 33, p. 678.

America in addition to silk and wool, the export of which has already been authorized.

We have already agreed in principle to the despatch of foodstuffs and newsprint to Syria in barter for wool and silk. We are now prepared to grant navicerts for a wider variety of harmless United States goods destined for Syria in exchange for Syrian exports. Provided there are no suspicious circumstances regarding the particular transactions concerned, we shall authorize His Majesty's Ambassador in the United States of America to issue navicerts for the United States goods involved in any barter deals arranged on these lines."

WINANT

890D.48/110 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Beirut
(Engert)*

WASHINGTON, March 22, 1941—7 p. m.

41. Your No. 84, March 19, 3 p. m., unnumbered [*No. 82*], March 19, 9 a. m. and previous. The Embassy at London has received the following letter from the British Ministry of Economic Warfare dated March 19 regarding trade with Syria :

[Here follows text of letter quoted in telegram No. 1087, March 20, 1 p. m., from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, printed *supra*.]

Applications for navicerts covering milk products were referred to London some time ago and the British Embassy in Washington is telegraphing its Government now urging prompt action. You may inform the High Commissioner that we expect favorable action in the very near future.⁴²

WELLES

740.00112 European War 1939/2376 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United
Kingdom (Winant)*

WASHINGTON, March 22, 1941—7 p. m.

972. Your No. 1087, March 20, 1 p. m. In an urgent telegram dated March 19, 9 a. m.⁴³ the American Consul General at Beirut reports that the French authorities in Syria are most anxious to obtain a favorable decision regarding the shipment of milk products from the United States to Syria. Unless these products arrive before the end of May infant mortality during the hot summer months is expected to increase greatly.

⁴² The Consul General was notified in telegram No. 50, April 2, 5 p. m., that the British Embassy had informed the Department that navicerts for four shipments of Nestle's milk to Syria were issued on March 31.

⁴³ Telegram No. 82, p. 679.

Navicert applications for Nestle's milk shipments were referred to the Ministry of Economic Warfare by the British Embassy in Washington some time ago. The Embassy is now telegraphing the Ministry urging a prompt decision.

As regards the general question of Syrian trade, the Department believes that prompt action should be taken to implement the assurances given in your telegram No. 1087. The French authorities in Syria declare that Syrian products are able to reach Germany through Turkey without any delay or obstruction and that wool, silk, and casings are already being shipped to Germany by that route. Germany is said to be demanding more and more Syrian products and is promising to ship pharmaceutical products, hospital equipment, and urgently needed chemicals in return. The Director of Foreign Commerce in Syria, M. Soule, states that all Frenchmen in authority there wish to avoid trading with the "enemy" but that unless stocks of wool and silk are immediately purchased by England or the United States they will surely go to Germany.

WELLES

890D.48/114

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] March 24, 1941.

The French Ambassador called to see me this afternoon. The Ambassador repeated the request he made of Secretary Hull some ten days ago that this Government urge the British Government to grant navicerts for the shipment or [of] urgently needed medical supplies to Syria.

I told the Ambassador that I would be glad to have this matter taken up.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

740.00112 European War 1939/2403a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Beirut
(Engert)*

WASHINGTON, March 24, 1941—8 p. m.

43. Department's No. 37, March 19, 8 p. m. In order that the Treasury Department may maintain supervision over funds to be derived from the future purchase of Syrian commodities in the United States, you are instructed to notify the Department by telegraph at the time each shipment leaves Syria, giving the name of the consignor in Syria and the consignee in the United States, the route to be taken by the shipment and if possible the name of the vessel.

The funds will be deposited in a special account, and American exports to Syria paid for from this account.

WELLES

740.00112 European War 1939/2405 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, March 26, 1941—9 a. m.
[Received March 26—8:30 a. m.]

87. Department's 37, March 19, and 41, March 22. The High Commissioner has requested me to express to the Secretary of State his sincere appreciation of the efforts made in Washington to bring about an arrangement which would enable Syria to resume a more normal economic life. He thought much sympathetic understanding had been shown by the American and British Governments of the problems which confronted Vichy and himself.

Repeated to Vichy.

ENGERT

740.00112 European War 1939/2405 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Beirut (Engert)

WASHINGTON, April 5, 1941—8 p. m.

51. Reference Department's No. 43, March 24, 8 p. m., that the United States Treasury Department is presently prepared to effectuate the arrangements which have recently been made regarding Syrian trade as follows:

(1) To license under Executive Order No. 8389, as amended, the establishment of a "Special Account" on the books of an American Bank in the name of a Syrian bank to be designated by the French authorities. Credits to such account may be made pursuant to specific licenses.

(2) To issue licenses permitting the proceeds of the sale in the United States of Syrian exports of wool, silk, tobacco, casings, olive oil, and hides and skins, to be credited to such account.

(3) To issue such licenses as may be necessary under Executive Order No. 8389, as amended, to effectuate shipments (including the licensing of payments therefor out of such "Special Account") of newsprint, foodstuffs, and other permitted exports from the United States, its territories and possessions, or other countries in the Western Hemisphere, or the Netherlands East or West Indies, to Syria for consumption therein.

You should ascertain as soon as possible from the French authorities in Syria the Syrian Bank in whose name the "Special Account" referred to above is to be maintained, as well as the name of the Ameri-

can Bank on whose books such account is to be established, and advise this Department.

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/2482 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, April 8, 1941—10 a. m.

[Received 1:52 p. m.]

101. Last paragraph of Department's 51, April 5, 8 p. m. I am orally informed that the Syrian bank is the Banque de Syrie et du Liban and the American bank, Chase National Bank, New York.

In this connection the French foreign trade control authorities have agreed to advise the Consulate General of the date on which each shipment leaves Syria. The British Consulate General is likewise supplying this office with copies of all certificates of origin issued here.

It would be appreciated if the Department could advise me as to the date on which the present agreement may be considered as having entered into effect for the purpose of calculating the value of 1 million dollars described in the Department's 37, March 14 [19], 8 p. m., as well as for the purposes of the notification of such shipments requested in the Department's 43, March 24, 8 p. m.

ENGERT

740.00112 European War 1939/2482 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Beirut (Engert)

WASHINGTON, April 18, 1941—noon.

55. Your 101, April 8, 10 a. m. The Treasury Department regards the arrangement indicated in the Department's telegram 51, April 5, 8 p. m. as being presently in effect and is taking action to license the establishment of the special account with the Chase National Bank in the name of the Banque de Syrie et du Liban, which account will be designated Special Account A.

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/2593 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, April 23, 1941—12 a. m.

[Received 2:33 p. m.]

116. Department's 55, April 18, noon, has been communicated to the authorities. Responsible businessmen known to the British Consulate General interested in this arrangement now inquire whether

the Treasury Department could temporarily free blocked funds which they already possess in the United States in order to finance purchase of authorized commodities for Syria. Otherwise they would have to wait until Syrian exports had actually reached the United States and had been sold before they could utilize the funds in the special account. French authorities fear that lapse of time between departure of goods from Syria and sale in the United States will be too great to serve Syrian interests and accordingly do not wish to give export permits unless they have assurance that the funds for the purchase of the corresponding American commodities are promptly available in the special account.

ENGERT

740.00112 European War 1939/2593 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Beirut (Engert)

WASHINGTON, April 25, 1941—5 p. m.

61. Your 116, April 23, 12 a. m. Treasury is issuing license permitting establishment with Chase National Bank of special account to be known as "Banque de Syrie et du Liban, Special Account A."

Treasury is also issuing licenses permitting transfer to the new "Special Account A" of balances amounting to approximately \$190,000 held at Chase National Bank and French American Banking Corporation in "special free accounts" of the Banque de Syrie et du Liban. It will, of course, be necessary for the Banque de Syrie et du Liban to instruct Chase National Bank and the French American Banking Corporation to make such transfers.

As indicated in our 51 of April 5, the funds in "Special Account A" may, under specific license, be used in payment for permitted exports to Syria and Lebanon. Applications for licenses to make such payments will be filed by Chase National Bank upon receipt of proper instructions from the Banque de Syrie et du Liban.

HULL

II. Efforts by the United States To Prevent French Authorities From Succumbing to German Pressures in Syria and Lebanon; Use of Syrian Airfields by German Planes

740.0011 European War 1939/7710 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, January 18, 1941—9 a. m.

[Received January 18—9 a. m.]

14. I had my first long talk with the new High Commissioner, General Dentz, last night. He stated among other things that the

mission which had been entrusted to him was primarily to keep Syria out of the war but to defend it against anybody who attacked it. He then attempted to justify France's surrender last June⁴⁴ by now familiar complaint that Great Britain had not furnished enough support and he accused the British of pursuing a selfish and short-sighted policy which might yet throw Vichy into the arms of the Germans.

I purposely ignored these and several other more outspoken and even less reasonable criticisms of England because I thought it best, at least to begin with, not to give him the impression that I was here to defend the British and Free French cause. However, when the High Commissioner asked me whether the astronomical figures recently mentioned in connection with the American rearmament program did not smack of militarism he gave me an opportunity to present the American point of view. I told him that our rearmament and conscription were not a sign of militarism but proof that we loathe militarism. We had hoped that militarism had been completely discredited by the last war but now that we found the world again tortured by militarist ambitions the American Government and people were determined to prove that democratic methods could be even more vigorous and effective than those of militarized dictatorships. I said we were arming on an unprecedented scale and with unprecedented speed because of our growing awareness of a threat to the peace and security of the Western Hemisphere and more especially because we felt that any compromise between the democracies and nations whose word could not be trusted would be but a precarious truce. The General made no comment except to say that France had long maintained that force was still the determining factor in international relations but nobody had believed her. He was glad to hear that the United States had become more realistic in that respect.

Repeated to Vichy.

ENGERT

740.0011 European War 1939/8488 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, February 19, 1941—1 p. m.

[Received 2:53 p. m.]

42. A person close to the High Commissioner has just told me that the news of the Turco-Bulgarian accord⁴⁵ has had a most depressing

⁴⁴ For correspondence on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. I, pp. 217 ff.

⁴⁵ Turkish-Bulgarian declaration, signed at Ankara, February 17, 1941, reaffirming policies of non-aggression; for text, see Martens, *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 3e sér., tome 39 (Leipzig, 1941), p. 357.

effect here. It is interpreted as a successful German diplomatic prelude to military action which virtually deprives Great Britain and Greece of effective Turkish support when and where they might need it most. It has given fresh impetus to the belief long current in Syrian and Lebanese circles that Turkey's so-called alliance with Great Britain⁴⁶ was nothing but a hollow sham which the Turks merely exploited in order to be able to annex the Hatay.⁴⁷ There is also the firm belief in French circles that Soviet diplomacy is at least as tricky as Hitler's and that consequently Turkey's freedom of action will always be paralyzed by the necessity of placating Moscow.

ENGERT

740.0011 European War 1939/8635 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, February 26, 1941—9 a. m.

[Received 10:05 a. m.]

49. My 42, February 19, 1 p. m. In high French military circles there is now no longer any doubt but that Germany is about to strike at Greece through Bulgaria⁴⁸ without any opposition from the latter or from Turkey. They believe that unless Great Britain establishes immediately and succeeds in holding a front in Greece it will not only be difficult to win the war in the Eastern Mediterranean but it will be impossible to win the war in Europe because they do not think another foothold can be gained anywhere else on the Continent. And without the possibility of landing large forces on the Continent it is futile to try to defeat Hitler.

Such views are held even in circles which are not anti-British and which do not underrate British and American resources and character. They are nervously watching the next phase of what they fear is Hitler's march towards world conquest and seem to forget that there may still be an active part for Frenchmen to play. For when I intimated that Syria was doubtless a definite factor in Axis plans in the Eastern Mediterranean I was told that "weak people must pursue a cautious policy" and was given to understand that the attitude of the French authorities overseas would be largely decided by the development of events. So long as Turkey's position remains equivocal in the event of a German attack against Greece the French here will have little faith in an ultimate British victory.

⁴⁶ Treaty of Mutual Assistance, signed at Ankara, October 19, 1939, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cc, p. 167.

⁴⁷ For correspondence on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. IV, pp. 832 ff.

⁴⁸ For correspondence on this subject, see vol. II, pp. 733 ff.

In the course of these conversations I referred to the strategic position of Syria as a stepping stone between Turkey, Palestine and Iraq and hinted at the possibility of the Axis having marked out a course for the use of Syrian submarine and air bases. Replies I have received leave me under the impression that the French authorities here would not permit the Axis Powers to use such bases nor would they give any other direct or indirect assistance to the Axis in the prosecution of possible political or strategic objectives.

The situation seems less clear as regards their attitude in the event of a British request for transit facilities should Turkey become involved. A feeling of real sympathy for Great Britain is growing and there is also a revival of courage and hope. It is therefore possible that if at the crucial moment the United States could express an interest in preventing the Axis from using Vichy as a catspaw for further aggression the French here would be inclined to offer a certain amount of passive resistance to instructions from Vichy which they would know had come from Berlin. They are even now desperately anxious to find an honorable compromise between their sense of duty and their desire to contribute something toward the preservation of the French Empire.

Repeated to Vichy and Angora.

ENGERT

890D.00/800 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, March 6, 1941—9 a. m.

[Received 3:55 p. m.]

61. There has been some rioting in Damascus during the past few days in course of which one student is reported to have been killed, a number of people were wounded, and about 130 were arrested. All shops are closed also at Aleppo and Homs and armored cars are patrolling the streets.

Demonstrations started ostensibly as protest against rise in price of bread, but the High Commissioner who has just returned from Damascus told me last night that he suspected German agents among the Moslem Syrians were at the bottom of it. Although Von Hentig himself—see paragraph 2, my telegram 34, February 12, 10 a. m.⁴⁹—left several weeks ago he told people that he expected to return soon with his wife and make a more prolonged stay. He [apparent omission] much printed propaganda in Arabic and some money among Germanophile Syrians and fictitious commercial agents who, in turn, are stirring up the masses by spreading all kinds of false rumors.

⁴⁹ *Ante*, p. 674.

The most significant thing in this connection is the fact that General Dentz ascribed the troubles to German activities. I feel quite sure that 6 weeks ago he either would not have mentioned the Germans at all or would have accused the British of fomenting the disturbances.

Repeated to Vichy.

ENGERT

740.0011 European War 1939/8963 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, March 11, 1941—3 p. m.

[Received March 12—11: 10 a. m.]

70. My 42, February 19, 1 p. m. The same informant states that [with] two armies at the gates of Greece and Thrace, he doubted whether the Eastern Mediterranean could withstand the impending grandiose attempt to obtain control of its shores. He went on to say it was obvious that Germany was now in a position to exercise terrific pressure on Turkey and Greece and the French here felt the communiqué issued at the end of Eden's⁵⁰ stay in Athens was so pathetically weak that it did not deceive anybody.

I asked him whether he thought that Darlan's⁵¹ defiant warning to the British yesterday was due to his belief that the British could not win. He said it was partly that but chiefly because Berlin probably insisted he must say something to counteract the effects of the Lease and Lend Bill.⁵²

He then asked me if I really believed passage of the bill would make any difference to the outcome of the war. I replied that I most emphatically thought so and hoped he would tell the High Commissioner that I thought so. I added that we were the last people in the world to allow ourselves to be bullied or frightened. As for Syria we realized that Germany was seeking a new road for her ambition to gain unobstructed access to the Middle East. But we refused to believe that the French and natives in Syria were ready to fall in with German plans and I begged him to remind the High Commissioner that the Nazis feared only those who were determined to defend themselves. The penalty of subservience was contempt at the hands of the aggressors and in Syria could only end in loss of honor for the French and every hope of independence for the natives.

⁵⁰ Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

⁵¹ Adm. Jean François Darlan, Vice President of the French Council of Ministers, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Interior, and Navy.

⁵² Approved March 11, 1941; 55 Stat. 31.

I felt it necessary to be very outspoken because the spirit of defeatism referred to in my 49, February 26, 9 a. m., has been growing, apparently both as a result of recent instructions from Vichy and ceaseless German propaganda in connection with the situation described in my 61, March 6, 9 a. m. Element of coercion seems to be ever present and I therefore consider it important that we constantly point out possible serious consequences if matters are allowed to drift. Passage of the Lease and Lend Bill should enable us to say to men like General Dentz that we have entered into a new relationship with all enemies of aggression and that every inch one of us surrenders also weakens the position of the rest. He should therefore give thoughtful consideration to his opportunities.

Repeated to Vichy.

ENGERT

740.0011 European War 1939/9255 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, March 21, 1941—9 a. m.

[Received March 23—3:30 a. m.]

85. My 74, March 13.⁵³ I learn from a reliable source that Vichy has informed the High Commissioner that Berlin desires to send a military mission to Syria. I understand High Commissioner is opposed as it would weaken his position here.

The proposed move is interpreted as an indication that since my 70, March 11, Hitler's diplomatic strategy in the Balkans and Turkey may not have been as successful as anticipated and that he is obliged to seek a fresh means of outflanking the British forces which it is now believed are being moved into Greece. The presence of a German military mission could doubtless be used to influence Syrian and Lebanese opinion in an anti-British sense and to cajole or browbeat the French authorities into a more submissive attitude. By means of large-scale bribery it could easily establish an extensive propaganda and espionage system with agents boring from within the country and gradually demanding complete collaboration with Germany.

The British could not, of course, tolerate such activities but as they may soon have their hands full elsewhere I understand they would prefer not to have to deal with Syria immediately. Considering that Vichy had apparently ordered the High Commissioner to give all facilities to Von Hentig and other German agents but refused Colonel Donovan⁵⁴ permission to enter Syria I am wondering if we could not

⁵³ *Ante*, p. 677.

⁵⁴ Col. William J. Donovan, unofficial observer for the Secretary of the Navy in the Near East and Southeast Europe, December 1940–March 1941.

informally intimate to Vichy that to allow a German military mission to come to Syria would be a great mistake as it may have the most serious consequences for France's position in the Levant. We might also perhaps refer to the Department's 37, March 19, 8 p. m.⁵⁶ to me and say that Great Britain and the United States are obviously interested in forestalling German efforts to bring Syria even indirectly under Nazi control.

Repeated to Vichy.

ENGERT

740.0011 European War 1939/9334 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, March 26, 1941—10 a. m.

[Received 11:58 a. m.]

88. I had a long conversation with the High Commissioner last night. After referring to the matter reported in my No. 87⁵⁷ of this morning he said he had spent most of his time in Damascus during the past fortnight but had not made much headway with the Syrian Nationalists and more serious rioting had taken place a day or two ago both there and in Aleppo.

I asked whether the news of the virtual abandonment of the British blockade had not helped him. He said it had theoretically but in practice it made little difference because the present disturbances had ceased to be economic and had become purely political. He then repeated the statement he had made to me on a previous occasion (see my No. 61⁵⁸) that the Germans were stirring up trouble presumably to annoy the British and that the Iraqis were helping the Germans. Both were using the Italians in Beirut and Baghdad and he had discovered the distribution of 40,000 gold pounds through the Italian Armistice Commission in Beirut. Unfortunately Syria was full of people willing to allow themselves to be either scared or bribed and although Italian prestige had completely vanished the Germans were now using Italians to do their bidding in the Middle East.

This gave me a chance to ask whether there was anything in the rumor of a German military mission mentioned in my telegram number 85, March 21. The General looked alarmed and said textually "I sincerely hope not! It would be a disaster and I might as well pack up and leave." He went on to say that Von Hentig had given him enough trouble and if a military mission arrived the shadow of the Gestapo would soon spread over the whole of Syria.

⁵⁶ *Ante*, p. 681.

⁵⁷ Dated March 26, 9 a. m., p. 684.

⁵⁸ Dated March 6, 9 a. m., p. 689.

He thought Hitler would like to use Syria as a convenient jumping off place in connection with his plans for an offensive to obtain control of Eastern Mediterranean. Now that he had Bulgaria and Yugoslavia he would try and overawe Greece and Turkey and with a military mission in Syria he would have made a further step forward.

In reply to my question whether he did not think Turkey's position had been strengthened by the recent Soviet declaration⁵⁹ he said that he had never trusted the Bolshevik and least of all now. He had found evidence of Soviet propaganda even in Syria chiefly in the Armenian communities and although they are disguising Bolshevik aims they are encouraging a Pan-Arab front which is both anti-French and anti-British.

Repeated to Vichy and Ankara.

ENGERT

740.0011 European War 1939/9255 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Leahy)

WASHINGTON, March 26, 1941—4 p. m.

261. Beirut's No. 85, March 21, 9 a. m. Please investigate report that Germany desires to send a military mission to Syria. If the report appears correct, you are requested to bring the matter to Marshal Pétain's⁶⁰ attention and to make clear to him this Government's interest in preventing Syria from being brought directly or indirectly under German control. You may say that you are convinced the French Government's desires in this regard coincide with our own, and point out the dangerous implications of such a mission as indicated in Beirut's telegram under reference and previous telegrams from Engert repeated to you.

For your information and appropriate use, the British Government adopted a policy some time ago of seriously restricting Syrian foreign trade, in an endeavor to bring about a more accommodating attitude by the French authorities in Syria. The Department questioned the advisability of this policy, and has brought the matter to the British Government's attention on several occasions,⁶¹ pointing out that the policy was likely to drive Syrian trade into German hands. The British Government has now been persuaded to change its policy with regard to Syrian trade, and has approved the export of principal Syrian commodities to the United States, including silk, wool, tobacco, casings, hides and skins, and olive oil, and the export of Ameri-

⁵⁹ March 24, 1941; see telegram No. 79, March 24, 1941, 6 p. m., from the Ambassador in Turkey, p. 836.

⁶⁰ Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain, French Chief of State.

⁶¹ For correspondence on this subject, see pp. 668 ff.

can commodities, notably foodstuffs, to Syria. You may point out to the French authorities that the American Government's action in this regard has been in accord with the requests of the French High Commissioner in Syria and that we desire to be able to continue this policy of cooperation. Any evidence of German activity or control in Syria would render our policy most difficult to maintain.

WELLES

740.0011 European War 1939/9431 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, March 28, 1941—2 p. m.

[Received March 29—11:30 a. m.]

89. I learn now that in the course of the disturbances referred to in the first paragraph of my 88, March 26, some 8 or 10 people including 3 gendarmes were killed in Aleppo, between 40 and 50 were wounded and about 300 arrests were made. Six were killed at Homs and one at Damascus. Martial law has been proclaimed at Damascus, Aleppo, Homs and Hama and no natives are permitted to travel between those cities. Beirut is quiet.

The following bazaar rumors have for the past month been current in Damascus and elsewhere. The French authorities have traced them to German and Italian sources and believe them to be largely responsible for the riots.

1. Most Syrian wheat and other foodstuffs are being shipped to France while the British blockade permits nothing to come in.

2. Some 20,000 French refugees from Lorraine will be settled in Syria on land to be expropriated from the Syrians.

3. In return for Turkish support the British Government has promised Turkey a free hand in Syria (this report was officially denied by the British Consul General).

4. The League of Nations being defunct the French mandate in Syria no longer has any *raison d'être*. Besides how could a defeated nation pretend to rule over other races?

5. Germany is in favor of Arab unity and will see that Syria is given independence and that Palestine is handed over to the Arabs.

6. The British will make of Syria first a battlefield and then a colony. The countries of the Near and Middle East should therefore look to Germany if they want prosperity and peace.

7. It is useless to expect the United States to do anything for Syria; they did nothing after the last war and besides they will this time not be in a position to do anything because Germany will have won the war long before help from America can possibly become effective.

Repeated to Vichy.

ENGERT

740.0011 European War 1939/9885 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, April 9, 1941—8 p. m.

[Received April 12—6 : 25 a. m.]

105. During a recent visit to Damascus I had an opportunity of conferring with Khaled Azem, the new head of the Syrian Government; [delegate] of the High Commissioner, M. Lavastre; the Commander-in-Chief of French troops in Syria, General Delhomme; as well as four of the principal nationalist leaders including Shukri Kuwatly. The following is a summary of my impressions.

1. There is not the slightest doubt in my mind that the recent disturbances in Syria and Beirut were engineered by Germans with the active and particularly official support of the Iraqi Government (see also second paragraph of my 88, March 26). The Iraqi Consul General in Damascus^{61a} is openly boasting that the Syrian Nationalists are "allies of Iraq" and that their policy and activities are directed by him. He is also reported to have said that the recent events in Baghdad⁶² all form part of same program.

2. The leader of the Nationalists, Shukri Kuwatly, assured me that he and his party were really not pro-German but admitted that German propaganda was in a very strong position because both the German and the Italian Governments had officially and in writing informed the Iraq Government that they were in favor of Syrian statutes and of an Arab confederation. The British on the other hand had not only refused to make a similar statement but had apparently promised Turkey slices of Northern Syria and Iraq in return for Turkish military support. To my question whether he had any proof of this he replied in the negative but said it was "common knowledge and the British Government has never officially denied it." He felt the most effective way of counteracting German propaganda was for the British to express sympathy with the Arab cause by making definite promises, preferably in consultation with the American Government. I told him it was much easier for irresponsible governments to make extravagant promises than for governments like the British and American who are in the habit of taking their promises seriously.

3. From other remarks he and Jahrifi Haffar who was present made I could see that the bluster and lies of the German and Italian broadcasts in Arabic had raised serious doubts in their minds whether any democratic nation including the United States could successfully compete with totalitarian methods. I made some obvious remarks about the unlimited resources of the United States and the British Empire

^{61a} Tashin Qadri.

⁶² See pp. 486 ff.

and explained that the very methods employed by the Axis Powers during the past 3 years placed us with no illusions as to the true nature of their intentions. I said I hoped the recent acts of brutality and injustice perpetrated against small and relatively helpless peoples would suffice to prevent Syrian patriots from playing into the hands of the Nazis. They assured me that was the case but I question their sincerity.

4. I came away with the uneasy feeling that—unlike the irresponsible groups of excitable young men whose emotional rhetoric need not be taken seriously—these mature men did not regard the European war as a calamity for the simple reason that like Stalin they hoped it would still further lower the prestige and reduce the power of the West as a whole. With their narrow nationalistic outlook they seemed only very dimly conscious of the great moral issues at stake and were merely wondering from which side of the ideological fence they could expect most by political support for their vague ambitions for the future. And the people of course are even less able than their leaders to differentiate between the West as a military political factor and as the creator and home of culture and ideals and they are therefore at the mercy of every paid agitator. I have pointed out to the contemporaries that my experience in China and South America has taught me that it was always far easier to provoke a revolution than to apply constructive thinking to the consolidation of a new government.

5. Opposition to the French is on the increase among all classes, especially in Syria but even in the Lebanon. Although after the collapse of France no immediate advantage was taken of it to embarrass the French authorities here because it was realized that France herself was facing an uncertain international future, Shukri Kuwatly tells me that the people are not willing to wait until the end of the war before obtaining from the French a definite declaration re Syrian independence. It appears therefore that the extremists will not be satisfied with the present concessions but will tolerate them as a transitional arrangement to test the good faith of the High Commissioner. They accuse the French, with some justice, of having done little in the last 20 years to promote ordered and systematic progress or to create a responsible governing class, while the French administration was itself marred by petty corruption, intrigue and gross inefficiency.

6. French official circles continue to live in the atmosphere of confusion and defeatism described in my 42, February 19, 46 [49], February 26, and 70, March 11. They believe the recent disturbances in Syria and Iraq were part of the successful Nazi plan to immobilize Turkey and that the present campaign in the Balkans will lead to

further dangerous developments which may well involve Syria. My answer to such observations has consistently been that all French Mediterranean interests will be safe only if Britain wins the war and that I felt sure the French in Syria would not wish to do anything that might endanger British security at a critical moment.

Repeated to Vichy.

ENGERT

740.0011 European War 1939/10201 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, April 21, 1941—4 p. m.
[Received April 23—9:50 a. m.]

112. The delegate of the High Commissioner at Damascus Monsieur Lavastre—see my 105, April 9, especially paragraph 6—came to see me this morning. He is friendly disposed toward Great Britain and the United States and spoke with apparent frankness. He said the arrival of British troops in Iraq had a steadying effect in Syria because the Arabs admired nothing more than force, and this was evidence that the British were prepared to use force although German propagandists in Baghdad and Damascus had told everybody that Britain could now be flouted with impunity. He added that the natives were distinctly frightened by German successes in the Balkans and by Turkey's obvious inability or unwillingness to help stem the Nazi tide which is moving further and further east. He thought the situation was most critical as there were indications that the Axis Powers were making all preparations for an open attack. I told him I agreed the situation was critical but it was by no means hopeless. Of course if all parts of the world which could still offer resistance allowed to be demoralized by an atmosphere of alarm created by Germany, they would naturally one by one have their throats cut as was the case in Southeastern Europe. But he should remember Hitler had already roused against himself and his new order the most powerful spiritual forces the world had ever mustered against any individual or doctrine and they would surely prove his undoing in the end.

I have advised them [?] of the substance of this conversation to my British colleague⁶³ but I feel that the presence of British forces in Iraq should be immediately taken advantage of to stiffen French morale and to counter Nazi activities in Syria before they become dangerous and cause the disintegration from within with which we have become so familiar in other countries. To accomplish this it would not be necessary for the French authorities to join the Free France movement or even to disobey the Vichy Government. On the

⁶³ Godfrey T. Havard, British Consul General at Beirut.

contrary the Department will recall (see my telegram 14, January 18) that the High Commissioner told me at our first interview that his instructions were to defend Syria against all aggression. But it seems to me the time is past when we can take it for granted that this includes defense against the Axis. As the Nazi military colossus is watching from one victim to another we must be prepared for violent surprises. Thus I do not exclude the possibility that German troop carrying planes may some day arrive in Syria and I should like to make sure that General Dentz would not feel he had to consult Marshal Pétain before he took decisive action against them for by then it would be too late.

I believe our enormous cultural and material interests in Turkey and Syria entitle us to know what their attitude would be in case of German aggression. The Middle East still forms a well nigh impregnable bloc stretching from the Bosphorus to the Persian Gulf and from the Caucasus to Libya. It would be folly to permit portions of it to submit tamely to Axis blackmail, flattery or coercion and thereby endanger the safety of the whole. A form of tacit informal and purely local Anglo-French understanding in the event of an attack on Syria is therefore imperative if the Axis is to be kept out of the Middle East. Thoughtful Frenchmen admit it but they would rather do it with Pétain's or at least Weygand's⁶⁴ blessing than without it.

Repeated to Vichy.

ENGERT

500.C 001/1508 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, April 28, 1941—9 a. m.

[Received 10:10 a. m.]

122. Official withdrawal of the French Government from the League of Nations has been given no publicity beyond the bare announcement of the decision. Informal local reactions are to the effect that legally it may have far-reaching results for the Levant States under French mandate but that practically the situation is not materially altered because the League really ceased to function when the war broke out. The French are trying to minimize the importance of the step while the natives are inclined to emphasize its significance in order to weaken France's standing still further. See also numbered paragraph 4 of my 89, March 28.

One of the Syrian leaders, Sheik Taj-ed-Din, whom the French recently brought back from France by plane, has told friends that

⁶⁴ Gen. Maxime Weygand, Delegate General of the French Government in North Africa.

Hitler forced the Vichy Government to withdraw from the League in order to be able to offer Syria to the Turks in return for their benevolent neutrality. He also said France was no longer interested in Syria and would let the Axis and Turkey do with it what they liked.

It would be very helpful to me to learn what Vichy's attitude with regard to Syria has been during the past 3 or 4 months in order to be able to interpret present local feeling more intelligently.

Repeated to Vichy.

ENGERT

740.0011 European War 1939/10505 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, April 30, 1941—2 p. m.

[Received May 2—10:12 a. m.]

124. My 112, April 21. In conversation with the High Commissioner this morning I referred to the many wild rumors which were now current and which had obviously been put about by Axis propaganda for the purpose of creating the usual atmosphere of crisis as a preliminary to some major Nazi move. I said I was responsible for a large American colony and much valuable property and I felt I knew him well enough to ask him a straightforward question.

I mentioned the report that Germany was about to land troops by air and/or small naval craft via Greek Islands and Rhodes. Should that happen what would he do about it? General Dentz looked extremely uncomfortable and replied lamely he did not think it would happen because the Germans have already succeeded in putting Turkey in a strategically hopeless position and did not have to come to Syria to get what they wanted. I said that even if Turkey's position were hopeless—which I did not believe—the Axis would doubtless find a foothold at Turkey's back extremely useful for the purpose of coercing her definitely into the Axis orbit not to mention Syria's convenient location as a springboard for Nazi ambitions in the direction of the Mosul oil fields and the Suez Canal.

The High Commissioner admitted this and added smilingly that German and Italian spheres of influence were doubtless already being staked out. I then reverted to my first question and he said textually: "I do not believe the Germans would come here without first conferring with Vichy. My present instructions are to defend the territorial integrity of Syria and I shall do so whether it be against Turkey, Germany, Italy or——". I am sure he was about to say England but stopped abruptly.

The General went on to say it was much more likely that the Axis Powers would intensify their political activities in this part of the

world, rather than attempt unwise incursions. I warned him that the Nazis had always very cunningly blurred the border line between political pressure and military intervention and he might find some morning that they had captured Syria from within. Dentz laughed and asked if I was preparing to evacuate my colony. I said I was not but that I trusted him to give me plenty of warning knowing he thought I should and in the meantime I hoped he would not close his eyes to the fact that the Axis Powers loved unresisting victims and could always be tempted by the prospect of an easy kill.

Repeated to Vichy and Ankara.

ENGERT

740.0011 European War 1939/10640 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, May 4, 1941—10 p. m.

[Received May 6—12: 14 p. m.]

128. A few days ago the British Consul General communicated to me the Department's instructions to our Ambassador at Vichy regarding British views on the subject of possible Axis aggressions against North Africa and Syria. He also communicated substance to the High Commissioner.

As there have been pro-Iraq street demonstrations in Beirut and the British Consulate in Damascus had many of its windows broken by a mob I went to Damascus today to discuss the situation with the head of Government and the principal Syrian leaders in the light of events in Iraq and the Department's point of view. I talked to them along the lines of my 112, April 21, and 124, April 30, and stressed the necessity of resolute action to counter Axis machinations if they did not wish to compromise the future of all Arab countries forever.

I again saw Shukri Kuwatly—see my 105, April 9—who said everything could be arranged if only Great Britain would make a definite statement promising Syria her independence after the war. But when I asked him whether, in the event of such a promise and the failure of the French to resist a German invasion of Syria, the Syrians would ask the British Government to defend their country he said "you do not expect me to invite the British to turn Syria into a battlefield (?)" (Please compare this statement with numbered paragraph 6 of my telegram 89, March 28). I replied, it seemed to me it was the Axis that was trying to turn the whole world into a battlefield by the most arrantly high-handed proceedings any nation has ever been guilty of. Syria instead of being the keystone of a peaceful and happy Middle Eastern arch was about to be used by the Axis as a wedge with which to split the arch asunder and open the way for fresh crimes.

I also saw Fakhri el Baroody, a popular Nationalist leader, and told him practically the same thing. I asked him how his followers would like the idea of having Syria's future decided by Hitler whose views on "inferior races" were well known. His answer was that in the past the fate of the Arabic speaking countries had been in the hands of London and Paris and the results had not been happy either.

The only leader who seemed to be genuinely anxious to keep the Axis out of Syria was Sheik Taj-ed-Din—see paragraph 2 of my 122, April 28—who is pro-French and told me frankly he was prepared to cooperate with the British if they should decide to protect Syria against Axis aggression and the Vichy Government ordered the French here not to resist. He requested me to pass this on to the British and I have done so.

On the whole I found that events in Iraq have had a deplorable effect on the Syrians. Even in circles which are not anti-British the belief is gaining ground that they may herald the decline and fall of British power and influence in the Middle East and that at this most critical juncture in the war Great Britain may find it impossible to spare enough troops to save Syria. And the moment one mentions American assistance people repeat parrot-like and *ad nauseam* the German refrain that it will come too late (see also last paragraph of my 89, March 28).

While Syria is still outside the power of the Axis it seems incredible that Great Britain should permit Germany to take advantage of Vichy's subservience to Berlin and again instigate new bases for military, naval and air action. It seems to me the complete disintegration of the French Empire especially in Indochina and West Africa would be a matter of vital concern not only to the British, but also to American security, and the Achilles heel of overseas France today is Syria.

Repeated to Vichy and Cairo.

ENGERT

740.0011 European War 1939/10761 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, May 9, 1941—noon.

[Received May 9—9:15 a. m.]

526. We were told in confidence by a Government official yesterday that instructions have been sent to the High Commissioner in Syria that in the event German planes fly over Syria toward Iraq they should not be fired upon; that if any of them should land in Syria they should not be permitted to depart pending instructions to be requested

from Vichy. If on the other hand British planes should fly over Syria the High Commissioner's instructions are to endeavor to shoot them down.

Repeated to Beirut.

LEAHY

740.0011 European War 1939/10840 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, May 12, 1941—noon.

[Received May 12—9:45 a. m.]

136. According to reliable sources at Dier ez Zor an unknown number of airplanes of unknown nationality were heard flying east at great height on May 8 at 10:30 p. m. Observers feel reasonably certain they were German.

Repeated to Vichy and Jerusalem.

ENGERT

740.0011 European War 1939/10859 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, May 12, 1941—4 p. m.

[Received May 13—8 a. m.]

139. My 136, May 11 [12]. I am reliably informed that three German planes landed at Aleppo Friday night.

Ten planes identified as German and Italian flew over Beirut early this morning presumably en route to Iraq.

Six French field guns and ammunition are being shipped by rail to Iraq possibly with the connivance of the Turkish authorities.

I have communicated the above to the British Consul General.

Repeated to Vichy.

ENGERT

740.0011 European War 1939/10881 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, May 13, 1941—3 p. m.

[Received 4:20 p. m.]

543. Embassy's telegram No. 526, May 9, noon. The Embassy learned in strict confidence this morning from an official source that German planes for the past 3 days have been arriving at Damascus and Palmyra on the way to Iraq; that 14 have arrived at Palmyra and

that they are being permitted to refuel and take off again. We are told that General Dentz requested that they land in the future at Palmyra and not at Damascus "where they would be seen by too many people." The orders permitting them to utilize Syrian air fields our informant said were issued from Vichy presumably by General Huntziger.⁶⁵ He also said that a certain amount of war material is being shipped from French supplies in Syria to Iraq under instructions from Vichy though he did not know the nature of the material nor quantities involved.

The foregoing seems to check with Engert's telegram 139, May 12, 4 p. m., which has just arrived.

Repeated to Beirut.

LEAHY

740.0011 European War 1939/10886 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 13, 1941—8 p. m.

[Received 9 p. m.]

1906. For the Secretary and Under Secretary. Following is text of a letter which the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs handed me personally this afternoon, with the request that it might be given the earliest consideration possible.

"I should be grateful if you could at once convey to your Government the following information which we have received in the last 2 days about the position in Syria.

On the 10th May our Consul at Aleppo reported that 3 German Heinkel planes, each carrying 6 passengers, arrived there from Beirut on the evening of the 9th May escorted by one small French plane. Two of the Heinkels left on the morning of the 10th May and we have what seems to be reliable information showing that they reached Mosul the same day. According to our Consul at Aleppo, one of the passengers was a German General, who received members of the German colony and friends at his hotel.

When our Consul General at Beirut took the matter up with the head of the Political Bureau of the French High Commission on the morning of the 12th May the latter at first professed ignorance but in the end telephoned to the High Commissioner, who is at Damascus.

General Dentz confirmed that the planes had landed at Aleppo, though not at Beirut. He said that this had been done without previous notice and that the planes claimed to have lost their way. He said that his orders were to allow German planes to land only if they were in trouble, and in that case effect immediate repairs and order the plane out of the country by the shortest route. He maintained that, in pursuance of these instructions, he had isolated the planes and crews while overhauls were effected and then asked them to leave.

⁶⁵ Gen. Charles Huntziger, French Minister for National Defense.

As a sidelight on this explanation I should add that General Dentz himself informed our Consul at Damascus on the same day that two of the planes that had landed at Aleppo were Iraqi and the third plane French.

Our Consul General at Beirut has further reported that about 10 aircraft flew over his house early on the morning of the 12th May at intervals of a few minutes, heading eastwards. One of the planes, which came low, seemed undoubtedly to have had Italian markings, but it was not possible to identify the others. The head of the Political Bureau told Mr. Havard that he thought all the machines must have been French as there were a hundred French aircraft in Syria which were periodically exercised. Commenting on this statement, Mr. Havard says that aerial activity on such a scale is most unusual.

Our Consul at Damascus also has reported unusual aerial activity on the night of the 11th to 12th May. He has heard various reports that 13 German planes bearing French colours have alighted at Damascus in the last 2 days and the British Vice Consul saw 2 troop carriers and 6 bombers on the aerodrome on the morning of the 12th. When he questioned General Dentz, the High Commissioner would not deny that Axis planes had landed at Damascus, and one of the senior French officials there practically admitted it.

General Dentz went on to say to our Consul that his instructions did not at present provide for a German occupation of Syria, but if those orders came he would obey them.

So much for enemy planes. Both our Consul at Aleppo and our Consul General at Damascus have received reliable reports to the effect that a substantial quantity of war material has been despatched from Aleppo for Iraq. According to the former, two trains left Aleppo on the morning of the 12th each carrying 400 tons of munitions from the French dumps. The head of the Political Bureau admitted the despatch of war material to our Consul General at Beirut, but asserted that it was being sent to strengthen the French frontier defences in case rebel parties tried to force their way into Syria. Our Consulate at Aleppo, too, had heard that the trains were leaving nominally for a frontier post in Syria but, according to a reliable report, the French N. C. O.'s who superintended the despatch of this material were convinced that it was intended for Iraq.

The foregoing reports are disquieting. They show that the Germans, with the connivance of the French authorities in Syria, are already making use of Syria for their preparations to send airborne assistance to Rashid Ali in Iraq. So far, such assistance does not seem to have been sent on a large scale. If, however, this use by the Germans of Syrian territory for military purposes continues, it is evident that the results will be very serious indeed. I can not help wondering, therefore, whether there is anything that the United States Government can do to stiffen French resistance to these German activities in Syria. No doubt the State Department are receiving full information [of] all these developments from Mr. Engert, your Consul General at Beirut, and are already considering what can be done. I would, however, suggest that immediate action at Vichy, and perhaps also by Mr. Engert, might be very useful. If only Vichy can

be induced to send instructions to their authorities in Syria that no facilities of any kind are to be given to German military operations, and that no use is to be made of Syrian aerodromes for sending German or Italian help to Rashid Ali, that would be the most satisfactory solution. Failing that, perhaps an attempt might be made to stiffen General Dentz, whatever Vichy says, but in view of his admission to our Consul at Damascus this does not seem very hopeful."

WINANT

740.0011 European War 1939/10966: Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, May 14, 1941—11 a. m.
[Received May 18—1:30 p. m.]

144. In view of Vichy's 543, May 13 to the Department, my 143, May 14⁶⁸ and the report that Vichy had capitulated to Berlin, I called on the High Commissioner late tonight upon his return from Damascus in order to make a last appeal to him to weigh most carefully all factors and considerations before he committed himself beyond recall.

I began by saying that I had come to see him unofficially as an old and sincere friend of France; that I had seen France in several of her most heroic hours during the last war and that my wife like so many other American women had been decorated for war work by the French Government. I knew him to be a man combining the qualities typical of the French soldier of courage, patriotism and enlightenment who doubtless realized that it was his and our business to think about the future civilization and the greatness of France. As on many previous occasions I would therefore speak my mind with the utmost frankness and he need make no reply to anything I said unless he particularly wished to do so.

I then explained to him the attitude of the United States Government and people toward aggressor nations in much the same manner as I had explained it to Iranian Prime Ministers and Ministers of Foreign Affairs during the last 3 years and as the Department was informed in my numerous telegrams on the subject from Tehran. I added that the American people had really not been morally neutral since the Italian conquest of Ethiopia and many of them had abandoned neutrality in Manchuria 10 years ago. We then began to distinguish definitely between nations devoted to decent international relationships and those committed to a policy of force and malice.

Today there was an ever-widening field of American anxiety and the President and Secretary of State had repeatedly declared that we could not view with equanimity a predatory world dominated by

⁶⁸ Latter printed *infra*.

fear. The American people were therefore showing an increasing interest in the wider aspects of the Middle Eastern problem and were quite openly inclined to support anybody willing to help liberate civilization from aggression. New manifestations of idealism were animating our nation and we were appealing to all likeminded peoples and individuals to take a firm stand on moral grounds against brutality and treachery.

Now that the Axis was about to cast its death-like pall over the Levant States I wished the High Commissioner to pause and ponder the enormous responsibilities that rested upon his shoulders not only in respect of the true interests of France but the entire civilized world and the native races entrusted to his care. I hoped he viewed the situation with a proper sense of perspective and proportion: for the past 4 months I had been witnessing in Syria the characteristically transparent tricks of Nazi technique which always precede a Nazi assault upon a new victim. He himself had spoken to me about them and we now knew that they were the preliminaries of the far more serious events of the last few days which I feared were precipitating the French and Syrians into a position from which there would soon be no escape.

But as Syria was not yet invaded the whole world felt that the right of the Axis Powers to interfere should be repudiated, for by obtaining important strategic concessions they could thrust a spearhead into the Middle East which might affect the whole military and naval situation at the eastern end of the Mediterranean. I reminded the High Commissioner that the American people were unflinchingly committed to the uttermost support of the British Empire and that when as in this case the whole course of the war was at stake we could hardly be expected to remain indifferent. We believed there was a true employer [*sic*] between the French and British Empires and the United States and it would be tragic if a portion of the French possessions were needlessly turned over to the enemy to the detriment of the common cause. The French could count implicitly on the sympathy and benevolence of the United States so long as they did not actively assist the Axis. Today the responsibility of barring the way happened to be his and I felt sure that not even Nazi pressure could permanently submerge the old French spirit. General Dentz replied that he agreed with much I had said and thanked me for being so frank. He would be equally outspoken and tell me that the world would not be in such a mess if the United States had joined the League of Nations. As regards American support for Britain, he realized its magnitude and sincerity but doubted whether it could be decisive. Rightly or wrongly German armies had created the im-

pression of invincibility. He believed if the United States had declared war on Germany a year ago the moral effect would have been immense and might at least have saved Southeastern Europe and the Balkans. Today he doubted whether it would make much difference especially in view of Japan's and Russia's enigmatic attitudes. He personally also felt uncertain whether Great Britain had sufficient forces in the Middle East to cope with determined Axis thrusts, particularly as he feared Turkey would cave in.

Referring to his own position he said politicians had been the ruination of France and he was glad Pétain was a soldier everybody trusted; and if, as seemed to be the case, the Marshal found it necessary to yield, he (Dentz) for one was not prepared to question the decision and he would continue to obey his instructions. Vichy was probably influenced by the belief that Germany's military grip on the Continent of Europe could no longer be broken and by the fact that collaboration with Germany was the only way to get the prisoners back. Whatever the reason he was sure Pétain knew a great deal more about the needs of France than he did and it was about time the French became disciplined enough to follow one leader instead of arguing every point ad infinitum.

Incidentally he pointed out that the Americans were making the same mistake the British made when they speak of the French Empire. There never really was a French Empire, only France and her colonies. Without France the colonies amounted to nothing and were helpless compared to the British Dominions.

The High Commissioner thought I took too gloomy a view of the local situation. It was true that some 15 German planes had come, and, thank God, gone again, but he did not think many more would arrive if the hostilities in Iraq came to an end soon. He had no intentions of turning the Levant States over to the Axis but he admitted very readily that the present concessions might lead to others. As to the war material shipped to Iraq, he had no choice for under the terms of the armistice such material was no longer, strictly speaking, French.

Finally he referred to the possibility hinted at by me that the situation might bring about military action by Great Britain and possibly armed conflict with the French forces. He said "Unless utterly unforeseen events should occur I do not believe you need fear such a contingency which I should consider as regrettable as you do."

Repeated to Vichy.

ENGERT

740.0011 European War 1939/10981 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, May 14, 1941—2 p. m.
 [Received May 15—3:45 p. m.]

143. A high French Government official who has always been very frank with me begged me this morning to transmit the following:

(a) Marshal Pétain should be immediately informed that large quantities of French war material in addition to guns mentioned in my 139, May 12, are being shipped to Iraq. He mentioned at least 10,000 rifles, many machine guns, ammunition and medical supplies. He feels sure that Pétain would not approve if he knew even though he may have been forced to place flying fields at the disposal of the Axis.

(b) Unless the British act at once, that is within the next day or two, and make themselves [apparent omission] for the protection of Syria against the Axis it will be too late and the situation both here and in Iraq will get completely out of hand. It will also most certainly cause the collapse of Turkey as intimated in my 124, April 30.

My informant is of the opinion which I share that if a British Army crossed into Syria it would meet with little serious resistance from the French Army. It is rumored that the French are preparing to evacuate Syria and to withdraw to the Lebanon.

I have informed my British colleague of the above.

Please see also last paragraph of my 112, April 21.

Repeated to Vichy.

ENGERT

740.0011 European War 1939/10916 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 14, 1941—4 p. m.
 [Received May 14—12:35 p. m.]

1914. For the Secretary and the Under Secretary. My 1906, May 13, 8 p. m. Following is text of additional letter dated today received from Mr. Eden regarding situation in Syria:

"In continuation of my letter to you of yesterday's date I write to let you know that we have now received from our Consul General at Beirut the following summary of the information which he has gathered from various sources regarding the passage of German aircraft through Syria.

On the 11th May, 3 Messerschmidts 110 with extra tanks for petrol landed at Rayak (halfway between Beirut and Damascus) and after refuelling left for Damascus or further.

Up to 14 German planes reached Damascus on the 11th and 12th May. These are said to include Messerschmidts and Heinkels 115 and 2 F. W. Condors. All these machines were painted with Iraqi colours.

All the planes have left Damascus except 2 Condors and 2 others.

The head of the Political Bureau at Beirut has admitted to our Consul General that some German planes painted over with Iraqi colours had reached Damascus. He added that the High Commissioner had sent a strong protest to Vichy and he suggested that as Marshal Pétain might have been kept in ignorance of what was happening in Syria, he should be personally informed by Admiral Leahy.

We hope you will recommend this to the State Department."

WINANT

740.0011 European War 1939/10918 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, May 14, 1941—5 p. m.

[Received 10:46 p. m.]

141. My telegram No. 139, May 12, 4 p. m. Altogether at least 15 German planes have so far arrived in Syria of which 3 Messerschmidts 110 have been identified at Rayak landing field, 4 Condor troop carrying planes and 4 Heinkel 115 bombers at Damascus and three Junkers at Aleppo. All are painted with Iraq colors of which the green is probably intentionally made to look so bluish as to look like French colors. Most of them are believed to have come via Rhodes.

When I asked the Director of Political Affairs whether there was any basis for the rumors regarding German planes he only admitted that three had arrived at Aleppo "because they had been obliged to make forced landing" and denied knowing anything about others. It was obvious that he was not telling the truth.

The High Commissioner is in Damascus and I shall see him tomorrow.

Repeated to Vichy.

ENGERT

740.0011 European War 1939/10882 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Leahy)

WASHINGTON, May 14, 1941—6 p. m.

409. Your 543, May 13, 3 p. m. and 544, May 13, 6 p. m.⁶⁷ Unless you have now received information concerning the Darlan report which would render the proposed action inappropriate, you should

⁶⁷ Latter printed in vol. II, p. 166.

promptly communicate with the French Foreign Office and state that this Government has received reports from various sources, including the Marshal's statement to you, which would indicate that the French authorities in Syria are affording military assistance, including the despatch of war material to German and Italian forces operating in support of Rashid Ali in Iraq. So far the assistance has not apparently been on a large scale, but if the use by the Germans of Syrian territory continues it is evident that such participation in the German military effort goes beyond the requirements of the Armistice Agreement and in fact would constitute active military aid to Germany. If these reports are correct they are not in conformity with the Marshal's assurances contained in your 508, May 4,⁶⁸ and renewed in your conversation yesterday.

Under the circumstances, you are requested on behalf of this Government, to obtain a complete and formal declaration from the French Government concerning the extent of assistance which it is apparently affording the German and Italian Governments. You may also add that this Government believes, because of the assurances given to it, as referred to above, that the French Government will send instructions to its authorities in Syria that no facilities of any kind are to be given to German military operations on French territory and that no use is to be made of Syrian airdromes for sending German or Italian help to Rashid Ali.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/11115a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Leahy)

WASHINGTON, May 14, 1941—9 p. m.

410. The British Government asks that the following statement, which is to be made in the House of Commons tomorrow noon, May 15, be transmitted to Marshal Pétain as soon as possible.

"Information at the disposal of His Majesty's Government shows that French authorities in Syria are allowing German aircraft to use Syrian airdromes as staging posts for flights to Iraq. His Majesty's Government have in consequence given full authority for action to be taken against these German aircraft on Syrian airdromes. The French Government cannot escape responsibility for this situation. This action under German orders in permitting these flights is a clear breach of armistice terms and is inconsistent with undertakings given by the French Government."

HULL

⁶⁸ Vol. II, p. 160.

740.0011 European War 1939/10965 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, May 15, 1941—4 p. m.
[Received May 15—1: 15 p. m.]

558. A formal urgent communication embodying the instructions contained in the Department's telegram 409, May 14, 6 p. m., was handed personally to Rochat⁶⁹ at 4 p. m. this afternoon.

LEAHY

740.0011 European War 1939/11038 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, May 17, 1941.
[Received May 17—9: 28 p. m.]

152. High Commissioner's communiqué published this morning states 15 of the German planes which recently flew over Syria have made forced landings on Syrian aerodromes. In accordance with terms of armistice, steps were taken to have them depart as soon as possible.

British planes without warning bombarded Palmyra and Rayak May 14th and 15th. One French officer was killed and several wounded. May 16th suburb of Beirut and landing fields at Damascus and Rayak were machine-gunned without causing damage. Leaflets inciting to dissidence are being daily dropped by British planes. These British proceedings constitute flagrant acts of hostility against France. High Commissioner has protested to British Consul General.

ENGERT

740.0011 European War 1939/11031 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, May 18, 1941—6 p. m.
[Received 7: 50 p. m.]

155. [For the] Secretary and Under Secretary. On basis of information received from French Mandate authorities in virtue of requirement of Railway Convention,⁷⁰ Turkish General Staff has advised British here that two trains including 21 cars of war materials have recently passed eastward from Aleppo through Turkish territory. Information of their own indicates that these trains carried some 120

⁶⁹ Charles Antoine Rochat, Acting Secretary General of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

⁷⁰ Protocol concerning the establishment of a new railway regime and the winding up of the present operating system, signed at Ankara by France and Turkey, October 27, 1932, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cxxxvi, p. 27.

Germans in civilian clothes and that their destination was Mosul. They also have reason to expect early passage of four more trains of presumably similar character.

(2) British here have also received (from source not specified) information that French forces are being withdrawn from other Levant States into Lebanon and construe this as covert French invitation to them to occupy Syria.

(3) Please advise War Department.

MACMURRAY

890G.00/595a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray)

WASHINGTON, May 19, 1941—4 p. m.

74. Several apparently authentic reports have reached the Department that guns, ammunition and other French military material are being shipped from Syria by rail to Iraq, across Turkish territory. Six French field guns and ammunition therefor are said to have been shipped several days ago, and at least 10,000 rifles, many machine guns and a large amount of ammunition were reported as being shipped about May 12. This French material may have been turned over to the Italian Armistice Commission in Syria.

According to a report from Cairo, the Turkish authorities have been asked about these shipments and have denied that they were sent through Turkish territory. Any information you may obtain in this regard is urgently requested.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/11179 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, May 21, 1941—6 p. m.

[Received 6:50 p. m.]

159. Your telegram No. 74, May 19, crossed my 155, May 18, reporting that trains of war material had been passed over Turkish section of railway upon notification received from French Levant authorities in accordance with railway convention (Protocol dated October 27, 1932: Embassy's despatch 233, November 22 that year⁷¹). It is doubtful whether information as to nature of material more detailed than Military Attaché has already reported to War Department is available here but he is endeavoring to supplement it.

MACMURRAY

⁷¹ Despatch not printed.

740.0011 European War 1939/11247: Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, May 22, 1941—6 p. m.
[Received May 24—2: 38 p. m.]

161. I received only today radio bulletin containing the President's statement of May 15th.⁷² As it had not been published locally and I have frequently found the High Commissioner very badly informed regarding American affairs I have quoted the text in a letter to him marked personal and added:

"In view of the great friendship which has for over a century and a half existed between France and the United States of America—a friendship the continuation of which you and I ardently desire as necessary for the salvation of civilization—I beg Your Excellency once more to pause before you take any steps that will inevitably create a situation the Government and people of the United States would deeply deplore.

The French people better than any others know that the strongest forces in the history of the human race have always been spiritual forces. Every Frenchman as does every American knows in his heart that Nazism corrupts and degrades everything it touches. Our two nations would therefore never understand or forgive us if we of this generation deliberately and gratuitously turned over to the Axis any portion of France's immortal heritage."

Repeated to Vichy.

ENGERT

740.0011 European War 1939/11251: Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, May 23, 1941—2 p. m.
[Received May 24—4: 37 p. m.]

163. Personal for the Under Secretary of State. The following information is considered absolutely reliable and I hope can be immediately communicated to the British.

Germans are arriving in Syria via Turkey and by air in ever increasing numbers, some with Bulgarian passports or as Jewish refugees or commercial travelers with French names. At Aleppo aerodrome the German Air Force has taken over complete control and all notices in its vicinity are in German. They are buying large quantities of supplies including trucks and passenger cars and are obviously preparing for a prolonged stay.

⁷² See telegram No. 411, May 15, 1941, to the Ambassador in France, vol. II, p. 171.

French military equipment continues to be shipped to Tor and several trainloads are to leave Talia near Baalbek within 2 or 3 days. I understand these arms and ammunition are not turned over to the Iraqis but are being stored for use by German forces later.

Considerable quantities of Iranian not Iraqi aviation gasoline are reaching the Germans by rail from Mosul and are being stored underground. French official explanation is that this is part of a barter arrangement between Iraq and Syria in return for munitions of war, see also my 162 of today.⁷⁸ Fictitious French trading company for the purpose has been organized in Aleppo by a German.

Best information is to the effect that majority of French and natives would welcome British occupation but with every hour that passes pro-British sentiment is losing ground. Latest German propaganda here points to Yugoslavia as typical instance of the fate awaiting any country which allows itself to be persuaded by the Anglo-Saxon nations to offer resistance to the invincible German war machine.

ENGERT

740.0011 European War 1939/11238 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, May 23, 1941—7 p. m.

[Received 10:51 p. m.]

166. Supplementing my 159, May 21. Upon more detailed inquiry Turkish General Staff has now given Military Attaché information presenting some discrepancies with that referred to in second sentence of my 155, May 18. They now say there were shipped May 11 from Aleppo to Tilizvan (in Syrian territory near Nusaybin) 60 cars containing horses and war materials and undetermined number of men. British profess to have information that this shipment made up four trains which, in addition to sealed cars containing unidentified war materials, carried 12 officers and 370 men, 70 horses and 12 guns. Turks and British alike now state that original report of Germans in civilian clothes seems to have been erroneous and that ascription of Mosul as destination was plausible presumption but not known fact.

Staff reports from April 11 to date on movements of French military supplies over railroad show besides this shipment only relatively small movements of transport material in both directions. Staff has no information as to possible movements of troops and supplies over highways in Syria.

MACMURRAY

⁷⁸ Not printed.

740.0011 European War 1939/11442 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State*BEIRUT, May 28, 1941—10 a. m.
[Received May 29—9:02 p. m.]

171. French hospital ship *Canada* arrived yesterday and is due to leave in a day or two. Local French sources fear French authorities will attempt to put on board a number of Free France sympathizers who are being rounded up in ever increasing numbers, including officers and non-commissioned officers who have recently declined to cooperate with German air personnel in Syria. They suggest ship be thoroughly searched by the British before it reaches a French port.

We learn that loads of arms and ammunition continue to leave Syria for Iraq while considerable quantities of gasoline are still reaching Aleppo from Mosul.

German planes are flying over Syrian territory at night and at present refuel at Palmyra rather than Damascus and Aleppo.

I hear the French are planning to start regular air service with de Voitine three-engined passenger planes between France and Beirut via Brindisi, Salonika.

Repeated to Vichy.

ENGERT

740.0011 European War 1939/11445 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State*BEIRUT, May 30, 1941—10 a. m.
[Received 2:13 p. m.]

179. Reliable source in Aleppo reports that at least 200 German air-planes have crossed Syria since May 9 and that most of them flew over Turkish territory of Hatay. In Aleppo nobody seems to have the slightest faith in Turkish professions of pro-British sentiments and most people believe today what relatively few felt 2 or 3 months ago, viz., that Turkey would prove a broken reed to lean upon. See my telegrams 42, February 19th and 70, March 11th. It is firmly believed that unless the British take over Syria immediately and deal the Iraqi rebels a crushing blow Turkey will yield to Nazi pressure just as Bulgaria did.

Since my 163, May 23, nearly 150 carloads of wheat, rice and sugar in addition to gasoline have already arrived from Iraq at Aleppo which is of enormous propaganda value to the German Government in supporting Syrian Nationalist and Iraqi rebel political and economic cooperation.

Repeated to Vichy and Ankara.

ENGERT

740.0011 European War 1939/11493 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, May 31, 1941—noon.

[Received 1:15 p. m.]

181. I learn from a reliable source that the German Government has demanded through Vichy that facilities be given to the landing of German military equipment, tanks, et cetera, at Beirut and Tripoli. High Commissioner was opposed on the ground that it would alarm the people and might cause disturbances. He offered instead a small landing place near the cement factories at Chekka just south of Tripoli. This the Germans declined as inadequate and have insisted on Latakia where they propose to land their supplies from small Greek vessels.

Germans have demanded delivery of 4,000 hectolitres aviation spirits per diem but the French state they cannot supply that much.

Sixteen German expert anti-aircraft gunners have just arrived.

About 25 French Devoitine pursuit planes arrived at Rayak a day or two ago which may explain the rumor reported in the last paragraph of my 171, May 28.

Repeated to Vichy.

Please inform British authorities.

ENGERT

740.0011 European War 1939/11606 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, June 3, 1941—11 a. m.

[Received 3:10 p. m.]

184. Personal for the Under Secretary. May I suggest that you impress upon the British great importance especially at this time of not broadcasting unconfirmed reports regarding Syria. I refer for instance to the recent announcement that 400 Germans had arrived on the French hospital ship (see my 178, May 30⁷⁴) or that German troops had landed at Latakia—refer my 181, May 31. As both French and natives listen eagerly to British broadcasts the present great confidence in their general accuracy will be undermined if they hear statements which they know to be incorrect.

ENGERT

⁷⁴ Not printed.

740.0011 European War 1939/11607 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, June 3, 1941—1 p. m.

[Received 2:30 p. m.]

186. My 181, May 31, noon. Reliable Free French source states that Latakia is very vulnerable and could be easily occupied by the Germans who would thereby obtain most important foothold facing Cyprus and within easy striking distance of Aleppo, Homs, and Tripoli. For these reasons same source urges that the British should take Latakia from the sea the moment they have decided to move into Syria. Present garrison, one battalion with little artillery, would probably offer but feeble resistance and the French authorities would have difficulty in rushing reinforcement north along exposed coastal road. Existing small landing field could be quickly enlarged.

Please inform British authorities.

ENGERT

740.0011 European War 1939/11624 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, June 4, 1941—9 a. m.

[Received 9:05 a. m.]

187. British planes dropped a few bombs on army gasoline stocks in Beirut yesterday and this morning. Today's bombing seems to have done considerable damage and I shall report details later. Population is remarkably calm and no resentment is felt.

I understand Germans are now withdrawing their airplanes and ground personnel from Syria, including base at Aleppo, in order to make it appear that British intervention is totally unwarranted and directed solely against the French and natives.

Repeated to Vichy.

ENGERT

740.0011 European War 1939/11674 : Telegram

The Chargé in Germany (Morris) to the Secretary of State

BERLIN, June 4, 1941—11 a. m.

[Received 2:52 p. m.]

2185. Following the discussion of Syrian situation at the press conference at the Foreign Office yesterday the *Dienst aus Deutschland* last night reformulated the present official German view in the following words:

"The situation in Syria has now become the subject of authentic declarations by the spokesman of the Wilhelmstrasse. According to his statements reports of the arrival of German troops at a Syrian port are believed not to correspond to the facts. In informed Berlin circles the opinion prevails that such reports of alleged German landings in Syria have been spread by English sources to establish a pretext for operations against the French mandated area. It goes without saying that Berlin is following with closest attention further developments relating to Syria and the evident English aspirations in that region. The view is held in Berlin that for the time being a British invasion of Syria would be an internal Anglo-French affair and that it is up to the French to react to it. The form of reaction which might be expected to a British invasion may, however, already be deduced from the statements of Admiral Darlan regarding the determination of France to defend its colonial integrity. As to the attitude of Germany one must wait and see in what manner France regards it as necessary to invoke the present German-French relationship arising from the most recent German-French meetings in case of a British invasion of Syria. Germany will of course be prepared to grant to the French the right to defend their own integrity."

It would seem that the German policy in the first instance is to force Vichy to oppose by force any action which Great Britain may take against German encroachments in Syria and thus to present the British with the dilemma of acquiescing in such encroachments or precipitating an armed clash with their former ally. Meanwhile Germany is undoubtedly proceeding at full speed with whatever plans it has for further action in the Eastern Mediterranean but is seeking to avoid the appearance of provocation in Syria itself. As usual in periods of preparation for new military action the war of nerves has taken the stage.

Repeated to Vichy.

MORRIS

740.0011 European War 1939/11680 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, June 4, 1941—9 p. m.

[Received June 5—9:20 a. m.]

190. Local atmosphere especially in French circles has undergone certain almost imperceptible changes in the last few days. Collapse of the Iraq uprising⁷⁵ despite facilities put at the disposal of the Germans by the French authorities in Syria has made the latter feel a little foolish especially as they had already visions of a plentiful supply of oil piped to Tripoli and an easy exchange of other commodities as intimated in the second paragraph of my 179, May 30.

⁷⁵ See pp. 486 ff.

