



LIBRARIES

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON

Foreign relations of the United States, 1946. The Far East: China. Volume IX 1946

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946

<https://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/G5OAT7XT7HRHX84>

As a work of the United States government, this material is in the public domain.

For information on re-use see:

<http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/Copyright>

The libraries provide public access to a wide range of material, including online exhibits, digitized collections, archival finding aids, our catalog, online articles, and a growing range of materials in many media.

When possible, we provide rights information in catalog records, finding aids, and other metadata that accompanies collections or items. However, it is always the user's obligation to evaluate copyright and rights issues in light of their own use.


U.S.

DEPT. OF STATE

FOREIGN
RELATIONS

1946
v.8

JX
233
.A3



LEHMAN
LIBRARY

Lehman

JY

233

A3

1946

v 9

copy 5

Foreign Relations
of the
United States
1946

Volume IX
The Far East:
China



United States
Government Printing Office
Washington : 1972

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 8561

HISTORICAL OFFICE

BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

For sale by the
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price \$7 (cloth)

PREFACE

This volume was prepared under the general supervision of E. Ralph Perkins, formerly Chief of the Foreign Relations Division, now headed by S. Everett Gleason.

The compiler of the volume was Ralph R. Goodwin. Preliminary planning and review of the volume was provided by John G. Reid and former staff member, Francis C. Prescott. Final review of the volume was the responsibility of Mr. Gleason and Mr. Reid, assisted by Rogers P. Churchill.

The editors acknowledge with appreciation the assistance provided them by the historians of the Department of Defense, including those of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Publishing and Reproduction Services Division (Jerome H. Perlmutter, Chief) was responsible for the technical editing of this volume.

WILLIAM M. FRANKLIN
*Director, Historical Office
Bureau of Public Affairs*

JANUARY 15, 1971

PRINCIPLES FOR THE COMPILATION AND EDITING OF "FOREIGN RELATIONS"

The principles which guide the compilation and editing of *Foreign Relations* are stated in Department of State Regulation 2 FAM 1350 of June 15, 1961, a revision of the order approved on March 26, 1925, by Mr. Frank B. Kellogg, then Secretary of State. The text of the regulation, as further amended, is printed below :

1350 DOCUMENTARY RECORD OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY

1351 *Scope of Documentation*

The publication *Foreign Relations of the United States* constitutes the official record of the foreign policy of the United States. These volumes include, subject to necessary security considerations, all documents needed to give a comprehensive record of the major foreign policy decisions within the range of the Department of State's responsibilities, together with appropriate materials concerning the facts which contributed to the formulation of policies. When further material is needed to supplement the documentation in the Department's

files for a proper understanding of the relevant policies of the United States, such papers should be obtained from other Government agencies.

1352 *Editorial Preparation*

The basic documentary diplomatic record to be printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States* is edited by the Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs of the Department of State. The editing of the record is guided by the principles of historical objectivity. There may be no alteration of the text, no deletions without indicating where in the text the deletion is made, and no omission of facts which were of major importance in reaching a decision. Nothing may be omitted for the purpose of concealing or glossing over what might be regarded by some as a defect of policy. However, certain omissions of documents are permissible for the following reasons:

- a. To avoid publication of matters which would tend to impede current diplomatic negotiations or other business.
- b. To condense the record and avoid repetition of needless details.
- c. To preserve the confidence reposed in the Department by individuals and by foreign governments.
- d. To avoid giving needless offense to other nationalities or individuals.
- e. To eliminate personal opinions presented in despatches and not acted upon by the Department. To this consideration there is one qualification—in connection with major decisions it is desirable, where possible, to show the alternatives presented to the Department before the decision was made.

1353 *Clearance*

To obtain appropriate clearances of material to be published in *Foreign Relations of the United States*, the Historical Office:

- a. Refers to the appropriate policy offices of the Department and of other agencies of the Government such papers as appear to require policy clearance.
- b. Refers to the appropriate foreign governments requests for permission to print as part of the diplomatic correspondence of the United States those previously unpublished documents which were originated by the foreign governments.

CONTENTS

	Page
PREFACE	III
The mission of General of the Army George C. Marshall to China to arrange for cessation of civil strife and to bring about political unification:	
I. Negotiations leading to the cease-fire agreements of January 10, 1946	1
II. Discussions pertaining to Political Consultative Conference (January-April)	131
III. Negotiations respecting military reorganization and integration of Communist forces into National Army (January-May)	177
IV. Initial problems arising in the implementation of the cease-fire agreements and the situation in Manchuria; recall of General Marshall for consultation (January-March 13)	341
V. Agreement to send teams into Manchuria, March 27, 1946	542
VI. Agreements to remove to Communist areas Communist troops near Canton and Hankow who were surrounded by Government troops	613
VII. The Manchurian crisis (March 28-May 22, 1946)	712
VIII. Negotiations leading to fifteen-day truce in Manchuria (May 22-June 6, 1946)	880
IX. Negotiations stalemated during Manchurian Truce (June 6-30, 1946)	985
X. Spread of hostilities in North China and Shantung; failure of political negotiations (July 1-21, 1946)	1272
XI. Efforts of Ambassador Stuart and General Marshall to break deadlock; the Anping incident (July 21-August 10, 1946)	1388
INDEX	1511

THE MISSION OF GENERAL OF THE ARMY GEORGE C. MARSHALL TO CHINA TO ARRANGE FOR CESSATION OF CIVIL STRIFE AND TO BRING ABOUT POLITICAL UNIFICATION¹

I. NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENTS OF JANUARY 10, 1946

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270: Telegram

General Marshall² to President Truman

[CHUNGKING,] January 1, 1946.

11. A rather critical conference with a Central Government group on Saturday afternoon precipitated a conference late Sunday night December 30th with the three governmental leaders in the People's Consultative Council³ including Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang.⁴ There was outlined the prospective Central Government's rather uncompromising position in reply to Communists' proposals for cessation of hostilities. For the first time I gave what might have been termed an opinion though I voiced it as a mere suggestion of the moment. In consequence the leaders held a meeting Monday morning, finally consulting with the Generalissimo.⁵ Doctor Wang then came to see me at 4:30 p. m., 25 miles out of city at Generalissimo's country place. He stated that as a result of my suggestions they would present following proposal⁶ to Communist members of the PCC at 5:30 p. m.

1. Immediate cessation of hostilities.

2. Appointment of Central Government and Communist representatives, one each, to consult with me in proposing terms and methods of enforcing and maintaining the armistice, restoration of rail communications, and initiation of surrender and removal of Japanese troops in disputed districts.

3. Appointment by PCC of a commission to visit disputed areas and determine facts and make recommendations.

¹ For previous correspondence relating to this mission, see *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. vii, pp 745 ff.

² Gen. George C. Marshall, Special Representative of President Truman in China, with personal rank of Ambassador.

³ For correspondence regarding more strictly political activities of the People's Consultative Council (PCC), see pp. 131 ff.

⁴ Wang Shih-chieh.

⁵ Chiang Kai-shek, President of the National Government of the Republic of China.

⁶ *Infra*.

The first two points only are concerned with immediate future. I have my staff developing plans for an executive combined agency or headquarters to carry out on the ground a possible directive⁷ to be agreed upon by the representatives with me. An elaborate command-control-communication setup will be required. I have already drawn upon Wedemeyer⁸ for some personnel and will have to secure more from him and especially of motors, radio material, etc. This group will have to control for the time being railroad reconstruction and operation, organization of railroad police to remove troops from such service, and troop movements incidental to Japanese surrenders and repatriation. Working members of group or headquarters will be under U. S. Executive, in effect a Chief of Staff, with staff officers and communication operatives from Central Government and Communist Armies, coordinated in each activity or mission by Americans. I propose establishing my immediate assistant and Military Attaché Colonel Byroade⁹ as this Executive. He is now planning organization, duties and equipment of group. I plan to appoint the American Minister, Mr. Robertson,¹⁰ as Chairman of the Control Group or Headquarters to balance the contentions, claims and views of the two hostile representatives.

I am quite certain that no other method will give genuine effect to the cessation of hostilities, reopening of rail lines, acceptance of Jap surrenders and repatriation of Japanese. There must be an impartial source of direction and authority on the ground. The directive for guidance of this group will be drawn up here by me and the two hostile representatives, to receive joint approval of Generalissimo and Mao Tse-tung.¹¹ Thereafter to be issued formally by Generalissimo. No American troop units are involved in present plans or envisaged for future developments.

The foregoing as to proposed combined Group or Headquarters is at present merely my proposition to bring forward at meeting proposed by Central Government and not yet accepted by Communists.

Tonight Communist representative¹² spent several hours with me and I frankly outlined my conception of necessary procedure. He apparently agreed throughout, at least he understands my point of view. He has not yet heard from Mao Tse-tung on question of acceptance of Central Government proposal. I was left with impression that he was favorably disposed.

⁷ For these draft plans and directives, see document and annexes, p. 3.

⁸ Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, Commanding General, U. S. Forces, China Theater.

⁹ Col. Henry A. Byroade.

¹⁰ Walter S. Robertson, Chargé d'Affaires in China.

¹¹ Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party.

¹² Gen. Chou En-lai, representative at Chungking of the Chinese Communist Party.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

The Government Three-Point Proposal Offered to the Communist Party

Early cessation of hostilities has always been the wish of the National Government. In order to attain this object, it is necessary for the two sides to reach an agreement on a definite procedure to be followed by both sides. Otherwise, the proposal to cease hostilities will, in practical application, run into difficulties. For this reason, the following suggestions were offered to the Communist representatives:

(1) All military conflicts throughout the country shall cease and railway transportation shall be resumed.

(2) As matters relating to the cessation of military conflicts and removal of obstructions to transportation, etc. also affect the discharge of China's obligations vis-à-vis our Allies regarding the acceptance of Japanese surrender and the repatriation of Japanese troops an agreement for a definite procedure regarding the cessation of hostilities and the resumption of railway transportation, etc. should be made. It is proposed that the National Government and the Chinese Communist Party should each appoint a representative to discuss and formulate concrete measures for the settlement of the aforesaid problem with General Marshall. Measures so agreed upon will be presented to the National Government for enforcement.

(3) The Resident Committee of the People's Political Council shall elect five impartial observers, forming a Military Inspection Mission, to inspect the military situation and transportation facilities in the zones of conflict as well as other matters related to the return of peace in our country. The Military Inspection Mission shall, from time to time, make reports on the situation and release them for publication. When the Political Consultative Council is convened, it will be invited to send impartial representatives to take part in the work of the Military Inspection Mission.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Document Prepared by the Staff of General Marshall.

[CHUNGKING,] 1 January 1946.

CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES PLAN ¹³

THE PROBLEM

To arrange for the immediate cessation of hostility between the Central Government and Communist Armies in China and the estab-

¹³ This is the first of a series of draft plans which General Marshall ordered prepared by his staff, in order to "thresh out the practical procedure so far as they could guess and so far as I could foresee, so that if a meeting [of a committee of three] was agreed to I would be prepared mentally to put forward what seemed to me a practical procedure." The annexed drafts are undated, but since they are so closely related both in the original documentation and in subject-content, and since they were already in use by January 4, they are inserted at this point.

lishment of the necessary executive headquarters to properly implement agreed terms of the armistice.

DISCUSSION

1. Representatives of the Central Government and the Communist Parties have agreed to effect immediate cessation of hostilities. A selected representative from each of the Central Government and the Communist Party have called on General Marshall to discuss the terms and execution of such agreement.

2. The problem at hand covers only the immediate aspects of the terms and implementation of the armistice and is a military problem. It must not be confused with the broader aspects such as integration of the Central Government and Communist Armies, civil rule in occupied areas, etc. which are matters for discussion in the Political Consultative Council.

3. The necessary steps to effect and secure a cessation of hostilities appear to be as follows:

a. Cease Fire Orders

Field orders containing cease fire instructions to the two armies in question should be dispatched simultaneously. The field orders to the Central Government troops should be signed by the Generalissimo and that to the Communist troops by Mao Tse-tung. Such orders should include the necessary instructions to insure proper action until establishment of the executive headquarters hereinafter mentioned. They should definitely include the order to cease destruction of communication lines, the cessation of troop movements within China except those Nationalist Forces destined for Manchuria, and such other instructions as may be necessary to establish the desired state of tranquility in the battle areas until further orders can be issued. Preparation of actual field orders is of course a function of the respective Chinese organizations. The important aspects of such field orders will probably be drafted by the committee of three (General Marshall, the representative of the Nationalist Government and the representative of the Communist Government) for submission to the Generalissimo and Mao Tse-tung for their approval. The pertinent portion of these directives should therefore be prepared immediately for use by General Marshall in his discussions.

b. Formation of Executive Headquarters

An executive headquarters will be required to carry out on the ground, the implementation of the terms of the armistice and perform such other functions as described herein. The headquarters should

be composed of one member designated by the Central Government, one member designated by the Communist party and one American designated by General Marshall with the American to act as the chairman. In addition to the above, an executive section must be organized preferably under the supervision of an American officer, to carry out and implement the decisions of the executive headquarters.

The executive headquarters must be organized and located in a central position within the present lines of conflict at the earliest possible date. Its location must be determined by its proximity to the headquarters of both armies as well as near the center of gravity of important lines of communication within North China. It must have sufficient American representation to permit the dispatch of combined Chinese and American delegates to the numerous army and communication points of conflict. It must have the required transportation, ground and air, to allow rapid means of transit of all of its members. It must have a signal organization to carry out efficiently and with security, radio communications with its outlying command posts, General Marshall in Chungking, and theater headquarters in Shanghai. It must be provided with its own immediate security and be furnished necessary housing and office space as required.

In establishing the above organization, plans must be prepared not only to cover the American participation, but the entire organization, and should include organization, location, strength, and operating procedure. The executive headquarters will function under the executive order of the Generalissimo. It shall make recommendations to the Generalissimo on such immediate problems as restoration of communications, to include formation of the required military police, acceptance of Japanese surrenders, initiation of repatriation of the Japanese from North China, etc. While this committee must function under the order of the Generalissimo, it is understood that agreements reached by the executive headquarters will be confirmed and approved by the Generalissimo so that the executive headquarters will be in effect a military agency with plenipotentiary powers.

c. Governmental Directive to the Executive Headquarters

There must be prepared immediately an executive order which will be issued by the Generalissimo establishing the executive headquarters in *b* above. It should define in general terms its functions and responsibilities. Simultaneously with this executive order, a public statement should be made by the Generalissimo announcing the establishment of such an executive headquarters, the members thereof, and the general powers conferred thereon.

[Annex 1]

Draft Memorandum Prepared by the Staff of General Marshall

TO HIS EXCELLENCY, THE GENERALISSIMO:

Subject: Cessation of Hostilities.

In conformance with the agreements entered into by the National Government of China and the Chinese Communist Party, it is desirable that cease firing orders be issued at once and simultaneously by yourself and by Chairman Mao Tse-tung. If this suggestion meets with your approval it is recommended that identical orders along the lines of the draft which follows be issued by you and by Chairman Mao Tse-tung at an agreed time on an agreed date.

The text of the proposed draft order follows:

"All units, regular, militia, irregular and guerrilla of the National Armies of the Republic of China are ordered to carry out the following directive, as of _____ hours, on _____ of the _____ year of the Republic:

(hour) (day) (month) (year)

a. All hostilities will cease immediately.

b. All movements of forces within China proper and Manchuria will cease with the exception of movements of forces of the National Government of the Republic of China into and in Manchuria for the purpose of re-establishing Chinese sovereignty. There also may be the purely local movements necessary for supply, administration and housekeeping.

c. Destruction and interference with lines of communications will cease and you will clear at once blocks placed against movement along land lines of communications.

d. For the time being all units will maintain their present positions.

e. Additional instructions and orders will be issued to you later.

Signed Chiang Kai-shek"

A similar memorandum ¹⁴ is being submitted to Mr. Chou En-lai for transmittal to Chairman Mao Tse-tung.

[Annex 2]

Draft Plan Prepared by the Staff of General Marshall ¹⁵

THE EXECUTIVE HEADQUARTERS

Preamble

By joint agreement, we, Chiang Kai-shek, President of the Republic of China, and Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of Central Committee, Chinese

¹⁴ Not printed; it is the same except for appropriate changes in names.

¹⁵ This draft was the one that was used for discussion of the organization of the Executive Headquarters at the third meeting of the Committee of Three on January 8, p. 76; it was based on an earlier draft, not found in Department files, discussed on January 6 at a meeting between General Marshall and General Chang Chun.

Communist Party, do establish as of _____ an Executive Head-
(date)
quarters empowered to implement the agreements for cessation of hostilities.

Mission

The Executive Headquarters established by this order will implement the agreed policies. The Headquarters will submit recommendations covering necessary additional subsidiary agreements to insure more effective implementation of the cessation of hostilities orders; to include disarmament of the Japanese forces, restoration of lines of communication and coordination of the movement of Japanese to the coast for repatriation. The formal instructions unanimously agreed upon by the three representatives will be issued in the name of the President of the Republic of China.

Jurisdiction

The Executive Headquarters will exercise control for the above stated purposes only of operations and movement over all regular, militia and irregular forces, Central Government and Chinese Communist, within the borders of China proper, French Indo-China north of 16 degrees, Hainan, Formosa, and Manchuria.

Organization

The Executive Headquarters will consist of three representatives with authority to vote, and to negotiate among themselves; one to represent the Chinese National Government; one to represent the Chinese Communist Party Government and one to represent the United States of America. The United States Representative will be the chairman of the group.

The Headquarters will have within itself as its implementing agency an operating group to be called the Executive Section composed of the number of officers and men required to supervise in the field the various agreements, and to render the required reports. Chinese Representatives shall be equally divided between the National Government and the Chinese Communist Party.

There will be included within the Executive Headquarters the necessary secretarial staff, and housekeeping sub-sections to support the Headquarters.

Housing and Supply

The National Government will furnish adequate living and office accommodations for the Executive Headquarters. The National Government will also furnish the subsistence for this Headquarters.¹⁶

¹⁶ In an earlier draft, not found in Department files, there was inserted at this point a sentence which read: "Over-all security will be furnished principally by the National Government and Chinese Communist Party forces"; see Notes on the Conference of Three (Meeting No. 3), January 8, pp. 76, 90.

Local security of the Representatives will be furnished by small units from forces of each party as circumstances render convenient.

Location

The Executive Headquarters will be located at Peiping.

Procedure

The Executive Headquarters will operate as the executives of the National Government, the Chinese Communist Party, and the United States respectively.

The three Representatives shall each have one vote. All action must be by unanimous agreement. Either the National Government or the Chinese Communist Party may, through its head or through its accredited representatives with the Executive Headquarters veto any proposed action, order or recommendation.

The Executive Headquarters will issue the necessary formal orders, directives, and instructions in the name of the President of the Republic of China.

Daily reports will be rendered to the President of the Republic of China and to the Chairman of the Central Committee, Chinese Communist Party.

The Executive Headquarters will operate through its Executive Section.

The Director of the Executive Section will be an United States Army Officer.

The Executive Section will supervise the publication and dissemination of all orders, directives, and instructions to all forces concerned.

The Executive Section will dispatch supervisory and reporting teams as required to insure proper implementation of the policies and agreements.

The National Government, the Chinese Communist Party, and the United States may each maintain independent signal communications.

Duration of Authority

The Executive Headquarters shall remain in existence and operate under the authority contained in this order until there is a change by amendment or until the joint order is rescinded by the President of the Republic of China or the Chairman of the Executive Council of the Chinese Communist Party, or their authorized representatives after due notification to the other party.

[Annex 3]

Draft Memorandum Prepared by the Staff of General Marshall

TO HIS EXCELLENCY, THE GENERALISSIMO:

Subject: Organization of Executive Headquarters.

The approval by Your Excellency and Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the directive to cease hostilities makes it mandatory that the Executive Headquarters become operational at once.

The Executive Headquarters should be kept as small as possible in order that it can commence functioning quickly, and handle without delay matters referred to it for action.

Mr. Walter S. Robertson, the American commissioner of the Executive Headquarters, will have initially a small staff of not to exceed four persons; a political advisor, an aide, a stenographer, and a translator.

The Operations Section, under Colonel Henry A. Byroade, must contain the necessary personnel to operate various sub-headquarters in critical areas, maintain communications, furnish the required office and housekeeping overhead, etc. The American portion of this Section is initially planned to consist of approximately ninety American officers and enlisted men and thirty civilian employees.

Attached is the type of organization Colonel Byroade has planned for the American portion of the Operations Section.¹⁷ I suggest that you organize, as a matter of urgency, a similar group for the National Government's staff of the Operations Section.

Colonel Byroade will go to Peiping on _____
(day) (month)
1946 to establish the Executive Headquarters and to assemble the American personnel.

Mr. Robertson will be ready to depart on _____
(day) (month)
1946. It would be most advantageous if the Commissioner of the National Government, as well as the Communist Commissioner, could be prepared for departure together. I propose providing my personal C-54 aircraft for this purpose.

I wish to stress that the National Government and the Communist Party staffs for the Executive Headquarters and Operations Section must be organized immediately and sent to Peiping to join the three Commissioners, Colonel Byroade, and their staffs. It appears to me that the National Government and the Communist Party staffs should

¹⁷ Not printed.

consist of not more than forty officers and ninety enlisted men. At least half of this personnel should report to Peiping by _____ 1946 and the remainder not later than one week following.

(day) (month)

A similar memorandum¹⁸ is being forwarded to Chairman Mao Tse-tung.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Counterproposal of the Chinese Communist Party Presented to Government Representatives on January 3, 1946

With an effective, unconditional, and immediate cessation of internal military conflict in view, the representatives of the National Government and the representatives of the Chinese Communist Party have agreed upon the following arrangements:

(1) Both sides will at once order the troops under their command anywhere within the country to remain at their present positions, to cease all military conflict, and to restore all communications.

(2) As internal military conflicts affect our obligations vis-à-vis our Allies regarding the acceptance of Japanese surrender and repatriation of enemy troops, it is agreed that the Government and the Chinese Communist Party will each designate a representative to confer, together with General Marshall, on matters related to the cessation of military conflicts, restoration of all communications, acceptance of surrender, and repatriation of Japanese troops, with a view to the formulation of concrete measures for the settlement of the said matters. The measures thus agreed upon will be presented to the National Government for execution. Upon the completion of the task mentioned above, or when the Government and the Chinese Communist Party believe that they can complete by themselves the task mentioned above, the conference shall cease.

(3) It is proposed that the Political Consultative Council will elect impartial persons from different professions in the country, including members of the People's Political Council, to form together with the representatives of the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party a Military Inspection Mission, to visit under the direction of the Political Consultative Council various districts where military conflicts have taken place and where Japanese and puppet troops are stationed, to make inspections on the spot, to report from time to time on the actual situation, and to publish their reports.

¹⁸ Not printed; it is the same except for appropriate changes in names.

761.93/1-346: Telegram

The Chargé in China (Robertson) to the Secretary of State

CHUNGKING, January 3, 1946—2 p. m.

[Received January 3—11:30 a. m.]

19. Personal to Secretary of State from Marshall. My message 18 of December 26¹⁹ requesting your personal estimate of the Soviet intent in Manchuria and relations between Russia and the Chinese Communists evidently did not reach you in Russia. I also raised the question as to whether the difficulties the Generalissimo reports in his relations with Russia in Manchuria are not mostly of the same pattern as our own similar difficulties in Europe, or whether Soviet policy in Manchuria is deliberately calculated to mitigate against an effective and unified China.

Your personal views on the above for eye only and to be kept out of the records would be most helpful to me in the present status of my negotiations with the Chinese. [Marshall.]

ROBERTSON

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Notes on Conference Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai, January 3, 1946, 3:30 p. m.

C[НОУ]: The Chinese Communist Party welcomes General Marshall's participation in matters pertaining to cessation of hostilities, announcing of surrender and opening up of communications, because Yen-an²⁰ feels that armed hostilities might be effectively stopped. In order to accomplish this, General Marshall's participation in this matter is in the interest of the Chinese people. Further, Yen-an telegram says that in order to achieve this aim, it is necessary that orders should be immediately issued for the cessation of hostilities on a nation-wide scale. The same telegram calls attention to the fact that right now serious armed hostilities are taking place in province of Jehol and along the Tientsin-Pukow railway and these hostilities must immediately be stopped and General Chou En-lai is very pleased to receive such a reply from Yen-an and, therefore, he calls on you first to inform you about this reply. General Chou, based upon the instructions from Yen-an and the last talk he had with you, has now made a draft²¹ on the cessation of armed hostilities and he will then

¹⁹ *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VII, p. 813.

²⁰ Chinese Communist "capital" in Shensi Province.

²¹ See counterproposal of the Chinese Communist Party, p. 10.

take this directive to National Government in order to reach a decision, but he wishes first to show you this draft.

General Marshall read General Chou's draft.

M[ARSHALL]: I take it that this part I just read that the conference be immediately declared stopped, you are referring to the group here of your representative, the Central Government's and myself. Now I outlined to you what I thought had to be done on the ground. If such a headquarters as that was created are you referring to that being wiped out right away too? I asked that question because as I see it, the work of the group here will be over long before the work of the group there. The group here will be probably very quickly done, so it will then go to the Consultative Group.

C: General Chou agrees with your idea that the headquarters on the ground may continue to work even if this group of three has been closed out.

M: That is as I see it. This group here sets the stage and the work goes on in the field, then we don't continue.

SHEPLEY:²² PCC itself would replace the committee here.

M: You relieve me—that is very encouraging to me.

What my staff and I are arguing about is whether I could properly read to you the idea I had for the cessation of hostilities or whether I must wait until you and the other representatives are together. I have decided that I will read it to you, but I will ask you to keep it to yourself. The basic difference between the draft I had made and your paper is only in one thing and that is regarding the number of troops now in progress to Manchuria. The U.S. Government is committed to the movement of troops into Manchuria. What I had done was to have Colonel Byroade and the staff officers I brought up from Shanghai, thresh out the practical procedure so far as they could guess and so far as I could foresee, so that if a meeting was agreed to I would be prepared mentally to put forward what seemed to me a practical procedure. Therefore, they had made drafts as I told General Chou the other day, first of the initiation of the immediate order for the cessation of hostilities.²³ Their draft, which seemed to me a good one, I wish to read to General Chou. It was proposed to send a memorandum such as this to Mao Tse-tung through General Chou En-lai and a similar memorandum to the Generalissimo. Now this I am assuming would be the agreement of the three.

General Marshall started to read until a translation was brought in which General Chou read.

M: Now that is merely what I would propose to the conference

²² James R. Shepley, member of General Marshall's staff and Attaché of Embassy in China.