On the other hand now that Crete is gone and we see the beginning of a new phase of the war most Frenchmen here are for the first time realizing the possibility of a complete German military occupation of Syria. Heretofore such a contingency had been regarded as too remote to require serious thought but today even those who believe in obeying Vichy are asking themselves whether Pétain would want Syria to become part of occupied France. And as few Frenchmen can conceal their natural hostility to the Germans they do not relish the prospect of Nazification in a part of the world they had considered immune. Not much desire of abetting further Axis infiltrations is left and even the High Commissioner is said to have warned Vichy that he could not be responsible for the consequences if Germany continued her activities here on a large scale.

In this connection a French officer said to me the other day "We have been in Syria for 20 years and do not propose to get out." He was somewhat taken aback when I replied "American institutions have been in Syria for a hundred and twenty years and did not propose to get out either."

There has been a slight revival of French morale and ever since the shipment of war materials to Iraq many officers have declared themselves slightly out of sympathy with Vichy's policy. They feel the British have every excuse to justify occupation of Syria but they still lack complete confidence that Great Britain is strong enough to take over Syria and protect it against a determined German attack. The Germans have been clever enough to sense this change and are now posing as the real protectors of the French Empire against impending British aggression.

Repeated to Vichy.

ENGERT

740.0011 European War 1939/11699 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, June 5, 1941—3 p. m.

[Received 10 p. m.]

179. In private conversation yesterday evening, my French colleague Henry⁷⁶ expressed belief that Germany is withdrawing from all military activity in Syria; that support given to Iraqi dissidents was mere gesture of sympathy which had disillusioning results in that incidental use of Syria, as base of German operations, even on small scale involved, had led to such outcry in France proper and in

⁷⁶ Jules Henry, French Ambassador in Turkey.

Empire and elsewhere that game did not seem worth candle. He based this belief on information from "one of highest German quarters". He did not specify his source more precisely; but Witman (here as courier from Beirut) had just told me of having called earlier on Madame Henry who had talked with him to much the same effect and somewhat unguardedly disclosed that her husband had been discussing question with Von Papen⁷⁷ whom he had persuaded to telegraph to German Government this advice that Syria be left alone.

2. Henry went on to express his own hope (no doubt in expectation that through you and perhaps through my British colleague his views would reach attention of London) that British would in these circumstances refrain from attacking Syria and thus inevitably lead to resistance by Vichy and quite probably its putting naval bases and forces at disposal of Germany. He said he felt sure British were sufficiently aware of these probable consequences to avoid action against Syria.

3. Upon my asking why Germans should be sedulous to avoid on their own part anything which would tend to provoke British to take action involving them in such disadvantageous consequences as he foresaw, he outlined views which I sum up as follows:

a. Main German assault upon British position in Eastern Mediterranean and Near East is to be by way of North Africa; advance thus far made in Aegean may well be merely contributory to that and not intended as basis for separate land attack through Levant.

b. Germany fears invasion of Syria would lead Turks to intervene jointly with British; she reckons on it (as Von Papen told him some time ago) that unless antagonized they will come to see that alliance with Britain gives them no advantages and will ultimately come over to German side; she therefore wishes, if possible, to await peaceful conquest rather than have to subdue Turkish resistance.

c. Above all, Germany cannot be sure of various French reactions to attempted German occupation of Syria: Even though it were in response to British attack it might quite conceivably have effect of arraying whole French Empire on British side despite Vichy; much would depend upon lead given in that event by Weygand who is head-strong and unpredictable.

4. He thought it probable also that in existing conditions of sea and air power Germany is not prepared to attempt invasion of Palestine. He nevertheless admitted difficulty of accepting conclusion to which his own theories led him, viz., that German southward advance could be expected to stop at Crete.

Repeated to Beirut, which I understand now has this cipher.

MACMURRAY

⁷⁷ Franz von Papen, German Ambassador in Turkey.

740.0011 European War 1939/11718 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, June 5, 1941—10 p. m.

[Received June 6—9:40 p. m.]

192. For the Secretary and Under Secretary. Referring to fifth paragraph of my 128, May 4, Sheik Taj-ed-Din came from Damascus to call on me tonight and requested me to transmit the following verbal message to the President of the United States.

"Syria is today facing the gravest crisis in her history. All patriotic Syrians fear that France is about to turn us over to the Axis Powers and we know the revolting hypocrisy with which both the Axis and French authorities here are today accusing the British of seeking to extend the war by attacking Syria. It is a thoroughly cynical policy whose sole aim is to bring about immediate and complete collaboration with a Europe politically and economically reorganized by the Nazis. Those of us who like myself have been loyal to France now believe it to be against the best interests of our country to be governed by a Berlin controlled Vichy let alone Berlin itself. We are therefore in favor of a British occupation of Syria and I know many Frenchmen feel as we do. But unfortunately there are some Syrians who because of German bribes and propaganda are or pretend to be pro-German; these elements might be troublesome as fifth columnists and in many other ways. I therefore venture to suggest the simplest and most effective way of winning them over to the cause of the democracies: A vast majority of Syrians even the so-called German or anti-British faction are today still intensely pro-American and have unbounded faith in the democracy and chivalry of the American Government and people. If therefore the United States could [apparent omission] that it approved the recent British declaration re Syrian independence and Arab unity⁷⁸ it would have an enormous influence on public opinion in Syria and Lebanon where it would be accepted as proof that anti-British propaganda could safely be discounted. Considering that Syria had in 1919 almost unanimously voted for an American mandate,⁷⁹ an expression of American interest in her fate at this time would seem rather logical particularly as we realize that the United States will after this war want the world to rise to a higher plane of international morality than after the last war. We all know that America seeks neither political influence nor protectorates but here is an unusual opportunity for her which may never return not only of frustrating Axis military and political designs in a strategically vital area, but also of becoming a factor for stability and constructive help in shaping the future of the world."

I feel the above appeal has much to recommend it. We are universally trusted because of our obvious disinterestedness and our well-

⁷⁸ Speech by Anthony Eden, May 29, 1941, British Cmd. 6289, Misc. No. 2 (1941): *Speech by the Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden . . . delivered at the Mansion House on May 29, 1941.*

⁷⁹ See Report of the King-Crane Commission, August 28, 1919, *Foreign Relations, 1919*, The Paris Peace Conference, vol. XII, p. 751.

known sympathy for the cause of small nations. After the depressing lessons of the last post-war period we would seem to be justified in expressing solidarity of opinion and action with the British in the face of problems confronting the Arabic world. The immediate effect would undoubtedly be a serious weakening of Nazi prestige in Syria and a corresponding strengthening of all influences which are wishing us well in our efforts to help rid the world of the Nazi menace.

ENGERT

740.0011 European War 1939/11719 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, June 6, 1941—4 p. m.

[Received 10:05 p. m.]

193. The following is the substance of note dated today which the French High Commissioner requests me to transmit to the British authorities of Palestine and Transjordan:

Referring to paragraph 2 of article V of the Paulet-Newcombe agreement of December 23, 1920,⁸⁰ fixing the Palestine frontier between the Mediterranean and El Hammeh and guaranteeing the British Government at all times the right to pass its troops along the stretch of railroad from Nassib to Samakh situated in Syrian territory, the High Commissioner finds himself obligated in view of present circumstances to suspend until further order all transit of military personnel or equipment over the line in question.

I am orally informed that there is no objection to the passage of non-military supplies.

ENGERT

740.0011 European War 1939/11754 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, June 6, 1941—9 p. m.

[Received June 7—1:30 p. m.]

642. Rochat asked Matthews⁸¹ to call at 8:00 this evening and said he had been urgently instructed by Admiral Darlan to give us the following message:

"In the light of the tenacious and persistent campaign carried on by the English radio with reference to the situation in Syria, the

⁸⁰ This is not a reference to the Paulet-Newcombe agreement but to the Franco-British Convention on certain points connected with the Mandates for Syria and the Lebanon, Palestine, and Mesopotamia, signed at Paris, December 23, 1920, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. xxii, p. 355. For text of the Report of the Paulet-Newcombe Boundary Commission, dated February 3, 1920, see *ibid.*, p. 366.

⁸¹ H. Freeman Matthews, First Secretary of Embassy in France.

Minister of Foreign Affairs desires to inform the Ambassador of the United States that he has just repeated to General Dentz the following previous orders:

Not to attack the English in reprisal for bombardments unless British troops cross the frontier. In the latter case, General Dentz would be free to use all the forces at his disposal to defend Syria.

It is again made clear that there is in Syria no collaboration between German forces and French forces."

Rochat went on to say that he had likewise "been authorized" by Admiral Darlan to inform us that Hitler himself had given orders for the withdrawal from Syria of all German airplanes which had gone to the assistance "of Iraq;" and that he had been further authorized to say that there are no German planes in Syria and no German military personnel.

We asked if this included anti-aircraft specialists (having in mind telegram No. 181, May 31, 12 noon, from Beirut) and Rochat replied that to his knowledge no German military personnel of any sort had been in Syria. He said that this question of Syria has assumed considerable importance in the eyes of the French Government since the tone and statements of the British radio have become "so exaggerated as to lead the French to believe that an early British attack is anticipated".

We merely said that we would transmit the message promptly.

In reply to our request for specific information as to the nature of today's important Cabinet meeting Rochat replied as usual that he had no information but did not believe that anything "sensational" had taken place.

As to news from Washington he made no comment on the Secretary's statement⁸² but did say that whereas this morning an "encouraging telegram" concerning resumption of our plan for supplying North Africa had been received (we had been shown earlier a telegram from Chatel⁸³ conveying to General Weygand the statements made to him by Murphy⁸⁴ under the Department's telegram 125, June 4, 6 p. m. to Algiers⁸⁵), this evening a 5-page telegram from Henry-Haye⁸⁶ had arrived indicating the suspension of all plans. The only section of the telegram he read us was a reference to orders stopping the loading of ships destined to supply North Africa and orders canceling authorization for the unblocking of funds for various French missions in the Western Hemisphere. He displayed no resentment, merely indicating that he imagined all de-

⁸² Statement to the press on June 5; for text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 7, 1941, p. 681.

⁸³ Yves Chatel, Secretary General of the Delegation General of the Government of French Africa and principal civilian adviser to General Weygand.

⁸⁴ Robert D. Murphy, Counselor of Embassy in France, on special assignment in French North Africa.

⁸⁵ Vol. II, p. 365.

⁸⁶ Gaston Henry-Haye, French Ambassador in the United States.

pend on the outcome of "political developments in Vichy with which he is not *au courant*".

Copy to Beirut.

LEAHY

740.0011 European War 1939/11742 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, June 7 [6], 1941—10 p. m.

[Received June 7—3: 33 p. m.]

195. High Commissioner published proclamation today in which he denies as gross lies the reports referred to in my 184, June 3, and claims all that happened was that "some foreign airplanes flying from west to east landed in Syria in order to continue their journey. They are returning under the same conditions going from east to west". He stated that the French Government had modified its policy toward Germany because France was facing starvation and hundreds of thousands of her sons were in captivity. If nothing is done to preserve France now there will be no Frenchmen left when years hence the "hypothetical victory is won which is being dangled before your eyes". He added the Marshal demanded that all French possessions be defended and in Syria and Lebanon the people did not want any emancipators other than the French.

ENGERT

740.0011 European War 1939/11743 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, June 7, 1941—4 p. m.

[Received June 7—2: 52 p. m.]

196. For the Under Secretary. My 184, June 3. Please see also second paragraph my 187, June 4, the last paragraph my 190, June 4, and my 195, June 6. The British are doing their cause great harm and are playing into the hands of the Germans by continuing to broadcast inaccurate statements re alleged German military activities in Syria. . If the British have decided to occupy Syria the events of the past 3 weeks have provided them with every legitimate ground without the necessity of resorting to specific rumors of today—most of which the Germans and the French are now deliberately combining to make appear utterly false and unfounded.

It seems to me what the British should proclaim from the housetops is that in view of recent French readiness to put Syrian landing fields at the disposal of the Germans and supply them with arms and ammunition there is nothing to prevent their doing it again whenever

it suits German plans. As this would render Cyprus untenable, renew the danger of German aggression in Iraq and would directly menace Palestine and Egypt the British cannot afford to run such risks.

ENGERT

740.0011 European War 1939/11744 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, June 7, 1941—6 p. m.

[Received June 8—10:30 a. m.]

197. My 195, June 6, and 196, June 7. General Jannekeyn, commanding French Air Force, sent an officer to assure me that the only serviceable German airplanes now in Syria were 2 troop carrying planes and 1 Messerschmidt 110 at Aleppo and they were expected to leave today or tomorrow. The following airdromes contain badly damaged German planes:

Palmyra 2 Heinkels 111, 1 Messerschmidt 110.

Aleppo 2 troop carrying planes.

Damascus 1 fighter plane.

Nothing at Rayak.

The General suggested that a representative from this Consulate General verify these statements by inspecting the flying fields. I am, of course, not accepting the offer as it would force us into the position of testifying against possible British claims.

ENGERT

III. British and Free French Invasion and Occupation of Syria and Lebanon; Good Offices of the United States in Arranging Armistice

740.0011 European War 1939/11795 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, June 7, 1941—6 p. m.

[Received June 7—2:06 p. m.]

2331. Personal for the President from the Former Naval Person.⁸⁷

"1. We enter Syria in some force tomorrow morning in order to prevent further German penetration. Success depends largely upon attitude of local French troops. De Gaulle's⁸⁸ Free French outfit will be prominent, but not in the van. He is issuing a proclamation

⁸⁷ Code name for Winston S. Churchill, British Prime Minister.

⁸⁸ Gen. Charles de Gaulle, Leader of the Free French.

to the Arabs offering in the name of France complete independence and opportunity to form either 3 or 1 or 3 in 1 free Arab states. Relations of these states with France will be fixed by treaty, safeguarding established interest somewhat on the Anglo-Egyptian model. General Catroux⁸⁹ is not to be called High Commissioner, but French Delegate and Plenipotentiary.

2. I cannot tell how Vichy will react to what may happen. I do not myself think they will do much worse than they are now doing, but of course they may retaliate on Gibraltar or Freetown. I should be most grateful if you would keep your pressure upon them. We have no political interests at all in Syria except to win the war.

3. Thank you so much for letting Harriman⁹⁰ go to the Middle East. He is seeing your son tomorrow before leaving, and I shall see him myself, I hope, at luncheon Monday."

JOHNSON

740.0011 European War 1939/11765 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, June 8, 1941—10 a. m.
[Received June 9—6:30 a. m.]

678. The following is the text of a proclamation to be made by General Catroux on entering Syria this morning accompanied by a supporting declaration by the British Ambassador⁹¹ here in behalf of the British Government:

"Inhabitants of Syria and the Lebanon:

At the moment when the forces of Free France united to the forces of the British Empire, her ally, are entering your territory I declare that I assume the powers, the responsibilities and the duties of the representative of 'La France du Levant'. This in the name of the Free France which identifies itself with the traditional and real France and in the name of her Chief, General de Gaulle.

In this capacity I come to put an end to the regime of the mandate and to proclaim you free and independent.

You will therefore be from henceforward sovereign and independent peoples and you will be able either to form yourselves into separate states or to unite into a single state. In either event your statute of independence and sovereignty will be guaranteed by a treaty in which our mutual relations will be defined. This treaty will be negotiated as soon as possible between your representatives and myself. Pending its conclusion our mutual situation will be that of allies closely united in the pursuit of a common ideal and aims.

⁸⁹ Gen. Georges Catroux.

⁹⁰ W. Averell Harriman, Special Representative of President Roosevelt in the United Kingdom, with the rank of Minister, responsible for expediting lend-lease aid to the British Empire.

⁹¹ See British Cmd. 6600, Syria No. 1 (1945): *Statements of Policy by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in Respect of Syria and the Lebanon, 8th June-9th September, 1941.*

Inhabitants of Syria and the Lebanon, you will see from this declaration that if the Free French and the British forces are crossing your frontiers it is to ensure it. It is to drive out of Syria the forces of Hitler. It is to prevent the Levant from becoming against the British and against ourselves an offensive base of the enemy.

We cannot allow, we who are fighting for the liberty of peoples, that the enemy should submerge your country step by step, obtain control of your persons and your belongings, and turn you into slaves. We cannot allow that populations which France has promised to defend should be thrown into the hands of the most pitiless master that history has known. We cannot allow that the age-long interests of France in the Levant should be handed to the enemy.

Inhabitants of Syria and the Lebanon, if in answer to our appeal you rally to us, you should know that the British Government in agreement with Free France has promised to grant you all the advantages enjoyed by free countries who are associated with them. Thus the blockade will be lifted and you will enter into immediate relations with the sterling bloc which will open the widest possibilities for your imports and exports. You will be able to buy and sell freely with all free countries.

Inhabitants of Syria and the Lebanon, France declares you independent by the voice of her sons who are fighting for her life and for the liberty of the world."

KIRK

740.0011 European War 1939/11745 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, June 8, 1941—11 a. m.

[Received 4:25 p. m.]

198. I have just called on the High Commissioner who confirmed to me in a voice trembling with emotion that the British attacked this morning and that the French forces were resisting. Town of Deraa on the railway to Damascus was already in flames and several Britishers who were caught interfering with communications behind the French lines had been captured.

He then repeated to me the substance of the information contained in my 197, June 7⁰² and said if the British had not precipitated matters he would himself have taken me to the various aerodromes to show me that practically no German planes were left. He also referred to the unfounded reports mentioned in my 184, June 3⁰³ and said it was regrettable that the British should base an invasion of a French possession on such flimsy pretexts.

I replied that I did not for a moment believe that the British Government's decision was influenced by such rumors but that public opinion in England—incidentally also in the United States—had be-

⁰² *Ante*, p. 725.

⁰³ *Ante*, p. 716.

come alarmed by the ease with which the German Air Force had been able to make use of Syrian landing fields during the past month not only without any objection on the part of the French but evidently with their full approval and cooperation. I again referred to the shipment of large quantities of French military supplies to help the rebels in Iraq and asked him if he thought the Germans would have been willing to withdraw their planes from Syria if their intrigues in Iraq had not ended in failure. General Dentz merely shrugged his shoulders and made no reply. I then said he and I could therefore scarcely blame the British if they wished to prevent a similar situation which would be a grave menace to the entire Middle East and might seriously affect the course of the war.

To my question whether there had actually been fighting at the border the General said his troops had been ordered to resist and so far as he knew he was at war with England! I smiled and said war was an ugly word to use between friends and former allies and was convinced the British had no intention whatever of fighting the French either here or anywhere else. The General remained silent.

I then asked him whether he thought the Germans would attack the British if the latter found it necessary to occupy Syrian territory. The High Commissioner replied categorically, "I personally shall certainly not invite any Germans to come to Syria". I told him I was glad to hear it and would he authorize me to say to my Government that if German planes or troops again arrived in Syria he would have repulsed them. He hesitated for a moment and then said with pathetic helplessness "That would depend on my instructions from Vichy".

Please repeat to London.

Repeated to Vichy.

ENGERT

740.0011 European War 1939/11757 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, June 8, 1941—noon.

[Received June 8—10:40 a. m.]

656. Rochat⁹⁴ has just handed us the following note signed by Admiral Darlan,⁹⁵ emphasizing verbally that the French for their part intend to do everything possible to "keep the conflict localized"; that they do not wish the fighting to extend to other areas:

⁹⁴ Charles Antoine Rochat, Acting Secretary General of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

⁹⁵ Adm. Jean François Darlan, Vice President of the French Council of Ministers, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Interior, and Navy.

"The French Government has just learned through a telegram received from the General High Commissioner of France at Beirut that Syrian territory was attacked this morning on the Nerdjayoun front south of the Djebeldruze and that enemy reconnaissance units, foot and motorized troops, have made contact with our outposts. Fighting is taking place.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs once more draws to the attention of the American Embassy the fact that there is no collaboration in Syria between German and French forces and that all the German aeronautical matériel and personnel which might have been there on the occasion of the events of Iraq⁹⁶ have been withdrawn (with the exception of 2 or 3 damaged machines and possibly 10 men).

The Ministry feels that it must especially emphasize to the American Embassy that any British attack—which nothing in the present situation in Syria can justify—carries with it the risk of bringing about the most serious consequences. As it has already been pointed out to the Embassy, the French Government is resolved to defend its territory and its possessions wherever they may be attacked with every means at its disposal. All measures have been taken to this end in Syria.

Conscious of the dangers which the situation entails, the French Government, for its part, and until further notice, will avoid everything which might tend to aggravate or to extend the conflict. If the latter should be extended, the French Government would be obliged to assure by the necessary measures the defense of the territories under the sovereignty of France".

Repeated to Beirut, Algiers and London.

LEAHY

740.0011 European War 1939/11817 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, June 9, 1941—10 a. m.

[Received 5:15 p. m.]

200. As the local representative of the United Press is telegraphing summaries of communiqués and the Department has, of course, access to British communiqués I shall confine myself to information not available to the public.

1. Neighborhood of Standard Oil tanks in Beirut was bombed twice yesterday. Little damage was done but several people were killed and injured. No air raid warnings were sounded either on this or previous occasions. There is no blackout and the local population appears to have blind confidence that no British plane will

⁹⁶ See pp. 486 ff.

hurt them. The city has not changed its normal aspect although all schools and some shops have been closed.

2. Most of the male British subjects were arrested last night and were locked up at the quarantine station. As this is a very unpleasant place besides being in the military defense area I objected and the High Commissioner has promised to remove them at once to a more suitable locality. Women have not been molested.

3. Most of the military section of the High Commission have been moved to other quarters, leaving only some of the civil bureaus in the present large and very conspicuous building.

4. On the whole the British appear to have encountered more French military resistance than they had anticipated but hardly any of the local French believe that it will last long.

5. All both official and unofficial and most of the Italians left Beirut and Damascus yesterday and today for Aleppo. Several of them have told their friends that they would be back soon and mentioned the recent air raids on Alexandria as an example of what happens to cities under British protection.

6. British bombing of Aleppo airdrome has destroyed radio station and barracks on south camp. German personnel of some 20 men has now moved to north camp where they live in the same building as French personnel near the gasoline dump.

7. Germans at Aleppo are under command of Von Manteuffel and are making no preparations to leave immediately. There are also some German soldiers who returned from Iraq. It is my considered opinion that they will remain until the last possible moment in the hope that the British will be held up by the French sufficiently long to enable German planes to bring enough German forces to Aleppo to hold northern Syria. It is therefore imperative that the British take Aleppo with the least possible delay especially as 500 tons of aviation spirits are expected to arrive there for the Germans from Rumania via Turkey in the immediate future.

8. British should also occupy as quickly as possible railway between Kameshli and Tell Kotchek as the French intend to blow up bridge at Wadi Rumeli.

9. German military mission has recently been inspecting Latakia—see my 181, May 31⁹⁷—and is undoubtedly continuing plans for the landing of troops there by sea and air.

Please inform British authorities.

Repeated to Vichy.

ENGERT

⁹⁷ *Ante*, p. 716.

740.0011 European War 1939/11820: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, June 9, 1941—6 p. m.

[Received June 10—12:11 a. m.]

660. This morning's press of course contains little but sensationally head-lined accounts of events in Syria. Marshal Pétain's⁸⁸ message to the French in the Levant has been prominently published on all front pages as have the several bitter communiqués against the De Gaullists and the British. The attack on Syria is characterized as a natural sequel to previous actions of the perpetrators of Mers-el-Kebir, Dakar, Gabon and Sfax. The directives to the press, copies of which we have obtained, instruct the papers to develop arguments in their editorial columns emphasizing the four following points:

1. That the Syrian affair was undertaken only after Iraq was finished and the "occasional flights of German aeroplanes" in transit had been terminated; the bombardment of Syrian aerodromes had provoked no military reaction on the part of France. It is to be emphasized that there are "no German troops" in Syria.

2. To remind the public of the "campaign of lies" of the British Government to convince the world of German troop landings in Syria as a justification for British intervention. The words of the Marshal on the radio have destroyed all these legends.

3. That "Admiral Darlan saw perfectly clearly the British game which he unmasked in irrefutable terms in his message of May 31" (certain paragraphs from Darlan's declarations to the press are reprinted in these instructions to help the editors).

4. That the French who fight in Syria are fighting not only through discipline and to obey their leaders but to stand by the French Empire: "They fight thus as Frenchmen defending their country. They struggle also to obtain for their country an honorable peace. Each soldier who fights and falls in that far off land drenched with French blood gives one more argument for France to refund the place in Europe which is her due".

While it is difficult to evaluate as yet the reactions of the general public there is no evidence that these efforts of the press and radio to stir the people up to the desired pitch of indignation have succeeded. While the people seem to be somewhat confused there is no evidence of excitement in Vichy today nor, as far as we can ascertain, in Lyon or Marseille.

LEAHY

⁸⁸ Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain, French Chief of State.

741.51/488

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] June 9, 1941.

The French Ambassador⁹⁹ came to see the Secretary at 11:00 a. m., Monday, June 9, 1941 at the Secretary's apartment at Wardman Park Hotel, the Secretary having changed the appointment from his office because of a slight cold. This call was made on the Secretary at the request of the French Ambassador.

The French Ambassador opened the conversation by stating that the French Government had done everything in the world it could to cooperate with the British—had even made the supreme sacrifice of going to war and shedding blood for the British. He pointed to the sadness caused by the spectacle of the British now attacking the French in Syria without, he said, any justification whatever. He said that Marshal Pétain and Admiral Darlan had stated that the French would take no military initiative against the British and had fully complied with that position. The Ambassador repeated the trials and sufferings through which the French had gone since the capitulation almost a year ago, and the effort made by the French Government at Vichy to obtain an amelioration of the conditions of the armistice for the relief of the civilian population, the return of the French prisoners from Germany, and the freedom of communication between the two separate parts of France. The Ambassador recalled that he, himself, had worked during his term of office in Washington for a better understanding between the British and the French but had only been able to give hope to his Government for some betterment of this relationship without any effective steps having been accomplished.

The Secretary listened patiently to the exposition of the Ambassador which was based almost entirely on the statement that the French had not taken any initiative with respect to military acts against the British, although he apparently avoided the issue as to whether the French could have been justly expected under the terms of the armistice to grant the right of use of airdromes in Syria to the Germans in their plan for military assistance against the British forces in Iraq. The Secretary, for his part, drew the picture presented by the acts and utterances of the French governmental leaders, particularly Admiral Darlan and previously Laval,¹ indicating an attitude of helpfulness and collaboration with the Hitler forces far beyond the requirements of the armistice terms. The Secretary further

⁹⁹ Gaston Henry-Haye.

¹ Pierre Laval, former French Minister for Foreign Affairs and Vice President of the Council of Ministers under Marshal Pétain.

recalled that since the French capitulation he and this Government had worked incessantly for a betterment of the relationship between the French and British and had so strongly pleaded the French cause in many instances as to obtain reversals of decisions by the British Government with respect to restrictive blockade measures and other aspects affecting the lives of Frenchmen, both in France itself and in their colonial territories. The Secretary went on to say that he and this Government would continue their effort most diligently to bring about an amelioration of the conditions under which the French people are living at the present time, and that there is no force on earth which can move them from the determination to continue this policy except the French Government itself by turning its back upon the friendly cooperation offered by the United States and adopting a closer collaboration with the forces of conquest which are seeking to destroy Great Britain and endanger the safety and security of our own country. The Secretary said that no one, including the Ambassador himself, in the face of the present world movement of destruction and conquest being attempted by the Hitler regime, if he were put in a position of responsibility for the security of the United States, would make any other decision than that of aiding with all its power the defense of Great Britain and other countries defending themselves against those forces seeking to destroy them and the associates of those forces, no matter under what guise of chimerical promises for the future.

The Secretary said that he is not undertaking at this moment to arrive at any final conclusions with regard to the attitude of the French Government but that we are analyzing all the facts and circumstances as they develop in the light of the utterances of Laval and of Darlan's recent statement in Paris and the statements of Marshal Pétain, which have a bearing along these same lines;—and that we are studying the tendency toward collaboration by the Vichy Government beyond the strict terms of the armistice, culturally, religiously, economically, and militarily, with the full realization that such cooperation must tend to the extinction of French civilization.

The Secretary then reverted to the Syrian situation and emphasized that the French had not defended themselves in Syria against the Germans when the Germans had made use of the Syrian airports contrary to the requirements of the armistice and in violation of the agreement of 1924 between the French and American Governments with regard to the preservation of the sovereignty over Syria.²

The Secretary then forcefully asserted that a question arises now as to the attitude of the French Government toward the British with respect to Syria and said that right here there must be a distinction

² Signed at Paris, April 4, 1924, *Foreign Relations*, 1924, vol. I, p. 741.

made between the small, local aspect of Syrian developments and the larger issue which was that Germany must have Syria in connection with its military operations in regard to Iraq and with respect to the Suez Canal, and that any action by the French authorities in permitting the use of facilities in Syria for the further extension of German military operations in Asia Minor affected the fundamental position of the British in their present struggle against the German forces. The Secretary made the definite point that it was most regrettable that the French cannot see the larger and more comprehensive element in this new development which is far more important and far closer to French interests and the future of all Frenchmen than to the smaller, more immediate and local issue with respect to a mandated Syria where Germany is anxious to bring about a situation which would further her own program of attempted crushing of the British position in the Middle East.

The Secretary reiterated with emphasis that he felt the French Government should realize that this is not a local issue confined to the matter of the mandated territory of Syria, but is one which touches upon the very foundation of the future continuance of French life, independence, and civilization.

The Secretary concluded by stating that he was not prepared to state that he had come to any conclusions with regard to the present developments but he must say that he is watching minutely and with the greatest apprehension the acts and developments as they arise and is analyzing the attitude and policy, as it might affect the relations between the French on the one hand and the British, and eventually other countries, including the United States, on the other hand, as declared and put into effect by the officials of the Government at Vichy.

740.0011 European War 1939/11909a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Leahy)

WASHINGTON, June 10, 1941—10 p. m.

470. Please seek an appointment with Marshal Pétain at the earliest practicable moment and deliver to him the following oral message, leaving with him an *aide-mémoire*:

"The Government of the United States has, ever since the Franco-German Armistice,³ been examining closely all the facts and circumstances that come to its attention in order to ascertain the true nature

³ Signed June 22, 1940; for text, see *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, series D, vol. ix, p. 671.

of the French policy and the French course with respect to Germany. In view of the past utterances of M. Laval, Darlan and others, the particular situation in Syria gives cause for special concern. Note has been taken of the fact that the French Government did not consider it necessary to defend Syria when the Germans made use of Syrian airports contrary to the requirements of the Armistice and in violation of the agreement of 1924 between the Governments of France and of the United States, with regard to the preservation of the control over Syria.

It would seem that a question has now arisen as to the respective attitudes of the French and the British Governments with respect to Syria. In examining this the Government of the United States considers that a sharp distinction must be made between the purely local aspect of Syrian developments and the large issue involved. In this latter phase, it appears obvious that Germany requires Syria in connection with its military operations against Iraq, and against the Suez Canal. The past action of the French authorities in permitting use of facilities in Syria as bases for further extension of German military operations in the Middle East necessarily affected adversely the British position in their present struggle against German forces. The French Government found it unnecessary to utter a word of objection, still less to offer resistance, to an avowed and actual German movement of conquest in the direction of Iraq, Egypt and the Suez Canal, using Syria as a base for that purpose. In view of this fact, it is impossible for this Government to understand why France now finds it necessary to fight the British in that area when Britain's only objective is to prevent further use of Syria as a base of German operations against its own forces.

It would seem plain to this Government that the real interest in opposing the British in Syria is not that of France, but that of Hitler; and that the French military operations now in progress are designed not to further French, but rather German interests. It believes that the broader issue involved in the present Syrian development is of far greater importance to French interests and the future of Frenchmen than the smaller, and more local, though more immediate issue as to the occupation of Syria. The broader effect of the present French policy in Syria would appear to be the creation of a situation furthering Germany's program of attempted crushing of the British position in the Middle East, rather than protection either of Syria as such or of any French interest therein.

In its large aspect the issue touches the very foundation of the future continuance of French life, independence and civilization. Under the guise of protecting control over Syria, it would seem that there is being carried out a gratuitous act of vast military aid to Hitler which if successful would assist him in his supreme purpose of conquering Great Britain, and securing control of the high seas, and thereby endangering those liberties and free institutions so precious to every American, which it is believed are still precious to all Frenchmen."

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/13261

The French Ambassador (Henry-Haye) to the Secretary of State

[Translation]

WASHINGTON, June 11, 1941.

Referring to the information given to His Excellency the Secretary of State in the course of their conversation on June 9, 1941, the Ambassador of France has the honor to advise the Honorable Cordell Hull that the French Government has sent the following communication to Sir Samuel Hoare, Ambassador of Great Britain in Spain, through the intermediary of its Ambassador at Madrid:

"The French Government renews its declaration that there are no German troops in Syria. French forces alone are defending the territory with which they are entrusted.

"Military authorities in Syria have had occasion to verify that British soldiers and sailors taken prisoner in Syria have expressed their astonishment at being prisoners of the French since their leaders had told them that they would be fighting the Germans.

"In these circumstances, the French Government wonders what the motive is which impels the British Government to continue its unjustified aggression. If it goes on, it might have serious political consequences which the French Government, for its part is desirous of avoiding."

The Ambassador of France is happy to find in this communication a new proof of the conciliatory dispositions of the French Government in the regrettable conflict created by British aggression in the territories of the Levant. He feels obliged to draw the most special attention of the Government of the United States to this point.

Mr. Henry-Haye is happy to take this occasion [etc.]

740.0011 European War 1939/11967 : Telegram*The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, June 12, 1941—7 p. m.

[Received June 12—5:18 p. m.]

680. Department's 470, June 10, 10 a. m. [*p. m.*]. I delivered the oral message and *aide-mémoire* to Marshal Pétain at 6:00 this afternoon.

Report of interview follows.

LEAHY

740.0011 European War 1939/11994 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, June 12, 1941—8 p. m.

[Received June 13—10:05 a. m.]

682. My telegram 680, June 12, 7 p. m. Marshal Pétain received me in the presence of Admiral Darlan. After I had delivered the message the Marshal said: "The British have attacked us. We said that we were going to defend our territory and we shall do so all the way up to the Turkish frontier. We know that we shall lose Syria but we are determined to fight to the end." Admiral Darlan stated that British and Gaullist forces vastly outnumber the French forces, the former totaling approximately 50,000 men against some 3 divisions or roughly 25,000 French and colonial forces. The British are also sending reinforcements. In addition, said the Marshal, the British have "several hundred tanks" and the French none.

The fact, he went on, that the British have been held so well so far (and he showed me on the map) constitutes "almost a French victory", particularly in view of the support given the British coastal column by naval units. Darlan remarked that he hoped, however, "to sink a couple of British warships very soon" (thus appearing to confirm reports of the sending of French submarines to that area).

While the manner of both was cordial and personally friendly throughout the interview they seemed to resent the implication that the French defense of Syria is to help Hitler. Darlan said that had this been the case they would have accepted "the aid which the Germans offered" and which, he went on, the French had "formally refused"; they are determined to fight the battle of Syria by themselves he said. "If the British think that they are going to stop a German drive on Suez by conquering Syria they are gravely mistaken", Darlan went on, "for the Germans have never planned to use Syria in their major operation." On the other hand letters in French possession, he said, which date back 6 months conclusively show that the British even at that time were planning an invasion of Syria. "In fact", said Darlan, "they always wanted Syria."

Darlan likewise expressed surprise that the Department's message gave no recognition to the fact that the British had attacked the French without warning.

Both the Marshal and Admiral Darlan appeared surprisingly calm and resigned to the loss of Syria. Darlan indicated however that this would be "the last affront" which the French would submit to on the part of the British. He also said that a written reply to the *aide-mémoire* would be prepared.

Repeated to Algiers.

LEAHY

740.0011 European War 1939/11995 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, June 12, 1941—10 p. m.

[Received June 13—11 a. m.]

683. My telegram 680, June 12, 7 p. m., and 682, June 12, 8 p. m. Less than 3 hours after delivering the message and *aide-mémoire* to Marshal Pétain, the following note initialed by Admiral Darlan was delivered at the Embassy :

"The *aide-mémoire* transmitted June 12 sets forth the considerations which actuate the American Government with respect to the evolution of the situation in the Near East especially in Syria.

In reply to that communication, the French Government feels that it should in its turn draw the attention of the Federal Government to the following facts which seem of a nature to lead the American Government to appreciate more objectively the developments of present events in the Near East :

1. The German planes which flew over Syria or which landed there were without exception in transit toward Iraq; none of them was destined for Palestine or for Egypt. On the other hand no Syrian airfield has been used as a base of operations for German planes.

2. The French Government was informed by a sure source several months ago of the British intention to attack Syria or to incite internal uprisings which could furnish pretexts for intervention.

3. Syria has always loyally proclaimed its determination to defend the Empire by its forces alone against any foreign attack. It is in that spirit and with the same will that it is facing the attack of which it is subjected on the Syrian frontiers and it has expressly declined all offers of military assistance which were given it. It must, however, reserve in this connection all freedom of action in case the development of the situation should require new decisions on its part.

4. The French Government observes that the British forces opened hostilities without any prior ultimatum or even a warning. If, forewarned of hostile intentions, the French forces had not been on their guard, the English assailants would not have met with any military resistance.

5. The French Government believes as does the American Government that present events in Syria present a problem of a general character. It seems that it is sufficient for England to consider that the occupation of a territory placed under French sovereignty or authority is necessary to prevent a German initiative for it to attack it without other pretext or reason. The French Government feels certain that it should once more affirm its determination to defend by all the means of which it disposes all those of its territories which are the object of an aggression.

6. The French Government notes with regret that the American Government refrained from any representation or any observations when without any reason Great Britain :

Interned French sailors ;

Attacked the French at Oran and Dakar;
Seized Gabon and New Caledonia, under cover of an undertaking
partially led by French rebels in its pay."

Repeat to Algiers.

LEAHY

740.0011 European War 1939/12022 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, June 13, 1941—noon.

[Received 1 : 10 p. m.]

208. A pro-British French Government official, whom I have always found well informed, has just sent word to me to warn me that the Germans are definitely planning to occupy northern Syria in the immediate future. He believes they will use chiefly Aleppo aerodrome to land suddenly large numbers of troops, accompanied or followed by landings of troops and heavy material at Latakia by sea and that the whole movement will be covered by intensive bombing of British positions in Syria and British naval units off the coast. My informant fears that Syria will share the fate of Crete unless the British are able to take immediate possession of all landing fields and to capture or immobilize French Army in Syria which is today far more anti-British than it was a week ago. He suggests a quick advance on Aleppo from Deir-ez-Zor and perhaps a landing near or at least a close watch on Latakia.

Please see in this connection my 186, June 3rd,⁴ and paragraphs 7 and 9 of my 200, June 9th. I personally entirely agree with the statements of my informant and feel that today speed is of the utmost importance. The longer this campaign lasts the more it will encourage the French to resist and tempt the Germans to participate.

Please repeat to London.

ENGERT

740.0011 European War 1939/12091 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, June 14, 1941—10 a. m.

[Received 10 p. m.]

190. The reaction of the Turkish press to the British and Free French invasion of Syria has been guardedly sympathetic with chief emphasis on their announced intention of giving it its independence and with the implied hope that this time the British may be quickly

⁴ *Ante*, p. 717.

successful. Various editorials have also mentioned the economic advantages which will accrue to Syria through British occupation and the importance to Turkey of having the situation in that country stabilized. Sympathy for the British as opposed to the Vichy Government in this move had been increased by Admiral Darlan's statement to the press at Paris on May 31 in which he is reported to have said that after the last war the English encouraged the Turks to throw the French out of Cilicia. This statement was the cause of bitter resentment and was attacked in length and in detail by practically the entire Turkish press.

MACMURRAY

740.0011 European War 1939/12056 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, June 14, 1941—2 p. m.

[Received 4:59 p. m.]

212. Reference paragraph 3 [1?] of my 208, June 13th. Principal German Agent Roser and some 8 or 10 German and Italian members of the armistice sub-commissions have just returned to Beirut from Aleppo. They are being taken on a tour of inspection of the front by the French authorities who seem to be anxious to prove to the Germans that the French forces are resisting in earnest. Several of these Germans and Italians have also visited the French military hospital, also interviewed French wounded regarding the fighting.

Please repeat to London. Repeated to Vichy.

ENGERT

740.0011 European War 1939/12113 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, June 16, 1941—1 p. m.

[Received June 16—11:55 a. m.]

702. Admiral Darlan told me this morning that the Germans had offered military aid for the defense of Syria and that he had again refused the offer.

He added that he still has no illusions as to ultimate French defeat in Syria. His naval bombers he said, however, had "destroyed" two British torpedo boats. On his side he has lost a destroyer which he was sending to Syria from Toulon presumably sunk by a submarine. Of the land operations he had nothing to say.

LEAHY

740.0011 European War 1939/12119 : Telegram

The Chargé in Germany (Morris) to the Secretary of State

BERLIN, June 16, 1941—2 p. m.

[Received 4:30 p. m.]

2380. The following conclusions regarding the German policy towards the Syrian situation in particular and the present state of collaboration with Vichy in general are based on the information available here as well as public and private utterances and the general propaganda line taken in Berlin:

1. Apart from propagandist and moral support German aid to the French in Syria appears thus far to be confined outwardly to aerial attacks on Cyprus, Egypt, Haifa, and British naval and supply shipping along the Lebanon coast.

2. It is clear that Berlin has been putting full pressure on Vichy to offer 100% resistance in Syria as a prerequisite for further German concessions under the collaboration arrangement. At present the resistance appears satisfactory to Berlin and Vichy is being rewarded by the progressive release of prisoners and shipments of food.

3. Vichy is likewise being urged to follow a similar uncompromising policy with respect to its African colonies with the promise that France will be allowed under a German peace to continue as a major colonial power. It has been stated in the press that the terms of the Armistice have been supplemented by subsequent arrangements giving Vichy what are described as far-reaching means of defending its colonial empire by land, sea, and air.

4. As a permanent guarantee for Vichy against Italian aspirations to French territory, Germany has reluctantly bought off Mussolini by permitting Rome for the time being at least to dominate most of Yugoslavia and Greece and by promising aid in reestablishing the Italian African Empire and with possible extension of Italian influence to Egypt and the Sudan.

The German policy towards France and the French Colonial Empire appears to be following closely that of steady penetration originally pursued in the Balkans rather than of open invasion with the hope that matters will shape themselves according to the Berlin design under incessant German pressure and without precipitating an extension of military and naval operations to French North and West Africa for which Berlin may not yet have completed preparations on its usual thorough scale. Nevertheless it is obscurely suggested that when the time is regarded as ripe, Germany will make full use of Vichy territory for its military schemes under the guise of assistance to what is now described as a victim of aggression.

Repeated to Vichy.

MORRIS

740.0011 European War 1939/12114 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, June 16, 1941—4 p. m.

[Received 9:15 p. m.]

705. The military news from Syria today Rochat said confirms that the French have withdrawn north of Sidon but that their positions there seem strong; in other areas the French are even counterattacking he claimed. He admitted that the German "offer" to send military assistance—of what specific sort he did not know—to the French defence of Syria is becoming more "insistent". He is pleased as are our other friends in the Foreign Office that the French Government has firmly declined this "offer": they feel that France's moral position will be much stronger even if Syria is lost, (and they probably realize that it would be lost to France anyway if Germany does occupy the territory, whether to send assistance or otherwise).

LEAHY

740.0011 European War 1939/12174 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State*⁵

BEIRUT, June 17, 1941—10 a. m.

[Received 5:22 p. m.]

219. Head of the Lebanese Government, Alfred Naccache, has sent to me in strict confidence a copy of the note referred to in paragraph No. 3 of my 217, June 16.⁶ In this note the Lebanese Government expresses with unusual boldness the hope that the High Commissioner would follow the example of the great military leaders in France who ceased useless fighting in order to save the defenseless civil population. It points out that the present operations have nothing whatever to do with the territorial integrity or independence of the Lebanon and it suggests (1) suspension of hostilities before the Lebanon is laid waste. The French would not wish to repeat in the Lebanon that [for which] they reproach Reynaud;⁷ (2) negotiations between the belligerents with a view to declaring Beirut an open city whose defenses and port must not be used by either side for military purposes. Such a declaration to be made in any event by the French as soon as the enemy reaches the city limits; (3) large towns must be respected and must not be defended.

⁵ This telegram was repeated to the Chargé in the United Kingdom as Department's No. 2178, June 18, midnight, with instruction to bring it immediately to the attention of the Foreign Office.

⁶ Not printed.

⁷ Paul Reynaud, French Premier, March–June 1940.

Monsieur Naccache added a verbal message for me requesting on behalf of the Lebanese Government that we sound the British authorities informally as to whether they would be willing to consider Beirut an open town provided the French make a declaration to that effect. Lebanese Government hopes for an early reply in order that unnecessary loss of civilian lives and destruction of property may be avoided. Incidentally, German agent Roser is reported to have said to a Lebanese official a day or two ago that the Germans would bomb Beirut within 24 hours after the arrival of the British. Paragraph 5 of my 200, June 9 and my 212, June 14.

As already pointed out in my telegrams the people in Beirut have touching faith that the British will not harm them if it can possibly be helped. An official British statement to that effect would therefore also have excellent propaganda value.

Repeated to Vichy.

ENGERT

740.0011 European War 1939/12158 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, June 17, 1941—7 p. m.

[Received June 17—12: 50 p. m.]

2500. My 2499, June 17, 6 p. m.,^s and Beirut's 198, June 8. I have communicated the substance of Beirut's telegram orally to the Foreign Office and when I saw Mr. Eden last evening he asked me to say how very much the British Government appreciates the attitude and help of Mr. Engert.

JOHNSON

740.00119 European War 1939/732 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, June 18, 1941—11 a. m.

[Received 2: 40 p. m.]

223. For Secretary and Under Secretary. Monsieur Conty, Director of Political Affairs, at the High Commission requests that I inquire of the British authorities as it were on my own initiative what terms the French here could expect in the event that they feel that the time had come to suggest that I offer my good offices with a view to bringing about a cessation of hostilities.

He referred to the report that the Free French organization had recently condemned General Dentz and other high officers to death and that such "plaisantries" were hardly conducive to the creation

^s Not printed.

of an atmosphere in which one could negotiate. They would therefore particularly like to know in some detail what the British Government and the De Gaullists proposed to do: (a) with the French Army of the Levant; (b) the French civil services in Syria and the Lebanon; and (c) all other Frenchmen and their families.

Conty implied although he did not say so that he was speaking on behalf of the High Commissioner and that the matter was very urgent but that it had to be handled with extreme discretion as they did not of course wish to appear to being [*be*] suing for peace.

I told him that I could not very well "on my own initiative" transmit his inquiries to the British authorities in Palestine direct but that I would be very glad to telegraph the substance of our interview to the Secretary of State with the request that it be discreetly brought to the attention of the British Government. He was willing that it should be done in this way provided I could be authorized at once to use my good offices without asking for further instructions in case the French authorities decided to take this step.

It is significant that Conty did not once in this interview refer to Vichy and that he did not have in mind terms of an armistice or negotiations of a purely military nature. On the contrary in reply to my question he said specifically the French desired to know what "political arrangements" could be made with the British and Free French.

My personal impression is that the French forces are weary and that they have not been able to receive reinforcements from France. They would probably be ready to accept terms that would safeguard all British military, naval and air requirements provided they were otherwise sufficiently generous to enable the French to yield gracefully and with honor.

ENGERT

740.0011 European War 1939/11718 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Beirut (Engert)

WASHINGTON, June 18, 1941—8 p. m.

102. Your 192, June 5.⁹ Sheik Taj-ed-Din's proposal has been given attentive consideration. Although the American Government continues to maintain its established policy of favoring the independence of Syria, provision for which was made in the Syrian Mandate incorporated in the treaty of 1924 between the United States and France, the Department does not consider that it would be desirable for the American Government to issue a statement on the subject at this particular time.

HULL

⁹ *Ante*, p. 721.

740.00119 European War 1939/732 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Beirut (Engert)

WASHINGTON, June 19, 1941—7 p. m.

104. Your 223, June 18, 11 a. m. The following message has just been received from the British Embassy in Washington :

1. You may assure the State Department that His Majesty's Government would be very ready to consider satisfactory arrangements whereby our strategical requirements in Syria are fully safeguarded. Far from desiring to impose any dishonourable terms on General Dentz His Majesty's Government are fully prepared to accord full honours of war to him and other civilian and military officers who have only done what they conceived to be their duty by their Government.

2. There is therefore no question of General Dentz or any other civilian or military official being condemned to death or to any other penalty.

3. The following is outline of terms which we would be prepared to accept :

1) Negotiations for cessation of hostilities, to be carried on between General Wilson^{9a} representing Commander-in-Chief and Vichy authorities in Syria.

2) Hostilities to cease at once and Vichy forces to concentrate in selected areas. All the compliments of war will be accorded.

3) (A) Surrender of all war ships and of all naval establishment intact. Note: Should this be unacceptable, alternative has been authorized. "War ships to be handed over intact for internment and subsequently to be reduced to care and maintenance basis at Beirut. With power to move as ordered by Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean if safety considerations demand it." In either alternative return of the ships after the war to a friendly France or compensation is guaranteed.

(B) Other ships including British and harbour services to be handed over intact.

4) All air craft whether Vichy or Axis and war material to be handed over undamaged.

5) All service personnel to be given the opportunity to join the Free French. Those who do not wish to do so will be repatriated as and when possible.

6) The High Commissioner, his Staff and all French officers and nationals other than those who are prepared to remain will be repatriated as and when possible.

7) All ports, all communications, fuel, stocks and guns to be handed over intact for our use.

8) The exact position of mine fields will be disclosed.

9) The Administration and public utility services to be maintained and operated for the time being under Allied Military direction.

10) Cable and wireless services to cease operations and to be handed over intact.

^{9a} Gen. Sir Henry Maitland Wilson.

4. His Majesty's Government suggest that the United States Consul General should be instructed to get into touch with General Wilson who is being authorised to give him full information. We shall be grateful for Consul General's personal services as an intermediary.

You are authorized to act as an intermediary in the event the French authorities desire you to do so. If you receive a request to assist in an arrangement for the cessation of hostilities, you are authorized to communicate with General Wilson. Please keep the Department fully and promptly informed by telegram of all developments.

HULL

740.00119 European War 1939/733 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, June 20, 1941—11 p. m.

[Received June 20—6:45 p. m.]

232. For Secretary and Under Secretary. Your 105 [104], June 19. Please inform British Embassy that in view of certain developments in the local situation I would suggest confining ourselves for the moment to communicating informally to Conty only paragraphs 1 and 2 and perhaps substance of subheadings 1, 2, 5 and 6 under paragraph 3. That is really about all he asked for and the rest we can tell him as soon as French authorities have definitely decided to discuss terms.

ENGERT

740.00119 European War 1939/733 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Beirut (Engert)

WASHINGTON, June 20, 1941—midnight.

107. Your 232 June 20, 11 p. m. British Embassy conveying sense of your message to London. In the meantime Embassy asks that you communicate sense of your message and any other useful information to General Wilson through the American Consulate at Jerusalem if you can communicate with him. General Wilson is fully informed and has already been authorized to deal with you.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/12279 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, June 21, 1941—8 a. m.

[Received 10:50 a. m.]

233. My 219, July [June] 17. Apostolic Delegate came to see me yesterday to inform me that at the request of the head of the Lebanese

Government he intended to telegraph to the Vatican proposing that the city of Beirut and its environs be declared a "neutral area" by the belligerents. He inquired whether I would be prepared to telegraph my Government in the same sense.

I said I would be glad to tell Washington of the suggestion and that if my Government thought it feasible it would doubtless inform me on any steps it may be in a position to take. I also told him of the verbal message from Naccache mentioned in my No. 219.

ENGERT

740.00119 European War 1939/733 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Beirut (Engert)

WASHINGTON, June 21, 1941—1 p. m.

108. Your 232, June 20, 11 p. m. The British Embassy in Washington has referred your suggestions to London and now informs the Department that the British Government agrees to your proposal to communicate informally to Conty only paragraphs 1 and 2 and perhaps the substance of subheadings 1, 2, 5 and 6 under paragraph 3 of the terms quoted in the Department's 104, June 18 [19] 11 a. m. [7 p. m.], and to communicate the remainder of the provisions to Conty as soon as the French authorities definitely express a wish to discuss terms.

The British Government states that it has no doubt that you will bear in mind that the British terms, as stated in the Department's 104, were based on an immediate cessation of hostilities.

The British Government is keeping British headquarters in Cairo fully informed, as well as General Wilson in Palestine.

Can you communicate directly with Palestine or Cairo?

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/12323 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, June 22, 1941—11 a. m.

[Received 11:30 p. m.]

729. In confirming the fall of Damascus this morning Rochat told us that in the light of the invasion of Russia¹⁰ the affair in Syria seems "of secondary importance now." "We have" he said, "done enough to save our honor" and only hope it will be quickly over.

¹⁰ For correspondence on wartime cooperation between Germany and the Soviet Union prior to the German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, see vol. I, pp. 116 ff.

We have received reports from several independent sources, one from our Embassy in Berlin and another from a friend in the Foreign Office, that the French have been sending or endeavoring to send troop reinforcements to Syria through Germany and Italy to Salonika and thence by boat. We asked Rochat concerning the truth of these reports and he denied them indirectly. "We have" he said "endeavored to find ways of getting reinforcements to Syria largely to relieve our hard pressed elements there, but we have been unable to find a way. Naval circles issue similar denials but we learn on good authority that a trainload of French soldiers en route through Germany was actually stoned by the local populace at Belfort.

LEAHY

740.0011 European War 1939/12395 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, June 24, 1941—11 a. m.

[Received 4:26 p. m.]

242. I called on the High Commissioner this morning and let him read the text of the *aide-mémoire* the Department telegraphed to Vichy on June 10¹¹ and which only reached me a few days ago via Cairo.

As usual, I found that he had not been informed of what Admiral Leahy had said in Vichy and he read the *aide-mémoire* twice very slowly and carefully underlining some of the phrases. He then looked up and said gravely, "This is pretty strong language! I wonder how Marshal Pétain took it." He then said he hoped I did not think he was enjoying what he was doing. He went on to say with some vehemence his instructions were to fight to the last man and the last cartridge and being a soldier he would obey orders even if there had to be fighting in the streets of Beirut. I interrupted at this point and asked if he wanted me to take this literally for we had quite a large American colony and some valuable property to think of. He replied that even if there was no actual street fighting there would probably be fighting in the outskirts. At any rate he had nothing to do with policy and it was all up to Vichy.

When General Dentz had calmed down a little, I said one of the reasons why I wanted him to see the *aide-mémoire* was that I had heard from various sources how highly Marshal Pétain thought of him and how much he trusted his judgment in all matters pertaining to Syria. I therefore hoped very much he would do everything in his power to recommend that this senseless tragedy be not prolonged a

¹¹ See telegram No. 470, June 10, 10 p. m., to the Ambassador in France, p. 734.

day longer than absolutely necessary. He nodded and said he personally had no feelings of hatred toward the British; on the contrary he had many very good friends among them while he had no friends at all among the Germans. It was therefore absurd to believe that he was about to turn Syria over to Hitler when the British attacked although he admitted that the use of Syrian air bases would be a great help to the Germans. However, he assured me he had steadfastly refused all offers of German help in the present conflict.

I was about to leave when he asked me to sit down again and said he wished he could share the confidence I had expressed to him on so many occasions that a victorious Britain seconded by the United States would be able to recreate a world in which France could revive and Frenchmen could live their individual lives without becoming mere units in the community of termites envisaged by Nazis and Communists alike. I reiterated my conviction that such a future was possible provided only we all pulled together and the time to pull together was now.

The interview lasted an hour and we went over some of the ground reported in my earlier telegrams especially my 144, May 14, and 161, May 22.¹² General Dentz tried hard to make light of the military situation in Syria but it was evident from his somewhat forced humor that he did not really believe he could go on much longer. He also went out of his way to say he was doing all he could for his British prisoners and made no reference whatever to alleged cruelties, firing on ambulances to which they had played up so much. As I took leave he laughed and said, "Anyhow, one thing certain, I shan't get a K. C. B. for all this!" I laughed, too, and replied as I was in charge of British interests, there was still a chance that he might.

Repeated to Vichy. Please inform British authorities.

ENGERT

740.0011 European War 1939/12279 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Leahy)*¹³

WASHINGTON, June 24, 1941—8 p. m.

507. Following telegram dated June 21 has been received from Beirut:

[Here follows text of telegram No. 233, June 21, 8 a. m., printed on page 746.]

You are requested, unless you perceive objection, to bring this suggestion to the attention of the French Government, stating that the

¹² *Ante*, pp. 705 and 713, respectively.

¹³ The same, *mutatis mutandis*, was sent on the same date to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom as telegram No. 2276.

American Government would of course be pleased to lend its facilities for effecting any arrangement which might serve to prevent the destruction of lives and property in Beirut, a city with which the United States has many connections of a cultural and intellectual nature.

The Embassy in London has been authorized, in its discretion, to bring the above suggestion to the attention of the British Government in a similar manner.

WELLES

740.0011 European War 1939/12442 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, June 25, 1941—noon.

[Received 1:05 p. m.]

245. Please inform British authorities that Conty told me this morning the French authorities did not feel the time had come to negotiate. And when I said the terms might not be quite the same later he replied peevishly he could not help that. He said the British military effort had been so feeble that at this rate it would take them 2 months to occupy Syria and by that time "the Germans will wipe up the floor with them and occupy Jerusalem within 48 hours."

He was in such an irascible mood that after a few minutes I merely told him I would come back another day when he felt less bitter.

Most of his bluster was undoubtedly put on and he said several times that naturally they could not hang on forever. Incidentally I hear from the Turkish Consul General in strict confidence that Conty and several other French officials have already obtained Turkish visas. But so long as Vichy continues to issue the instructions mentioned by the High Commissioner in my 242, June 24, they will of course pretend to fight to the last ditch. Regular Gestapo methods are now being employed and even wives of Frenchmen not in official positions have been warned that they must express only views approved by Vichy or their husbands will suffer the consequences.

ENGERT

740.0011 European War 1939/12519 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, June 26, 1941—5 p. m.

[Received June 26—1:30 p. m.]

751. Department's 507, June 24, 8 p. m. The suggestion of the Apostolic Delegate at Beirut was brought to the attention of the French Government today together with an indication that the American Government would be pleased to lend its facilities for effecting any arrangement to prevent the destruction of lives and property in Beirut.

Rochat indicated orally that [apparent omission] would take the suggestion under consideration, adding that the suggestion is a somewhat complicated one especially in view of fact that Beirut is the principal port in that area. He said that he would give us some indication of his Government's reaction later.

LEAHY

740.0011 European War 1939/12593 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]

VICHY, June 27, 1941—1 p. m.

[Received June 28—10:02 a. m.]

756. I called this morning on Marshal Pétain to obtain his impressions of the new situation which has developed from the Russo-German conflict. He received me alone. Before I touched on the subject of my visit he himself started to talk of Syria. He said that French resistance had been remarkable there considering the fact that they were outnumbered 3 to 1 and had continued holding for 3 weeks. He showed me on the map where the present lines run: he indicated that a British column is pressing east from Damascus and that the French forces in the center of Lebanon between the two mountain ranges north of Merdjayonn are withdrawing northward.

Defense on the coast is greatly hampered by British naval forces; Palmyra, he indicated, is but lightly held and the strong British columns there with a substantial number of tanks could not long be held up. He seems to feel that the French may be able to hold on some time longer in the northern area of the two mountain ranges of the Lebanon and possibly later withdraw to Aleppo. The principal difficulty for the French, he said, is their inability to obtain necessary supplies and reinforcements. He has therefore, he said, sent a letter to President İnönü of Turkey asking that the French be permitted to use the port of Alexandretta to send reinforcements and supplies overland to the south. He indicated that by utilization of the Turkish coastal waters this aid for the French forces in Syria could arrive at that port by sea. He said that he had not yet received President İnönü's reply. (This is of course the object of Benoist Mechin's^{13a} mission—Embassy telegram No. 747, June 25, 6 p. m.¹⁴ This morning's

^{13a} Jacques Benoist-Mechin, Secretary of State to the Presidency of the French Council of Ministers.

¹⁴ Not printed. In telegram No. 224, June 29, 1 p. m., the Ambassador in Turkey reported that M. Benoist-Mechin had requested not only that Turkey permit the transit of war supplies to Syria but that the Turkish Government furnish tanks and other war materials. The Turkish Government refused both requests (740.0011 European War 1939/12643).

French press merely announces briefly that Benoist Mechin arrived at Ankara yesterday bearing "a personal message from Marshal Pétain to the President of the Turkish Republic".) The Marshal insisted that he has still refused to accept any German aid and that there are no Germans in Syria. He mentioned the tragedy of Frenchmen fighting Frenchmen in that area and said he wonders what was the reaction of the De Gaullist forces in view of their "promise not to attack Frenchmen" when they found themselves "not facing Germans as they had been led to believe by their own compatriots."

I brought up the suggestion of the Apostolic Delegate at Beirut that that city be neutralized to prevent useless loss of civilian lives and property. He said that he had not heard of the suggestion and rather lightly dismissed it as impracticable. He did not seem to have any definite impression whether Beirut can or will be defended much longer.

He then spoke of the fact that in recent days the British had engaged in heavy bombing of towns in northern France and read a list of figures of women and children who had been killed therein. They total about 100 killed and 300 wounded and he said that no Germans had been injured and that in the villages bombed in the Pas-de-Calais and Nord there are few Germans left. This is having, he said, "a bad effect" and asked me to mention it to my Government.

LEAHY

740.0011 European War 1939/12595 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, June 27, 1941—5 p. m.
[Received June 28—9:54 a. m.]

758. Department's 507, June 24, 8 p. m., and Embassy's telegram 756, June 27, 1 p. m. Rochat said this afternoon that he had telegraphed General Dentz concerning the suggestion of the Apostolic Delegate (of which the French Government had not learned from other sources) but that no reply has yet been received. He indicated that it was for this reason that Marshal Pétain had not been informed of the suggestion prior to this morning's interview.

Rochat said there is "no real news" from Syria today. In reply to our question as to the accuracy of the reports of several trains of French troops and supplies already waiting in Bulgaria for authorization to pass through Turkey (telegram 757, June 27, 2 p. m.¹⁵) he

¹⁵ Not printed.

said: "We are naturally trying to send reinforcements by every means that may be available. I cannot say that those troops are not in Bulgaria. It is quite possible".

Repeated to Algeria and Beirut.

LEAHY

740.0011 European War 1939/12596 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, June 28, 1941—10 a. m.

[Received 10:28 a. m.]

762. Department's 507, June 24, 8 p. m., and Embassy's telegram 758, June 27, 5 p. m. Rochat informed us this morning that he had been instructed to say that the French Government is "somewhat surprised at the *démarche* made by the American Government" for the neutralization of Beirut; that France has made it quite clear she is determined to defend her territory and that it is "only the assailants who could avoid destruction of lives and property in Beirut by refraining from attacking it."

Rochat also said that still no word of Apostolic Delegate's suggestion has been received from the Vatican. In fact, he added, the Nuncio had called on him yesterday on a matter of very secondary importance and had made no mention of Syria.

Repeated to Algiers and Beirut.

LEAHY

740.0011 European War 1939/12619 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, June 29, 1941—7 p. m.

[Received June 30—9:20 a. m.]

255. Department's 110, June 24,¹⁶ and Vichy's 762, June 28. Apostolic Delegate told me this afternoon that he telegraphed to the Vatican on June 20, in the sense reported by me, and that he added I would telegraph Washington on the subject. Could we perhaps inquire in Rome?

Repeated to Vichy.

ENGERT

¹⁶ Not printed (740.0011 European War 1939/12279). It informed the Consul General of Department's telegram No. 507, June 24, 8 p. m., to the Ambassador in France, p. 749.

740.0011 European War 1939/12797 : Telegram

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Pinkerton) to the Secretary of State

JERUSALEM, June 30, 1941—noon.

[Received July 4—3:35 p. m.]

211. Lieutenant General Lavarack, commander of Australian forces in Syria has requested that the following message which General Lavarack's staff officer states has the approval of General Wilson be sent confidentially to General Dentz through appropriate channels.

"The Commander of the Australian forces in Syria, General Lavarack, feeling that to both Frenchmen and Australians, the idea of comrades of the last war fighting against one another is repellent and distasteful and a useless waste of good men, suggests that he send an envoy by air to Rayak or to some other mutually convenient airport at an early date to meet the representative of General Dentz and to deliver to him a message from General Lavarack which may lead to a solution of the unpleasant conditions which today exist and thus avoid unnecessary bloodshed".¹⁷

For the Department's confidential information and not for transmission to Beirut at present the message which Lavarack's envoy will deliver if Dentz receptive to the proposal is as follows:

"As the commander of the Australian forces facing you in Syria, I would like to inform you in all sincerity that the idea of Australians fighting against Frenchmen is abhorrent to me, and to my men, just as I believe it is surely hateful to you and your soldiers to be fighting against us.

During the war of 1914-1918 we fought together in Gallipoli and France, on the sea and in the air. We came to respect one another through a stern yet wonderful comradeship in arms against the common enemy.

The people of France took our men into their homes and cared for them and in many places, in particular at Villers-Bretonneux, erected fine monuments to the memory of the Australians who had fallen in the defense of their beloved France. Our children in Australia have for over 20 years saved their pennies and sponsored certain schools of your children in France.

We have no quarrel with you, but it is our task and our one object to see that Syria is not occupied nor used as an operational base by Germany.

This task we have been given and we will complete to the best of our ability. Nothing else do we want in or of Syria.

With you, I take the liberty of stating, it is a question of honor both as Frenchmen and soldiers. You will defend Syria against us and in the battle many good men of France and Australia will be killed—but

¹⁷ This telegram up to this point was repeated to the Consul General at Beirut as Department's telegram No. 127, July 5, 7 p. m., with authorization to take the action requested by General Lavarack.

in the end—and I say it without boasting—we will, by the strength of our men, our guns and our airplanes, occupy Syria.

It has come to my knowledge that several Australian officers when captured by your forces have been treated with kindness and with courtesy, and your officers have been amazed that Australians are fighting against Frenchmen—comrades of the last war and in many reunions since.

I can assure you, General, from the bottom of my heart that this is not my wish and I suggest therefore that a solution can be found which does honor to both sides and which will avoid the bloodshed that must of necessity occur if this battle continues.

I have sent my envoy to you so that he can convey this message to you in person, and I would ask that if the proposal coincides with your feelings, arrangements could be made for you and me to meet at some suitable place and time where we may, as soldiers, find a happy solution to this problem.

I feel that you and I carry a big responsibility on our shoulders and can surely find a plan which will avoid so much unnecessary bloodshed."

PINKERTON

740.00119 European War 1939/742 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, June 30, 1941—7 p. m.

[Received 11:25 p. m.]

776. We have just been given the following communication by the Foreign Office:

"The British, through the intermediary of the American Consul General at Beirut, have made proposals for the cessation of hostilities to General Dentz:

"In reply the French Government transmits to the Embassy of the United States in France the following text:

"The French Government is disposed to authorize General Dentz to enter into contact with General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson to examine conditions for the cessation of military operations.

It considers that it is itself all the more justified in giving authority to this end to General Dentz since it has never ceased to consider that the opening of operations was founded on no real motive and that the British therefore bore the entire responsibility.

It is obvious that the proposed negotiations imply the recognition by the British Government of the maintenance of all the rights and prerogatives that the mandate guarantees to France over the whole of the territory of Syria and the Lebanon.

The principle of the agreement should be the fixing of a line of demarcation determined in the light of the present position of the armed forces, line to the south of which the British command would have the powers which are recognized by international law to an occupying force.

It is under these conditions that the French Government is disposed to envisage the immediate cessation of hostilities on land, in the air and at sea (Eastern Mediterranean including the Aegean Sea).

If the provisions to be agreed upon do not correspond to its desire to respect its obligations towards local populations and does not conform to the sentiment of dignity which motivates under all circumstances its line of conduct, the French Government remains determined to continue to assure by all means in its power the safeguarding of the territories of the Levant.'"

Repeated to London, Beirut and Algiers.

LEAHY

740.0011 European War 1939/12724 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, July 1, 1941—noon.

[Received July 2—10:06 a. m.]

259. Last night's raids were even more intensive than those reported in my 257 of yesterday.¹⁸ No damage whatever was done to any military objectives although several may have been aimed at. The Municipality or City Hall was badly damaged and is being permitted by the American University to occupy one of the latter's buildings. A native hotel, a flour mill and two small mosques were hit. Several bombs narrowly missed the Saint George and Normandy, two leading Beirut hotels. At least 8 civilians were killed including a woman and her 4 children.

The head of the Lebanese Government accompanied by the Mohammedan member of his Cabinet came to see me this morning to ask if I could not bring to the attention of the British Government the fact that the raids of the last two nights had caused great consternation among the inhabitants, both Christian and Moslems, who had counted on England's good nature and had hoped bombing of thickly populated areas in the center of Beirut would be avoided.

I have also received an official written protest from the High Commissioner who states that the French air force has refrained from bombing Jerusalem and Damascus although British troops and headquarters are there.

Please see second paragraph of my telegram number 257, June 30,¹⁹ which contains my considered opinion on the subject.

ENGERT

¹⁸ Not printed.

¹⁹ In the second paragraph of this telegram the Consul General at Beirut suggested that even though bombings might be justified on military grounds, the possible advantages might be offset by a revulsion of feeling by the local inhabitants against the British (740.0011 European War 1939/12662).

740.0011 European War 1939/12683 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, July 1, 1941—7 p. m.
[Received July 1—12:20 p. m.]

2765. Department's 2276, June 24, 8 p. m.,²⁰ was communicated informally to the Foreign Office with the comments suggested and a letter has been received from Sir Alexander Cadogan²¹ which concludes with the following paragraph:

"I am sure that our military authorities in the Middle East are already taking all possible steps compatible with the pursuit of military operations to minimize civilian sufferings, but the offer of the United States Government is being brought to their attention."

WINANT

740.00119 European War 1939/749 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, [July 1, 1941—8 p. m.]
[Received July 2—10:01 a. m.]

791. Embassy's telegram 776, June 30, 7 p. m. We asked Rochat for further background with respect to the British offer for the cessation of hostilities transmitted through our Consul General at Beirut. He replied that unfortunately there is very little he can tell us and that he himself is somewhat mystified. He gave us the text of a memorandum which he stated had been left with the Director of Political Affairs at Beirut at 1 p. m. on June 21 by the American Consul General at Beirut. The memorandum had not been telegraphed to Vichy by General Dentz but has been forwarded by courier. Memorandum reads as follows in translation:

"Far from wishing to impose dishonoring conditions on General Dentz, His Majesty's Government is quite willing to grant him all the honors of war as well as to the officers and civil servants who have only done what they considered their duty towards their Government.

Consequently, there can be no question of condemning General Dentz or any officer or civil servant to death or to another sentence.

The High Commissioner, his general staff, all French officers and civil servants who do not desire to remain in the Levant will be repatriated as soon as convenient circumstances permit.

Negotiations with a view to the cessation of hostilities will be conducted by General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson in his capacity as

²⁰ See footnote 13, p. 749.

²¹ British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

representative of the Commander-in-Chief of the British forces and by the representative of General Dentz. Hostilities will cease at once and military honors will be granted to the military forces."

The memorandum seemed rather vague and general and offered little indication of the nature of conditions for ceasing hostilities.

Repeated to London, Beirut and Algiers.

LEAHY

740.0011 European War 1939/12756: Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, July 3, 1941—9 a. m.

[Received 11:28 a. m.]

265. My 259, July 1, noon. Head of the Lebanese Government have sent me signed note giving full details re damage caused in Beirut by raids during nights June 29th to 30th and June 30th to July 1st. He concludes with the statement that only objectives devoid of all military character were hit which has caused considerable emotion among the civilian inhabitants. Lebanese Government protests energetically and requests me to intervene so as to put an end to useless destruction of property and innocent lives.

ENGERT

740.0011 European War 1939/12997b: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Italy (Phillips)

WASHINGTON, July 3, 1941—5 p. m.

472. For Tittmann.²² Apostolic Delegate at Beirut informed Engert on June 20 that at the request of the Lebanese (local Arab) Government, the Delegate intended to telegraph the Vatican proposing that Beirut and its environs be declared a neutral area by the belligerents. The Delegate inquired whether Engert would telegraph the American Government in the same sense.

The Department informed the Embassy at Vichy of the above, and requested the Embassy to bring the suggestion to the attention of the French Government, stating that the American Government would of course be pleased to lend its facilities for effecting any arrangement which might serve to prevent the destruction of lives and property in Beirut.

Embassy at Vichy reported June 28 that the French Government had not received from the Vatican any word of Apostolic Delegate's suggestion.

²² Harold H. Tittmann, Jr., Counselor of Embassy in Italy and Assistant to Myron Taylor, Personal Representative of President Roosevelt to Pope Pius XII.

You are authorized, in your discretion, to ascertain informally whether the Vatican intends to act on the Delegate's suggestion. It should be emphasized that the American Government does not desire to take the initiative in the arrangements for declaring Beirut an open city, and is merely lending its facilities when they may be appropriate or helpful.

WELLES

740.00119 European War 1939/752 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, July 5, 1941—1 p. m.

[Received 1:50 p. m.]

811. Embassy's telegrams numbers 791, July 1, 8 p. m.; and 776, June 30, 7 p. m. Rochat has asked us whether we have any further news with respect to the suggested cessation of hostilities in Syria, particularly whether any further communication has been received from the British following their receipt of the French reply.

Repeated to Department, Beirut, London, and Algiers.

LEAHY

740.0011 European War 1939/12827 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State

ROME, July 6, 1941—3 p. m.

[Received July 7—4:05 p. m.]

950. From Tittmann. Number 40. Department's telegram 472, July 3, 5 p. m. The following facts were given this morning by the Cardinal Secretary of State ^{22a} regarding the Beirut matter.

The telegram from the Apostolic Delegate was dated June 26 but was not received at the Vatican until June 27. On June 28 the Cardinal instructed the Papal representatives in Vichy, London and Berlin, to approach those Governments with the suggestion that in order to ensure the preservation of monuments of Christian culture in that city Beirut be declared a neutral zone.

Berlin replied on July 3 to the effect that while Germany wished to stand aside from events in Syria in principle it was in favor of preventing the destruction of churches and other monuments of Christian culture.

Vichy replied on July 4 stating that it was "absolutely impossible" for the French to consider any such declaration since Beirut was too important center of French resistance. However the French Government was willing to take all necessary precautions to preserve

^{22a} Luigi Cardinal Maglione.

churches and Christian monuments in accordance with the provisions of international conventions.

No reply from London has been received so far but Cardinal Maglione promised to let me know as soon as it arrives. [Tittmann.]

PHILLIPS

740.0011 European War 1939/12970 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, July 7, 1941—11 a. m.

[Received July 10—10:30 p. m.]

899. Practically the entire press here carries this morning under a Damascus headline an article of the situation by a correspondent of the *Daily Telegram* which contains an authorized statement on the subject by General Catroux that may be briefly summarized as follows:

The slow progress of operations in Syria is due to the desire of the Allies to avoid shedding as much blood as possible and accordingly there is a delay in realizing Syria's nationalist aspirations. So long as Syria is not entirely in Free French hands it will be impossible to conclude with Syrian Government a treaty providing for the country's independence. Every part of Syria, whether occupied by Free French or Vichy forces, has the right to be heard.

The treaty which will be made with Syria will not be modeled upon the Anglo-Egyptian, Anglo-Iraq or any other treaty or draft treaty. "It will be a Franco-Syrian treaty establishing and guaranteeing Syria's independence which adapted purely to the local situation will derive inspiration from all the experience secured in this respect in recent years in the Near East. Meanwhile, in all my acts will take into consideration Syria's interests, political as well as economic."

KIRK

740.00119 European War 1939/758 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, July 7, 1941—noon.

[Received 9:44 p. m.]

278. Your telegram No. 127, July 5, 7 p. m.,²³ only reached me this morning. Considering that the message is now a week old and the military situation changes from day to day I should like to have confirmation from the British Government that it still desires it to be delivered in this form. Please point out that in view of Vichy's 776, June 30, I believe it desirable to give the French authorities no fresh excuse for a statement that the British are taking the initiative in all

²³ See footnote 17, p. 754.

these peace overtures. If General Lavarack's message is to be handed to General Dentz I venture to suggest that it be linked up in some way with the original French inquiry as transmitted in my 223, June 18, 11 a. m., and with the British Government's reply contained in the Department's 104, June 19, 7 p. m. I assume of course that Generals Wilson and Lavarack are also aware of the contents of my 237, June 22,²⁴ and 245, June 25. Please state that I shall gladly put myself at their disposal for the transmission of any message they wish but in this instance I feared lest the French in their present mood gain the impression that this is an entirely new suggestion influenced perhaps by military operations with which because of its date it could naturally have had no connection.

ENGERT

740.00119 European War 1939/757 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, July 7, 1941—1 p. m.

[Received 1:01 p. m.]

816. Our Naval Attaché has been informed by reliable naval sources that negotiations began yesterday in Beirut on French initiative for an armistice; that the only important condition the French are asking is that those of their military forces who desire to return to France or North Africa be permitted to do so.

We endeavored to obtain confirmation of this report this morning from Rochat. He replied, we have no reason to doubt his sincerity, that he has absolutely no knowledge of any such negotiations; that the last he had heard on the question was a telephone call from General Lacaille (Huntziger's²⁵ right-hand man) on Saturday afternoon as to whether any further word had been received from the British since the French "reply" to the British suggestion for the cessation of hostilities (Embassy's telegram 776 June 30, 7 p. m.). He said that it was following this phone call that he had made inquiry of the Embassy (Embassy's telegram No. 811 July 5, 1 p. m.). He remarked that Admiral Darlan had not informed him of any such negotiations, but admitted the possibility that they might nevertheless be in course without his (Rochat's) knowledge.

Admiral Darlan is leaving for Paris this noon.

Repeated to Algiers.

LEAHY

²⁴ Not printed.

²⁵ Gen. Charles Huntziger, French Minister for National Defense.

740.00119 European War 1939/752 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Leahy)

WASHINGTON, July 7, 1941—7 p. m.

542. Your 776, June 30, 7 p. m., and your 811, July 5, 1 p. m. Following is the text of an *aide-mémoire* handed to the Department today by the British Embassy :

“On June 30th the State Department were good enough to communicate to the British Embassy a message received that day by the United States Ambassador in Vichy from the French Government setting forth the terms on which the French Government were prepared to authorize the French High Commissioner in Syria to negotiate an agreement for the cessation of hostilities.

It is understood that this message was simultaneously delivered to the Foreign Office by the United States Ambassador in London.

Full consideration has now been given to the French Government's message, and the British Embassy has been instructed to request the United States Government to inform the French Government that the terms which they proposed for the cessation of hostilities in Syria do not offer a basis for discussion.”

You are requested to communicate the foregoing to the French authorities.

WELLES

740.00119 European War 1939/760 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, July 8, 1941—10 a. m.

[Received July 9—1:15 a. m.]

281. The following telegram has been sent to London :

The High Commissioner has just handed me a signed statement in French of which the following is a translation with the request that it be immediately communicated to the British authorities :

“By order of his Government the High Commissioner, Commander in Chief of the troops of the Levant, has the honor to propose to the Commander in Chief of the British forces in the Middle East, the immediate suspension of hostilities on land, on the sea and in the air, and the opening of negotiations with a view to their definitive cessation.

He would be obliged if he could be good enough to indicate, in the event of acceptance, the place where the representatives of the French Commander could meet those of the British Commander.”

Repeated to the Department, Vichy and to Jerusalem via Angora.

ENGERT

740.0011 European War 1939/12909 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, July 8, 1941—11 a. m.

[Received 2:40 p. m.]

282. My 281, July 8, 10 a. m.

1. General Dentz obviously had no knowledge of the proposal emanating from the Australian Commander-in-Chief quoted in the Department's 127, July 5, 7 p. m.²⁶ In accordance with the point of view expressed in my 278, July 7, I did not of course make any mention of it. As the record now stands the High Commissioner's present request for a suspension of hostilities is his own and not a reply to some real or imaginary British proposal. And that, I maintain, is as it should be in view of all the circumstances.

2. General Dentz received me in an empty house—the third his headquarters have occupied since the outbreak of hostilities because of the air raids—and I found the place in a state of utmost confusion. It was evident that he and his staff were about to evacuate Beirut. Incidentally even Conty and other officials of the political bureau were in uniform with large pistols strapped around their waists. The General briefly introduced the subject by stating that the British had broken through at Damour and although they had been counter-attacked and had suffered heavy losses they had received reinforcements while the French had not and he had therefore been instructed by Vichy to suggest an immediate suspension of hostilities. But he added with his usual defiance "the game is by no means up yet".

3. I learn indirectly that the French became discouraged when they found that reinforcements could arrive only in relatively small numbers and that they would soon be short of arms and ammunition as a result of the sinking of the *Saint Didier* by British planes at Adalia. A French airman also stated that the air force had lost 120 planes between June 8 and July 2 and were difficult to replace. Moreover, even General Dentz did not quite dare invite active German military support more because he knew how strongly his subordinates felt on the subject. But he always implied that he might after all have to resort to it if the British pushed him too hard. So that when Germany attacked Russia and he realized that no help on a large scale could possibly be forthcoming for at least several months his last trump card failed him.

4. I understand that General Dentz will move his headquarters to Tripoli where the American Girls School has just been taken over by the military presumably for that purpose. Garrison there is now said to number about 6,000. Three large planes are constantly being kept in readiness in Beirut for the evacuation of the High Commis-

²⁶ See footnote 17, p. 754.

sioner and his staff. Gold reserves mentioned in paragraph 1 of my 221, June 17,²⁷ amounting to 800,000 sterling have already been shipped to France by air and all stocks of unissued banknotes have been destroyed.

ENGERT

740.00119 European War 1939/759 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, July 8, 1941—6 p. m.

[Received 6:18 p. m.]

828. Embassy's telegram 816, July 7, 1 p. m. We called on Rochat this afternoon to discuss the situation in Syria and before we could bring up the High Commissioner's statement reported in Beirut's triple priority telegram to London this morning²⁸ he stated that steps have now been taken to open direct conversations for an armistice in Syria. He reiterated that at the time of our conversation yesterday he had no information that such a move was even in the air. We told him of our receipt of Beirut's telegram following which he went on to request that the Embassy emphasize two points in reporting to the Department and to Beirut. The first point he said to which the French attach the greatest importance is continued recognition of French political rights in Syria and the Lebanon. He stressed, with reference to British indications of future independence for Syria, that an armistice for the cessation of hostilities is not the logical place for discussion of such political questions as change of sovereignty. The second point which he said is one of great importance from the point of view of the sensibilities of this Government is that the negotiations should be carried on directly with the British high command and not with any representatives of the De Gaulle forces. Should General Catroux or one of his subordinates be appointed to discuss terms for the cessation of hostilities he feels that such a move might seriously complicate the progress of negotiations or even result in their being broken off.

He said that he is not familiar with the military terms to be discussed; that it is felt much wiser to leave them almost entirely to General Dentz and that the latter had been given "very broad powers"—subject only to the above-mentioned limitation with respect to French political rights in the Levant.

We merely informed Rochat that we would convey the foregoing to our Government.

Repeated to London, Beirut, and Algiers.

LEAHY

²⁷ Not printed.

²⁸ See telegram No. 281, p. 762.

740.00119 European War 1939/760 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Beirut
(Engert)*

WASHINGTON, July 9, 1941—3 p. m.

132. Your 281, July 8, 10 a. m. The British Embassy in Washington informs the Department that the message from General Dentz quoted in your telegram under reference has been communicated to the British Government and that the British Government desires the following terms be communicated to General Dentz as soon as possible:

“1. The Allies have no aims in Syria except to prevent it being used as a base for enemy ground and air forces against their military position in Middle East. They also have obligation to the Arab population by the guarantee of independence given on their entry into Syria. Great Britain has supported General Catroux's declaration. The representation of French in the Levant will be assured by Free French authorities within framework of promise of independence which they have given to Syria and Lebanon and with which Great Britain has associated herself.

2. The Allies have no feeling of any kind against French in Syria and are prepared to grant a complete amnesty as regards the recent fighting. They have no charge to make against any of the commanders, authorities or troops in Syria. General de Gaulle who has never arraigned any of his army comrades who have fought against him acting under orders they received has no intention of doing so in present circumstances.

3. They must however take steps to prevent material of war in Syria being used against them. These materials must therefore be handed over to them.

4. As regards the French troops in Syria they must be given full opportunity of joining the Allied forces in their fight against Axis powers. At the same time the Allies reserve their right to take measures to ensure that choice of each man will be genuinely free. Every opportunity must be given of fully explaining to each individual the conditions and choice offered him. Any members of fighting forces who are not prepared to join the Allied cause will be repatriated with their families if and when circumstances permit.

5. Honourable conditions will be offered to all who wish to join the Allied forces. Those who are accepted for service will be offered continual employment in their existing ranks with full rights of promotion and guarantee of pension. The others will be honourably treated pending repatriation.

6. All French officers prepared to assist the Allied cause will as far as possible be given employment suitable to their position and rank and their salaries will be guaranteed. Other ranks will be treated in the same way as army officers. Those who are not prepared to assist Allied cause will be repatriated with their families.

7. The railways, ports, communications, wireless, oil installations, etc. will not be damaged or destroyed but will be handed over for

Allied use. The Allied forces will have the right of military occupation of Syria for period of the war.

8. Any Germans or Italians in Syria will be handed over for internment.

9. All war ships to be handed over intact for internment and subsequently to be reduced to care and maintenance basis at Beirut with the power to be moved elsewhere by the order of the C-in-C Mediterranean if safety conditions demand it. Return of ships after the war or compensation guaranteed to friendly France.

10. The blockade will be lifted and Syria and Lebanon will be put into immediate relations with the sterling block.

11. All British prisoners taken in the course of operations in Syria and Lebanon shall be released."

The British Government desires that you make it clear to General Dentz, in communicating these terms to him, that with reference to reports that certain British officers have been sent to France by air for internment there, it will be necessary for the British authorities to intern, pending the release of the British prisoners concerned, a suitable number of Vichy supporters from Syria, if any British prisoners of war are not returned but remain interned in France.

The British Government also desires that you explain that if General Dentz accepts the terms contained in the attached memorandum as a basis for negotiations and replies to this effect, the British military authorities will be prepared to cease hostilities and meet General Dentz's representatives without further delay.

WELLES

740.0011 European War 1939/12973 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, July 10, 1941—7 a. m.

[Received 3:10 p. m.]

285. At 2 o'clock this morning I was shown a printed leaflet (which had presumably been dropped from a British plane) addressed in French to General Dentz by General Wilson calling on the former to declare Beirut an open city and requesting him to send a message to that effect by a messenger with a flag of truce to the nearest Allied outpost. If by half past five this morning such a message was not received [apparent omission] would take all measures necessary to occupy the city and would hold General Dentz personally responsible for losses of civilian lives and property.

I immediately got in touch with the High Commissioner who received me a little after 3 o'clock. He had not yet seen the [apparent omission] and as soon as he had read it he said angrily "I can tell from the language that this comes from Catroux and not Wilson. Especially the reference to my having surrendered Paris proves it. I shall

ignore it. If General Wilson wants to communicate with me he can send a parliamentarian. These leaflets are propaganda addressed to the inhabitants rather than a message to me.”

After this and similar outbursts I said somewhat coldly that I had not come to disturb him in the middle of the night to discuss points of military etiquette with him. I did not know whose turn it was to dispatch a parliamentarian but it seemed to me this was a well-intended warning issued in good faith which required immediate attention. The General replied that he had survived before—e. g., see second paragraph of my 242, June 24, 11 a. m.—he could not suddenly make an open town out of a naval base but that he had no intention of fighting in the streets of Beirut. The British had not yet pierced his outer defenses and as soon as they did he would offer no further resistance. I replied that by that time it might be too late as his so-called outer defenses were already within easy range of the city, not to mention the fact that yesterday afternoon his heavy shore battery at Ras Beirut, i. e., within a few hundred yards of the American University and various Consulates, had for hours bombarded the British positions near Khalde. I felt the British had shown very commendable self-restraint in not immediately sending over some bombers to silence these large guns in which case a section of the residential city in that neighborhood might well unavoidably be destroyed too.

General Dentz admitted this and said he would give immediate instructions that the heavy guns of [apparent omission] Beirut do not fire on the British positions unless British naval units shelled French positions. He also said his anti-aircraft guns would not fire on British planes provided no bombs were dropped. I said it was extremely important that this information be at once communicated to the British and asked if he could not send some one with a flag of truce to say at least that much and that he would not fight nearer than Khalde. He said he could not do that because the morale of his troops would suffer if it became known that an emissary had gone to parley with the enemy. But when I insisted he compromised by saying he would try and get through to the British by radio and wrote the message out in my presence.

At 4:30 a. m., he telephoned me to say that he could no longer use the radio station and was therefore unable to get in touch with the British. I begged him to send a messenger after all and when he again refused, I offered to go myself in order that only the fewest possible number of his forces should know about it. But he remained obstinate and I could do nothing but point out to him that he was assuming a very grave responsibility for no reason except that appeared to me personal pique. I added that my Government would

not understand it if a thousand American lives and property were needlessly endangered or harmed.

It is respectfully requested that especially substance of section 3²⁹ of this telegram be immediately conveyed to the British military authorities. I am very much afraid that General Dentz is utterly insincere in everything he says and does and is only playing for time hoping against hope that in the end the Germans will save him yet.

Repeated to Vichy. Please repeat to London and Cairo.

ENGERT

740.0011 European War 1939/12971 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, July 10, 1941—11 a. m.

[Received 1:35 p. m.]

286. The following telegram has been sent to London.

The High Commissioner informs me officially that he has designated Rear Admiral Gouton to remain in Beirut in charge of the administrative services in the portion of the Levant States occupied by the British armies with full powers to deal with the British authorities. His staff will consist of a captain and three other officers whose names I have.

General Dentz also incloses a list of a number of French officers and other ranks, in addition to civilian officials, whom he has instructed to look after public security, the police and food administration.

The High Commissioner requests that the above mentioned persons be considered as non-combatants charged with diplomatic or administrative duties.

Repeated to Washington. Please repeat to Cairo.

ENGERT

740.00119 European War 1939/766 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, July 10, 1941—5 p. m.

[Received July 10—4:35 p. m.]

844. Embassy's telegram 828, July 8, 6 p. m. General Huntziger telephoned Rochat while we were in the latter's office this afternoon and requested him to express to the Embassy the "very painful impression" which "the failure of the British to send any reply to the French request for an armistice" has caused. Rochat said that a telegram sent by General Dentz *en clair* at 10 o'clock this morning reported that severe fighting was then still going on in the Beirut area as well as heavy bombing of the city. The French Government, Rochat went

²⁹ The two preceding paragraphs.

on, is all the more astonished in view of Mr. Churchill's declaration in the House of Commons "of his satisfaction that an early end could now be made to the useless killing in Syria." He is unable to understand, Rochat continued, why the British are so long delaying a reply to General Dentz's armistice request and appointment of negotiators, if they really desire to stop the slaughter. If it continues, the French, he said, may have to take their own steps in retaliation. He added that the French have at no time bombed British towns.

Both General Huntziger and Rochat expressed some indignation at tracts reported to have been dropped over Beirut last night characterizing General Dentz as a coward who had already fled from Beirut deserting his command. Rochat remarked that General Dentz has merely performed his duty obeying orders as a loyal soldier and he found it difficult to find justification for British attacks on his person.

Repeated to London and Beirut.

LEAHY

740.00119 European War 1939/774 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, July 11, 1941—noon.

[Received 2:10 p. m.]

289. Text of the terms quoted in the Department's 132, July 9, 3 p. m., was handed by me to the High Commissioner in person at 11 o'clock this morning together with a transmitting note in which I mentioned the substance of the two concluding paragraphs of your telegram.

General Dentz read them over and said he was prepared to accept them as a basis for negotiations and to cease hostilities immediately. He will confirm in writing tomorrow after consulting with Vichy but requests the British military authorities be at once advised and be asked to indicate the place where his representatives could meet theirs.

With regard to the British prisoners sent to France he said they would of course be released and returned.

Repeated to Vichy, London and Cairo.

ENGERT

740.00119 European War 1939/771 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, July 11, 1941—noon.

[Received July 11—10:55 a. m.]

856. Rochat says that the French reply to the British armistice conditions will be transmitted to us this afternoon. He said that the

conditions had caused "the most painful impression everywhere in Government circles" (and we find that this is true even among our pro-British friends in the Foreign Office) and that the reply would be negative. No government he said could sign an agreement to abdicate political rights over Syrian territory in armistice negotiations as implied in the British communication.

The British conditions he said are to be published promptly for the Government "must show the public why the armistice terms are not acceptable." Meanwhile General Dentz is to be instructed to "make the best arrangement he can on the spot."

In reply to our question, he said that he did not believe that these "astonishing conditions demanded by the British" would produce direct repercussions outside of the Syrian area. They show, however, he feels, a complete failure to understand "the psychology of the situation."

Repeated to London and Beirut.

LEAHY

740.00119 European War 1939/783 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, July 11, 1941—1 p. m.
[Received July 12—10:10 a. m.]

290. My 289, July 11, 12 noon. When General Dentz learned what the terms were he seemed anything but pleased. He snorted audibly every time he came across a reference to Free French interests and said it was "disgraceful and outrageous of Great Britain to encourage Frenchmen to engage in civil war." He added that he would have no dealings with the Free French but would deal exclusively with the British and all French officials who were remaining behind had been instructed to do likewise.

He wanted it distinctly understood that these terms could serve exclusively as a basis for discussion as several of them, especially surrender of war material, etc., were quite unacceptable in their present form.

Our British friends should be prepared to be very firm with him even at the risk of renewing hostilities. It would be dangerous to permit him to engage in protracted quibbling or to yield on any but unimportant details. He is already taking advantage of every hour of respite he can gain to move material and men north and consolidate fresh position. Please see also paragraph 3 my 282, July 8, and concluding sentence my 285, July 10.

Repeated to Vichy and London.

(Is the Department now receiving Beirut's telegrams direct?)

ENGERT

740.00119 European War 1939/776 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, July 11, 1941—5 p. m.
[Received July 11—3:30 p. m.]

857. Embassy's 855 [856], July 11, noon, with a request that it be transmitted to the British Government.

Rochat has just handed us the following communication :

"Reply of the French Government to the memorandum delivered on the night of the 10th–11th of July by the Embassy of the United States of America containing an outline of the British conditions to be communicated to General Dentz with a view to the cessation of hostilities in Syria.

(a) The French Government has taken note of the conditions which the British Government wishes to have communicated to General Dentz in reply to the *démarche* made by him on July 8,^{20a} through the Consul General of the United States at Beirut.

(b) It regrets to note that the political conditions figuring under paragraph number 1 are incompatible with the rights and prerogatives as mandatory power which it has the duty of maintaining especially with respect to the population entrusted to its protection. France has always considered as an essential object of the mission which the mandate assigned to it to bring about as promptly as possible the emancipation of Syria and the Lebanon and to make of them free nations. It does not intend to shirk its obligations. But, it is only under its sole responsibility that it will choose the moment for and determine the procedure of that independence. No other power can rightfully be substituted for France in this question. The declaration by which the British Government claims to emancipate Syria and the Lebanon cannot but be therefore null and void.

(c) It cannot furthermore lend itself under any pretext whatsoever to negotiations with Frenchmen who are traitors to their country like De Gaulle and Catroux.

(d) The French Government cannot accept the term "complete amnesty" used by the British Government in paragraph number 2. French soldiers obeying the Government of their country do not have to be amnestied.

(e) The French Government cannot sign an armistice which seeks to impose clauses so contrary to its interest and its dignity.

(f) The French Government has given discretionary powers of attorney to General Dentz to take the steps required by the *de facto* situation with which he will be faced if the English Government assumes the responsibility of inhumanly prolonging the duration of a conflict which it initiated."

Rochat again indicated orally that the authority to General Dentz contained in the last paragraph is very broad as far as cessation of hostilities is concerned under such conditions as he could arrange, but

^{20a} See telegram No. 281, July 8, 10 a. m., from the Consul General at Beirut, p. 762.

that the French Government would sign no armistice with political clauses such as the British suggested.

The two notes are to be made public almost immediately.

Repeated to London, Beirut and Casablanca.

LEAHY

740.00119 European War 1939/775: Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, July 11, 1941—6 p. m.
[Received July 12—12:20 p. m.]

292. High Commissioner is endeavoring to send following message to British Commander-in-Chief Cairo:

“General Dentz, High Commissioner, Commander-in-Chief troops of Levant, has the honor to inform British High Command, Middle East, that he is prepared to engage in negotiation on the basis of the memorandum which was today July 11, handed him by American Consul General in the name of the British Government.

He therefore proposes to suspend hostilities July 11 at 21 hours 1 minute Greenwich time. He requests British High Command to inform him of the place where he may send his plenipotentiary, it being understood that the French Government authorizes him to deal only with British representatives to the exclusion of those of any Allied forces.”

Repeated to London and Cairo.

ENGERT

740.00119 European War 1939/766: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Leahy)

WASHINGTON, July 11, 1941—10 p. m.

561. Your 844, July 10, 5 p. m. The sequence of events regarding General Dentz' request for armistice terms is as follows:

On the morning of July 8 General Dentz requested Engert to inform the British authorities that he (Dentz) proposed an immediate cessation of hostilities. Engert immediately forwarded this information by triple priority telegram no. 281, July 8, 10 a. m., addressed to London, Vichy, Jerusalem via Ankara, and the Department, where it was received at 1:15 a. m., July 9.

Immediately upon receipt of the telegram, the Department informed the British Embassy in Washington, July 9.

As early as noon on July 9 the British Embassy in Washington had received British armistice terms from London and handed them to the Department. At 3 p. m., July 9 the Department despatched these terms by triple priority telegram no. 132 to Beirut. At 6 p. m. July 9 the Radio Corporation of America informed the Department that all endeavors to get the message through to Beirut had failed. An effort

was then made to send the message by Western Union cable via London and Berne. At 6:30 a. m., July 10, Western Union reported that it was also impossible to get through to Beirut by this means. The Department began communicating the terms to you early on the morning of July 10, for repetition to Beirut and also for communication to the French Government. The Department also endeavored to communicate the terms to you by telephone on the morning of July 10, but French telephone authorities refused to permit the connection, citing the French-German armistice provisions as their reason.

It is apparent from the above that the British Government acted with the greatest promptness in drafting the armistice terms, and that the delay in communicating them was occasioned entirely by transmission difficulties which the Department tried by every means to overcome.

An important fact for which no explanation has been found is that throughout July 9 and 10 the Department received telegrams from Beirut within a few hours after they were despatched, yet the Department has been unable to send any messages to Beirut. The French authorities may desire to investigate the reasons therefor. Furthermore, it might be pointed out to the French Government that had the Department been permitted to communicate with you by telephone, some of the delay against which the Vichy authorities complain would have been avoided.

The Department regrets that it was impossible to get the terms to Beirut sooner. It should hardly be necessary to remind the French authorities that it was possible at any time during the period under discussion for General Dentz to seek an armistice under a flag of truce, by direct conversations with his military opponents.

You may use the foregoing in any manner which may be appropriate.

WELLES

740.00119 European War 1939/792 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, July 13, 1941—2 p. m.

[Received 6:50 p. m.]

944. My 940, July 12, noon.³⁰ The Legation is advised that the terms of an armistice in Syria were initialled last night by Generals Wilson and Verdillac and submitted here for approval. The terms were found acceptable in general but it was decided that changes were necessary in respect to certain points particularly the following.

1. General Wilson should sign for the Allied Forces (thus acting on behalf of both the Free French and British) rather than for the British Government as specified in the initialled draft.

³⁰ Not printed.

2. Full opportunity should be allowed for Vichy forces desiring to do so to join the Free French.

3. Provision should be made for the departure from Syria of undesirable French civilians.

It is understood that orders have been sent to General Wilson directing that appropriate rectification be made in the terms in respect to these and certain other points and that failing agreement he should signify his intention of renewing hostilities tomorrow at 2 p. m.

KIRK

740.00119 European War 1939/795 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, July 14, 1941—6 p. m.

[Received 10:53 p. m.]

949. My 944, July 13, 2 p. m. I am informed that agreement has been reached on the points in the armistice terms which the British found unacceptable and that formal signature has taken place. The text of the revised terms has not yet been received here but it is expected that it will become available in the course of the day and that it may be possible to make it public tonight.

KIRK

390D.1115/121 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, July 15, 1941—9 a. m.

[Received 5:50 p. m.]

299. Now that the armistice has been signed the Department may wish to inform inquirers that as far as I have been able to ascertain all American citizens in Syria and the Lebanon are well and the properties of American institutions have suffered no damage.

ENGERT

740.00119 European War 1939/797 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, July 15, 1941—6 p. m.

[Received July 15—3:20 p. m.]

884. The information contained in Department's 561, July 11, 10 p. m., was communicated to Rochat this afternoon, who expressed great appreciation of all the Department's efforts to communicate the British armistice terms in reply to General Dentz's request as soon

as possible. He said that he would bring the Department's résumé to Admiral Darlan's personal attention.

He made no comment on the Department's observation that General Dentz could have at any time sought an armistice under a flag of truce. He likewise could throw no light on the reasons why the Department was unable to establish communication with Beirut during that period.

LEAHY

740.0011 European War 1939/13235 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, July 15, 1941—7 p. m.

[Received July 16—8:05 p. m.]

300. First British troops consisting of an Australian battalion entered Beirut about 1:00 p. m. today. At the request of the Colonel I took him to call on Admiral Gouton—see my 286, July 10, 11 a. m.—and assisted him and his political officer in establishing contacts with the heads of certain administrations charged with the maintenance of order, food control, et cetera. The attitude of the French official was correct, courteous and helpful.

General Wilson and General Catroux arrive tomorrow morning.

As previously reported by me, neither Admiral Gouton nor any other French official is permitted by Vichy to have any relations with the Free French authorities who are about to take over in Beirut. This will, of course, complicate the situation enormously and it will require the utmost tact on the part of everybody to avoid an impasse at the very outset.

Repeated to London and Vichy.

ENGERT

740.0011 European War 1939/13243 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, July 16, 1941—6 p. m.

[Received July 17—1:10 a. m.]

889. The termination of hostilities in Syria has unquestionably been received with great relief in all French circles. While the Government's efforts under German prodding to stir up public indignation over the British and Gaullist "invasion" of Syria fell rather flat, as indicated in previous telegrams, the daily bulletins of the progress of the fighting in that area with indications of casualties and particularly the thought of Frenchmen fighting Frenchmen gave even the more apathetic elements of the public a feeling of uneasiness

and futility. Even those who recognized that the French Government's delivery of Syrian air bases to Germany during the Iraqi affair amply justified British action hoped only for an early termination of hostilities. In fact, the principal complaint heard from our pro-British friends, both in the Ministries and in French military and naval circles, concerned the failure of the British to have undertaken the operation without sufficient force to end it quickly.

The text of the armistice terms published here today will receive general approval and, in spite of the breast-beating of the "collaborationist" press that the Syrian incident has ended in neither a "capitulation" nor even a "military defeat", the fairness of the British armistice conditions should help somewhat to remove the bitterness engendered by the affair. (Rochat incidentally attributes the "reasonableness" of the British around the armistice table to the "influence" of our Government.)

Coupled with this sense of relief that the war in Syria is over there is a natural feeling of pride that the French Army, so quickly and decisively destroyed in May and June, 1940, has on a small scale and "outnumbered four to one" proved its worth in Syria. There is also the feeling that the incident has adduced good evidence that France can and will, within the limits of her resources, "defend her empire", and this aspect of the situation has been helpful in the delicate balance of French relations with Germany in dispelling a certain perhaps not unwarranted Nazi suspicion on this score.

If the British "attack" on Syria did not arouse the bitterness and indignation which might have been expected it was chiefly criticised as ill timed, unnecessary and Gaullist inspired—there is on the other hand no doubt that British military prestige has in no way been enhanced in their eyes by the 4 weeks' campaign. The firm belief, all too prevalent in France, even among those who most ardently hope for an Allied victory, in British "military incompetence" and talent for "bungling" land operations (as distinct from general admiration in France for the British Navy and the R. A. F.³¹) has but deepened. The forces of the advocates of Franco-German collaboration would as a result have had their ranks greatly swelled by those who believe, however fallaciously, that a German victory is inevitable and that France should, therefore, endeavor to obtain a better place for herself in a German ruled world by displaying enthusiasm for the New Order from the present moment, were it not for several offsetting factors: The first and foremost of these is the strength and power of resistance which the Russian Army has displayed and the corollary feeling in all quarters in France that German losses both in men and material in the eastern campaign are far heavier than Hitler anticipated. A

³¹ Royal Air Force.

further offsetting factor is American occupation of Iceland³² and the significance of its implications. In spite of this, the evidence of British lack of military and strategic efficiency displayed, in French eyes, in the Syrian test has added one more discouragement to our pro-British at Paris to the list which began with the loss of Benghazi.

Repeated to London.

LEAHY

740.0011 European War 1939/13251 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, July 16, 1941—7 p. m.
[Received July 17—11:10 a. m.]

302. Generals Wilson and Catroux arrived in Beirut this morning and at the Grand Serail received the head of the Lebanese Government and his Cabinet, high ecclesiastical dignitaries both Christian and Moslem, the Consular Corps and native and foreign notables.

General Dentz left yesterday morning for Tripoli just before the arrival of the first British troops.

I have had a talk with Wilson at my house and with Catroux at his office which I shall report separately. Both said that unless the uncompromising attitude of the Vichy French in Beirut was modified Catroux would have to ask Gouton and Dentz to leave the Levant States immediately. As anticipated, there was an unpleasant little incident this morning when the proceedings were held up for half an hour because Gouton refused to turn anything over to Catroux.

Repeated to Vichy and London.

ENGERT

740.0011 European War 1939/17227

*The Chief of the Government of Lebanon (Naccache) to the American Consul General at Beirut (Engert)*³³

[Translation]

259/C

BEIRUT, July 18, 1941.

MR. CONSUL GENERAL: I am happy to assure you of the gratitude of the Lebanese people for the interest you took in them at the time of the air raids on Beirut and for your effective intervention with the competent authorities.

³² See vol. II, pp. 776 ff.

³³ Transmitted to the Department by the Consul General in his despatch No. 112, July 20; received December 9.

To these thanks should be added my own pleasure at having established with you personal relations full of cordiality and esteem of which I shall keep the most pleasant memory.

I hope that this happy collaboration in the interest of the public welfare will become still closer in the future.

Please accept [etc.]

A. NACCACHE

740.0011 European War 1939/13488 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, July 25, 1941—8 p. m.
[Received July 28—1:02 p. m.]

309. General de Gaulle arrived in Beirut at noon today accompanied by General Catroux. General Wilson also spent the day in Beirut.

De Gaulle received this afternoon the same officials mentioned in paragraph 1 of my 302, July 16, 7 p. m. He expressed to me his appreciation of the sympathy and support the Free French cause was receiving from the United States.

Yesterday the Vichy garrison at Soueida, capital of the Jebel Druze, was supplanted by a British cavalry brigade. This was the last French force to disappear from the Syrian scene under the terms of the armistice because it was feared that the Druzes might overpower the French if they became defenseless before the British were ready to take over. I understand that the Jebel Druze will be under British not Free French administration.

ENGERT

740.0011 European War 1939/13602 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, July 27, 1941—10 a. m.
[Received August 1—11:25 a. m.]

313. My 309, July 25, 8 p. m. General de Gaulle asked me to call on him yesterday afternoon as we had not had an opportunity to talk much at the reception and he was leaving for Damascus today.

He began by saying that the Free French were here to uphold and continue the rights of France in the Levant. This was generally understood and approved not only by the British but also by the Syrians and Lebanese. He had received the necessary assurances from the British Government and quite recently these assurances were renewed and confirmed. However, he had observed that while men like Churchill and Eden seem to understand the situation thoroughly, there was evidence of less comprehension on the part of some of the

British military authorities in the Middle East. He regretted this because it rendered the principal task a little more difficult. Few people seemed to realize he had to watch public opinion in France most carefully in order to counteract German propaganda that the Free French movement was merely a tool of the British. (I gathered from the tone and manner in which he said this that he wished to convey the thought that occasionally he had to appear less disposed toward the British than he personally felt because everything he said and did had its reaction among the French people.) I thanked the General for taking me into his confidence in connection with a matter which was extremely delicate but which all of us had so much at heart. I said I hoped he realized that in the Levant he found himself in an atmosphere of characteristically oriental intrigue and that he would not take too seriously the multifarious accusations, denunciations, innuendos, et cetera, which had doubtless already come to his ears. There were a great many people in Syria and the Lebanon who would like nothing better than to see serious friction develop between the Free French and the British quite apart from a relatively numerous group who were either in Axis pay or had pro-German sympathies and would therefore take advantage of every opportunity to sow discord and suspicion.

It seemed to me, I said, there was one—and perhaps only one—solid tongue which could provide a common starting point for everybody right now, whether French or British, Christian or Moslem or any other nationality or race, and that was the immediate necessity of defense. For the present nothing mattered except the purely physical and strategic position of keeping the Axis out of Syria. And in so far as the situation in Syria was linked up with Britain's general war effort and could be made to contribute to the overthrow of Hitlerism and any other reason to think of direct interests and concern to the American Government and people.

I therefore ventured to hope that neither his relations with the British nor the admittedly complex and trying relationships of both occupying forces with the natives would be permitted to impede the military effort of the Allies. I did not mean that political problems should not be discussed even now especially as everybody was agreed that Syria and the Lebanon were entitled to independence. But it was futile to allow political schemers to stir up internal dissensions while the present potentially dangerous situation continued, for not only would it be playing into Hitler's hands but it would jeopardize the very existence and integrity of the territories for whose independence the same politicians profess so much solicitude.

General de Gaulle said he was in entire accord with me but it remained to be seen whether it would prove practicable to postpone indefinitely the implementation of certain political promises which had

been made to the natives. I replied the essential thing was that they should temporarily be relegated to the background and that irrevocable commitments should as much as possible be avoided before the successful conclusion of the war.

Repeated to London and Cairo.

ENGERT

740.0011 European War 1939/13608 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, July 30, 1941—11 a. m.

[Received August 2—2 p. m.]

319. General de Gaulle made a speech in Damascus yesterday in which he said the time had come to put an end to the mandate and to negotiate with the Syrians regarding the conditions for their "full and complete sovereignty and independence and to establish the terms of an alliance which both sides most sincerely desire." He added that in this war the liberties and even existence of all peoples were at stake. France would prevent Syria from being enslaved in cooperation with her brave British allies "who have come here exclusively for strategic reasons. In this connection, I am pleased to refer to the declarations and undertakings of the Government in London by which Great Britain expresses herself completely free from all political aims in Syria and the Lebanon and determined to respect in its entirety the position of France." Even these unequivocal diplomatic instruments might not stop enemy propaganda or inconsiderate words "but I am counting on the complete union of England and France which existed in the past and simultaneous actions of their armies in the Levant states to contribute toward the reassurance of Syria and the Lebanon in the certainty that they will preserve from the Tigris to the Mediterranean and from Trans-Jordan to Turkey their national liberty and integrity."

The General concluded by expressing his firm conviction that the powerful British armies and determination, the mobilized resources of America and the losses inflicted on Germany by Russia were all bound to lead to victory.

ENGERT

740.0011 European War 1939/13750 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, August 5, 1941—11 p. m.

[Received August 7—11:15 a. m.]

323. My 313, July 27. General de Gaulle sent for me again this afternoon and said he had done so because he knew I was a sincere

friend of England and France and he authorized me to make use of our conversation as I saw fit.

He said his relations with the British had reached such a critical stage that he was beginning to doubt whether he could go on like this much longer. Despite all promises made to him by the British Government as recently as July 25, by Lyttelton³⁴ in Cairo, British military seemed determined to thwart and defy him wherever they could. In the first place the armistice terms in themselves were a betrayal of the Free French cause and had been dictated by the British against his own wishes. As far as he was concerned they were, therefore, practically null and void. In the second place, the solemn assurances given him by the British Government and his recent agreements with Lyttelton were being deliberately disregarded by the British military on the spot. And thirdly, British political officers were traveling all over the Jebel Druz, Hauran and Jezideh which gave the natives the impression that the British were the real masters of the country.

General de Gaulle then showed me a letter Lyttelton had sent him July 25 to which were attached two agreements regarding British and French collaboration in Syria and Lebanon. After reading them I remarked that they seemed to me quite fair and logical and if both parties acted in good faith I could not see why there should be trouble. The General replied that he accepted London's good faith but the good faith of the British military in Syria was more questionable. I said I could not possibly enter into a discussion of this nature and expressed the hope he would tell his British friends quite frankly whenever he thought they were at fault and I knew they would appreciate it. He then startled me by saying he had found it quite useless to talk to them and from now on he would insist on Free French rights "even if this should lead to a rupture of relations with the British." At first I thought it best to ignore this statement but when a few minutes later he repeated it with emphasis, I said "I deeply deplore your statement, for if you should make it to an indiscreet person you would be playing into the hands of Hitler which I know is furthest from your thoughts. I personally refuse to believe that the situation is such as to justify a threat of this kind. I am certain that with good will and common sense and a little tact on both sides there is no problem between French and British in Syria which cannot be satisfactorily settled. We in America are naturally interested in the preservation of harmony and effective cooperation between all the Allies, because only so will the Axis be defeated."

³⁴ Oliver Lyttelton, British Minister of State, representing the British War Cabinet in the Middle East.

We talked for an hour and a quarter but I fear he instinctively distrusts the British and is by nature quite incapable of understanding British character and purpose.

I have informed Generals Wilson and Spears³⁵ of this conversation but Department may wish to repeat above to London.³⁶

ENGERT

740.0011 European War 1939/14008 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, August 15, 1941—11 p. m. [*a. m.*]

[Received 10:07 p. m.]

332. Local newspapers published yesterday exchange of letters dated August 7th between General de Gaulle and Oliver Lyttelton³⁷ signed during Lyttelton's recent visit to Beirut. The British Government reiterates its disinterestedness in Syria and the Lebanon except to win the war and to recognize their independence. It admits that France should enjoy in these countries a preeminent position compared to any other European power.

General de Gaulle expresses satisfaction that Great Britain recognizes in advance the preeminent and privileged position of France as soon as the Levant States are independent, and in return he gives assurances that Free France is resolved to continue the war at Great Britain's side until complete victory has been won.

ENGERT

740.0011 European War 1939/14012 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, August 15, 1941—noon.

[Received 10:05 p. m.]

333. Exchange of letters mentioned in my telegram 332, August 15, 11 a. m., was the outcome of recent conversations between Lyttelton and de Gaulle in Beirut in order to convince the latter of the good faith of the British Government and if possible to prevent further reckless observations such as he made to me on August 5 and reported in my 323.³⁸

It may amuse the Department to learn that General Wilson claims he found de Gaulle much more reasonable and tractable after I had my chat with him but I doubt whether the present extraordinary

³⁵ Maj. Gen. Edward L. Spears, head of the British Mission to Syria.

³⁶ Apparently this information was not repeated to London by the Department.

³⁷ British Cmd. 6600, Syria No. 1 (1945) : *Statements of Policy by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in Respect of Syria and the Lebanon, 8th June-9th September, 1941*, pp. 3-4.

³⁸ Dated August 5, 11 p. m., p. 780.

complexity of the daily contacts between the British and French political and military authorities in the Levant States can in the near future be expected to become less acute.

ENGERT

740.0011 European War 1939/14203 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, August 20, 1941—6 p. m.
[Received August 21—4: 03 p. m.]

336. My 332, August 15, 11 a. m. Following upon the exchange of letters the British turned over to the French such administrative control in Syria and Lebanon, including public security, intelligence service, censorship, et cetera, as they were still exercising. But what is more serious the British have now also given the French complete military control south of a line running roughly east from Latakia though excluding the Syrian desert.

No publicity has been given to these latest concessions but in discussing them with me a senior British officer said he was told in high quarters in Cairo a few days ago that they had been made "in deference to the wishes of the American Government". I said I felt quite sure my Government had never expressed any wishes in the matter and that it would be interesting to trace the statement to its source.

I consider the question of some importance because the concessions made to the French—especially intelligence service and military control of south Syria—are far wider than anticipated or believed necessary. Considering that a great many Vichy French are still in the country and may remain even in official positions without declaring themselves for Free France, not to mention doubtful or unfriendly native elements, the danger in an emergency becomes a very real one. A report, therefore, that the United States had induced the British Government to surrender rights which the British military believed necessary for their safety would be calculated to cause uneasiness among the British and may perhaps even be the result of local German propaganda which is still quite active.

Repeated to Cairo.

ENGERT

740.0011 European War 1939/14323 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, August 23, 1941—8 p. m.
[Received August 24—11: 40 p. m.]

1218. Beirut's No. 336, August 20, 6 p. m., to the Department. An official of the British Embassy, who has been intimately connected

with the elaboration of British policy in respect of Syria and who recently accompanied Lyttelton to Syria, states that the allegation of the senior officer mentioned in the telegram under reference has absolutely no basis in fact insofar as British policy in Syria is concerned, and furthermore that he knows of no circumstance which could have been so misconstrued as to give such an impression. He added he would look into the matter with a view to ascertaining if possible the source of this false report and to taking appropriate steps to check its propagation.

Repeated to Beirut.

[KIRK]

740.0011 European War 1939/14800 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, September 8, 1941—11 a. m.

[Received 1:45 p. m.]

354. I learn from an authoritative source that the arrangements between the British and the Free French referred to in the first paragraph of my 336, August 20, 6 p. m., provides that the French shall be paramount in all matters concerning civilian administration, with the support whenever necessary of the British military authorities, both in Syria and in the Lebanon.

However, north and east of a line running from Latakia to Aleppo, thence via Kariatine and Sababiar to the junction of the Iraq, Syria and trans-Jordan boundaries, the internal security will be the responsibility of the British military authorities although when possible the French administration will be used to implement such security measures as may be necessary.

I understand that in the above so-called frontier zone, the requirements of the British military commander will be considered paramount. But in order to maintain the closest possible liaison with the Free French, even he will work through the French civil administration. Should this fail he will make a demand and if the French authorities decline or are unable to implement his wishes, he will report to headquarters and immediate steps will be taken to have his orders enforced.

Repeated to London. Code texts by mail to Ankara, Baghdad, Cairo, Jerusalem.

ENGERT

IV. Refusal of the United States To Recognize New Regimes Established by the Free French in Syria and Lebanon; Reservation of American Treaty Rights

890D.01/420a Supplemental

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

No. 433

WASHINGTON, August 7, 1941.

SIR: The Department has been informed that negotiations have been or are about to be initiated by the British authorities in Beirut, looking towards the establishment of independent governments in Syria and the Lebanon. In this connection, there is enclosed herewith a copy of an instruction which was sent to the American Ambassador at Paris on August 4, 1936,³⁹ when treaty negotiations were in progress between the French Government and representatives of Syria and the Lebanon regarding the independence of those mandated territories. The American Government maintains the attitude set forth at that time concerning the necessity for the adequate safeguarding of existing American treaty rights in any arrangements which may be made for the independence of the areas concerned.

The Department has no reason to believe that the authorities now in control in Syria and Lebanon will fail to respect the full rights which the American Government enjoys with respect to Syria and Lebanon by virtue of the American-French Convention of April 4, 1924.⁴⁰ Furthermore, the Department is confident that those authorities will bear in mind the fact that no modification in the terms of the Mandate, including termination thereof of course, will affect existing American treaty rights in the area unless such modification has been assented to by the United States.

You are requested to discuss the matter with the British Foreign Office and to inquire what arrangements the British Government contemplates with respect to consultation with the United States concerning the termination of the Mandate.

A copy of this instruction is being forwarded to the American Consul General at Beirut for his information.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:
SUMNER WELLES

³⁹ *Foreign Relations*, 1936, vol. III, p. 496.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 1924, vol. I, p. 741.

890D.01/526 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, August 22, 1941—midnight.

[Received August 22—6 : 52 a. m.]

3822. Department's instruction No. 433, August 7. Foreign Office states orally that negotiations looking towards the establishment independent governments in Syria and the Lebanon will be undertaken solely by the Free French authorities. The British Government will not take part in the negotiations but would be pleased to make on our behalf any representations to the Free French that we may desire. Such representations would probably be made through the British Minister of State in the Middle East.⁴¹

WINANT

890D.00/852 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, September 28, 1941—10 p. m.

[Received September 29—11 : 30 a. m.]

381. My 376, September 22, 9 a. m.⁴² The first President of independent Syria Sheik Taj-ed-Din el Hassani, was yesterday inaugurated at Damascus. General Catroux⁴³ read a proclamation from which I summarize the following points.

1. Syria to exercise at once all rights and prerogatives of an independent and sovereign state, limited only by the exigencies of the war and the security of its territory.

2. Its position as ally of Free France and of Great Britain requires close conformity of its policy with that of the Allies.

3. "By assuming independent international life Syria assumes of course the rights and obligations heretofore subscribed to in its name."

4. Syria has the right to appoint diplomatic representatives wherever it considers it necessary. Elsewhere Free France will use its good offices to protect Syrian interests and nationals.

5. Great Britain having already undertaken to recognize Syrian independence Free France will immediately approach other friendly or Allied Powers to obtain recognition from them too.

6. Free France favors closer ties between the different parts of Syria and will therefore modify the special status of certain regions

⁴¹ Oliver Lyttelton.⁴² Not printed.⁴³ Gen. Georges Catroux, Free French Delegate General and Plenipotentiary in Syria and Lebanon.

so as to put them politically under a central Syrian government while maintaining their financial and administrative autonomy (this obviously refers to the Jebel Druze and the Alaouites).

7. It is understood that all guarantees under public law in favor of individuals and religious communities will be respected.

8. Free France will assist in establishing better economic collaboration between Syria and the Lebanon.

9. For the duration of the war the Allies will take charge of the defense of the country. To that end the Syrian national forces will cooperate and place at the disposal of the Allies all communications, landing fields and ports. *Gendarmerie* and police will collaborate with the Free French in protecting Syria against internal enemies.

10. Syria being included in the war zone and in the economic and financial system of the Allies the closest collaboration is also necessary regarding all measures of economic warfare. Syria having entered the sterling bloc will accord the greatest possible freedom of trade with the countries of that bloc and will adopt the necessary economic, financial and exchange measures in harmony with the pledging of the sterling bloc.

11. The above stipulations are inspired by the sole thought of winning the war and thereby assuring to Syria the future of a free people. Despite the war Free France did not wish to delay the fulfillment of Syrian national aspirations but it is necessary that as soon as possible a Franco-Syrian treaty definitely consecrate the independence of the country.

ENGERT

890E.05/3 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, October 2, 1941—11 a. m.

[Received 1:13 p. m.]

392. Decree No. 242 dated September 26th signed by General Catroux published today modifies temporarily many provisions of Decree No. 324, November 22, 1939, relative to the organization of the Mixed Courts in the Lebanon. Principal changes are to the effect that a majority of French judges is no longer necessary in any court and in some of them the judges may be either French or Lebanese. Prerogatives of the Inspector-General are now delegated to the Chief of the Lebanese State or to the Under Secretary of Justice.

A similar Decree modifying the composition of the Mixed Courts in Syria, No. 96 dated August 18, 1941, is now en route with my despatch No. 132, August 22.⁴⁴ It modified Decree No. 316, December 2, 1940, and referred to Decree No. 290, October 19, 1939.

⁴⁴ Not printed.

As the files of this office do not show that either the two last mentioned Decrees or No. 324, November 22, 1939, were ever transmitted to the Department I am forwarding copies of all by the pouch.

ENGERT

890D.00/855 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, October 4, 1941—10 a. m.

[Received 11:51 a. m.]

395. My 375, September 22 [20]⁴⁵ and 381, September 28. I have just received a formal note from the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs in Damascus dated October 2 in which he announces the proclamation of the independence of Syria on September 27. He continues:

“This event which corresponds to the profound aspirations of the people of Syria inaugurates in this country a new political era and enables Syria to consolidate and develop the very cordial relations which it maintains with your country.

It is to this end that the Syrian Government has established a Ministry of Foreign Affairs which has immediately taken in hand all matters coming within its competency.

This Ministry will henceforth be happy to communicate with you.”

When [*What?*] reply if any does the Department wish me to make? The only two colleagues I have questioned so far are also asking for instructions from their Governments.

ENGERT

890D.00/852 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Beirut (Engert)

WASHINGTON, October 6, 1941—5 p. m.

182. Your no. 387 [381], September 28, 10 p. m. You are instructed to inform General Catroux in a written communication that his proclamation of September 27 has been brought to the attention of this Government and that while the United States, in accordance with its traditional policy, is in full sympathy with the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian and Lebanese peoples, this Government considers it necessary to remind not only the authorities who may assume responsibility for granting independence to Syria and Lebanon but also the

⁴⁵ Not printed.

Syrian and Lebanese authorities that the United States has certain treaty rights in the area which can not be abrogated or modified without the consent of this Government. Fundamental among these rights, as provided in Article 6 of the Convention between the United States and France signed at Paris on April 4, 1924, is that no modification in the terms of the mandate for Syria and Lebanon shall affect American treaty rights in the area unless such modification has been assented to by the United States. Termination of the mandate would constitute, of course, the most extreme modification possible. General Catroux is doubtless aware that Article 5 of the mandate for Syria and Lebanon, provides that the privileges and immunities of foreigners, including consular jurisdiction and the capitulations, shall at the expiration of the mandate be immediately reestablished unless those Powers which enjoyed them in 1914, including the United States, shall have previously renounced the right to their reestablishment. The United States has of course made no such renunciation. While the American Government has no reason to believe that the regime to be set up in Syria and Lebanon will make necessary the resumption of consular jurisdiction, it is necessary to recall the provisions of Article 5 of the mandate in any full consideration of the subject at hand.

You should inform General Catroux that your communication to him is made solely as a result of his public declaration and has no other purpose or significance than to invite attention to the treaty rights of the United States in Syria and Lebanon and to make a full reservation of those rights. Pending a clarification of the situation in the area, the United States does not consider that the circumstances existing at present offer a suitable occasion for this Government to enter into any negotiations for the conclusion of appropriate agreements covering relations between the United States and the area concerned.

Unless you perceive objection, please request General Catroux to bring the foregoing to the attention of the appropriate local authorities.

For your own information, you will find in the Department's instruction to Paris, no. 734 of March 8, 1938,⁴⁶ a copy of which was handed to Consul General Palmer and presumably placed in the Beirut files, a full discussion of the arrangements which we have had in mind to regularize our position in Syria and Lebanon in the event their independence is recognized.

HULL

⁴⁶ *Foreign Relations*, 1938, vol. II, p. 1014.

890D.00/861

*The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle)*⁴⁸ to the
Secretary of State

No. 58

LONDON, October 6, 1941.

[Received October 18.]

SIR: I have the honor to report that M. Maurice Dejean, National Commissioner for Foreign Affairs in the recently formed De Gaulle National Committee, has asked me to forward the attached copy and translation of an *Aide-Mémoire*, dated October 2, 1941.

In handing me these documents, M. Dejean pointed out that the American Consul General in Beirut had inquired what opportunity would be offered our Government for consultation on the possible termination of the French Mandate in Syria. Moreover, the Consul General there asked what guarantees would be given for the safeguard of American rights acquired by virtue of the existing treaties and of the present position of the United States in relation to Syria.

M. Dejean believed that the attached *Aide-Mémoire* clearly set forth the Free French position in relation to these questions.

Respectfully yours,

A. J. DREXEL BIDDLE, JR.

[Enclosure—Translation]

*Aide-Mémoire by the National Commission for Foreign Affairs
of Free France*

[LONDON,] October 2, 1941.

The United States Consul-General in Beirut has enquired what opportunities would be offered to his Government for consultation on the subject of the possible termination of the French mandate in Syria. Moreover, he has asked what guarantees would be given for the safeguard of American rights acquired by virtue of the existing treaties and of America's present position in Syria.

Free France has no intention whatsoever of encroaching on the rights and position of the United States in Syria. In particular, she means to respect the Franco-American Convention of August [April] 4th, 1924. Nevertheless, however desirous Free France may be to grant in fact to the States of the Levant the maximum independence compatible with the necessities of the war, she holds that there can be no question of legally putting an end to the mandate régime as instituted by an act of the Council of the League of Nations, dated July 22nd, 1922, which entered into force on September 29th, 1923.

⁴⁸ Mr. Biddle was also accredited to various other exiled governments established in England.

Free France, which is only recognised—in certain conditions—by Great Britain and the U. S. S. R., is not qualified to ask for the discharge of this mandate, which could only be granted by the Council of the League of Nations.

The régime to be set up in Syria during the war cannot be anything but provisional. Nonetheless, the Free French authorities could not at any time tolerate that special rights should be set aside or neglected in the case of a nation which, by the help it is giving to Great Britain and the U. S. S. R., is making such an important contribution to the struggle for the liberation of France.

890D.01/540 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, October 8, 1941—10 a. m.

[Received 2:40 p. m.]

404. In connection with the proclamation of Syrian independence I am quoting below from a letter General de Gaulle addressed to General Catroux under date of June 24, 1941, i. e., 3 weeks before the Allies entered Beirut. Text is contained in my despatch number 131⁴⁹ which may not reach the Department for some time.

“The mandate for which France was made responsible by the League of Nations in 1924 must come to an end. For this reason you will take as a starting point for the negotiations with the States of the Levant the Treaty of Alliance concluded with them in 1936.⁵⁰ I take it upon myself to transmit to the League of Nations at the proper time the substitution in the Levant of the régime of the mandate by a new régime which will be in accord with the purposes for which the mandate was created.”

ENGERT

890D.00/858 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, October 8, 1941—5 p. m.

[Received October 8—3:46 p. m.]

405. I have today handed General Catroux a note containing the substance of the Department's 182, October 6, 5 p. m.

He said he entirely understood the Department's points of view and would reply in writing. He particularly appreciated the friendly

⁴⁹ Dated August 20, not printed.

⁵⁰ Franco-Syrian Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, signed at Damascus, December 22, 1936, and the Franco-Lebanese Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, signed at Beirut, November 13, 1936. These treaties were never ratified by France. For texts, see France, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, *Rapport à la Société des Nations sur la situation de la Syrie et du Liban (année 1936)*, pp. 201 and 229.

tone of the Department's observations and would do what he could to see that the treaty rights of the United States and other powers were protected.

I then asked him if he would be so good as to bring the note to the attention of the Syrian and Lebanese authorities and he said that he would be glad to do so.

I am also giving a copy of my note to the British authorities.

In my conversation with Catroux I took the occasion to refer to the Mixed Courts—see my 392, October 2—and informed him that I naturally was obliged to reserve all rights on behalf of American citizens whose interests might be affected by the new legislation. He replied it was a purely temporary measure and gave me his personal promise that if an American case should come up he would see that a majority of judges was French even if he had to send to Egypt to obtain them.

ENGERT

890D.00/855 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Beirut (Engert)

WASHINGTON, October 13, 1941—10 p. m.

186. Your 395, October 4, 10 a. m. You should acknowledge the receipt of the communications in an informal letter without according any title to the addressee, stating that you have referred his communication to your government, where the general subject of American relations with the area of Syria and Lebanon are under consideration. You should add that your government, meanwhile, has instructed you to make a full reservation of American treaty rights in Syria and Lebanon, and should include the observations contained in your note to General Catroux drafted in accordance with the Department's telegram no. 182, October 6, 5 p. m., making necessary changes, *mutatis mutandis*, to apply to the Syrian official rather than Catroux.

HULL

890D.00/859 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, October 14, 1941—11 a. m.

[Received 1:30 p. m.]

412. My 405, October 8, 5 p. m. I have today received a note from General Catroux dated yesterday in which he acknowledges mine of October 8th. He quotes the sentence from his proclamation of September 27 mentioned in numbered paragraph 3 of my 381, September 28 and states that this provision applies of course to the obligation

assumed for the benefit of the United States and "is of a nature to give every reassurance to the American Government."