²³ Draft memorandum prepared by the staff of General Marshall, p. 6.

itself, if there was an agreement to the conference. Here is an agreement (referring to General Chou's memorandum). I don't know whether the Central Government people would accept that (General Marshall's memo) just as I do not know whether you, General Chou, would accept it. Nobody has seen that except you, and that is something for debate later. The reason I wanted you to see it now was all of this seems perfectly all right to me with the exception of movements into Manchuria. So I wanted you to see what I said there. The main thing, as I see it, is this is an agreement to the conference and this is the first statement of Communists' views and I am perfectly gratified that there should be this indication of general understanding and I will ask General Chou just to assume he has not seen that, but whoever comes to the conference can expect that I will make some such proposal. I will say again I am very much pleased and gratified to see this long step towards bringing about a cessation of hostilities, because that clearly is essential before there is any discussion and I am in thorough agreement with General Chou that this preliminary committee should pass out of the picture just as soon as it has performed its initial functions of this order and the directive to the local headquarters. My concern is with the first two parts rather than the third. If that is to be brought up in this meeting of the three I will do my best, but that isn't what I am concerned about. That introduces political factors (the selection of representatives) and purely Chinese affairs. Now whether that is brought up to the committee of three I don't know, but I don't feel that I should be the person in there. I will be willing to help, but I would be very much dismayed if it got in the way of the first two. Will you state to General Chou that I appreciate his coming here this afternoon in all frankness.

C: General Chou wishes to call your attention to two points. The first point is about the restoration of communications. In his draft it is proposed that all means of transportation should be restored instead of saying railway communications only. All types of communications. He indicates it in this way because it is not only railway but [*but*] air traffic, sea traffic, telegraph, post.

M: We are in agreement. We agree to that.

C: It is not only incoming by the Chinese but also for the foreign correspondents and the missionaries restoring all the others.

BYROADE: Will you read part C to see if it is correct.

INTERPRETER: "All kinds of actions pertaining to the destruction and obstruction of all communication lines should be stopped and all kinds of barriers to the land communications lines should be immediately removed."²⁴

²⁴ The interpreters' translation of part C is not identical with text but substance is the same.

B: That is all right.

C: Only the land mines have barriers.

And the second point is on the Manchuria problem. General Chou understands that there is some exception on this Manchurian problem and he recognizes this exception because it not only affects China and the U.S. for the communications, or to application to certain Chinese troops in Manchuria, but it also affects Sino-Soviet Pact.²⁵ But how it should be set forward on this point, General Chou wants to contemplate on this matter.

M: He wants to think it over.

INTERPRETER: That is it. Please correct me if I am wrong.

M: Contemplate is all right.

C: General Chou wants to make certain the proposal to be submitted to the Generalissimo is just the same.

M: Identical.

You say, "Both sides should immediately . . .".²⁶ That is all right as a basis of our agreement, but you have got to be very precise as to time and date. Going back to paragraph D [B], last line. "There also may be the purely local movements necessary for supply, administration and housekeeping." You may have troops deployed. That sentence does not apply to Manchuria. It applies everywhere.

C: I understand.

M: This is merely the first draft. We have tried to find out how much you could say at the state [*start?*] and just use as precise terms as you could in covering the various points.

C: General Chou said he has something to say about your idea on the field headquarters on the ground. He desired to say that it may work quicker and more effectively if there are more than one headquarters, but many headquarters in different places and therefore we would like to suggest that it would be better to have many sub-quarters under this main one. Main headquarters will be under the committee of three.

M: I feel there should only be one directing headquarters, but our plans that I was preparing to submit to this group of three of which I would be one contemplated four radio communication centers which means four smaller headquarters and eight little stations in various places in the field as a beginning but only one central headquarters. Equipment for four communications sub-headquarters and eight little groups, combined headquarters to look out from place to place as a beginning.

C: What is your idea of the site of your field headquarters.

M: They have been studying the map and they have looked at three

²⁵ Signed August 14, 1945, United Nations Treaty Series, vol. x, p. 300.

²⁶ Points appear in the original.

or four proposed places. The most central one seems to be, considering airfields which are very important, at Tsinan. However, the difficulty of communication there and all seemed so great that for the time being it appeared that the headquarters should be started at some point that had more facilities. It seemed to us that communications, air, radio, roads, telephone and accommodations were very important for the beginning. The nearest place we could find that has all the accommodations and communications to permit a rapid establishment and the quick transaction of business was Peking. Whether that could be considered for any length of time I don't know. You certainly could start more quickly there. I thought of complications that might arise because of the presence in the Peking area of a regiment of Marines and if there was, I would consider taking up with General Wedemeyer the removal of those Marines. I do not know the conditions, but I do not imagine there would be any difficulty about my having them moved out of Peking if that was going to be an objection. Peking naturally has more communications and resources than anywhere else. I would be much interested in having General Chou's suggestions.

C: I think it is very good to have Peking as a center of the field headquarters, but it may be necessary to move it from time to time.

M: I think so too.

C: With regard to the subsidiary field headquarters, he suggests they should be set up in places where fighting is taking place or is most imminent and he suggests the following places for consideration:

- One at Jehol, Province of Jehol at Changteh,
- One in Province of Chahar at Kalgan,
- One on Tientsin-Pukow railway at Tsinan or Hsu Chow,
- One on the Peking-Hankow railway at Hsin Hsiang,
- and one on Tatung-Tunkow railway at Tatung.

M: He might like to hear the leading paragraph in the proposal I was prepared to make for the organization of the executive headquarters. (General Marshall read part on Executive Headquarters).²⁷ I will not go into the details of various staffs and that of what we arrived at here, except to say here: "An Executive Section will be composed of number of officers and men required to supervise adequately in the field the various agreements and to render the required reports. Chinese representatives shall be equally divided between the National Government and the Chinese Communist Party." That is just a rough outline, that is one way of agreeing on the thing. They tried to prepare for me what I might have to say and I will have whatever that is translated like that so that I have it when the meeting of three is held. I think that that arrangement permits them to work

²⁷ See draft plan prepared by the staff of General Marshall, p. 9.

out on the local situations with a fair degree of understanding on all sides and I would see that the American officers, all of them, were absolutely neutral. Their views would only relate to the thing they saw on the ground, as to the necessary military arrangements.

C: General Chou is very much gratified that you have told him beforehand about your idea and he will first think it over.

M: I didn't have any idea that he could tell me now but I wanted him to know. I would like to say now, that to repeat again, that this statement of my views I would like him to regard that as confidential—the fact that I have given them all. If the representatives of the Central Government called on me as he has done, I would do the same thing, but I will not go to them nor will I discuss this paper he has given to me. I leave that entirely to him to announce. I will have nothing to say about that or will any of my officers. Now I would like to ask him whether Dr. Wang communicated to him as to communications—radios?

C: Dr. Wang sent somebody over to General Chou on this matter. He sent them today, and this man told General Chou that it has not been possible yet to install this radio station, but radio stations of the National Military Council would provide a part of the station for the Chinese Communist Party and asked General Chou to send his own personnel to operate it.

M: Is that satisfactory?

C: General Chou is going to see Dr. Wang this evening and I will talk it over with him.

M: If he does not reach a satisfactory agreement I would like to know. It is this three [way] communication under your own control I regard as very important to successful negotiations. [At?] This executive headquarters I regard [it?] as very important that the Communist Party representative, the Central Government representative and the U.S. representative each have his own channel and the same here during this conference. So I hope the proposal to turn over to your operators a part of the plant will prove satisfactory.

C: General Chou doesn't know yet how it is going to be operated and whether it will be satisfactory. If he finds anything wrong he will let you know immediately. Right now General Chou is going to meet the Government representatives and he will submit the same directive he has shown to you and he will let you know about the results.

M: Let me make one suggestion. In his talks to the Government representatives I think he (General Chou) should propose that they have a mutual understanding that no press release of any kind be made until a formal agreement was reached. The exact wording of

which is decided upon and then they agree on what is to be said to the world. This is not a political consultations [*sic*] which you murth the press sometimes if you can. This is a military matter for ace of China, rather for the cessation of hostilities and it would st unfortunate if the negotiation was disrupted by some outside press business, so I think it is very important to have an immediate understanding that nothing comes out until we get together, until we decide—until Mao Tse-tung and the Generalissimo approve it and then, not until then, then the statement is agreed upon.

C: General Chou says it is most unfortunate that Government proposal was immediately published by the Government so I was forced to announce the first Communist proposal.

M: I hope that is water over the dam because I have a new dam.

C: Thank you very much.

M: I think we understand each other.

761.93/1-346: Telegram

The Chargé in China (Robertson) to the Secretary of State

CHUNGKING, January 3, 1945 [1946]—4 p. m.

[Received January 4—8:41 p. m.]

24. According to General Marshall, on Christmas Day Generalissimo informed him that Stalin²⁸ had requested or invited him to send a special representative to Moscow. Generalissimo asked for Marshall's advice. He replied that he saw no disadvantage in sending a special representative but that unless the individual was a dominant character of effective personality nothing constructive would result. (Moscow's 253, December 31 to Chungking²⁹). Other than this incident nothing is known of the matter. (Sent Moscow as 3; repeated Dept as 24).

[Here follows personal greeting by General Marshall.]

ROBERTSON

893.00/1-446: Telegram

The Secretary of State to General Marshall

WASHINGTON, January 4, 1946—noon.

16. Personal for General Marshall. I did not see message you referred to.³⁰ The Marshal insists that Soviets remain in Manchuria only

²⁸ Marshal Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, Chairman of the Council of Commissars of the Soviet Union.

²⁹ See *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VII, footnote 58, p. 799.

³⁰ Telegram No. 18, December 26, 1945, from General Marshall, *ibid.*, p. 813.

at request of Chinese National Government. In response to my direct question as to his intention with reference to supporting National Government, he stated that by his treaty with China, signed last August, he pledged his support to the National Government and he intends to comply with that obligation. He denied aiding Communists in Manchuria and said they had no military strength there and that the National Government had exaggerated the situation.

My conclusion is, as stated in your letter, that relations are of same pattern as our relations in Europe.

He was suspicious of our intentions in North China, suspecting we intend to remain there. He proposed that we leave North China and they leave Manchuria January 15. I explained our difficulties to his satisfaction and later he agreed to join in the declaration as to support of the National Government in China,³¹ which I wanted in the hope it might help you.

The only statement he made indicating interest in the Communist Party in China was his request for the language that in the reorganized government there should be broad representation of all political parties. This was substantially what we had asked in the Balkans and substantially what the President suggested in his statement of policy.³² Therefore we agreed.

My estimate is that at this time he intends living up to his treaty with China and will not intentionally do anything to destroy our efforts for unified China.

BYRNES

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Draft Proposal of the Chinese Government*³³

With regard to the cessation of internal military conflicts, the following measures have been agreed upon:

(1) Cessation of all military conflicts throughout the country and restoration of all communications.

(2) Owing to the fact that internal military conflicts and the interruption of communications affect our obligations to our Allies concerning the acceptance of enemy surrender and the repatriation of enemy troops, the Government and the Chinese Communist Party should each appoint a representative to confer immediately, together

³¹ The "Moscow Declaration": for section IV on China in the communiqué on the Moscow Conference of three Foreign Ministers, see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 30, 1945, p. 1030.

³² For published statement by President Truman of December 15, 1945, see Department of State, *United States Relations With China* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 607.

³³ Notation: "Discussed with Marshall Jan[uary] 4 by Dr. Wang [Shih-chieh] but not presented to Communists".

with General Marshall, on concrete measures regarding cessation of hostilities, restoration of all communications, acceptance of enemy surrender and repatriation of enemy prisoners of war. The measures thus agreed upon will be presented to the Government for execution.

(3) The Resident Committee of the People's Political Council and the Political Consultative Council will each select eight impartial persons who are not responsible officers of either the Kuomintang or the Communist Party to form a Military Inspection Mission, to proceed in separate groups to various localities where hostilities have occurred, to inspect military conditions, communications, and other matters concerning the restoration of internal peace. The Mission will report and publish its findings from time to time.

121.893/1-546

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] January 5, 1946.

The Chinese Ambassador ^{33a} called at his request to see the Secretary.

The Ambassador told the Secretary he wished to congratulate him on his recent success at Moscow,³⁴ that it was very helpful that the stalemate had been broken. The Ambassador then inquired what Mr. Molotov had said about the Chinese situation.

The Secretary said he thought the agreement with the Soviets on the Chinese situation was good and ought to be helpful. He said that the published agreement represented the Soviet views, that they intend to stand by their agreement at Potsdam and their treaty with the Chinese. The Soviets suggested the statement about giving a broad representation to two parties in the National Government, and since this was precisely what the US had asked for Bulgaria and Rumania, there could be no objection to it. The Soviets showed no intention of failure to carry out the treaty. The Secretary said they did not go into details of the composition of the Chinese Government—that is for General Marshall to work out over there.

The Ambassador said there was no doubt about the National Government's policy, that the Government has pursued their efforts toward unification for a long time, but that the Communists would not stick to their terms.

The Secretary said he had insisted on a statement in the Moscow communiqué about China so that there could be no doubt about unity among the three powers on policy.

The Ambassador said he had come to inform the Secretary that he has been asked to return to China for consultation and that he

^{33a} Wei Tao-ming.

³⁴ For the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in December 1945, see *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. II, pp. 560 ff.

expects to leave Monday. He is to be in Chungking before the 15th, so he must rush.

The Secretary said he thought it tremendously important that there be a unified China. He said that General Marshall represents this Government and he has complete authority there. He said he also believed that both the British and Soviet Governments would support any decisions the General makes.

The Secretary wished the Ambassador success in his efforts and those of his government.

The Ambassador, bidding the Secretary goodbye, wished him success in the UNO Assembly meeting.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Notes on Conference of General Marshall and General Chou En-lai,
January 5, 1946, 4:30 p. m.*

C: General Chou says that on the day before yesterday after he left here he went straight from here to meet the Government representatives to present his counter-proposals and the Government representatives told him with regard to the first point, it was felt that maybe some adjustment on the wording to the first point was needed but with regard to the third point there may still be some contemplation, so they have to ask for instructions from the Generalissimo. Therefore, only a short communiqué has been published on that day saying that an agreement has been reached on principles. Today they will again meet at 6 o'clock and General Chou hopes that a solution may be found quickly, so that the committee of three may soon meet, and hostilities may be soon ceased. With regard to the committee of three, the Government representatives have not yet decided on the representative of the government and they will still consider that and General Chou guesses that you may not yet be informed of that.

M: I have not been informed on it.

C: As to the order of the cessation of hostilities, General Chou has made a study and as a result of his study he thinks of course the Manchurian problem should be an exception. As to how the government should take over Manchuria because related with regard to the transportation of troops with United States and it is also related to the Soviet Union. He thinks it is not necessary to put it in words in this statement. He would suggest that it should only be said that hostilities should be ceased in China and the movement of troops should cover China proper with nothing to be said of Manchuria. He suggested that this second point should only say that in China

proper all movements of troops should be stopped and all the other sentences can be dropped.

M: Are you referring to the last sentence referring to local movements?

C: That can be retained.

Then in the third point it would add after the word blocks "and fortifications" because the Japanese have set up quite a few.

M: Blocks and fortifications.

C: Yes. That is what he would [like?] to modify.

M: What is his reason for making this omission in part on Manchuria?

C: Just as he has said before because the Chinese Communists recognized that the Chinese Government has the right to take over Manchuria, and right now the Chinese troops can move into Manchuria through many ways of transportation such as by direct boat, by air and by railways and they have the assistance of the United States direct and also by obligation with the Soviet Union by treaty and the Chinese Communists do not want to interfere with the Chinese obligation both toward the United States and the Soviet Union. It would also involve the Soviet Union in this matter if this is stated otherwise the Chinese Government can negotiate directly with the United States and with the Soviet Union in taking over Manchuria.

M: Suppose we strike out—we omit the portion General Chou desires omitted—then the written word would prohibit the movement of troops from Chinwangtao up the railway into Manchuria because that is in China proper. The written word would prohibit the movement of troops now marching into Shanghai which are to go to Manchuria. The written word would prohibit the movement of troops into Kowloon—troops that have marched all the way from Burma. They are assembling in Kowloon. That is part of the movement of troops into Manchuria and the written word would prohibit that. The Communists, I don't mean General Chou, but other Communist individuals could say that the Central Government was breaking faith and that the American representative was agreeing with him in breaking faith.

We put those words in, the American officers, in order to avoid any indication of a breach of faith. It may be the National Government doesn't want them, I don't know.

C: First of all, General Chou wishes to say that he perfectly agrees that Manchuria should be excluded from the general declaration and if China and the Soviet Union and the United States agree that troops should be moved into Manchuria then of course there should

be no limitation to this regulation, but he wants to think it over as to how it can be expressed. Whether it should be expressed in a separate regulation of [*or*] use a different wording.

M: We might omit it here and have it recorded in a very careful minute of the meeting. "It is understood that . . ." ³⁵ Quite a few things, I think we can draw out that way. We make these very concise, but we can have minutes carefully prepared. It is understood that this that [*sic*] and all sign the minutes so that is as binding as the issue here by the higher authorities. That is one way to do that. I expect he will be thinking it over, but I believe that is a very good way to clear up a great many points that we don't want to be in these instructions we issue. They all can begin, "It is understood that, or it is agreed that. ["]

C: Yes, he does think this is a better way.

M: I see no objection to inclusion of the words "and fortifications" in paragraph *c*.

C: As to the radio, no settlement has yet been reached. They promised that part would be turned over to the Communists operators for four different times but up to now it has not been settled and we still cannot operate it. Apparently it is all red tape and General Chou hopes that this evening he will talk it over with them.

M: I will get word to Dr. Wang before the meeting to urge him to cut the red tape. I am sorry it hasn't already been done.

C: General Chou hopes that agreement can be reached between the two parties and communiqué can be issued. When do you think will be the best time for the three sides, including you, to meet.

M: The very first hour they will meet with me.

BYROADE: It should be before the release of the communiqué.

M: I think there should be no statement before we reach an agreement. The communiqué should be issued before the order to stop fighting because if one party says one thing and another party the other, then we have to start all over again. I think the publication of the order is the communiqué and I might say by way of illustration I don't care what they say about me. I am quite sincere in that, if we reach a good result, but I care very much about what the two parties say about each other because that makes my task almost impossible. A real negotiation that is a military thing—not a political thing, is easily ruined by public statements. I have a responsibility, a very direct responsibility, to try to achieve a meeting of the minds—an agreement. That is my job. Therefore, I feel that I have a right, if the Communist party and if the Central Government use me, I have a right to insist that they do not make my position impossible, and

³⁵ Points appear in the original.

the premature announcement can easily be fatal to the negotiations. It must be simultaneous and I should be allowed a voice in it. In respect to this particular question, I am not the negotiator, but, putting it very politely, I am the demander, because the job is hard enough without that and I think it would make for great confidence on all sides if there comes out a unified announcement that is businesslike and exact. I think everybody would respect the procedure. They probably will find much to criticize later which we cannot avoid, but we must make a clean start because it will affect all the troops and their commanders. General Chou and I can reach an understanding. Dr. Wang and the Governor ³⁶ and I can reach an understanding. Maybe all three of us can reach an understanding. But, it is a long distance down to the troops and they have very strong feelings undoubtedly. Many will be very resentful undoubtedly because they will have heard none of our discussion. All they will have is an order. Therefore it is very important to the success of our procedure that this matter be very carefully handled.

Now, yesterday evening Dr. Wang called on me. He had wished to discuss the probable government reply ³⁷ to General Chou's statement. General Chou's statement was short but it had several conditions. General Wang proposed several other conditions in reply. I told General Wang and I now tell General Chou that I thought it a mistake to exchange conditions in these papers. That could go on for weeks. The thing to do was to start the conference. Then most of these points could be settled then just as General Chou and I have reached agreement in our ideas on a number of points. The representatives can know all the views and they all can be discussed orally and a record kept. There are many complications but they cannot be solved by writing letters. Therefore, I hope that General Chou and Dr. Wang will decide on our recommendation that we start the conference and then we can find what the trouble is. That is what the conference is for. With only three of us there, with only two sides, it ought not to be difficult, it ought not to take much time to reach a decision in most points and to know where we have a serious difference. The serious differences will go higher. I hope we can perform a miracle and not have any. I gave Dr. Wang yesterday evening the same paper I gave you the day before. He did not have time to go over it here but he read it here, so both of you know what I was talking about.

C: General Chou agrees in line with you and in today's meeting he will propose that a simple solution should be reached quickly and that the meeting of three should be initiated.

³⁶ General Chang Chun.

³⁷ See draft proposal of the Chinese Government, p. 18.

M: I am ready any time.

C: Do you think the field headquarters should be established immediately?

M: Immediately. My idea is this. The moment we seem to agree, the moment the first point is agreed upon then I want Colonel Byroade to go to Peking or wherever it is you decide, and to take with him the assistants that he has here. The moment we think we are going to reach an agreement, a little earlier, I will want to send an officer from General Wedemeyer in Shanghai secretly to Peking, if that is the place, to see what accommodations we can get. They will start the lay out of how to set the headquarters up. The U. S. personnel will fly with the radio equipment, telephone equipment and other similar equipment from Shanghai. Then it would be my idea that about 36 hours later, maybe 48 hours later, the three commissioners with their immediate assistants, aides, interpreters should fly to Peking. When the[y] arrive, the accommodations will be ready, communications will be at least partly established, offices will be set up. Then the personnel from the Communist group, from the Central Government group should go in immediately. The staffs of the commissioners should arrive after the commissioners, so that the framework will all be established and there will be no confusion. I want to avoid a Communist officer and a Central Government officer all wanting in [*waiting at?*] the same time for rooms and beginning to fight right there. I think Colonel Byroade can make the thing go up evenly. That is how the headquarters is going to function. Once that is going to be approved then the commissioners should leave very soon, probably within the next twenty-four hours, Colonel Byroade having gone. The first thing would be to learn from the two Army commanders, the local Central Government commander, the nearest Communist commander if there was any trouble, where that trouble was and somebody immediately can make a start. At the same time, or a little later these small groups would start out with their radio communication centers—Kalgan, Tsinan, etc. During this time you are trying to get everything at peace. After that you start on how to organize railway police, by what method, by what people, by what commanders, and at the same time you start then the engineer problem of reconstruction of the railroad. After those things have been gotten under way, you then turn to the problem of first, Japanese surrenders and movements and what is to be done with their arms. That, I think, is about the order in which the headquarters should get going—get established. If there should be a very serious situation at some particular point, I should think the commissioners themselves would go there, but as a rule I should think most of the difficulties could be settled by representative groups of subordinate

officers going to the place. Probably the headquarters should have representatives from each army in that region in the Peking headquarters to transmit the orders to the Army and to explain the situation of the Army. My instructions would be in so far as Americans are concerned they, as far as possible, particularly at headquarters, the Americans should be as inconspicuous as possible. At the same time, in the business of the headquarters, I feel that the Americans must take the lead, because we can't rest on the Communist side and we can't rest on the Central Government side, but we can rest the frame on the American personnel. For example, the MP's of the central headquarters should be Communists and Central Government and not Americans, but when it comes to the machinery within the headquarters that will have to be Americans because they are in the middle. The more rapidly and smoothly the machine works the fewer Americans will be necessary. Does that give him an idea of what I think.

C: Yes. General Chou states that the Communist representative shall go to field headquarters first to proceed to Yen-an and then to Peking because he has to get some equipment and material, communications lines and radio equipment, and in that respect he asks that he wonders if you will provide the necessary facilities with regard to airplanes.

M: Would it not be best for him to fly from here to Peking in my plane and then go to Yen-an, so that they would arrive together. I propose to put my plane at their disposal so that they could all arrive together. We could have a plane there to take him right to Yen-an. How far is Yen-an from Peking.

C: About three hours flight.

M: From here to Peking is how much.

B: About six hours.

M: What do you think.

B: I hate to see the Communist member arrive later.

M: I hate to see the others arrive without him.

B: I think this is a question for the committee of three to answer because the Central Government may have some arrangements to consider and it could all be arranged at the same time.

M: We can provide the plane and we will work out the arrangements.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by Colonel Henry A. Byroade to General Marshall

[CHUNGKING,] 5 January 1946.

Mr. Robertson just phoned to say that in the 6 o'clock meeting tonight between the Communists and the Central Government they

had reached agreement on Dr. Wang's proposal³⁸ of last night, which you did not like, with the added phrase:

"Orders for the surrender and details for the restoration of communications would be agreed upon by the following Committee of Three:

General Marshall
Governor Chang Chun
General Chou En-lai"

The above two delegates will be glad to meet with you either Monday morning or Monday evening at your convenience. (We are to notify Mr. Robertson as to which time is satisfactory. I did not make a decision on this as he did not want to contact them again tonight anyway.)

Minister of Information, K. C. Wu, released at 8 o'clock this evening the following information for the press:

"With regard to the procedures for the cessation of hostilities and restoration of communications submitted respectively both sides have reached agreement in accordance with procedure agreed upon. Governor Chang Chun and General Chou En-lai will confer immediately together on carrying out the procedures."

The press asked K. C. Wu if it were not true that these two representatives would meet with General Marshall. He replied: "It is implied that these two will confer with General Marshall."

H[ENRY] A. B[YROADE]

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Notes on Conference Between General Marshall and Governor
Chang Chun, January 6, 1946, 4:30 p. m.*

C[HANG]: The Generalissimo, after talking to you and after considering your plan instructed Governor Chang Chun to come to report to you the Generalissimo's opinion on that memorandum.³⁹ Regarding the order for cessation of hostilities, the Generalissimo has a few points to refer to you. That is the subparagraph *b* that refers to movements of forces within China proper. In paragraph *b*, there are three points. The first is all movement of forces within China proper and Manchuria will cease. Second point, with exception of movement of forces of National Government of Republic of China into and in Manchuria for the purpose of reestablishing Chinese sovereignty. Third point, there may be the purely local movement necessary for supply and administration and housekeeping. Regarding the

³⁸ Apparently the draft proposal of January 4, p. 18.

³⁹ Draft memorandum prepared by the staff of General Marshall, p. 6.

third point, the Generalissimo thinks that is all right. Regarding the second point, that troop movements into and in Manchuria, Generalissimo has that more in mind that Jehol Province should be included in Manchuria. Regarding the first point, that all movements of forces within China proper—regarding that point, Governor Chang would like to describe to you, sir, the past trend of conversation between himself and the Chinese Communists.

In October, Governor Chang had talks with Communist representatives that [*and?*] the cessation of hostilities was also brought up in October. The Communists made the proposal that after the cessation of hostilities then those railways in Northern China that is Peiping-Suyan [*Suiyuan*] railway, Tatung-Tolun railway, Peiping-Pinghan [*Hankow?*] railway, northern section, Mukden railroad, eastern section, Tientsin-Pukow railway, Tsingtao-Chinwangtao [*Tsinan?*] railway and Mukden-Peiping railway, the western sector, that is, near the Peiping section [*sic*]. Those above mentioned railways [*sic*] that is the Communist proposal not to move any troops on these railways, or troops should not move into the railway zones. That is the proposal made by the Communists in October. In other words, the Communist proposal includes all the area in northern China with the exception of the railway in Mukden province and the Jehol province.

That was in October and our contemplation was to move troops in those railways providing they would withdraw all the troops away from the railway zone and at the same time organize police forces to guard the railway. That was what caused General Chou En-lai to go back to Yen-an. Based on that conference with the Communists the Generalissimo and Governor Chang Chun would like to make some amendments on that paragraph *b* and the first point we feel that we should not move any troops on those railways just mentioned. No troop movements north of the Yangtze River and furthermore the troops south of the Yangtze River will not be moved to the north unless there is an agreement in the three man committee. The Generalissimo and the Governor feel that in the reorganization and readjustment planned as recommended by General Wedemeyer that we reorganize and retrain our troops and make a small efficient Army and in that step movement of troops south of the Yangtze River cannot be avoided.