He adds that the new regime in Syria will later be supplanted by "a definitive regime to be established by treaty. I can already now give you the assurance that when the negotiations for that treaty take place full account will be taken of the rights conferred upon the United States by the above mentioned convention", i. e., our treaty of 1924.

He states he informed the Syrian Government of my note. I am giving a copy of his reply to the British.

Repeated to London.

ENGERT

890D.00/865 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, October 24, 1941—9 a. m.

[Received October 25—2:18 p. m.]

426. Department's 186, October 13. A personal letter in the sense suggested was on October 15th addressed to Fayez El Khouri the official in question. On October 22 he came to Beirut to call on me and told me on behalf of President Taj-ed-Din that they were just a little disappointed in Damascus that the American Government was apparently not yet prepared to give the new regime in Syria its blessing. Incidentally he informed me that the contents of my note of October 8th to Catroux had not yet been brought to the attention of Syrian authorities although as stated in my 405, October 8, the General had promised me to do so.

I explained to him the point of view of the Department very frankly but as kindly as I could and stressed the fact that in principle of course the Government of the United States had always favored the legitimate aspirations to independence of the Levant States.

Fayez el Khouri then declared that President Taj-ed-Din authorized him to state the Syrian Government was quite willing to assure the United States officially and formally that all present American treaty rights would be fully respected pending negotiation of a fresh treaty and the definite abolition of the mandate.

I reported this conversation to General Spears⁵¹ and asked him what the attitude of the Foreign Office was toward the new regime in Syria. He informs me today that the British Government is about to recognize the Syrian authorities and that similar action by the United States would of course enormously strengthen the position of these authorities and would have a stabilizing effect throughout the Middle East.

⁵¹ Maj. Gen. Edward L. Spears, head of British Mission to Syria.

Please refer in this connection to my telegram 192, June 5.⁵²

I understand that General Catroux is contemplating the creation also of an independent Lebanese Government in the immediate future.

ENGERT

890D.01/548 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, October 30, 1941—11 a. m.

[Received October 30—8:44 a. m.]

434. My 432, October 29; 433, October 30;⁵³ and referring once more to paragraph 4 of my 426, October 24. General Spears has just shown me a telegram from his Foreign Office stating that the British Ambassador in Washington has been instructed to inform the Department that it would welcome the recognition of Syria by the United States. Spears was instructed to tell me privately the Foreign Office hoped I would find it possible on my part to recommend that such recognition by the United States be accorded. I said I had kept the Department currently informed of developments in the Levant and the Department's 182, October 6, on which I based my note of October 8 of which I had given him a copy, represented for the moment the only expression of the Department's views I had so far received.

The Department may wish to consider among others the following points in arriving at a decision.

(1) We should first of all feel reasonably sure that British Government is determined and prepared to defend Syria at all costs.

(2) Assuming that this is case our recognition would of course be of tremendous help to Allies and would thus [be] welcome part of general war effort to defeat Axis.

(3) It would strengthen the moderate elements both in Syria and Lebanon who are genuinely pro-American and in sympathy with Allied war aims and would have a steadying influence on entire Arab world.

(4) It would discourage all German sympathizers who are still trying to cause confusion and embarrassment and who are potential fifth columnists behind Allied forces.

(5) It would discredit German defeatist propaganda and correspondingly instill greater confidence among the people that United States will continue to back Britain to limit.

(6) It would facilitate from military point of view all preparations and arrangements which might eventually become necessary in connection with American interest in establishment of powerful battle front in Middle East.

(7) It should also have beneficial effect on British-Free French relations which at present leave much to be desired.

⁵² *Ante*, p. 721.

⁵³ Neither printed.

(8) As regards adequate safeguarding of our treaty rights it would seem that not only Syrian Government but also British and Free French would be quite prepared to give us any guarantees we might desire.

Department may perhaps wish to ask me specific questions.

ENGERT

890D.01/563

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. George V. Allen of the
Division of Near Eastern Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] October 30, 1941.

Participants: Mr. Barclay, Second Secretary, British Embassy
Mr. Murray ⁵⁴
Mr. Alling ⁵⁵
Mr. Allen

Mr. R. E. Barclay, Second Secretary of the British Embassy, called this morning to present the hope of the British Government that the Government of the United States might extend formal recognition to Syria. He said that Lord Halifax ⁵⁶ had mentioned the matter to the Secretary last night.

Mr. Barclay said that the Embassy had received instructions from the British Government to point out that a recognition of Syrian independence by the United States would have a considerable stabilizing effect in the Near East and would strengthen the position of Great Britain and her allies throughout the Arab countries.

Mr. Murray suggested to Mr. Barclay that the recognition of Syrian independence by this Government presented a good many technical and political considerations which he thought would need clarification before action could be taken by this Government. In the first place, he pointed out that the rights pertaining to the United States and its Nationals in Syria were derived from a formal treaty between the United States and France signed in 1924, consent to the ratification of which was accorded by the United States Senate. Mr. Murray said that under American constitutional procedure these rights could not be given up by executive action alone, and that recognition of Syrian independence, unaccompanied by a new treaty making provision regarding those rights, might jeopardize these rights.

Mr. Murray pointed out that our position with regard to recognizing the independence of Syria was also different from that of Great Britain, since we still maintained diplomatic relations with Vichy.

⁵⁴ Wallace Murray, Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs.

⁵⁵ Paul H. Alling, Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs.

⁵⁶ British Ambassador.

Mr. Barclay said that the Secretary had mentioned this phase of the subject to Lord Halifax.

Mr. Barclay was asked whether he had any further information regarding the exchange of letters which took place on August 7, 1941, between Mr. Lyttelton and General Catroux, in which Mr. Lyttelton stated on behalf of the British Government that when the independence of Syria and Lebanon has been granted "we freely admit that France should have the predominant position in Syria and Lebanon over any other European Power". In replying to this letter, General de Gaulle took note of the British renewed assurances that Great Britain admitted as a basic principle the "preeminent and privileged" position of France when Syria and Lebanon shall have attained independence. Mr. Barclay said that he presumed this promise of a continuing preeminent position for France referred only to military matters, and would be similar to the position held by Great Britain in Iraq following the granting of independence to that country in 1932. Mr. Murray said that he was afraid that the Free French might have in mind a more extensively preeminent position, relating possibly to commercial, cultural and political privileges in addition to military privileges. Mr. Barclay agreed that the position to be held by France in Syria needed clarification, but pointed out that the preeminent position of Great Britain in Iraq following the independence of that country had extended only to the right to maintain troops there and did not include any commercial or other privileges. He said he felt certain that no more than military privileges were intended for France in Syria.

It was pointed out to Mr. Barclay that according to information we have received from Beirut, the Turkish Government has announced its decision not to recognize the independence of Syria, on the grounds that Turkey did not desire to recognize independence conferred by a belligerent government. Mr. Barclay said that he was not aware of this development and thought that his Government, in view of its treaty relations with Turkey, should look into the matter at once.

During the conversation, it was suggested to Mr. Barclay that his Government itself might derive some benefit by the adoption of a careful policy by the United States with regard to Syrian independence. It was suggested that Great Britain, because of the international situation at the moment, may have considered it necessary to make concessions to de Gaulle and did not feel in a position to demand a specific description of the special rights which France would enjoy following independence. The United States, however, was under no embarrassment in this respect, and the British might welcome insistence on our part that the continuing privileges of France in the area be clarified. At any rate, the American Govern-

ment would doubtless require such clarification before taking action in the matter of recognizing Syrian independence under the present arrangements.

Mr. Barclay was asked whether his Government had indicated an appreciation of the effect which a recognition of the termination of the mandate in Syria might have on the Palestine situation. Mr. Barclay said that he felt certain his Government had this prominently in mind. He thought that while the Jews in Palestine might object to the British Government's action in having agreed to the termination of the Syrian Mandate without having first adequately safeguarded the position of non-Arab peoples in the area, the Jewish displeasure would be offset by the very great pleasure with which all Arabs would welcome the independence of Syria. Mr. Alling pointed out that the Jewish question was one which the American Government wished to bear prominently in mind. Mr. Murray said that he was not certain the Arabs would be so enthusiastic about the so-called "independence" of Syria when they realized the full implications of the reservations made on behalf of France.

In leaving, Mr. Barclay said that he would report to his Government that the constitutional procedure with regard to the relinquishment of American treaty rights complicated the question of the recognition of Syrian independence by this country, and that the American Government would also doubtless desire further clarification of the position to be held by France after independence is granted.

890E.01/98 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, October 31, 1941—8 a. m.

[Received November 1—10:19 a. m.]

435. I have been shown in confidence an advance copy of the proclamation which General Catroux proposes to address to the Lebanese people in about a week. It resembles very closely his proclamation to the Syrians, reported in my 381, September 28, but stresses France's "tutelary duties" and states that in recognizing the independence of Lebanon France does not renounce either her "tutelary friendship" or the privileged position which she acquired here in the course of centuries. He adds that French assistance will be granted in the spirit of the Treaty of Alliance and Friendship of 1936 "which has received the unanimous approval of Lebanese opinion".

Due no doubt to our representations of October 8 the clause quoted in numbered paragraph 3 of my 381 has been amplified to read "rights and obligations deriving from international conventions and instru-

ments concluded by France regarding it, i. e., Lebanon, or in its name”.

Catroux also emphasizes necessity that all regions and all creeds be assured equitable representation in the Lebanese Government both in high offices and in the administrative services in general. Equality of civil and political rights of all its nationals “without distinctions whatever” must be guaranteed.

The presidency has been offered to Alfred Naccache who is now head of the state and he has accepted.

ENGERT

890E.01/100 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, November 9, 1941—11 a. m.

[Received 3:48 p. m.]

443. My 441, November 7.⁵⁷ General Catroux sent for me last night and showed me the text of the proposed proclamation which I had already been shown by the British (see my 435, October 31). He then let me read revised text which he had prepared after consultation with the British but which he said still contained certain clauses or phrases to which the British objected. The whole question had now been referred to London to be threshed out between De Gaulle and Eden.⁵⁸

Catroux said the British were unreasonable in their attitude and obviously tried to reduce or even hoped to eliminate French influence in the Levant States. That he could not permit, nor would he yield to some of the veiled threats General Spears had uttered. I laughed and said he talked just like De Gaulle and I was therefore obliged to tell him exactly what I had said to the latter. I then repeated the substance of my remarks to De Gaulle when I last saw him in Beirut as reported in the second half of my telegram 323, August 5, 11 p. m.⁵⁹ I added that during the past 3 months I had had ample opportunities of watching Anglo-Free French relations and was more than ever convinced that the problem was psychological rather than political. So long as the Free French suspected the British of intriguing and of wishing to harm French interests it would be difficult to bring about the whole-hearted cooperation which the security of Syria demanded. Moreover, everything that could be interpreted as an indication that the Free French did not trust their British allies was encouraging the pro-Axis sympathizers among the natives and was facilitating Nazi

⁵⁷ Not printed.

⁵⁸ Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

⁵⁹ *Ante*, p. 780.

propaganda. The American Government and people had complete confidence in the good faith of the British Government in its epic struggle for the preservation of civilization and I ventured to hope that the Free French would give proof of similar confidence by not hampering the British war effort with insistence on relatively minor matters.

Catroux replied he personally quite agreed that the British were not as unscrupulous as some people thought but he had found it difficult to convince De Gaulle of it.

Repeated to London.

ENGERT

890E.01/100 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Beirut (Engert)

WASHINGTON, November 13, 1941—7 p. m.

204. Your 434, October 30, 11 a. m., 435, October 31, 8 a. m., and 443, November 9, 11 a. m. For your confidential information, the British Embassy here recently gave oral expression to the hope of the British Government that this Government would formally recognize the independence of Syria, for the reason that our recognition would strengthen the position of Great Britain and her allies in Arab countries and would have a stabilizing effect in the Near East generally.

Response was made that, among other considerations, American treaty rights could not be given up by executive action alone, and that those rights might be jeopardized if Syrian independence were to be recognized unaccompanied by a new treaty. Moreover, we would doubtless require a clarification of the continuing special rights and privileges claimed in Syria by France.

Apparently similar considerations would apply with at least equal force to the question of this Government's recognition of the independence of the Lebanon which presumably will be proclaimed in the near future.

The Department feels that the objects which the British have in mind and which are mentioned in your no. 434 can be attained through the issuance by this Government of a sympathetic public statement prompted by the achievement of independent status by Syria and the Lebanon. The issuance of such a statement, which, however, would not constitute recognition, is contemplated soon after the independence of the Lebanon is proclaimed. The British Embassy will be so informed.

HULL

890E.01/101 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, November 13, 1941—10 p. m.

[Received November 14—1:35 p. m.]

449. My 443, November 9. I have just been shown in strict confidence a note dated yesterday which General Catroux is sending to Lyttelton today rejecting two principal British suggestions regarding the proclamation. Incidentally the British observations have been made verbally not in writing.

1. Foreign Office had suggested that reference to the treaty of 1936 be omitted because the Lebanese did not like it and it had never even been ratified by France. Catroux presumably under instructions from de Gaulle states that reference to the treaty is necessary because it satisfies Free France and cannot harm British interests. It confirms "the preeminent and privileged position of France in the Levant, a position which no nation has challenged and which the British Government has recognized as existing and as continuing after the granting of independence." He then explains that France needs the right to station troops in the country for the protection of Christians and other minorities in Syria and the Lebanon concerning whose fate "America and Great Britain have repeatedly expressed interest. . . .⁶⁰ inasmuch as it is inconceivable that Great Britain should wish to question either France's privileged position in the Lebanon or her role as protector of the Christians" there could be no objection to taking the 1936 treaty as a basis.

2. The Foreign Office had objected to the statement that the Lebanon constituted "a politically and territorially indivisible entity whose integrity must be protected against all encroachments." It feared lest an irrevocable fixing of boundaries cause dissatisfaction in Syria and disturb the relations between Great Britain and the Arab world. Catroux replied that Syrians had been aware of his intention since September 27, 1941, and not a single protest had been received directly or indirectly. A compact Lebanon was necessary for the interests of France and useful to Britain and other western powers as a bridge-head vis-à-vis the independent Mohammedan countries. Moreover, the principle of Lebanese unity was recognized by the mandate which refers to the frontiers established in 1920 "and the Franco-American Convention of April 4, 1924, extended to the Lebanon thus defined the guaranty of the United States." Syria formally accepted this state of affairs in 1936 and renounced all claims regarding the frontiers of the Lebanon. Furthermore, all difficulties between Syria and the [apparent omission] must be settled "through the medium of France to the exclusion of any other power." He, therefore, considered the discussion as closed and there was no point in reopening it.

From conversations with General Spears I gather that the British feel several other passages besides those mentioned show a distinct inclination on the part of Free French to perpetuate a tutelary relation-

⁶⁰ Omission indicated in the original telegram.

ship which might even during the war confine Lebanese collaboration to Free France to the exclusion of Great Britain, the other Allies or the United States. I agree that all unnecessary limitation of Lebanese independence merely to serve French vanity is undesirable and will not only be criticized locally but will be used by Nazi propaganda.

The Department may wish to make some observations regarding the reference to our treaty of 1924 quoted above.

Repeated to London. To Cairo by mail.

ENGERT

890D.01/565

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Murray)

[WASHINGTON,] November 17, 1941.

Subject: Recognition of Independence of Syria.

Participants: Mr. Barclay, Second Secretary, British Embassy
Mr. Murray
Mr. Allen

Mr. Barclay recalled the observations which had been made to him during his previous visit to the Division regarding the above subject, and said that his Embassy had telegraphed to the British Foreign Office that the State Department was hesitant regarding the formal recognition of Syrian independence due to (1) the legal procedure in the United States with regard to any action which might affect the rights enjoyed by formally ratified treaties and (2) the desire of the Department to have further information regarding the continuing privileged position of France in Syria after independence had been granted.

Mr. Barclay said that the Embassy had now received a reply by telegram from London on the subject. In this telegram the British Government pointed out that the independent status intended for Syria involved a change in but not a termination of the mandate. As regards American rights in the area, the British Government referred to the fact that Syria acceded naturally to the obligations hitherto assumed in her name.

Mr. Murray said that the statement of the British Government that the present plans for the independence of Syria did not involve a termination of the mandate was surprising. He said that the Department had presumed that the British and Free French authorities intended that the mandate would be considered by them as terminated immediately, and referred to the following statement contained in a letter from General de Gaulle addressed to General Catroux on

June 24, 1941 (reported in Beirut's telegram no. 404, October 8, 10 a. m.) :

"The mandate for which France was made responsible by the League of Nations in 1924 must come to an end. For this reason you will take as a starting point for the negotiations with the States of the Levant the Treaty of Alliance concluded with them in 1936. I take it upon myself to transmit to the League of Nations at the proper time the substitution in the Levant of the régime of the mandate by a new régime which will be in accordance with the purposes for which the mandate was created."

Mr. Barclay said that the British Embassy, likewise, had not understood clearly whether it was intended to terminate the mandate until the receipt of the recent telegram from London. Mr. Murray said that he thought it possible that the British Government had revised its attitude on further consideration of the matter.

Mr. Murray suggested to Mr. Barclay that he give us an *aide-mémoire* on the subject, setting forth the further observations of the British Government. Mr. Barclay agreed to do so (the *aide-mémoire* received on November 18 is attached hereto ⁶²).

WALLACE MURRAY

890D.01/566

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

His Majesty's Embassy understand that the Free French Headquarters in London are keeping Mr. Biddle informed about affairs in Syria, and also about the Lebanese declaration of Independence which is expected to be made in the very near future. General Catroux has also informed the United States Consul General at Beirut of the proposed Lebanese declaration.

2. From these declarations the United States Government will see that the creation and recognition of an independent Syrian Government involves a change in but not a termination of the Mandate *in toto*, nor does it involve a termination of French responsibilities. It puts Syria in a position analogous to that of Iraq before the last Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance ⁶³ and before Iraq became a member of the League. Iraq was at that time recognized as an independent Government but His Majesty's Government nevertheless retained mandatory responsibilities which were not terminated until Iraq's admission to the League.

⁶² *Infra.*

⁶³ Signed at Baghdad, June 30, 1930, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CXXXII, p. 363.

3. Under the declarations of Independence new Constitutions for Syria and Lebanon are contemplated, as well as new treaties of Alliance between France and these countries. Meanwhile, they contain a clause which lays down that "in acceding to an independent international life Syria succeeds naturally to the rights and obligations hitherto [? assumed] ⁶⁴ in her name". These clauses amount to a formal recognition by the Free French, Syrian and Lebanese Governments of the rights of the United States Government under the Treaty of 1924.

4. His Majesty's Embassy are informed that Egypt has already recognised Syrian independence. Saudi Arabia has expressed the intention of establishing relations and the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs has told His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad that the Iraqi Government recognise the independence of Syria though not the form of Government established by the Free French High Commissioner.

5. In the light of the above information His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom trust that the United States Government will on reflection be prepared to take a favourable decision about the recognition of Syrian independence. Such a decision would be in accordance with the spirit of principles one and two of the Atlantic Charter,⁶⁵ and would be a powerful aid to the stability of the Syrian Government and of conditions generally in the Near Eastern theatre of war.

WASHINGTON, November 18, 1941.

890D.01/567

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] November 18, 1941.

The British Minister, Sir Ronald Campbell, called to see me this afternoon at his request.

Sir Ronald said he had been talking this afternoon with the officials in the Near Eastern Division concerning Syria and the Lebanon. He said it was the earnest hope of the British Government that the United States would recognize the independence of Syria and the Lebanon.

I said to Sir Ronald that undoubtedly he had been informed of the difficulties which this Government faced regarding this problem in view of the questions raised by the continuation of the Mandate and our treaty rights in the two regions in question.

⁶⁴ Brackets appear in the original.

⁶⁵ Vol. I, p. 367.

He seemed to be familiar only in the most general terms with these problems and said I had assumed that he would wish to inform his Government fully of the point of view of this Government as explained to him by Mr. Murray and his associates.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

890E.01/101 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Beirut (Engert)

WASHINGTON, November 19, 1941—6 p. m.

210. Your No. 499 [449], November 13, 10 p. m. The Department does not understand the meaning or intent of the statement in Catroux' letter to Lyttelton that "the Franco-American Convention of April 4, 1924 extended to the Lebanon thus defined the guaranty of the United States."

Please comment.

HULL

890E.01/102 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, November 24, 1941—11 a. m.

[Received 2:53 p. m.]

459. Since my 449, November 13, the British have been trying to induce Catroux to withdraw his note of November 12th to Lyttelton and he has practically promised to do so. I shall therefore wait a little before trying to clarify the point referred to in the Department's 210, November 19.

General Spears has made some definite recommendations to the Foreign Office regarding the wording of certain passages in the proposed proclamation as he feels very strongly that the rights of the Lebanese should be safeguarded against any French attempt to continue mandate in disguise. He believes British and other foreign interests in the Lebanon and Syria will suffer if De Gaulle is permitted to have his way. He also sees a danger to the British position in the eyes of the Arab world if the French try to justify their policy in the Lebanon by implying that they are the champions of the Christian West versus Islam.

After numerous exchanges of telegrams with London the Foreign Office has decided not to insist on elimination of the reference to the 1936 treaty. Nor does it seem to be convinced that some of the minor textual changes are essential.

De Gaulle has instructed Catroux to issue the proclamation this week and Catroux proposes to do so November 26. Spears has warned

him that if the proclamation is published without having first been approved by the British Government the latter may have to issue a statement that it did not agree with its contents.

Repeated to London, Cairo.

ENGERT

890D.01/558 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, November 25, 1941—11 a. m.

[Received 3:08 p. m.]

463. My 460, November 25.⁶⁶ I have just received a formal note from General Catroux dated today with which he encloses a copy of the proclamation he intends to issue tomorrow morning. He states "at the moment of proclaiming Lebanese independence, I wish to confirm the terms of my letter of October 13 last and to reiterate to you the assurance that the treaty rights enjoyed by the United States in the States of the Levant will not suffer any impairment as a result of the new status conferred upon the States of Syria, Lebanon."

The letter of October 13 was referred to in my telegram 412, October 14, 11 a. m., and was forwarded to the Department with despatch number 178, October 22.⁶⁷

The proclamation itself is essentially as shown me privately 4 weeks ago (see my 435, October 31), however, in deference to British suggestions a few minor changes in the phraseology have been made.

Repeat to London and Cairo.

ENGERT

890E.01/103 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, November 26, 1941—1 p. m.

[Received 2:26 p. m.]

467. My 463, November 25, 11 a. m. General Catroux read this morning his proclamation to Lebanese people. President Naccache replied that until circumstances permitted signing a treaty which would transfer to the Lebanon all attributes and prerogatives of sovereignties we were today witnessing the first tangible signs of this sovereignty. To safeguard independence France guaranteed political unity and territorial integrity of the Lebanon while the Lebanese themselves would now have to drop all partisan strife and induce all regional and religious communities to share the responsibility for affairs of state even though the war does not permit the normal functioning of representative institutions.

⁶⁶ Not printed.

⁶⁷ Despatch not printed.

"Individual liberty and freedom of conscience will be guaranteed and protected. We renew this solemn assurance.

Upon these bases, with the assistance of France and the support of Allied or friendly powers and especially the aid of Great Britain and her liberal comprehension of our political needs, I have the confident hope that the Lebanon will achieve complete and effective independence.

In the dramatic hours through which humanity is living her fate is linked with the liberation of France and final victory. The day will come when in a world rescued from the violence of war the Lebanon will with the help of her great and generous ally accomplish her destiny and mission in the Eastern Mediterranean."

ENGERT

890E.01/104 : Telegram

The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, November 27, 1941—9 p. m.
[Received November 28—12:03 p. m.]

468. My 467, November 26. There has been no sign of popular enthusiasm in connection with the declaration of Lebanese independence. On the contrary most Lebanese are disappointed with Catroux's proclamation and resent his reference to the treaty of 1936 and other passages indicating that France will insist upon a privileged position which may prove incompatible with real independence. Many leaders outside the immediate entourage of the President feel that they should raise their voices in protest before the Free French have obliged the present Government to sign away any important rights. They desire to postpone a definitive treaty until after the war when elections can be held and the true wishes of the people can be ascertained. The Maronite Patriarch has been particularly bitter in his opposition to Naccache, whom he considers a creature of the Jesuits even though he is a Maronite, and to Catroux who appears to have slighted him.

To all those who have come to see me or have sent word to me I have counseled great prudence and much patience and above all no action that might render the prosecution of the war by the Allies more difficult.

Repeated to London and Cairo.

ENGERT

890E.01/102 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Beirut (Engert)

WASHINGTON, November 28, 1941—8 p. m.

214. Your no. 459, November 24, 11 a. m. British Embassy, in an *aide-mémoire* handed Department on November 18, states that the

new régime established in Syria involves a change in the mandate but not a termination thereof *in toto*. Syria, in the British Government's view, is to be in a position under the new régime analogous to that of Iraq before Iraq became a member of the League.

The Department has pointed out to the Embassy that this view is somewhat surprising since we had been under the impression that the British and Free French authorities intended that the mandate would be considered by them as terminated immediately. Your no. 404, October 8, 10 a. m., was cited in this connection.

General Spears' uncertainty regarding the continuing French position in Syria appears to correspond to our own. The opposition he expresses to the continuation of the mandate does not appear to be felt, however, by his Government.

You may inform General Spears of the statement made to the Department by the Embassy. Please report any further information you may obtain regarding the British and Free French attitudes toward the question whether the mandate is to be considered as terminated.

HULL

890E.01/106½

Press Release Issued by the Department of State, November 29, 1941

Inquiries have been received as to the attitude of this Government in view of the proclamation issued at Damascus on September 27, 1941, regarding the independence of Syria, and the proclamation issued at Beirut on November 26, 1941, regarding the independence of the Lebanon.

The American Government and people have always sympathized with the natural and legitimate aspirations of the peoples of Syria and the Lebanon. This Government therefore welcomes any steps toward the realization of these aspirations, chief among which is, of course, the full enjoyment of sovereign independence.

The Convention between the United States and France, signed at Paris on April 4, 1924, and the provisions of the mandate for Syria and the Lebanon included therein, clearly embody the idea of Syrian and Lebanese independence. The American Government continues to support these provisions which it endorsed in 1924 and which are a cornerstone of the mandate principle. The 1924 convention, which also set forth the rights of the United States and its nationals in the areas concerned, was formally ratified by the American Government in accordance with the required constitutional procedure, and must be regarded as continuing in effect until new instruments of a mutually satisfactory nature can be similarly negotiated and ratified. This Government is hopeful that, as soon as international conditions permit,

such negotiations may be undertaken, enabling this Government to extend formal recognition to Syria and the Lebanon.

740.0011 European War 1939/17639

*The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle)
to the Secretary of State*

Polish Series No. 75

LONDON, December 2, 1941.

[Received December 18.]

SIR: I have the honor to report that under date of December 1, 1941 Monsieur Dejean, Free French National Commissar [*Commissioner*] for Foreign Affairs, addressed a letter to me⁶⁸ enclosing a communication of November 28 [29], 1941 from General de Gaulle requesting me to notify the United States Government, as a signatory of the Franco-American Convention of April 4, 1924, of measures taken by the Free French affecting Syria and the Lebanon. At the same time, Monsieur Dejean enclosed a copy of a similar notification which General de Gaulle had sent to the Secretary General of the League of Nations.⁶⁸ Copies of this correspondence are enclosed.

As will be noted, General de Gaulle states, among other things, that as leader of the Free French he has since July 14, 1941 assumed, in the States of the Levant under French Mandate, the powers and responsibilities which France derives from the Mandate Act of July 4, 1922; that he has invested General Catroux, Delegate General and Plenipotentiary in the Levant, with the powers exercised by the French High Commissioner in the States of the Levant; that General Catroux, acting in the name of the leader of the Free French, has, by virtue of and within the framework of the Mandate, proclaimed on September 27, 1941 the independence and sovereignty of the Syrian State; and that on the same basis, and taking account of the special relations between France and the Lebanon, General Catroux, acting in the name of General de Gaulle, leader of the Free French and President of the French National Council formed at London on September 24, 1941 has proclaimed the independence and sovereignty of the Lebanon on November 26, 1941.

Monsieur Dejean called on me this afternoon and I explained to him that while I welcomed any information that he or General de Gaulle might supply to me informally, I felt that in asking me to notify my Government regarding these matters they had adopted a procedure which raised questions touching on relations between the United States Government and the French Government, the legal

⁶⁸ Not printed.

position of these Governments in regard to the Mandates and the possible relationship of the Free French and the United States Government. In the circumstances, I felt that it would be preferable to make any approach in this matter through their representative in Washington.

Monsieur Dejean indicated that he understood the force of these considerations and he accordingly withdrew the above mentioned letters. He added that he would proceed in the manner suggested.

Respectfully yours,

A. J. DREXEL BIDDLE, JR.

[Enclosure—Translation]

The Leader of the Free French (de Gaulle) to the American Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle)

[LONDON,] November 29, 1941.

MR. AMBASSADOR :

(1) Since the attempt to transform Syria and Lebanon into a German military base has led the Free French Forces, in cooperation with British troops, to take in hand the defense of these countries, I have the honor to inform you that, in my capacity as Leader of the Free French, on July 14, 1941 I assumed in the Levant States under French mandate the powers and responsibilities which France has under the Mandate Act of July 24, 1922, which entered into force September 29, 1923.

(2) I have vested General Catroux, Delegate General and Plenipotentiary in the Levant, with the powers exercised by the French High Commissioner in the Levant States.

(3) In conformity with the principles laid down by the Mandate Act and with the traditional policy of France, General Catroux, acting on behalf of the Leader of the Free French, on September 27, 1941 proclaimed, by virtue of and within the framework of the Mandate, the independence and sovereignty of the Syrian State, of which Sheik Taj-ed-Din has become the President.

On the same bases, and taking into account the special relations between France and Lebanon, General Catroux, acting on behalf of General de Gaulle, Leader of the Free French and Chairman of the French National Committee formed in London on September 24, 1941, proclaimed, on November 26, the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon, with Mr. Naccache as President.

(4) The independence and sovereignty of Syria and Lebanon will not, in fact, involve limitations other than those resulting from the exigencies of the war.

(5) They do not, however, affect the juridical situation as it results from the Mandate Act. Indeed, this situation could be changed

only with the agreement of the Council of the League of Nations, with the consent of the Government of the United States, a signatory of the Franco-American Convention of April 4, 1924, and only after the conclusion between the French Government and the Syrian and Lebanese Governments of treaties duly ratified in accordance with the laws of the French Republic.

(6) General Catroux will continue, therefore, to exercise on behalf of the French National Committee, with due regard for the new *de facto* situation, the powers of the High Commissioner of France in Syria.

(7) I should appreciate it very much if you would be good enough to inform the Government of the United States, which, together with the French Government, signed the Franco-American Convention of April 4, 1924.

I have the honor to enclose the text of the proclamations of General Catroux with respect to the independence and sovereignty of Syria and Lebanon.⁷⁰

Accept [etc.]

C. DE GAULLE

740.0011 European War 1939/18204

The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

No. 77

LONDON, December 8, 1941.

[Received January 5, 1942.]

SIR: Referring to my despatch Polish Series No. 75, December 2, 1941, I have the honor to report that in today's conversation with M. Maurice Dejean, Free French National Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, he showed me a memorandum he had just written concerning certain points which he felt would be of interest to our Consul General in Beirut, as a result of decrees enacted by General Catroux on August 18th and September 26th respectively, and entailing certain modifications in the judicial system of Syria.

Following our conversation, he handed me the attached memorandum covering his remarks on these various points.

Respectfully yours,

A. J. DREXEL BIDDLE, JR.

[Enclosure—Translation]

Memorandum by the Free French National Commissioner for Foreign Affairs (Dejean)

1. Further to the decrees enacted on August 18th and September 26th, 1941, by General Catroux entailing certain modifications in the

⁷⁰ Not printed.

judicial régime of Syria and the Lebanon, the United States Consul-General in Beirut was kind enough, by letter dated November 8th, to draw General Catroux's attention to the rights held by the United States in virtue of the Franco-American Convention of April 4th, 1924.

2. The decrees in question have in fact modified, in favour of the Syrians and Lebanese, the proportion of judges on the Supreme Court and on tribunals dealing with foreign questions. French magistrates will still preside, but will no longer necessarily form a majority. Moreover, Syrian and Lebanese nationals will henceforward be eligible to hold office as examining magistrates.

3. The French National Committee, however, in no way contests the fact that they rank amongst those for which, according to the Franco-American Convention of April 4th, 1924, the previous consent of the United States should be obtained.

It is therefore quite prepared, in accordance with the assurance given by General Catroux to the United States Consul-General in Beirut, to apply as far as possible the previous judicial régime in cases concerning American nationals.

4. The French National Committee is moreover resolved to limit measures of this kind to the strict indispensable minimum.

LONDON, December 5, 1941.

890D.01/575

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The following further information has been received about the position in Syria and the Lebanon since the question was last discussed between members of the Near Eastern Division and a representative of His Majesty's Embassy.

General de Gaulle's views regarding the termination of the mandate were given in an official communication from the Free French headquarters dated November 5th in which it was stated that:

“La proclamation de l'indépendance syrienne par le délégué Général et plénipotentiaire laisse subsister le mandat, le Général Catroux exerçant, compte tenu de la nouvelle situation de fait, les pouvoirs du haut commissaire de France en Syrie.”

The statement went on to say that the changes introduced in Syria did not affect the juridical position, which could only be modified with the consent of the League of Nations and of the Government of the United States. Furthermore the Comité National Français only envisaged the termination of the Mandate after the conclusion with the Syrian and Lebanese Governments of treaties duly ratified according to the law of the French Republic.

On November 28th General de Gaulle communicated to the Secretary General of the League of Nations full particulars of the events which have taken place in Syria since last summer. It is understood that a similar communication was sent to Mr. Biddle with the request that he should inform the United States Government as a signatory of the Treaty of April 4th, 1924.

It is not, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, possible to give a categorical answer to the question whether after the mandate is terminated, the treaties based thereon remain valid, since this depends *inter alia* on the nature of the treaties. It is thought, however, that this question is not really relevant since the case of Syria and Lebanon is analogous to that of Iraq before the termination of the Mandate. In the case of Iraq, His Majesty's Government made it their business to see that the position of the treaties relating to Iraq with the United States and other powers was satisfactorily clarified before their mandatory responsibility terminated, and in particular that the Iraqi Government accepted responsibility for all the treaties with third powers which His Majesty's Government had made in their name. As the United States Government are aware, the Free French are adopting the same course as regards Syria and the Lebanon, and have included in the proclamations of independence a clause stating that in acceding to an independent national life Syria (the Lebanon) succeeds naturally to the rights and obligations hitherto undertaken in her name. General Catroux is understood to have drawn the attention of the United States Consul General at Beirut to this statement and to have assured him that, pending the stabilization of the new régime by a Franco-Syrian treaty, the rights of the United States would be fully safeguarded by this stipulation.

WASHINGTON, December 15, 1941.

890D.01/575

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Alling)

[WASHINGTON,] December 16, 1941.

Mr. Barclay handed me the attached *aide-mémoire*⁷¹ which he said furnished further information concerning the proclamation of Syrian Independence. He added that through some oversight the telegram on which this *aide-mémoire* was based had only just been received from the Foreign Office, although it had been drafted some two weeks ago. He went on to say that he was instructed to ask whether, in view of

⁷¹ *Supra.*

the information contained in this document, it would not now be possible for the United States to extend full recognition to the Republic of Syria.

After reading the *aide-mémoire* I told Mr. Barclay that it appeared to contain no information which we had not received from other sources and that practically all of this information had been available at the time the decision had been reached that it was impossible for us to extend recognition to Syria. I added, furthermore, that since the time when the telegram had been drafted in the Foreign Office, upon which this *aide-mémoire* was based, we had issued our statement expressing our position in favor of Syrian independence, and that consequently the considerations which the Foreign Office put forward seemed to me no longer to hold good. I added that what information we had indicated that the Syrians and Lebanese were completely satisfied with the official statement which had been issued by the Department and that I could not see that any further action was required at this time. I mentioned in this connection that the President of the Lebanese Republic had recently made a most friendly statement to our Consul General at Beirut and that this had been given to the press. Mr. Barclay said that he was under instructions, nevertheless, to request us to reconsider the whole matter. I told him I thought it was very unlikely that any new decision would be reached since our position had already been decided upon and it seemed that there was no good reason to alter it.

Mr. Barclay then inquired whether Mr. Bullitt⁷² would consider this question during his present trip to the Near East. I told him that Mr. Bullitt might possibly visit Syria, that he was of course free to discuss any matters that came up, and I assumed that if he had any views on the question he would pass them along in due course.

⁷² William C. Bullitt, former Ambassador to France.

TURKEY

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN CONTINUANCE OF ANGLO-TURKISH COOPERATION AND CONCERN REGARDING TURKISH RELATIONS WITH GERMANY; EXTENSION OF LEND-LEASE AID TO TURKEY¹

740.0011 European War 1939/7608 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, January 14, 1941—7 p. m.
[Received January 14—4: 58 p. m.]

10. The Embassy has learned from a most authoritative source that the purpose of the visit of Lieutenant General Cornwall, Deputy Chief of Staff of the British forces in the Near East, and Air Vice Marshal Elmhurst (formerly British Air Attaché in Ankara) who arrived here Monday is to revise in the light of France's capitulation the plans for military cooperation under the Tripartite Treaty² which had been drawn up prior to the collapse of France and which have not been modified since that event.

The Embassy is convinced that there is no basis for the report understood to be in circulation to the effect that the object of the visit of this delegation is to induce Turkey to take an active part in the war.

Inform War Department.

MACMURRAY

740.0011 European War 1939/7899 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, January 24, 1941—5 p. m.
[Received January 25—8: 12 a. m.]

17. For the Secretary and Under Secretary only. Both Turkish and British informants assured me that the military consultations reported in my No. 10³ are proceeding very satisfactorily.

I have reason to believe that the Turkish Government has made clear its intention to fight in any of the following eventualities: first,

¹ See also correspondence regarding efforts of the American and British Governments to acquire Turkish chrome and to prevent its sale by Turkey to Germany, pp. 936 ff.

² Anglo-French-Turkish Treaty of Mutual Assistance, signed at Ankara, October 19, 1939, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cc, p. 167.

³ *Supra*.

an attack upon its own territory from any quarter; second, a Bulgarian attack on Greece; third, a German advance into Bulgaria; and fourth, an Axis advance threatening seizure of Saloniki. There appears to have been no decision yet reached as to the case of a German advance through Yugoslavia not directly menacing Saloniki.

The Foreign Minister ⁴ today reaffirmed to me his confident conviction that Bulgaria will not, at any rate willingly, allow the passage of German [troops?] through her territory.

MACMURRAY

740.0011 European War 1939/8231b : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray)

WASHINGTON, February 9, 1941—8 p. m.

12. In view of recent discussions of this Government's position with regard to the developing world situation we desire you to make clear to the Turkish Government just what our position is as outlined below.

In a recent statement to the nation ⁵ the President said "we are planning our own defense with the utmost urgency and in its vast scale we must integrate the war needs of Britain".

This continues to be the keystone of American National defense policy and the developing situation has intensified this effort. We are convinced that Britain will win. Production of war material in America has already been undertaken on the vast scale indicated and the providing of facilities to meet British requirements will continue ever increasingly until the final victory. The President has pointed out on several occasions there can be no deviation from this policy as in his own words "we know now that a nation can have peace with the Nazis only at the price of total surrender".

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/8392b : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray)

WASHINGTON, February 14, 1941—7 p. m.

14. My 12, February 9, 8 p. m. Will you please by direction of the President make occasion to convey the following message to the Prime Minister: ⁶

"The President at this moment when peaceful nations are seeking a policy to insure their own integrity is convinced that any victory on

⁴ Sükrü Saraçoğlu.

⁵ Address by President Roosevelt delivered from the White House over a nationwide network, December 29, 1940, Department of State *Bulletin*, January 4, 1941, p. 3.

⁶ Refik Saydam.

behalf of the predatory powers even if it only be in the diplomatic field would but pave the way for fresh demands accompanied by threats of force against the very independence of the nation thus menaced. The President also desires it to be realized that the so-called Lend-Lease Bill now before the Congress and which has been passed by the House of Representatives and by the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate permits in its present form for the President to supply the materials of war to those nations that are now the victims of aggression or which are threatened with aggression."

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/8408 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, February 15, 1941—4 p. m.
[Received February 15—3:40 p. m.]

287. The Turkish Ambassador ^{6a} told me last night that his Government is now convinced that Germany contemplates an attack on Turkey in the relatively near future. He said there is no doubt that Turkey will resist. Insofar as concerns present relations between the Soviet Union and Turkey, he said that he has had no conversations with the Soviet authorities for some time past on other than the most routine matters and that, insofar as he knew, there had been no political discussions between the Soviet Ambassador at Ankara and his Government. He said that the attitude of the Soviet authorities towards him of late had been correct but nothing more. With respect to rumors, first, that Sobolev ⁷ and then that Suritz, the former Soviet Ambassador to Paris, had recently been in Sofia with the object of dissuading the Bulgarian Government from succumbing to German pressure, the Ambassador said he had been unable to confirm these rumors and that if the Soviet Government was endeavoring to influence the Bulgarian Government it was doing so most discreetly. The Ambassador expressed the opinion that Germany has been exerting pressure on Japan during the past few days to yield to the Soviet conditions for a Soviet-Japanese political agreement, and in this connection, he remarked that Germany, the Soviet Union, China, and Great Britain each for reasons, which he said were obvious, are desirous of seeing war between the United States and Japan.

STEINHARDT

^{6a} Ali Haydar Aktay.

⁷ A. A. Sobolev, General Secretary of the Soviet Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

740.0011 European War 1939/8415 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, February 16, 1941—5 p. m.

[Received 7:15 p. m.]

31. For the Secretary and Under Secretary.

1. I now learn that almost simultaneously with my sending my telegram No. 30 yesterday⁸ the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, to its great surprise, received word that the Bulgarian Government would accept a formula which the Turkish Government had submitted. On that basis an agreement is to be signed tomorrow and published probably the following day which provides, subject to the stipulation that it is without prejudice to the contractual obligations of the several parties, for: (a) mutual nonaggression; (b) cultivation of neighborly relations; (c) intensification of commercial exchanges; and (d) restraint (by implication) upon the tone of the press.

2. Although I understand the Turks consider that the text fully safeguards their position under the Balkan Entente Agreement⁹ and their treaty of alliance with Great Britain¹⁰ there would seem to be reason to apprehend that enemy propaganda may at least plausibly misrepresent Turkey's participation in such an agreement as an acquiescence in the *fait accompli* of German military penetration of Bulgaria and even in the purposes thereof.

MACMURRAY

740.0011 European War 1939/8465 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, February 18, 1941—4 p. m.

[Received 9:25 p. m.]

33. The declaration referred to in my 31, February 16, 5 p. m., was signed here yesterday and released for publication abroad after midnight. I shall not telegraph the text unless so instructed.

The Foreign Minister was quoted as saying after the signature that the modest document which had just been signed would perhaps be susceptible of preventing new complications in the Balkans.

MACMURRAY

⁸ Not printed.

⁹ Signed at Athens, February 9, 1934, by Greece, Rumania, Turkey, and Yugoslavia; League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CLIII, p. 153.

¹⁰ Signed May 12, 1939; *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 347, col. 952.

740.0011 European War 1939/8473 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, February 18, 1941—4 p. m.

[Received February 19—6: 05 a. m.]

34. (1) Upon my presenting to the Prime Minister the text of the message contained in your telegram No. 14, February 14, 7 p. m., he asked me to convey to the President in his own name and that of his Government his cordial appreciation of that communication. Fixing upon the concluding reference to nations threatened with aggression he said that that was the case of Turkey and that he welcomed the opportunity to make quite clear the position of the Turkish Government: from the very first it had wholeheartedly committed itself to the purposes and ideals with which both Great Britain and the United States are identified; it had not in any way changed from that viewpoint which it would support to the end even if compelled to fight; but that it naturally hoped that circumstances would permit its being spared actual participation in the war and must furthermore take account of its own limitations in case such participation were forced upon it and must consider in the light of actual developments what action on its part would best serve the common cause; the lack of adequate military equipment for the time being excluded the possibility of any but strictly defensive action; for such defense against possible attack it was keeping its forces at full strength and was spending (apart from the British and French credits) to an extent that caused actual privation to its people. He asked whether Turkey might look forward to receiving materials from the United States and I replied that in view of the terms of the message I thought that not impossible.

(2) He asked whether there prevailed in the United States any idea that the Turkish Government was wavering in its attitude. I said I did not believe there was any such feeling in official quarters but that there frankly was evidence that such an idea existed in some minds and that I understood an American broadcast had interpreted yesterday's joint declaration with Bulgaria as indicating that Turkey would stand aloof regardless of what German action in Bulgaria might be. The Prime Minister at once controverted that interpretation explaining that the actual effect of the declaration was to bind Bulgaria to unconditional neutrality towards Turkey, whereas the latter's obligations to Great Britain in any eventual contingencies were safeguarded. I asked whether obligations under the Balkan Entente were also contemplated and he answered in the negative and explained that the Entente was no longer of any immediate practical concern since the submergence of Rumania.

(3) When I asked what would be Turkey's attitude in the event of an untoward development of German activities in Bulgaria short of an immediate threat to the Turkish frontier he said that that must depend upon the circumstances that developed and that he could not in advance be any more categorical than to say that his Government would within the limits of its possibilities endeavor loyally to meet its obligations and responsibilities.

Repeated to Sofia.

MACMURRAY

767.74/118

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Murray)

[WASHINGTON,] February 20, 1941.

The Turkish Ambassador¹¹ called on me by appointment yesterday and left the attached official text,¹² in French translation, of the lately negotiated Turco-Bulgarian nonaggression agreement. The Ambassador confirmed my understanding that the present agreement is in fact a reaffirmation of the substance of an earlier one negotiated as long ago as 1925.¹³ He added that he had in fact been instrumental in the negotiation of the earlier agreement.

Mr. Erteğün said he was somewhat disturbed by American press reaction to this agreement since it seemed to impute rather sinister designs to Turkey which he felt sure were not justified. He added that while he was not officially informed as to the circumstances surrounding the present agreement, he was confident there were compelling reasons which motivated the agreement at this time. Mr. Erteğün went on to say that a critical situation has existed for some time along the Turco-Bulgarian frontier where there had been large concentrations of troops on each side. The present agreement would undoubtedly result in the withdrawal of the troops on both sides, and Turkey was now assured that even if she should be attacked by Germany, Bulgaria would not participate in the attack.

Mr. Erteğün went on to say that Turkey was not prepared to launch an offensive-defensive action in order to prevent the entry of German troops into Bulgaria. If she had endeavored to take such action she would have inevitably come into immediate conflict with Germany outside Turkish territory and would have run the risk of being attacked simultaneously by Soviet Russia. Such a development could

¹¹ Mehmet Münir Erteğün.

¹² Not attached to file copy of memorandum.

¹³ Signed at Ankara, October 18, 1925, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. LIV, p. 125.

not possibly have been in the best interest of Great Britain, who is certainly not in a position to assist Turkey adequately in any such crisis. Turkey is prepared and determined to stand fast at the Dardanelles in order to block Germany's passage into Asia. If Turkey meanwhile runs the risk of defeat in endeavoring to block German passage into Bulgaria, the chief bastion of British defense in that area might collapse and the whole of the Near East and Asia would be at Germany's feet.

As far as Bulgaria is concerned, the Ambassador said he had great sympathy for her in her present dilemma and added that if he were a Bulgarian he would pursue no other course. Bulgaria had been defeated, mutilated and disarmed in the first World War and had never been allowed to equip herself properly for defense even against countries far less powerful than Germany. It was a great misfortune, in his opinion, that the various Balkan countries which had seized Bulgarian territory after the World War had consistently refused to compensate Bulgaria sufficiently in order to induce her to join the Balkan Entente. The Balkan Entente as it was finally set up without Bulgaria was in fact a sort of "gang-up" against that little country to prevent its regaining any of its lost territory. If Bulgaria could have been brought into the Entente, a fairly impressive bloc of Balkan countries determined to stand on their own feet and to exclude the pressure and intrigues of the Great Powers could have come into being and the present developments might have been avoided. But with Bulgaria left dissatisfied and receiving her first encouragement from the Germans when the Dobrudja was returned to Bulgaria by Rumania under German pressure, the present developments became inevitable.

The Ambassador closed his conversation with an expression of his earnest hope that this war could be terminated before it was too late to prevent a world disaster. With a smile, he said he realized such talk was regarded in this country as "Fifth Columnist", but he was nevertheless persuaded that unless some early settlement could be reached all of Europe, including his own country, would sink into a chaos like that of the Dark Ages and that we would be unable to prevent the Bolshevization of the entire Continent of Europe. I may say that the Ambassador has on several occasions taken this line and he seems to be obsessed with the idea that the only hope for the world is for the United States to announce its views as to a just settlement and, if necessary, impose it. In reply to my observation that a peace settlement at this juncture would necessarily be a Hitler peace, he stated that in his opinion any settlement would have to take into account that some of England's claims are "unjust" and some of Germany's are "just." The problem, said the Ambassador, was to do justice to all.

740.0011 European War 1939/8558 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, February 21, 1941—2 p. m.

[Received February 22—7: 15 p. m.]

37. In response to my inquiries the Secretary General of the Foreign Office¹⁴ yesterday gave me his views as to the significance of and bearing of the joint declaration with Bulgaria in the elaboration of which he had had a principal part. He recalled that this country had long been desirous of a better understanding with Bulgaria. He then told me that last November Sobolev, Secretary General of the Soviet Foreign Office, had visited Sofia on a mysterious errand which the Turkish Government learned was a proposal to enter into a pact of mutual assistance directed professedly against Turkey—a proposal which there was even some reason to believe had been gilded with an offer to assure to Bulgaria a portion of Turkish Thrace. The Turks had taxed Molotoff¹⁵ with making this proposition in violation of the Russo-Turkish agreement of 1929¹⁶ and he had protested that the matter had gone no further than mere soundings of the Bulgarian reaction to the possibility of danger not from Turkey herself, but from some combination (scilicet with the British) in that direction. Although the Bulgarians had rejected these Soviet overtures this incident had given the Turkish Government occasion for a new impetus in the effort to establish a greater confidence in the relations with Bulgaria—an effort strongly encouraged by the British who hoped it might develop as basis for mutual support among the Balkan States not already overrun by Germany. The Turkish Government had therefore initiated and carried on in constant consultation with the British negotiations for some sort of an understanding. It had proposed at first to give this the form of a solemn reaffirmation of the intention of each country to maintain its independence and neutrality along the lines of the joint declaration of January 13, 1940 (my despatch No. 1346, January 30 [1940]¹⁷); but the Bulgarians had refused this as being under present circumstances too obviously and provocatively directed against Germany. The Turks had finally proposed that a new declaration might be built upon the basis of the existing treaty of amity of 1925 (see High Commissioner's despatch No. 1919, May 29, 1926¹⁷) amplified by a statement that the policy of both Governments was to abstain from any aggression and qualified by a reservation as to the existing commitments of each of the parties.

¹⁴ Numan Menemencioğlu.¹⁵ V. M. Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.¹⁶ Signed at Ankara, December 17, 1929, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CLVII, p. 361.¹⁷ Not printed.

They had presented this formula as a summing up of their position but with really no expectation that it would prove acceptable in view of the course of the negotiations; and they had been astonished accordingly when on the 15th of this month the Bulgarians proposed signing promptly a declaration on that.

2. Numan Bey was frank to admit that the declaration fell short of what could have been desired since it had been necessary to work with a Government which is not sure of the support of its own people and which is distracted by German pressures and by Russian intrigues. But he maintained it was at least moderately helpful to the situation and expressed disappointment and even resentment that in both Great Britain and the United States there seemed to be a tendency to adopt the interpretation promulgated by German propaganda that the purpose and effect of the declaration is to give assurance that Turkey has disinterested herself in whatever may happen elsewhere in the Balkans and thus given the Germans a green light to go through Bulgaria against Greece. He maintained that the reference to both parties abstaining from aggression meant, and was fully and explicitly understood by the negotiators on both sides to mean, aggression in any quarter and specifically aggression against Greece; and that similarly it was understood that the word aggression covered assistance to an aggressor and specifically a consent to Germany's using Bulgarian territory as a base of invasion. He therefore considered that the declaration obligates Bulgaria not to attack or permit its territory to be used for the purpose of an attack on Greece (although he conceded that Bulgaria may well find it politically and militarily impossible to make any effective resistance or obstruction to German action).

He furthermore pointed out that the reservation as to existing obligations is in effect unilateral since Bulgaria has no such engagements whereas Turkey has thereby maintained her freedom of action with regard to her commitments to Great Britain, the Balkan Entente and Greece: the reservation may therefore be construed as a warning by Turkey that she is prepared to live up to those obligations in case Bulgaria should so act as to bring them into question. As to obligations under the Balkan Entente Numan gave a statement perhaps more professional than that of the Prime Minister as reported in my No. 34 of February 18, 5 [4] p. m.: he said that although of no practical present utility since Rumania's defection it is nevertheless still juridically in force and regarded by Turkey as binding and susceptible of being appealed to by any of the parties who may deem such an appeal useful in their own interest.

3. He furthermore said that his Government had expressly informed both the Bulgarian Minister and the German Ambassador

that the establishment of German armed forces in Bulgaria would be a grave matter which Turkey could not regard with indifference.

4. Despite the satisfaction manifested in official circles and its reflection in the inspired press, the indications are that Turkish opinion generally is inclined to regard the declaration as, at any rate, a means of temporizing in an acute situation and is not disposed to be critical of the Government for postponing an evil which is perhaps inevitable. Local British opinion deplores the fact that an agreement not bad in itself has in the end taken a form that lends itself so readily to misrepresentation. The local Axis representatives are jubilant.

Repeated to Sofia.

MACMURRAY

740.0011 European War 1939/8581 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, February 24, 1941—4 p. m.

[Received 9:43 p. m.]

40. The following is a translation of an interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs published in this morning's semi-official *Ulus* in reference to the divergent interpretations placed upon the recent Turkish-Bulgarian declaration.

"Nothing has changed in Turkish policy; Turkey remains faithful to her alliances; she is determined to live on good terms with all the Powers, particularly with her neighbors. Turkey could not remain in any way indifferent to foreign activities which might take place within her zone of security; Turkey would oppose by arms any aggression which might be directed against her territorial integrity or her independence.

"The Turco-Bulgarian accord is an understanding between the two States whose desire is to safeguard their own peace and stretch out their hands cordially to each other declaring that they have nowhere any aggressive purposes whatsoever. Any desire that might be manifested under the same circumstances for the realization of a like aim would also be welcomed by Turkey with the same eagerness."

Repeated to Sofia.

MACMURRAY

767.74/116

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

[WASHINGTON,] February 25, 1941.

The Turkish Ambassador called to see me this morning at his request. The Ambassador said that he was calling by instruction

of his Government to make clear in an official way to this Government the position of Turkey in view of the misinterpretation which had been given in the American press to the recent pact concluded between Turkey and Bulgaria.

The Ambassador delivered to me the public statement made by the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs as conveyed to the Department by Ambassador MacMurray.¹⁹ He further stated that, as I knew, the negotiations between Bulgaria and Turkey for a non-aggression pact had been going on for some three or four months and that the sole objective on the part of the Turkish Government in concluding the pact was to secure the assurance that in the event Turkey was obliged to defend herself against German aggression, the fifteen Bulgarian divisions would not be used against Turkey. The Ambassador seemed to feel that the pact recently concluded provided satisfactory assurances in this sense.

I asked the Ambassador for his interpretation of certain portions of the Turkish Foreign Minister's public statement, notably that portion which declared that Turkey could not view with indifference activities of other powers within Turkey's "zone of interest". I asked whether I was to understand that this meant that in the event Germany undertook aggressive action against Greece, Turkey would render assistance to Greece both because of this statement and because of Turkey's existing engagements to Greece, which the same statement said remained unimpaired.

The Ambassador replied that it should be regarded as clear that both Bulgaria and Greece were within the Turkish "zone of interest". He said, however, that what action Turkey would take in the event that Germany occupied Bulgaria or entered the war against Greece would depend necessarily upon practical considerations. He said that Turkey above all did not wish to make the same mistake as that made by France and undertake to fight on strategic lines which had not been prepared in advance. The Ambassador said that for defensive operations, Turkey believed that their existing lines of defense, as well as the natural Turkish terrain, were admirably fitted for successful operations but that the movement of Turkish forces outside of these lines of defense was another matter. Whether the Ambassador was completely informed or not, I gained very definitely the impression that his own personal belief was that the material assistance which Turkey might give Greece in the event that Germany moved against Greece would be of very little significance.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

¹⁹ For statement sent by Ambassador MacMurray, see telegram No. 40, *supra*.

740.0011 European War 1939/8614 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, February 25, 1941—10 a. m.

[Received 11:25 p. m.]

41. Following for Secretary, Under Secretary.

1. Through what I believe to be an entirely trustworthy intermediate source I am informed that a junior official of the German Foreign Office recently called in the Turkish Ambassador to Berlin^{19a} and made to him a statement along these lines: Hitler had summoned the Yugoslav Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs to Berchtesgaden for the purpose of apprising them of Germany's intentions with regard to the Balkans and the necessity of access to the Aegean Sea and warning them that Yugoslavia must count upon the fact that since the fall of France Germany is the sole great power on the European Continent and that it would be an illusion to suppose that Soviet Russia could be played off against her. The Turkish Government for its part should likewise realize and be guided by the state of facts thus indicated. Despite the persistently unfriendly attitude of the Turkish press the German Government is prepared to be tolerant with respect to Turkey's pro-British sympathies and even of such things as taking British generals on tour of inspection so long as no British forces are admitted; but Germany is prepared to take immediate action against Turkey if she permits so much as one British plane to base upon her territory.

2. There is some reason to believe on the other hand that the British have been urging the Turks to permit the establishment on Turkish territory of forces corresponding unit by unit with those which the Germans may establish in Bulgaria. The Turks have with apparent reason pointed out that their air and other bases have not yet been developed to the point they would suffice for effective military operations and that meanwhile the basing of even minimum forces on this territory would entail reactions which the British themselves would not be prepared to meet: they are altogether cooperative in preparing the necessary facilities but definitely unwilling to let anything be started before means of finishing it have been provided.

3. I have gathered the impression that the British diplomatic and military authorities here alike feel that their Government is trying to hustle the Turks faster than their temperamental and technological situations would justify and are inclined to advise the British Government that it would be wiser not to arouse in them a feeling of resistance but to rely rather upon their response to their impulses of self-interest and their sense of loyalty which in spite of their wariness

^{19a} R. Husrev Gerede.

and shrewdness in minor matters can be counted on to keep them faithful to the alliance and assure their eventual cooperation to the fullest extent of their potentialities.

MACMURRAY

740.0011 European War 1939/8673 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, February 27, 1941—4 p. m.

[Received February 28—8 a. m.]

46. For the Secretary and Under Secretary.

1. My British colleague²⁰ invited me yesterday to a talk with Sir Anthony Eden,²¹ General Dill²² and himself which I would sum up as follows:

2. Eden spoke with appreciation of his contacts with Mr. Hopkins²³ and of the good that Colonel Donovan²⁴ had accomplished in this region. I said that I felt Donovan's bird's-eye view of the Balkans and Near East had been of great help to us in the field as giving a broader frame of reference for our ideas and interpretations of events and that he had also served a very useful purpose in bringing to the Turks, for instance, first-hand information of American intentions and capacities which they might have read about in the press but had never quite realized. He then said that Donovan's observations of the situation in this area had been of great help to the British.

3. He asked my opinion whether the loyalty of the Turks could be counted on. I replied (along the lines of the third paragraph of my No. 41, February 25) that I thought it could, . . .—that they might haggle and even cause many headaches about their performance of one thing or another that they had undertaken to do but that they would prove staunch and courageous in carrying out their fundamental obligations. I told him of the Premier's query whether American opinion was in doubt of Turkey's loyalty (see my 34, February 18, 5 [4] p. m.). He said he realized the Turks were abnormally sensitive on that point.

4. He asked how they had received the two communications of the President's views that I had recently had occasion to present to them (your Nos. 12 and 14²⁵). I acknowledged that neither of these com-

²⁰ Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen.

²¹ British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

²² Gen. Sir John G. Dill, Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

²³ Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to President Roosevelt.

²⁴ Col. William J. Donovan, unofficial observer for the Secretary of the Navy in Southeast Europe and the Near East, December 1940–March 1941.

²⁵ Dated February 9 and February 14, p. 815.

munications had elicited any marked reaction on the part of the Turks who are perhaps too isolated from American thought to be able to relate these communications to our policy and to realize their potential significance. He asked whether they had not reacted to the suggestion that we might make our material resources available to them. Upon my answering that they had not seemed especially impressed he asked whether they had not realized as England did that American industry would tip the balance in the war. . . . He remarked that it was not just a question of equipment but equally of technical ability in using it and Dill interposed that he understood the Germans had reckoned on 4 years to create and train an armored division. Both assumed that Turks were not yet even aware of their deficiencies in this regard.

5. Speaking incidentally of military prospects both Eden and Dill seemed to take for granted that Bulgaria would be a base of German operations against Greece and/or Turkey as soon as the condition of the ground should permit. When Hugessen said Turkish staff estimated that would be about mid-April Dill remarked that would give British several more weeks than they had reckoned on and Eden added that every day would count.

6. In expectation of further contacts I refrain from interpretation or comment for the time being.

MACMURRAY

740.0011 European War 1939/8711 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, March 1, 1941—8 p. m.

[Received March 2—5: 18 p. m.]

49. For Secretary and Under Secretary. Pending receipt of expected more comprehensive information I have reason to believe Eden and Dill convinced themselves it would in their own interest be disadvantageous to have Turkey participate in war under present circumstances and that they reached altogether frank and friendly understanding with Turks that they should not declare war even in event of German invasion of Greece but unless attacked should hold aloof for present although making preparations (along lines not yet fully worked out) for eventual participation. See third paragraph my 41.²⁶

MACMURRAY

²⁶ Dated February 25, 10 a. m., p. 825.

740.0011 European War 1939/8817

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] March 3, 1941.

The British Ambassador²⁷ called at his request. I inquired of him what he knew about the Balkan situation and prospective movements of the various interested countries in that area, to which he replied that he had nothing from his Government on the subject. The Ambassador proceeded very definitely to inquire whether this Government would supply Turkey with war materials direct or whether it would have to be done by or through Great Britain. I replied that it is my understanding that this Government would contemplate the fullest feasible measure of cooperation in supplying materials to Turkey under appropriate circumstances, but that I would confirm the matter by further conferences and advise the Ambassador at an early date.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

740.0011 European War 1939/8750 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, March 3, 1941—5 p. m.

[Received March 4—5 : 30 a. m.]

50. I found the Minister of Foreign Affairs unperturbed as usual this morning although quite plainly stating his opinion that the German occupation of Bulgaria²⁸ brings to the very frontiers of Turkey a situation for the creation of which there can be no purpose except as it is directed against her as well as against Greece and Yugoslavia; he assumed that the Germans must intend either by force or by menaces to make Turkey subservient to their designs whether those be confined to controlling the Straits or involve more far-reaching objectives such as the Iraq oil fields or India or the Suez Canal. He repeated that Turkey would in any case resist to the utmost any such attempt.

2. He acknowledged surprise that the Bulgarian Government had adhered to the Axis and therewith consented to an immediate occupation; he had expected that the Bulgarians would yield under protest to the German demands only after perhaps another month of real or feigned opposition. To my question whether this Government regarded that adherence as compatible with the recent joint declaration with Bulgaria he unequivocally stated the opinion that it was a gross violation of that declaration as well as of international law.

²⁷ Viscount Halifax.²⁸ Beginning March 1; for correspondence on this subject, see vol. I, pp. 294 ff., *passim*.

3. Beyond expressing his Government's entire satisfaction with their results he avoided all discussion of the recent conversations with the British.

MACMURRAY

740.0011 European War 1939/8752 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, March 3, 1941—7 p. m.
[Received March 4—5:35 a. m.]

51. Availing itself of article 6 of the Montreux Convention²⁹ (without considering it necessary to issue any declaration that it considered itself threatened) the Turkish Government had the Istanbul port authorities issue on February 25 a notification making pilotage compulsory in the Straits.

2. The Minister for Foreign Affairs today informed me that this action had been taken because of the decision to place barriers against submarines in both the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.

3. When I commented that Russia might be somewhat sensitive about any restrictions upon traffic through the Straits he rather sharply answered that Turkey does not have to consider Russian or other sensibilities in making provision for her own safety. To my query whether the matter had been taken up in any way with the Russians in advance he replied negatively and added that to do so would have implied that this Government was seeking permission for such action.

MACMURRAY

740.0011 European War 1939/8782 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, March 4, 1941—1 p. m.
[Received 10:35 p. m.]

52. For Secretary and Under Secretary. From authoritative source I have confirmed substantial accuracy of my 49, March 1, although I have not yet received fuller details as to results of Eden mission.

MACMURRAY

867.24/147

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] March 7, 1941.

The British Ambassador, accompanied by the Australian Minister,³⁰ called at his request.

²⁹ Convention regarding the regime of the Straits, signed at Montreux, July 20, 1936, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CLXXIII, p. 213.

³⁰ Richard G. Casey.

With respect to the Ambassador's former inquiry as to whether this Government would aid Turkey direct or through Great Britain, the Ambassador said that he had unexpectedly come in contact with the President and brought this matter up at that time. He added that the President had indicated it would probably be preferable for us to aid Turkey through Great Britain.

The Ambassador handed me a copy of a telegram (attached), received from his Government, relative to the matter.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

[Annex]

The British Embassy to the Department of State

TELEGRAM FROM LONDON DATED FEBRUARY 23RD, 1941

As you are aware, under the Anglo-Franco-Turkish Treaty of Mutual Assistance special agreement annexed thereto we are under an obligation to provide Turkey with war material of 25 million pounds including material urgently required in order to enable her to withstand an attack against her European frontiers. As originally signed the Treaty contained a suspense clause whereby Turkey was absolved from fulfilling her obligations until such time as she had received her urgent armament requirements. The stipulations of this clause were declared fulfilled in January 1940 largely as a result of the agreement on definite programme of armaments deliveries drawn up between a Turkish Military Mission and the French and British Governments in December 1939. Following the collapse of France our delivery of certain items e. g. anti-aircraft guns has been delayed and in certain cases (e. g. fighter aircraft), suspended indefinitely. French supplies ceased altogether and Turkey has failed to obtain such vital defence equipment as anti-tank guns, machine guns, and anti-aircraft guns promised in large quantities by the French but never delivered.