M[ARSHALL]: I see.

C: That is the first one the Governor would like to talk to you.

M: That seems rough to me. I am not so certain about Tientsin, Tsingtao, Chinwangtao. I think that is all right.

C: Furthermore, Governor Chang when talking to the Communists about the Communist proposal and those eight railways, Governor Chang points out that should not be included in the eight railways.

M: However, if all interpretations [*interruption?*] of the railways ceases, we are all right there. This would read something like this: All movements of forces within China proper north of the Yangtze River and Manchuria will cease with the exception of the movements of forces of the National Government of the Republic of China into and in Manchuria and including Jehol for the purpose of reestablishing Chinese sovereignty. South of the Yangtze there will be no movements or concentrations to the north without the agreement of the parties to this document. That isn't the right wording but is that the idea.

C: Yes, exactly. There is another point on movements of troops within China proper and Manchuria. Movement into Manchuria including Jehol will be an exception.

M: Now, having gotten the idea. It seems all right to me, I don't know what will be the debate on it. You will have quite a discussion—I don't know the outcome. Chou En-lai accepts the exception regarding Manchuria. He accepts that [—] the exception you make here regarding Manchuria [—] because he says that is [in] conformance with the announced U. S. policy and that is in conformance with the Sino-Soviet treaty. Therefore, the Communists accept that. However, he proposes that it not appear in this, because he thinks if it appears in this it will be taken by people to believe the Communists have opposed this movement into Manchuria and they are not opposing it.

C: Has General Chou mentioned anything about Jehol.

M: No, nor would I. I haven't finished yet. I said that unless there was some written agreement, then the Central Government could not state that the Communists would not attack its moves as being a breach of faith. I said I did not know what the point of view of the Central Government would be. I suggested this possibility and I mentioned that the same thing might be used in a number of other cases. That [would be] in the formal minute of the meeting. In the formal minute of the meeting would be stated definite understanding. In other words, it is stated, it is understood, it is agreed that then we put this in. Then you would not have to approve in the public order to the troops. That is one way of doing it. That gave me this thought, that there may be many other points which are very difficult to phrase exactly and that we could use the device of the minute to state that it is understood that and agreed that and you make a general statement which avoids accusation of lack of good faith. I don't know whether that is acceptable to Chou En-lai or whether that will be acceptable to the Governor, but that is one way of meeting a good many little difficulties.

In paragraph *c*, Chou wished the words after the word block "and fortifications". I don't know exactly the definition of the word block. To us it is a fortification, but maybe to him a fortification is something else. I don't know.

C: The Governor feels that the word block means something to impede communications but fortification may mean a look-out tower to guard against communications.

M: You will have to discuss that at the time.

C: In the last part of the paragraph, "there may be the purely local movements necessary for supply, administration and housekeeping", Governor Chang suggests that meaning be added for the term administration so that they may not have any different interpretation.

M: (Aside). What did you mean when you wrote that.

BYROADE: I meant for the units. Suppose a unit or a division was spread out for 100 miles, with the headquarters in one place and the supply in another. For administrative purposes of bringing them together.

M: Maybe there is another word that would be better.

C: Both in Manchuria, including Jehol, the Japanese surrenders were accepted by Russians so we have to consider that. Governor Chang wanted to know what the word administration meant.

M: No reference to that. It is all within the divisions.

B: You may have units in one place and units in another, you have to have administrative facilities.

M: That would have no reference whatever to the affair in Jehol. That would be an internal matter within the Army. A movement of troops towards the quarters for convenience.

C: In the original copy it is administration and housekeeping but in the Chinese version it is supply administration and security.

M: That would be the men to go in different buildings to arrange facilities, the comforts of life.

B: We will have to be most careful with our translations.

M: My housekeeping here means to use the good house and not live down by the gate.

C: We thought your term housekeeping meant security.

B: We will have to find another word besides housekeeping.

M: We could say convenience.

C: Governor Chang feels that another consideration in [*is?*] that where the movements of troops in any spots and they are attacked, by some forces.

M: Security is normal to any military unit, or they are not military units. I think instead of housekeeping we ought to say supply, administration and convenience. That gives the idea, or instead local security. Maybe that would be better.

C: That is better.

M: Omit housekeeping and say local supply, administration and local security. How much further have the troops to go in order to connect up with the Russians.

C: Our troops reach (points on map).

M: Russians in these two places—Chihfeng and Tolun. What is the agreement?

C: That Central Government troops take over those places by the first of February so we must send troops into Jehol Province to take over from the Russians.

M: You have no idea of the number?

B: About 50,000.

C: Not so many.

M: Would you say at the beginning that if the Governor started by talking about the whole province and we found that was a firm resistance on the part of the Communists.

Now listen to me very carefully. Suppose Chou En-lai requests the omission from this paragraph in [of?] the reference to Manchuria. The Governor accepts. In other words the Communists make the request to the Governor and he says yes. Then he in turn proposes the exception to Jehol. Now maybe, I don't know, maybe they will accept. Now if they do not accept then they appear very firm, then what I wanted him to consider in that event would the acceptance of those two places where the Russians now are be accepted rather than see the armistice affair abandoned.

C: About the omission of the words on Manchuria we might suggest that you take them out from the order to be published by us in the formal minutes. Governor Chang thinks that is one way it can be handled. When the Japs established control in Jehol, it was included in Manchukuo. Jehol province was one administrative unit. The Russians also had Jehol in their scope of activities and accepted Japanese capitulation.

M: The Generalissimo doesn't accept Jehol as part of Manchuria for the future? It is part of China.

C: The Generalissimo sent Chiang [Ching-] Kuo—Jehol is under his command.

M: I understand that. I don't think you translated correctly. Does the Generalissimo look at Jehol as part of Manchuria or China in the future. In other words, does he accept for the future Japanese assignment of Jehol.

C: Those three provinces in Manchuria were divided up into 9 provinces.

M: It has already been divided from Manchuria?

C: Manchuria doesn't mean anything to us. We just say the north-east provinces.

M: The two towns the Russians are in.

C: The Russians will have withdrawn by first of February so our troops must be there in time to take over from the Russians. So even after cessation of hostilities National troops were also being advanced to those two places to take over from the Russians before the first of February.

[M:] If Chou En-lai proposes the omission of the reference to Manchuria and if Governor Chang states that he will accept that proposal and if Governor Chang then proposes the exception regarding to Jehol—three "Ifs", and if the Communists very firmly, very flatly refuse to consider the statement of an exception for Jehol, then would the Central Government consider as a compromise the inclusion of those two cities rather than referring to the entire province. Would they consider a compromise referring to those two cities rather than to the entire province. The future moves in Jehol other than those two towns being the subject of future agreements.

C: The Governor states this point that it is only for the Americans and other foreign countries that we use the term Manchuria. If that point is brought up that word of [*or?*] the words would be that movement of forces in movements of forces into [*from?*] China proper into and in Jehol between the provinces [*of?*] the northeast provinces.⁴⁰ You omit the term Manchuria altogether, that is in the northern provinces based on the agreement made between this Government and the Soviet Government for the Chinese National Government to take over from the Russians as they will withdraw from the points in that area.

M: I haven't gotten the question across at all. I am not discussing Manchuria, I am discussing procedure. I understood the Governor to say that the suggestion that reference to Manchuria be left out of this and put in the minute was proper agreement after he discussed with the Generalissimo, so I wasn't talking about that. I only referred to that in procedure as being something where the Governor was accommodating the Communists, the Communists ask for something, the Governor said all right, I will give you that asking for something and that something being accidentally Jehol, now then the Governor turns around and he asks for an exception about Jehol. Now my guess is that by judging what I read in the paper they oppose that. If they don't say yes does he think it possible that the Generalissimo might consider a compromise.

⁴⁰ Sentence apparently garbled.

SHEPLEY: That the Nationalist forces proceed to two towns in Jehol and stop. Is that an acceptable compromise.

M: Does he think this is something to consider.

C: Well, sir, I am afraid Governor Chang's answer is again indirect. Instead of making the proposal that Jehol should be included in the northeast provinces he will change the wording to "any area occupied by Russian troops["], the Central Government [to] send troops to that area to take over from the Russians when cessation of hostilities can be done. Do you think that will be agreeable to the Communists.

M: I think this at the moment. It would be much more agreeable I assume to the Communists in Jehol, but I am uncertain whether it would not embarrass the Generalissimo in Manchuria. I would be afraid to do anything that might weaken that.

C: Governor Chang thinks that it would be more agreeable proposal if the wording were as follows, that is, regarding Manchuria put that in the formal minutes. Regarding Jehol we thought mention the whole province, not mention any particular part, just say in the Jehol province, any place that we have made agreement with the Soviet Government for the Chinese Government to take over, then the National Government would proceed on [*to?*] taking over those towns after the Russians withdrew.

M: I understand, but I would suggest this approach. In the minute would be [a] statement. With reference to paragraph *b*, it is understood and agreed that the movements of forces of the National Government of the Republic of China into and in Manchuria for the purpose of reestablishing Chinese sovereignty and to such other specific areas as are now occupied by Soviet troops in North China will continue, all these movements being in accordance with agreements between the Central Government of the Republic of China and the Soviet Government.

That is what the Governor said, but I worded it different.

C: The Governor thinks that is good.

M: That is one way of doing it. I thought this was one way of putting it and I didn't want to stop it. Tell the Governor I have not discussed this Jehol at all with Chou En-lai and I will not. I recognized this as a very delicate thing that I could only talk about when we came to the general meeting. I still go back to procedure that if the Governor, if Chou En-lai requests a change, will the Governor be authorized to accept the change, then he follows immediately with his change and we probably put it all over.

C: Yes, the Governor sees that.

M: I am very hopeful that we can tomorrow get an agreement on this order.

C: Governor Chang asked whether it is feasible to add another paragraph making it *f*. The Generalissimo mentioned to you yesterday that after the cessation of hostilities how about a disposition and reorganization of the Chinese troops. You mentioned that it is beyond your scope of talking at the time being and Governor Chang likes to report to you that in the past, during the discussions between Government representatives and the Communist representative we agreed that we would set up a three man committee, a military committee, to go about the details of the reorganization. The Governor asked whether it is feasible to add one paragraph that the, after the cessation of hostilities, the three man committee should proceed to talk about the disposition and reorganization and start [reorganizing?] armies of Chinese troops within two months.

M: I have no objection to that, but I should think that it would be better to propose that as soon as we see this other beginning to work out.

C: This three man committee is another three man committee—it is a military committee.

M: I don't think I would put that in there. If they both agree, all well and good. If General Chou En-lai accepts, that is all right. The cessation of hostilities is the thing we want, the best start is the thing we want. Now all these other things are of vast importance, but they may complicate this matter. I interpose no objection except that I would hope we would not endanger what we have on hand right now by adding it there.

C: Governor Chang has this in mind, that it seems that the agreement is more or less incomplete without mentioning something about that military three man committee. By adding another paragraph that is putting it so as something will be done on the disposal and reorganization of the Chinese Armies.

M: Did the Communists agree to that three man committee.

SHEPLEY: They agreed, but never sent a man to it.

C: They agreed, but it has never been convened for they delayed the sending of their representative. Their representative is now in Chungking.

M: I would interpose no objection. I just don't think it is a good move at the moment, because you see this order is very brief. This is only a very small part of the story. The large part of the story is this next order where the field headquarters goes up. That is the real thing, that is the thing that will be most impressive. This is just a general order that doesn't say a word about Manchuria. If it is agreed

that will make a great impression. I interpose no objection to this. Shepley is afraid that the Communists would come in and want to add more paragraphs. I interpose no objection. I don't attempt to tell the Governor about Chinese judgment. I don't know about that.

C: The Governor understands all that part, but he hopes that some form of understanding will exist that [will settle?] once and for all the most important point of all, [what] we should do after cessation of hostilities. There is general understanding on that.

M: I am going to be very frank. I was struggling to see this work. The Generalissimo doesn't think it will work, I think it will work. Colonel Byroade goes [*gives?*] the best argument against this in this way. This is not an announcement to the public. This is an order to the troops. So you will be putting in an order to the troops something that was rather out of place in that connection. Might get the agreement here to make the announcement of that. That would be an announcement in an order to the armies. The armies don't have anything to do about that. This is something up here—not down there.

C: Governor Chang Chun expresses concurrence with you on that point. He doesn't insist on putting in this paragraph, but he desires to reach some sort of understanding.

M: We can do that at a meeting and write it into the minute.

C: Governor Chang is afraid that he has to take some more time from you in discussion of other points.

C. About the executive headquarters,⁴¹ the present first paragraph, Governor Chang suggests to make it read as follows: "By joint agreement, we, Governor Chang Chun, representative of the Central Government and General Chou En-lai representative of the Chinese Communist party do establish as of date an executive headquarters empowered to implement the cessation of hostilities issued by order of the Central Government. ["]

M: Down in the second paragraph we have that, form of instructions will be issued in the name of the Republic of China.

C: Bring about a point that after an agreement has been made we must submit to the Central Government to issue an order to implement it.

B: That is right down here in the last sentence of the letter.

M: That refers to the work of the committee.

C: That is the two representatives agree to establish an executive headquarters. That headquarters, the bigger centers of that headquarters should be approved by the National Government so that the

⁴¹ The draft used at this meeting has not been found in Department files, but see draft plan prepared by the staff of General Marshall, p. 6.

National Government, would submit to the approval of the National Government and the National Government issue orders.

M: I don't think that paragraph is written right because this is written by the people who are agreeing to do this. That he, the Governor and representatives of the Chinese Communist party are submitting this plan for approval that is one thing, but this is written, this paragraph was written as the confirmation of the plan. Now if it is being changed to be submitted for approval the thing isn't written right. What we had in mind was the Governor and Chou En-lai and myself would write a note submitting this whole thing to the Generalissimo and to Mao Tse-tung. If they accepted this is in the form for their acceptance. Is his purpose to secure the approval of the Generalissimo.

C: To send to the National Government to put into the file of the National Government so the National Government is aware of the existence of such a body.

M: Now wait let me try. "By joint agreement we, Governor Chang Chun, authorized representative of the Central Government and Chou En-lai, authorized representative of the Chinese Communist Party do establish as of date an executive headquarters empowered to implement the agreements for cessation of hostilities under formal orders to be issued by the President of the Republic of China." Would that do it.

C: Yes.

M: In other words you are authorized to take this action. I am assuming that you and Chou En-lai can complete an agreement. Does that do what you are talking about.

C: Yes. That does it.

M: Now down here in this paragraph, the last sentence, which refers to the executive headquarters only, the formal instructions agreed upon by the three representatives will be issued in the name of the Republic of China. The formal orders of the executive headquarters will be issued in the name of the President of the Republic of China. It appears twice, once for the principals and once for the subordinates.

That is the local headquarters down there. What we are talking about here is the cessation of hostilities.

C: The first paragraph refers to the executive headquarters. To make it legal we must submit it to the President of the Republic of China to inform him of the establishment of such a headquarters.

M: We haven't gotten anywhere. I understand that we will have to change it.

C: I have explained to Governor Chang that you would rewrite that

based on what he has suggested and at the same time he will try to put it in writing and give it to you.

M: This first part the cessation of hostilities, the three representatives, that is the three of us would have to sign this. We sign the one to Mao Tse-tung. Chou En-lai would have to tell us what Mao Tse-tung wanted for a date and the Governor would have to tell us what the Generalissimo will want and we would have to agree upon it. Signed by the three of us. Now that puts it into the record doesn't it. Does that not go into the records of the Chinese Government. So this is really rewritten to go from this committee for the establishment of this headquarters and we would all sign that.

I will try something and the Governor will have something. The Governor can make a draft on it. How would this go, Governor. Take the last few words, empowered to implement the agreements of the cessation of hostilities. The agreements for the cessation of hostilities in the name of the President of the Republic of China.

Something like that. We will think it over.

C: On the third paragraph. That will have to be changed.

M: Yes. That paragraph will have to be changed.

C: Then in the organization paragraph, the second sentence, the U. S. representative will be invited to be the chairman of the group.

M: That is all right.

C: Governor Chang has a real doubt about the Chinese translation. We say the headquarters would have within itself an executive section composed of a number of officers and men. Chinese representatives being equally divided between the National Government and the Communists. The same number?

M: Going on the basis of an equal number. One Communist, one American, one Central Government.

B: Each one will have the same responsibility.

M: I think this section from the headquarters will have within itself a group to be called an "Operations" section rather than Executive Section. Operations with us means to direct this, direct that and to plan. Strike out adequately. Make it to supervise in the field.

C: Shall be equally divided between the two, that phrase be changed into Chinese Government and the Chinese Communist Party representatives to participate in it. Chinese representatives.

From both sides, representatives will be passed between National Government and the Communist Party.

M: Higher officers.

C: How many.

B: I would say it will run about 100 officers and men for one side—probably about 25 officers and 75 men for each side.

C: Governor Chang likes to know what [is] the exact meaning of the National Government will also furnish assistants, over-all security will be furnished jointly by the National Government and Communist forces will be sent to maintain order and security.

B: I wrote that when I didn't know where we were going to put our headquarters.

M: When we wrote that we thought we were going right in the middle of Communist territory where there were no Nationalists troops at all.

B: Perhaps we could cross out that sentence. Cross out the sentence on over-all security.

M: How about scratching out the second sentence on over-all security.

C: Yes that is good.

Local security will be retained. Then about the location. The Generalissimo suggests Tientsin instead of Peking for the U. S. marine headquarters is there and there would be security, communications, signal communications and other trucks and everything more convenient to the American members of the headquarters.

M: That is true, but I would imagine, it would be my guess, that it would be very questionable to put this headquarters where there are so many American troops. To put the headquarters down in the middle of American troops that everybody is fighting about back in the U. S. and they are fighting about back here. As a matter of fact, I expected Chou En-lai to [have] objection to Peking because there are Marines at Peking and I thought it would be very dangerous for us to locate our headquarters or any part of our headquarters in or near the Marine concentrations and I thought if they would object to the Marines, that we might meet that by reducing the number still keeping enough to make certain of the security of the airfields, but they have not said anything about objecting. I think I can say that if we were to go into Tientsin from here you would get a very bad reaction on the part of the big Marine garrison which they are all fighting about. Now they have never mentioned the word Marine to me, but I have almost been expecting it to come and I don't want to upset the arrangements after now. We have a good airfield at Peking under Marine operation and we can have good radio communication from there with American equipment and we can get trucks and things we need there and the planes.

C: Compared with Tientsin, Peking is more useful town as it is better located.

B: It is more to the center of the group.

C: Generalissimo thinks that it would make it more convenient for

your officers in Tientsin. As far as security is concerned, transportation is concerned, he has no other considerations.

M: They will get along all right.

C: Governor Chang will transmit that to the Generalissimo.

M: Thank him for the consideration.

C: Of course about the minor points on the wording of those document we will have to talk over.

M: I doubt very much whether at our first meeting we get into the second part—the executive headquarters. I think we can take all of our time on this. We can be working out these other changes in this.

C: 10 o'clock tomorrow.

M: If that is agreeable to you. I will [make?] facilities available here.

C: Do you think the governor should take some experts, assistants?

M: I think he ought to bring one man to keep all of his notes.

B: I will have maps on a board.

C: Governor remarks that all of these talks will be very very important and for the interest of this country and he hopes that while you have spent so much time on these affairs that you will have speedy returns and he hopes that everything will work out speedily.

M: Thank you, very much, and I hope the same for him.

C: Governor Chang has three positions and he hopes something can be worked out.

M: If agreeable to the Governor, I will arrange to have very careful notes taken of everything that transpires so that minutes of the talks will be in English and Chinese for all of us to approve. That this is a correct record of the conference. I will have Mr. Hickey⁴² take it down in English, then we will have it translated into Chinese and see if you approve it and if General Chou approves it, what actually happens. It is my hope that we will get through so quickly and that the work in the field will be on such a businesslike basis that it will make for confidence towards all things we are talking about. The Generalissimo expressed fear about the working of the set up. I do not share the same fear because with the careful headquarters that Colonel Byroade is organizing we will have a framework of Americans. A skeleton of Americans. We cannot expect the Central Government to run it or we cannot expect the Communist to run it, or we cannot expect the two together to make a very good team, so we depend upon the skeleton, the frame, of Americans to keep pushing the work straight ahead, but they must be as inconspicuous as possible, they will have to carry the burden of the work

⁴² Chief Warrant Officer R. C. Hickey, secretary to General Marshall.

within the headquarters, but out in the field, it will be the Communist officer and the Central Government officer. I suggest that we call this special main group of the executive headquarters, commissioners.

C: Yes.

M: That is all.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer to General Marshall

[SHANGHAI,] January 7, 1946.

19327. Following observations are submitted and may be completely unnecessary. However, I know that you will accept them in the spirit in which they are given. Although I have adhered strictly to military functions throughout my service in China, naturally I have followed closely the negotiations between the Central Government and the Communists as well as the aspirations and maneuvers of those two political parties, the Democratic League and lesser political groups. I am not certain relative to the sincerity of either Central Government officials or the Communists in their willingness or intentions to discontinue the practice of jockeying for power, both military and political. The acceptance of your plan for a cessation of hostilities is a constructive step forward and certainly should create conditions for the settlement of remaining problems to include repatriation of the Japanese, disposal of enemy equipment and redispotion of military forces.

I believe we should be alert to all of the implications of the last indicated matter because during any lull in hostilities the Central Government may attempt to redispote forces and to strengthen their over-all position, both military and political, so that should hostilities flare up again they will have overwhelming power against the Communists. The Central Government may attempt to dispote forces for a concerted attack against Kalgan for example. Obviously this would be interpreted by the Communists and correctly as a breach of faith. In the Jehol Province similar activities on the part of the Central Government can be anticipated. Each side is suspicious of the other. To ameliorate this condition I suggest that no troop movements be permitted unless definitely cleared by the Executive Headquarters that you visualize establishing. In each case the Central Government or the Communists should be made to justify the necessity for redispoting their forces.

(New subject) The Generalissimo's determination to hold a conclave of the National Assembly on May 5th without prior elections is indicative to me of his intention to insure that the National Assembly is overwhelming[ly] packed with old party line members of the Kuo-

mintang. Before this general assembly is convened I think a general election should be held within the villages where representatives would be elected to select district representatives. The latter should then convene to select provincial representatives to the National Assembly. Only in this manner can we achieve representation along broader lines in the National Assembly. Obviously this would postpone the meeting of the general assembly but I feel it would be justified.

(New subject) It is difficult to determine when if ever it would be appropriate for you to discuss with the Generalissimo the suppression of free speech and writing. I have urged on numerous occasions more liberal treatment with regard to press and radio. However, I am informed, and have reason to believe my informants, that the Tai Li ⁴³ organization operates continually to suppress organizations or individuals who express views critical to the Central Government. Among the youth of China particularly in the schools there is a Kmt ^{43a} Youth Corps which employs violence against young people in the schools when the latter discuss in a critical vein the existing conditions in their country. Further the blacklisting of many prominent foreign writers has had a most harmful effect abroad. Edgar Snow ⁴⁴ was recently among those blacklisted. I disagree with Edgar Snow's views on China but he has full right to express them. The Central Government has equal right to disagree but has done more harm by attempting to suppress them. On numerous occasions I have pointed out to the Generalissimo that his information service should be liberalized and that it would be helpful to expose the shortcomings of his administration openly and freely. I emphasized that he should operate on the premise that he has nothing to conceal and would gladly permit constructive criticism. It might be appropriate to point out that this suppression still existing in China will cause many of the Chinese intellectuals, small business men and the students to affiliate themselves with the opposition. Whereas if they were permitted to have an opportunity to express themselves and to feel that they were contributing toward a stronger and democratic government, they would be of invaluable assistance to the realization of that goal.

(New subject) I have previously indicated that my representative in Yen-an, Colonel Yeaton, ⁴⁵ recommended that I visit that area and I asked Caraway ⁴⁶ to explain my views to the effect that I did

⁴³ General Tai Li, Deputy Director of the Bureau of Investigation and Statistics of the National Commission of Military Affairs (the secret service system).

^{43a} Kuomintang (Nationalist Party).

⁴⁴ American writer on Chinese affairs, sympathetic to the Chinese Communists.

⁴⁵ Col. Ivan D. Yeaton, commanding Yen-an Observer Group, U. S. Forces in China theater.

⁴⁶ Brig. Gen. Paul Caraway, Commanding General of the Army Liaison Group at Chungking.

not agree with Yeaton. However, Colonel Yeaton is obtaining information concerning the organization both political and military of the Communists and has prepared charts which might be helpful perhaps to you. I should like to suggest that Colonel Yeaton report to you in Chungking with such information. In the future I desire to discuss the continuation of the Yen-an Observer Group, however, for the time being I feel that this group should remain in that area.

893.00/1-746 : Telegram

The Chargé in China (Robertson) to the Secretary of State

CHUNGKING, January 7, 1946—8 p. m.

[Received January 7—2: 25 p. m.]

44. Military Attaché's report for week ending December 29 was received late. It is briefly summarized below.

Military activities have been restricted to occasional clashes and harassing by Communists of Central Govt formations. (Sent to Dept as 44, January 7, 8 a. m. [*p. m.*]) Communists appear not to have opposed occupation of Manchuria by Central Govt. At present Central Govt has 13th and 52nd Armies deployed between Hulutao and Mukden, 92nd Army advancing toward Chengteh, Jehol, and 94th Army deployed toward Kalgan. All these armies are Alpha⁴⁷ trained and equipped except for 92nd. In addition to occupation of Manchuria Central Govt program apparently includes recovery of Inner Mongolia, where since end of war Communists have been entrenching themselves. North of Peiping area Communist strength believed to be 200,000 and in area immediately south estimated at 70,000.

Chinese originally expected that new First Army from Canton and new Sixth Army from Shanghai would by this time have been transported to North China by SKA [*sea?*] to strengthen forces in Manchuria. However, these two armies, which are China's best, are still in Canton and Shanghai.

Central Govt finds it very difficult to establish lines of communication in area between Lunghai Railroad and Peiping, for Communists, apparently adopting same tactics used against Japanese, are skirmishing in rural areas and severing or tearing up portions of the rail lines.

Surrender of Japanese has recently become rather informal. For instance, surrender at Taiyuan was mere formality, with Japanese General surrendering his troops, but troops retaining their arms.

⁴⁷ American.

Presence of armed Japanese in China has aggravated Central Govt conflict and will continue to do so.

There follows summary of Military Attaché's report from week ending January 5, 1946: Troops of Central Govt continue to progress slowly in reoccupation of Manchuria although severe weather is impeding their advance. Russians are reported to have handed over civil administration of Mukden to Chinese Central Govt authorities on December 27 and that of Harbin on January 1. At Changchun Chinese Air Force is said to be preparing for airlift of Chinese troops to that city.

Military position of Communists in North China seems to be deteriorating as the Central Govt launches an assault on southeastern Jehol and masses troops in Honan and northern Kiangsu for drives to clear Peiping-Hankow and Tientsin-Pukow Railways.