2. Hitherto in spite of repeated offers of assistance recently made by His Majesty's Government to send British anti-aircraft units and air squadrons to Turkey the Turkish Government has taken up the attitude that the assistance which we have so far given is not sufficient to enable her to risk action that might provoke a direct German attack. She adds that it might have been different if the armaments promised her had been supplied but as things are she does not yet consider herself as in a fit position to withstand successfully a German attack.

3. It is impossible above all to any appreciable extent to supply Turkey from Empire sources and it is therefore necessary if she is to be induced to intervene in the near future that she should be able to

draw on the United States. The sure knowledge that American aid will be given may well tip the scale in a crisis.

740.0011 European War 1939/8892 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 9, 1941—1 p. m.

[Received 3:15 p. m.]

455. I understand that the Soviet Ambassador at Ankara has intimated to the Turkish Government that the Soviet Government is prepared to "enlarge its policy towards Turkey". My informant interpreted the phrase to mean that the Soviet Government would be prepared to discuss the delivery of war material to Turkey in the event of a German attack. He gave it as his opinion that the Soviet Government was motivated less by fear of a German attack on Turkey and its consequences than by the fear that Turkey might join the Tripartite Pact.³¹

STEINHARDT

740.0011 European War 1939/8952 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray)

WASHINGTON, March 14, 1941—5 p. m.

28. Colonel Donovan reports from London that the Turkish Government has been notified by Russia that the latter will not join with Germany in any attack on Turkey if Turkey should defend itself against Germany.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/9148

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] March 15, 1941.

The Ambassador of Turkey called and said that he had endeavored to reach me last Monday, but that I was too busy with emergency matters.

He came to report to me and this Government the substance of the communication from Hitler to the President of Turkey. On Tues-

³¹ Signed at Berlin by Japan, Germany, and Italy, September 27, 1940; for text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. ccrv, p. 386.

³² İsmet İnönü.

day, March fourth, last, the German Ambassador at Ankara called on the President at the former's request and presented a message from Hitler, who said that he was in the war against the will of the German Government; that he made it a point to destroy British influence on the continent of Europe, and to do so he was taking precautionary measures not to let Great Britain get to Greek territory. Hence he had asked Bulgaria for troop movement privileges, and Bulgaria, knowing that this move was not directed against Turkey, gave her consent. Hitler assured Turkey that these movements were not directed against the independence or territorial integrity of Turkey. On the contrary, Hitler said that his purpose was friendly cooperation with Turkey in the future, as the two countries had cooperated in the past when Turkey was struggling for existence. Hitler stated that he had no territorial ambition in that area; that he would evacuate Bulgaria as soon as the danger was over; that these two countries (presumably Greece and Bulgaria) were bound to the association with Turkey and Germany in the economic field, and that in the territorial arrangements to be made after the war, Germany would not antagonize Turkey, and for these reasons, he, Hitler, had given orders to German troops in Bulgaria that, in order to avoid any misunderstanding, they should stand at a distance from the Turkish frontier, unless measures taken by Turkey compelled Hitler to change this attitude as his decision to oppose Great Britain's going into Greek territory was unalterable.

I thanked the Ambassador and requested him to express our appreciation to his Government and the President of Turkey for this valued courtesy. I then said that this communication from Hitler was taken out of his stock on hand of similar communications, which he has been sending to each of the twelve occupied or conquered countries, and which he seems to contemplate sending to countries whose seizure he has in mind in the future. The Ambassador smiled and very promptly spoke his assent.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

740.0011 European War 1939/9166 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, March 19, 1941—5 p. m.

[Received 5:55 p. m.]

67. [For] Secretary and Under Secretary. I have just been able to confirm from Secretary General of Foreign Office substance your 28, March 14 (which incidentally my Soviet colleague had previously denied).

It appears that upon returning to Moscow after coming here to see Eden, Cripps³³ informed Russian Foreign Office he had found Turks apprehensive lest Russia attack them in event of German attack and suggested giving reassurance. Vishinsky³⁴ accordingly gave Turkish Ambassador formal assurance that in such event Soviet would respect existing nonaggression pact and refrain from any hostile action against Turkey provided latter resisted. Turkish Government expressed gratitude and volunteered precisely reciprocal assurance.³⁵

Numan remarked that reaffirmation of existing obligation added no new element to situation save insofar as it conveyed implication that Russia would be glad to have Turks defend Straits for her benefit.

Repeated to Moscow, Athens, Belgrade.

MACMURRAY

740.0011 European War 1939/10172

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) to the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Murray)

[WASHINGTON,] March 21, 1941.

MR. MURRAY: General Burns,³⁶ who is acting for Harry Hopkins during the latter's absence, called me on the telephone this morning to tell me that the British Government had requested this Government to make available to Turkey under the terms of the Lend-Lease Bill,³⁷ fifty 155-millimeter howitzers and 18,500 rounds of ammunition. General Burns inquired whether we had any objection from the standpoint of policy. I said none whatever—quite the contrary. You may wish to mention this confidentially to the Turkish Ambassador.

740.0011 European War 1939/9228: Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, March 21, 1941—noon.

[Received 5:50 p. m.]

73. The Minister of Foreign Affairs and the British Ambassador returned yesterday from an elaborately and successfully concealed absence of 3 days during which they visited Cyprus for conference with Eden at his invitation. Despite rather sensational speculations

³³ Sir Stafford Cripps, British Ambassador in the Soviet Union.

³⁴ Andrey Vyshinsky, Soviet Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

³⁵ Similar information was received in telegrams No. 504, March 15, 9 a. m., and No. 523, March 17, 7 p. m., from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (740.0011 European War 1939/9055, 9096).

³⁶ Maj. Gen. James H. Burns, executive to the Assistant Secretary of War for Air and member of executive committee of the Army and Navy Munitions Board.

³⁷ Approved March 11, 1941; 55 Stat. 31.

as to this conference I understand it dealt not with any new projects but with the opportunities and modalities for carrying out plans previously discussed.

MACMURRAY

740.0011 European War 1939/9232 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, March 21, 1941—1 p. m.

[Received 11:20 p. m.]

74. Following for Secretary and Under Secretary. Probably for reason of military secrecy and perhaps in part because of rather negative character of results as reported my 49, March 1, my British colleague has not given me expected fuller and more concrete information concerning Eden's visit (my 46, February 27). All indications I have received from that and other sources, however, seem to confirm that agreement was reached among British, Greeks and Turks upon strategic plan in which it would be Turkey's part to remain non-belligerent (save in case of attack upon her territories) at least until her army can be more fully equipped and air fields further developed.

2. Greek Ambassador has said to me that while regretting Turkey is not in position to afford more positive assistance against expected German attack his Government recognizes she could under actual conditions play her part most usefully in that way. And Numan Bey yesterday remarked to me that idea of Turkey's despatching troops into Greece was academic—that it could only waste limited forces this country can oppose to Germans in defense of its own integrity and as bastion for protection of the Near East.

3. Above appreciation of Turkish position on eve of expected German drive into Greece I was ready to send when I learned of Cyprus conference (my next previous telegram³⁹) and was withheld until I could learn its bearing on situation. I have now gathered that conference contemplated no new development save insofar as British sought to prevail upon Turks to encourage apparent stiffening of Yugoslav temper of resistance against German pressure by new overtures promising Turkish support in event of drive toward Saloniki which would equally threaten both countries. There was discussed but not definitely decided proposal that in such event Turkey should declare war against Germany, bring alliance with Britain into effect and make air bases available to British forces. I venture to hazard conjecture nothing substantial will result.

³⁹ *Supra.*

4. In strictest secrecy I may add that Turks have learned their diplomatic codes have been broken down by Germans and there is reason to believe that tingle tangle of cross purposes in their negotiations with Yugoslavs has probably been due at least in part to falsification of instructions to their Sofia Embassy and of its reports.

Repeated Athens, Belgrade.

MACMURRAY

740.0011 European War 1939/9576

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] March 24, 1941.

The Turkish Ambassador called to see me this evening at his request. The Ambassador stated that some weeks ago he had given to Secretary Hull for the confidential information of this Government the contents of the message received by the President of Turkey from Hitler.⁴⁰ The Ambassador said that he now wished to convey in the same confidential way to this Government the contents of the reply made by President Ismet İnönü to Hitler, adding that this information was being conveyed solely to Great Britain and to the United States.

The contents of the reply of the President of Turkey, which was delivered to Hitler by the Turkish Ambassador in Berlin, was in general as follows:

Thanks were expressed for Hitler's message and for the reminder therein of the association of Germany and Turkey in the World War of 1914.

Attention was called to the policy pursued by the Turkish Government since that time which was stated to be one of peaceful evolution without the violation by Turkey of the rights of any other nations. It was emphasized that Turkey had followed this policy scrupulously since the outbreak of the present war in September 1939.

Turkey cannot view her independence and integrity as a matter to be determined by any other nation or by any combination of nations, nor can her independence or integrity be regarded as something contingent upon the victory of any other power.

Turkey will resolutely oppose by her armed forces any attack from whatever source upon her national territory.

Turkey has proved her firm determination to safeguard her rights and her independence by the conclusion of her defensive alliance with Great Britain.

The policy pursued by the Turkish Government with regard to the Balkan countries has been a policy intended to further the maintenance of peace in the Balkan peninsula. The Turkish Government notes that Germany declares that this is the German objective.

⁴⁰ See memorandum by the Secretary of State, March 15, p. 831.

From the assurances given to Turkey by Germany in this regard, the policies of Germany and Turkey with regard to the Balkan peninsula would seem to be parallel.

The German Chancellor will have to admit that the present changes in the situation of the Balkan countries are due to causes completely alien to the policy pursued by the Turkish Government.

If Germany respects the independence and integrity of Turkey, German and Turkish armies will not be brought face to face.

Hitler alleges that the German Government does not demand of Turkey anything incompatible with the declared policy of Turkey. The President of Turkey "takes note" of German assurances in that regard.

The Turkish Army will maintain vigilant guard on Turkish frontiers unless the German Government causes the Turkish Army to change that attitude. The Turkish President hopes that such a "catastrophe" will not occur.

In view of the message received from Hitler, the Turkish President believes the frank statement above conveyed to be fully justified. He expresses his hope that relations of mutual comprehension between Germany and Turkey as well as an attitude of "correctitude", which alone can make such relations possible, will exist.

In conclusion the Turkish President hopes that this interchange of views will make continued normal relations possible.

I expressed to the Ambassador my appreciation of the confidence in this Government shown by the information thus given and I expressed the hope that in the interest of the two countries these confidential exchanges of views would continue to take place whenever it was considered necessary and desirable.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

740.0011 European War 1939/9302 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, March 24, 1941—6 p. m.

[Received March 25—9 : 25 a. m.]

79. The following is a translation of a communiqué to be published in Turkish at Angora and in Russian at Moscow as soon as agreement on time of release has been reached (probably tomorrow) and it is meanwhile confidential.

"Declarations have recently been exchanged between the Turkish and Russian Governments; in consequence of news appearing in the foreign press to the effect that if Turkey were constrained to engage in war the Soviets would take advantage of the difficulties which she would have to confront by themselves attacking her; and in connection with a question asked on this subject the Soviet Government has informed the Turkish Government as follows:

(1) This news does not correspond in any way with the position of the Soviet Government.

(2) In the event that Turkey should actually be the object of an aggression and that she should find herself constrained to engage in war for the defense of her territory, Turkey could, in conformity with the existing nonaggression pact between her and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, count in that case upon the entire understanding and neutrality of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The Turkish Government has expressed to the Soviet Government its most sincere thanks for this declaration and has made known to it that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for its part in the event of finding itself in a like situation could count upon the entire understanding and neutrality of Turkey."

MACMURRAY

740.0011 European War 1939/9322 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, March 25, 1941—6 p. m.

[Received 10:15 p. m.]

80. For Secretary and Under Secretary. I now learn that at Cyprus conference reported in my 74, March 21, Turks agreed to make fresh overtures to Yugoslavs for conference as to possible joint action in event of attack upon Saloniki which, if latter agreed, Turks would be prepared to regard a "mortal danger" (rather than "casus belli" as attitude reported in my 39, February 24⁴¹ would have warranted expecting); but that in view of Yugoslav crisis reported in Belgrade's 219, March 21,⁴² Turkish Government suspended action on that undertaking and has only now consented under British pressure to send its Ambassador seemingly futile instructions to act thereon if he finds occasion suitable.

Repeated Athens, Belgrade.

MACMURRAY

740.0011 European War 1939/10172

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Murray) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

[WASHINGTON,] March 26, 1941.

MR. WELLES: During a call from the Turkish Ambassador this morning I conveyed to him in confidence the information contained in your attached strictly confidential memorandum.⁴³

⁴¹ Not printed.

⁴² Vol. II, p. 963.

⁴³ Dated March 21, p. 833.

The Ambassador informed me that Mr. Davidson, of the British Purchasing Commission in Washington, had been in touch with him regarding this matter and had requested him to sign at once certain documents which would presumably make available immediately to Turkey the fifty 155-millimeter Howitzers and the 18,500 rounds of ammunition. Among these documents was a letter which the Ambassador was expected to sign and to address to the President, promising on behalf of his Government that none of this material would be transferred to any third power without the consent of the President.

The Ambassador went on to say that since this development was an entirely new one, and since he had no instructions from his Government, he had thought it desirable as a first step to inform his Government thereof and to seek instructions and authority to sign any necessary documents.

The Ambassador added that he had not as yet had time to study the text of the Lease-Lend Act but that he had had the impression from statements made by the President and others that Turkey might not be in a position at present to qualify under the terms of the act as a recipient of such material. He would of course be happy if Turkey could so qualify but said he felt certain his Government would wish to be assured of this in advance before any requests of a written nature were made.

I told the Ambassador that I would be glad to pass this information along to you and to other competent officials of the Department and that upon receipt of a reply to his inquiry of his Government we would be glad to be of any assistance that might then become necessary.

WALLACE MURRAY

740.0011 European War 1939/10173

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Welles), to the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Murray)

[WASHINGTON,] March 27, 1941.

Mr. MURRAY: You may wish to discuss this in its legal aspects with Mr. Hackworth: ⁴⁴

My suggestion would be that we regard this as assistance to Great Britain under the terms of the Lend-Lease Bill and that as a part of this assistance we are at Great Britain's request making this material available to the Turkish Government. Obviously the way in which this is being done is a means of gaining time. I see no particular advantage to be gained by going into the questions raised by the Ambassador and it would seem to me that you might assure him in general terms that the action we are taking is being done at the in-

⁴⁴ Green H. Hackworth, Legal Adviser.

stance of and at the request of the British Government, while making it clear, of course, as you always do, that we are maintaining the deepest interest in the situation in Turkey and have a most complete assurance that Turkey will take every step necessary to ensure her independence and integrity.

740.0011 European War 1939/10171

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Murray) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

[WASHINGTON,] March 31, 1941.

MR. WELLES: Referring to my attached memorandum of March 26⁴⁵ and to your reply of March 27,⁴⁶ regarding the question raised by the Turkish Ambassador as to the applicability of the terms of the Lend-Lease Act to Turkey, I am sure you will be pleased to know that the Turkish Ambassador telephoned me this morning to say that, acting on his own responsibility, he was this day addressing a letter to the President, as suggested by Mr. Davidson of the British Purchasing Commission in Washington, promising on behalf of his Government that none of the material that might be made available to Turkey under the provisions of the Lend-Lease Act would be transferred to any third Power without the consent of the President.

The Ambassador went on to say that in reply to his request for instructions in this matter from his Government he had received a telegram today authorizing him to exercise his own discretion. The Ambassador had accordingly decided to take the action recited above.

I told the Ambassador that I was happy that he had come to this decision and I was sure that you would be likewise. In reply to a further question on my part the Ambassador stated that it would not be necessary in the circumstances to receive from us any specific response to the questions which he asked of me on March 26, as recorded in my memorandum of that date.

WALLACE MURRAY

740.0011 European War 1939/9717: Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, April 7, 1941—7 p. m.

[Received 7:01 p. m.]

90. [For] Secretary and Under Secretary. Although feeling in all Turkish circles is outraged by German attack on Yugoslavia⁴⁷

⁴⁵ *Ante*, p. 837.

⁴⁶ *Supra*.

⁴⁷ See vol. II, pp. 937 ff.

and Greece,⁴⁸ present indications point to this Government's maintaining a negative if not indeed aloof attitude unless its own territories are threatened or possibly unless Bulgaria joins in the German attack.

Repeated to Athens, Belgrade.

MACMURRAY

740.0011 European War 1939/9783 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, April 8, 1941—7 p. m.
[Received April 10—4:30 p. m.]

92. [For] Secretary and Under Secretary. A week ago I received visit from Rauf Bey (former Prime Minister) who, while keeping politically inconspicuous, is intimate personal adviser of President Ismet and whom I am disposed to believe President is using as informal medium for communicating his ideas through us to the British. He outlined to me as though they were his own private views following appreciation of situation as regards Turkey's attitude towards war: This Government has committed itself wholeheartedly to the British cause; even if there were doubt as to its wisdom that decision is nevertheless irrevocable. It is therefore prepared to do whatever it usefully can do to make that cause prevail. With utterly inadequate equipment now at its disposal, however, it could not hope to carry out successful operation beyond Turkish borders either in Bulgaria or in Greek Thrace. With that possibility excluded Rauf feels this country's best contribution to cause would be to remain on guard at its own borders to perform function that he, as old naval man describes (by somewhat loose analogy) as that of fleet in being. He said that British had for a long time misunderstood that viewpoint; they and French had made to Turks promises of all sorts of material assistance that had in fact proved impossible for most part to fulfill, but had gone on thinking that Turks could, at suitable moment, be projected into action in support of whatever plans might have been devised for them. Implication of this attitude that Turks particularly resented was that it seemed to indicate, on the part of British, distrust of their loyalty and desire to get them involved, if only for sake of committing them. This had led to certain degree of underlying distrust and shadow boxing until arrival of Eden and Dill at end of February. That gave opportunity for completely frank exchange of views which, although perhaps disappointing to British in that it made clear limitations upon possibilities of active Turkish military support, was nevertheless very satisfac-

⁴⁸ See vol. II, pp. 714 ff.

tory to them in that it dispelled previous doubts and enabled them to assess definitely Turkey's military potentialities and agree upon a clean-cut allocation to her of a fixed, though relatively passive, role in any operations that might be undertaken in Balkan area.

Rauf said he came to me just for sake of talking out with a friend his own apprehensions that Yugoslavia's abrupt turning against Axis which of course created new political situation might be taken by British as occasion for reopening military understanding with Turkey reached during Eden's visit, and that they might again try to push Turkey into attempting role which would involve defeat of Turkish Army, ruin of this country, and destruction of only bulwark against German invasion and domination of Near and Middle East.

2. When I saw Foreign Minister ⁴⁹ next day he was somewhat reserved about developments, but nevertheless, more categorical than he has ever been with me in stating that Turkish Army is not prepared for offensive action and must of necessity confine itself to purely defensive role. He insisted this country was already doing its part by containing on Thracian frontier 5 divisions or so of Bulgarians and (further back from boundary) perhaps as many as 10 German. I asked if there were any way in which Turkey and Yugoslavia could collaborate for mutual support. He answered only by pointing on map to Macedonia and asking rhetorical question whether Turks here could really help there. Saying that I quite understood that Turks might not think it good strategy to enter vacuum which Greeks and British seemed to have decided to create in Greece and Thrace I inquired whether his Government contemplated possibility of putting into operation its conditional alliance with Great Britain making air and naval bases available to British forces and entering upon what would indubitably be state of war with Germany. He replied negatively and (as I think with entire honesty) that his Government did not think that in immediate circumstances that would be helpful to cause.

3. In even more than usually outspoken talks with British colleague I have discussed these impressions and am disposed to feel that he and the various British missions that have actually been here are fully cognizant of situation of Turkish Army and in general sympathetic with military policy based thereon. (Whereas London authorities have suggested possibility of persuading Turks to send a few divisions to Greece as symbol of unity with British, Greeks and Yugoslavs, British diplomatic and military representatives here have not urged this directly because conscious that it might dangerously arouse Turkish obstinacy against any appearance of pressure but have confined themselves to intimations that Turks might be well advised in their own interest to do something of the sort.)

⁴⁹ Sükrü Saraçoğlu.

4. I now understand from him, however, that since German attack on Yugoslavia and Greece he feels that Turks are showing tendency to translate that policy of merely defensive military action into one of political aloofness that balks even at giving any statement of continuing moral solidarity. Immediately on receipt of news of German and Italian declarations he saw Foreign Minister to ask his views and received intimation that nothing in Turkey's attitude had been changed thereby; he recalled Minister's assurance to him (my 17, January 24) that this Government would regard attack upon Saloniki from any quarter as *casus belli* and was amazed to find Minister (for first time in his experience with him) evasive to the point of professing not to recollect such assurance and not even prepared to declare that such attack would be "mortal danger" to Turkey (see my 80, March 25). Minister appears to have been equally noncommittal and aloof with Greek and Yugoslav Ambassadors. All three seem to be seriously perturbed lest Turkey's passivity create impression of her having dissociated herself from what she herself has hitherto urged as common cause.

5. At Hugessen's instance I conveyed today to Rauf as my personal observation impression that British still adhere to Eden's assurance that as regards military action they have nothing to ask of Turkey but that they (as well as other friendly observers including American journalist) seem to sense on the part of officials and inspired press sudden chill in Turkey's sympathy towards her allies; and I contrasted this Government's failure to give even confidential word of reassurance to Ambassadors of its allies at this new crisis with the expressions of sympathy and helpfulness which on this and previous occasions our own Government has promptly and spontaneously offered to Balkan countries although under no like obligations to them. He remarked that criticism was destructive and asked what constructive step could be suggested. Indicating I did not feel it was for me to suggest anything more concrete I hoped that Turkish Government was bearing in mind great psychological danger of maintaining politically negative attitude which would create among her friends impression of indifference or lukewarmness. He said that if British had any feeling that Turkey was not doing her full part in that respect Hugessen should see President and thresh matter out with him before such difference of opinion could develop into mutual suspicion. I have passed on this suggestion.

6. By way of summary statement of situation as I conceive it from this viewpoint I submit following:

(a) Turkey is desperately anxious to avoid hostilities but will fight (perhaps inefficiently but courageously and doggedly) if attacked.

(b) If she fights her military effort will not be directed (like Poland's) towards do or die defense of any particular line or holding of any city. . . . I think they have made up their minds to possibility

that their Cakmak line (at frontier with Bulgaria) might either be broken by frontal attack or turned from Greek Thrace that they would have to fall back to so-called Catalca line and might then have to retire to positions dominating Bosphorus and Dardanelles and perhaps have to retreat into Anatolia and carry on war of harassment and attrition.

(c) This situation might have been different (as possibly it may still be) in event of fulfillment British promises of material assistance. Turks accept without resentment fact that French could do nothing and British only part of what they had undertaken to do in equipping Turkish Army; but as case stands they have had to base plans upon fact that in spite of admirable combative spirit their army must measure and use its strength according to its possibilities in terms of modern warfare and that they must not let themselves be persuaded into attempting more than they can really do.

7. For reasons substantially different from what our more sophisticated Turkish friends expound I wholeheartedly agree with their conclusion that in interest of cause it would be far wiser to let them stay neutral until defensive part is forced upon them. . . .

Repeated to Athens.

MACMURRAY

740.0011 European War 1939/9791 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, April 8, 1941—midnight.

[Received April 9—12:30 p. m.]

93. Under instructions British Ambassador today made formal request to Turkish Government to break off relations with Germany and Italy and to deport or intern their nationals.

2. Stating that Bulgarian troops had been found participating in attacks on its territory Yugoslav Government had its Ambassador call upon Turkish Government to fulfill its obligations under Balkan Entente.

3. German Ambassador is understood to have renewed his assurance that military operations now in progress are not in any way directed against this country and to have stated that Bulgaria will not participate in operations against either Greece or Yugoslavia.

Repeated Athens.

MACMURRAY

740.0011 European War 1939/9748 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray)

WASHINGTON, April 9, 1941—6 p. m.

39. Your 91, April 8, 5 p. m.⁵⁰ Reports recently made public here state that the Yugoslav Minister in Ankara^{50a} has informed the

⁵⁰ Not printed.

^{50a} Iliya Shumenkovich.

Turkish Government that Bulgarian troops have joined in the attack on Yugoslavia, implying that Turkey is being called on to implement the Balkan Entente. Please comment.

The Department would appreciate being kept informed as fully and continuously as possible regarding Turkey's position vis-à-vis present developments in the Balkans.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/9828 : Telegram

The Chargé in Germany (Morris) to the Secretary of State

BERLIN, April 9, 1941—7 p. m.
[Received April 10—9:10 a. m.]

1370. The Turkish Counselor definitely states to me today that Turkey would not enter the Balkan war unless attacked by Germany. He said this was not only his personal conviction but he was convinced that it was the policy of Ankara. He remarked that Turkey had consistently urged upon its neighbors the creation of a Balkan alliance which would have been able to oppose a force of 5 million soldiers to German aggression. The Balkan States, however, including Yugoslavia had declined to participate in such a defensive bloc and accordingly Turkey was now obliged to follow an independent course and concern herself only with her own self-defense. As regards the possible objection that if Germany defeated Yugoslavia and Greece she would then turn on Turkey, he said that Turkey would be ready and able to defend herself particularly now that she was assured of Russia's neutrality. Turkish policy was completely identified with that of Great Britain but Ankara could not implement that policy until she was certain the British could extend really adequate military assistance to Turkey which he quite clearly indicated Britain was not now in a position to do.

In a recent conversation the Turkish Ambassador has intimated to me much the same viewpoint so forthrightly expressed by his Counselor. I have the impression that whether or not the views above expressed reflect Turkey's settled policy, it is the line which the Turkish Ambassador here has recommended that his Government should follow.

MORRIS

740.0011 European War 1939/9897 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, April 11, 1941—6 p. m.
[Received April 12—2:50 a. m.]

96. For Secretary and Under Secretary. While reserving possibility of subsequent qualification of my first impressions I feel I

should at any rate make interim report on surprising change of mood on part of Turks which has perhaps been in progress somewhat longer but has become painfully obvious within past week, most noticeably since invasion of Yugoslavia. Up until then temper of officials and press was serious, determined and serene. They now manifest tendency to speak as if they had written off all interest or responsibility in Balkan situation in consequence of folly of their neighbors in failing to respond to Turkish leadership in formation of common front and assume what seems extravagant air of unconcern and levity about situation. This sense of change in Turkish feeling is shared not only by my colleagues (of all shades of opinion other than Axis) whose opinions are worth consulting but also by foreign journalists who from their own viewpoint are convinced something important is afoot. Those who like myself have been most confident in essential staunchness of Turks feel disappointed and anxious and close to sense of disillusion. For this feeling there is as yet no very tangible basis, apart from a few incidents (such as permitting German reconnaissance planes on various occasions to fly unopposed over Thrace and even as far inside border as Bandirma) which might be explained on other grounds, this Government seems not to have taken any definite action or attitude inconsistent with its obligations; but then on the other hand conspicuously failed or evaded doing or saying anything which would have confirmed at this critical time its solidarity with Allies. They had reconciled themselves (certainly reluctantly but I think wisely) to fact that Turkey would be most useful to common cause in remaining militarily on defensive. But whereas they felt Turkey might at least have gained for her allies a few precious days of time for preparation against German thrust into Greece by some manifestation of moral support fact is that this Government has gone out of its way to evidence its unconcern about anything outside of its own borders. Allied Ambassadors (as well as French who is gravely concerned about possible effects in Syria) are apprehensive lest this Government should prove to have no interest in common cause beyond protection of its own territories—an interest purely egoistic in itself although undoubtedly of great strategic importance.

2. Lest I convey false impression I should add that despite current rumors neither I nor any of my interested colleagues have reason to believe that Turks have gone over to Axis or are likely to do so; our real apprehension is as to lack of wholeheartedness in their cooperation.

Repeated to Athens.

MACMURRAY

740.0011 European War 1939/9931 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, April 12, 1941—11 p. m.

[Received April 13—2:47 p. m.]

98. [For] Secretary and Under Secretary. British Ambassador has been greatly reassured and heartened by very frank talks which he had yesterday with Foreign Minister and today with President İnönü.

2. In first of these he spoke unreservedly of aloofness and chill that has recently come over Turkish attitude and has set going everywhere rumors that this country is drifting towards Axis. Saraçoğlu in equally candid reply explained that British demand for breaking off relations with Germany and Italy had revived Turks suspicions that British were trying to push them into war despite Eden's promise. He said no political proposal such as rumored offer of nonaggression pact had yet been made by Germans although he rather expected it would be sooner or later.

In conversation with President (in which Foreign Minister and General Cornwall took part) solidarity of interests was apparently taken for granted and discussion turned almost wholly upon military aspects of present situation and developments to be anticipated. Cornwall just back from inspection of Thracian frontier defenses frankly pointed out that Cakmak line along Bulgarian frontier would prove no more than a trap as soon as floods in Maritza had gone down enough to permit crossing of that undefended boundary by German armored divisions already based on Dedeagac: and he even urged withdrawal to Catalac line. Both he and Hugessen were convinced of President's wholehearted sincerity.

3. I believe Cornwall (who it is understood would command British forces in event of operations here) has reported home his judgment that Turkey's involvement under present circumstances could result only in quick disaster and that every effort should be made to postpone it at least until next year.

4. I also understand that he has persuaded to acquiescence in this view certain Yugoslav staff officers now here on secret mission who had urged British to put pressure upon Turks to create diversion.

5. Greek Ambassador is also understood to be considerably reassured as to Turkish attitude. On recent request from him Turkish Foreign Office has recently intervened successfully with German Embassy to arrange for return from refuge in Turkish territory of Greek local officials and police to no man's land between frontier and advanced German forces.

Repeated Athens.

MACMURRAY

740.0011 European War 1939/10052 : Telegram

The Chargé in Germany (Morris) to the Secretary of State

BERLIN, April 17, 1941—8 p. m.
[Received April 17—5:26 p. m.]

1479. The German Ambassador to Turkey Von Papen is reported to have left Ankara for Istanbul on his way to Berlin. A source which has wide connections in official circles says this means the first step in endeavoring to force the Turkish Government to come to terms and that high official circles are confident of succeeding as a result of the altered military and strategic situation in the Near East.

MORRIS

740.0011 European War 1939/10093 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, April 18, 1941—4 p. m.
[Received April 19—12:50 a. m.]

101. Turkish opinion seems to have made substantial recovery from demoralization reported in my 96.⁵¹ I am still at loss to understand that rather unedifying divagation but some factors primarily responsible were: first, shocked and even panicky realization of ruthless effectiveness with which Germans had bombed Belgrade; second, fear that withdrawal of British from Cyrenaica demonstrated they were only good enough to beat Italians but not stand up to Germans; and third, genuine and comprehensible feeling on part of Turkish leaders that Britain was trying to force their hand despite understanding with Eden (my No. 98⁵²). Now that this last point seems to have been cleared up one has impression that word has been passed down to political and press circles to assume less negative tone.

There has at any rate in past few days been evident in editorials of journalists who are also politicians and mouthpieces of administration more of familiar self-confident attitude and cessation of tendency to skirt around all questions of Turkey's sympathies and obligations and in justification of her apathy to find someone to blame for present disheartening situation in Mediterranean area—either one or more of Balkan neighbors for not having heeded Turkish advocacy of common front, or British for not having given sufficient support, or (strangely and irritatingly) ourselves for not yet having put Yugoslavia or Turkey in possession of needed military equipment. This last criticism is still more or less bandied about although so far as I

⁵¹ Dated April 11, 6 p. m., p. 844.

⁵² Dated April 12, 11 p. m., p. 846.

know Turks have not even yet specified what equipment they want from us. But their mood seems on the whole to be restored to normal and I hope that wounds caused in minds of their allies and friends may have healed even though they leave some scars.

Repeated Athens.

MACMURRAY

740.0011 European War 1939/10370 : Telegram

The Chargé in Germany (Morris) to the Secretary of State

BERLIN, April 26, 1941—5 p. m.

[Received April 27—10:48 a. m.]

1611. In conversation with the Turkish Ambassador today I learned from him that Von Papen had had several conversations with Hitler but had received from him no indication of a definitive attitude towards Turkey. Von Papen expects to be called again by the Chancellor and to return to Turkey within a few days. The Ambassador expressed the belief that Von Papen is a sincere friend of Turkey and insofar as he can will advise against any strong pressure on that country. The Ambassador derived from him the impression that Germany will not ask for unmolested passage of its troops, at least under the circumstances that exist today.

I told the Ambassador that some sources had given me to think that the question of passage of German troops through Turkey was intimately tied up with and would ultimately depend upon the relative success or failure of the German-Italian forces to break through Egypt to the canal. The Ambassador said that he shared this view. Failure in Egypt would probably lead to a pressure on Turkey for free passage. He added that the Turkish policy would not change from its determination to fight rather than yield although it was doing everything it could to placate Germany short of a surrender of its honor which would be involved in yielding either to threats or blandishments in respect of German interference in its sovereign position. He pointed out, for example, as the best recent proof of this, the fact that Turkey had calmly stood by and watched Bulgaro-German forces occupy Eastern Thrace the bulk of whose population is Turkish.

The Ambassador further pointed out that Turkey is acquiescent in the restoration of direct rail communications between Berlin and Istanbul and if Germany will supply the iron and steel Turkey will undertake its share of necessary railway work.

This representative has had a long career in Germany and while probably not pro-Nazi undoubtedly is ready to advocate a policy of

appeasement anywhere short of the point of violation of his country's independence.

Repeated to Ankara.

MORRIS

740.0011 European War 1939/10689: Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, May 6, 1941—8 p. m.

[Received 10:14 p. m.]

132. Outlining the situation from the viewpoint of the Turkish Government the Secretary General of the Foreign Office yesterday remarked that it had discounted the probability that the British would have a bad time of it this spring and summer and that their recent setbacks in Greece and North Africa did not impair Turkish confidence in their ability to hold out and turn the tide next year. He admitted, however, that the events of the past month had increased the potential danger to this country: from Dedeagatch as well as the captured Greek islands the Germans were now in a position not only to exercise a negative control over the Straits but to blockade Turkey's whole Aegean coast; and that in combination with the blocking of traffic over the Baghdad line by the events in Iraq this meant that Turkey could no longer count on any regular line of supply for necessary importations from either the United States or the British Empire and must therefore rely upon very inadequate previous accumulations.

2. He went on to say that despite this unfavorable situation his Government was prepared to face realistically whichever of the various alternatives Von Papen might present on his return (supposedly the 7th). He might perhaps ask that Turkey renounce or dilute its alliance with Great Britain or enter into some agreement which would put this country under bonds to Germany or even open Turkish territory to the passage of German troops.

Numan said that his Government could not entertain any of these proposals. If, however, the Germans were to propose any arrangement whereby Turkey would maintain a position of "neutrality" that implied no impairment of its territorial integrity and political sovereignty, his Government would be prepared to lend a cautious ear to any concrete proposals. The implication of his remarks was that while prepared to go a long way in "appeasing" the Germans the Turks nevertheless intend to make a stand at the point where Germany might ask for the passage of troops or make any other demand incompatible with the complete sovereignty of this country.

3. With regard to Soviet Russia he reaffirmed that (as reported in my 104, April 22, 4 p. m.⁵³) no initiative has been taken by either side

⁵³ Not printed.

towards bringing about closer relations. He was not disposed to give credence to the persistent reports that Germany is about to attack Russia.

4. He said that this Government is in close touch with that of Iran and has indeed considerable influence with it; he is confident that that Government is maintaining a correct neutrality and that there is no danger of that country's aligning itself with Germany.

MACMURRAY

740.0011 European War 1939/10977 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, May 15, 1941—5 p. m.

[Received 6:22 p. m.]

151. I understand that Von Papen who had returned the previous day saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs day before yesterday and renewed the assurances of Germany's friendly intentions with regard to Turkey; he stressed in particular that the occupation of the Greek Islands and possible further developments along similar lines in the Eastern Mediterranean were matters of temporary military necessity not directed against this country and presenting no threat to its interests, and he quoted Hitler as offering the assurance that in the peace settlement Turkey would be consulted as to the arrangements to be made in respect of the territories so affected.

He also referred to the desire of his Government to increase the commercial exchanges between the two countries.

His interview with President İnönü yesterday is believed to have followed the same lines.

MACMURRAY

740.0011 European War 1939/11120 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, May 19, 1941—noon.

[Received May 20—4 a. m.]

156. For Secretary and Under Secretary. As stated not only to me but to other more directly interested Ambassadors present attitude of Turkish Government is that it desires and intends to remain nonbelligerent unless its territory is attacked or its sovereignty or honor are threatened by demands such as: (a) to join Tripartite Pact; (b) to conclude nonaggression treaty with Germany; (c) to renounce its alliance with Britain; or (d) to permit passage of troops. I still believe that this formulation of Turkey's position represents sincere convictions and intentions of leaders of Turkish policy.

2. Although this does not in substance differ from what I have hitherto reported as last ditch position to which this Government has (to my mind realistically and wisely) retired through almost 2 years of gradual abatement of former exaggerated presumptions of power and influence in Southeastern Europe, I nevertheless cannot but feel that it is to be understood and interpreted now in somewhat different light or at least with different nuances since that position was adopted, say couple of months ago. There has in meanwhile occurred demoralizing realization (see my 96, April 11 and 101, April 18) of perils and horrors of warfare undreamed of in experience of this warlike people; and it would appear that despite substantial recovery of morale the intellectual and emotional ferment which it produced has not yet worked itself out in Turkish mind. I cannot otherwise account for fact that rather banal flattery in Hitler's speech of May 4 about genius of Atatürk⁵⁴ and realistic policy of Turkey's present leaders have been quite generally seized on by Turkish press as persuasive evidence that Germany has no aggressive intentions and occasions for rather servile protestations of "loyalty" of this country's neutrality. Although it needs watching, however, I do not think this new slant of somewhat superficial press (which has perhaps merely overdone its job on official intimations to "pipe down a bit" in its tone towards Germany) should be taken too seriously.

3. Of far greater actual or potential significance is almost imperceptible change in attitude of Turkish administration towards the British, scarcely to be detected amidst formulas retailed by Foreign Office officials but more nearly tangible in private conversation of other influential personalities such as an official "elder statesman" Rauf Bey. While they have none of them said outright any of these things I venture to summarize in this way my inferences from what has been said both to me and to members of my staff.

Although it were only upon material grounds Turks have no alternative but to be faithful to their alliance with British because they can hope for national survival only in event of British victory. They can be useful to British cause as guardians of this gateway to Near and Middle East but only on defensive; they cannot do the impossible and are puzzled and hurt by vacillations of British policy which at one moment agrees that they must reserve their forces for that task and next importunes them to do something that would lay them open to head on clash with Germans which would destroy their usefulness for agreed purpose. They are perhaps over sensitively inclined to attribute these importunities to British distrust of

⁵⁴ Kemal Atatürk, former President of Turkey.

their loyalty and consequent desire to commit them by armed involvement against Germany.

Up to quite recently Turks (who had never wavered in their confidence in ultimate success of British morale and particularly of sea power) had relatively detached attitude of rooters at football game who saw other team doing most of scoring but nevertheless felt sure their side would win; but past 6 weeks or so had changed it all from exciting game to life and death reality.

British had agreed to give them tanks and guns and planes, had pleaded inability to deliver them, had sent them to Greece and had then told the world that these things had been sent with foreknowledge that they would be lost in hopeless campaign. Why should not they have been sent to Turkey.

Granted British Navy had been busy in evacuating Imperial forces from Greece; but why had it so completely ignored overshadowing strategic importance of Greek Aegean Islands and permitted them to be occupied to almost hopeless disadvantage not only of its own freedom of action in that sea but also of Turkey's defensive arrangements including air bases which Turks had prepared with British collaboration near western coast. How did they even ignore Turkish warnings of German and German-controlled vessels going out through Straits to participate in operations which gave Germans control of Aegean and its shores.

Why were British stupid enough not to take Arab tribal feuds as they found them but to make issue of Iraqi domestic quarrel with result of stirring up hornets' nest that threatens to close Turkey's sole dependable channel of supply from Britain or elsewhere.

4. Turkish leaders seem to have come to sudden quite comprehensible realization that they are very junior partners in joint enterprise whose affairs may indeed be conducted on lines that seem to them to take insufficient account of their particular interests.

Those close to President who have said things permitting of these interpretations have further gone on to imply that if such ideas came to prevail they might impair confidence in pro-British policy for which he is responsible and thus undermine his unquestioned leadership and destroy sense of national unity. With a people whose intense nationalism is still immature and overemotional this possibility cannot be ignored.

5. While professing again my own belief that Turks will prove staunch in any final test I must in frankness report that in this faith (possibly diversified by doubt) my British colleague and I are almost alone; most of our colleagues whose opinions are worth ascertaining are disposed to feel that they will flinch under increasing German pressure. Although I must admit that ferment of Turkish opinion has taken

developments I had not foreseen I am, nevertheless, not yet persuaded that it represents any change in fundamental position on essentials rather than mere shift of stance in meeting unanticipated set of day to day events.

MACMURRAY

867.24/150 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, May 24, 1941—1 p. m.
[Received May 24—11:45 a. m.]

168. In view of the frequent complaints of the local press previously reported (although not shared in informed official circles) as to our alleged slowness in furnishing aid to Turkey and other small countries and of my lack of any definite information on the subject, I should appreciate being informed more specifically as to the nature and extent of the aid mentioned in your telegram No. 72, May 17, 4 p. m.,⁵⁵ as having been already extended to Turkey under the Lease-Lend Act and as to any arrangements for such aid in future.

MACMURRAY

740.0011 European War 1939/13013

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] June 15, 1941.

The British Ambassador called to see me this morning. Lord Halifax gave me to read a telegram he had received from his Foreign Office indicating that the Turkish Government was about to sign a so-called nonaggression pact with Germany.⁵⁶ The British Government asked most urgently that the American Ambassador in Ankara indicate to the Turkish Government what a disastrous effect upon American public opinion this step would involve.

I said that I would be very glad to send a telegram in that sense at once.

The Ambassador subsequently sent me further telegrams he had received from his Government on this subject which gave more detailed information with regard to the negotiations in progress between Turkey and Germany.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

⁵⁵ *Post*, p. 936.

⁵⁶ See *aide-mémoire*, *infra*.

740.0011 European War 1939/19391

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

Towards the end of May His Majesty's Government learnt that the German Ambassador at Angora had invited the Turkish Government to open conversations. The object of these conversations appeared to be the maintenance of Turkish neutrality in the event of a German-Soviet war, and German neutrality towards Turkey. The Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs assured His Majesty's Ambassador that the Anglo-Turkish Alliance would be safe-guarded; His Majesty's Government nevertheless felt considerable anxiety about these negotiations, which they conveyed at repeated intervals to the Turkish Government.

On June 14th, the Minister for Foreign Affairs showed the British Ambassador the rough draft of a proposed agreement, which was as follows:

Article 1.

Germany and Turkey undertake to respect mutually the integrity and inviolability of their territories and abstain from all action which would be aimed either directly or indirectly at either contracting party.

Article 2.

Germany and Turkey undertake to put themselves amicably into contact in future on all questions touching their common interests, in order to bring about an understanding on such questions.

A third article would deal with the duration of the agreement.

After strong pressure from the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, the German Government reluctantly agreed to a clause in the preamble safeguarding existing agreements, but without any specific reference to the Anglo-Turkish alliance.

The British Ambassador has been instructed to see the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs urgently and speak to him on the following lines:—

It is obvious that Germany wants this agreement in a hurry as part of the pressure which she is now bringing to bear on Russia. The Turkish Government should not allow themselves to be rushed into concluding this agreement at a moment when there is no direct German military threat to Turkey and when the situation on Turkey's southern frontier has greatly improved owing to the restoration of the situation in Iraq and the good progress made in Syria.

However innocuous the agreement may appear the mere fact of its conclusion at this moment would create the worst possible impression everywhere. Moreover, Article 2, seems to preclude Turkey from taking any action with regard to Syria without consulting Germany.

His Majesty's Government could not countenance any agreement of this kind unless there were included in it an explicit statement safeguarding the Anglo-Turkish Treaty.

WASHINGTON, June 15, 1941.

740.0011 European War 1939/12134b : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray)

WASHINGTON, June 15, 1941—4 p. m.

90. This Government has learned from a secret source, which it believes completely reliable, that secret negotiations have been in progress between the German and Turkish Governments which may result in an agreement by Turkey to enter into an ostensible "non-aggression pact" with Germany.

You are requested at the earliest possible opportunity to make it clear to the Turkish Government that any weakening at this time of the position taken by Turkey in opposing the spread of German aggression and any subsequent change in the policy of Anglo-Turkish cooperation would, of course, have a disastrous effect upon American public opinion. As the Turkish Government knows, it has now received valuable deliveries of war material as a result of the operation of the Lend-Lease Act of the United States. Such deliveries could, of course, not be continued in the event of any change in present Turkish policy.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/12105 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, June 15, 1941—4 p. m.
[Received June 16—11:15 a. m.]

192. For Secretary and Under Secretary.

1. My British colleague promises me that he is asking his Government to repeat to Lord Halifax for communication to you his telegram reporting probable early conclusion between Turkey and Germany of a sort of non-aggression pact proposed with some insistence by Von Papen last Thursday, which would in its preamble conspicuously make reservation of existing commitments of both Governments (i. e., on the part of Turkey her obligations under Treaty of Alliance with Britain).

2. This would be somewhat suddenly concretized result of conversations which (with cognizance of British) Turks have for several weeks been carrying on with Germans with a view to keeping Turkey

out of war, at least for time being, in accordance with policy on which Eden and Dill came to definite agreement with Turks and to which their Government still adheres in spite of occasional vacillations.

3. My impression is that Hugessen does not consider this development unfavorable in itself although he is mildly critical of the Turks for in final stage of their talks with Germans reached point of committing themselves without full consultation with British Government. I gather, however, that he fears his Government . . . may misinterpret their action as indicating breach of Turkey's psychological position and first step towards alienating her loyalty to alliance.

4. I am myself inclined to agree with his viewpoint that Turks are only trying . . . to follow what they have reason to believe is common policy of Turks and British. But it is impossible to forget disastrous effects of Turks going off on tangent of their own and outsmarting themselves in nonaggression agreement with Bulgaria last February (my number 36⁵⁷).

5. Hugessen relates sudden insistence of Germans upon some sort of understanding with Turkey to imminence of German attack upon Russia.

Repeated Bucharest, Moscow.

MACMURRAY

740.0011 European War 1939/12097 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, June 15, 1941—6 p. m.

[Received June 16—7: 55 a. m.]

193. For Secretary and Under Secretary. My next preceding telegram.⁵⁸ Hugessen has just shown me his Government's instructions to Halifax directing him to take up with you question of instructing me to try to dissuade Turks from concluding agreement with Germans at this juncture and to intimate threat to withhold from Turkey supplies under Lease and Lend Act. I am fully in accord with idea that we should make an attempt (even though not hopefully) to dissuade this Government from giving Germany psychological advantage which would accrue from signature of any political agreement whatsoever. But I feel strongly (and add for your private information that Hugessen concurs) that it would be mistake to accompany such representations with threat suggested which I am sure would irritate Turks . . .

2. If you wish me to take matter up with Turks I suggest that I be authorized to do so rather along line that proposed agreement with

⁵⁷ Not printed.

⁵⁸ *Supra.*

Germany would surely be misunderstood by American opinion as indicating weakening of Turkey's solidarity with Britain and would tend to make more difficult any eventual cooperation between her and United States.

MACMURRAY

740.0011 European War 1939/12125 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, June 16, 1941—7 p. m.
[Received 9:18 p. m.]

195. Your 90⁵⁹ (which crossed my 192 and 3 of yesterday) reached me in course of conversation in which British Ambassador showed me his 1464 to Foreign Office repeated to Washington reporting conversation yesterday with Foreign Minister from which it appeared Turks are irretrievably committed to conclude without delay proposed agreement with Germany provided latter approves Turks' draft text which it now has under consideration. Utmost Minister feels able to promise is drawing out of negotiations in event that Germany proposes some modifications of draft.

2. Hugessen considering that Turkish decision is irrevocable feels strongly that best that can be made of bad matter is to accept situation with as good grace as possible, to prepare Allied and neutral opinion to receive it as the legalistically innocuous document which it is rather than as evidence of alienation of Turkish sympathies with Britain, and above all to avoid antagonizing Turks by any expression of disapproval on part of British Government and its friends.

3. I myself fully share his feeling that now that it is clear Turks have definitely obligated themselves it is too late to say to them anything which would not actually be harmful; and in spite of categorical nature of your instructions I have felt warranted, in view of intervening developments, in withholding action until further instructed by you.

MACMURRAY

740.0011 European War 1939/12134c : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray)

WASHINGTON, June 16, 1941—9 p. m.

92. Department's 90, June 15, 4 p. m. and your 192, June 15, 4 p. m. and 193, June 15, 6 p. m. The Department accepts your judgment that it would be undesirable to refer to the possibility of termination

⁵⁹ Dated June 15, 4 p. m., p. 855.

of aid under the Lend-Lease Act and the instructions contained in the Department's 90 are modified accordingly. Please use your best endeavors to dissuade the Turkish Government from signing the proposed pact, using the arguments outlined in the second sentence of the Department's 90 and in paragraph 2 of your 193.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/12195 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, June 18, 1941—11 a. m.

[Received 11:25 a. m.]

196. For Secretary and Under Secretary. The understanding foreseen in my 192, 15 instant was hastily initialed yesterday about noon upon Von Papen's informing Foreign Office that his Government accepted Turkish draft incorporating in preamble saving clause as to obligations under alliance with Britain and it is expected to be signed tonight after receiving party approval and be made public after midnight.

Repeated to Bucharest and Moscow.

MACMURRAY

740.0011 European War 1939/12196 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, June 18, 1941—5 p. m.

[Received 11:40 p. m.]

197. Your 92⁶⁰ crossed my Nos. 195⁶¹ and 6.⁶² Meanwhile British Ambassador has shown me copy of his Government's telegram to Halifax directing him to request you to instruct me to make no effort to dissuade Turks from signing agreement but to support British insistence upon Turks making some public statement clarifying fact that it implies no weakening of Turkish alliance with Britain. Feeling confident that intent of your instructions was that I should give such assistance as possible to British in this diplomatic crisis as it has actually developed I have again felt warranted in varying from letter of your instructions and accordingly in interview with Foreign Minister this noon urged only that he take every possible care to avoid misconception particularly part of American public opinion.

2. Although he was most emphatic that alliance continues and will continue unimpaired and that full reservation of Turkey's obligations

⁶⁰ Dated June 16, 9 p. m., p. 857.

⁶¹ Dated June 16, 7 p. m., p. 857.

⁶² *Supra.*

thereunder is made in proposed pact with Germany he gave me impression of failing to realize adequately necessity of counteracting psychological impression to the contrary, which agreement is likely to produce, and over-timid about making any statement so deliberate and explicit as to risk antagonizing Germans. It appears that as result of Hugessen's and my own conversation with him best that we can hope is that he will tomorrow morning make a statement in general terms to representatives of British and American press and will be prepared to reply affirmatively to question whether reservation in preamble includes British Alliance and thus leaves it unimpaired.

3. More detailed report of interview will follow.

4. Minister is instructing Ambassador to explain Turkish position to you.

Repeated to Bucharest, Moscow.

MACMURRAY

740.0011 European War 1939/12241 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, June 18, 1941—10 p. m.

[Received June 19—9:30 p. m.]

198. In a hastily arranged interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs⁶³ this noon I informed him that I had received from him word of your having learned from a good source of the proposed early signature of a Turco-German nonaggression pact and had been instructed to see him immediately and to say while you were not informed of its terms and would not wish to be understood as implying any judgment as to its implications, you were nevertheless fearful that the signature of such a pact might be misconstrued with disastrous effect by American public opinion as indicating a change in the Turkish policy of solidarity with the British. I, therefore, urged that with this possibility in mind he take every available step to clarify the Turkish position.

2. Referring further to rough notes he then made in reply a statement along these lines: Turkey is and will remain the ally of Britain and that relationship will be in no way affected by the proposed agreement which is the outcome of conversations initiated by him with the German Ambassador approximately 6 weeks ago with the entire cognizance and acquiescence of the British Government, which has all along been kept fully informed. Most of the discussion had turned upon the Turkish insistence upon the inclusion in the preamble of the agreement of a clause which would adequately safe-

⁶³ Sükrü Saraçoğlu.

guard Turkey's obligations as the ally of Britain. He stated that although this clause was theoretically reciprocal it had in fact no significance as regards anything but Turkey's treaty with Britain, and that that fact was fully understood between the Turkish and German negotiations. After outlining to me the terms of the agreement he stated that while contributing towards enabling Turkey to stand aloof from the war it did not in any degree detach her from the alliance.

3. Conceding that the legal aspects of the matter might be adequately safeguarded I insisted that the concern which you felt and which I must endeavor to impress upon him was as to the psychological effects upon American opinion which I repeated might well be disastrous. He said he thought any misconception could be avoided by a mere word explaining that the safeguarding clause effectively preserves the alliance unimpaired. Ignoring his casual remark that it seemed to him that it was for our Government to take care of American opinion I endeavored to persuade him that the most authoritative and explicit statement on behalf of his Government seemed necessary. He said he proposed to deal with the matter by calling in tomorrow morning the representative of Reuter and giving him a formal interview which should be sent to the British press and turned over by him to the representatives of the American press. I made this the occasion for asking if I might be frank enough to tell him that it seemed to me that there was a grave danger of the Turkish Government's alienating American opinion and that it seemed to me most desirable he should make every effort to present the matter in the way that would be most convincing and acceptable to the American press: if he chose to give his statement in the form of a press announcement rather than a more formal official declaration in the name of his Government, he should at least give such an announcement to the American press representative here. Despite my insistence that he receive all of them for the purpose I could get him to go no further than say that he would favorably consider talking with some selected correspondent on behalf of the American journalists.

4. In a further endeavor to bring home to him the importance of the matter from the standpoint of American opinion, I recalled that the administration had already been subjected to widespread and severe criticism for having dissipated its material assistance among various countries more or less aloof from the conflict instead of concentrating its entire efforts upon furnishing to the British everything that could be spared from our own needs; and I asked him to realize the difficulties which would be created for our lend-lease policy if the opinion were to become current that Turkey had lost interest in the struggle

for the purpose of which we were supplying materials to her. He retorted that no American materials had in fact been furnished; on the basis of such information as I have had from you I assured him that he was mistaken as you had informed me that large quantities of materials were already on their way; he dismissed the particular question with the incredulous remark that at any rate he had no knowledge of anything having been delivered as yet.

5. At the conclusion of our conversation he remarked that the situation naturally appeared very differently to Americans thousands of miles away and to Turks who hoped to be spared at least as long as possible from the war which they had already seen ruin other small nations on their very borders.

Repeated to Bucharest, Moscow.

MACMURRAY

740.0011 European War 1939/12220 : Telegram

The Chargé in Germany (Morris) to the Secretary of State

BERLIN, June 19, 1941—11 a. m.

[Received 1:40 p. m.]

2430. It was announced last night that a 10-year Pact of Friendship has been signed at Ankara between Germany and Turkey in which after reserving their existing obligations the two Governments undertake to respect each other's integrity and territorial inviolability and to take no measures directly or indirectly against each other. They further agree to consult each other in a friendly manner on all questions affecting their common interests. Simultaneously notes were exchanged over negotiations to be initiated for a new economic agreement and a joint declaration was issued to the effect that the press and radio of the two countries would give due consideration to the regulation of friendship and mutual confidence now established.

The German press this morning devoted unusual prominence to this news and describes the pact in lengthy editorials as a victory of both German and Turkish diplomacy over Anglo-Saxon machinations. The newspapers recall the traditional friendship of Turkey and Germany culminating in their brotherhood in arms in the last war and declare that both the lively trade and the high mutual respect which were built up in the Kemalist era, especially after 1933, were "temporarily interrupted" by high pressure propaganda and diplomatic and economic inducements on the part of Great Britain. The pact it is asserted marks the end of this estrangement and shows that Turkish realistic statesmanship and German forbearance have reestab-

lished the natural comradeship between the "forger of the new order and the guardian of the Straits."

There is an obvious effort to impress on the German public that this development is a great diplomatic victory which will round out the military successes in the southeast and to present it to the outside world as marking a major stage in the history of the political prosecution of the war. Both the timing of the pact and the extraordinary publicity given to it appear to be designed in part to give nourishment to the speculation current in Germany and abroad regarding the present state of German-Soviet relations.

Repeated to Moscow and Ankara.

MORRIS

740.0011 European War 1939/12222 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, June 19, 1941.

[Received June 20—3:24 a. m.]

199. (1) The following is a translation of the French version of the Turco-German Treaty⁶⁴ as published by the semi-official Anatolian Agency signed last evening.

Turkey and Germany animated by the desires to establish their relations upon a basis of mutual confidence and sincere friendship have decided while reserving the already existing engagements of each of them to conclude a treaty and for this purpose have named as their respective plenipotentiaries to wit the President of the Turkish Republic, Mr. Sükrü Saraçoğlu, Deputy of Izmir, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Chancellor of German Reich, His Excellency Mr. Franz von Papen, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Ankara, who after having exchanged their full powers found in good and due form have agreed upon the following provisions.

Article I. Turkey and Germany undertake to respect mutually the integrity and inviolability of their territories and to [abstain] from any action directly or indirectly against other contracting party.

Article II. Turkey, Germany undertake to enter into friendly contact in future in regard to all questions affecting their common interests in order to reach an agreement with regard to solution of such questions.

Article III. The present treaty which comes into force on the date of its signature will be valid for a period of 10 years. High contracting parties shall consult each other in due time with regard to question of its extension.

The present treaty shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged with the least possible delay in Berlin.

⁶⁴ Official text printed in Turkey's *Official Gazette*, No. 4849, July 2, 1941.

Done in duplicate in Turkish and German languages, the two texts having equal value, Ankara June 18, 1941.

(2) Upon the occasion of the signature of treaty Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs made the following statement to press.

Turkey and Germany which for centuries were never opposed to each other during the vicissitudes of world events and whose mutual positions have remained always clear and correct have just by the treaty the text of which is published today based their friendship upon the most solid foundation and confirm that in the future likewise they will not be opposed to each other.

Thus by this treaty the Turkish and German nations have once more shaken hands in a new atmosphere of absolute security.

As will be seen from the text the existing contractual obligations of the two parties are reserved and it is confirmed that these obligations are not opposed to the basic ideas of the treaty.

I welcome with great pleasure the signature of this treaty which constitutes an important historical document of friendship and on this occasion I consider it my duty to make special mention of the valuable efforts which my friend, Mr. von Papen, who knows my country very well, has exerted in order to arrive at this result.

In view of the conclusion of the negotiations for the treaty we are in accord with the Delegate, Ambassador von Papen, in expressing the desire that the publications of the press and the radio broadcasts of our countries be carried on in the spirit of friendship and mutual confidence which characterizes the relations between Turkey and Germany.

(3) German Ambassador made following statement to Turkish press through Anatolian Agency :

Happy conclusion of treaty which has just been signed gave His Excellency, Minister for Foreign Affairs, occasion to address to press certain remarkable words for which I thank him heartily. This treaty again confirms former relations of confidence and friendship which have united our countries for centuries and which were temporarily troubled only by misunderstandings concerning aims of policy which desires to give Europe a new and better order and a lasting peace. We should also consider importance of present treaty within framework of great historical events of our epoch. This agreement is at same time proof that German Reich and Allied Powers in their struggle for a new order based upon justice in Europe have resolved to assure to Turkey and to Turkish people who have always taken safeguarding of their independence as dominating principle of their foreign policy, place and influence due them as heritage of a long and glorious history and as a connecting link between the West and Near East. In praising constant efforts of my very honored friend, Minister for Foreign Affairs, for bringing this treaty to successful conclusion and in expressing to him my very sincere thanks I am very glad that decision of Chancellor of Reich and of Minister for Foreign Affairs of Reich has made it possible for me to sign this memorable document since in this way I am in a position after having fought in ranks of Ottoman Army and side by side

with sons of this nation for a great common cause to persevere henceforth in this task in field of peace. This country and this nation have always been imbued with unshakable sense of justice; we may also hope that despite all vicious propaganda there will develop a new comprehension of imperative necessity of process of historical regeneration which our generation is witnessing. As Minister for Foreign Affairs mentioned just now Government of Reich and Government of Republic in connection with occasion of happy conclusion of treaty are agreed in expressing desire that press of two countries as well as radio broadcasting stations of two countries will always be guided in their publications by spirit of friendship and mutual confidence which characterize German-Turkish relations.

MACMURRAY

740.0011 European War 1939/12250: Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, June 19, 1941—5 p. m.

[Received June 20—7:05 p. m.]

200. I am now in a position to report following background of Turco-German agreement:

Shortly after Papen's conversation with President İnönü reported in my 151, May 15, my British colleague frankly informed me he had reason to know there was something in the wind between Germans and Turks who were seeking to stave off as long as possible clash with Germany which they feel to be ultimately almost inevitable. In view of his Government's agreed policy of keeping Turkey out of war as long as possible he was disposed to take at least complaisant attitude toward such development provided it should imply no political commitment or involvement of this country; he thought something might perhaps be worked out on economic lines by way of barter agreement more extensive than those hitherto arranged and including even copper and other minerals (other than chrome) in exchange for German manufactures (particularly spare machine parts) urgently needed by Turkish industry. While matter was, however, in such nebulous stage that he asked me to consider his intimations as mere private background information until there should emerge at least some definite tendency in these discussions.

For some time the rather academic exchanges of views between Turks and Germans (of which Hugessen was kept informed) seemed to make no progress.

He then told me Turks had confided to him that Germans had orally proposed possibility of concluding pact directed towards keeping Turkey neutral in event of hostilities between Germany and Soviets although it was not clear whether Russia was to be specifically

referred to. Turks apparently did not treat this proposal very seriously; and he himself took attitude of letting them use that opening to explore German intentions. He again asked me to make no report of matter at stage not definite enough to be taken up with London. I should here interpolate what he later put to me quite bluntly that his Government feels it has reason for profound distrust of secrecy of our codes; see my 50, April 20, 1939,⁶⁵ to you and my April 27 to London presumably repeated to you.⁶⁶

At Foreign Office reception late in evening of 14th he took me aside to tell me he had to his amazement been informed by Foreign Minister few hours earlier that 2 days before Papen had urgently proposed text of a general non-aggression pact; that Minister had insisted any such agreement must contain clause (such as he had always demanded as condition to any eventual agreement) safeguarding alliance with Britain but had on that condition consented to refer question to higher authority; and that he had now received and communicated to German Ambassador (precipitately and without communication to the British) his Government's approval in principle (see my Nos. 192 and 193⁶⁷).

Since then position has developed with confusing rapidity; your instructions crossing my reports have been out of date on reaching me; and I have felt not only warranted but obligated to use my best judgment in applying to circumstances of moment intent rather than wording of even your very categorical instructions.

2. Conversations reported in later and less confidential of my telegrams of yesterday left upon my mind this disappointing set of impressions: (1st) that Turkish policy has evolved into less resolute mood than I have hitherto contemplated as possible; (2d) that Turks are naive enough to suppose that any harmful impressions upon opinion in United States, Britain, or elsewhere can be conjured away by mere statement there is no basis for them; and (3d) that they do not seem altogether to realize extent to which United States is party in interest in matters concerning war.

MACMURRAY

867.24/162

Memorandum by the Assistant to the Secretary of State (Gray) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

[WASHINGTON,] June 19, 1941.

MR. WELLES: When I saw him this morning, the Secretary asked me to pass along to you the following suggestion: that, in view of the

⁶⁵ Not printed.

⁶⁶ Telegram No. 574, April 28, 1939, 6 p. m., from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, not printed.

⁶⁷ Dated June 15, 4 p. m., and June 15, 6 p. m., pp. 855 and 856, respectively.

recent Turkish-German Pact, our position vis-à-vis, and relations with Turkey be reconsidered to the extent of getting the views of our own defense agencies and those of the British. The foregoing applies particularly to priorities and material furnished to Turkey under the lend-lease legislation.

C. W. GRAY

740.0011 European War 1939/12278 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, June 20, 1941—6 p. m.

[Received June 21—5:40 a. m.]

203. Referring to the third paragraph of my number 198, June 18, 10 p. m., it appears that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs yesterday morning called in Reuter's correspondent and on behalf of the Minister handed to him a statement in French "of which the following is a translation" to be treated as a report of an exclusive interview "(Question): Mr. Minister, can you tell us which are the engagements that Turkey intended to reserve by the preamble of the treaty concluded with Germany? (Answer): Certainly; in the first place our treaty with England and all the other treaties and agreements concluded and in force with other countries".

Neither the Foreign Office nor the Press Bureau communicated to any of the American correspondents the declaration embodied in this "interview" which is thus far the sole statement made by any of the Turkish authorities by way of specific reference to the alliance as unaffected by the treaty with Germany.

MACMURRAY

762.6711/17

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

[WASHINGTON,] June 20, 1941.

The Turkish Ambassador⁶⁸ called to see me this morning by instruction of his Government. The Ambassador, from notes which he had in his hand, read to me an analysis of the treaty concluded the day before between Turkey and Germany which differed in no wise from the telegrams received from Ambassador MacMurray on this subject.

The Ambassador made these additional statements in the name of his Government:

⁶⁸ Mehmet Münir Erteğin.

1. The treaty stated categorically that Turkey strictly reserved the full status of her previously existing obligations to Great Britain.
2. The British Government had been fully advised and consulted with throughout the course of the negotiations between Turkey and Germany.
3. The conclusion of the treaty resulted in no change whatever in the Turkish situation vis-à-vis Great Britain.
4. The Turkish Government will not permit Turkish territory to be utilized, directly or indirectly, in any action against Great Britain.
5. The Turkish Government is determined to repel any attempt from whatever source on Turkish independence or integrity.
6. The treaty between Turkey and Germany only creates a "normal atmosphere of friendship with Germany".