It appears Jehol campaign will consist of simultaneous thrusts from each end of Japanese built railroad connecting Peiping with [Chengtch, Jehol, and towns?] in Manchuria. Protection of Central Govt's overland line of communication between North China and Manchuria will be greatly facilitated by control of railway through Jehol. Communist sources state that Central Govt armies are being concentrated near Chenghsien, Honan, for northward drive and extensive river-crossing preparations are reported in progress along Yellow River between Chenghsien and Kaifeng. A major engagement appears to be shaping up along Shantung-Kiangsu border north of Hsuechow. Communists seem to have succeeded temporarily in halting the 97th Army at Lincheng and are apparently consolidating their grip on the Lincheng, Tsaochuang, Tsenghsien area with the aim of resisting along the line of the Grand Canal north of Hsuechow.

Report of Communist destruction of railways as they withdraw westward from Paotou and Kueisui indicate they have given up hope, for the time being at least, of capturing these cities. Their failure is attributed to supply difficulties, heavy casualties, extremely cold weather and lack of sufficient artillery. This campaign apparently was considerable drain on Communist manpower and failure is serious setback as it leaves their western flank exposed. Communists have completely isolated Tsinan by land. Eastward they appear to be successfully impeding traffic along large portion of Tsingtao-Tsinan Railroad. Eighth Army seems to have bogged down in effort to push west from Tsingtao. Chinese sources report that mission of this army has changed and that it will be used for garrison duty along railroad in Tsingtao area. North of Tsinan, Communists claim to have severed Tientsin-Pukow Railroad in several places.

Recent Communist gains in Kiangsu Province along Grand Canal

just north of Yangtze continue to deny Central Govt troops use of Grand Canal.

Communists are not on the offensive in any important sector. Their local attacks appear to be limited to attempts to hamper the advance of Central Govt troops rather than drive them back.

ROBERTSON

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Notes on Conference of Three (Meeting No. 1)—General Marshall, Governor Chang Chun, Central Government Representative, and General Chou En-lai, Communist Party Representative—at General Marshall's Residence, Chungking, January 7, 1946, 10 a. m.*⁴⁸

M[ARSHALL]: If it is agreeable with you gentlemen we will proceed to the meeting. I would suggest that we have a record in English kept and that I have two stenographers to do it who will take turns. In that way we can keep abreast of the proceedings, and then as quickly as possible after each meeting I will furnish each of you gentlemen an English record and you can arrange your own translation. I have thought that we might manage the translation here, but it seemed rather difficult to do and we had had a very unfortunate experience with the previous translation. If we should have any special agreements for the minutes we could do that separately and immediately, so that there will be no delay in having the paper ready for signature in English and in Chinese. Now if that is entirely agreeable, we will proceed on that basis. As both of you gentlemen are intimately familiar with the various proposals, I think it the best to start the meeting by calling on Governor Chang, the Governor can make his proposal.

G[OVERNOR CHANG]: Governor Chang is referring to the proposed measures discussed between the representatives of the Central Government and the representatives of the Communist party on the 5th of January. We agreed that the measures concerning the cessation of hostilities and the restoration of communications should be agreed upon immediately by reference to General Marshall, and therefore we now propose to submit the question to this conference for discussion. Governor Chang asks if the chairman agrees to this proposal.

M: That is agreeable with all of us.

G: Is it agreeable to you to proceed to discussion of the concrete proposals.

M: That is agreeable. So agreed.

⁴⁸ These notes and minutes of other meetings held January 7-10 are the corrected record; copies were forwarded to the Department under cover of General Marshall's memorandum OSE 201 of June 20, not printed.

C[HOU]: Yes.

G: Now let us start to discuss an agreement for cessation of hostilities and restoration of communications. The first point to be discussed is that the agreement when complete will be submitted to the National Government and the Communist Party for execution. So we propose that the agreement when concluded will be sent to the National Government and the Communist Party, both of which will issue orders for the implementation of the details of the agreement. The first point to be contained in the proposed order will be the cessation of hostilities in the country. The second point is the restoration of communications and the removal of all obstructions to communications. The third point is that after the cessation of hostilities, all troops should maintain their present positions. For the moment, I propose these three points.

M: Has General Chou any comments to make.

C: With regard to the three points referred to by Governor Chang, General Chou wants to point out that as to the first point, cessation of hostilities should cover the entire country. With regard to the second point, the removal of all obstructions to communications, General Chou proposes that it should imply the restoration of everything that has been destroyed, and all barriers and fortifications should be removed. As to the definition of communications, it should include railways, highways, steamers, telegrams, and post service, that is, all kinds of communications. With regard to the third point he has nothing more to comment. Generally speaking, he agrees in principle with the three points. But he wants to make one addition, that is in the order of the cessation of hostilities, the date of its enforcement should be fixed. Is this called a conference or a committee or a group.

M: I leave it to you two gentlemen. You proposed it, what would you like to call it.

G: Special meeting. Just a conference.

C: Conference of three. As to supervising the implementation of this order of cessation of hostilities, General Chou suggests that a certain agency must be created from this conference for this purpose.

M: What is it, first the date, then to supervise.

C: Yes.

G: We agree to the cessation of hostilities throughout the country, subject to certain exceptions. I mean, that although hostilities should cease in the whole country, certain military operations must be reserved in certain regions.

G: The first exception is in regard to Manchuria as the National Government troops must take over all those regions in Manchuria. The second exception covers those regions in North China outside of

Manchuria which should be taken over in accordance with the agreement with Soviet Russia. In those cases mentioned in these two exceptions, that is Manchuria and other places in North China, which should according to the Sino-Soviet agreement be taken over by the Government, in those regions hostilities should cease, but nevertheless military operations should continue. As regards communications, it is of course understood that all communications should be restored, but the most important thing in this connection is the restoration of railroads. As regards the proposal to fix a date for the cessation of hostilities, we agree; and the proposal that an agency should be established for the supervision of the implement[at]ion of whatever decisions we may agree upon, we also accept.

C: General Chou would like to express his opinion on the explanations made by Governor Chang. With regard to the first point that the taking over of the nine provinces in Manchuria by the National Government should form an exception, General Chou suggests that it should be recorded in the minute instead of in the order. If this is agreeable to all sides then it can be discussed later on, how the wording should be formed. With regard to the second exception he thinks the claim is without foundation because in North China whatever should be taken over has already been taken over either by National Government or by the Communist Party and the right of receiving surrender was a point of hot controversy between the National Government and the Communist Party in North China resulting in the present armed hostilities in North China including Chahar and Jehol. As to the restoration of communications we agree that railway communications should first of all be restored, but at the same time, the conference of three should consider the restoration of all kinds of communications.

M: Do you wish to make any more comments.

G: The exception of the nine provinces in N. E. in my opinion should be put into the order and not into the minutes. The second exception as stated refers to those regions which according to our agreement with Soviet Russia should be taken over. For example, Chihfeng and Tolun. Chihfeng in Jehol and Tolun in Chahar on the border of Jehol. According to our agreement with Russia all these places should be taken over, therefore, after the signing of the agreement we will proceed to take over these places.

M: What does "these" mean?

G: Meaning, Chihfeng in Jehol and Tolun in Chahar and possibly other places, if any, for according to our agreement with Soviet Russia they should be all taken over by the National Government.

I think both sides are in general agreed on both sides on communi-

cations, that is to say, while we agree that in principle all kinds of communications should be restored, we lay special emphasis on the restoration of railway traffic.

C: Now the problem has (been) reduced to only two problems from what Governor Chang has just said. The first one refers to the nine provinces in Manchuria and the second one refers to those places which Governor Chang just mentioned and which he supposed to have some connection with the Sino-Soviet agreement. With regard to the nine provinces in Manchuria, if this should be included in the order, then General Chou suggests that it should be stated as follows: "All troop movement in the nine provinces of Manchuria should be fixed by consultation." The reason for such a stipulation is because during the past negotiations between the National Government and the Communist Party, this problem has been brought up and secondly the problem of Manchuria involves American assistance in transporting troops of the National Government to Manchuria and also the problem of taking over Manchuria by the National Government from Soviet Russia. With regard to the second point raised by Governor Chang, General Chou says it has not been mentioned in the Sino-Soviet pact, hence it is a new problem which should be solved by direct negotiations between China and Soviet Russia. Since it involves Soviet Russia, he thinks that Russia should be included in discussing this problem or some other form of discussion should be suggested and it is not necessary to include it in this order. What actually happened in those places was that during the anti-Japanese war, troops of the Outer Mongolian Republic have gone into those towns, but later on they evacuated and the 8th Route Army has taken over those places and so actually it is rather different from what Governor Chang has stated regarding Tolun in Chahar and Chihfeng in province of Jehol.

G: As regards the first point raised by General Chou, that is the exception concerning the Northeast, that it may be contained in the order that military operations in the Northeast could only be effected by consultation as regards that point, I agree to the inclusion of the exception in the order which was originally my own proposal, but as regards consultation for military movements in the Northeast, I cannot agree. I refer to our discussions, the discussions between myself and the representatives of the Communist Party in the past; the leaders of the Communist Party in those discussions agreed that the Northeast should be an exception to the military operations; that is the air lifting of troops and the transportation of troops by sea were always understood to be military operations to be ordered and controlled by the National Government exclusively. Then as regards

transportation of troops by land, we discussed the question of railway transportation and the Communist leaders proposed that no troops should be moved by eight railways, but it was understood (by our side)? that the western section of the Peiping-Liaoning Railway should be an exception—the section from Tientsin to Shanhaikuan. Therefore, we have always understood it to be that the transportation of troops from Tientsin to Shanhaikuan to the Northeast should be controlled by the National Government exclusively. In view of these understandings, we cannot agree to the exception of military movements in the Northeast which could only be effected by consultation. We couldn't agree to the point of consultation, but we agree to the proposal that no troops, after the cessation of hostilities, should be transported by the eight railways with the exception of the Peiping-Liaoning Railroad. That's one point.

M: Would you spell the names of the two towns?

G: Tientsin and Shanhaikuan. As regards the point made by General Chou that discussions should first be had with the representatives of Soviet Russia with regard to Chihfeng and Tolun, it is my understanding that Chihfeng and Tolun, according to our agreement with Soviet Russia, should be evacuated by Soviet troops. They are as a matter of fact at present still occupied by Soviet troops. According to our arrangements with Soviet Russia we should take over these places. Therefore, there is no necessity of discussing this point with Soviet Russia.

C: First of all, General Chou wants to point out that he is not very sure whether there are still Soviet troops in Chihfeng and Tolun. According to reports he has received, he only knows that those two places have been taken over by troops of the Communist Party, and the reports which Governor Chang have received apparently come from another source. Now these two problems—Manchuria and those two places outside of Manchuria—are places which the National Government has taken over or is going to take over from the hands of Soviet Russia. Since such is the case, I suggest that these two problems should be combined together and such a principle should be recognized and put in the order, namely: Places which the National Government is to take over from the hands of the Soviet troops are not affected by these orders. In that case all of these places can be taken into consideration and the taking over by China from Soviet Russia will not be restricted.

G: I propose that Manchuria, that is the nine provinces in the Northeast, should be expressly mentioned as an exception while the principle as proposed by General Chou should apply to other places outside of Manchuria, that is, those places in the provinces of Chahar

and Jehol. In those provinces military operations may continue because in those provinces there are regions which according to our agreement with Soviet Russia should be taken over by us. Therefore, we limit the application of the proposed principle to places outside of Manchuria while Manchuria itself should be (expressly) specifically mentioned.

M: I understood General Chou to refer in his proposal to places occupied by the Russians. Was the Governor referring to places occupied by the Russians or otherwise?

G: The Governor has especially in mind Tolun and Chihfeng, which were occupied by Soviet troops and which may possibly still be occupied by Soviet troops and Communist troops at the same time—there are also some Communist troops in those places. What Governor Chang has referred to is those places outside of Manchuria, which according to our agreement with Soviet Russia we are to take over. In those places there may already be Communist troops.

C: General Chou has a suggestion to compose the difference of opinions. He suggests, as a compromise, just to have something in the record which may serve as a basis for later discussions so that both sides understand how problems related to the negotiations between China and Soviet Russia can be dealt with later irrespective (of) whether it refers to inside Manchuria or outside, and if it has been agreed by the National Government and Soviet Russia that certain places outside Manchuria will be taken over by the Chinese National Government of which we are not informed up to now then it would also find a point of reference in this order and if such an insertion is made it will show at least that today we have recognized in principle how such problems may be dealt with later.

G: In regard to the principle proposed by General Chou that there should only be one statement intended to cover both Manchuria and certain places in Jehol and Chahar, I am still of the opinion and I insist that Manchuria should be an express exception. It should be expressly mentioned as an exception to the cessation of military operations, while the proposed principle may apply to those places in Jehol and Chahar which according to our arrangements with Soviet Russia we should take over. Therefore, the principle as stated by General Chou should only be limited to Tolun and Chihfeng and possibly other places, but should not be extended to cover Manchuria, which should be expressly stated as an exception. That is to say, Manchuria should be set aside as a class by itself.

M: Is this correct as to the Governor's meaning? That Manchuria should be an exception without limitations. Is that what that means, that Manchuria should be an exception without limitations? In

other words, that limitations referring to the proposals that we should have further agreements and things of that sort?

G: Yes, that's right.

M: That the limitations should refer only to those places in North China where the Soviet Government has had an agreement with the Central Government of China. (To interpreter: Translate that for General Chou and explain it to him so that he understands me correctly.)

G: Governor Chang says that Manchuria should be a complete exception without limitations. As regards those places in Chahar and Jehol which I have stated they should also be an exception. What I mean is that the Central Government troops should, after the cessation of hostilities, move into those places according to our arrangements with the Soviets, and that is all.

M: I understand. Did I understand General Chou correctly that with regard to Jehol and Chahar he stated that the exception as stated in the paper should refer only to those places actually occupied by Russian troops?

C: Not exactly. First, he is not well informed about the actual conditions there and so he is not in a position to give a concrete answer to this question right now. Secondly, he is not informed about such a negotiation between the National Government and Soviet Russia, since no such document is contained in the Sino-Soviet pact and he is not informed of any such negotiation or any other negotiation on this matter. Therefore, at the present time he is not in a position to recognize separately such a clause that any place which is now occupied by the Soviet troops should be taken over by the National Government and, therefore, in his proposal he endeavored to establish a principle which also includes Manchuria and if the representative of the National Government takes exception to this principle, he can withdraw this proposal.

M: "He" being General Chou?

C: Yes. And, therefore, I cannot agree with the second point raised by Governor Chang; that is, to form a separate clause regarding places outside Manchuria.

G: I think we can state the problem in this way. We can very well dispense with the general principle as proposed by General Chou. We can simply say that Manchuria should be an exception completely. In regard to Chifeng and Tolun we can simply stipulate that Central Government troops may move into those places to take over. That is all. We don't have to bother with general principles.

C: I think this is more unacceptable because the more concrete the order is the more is it hard to accept because I may first ask why

the Government's right to take over those two towns should be recognized. Then the Government representative answers "This is based upon the negotiations between China and Soviet Russia," but as a matter of fact, I am not informed in whose hands those two towns are at the present time. As far as I am informed sovereignty of those two towns are now in the hands of the Communist troops and I am not informed whether there are still remaining some Soviet troops, and secondly, I am not informed of the contents of the negotiations which have been or are now being conducted between the Government and the Soviet Russians.

M: Gentlemen. If it meets your agreement, I suggest that we leave for the moment the question of exceptions regarding Jehol and Chahar and the statement to be made formally regarding Manchuria, and that for the time being we consider the form of the proposal which I had already made for an order for the cessation of hostilities, the two disputed points to be discussed later.

M: Is that proposal agreeable to you gentlemen.

G: Yes, and we will talk about other portions later on.

M: I would suggest that we three submit for the approval of the Generalissimo and of Mao Tse-tung a paper proposing the actual terms for an order to be issued terminating hostilities. Two identical memoranda are proposed. One addressed to the Generalissimo and one addressed to Mao Tse-tung. The subject, the cessation of hostilities. The first paragraph now reads as follows: "In conformance with the agreements entered into by the National Government of China and the Chinese Communist Party it is desirable that cease firing orders be issued at once and simultaneously by yourself (this being the Generalissimo) and by Chairman Mao Tse-tung." Is this first sentence acceptable.

G & C: Yes that is agreed.

M: "If this suggestion meets with your approval it is recommended that identical orders along the lines of the draft which follows should be issued by you (the Generalissimo) and by Chairman Mao Tse-tung at an agreed time and agreed date". Is that acceptable?

G & C: Yes.

M: Then the first paragraph entirely is acceptable. "The text of the proposed draft follows: All units, regular, militia, irregular and guerrilla of the National Armies of the Republic of China are ordered to carry out the following directive, as of hours, on day month of the year of the Republic". The similar draft reads all units, regular, militia, irregular and guerrilla of the Communist Party of the Republic of China so and so. Is that acceptable?

G & C: Yes.

M: Then that is formally accepted.

"*a*. All hostilities will cease immediately." Is that acceptable?

G: Of course it is understood that all hostilities should cease on the same date on which the order is issued.

M: You mean you would prefer it to read: "All hostilities will cease at hour and date.["]

G: Yes, that is our understanding. In the preceding paragraph we say that the units are ordered to carry out the following directive and immediately following hostilities will cease as of that date and that time.

M: Should we word it differently. "All hostilities will cease in accordance with the foregoing." Is that preferable?

BYROADE: I don't think so. You are giving an order to be effective for the hour for hostilities to cease immediately.

M: Suppose we scratch out the word immediately. Just say all hostilities will cease. Omit the word immediately. What does General Chou think.

C: He thinks this is OK. The original text.

G: Of course the order will eventually be issued in Chinese and the Chinese interpretation will make that clear.

M: Then that is acceptable.

G: Yes.

M: Paragraph *a* is therefore accepted. In paragraph *b*, we will omit reference to the first sentence.

G: Reserved for further discussion.

M: I haven't mentioned the second. That is understood.

C: Yes.

M: The second sentence reads, "There also may be the purely local movements necessary for supply, administration and housekeeping." The last word was improperly translated, I believe, to security and I propose that the last word housekeeping be changed to read "and local security". The sentence would therefore read, "There also would be the purely local movements necessary for supply, administration and local security".

G: You have two "locals" in the sentence.

M: I don't know how to avoid that. Is that acceptable.

G: Governor Chang says that he can't express a definite opinion in regard to this part separately without referring to other parts in the paragraph.

M: It was intended to mean everywhere. I suggest that we omit any reference to that sentence for the present. Is that agreeable?

G: Agree.

M: Paragraph *c*. "Destruction and interference with lines of communications will cease and you will clear at once blocks placed against movement along land lines of communications." The proposal was made "blocks and fortifications". May I ask General Chou just what he means by fortifications.

C: Because he thinks that Japanese have established many fortifications along the railway lines to protect themselves from attack and also in the territories controlled by the National Government, the National Government has set up many fortifications to block the travel and movement of civilians and he thinks that all these should be expressly stated so that there can be no misunderstanding in the interpretation of the word block in implementing this order.

M: Would he prefer that we omit the word "block" and substitute "fortifications"?

C: He thinks that blocks and fortifications are two distinct matters because you may remove the block to restore communications but the fortifications are still there which form a constant menace to communications. So he would like to use both of them.

G: Governor Chang states that since none of us have made any inspection of all the railways, we had better state a principle, that we had better limit ourselves to the discussion of a principle; that is, anything that obstructs communications should be removed, but anything which is intended for the protection of the railway should be retained. Therefore, I propose that we had better let the original paragraph stand as it is without adding anything, but we understand that the idea is to remove any obstruction to railway communications, but to retain anything that is intended to protect the railway communications. When we proceed to execute this article we bear that principle in mind. It will be left to the executive headquarters to decide. For the moment we will leave it as it is.

M: Do I understand that you mean that the sentence should stand as now written and that a minute should state the understanding that everything that obstructs the railway operations should be removed, but those structures which are for the defense of the railway should be left intact.

G: Yes.

C: Very good.

M: That is agreed.

C: I suggest you strike out "lines" in the first line. Just interference with all kinds of communications.

G: In the first place, I feel you need the preposition "of" after "destruction"; "destruction of and interference with". That is what was intended.

M: Would this review of the sentence be acceptable. “*c.* Destruction of and interference with all kinds of communications will cease and you will clear at once obstructions placed against or interfering with such communications.”

G: Governor Chang thinks that the phrase “all kinds of communications” is too inclusive—too wide in scope. It may be that it would have different kinds of interpretation. While he agrees in principle with the restoration of all kinds of communication, he thinks we should lay special emphasis on the restoration of railway traffic and as regards other kinds of communications we may discuss them later. If we say all kinds of communications, the expression will include, as already proposed by General Chou, such things as communication by boats, air, telegraph, which cannot be carried out by troops and this order is supposed to be issued to military men—to troops. This would be beyond the authority of the military people. We would retain the original proposal.

M: With regard to troops this refers to a prohibition against destruction or interference with communications.

G: We propose to substitute the word “lines” for “kinds” so the sentence would read: “Destruction of and interference with lines of communications will cease and you will clear at once obstacles placed against, or interfering with such lines of communications.”

M: You substitute “all lines” for “all kinds.”

C: General Chou thinks that all kinds is more inclusive than all lines. To the Chinese “the lines” refers only to railway lines, highways and telegram lines, but it would not include posts, but in that case the Communist party would have to reestablish all the destruction, but they would not enjoy all kinds of their service facilities.

M: The issue then from the point of view of General Chou the question of involving in this the reestablishment of post communication, by post.

C: Governor Chang has just explained to him the lines would also include post service and in that case there is no more dispute there and he now will change the word “kinds” to “lines”.

M: The sentence now reads: “Destruction of and interference with all lines of communications will cease and you will clear at once obstructions placed against or interfering with such communications.[”]

G: Such lines of communications. I think it would be better to say lines of communication.

M: That is all right. It being understood that lines of communication includes post communications.

G: Yes.

M: That sentence is then agreed upon.

M: "*d.* For the time being all units will maintain their present positions."

C: Agreed.

G: May I seek some elucidation of this paragraph? I take it that this paragraph only refers to those units which are in areas of conflict. It doesn't refer to those units which are far far behind the front line, and in my opinion, this doesn't seem to apply to units which have never been related to the areas of conflict. This paragraph is not intended to freeze all military operations in the whole country. Is this understanding correct?

M: It was written with the idea that certain exceptions had already been made. Now we have concluded our discussion of those exceptions.

C: My understanding is that with certain exceptions agreed upon, this should be applied to all troops within the country, because it is very difficult to demarcate to which troops it should be applied and to which not.

M: The officer who drafted the paragraph had in mind that for the moment all movements should cease, but that the instructions for the Executive Headquarters would specify the details for the resumption of certain movements. I mean by that that the instructions for the Executive Headquarters agreed upon here; for example, I understood from Governor Chang that it would be the desire of the Central Government that the movements of Government troops into Manchuria and that south of the Yangtze there would be no movements or concentrations to the northward without the agreement of the parties to this document. Meaning that reorganization of divisions and the various movements of that character could proceed to the south of the Yangtze, with the reservation that there would be no northward concentration.

C: What does the General mean by "reorganization of troops"?

M: The National Army is being reorganized—divisions being demobilized.

G: Were you stating what General Chou said to you?

M: I was stating just a rough idea of it.

G: He did not catch what was said.

M: He would rather I made no further mention of it?

G: Would you repeat it please?

M: I will go back to the beginning of the discussion. Paragraph *d.* was drafted by the Officer, Colonel Byroade, having in mind that for the moment all movements should cease, but that there would follow detailed instructions for movements of the character of troops going to Manchuria. There would also be probably other movements not

involved in the Manchurian exception. The authority for these would be covered in the document to be agreed upon here for the establishment of the Executive Headquarters. This order going to the troops has to be brief and concise. Therefore, the details would be included in the lengthy instructions to the Executive Headquarters. In other words, for the time being in China proper all movements would cease, but the moment the Executive Headquarters was established the detailed exceptions agreed upon here would be put into effect. One of these I discussed with the Governor. South of the Yangtze there would be a number of movements incident to the reorganization of divisions of the Chinese Army and, though this was a mere discussion, that might be carried out without involving any concentration to the north.

G: You mean south of the Yangtze?

M: It would be essential to the continuation of the orders now in effect for the reorganization of units of the Central Government to continue; that so long as they did not constitute a deployment south of the Yangtze to the northward, it would seem there could be no objection. That was the impression I received of the discussion in regard to prohibition of movements. It is not in any form an agreement and it may not be even a correct presentation of the views of the Governor, but it illustrates a complication that must be met. Now it may be that this brief paragraph is too all-inclusive. I would appreciate hearing your views.

G: Governor Chang would like to supplement what you said. He would like to put forth some views concerning the first sentence of the second paragraph, Paragraph *b*, which is reserved for further discussion but unfortunately the topic that is now under discussion has close relations to this provision. Governor Chang inquires whether it would be in order to proceed to the discussion of this sentence, or just exchange our views freely without any restriction?

M: Does he mean to go back to the discussion of *b*?

G: Yes.

M: Just a moment. My suggestion is, in answer to the Governor's proposition, that the purpose of paragraph *d* is so confused with paragraph *b* that, in my opinion, it is of such small importance from the viewpoint of those who proposed it, that I think the whole paragraph should go out. I am assuming that whatever we agree upon for paragraph *b* will include the statement, "All movements of forces within China proper will cease." That there may be exceptions, but the broad statement would be there. Therefore, I do not think paragraph *d* is of sufficient importance to include and would confuse the recipients.

G: The Governor agrees to the suppression of paragraph *d* and the discussion of paragraph *b*.

C: I would suggest that we first have free discussion on *b* and after we have agreed on *b*, we will consider whether it is still necessary to retain *d* or we should strike it out.

M: That is agreeable to me, but we might add that we strike out *d* on the understanding that a statement of the prohibition of movements will be included in paragraph *b*.

C: I understand that when all parties agree that the sentence, "All movements of forces within China proper will cease," shall include the meaning of *d*, then we can omit *d*.

M: What I said was, we might agree that whatever order is to be given to prohibit movements will be included in paragraph *b*. Therefore, under those circumstances there could be no purpose in paragraph *d*. If it will simplify things, I will drop *d* until later. Do you prefer that?

C: Yes.

M: Will you accept that?

G: Yes.

M: Paragraph *e*: Additional instructions and orders will be issued to you later.

G: The Governor says that this is quite unnecessary for the Government has the right to issue orders at any time.

M: It is very common in our Army, and we had some eight million men, but I am going to do this the Chinese way. Now, on thinking it over, I came to the conclusion last night that this order is quite incomplete, in that it does not give any intimation of what is to happen next in the way of control. Therefore, I have made this draft to substitute for paragraph *e*. It should include these four additional words, "through this Executive Headquarters." The last sentence would then read: "The necessary instructions and orders unanimously agreed upon by the three Commissioners, will be issued in the name of the President of the Republic of China through this Executive Headquarters." And that would be my proposal for paragraph *e*, and I might say now that the details for the organization and for the operation of the Executive Headquarters can be decided upon here later. This merely establishes the principle and notifies all concerned of the method of procedure to be expected. My purpose in submitting this proposed paragraph *e* was to inform all the troop commanders of the source from which they would receive their future orders and the source from which inspection groups would go forth, so that those inspection groups would be honored with the proper courtesies and respect. It is essential, of course, that all the troops know that there

is such a Headquarters duly authorized because they have to have heard of such a thing. For example, we probably will have to have a particular armband to identify all these officers from that Headquarters, or no one would pay any attention to them. I was assuming that there would be an agreement to such an Executive Headquarters whatever the detailed instructions might yet be. This merely says there will be such a Headquarters, it will be established immediately and through it will come the detailed orders.

G: We have just been discussing the term "Executive Headquarters" and what the Chinese translation would be.

M: You have an Executive Yuan; this is a military one. Any term that your people will understand. I got tired of calling them a group as there are too many groups.

G: Commission?

C: Executive Commission.

G: Yes.

C: General Chou requests that the word "Government" from the "Chinese Communist Party Government," be omitted.

M: What about the Executive Headquarters? What about Commission?

G: Executive Headquarters is all right but it is very difficult. Commission is all right, but what kind of commission? There are so many commissions.

C: Headquarters is good, it gives a very good explanation and is much better than the English word "Commission." In English it is perfectly all right now, but what we want is a proper Chinese translation.

M: Governor, may I ask what your view is to this proposal?

G: This is quite agreeable to the Governor, except that there appears to be a little redundancy in the first sentence and the last sentence: "Additional instructions and orders will be issued later through an Executive Headquarters," and then towards the end there is, "The necessary instructions and orders unanimously agreed upon by the three Commissioners, will be issued in the name of the President of the Republic of China through this Executive Headquarters." These could very well be combined to read, "Additional instructions and orders will be issued in the name of the President of the Republic of China through an Executive Headquarters to be established" and so on, and change the last sentence that all actions of the Executive Headquarters should be taken by unanimous vote or unanimous agreement of the three Commissioners, or something like that. Or we can omit the first part of the first sentence and just say: "An Executive Headquarters will be established in Peiping," etc.

M: "An Executive Headquarters will be established immediately in Peiping for the purpose of carrying out the agreements for cessation of hostilities. This Headquarters will consist of three Commissioners; one representing the Chinese National Government, one representing the Chinese Communist Party, and one to represent the United States of America. The necessary instructions and orders unanimously agreed upon by the three Commissioners, will be issued in the name of the President of the Republic of China through the Executive Headquarters." Did you follow those changes?

G: Yes.

M: "Additional instructions and orders will be issued later through"—all of that to be struck out. The sentence will start, "An Executive Headquarters will." Where it says "to" it will be "will." The word "Government" is stricken out down below, and the last four words will read, "through the Executive Headquarters." With those corrections, is that acceptable to the Governor?

G: Yes.

M: With those corrections, is that acceptable to you?

C: Yes.

M: Then that is agreed upon. Now, as I understand it, we have agreed with minor amendments to all of this document except paragraph *b* and paragraph *d*, including a complete re-write of paragraph *e*. Then it appears to me that the next order of business is to resume the discussion of paragraph *b*. It is now about 1:00 o'clock. What is your pleasure?

G: Let's eat.

M: Do you wish to continue this meeting this afternoon, do you wish to go on now without any lunch, or do you want to wait until tomorrow morning? What is your pleasure?

C: There will be a tea party at 3:00 o'clock this afternoon for the PCC delegates. What do you think, maybe after dinner there will still be some time, or else tomorrow morning.

G: Governor Chang prefers to continue the discussions tomorrow morning.

M: What hour?

G: Any hour you designate.

M: Any hour from 6:00 o'clock in the morning on? Whatever the Governor thinks.

G: The same time then—10:00 o'clock tomorrow morning?

M: 10:00 o'clock tomorrow morning.

C: 10:00 o'clock.

M: May I make one suggestion. Mr. Shepley tells me that the Press is waiting outside the door. I am not going out but—

G: I would like to stay here with you.

M: I make the request that we have nothing to say until we reach a complete agreement. My advisor, he knows the Press here better than I do, suggests that it might be easier for you if we state that we have made good progress and that we will meet again tomorrow morning. That we are making good progress, have nothing to report at present, but will meet again tomorrow.

121.893/1-846 : Telegram

General Marshall to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)

CHUNGKING, 8 January 1946.

26. Reference 91636 from Davis⁴⁹ and your number 28, January 4, 8 p. m.:⁵⁰ Robertson is due if current negotiations are successful to be chairman of 3-man commission in Peking administering details of cessation of hostilities, reopening of communications, etc. I have arranged to take over personally direct general supervision of Embassy during his absence.

His prestige in vital job in Peking would be seriously damaged by change of status therefore I desire to continue him as Minister for present.

Due to the lack of experienced China service personnel other than Smyth⁵¹ I desire that he be held here for at least 6 weeks after arrival of Butterworth. I hope that 2 months or less from now Robertson's special job will have been completed. Hereafter I imagine your arrangements for permanent set up of Embassy can be conveniently put into effect without prejudice to my mission.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Notes on Conference of Three (Meeting No. 2)—General Marshall, Governor Chang Chun, Central Government Representative, and General Chou En-lai, Communist Party Representative—at General Marshall's Residence, Chungking, January 8, 1946, 10 a. m.

M[ARSHALL]: If agreeable with you gentlemen, we will proceed with business. First are there any corrections you wish to suggest for recorded minutes of the last meeting.

G[OVERNOR CHANG]: Governor Chang says that the minutes are just being translated and suggests we consider it later.

⁴⁹ Not printed; this telegram dealt with assignment of W. Walton Butterworth to the Embassy in China (Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270).

⁵⁰ Not printed.

⁵¹ Robert L. Smyth, Counselor of Embassy in China.

M: At some later date.

C[HOU]: We have some which we have given to the secretary.

M: We will take up approval of these meetings at some later time. We have already noted certain changes that General Chou wished to make.

Yesterday there was one understanding to be recorded in the minutes. I will read it to see if it is a correct record. Formal statements to be included in minutes of the meeting. With reference to paragraph *c* in cessation of hostilities document, "It is understood and herewith made a matter of record in the minutes of the conference that lines of communications mentioned in paragraph *c* include post communications." Is that acceptable?

G: Yes.

C: Yes.

M: So noted as acceptable. Are there any other preliminary statements that you wish to make, Governor Chang?

G: No.

M: Are there any other preliminary statements that you wish to make, General Chou?

C: No.

M: Then if agreeable, we will proceed with the discussion of paragraph *b*.

G: Governor Chang proposes an amendment to paragraph *b*. The proposed amendment will include the fourth topic, the fourth item, discussed yesterday.

B[YROADE]: Paragraph *d*.

G: Paragraph *b* will first of all contain the principle of cessation of hostilities, that is to say, after cessation of hostilities, all movements will cease in the whole country, no matter in what place, but with certain exceptions. There will be four exceptions. The first exception will be movements of forces south of the Yangtze River for purposes of demobilization, reorganization and redeployment. The second exception covers the point already contained in the original draft. That is, movements of forces of the National Government into and within Manchuria for the purpose of reestablishing Chinese sovereignty. This can be accepted. The third exception. Movements of forces for the purpose of taking over certain places in the Province of Jehol and the Province of Chahar in accordance with our arrangements with Soviet Russia. The fourth exception is the same as the last sentence in the original paragraph. That is, movements of purely local nature necessary for supply, administration and security. These are the four exceptions to the general rule that all military movements should cease throughout the country immediately after the cessation of hostilities.

C: I noticed that Governor Chang has in his proposal made one more addition to yesterday's proposal. Yesterday he proposed to add the item concerning Jehol and Chahar and today he makes another addition concerning troop movements south of the Yangtze River.

G: Yesterday I proposed the area in which military movements should be prohibited to be the areas covered by the eight railways as originally proposed by General Chou, but what I have now proposed compared with the original proposal of the Communist leaders, seems to be a concession; we have even granted more than what they have asked for.

C: Speaking concretely with regard to Jehol and Chahar, I know definitely that the Government cannot produce any kind of agreement or arrangement on the matter of taking over from Soviet Russia. On the other hand, about the places which Governor Chang has referred to, like Chihfeng and Tolun, we know definitely their sovereignty has been taken over by the 8th Route Army. Only in the past, there have been some troops of the Outer Mongolian Republic there and after we have taken over the sovereignty, I have not been informed about any change of its state and the assertion made by Governor Chang that the Government is going to take over those places in accordance with any certain agreement is without foundation.

M: Only in the past meaning what?

C: Meaning before the 8th Route Army came to these places, troops of Outer Mongolian Republic had been there, but then evacuated.

By raising this point it would only make the realization of cessation of hostilities impossible. Right now military operations of the National troops are still going on in the eastern part of Jehol moving towards Chihfeng and Tolun. This makes it impossible to cease the war and he most regrets for such actions. As to the second item, the second exception proposed by Governor Chang concerning troop movement south of the Yangtze River for the purpose of reorganization, redeployment etc., I think it is better to make it applicable throughout the country and I am thinking to incorporate this point in item four. That is to say that item four referring to local movements would not only cover supply administration and local security, but would also cover redistribution and training. For troop movements for such purposes would not only be required in the south of the Yangtze River and not only be required by troops of the National Government, but also be required by troops of the Communists.

M: Only south of the Yangtze. I don't get the meaning.

C: Not only troops south of the Yangtze River will be required for the purpose of reorganization. Not only in the southern part

of the Yangtze River and also in other places for the purpose of training, demobilization, local security, or supply. Not only in the south and [*but?*] also in the north, not only on the Government side, but also on the Communist side.

I think the cessation of hostilities can be settled rather quickly. As to the problem of reorganization of troops, I understand that the Government is going to draw up a national scheme and the same problem will also be taken up by the PCC. It will be carried into effect after the cessation of hostilities has been effected and this reorganization of troops would also include the Communist troops. Right now the problems involved in the cessation of hostilities are troop movements for the purpose of training, demobilization, local security, administration, supply and for local redistribution.

G: Reallotment of positions.

C: Local reallotment of positions. Therefore, I think that last sentence in paragraph *b* of the original draft may cover all these things. By adding a few words like training, demobilization, local redistribution.

As regards the second exception raised by Governor Chang, I insist that this order only states that troop movements in China proper should cease and we will put it down in the minutes that Manchuria should form an exception.

G: I will state my views in regard to the points raised by General Chou in the same order as he has submitted them. Regarding the question of Chihfeng and Tolun the proposal of the Government has its proper legal basis. On October 31st of last year, General Hsiung Shih-hui, Chief of the Generalissimo's Headquarters in the Northeast, reached an understanding with Soviet authorities in regard to the taking over of the Northeastern Provinces, the taking over of all those places occupied by Soviet troops. The agreement was discussed and concluded with General Vasselevski [*Bochlovsky*], the Soviet Chief of Staff. Evacuation of Soviet troops and the taking over by Chinese troops should be effected by stages, according to the agreement. There should be five stages according to the agreement. The first stage should be accomplished on November 10th, including Yingkou. The second stage should have been accomplished on November 12th, with Takushan, Chinchow, Kupeikow, as the line of demarcation—that is the second line. The third stage of evacuation should have been accomplished on November 15th, and this line goes through Chaoyang up until the line terminates at Shanhuangchi—that is the third line. The fourth stage of evacuation should have been accomplished on November 20th. This line covers Shenyang (Mukden), Hsinlitun, Chihfeng and Tolun. The fifth line has no relation to the

subject. However, this line should have been reached on November 25th. According to these arrangements, Soviet troops should withdraw stage by stage, leaving a few troops in the original places which they evacuated, for the purpose of maintaining local order until they were actually taken over by our troops. Because of the fact that the taking over of the places evacuated by Soviet troops by Chinese troops could not be effected without the help of American transportation, we transmitted this plan as agreed upon between the Chinese and the Soviet authorities, to the American Military Headquarters on November 2nd. On the same date, General Shan Cheng,⁵² at a meeting with the American military authorities, reported these arrangements. That is the combined staff conference. He made a report to the Chinese-American Combined Staff Conference. Unfortunately, the Government later met with obstacles in dispatching troops to the Northeast regions for the purpose of taking over these regions. Consequently, the Government had to approach the Soviet Government with a view to postponing the definite dates for the taking over of the lines as originally agreed upon and, finally, the date of February 1st was fixed for the final evacuation of all Soviet troops from Chinese territories, and the last line, the fourth line which covers Hsinlitun, Chihfeng and Tolun, which should have been reached on November 20th, has not yet been taken over by the Chinese troops because of the difficulties met with by the Chinese troops. Therefore, this line will be taken over by Chinese troops according to our agreement with the Soviet Government. As I have stated, the Soviet troops when withdrawing from certain occupied regions, will leave a few troops for the maintenance of the local peace and order. Therefore, in Tolun and Chihfeng there are a few mixed units of Mongolian troops and Soviet troops. (Showing map—he designated Chihfeng, Tolun and Hsinlitun.)

M: What is the date of that?

G: (Pointing) This line—November 20th.

M: As I understand it, a copy of this was delivered to the American Headquarters in November?

G: Yes, sir. Also a copy of the telegram. The telegram and the overlay went together.

B: What is the telegram?

G: That telegram was from General Tsung⁵³ regarding the plans they made. If you want, we can send another copy of the telegram and the sketch.

⁵² Shang Chen, personal chief of staff to President Chiang Kai-shek.

⁵³ Hsiung Shih-hui, director of President Chiang Kai-shek's headquarters in the Northeast (Manchuria).

B: I think it should be in the record.⁵⁴

G: Recently the Soviet military authorities have repeatedly been asking us to effect the process of taking over, and our troops for the taking over of the places towards the west, on the left-hand side, are now trying to establish contacts with the Soviet Headquarters.

As to the point raised by General Chou that in the past we have not discussed the point with regard to Chihfeng and Tolun, the fact is that we have had no opportunity of discussing this question in the past. We have had no opportunity of discussing the details of taking over those places in the Northeast.

General Chou commented on my proposal relating to the exception of the regions South of the Yangtze. He suggested that this point could be combined with the fourth point, that is to say, all movements of forces of a local nature for training, demobilization and redeployment could be combined. However, I want to emphasize the point of reorganization about which General Chou seems to have expressed an opinion that this should cover not only the Government troops, but also Communist troops. General Chang has a different opinion on this point.

M: What was that?

G: General Chou said that the point of reorganization should not be included in the second exception. Our plan of reorganization was fixed at the time of the establishment of the General Headquarters of the Chinese Army at the end of the year before last—the end of 1944. The object of the reorganization scheme was to strengthen the Chinese Army for the purpose of taking up a counter-offensive against the then enemy. At the time of victory and the surrender of the Japanese, the preliminary stage of the scheme had already been accomplished. After the war, it is only natural that we should endeavor to continue the execution of the reorganization plan. In last November we had a conference for demobilization and reorganization. At this conference it was decided that the original plan of reorganization should be continued, at least in regions South of the Yangtze. At that time, unfortunately, due to conflicts occurring in the North, we could not push through this scheme North of the Yangtze River. It is our wish that while the plan would continue South of the Yangtze River, the plan could be also carried out in other regions, providing we could continue the discussion and conferences. There have been three main groups which we have been discussing at present, the question of the plan of reorganization in the North is under discussion, and this can be completed in the future, but in the regions South of the Yangtze, the Government has wished to carry out the scheme of the reorganization.

⁵⁴ For text of telegram, see p. 98.

After the cessation of hostilities there will be no need of making use of large numbers of troops for engagements. Therefore, there would be all the greater need of reorganization. Hence, I propose that the reorganization of the Government troops South of the Yangtze should be an exception.

General Chou says in regard to the question of the Northeast that the restriction or the prohibition of military movements should be limited to cover China proper, with no mention of the Northeast in the General Order, but in the minutes it may be recorded that the Government troops may move into Manchuria. Now, this suggestion I will consider. While I would consider the formal agreement as suggested by General Chou as regards the Northeast, I would at the same time urge General Chou and his colleagues to reconsider the questions in regard to Chihfeng and Tolun and the plan of reorganization South of the Yangtze.

M: What was that?

G: The point raised by General Chou in regard to the Northeast—in regard to Manchuria. I promise that I will consider the suggestion made by General Chou in regard to the Northeast; that is, in the General Order no military operations should take place in China proper, but in the minutes it will be recorded that Chinese troops can proceed to the Northeast. This suggestion I will consider. While I promise to consider this point, I urge General Chou and his colleagues to reconsider my views in regard to Chihfeng and Tolun and the question of reorganization of forces South of the Yangtze.

M: Now, Gentlemen, it is a little after 11:00 o'clock and I have given you no tea, so I presume that I have offended the Chinese custom. Also to follow an American custom, when you reach a certain stage of a baseball game, which is the 7th inning, all business ceases and everybody stretches their legs. I therefore suggest, if agreeable to you gentlemen, that we have a fifteen minute recess. I will turn over my room to Governor Chang and his associates, and they can have their discussion, tea, and relax, and I will turn over the dining-room to General Chou. Is that acceptable?

G: Yes.

C: Yes.

M: Then we will resume the discussions. There will be a fifteen-minute recess.

Recess

M: If agreeable to you gentlemen, the meeting will come to order. I have a message from the photographers. They wished to get yesterday photographs here at the table and we forgot them. If there is no objection, we will let them come in now for a moment to take the

pictures because they are trying to catch a plane to Shanghai with the films. This is entirely a question of the pleasure of the Governor and General Chou. Is that agreeable.

G: Yes.

C: Yes.

M: From now on they will tell us what to do.

Session with Photographers

M: We will resume the order of business. Governor Chang, have you any further statement to make?

G: No.

M: General Chou?

C: First of all, I want to comment on certain points. Regarding the first exception raised by Governor Chang, I suggest separating it into two parts. Regarding demobilization and local replacement of troops, I suggest to incorporate them into the last sentence of paragraph *b* of the original draft. Last sentence, referring to local security, administration, supply, should be changed into: Local movement necessary for supply, administration, local security, demobilization and local replacement, which means a redistribution without changing strength at each place.

M: Regrouping?

G: For example, we have now three units in Taiwan, (Formosa). We want to withdraw a number of units and send there an equal number of units to take their place.

C: To take their place.

M: Redeploying them is on the line. Redistribution or regrouping. Regrouping is the English meaning.

C: We are not sure of these terms. Redistribution.

G: Redistribution.

M: Then it reads, demobilization, reorganization and redistribution.

C: No. Demobilization and redistribution.

C: With regard to troop movements for the purpose of carrying out the reorganization of divisions, reorganization of troops in regions south of the Yangtze River, I agree, after consideration, that it can be an exception, put into this paragraph.

G: Separate sentence in the paragraph.

C: Yes.

M: Just one minute. We will have to keep in mind that this is an order to the troops and normally would not include matters that do not apply to subordinate commanders. It seems to me that General Chou's last statement including the separate sentence here involves a high governmental understanding and not a directive of specific troops. Therefore, it would seem to me it should be in the minutes rather than the order.

C: I agree.

G: I agree.

M: We have a sentence in the minutes. Reading how?

G: In the minutes you can refer to this paragraph, that is the provision in the second paragraph of the general order.

M: There will be a number of references to this paragraph, so this is another of them.

G: This paragraph will not prejudice military movements south of the Yangtze River for the execution of the reorganization plan which should be continued.

M: What is General Chou's idea of the sentence.

G: Strike out the words which should be continued and add for the continued execution.

M: Paragraph *b* does not prejudice military movements south of the Yangtze River for the continued execution of the plan of military reorganization of the National Government. That is accepted?

G: Yes.

C: Yes.

M: Where does that sentence go.

C: That is in the minutes.

G: Yes.

G: In regard to the term redispotion, Governor Chang doesn't think we could add the word local to the term because that would prohibit the Central Government from dispatching troops to Japan as we are planning to do. At the same time, we may shift troops from Szechwan to other regions, say Hupeh, which will have nothing to do with the general situation; and if we employ "for the maintenance of security in certain regions", if we employ the term "local redispotion", that would be too restrictive.

M: The sentence now reads, "There also may be purely local movements." Your proposal is to strike out "purely local". Is that correct?

I have it written now following Governor Chang's statement, "There also may be the movements necessary for supply, administration and local security and demobilization and redispotion."

G: We think that demobilization and redispotion, being of greater importance than supply and administration, should come first.

M: The sentence would then read, "There also may be the movements for demobilization, redispotion, supply, administration and local security."

G: Would the sentence read better if we had one or two more words, "There may also be such movements as are necessary for demobilization, redispotion, supply, administration and local security."

M: There also may be such movements as are necessary for demobi-

lization and redistribution, supply, administration and local security.

G: Yes.

M: General Chou?

C: General Chou expressed a doubt as to "such movements as are necessary". He thinks that such phrasing may include other movements—any movements which are not necessary for the purpose.

M: If there is objection to that would Governor Chang be agreeable to changing it back to read, "There also may be the movements necessary for demobilization, redistribution, supply, administration and local security."

G: Do you think "the" is necessary. There also may be movements.

C: That is much better.

M: Are hostilities going to depend on the word "the" here? Have you reached an agreement regarding this sentence.

C: General Chou would like to have that in.

G: Agreeable to us.

M: Then the sentence, I understand, is accepted to read as follows: "There also may be the movements necessary for demobilization, redistribution, supply, administration and local security." Is that acceptable.

G: Yes.

C: Yes.

M: Now, as I understand it, that would be the concluding sentence of paragraph b.

G: Yes.

C: Yes.

M: Then we have to consider again the remainder of the first part of the paragraph which, I take it, will have to be subject to certain exceptions taken in the minutes, one of which, I understand has already been agreed upon, that relating to movements south of the Yangtze. The paragraph now reads: "All movements of forces within China proper and Manchuria will cease with the exception of movements of forces of the National Government of the Republic of China into and in Manchuria for the purpose of reestablishing Chinese sovereignty." Has General Chou any immediate proposal to that?

I had better explain that I was talking about the construction of the paragraph and not the details of the exceptions. (Interpreter: They are discussing whether or not to use the word "Proper" and "Manchuria".) I have heard a suggestion which omits reference to China proper. If it is agreeable to you gentlemen, I will read it.

G: Please read it.

M: "All movements of forces, regular, militia, irregular and guerilla, of the National Armies and the Communist Armies of the

Republic of China which are related directly or indirectly to hostilities between these two Armies will cease." I will read that a second time, and let's have a second translation. (To General Chou's interpreter). Will you translate? "All movements of forces, regular, militia, irregular and guerrilla, of the National Armies and the Communist Armies of the Republic of China which are related directly or indirectly to hostilities between these two Armies will cease." Now that would require certain exceptions in the minutes. It is understood that if such a paragraph were acceptable, it would complete the order and our problem would be a discussion of the exceptions.

G: This sentence would be followed by the second sentence?

M: Yes, we completed the end of the paragraph.

G: Governor Chang would like to ask a question about where we put the understanding in the minutes, will the minutes be published?

M: I do not know. What is your idea about that?

G: It seems to us that it is necessary to publish the fact that we have reserved certain matters. For instance, if we don't announce the fact that we may move troops into Manchuria, those who read the order will naturally have doubt as to what our position may be with regard to the Northeast. So we think it is quite necessary to publish the facts as recorded in the minutes.

M: That is a matter for the two parties to decide. Something for you two gentlemen to agree upon. I would assume that the exceptions specifically recorded in the minutes might well be released for public understanding at the time that the order is published. The one is an order to the troops; the other is for the purpose of a general understanding of the people of China. But that is a matter for you gentlemen to decide.

G: Our original proposal was to incorporate all the exceptions into paragraph *b* in order that the public would know our exact position. Now General Chou has proposed that certain exceptions should be put in the minutes, I can accept his proposal, providing in paragraph *b* in the main order, we should explain that as a principle, "except in certain specific areas, all movements of forces will cease." Then, at the same time we publish the facts as recorded in the minutes bearing on these specific areas.

M: General Chou?

C: I am afraid that by adding these few words at the beginning of this draft, there may be a distortion of the original meaning of the sentence, for if you add, "Except in certain specific areas," then it would imply that hostilities would only cease for certain territories, while in those territories covered by the exceptions the hostilities may continue.

M: What is General Chou's opinion regarding the publication of exceptions?

C: He thinks that they can be published when necessary.

M: Meaning?

C: For example, if inquiry is made to the National Government, or if the National Government is going to issue orders to specific troops in accordance with the minutes, then it can quote the minutes, in its order.

M: In the order?

C: In specific orders.

M: I don't understand you.

C: General Chou repeats, it can be published, for example, under two conditions: one is if inquiry is made to the National Government on the details, then the Government may give a reply by publishing the minutes. Another example is if the Government is going to issue special orders in accordance with these minutes, then they can also publish the particular minutes relating to it as a reference.

M: Have you any comment, Governor Chang?

G: Since General Chou has agreed that what is recorded in the minutes may be published, if necessary, and may also be sent in orders to the commanders, I will not insist on putting all the exceptions into the paragraph under discussion, but I should think that we must put in the main paragraph some phrase or some words such as, "With the exception of certain cases," or "Except in certain specific cases, all movements of forces in China will cease." (Pointing to paper) We are not using this as the basis.

M: You are using the original?

G: Yes, we are using the original. "Except in certain specific cases, all movements of forces in China will cease." It seems that General Chou and Governor Chang have agreed on the Chinese text. The English translation would be, "Except in certain specific cases, all military movements in China will cease." "Except in certain specific cases, all movements of forces will cease."

M: Now, as I understand it, paragraph *b* would read in its first sentence, "Except in certain specific cases all military movements—

G: No, just all movements.

M: Oh, without the "military"? All right then, "Except in certain specific cases, all movements of forces in China will cease." That sentence would be followed by this one already agreed upon. "There also—" I think that "also" could go out.

G: I think it should be in there.

M: "There also may be the movements necessary for demobilization, redistribution, supply, administration and local security." Is that your idea of the completed paragraph?

C: No.

M: No, it is not?

C: No, I mean, yes, there are no additions.

M: Is that right?

G: Yes.

M: But not the exceptions.

G: Yes.

M: Then with the exception of paragraph *d* that completes an agreement on the order.

G: Agreed.

C: Yes.

M: That is agreed. I ask the question, do you consider it necessary now to continue paragraph *d*?

G: No.

C: No.

M: It is agreed that paragraph *d* will be struck out and, therefore, paragraph *e* becomes paragraph *d*.

C: Yes.

G: Yes.

M: Then it is my understanding that we have agreed upon the wording of the order and we are now ready to return to the question of exceptions.

G: Would you kindly read the text of the order once more.

M: "Memorandum To His Excellency, The Generalissimo" and a similar memorandum to Mao Tze-tung. "Subject, Cessation of Hostilities.

"In conformance with the agreements entered into by the National Government of China and the Chinese Communist Party, it is desirable that cease firing orders be issued at once and simultaneously by yourself and Chairman Mao Tze-tung. If this suggestion meets with your approval it is recommended that identical orders along the lines of the draft which follows be issued by you and by Chairman Mao Tze-tung at an agreed time on an agreed date.

"The text of the proposed draft order follows:

'All units, regular, militia, irregular and guerrilla of the National Armies of the Republic of China' (and of course in the corresponding order it will read "Communist Armies") 'are ordered to carry out the following directive as of

_____ (hour) _____ hours, on _____ (day) _____ (month) _____ of the _____ (year)
of the Republic:

'a. All hostilities will cease immediately.