At this point the Ambassador had concluded the observations he was instructed to make and apparently expected me to make some observations in reply. I limited myself to stating that I appreciated the courtesy of the Turkish Government in making these statements to the Government of the United States. I further said that it would, of course, not be a matter of surprise for the Turkish Ambassador to learn that American public opinion, in view of the repeated notorious incidents during the past two years, would find it difficult to comprehend why Turkey had found it desirable to enter into a "nonaggression pact" with Germany. The Ambassador made no oral reply but merely looked exceedingly dejected and nodded his head.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

762.6711/4: Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, June 21, 1941—1 p. m.

[Received June 22—4: 13 a. m.]

207. My British colleague expresses conviction (impliedly shared by his Government) that disappointing and deplorable as was action of Turkey in concluding treaty with Germany, it nevertheless should not be construed as betrayal of alliance with Britain or as a bar to operation of alliance in event of developments requiring joint defensive action in Turkish territory; and that it is therefore desirable to continue efforts to make this country as strong as possible against that eventuality.

2. For my own part, I feel that apart from immediate psychological harm done to Allied cause, real danger of this Government's action lies not in any actual restriction which it places upon what had already evolved into a passively defensive policy but rather in the possibility that it will invite and facilitate German pressure to break down Turkish solidarity with the Allies.

In view therefore of suggestion in your 90,⁶⁹ that supplies under Lend-Lease Act might be withheld, I venture to invite your consideration of risk of any action leading Turk Government to feel that it has lost confidence of Allies or those sympathetic with their cause and to feel in consequence that it has been abandoned to Germany. . . . I would urge that our Government (perhaps in consultation with British in the light of their presumed desire not to forego eventual Turkish cooperation) adopt policy of putting best possible construction on treaty and make no change in its attitude of helpfulness to Turkey unless new developments should require reconsideration.

MACMURRAY

740.0011 European War 1939/12336 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, June 21, 1941—5 p. m.

[Received June 22—11:30 p. m.]

208. When I took occasion to remark today to the Secretary General of the Foreign Office that he had just added a new chapter to history he belittled the effect of the new treaty with Germany saying that it actually changed nothing at all and proceeding with an air of self-justification to offer an exposition along these lines:

Turkey was isolated with no immediate prospect either of adequately supplying her own minimum equipment needs or of obtaining military support from Great Britain in case of need; at the moment when the Germans had overrun the Balkan region and were most fully concentrated in immediate proximity to her they had repeated their assurances that they had no designs against her (as they said shortly [would] be demonstrated by the substantial withdrawal of their forces) and had inquired whether this country was similarly disposed and would be willing to join in certifying by some sort of treaty the common desire for the maintenance of normal friendly relations. Having consulted the British and found them acquiescent the Turks had signified their willingness to discuss the matter on the understanding that any agreement reached should fully safeguard their alliance with the British; the Germans had maintained that while they had no objection to the Turks making any unilateral statement they chose to that effect, the incorporation of any safeguarding clause in the treaty itself would not be acceptable; the Turks had insisted and had proposed a whole series of drafts of such a clause even any agreement [*sic*] had been reached as to what should constitute the subject matter of the agreement itself; and only at the last moment

⁶⁹ Dated June 15, 4 p. m., p. 855.

had the Germans consented to incorporate the clause in a treaty of friendship.

As for the substance of the treaty Numan maintained it was of considerable advantage both to Turkey herself and to her ally. She had not entertained (nor had Great Britain desired that she should) the remotest intention either of attacking the German positions in the Balkans or of permitting the use of her territory by other powers for that purpose; in exchange for a public declaration to that effect she had obtained the assurance that Germany (whether alone or in combination with Russia) would not attack Turkish territory. This had likewise a great value for the British in that it assured them that Turkey's geographical situation could not be utilized for the purpose of turning the flank of their positions in the East.

As against these solid advantages the Germans could claim to have gained nothing more substantial than a propaganda victory which he admitted was a striking one but whose enduring effects he minimized. He felt (and stated that the British Government has expressed the same feeling) that on balance the treaty gave Turkey and Great Britain more than it cost.

He raised in order to answer it the question what reason the Germans had had for wanting the treaty. There was a possibility that they would make war on Russia—he himself did not believe that probable but it was unquestionably a contingency which the Germans had had in mind and with regard to which they had felt it necessary to take the precaution of assuring their Balkan flank against any possibility of attack by or through Turkey and his Government had been in a position to give that assurance without detriment to its own interests or those of its ally.

2. Referring to the fact that both the Turkish Foreign Minister and the German Ambassador in their statements to the local press had spoken of being in accord in desiring that the press of each country should maintain a friendly tone I recalled that the press despatches from Germany and Italy presented this as a matter of formal agreement between the two Governments. He assured me it represented merely a concordance of views and involved no mutual obligation.

He took occasion to add that there were no unpublished agreements or other understandings entered into in connection with the treaty.

3. I asked about the reports from the same source that there had also been some sort of economic understanding. He stated that all that is in contemplation is a new *ad hoc* barter arrangement to replace the current one of a series of such arrangements which is due to expire in about 2 months; clearing agreements had proved unsatisfactory from the Turkish standpoint and no more general type of commercial agreement is in prospect at this time.

4. I also inquired about the reported signature of an agreement concerning the operation of the section of the railway which crosses the Turko-Greek frontier several times on the way from Thrace to Bulgaria. He said that immediately upon being put into occupation of that portion of Greek territory the Bulgarians had informed the Turkish railway administration that by authorization of the Germans they were now administering the formerly Greek sections; the Germans had on inquiry flatly denied this and had proposed that they and the Turks jointly repair and operate the line from Uzunkopru to Sviligrade; but the Turks had successfully insisted upon their sole operation on a temporary basis without prejudice to any question of territorial sovereignty and on a reciprocal understanding that the line cannot be used for the transportation of troops or war materials.

MACMURRAY

740.0011 European War 1939/12351 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, June 22, 1941—7 p. m.

[Received June 23—10:30 a. m.]

212. (1) It would now appear that eventuality of war between Germany and Russia played considerable role in negotiation of German-Turkish treaty of friendship. As I have reported to Department Germans at one time proposed agreement designed to ensure neutrality of Turkey in event of war between Germany and Russia. In explaining to British reasons for concluding treaty Turkish Government emphasized it would facilitate such war. This justification of treaty was also advanced by high official of Foreign Office to an officer of Embassy. Department will recall that Numan Bey in course of conversation reported yesterday in my 208,⁷⁰ stated that advantage which Germans would gain from treaty was that it would afford protection to German right flank in such struggle.

(2) On basis of information now available I am convinced that Germans in bringing about Turkey's acceptance of treaty made adroit use of fear and antagonism toward Soviet which has come to exist in high Turkish circles. (As Department I believe is aware, Hitler made use of Rumanian animosity towards Soviet regime in gaining Rumanian acquiescence in German plans with regard to Rumania, holding forth prospect of German assistance in recovering lost territory and getting rid of Bolshevik menace forever. Former Yugoslav Minister to Moscow has informed me that Hitler won over violently anti-Soviet Prince Paul to his plans by assuring him that

⁷⁰ *Supra.*

German action in Balkans was designed only to obtain protection of German flank in approaching war with Soviet Union.)

(3) There are many indications that Turkish leaders have recently come to conclusion that Moscow is definitely hostile to Turkey and that friendship which existed between the two countries prior to conclusion of German-Soviet Non-aggression Pact⁷¹ could not be restored. In my conversation with him yesterday Numan spoke with frankness that neither Foreign Minister nor he has ever permitted himself in talking with me about Russia. I have repeatedly had occasion to report (with my own reservations) their optimistic statements about better relations with Soviets. This time he gave me impression of being thoroughly disgusted with Russians and wanting to relieve his mind about them. He said that during course of Turkish-German negotiations British Ambassador had suggested that Turks consult with Russians in accordance with protocol between them of December 1929; in reply Foreign Office had furnished British memorandum of about 20 instances in which since war began Turks had suggested to Soviets various bases for new *rapprochement*—to none of which had any definite reply even been received. Numan in stating to me case involving Bulgaria (referred to below) in connection with which question had arisen as to obligation of each Government under 1929 protocol to keep other informed as to any negotiations with a neighboring state; Molotov had at first pretended not to recollect that provision and had then asked if Turkey would be willing to abide by it and was answered affirmatively. Whereupon this Government had instructed its Ambassador to go so far as to tell Molotov that Turkey would in fact be prepared to extend scope of protocol so as to obligate both parties to keep each other currently informed if [*of?*] any negotiations with any other government whatsoever. This offer had been completely ignored. In these circumstances Turks had told British that there was no use talking about anything to Russians who would only peddle to Germans any useful information they might pick up.

(4) More persuasive than Soviet Government's unresponsiveness to efforts to restore cordial relations had been evidence obtained by Turks of existence of hostile intentions on its part. My telegram No. 37, February 21 escorted [*reported*] on Numan's authority that Secretary General of Soviet Foreign Office on occasion of visit to Sofia last November had offered Bulgarians part of Turkish Thrace. Yesterday Numan specified that proposal was that Bulgaria extend its frontier to Enos-Midia line while Russia would take rest of Thrace down to Straits. When questioned about this proposal by Turkish Ambassador in Moscow Molotov had been evasive. Again on his visit

⁷¹ Signed at Moscow, August 23, 1939, *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, series D, vol. VII, p. 245.

to Berlin Molotov had proposed to Germans as basis of closer cooperation that Russia should occupy "certain bases" on Straits while Thracian Hinterland should go to Bulgaria.⁷² This according to Numan Hitler had categorically refused. On being informed of this by Germans Turks had taken this matter up through their Embassy in Moscow with Molotov who had again answered evasively. (This as I have heard from various sources within past few days was given by Government spokesman at secret party meeting on afternoon of 18th as one of principal underlying reasons necessitating new Turkish-German treaty.)

(5) It is my opinion that Numan's attitude reflects present viewpoint of Turkish leaders towards the Soviet Union. Various influential Turkish statesmen have recently in conversation with members of my staff have given expression to anti-Soviet sentiments. I have been informed that Minister for Foreign Affairs who while distrustful of Soviet Government ever since his visit to Moscow 2 years ago has been restrained in any expression of his opinions with regard to Soviet Union was very outspoken at private luncheon a few days ago in criticising Soviet Government. Conclusion of German-Turkish Treaty of Friendship may well mark termination of friendship which developed between Soviet and Kemalist regimes and recrudescence of historical antagonism between Turkey and Russia over control of Straits.

Repeated to Bucharest, Moscow.

MACMURRAY

740.0011 European War 1939/12484 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, June 24, 1941—6 p. m.

[Received June 26—5:30 a. m.]

217. Turkish leaders are giving vent in private to unrestrained jubilation at the outbreak of war between Germany and Russia. It is their fervent hope that the two "gangsters" will exhaust themselves in a long struggle. A similar sentiment is prevalent in [apparent omission] circles and among the general public.

Turkish press has been restrained and noncommittal in its comments. However, attention is drawn to the statement of Hitler with reference to the demand made by Soviet Government for military bases on the Straits and indignation expressed at such activities on the part of a country of which Turkey has been a sincere friend for

⁷² Probably a reference to Molotov's proposal of November 26, 1940, subsequent to his visit to Berlin, *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941*, p. 258.

20 years and with which it has done everything possible to maintain relations on a basis of complete confidence. The press emphasizes that Turkish Government has proclaimed its neutrality; but Turkey must be on its guard and watch carefully developments. Editorial writers have avoided making any prophecies as to outcome of the struggle declaring that only time can tell. Several papers point out that Soviet Union is now paying for the great errors which it has committed; the Soviet leaders had counted upon a long war between the "imperialists" states which would leave them, particularly Germany, so weakened that Soviet Union would be the dominant power; the Soviet policy had permitted Germany to destroy her opponents separately and now Soviet Union practically alone must confront Germany. Only one writer has observed that the German attack on Russia shows utter worthlessness of non-aggression treaties now-a-days.

MACMURRAY

740.0011 European War 1939/12537 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, June 27, 1941.

[Received June 27—9: 50 a. m.]

1236. Today's papers publish a Tass denial of statements made by Hitler with respect to Soviet claims on the Bosphorus and Dardanelles and designs on Bulgaria which it states are being published in Turkish newspapers. The statement qualifies [*characterizes?*] these statements as an abominable slander against the Soviet Union with respect to its attitude towards both Turkey and the Straits and Bulgaria.

STEINHARDT

867.24/150 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray)

WASHINGTON, June 28, 1941—7 p. m.

110. Your no. 168, May 24, 1 p. m. and Department's no. 108, June 28, 11 a. m.⁷³ The following data, complete through June 13, 1941, regarding American Lend-Lease aid to Turkey are furnished in response to your inquiry, and for the time being, only for your information. Reference is made also to the scepticism regarding the extent of American aid to Turkey expressed by the Foreign Minister and reported in your no. 198, June 18, 10 p. m.

⁷³ For telegram No. 108, see p. 940.

Although no actual materials furnished Turkey under Lend-Lease may have arrived in Turkey as yet, the Turkish Ambassador in Washington will doubtless confirm that Turkey has enjoyed a conspicuously favored position and is the only neutral country outside the Western Hemisphere which has received any direct Lend-Lease aid.

There are at present en route to Turkey 50 Howitzer 155 millimeter guns and ammunition therefor, valued at \$1,290,000, which were furnished Turkey by the United States Government under the Lend-Lease Act, without any cost to Turkey. In addition, propelling charges for this ammunition, 200 two-and-one-half ton trucks, 50 tractors for Howitzers, and 1,500 sledge hammers have recently been accorded Turkey without cost under the Act. Valuation of this additional material probably exceeds \$500,000. Furthermore, some 35 applications for further Lend-Lease grants to Turkey are now pending, for different classes of material and worth many millions of dollars. These include: 520,000 complete rounds of ammunition for 155 millimeter Howitzers, valued at approximately \$15,000,000; 67,000 entrenching tools, 406 heavy duty seven to nine ton trucks, 108 seventy-five millimeter guns, 300 one-half ton trucks, 50 water tank trucks, 7,000 field telephones, about 6,500 miles of heavy field cable, 900 truck and car tires, 1,200 pack saddles with mount and ammunition, et cetera.

Perhaps equally as important as the above, however, are the facilities which have been accorded Turkey to purchase commodities in the United States and export them to Turkey, including airplanes and parts, chemicals, metals, and large amounts of other strategic materials, some of which are ordinarily allowed to go only to countries resisting aggression. Turkey has been classed in an even more favored position than countries in the Western Hemisphere in many respects.

A change in the American Government's policy towards Turkey would be most keenly felt by Turkey, and the Department would be reluctant to adopt such a change. However, it will be difficult to justify a continuation of the very favored position accorded Turkey without some very clear indication from the Turkish Government, by actions more than public statements, that Turkey firmly intends to resist Axis pressure, by force of arms if necessary, and that Turkey remains loyal to its alliance with Great Britain. The chrome situation offers an excellent opportunity to Turkey to counteract any impression which may have been gained by the American public that Turkey's fundamental policy has changed. It is important, however, that no intimation be given the Turks that we agree to continue aid to Turkey if the latter cooperates regarding commercial transactions

such as the chrome purchases, or that we intend to use the Lend-Lease Act as a bargaining instrument.

WELLES

762.6711/12 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey
(MacMurray)*

WASHINGTON, June 30, 1941—10 p. m.

111. Your no. 214, June 23, 5 p. m.⁷⁴ It is observed, from your telegram under reference, that the Turkish Press, in commenting on the recent German-Turkish pact, points out that the pact will mean that the British fleet will not be permitted by Turkey to pass through the Straits, although no reference is made to any prohibition against German use of the Straits, by naval vessels or otherwise.

It is recalled that during the campaign in Crete, Turkey permitted vessels loaded with German troops to transit the Dardanelles from the Black Sea for the purpose of fighting British and Greek forces in Greece and the Aegean Islands (see your 156, May 19, noon, Section Two, third paragraph⁷⁵) in apparent disregard, *inter alia*, of the Greek-Turkish treaty of April 27, 1938,⁷⁶ negotiated at Turkey's instance, providing that if either Greece or Turkey should be the object of unprovoked attack, the other would safeguard its neutrality, by force of arms if necessary, to prevent its territory from being used for the passage of troops.

In view of the foregoing, it would appear that Turkey may afford to the Germans facilities in transiting the Straits which might be denied to the British or to Britain's allies. Your comments are requested, after discussion with the Turkish authorities if you consider desirable.

WELLES

867.24/153

The British Embassy to the Department of State

The British Government have been giving earnest consideration to the policy which, in the light of recent events, they should adopt in regard to the sending of supplies of war materials and other articles to Turkey from the United Kingdom. They have now decided that the present priority to Turkey shall be maintained and that their existing policy as regards both military and civilian supplies should continue

⁷⁴ Not printed.

⁷⁵ Paragraph beginning "Granted British Navy had been busy", p. 852.

⁷⁶ League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cxciii, p. 175.

as before, namely that while no increase in the volume of supplies is possible there should be a steady flow of both military and civilian material, subject to the proviso that caution should be exercised in regard to long-term projects and no undue call made on shipping space in respect of articles which would be of little use to the British authorities themselves in the Middle East.

The British Embassy has been instructed to inform the State Department of the above decision and to explain that it was based on the following considerations:

(a) The British Government are under an obligation under the Anglo-Turkish Treaty of Mutual Assistance to provide Turkey with war material. If they were now to cut off supplies they would be failing to fulfil that obligation just at the time when they have been successful in obtaining assurances that this Treaty is safeguarded under the preamble of the recent Turco-German agreement.

(b) If the British authorities were to cut off a large proportion of their military supplies to Turkey the Turks would either assume that Great Britain had lost all trust in them or that Great Britain was in such a difficult military position that they could not afford to send any important supplies to Turkey. Either assumption would be almost equally damaging and either might cause the Turks to turn to Germany for their military supplies. If the latter eventuality materialized the Germans would be encouraged to make further demands on Turkey—e. g. for the dismissal of British personnel now in Turkey, the passage of war material, the suppression of British news, etc.

(c) The disadvantages of cutting off the military supplies might well outweigh the advantages. If Turkey obtained the impression that Britain had lost confidence in her she might well give way to the first German demand for a passage through Turkey of troops and war material and the small addition to British supplies in the Middle East resulting from a change in our supplies policy towards Turkey might be more than offset by the appearance of Germans in strength on the Turco-Syrian frontiers.

(d) If Turkey sided with Germany all the Arab countries—Iran and Egypt—would be affected.

In the circumstances, it is felt in London that the wisest course would be to maintain military supplies to Turkey at their present level until it is seen how the matter develops as a result of the recent Turco-German agreement. If, in spite of efforts to show the Turks that Great Britain continues to trust them it becomes plain that Turkey is unable or unwilling to resist the increasing German pressure, then, but only then, will the British authorities cut down these supplies.

The British Government feel that while the United States Government are of course under no Treaty obligations to the Turks, yet the same arguments apply to the question of American supplies to Turkey. There is too the further consideration that if the Turks obtained the impression that they were being abandoned by the United States, they might find some excuse to refuse the renewal of their agreement with

Great Britain due to expire next January, whereby they deliver to Great Britain their whole output of chrome which is subsequently sent to the United States.

For all these reasons, the British Government hope that the United States Government will feel able to adopt an attitude similar to that of the British Government and that they will feel able to continue to give the Turks the exceptional facilities that are now being extended to them.

[WASHINGTON, July 1, 1941.]

740.0011 European War 1939/12834 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, July 2, 1941—midnight.

[Received July 3—8:35 p. m.]

234. Your 111, June 30. Relevant passage of press comment summarized in my 214, June 23⁷⁷ appeared in course of rather ill-informed editorial which analyzed advantages accruing from Turco-German treaty to both Germany and Britain and could not even apart from its context be construed as implying intention on part of Turkish Government to accord to German naval vessels right of passage through Straits denied to British and indeed forbidden under Montreux convention (article 19, paragraph 2).

2. Your telegram cites my 156, May 19, in support of statement that "Turkey permitted vessels loaded with German troops to transit the Dardanelles" etc. My telegram made no such assertion and I know of nothing to support it (nor do my British and Greek colleagues whom I have taken occasion to consult again) unless it be information furnished to British in strictest confidence by Turkish port authorities to effect that German steamship *Delos* transiting April 16 was believed to have been carrying mines and possibly troops to Lemnos—a belief which convention gave port authorities no authority to confirm by inspection. What my telegram was intended to convey was that although precluded from interfering with passage of certain German vessels Turkish authorities nevertheless tipped off British—action demonstrating intentions quite contrary to what your telegram assumes.

3. I think it clear (and Greek Ambassador agrees) that Turkish obligation under treaty with Greece to which you refer not applicable to passage of troops or supplies through international waterways to which Turkish Government is responsible for maintaining freedom of transit and navigation subject to provisions of convention (article 4).

⁷⁷ Not printed.

4. Assumption that Turks may be prepared to afford to Germans facilities which they deny to British seems to me so clearly unwarranted by facts that I have not thought it desirable to antagonize any of Turkish authorities by asking expression of their view.

MACMURRAY

740.0011 European War 1939/12954 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, July 7, 1941—3 p. m.

[Received July 9—3:40 p. m.]

238. Intellectual and emotional ferment which my 156, May 19, noon, reported as going on in minds of Turks is still in process. Looking back on developments I would reemphasize that they were stamped by obstruction [*destruction*] of Belgrade which brought home to them realization that their previous concepts of national defense were out of date and illusory. Their fears and their sense of helplessness were increased by progress of Balkan and Aegean campaign; they were awed by German successes, disheartened by British defeats and acutely conscious of being hemmed in and cut off from any support by their allies and indeed from any dependable communications with outside world other than Axis-controlled Europe.

2. They were furthermore annoyed with British who from time to time badgered them to make one or another gesture of solidarity with Allies (which Turks felt would quite likely involve them in the German campaign) despite understanding with Eden that Turkey could best contribute to common cause by remaining nonbelligerent at least until new balance of forces might be established in Near East.

3. It was while Turks were in temper thus indicated that Germans discontinued movement which had seemed to threaten occupation of Syria and Iraq and began to withdraw their forces from Balkans and Aegean Island and furthermore adopted towards Turkey tone of good will and flattery. This created in journalistic and popular circles extraordinary mood of relief and complacency. More realistic and cautious official circles shared that mood to surprising degree, although with qualification that something must be done to make dream of peace come true. In that spirit they undertook (with acquiescence of the British) exploratory conversations with Germans as to possibility of some sort of agreement which would evidence that there is no present cause of conflict or antagonism between them (see my 200, June 19, 5 p. m.).

4. It would now seem that when Papen carried these conversations beyond the field of mere economic agreement he appealed to latent

Turkish suspicions of Russia by recounting Molotov's demand for bases on the Straits; and that in proposing neutrality pact which would enable Turkey to hold aloof in event of war between Germany and Soviets he must at least have intimated that that was in prospect; for even those Turkish officials who at the time professed skepticism of such an eventuality now refer outspokenly to alternatives then presented—namely, German campaign either into Russia or into Turkey and Levant. Though warning Turks of danger of entering into any sort of political accord with Germany British somewhat grudgingly refrained from making definite objection to proposed neutrality pact. They were, however, utterly taken aback when Turks informed them of having already signified acceptability of new German proposal taking not the negative form of neutrality pact but more positive form of treaty of friendship.

5. It is true that treaty signed with Germany June 18 did not in fact impart any juridical prejudice to alliance with Britain; in first place safeguarding clause was written into its preamble; and it was furthermore the case that through successive developments in war situation British had agreed in their own interest to waive every conceivable contingent obligation on part of Turkey except what she would be expected to do even in absence of any alliance, namely, to defend what Foreign Minister had defined to British Ambassador as her "territory, sovereignty, independence, and honor." Yet mere fact of concluding treaty of friendship with enemy of her ally gave occasion for general questioning of Turkey's loyalty, impaired British prestige particularly in Moslem world, gave German propaganda wide field for exploitation, and (especially in view of consultation clause and concurrent declarations about attitude of press) opened up possibilities for insinuation of German influence in Turks domestic affairs as well as in their relations with British.

6. I believe thinking Turks quite generally realized that they had to this extent let British down and felt corresponding sense of humiliation which manifested itself in readiness of officials, journalists and private persons to volunteer explanations, justifications, one [and?], indeed, fervent encomiums of "Turkey's policy of peace" whereas they react with hyper-sensitive aloofness, if not in fact resentment, to any mention of subject by foreigners. There seems to be going on in their minds curious though understandable spiritual process of self-exculpation by subconscious rationalization of what they have done. There have become apparent two lines of thinking not wholly compatible one with other but generally intermingled in various degrees.

(b) Other line (more prevalent among private individuals and in subtly veiled form in some sections of press) is more directly inspired by Germans and potentially more dangerous: It is that Turks owe

nothing anyhow to British who have never been their friends whereas Germans have never been their enemies; that alliance was made for protection of Turkey but that British have perverted it into obligation of Turkey to protect their imperial interests; that British have held back on their promised supplies of necessary war material and by their muddling in Eastern Mediterranean have created rather than relieved difficulties for Turkey and that Turks are therefore well out of it in having been able to reach with Germany understanding that hedges bet they were misguided enough to make [on] an undependable ally.

7. In first flush of their pride and elation in having as they thought diverted immediate menace towards their historic antagonist, Turks have shown marked tendency to insist that they had never ceased to regard Russia as their primary enemy despite Atatürk's policy of conciliation—policy which one of his closest associates at time tells me he adopted with misgivings but which was thereafter followed not only faithfully but with confidence in Russia's good faith until 2 years ago when Soviets made proposals indicating they had not relinquished imperialistic designs upon Straits (my telegram 127, October 18, 1939⁷⁸). On second thought, however, Turks are conscious that the German campaign in Russia promises new dilemma for them; they realize that if Soviets repel attack they will be free to develop policy of self-interest unrestrained by any necessity for consideration of Turkish interests; but they apprehend that if Germany should have quick success she might be expected in near future to drive towards Suez either directly through Turkey or indirectly through Iran and Iraq and Syria with result of isolating this country completely; and they are therefore pathetically anxious that campaign should bog down into one of mutual attrition. This anxiety lest newly recreated friendship with Germany should prove to afford only a respite, introduces new element into Turks psychological ferment; and while I do not think it impairs their determination to defend against any outright assault their last ditch position even in hopeless conflict, I am afraid that it lays them open to wearing down of their morale by temporizing and compromise and efforts at conciliation which might carry them further than they mean to go towards Germany's side.

8. I must in frankness admit that Turks' morale is now less solid and stable than I have hitherto believed it would prove. Their convictions and sympathies are still strongly against Nazi regime, they fully realize that German victory would mean end of Turkish independence and they put no faith in Hitler's promises; yet one senses among them such a bewildered yearning to be left alone as might

⁷⁸ Not printed.

under conceivable circumstances tempt them to undertake desperate hazard of buying peace with Germany. I still do not think their morale would crack under direct pressure but I fear it might give way under lateral strain. It is for that reason that I feel (as indicated in my 207, June 21) that it would be a mistake to do anything that might add to their inner turmoil, demoralizing suspicion that their friends may desert them and leave them to face German menace by themselves.

9. I am not in a position to judge what it means to us in our support of British war effort to prevent Turkey's drifting further towards Germany and perhaps even being forced like Sweden into the position of according passage through her territories; nor do I feel able to give any assurance that such developments could definitely be prevented by any degree of material aid that we could furnish. But I submit that if (as I assume) our Government regards as essential maintenance of Turkish barrier to German advance into Near and Middle East then it is a question of how large premium we are willing to pay upon insurance policy against Turkey's being manipulated into the mood of seeking safety under Germany's aegis. My own estimate of situation is that with eyes open to possibility of failure, we should nevertheless reckon it worth our while to continue material aid to this Government in degree sufficient to retain so far as possible its confidence in support by democratic cause.

MACMURRAY

711.67/107

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] July 8, 1941.

The British Ambassador called to see me this morning at his request.

The Ambassador referred to the situation in Turkey and expressed the hope that inasmuch as he was given to understand that the Turkish Ambassador in Washington had reported to his Government that it was unlikely that any further assistance to Turkey under the Lend-Lease Act would now be forthcoming in view of the Turkish-German nonaggression pact, the American Ambassador in Ankara be instructed to make it clear to the Turkish Government that this would not be the case. The British Government strongly urged that we deal with the Turkish Government as they themselves were dealing with it, namely as if nothing had occurred to change the relations between the two countries.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

867.24/163

*The British Minister (Hall) to the Assistant Secretary of State
(Acheson)*

WASHINGTON, July 10, 1941.

DEAR MR. ACHESON: I have discussed with my Ambassador our most interesting talk about Turkey yesterday morning, and have cleared on the telephone with Mr. Wallace Murray the point that you will consider your decision about export licences for Turkey for goods, including arms and munitions, after you have got a satisfactory arrangement about supplies of chrome. The Ambassador welcomed my report that we had agreed together that any overt act of a kind which might arouse Turkish susceptibilities would be avoided by you, although you would gently reduce the status of unique privileges with regard to supply priorities that Turkey has enjoyed.

Lord Halifax asks me to thank you for your help and interest, but to add that H. M. G. attaches very great importance indeed to avoiding any action that might wound the Turks or lead them to believe that British confidence in them is severely shaken. It was this point of view that I tried to expound yesterday morning, and I welcomed your sympathetic understanding of it.

In view of the very great importance that we attach to avoiding any incident, however small, vis-à-vis the Turks in the present delicate state of affairs, I have thought it worth while to give you on paper the upshot of my talk with the Ambassador who, as I think you know, has already expressed this view to Mr. Welles.

Yours sincerely,

NOEL F. HALL

740.0011 European War 1939/13250

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] July 14, 1941.

The British Ambassador called to see me this morning at his request.

The Ambassador read to me a telegram he had received from his Foreign Office in which Mr. Eden informed Lord Halifax that he believed Turkey was remaining entirely loyal to Great Britain. As an indication of this, Mr. Eden stated that on July 9 the Turkish Chief of Staff had written a letter to the Aviation Attaché of the British Embassy at Ankara stating flatly that the Turkish Army did not trust Germany, with whom it had already had too many bitter experiences. The Turkish Chief of Staff expressed the hope that after the conflict with Russia Germany would be too exhausted to undertake any further expansionist activities for the time being but that he fully recognized

the fact that if Germany were able quickly to crush Russia, Turkey would undoubtedly be the next victim. . . .

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

867.24/173

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Alling)

[WASHINGTON,] July 15, 1941.

Mr. Erol⁷⁹ opened the conversation by saying that the Ambassador had desired to call on Mr. Murray in connection with the present problem but he had been unable to do so since he had been indisposed for several weeks. Mr. Erol therefore had come at the Ambassador's direction and desired to seek the assistance of the Department in solving a problem which had arisen in connection with Turkey's defense measures.

Mr. Erol said that the Turkish Government had been buying various kinds of bombs in the United States and Great Britain, but that for various reasons these supplies were not sufficient and it had therefore decided to endeavor to manufacture at least a portion of its requirements of bombs. The Embassy had been exploring the possibility of purchasing in the United States patents covering incendiary, demolition, mine and flare bombs. It had been found, however, that patents covering all of these bombs were either owned or controlled by the United States Government and that special permission or license was required in order to purchase and export the covering patents. Apparently the Embassy had had this matter under discussion with the British Purchasing Commission, for Mr. Erol stated that that Commission had advised him in confidence to seek the aid of the State Department in obtaining permission to purchase and export the patents. Apparently the British Purchasing Commission had informed Mr. Erol that such an approach would be more likely to succeed than a direct approach either by the Turkish Embassy or the British Purchasing Commission to the War and Navy Departments.

I told Mr. Erol that I had no background regarding such matters, but that I assumed it would of course be necessary to consult the War Department and the Navy Department before any decision could be reached in regard to his present request. He said he assumed that would be the case, but here again he felt that the Turkish Government would be more likely to have its request granted if the approach were made through the State Department. I asked him if he had any more definite information as to the exact patents which were desired,

⁷⁹ Orhan H. Erol, Counselor of the Turkish Embassy.

and he answered in the negative. Apparently he merely desired to have the Department take up the matter as a question of principle. I told him that I would bring the matter to the attention of the appropriate officials in the Department and that we would let him know the results as soon as possible.

867.24/163

The Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson) to the British Minister (Hall)

WASHINGTON, July 21, 1941.

DEAR MR. HALL: I am very glad to have your letter of July 10, 1941, regarding Turkey, and to confirm your understanding of our position as discussed in my office. I think I should emphasize, however, that although it is entirely true that we have been withholding our final decision regarding Turkey pending an answer on chrome, broader questions than chrome are involved in our consideration of Turkey's position. Perhaps your understanding of our attitude is already clear, but it may not be amiss to mention the point.

You may be assured that your Government's position regarding Turkey is being kept most prominently in mind here, and that we shall continue, as in the past, to welcome frank exchanges of viewpoints.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON

740.0011 European War 1939/13460: Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, July 24, 1941—4 p. m.

[Received 11:30 p. m.]

269. Commenting with unusual frankness on unexpectedly strong resistance of Russians, Foreign Office Secretary General yesterday expressed to me earnest hope that slowing down of German advance would mean stretching that campaign on into winter with result of so far weakening Germany that Anglo-Saxons could defeat her, which would, from Turkish point of view, be ideal outcome of war. Either German or Russian hegemony of Europe would be disastrous for Turkey, but of these alternatives the worst would be Russian domination; under Germans, Turkey would, no doubt, lose her political and economic independence for long period but could at least find means of survival in cooperation with a people who are at any rate civilized and constructive, and nourish hopes of eventual national resurgence; whereas, under Russians they could look forward to nothing but

destructiveness and ruthless stamping out of every element of Turkish nationhood.

2. I believe Numan's comments accurately reflect present opinion of Turkish political leaders as well as current popular sentiment. They represent what is perhaps extreme of revulsion of Turkish feeling in consequence of disillusion created by what is regarded as Moscow's betrayal of Kemalist policy of mutual confidence and cooperation.

3. I do not, however, detect any tendency to find fault with British alliance with Russia or our own promises of material assistance (probable effectiveness of either of which Turks are inclined to estimate at minimum); their general assumption is that Germany is far more powerful than Russia and they are hard-boiled enough to see only advantage for themselves in any help to Russians, however slight, which tends to even up balance and so protract campaign and make its results less decisive. There is, however, discernible slight undercurrent of uneasiness lest her alliance with Russia should eventually bring about situation in which Britain would find it difficult to oppose Russian pretensions at expense of Turkey, particularly as regards Straits.

Repeated Bucharest.

MACMURRAY

867.24/158: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey
(MacMurray)

WASHINGTON, August 1, 1941—6 p. m.

134. Personal for the Ambassador. Your 275, July 26, 4 p. m.^{70a}

1. The main lines of policy, as you readily recognize, now have to be determined by the broadest consideration of the actual trend of events. We are under pressure to give assistance to a great number of countries at the very moment when we are straining every resource to build up our own defense facilities. In consequence, the degree of need is necessarily the determining consideration. We have consequently taken the view, with which I fully agree, that the countries actually fighting have first claim on our resources.

2. In this aspect, the incidents mentioned in paragraph 3 of your 275 no longer have determining significance. Other nations are actively fighting in the front line to protect themselves and these necessarily take prior place.

3. I note your preoccupation with Halifax's telegram 3067 to the British Foreign Office, reported by the Foreign Office to the British

^{70a} Not printed.

Embassy at Ankara and purporting to give an account of a conference held in the Department. The fact is that certain of the evidence relating to the incidents of which you have reported was made available to us by the British Embassy here; we endeavored to evaluate this information and, as it happens, the Halifax telegram was in error in indicating that we had made any decision.

4. The policy is actually determined on the broad considerations given above, with which I am certain you will readily agree. As matters now stand Turkey is being treated on a parity with the other American republics, which are closest to us in ties of obligations, affection and interest.

5. We attach the highest value to your opinions and judgments in all matters and particularly in those relating to our policy towards Turkey and we have given and will continue to give the fullest consideration and attention to them.

WELLES

867.24/309

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] August 2, 1941.

The British Ambassador called to see me this morning. He read to me a secret report received by his Foreign Office from the British Ambassador in Ankara under date of July 23 which stated that the Chief of the Air Staff of the Turkish Government and the Chief of the General Staff of the Turkish Government had informed the British Embassy that the Turkish Government, after a period of vacillation subsequent to the signing of the Turkish-German treaty, had reached the conclusion that their treaty meant nothing at all and that the British Government should realize that the treaty between Turkey and Great Britain formed the cornerstone of Turkish policy. These Turkish generals further stated that it was essential that secret talks between the Turkish General Staff and the British General Staff be undertaken immediately and, in order to avoid any leaks, suggested that these conversations be held either in Palestine or in Egypt. They further stated that they believed that a German attack was imminent; that Turkey would resist to the utmost any such German attack; and that they considered it extremely urgent that the defense preparations by Great Britain in Syria and Iraq be expedited to the utmost extent possible.

The British Government, Lord Halifax said, considered this statement of extreme importance and as being highly gratifying, and consequently believed that there should be no "hold up" in furnishing military supplies and equipment to Turkey.

I stated to Lord Halifax that this message was very similar in its tenor to a message I had received today [*yesterday*] from Mr. Eden through the American Ambassador in London.⁸⁰ I stated that my own view was that because of the importance of Turkey to Great Britain in the latter's campaign in the Near East, the British point of view as to the nature or quantity of supplies to be furnished Turkey should necessarily have great weight in the decisions which might be reached in Washington. I therefore recommended that these views be put forward by the appropriate British officials in Washington in their conversations with our own military and naval authorities as well as with the lease-lend authorities. I said it seemed to me that the determining factor in the consideration of these and similar questions was where the military equipment and matériel we might have available could most effectively be used from the standpoint of the war as a whole. I said that I felt that this point of view was becoming more and more preponderant on the part of the officials of the United States.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

867.24/181

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle) to the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Murray)

[WASHINGTON,] August 4, 1941.

MR. MURRAY: I refer to the directive given that priorities to Turkey should be placed on the same basis as the priorities accorded to the other American republics. This directive, of course, holds.

Under date of August 4 [?] the British Ambassador talked to Mr. Welles⁸¹ along the lines of the attached cable.⁸⁰ (see Mr. Welles' memorandum to Mr. Murray, attached⁸²).

You will note that nothing was said about the original directives, merely that we would consider any representations which the British made as to where the limited amount of military matériel and munitions could be used to best advantage.

It may be noted that the communication handed by Mr. Eden to Winant indicates that the British, in that note were proposing to do more than merely consider the advantageous disposition of matériel. By section four they were "diverting to the United States many of Turkish military requirements, some new and some old obligations outstanding from the time of the signature of the Anglo-Turkish

⁸⁰ Telegram No. 3341, August 1, 2 p. m., not printed.

⁸¹ See memorandum *supra*.

⁸² Not printed.

alliance." The Anglo-Turkish alliance covered a multitude of subjects, by no means limited to immediate military needs.

And, therefore, if views are presented about what should or should not be shipped to Turkey, consideration should be given as to whether a present need is being taken care of, or whether some previous outstanding obligation of Britain toward Turkey is being "diverted" in our direction.

This is the first information we have had about any such "diversion" by which we are supposed to fulfil previous outstanding obligations of Britain to Turkey.

Meanwhile, we have some commitments towards Latin American countries, which so far as we are aware, are "undiverted" and indeed, there is no one to divert them to.

A. A. BERLE, JR.

867.24/171

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] August 9, 1941.

The British Ambassador, accompanied by his associate, Sir Ronald Campbell, came in at his request. The Ambassador referred to reports that after the Turkish-German treaty of some weeks ago this Government might withdraw its proposal to aid Turkey in the way of military supplies. The Ambassador earnestly urged that we continue to aid Turkey to the extent of our promises. I replied that we had already decided to aid her to the same extent that we do South American countries and that ought to satisfy her. He also urged that we aid her to the extent that we had first agreed. I gave him no encouragement but indicated that I would look over the situation a little further.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

867.24/167: Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, August 9, 1941—4 p. m.

[Received August 10—12: 50 a. m.]

289. Personal for Welles. I heartily concur in policy (set forth in fourth paragraph of your 134 August 1) of according Turkey parity with Western Hemisphere countries under Lease-Lend Act; I have never suggested preferential position for her and if consulted should not have recommended that she be put on same basis as countries actually bearing brunt of war. What I have been objecting to

was intention recently manifested in certain quarters to disrate or blacklist her in punishment for certain imaginary "discreditable" acts as to which (through what would appear to be a bureaucratic lapse) I was cited as principal witness, despite contrary tenor of my reports.

2. I assume that sole interest of our Government in giving Turkey any benefits from Act derives from our desire to assist Britain by helping to keep Turkey available as a support of British position in Near and Middle East.

3. Under present circumstances, that support takes the passive form of constituting her a non-belligerent buffer between areas of German and British control; and at least until they are themselves in a position to take a more active role in Near East, British are more than content with her friendly neutrality. But Turkish morale is meanwhile subject to great temptations. Turks realize that even with such help as British are now in a position to give them they could not hope to resist a mechanized drive through Thrace to Straits or prevent destructive raids on all their principal cities and strong points from bases already prepared in Bulgaria and the Aegean Islands and they naturally recoil from sharing fate of Yugoslavia and Greece. I, nevertheless, believe (as I have previously reported) that they can be counted on to resist even at cost of self-immolation any overt assault upon their national rights or dignity—that what is to be feared is not their cracking under direct pressure but possibility of their buckling under such lateral strains as propaganda undermining their confidence in the reciprocal loyalty of their British allies.

4. As I see it, therefore, greatest service we can render to cause here would be in helping to build up or at any rate to counteract undermining of Turkish confidence in all out [apparent omission] and our Lend-Lease supplying of military materials should be made to serve primarily that purpose. (For reasons hitherto explained I am not disposed to attach comparable importance to military utility of equipping Turkish forces with a view to possibility of their eventual active participation in hostilities.) I submit that our supplying of equipment to Turks has not been so conducted as to contribute appreciably to that psychological result; and I venture following observations and suggestions:

5. Instead of my being instructed and especially cautioned (as in Department's 128, July 18⁸⁴) to treat as a purely personal confidence fact (of which I know British and I think Turks are cognizant) that we have put Turkey on basis of parity with American Republics, I should be at liberty to discuss matter freely and frankly with Turkish officials and make plain to them that this basis is one of exceptional favor to a country which is neither a component element of our de-

⁸⁴ Not printed.

fensive provisions nor an active participant in war. I should furthermore be authorized to explain that we are giving them this assistance as part of our policy of aid to Britain and that its purpose is to make good (by agreement with British, who have to share with us disadvantages of sparing to Turkey things that both we and they need for our own use) the promises that exigencies of war have made it impossible for British to fulfill.

6. Instead of being forbidden (as in Department's 110 of June 28) to make use of information furnished me as to supplies we have made and are making available to Turkey, Embassy should be kept currently informed of status of this matter and not merely authorized but instructed to discuss it as a matter of common interest with proper Turkish officials in order to make them aware of what is being done and conscious of our readiness to accommodate our efforts to their requirements as fully as our own necessities allow (as for example, in doing our utmost to meet such particular needs as aviation repair material for which they made request transmitted in my 161, May 22⁸⁵). I would suggest that monthly summaries of status of this matter be telegraphed to me for my own use and that of Military Attaché.

7. Secretiveness enjoined upon me by my present instructions with regard to a matter of joint concern to British, Turks and ourselves not only embarrasses me in my relations with my British colleague (who is quite fully informed in regard to it) and with Turkish officials . . . it definitely precludes any possibility of Embassy's doing its part in realizing only purpose which really justifies spending American money for benefit of Turkish Army. If that purpose is as sound as I believe it to be I submit it should not be made nugatory by instructions to the effect that our Government's representation in Turkey should hold itself aloof and pretend ignorance of the whole business.

MACMURRAY

887.24/164

*Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State
(Edminster) to the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] August 13, 1941.

MR. SECRETARY: The Division of Near Eastern Affairs has kept in close touch with me in connection with the lend-lease phases of this problem. In that connection I desire to call your attention to one important point which is apparently not properly understood in the Department.

The point is this: that putting Turkey on a parity with the Amer-

⁸⁵ Not printed; the release was requested of \$50,000 worth of machine tools ordered and paid for by the Turkish Ambassador at Washington (811.20 (d)-Regulations/2436).

ican Republics from the standpoint of priorities and export licenses sounds like far more favorable treatment than it is. The American Republics, although eligible for lend-lease aid and able to secure priorities for a limited list of military supplies, nevertheless, on an overall view, come far down on the priority list as compared with countries actually resisting aggression. Under the "Latin-American parity" formula, some things can be and are being supplied to Turkey; but in amount and variety they are significant more as tokens than as vital contributions to Turkish defense.

It is my understanding that both the British Ambassador and Ambassador MacMurray have presented urgent reasons, in the light of the latest turn of events in the Near East and in Russia, for our disregarding the recent Turko-German Pact and giving all-out aid to Turkey, in so far as such aid is feasible. Without pretending to pass upon the merits of the case for all-out aid to the Turks, I simply want to make it clear that the present formula of treating Turkey on a parity with South America means, in practice, treatment far less favorable than we might wish to accord to Turkey if the considerations advanced by the British and by MacMurray are accepted at anything like their face value.

LYNN R. EDMINSTER

740.0011 European War 1939/14108

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] August 13, 1941.

In a conversation with the British Ambassador, who came in to participate in the exchange of ratifications of certain treaties, he handed me the accompanying copy of the British note to Turkey.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

[Annex]

The British Embassy to the Department of State

On August 10th the British and Soviet Ambassadors in Angora handed to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs notes containing a declaration confirming their respective Governments' fidelity to the Montreux convention and assuring the Turkish Government that their respective Governments intend scrupulously to observe the territorial integrity of Turkey.

The text of the notes which were in identical terms *mutatis mutandis* was as follows:

"The British Government confirms their fidelity to Montreux convention and assure the Turkish Government that they have no aggres-

sive intentions or claims whatever with regard to Straits. The British Government as also the Soviet Government are prepared scrupulously to observe territorial integrity of Turkish Republic.

While fully appreciating desire of Turkish Government not to be involved in war, His Majesty's Government as also the Soviet Government would nevertheless be prepared to render Turkey every help and assistance in the event of her being attacked by any European Power".

These notes were accompanied by oral preambles, the text[s] of which were as follows:—

"United Kingdom oral preamble.

In view of anti-Russian propaganda by Germans, His Majesty's Government and Soviet Government have considered it right to re-affirm categorically their attitude towards Turkey in order that the Turkish Government may be under no delusion in the formation of their own policies towards Great Britain and the Soviet Union.["]

[“]Text of Soviet oral preamble:

As late as March 1941, that is to say during the period of wellknown treaty relations between Soviet Union and Germany, Soviet Government exchanged assurances that [*with?*] the Government of Turkish Republic [*in?*] connection with reports that were then being spread to the effect that, if Turkey were compelled to enter the war, the Soviet Union would take advantage of Turkish difficulties to attack her. It will be recalled that the Soviet Government for their part considered it necessary at that time to declare that such reports in no way corresponded to the attitude of the Soviet Union and that if Turkey were in fact attacked and compelled to enter the war for the defence of her territory, she could count on the full understanding and neutrality of the Soviet Union on the basis of the non-aggression pact between the two countries.

It is known that after the treacherous attack of Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union, the Germans conducted and are still conducting a malicious propaganda against the Soviet Union intended *inter alia* to bring about discord between the Soviet Union and Turkey.

In view of the fact this propaganda, which is being intensively conducted by the German Government, has become even stronger at present and considering that in the present international situation it is opportune that an exchange of views should take place between the Soviet Government and the Turkish Government on the subject of relations between His Majesty's Government, Turkey and the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government have instructed me, M. le Ministre, to make to Your Excellency the following declaration.["]

Simultaneously the British Ambassador handed to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs a letter stating that as far as the British Government were concerned the declaration was intended to be merely a repetition of their undertaking towards Turkey as set out in Article 1 of the Anglo Turkish Treaty of October 13th [*19th*], 1939. The declaration did not in any way modify, extend or detract from the Anglo Turkish Treaty.

867.24/167 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray)

WASHINGTON, August 15, 1941—1 p. m.

141. Your 289, August 9, 4 p. m. The injunction to secrecy contained in the Department's 128, July 18,⁸⁶ was in accordance with the strong desire of the British Government that no intimation of any kind be given the Turkish authorities that Turkey was being placed in a lower category of priorities.

The restrictions contained in the Department's No. 110 June 28, resulted from a desire not to give the Turkish Government hopes which might not subsequently prove justified in connection with pending lend-lease applications for Turkey, as well as a desire not to give the Turks any basis for claiming subsequently that we had agreed to furnish further aid if Turkey took favorable action regarding specific matters such as chrome.

While the above considerations continue to be valid, the Department is in accord with your suggestion that appropriate use should be made of information regarding facilities being accorded Turkey, along the lines indicated in your telegram No. 289, August 9, 4 p. m. You may therefore use the information which has been furnished you in such a manner as will, in your best judgment, strengthen the will of Turkey to resist aggression and to remain loyal to her British alliance.

The Department will endeavor to furnish you with information periodically regarding the material assistance which is being rendered to Turkey, although there is some difficulty in obtaining complete or entirely current reports, due to the variety of the types of requests made for facilities to Turkey, by no means all of which are for Lend-Lease aid.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/14100 : Telegram

The Chargé in Germany (Morris) to the Secretary of State

BERLIN, August 19, 1941—noon.
[Received August 19—10:40 a. m.]

3218. The Turkish Ambassador to Germany has been summoned to a consultation outside of Berlin with Hitler and Von Ribbentrop⁸⁷ to take place today.

Repeated to Ankara.

MORRIS

⁸⁶ Not printed.

⁸⁷ Joachim von Ribbentrop, German Minister for Foreign Affairs.

740.0011 European War 1939/14195 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, August 20, 1941—5 p. m.
[Received August 21—8:44 a. m.]

304. Commenting to me yesterday afternoon upon Anglo-Soviet declaration reported in my 294, August 14,⁸⁸ the Minister for Foreign Affairs rather minimized its importance saying that the only aspect of it which implied any practical consequences was the British assurance which after all contained nothing (as was evidenced by the supplementary British note) not already covered by the Treaty of Alliance. To my question whether he attached no value to the Soviet declaration he replied that it would have had a far greater significance if it had been offered before instead of after the Soviet Union had been attacked; but that it did have a certain moral or psychological value in that it had actually done a good deal to allay the popular apprehensions that inevitably arise in Turkey whenever the subjects of the Straits and of Russia come up simultaneously; the Russian declaration was therefore welcome and doubly so as it was made co-jointly with the British who might therefore be considered as guarantors.

My 280, August 1, 6 p. m.⁸⁹ reported that there was apparently little prospect that the Soviet Government could be induced to make any such gesture of assurance to Turkey as British were urging upon them. British Ambassador tells me that that continued to be the case up to last moment when Molotov unexpectedly proposed the draft of joint declaration which was in fact adopted. Hugessen had meanwhile been sounding Turks as to possibility of some kind of declaration which would quiet their apprehensions about Russian ambitions particularly as regards the Straits, but matter had not reached point of any concrete suggestion from either side up to moment when he and his Soviet colleague were instructed to present joint declaration.

I have assumed you had advance notice of declaration as Hugessen had told me he would request Foreign Office to keep you advised.

Repeated to Moscow.

MACMURRAY

⁸⁸ Not printed; for Anglo-Soviet declaration, see note from the British Embassy, p. 891.

⁸⁹ Not printed.

740.0011 European War 1939/14293 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, August 23, 1941—3 p. m.

[Received August 24—3:40 a. m.]

309. My British colleague to whom I communicated substance of Berlin's 3218, August 19, tells me that yesterday evening he took up subject (which had already been broadcast) incidentally to a conversation on other subjects with Minister for Foreign Affairs and latter said that Turkish Ambassador had conferred at some headquarters on Russian front, not with Hitler but with Ribbentrop at latter's invitation, for purpose of what was described as a general and somewhat academic discussion of present European situation. Saraço lu said he had expressed views that Germany was already completely victorious over Russia and that opportunity was open for Turkey to indicate what portion of spoils (presumably Russian Turkestan) she would desire to claim. He stated specifically that Ribbentrop had made no open or clearly implied threats but that Turks were conscious of logical implication that they must share spoils or put themselves into opposition.

2. In this connection Saraçoğlu volunteered to Hugessen that 3 or 4 weeks ago a certain third party (in Hugessen's opinion and mine probably Mariassy, retiring Hungarian Minister) had told him that Germany was having easy victory in Russia and that he thought it was now time for Turkey to say whether she was with or against Axis Saraçoğlu had said that until he had had occasion to consider matter officially he could not be expected to give any formal reply but that his off hand personal inclination was to say no to Axis as definitely as he would say no to British if they tried to force him into position of active partisanship. On being asked whether Turkey was sympathetic with new order he replied that he did not know what that meant beyond what Turks could infer from rather unhappy experiences of their Balkan neighbors.

3. It is possible that this represents beginnings of minatory if not indeed military pressure upon this country. British sources have it that within past few days Germans have put into Bulgaria advance units of two entirely fresh divisions and that Italians have greatly reinforced their military occupation of Aegean Islands. Other less dependable sources state that Germans are sending back considerable forces to Salonika. This Embassy is not in a position to judge probabilities of early German attack through Turkey upon British position in Near East. My own inclination at the moment is to consider that Germans are bluffing in belief that Turks are softer than they

really are and can be cajoled or cowed into yielding control of Straits and of Anatolian plateau.

Repeated to Berlin, Moscow.

MACMURRAY

867.24/169 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, August 25, 1941—5 p. m.

[Received 10:25 p. m.]

312. My British colleague has shown me copy of Foreign Office telegram 4745, August 23, instructing British Embassy in Washington to present to you view that it would be highly advantageous at present juncture in discussions now in progress with Turkish General Staff if I were to be instructed to hint to Turks that they might expect issue of American export licenses to be on more generous scale and state that in matter of priority Turkey would come next after British Empire. On basis of your 141, August 15 (of which I have not yet found opportunity to make such discreet use as you authorized), I expressed doubt whether you would be prepared to entertain favorably a proposal which would seem to contemplate giving Turkey preference not only over American Republics but also over China and Russia. And, having in mind fact that Turkey does not even yet seem to realize extent of windfall with which our assistance is blessing them, I suggested that impression of strong American support which British wish to convey might be adequately achieved by means of some authoritative communication on our own part apprising Turkish authorities of the actually very high priority we are in fact conceding them.

2. Concretely I venture suggestion that you direct me on behalf of President to make to Prime Minister (with whom general offer of American assistance was originally taken up in accordance with your 14, February 14) oral communication (confirmed by *aide-mémoire* with unofficial French translation) along some such lines as following:

"In pursuance of the offer of American assistance communicated to Y[our] E[xcellency] February 18, Government of United States has given particularly favorable consideration to requests of Turkish Government for export licenses for materials purchased by it and has furthermore made available to Turkish Government under terms of Lease-Lend Act materials already totalling very considerable value. In administering supply of materials required for military needs of United States Government itself and for assistance of various nations resisting aggression it has, of course, been necessary to establish system of priorities. I am happy to be able to inform YE, by direction of the President, that being satisfied that Turkey while actually nonbelligerent is nevertheless wholeheartedly in sympathy

with cause of democracies and is determined to resist any aggression upon its sovereignty or independence, Government of United States is prepared to accord to Turkey in respect to supply of war materials same priority which it gives to American Republics associated with it in defense of Western Hemisphere, YE [*the?*] priority next after that accorded to nations actually resisting aggression."

3. I have discussed this matter with my British colleague who is telegraphing his Government with knowledge of contents of this telegram.

MACMURRAY

740.0011 European War 1939/14419 : Telegram

The Chargé in Germany (Morris) to the Secretary of State

BERLIN, August 27, 1941—10 a. m.

[Received 2 p. m.]

3295. Following telegram has been sent to Ankara.

August 27, 10 a. m. I appreciate your 309, August 23, 3 p. m. to the Department. I have confirmed that the Turkish Ambassador was received only by Ribbentrop by whom he was engaged in conversation for nearly 3 hours. What you learned of the conversation from your colleague appears to be substantially accurate. In addition Ribbentrop played up the alleged enormous Russian losses. He stated that Germany had taken 2 million prisoners and had put out of action 3 million other Russian troops, that effective Russian resistance was nearly at an end, that the town of Nikolaev had been found with all its installations intact and gave other details purporting to show that the German victory was overwhelming. The Ambassador drew the conclusion that these statements which he knew to be grossly exaggerated were made with the object of impressing him and intimidating his Government. This information is from a sure source.

The impression prevails in Turkish circles here that Turkey will not be asked outright to grant passage to the German Army or to declare herself in favor of German policy but will be asked to give more and more positive assurances of a tolerant neutrality, their degree and form to be measured by the proportion and success of German arms. It is expected that this type of pressure will reach its maximum when and if Germany succeeds in occupying all the Russian Black Sea littoral and the Caucasian area.

Repeated to Department.

MORRIS

867.24/174

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

[WASHINGTON,] August 27, 1941.

The British Chargé d'Affaires, Sir Ronald Campbell, called to see me this morning at his request.

Sir Ronald Campbell brought out once more the desirability of coaxing Turkey along by assuring them that the United States, under Lease-Lend, would grant special priorities for matériel to be delivered to Turkey. I replied that this matter had already been dealt with and instructions sent to our Ambassador at Ankara and that this Government had gone as far in this matter as it felt it was possible to do under present conditions. I made it clear that this Government could not agree to giving Turkey priorities over other nations actively resisting aggression, such as China, nor over the other American Republics, in whose defense we were vitally interested. He agreed fully as to the reasonableness of this position.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

740.0011 European War 1939/14471 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, August 28, 1941—3 p. m.

[Received 9:46 p. m.]

317. British Ambassador yesterday found occasion to call on President İnönü for general discussion of progress of war. While their conversation was in other respects conspicuously friendly President made very strong protest against alleged failure of British to live up to their promises of war materials even though Hugessen was able to present him with reports indicating that deliveries had recently been very greatly increased and promises in very large part made good.

2. President then referred in what Hugessen described as caustic terms to alleged complete failure of our own Government to meet Turkish requests saying that there had been constant difficulties and so little result that Turks had ceased to count upon American assistance. Hugessen expressed great surprise in view of what information he had received from me as to very considerable quantities of American materials already turned over for shipment to Turkey or assured for near future.

3. Upon receipt of more up to date specific information promised in your 141, August 15, 1 p. m., propose to take steps to make sure that President's ignorance in this matter is cleared up.

MACMURRAY

867.24/175

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John D. Jernegan of the
Division of Near Eastern Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] August 29, 1941.

Participants: Mr. Murray
Mr. Edminster
Mr. Meltzer⁹⁰
Mr. Blaisdell⁹¹
Mr. Jernegan

Mr. Edminster and Mr. Meltzer brought out the fact, upon which all were agreed, that the formula of "parity with the American republics" is meaningless as applied to Turkey's requests for material from this country. This is true both because Turkish needs are at present in many cases not comparable to those of the American republics and because a general formula of this type takes on meaning only as it is applied to each specific article needed.

It was felt, therefore, that less importance should be given to formulae, although there must necessarily remain a certain "weighting" factor in allotting American production to our own needs and those of the various nations supporting the democratic cause. In the case of Turkey, this "weighting factor" must necessarily be influenced by the fact that Turkey is not at war and that it is not at all certain that she will ultimately enter the war on the Allied side. It was recalled that the Secretary and Under Secretary have repeatedly told the British that this Government is not prepared to give Turkey preference over nations actively resisting aggression or over the American republics.

Mr. Edminster explained that there is a considerable body of pending requests under Lend-Lease, made on behalf of Turkey by the British. He believes that the failure to make a decision on many of these requests may be a result of the State Department's action of last June in requesting that all action be suspended in view of Turkey's nonaggression pact with Germany. This in spite of the "go ahead" signal given on July 25, when the American republics parity formula was decided upon.

Mr. Edminster said he thought that a large number of these requests for Turkey could probably be approved within a few days if this Department expressed an interest in them.

It was agreed that Turkey's present attitude is too uncertain to warrant sending any very large quantities of supplies at this time. However, in view of the desirability of giving the Turks some sort

⁹⁰ Bernard D. Meltzer, Assistant to Assistant Secretary of State Acheson.

⁹¹ Donald C. Blaisdell, Division of Studies and Statistics.

of encouragement, to keep them from feeling abandoned by the democracies, it was felt that some sort of a showing ought to be made as soon as possible. This might be done without committing ourselves too far, since articles approved now would not reach Turkey for two or three months and could be stopped en route if the situation should change.

It was therefore decided that an interim telegram should be sent to Ambassador MacMurray, letting him know that the American republics parity formula is not workable and not being applied, the purpose of this telegram being merely to prevent the Ambassador from making any over-enthusiastic statement to the Turkish Government. Mr. Edminster would get in touch with the Lend-Lease people and endeavor to obtain approval for as many Turkish requests now pending as possible. Details of these approvals would then be cabled to the Ambassador, together with a general statement of policy to be communicated to the Turkish Government which should call attention to the practical steps taken to help Turkey rather than to any specific priority status assigned to her.

The meeting agreed in substance that no definite stand on Turkey should be taken at this time, but that Mr. Edminster's office should keep in touch with the appropriate Government agencies with a view to obtaining approval for such Turkish requests as may appear advisable from week to week, in the light of the international situation and Turkey's attitude.

867.24/169 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray)

WASHINGTON, August 30, 1941—7 p. m.

152. Your 312, August 25. As you correctly indicated to the British Ambassador, the Department is not prepared to give Turkey preference over the American Republics and nations actively resisting aggression. The British Embassy here has been so informed by the Secretary and Under Secretary on several occasions, the latest being on August 27.

It has been found, however, that the formula of "parity with the American Republics" does not provide at present a wholly satisfactory working basis because of its generality and because the needs of those countries and Turkey are often not the same. At the present time therefore no attempt is being made to follow a rigid priority formula with regard to Turkey. The Department is in close contact with the appropriate agencies of the Government and is taking up Turkish requests item by item with a view to determining what articles can be spared. Each case is decided on its own merits in

the light of all demands for the commodity involved. It is hoped that within a very short time approval can be obtained for a part of the pending requests, and you will be informed of the items so approved.

It is felt that any statement to the Prime Minister had best be postponed until the Department is able to furnish you details of steps actually taken to meet Turkey's needs.

HULL

867.24/176 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, September 16, 1941—5 p. m.
[Received September 17—1:15 a. m.]

342. Your 141, August 15. Although I have taken several occasions to mention to him Lease-Lend shipments to Turkey made or contemplated as outlined in your 110, June 28, Minister for Foreign Affairs has hitherto appeared uninterested and in fact politely incredulous. Apparently in consequence of arrival here few days ago of 50 howitzers, he yesterday informed me that our generous assistance had been matter of most [apparent omission] full comment among members of Cabinet at their last meeting; and he asked me to repeat while he took notes principal items specified in your telegram, and earnestly requested more up-to-date list as soon as available. He inquired up to what value Turkey might expect to receive such materials; and I explained that I understood question was one not of any fixed limit but of priorities among those requiring aid; and that although its application presented some practical difficulties general principle adopted was that Turkey should enjoy along with American Republics priority next after those countries actually fighting. He was profuse in expressions of gratitude.

2. Both at beginning and at end of this discussion he remarked solemnly and oracularly that nobody can foresee what may develop next spring and that Turkey must in meanwhile build up modernized army.

MACMURRAY

867.24/178 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, September 17, 1941—1 p. m.
[Received 2:05 p. m.]

343. A despatch ascertained to have been from Reuter given out yesterday evening under Washington date line by the semi-official Anatolian News Agency summarizing the President's report to Con-

gress on the operation of the Lease-Lend Act⁹² indicates in some detail assistance afforded to other countries including Greece and Yugoslavia but contains no reference to Turkey. To counteract so far as possible, the unfavorable impression which will doubtless be created upon Turkish opinion by this presentation of the matter, I beg to request that as soon as possible I be put in a position to inform the Turkish Government of so much of the President's report as relates to Turkey.

MACMURRAY

867.24/178: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray)

WASHINGTON, September 20, 1941—6 p. m.

163. Your 343, September 17, 1 p. m. The President's report covering operations under the Lend-Lease Act for the quarter ending August 31 did not mention aid to Turkey since such aid was rendered through the British. However, consideration is now being given to making future aid available direct to Turkey, in which case Turkey would presumably be named in the next quarterly report.

As regards the mention of Greece and Yugoslavia in the report, it may be pointed out that they had actually been resisting aggression and therefore no question could be raised in any quarters regarding the propriety of extending direct aid to them.

The Department is making every effort to hasten action on a considerable list of pending applications for lend-lease aid to Turkey and hopes to have some very definite news for you shortly. Meanwhile, following are examples of applications filed on behalf of Turkey which have recently been approved: 134,890 feet of steel wire cable, 40 tons of glycerin, 10 rubber life boats for aircraft, 50 self-inflating life jackets, 475 truck tires, 420 car tires, and 15 motorcycle tires, 30 tons of trisodium phosphate, large quantity of jack bits, and hammers.

The Department will telegraph you further in the above regard in the near future.

HULL

867.24/183

Memorandum by the Acting Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Alling) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

[WASHINGTON,] September 29, 1941.

MR. WELLES: I believe that you may wish to ask the British Chargé to call to discuss the question outlined in Mr. Edminster's attached

⁹² *First Report Under the Act of March 11, 1941, June 10, 1941 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1941).*

memorandum.⁹³ Briefly the situation is this: Despite the fact that the British Embassy here has been urging for some time that we give Lend-Lease material to Turkey, it has just been revealed that simultaneously the British Supply Council had requested the War Department to "defer indefinitely" the financing of practically all of the items on the Turkish list. The result has been that practically all of the Turkish requests have been disapproved.