'b. Except in certain specific cases, all movements of forces in China will cease. There also may be the movements necessary for demobilization, reposition, supply, administration and local security.

'c. Destruction of and interference with all lines of communications will cease and you will clear at once obstructions placed against or interfering with such lines of communications.

'd. An Executive Headquarters will be established immediately in Peip'ing for the purpose of carrying out agreements for cessation of hostilities. This Headquarters will consist of three Commissioners; one representing the

Chinese National Government, one representing the Chinese Communist Party, and one to represent the United States of America. The necessary instructions and orders unanimously agreed upon by the three Commissioners will be issued in the name of the President of the Republic of China through the Executive Headquarters.

Signed—(this order) Chiang Kai-shek' ["]

The other order will be signed Mao Tze-tung.

G: The first paragraph is, of course, not included in the order and therefore would not be published?

M: No, that is our memorandum. We have to sign two copies of these letters; one to the Generalissimo, and one to Mao Tze-tung.

G: Yes.

M: This is our proposal for their agreement.

G: And we take it, you will not publish the memorandum?

M: No, that is their letter. Is that accepted in the form in which I read it?

G: Yes.

C: Nodded yes.

M: That is accepted. Now, it is a little after 12:30. Do you wish to proceed with the discussion of the exceptions or do you wish to delay that until this afternoon possible at some hour agreeable to you. I interrupted General Chou when he was in the midst of his presentation. It is possible that he would wish to finish his comments. What is your pleasure, gentlemen?

G: Now the only point of dispute is Tolun and Chihfeng. On all other exceptions there is agreement.

M: In other words, there is an agreement relating to the exception relating to Manchuria and there is an agreement relating to the exception relating to South of the Yangtze, and there remains to find an agreement regarding Tolun and Chihfeng. I would like to see those two cities. Did I interrupt you, General Chou?

C: No, I was only going to discuss this matter, but now I think it is better for us to decide whether to carry on our discussions or postpone it.

G: I presented all my views in regard to the question of Chihfeng and Tolun and have no further remarks to make. I hope that this question can be as amicably settled as other difficult points, and I don't know what General Chou now thinks about it.

C: He asks your opinion on whether you would like to hear his views on this particular subject or if you'd rather postpone the matter, because if he is going to express his views then the meeting might be drawn into the length.

M: We will listen to General Chou's views now.

C: Now I am going to express my views on this matter. As I understand from what Governor Chang has just stated on this subject, he

again confused the problem of Manchuria with this Tolun-Chihfeng affair, because he related the discussion with General Malinovsky on the plan of taking over of all those places as stated so he has identified Manchuria with Chahar. From what Governor Chang has stated, this problem evidently involves Soviet Russia in how it was arranged and how the places are to be taken over. This is a problem concerning both China and Soviet Russia and, therefore, I am thinking it might be necessary to have military representatives from Soviet Russia to explain to us about the actual situation, but in that case, the problem might become very complicated. From what I understand from Governor Chang's last statement the problem concerning Chihfeng, Tolun and Chouyang [*Chaoyang*] is a problem of taking over those places. As a matter of fact, the sovereignty of those places has already been taken over by the Eighth Route Army. Now our present problem is cessation of hostilities. As troops of the National Government are advancing toward those places, so hostilities are inevitable. Our immediate concern is how to cease hostilities at once. In the future, all troops in China shall be reorganized, including Communist troops. Thereafter, we will have to discuss the redistribution and redeployment of all troops for at that stage all Chinese armies shall be National armies, so I don't see why the Government is hastening to take over those places at the present time by means of force.

G: I would like to make these observations. The first point is this. An agreement was completed between the representative of the National Government and the representative of the Soviet forces and there has been no dispute between the National Government and the Soviet Government. As regards the relations between the Central Government and the Communist Party, they are matters between the two parties exclusively and they do not relate to any matters in which the Russian side has manifested any interest. General Chou says that those places in question have already been taken over by the Communist troops which are now in control of these places and that if Central Government troops should be dispatched to those places there may be future conflict which would be contrary to the subject of the arrangement which we are now discussing, but I would like to remark that it is for the very purpose of avoiding conflicts that we are now introducing this question, that we are now insisting on these places as forming an exception to the rule of restriction. This is for the very purpose of avoiding any possible conflict in the future. What we ask for is simply the implementation of our engagements with the Soviet Government.

M: It seems to me, gentlemen, that we are not at an immediate approach of agreement and, therefore, as the hour is late, that unless

Governor Chang has not completed his statement, we should adjourn to another hour. Has he finished?

G: He has another point.

M: I withdraw my comment.

G: Governor Chang refers to the point made by General Chou that the question of Chihfeng and Tolun might be settled later on as a part of the execution of the reorganization plan which would include, not only the National troops, but the Communist troops as well. The Governor remarks that this seems quite well, but he points out that there are no reasons why according to the agreement with Russia we should not take over Chihfeng and Tolun. Probably General Chou's remark might well apply to those places which are to the south of Chihfeng and Tolun and which according to the arrangements with Soviet Russia we should have taken over. But the question of these places they may probably be discussed later. As to the places of Chihfeng and Tolun, they form an immediate problem and we will proceed to take over these places in pursuance of our authority with the Soviet Government. This is the opinion in reply to General Chou.

M: Does that mean as raising the question of the two points and excluding the other points or areas for the time being.

G: Governor Chang lays special emphasis on Chihfeng and Tolun, but as to the other places south of that line, they may be discussed later on. Those seem to form an immediate problem.

M: In other words, there would be no movement into those regions until there had been further discussion.

G: After cessation of hostilities we will do according to what was agreed upon, but as to these places we will proceed to take them over as we have suggested.

M: If agreeable to you gentlemen, I suggest that we adjourn now and meet at some later hour, either today or some other hour tomorrow. Is that agreeable.

C: Yes.

G: Yes.

M: Then when would you suggest—today at some hour, or tomorrow morning.

G: It will depend on the hour suggested by General Chou. It is up to him.

C: What is your suggestion.

G: As far as the Government is concerned we will leave it up to General Chou.

C: He has no particular view on the hour of the meeting.

M: Would 4:30 be convenient to General Chou.

C: Yes.

M: Is that agreeable to Governor Chang.

G: Yes.

M. Then we will adjourn to 4:30, but I have in mind that if possible we should as soon as possible take up the administrative order of the executive headquarters.

C: You mean that the question of the executive headquarters should be brought up first?

M: Not necessarily first to discuss. We ought to be ready to discuss it this afternoon, because as long as we do not go into those details they can do no work with the organization and it is important to allow them to organize as much as possible while we try to reach agreements on higher policy. Is it agreeable to adjourn until 4:30?

G: Yes.

C: Yes.

M: So adjourned.

761.93/1-846: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, January 8, 1946—noon.

[Received—11:51 p. m.]

64. Chiang Ching-kuo has left Moscow on his way back to Chungking. (Sent Dept as 64; repeated Chungking as 4.) Chinese Ambassador left yesterday morning for London for UNO^{54a} Conference in London.

Chinese Chargé has given me in confidence following version of background and purpose of meeting. In November, Chinese Govt was extremely worried over situation in Manchuria. Chinese had been permitted by the Russians to despatch 300 liaison officials to Changchun. Upon arrival there these officials had found large Chinese Communist forces encamped on edge of town. Russians were threatening to evacuate place and leave them at mercy of Communist forces. Similar situation prevailed in one of Manchurian ports. In order to bring about solution of question, Chinese had proposed visit of Chiang Ching-kuo to Stalin, but had received reply that Stalin was away on vacation and could not receive him until he returned to Moscow and reassumed conduct of affairs. Thereafter, in December matters had improved greatly in Manchuria and there was no longer any urgent necessity of such a visit. Having made the request, however, Chinese felt obliged to go through with it. Chiang had seen Stalin twice during his visit here and conducted conversations personally in Russian with Stalin. For this reason, Chinese Ambassador, who was

^{54a} United Nations Organization.

present at both interviews, had not entirely understood course of conversations although he had of course had complete subsequent reports from Chiang. Discussions had been limited to technical modalities of future collaboration in Manchuria, questions of guarding the railroad, of Soviet seizure of industrial equipment, etc.

KENNAN

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Notes on Conference of Three (Meeting No. 3)—General Marshall, Governor Chang Chun, Central Government Representative, and General Chou En-lai, Communist Party Representative—at General Marshall's Residence, Chungking, January 8, 1946, 4: 30 p. m.

M[ARSHALL]: If agreeable to you gentlemen the meeting will come to order. I would first call attention to the fact that we placed on the table at your places copies of the minutes of this morning's meeting, and at some later time we can inquire whether or not they are accurate records, in your opinion. We also placed there two copies each of the Cessation of Hostilities Order as we understood it as agreed upon this morning. At your convenience you can confirm as to whether or not that is an accurate statement of your agreement.

Now, I have here three exceptions to which there has been an agreement. I said three; I should have said two. The first exception reads as follows: "Paragraph *b*, Cessation of Hostilities Order, does not prejudice military movements South of the Yangtze River for the continued execution of the plan of military reorganization of the National Government." Is that a correct statement?

G[OVERNOR CHANG]: It is.

C[HOU]: Yes.

M: It is accepted as correct. Another exception which I read this morning and which was agreed to was: "Lines of communications mentioned in paragraph *c*, Cessation of Hostilities Order, includes post communications." That was accepted. Now in paragraph 2 of the sheet you were handed is the present wording of the exception regarding movements in regard to Manchuria. I will read them as they are now written: "Paragraph *b*, Cessation of Hostilities Order, does not prejudice military movements of forces of the National Army toward and within Manchuria which are for the purpose of restoring Chinese sovereignty." Is that wording satisfactory and acceptable?

G: Yes.

C: General Chou inquires about the word "toward." Can it be so understood that all troops within China proper may be moved under this provision?

M: It was not so intended.

C: Is this not too inclusive?

M: Has General Chou another word he wishes to submit?

G: The present plan of the Government only envisages the sending of troops into Manchuria necessary to maintain peace and order in that region and not—

M: I think the problem is the use of the word “toward”, and I assume General Chou’s question is whether any troops in China could move toward Manchuria that is due North. But the intention of this “toward” was, from my point of view, to the ports for shipment to Manchuria or the marches overland, the troops having arrived at Shanhaikuan—

C: Chinwangtao?

M: Chinwangtao.

C: Hulutao?

M: Hulutao may be frozen—they might disembark at Chinwangtao. Was not that your question?

C: General Chou says that Governor Chang and General Marshall have answered his question in two distinct respects. General Marshall has replied about the route of moving troops, the route that is going to be pursued, that is by sea, and Governor Chang has answered him on the purpose and the strength of troop movements, and he would like those to be recorded in some way.

M: Can General Chou suggest another word instead of “toward”?

C: He is afraid that if he makes another change it would make the phrase rather long and if he is asked to make a proposal, he would propose to say that the troop movements for this purpose will be effected only by agreement.

M: Will be what?

C: Troop movements will be effected, will be carried out each time after agreement.

M: I don’t think that would work. Will General Chou please consider this suggestion? Following the words “National Army into or within, or toward ports in China for embarkation for Manchuria.” I will read it again. “Paragraph *b*, Cessation of Hostilities Order, does not prejudice movements of forces of the National Army into or within, or toward ports in China for embarkation for Manchuria which are for the purpose of restoring Chinese sovereignty.”

G: General Marshall, do you mean to say, “forces of the National Army into or within Manchuria or toward ports in China for embarkation for Manchuria” etc.?

M: Yes, that’s right.

G: I believe in this case it would be better to repeat the word “Manchuria” again.

M: All right. “into or within Manchuria or toward ports in China

for embarkation for Manchuria." Insert "Manchuria" after "within". The word "Manchuria" would then appear twice. I was trying to avoid too involved statements. My statement and that of the Governor's are in the minutes but they would make very lengthy and debatable exceptions because these will be stated almost like an order. (to General Chou's interpreter: Will you translate that?)

C: I personally don't agree, because on this particular subject, the Manchurian problem, there has been dispute during the talks of the Government and the Communist Party previously. In the past both parties had discussed the movement of troops along eight railway lines in the North. At that time, the Government representatives had proposed to make an exception on the western section of the Peiping-Liaoning Railway so that the Government may move troops without consulting the Communist Party, but the Communist Party insists that movements of troops along this railway line—

M: Railway line?

C: Yes, along the western section of the Peiping-Liaoning Railway line—should be done after consultation with the Communists.

M: Western section, meaning Peiping to Shanhaikuan?

C: To Chinchou.

M: Chinchou is in Manchuria, is it not?

C: Yes, in Manchuria. This problem was left unsolved.

M: Why Shanhaikuan to Chinchou?

C: Because certain regions covering the section between Shanhaikuan and Chinchou, constitute a base of guerrilla operations of the Communist troops before the Japanese surrender. Because this problem has not been solved, I returned to Yen-an to talk over all this matter. At that time one of the Government representatives, Mr. Shao Li-tse, had told us that if we are not opposed to the moving of National troops along this section, then the Government is willing to discuss with the Communist representatives on the number of troops that will be moved, and also after all troops have been reorganized certain units of the Communist troops may be stationed in Manchuria. I reported all of this to Yen-an and Yen-an was of the opinion that it has no objection to the taking over of Manchuria by the National Government, but it hopes that the Government would consult the Communists on the number of troops to be sent to Manchuria and the routes which will be taken by these troops.

C: With regard to this paragraph, General Marshall and Governor Chang have explained to my satisfaction and I personally agree with the amendments made in this paragraph, but I feel obliged to report to Yen-an about these amendments and I hope to receive a reply in a day or two.

M: When General Chou used the word, the expression, consult with the National Government, did he have in mind that the executive headquarters we have talked about only operates by virtue of the unanimous vote. If that agreement for the executive headquarters was accepted, then the expression consult with [will?] imply a single vote at executive headquarters could stop all movements to Manchuria.

C: When I was talking about consultation with the Government, I referred to past negotiations between the National Government and the Communist Party. I do not have in mind the executive headquarters. I personally am entirely satisfied with the explanation made by you and Governor Chang, but I feel that I have to report to Yen-an on this particular subject.

M: Therefore, if it is agreeable to both of you gentlemen, we will leave this to be decided later.

C: Yes.

G: Governor Chang likes to make a few remarks. In our past discussions with the Communist representatives, we always insisted on the right to send troops into Manchuria by rail but the Communist representatives suggested that to transport troops into Manchuria by rail should be done only by consultation, but the Government representatives never agreed to this point. Then the Communist representatives suggested that inasmuch as there were Communist troops around the region into which the Government intended to send troops, the Government troops had better fight their way into Manchuria. Then quite privately Mr. Shao Li-tse, referring to what was just referred to by the Communist representative, suggested that instead of having any real fighting some consultation might take place, but that was simply a suggestion made casually for which the Government should not be responsible. Whatever may have transpired in the past, the matter has been discussed already here and only this morning we agreed to this, both sides seemed to have agreed to this matter relating to Manchuria and it was after I had considered the opinion furnished by General Chou that I agreed to put this paragraph into the minutes and I would rather see this paragraph retained in its original form. That is, movement of forces of the National Army into and in Manchuria. Let it stand as it is without any additional phrases or words.

C: General Chou doubts whether it can be stated as Governor Chang has said that Mr Shao Li-tse does not represent the view of the government seeing Mr. Shao Li-tse made this statement in a formal meeting with the Communist representatives as an official representative of the Government.

M: One minute, gentlemen, you are getting away from me here.

G: Governor Chang, in commenting on the point made by General Chou that certain words were said by Mr. Shao Li-tse to the effect that consultation should be held before transporting troops into Manchuria, emphasized that that was a personal opinion in answer to the remark made by the Communist representative that the Central Government troops would have to fight their way into Manchuria. Mr. Shao Li-tse made that point on his own initiative. It was a personal opinion.

M: It seems to me that we are getting a little bit into the PCC and beyond my responsibility in the conference. I understand. I understand that Governor Chang agrees to the paragraph I am about to read and General Chou expresses his tentative acceptance of the paragraph in view of statements in the record by the Governor and myself and pending reference to Yen-an. If that is correct, I propose that we drop this for the time being until we hear from General Chou after his consultation with Yen-an. Is that agreeable to the conferees?

G: Yes, I agree to the postponing of the discussion of this question, but as far as I am concerned I cannot and will not give up my views on this question.

M: It is understood that we will postpone further discussion of this pending a report from General Chou.

At the bottom of this same page appears paragraph 5 which reads as follows: "It is further agreed that moves of the forces of the National Army under the foregoing stipulations shall be reported daily to the executive headquarters." The understanding being that this is the final paragraph to the various exceptions that we finally record. The executive headquarters as a normal procedure of any military procedure, should itself make a daily report of troop dispositions. It, of course, could not do this unless it received reports. The procedure, of course, would keep all informed of the general troop situation and so make for general understanding and avoid unfounded rumors. I repeat again that this paragraph would be the last one on whatever exceptions we have. Is such a paragraph acceptable, or what amendments are required?

C: General Chou agrees.

G: This seems to be a new point and we should like to reserve our comments until the proceeding [*preceding?*] four paragraphs are approved.

M: We will delay action on that paragraph. In that paper the third paragraph referred to the exception of the understanding regarding the situation in Jehol and Chahar. We adjourned this morning in a state of incomplete discussion. Has General Chou anything further to say on the subject?

C: On this matter I have the following comment: First, I wish to know to what an extent an agreement has actually been reached between China and Soviet Russia, because in the past I was not informed on this matter at all, and therefore I think there are two concrete means to achieve this. Firstly, I hope that the Government may let me read the telegram sent by General Hsiung Shih-hui to the National Government regarding the agreement between China and Soviet Russia on this particular matter. Secondly, I hope that U. S. Army headquarters would let me read the document sent by the Chinese National Government to it notifying this agreement.

M: Read the last again.

C: Secondly, I hope that the U. S. Army headquarters would let me read the document sent by the Chinese National Government notifying it on this agreement. There might be another means that is since I am thinking that this affects the relation between China and Soviet Russia, so I am considering whether we should invite Soviet Russia to participate in this discussion. If I can read over the official document of the Sino-Soviet agreement on this particular matter and if it can be ascertained that there have been listed in the document the places that have to be taken over, definitely taken over by the National Government, so I would make a study and consider Governor Chang's proposal.

M: I understand. Have you any comment? (to Governor Chang).

G: I feel that the document I brought up this morning serves the purpose which General Chou has in mind. If he wants to see the document, he can either see the document which I produced this morning or the document which the American headquarters may supply to General Chou. The document is just the same, either one will serve his purpose.

C: General Chou remarks that this morning the official document was not presented and he would like to see the official document.

(Telegram then produced for General Chou to read).⁶⁵

M: How about the over-lay.

G: We didn't bring that.

M: The Governor filed that, eh?

Would the records of the U. S. headquarters be in Shanghai?

COLONEL PEE: ⁶⁶ General Caraway was here at the time.

CAPTAIN ENG: ⁶⁷ His files would remain here in Chungking.

M: Records will be in the combined staff file then.

C: This telegram alone cannot make me fully understand the situation and problem related to Jehol and Chahar. As far as I am in-

⁶⁵ General Hsiung Shih-hui's radiogram of October 31, p. 98.

⁶⁶ Col. Peter Pee, aide to Generalissimo Chiang.

⁶⁷ Capt. Horace Eng, member of General Marshall's staff.

formed, at the end of October there were no more Soviet troops in Jehol, and in certain places Soviet troops have never been there and still I don't feel that I am getting wiser about the actual situation there. Secondly, this telegram is sent by General Hsiung reporting certain arrangements he made with the Soviet troops, but it is not disclosed in this telegram whether the arrangements were verbal or written. Really the telegram only stated about withdrawal of Soviet troops. No mention was made of how the different places will be taken over by the Chinese troops or whether there are already certain Chinese troops there. It bears no relation to the business to be handled here. From what I can read from the telegram, it is just a general report. It is not a formal clear-cut verbal agreement reached by both sides, and therefore I hope to see the formal document of agreement, so that my report to be sent up to Yen-an may then carry more weight, because this is an entirely new problem to us.

M: With apologies for interrupting the present discussion, but in an effort to avoid long delays and discussions in order that hostilities may actually cease at as early a date as possible, I have a very rough proposal here which would affect the exception we were discussing regarding movements into Manchuria and make that specific exception unnecessary and would also endeavor to compose the difference in Jehol and Chahar.

M: In other words, this would cover two exceptions. I will read it and I am going to suggest after it that you do not endeavor to reply today at all. "It is understood and agreed that the provisions of paragraph 5 of the Cessation of Hostilities Order, do not prohibit the movement of National Army troops in accordance with the terms of the formal agreement, dated , between the representatives of the National Government of China and the Soviet Government, for the transfer of control in the unrecognized and so-called principality of Manchukuo. However, it is further understood that in the provinces of Jehol and Chahar such movements will be specifically restricted pending further agreements to the occupation of the towns of Chihfung and Tolun, and that the size of the force in each case will not exceed one thousand soldiers." I think it best not to attempt to discuss that now, Gentlemen, if agreeable to you, my suggestion to be that we would postpone any further discussion of this until tomorrow because I have introduced an entirely new proposition and I would like you to have plenty of time to examine it, as well as some time for me to assimilate what you have already said. Are you willing to take that answer?

G: Yes, we can defer the discussion until tomorrow.

C: Yes, it is.

M: Is it agreeable to you to make at least a partial effort to reconstruct this order for the Executive Headquarters?

C: Yes.

M: Is that agreeable to you, Governor?

G: Yes.

M: Here are two corrected copies⁵⁸ which have been gone over making a number of very definite changes in the document which was originally gotten out.⁵⁹ The principal change is to produce a joint agreement by you gentlemen here, you having been duly authorized by your respective chiefs to so agree. It being assumed, of course, that this would have to be confirmed by your chiefs before you could agree. The joint agreement would therefore be in the persons of Governor Chang and General Chou. I have made the changes accordingly in the document. "By joint agreement we, Governor Chang Chun, authorized representative of the Central Government, and Chou En-lai, authorized representative of the Chinese Communist Party, do establish in the name of the President of the Republic of China, as of date, an Executive Headquarters empowered to implement the agreements for cessation of hostilities." I submit that paragraph for discussion.

G: I believe the Governor prefers to be called "General" here (in this document).

M: Oh, General instead of Governor?

G: Yes.

M: And then that should be General Chou, should it not?

C: Yes. I apologize for getting it all wrong.

G: The preamble in its present form is not easy to translate into Chinese.

M: What changes do you suggest?

G: We suggest, so and so "do establish with the approval of the National Government" an Executive Headquarters.

M: "With the approval of the National Government." That conveys an entirely different meaning.

B[YROADE]: He means in here. It's all right.

G: That is not the Chinese way of saying it.

M: Yes, that is a different indication to us. What other corrections?

G: Substitute "with the approval of the National Government" for "in the name of the President of the Republic of China."

M: Is that the correct use of the word Central Government that way?

⁵⁸ Not found in Department files.

⁵⁹ Reference is to the draft plan prepared by the staff of General Marshall entitled "The Executive Headquarters," p. 6.

B: Yes, should we use Central Government or National Government throughout?

G: National Government.

M: In the changes proposed by General Chang, I understand that the second line, change the word "Governor" to "General." In the third line, change the word "Central" to "National." In the fourth line, add the word "General" in front of Chou En-lai. In the fifth line, add to the word "establish", insert the words "with the approval of the National Government" and strike out the words "in the name of the President of the Republic." The sentence then would read: "By joint agreement we, General Chang Chun, authorized representative of the National Government, and General Chou En-lai, authorized representative of the Chinese Communist Party, do establish with the approval of the National Government of China, as of date, an Executive Headquarters empowered to implement the agreements for cessation of hostilities." General Chou, is that acceptable to you?

C: Yes.

M: Is that acceptable to you, General Chang?

G: Yes.

M: That first paragraph as I read it is acceptable. Are there any comments on the second paragraph?

C: General Chou requests explanation on two points. The first one is regarding the repatriation of Japanese. He inquires whether it refers to war prisoners only or to all Japanese, civilians as well as military men?

M: As far as the United States is concerned, the interest is specifically directed toward soldiers. So far as you gentlemen are concerned, it seems to me the decision is what you choose to make it.

(INTERPRETER to Marshall: General Chou is asking Governor Chang about the Chinese Government's decision on that.)

C: Which refers only to war prisoners.

M: Soldiers.

C: Yes.

M: Is that satisfactory?

G & C: Yes.

C: Secondly, General Chou inquires whether the recommendations made by the Headquarters should first go through the conference here and then be issued in the name of the Government.

M: Which conference?

C: This conference here, or their recommendations go directly to the Government and be issued?

M: My assumption was that this particular conference might not

then exist, and I assume that the reports would be submitted in this manner: Each Commissioner would submit the report to his own chief. Your Commissioner to Mao Tse-tung, or you, or whatever you direct. The National Government Commissioner would report to his Chief, and the American representative to me. The record copy would go to the Generalissimo for the ordinary procedure of implementing it. Would that be your understanding, General Chang?

G: Yes.

M: Is that a satisfactory reply?

C: Yes.

M: Are there any other questions, General Chou?

C: No.

G: May we ask you a few questions in regard to certain points. In the first place, the first sentence says, "The Executive Headquarters established by this order will implement the agreed policies." We take it that "agreed policies" refers to policies based on agreements for the cessation of hostilities. Don't you think it desirable to make it clearer? That is point one.

M: If you go up to the preceding paragraph in the last two lines it says, "The Executive Headquarters is empowered to implement the agreements" etc. Do you wish to repeat the same thing that is up there in the preceding line?

G: I don't know if that is clear. The above-mentioned paragraph only says "empowered to implement the agreements for the cessation of—"

M: Now, if you want to put that it [*in?*], "the agreed policies of the cessation of hostilities order", that's all right if that's what you prefer?

G: Yes.

M: That is agreed?

C & G: Yes.

M: And the next point?

G: "By this order." Is it an order or an agreement? It seems to be an agreement. This whole document is an agreement.

M: It establishes the details of the order for the Executive Headquarters. However, if that is confusing in the Chinese translation, you can make another suggestion.

G: I was thinking you could very well say "The Executive Headquarters will implement the agreed policies for the cessation of hostilities."

M: Is that agreeable?

C & G: Yes.

M: It is agreed to strike out the words "established by this order."

C & G: Yes.

G: Then the part "The Headquarters will submit recommendations." First of all, to whom will the Headquarters submit its recommendations?

M: We did not like it in there for the reason that it is a rather lengthy statement. In the preceding paragraph the implication "with the approval of the National Government" in the English defines the Headquarters under which this was going to operate. Now you have three Commissioners, each with a responsibility each to a different chief. Certainly each one would report to his Chief or his Government or Party. The record copy though should go to the Generalissimo. Now that is rather a complicated statement. There was no doubt in our minds that each Commissioner would report to his own Chief. Therefore, why complicate the paragraph by stating that? The only purpose for a reference of that kind would be a prohibition against his making such reports which we assume to be quite out of the question. Therefore, this statement was put in this simple form and the last sentence implies the whole, which reads: "The formal instructions unanimously agreed upon by the three Commissioners, will be issued in the name of the President of the Republic of China." Is that satisfactory?

G: It is all right. Then the phrase to include disarmament of the Japanese forces. Does this phrase follow the word "agreements to insure" "Agreements to include"?

M: "To insure more effective implementation of the Cessation of Hostilities orders to include ["] the Cessation of Hostilities Orders. It covers all of these things I think.

G: What includes it?

M: How would you wish to state it?

G: Recommendations covering the disarmament?

B: He is wondering what includes this?

M: The recommendations they submit will include matters on this subject.

G: Rather change to "Such recommendations to include"?

B: All right.

M: Would it not also be required in connection with that last modification to add the words after include "measures for."

G: Yes, that's right.

M: "Such recommendations to include measures for disarmament of the Japanese forces."

M: The next to the last line, the word "representatives" should read "commissioners".

G: Do you think the word "functions" would be better than "mission".

M: I will now read the paragraph as I understand it has been amended acceptable to you two gentlemen: "Functions. The Executive Headquarters will implement the agreed policies for cessation of hostilities. The Headquarters will submit recommendations covering necessary additional subsidiary agreements to insure more effective implementation of the cessation of hostilities orders; such recommendations to include measures for the disarmament of the Japanese forces, restoration of lines of communication and coordination of the movement of Japanese soldiers to the coast for repatriation. The formal instructions unanimously agreed upon by the three commissioners will be issued in the name of the President of the Republic of China." Is that agreeable to you gentlemen.

G: Yes.

C: Yes.

M: It is so agreed.

M: On the next page the leading paragraph is entitled, "Jurisdiction". In view of the various exceptions and all, the whole paragraph may be omitted, because we are going into the details of that very exactly.

G: Agreed.

C: Yes.

M: The next paragraph is entitled, "Organization". At the end of the paragraph the word "representatives" should read "commissioners". Are there any suggestions for amendments.

G: These three words "of the group" at the end of the first paragraph can be omitted. To make it read, "the U. S. representative will be invited to be the chairman." The second sentence in the second paragraph, "The Chinese representatives shall be accordingly divided between the National Government and the Chinese Communist Party"[;] the idea of this is that the two sides should have an equal number of personnel in the Operations section. Is that the intention?

M: That is the intention.

G: If that is so, we believe it should read, "The National Government and the Chinese Communist Party will have an equal number of personnel in the Operations Section.

M: Will you repeat that again.

G: The National Government and the Chinese Communist Party will have an equal number of personnel in the Operations Section.

M: No other comments.

C: No objection.

M: I will reread this paragraph as now amended: "Organization. The Executive Headquarters will consist of three commissioners with authority to vote, and to negotiate among themselves; one to repre-

sent the Chinese National Government; one to represent the Chinese Communist Party and one to represent the United States of America. The United States representative will be invited to be the chairman. The Headquarters will have within itself as its implementing agency a group to be called the Operations Section composed of the number of officers and men required to supervise in the field the various agreements, and to render the required reports. The National Government and the Chinese Communist Party will have an equal number of personnel in the Operations section. There will be included within the executive headquarters the necessary secretarial staff to support the headquarters." Is that acceptable?

G: Yes.

C: Yes.

M: It is agreed.

M: Next paragraph is entitled, "Housing and Supply". Certain portions have been struck out in your copies. Are there any comments? Next to the last line, first word, should be "headquarters". We might have said about the representatives, too. Are there any comments?

G: We take it that this sentence means if the personnel of the headquarters should go out to these various places they will be protected by small units.

M: It refers to immediate security.

G: In that case this sentence would not apply.

M: We could say headquarters and detachments will be—after the word, "headquarters" put "and detachments". Local security and headquarters and detachments.

G: Attachments or detachments?

M: Detachments.

G: Forces of each party. Does it mean each of the three parties?

M: No. Forces of each Army. That refers to the National Army and the Chinese Communist Army. It must be understood that this does not apply to U. S. troops.

G: No, that is understood. Governor Chang says that the Government will provide housing accommodations and subsistence and also protection for the executive headquarters. Since the executive headquarters will be located in Peiping, the Government will be responsible for the security of the personnel of the headquarters and it will be confusing if both sides should provide certain units for maintaining the security of the headquarters, but when certain personnel should be sent out to the field, then they would be protected by the units belonging to that side which happens to be in control of those places. General Chou seems to be of the same opinion, but he likes to know whether it was the original intention of the person, or persons,

who drafted this paragraph that when both sides bring large numbers of personnel to the headquarters, would they also bring along certain guards in small numbers for the protection of their respective personnel.

M: The intention when the draft of the paragraph was made, first it was drafted without a knowledge of where the headquarters would be placed. To provide for the security of the headquarters and as it was a combined headquarters it was the feeling that there should be an equal representative, maybe not an equal representation, but at least a representation of the side who had no troops, or fighting troops, in that vicinity. Whatever the troops that are brought in should be in accordance with the agreement of the headquarters and not of the choice of the individuals. That would be my conception. I don't think we can write this solely for Peiping because it may prove later desirable to move the headquarters when we are sure that communications and other conveniences in the paragraph should apply to wherever we go. It is assumed that these detachments are very small forces, customarily around a headquarters. With us they would be military police detachments. I am not talking about regiments, brigades or divisions. I am not talking about large units, more in platoons and I was assuming that this arrangement would be by agreement as in other matters. This paragraph stating the policy.

G: General Chang still is of the opinion that it is much better to entrust the security of the headquarters to the local authorities and the local authorities would only use police and gendarmes for this purpose and it would be confusing if you let both sides to bring in a number of men to protect the respective sides and if anything would happen then the local authorities would say each side has its own protection.

B: I think you have misunderstood the remark, local security. I had in mind mostly immediate guards, say at your radio station. Each party will have [a?] radio station. Perhaps there will be your men to protect the immediate security of the code file. I am speaking here of a very few men around by the headquarters by local security.

C: I agree without making any amendments.

M: I think the trouble is over the employment of the word local. We had in mind, as Colonel Byroade has said, guards such as are around these quarters here, guards around the various radio stations; guards meaning sentinels guarding the record rooms and sentinels guarding the entrance and exits into and from the buildings. We were not referring to deployment of battalions or major units to guard a locality. The Communist Party will have certain number of rooms, certain number of records and a radio station. All we had in mind is they would have their own soldiers to guard those. We did not have

in mind that in Peiping, for example, the Communist Party would bring in, the Communist Army would send in troops to deploy in defense of half of the headquarters. The question then as I see it is this. If the headquarters is located entirely within the zone of one Army, will the representatives of the other Army be authorized to have the necessary individual guards for their particular offices and their radio stations, for example.

G: Can it be made more clear.

M: How would you suggest.

G: To distinguish what you mean by local security from general security.

M: How would you suggest.

G: General Chang has in mind the distinction between general and local security. The general security of the place should be intrusted to the local authorities, but the protection of personnel may be taken up by small units.

M: How do you propose to word this.

G: I don't know.

M: How would this read: "Immediate security for offices, quarters, and installations will be provided by military personnel of each other Army as requested and agreed upon." Now previously we had a sentence in there, "Over all security will be furnished principally by the National Government and Chinese Communist Party forces. We might precede that by "Over all security will be furnished by the local commanders" if you want to say that, but we can leave it with that sentence I have just read. What do you think of that.

G: Over-all security.

M: Yes. I am talking about this sentence I have just read.

G: Military personnel, what were the words following military personnel?

M: Of each Army. I could say individual military personnel.

B: I think that is all right.

G: We would like to retain the sentence that has been stricken out but in another form: "Over all security will be furnished by the local authorities. Immediate security of offices, quarters and installations will be provided by small units of each Army as required and agreed upon."

M: Will be provided by small units of each Army as required and agreed upon. Now the first, "Over all security will be furnished by the local authorities.", that is all?

G: Yes.

C: I agree.

M: Then the paragraph now reads: "Housing and Supply. The

National Government will furnish adequate living and office accommodations for the Executive Headquarters. The National Government will also furnish the subsistence for this Headquarters. Over all security will be furnished by the local authorities. Immediate security for offices, quarters, and installations will be provided by small units of each Army as required and agreed upon." Is that acceptable?

G: Yes.

C: Yes.

M: The paragraph is so ordered. The next paragraph is headed "Location. The Executive Headquarters will be located initially at Peiping." I have inserted the word initially. Any comment regarding that?

C: OK.

G: Yes.

M: That is adopted. The next paragraph "Procedure", you have the changes there[,] have you any comment?

G: Does the second sentence in the second paragraph mean that when a decision has been taken by certain commissioners one side through its head may veto the decision. Does it mean that?

M: The intention of the sentence was this, that first the commissioners could veto it by refusing to agree to it. If he agrees and the other two commissioners agree, then it is an accepted arrangement to go through the formality of being issued in the name of the President of China. The paragraph was intended to indicate that before reaching an agreement, the individual commissioner, or his chief acting through the commissioner—I think it is badly written and I would like to hear your proposal, because once the commissioners have agreed. The problem as I see it is this. If the commissioner has no latitude then all—every detail will have to be referred to his chief. Certainly all matters of policy will have to go to his chief, but if he has no discretion there for himself, he is merely a figurehead. Now how to construct the sentence?

G: You say "proposed action." If it is a proposed action it is not an action, it is not a decision at all, it is simply under consideration, it hasn't become a valid decision. If that is the case then you can not apply the word "veto."

M: Let's take the word "veto" out then?

G: Yes, personally I think the whole sentence is useless; when you have already said "All actions must be unanimous decisions" then this is just useless.

M: Yes. Do you agree to that General Chou? I think everything is implied in the second sentence, so it is agreed that we strike out the sentence?

C & G: Yes.

C: General Chou inquires whether you stick to your original intentions to establish several subsidiary headquarters, or something like that, or you would only have such teams as are included in "The Operations Section will dispatch supervisory and reporting teams as required." This means there are dispatched no others than these teams?

M: These teams will operate from these various stations and control points set up.

C: Do you still have subsidiary headquarters?

M: No, we didn't contemplate that, but the team will be there and it can be enlarged according to the circumstances. If the situation is difficult or enlarged in that place the team will have to be larger, that will mean there will [*sic*] both in and out. We have the machinery at the present time for five places. If we get additional communications we can have more places, but the size of the team will depend upon what is to be done at that particular place. The radio will be the means for the team to keep in touch with the main headquarters. The suggestion that Colonel Byroade makes is that the paragraph you mention is, "The Operation Section will establish sub-headquarters and will dispatch" and so on.

C: Yes.

M: And, as I say, we have five communications sections at the present time.

C: Yes.

M: I am going to change that paragraph again, in the second line, "teams as required to implement the policies and agreements."

C: Second paragraph?

M: Yes, second line, "teams as required to implement the policies and agreements.[""]

G: Are there any proposed alterations?

M: Yes, in the paragraph in the middle of page four, "The Operations Section will" it reads "dispatch". General Chou and myself have agreed at [*on?*] these modifications: "The Operations Section will establish sub-headquarters and will", and it reads on, "dispatch supervisory and reporting teams as required," you strike out next two words "to implement the policies and agreements." "The Operations Section will dispatch sub-headquarters—[""]

G: "Dispatch sub-headquarters"?

M: "The Operations Section will dispatch sub-headquarters—" that doesn't make it good English then.

G: Leave out "Dispatch sub-headquarters".

M: No. "and will dispatch supervisory and reporting team as required to implement the policies and agreements."

G: But take out "proper implementation"?

M: Yes. "to implement the policies and agreements."

G: Sub-headquarters for the Operations Section, not for the Executive Headquarters itself?

M: Yes, it is for the Executive Headquarters. The Operations Section is a subordinate part. The Operations Section is going to do it, but it is working for the Executive Headquarters. This is not a new set of Commissioners.

C & G: No.

G: The word "Headquarters" is very confusing—sub-headquarters, sub-station—

M: "Sub-stations", is that more acceptable?

G: Yes, "sub-stations", that is the word.

C: Sub-stations.

M: "stations" or "sections"? "Stations" I guess is all right. "will establish sub-stations and will dispatch supervisory."

G: I think instead of "will" you should use "may establish."

M: All right. "May establish sub-stations and will dispatch supervisory and reporting teams as required to implement the policies and agreements."

G: Is it right that anything that is adopted and decided upon by the Executive Headquarters should be in the name of the President of the Republic?

M: The Executive Headquarters will issue the necessary formal instructions and amendments in the name of the President of the Republic of China.

G: So whatever reports are submitted by the Headquarters would also be in the name of the President of the Republic of China?

M: Yes, but the reports here are up to the Operations Section.

G: We are referring to the first paragraph of page four "Daily reports will be rendered to the President of the Republic of China and to the Chairman of the Central Committee, Chinese Communist Party."

M: That report would be done in the name of the Executive Headquarters.

G: But if everything is in the name of the President of the Republic that would be—

M: No, this is just a situation report.

G: Would it not be better to leave the Commissioners to report themselves?

M: The Commissioners generally discuss these matters.

G: Yes, but the Commissioners will report the discussions back to their Chiefs?

M: Yes, but there is a lot of detailed reporting that is like troop

movements, number of men, number of Japanese disarmed, miles of railroad reconstruction, etc. to be reported on. We can do this in the name of the Commissioners if you desire, but there is a wealth of detail that has got to be prepared by somebody. You are going to be involved in progressive reports on the development of certain things, on the reconstruction of the railroads, reports on accidents, reports on such troop movements as may be required, the reports on where the various units are. All those things are ordinary, functional details which would almost stop the Commissioners from doing the business of policy-making. Now the Commissioners can control it, or stop it if you want to, but in the end you are making office boys of the Commissioners.

B: The Operations Section works for the three Commissioners.

M: It isn't an independent agency. We are trying to define what the duties are, but if you want to qualify it, we can do this. Listen to this: "Daily reports will be prepared by the Operations Section and rendered by the Commissioners." How would this do? "Daily reports will be prepared by the Operations Section to be rendered by the Commissioners to the President of the Republic of China and to the Chairman of the Central Committee, Chinese Communist Party." I'll read that again: "Daily reports will be prepared by the Operations Section to be rendered by the Commissioners to the President of the Republic of China and to the Chairman of the Central Committee, Chinese Communist Party."

C: All right.

M: Is that all right with you?

G: Could you say "to be rendered by the Commissioners to their respective Chiefs?"

B: That we assume will be done anyway. This was a report of the whole Headquarters. I would like very much to cross it out all together.

G: Cross the whole thing out, the whole paragraph out?

B: I would rather cross it out rather than change it as suggested. We assume here that they will have their independent signal communications and that each Commissioner will report daily or as many times as they want to to their Chiefs.

G: That is what we think, that it is quite unnecessary to have a special report.

M: Let's have it like this: "The daily reports will be prepared by the Operations Section to be rendered to the Commissioners.[""]

B: Don't you think there ought to be one official report which goes to everybody? It seems to me that is a necessity.

G: If the reports are prepared by the Operations Section and rendered to the Commissioners, there will only be one report?

B: That isn't what he means, he means that we are blocking other reports. That isn't the intention to block other reports.

M: Here is probably your trouble and our trouble. In the American Army on the staff there has to be a daily report, that is a technical report. The Commander doesn't read everything that comes in, there is too much of it, so it is digested for him, but from this report he will get the essential facts, but wouldn't have special things on policy, special points of view from the Commissioners to their Chief. We are talking about the ordinary operating procedure of a well organized headquarters. Maybe we are all wrong on this. I told them to put something of this sort in, because I thought the record requires a daily report of the one hundred details that will be coming up from all over the regions. I am not talking about policy, I am not talking about the critical decisions, I am talking about this mass of things which is put together into a report so there will not be great gaps in the understanding of the higher officials. For the protection of the officials, for the protection of the interests of the United States Government, I would feel that it was quite essential to know that Mao Tse-tung had received a detailed operations report. What else he received I am not concerned with, but I am concerned what the reports of this or of that or of the dozens of things that will come in, too much for the Headquarters, enough to flood the Headquarters, that all of that will go out in a business-like form, because the United States Government has a responsibility, through the presence of its own individual there, and there can be little misunderstanding if all the details are covered in a report of this kind. What you propose to call it is something else.

C: General Chou entirely agrees with your amendment made to this paragraph. "Daily reports will be prepared by the Operations Section to be rendered by the Commissioners to their respective Chiefs."

M: You wish the word "respective" chiefs?

C & G: Yes.

M: It would now read this way: "Daily reports will be prepared by the Operations Section to be rendered by the Commissioners to their respective Chiefs." Is that acceptable?

C & G: Yes.

M: Is there any other paragraph?

G: The Director of the Operations Section will be an United States Army officer should be changed to "The Operations Section will have a U. S. Army officer as its director".

M: "The Operations Section will have an United States Army Officer as its director." But we will not concede the point on "an". Is that acceptable?

C: Yes.

G: Yes.

M: Is there any other paragraph?

G: The last paragraph refers to radio installations. Is that right?

M: Yes.

G: We would like to suggest the addition of a phrase to the last paragraph. Where may the stations be established, at the place of the headquarters? Where may such signal communication be installed.

B: They would be if we each had individual signal communications out of the Executive Headquarters—three radio stations at the Executive Headquarters. It was my opinion that the sub-sections would be merely contact points for parties of three going out in the field to report in to the Executive Headquarters and as such there would probably be only one radio station at each sub-station, with each member of the party being able to send anything he wants to send to the Executive Headquarters.

M: But at the Executive Headquarters there would be these three individual stations for communications with the Generalissimo, with Mao and with the American Embassy.

G: Then at each sub-station.

M: We don't have enough sets for that, we were referring to the main headquarters. It's just a question of how much equipment is available. If you have the equipment. It is within the agreement to do as much as you want in setting it up.

G: Then would it be better to make it clearer by saying, "Each may maintain independent signal communications at the place where the Executive Headquarters is located."

M: "The National Government of the Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party will each maintain signal communications at the location of the Executive Headquarters."

C: General Chou doesn't think it is practical because the headquarters Commissioners have each separate communication system with his own troops in the field. Therefore communications cannot be restricted to the location of headquarters alone.

B: It appears to me that once you get stations, the people could contact anyone you wanted.

M: We are not asking you to tear down your stations. We are making sure each one had communications. Is that agreeable?

G: Yes.

C: Yes.

M: Then this is the paragraph on procedure. "Procedure. The Executive Headquarters will operate as the executives of the National Government, the Chinese Communist Party and the United States

respectively. The three commissioners shall each have one vote. All action must be by unanimous agreement. The Executive Headquarters will issue the necessary formal orders, directives, and instructions in the name of the President of the Republic of China. Daily reports will be prepared by the Operation Section to be rendered by the commissioners to their respective chiefs. The Executive Headquarters will operate through its Operations Section. The Operations Section will have a United States Army Officer as its director. The Operations Section will supervise the publication and dissemination of all orders, directives, and instructions to all forces concerned. The Operations Section may establish sub-stations and will dispatch supervisory and reporting teams as required to implement the policies and agreements. The National Government, the Chinese Communist Party and the United States may each maintain independent signal communications at the location of the Executive Headquarters." That completes the paragraph. Is it acceptable.

G: Yes.

C: Yes.

M: It is so ordered. We come down to the last paragraph. Any comments on it. I have several changes to propose to that. May I read it?

"The Executive Headquarters shall remain in existence and operate until this agreement is rescinded by the President of the Republic of China or the Chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party after due notification to the other party." Scratch out there after Chinese Communist Party, scratch out remainder. I will read it again. "The Executive Headquarters shall remain in existence and operate until this agreement is rescinded by the President of the Republic of China or the Chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party after due notification to the other party." Is that agreeable?

G: Yes.

C: Yes.

M: Then, gentlemen, we have reached agreement as to the form of this document and I will have a clear copy prepared tonight and sent to you. I will also have a clear copy of the policies or exceptions which have been agreed upon sent to you. We have agreed upon a form for the order for the cessation of hostilities. May I suggest that an effort be made to secure approval of those documents as soon as possible so it will only remain to fill in the disputed points. It seems to me that will save us time later on. That is only a suggestion. As the hour is late I suggest that we adjourn, but I would like to have your desires as to the next meeting.

C: General Chou suggests tomorrow afternoon.

G: General Chang says 4:30.

M: Then it is agreed that we adjourn now to meet again tomorrow here at 4:30.

Agreed release to press: Major portions of the problem have been settled but there remain some details to be agreed upon.

[Annex]

GENERAL HSIUNG SHIH-HUI'S RADIOGRAM OF OCTOBER 31

Agreement was come to with the Soviet, Chief of Staff General Bochkovsky as follows:

1. Soviet troops formerly station[ed] in Yinkow to be withdrawn before Nov. 10, to west of the Santoukou-Hanchia-Chifang-Sanchiatsu-Chiensihchiaotsu - Niushukow - Tienchuantai - Szumiaotzu - Chingmachuantzu-Erhkiakow line, the line itself to be garrisoned by Soviet troops. For the purpose of keeping order, a small detachment of the Soviet City Garrison Headquarters will not evacuate Yinkow before Nov. 10. The Chinese Army can land south of the line but must not step over it. Beginning from Nov. 10, the Soviet Army will withdraw northward, its main strength to be withdrawn to Mukden, part of it to Antung and Liaotung Peninsula (between Nov. 10 and Nov. 20th, there will be troop train service between Dairen and Yinkow). On the same date the Soviet City Garrison Headquarters and its small detachment will evacuate Yinkow.

2. By Nov. 12, the Soviet Army will have been withdrawn to Takushan - Hsiyuen - Niuchuan - Panshan - Chinchow - Pingchuan-Hsiapancheng-Kupekow line.

3. By Nov. 15, the Soviet Army will have been withdrawn to Hsiyuen - Liaoyang - Siaopeiho - Heishan - Ichow - Chaoyang - Ningcheng-Changsanyin-Shanghwangchi line.

4. By Nov. 20th, the Soviet Army will have withdrawn to Tayintzu-Pengchi-Mukden (not included) - Sinlitun-Chihfeng-Tolun line.

5. The Soviet troops at Antung will have been withdrawn to Tahwangkow-Kwantien-Fengcheng-Tayintzu line by 25 Nov.

The above information has been radioed to General Tu Li-min, Commanding General of the Northeast Garrison.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Notes on Conference of Three (Meeting No. 4)—General Marshall, General Chang Chun, Central Government Representative, and General Chou En-lai, Communist Party Representative—at General Marshall's Residence, Chungking, January 9, 1946, 5 p. m.

M[ARSHALL]: If agreeable, the meeting will come to order. Has either of you gentlemen any proposition to make? Has General Chou any comment to make?

C[HOU]: No.

M: Did you receive the minutes on yesterday's meeting.

G[GENERAL CHANG]: Yes.

C: Yes.

M: Are there any comments regarding those minutes?

G: The minutes are being translated.

M: You are not ready to comment. We terminated the meeting last night and I submitted a possible compromise regarding Chihfeng and Tolun. Have you any comment to make regarding that?

G: We are ready to discuss, to continue our discussion on the basis of this draft (referring to the draft produced by General Marshall at the previous meeting).

M: We are ready to listen to General Chang.

G: We can accept this proposal in principle.

M: Can or cannot?

G: Can. According to our understanding with Soviet Russia, we should take over not only Chihfeng and Tolun, but also the regions south of those towns, but we are now willing to have those towns south of Chihfeng and Tolun discussed later on and for the time being, we will not enter into discussion of the taking over of those places, but as regards Chihfeng and Tolun, we will send limited numbers of troops as we have proposed to those places—Chihfeng and Tolun, but in regard to the first paragraph, I think the form will have to be changed. When you use the word Manchukuo, you have included Chahar. Now the term never included Chahar, though it included Jehol, we would rather see that the Northeast provinces, or the nine Provinces, expressly mentioned in this proposal as a separate unit. As regards Chahar and Jehol, we will only occupy the two places of Chihfeng and Tolun with a limited number of troops.

C: As regards Chihfeng and Tolun, we think that the Government claim is in principle unreasonable, because right now we are discussing the problem of cessation of hostilities and not the problem of taking over certain territories in accordance with any treaty or agreement. For if we base our discussion on treaties or agreements, then we would not only have the Sino-Soviet agreement, but we may also have Sino-American agreements or other agreements. Regardless whether the Sino-Soviet agreement exists or not as it has been accounted in General Hsiung's telegram or what this agreement is, if we take it as a basis of our discussion, it would not only affect these two cities, but would also involve other places in and around those territories. Governor Chang has just said that right now the Government only claims sovereignty of those two towns and would leave other places for later discussion and from this reasoning it can be deduced that the Government may also lay claim on other places,

possibly others than those two towns later. Based upon the same reason, the Government may claim in future that in accordance with General MacArthur's order,⁶⁰ it is entitled to take over all places which have already been taken over by Communist troops, but it was just this particular problem, who should have the right to participate in the receiving of surrender, we have had military hostilities during the past four months. Our immediate concern is that hostilities must be ceased and after it has been effected then we will start to solve political problems. When touching the political problems we will have to discuss such matters as the location of troops, the reorganization of Armies, etc. as I have stated yesterday and therefore our party is of the opinion that irrespective whether the Sino-Soviet agreement exists, and how it is worded, it is not our concern. Yesterday I have suggested that if it affects Soviet Russia then we may invite Soviet representatives to explain this matter and to discuss it, but Government representatives have made no reply to my suggestion. This proves that it is not necessary to have the present conference linked up with the Sino-Soviet agreement. As to the actual facts in Chihfeng and Tolun right now there are Chinese troops who are assuming sovereignty over those two towns. Of course, these troops are Communist troops, but after the reorganization of the Army we may discuss the location of troops, as it is a political problem which we certainly will take up later. Furthermore, from the telegram we can see that what we are now discussing are matters which should have been completed in November, all this now are things of the past and those two towns have been taken over by the Communist troops. Now we have already stipulated certain exceptions to which after consideration we have given our consent, but now we definitely cannot agree with this particular exception. On the exception of Manchuria we have from the very beginning stated that we may agree on it and later the government representative has raised new exceptions, such as the movements of troops in regions south of the Yangtze River for the purpose of military reorganization and we have accepted this point. The same is with the problems of demobilization and redistribution. All these show that I have done my best to agree on anything that I am in a position to do so. We have since the very beginning asked for unconditional cessation of hostilities and for these reasons we have raised no condition. In the present conference it was our hope that cessation of hostilities order may be published as soon as possible because this is in the interest of the people and is also the hope of all the people. Now agreement has been reached on the

⁶⁰ General Order No. 1: Instruments for the Surrender of Japan, August 15, 1945; *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. vii, p. 530.

cessation of hostilities order and on the executive headquarters and I am of the opinion that these agreements should be carried into effect immediately. If it is said that unless the exception of Chihfeng and Tolun are accepted all our past agreements shall become invalid, then it means that our cessation of hostilities is not an unconditional one. If the government insists that it must take over these two cities and is not afraid to take military action for this purpose, then I must state definitely that the responsibility will not be on our side. Therefore, it is my earnest request that this order of cessation of hostilities may be immediately published and agreement on executive headquarters be at once effected and would not regard the questions of Chihfeng and Tolun as a prerequisite to such matters.