At this time when Dr. Clodius^{93a} is in Turkey negotiating a trade agreement⁹⁴ and when von Papen has just returned, it seems a pity that we are unable to tell the Turks that we are going to furnish them with at least some of the supplies which they require. In this connection you will recall that when fifty large guns, supplied under Lend-Lease reached Turkey about ten days ago the Turkish Foreign Minister expressed his thanks in the warmest terms to Ambassador MacMurray. As matters now stand the Turks probably feel that it is this Government which has held up the furnishing of supplies whereas actually the cause is due to the action of the British Supply Council. In the circumstances it seems particularly important that this whole question should be straightened out as soon as possible. It would be particularly helpful if within the next few days, while the Turks are still negotiating with Dr. Clodius, we could inform them through Ambassador MacMurray that approval had been given to furnishing a substantial portion of the supplies which they require. This would seem to involve no risks since if within the next few weeks the Turks do not stand fast to their engagements to the British, the supplies intended for the Turks can later be diverted to other sources. You may also think it desirable to inform Mr. Winant of these developments so that he can take the matter up in London. If so, we shall be glad to draft appropriate instructions to that end.⁹⁵

PAUL H. ALLING

740.0011 European War 1939/15491 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, September 30, 1941—4 p. m.

[Received 5:16 p. m.]

364. I have several times reported the belief of Turkish officials that Turkey need fear no attack by Germany at any rate until spring. This has now developed into a conviction (which within the past few days both Foreign Minister and Secretary General have

⁹³ Not printed.

^{93a} Carl Clodius, Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department of the German Foreign Ministry.

⁹⁴ For correspondence on this subject, see pp. 936 ff.

⁹⁵ Marginal note: "O. K. for last 2 sentences—S[umner] W[elles]".

stated categorically to British Ambassador, and leading staff officers to our Military Attaché) that such an attack is to be definitely expected next spring.

MACMURRAY

867.24/182 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, September 30, 1941—7 p. m.

[Received 8:19 p. m.]

365. Your 163, September 20. In addition to the promised information as to Lease-Lend material already furnished and under consideration for Turkish Government account I should welcome being advised concerning the system followed in dealing with Turkish requests for such supplies as to which this Embassy has no information beyond certain rather indefinite indications from the British Military Attaché whose office assists the Turkish General Staff in selecting and compiling lists of material needed. My understanding is that these lists are first presented through the Turkish Embassy in Washington to a Joint American-British Advisory Committee (on which the Turks are now represented by an officer and a technician) and upon revision by it are presented to a priorities board by the British on behalf of the Turks. I should like to have this understanding confirmed or corrected, particularly with respect to the questions who presents the requests to the competent agency of our Government and whether the material supplied is earmarked in advance for Turkey. The Turkish officials, including those of the staff, seem to have no idea how this matter is handled; and especially since the arrival of Howitzers and Tomahawk fighters has made them conscious of the reality of American assistance they are approaching the Embassy and the Military Attaché's office both directly and round about with requests and suggestions of one sort or another. It would be helpful to us, in avoiding confusion on the one hand and on the other an appearance of indifference, if we were in a position to explain clearly the prescribed routine which such requests should follow.

2. Your 163 speaks of your having under consideration arrangements to furnish materials to Turkey directly rather than through British intermediation. If Turkish Embassy has not already been consulted I beg to suggest that I be authorized to make sure from Foreign Office that this Government would not find such arrangements embarrassing as too conspicuously singling it out as actually or potentially resisting Axis aggression at a time when it is making every effort to avoid appearance of provocation.

MACMURRAY

867.24/183 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, October 1, 1941—9 p. m.

4159. The British Government has on a number of occasions during the past few months expressed the hope that the United States would continue to grant such aid and facilities to Turkey as possible. Lord Halifax made a special plea on August 2, 1941, asking that there be no "holdup" in granting such aid. Largely as a result of these representations by the British Government, the Department of State has made very considerable effort during the past 2 months to obtain approval by the appropriate authorities of this Government of a number of applications submitted by the British Purchasing Commission for Lend-Lease aid to Turkey. The American Ambassador in Ankara has been authorized to inform the Turkish Government of the endeavors of the American Government to facilitate aid to Turkey.

For several weeks the State Department, in continuing its efforts to have items on the pending Turkish list approved, has realized that there was some opposition to granting the Turkish approvals, but the exact source of the opposition was not immediately apparent. A few days ago the Department received the surprising information that practically all of the Turkish items had been refused, at least for the time being, by the United States War Department as a result of a specific request by the British Purchasing Commission that the financing of these items be deferred.

The explanation of the Purchasing Commission is that Great Britain has already made applications for lend-lease aid in excess of the amount of money available to Great Britain under present lend-lease appropriations, and that the granting of Turkish requests would consequently reduce the amount available to Britain. The Department has made known to the Purchasing Commission informally that this explanation is not considered satisfactory, since the British Government, at the time it was urging us to accord more aid to Turkey, should have taken account of these circumstances and considered in advance just how much importance it placed on Turkey's being accorded the items on the list. As the matter stands, the Turkish Government has evidently concluded that the failure of this Government to take more prompt action with regard to aid to Turkey has been something for which the United States, not Great Britain, was primarily responsible. The Foreign Minister of Turkey recently spoke in a rather critical manner to Ambassador MacMurray of the failure of the oft-mentioned aid from the United States to materialize.

When reminded by the Department of the insistence of the British Embassy upon prompt aid to Turkey and the simultaneous request of the Purchasing Commission that the aid be deferred, a member of the Commission has frankly admitted that there is great need of a further clarification of the British Government's policy in this matter. The Purchasing Commission has undertaken to obtain this clarification, but you are requested to bring the circumstances to the attention of Mr. Eden, pointing out the difficulty which Mr. MacMurray is finding in explaining to the Turkish Government the failure of American aid to Turkey to reach the expected amount.

Repeated to Ankara.⁹⁶

HULL

867.24/192

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Murray)

[WASHINGTON,] October 3, 1941.

With the approval of the Secretary, I this morning conveyed to the Turkish Ambassador the information that in matters of lend-lease aid to Turkey we contemplate in the future dealing direct with the Turkish authorities and not, as in the past, through the British.

The Ambassador expressed his sincere appreciation for the Department's attitude in this matter and added that some short time ago representatives of his Embassy dealing with arms purchases in the United States had been informed he thought by an official of O. P. M.,⁹⁷ to the same effect. His representative had, however, at the same time been advised that the Embassy would be furnished shortly with a detailed statement of procedure for direct lend-lease aid to Turkey. This communication has never yet arrived and for that reason the Ambassador presumed that no new procedure was as yet in operation.

The Ambassador then said he wished to speak to me as a personal friend and not as an official about the matter of lend-lease aid to Turkey. He said that personally, in view of a variety of circumstances, he had been extremely reluctant to be put in a position of requesting any aid from this country which Turkey was not in a position to pay for. He said he still entertained the same feeling. As far as he was concerned, and he felt sure that his Government and people felt the same, he would rather see his country purchase all available military supplies as far as the resources of the country permitted and after that to fight, if need be, with sticks and stones, or hatchets, or even bare hands, against any invader.

⁹⁶ As telegram No. 173, October 1, 9 p. m.

⁹⁷ Office of Production Management.

As for the granting of lend-lease aid through the British, the Ambassador said he had thought the matter over since he had received the above-mentioned word from O. P. M. and had been somewhat inclined to the view that it was more logical for such aid to come to Turkey through the British since the British were bound by a treaty to furnish Turkey with all necessary military supplies, whereas we had no such obligation. He had furthermore felt that it might be preferable not to be put in the position of having to ask for assistance direct from this Government and suffer a rebuff which the British could not afford to administer to Turkey because of her alliance with that country and her treaty obligations to it. I made no comment on this reasoning of the Ambassador but merely said that we thought it advisable to proceed along a different line in the future in lending assistance to Turkey and that we contemplated dealing direct with her in all such matters.

887.24/184 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, October 9, 1941—6 p. m.

[Received 6:50 p. m.]

4810. Your 4159, October 1, 9 p. m., was discussed with Mr. Eden on October 2d. I confirmed my talk the same day by a personal letter transmitting substance of your telegram. I have today received from Mr. Eden the following letter dated October 8th.

"Many thanks for your letter of October 2d in which you were so good as to enclose a copy of a telegram about lease-lend supplies for Turkey.

We are, as you know, most anxious that Turkey should benefit as much as possible from the provisions of the Lend-Lease Act. The appropriations voted by Congress for material permitted to be supplied under the Lease-Lend Act, though generous, are not unlimited and do not, as you are aware, cover all our requirements, present or anticipated. The best means therefore of assuring deliveries to Turkey is to release whenever possible the supplies she wants from material allocated to us and covered by our share of the defence aid appropriations.

On the other hand much of the material for which the Turkish Government are asking us, e. g., certain types of ammunition, A T guns, et cetera, is not likely to be available for a considerable time in the United States or elsewhere. It will be appreciated that we do not wish to fill up the appropriations by earmarking any part of them for material, the supply of which cannot be made either this year or next, and need not therefore be covered by our present or forthcoming allocation. I believe that this may explain the state-

ment in the second paragraph of the telegram which you enclosed that the holdup in the release of supplies to Turkey is the result of a specific request from the British Purchasing Commission that the financing of certain items should be deferred.

The British authorities are perhaps to blame for this in that in considering the various lists of Turkish requirements we have not made it clear to the Turkish Government or the British Purchasing Commission that in passing this or that item to the United States we had not expected that supply would prove possible in the near future. The Turkish lists are coming up for review by the competent authorities here and when this review has been completed we shall make clear both to the Turks and the British Purchasing Commission what the position really is. When this has been done I feel certain that the Turkish Government will realize that they are obtaining from the United States the maximum aid which the war situation elsewhere permits.

His Majesty's Government have much appreciated the efforts made by the United States of America to meet their desire that supplies for Turkey should not be held up; they regret that the rather complicated circumstances explained in the preceding paragraphs should have led the Turkish Government to doubt unjustly the good will of the United States of America towards them and they are instructing His Majesty's Ambassador at Angora to make clear to the Turkish authorities that the United States of America are to their knowledge responding generously to Turkish requests for assistance in the matter of war supplies.

I might add that we have now ourselves received a telegram from Washington on this subject to which we shall be replying on the lines of this letter."

WINANT

740.0011 European War 1939/15752 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, October 9, 1941—7 p. m.

[Received October 9—2:39 a. m.]

378. The Turkish press published this morning the following joint Turkish-German communiqué:

"During recent weeks press and radio news from foreign sources have sought over and over again and in different ways to give the impression that Germany was formulating demands, exercising pressure, concentrating troops in Bulgaria and was on the point of attacking Turkey.

The Turkish and German Governments which have at no time attached the slightest importance to these tendentious rumors have nevertheless agreed to declare that these baseless publications cannot in any way disturb the relations of trust friendship which the two countries confirmed between themselves by their agreement of June 18, 1941."

[Here follows report of favorable Turkish press comment.]

MACMURRAY

867.24/186: Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, October 15, 1941—4 p. m.

[Received October 16—6:26 a. m.]

383. Fact that Turks have definitely disappointed us on chrome issue now confronts us with question of justification for further material contribution to Turkey's war potential in view of what is at least in appearance politically equivocal position of Turkish Government as between British Allies and German friends.

2. I assume that what we have already given and contemplated giving to the extent of some tens of millions of dollars has been for sole purpose of fortifying Turkey as bastion of Allied position in Near and Middle East. However much therefore we may resent timid and tepidly loyal attitude of that Government, question is not one of how much it deserves but how much is necessary or desirable for purposes we have in view—that is of what will best serve interests of British and Allies. There may indeed be question in the minds of British as to degree to which Turkey is essential to plans for eventual defense of this general area. . . . One may even hear whispers of military calculation whether defense against direct German thrust through Asia Minor could be most effectively made on line of Straits with full cooperation of Turkish Army or on that of Taurus Mountains regardless of Turks but free on almost insuperable problem of supplying any considerable forces by very inadequate available means of communication across Anatolia. This is not yet, so far as I know, an immediate question; but it might become factor in British calculations as to their attitude towards Turkey as a potentially active ally.

3. So far as I know, however, British plans still take account of Turkey as major factor even despite dualism of policy to which your 173, October 1⁹⁸ referred. And my own feeling is that so long as British think it necessary or desirable to strengthen Turkey as much as possible and to keep her convinced (even at expense of very one-sided cooperation) of community of war purposes we should go on furnishing to her material she desires so far as it is politically possible for our Government to do so.

4. In view, however, of levity with which Turks accept what we give them as though it were their right yet refuse to recognize that we have any *locus standi* in their affairs (incidentally Foreign Minister in conversation with Hugessen has referred to my memorandum October 7⁹⁹ as "wholly unjustified") I venture to suggest once more

⁹⁸ See footnote 96, p. 906.

⁹⁹ See numbered paragraph 3 of telegram No. 374, October 7, 4 p. m., from the Ambassador in Turkey, p. 958.

that we abandon policy of aloof and impersonal beneficence and take every possible occasion to make Turks conscious of fact that we are doing very great deal for them but only because and so long as we believe them to be making common cause with democracies and that we naturally reserve our right to decide whether at any juncture Turkish policy of placating Germans would make it not worth our while to go on giving. (Turkish authorities are now aware of fact that supplies for them have been at least partially withheld for certain period. In connection with any explanations that may be made on this would we be warranted in conveying (both in Washington and here) intimation that such misunderstanding or working at cross purposes as actually occurred could scarcely have taken place if warmth of interest in their behalf had not been made lukewarm by indefiniteness of their position as implied by their adoption of policy of appeasement.)

5. I should in this connection suggest that you ask Turkish Ambassador for precise details of arrangement which has been made with Germany concerning chrome as to which our representations have been ignored but which have obvious present and future relevancy to whole policy of defense production and Lend-Lease assistance; and make clear that if we are to continue furnishing war material to this Government we shall expect it to recognize privity of interest with United States.

MACMURRAY

867.24/211

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] October 21, 1941.

The British Ambassador called to see me this afternoon.

The Ambassador said that he had some matters that he would like to take up with me. He said that during the time that I was away from the Department, the Department had informed the British Embassy that it believed that supplies to be made available to Turkey under the provisions of the Lease-Lend Act should be made available directly by the United States and not through Great Britain. The Ambassador brought with him an *aide-mémoire*, in the nature of a reply of the British Government to this opinion which it attached herewith.¹

The Ambassador said he wished to add to what was contained in the *aide-mémoire* two further considerations which he considered of great importance. First, as this Government knew, Turkey frequently complained that Great Britain had not complied with the terms of her agreement with Turkey by furnishing all of the arms and ammunition

¹ *Infra.*

which had been stipulated in the original agreement. He said that if the arms and ammunition furnished under Lease-Lend were to be supplied directly to Turkey by the United States, the Turks would have further ground for their contention that Great Britain had not complied with her commitment and that Turkey was receiving this matériel from other sources and consequently at a given moment the danger might be increased by Turkey, maintaining that Great Britain had not complied with her part of the agreement, declaring that she was consequently released from her commitments to Great Britain with respect to Germany. Second, the British High Military Command believes that the best aerial assistance which can be afforded by Great Britain to Turkey lies in the furnishing of British aviation squadrons. The British Government feels that if aviation matériel is made available to Turkey directly by the United States, the Turks will endeavor to expand their own aviation forces to preclude the preponderance of British air squadrons and that consequently there will result very serious interference with British strategy and British aviation plans for the Near East.

I stated to the Ambassador that it seemed to me that these questions merited the very careful consideration of this Government and that the problem would immediately be given further attention.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

867.24/211

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

His Majesty's Government have given most careful consideration to the suggestion made by the State Department some weeks ago that materials furnished to Turkey from the United States under the Lease-Lend Act should be supplied by the United States Government direct to the Turkish Government rather than through the intermediary of the British authorities, as is at present the case. The British authorities are fully alive to the strength of the arguments advanced by the State Department in support of this proposal and appreciate the advantages which might accrue from the political point of view were the United States Government to supply these materials direct to the Turkish Government. After full consideration of all the factors involved, however, the British Government have come to the conclusion that it would be greatly preferable to maintain the existing procedure whereby materials for Turkey are supplied through the intermediary of the appropriate British authorities.

It seems inevitable that the Middle East must be regarded as a strategic whole, and that in considering the question of what armaments should be made available to Turkey this whole picture should be taken into account. Nor can British commitments in other parts of the world be ignored. The effect on these commitments of any decision to supply materials to Turkey must also be borne in mind. In the view of His Majesty's Government it is imperative to make the best and most economical use of the resources of war material, at present severely restricted, which are available in non-axis countries. That can only be done on the basis of strategical considerations which, as regards the area where British interests are closely involved, are more easily appreciated in London.

Further, the British Government are under an obligation under their treaty arrangements with Turkey to supply the latter with armaments, some of which are now being obtained by the British authorities from the United States. It is not possible for practical reasons for the British authorities to consider the full details of the requirements which the Turkish Government present to them unless they can themselves decide whether certain particular items are to be provided from the United Kingdom or from the United States.

For the foregoing reasons the British Government are therefore most anxious to see the existing procedure maintained.

As a result of informal conversations which have been taking place between the British Embassy, the British Supply Council and the State Department, the Supply Council have been in communication with London on the general question of supplies from the United States of America to Turkey. It is appreciated that most supplies for Turkey under the Lend-Lease Act (as distinct from items which Turkey is able to produce with her own dollar resources) must under present conditions come out of allocations made in the first instance to the United Kingdom on behalf of the British Empire and the Allied Governments within the area where British interests are involved. This results partly from the supply position in the United States, but principally from the policy of His Majesty's Government in favouring Lend-Lease supplies to Turkey through the United Kingdom as intermediary rather than direct or separately for Turkey out of Lend-Lease appropriation.

It has been agreed by His Majesty's Government that Turkey should receive from them monthly or quarterly allocations out of deliveries coming forward to them, so far as supplies permit. For instance, 100 trucks have been allocated to Turkey for October and other allocations will be made as the cases arise.

It will be appreciated, however, that in the absence of firm forecasts of transfers to the British pool out of Lend-Lease appropriations and in view of the inevitable short term changes that occur both in these forecasts and in the developments of the war, it is virtually impossible to allocate Lend-Lease supplies far ahead if such distribution is to be useful and economical.

There are, however, a number of Turkish requirements already notified to the British Supply Council which clearly cannot be supplied at present. This is due in part to the natural difficulty experienced by the United States procurement agencies in finding capacity for alien types of equipment without hindrance to their own supplies, and in part to the fact that deliveries under Lend-Lease from which diversions to Turkey could be made have so far been small in quantity. His Majesty's Government propose to explain frankly to the Turkish Government which are these items, and to advise as to the items which show earlier possibility of delivery. The British Supply Council expect a further communication from London on this subject.

WASHINGTON, October 21, 1941.

867.24/193

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] October 22, 1941.

The British Ambassador called at his request and I outlined our position with respect to the supply of war materials for Turkey insofar as our two countries were concerned. Our policy was based on the general proposition that such steps should be taken as would give the British the maximum of influence in regard to Turkey, if and when a Turkish-German crisis threatened. I suggested that it was very important to hold a conference between the British and ourselves to work out every phase of the intervening steps considered necessary and advisable, including the question of which Government should supply military implements and other materials to Turkey, keeping in mind our wish to build up British influence to the maximum, et cetera, et cetera.

The Ambassador then handed me a document, a copy of which is attached,² in regard to the Turkish military situation. I thanked him.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

² *Infra.*

867.24/193

The British Embassy to the Department of State

In view of the importance which the Turkish question has assumed in recent months, His Majesty's Government feel it desirable to state for the information of the United States Government the nature of their policy in regard to Turkey and the strategic grounds on which it is based.

It is vital to the Middle Eastern position of the Allies, firstly, that the Germans should not be allowed passage through Turkey and, secondly, that Turkey should resist if attacked. An Axis attack on Turkey would not be aimed at the conquest of Turkey alone, though no doubt Germany would be glad enough to obtain certain Turkish raw materials. The main objective of the attack would be the destruction of the right flank of Great Britain's position in the Middle East and the capture of Egypt and the Suez Canal. A further aim might well be Iraq and the Persian Gulf, though this is unlikely to be an immediate objective until the Germans have occupied the Caucasus. The best, and so long as Great Britain holds Cyprus and has control over Syria, the only method of turning the British right flank is a drive through Anatolia.

Were the Turks to acquiesce in the passage of German troops, the British forces would be obliged to occupy defensive position along the Northern Syrian and Iraq frontiers, with the following grave disadvantages: (1) unsuitable country with no natural strong defensive features, and a very difficult divergent line of withdrawal through Syria and Iraq; (2) a heavy scale German air attack from the Anatolian air fields on British lines of communications and Egypt; (3) a powerful threat of air and sea invasion of Cyprus, and in the event of its loss an increased air threat to British positions in Syria, Palestine, Egypt and the Canal itself.

In the event of Turkish resistance and combined Turco-British action a very much more satisfactory system of defence in depth could be adopted with the following advantages: (1) topographically, Turkey is much more suitable than Syria for defence, and even if most of Anatolia were quickly overrun there are very strong natural defensive positions in Turkey along the line of the Taurus mountains which the Allied forces would be able to occupy instead of having to stand in Syria; (2) the German air threat to Syria would be kept at a distance, and the Anatolian air fields would be at the disposal of the Royal Air Force for attacks on Axis bases in the Aegean Islands and Greece, German lines of communication through the Balkans, and the Roumanian oil fields; (3) Cyprus would be less vulnerable.

There are the following further advantages of Turkish resistance: (1) Even if the resistance were not prolonged, some toll would be taken of Axis man and war material; (2) A successful defence of Anatolia would provide Allied bases for both land and air forces for attacks on Greece, Crete, the Aegean Islands and the Dodecanese and could lead to the developing of an offensive strategy through the Balkan countries at a future date.

The above strategic considerations will make it plain how important it is to His Majesty's Government that the Turkish will and capacity to resist should be maintained. If she is to resist, it is necessary to collaborate with her whenever possible and generally try to build her up militarily so that she may be in a position to play a useful part if attacked. It is from this point of view that the maintenance of as large a supply of war materials as possible in the period before a German attack or German demands for transit rights assumes particular importance. Any hint or suspicion in the Turkish mind that the present volume of military supplies might be decreased would seriously prejudice the chances of the Turks resisting German demands or a German attack. During the recent discussions with Turkey about the supply of chrome, His Majesty's Government would have liked to be able to use the threat of cutting off supplies if a satisfactory chrome agreement were not concluded. But in practice they could not afford to do so, for the simple reason that strategically it is essential, with a German attack in the Middle East as an ever-present possibility, that His Majesty's Government should avoid any quarrel with Turkey such as might lead the latter to adopt a policy of isolation or to go over to the Axis.

WASHINGTON, October 22, 1941.

867.24/212

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Murray) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

[WASHINGTON,] October 28, 1941.

MR. WELLES: Attached is a rather full report³ of the meeting in my office on Friday with representatives of the British Embassy and the British Purchasing Commission to discuss the question whether lend-lease aid to Turkey should continue to be furnished by the United States to Great Britain for retransfer to Turkey, or whether such aid should be furnished direct to Turkey in the future.

I regret to report that very little if any progress appeared to be made towards reconciling the view espoused principally by Mr. Philip

³ Not printed.

Young, Assistant to Mr. Hopkins,⁴ who favored direct aid to Turkey, and the view of the British officials that we should continue to furnish Great Britain with the materials intended for Turkey, the authority remaining with Great Britain as to when and how this material is retransferred to Turkey.

The principal arguments of the British were those already indicated to you by Lord Halifax. The British spokesman, Mr. Pincent, pointed out that Britain had certain treaty commitments to furnish supplies to Turkey, that Britain could not furnish all of the materials, but that if Britain could continue to retransfer to Turkey materials obtained from the United States Turkey would be estopped from claiming nonfulfillment of the Treaty. Mr. Pincent also pointed out that Great Britain was required, by the military situation in the Near East, to coordinate Turkish needs closely with her own and to determine the relative urgency of the available material in the United States. He felt that since Britain is responsible for the military operations in the Near East and must retain the right to make final decisions, it would be preferable for all the steps connected with supplying Turkey to remain in British hands until the final moment of delivery to Turkey. He was also afraid that direct American aid to Turkey would enable the Turks to play the Americans off against the British.

The principal arguments for direct aid to Turkey were presented as follows: The present method is not working satisfactorily. The British authorities have been bombarding the Department with memoranda and representations urging the necessity of keeping Turkey in a favored category under lend-lease. Lord Halifax left a further memorandum with the Secretary on the subject last Wednesday, pointing out at length the extreme military importance of Turkey and the urgent necessity to "build her up militarily" and to send her "as large a supply of war materials as possible." But ironically, the British themselves have not kept Turkey in a favored category, and have been directly responsible for the fact that Turkey has received almost no supplies under lend-lease. We have been willing to give the British a considerable amount of supplies for Turkey under the present system, but the British have refused to permit them to go through, although pleading with us meanwhile to be generous to Turkey. For example, only two major requisitions for Turkey have been finally approved and the materials shipped. One was for 50 Howitzer guns and the other for 200 large (2½ ton) trucks. All of the guns and trucks were shipped from New York during June, more than four months ago. The guns arrived in Turkey a month or more

⁴Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to President Roosevelt, with primary responsibility at this time for Lend-Lease affairs.

ago, and ten of the trucks have arrived; but the British authorities here do not appear to know what happened to the other 190 trucks. The Lend-Lease office is anxious to comply with the British desire for more supplies to be furnished to Turkey, and feels that a considerable step towards solving this difficulty would be to make aid available direct to Turkey, subject to British countersignature of Turkish requisitions.

Some of the other suggestions favoring direct aid to Turkey which were brought out in the meeting were as follows:

(1) The present system is not impressing Turkey that America is interested in her welfare, and is even causing the Turks to regard with "levity" any mention of American aid, according to Mr. Mac-Murray.

(2) The present system is objectionable from an administrative point of view since the machinery for retransfers is cumbersome and the American authorities have great difficulty in finding out what happens to material given to Britain for retransfer to Turkey.

(3) Direct aid to Turkey would have a strong effect on Turkish morale.

(4) By receiving aid from the United States direct, Turkey would assume a moral obligation to the United States in addition to her treaty obligation towards Great Britain and would therefore be more likely to remain in line.

(5) If Turkey is willing to receive American aid, she should be willing to do so openly. . . .

(6) Indirect aid to Turkey, through Great Britain, is something of a subterfuge, and unless there are strong reasons to the contrary, the American public has a right to expect that American lend-lease aid be made direct to the beneficiaries, in order that American policy may benefit from the expenditure of American funds.

Both the pro's and con's of this argument have merit, it seems to me. It may not be of overwhelming importance, in actual practice, which method is accepted. We might come out at more or less the same point by either method, on the whole. However, I am inclined to believe under the direct method we can adequately take care of the British objections, by close cooperation between ourselves and the British with regard to Turkish requisitions, and at the same time accomplish better results than at present. I am not sanguine that the objections to the present method of aid through Britain can adequately be met by efforts to improve the present system.

The British are really afraid, I believe, that if we make supplies available direct to Turkey, we may follow an independent policy towards Turkey and grant or withhold supplies according to our own ideas of how Turkey is behaving. Lord Halifax's latest memorandum⁵ seems to point to this conclusion. I do not believe these fears

⁵ *Supra.*

are well-founded. The direct method seems to be the best means of accomplishing just what the British have been pleading with us to do, which is to get supplies to Turkey.

WALLACE MURRAY

811.20 (D) Regulations/5128 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, October 28, 1941—4 p. m.

[Received October 29—5 a. m.]

402. Acting Commercial Attaché advises that recent reports from Turkish importers would indicate an increasing restriction of United States exports to Turkey. Specifically it is reported that export licenses for Turkey are now being granted only upon guarantee by the Turkish authorities in the United States that the merchandise covered is to be utilized for National Defense purposes.

In view of inquiries being made of Embassy with regard to difficulties in importing goods from the United States, the Embassy would appreciate being informed of the accuracy of this report and kept currently advised of changes in export policy affecting Turkish-American trade.

MACMURRAY

867.24/196

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. George V. Allen of the
Division of Near Eastern Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] November 4, 1941.

Participants: Mr. Hayter, First Secretary, British Embassy
Sir Louis Beale, Chief, Allied Requirements Section,
British Supply Council
Mr. Tomkins, British Supply Council
Mr. Graham, Mr. Kaufman, Mr. Rauh, Office of Lend-
Lease Administration
Mr. Edminster
Mr. Blaisdell
Mr. Winant, DE ⁶
Mr. Murray, Mr. Alling, Mr. Allen

Mr. Murray opened the discussion by informing the British representatives present that while the American Government desires, at least for the time being, to accede to the wishes of the British Government and to permit lend-lease material destined for Turkey to go

⁶ Division of Exports and Defense Aid.

through British hands, it naturally wished to assure itself that the materials which the British and American Governments agreed should be destined for Turkey actually got there, or, should it later be deemed by the British Government that changes in such original plan should be made, that this Government be given an opportunity to express its views before such changes are made effective.

In this connection, Mr. Murray made it clear that the British authorities have no option to withhold such material from Turkey without our consent, under our lend-lease law and procedure, and said that although there is no reason to believe that our desires will be any different from those of the British in case of emergency, we must insist on being consulted before material for Turkey is diverted. Mr. Murray said that in case of very grave emergency, the Department realized that the British authorities might be called upon to act immediately, but that in such case the American authorities would desire to be consulted at the earliest feasible moment thereafter.

Mr. Hayter and Sir Louis Beale said that the British Government would have no objection whatsoever to the procedure suggested under the reservation embodied therein concerning extreme emergency.

Mr. Murray asked the British authorities if they had any suggestions to offer regarding the best method by which the American Government might assure itself that materials intended for Turkey actually arrived in that country.

Mr. Hayter made no specific suggestions on this point, but read a copy of a telegram which the British Ambassador in Washington sent to his Foreign Office immediately following the previous discussion on this subject of October 24. The telegram reported that the State Department was disturbed regarding the failure of more supplies to reach Turkey and stressed the desirability of prompt British action in this regard. Mr. Murray said that officials of the Department and the Lend-Lease Administration had considered the question since the last discussion with the British and had certain specific suggestions to offer which might remove some of the difficulties which have been experienced with regard to lend-lease aid to Turkey. In the first place, he said that the Department contemplated notifying the Turkish Government, through the Turkish Embassy in Washington and the American Embassy in Ankara, whenever the American Government transferred articles to the British with authority to retransfer them to Turkey. Sir Louis Beale and Mr. Hayter said that their Government would have no objection whatsoever to this procedure.

Mr. Murray said that the State Department desired to be informed by the British authorities when supplies destined for Turkey actually left the United States, including the commodities concerned, the

name of the vessel, the port of departure, the port of destination, and the approximate date of arrival. Mr. Tomkins said that he would be glad to furnish the Department with this information, and Sir Louis Beale and Mr. Hayter agreed that the British authorities would be glad to furnish the Department this information.

Mr. Murray said that the State Department desired to be informed by the British authorities when the vessels mentioned above reached the Near East, if this were practicable. The British representatives said that they would endeavor to do this.

Mr. Murray said that the American authorities desired also to propose to the British that cash-reimbursable lend-lease to Turkey be handled on requisitions made by the Turkish authorities and submitted direct to O. L. L. A.⁷ He said that this was a technical matter which Mr. Graham would be able to explain more fully.

Mr. Graham said that since Turkish officials are already dealing direct with the Lend-Lease Administration in matters of Turkish purchases for cash in the United States, it would be helpful to the Turkish authorities if they were permitted also to deal direct with the Administration in the class of Turkish cases known as "Cash-Reimbursable Purchases under Lend-Lease". He explained that these cases concerned purchases which Turkey desired to make in the United States, but which could be obtained more readily, at a better price, and with better priorities, if the purchases were handled as lend-lease transactions, the Turkish authorities depositing a check in advance with the United States Treasury to pay for the articles to be purchased.

Sir Louis Beale said that he saw no objection to the arrangement whatsoever provided there were prior consultation and agreement with the British authorities before such Turkish purchases were approved. He said that he thought it most important for the American and British military authorities to agree on the advisability, from a military point of view, before Turkey was permitted to purchase commodities in the United States, even though Turkey might have the cash in hand with which to buy the commodities in question. He thought the possession of cash by the Turks was a relatively unimportant consideration. (In this connection, Mr. Tomkins said later that the amount of cash available to the Turks was very small indeed as compared with the amount of material the Turks needed. He said that lists of materials desired by the Turks which had already been approved in principle by the British authorities amounted to upwards of \$400,000,000, and that the \$2,000,000 or \$3,000,000 in cash which the Turks had for purchasing military supplies in the United States was therefore almost negli-

⁷ Office of Lend-Lease Administration.

ble.) Sir Louis Beale proposed that there be consultation between the British and American military authorities at the earliest stage in connection with Turkish requests, and that once these authorities had agreed on items for Turkey, there should be no more difficulty, such as has been experienced in the past, when the military authorities, either British or American or both, had stepped in to defer Turkish requests.

Mr. Graham agreed that early consultation between the military authorities was very important, but he insisted that agreement between the American and British military authorities was not necessary with regard to cash Turkish purchases. He said that for instance, if the Turkish request to buy one thousand trucks in the United States, now pending, should be disapproved by the British military authorities but approved by the American military authorities, the American Government would reserve the right to make the decision. Sir Louis Beale accepted this clarification. Mr. Graham said that another point needed clarification. He thought the American Government should be informed of all Turkish requests for lend-lease material, and that if such requests were received by the British authorities in the United States they should be forwarded to the Lend-Lease Administration, even though the British authorities might not approve them. In the latter case, he said the requests could be accompanied by a memorandum from the British authorities giving their reasons for disapproval. He thought it important for the American Government to be informed of the requests in any case, since it was necessary for his office to make estimates for production needs in advance and that he could not make such estimates unless he had some idea of the potential requirements of the various countries here. Sir Louis Beale pointed out that this system of making known to O. L. L. A. all Turkish requisitions had already been informally instituted by Mr. Tomkins and that it would be continued as a regular procedure.

At the conclusion of the meeting, it was agreed that there were no longer any outstanding differences of opinion between the American and British authorities regarding lend-lease procedure for Turkey, and that the State Department would let the British have a statement of its understanding of the points agreed upon.

867.24/193 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray)

WASHINGTON, November 6, 1941—8 p. m.

200. Your 365, September 30, 7 p. m., paragraph 2. Following extended conferences with the British authorities in Washington, the Department has agreed to accede, at least for the time being, to the

wishes of the British Government that articles intended for Turkey under lend-lease continue to be granted to the British for retransfer to Turkey, as in the past. The plans for direct lend-lease aid to Turkey referred to in your telegram under reference have therefore been dropped for the time being, as a result of strong British insistence. However, since Turkish purchases for cash in the United States may be made more advantageously by Turkey, both as regards price and priorities, if consummated as lend-lease transactions, it has been decided to extend direct lend-lease aid to Turkey with respect to this class of cases, known as cash-reimbursable transactions under the Lend-Lease Act.

As a result of recent changes in lend-lease procedure, in which the President has delegated to Mr. Stettinius authority to transfer articles under the Lend-Lease Act and to authorize their retransfer to countries whose defense shall have been found by the President to be vital to the defense of the United States, it appears necessary for the President to issue such a finding with respect to Turkey, whether lend-lease aid to Turkey is given direct or indirect. In connection with this finding, expected to take place within the next few days, the Lend-Lease Administration considers it desirable to issue the following statement for the press:

"The President announced today that he had found the defense of Turkey vital to the defense of the United States and had directed Lend-Lease Administrator Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., to see that the defense needs of the Government of Turkey were filled as fast as possible.

The program of aid to Turkey is being worked out in close cooperation with the State Department and with the Government of Great Britain."

The Lend-Lease Administration believes that the finding of the President regarding Turkey will become known to the press since, under the procedure recently set up, any further aid for Turkey will pre-suppose such a finding. The Department is inclined to agree that some statement for the press may be desirable, but before expressing its concurrence will be glad to have your recommendations.

HULL

867.24/217

*President Roosevelt to the Lend-Lease Administrator (Stettinius)*⁸

WASHINGTON, November 7, 1941.

MY DEAR MR. STETTINIUS: I have today found that the defense of the Government of Turkey is vital to the defense of the United States.

⁸ Copy transmitted to the Secretary of State by Mr. Stettinius in his covering letter of November 8, 1941, not printed.

I therefore desire you to take immediate action to transfer to the Government of Turkey under the Lend-Lease Act all feasible material aid.

I should appreciate it if you and Secretary Hull would work out the details of this program with representatives of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

811.20 (D) Regulations/5128 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray)

WASHINGTON, November 8, 1941.

201. Your 402, October 28, 4 p. m. License applications for exports to Turkey must be accompanied by a statement from the Turkish Embassy regarding the need for the material and showing that a navicert has been issued. This procedure was instituted some time ago, with respect to all countries with which no other special arrangements were in effect, in order to assure that available material for export from the United States might be best distributed for the general defense effort.

However, the principal reason why difficulties have been experienced in obtaining goods for Turkey and all other countries is that supplies are increasingly restricted due to the enormous military demand. The demand for every one of the important metals largely exceeds supply, and it has been necessary to restrict consumption of all the metals for civilian uses in the United States and to limit their use increasingly to direct defense purposes. Machinery, steel, and a long list of other articles are now available for use within the United States, or for export, only on specific proof to the authorities controlling supply that the intended use of the material has an immediate connection with the defense effort. These scarcities show no sign of growing less and become greater with every increase in the program for ships, tanks, airplanes, etc. The difficulties of Turkish importers from the United States are shared by importers everywhere and by all industries in this country except those which are producing direct defense materials and ships.

HULL

867.24/201

The Lend-Lease Administrator (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, November 12, 1941.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: On November 7, the President found that the defense of the Government of Turkey was vital to the defense

of the United States and requested me to work out details on a program for Lend-Lease Aid with you and representatives of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.

Attached is a procedure to be set up for accomplishing this and which has been worked out in cooperation with the Near Eastern Division and Mr. Winant of your department, and also, the representatives of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.

If this procedure meets with your approval would you please sign the attached original and return it to this office? We have enclosed an extra copy for your files.

Sincerely yours,

E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.

[Enclosure]

PROCEDURE ADOPTED FOR LEND-LEASE AID TO TURKEY

The Turks will get aid from the United States in two ways: (1) Lend-Lease aid by retransfer from the British; (2) Direct Lend-Lease aid on a cash payment basis.

I. RETRANSFER PROCEDURE

1. The Turks submit lists of their requirements to the Office of Lend-Lease Administration and to the British, who will then meet with the Office of Lend-Lease Administration and the Turks to discuss them.

2. After the British and U. S. authorities have discussed the items preliminarily with the Turks, the British will submit all Turkish requisitions, indicating in the "Remarks" section of the Requisition Form whether they approve or disapprove of each particular Turkish request. The Office of Lend-Lease Administration will give full consideration to all British objections but reserves the right, in conjunction with our military authorities, to make the final decision on all Turkish requests.

3. No Lend-Lease procurement agencies will delay any Turkish requisitions passed for procurement without prior consultation with the Office of Lend-Lease Administration.

4. All Retransfer Directives covering items for Turkey shall direct the British to retransfer them to the Turks, and not to withhold them for British use without prior consent by the Lend-Lease Administrator, except in cases of urgent military necessity. In the event of such urgent necessity, the British will promptly notify the Office of Lend-Lease Administration.

5. The Office of Lend-Lease Administration will send copies of all Transfer Directives concerning aid for Turkey to the Allied Requirements Section of the British Supply Council, and to the State

Department for distribution to the Turkish Embassy in Washington and to the American Embassy in Ankara.

6. The British will inform OLLA the date when supplies destined for Turkey actually leave the United States, including the commodities concerned, the name of the vessel, the port of departure, and when feasible, the port of destination, and the approximate date of arrival. OLLA will make this information available to the proper authorities in the State Department when desired.

II. CASH PURCHASING

1. The Turks will make all purchases of defense articles in the United States through Lend-Lease. Turkish Lend-Lease cash reimbursement requisitions will be submitted directly by the Turkish authorities.

2. The British will be sent copies of those requisitions and will be consulted by the Office of Lend-Lease Administration as to the justification for such purchases. However, the final decision will be made by the Office of Lend-Lease Administration.

3. The Turks will be informed that it may be possible, if they so desire, to institute a partial cash payment Lend-Lease program.

Approved

State Department

E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.

Lend-Lease Administration

740.0011 European War 1939/16687 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, November 13, 1941—4 p. m.

[Received November 14—1:04 p. m.]

424. The British Ambassador informs me that a friendly diplomatic representative (who had asked that his identity should not be disclosed) had quoted his colleague in Washington as reporting that the Under Secretary had told him President İnönü's reference to Turkey as the possible "source of peace" (my telegram 406, November 1, 6 p. m.⁹) had created a bad impression in Washington where it was regarded as a warning to the Western Powers that Turkey would not resist an eventual German demand for cooperation.

If the Under Secretary has been correctly quoted I should point out that my original comment on İsmet's speech (my No. 409, November 3,

⁹ Not printed; it reported the speech by the President of Turkey at the opening of the Grand National Assembly (867.00/3115).

6 p. m.¹⁰) made no reference to the passage in question since it was not until the development reported in my telegram No. 422, November 11, 7 p. m.,¹¹ that there seemed to be occasion to comment upon a passage which I consider quite materialist [*immaterial?*] and without concrete significance.

MACMURRAY

867.24/195 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray)

WASHINGTON, November 13, 1941—10 p. m.

205. Your No. 413, November 4, 4 p. m.,¹² and Department's No. 200, November 6, 8 p. m. The following procedure with regard to Lend-Lease aid to Turkey has now been agreed upon by American and British authorities. Full report of conversations follow by mail.

"Assistance accorded to Turkey by the American Government under the Lend-Lease Act will continue, at least for the time being, to be furnished to Great Britain for retransfer to Turkey. In order, however, that difficulties which have been experienced in the past may be avoided, the following procedure will be followed:

1. The Department of State will notify the Turkish Government, through the Turkish Embassy in Washington and the American Embassy in Ankara, whenever the American Government transfers articles to the British for retransfer to Turkey.

2. In the unlikely event that material granted to Great Britain for retransfer to Turkey should subsequently be diverted, the British authorities will obtain the approval of the American Government before such diversion takes place, except in case of very grave emergency, when the British authorities may be called upon to act immediately. In such case the American Government will be consulted at the earliest feasible moment thereafter.

3. The Department of State will be informed by the British authorities when supplies destined for Turkey actually leave the United States, including a statement of the particular commodities concerned. This statement will also include, if feasible, the name of the vessels on which the commodities are shipped, the port of departure, the port of destination, and the approximate date of prospective arrival.

4. The Department of State will also be informed by the British authorities when the vessels mentioned above reach the Near East, if this is practicable.

5. Lend-Lease aid to Turkey in the class of cases known as 'cash-reimbursable transactions' will be extended by the American authorities direct to Turkey, with the understanding that there will be prior consultation between the American and British authorities regarding

¹⁰ Not printed.

¹¹ Not printed; it reported German propaganda to the effect that the Turkish President was cautiously suggesting a plan for Turkey to propose in the near future negotiations for a compromise peace (740.0011 European War 1939/16518).

¹² Not printed; in this telegram the Ambassador asked to be advised of the decisions reached with the British regarding lend-lease aid to Turkey.

the Turkish need for the commodities concerned before any such transaction will be approved by the American authorities. It is understood, however, that in the unlikely event of disagreement between the American and British military authorities the American Government reserves the right to make the decision concerning this special type transaction.

6. There will be close consultation and cooperation between the American and British military authorities at the earliest stage with regard to all requests of Turkey for Lend-Lease aid. This consultation is for the purpose of avoiding the deferment of Turkish requisitions subsequent to their initial approval.

7. The Lend-Lease Administration will be informed of all Turkish requests for Lend-Lease materials which are received by the British authorities in the United States. Those requests which the British authorities in the United States do not approve will be forwarded to the Lend-Lease Administration with a memorandum giving the reasons for such disapproval. The purpose of this notification is to keep the American Government as fully informed as possible of Turkish requests, in order that the Lend-Lease Administration may make estimates of American production needs in advance, on the basis of the potential requirements of Turkey and of other countries concerned."

British Embassy in Washington has concurred in the procedure. It has telegraphed the above quotation to the British Foreign Office and is awaiting reply.

With reference to second paragraph of Department's 200, November 6, 8 p. m., the President issued a formal finding on November 7 that the defense of Turkey is considered vital to the defense of the United States. Public announcement is being withheld pending your reply to Department's no. 200.

HULL

867.24/198 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, November 14, 1941—7 p. m.

[Received 9:43 p. m.]

430. Your 200, November 6, 8 p. m. Considering it prudent to make sure of the attitude of the Turkish Government with regard to the proposed press release I took the matter up with the Foreign Office and the Secretary General has now informed me that his Government desired to make two observations:

The first (on which he said he would not insist) was an inquiry as to whether it would be possible to substitute for "the defense of Turkey" "the integrity and independence of Turkey". I said I did not think that could be done as the formula used was the one contemplated by the law itself. Secondly, his Government did not like the second paragraph because there might be read into it the impli-

cation that Turkey was conspiring with the United States and Great Britain against some one. I gathered that the Turks fear being embarrassed in their policy of neutrality by an official announcement which would too pointedly emphasize their cooperation with one side.

2. I am inclined to question the desirability of issuing the contemplated formal statement to the press lest it give rise in the minds of the Turks and others to a false conception of our complacency towards their recent treaties with Germany; and I suggest that if possible the press be advised of the necessary finding by the President only through an informal statement made at a press conference. If, however, it is not possible to dispense with a formal statement I recommend that the second paragraph be omitted in accordance with understanding of Turkish Government.

MACMURRAY

867.24/201

The Secretary of State to the Lend-Lease Administrator (Stettinius)

WASHINGTON, November 26, 1941.

MY DEAR MR. STETTINIUS: The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of November 12, 1941, indicating that on November 7, 1941 the President had found that the defense of Turkey was vital to the defense of the United States and had requested you to work out a program of Lend-Lease aid with the Department of State and representatives of Great Britain. Enclosed with your letter under acknowledgment was a statement of procedure designed to fulfill the President's directive in this regard.

The Department of State concurs with the statement of procedure and returns the original herewith, endorsed in accordance with your request. The Department presumes that your office will take whatever steps may be necessary for consulting with the appropriate British authorities with regard to this procedure.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:

DEAN ACHESON

Assistant Secretary

867.24/222

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. George V. Allen of the
Division of Near Eastern Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] December 4, 1941.

Participants: Turkish Ambassador
Mr. Murray
Mr. Allen

The Turkish Ambassador called at the Near Eastern Division today, on his own initiative, to express his personal appreciation for

the statement issued at the White House yesterday, stating that the President had found that the defense of Turkey was vital to the defense of the United States. The Ambassador emphasized that he had received no instructions from his Government on the subject and that he was calling in a personal capacity. He said that the statement indicated that the United States placed confidence in Turkey, and he was appreciative of the willingness of the American Government to aid his country.

867.24/206 : Telegram

The Chargé in Turkey (Kelley) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, December 5, 1941—8 p. m.
[Received December 6—4:45 p. m.]

467. Referring to my preceding telegram,¹³ according to information received from a variety of sources, the President's announcement has made a considerable impression in Turkey. The Embassy has been reliably informed that the Turkish press has been advised not to play the matter up, apparently with a view to avoiding provoking the Germans. In commenting on the announcement for the benefit of newspapermen the Director General of the Press Bureau emphasized particularly two points: first, that the action of the President was an act of friendship towards Turkey for which the Turks were very grateful, and second, that it indicated that the United States fully understood and had confidence in Turkish policy. Among foreign diplomats and newspapermen there is the feeling that our action strengthens Turkey's position and will tend to encourage her to resist German pressure.

KELLEY

867.24/220

The Lend-Lease Administrator (Stettinius) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson)

WASHINGTON, December 12, 1941.

DEAR DEAN: With further reference to your letter of November 25,¹⁴ I am pleased to enclose for your information a complete report on Lend-Lease aid to Turkey, indicating all steps taken in that direction since the passage of the Act on March 11.

You will note this report contains in addition to information on the points you raised background and general material. It does con-

¹³ Not printed.

¹⁴ Not printed; it asked information as to the quantities, dollar values, and transfer dates of lend-lease aid which had been furnished to Turkey since the passage of the Lend-Lease Act (867.24/199).

tain, however, everything which you asked for, and as this complete report was available I felt that sending it to you in this form would be the best answer to your inquiry.

With best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.

[Enclosure]

*Report on Turkey by Mr. Ray A. Graham, Jr., Liaison Officer,
Office of Lend-Lease Administration*

[WASHINGTON,] November 27, 1941.

I. On March 23, 1941, the President, in a letter to the Secretary of War, found that the defense of the Turkish Government was vital to the defense of the United States, and authorized him to transfer 50 155 mm howitzers and 18,500 round of ammunition for these howitzers to the Government of Turkey. . . . Up until this time Turkey had been procuring defense items in the United States through the President's Liaison Committee on PNR's¹⁵ and letter clearances. (See Table I.)¹⁶

II. Since March 23, the British have submitted various requisitions for retransfer to the Turks as it was decided that this would be the most expeditious way of rendering the Turks aid under Lend-Lease, since the British controlled most of the facilities for shipping. These requisitions, together with their value and disposition are shown in Table II, attached. This table should by no means be interpreted as being the full requirements of the Turks. In fact, it does not represent their most urgent requirements which are anti-tank guns, anti-aircraft guns, planes, tanks and trucks.

The British have a requisition no. 3943, which calls for 700 trucks. We have been trying to move this for three months with little success.

Their requisitions of note are the ones for raw materials, which are to go into Turkish arsenals for the making up of high explosive shells. The reason for this is that the Turks' artillery is a mixture of German, Austrian and French guns. These bastard types are of non-standard United States sizes, hence the need for raw materials to make their own shells and ammunition. Their total requirements and defense programs have been submitted to the Lend-Lease Administration and were forwarded to SPAB^{16a} by Mr. Stettinius.

III. When I was assigned the Turkish problem about September 1, the only material the Turks had received on British requisitions

¹⁵ Purchase Negotiation Reports.

¹⁶ Tables not printed.

^{16a} Supply Priorities and Allocations Board.

were the howitzers, ammunition, and 10 trucks. 200 of these trucks were shipped in June, and according to the British, the remaining 190 are still in transit.

The background of the delay on these retransfer requisitions to Turkey submitted by the British stems back to the latter part of June when the War Department at an informal request of the British Purchasing Commission put all these requests on the shelf. Later on the State Department ran into this situation when they were trying to gain some concessions from the Turkish Government. As a result of this, on August 15 they were referred to Colonel V. D. Taylor, of the Defense Aid Supply Commission, for action. However, no action was forthcoming because the British Purchasing Commission again requested the War Department to defer the financing of these requisitions. In the meantime, the Allied Requirements Section of the British Supply Council and the State Department were needling this office to get action on these requisitions, and the former even specified in telephonic conversations which ones they wanted moved, saying that they had urgent cables from London. As a result of these delays, we initiated the idea of Lend-Leasing aid to Turkey direct and after getting the green light from Mr. Hopkins on September 6, we started conferences with the British Supply Council and the State Department with regard to changing over to the direct procedure.

IV. In the first meeting held on October 23, in the State Department, it was brought out that the Turks had obtained more material through the PNR's and letter clearances for cash than they had through retransfer under Lend-Lease from the British. In spite of these facts, the British would not agree to the principle of Lend-Lease aid direct by the United States at this meeting. This conference was very unsatisfactory and it was decided to hold another one at a later date. Before the second conference, this office and the State Department met and drew up a method of effecting retransfer and also a procedure for giving the Turks Lend-Lease Aid, direct on a cash reimbursement basis. The reason for keeping the retransfer method through the British stemmed from a request by Lord Halifax made in the interim to Secretary Hull, wherein Halifax said it was imperative for the British to use their Lend-Lease aid for the Turks in order that they might meet their existing trade treaty with the Turkish Government. (This means the British are reimbursed by the Turks for aid given them by the United States.) At this second meeting, held November 4 in the State Department, all the principles underlying a retransfer method for cash and an effective retransfer method with more United States control were approved and concurred in by all present, including the British, who were represented by Mr. Hayter of the Embassy, and Sir Louis

Beale of the British Supply Council. (This lays the path for all direct aid by the United States, if the need arises in the future.)

V. On September 11, the President revoked the former letter of March 23 and authorized the chairman of the British Supply Council of North America to transfer the 50 howitzers and ammunition to Turkey. This amounted to picking up on paper what had actually been done in practice since the British had, through their shipping facilities, the only means of sending material to the Turks. This revocation had a bad effect in that in order for the Lend-Lease Office to send aid direct to Turkey, the President had to find again that the defense of Turkey was vital to the defense of the United States.

VI. On November 7, the President wrote Mr. Stettinius, saying that the defense of Turkey was vital to the defense of the United States, and that he should take immediate action to transfer all feasible material aid to the Turks. On November 20, Mr. Stettinius signed the procedure for retransfer and direct aid for cash and forwarded it to the State Department. This procedure was based on the principles agreed to in the last meeting in the State Department with the British. The first things to be transferred to the Turks on a cash reimbursement basis directly by the United States will be 1000 Ford trucks. We are getting this on a requisition at the present time.

VII. All actual Turkish purchasing is being done from the Embassy and the Allied Requirements Section of the British Supply Council, who are working in collaboration with a Turkish Technical Mission. This Turkish Mission is composed of two Turkish military men who were sent over to America at the request of the British. Until they moved to Washington, a few weeks ago, the Embassy and this Mission did not seem to be in close liaison. The Turks have paid in cash for their transportation and shipping on all purchases made in this country. They have even paid the British for the shipment and transportation of the howitzers and trucks which they received from the British through the medium of Lend-Lease. They have paid in cash and placed orders under PNR's and letter clearances and lately we have had no trouble in getting them priority ratings that are equal to our own. This is illustrated in Table I, attached.

VIII. The Turks have a small merchant fleet composed of about 50 ships which operate up and down the coast of the Mediterranean, the Caspian and the Black Seas. Since the war began they have been ordered to stick close to Port.

To get material to Turkey from the United States now takes about 90 days because it has to go by way of Cape Horn and then to Suez. Perhaps in the future this shipping can be speeded up since the Neutrality Act has been repealed and our own ships are beginning to come off the ways.

IX. The economy of the Turkish Nation, with a population of 17,000,000 is based primarily upon agriculture, with wheat, barley and tobacco being the principal products. She has the largest chrome ore deposit in the world, to say nothing of copper, iron ore and coal. She has one small airplane factory which has just been completed with the aid of Curtiss Wright, where she can assemble everything but the engines for which she has no factories.* She has one large up-to-date, modern arsenal which is situated in the hills, hard to get at, outside of Ankara. There is another small arsenal at Istanbul. Just before the War started, with the aid of the British, they completed a steel plant in Karabuk. This plant has a capacity of 200 tons a day. Turkey has two lines of fortifications, one at the bridge head in Thrace, opposite Bulgaria and the other at the Caucasus. The Turkish Government is a very small group of military men, all officers in the last war, who took over the country in a Nationalist revolution in April, 1920. An intensely patriotic government, it has effected such various reforms as unveiling the women and building a very fine broad gauge railway, the length of the country. It has also built a brand new capital in Ankara, all spic and span, in the middle of an Asiatic desert. This Government is intensely proud of everything it has done.

X. The Turks are now interested principally in being allowed to go on running Turkey without interference. For this purpose it wants to be on the winning side. It regards all foreign powers, with the possible exception of the U. S. A., as fundamentally hostile to Turkish national interests. It thinks the Russians want the Dardanelles. It was allied with the Germans in the last war and has no illusions about what it is like to be a small country in a German run world. It knows that the British are not greedy for themselves but it is not at all sure that the British wouldn't give away part of Turkey in payment of their war debts, say the Dardanelles to Russia. Adding these factors up the Turks would a little rather be on our side but, the only essential thing in their international policy is that they end on the winning side.

XI. The Turks have a large standing army: 750,000 fully armed, 1,000,000 in reserve. It is tough, trained to hardships, and there is a fighting tradition behind it. It is led like the German Army by veterans from the last war, but the Turks have no air force† to speak of, no tanks, few anti-tank guns, and not much artillery.

XII. If the Allies are ever going to attack in Europe it would be important to have Turkey on their side. Since it is the natural bridge

*On PNR T-04 see Table I the manufacturing rights, jigs and fixtures were made available to them to put up such a plant. [Footnote in the original.]

†Turkish air force amounts to 500 planes, 50 of which are first class. [Footnote in the original.]

head into the Balkans and then into the heart of Germany, and if that bridge head remains in friendly hands, there will be at least one place on the map where the allies can say "here we will be able to attack". The other end of Turkey butts up against the Caucasus. At one end of the Caucasus there are the oil wells of Baku and at the other end there are already the Germans. In view of this surely no one can doubt the strategic position and in the words of the State Department we have already put some chips in and by raising the ante a little more we have everything to gain and nothing to lose.

XIII. It is also interesting to note that the Turks have a trade treaty with the Germans somewhat like the one Russia had. Also there are 200,000 tons of chrome ore already mined, waiting for a buyer who can transport it.

R[AY] A. G[RAHAM,] JR.

867.24/209a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Turkey (Kelley)

WASHINGTON, December 26, 1941—6 p. m.

237. Prior to September 1 the following Lend-Lease supplies were shipped to Turkey: Fifty 155 millimeter Howitzers and related parts, 50 limbers for foregoing, 50 tractors for hauling foregoing, 18,500 complete shells for foregoing, 200 large trucks. (190 of these trucks are understood to be still in transit although they were shipped in June.)

Between September 1 and December 10 the following Lend-Lease supplies were shipped to Turkey on vessels and dates named: 1500 sledge hammers, *Buchanan* September 6; 5 tons trisodium phosphate, *Eaton* October 1; 11 reels mooring cable, *West Celina* September 6; 420 tires and 420 tubes, *Windrush* October 6; 760 tons reinforcing steel bars, *Essylt* November 3; 1160 tons steel bars, *Montanan* November 11; 990 tons steel bars, *Jeff Davis* November 18; 290 tons steel bars, *Michael Livanos* November 18.

Between November 27 and December 17 additional Lend-Lease supplies for Turkey were transferred to the British Government for retransfer to Turkey, and are now being shipped or awaiting shipment. Included are 300 tons ferrosilicon, 10 tons ferrotungsten, 4 tons chrome nickel steel, 85 tons tungsten bars, 10 tons cobalt bars, 17 tons carbon die steel, 10 tons chrome bullet steel, 1½ tons tool steel, 1 ton cast tips, 200 oxygen cylinders, 110 micrometers, 2520 grinding stones, 9325 Emery stones, 15 tons aluminus oxide abrasive, and various army hospital supplies.

On December 16 the Turkish Ambassador in Washington submitted to the Lend-Lease office a considerable list of the most urgent further requirements of Turkish Ministry of National Defense with request that they be furnished under Lend-Lease as soon as possible. This is first instance that Turkish Ambassador has presented a request direct to us for Lend-Lease aid. List includes 72 field guns, 75 millimeters, with 108,000 rounds ammunition; 36 pack Howitzers, 75 millimeters, with 54,000 rounds ammunition; 22 pack Howitzers, 105 millimeters, with tractors and 54,000 rounds ammunition; 15,000 rounds ammunition for 155 millimeter Howitzers, 910 anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns, 20 millimeters, with 21,300,000 rounds ammunition; 225 light tanks M/3 with 36,000,000 rounds machine gun ammunition and 341,000 rounds gun ammunition; 9,200 machine guns, 30 calibre, with 250,000,000 rounds ammunition; 9,000 Thompson sub-machine guns with 90,000,000 rounds ammunition; 540 anti-tank guns, 37 millimeter, with 540,000 rounds ammunition; 700 trucks 2½ tons; 432 pick-up trucks ½ ton; 300 trucks ½ ton; 500 ambulances; 50 watertank trucks; 75 gasoline tank trucks; 50 portable repair trucks, 2½ tons.

Although Department has no indication when supplying of above can be completed, program of aid to Turkey is going forward steadily, with prospects of shipping situation improving.

You and Military Attaché may make discreet use of this information with appropriate Turkish authorities.

HULL

867.24/214

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

His Majesty's Government have now examined the memorandum regarding the procedure to be followed with regard to Lend-Lease aid to Turkey which was enclosed in Mr. Alling's letter to Mr. Hayter of November 7th last,¹⁷ and desire to thank the United States Government for their agreement that assistance accorded to Turkey under the Lend-Lease Act shall continue to be furnished through the intermediary of the United Kingdom. They consider that the proposals contained in this memorandum constitute a suitable procedure for transfers of material to Turkey, and accordingly instructions have been sent to the competent British authorities to ensure that the stipulations contained in the memorandum are carried out.

¹⁷ Letter not printed. No copy of memorandum is attached to file copy of letter but apparently it was the memorandum quoted in telegram No. 205, November 13, 10 p. m., to the Ambassador in Turkey, p. 926.

2. As regards paragraph 5 of the memorandum, it will be realised that cash-reimbursable Lend-Lease transactions temporarily reduce the amount of Lend-Lease appropriations available, and His Majesty's Government therefore attach the greatest importance to the understanding in this paragraph of the memorandum that there will be prior consultation between the American and British authorities regarding the Turkish need for the commodities concerned. Moreover deliveries to Turkey of most types of war material, however financed, must be at the expense of deliveries to Great Britain, and this is further reason for friendly consultation when relevant cases arise.

3. As regards paragraph 7 of the Department's memorandum, His Majesty's Government agree that the Lease-Lend administration should be informed of all Turkish requests received by the British authorities in the United States. Such requests might emanate either from the British authorities in London or from the Turkish authorities in Washington. In the latter case the British authorities in the United States, before communicating with the United States authorities, would propose to inform His Majesty's Government of the requests received, in order to avoid the risk of a duplication and to enable His Majesty's Government to define their attitude to the requests.

4. In order to facilitate the carrying out of the above procedure His Majesty's Government have arranged to make room under their share of Lease-Lend appropriations for any special requests filed with the United States Government on behalf of Turkey.

WASHINGTON, December 30, 1941.

EFFORTS BY THE AMERICAN AND BRITISH GOVERNMENTS TO ACQUIRE TURKISH CHROME AND TO PREVENT ITS SALE BY TURKEY TO GERMANY¹⁸

811.20 Defense (M)/2043b : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray)¹⁹

WASHINGTON, May 17, 1941—4 p. m.

72. The Procurement Division of the Treasury and the Metals Reserve Company have agreements with the British Ministry of

¹⁸ For previous correspondence regarding acquisition of chrome from Turkey, see *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. III, pp. 944 ff.

¹⁹ Telegram repeated to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom as No. 1703, May 17, 4 p. m., with following additional paragraph:

"Reference your 1868 of May 11 [not printed]. As appears from the above telegram just sent to Amembassy, Ankara, the Department prefers that no instructions be given to the British Ambassador in Ankara to discuss future Lease-Lend aid with the Turkish Government. It is believed that discussions of Lease-Lend arrangements should be conducted only by representatives of the American Government."

Economic Warfare to buy 158,316 tons of Turkish chrome of which about 50,000 tons have been delivered or are on the water. The agreements provide that the British shall supply shipping to carry one-half of this chrome to United States ports and to carry the other one-half to Lourenço Marques, East Africa, for transshipment to American vessels. Recent developments have made it impossible for the British to keep up with their schedule of shipping, and the result is that the United States may be deprived, temporarily at least, of Turkish chrome which is urgently needed here for defense production. The Ministry of Economic Warfare advises that Mersine and Alexandretta are the only Turkish ports now open to British shipping and that although there is considerable chrome at Sea of Marmara points and Fethiye, the chrome at the two latter ports can be lifted only by Turkish ships. The British Ambassador at Ankara ²⁰ has accordingly been instructed to negotiate with the Turkish Government to have Turkish ships transport chrome from the Sea of Marmara ports and Fethiye for transshipment to British or British controlled ships at Haifa or Port Said. You are requested to advance this proposal on behalf of the United States Government on the grounds of the urgent need of the American Government for this chrome. It is suggested that you go further in your request to the Turkish Government and ask whether it would not be possible to have Turkish vessels carry the chrome from the Sea of Marmara ports and Fethiye to Red Sea ports where the chrome could be transhipped to American vessels. You are, of course, free to talk with your British colleague but the Department desires that these proposals be advanced as an independent suggestion of this Government.

In your conversations with the Turkish Government you are authorized to refer to the aid already extended to the Turkish Government under the Lease-Lend Act ²¹ and to the possibility of further aid under that Act. You are also authorized to refer to the policy of the United States Government in allowing the purchase by the Turkish Government in the United States of many materials and articles the export of which would not be allowed to other countries, such as airplane spare parts, steel, leather, shell casings, fuses, caps, chemicals, tin, lubricating oil, ammunition of various sorts, and the like. In view of this Lease-Lend aid and this liberal policy as to export licenses, it seems reasonable to the Department to expect the Turkish Government to make every effort possible to facilitate the shipment of the chrome urgently desired by this Government.

HULL

²⁰ Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen.

²¹ Approved March 11, 1941; 55 Stat. 31. For correspondence on lend-lease aid to Turkey, see pp. 814 ff.

811.20 Defense (M)/2082 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, May 22, 1941—3 p. m.

[Received May 23—9:20 a. m.]

160. I was only today able to see Secretary General of the Foreign Office ²² with reference to your No. 72, May 17, 4 p. m. He promised to take up the matter at once and assured me that his Government would do its utmost to be of help in the matter but said that in view of difficulties previously encountered in arranging transport of materials from Egypt he was frankly doubtful whether it would prove materially possible for the small Turkish merchant marine to afford substantial assistance.

MACMURRAY

811.20 Defense (M)/2412 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray)

WASHINGTON, June 20, 1941—6 p. m.

95. Your 160, May 22, 3 p. m. In the course of a recent discussion with an officer of the Department regarding the possibility of using Turkish ships to transport chrome to Red Sea ports, the Turkish Ambassador ²³ said he could see no reason why some such arrangement could not be made. He added that he would be glad to give us the names of the American vessels which are transporting goods for Turkey to Port Suez in the thought that if this information were transmitted to our Embassy at Ankara, arrangements could be worked out there for Turkish ships to carry chrome to Port Suez and pick up the cargo from the United States. He said he would be very glad to cooperate in this manner in any way he could since it seemed to him that it was to the mutual advantage of both Governments.

Please telegraph your comments.

HULL

811.20 Defense (M)/2469 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, June 25, 1941—6 p. m.

[Received June 26—11:15 a. m.]

218. Your 95, June 20. The question of the possibility of using Turkish ships to transport chrome from Fethiye (I assume that this

²² Numan Menemencioglu.²³ Mehmet Münir Erteğün.

port is meant in view of previous telegrams) to Red Sea ports for transshipment to the American vessels transporting goods for Turkey has been discussed informally at the Foreign Office. The competent officials are of the opinion that the utilization of Turkish vessels for this purpose is not feasible because in view of the location Fethiye any vessel carrying British-owned chrome would almost certainly be captured or sunk by Axis warships. Furthermore, they stated that if chrome was documented as having been purchased by the United States the Turkish Government would be placed in an embarrassing position in view of the fact that it has refused to sell chrome to Germany on the ground that all Turkish chrome had been purchased by Great Britain. (The British Commercial Attaché^{23a} in a conversation relative to this point, pointed out that the chrome at Fethiye could be sold by the British Government to the American Government f. o. b. Fethiye and he did not see how the Turkish Government would be involved inasmuch as the American Government would have acquired the ore from the British Government.) The Turkish officials believe that the safest way to transport chrome at Fethiye to the United States would be by shipment on Turkish vessels to Mersin or Alexandretta for transshipment to vessels sailing from these ports.

The British Commercial Attaché also believes that this would probably be the best way to handle the chrome at the port in question. While no formal reply has been made to the proposal presented to the Turkish Government by the British Government, referred to in your section 2, Number 72, May 17, 4 p. m.,²⁴ or to the representations of the Embassy in support of this proposal the Foreign Office states that it has been decided that no Turkish vessels can be used for the transportation of chrome from Fethiye for transshipment to British or British controlled ships at Haifa or Port Said because the Turkish Government considers that any Turkish vessels engaged in such traffic would be captured or sunk by Axis vessels. The Embassy gathers that the British Embassy considers that the Turkish position is well taken.

The Embassy is in accordance with the opinion that the safest way to obtain the chrome at Fethiye under present conditions in the Eastern Mediterranean would be by shipment on Turkish vessels to Mersin or Alexandretta.

MACMURRAY

^{23a} Stanley R. Jordan.

²⁴ First paragraph, sentence beginning "The British Ambassador at Ankara", p. 937.

811.20 Defense (M) / 2412 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey
(MacMurray)*

WASHINGTON, June 28, 1941—11 a. m.

108. Personal for the Ambassador. Department's No. 95, June 20, 6 p. m. and your No. 218, June 25, 6 p. m. You are requested to seek an early appointment with the Minister of Foreign Affairs,^{24a} to inform him that the American Government has reason to believe that in the forthcoming negotiations between Turkey and Germany concerning an economic agreement, the German Government may make certain requests regarding the acquisition of chrome and other mineral ores in Turkey. The Turkish Government is aware, of course, that the American Government is desirous of obtaining considerable Turkish chrome ore which has already been contracted for. Moreover, the American Government is very hopeful that the Turkish Government will cooperate in the transportation of this ore. While the American Government has every confidence that the Turkish Government will resist any German suggestions which might in any way affect the obtaining by the United States of the chrome ore in question, the reports of the forthcoming German-Turkish economic negotiations would seem to justify an inquiry on the subject, with a view to obtaining the firm assurances of the Turkish Government in this regard. The American Government is desirous also of being able to continue to purchase Turkish chrome.

The Turkish Government will understand that a very favorable impression would be made on American public opinion if Turkey should cooperate enthusiastically regarding the transportation of the chrome which would be taken as a positive demonstration that the Turkish Government continues unimpaired its friendly disposition towards the United States and Great Britain. A reply on the part of the Turkish Government is urgently requested.

As regards shipping possibilities, as treated in your 218, a separate reply will be sent. For your strictly personal information and not for intimation to the Turkish authorities, the American Government has under urgent consideration the question of its future policy towards Turkey with regard to further Lend-Lease aid and with regard to Turkish purchases of materials subject to export control in the United States. The Department is forwarding to you in a separate telegram information regarding the facilities which have been accorded Turkey in the above regards, but it does not desire that the question of our future policy towards Turkey be connected in any way with your discussions concerning the chrome matter, since we do not desire to suggest that either continuing favorable action

^{24a} Sükrü Saraçoglu.

towards Turkey or a discontinuance of such action will be governed by the Turkish Government's measures concerning chrome, important as that may be.

The Department is informing you in a separate telegram regarding the extent of aid the U. S. has furnished Turkey, as requested in your No. 168, May 24.²⁵

WELLES

811.20 Defense (M)/2576 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, July 10, 1941—6 p. m.

[Received 8:25 p. m.]

247. While awaiting receipt of the further instruction regarding shipping facilities I took up today with the Secretary General of the Foreign Office so much of your telegram 108, June 30 [28], as relates to the possible interference with our purchase of chrome in consequence of sales to Germany. Numan assured me most earnestly that his Government will positively refuse in the future, as it has in the past, to sell chrome to Germany and that the American Government need have no fear of difficulties being put in the way of its purchases.

MACMURRAY

811.20 Defense (M)/2660 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, July 18, 1941—5 p. m.

[Received 9:22 p. m.]

261. Your 108, June 28. Exercising ahead of prescribed date their option under existing agreement to contract for next year's entire supply of Turkish chrome, British are now negotiating for purchase and anticipate no difficulty.

2. Report which I understand has been broadcast to United States that Turks are proposing to sell chrome to Germany is understood to have been based at least in part upon statement of Swiss journalist whom there is reason to believe Germans are using.

3. In reply to inquiry of British Ambassador on this subject Numan Bey yesterday stated that German Embassy had not in fact mentioned chrome in connection with forthcoming negotiations for new barter arrangement (which he said incidentally are to be postponed until September when he has returned from expected opera-

²⁵ *Ante*, p. 853.

tion); and then he had anticipated any such suggestion by informing Papen²⁶ that that item must be excluded from discussions.

MACMURRAY

662.6731/135: Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, July 24, 1941—3 p. m.

[Received 10 p. m.]

267. Numan Bey yesterday told me that in the trade negotiations to be begun in September the Germans will be represented by Dr. Clodius.²⁷ In the meanwhile the technical advisers are to work out together some mutually acceptable type of agreement as the Turks, in view of past experiences, are not willing to accept a clearing agreement and the Germans will not accept the Turkish device of private compensation. He anticipates the agreement will take the form of an arrangement for barter on the basis of a set of corresponding categories (for instance, olive and other vegetable oils in exchange for munitions, foodstuffs for machinery, et cetera). In any agreement reached Turkey would insist upon the proviso that her exports to Germany should not at any time exceed the equivalent of goods actually received therefrom. He pointed out that under practically a year's operation of the current agreement contemplating exchanges to the value of 21 million Turkish pounds on either side Germany has been able to supply goods to the amount now of only about 9 million, which he attributes primarily to her reduced productive capacity rather than to transportation difficulties. This country is principally interested in obtaining from Germany munitions and spare parts for industrial machinery which are beginning to be desperately needed.

From another source believed to be reliable but not confirmed in this instance it now appears that a report circulated to the effect that this Government intends to sell chrome to Germany has this much basis: that in a recent inter-ministerial memorandum the Ministry of Commerce (which has had a number of German advisers and which is understood to be still rather tinged with German influence) chrome was included in a list of Turkish products suggested for consideration in any negotiations for a barter arrangement. But there is no indication that the Foreign Office (with which [rests] authority in the matter) has any intention of violating its assurances to the British and ourselves.

MACMURRAY

²⁶ Franz von Papen, German Ambassador in Turkey.

²⁷ Carl Clodius, Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department of the German Foreign Ministry.

662.6731/140 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, September 17, 1941—6 p. m.

[Received 10:01 p. m.]

344. My 267, July 24. The Secretary General of the Foreign Office today informed me that his negotiations with the German Trade Delegation are proceeding normally and easily on the basis of two principles that he had got them to accept in advance: First that Turkish products will be exported only upon the receipt of German goods to the same amount; and second that exchanges will be effected on the basis of prescribed categories of goods of equivalent economic value.

2. Upon inquiry, it appeared that under latter principle Germans have broached question of getting chrome in exchange for certain greatly needed military equipment ordered in Germany before war but never delivered. Numan said that this Government is extremely reluctant to accede to this request and would not in any case do so without full consultation with British. He went on to argue, however, that British have no legal basis for their claim to right of renewal of contract (expiring next January) which gives them exclusive right to purchase of entire Turkish output inasmuch as in that contract they were joint parties with French. I expressed hope that Turkish Government would also take into account American interest in having no chrome go to Germany and referred to his own previous assurances; but he avoided committing himself.

3. British Embassy informs me that Clodius in fact claimed that Germany by right of conquest succeeded to French right to four-fifteenths share under chrome contract but that Numan categorically refuted this pretension.

MACMURRAY

867.24/179 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, September 18, 1941—1 p. m.

[Received September 19—9:45 p. m.]

345. Supplementing my next previous telegram.²⁸ I am disappointed and anxious that Turkish Government in spite of repeated assurances is even considering German request for chrome; and on consulting British Counselor and Commercial Attaché^{28a} (in temporary absence of Ambassador) I find them also very seriously perturbed. They have reason to believe that Turks contemplate giving Germany 3,500 tons. That amount is relatively insignificant in view of fact

²⁸ *Supra.*

^{28a} J. Morgan and Stanley R. Jordan, respectively.

that German stocks are understood to be 90,000 tons or enough to last through 1942 but significant as "token" concession and capable of being exploited as means of lateral pressure to buckle Turkish morale (see my 238, July 7²⁰). . . .

2. My own recommendation as to most effective way to impress them with seriousness of step they contemplate is this: Secretary or Under Secretary might call in Turkish Ambassador and lay case before him with statement that matter is being taken up with him because he has first-hand acquaintance with developments of policy of lease-lend assistance and question of according such aid to countries not actually participating in war and because he understands and can make clear to his Government vital importance of American public opinion in such matters of policy; then explain to him that our Government would put itself in altogether untenable position if it were to continue giving lease-lend assistance to a non-belligerent country which although allied with Britain nevertheless gives her enemies essential materials contributing to their war potential despite contractual arrangements made with Allies for very purpose of avoiding that contingency and despite repeated recent assurances to them and to ourselves; and state that such action on their part would introduce a new element into situation and compel us to take under fresh consideration question whether Turkey can be considered a country entitled to assistance under terms of Lease-Lend Act.

3. I feel confident that such plain speaking (without pulling of punches because of any dainty apprehension lest they suspect us of bargaining) on the part of official recognized as having direct responsibility in administration of Act would not only forestall particular transaction we apprehend but have most salutary effect . . . In view of fact that trade negotiations are expected to be concluded within 2 weeks and of habitual Turkish tendency to make and carry out decisions with startling abruptness, action on our part should be taken with least possible delay.

MACMURRAY

811.20 Defense (M)/3364a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, September 19, 1941—5 p. m.

3912. Department has received following telegram from Ankara (in paraphrase):

[Here follows paraphrase of telegram No. 344, September 17, 6 p. m., from the Ambassador in Turkey, printed on page 943.]

²⁰ *Ante*, p. 878.

The British Embassy here has no late information as to the present state of the negotiations which it understands are currently going on in Ankara for the purchase by the British of the entire 1942 output of Turkish chrome. The Department considers that it is of great importance that an agreement be reached for the acquisition of this chrome by the British or by the British and the United States combined, and even is prepared to recommend that the Federal Loan Agency assume the financial cost of acquiring all this chrome if it cannot be had in any other way. It is accordingly the inclination of the Department to telegraph to the American Ambassador at Ankara requesting him to join with the British Ambassador to Turkey in a joint approach to the Turkish Government looking forward to a contract for joint acquisition of the 1942 chrome production. Indeed the Department is prepared, in view of the high importance of the successful conclusion of this undertaking, to recommend that such other steps as may be desirable such as the furnishing of ships for the transportation of Turkish tobacco to the United States be facilitated by this Government in order to supplement the corresponding effort of the British which it is understood has already resulted in a recent purchase of approximately £4,000,000 in value of wool, olive oil, mohair and valonia. The Department has determined, however, not to make the request of the American Ambassador in Ankara above referred to until it has received further information from you as to the status of the Turkish negotiations. You are accordingly requested to telegraph this information urgently and to give your opinion as to whether the suggested instruction to Ankara is the best approach which can be made.

The final paragraph of this telegram has been repeated to Ankara.³⁰

HULL

811.20 Defense (M)/3366a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray)

WASHINGTON, September 20, 1941—2 p. m.

162. Your 345, September 18, 1 p. m. has been repeated to London.³¹ The Department has added that it is inclined to concur with your suggestion but has instructed the Embassy to discuss the matter with the British authorities and afford them an opportunity for comment

³⁰ In telegram No. 160, September 19, 7 p. m., with the addition of the following paragraph:

"You are requested to telegraph such information as you may have as to the current status of the negotiations between the British and the Turkish Governments for the purchase of chrome". (811.20 Defense (M)/3289a)

³¹ In telegram No. 3935, *infra*.

before action is taken here. A reply by Tuesday³² at the latest has been requested.

Meanwhile, please inform the Turkish authorities that your Government attaches the greatest importance to chrome and has the matter under urgent consideration. You should if you find it necessary insist that the Turkish Government avoid any agreement with Germany regarding chrome until we have had an opportunity to present our views to the Turkish authorities.

HULL

811.20 Defense (M) / 3364b : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, September 20, 1941—3 p. m.

3935. Following just received from Ankara :

[Here follows text of telegram No. 345, September 18, 1 p. m., from the Ambassador in Turkey, printed on page 943.]

The Department is inclined to concur in Ambassador MacMurray's suggestion, but desires you to consult with the British authorities and afford them an opportunity to comment before action is taken here.

In view of the great interest of the American Government in the question of chrome and of the urgency of the matter, a reply by Tuesday at the latest is urgently requested.

Meanwhile the Ambassador at Ankara has been instructed to reiterate to the Turkish authorities the great importance we attach to chrome, to point out that we have the matter under urgent consideration, and to request the Turkish Government to defer any decision until we have had an opportunity to present our views to the Turkish authorities.

HULL

811.20 Defense (M) / 3290 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, September 20, 1941—10 p. m.

[Received September 20—8:40 p. m.]

4415. Your 3912, September 19, 5 p. m., was taken up immediately with the Department of the Foreign Office which has been handling the London end of the British-Turkish chrome negotiations. Following is present status of negotiations as described by head of the Depart-

³² September 23.

ment: Some 2 months ago the British Ambassador at Ankara was instructed to present a note to the Turkish Government suggesting the renewal of the existing agreement which expires next January and proposing that under the renewed agreement, the British would take over the entire Turkish output. Before the arrival of Clodius at Ankara the Turks had begun to express doubts about agreeing to permit the British under a renewed agreement to take also the proportion of chrome which fell to the French under the old tripartite contract. They have even argued vaguely that they are not legally bound to renew the contract. Since the arrival of Clodius, the Turkish attitude has been increasingly unsatisfactory, although they have never yet stated to the British that they have any intention of allotting the French percentage to Germany.

The British Ambassador has been absent from Ankara at Smyrna during the past week but returns to Ankara on Monday. The discussions have in the interim been carried on by the Counselor of the Embassy and Secretary General of the Foreign Office. The most which the Turks have promised is that they will not sign any agreement with Germany in regard to chrome before the return of the Ambassador and before he has the opportunity to make his Government's representations. The Foreign Office is therefore cabling today a long telegram of instructions and guidance to the Ambassador which is to be acted upon as soon as he returns to Ankara. In this telegram they lay down their objectives and stress not only the economic but political angle pointing out that they regard Turkish action on this matter as a test of their good faith. According to the Foreign Office the British can demolish any legal argument the Turks may advance that there is no obligation to renew the contract. This telegram has been repeated in full to Washington and will be made available by the British Embassy to the Department.

The Foreign Office is aware of the importance which we attach to the successful conclusion of these negotiations. The officer who discussed the matter this afternoon said that he could state quite frankly that the opinion of all concerned in the Foreign Office is that if the United States desired to take action which would assist the British negotiations in their opinion it would be more effective if representations were made through the Turkish Ambassador at Washington than at Ankara.

In Foreign Office opinion the Turks are playing a slippery game on the chrome question and are merely angling for quick advantage to themselves whether it comes from Germany or elsewhere. It is the Foreign Office's understanding, however, that Germany is unable to give the Turks the things they immediately require. It would seem

therefore that any material advantage which we could offer the Turks along the line set forth in the Department's telegram might throw the balance the right way. The British would welcome our action.

WINANT

811.20 Defense (M)/3289a Suppl. : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray)

WASHINGTON, September 21, 1941—6 p. m.

164. Reference Department's 160 of September 19, 7 p. m.⁸⁸

[Here follows summary of telegram No. 4415, printed *supra*.]

In accordance with this telegram from London and your suggestion in your 345 of September 18, the Secretary proposes to request the Turkish Ambassador to call tomorrow, September 22, and to inform him: (1) that the United States by agreement with Great Britain has a share in the British chrome contract and has a definite interest in the renewal of this contract so as to cover the entire production of Turkish chrome for the year 1942, (2) that this Government would find itself in an untenable position if it were to contemplate giving Lend-Lease aid to a country which although having contractual agreements with Great Britain and indirectly with the United States would nevertheless give to the enemies of Britain essential strategic materials seriously needed by Great Britain and the United States and (3) that of recent years and prospectively the United States has done and intends to do its utmost to sustain trade with Turkey and has provided materials and manufactures which have contributed to Turkish development and defense and it regards this request on chrome as a reasonable counterpart.

While it is hoped that this interview between the Secretary and the Turkish Ambassador will be helpful in obtaining the desired result, it is believed that a similar approach, emphasizing the three major points outlined above, should be made by you in Ankara. You are accordingly requested after consultation and in collaboration with your British colleague to present these three points to the Turkish authorities and otherwise to take such action as you will deem most effective to insure the prompt execution by the Turkish Government of an agreement with Great Britain or if it seems more desirable with Great Britain and the United States jointly for the acquisition of the entire production of Turkish chrome for 1942.

HULL

⁸⁸ See footnote 30, p. 945.

811.20 Defense (M)/3481

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] September 22, 1941.

The Ambassador of Turkey³⁴ called at my request. I reviewed the history of the British-French contract to purchase the output of chrome from Turkey, the subsequent elimination of the French due to military reverses, followed by an agreement between the United States and Great Britain for the United States to share in this purchase, to which the Turkish Government agreed. I mentioned with appreciation the valuable cooperation rendered by the Turkish Government in facilitating the shipment of this chrome. I then said that, not only at present but during the coming year, my Government needed every pound of this chrome that was due it under the present contract with Great Britain, and that I know that Great Britain needs all of the portion coming to her. I said that the contract, which expires in December, is up for renewal and that the natural and logical thing for Turkey to do for the benefit of herself and all concerned would be for this business relationship to be continued through a renewal of the existing contract. I said further that even if a small portion should be sent to another country, such as Germany, it would cause serious repercussions far out of proportion to the actual size of such a shipment and likewise that it would engender a feeling of genuine concern among all of the countries involved resulting in much talk, many explanations back and forth and many efforts to compose the difficulties thus produced. I stressed the view that it would be wholly defensible on Turkey's part to say to Germany or any other country that this contract was made sometime ago and that some special reason would have to exist to cause Turkey to abandon, or even to suggest that Turkey should abandon, this business relationship for the sake of permitting some of the chrome to go to another country, such as Germany.

I then emphasized the very great help we have extended to Turkey in the administration of our export licensing system and the aid we are now in the act of granting to her under the lease-lend policy, one shipload of cannon having arrived there last week. I said that more and more we should be in a situation to aid Turkey with respect to all the ways in which we are now furnishing assistance; that I am not unmindful of Turkey's difficulties any more than our own difficulties and those of Great Britain and other countries, but that I feel satisfied that the position of each of our countries will be better safeguarded if existing relations, including the chrome sales arrangement, are kept intact. I again emphasized the conflicts that would immediately arise even if a small portion of this chrome should be allotted to Germany.

³⁴ Mehmet Münir Ertengin.

I made clear all the details of each important point that was brought up.

The Ambassador seemed to agree with the statements I had made and said he felt that he fully understood them. He added that he would be glad to present the matter fully and accurately to his Government and keep me advised in the premises.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

867.24/180 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, September 23, 1941—6 p. m.

[Received September 24—12:25 a. m.]

352. While awaiting reply to recommendation contained in my 345, September 18, I chanced to be brought into contact with Rauf Bey³⁵ and was tempted to avail myself of particularly friendly relationship to outrun my instructions to extent of stating to him as occasion for serious apprehensions on my part views which in that telegram I suggested that you convey to Turkish Ambassador. He was particularly struck with statement that Foreign Office had repeatedly given assurances that Turkey would give no chrome to Germany and emphatically stated they can't go back on their word: "they won't give any". He has since called on me to say that while he does not feel in a position to take initiative in matter with President, he will nevertheless exert himself to bring to attention of others in appropriate quarters our viewpoint with which he is in accord.

2. Having since received your 162, September 20, I called this morning on Foreign Minister,³⁶ recalled to him our joint interest with British and assurance given me July 10 (my 247) by Numan Bey, said that giving chrome in any quantity whatsoever to Germany raised questions which my Government now had under serious consideration and that under instructions, I was asking him to postpone decision until it should have communicated its views. He stated he had not yet committed himself and no decision had in fact been reached but then went on to take line that Turkey was contractually obligated to sell to France a portion of its chrome output and asked if I thought he could honorably go back on that engagement if French called for its fulfillment. I recalled that contract had been made with British and French as Turkey's allies for purpose of preventing any chrome going to Germany and that to live up to letter of it under present circumstances would be to defeat its very purpose. He then spoke of

³⁵ Former Turkish Prime Minister and intimate personal adviser of President Ismet İnönü.

³⁶ Sükrü Saraçoglu.

Turkey's precarious international situation and necessity for modernizing her forces and not neglecting opportunity to obtain from Germany at cost of insignificant quantity of chrome certain arms which are desperately needed; and he expressed almost resentfully his surprise that our Government should so far disregard necessities of this helpless country as to interpose in matter with what he described as in effect an ultimatum. I said that not only I myself but my Government were fully conscious of Turkish necessities and in fact doing everything possible to meet them but that we could not ignore conditions of American legislation and American opinion which would enable us to continue such assistance. He protested that this viewpoint was extremely egoistic; and while admitting that Germans wanted this chrome as a symbol rather than for its actual utility to them, he asked why we had for our part seen fit to adopt chrome as a touchstone of our whole attitude towards Turkey. I said that Turks had themselves made a special case of chrome as distinguished from all other products including minerals by having in first place signed contract for sale of their whole output to their allies and by having repeatedly declared and given specific assurances both to my British colleague and to me that they would under no circumstances let any of it go to Germany. He said sharply that Turkey had no contractual obligation to us in this matter. I conceded that but reminded him that Numan had nevertheless given me in response to a formal request an assurance on behalf of his Government. He made no reply other than to ask me to repeat while he took down in writing representations I had made. I said that I would instead send him a note embodying their purport. Shortly afterwards Numan telephoned to Kelley³⁷ suggesting that this document should take form of unofficial and informal memorandum rather than of official note.

4. Your 164, September 21, has just been decoded.
Repeated to London.

MACMURRAY

811.20 Defense (M)/3312 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, September 23, 1941—7 p. m.

[Received September 24—12:25 a. m.]

353. Your telegram 160, September 19, 7 p. m.³⁸ As regards status of British negotiations for renewal of chrome contract expiring January 8 next following information has been given me by my British

³⁷ Robert F. Kelley, Counselor of Embassy.

³⁸ See footnote 30, p. 945.

colleague in addition to what was contained in my 344:³⁹ About a year ago the Turks complained that the London market price as specified in the contract (only 36 shillings per ton at that time as against 105 that the Germans were offering) was purely artificial and the British then undertook to pay the German price for the whole output including the four-fifteenths French share for which they had meanwhile assumed responsibility. Last July when rumors were current that some chrome would be given to Germany my British colleague wrote to the Foreign Office (see my 261, July 18, 5 p. m.) in exercise of the option of renewal; receiving no reply for several weeks, he inquired of the Minister and was told that there would be no question of the British right but that in view of the forthcoming trade negotiations with Germany the Ministry would appreciate it if the British could permit him to give to Germans at least some portion of the 7,000 tons which had been granted last year to Italy (that related to an arrangement made with British and French consent in the spring before Italy entered the war, by which Turkey was to have given the 10,000 tons in barter for sulphur not obtainable elsewhere; and 3,000 tons had in fact been given on this deal); the British refused assent and that incident of the discussion was apparently concluded. Repeated urgings elicited no reply to the note; and only now has Turkish Government raised the new legalistic argument about the necessity of French participation in any requests for extension of the contract despite the fact that it has been selling the whole output to the British at the higher price on the assumption that they had replaced the French and assumed their obligations under the contract.

Repeated to London.

MACMURRAY

811.20 Defense(M)/3319: Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, September 24, 1941—5 p. m.

[Received 8:52 p. m.]

356. My 352, September 23. Shortly after I had seen Foreign Minister yesterday British Ambassador had 4-hour discussion with him and Secretary-General as outcome of which Minister said question would be reconsidered. Although Turks argued at length legal aspect of matter they conceded that question was fundamentally political. Huggessen tells me that when he referred to anxiety I felt as to effect which giving of chrome to Germany would have in America Saraçoğlu rather hotly accused him of having put me up to intervening in matter and made clear that he was greatly irritated by what he

³⁹ Dated September 17, 6 p. m., p. 943.

felt to be my gratuitous intrusion. Hugessen of course made it plain that whatever action I had taken was prompted by my Government's very real interest and concern.

2. He strongly feels and I concur that it would be ill-advised for either of us to press matter further at this moment in view of action already taken; authorities are obviously smarting at being called to account and made to realize error of what evidently was their calculation that they could in this way "throw a teab to the whale" without serious consequences; and we both feel that there is danger of exasperating this feeling to extent of its obscuring their judgment and arousing their characteristic recalcitrancy in face of pressure just when they are undertaking to consider matter afresh. I am therefore assuming that representations I made yesterday substantially carry out purpose of your 164, September 21, and unless otherwise instructed shall make no further *démarche* at present stage of question.

Repeated to London.

MACMURRAY

811.20 Defense (M) /3347 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, September 27, 1941—1 p. m.

[Received 4:12 p. m.]

359. My 356, September 24. Although Turkish authorities have given neither British nor ourselves any intimation of their decision there are seemingly reliable unofficial indications that they have decided to refuse German request for chrome.

Repeated to London.

MACMURRAY

811.20 Defense (M) /3357 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, September 28, 1941—noon.

[Received September 29—3:37 a. m.]

361. It would be premature to report that chrome question is definitely settled in our favor but I think it is.

2. At Cabinet meeting on Thursday Chief of General Staff Marshal Fevzi Cakmak who had been called in spoke very bluntly about fact that civil officials in pursuance of their own conceptions of national defense were trying to carry water on both shoulders without even consulting responsible military leaders who were quite aware that nothing this Government would get from Germany would compensate for such alienation of British and American support as would result

from giving chrome to Germany. Result of Cabinet meeting appears to have been decision that German request is to be refused. As is quite understandable however Turks seem to be handling matter cautiously so as to avoid loss of face either for themselves or for Germans.

3. Hugessen advises me Foreign Minister has now told him question is virtually settled, and even promises early renewal of contract but still balks at giving categorical assurance that no chrome will go to Germany. Numan Bey has been very outspoken in telling that he had been instructed to "accustom Germans to idea of not getting any chrome" and had on Thursday told Clodius none would be given. Latter at once cancelled plans for visit to Izmir Fair and asked for meeting of trade delegations on Monday 29th. Numan expects him to make issue of matter and either break off commercial negotiations or demand face-saving concession of increased quantities of copper—as to which British who have agreed to considerable shipments heretofore are relatively indifferent and would oppose no objection.

4. H[u]gessen and members of his staff who are most appreciative of our intervention nevertheless tell me they have received impression that it was at least momentarily infuriating to Foreign Minister who definitely resented intervention which he is disposed to consider intrusion of my own upon a scheme by which he had hoped to gratify both parties—perhaps by promising Germans chrome upon conditions which they would not be in a position to fulfill. Possibly for that reason he has given British Ambassador account of Secretary's talk with Turkish Ambassador Monday which I cannot believe to be accurate (and which is very different from that received by H from London Foreign Office) to effect that Secretary had intimated no American interest in chrome save as we were anxious that Turks should not do anything distasteful to British. I have naturally found it prudent to hold aloof from official contacts under circumstances already reported to you but with view to future contacts should he, of course, find it useful to be informed of tenor and effects of that conversation.

Repeated London.

MACMURRAY

811.20 Defense (M) / 3373 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, September 30, 1941—11 a. m.

[Received 5:20 p. m.]

362. My 361, September 28. I understood that at yesterday's meeting of trade delegations (attended also by Von Papen) Numan steadfastly refused to give any chrome and that Germans while insisting

on their original request and stating that they were awaiting further instructions nevertheless gave the impression of being disposed not to force the issue but to continue the negotiations on the basis of either receiving additional copper or giving less of the highest category materials desired by Turkey.

Repeated London.

MACMURRAY

811.20 Defense (M) / 3452 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, October 3, 1941—6 p. m.
[Received October 4—8:30 a. m.]

370. As explained in my 361, September 28, I have felt constrained to avoid Turkish official contacts until in a position to contradict authoritatively somewhat flippant view of American attitude which it seems to take. Generally prevalent impression among Turks and foreign journalists (who have been allowed by very real although unacknowledged censorship to telegraph and broadcast with utmost freedom on this subject of which not a single whisper has appeared in Turkish press) is that we have won on chrome issue as Germany is to get none at present time.

2. Last night my British colleague told me that he had received from Foreign Minister and Secretary General oral assurance that Turkey would deliver no chrome to Germany now and that their Government regarded existing chrome contract as already renewed in favor of Great Britain for further year (i. e., until January 8, 1943) provided by option, although Minister would not put it in writing at this juncture lest it seem to be a challenge to Germans; and that Von Papen and German trade delegation were staying on awaiting instructions. Reassuring as this was, however, Hugessen coupled it with statement that he had reason to believe there was at least basis of truth in current rumors that Turks had not opposed flat refusal to German demand but (as I had first heard in concrete form from a journalistic source yesterday) had proposed to Germans two alternative formulas for incorporation in trade agreement: (a) that Germany should be free to buy any exportable surplus of Turkish products; or (b) that she should be enabled to buy any chrome which Turkey should be free to sell. (It is to be noted that formulas above outlined reached me orally at second or third hand and through mutations from Turkish probably through French into English so that no inferences can safely be made as to wording which might well prove crucial.) He also told me he had suggested extending contract for 3 or even 5 years but that Minister had said that he could not go beyond one year's extension in good faith

to Germans. That seems clearly to imply that Turks consider themselves so far committed to Germans as not to preclude their getting chrome in 1943.

3. I am frankly puzzled that my British colleague, although he had at once protested against any such committal, nevertheless seems rather indifferent to that possibility since he assumes course of war will by that time have made question academic. I urged upon him that we cannot safely act on such assumption and that I could not feel my Government would be content to contemplate any possibility that its supply of Turkish chrome might be cut off in January, 1943.

4. . . . I frankly confess myself at a loss to recommend course of action in case they should outright give chrome to Germans. It would be a natural and justifiable retort to refuse them any further lease-lend assistance; but I fear that might only defeat purposes which have justified our aid. Yet it would be vital mistake to let them get away with feeling that they can interpret their obligations loosely with no more serious consequences than to make [apparent omission] and myself a bit peevish.

5. Having indicated some of complications and dangers I nevertheless venture to recommend that Secretary follow up his talk with Münir Bey September 22⁴⁰ by telling him (and telegraphing me transcript of conversation for use in my discretion) that our Government is not in a position to continue furnishing armament to Turkey unless assured beyond all equivocation that at least so long as war lasts Turkish Government will see to it that United States is in a position either directly or through Britain to obtain for purpose of manufacturing such armaments all chrome that Turkey can produce. I further recommend that Turkish officer associated with British Purchasing Commission be told same thing by highest American official responsible for lease-lend matters in order that he may be in a position to report to General Staff independently of Foreign Office which is perhaps timid in passing on bad news to military authorities.

6. Although it involves considerations outside my province I venture to suggest that thereafter in consultation with Britain there might be offered to Turks a joint and several obligation to purchase their entire chrome output (if specific figure is desirable say up to 250,000 tons a year) either for 5 years or for duration of war and thereafter until denounced.

Repeat to London.

MACMURRAY

⁴⁰ See memorandum by the Secretary of State, September 22, p. 949.

841.24/851 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, October 4, 1941—1 p. m.

[Received October 6—7:43 a. m.]

371. (1) British Ambassador tells me that yesterday under instructions he proposed to Foreign Minister new chrome contract for 5 years or until year after end of war, whichever earlier. Minister confirmed readiness to give 1-year option on extension under existing contract, repeated statement he could not without breach of faith with Germans make any arrangement carrying obligation to British beyond June 1943, but said his Government would be free and prepared to make in advance long term contract to run from expiration of German trade agreement which is to run for 18 months and is expected to be signed Tuesday, i. e., from about April 7, 1943. This seemingly indicates that in order to avoid immediate issue Turks have committed themselves to allowing Germans at least theoretical right to buy during roughly 3 months at beginning of 1943. It should in fairness be admitted that they may well have resorted to this device in good faith in conviction (which I have elsewhere reported) that before that time they will have been forced into hostilities cancelling that commitment.

(2) Minister also told Hugessen that Von Papen and Clodius had at first taken rather high line in demanding chrome saying refusal on Turkey's part would indicate unwillingness to live up to spirit of recent Treaty of Friendship. Minister had replied he could not admit intrusion of such clearly political considerations into negotiations which Germans themselves insisted were purely commercial. They had talked similarly to Seczge [*Secretary General?*] who had likewise stood firm and who had opposed strenuous denial to further argument that Turks were not getting promised war materials from Britain and might better look to Germans who could promise prompt delivery. A day or so later they had told MGNA [*Minister for Foreign Affairs?*] that on reflection they agreed with his viewpoint and had asked for instructions (which have not yet been received) authorizing them to drop demand for chrome (presumably demand for definite delivery under trade agreement; he did not explain the circumstances or precise nature of 1943 commitment referred to above). Germans had then said there had been so much talk of Turkish fears of attack by Germany as to create a false impression of mutual distrust which it would be opportune to dispel by issuing some sort of statement embodying assurances that neither nation would attack other; and that he had assented to that proposal.⁴¹ I

⁴¹ See telegram No. 378, October 9, 7 p. m., from the Ambassador in Turkey, p. 908.

trust this supererogatory and seemingly innocent statement will not (like Treaty of Friendship which grew out of very similar proposal) develop into something with more far-reaching implications than Turks contemplated beforehand or indeed seem even yet to realize.

(3) I fear that disclosure of dualism in British policy referred to in your 173, October 1,⁴² may delay if not make impossible course recommended in my 370, yesterday. But I continue to hope that on suitable occasion Department take suggested means to bring home to Turkish diplomatic and (particularly) military representation in Washington our interest and concern in chrome question and its relation to our lease-lend program.

Repeated London.

MACMURRAY

811.20 Defense (M) /3485 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, October 7, 1941—4 p. m.

[Received October 8—8:39 a. m.]

374. Last night British Ambassador advised me that during evening Foreign Minister had called him in and informed him as follows:

Clodius had that morning told Numan Bey that Germany was prepared to respect Turkey's contractual obligation to sell entire chrome output to Britain up to January 1943 but demanded that Turkey sign secret exchange of letters, obligating herself to supply in exchange for war materials furnished by Germany under trade agreement, half of her production (and not less than 150,000 tons)⁴³ in 1943 and again in 44; if Turkey would not agree there would be a rupture of trade negotiations. He had insisted that this should not be communicated to British Ambassador but Numan had refused. Cabinet had immediately considered matter and decided to offer counterproposal as follows:

Provided Germany will now furnish war materials already asked for in connection with proposed trade agreement, Turkey will undertake to furnish Germany 100,000 tons each in 1943 and 4, in payment for such further military supplies as Turkish Government may designate from time to time during that period. Min[iste]r argued to Hugessen that such undertaking would not effectively commit Turkey to furnish chrome inasmuch as it would be open to Turkish Government when time came to specify war materials that Germany

⁴² See footnote 96, p. 906.

⁴³ In telegram No. 376, October 8, 10 p. m., the Ambassador in Turkey reported that the German delegation had accepted a counterproposal for a maximum of 90,000 tons each year without mention of half of the Turkish production (811.20 Defense (M) /3497).

would not be in a position to furnish. He also argued that in any case, giving of chrome to Germany would not necessarily diminish amount available to Britain and ourselves, as production could be increased correspondingly if mining equipment and particularly overhead cable lines and trucks could be furnished. (It is of course absurd to suppose that Turkey, whose production has decreased this year and which in view of quasi-mobilization has had to introduce forced labor in some mines, could double output by '43.)

2. In view of extreme urgency of matter I feel warranted in exercising broad discretion conferred on me by your 164, September 21 and have concerted with H[ugessen] that he should see Min[iste]r this morning to protest against proposed arrangement and to say that he had consulted me and that I proposed to call and present certain views. He has now done so and tells me that he first asked Minr to withhold action until British Government could state its views but was told that that was impossible as negotiations had already dragged on too long. In reply to question he was told that Turks were making their counterproposal as a "take it or leave it" proposition. He asked whether Minr could at least confirm definitely his assurance that supplies available to Britain and United States would not be diminished and Saraçoğlu unhesitatingly promised this on condition that mining equipment and particularly overhead cable carriers and trucks could be furnished. He says Minr almost in so many words gave him to understand that Turks are prepared to accept German demands with idea of tiding over time until 43 when they feel situation will have developed to point at which Germany will either be in a position to take what she wants or else in such a position that Turkey can afford to find some basis for not carrying out agreement. When H mentioned my intended call Minr rather heatedly exclaimed "are Britain and United States combining to force us into war."

3. I am awaiting appointment with Minr when I shall hand him memorandum of following tenor :

"While on one hand Government of United States has no direct contractual rights in matter purchase of chrome from Turkey it has on other hand no obligation in matter either of according to Turkish Government favored position with regard to purchase of American materials or of supplying war materials to that Government under so-called Lease-Lend Act.

American Government has in fact allowed to Turkish Government a position of high priority in both these respects, has already made available to it important quantities of materials and is taking steps to supply them in great quantity.

American Government has been enabled to supply war materials without cost to Turkish Government by virtue of provisions of Lease-Lend Act authorizing it to give such assistance to any country whose defense President deems vital to defense of United States. President

has construed that authorization as justifying aid to Turkey by reason of her definite identification with cause of democracies through her alliance with Great Britain and of her determination to resist aggression and to give no aid to aggressor nations.

In fulfilment of its program of assistance to democracies American Government is making every effort to expand industrial energy of United States and concentrate it upon production of war materials. For this purpose it is essential that there should be available for American industry bulk of present chrome output of Turkey; and when American industry reaches its peak production of war materials in 1943 it may be expected to require all chrome Turkey can produce. American Government can not contemplate without anxiety prospect that its program of assistance to democracies, by which Turkish Government is now benefiting, should be jeopardized by action which for benefit of a country at war with democracies would cut off or reduce supply of chrome at a time when it would be more than ever essential.

Secretary of State on September 22 advised Turkish Ambassador in Washington of serious repercussions that could not but arise at once in event that Turkish Government should allot to Germany any portion of chrome output of Turkey."

Repeated to London.

MACMURRAY

811.20 Defense (M) /3500 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, October 8, 1941—4 p. m.

[Received October 9—7:45 a. m.]

375. Shortly after sending my 374 yesterday I was received by Foreign Minister who in earnest but this time not unamiable mood confirmed general situation reported in that telegram and overwhelmed me with arguments that he was doing just what we wanted Turks to do about chrome; we desired not an infinity of it but enough to satisfy our needs even for a greatly expanded war industry; British and we together were not now taking he maintained as much as Turkey can produce with result that some mines had shut down; we could have that and more if we wanted for duration of British contract; thereafter if we had been interested enough in meanwhile to provide additional transportation facilities there was no reason why production should not be doubled or quadrupled so as to provide our maximum needs in addition to German quota. He brushed aside all question as to feasibility of this. He then went on to claim that Turkey had been confronted with critical situation in which she could not have refused German demand on any ground except open enmity and that a way out had been found by putting off fulfillment of those demands and making it dependent upon conditions which it might well prove impossible for them to meet. He even said that he felt he de-

served congratulations for averting this crisis in interests of United States and Britain as well as of Turkey. I then asked him to read informal memorandum quoted in my next preceding telegram.⁴⁴ He studied it carefully then asked whether it embodied fresh instructions I had received; I said it was my own formulation of my Government's views as I understood them from a whole series of instructions. He said it raised a wholly novel point in insisting on behalf of United States that no chrome be given to Germany. I said that Secretary had twice emphasized that point in conversation with Turkish Ambassador September 22. He sent for and translated to me Münir Bey's report of that conversation which I was disappointed to find was rather casual and unprecise and failed to convey any clear idea of matters discussed or of any importance which our Government attaches to them. I read him relevant portions of your 172, September 30,⁴⁵ and particularly pointed out that Secretary's comments on repercussions to be expected in event of giving chrome to Germans were not (as Minister suggested) limited to case of giving it during life of British contract. He then turned to passage re lease-lend assistance and rather dramatically implored me to make clear to my Government that Turkey quite definitely expects to be attacked by Germany before next summer; that meanwhile she has no choice but to arm herself (from whatever source available, even Germany) to fullest extent possible in hope of deterring or eventually meeting that attack on best terms possible; and that she relies on her friends of democracies to understand her position and contribute utmost they can to strengthen her as bastion of Middle East. I promised to convey this message whose purport I fully understood and had indeed reported home on various occasions but said that I counted upon his understanding that my Government too has its own interests and problems and viewpoints to consider. I attempted no more detailed argument of points he raised as he gave me to understand that Turkish position (set forth in first paragraph of my next previous) had been finally determined and would be at once communicated to German Trade Delegation (which was in fact waiting in his anteroom) and incorporated without delay in signed agreement, if accepted by Germans.

2. Whereas my British colleague and his advisers are not disposed to take it tragically, feeling that essential point has been gained and that events may be expected to take care of matter of ultimate deliveries of chrome to their enemies, I cannot but feel that common cause has suffered serious defeat in this field, although it may well prove that in upshot Turks will never actually give Germans any chrome. Fact remains that they are now promising 14 months hence to transfer to

⁴⁴ *Supra.*

⁴⁵ Not printed; it repeated memorandum by the Secretary of State, September 22, p. 949.

Germany, from their allies and friends who are arming them against Germany, the very substantial first call upon their output of vital war material. To speak only of matters within my ken, I feel that not only will German propaganda make most in Near and Middle East of such a breach in Turkey's solidarity with democracies but effect on Turkish morale of this Government's yielding to first use of pressure in implementation of recent Treaty of Friendship cannot but be one of defeatism and flabbiness of will in meeting any further pressure. I still believe in good will and loyalty of Turks to cause of democracies even though it be result of their conviction that Allied victory is only assurance of their national survival; but this case has shaken my confidence in their capacity to keep their heads in a tight situation . . .

Repeated to London.

MACMURRAY

662.8731/147 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, October 9, 1941—5 p. m.

[Received October 10—12: 24 a. m.]

377. The German-Turkish commercial agreement was signed about noon today.⁴⁶

MACMURRAY

740.0011 European War 1939/15970

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

[WASHINGTON,] October 9, 1941.

The British Ambassador⁴⁷ called to see me this afternoon at his request.

The Ambassador read to me some messages from his Foreign Office concerning the situation in Turkey and the negotiations between the Turkish and German Governments involving the right of Germany to acquire chrome in Turkey. The British Foreign Office again was very anxious that the Turkish agreement with Germany should be played down and that too much pressure should not be brought to bear upon Turkey by either Great Britain or the United States as a result of the agreement Turkey had entered into with Germany. The British Foreign Office again feared that Ambassador MacMurray was adopting too defeatist an attitude and reporting too gloomily to

⁴⁶ For text, see *Reichsgesetzblatt*, vol. II, No. 2, November 15, 1941, p. 375.

⁴⁷ Viscount Halifax.

the Department of State regarding the attitude of the Turkish Government.

I said that I was somewhat at a loss to account for this new instance of discord in the implementation of the policies of our two Governments with regard to Turkey. I said that the United States had consistently endeavored to support the British position vis-à-vis Turkey, and that in as much as I knew from my personal friendship for him of the unusual ability of Ambassador MacMurray and of the highly intelligent manner in which he conducted his official business, I felt sure that the American Ambassador in Ankara had carried out the instructions sent to him in accordance with the policy of this Government. I said that what had happened during past months had been that frequently after this Government has communicated its views to the Turkish Government in response to requests from the British Government, the latter had then modified its own position. I said that in the present instance I believed that Ambassador MacMurray was reporting objectively and by no means in an unduly defeatist spirit and that he had done his utmost, as had this Government, to support the British Government in order that the Turkish Government might be dissuaded from giving way to Germany more than was absolutely inevitable under present conditions.

Lord Halifax said that he felt very much the same way.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

811.20 Defense (M) / 3500 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray)

WASHINGTON, October 11, 1941—5 p. m.

180. Your No. 374, October 7, 4 p. m., your 375, October 8, 4 p. m., and your 378, October 9, 7 p. m.⁴⁸ The Department concurs in the representations which you made to the Turkish Foreign Minister, and takes note of Saraçoğlu's remarks in reply. It agrees that no further representations to the Turkish authorities appear necessary at this time with regard to the Turkish-German trade agreement or to the joint communiqué issued at the time of its signature.

While neither the Turkish action in agreeing to sell chrome to Germany in 1943 nor the joint communiqué are pleasing to this Government, it is considered preferable to endeavor to strengthen our economic ties with Turkey as much as possible in the near future, by such means as finding tonnage to lift Turkish chrome and tobacco, and effort will be made in this direction at once. If this can be accomplished, the principal German argument for trade with Turkey will be obviated. However, an immediate suggestion along this line to the

⁴⁸ *Ante*, pp. 958, 960, and 908, respectively.

Turks would give a false impression of our reaction to the German agreement, and no mention of the matter will be made until tonnage can be guaranteed.

HULL

662.6731/151: Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, October 17, 1941—5 p. m.

[Received October 18—10:20 a. m.]

386. Although Foreign Minister at first consented to give British Ambassador only in strictest secrecy copies of document constituting trade agreement with Germany, he has now assented to Hugessen's request that he be allowed to communicate them to me. I shall shortly telegraph résumé of most essential points.

2. This change in attitude with regard to our relationship to the questions involved, of course, invalidates the suggestion in fifth paragraph of my 383, October 15.⁴⁹

Repeated London.

MACMURRAY

662.6731/152: Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, October 17, 1941—7 p. m.

[Received October 18—6:46 p. m.]

388. My 377, October 9, 5 p. m.

1. Turkish-German commercial arrangement (comprising commercial agreement with protocol and 13 confidential exchanges of notes, and payments agreement with confidential protocol and 2 exchanges of notes) which entered provisionally into force on October 9 and is to remain in force until March 31, 1943, provides for exchange of goods divided into 2 groups to the value of 96 million Turkish pounds. Turkish goods to f. o. b. value of 55 million Turkish pounds of which the most important items are: minerals and metals (copper, chrome "to be delivered after January 15, 1943" and antimony), 10 million, olive oil, 7, cotton, 7, mohair and other goats' hair, 6, skins, 5, and oleaginous seeds, 4.5, are to be exchanged for specific German goods to a similar value, c. i. f., of which the most important are: war material, 18 million, iron and steel, [apparent omission], machines, means of transport, 30, and copper manufactures of which copper content is not to exceed 1,000 tons, 2.5. Turkish goods

⁴⁹ *Ante*, p. 909.

to a value of 41 millions, of which most important items are: tobacco, 20 million, figs, 6.5, hazel nuts, 5.4, raisings [*raisins?*], 3, fish, 2.5, are to be exchanged to the extent of 50 percent for German goods specified in first group with the exception of war material, copper manufactures and sugar beet seed and hardware, iron and other metal manufactures, and to the extent of 50 percent for German goods of any sort.

While the commercial agreement stipulates that export of Turkish goods will be authorized to the value of German goods in corresponding category arriving in customs in Turkey, a confidential exchange of notes provides for a margin in each group of 10 percent of value of goods to be exported. This apparently means that at the beginning the Germans could import from Turkey Turkish goods in group 1 to the value of 5,500,000 Turkish pounds prior to the arrival of any German goods in Istanbul. It is provided that when the margin is exceeded either Government may take measures necessary to restore the equilibrium. In a confidential note the Turkish Government agrees to issue export licenses to Germany for: 12,000 tons of copper, 7,000 tons of cotton, 45,000 tons of chrome and 8,000 tons of olive oil. In this connection it is worthy of note that the export of copper, chrome and antimony to Germany was not authorized under the previous Turkish-German commercial agreement, and that the quantities of cotton and olive oil have been vastly increased.

2. In a confidential exchange of notes the two Governments agree to conclude before March 31, 1943, an agreement concerning the delivery of Turkish chrome to Germany to be effected up to December 31, 1944 on the following conditions

(1) that amount of war materials specified in schedule 1-A "must be entirely liquidated by the delivery to Turkey of the materials in the conditions specified by the agreement";

(2) "the chrome to be exported from Turkey will form the counter value of further war materials to be agreed upon by the two Governments";

(3) "the Turkish Government will then authorize the exportation of an annual quantity of chrome amounting to 90,000 tons, for the periods from January 15 to December 31, 1943, and from January 1 to December 31, 1944, that is a total of 180,000 tons from the 15th of January 1943 to the end of 1944."

The war materials to be delivered by Germany to Turkey are: spare parts for German planes, heavy machine guns, Krupp guns 7.5/60, with sights and ammunition, Bochum guns 7.5/20 with ammunition, pontoons and engineering material spare parts for trucks and motorcycles and 40 relined Bochum guns.

3. Payments agreement which is similar to 1938 agreement covers in addition to payments arising out of commercial exchanges financial

transfers of all sorts between the two countries, provision is made in a supplementary note for the utilization of excess blocked funds in Germany of persons residing in Turkey for the purchase by German banks for Turkish account of obligations of the Anatolian Railway, Port of Naydar Pasha and Turkish debt 1933 in circulation in Germany or in territories occupied by Germany.

MACMURRAY

811.20 Defense (M) / 3596 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, October 24, 1941—4 p. m.

[Received 4:35 p. m.]

5070. 1. Ministry Economic Warfare are now preparing instructions for Ambassador at Ankara with respect to conclusion of chrome purchase contract covering year 1942. Chief object which Ministry has in mind is to evacuate every ton of chrome they can from Turkey just as soon as possible, particularly not to leave any stocks in Turkish ownership at beginning of 1943, to avoid such unsold stocks possibly being delivered to Germans.

2. As regards price, British Ambassador at Ankara has suggested 140 shillings per ton as possible ceiling for 48 percent ore. He also reported that Germans had offered 150 shillings. Ministry therefore point out that while an effort should be made to obtain as low a price as possible it is likely to be very difficult to drive any hard bargain with the Turks who are under no illusions as to importance being attached to their chrome supplies. Ministry Economic Warfare in particular feel strongly that a price should be paid for ore at Mersin, Payas and Iskanderun which would be sufficient to induce mine owners or Turkish Government to take all steps in their power to get the ore to these ports particularly Mersin. They point out that it is in fact much more advantageous to pay 170 shillings for ore at Mersin than 130 shillings for ore which may never leave the mining area or only reach the ports after long delays.

3. Ministry Economic Warfare has telegraphed British Ambassador at Ankara in general terms setting forth these considerations and suggesting to him that he explore the following three inducements for the Turks to bring the ore to one of the three selected ports:

(a) Either a basic price at one of three selected ports with penalty for deliveries elsewhere or alternatively a basic interior price with a premium for delivery at one of three selected ports.

(b) Only part payment for ore when delivered at ports other than the three selected, the balance to be payable when delivery is made at Mersin, etc.

(c) Combination of the two foregoing points.

4. Ministry Economic Warfare state they have centralized all their activities in this matter with their Embassy at Ankara and express the hope that pertinent American Government authorities will coordinate their activities so that American Ambassador there will be in a position to work closely with his British colleague.

5. Ministry Economic Warfare also state they would appreciate any suggestions or comments Department or defense agencies concerned might care to advance at earliest moment.

WINANT

811.20 Defense (M) /3596 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray)

WASHINGTON, October 28, 1941—9 p. m.

194. The Department has received the following telegram from London :

[Here follows telegram No. 5070, printed *supra*.]

The Department agrees completely with London's decision, as expressed in paragraph 4 of London's 5070, to center their activities having to do with chrome in their Embassy at Ankara, and intends similarly to center its activities in your Embassy.

The Department also believes the general line of suggestion as to price and buying policy set forth in London's 5070 to be sound and promising, especially in regard to the suggestion of buying f. o. b. Mersin, Payas, and Iskenderon. Before formulating final definite instructions to you, however, it seems useful to wait until the British Embassy in Washington has received a reply from the British Government in response to two cables that it has sent after discussion with us. These apparently crossed London's 5070. One contained suggestions on policy; the second was a cable from Washington on October 27, requesting data on chrome production, stocks, and movements during 1941. We surmise that it is probable these cables have been repeated to the British Embassy at Ankara.

Meanwhile, it would be useful for you fully to consult with your British colleague.

All interested agencies of this Government have been concentrating attention on the greatly desired objective of securing as much chrome from Turkey as possible between now and the end of 1942. It is realized that this is a question involving the maintenance of the highest possible rate of production at points and places from which the chrome can be shipped; second, the best utilization of available railway transport; third, the making of arrangements for ship transport.

All of this it must be realized must be done under the changing circumstances created by the war.

It is thought that perhaps more will be achieved if the Federal Loan Agency (Metals Reserve Company) has on the spot working towards this end a small and properly selected group of representatives to concentrate on this matter, to keep in close touch with the Turkish authorities, and to advise the different branches of this Government as to what needs to be done at any particular moment. It may even be that by providing a small measure of extra financial inducement or equipment this Government could directly help to get increased amounts.

Would the Embassy advise as to the usefulness of such representatives, as to how they would be received by the Turkish authorities. Furthermore, we would be glad to receive from the Embassy recommendations as to any Americans whose recent or present experience in Turkey would appear to qualify them particularly well for such an assignment.

Furthermore, since it is the intention of the Department to center activities relating to the chrome program in your hands, you are requested to report your general advice and suggestions as fully and expeditiously as possible.

HULL

811.20 Defense (M)/3701 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, November 5, 1941—4 p. m.

[Received November 6—5:54 a. m.]

414. Your 194, October 28. Following are conclusions reached by my British colleague and myself after thorough canvass of chrome situation:

1. Every effort should be made to ship from Turkey as soon as possible all existing stocks of chrome now lying principally at Marmara and Aegean ports, and with this end in view he and I propose again to approach Turkish authorities separately with urgent request for their assistance in transporting this chrome by coastwise shipping and by rail to ports accessible to British shipping. Turks have already placed at disposal of British one coastwise vessel with capacity 3,500 tons. We propose to endeavor to obtain additional vessels. Furthermore every effort should be made to ship during 1942 every ton of chrome which is mined in order, if possible, that at no time, particularly at beginning of next spring when action by Germany against Turkey is possible or at end of period covered by British contract, shall there be any stocks on hand.

2. Conclusion of British chrome purchase contract for period January 8 next to January 8, 1943, should be expedited. Details of this contract are now under discussion between British Embassy and Turkish Foreign Office.

3. We recommend that no representatives of Metals Reserve Company be sent to Turkey at present inasmuch as it is considered that presence of such representatives would not be of any particular usefulness under present circumstances and might tempt Turks to try to play off American against British interests. British have a chrome expert who keeps in touch with mines and interested Turkish authorities. We propose however to keep in mind possibility of presence of American expert becoming desirable in connection with subsequent developments.

4. With regard to bringing about increased chrome production in '42 there appears to be some difference between our own and British approaches to question; for whereas I take it that primary purpose of our Government is to acquire for its own use maximum quantities (not only in 1942 but I assume in succeeding years), British put primary emphasis upon keeping to a minimum amount available to Germany in 1943 and 1944.

In view of latter consideration and of fact that such permanent equipment as ropeways could not be installed until too late in '42 to affect substantially that year's production and would remain available for increasing production for Germany thereafter we agree in recommending that no equipment more substantial than trucks be made available to Turkish Government. As best method calculated to induce Turks to make greatest possible effort to increase production during this year it is recommended that consideration be given to working out a scheme whereby there will be delivered to Turkey a specified number of units of military equipment greatly desired by her such as planes or guns for every 1,000 tons delivered at Mersin for instance over and above quantity shipped out of Turkey in present year (it is estimated approximately 80,000 tons will be shipped in '41).

5. Thought should be given immediately to arrangements to be entered into with Turkey with regard to purchase of chrome subsequent to January 8, 1943, whether for instance it is advisable to enter into long term contract say for 5 years providing for purchase of all Turkish chrome with exception of amounts which Turkey is now obligated to furnish Germany in '43-'44 and which would contain provisions in respect to those years to [*sic*] which would enable us to get as much chrome as possible and make it difficult for Germany to obtain amounts specified in trade agreement.

Repeated London.

MACMURRAY

811.20 Defense (M)/3701 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray)*⁵⁰

WASHINGTON, November 10, 1941—9 p. m.

202. Your 414, November 5. Department after consultation with British Embassy is in agreement with suggestions your paragraph 1. The policy to be followed is to lift all the chrome to be produced during 1942 and in addition all stocks which have accumulated at the mines, ports and railway stations. According to information supplied to the British Embassy here direct from Ankara, the Turkish 1942 production of 48 percent ore and of concentrates will be about 90,000 tons and of all grades about 160,000 tons. Furthermore, there are now at ports and railway stations about 80,000 tons and at mines about 200,000 tons. Accordingly, to carry out the policy of lifting all chrome now on hand or to be produced in 1942, it will be necessary to make arrangements to lift 440,000 tons. Please confirm if your figures agree since it is clear if these figures are correct that the measures we take in 1942 will have to be on a quite different scale to those employed in 1941 when only 81,000 tons were lifted.

The Department is in agreement with your recommendation that the British chrome purchase contract covering the year ending January 8, 1943 be expedited. The Department believes that the agreement should include all stocks on hand plus the 1942 production to the extent that this production is not already contracted for under the agreement terminating January 8, 1942. The reason why the contract should be drawn in this way is that the Department desires that there should be no chrome on hand on January 8, 1943 which is not subject to prior contract to Great Britain or the United States.

With reference to your paragraph 3, the Department agrees that no representative of Metals Reserve Company go to Turkey at present. However, it is believed that in view of the importance of the transportation problem, it would be helpful to you and to the British to have American transportation experts to assist you in the negotiations with the Turkish Government with respect to transportation, which negotiations will clearly be most difficult. Please telegraph if you are in agreement, in which event necessary arrangements will be made immediately.

Your paragraph 4 will be the subject of a later telegram since the points raised in this paragraph involve consultation with other Departments and agencies of the Government.

The Department requests that you reconsider your paragraph 5. The Department does not desire to discuss at this time the purchase

⁵⁰ Repeated on the same date to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom as telegram No. 5108.

of chrome subsequent to January 8, 1943 if there is any possibility of being asked during such negotiations to recognize the validity of any claim by Germany with respect to the chrome production of Turkey subsequent to January 8, 1943 and it would seem most difficult to avoid this subject if you were now to begin conversations for the purchase of the production in 1943 and subsequent years. You are accordingly requested, after consultation with your British colleague, to give us your further recommendations on this point bearing in mind that if you both should recommend that such a long term contract be made, it would be given most favorable consideration.

HULL

811.20 Defense (M) / 3759 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray)*⁵¹

WASHINGTON, November 21, 1941—1 p. m.

209. Reference your 427, 428, and 429, November 14, and your 423, November 12.⁵² The Department is obtaining consideration for the desire of the Turkish Government for additional shipping. The Department has also noted the Turkish request that Great Britain furnish 50,000 tons of wheat. The British Embassy here has informed the Department that the Turkish Government has also requested from them 30,000 tons of barley. These requests for foodstuffs will be favorably considered by this Government and, it is assumed, by the British Government, but before replying definitely, the Department desires further information as to the possibility of the Turks being able to move the chrome to be purchased during 1942 to the ports of Mersin and Alexandretta or other ports in their vicinity.

The policy of this Government and it is believed of the British Government to date has necessarily been based on the premise that the Turks will be able to move from the three chrome areas 307,000 (your 428 of November 14) tons of chrome to the ports of Mersin and Alexandretta or other ports in their immediate vicinity during the year 1942. If this can be done by the Turks, necessary shipping can be provided to take this chrome from these accessible ports to the United Kingdom and the United States or some intermediate point of transshipment. Recent information which the Department has received as to the extent of sea and rail transport in Turkey has led the Department to believe that there is a serious doubt whether the Turks will be able through their railroads and coastal shipping to move this total of 307,000 tons to these accessible ports in 1942. If this doubt is valid, it is obvious that some new measures not presently

⁵¹ Repeated on the same date to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom as telegram No. 5321.

⁵² None printed.

under consideration will have to be adopted if the objective of cleaning out Turkish chrome by the end of 1942 is to be achieved. You are accordingly requested to consult with your British colleague and to telegraph the Department your opinion as to whether the Department may safely rely on the willingness and ability of the Turkish Government to move the 307,000 tons of chrome to Mersin and Alexandretta or other ports in their vicinity in 1942. If you believe that it is not safe to rely upon the Turkish ability and willingness to transport this amount of chrome, your opinion is requested as to whether and to what extent the Turks will increase the amount of chrome made available to these accessible ports during the 12 months of 1942 over the amount so delivered during 1941.

You are also requested, after consultation with your British colleague, to telegraph to the Department your opinion as to the maximum amount of chrome which can be made available by the Turkish Government at the Sea of Marmora ports, Fethiye, Mersin and Alexandretta and adjacent ports during the months of December 1941 to April 1942, inclusive, specifying in your reply the total tonnage to each port and assuming that you can obtain the maximum cooperation of the Turkish Government in making chrome available at ports during this period.

HULL

811.20 Defense (M)/3837 : Telegram

The Chargé in Turkey (Kelley) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, November 28, 1941—6 p. m.

[Received November 29—2:11 p. m.]

454. (1) Reference your 209, November 21, 1 p. m. It is my opinion which is concurred in by my British colleague that we can count on Turk willingness to move in 1942 the 307,000 tons of chrome to accessible ports (Mersin and Alexandretta and other ports in vicinity). However, while confident of Turk goodwill in matter we both feel that it is essential that Turk Government be kept constantly under pressure. With this end in view, British authorities are making delivery of wheat and barley contingent upon Turk Government making chrome available at accessible ports. The Turk Government has been pressing British to deliver 50,000 tons each of barley and wheat. A token shipment of 8500 tons of wheat has already been made to meet urgent request of Turk Government and with a view to encouraging acceleration of chrome deliveries, since it is understood by Turks that delivery of remainder of requested barley and wheat will be effected only against chrome deliveries.

With regard to ability of Turk Government to move chrome in question we believe that transportation facilities now in prospect are adequate to transport this amount of chrome. Status of transportation facilities now being arranged to remove chrome from Fethiye and Marmara ports to accessible ports is as follows:

With regard to three ships promised by Turkish Government (Embassy's 429, November 14⁵³), one ship of 3400 tons will commence loading at Fethiye within few days, a second ship has been allocated and is on point of being designated, and the third ship is to be allocated and designated shortly. Furthermore Turks have agreed to allocate 10 to 15 cars a day from November 25 to transport chrome by rail from mines in Marmara area to Mersin. In addition Ucom Corp is chartering small sailing and motor boats up to 150 tons to take chrome from Marmara ports and Fethiye. Four have already been chartered and it is hoped to secure more. These transportation facilities are considered adequate to take care of chrome at Marmara ports and Fethiye. With regard to movement of chrome ore from Guleman mine to Mersin during 1942 we believe that Turks have sufficient cars to transport from mine the existing stocks there and amount estimated to be produced in 1942.

It is my opinion after consultation with my British colleague that between now and April 1942 assuming maximum cooperation of Turk Government not less than 100,000 tons can be made available at Mersin and Alexandretta. A more precise estimate is not possible at this time. I assume that mention in your telegram of Marmara ports and Fethiye as places where chrome is to be made available was made by inadvertence inasmuch as arrangements under contemplation are designed to remove as soon as possible all chrome from these ports to Mersin or Alexandretta.

(2) Referring to second paragraph Embassy's 428, November 14,⁵³ agreement has now been reached between British Embassy and Turkish Government with regard to chrome purchase contract for 1942, signature of which is awaiting London's approval. In draft contract Turkish Government undertakes to sell to the British Government all stocks of chrome existing at end of 1941 which have not been taken over by British and all chrome produced between January 1, 1942, and January 8, 1943. Consequently there will be no Turkish chrome above ground on January 8, 1943, which can be sold to Germany. Basic price is 140 shillings per ton with increase of 4 shillings for each unit over 48 percent and reduction of 3 shillings for each unit under that figure. It is provided that British-owned chrome which has not been actually delivered prior to January 8, 1943, will

⁵³ Not printed.

have no priority with regard to transportation after that date. Turks insisted on this provision in order that there would be no interference with delivery to Germany of the 45,000 tons of chrome which they had promised to supply in period from January 15 to March 31, 1943.

Repeated to London.

KELLEY

811.20 Defense (M) /4034 : Telegram

The Chargé in Turkey (Kelley) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, December 26, 1941—6 p. m.
[Received December 27—12: 40 p. m.]

505. My 434 [454], November 28, 6 p. m. Chrome purchase contract referred to in part 2 was signed on December 23, without any major change.

With regard to movement of chrome from Fethiye to Mersin Embassy is informed that one ship of 3,400 tons has already left former port and that a second ship of same tonnage is now ready to leave. Embassy understands that third ship allocated is being temporarily used by British to transport urgently needed emery.

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