G: General Chou has said that we are discussing questions relating to the cessation of hostilities and not to any treaties or agreements. This is quite true and I entirely agree with his views. For this reason I did not answer the suggestion made by General Chou that we should invite Soviet Russia to participate in our discussions because, like him, I thought that our discussions had nothing to do with Soviet Russia, apart from the fact that there are certain arrangements with Soviet Russia which have some bearing on the position we have taken. The reason why I introduced the question of our arrangements or agreements with Soviet Russia was simply because, according to our understandings with Soviet Russia there are certain regions which we should take over, and this is not a condition precedent to the cessation of hostilities. This is simply a part of the various topics that are under discussion on the subject of cessation of hostilities. We have never said anything or suggested anything as a condition for cessation of hostilities. I would like to make this point very clear. General Chou has said that at present the Government is pressing for the carrying out of the terms of our understandings with Soviet Russia. Therefore we must take over Chihfeng and Tolun. He has expressed the fear that in the future we might press for the taking over of other places south of those towns. Now, although according to our agreements with Soviet Russia we are duty bound to take over those places evacuated by Soviet troops, yet we are now only in the process of taking over Chihfeng and Tolun. Other regions may be arranged as a part of the general plan concerning the reorganization of troops, including Communist troops. So this also I want to make clear. I feel what General Marshall has proposed in the second paragraph of the draft that is before us is entirely in agreement with my viewpoint. He has also suggested that, for the time being, inasmuch as we are already on the way of taking over Chihfeng and Chahar, we will be permitted to establish a certain number of troops

in those places. The fears as expressed by General Chou in regard to the possibility of the Government asking for the taking over of other places south of Chihfeng and Tolun by virtue of our arrangements with Soviet Russia or in pursuance of any orders issued by General MacArthur, those fears are really not well founded because those things we have never thought about. After the cessation of hostilities everything will be arranged and settled according to terms of our agreement, so any questions concerning regions in Chahar and Jehol south of Chihfeng and Tolun can be arranged later on, in any manner as permitted by whatever arrangements we reach here. So General Chou really should not entertain any fear as regards those regions.

M: May I interrupt? As I understand General Chou, his fear was that a precedent was established which would be utilized in further discussions regarding other points in Jehol and Chahar. Is that correct?

C: This is one of his reasons.

M: I was just asking this one question.

C: Yes, but not all.

M: Yes, I understand. I interrupted you, General Chang.

G: We are now discussing these questions before the cessation of hostilities. After the cessation of hostilities everything will be arranged and fixed according to the terms of our agreement, so no precedent can be established. If we continue our discussions without reaching any definite result, without cessation of hostilities, then when one concession has been made on Chihfeng and Tolun we may ask for some other advantages. This may create a precedent, but after the cessation of hostilities conditions will entirely be changed, so the question of precedent does not arise. We want to emphasize the point that we are not attempting to introduce any condition precedent to agreeing on the cessation of hostilities, but it happens that we are just advancing to take over Chihfeng and Chahar in accordance with our obligation arising out of an agreement with Soviet Russia, and now that more than ninety percent of our difficulties have been overcome, it seems that we should reach an agreement as soon as possible on the general question of the cessation of hostilities. Now we are far from setting up any obstacles or creating any conditions to the realization of our common hopes. General Chou referred to the date fixed for taking over Chihfeng and Chahar. He seems to think that the date has already passed and that these places have already been taken over by Communist troops, but General Chang would like to point out that the date has been postponed by agreement and the date is approaching now as newly fixed, and the date was postponed because of the difficulty we met with in effecting our

taking over. We also earnestly hope that the Communist Party can see its way to accept our suggestion as one of the exceptions.

C: The points which have been raised by Governor Chang, I think, are conflicting with each other in certain respects. First, Governor Chang referred to the fact that the Chinese Government has certain obligations toward other countries, but I wish to point out that China has many obligations toward foreign countries, but why take up this one particular obligation without paying regard to the others? Concerning these two towns, I have repeatedly stated that they have already been taken over by Communist troops. Secondly, Governor Chang also admits that this would now serve as a precedent for the future. If that is the case, why should we take certain steps which may provide ground for precedent? Thirdly, regarding the date in General Hsiung's telegram, it referred to some time in November, but the Government troops have not reached those places in the afore-said time, and the Communist troops have taken them over, and this is a matter which happened more than a month ago, and, fourthly, according to treaties the Soviet Russian War Theater is entirely restricted to Manchuria—to the nine provinces of Manchuria, while the actions taken by the Russian troops in Jehol and Chahar are entirely due to emergency military needs with no reference in any agreement. Therefore, I conclude that if the Government insists that an exception should be made regarding these two towns, and have it recorded in our minutes attached to the order of the cessation of hostilities, then it would mean that the Government is continuing the hostilities, for otherwise the Chinese Communist troops have to evacuate those towns. Right now, though the Government has already concentrated certain large forces in Manchuria, there are still many places in Manchuria left in the hands of the Soviet Russian troops and have not been taken over. But the Government right now is not sending its troops to those places, but direct one Army into Jehol in order to take over those two towns, and therefore I can under no condition accept such an exception.

M: Gentlemen, it appears to me that there is a complete disagreement with no prospect immediately before us of reaching any acceptable compromise. It seems too bad to me that we have so nearly reached complete agreement on a large number of difficult problems and then at the end we reach a complete impasse. I have been debating in my mind whether it was appropriate for me to suggest any other form of compromise. I had thought of the possibility of suggesting that a group of three representatives should be sent to the two towns in question to take over control in the name of the executive headquarters while the political settlement of the matter was reached. However, I do not think it advisable to submit this proposition at

this time and I therefore am of the personal opinion that we gain nothing further by continuing our present discussion. We only get into a more complicated state of misunderstanding, or rather definition of point of view, so that it appears to me that it would be best, if agreeable to you gentlemen to adjourn this meeting until say 10:30 tomorrow morning in the hope that in the meantime some other basis of compromising can be found. There is no doubt in my mind it would be a tragedy to have this conference fail at the last moment and particularly on the eve of your consultative conference. I therefore propose that we adjourn until tomorrow morning at 10:30.

G: Unfortunately the time you suggested conflicts with the time at which the first meeting of PCC will take place—at 10 o'clock.

M: I thought it was noon.

M: What is your suggestion.

G: Some time in the afternoon.

M: Tomorrow afternoon. What hour.

G: Any time in the afternoon, say 3:30.

C: It will suit General Chou.

G: General Chang has another conflict of schedule at 3 o'clock. There will be another exchange of views between the representatives of the Kuomintang in the PCC and the representatives of the Communist party at the same hour. Governor Chang suggest 5 tomorrow afternoon.

C: I can come any time.

M: Well then, as I understand it, we adjourn until 5 o'clock tomorrow afternoon and we are left with a most unfortunate situation of starting the PCC with the hostilities still in force, and this meeting is adjourned.

C: General Chou has the same feeling, that it is most unfortunate.

M: (To General Chou) Here is a copy I have obtained from the combined headquarters of this message.⁶¹ That is for your file.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Notes on Meeting of Conference of Three (Meeting No. 5)—General Marshall, General Chang Chun, Central Government Representative, and General Chou En-lai, Communist Party Representative—at General Marshall's Residence, Chungking, January 10, 1946, 8:15 a. m.

M[ARSHALL]: If agreeable to you gentlemen the meeting will come to order. Last night I had a talk with the Generalissimo and he generously agreed to the issuance of the order for the cessation of hostilities without reference to Chihfeng and Tolun.

⁶¹This has reference to the radiogram from General Hsiung, October 31, (annex), p. 98.

G[ENERAL CHANG]: After I had reported to the Generalissimo he expressed the hope that we could continue our discussions, conclude our discussions, so that the order for the cessation of hostilities could be issued at the earliest possible time. Therefore, we would not at this junction press for an immediate solution of the question of Chih-feng and Tolun which would be a part of the problems relating to Jehol and Chahar. The Generalissimo has full confidence in General Marshall and wishes to place these problems into the hands of General Marshall for a just and equitable solution.

C[HOU]: I feel very gratified to hear the statement made by General Marshall and Governor Chang. I have full confidence that the Generalissimo is eager to have this order published without delay due to Chihfeng and Tolun.

M: I appreciate very much the statement the Governor has made quoting the Generalissimo regarding me personally and I appreciate very much General Chou's references to me personally. I assure you, gentlemen, that my purpose to the best of my mental equipment is directed solely to an effort to help as much as possible in solving a very complex problem. However, with your permission I will not refer to the problem of Chihfeng and Tolun until after we complete the small details that remain to be understood. Therefore, if that is agreeable, I would like to go over finally the statement of exceptions and understandings. The first paragraph reads: "It is understood and herewith reentered as a matter of record to the minutes of these conferences that the cessation of hostilities as now agreed upon was agreed upon with the understanding that the following should be included within the formal minutes of the meeting.

1. Paragraph *b*, cessation of hostilities order does not prejudice military movements south of the Yangtze River for the continued execution of the plan of military reorganization of the National Government." I am assuming, gentlemen, if there is any difference you will interrupt and raise the issue.

"Paragraph 2. Paragraph *b*, cessation of hostilities order does not prejudice military movements of forces of the National Army into or within Manchuria or toward ports in China for embarkation for Manchuria which are for the purpose of restoring Chinese sovereignty." That is the first time that. . . .⁶²

G: The Governor was referring to the opinion he expressed before that it seems desirable to use the original wording of this paragraph without referring to the method of transporting troops. He would like to know whether the word "ports" includes all ports in China. Now at certain times of the year Hulutao may not become navigable and other ports can not be made available for immediate use by the

⁶² Points appear in the original.

Chinese troops, it would seem difficult for the Government to use certain ports that could be used, but does the word "ports" refer to any port in China. For instance, Chinwangtao?

M: My recollection of the previous discussion was that Chinwangtao was specifically mentioned by me as an example of where a port would be available for use even though within China in the event that ports in Manchuria were not available due to being frozen. However, no reference was made by me to any other port than Chinwangtao, as I understood that did not freeze up. If Chinwangtao should freeze up, an issue would be raised regarding some other port, but I should think that could be settled by agreement. General Chou?

C: If Governor Chang thinks that the wording here is too rigid and entails difficulties, General Chou suggests that this phrase, "toward ports in China for embarkation to Manchuria", be stricken out so that we will only have "into or within Manchuria". General Chou thinks that he can agree with that providing it is stipulated in paragraph 5 that reports have to be sent daily to the executive headquarters and under this condition if Government wishes to move troops to Manchuria through Communist territories then they should first make a report to executive headquarters and have it talked over there so there will be no difficulty for their transit.

M: Governor, would this be acceptable in its present form, or towards ports in China for Manchuria if it was understood and agreed to by General Chou that Chinwangtao would be available in the event that Hulutao was unavailable. Would that be all right?

G: The Governor accepts the suggestion made by General Chou that this phrase be stricken out entirely.

M: My understanding of that suggestion of General Chou that that phrase be stricken out involves an interpretation of the proposed paragraph 4. That proposed paragraph 4 provides for a daily report. As now written it does not involve an agreement. Is that understood by General Chou.

C: General Chou understood that in paragraph 4 only the question of reports is involved, but if the National Army are to pass through Communist territories like in Jehol then he understands that of course the Government would first discuss with the Communist representative.

M: I also understand. As I understand it the words, "or towards ports in China for Manchuria" will be stricken out. Is that correct?

G: Yes.

C: Yes.

M: So ordered. The next exception now labelled paragraph 3 reads lines of communications mentioned in paragraph c, cease hostilities, includes post communications. The fourth paragraph which

has not been approved reads as follows: "It is further agreed that movements of forces of the National Army under the foregoing stipulations should be reported daily to the executive headquarters." Is that acceptable, General Chou?

C: Yes.

M: Is that acceptable, Governor Chang?

G: The Generalissimo has just telephoned to us to say that there are certain expressions or words in the translation of the cessation order which should be improved and he is having a new draft being sent to us, rather a corrected draft.

M: We will have to wait until we [have] received that. The American is acceptable.

G: Yes.

M: But the Chinese translation is in doubt.

C: General Chou is waiting for the Chinese translation.

M: I am now authorized as I understand it to include these special minutes as an accepted document.

G: Yes.

C: Yes.

M: Agreed.

M: With your permission then, Gentlemen, I will now turn to the actual order for the cessation of hostilities. The first paragraph of the document is a recommendation from this group to the Generalissimo and to Chairman Mao Tse-tung. May I understand that the two representatives are authorized to state for their chiefs that the body of the order as previously approved by them, the representatives, is acceptable?

G: Yes.

M: Is that correct, General Chou? (Discussion between General Chou and General Chang.) Will you translate that, please?

C: General Chou has asked Yen-an for approval of this order, and he now gets word from Yen-an that Yen-an has one more suggestion. First, that Yen-an ratifies this draft and, secondly, Yen-an suggested that the words "Chinese Communist troops" be changed to "Chinese Communist-led troops," because there are certain units which are not Communist troops but they are led by the Communists.

M: Are there any objections to that?

G: No objection.

C: In all places "Communist troops" should be changed into "Communist-led troops."

M: Is that acceptable?

G: Yes.

M: It is so ordered. Then it is agreed that this document, with

that alteration, is accepted by the Generalissimo and by Mao Tse-tung. Is that correct?

G: The Governor is not in a position to say definitely until we have received the note from the Generalissimo which is on its way.

M: Presumably that note refers to translations?

G: We are not too sure about that.

M: Then we will have to delay the formal acceptance of this document until the Governor has heard from the Generalissimo. Meanwhile, it would seem—is the Governor getting lost in papers?

B: General Chou, we have “Communist Armies” in the papers. I believe you said “Communist-led troops.” Would you rather substitute “troops” for “armies”?

C: It is the same in Chinese. There is no question in Chinese.

M: “Troops” and “Armies” are the same?

C: Yes.

M: Then every company commander is an army commander? I will submit for your consideration, pending the formal acceptance of the order, a draft of a proposed press release. The document appears long, but most of it is a quotation. The first paragraph reads: “We, General Chang Chun, Representative of the National Government, and General Chou En-lai, Representative of the Chinese Communist Party, have recommended to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and Chairman Mao Tse-tung and have been authorized by them to announce that the following order has been issued to all units, regular, militia, irregular and guerrilla, of the National Armies of the Republic of China and of the Communist-led troops of the Republic of China:” Then there follows a quotation of the order. Further it states, on page two, at the bottom of page one, “As a matter of public interest we are further authorized to announce that the following stipulations regarding the above Cessation of Hostilities Order were agreed upon and made a matter of record in the minutes of the conferences.” There then follows the exceptions. In the middle of page two, another paragraph appears: “We are also authorized to announce that the agreements, recommendations, and directives of the Executive Headquarters will deal only with the immediate problems raised by the cessation of hostilities and will not interfere with or impair the parties’ rights and authority to negotiate in the future, political agreements, or make recommendations covering the reorganization, integration, or deployment of National Government forces or forces of the Chinese Communist Party.”

G: General, we should like to pause for just one minute. This paragraph “or make recommendations”—does this phrase follow “will not interfere or make recommendations” or does it follow “the parties’ rights and authority to negotiate”?

B: The parties' rights.

G: "The parties' rights and authority" to make recommendations?

M: Do you wish to change it?

G: I want to be clear on this point.

B: "The Executive Headquarters will not interfere or will not make recommendations."

M: How do you want that in, "or will not make"?

G: "Or" or "and"? "And."

M: "and will make." All right. I might say that the point has been raised by some of those involved in drafting this that the whole paragraph, commencing "We are also authorized to announce," well might terminate with, after the word "hostilities" in the third line, the remainder of the paragraph they felt was a matter of course.

G: You intimate that the rest can be omitted?

M: The thing is that the rest is implicit. It was put in so there would be no technical misunderstanding, but it might well stop with after the word "hostilities."

G: The Governor would propose to take out all the words after "hostilities."

M: Is that acceptable to General Chou?

C: Yes.

M: All will be struck out after the word "hostilities." A period will go in after "hostilities." The next paragraph reads: "American participation within the Headquarters will be for the purpose of assisting the Chinese members in implementing the Cessation of Hostilities order." I would like to insert the word "solely"—"American participation within the Headquarters will be solely." Is the paragraph as amended by me acceptable?

C & G: Yes.

M: It is so ordered. The next paragraph reads, "The Executive Headquarters will include an Operations Section, composed of the number of officers and men required to supervise adequately in the field the various details." Any objection to that or is it acceptable?

C & G: Yes, sir.

M: It is so ordered. Next paragraph reads, "It is agreed that separate and independent signal communications systems may be established by the Operations Section for each Commissioner in order to insure rapid and unhampered communications." I would suggest there that the words "by the Operations Section" be struck out. Did you get my amendment?

G: Drop the words "by the Operations Section"? Yes.

M: Is that acceptable?

G: Yes.

M: Is that acceptable?

C: Yes.

M: So ordered. "The Headquarters will be located initially at Peiping." Is that acceptable?

C & G: Yes.

M: "The names of the Commissioners in the Executive Headquarters follows:"

G: I don't know who will be the Commissioner, they haven't been named yet. Nobody knows. They haven't been appointed.

M: All right, then we will have to strike out this last paragraph.

G: All right, take out the last paragraph.

C: Yes.

M: Now, I wish to read to you the first paragraph. Is that acceptable as written?

C: With the exception of the last line it should be "Communist-led troops."

G: General, the suggestions made by the Generalissimo only concern the Chinese text. They don't involve any changes.

M: Then we can finish with this now so that we can get it typed. Is that first paragraph acceptable?

C & G: Yes.

M: I propose that the blank spaces below in the next paragraph, which is a quotation from the Cessation of Hostilities Order, be filled in as follows: "As of 10 o'clock on the 10th of January of the year 1946 of the Republic." Or what is it?

C: 35th.

M: "35th year of the Republic." Is this the 10th of January?

C & G: Yes.

M: That should be "1000 hours". That makes it a. m. It will not be necessary to have any signature because this is a press release. Now may I make this—(discussion between General Chang and General Chou). I am trying to time this with that meeting.

G: But, according to this order everything will take effect on this date.

M: Yes. It won't get to the troops. The minute you receive it you stop. We can only do the best we can.

G: It will take a couple of days at least.

M: Yes, but nobody can specify the exact number of days. While you get it, the man over there may be fighting yet, but we can only do the best we can. There is no other way you can do it, because there is a varied time schedule all over China.

G: The Governor says that before we leave this room the order will have supposed to have taken effect.

M: Whenever you do it it will mean that. We could say 1:00 o'clock today, but we wouldn't gain anything one way or the other.

I participated in one Armistice where they took four hours. I was Chief of Operations of an Army, but the fighting went on for six or seven hours, but we still had the Armistice. That was Germany. We had prisoners, casualties, very heavy fighting.

G: Your conditions are different.

M: It is a matter of communications.

G: Yes, it is a matter of communications.

M: They were not sufficient there; they are not sufficient here. What's the difference? If you should select an hour when you are certain that everybody will have it, you are having fighting going on in a number of places for three or four days. Is that tolerable?

G: General Chang is afraid that it will take probably four or five days for the order to reach all the important cities, not to speak of far-flung places, and if we should say that this order will take effect today at 10:00 o'clock, then during a period of four or five days either side may be accused of violating the terms of the order because fighting is still going on during that period. He would inquire if it could be so arranged, as he discussed this question with General Chou before and General Chou also expressed the opinion that it would probably take four or five days, for the order to take effect. He now inquires if it would be in order if the order would be issued at 10:00 o'clock today and in the order will be fixed the date and time for it to take effect?

M: The present form of the Cessation of Hostilities Order involves that particular character of statement which you have just referred to.

G: "To carry out the following directive as from today at 10:00 o'clock. ["]

M: No, the form agreed upon for Cessation of Hostilities Order included a provision of that character which the Governor has just referred to. Will you translate that please?

C: General Chou favors the original form because he thinks this only stipulates that the order has been issued at this time and all the troops on receiving this order should immediately carry it into effect and if they cannot carry it into effect at the time stipulated, then it is only because they haven't received it, but immediately after receiving it they should stop firing.

M: I think what he is saying is the same thing I am thinking. If we should provide a time here for the cessation of hostilities, based on how long it would require to transmit this order to all the troops, you will have a period of very serious possible consequences with troops on both sides maneuvering for best advantage. That, I think, would be most regrettable. We are trying to cease hostilities and we should avoid difficulties.

C: Yes, General Chou entirely agrees.

G: There will be a period, however, during which conflict will occur in certain regions where the order has not been received and these conflicts are unavoidable.

M: But I think you get into much more serious ones if you leave it open. After the words, the following directive, all units, regular, etc. are ordered to carry out the following directive and then put a period right there.

G: Cut out the date and the hour.

M: Cut out the time.

G: All hostilities will cease immediately.

M: That means when you receive the order you stop. There is no way you can time this without having a longer interval in there with everybody playing for position and that is what I think should be avoided.

C: General Chou advises that the original should be retained but if it is more acceptable to leave it out then he thinks there should be an understanding between himself and Governor Chang that it would take three or four days to get a fixed time so that all orders will have reached the Armies in the front. Both sides should assure that [on] a certain date all orders must have reached the Armies in the front.

M: That would be one way to do that right here in the minutes and not publicize this complication to the troops. If the Governor and General Chou agree that the orders will be issued in such a manner as to reach the troops within certain number of days. Therefore, it would not be necessary to include in this any wording after the word directive.

G: Is it taken for granted that this order would be issued today.

M: Yes. That would be my understanding.

B: I think that ought to be in the minutes.

M: I have the proposal that we record here in the minutes, not to be a published exception that it is agreed that the order will be issued at noon today. If that is acceptable? That the words after the word directive be omitted, as of 10 hours on the 10th of January, that that be struck out. Do you wish to put in at noon? ⁶³

G: The Governor suggested to say in the forenoon.

M: That is agreeable.

C: Agreed.

M: The records of the minutes will show that General Chang and General Chou agreed that the order will be issued before noon, this morning, January 10. That is a matter of record. Next is it agreeable that that portion of the draft of cessation of hostilities order in the first paragraph, third line, the word directive be omitted, which

⁶³ Notation on the original: "Meaning the time of publishing."

reads as follows: "on hours on day, on month on year of the Republic." Is that agreeable?

G: Yes.

C: Yes.

M: It is so ordered. Now I will ask you to return to the press release. Do you want to await the Generalissimo's comments.

G: No.

M: The words in that same paragraph, "as of hours of day of month" on message will be struck out. Now I wish to inquire what hour should be placed on this press release? May I suggest 10:30?

G: The Governor would like to have a little time in which we could make a final report to the Generalissimo before this is released, just to show the order and everything in its final form to the Generalissimo. That won't take too long.

M: May I make this inquiry. Is there a probability of reopening the question of the wording of the order.

G: I would presume that he won't make any changes.

M: I would merely suggest to the Governor that he communicate to the Generalissimo my own concern if there is any delay between whatever statement the Generalissimo makes at ten o'clock and the release of these details. What will happen in the U. S., I know, will be a very confused statement because there will be a news flash immediately and unless they know what is stated in this paper they are going to guess and then we are in for all kinds of trouble. So that if this does not follow closely on the Generalissimo's announcement you are going to have all kinds of confusion and you will be forever straightening it out.

G: There won't be any delay.

M: The complication is that if we get nothing here and the Generalissimo announces it they will flash his announcement with a lot of guess work.

G: Is there anything else regarding the release.

M: I understand the Governor does not wish that release be accomplished until he has the approval of the Generalissimo. Now is my understanding correct that we will await instructions from the Generalissimo until that release has been looked over.

G: Colonel Pee is going to deliver that and he will call here.

M: That completes our business of the moment; before we go would it be agreeable to you gentlemen to meet at 5 o'clock. When will it meet their pleasure to sign the order. The English text will be the record text. You have enough basis now for issuance of the order. Then the actual signing of the English text will be a mere matter of form. Is that correct.

G: You mean to sign the agreement.

M: The proposal is drafted for our three signatures.

G: The Governor suggests that he and General Chou sign the press release now, immediately after we have heard from the Generalissimo.

M: Is it agreeable to meet at 5 o'clock?

G: Three o'clock. Governor Chang inquires when the Executive Headquarters will be brought into being.

M: That is what I wanted to do at three o'clock or this morning if we had time. I have got that all here.

C: General Chou has a technical request to make. That is regarding to signal communications here, because up to now we are not able to send a man to operate the radio station of the Military Council. Now since we have a separate system in the executive headquarters, I hope that the government has no objection that we have our own station here at the office and he hopes the original station can be established. If I had communications with Yen-an this afternoon I could arrange these things to Yen-an real quick.

M: That would be my recommendation.

G: General Chang likes to take this opportunity to say [to?] both that it is most unfortunate that hostilities should have occurred. Now that hostilities will cease it is a thing worthy of congratulations and he hopes that our efforts towards the reestablishment of peaceful relations will produce still greater results because the cessation of hostilities is not an end in itself. He wishes that the committee of three which has already been appointed will proceed with its work and that we urgently recommend to this committee that they immediately proceed with the duties assigned to them so that our efforts will produce better results and at the same time he wants to express my thanks to you, General Marshall, for all you have done to bring us together and bring about the cessation of hostilities and we also hope that you will contribute your further efforts towards this discussion.

M: Thank you, Governor, I appreciate very much your generous expressions of whatever I may have done. I, too, regard this as a most favorable development that we have reach[ed] a basis for terminating hostilities and I hope that it will prove historic. I agree completely with the Governor regarding the importance of proceeding with the negotiations for the reorganization of the Armies of China. I understand a committee has been agreed upon to consider this very complicated matter and I would think that it was imperative that a solution be reached at the earliest possible moment because that is a fundamental to all the difficulties. What we are doing is giving a pause for deliberation. Now, certainly something very definite should be done to find a solution for the difficult problem of reorganization of the Armies of China. Whatever the timing of the execution of such a

plan, it seems to me it is essential to immediately develop a plan because at best it is going to be a very difficult matter of compromises. It is my hope that the good faith that will be built up under the terms of this cessation of hostilities order as it is being carried out by this practical headquarters in the field will result in a development of confidence in the good faith of all parties so that it will not be as difficult as it would now appear to reach a solution. Now as I understood the Governor, he proposed that this particular group submit an urgent recommendation that this committee to which he referred be convened immediately to proceed with the development of an acceptable plan for the reorganization of the Armies of China. As I have said, I think that is both a fundamental and imperative requirement and while I feel a reticence, or rather a hesitation in injecting myself into that measure, with which I have not been previously associated, I would be very happy to participate with this group in submitting that urgent recommendation.

G: Did you say that this committee or you would write a letter.

M: I said while I hesitated, felt reticent, about injecting myself into a matter with which I had not been previously associated or invited, I would be happy to participate with this group in such an urgent recommendation.

C: Since the time is short, I will only say a few words. First of all, I want to thank General Marshall for his participation in the order of the cessation of hostilities you have published. Governor Chang has also done his best. I myself suggest sincerely that the reorganization of all Chinese troops can be proceeded, which includes the Chinese Communist-led troops so that they will be an equal part in the National Armies and I hope that this will also enjoy General Marshall's support.

M: Then it is agreed we meet at three o'clock. I would like to make certain that you get the correct interpretation of what I said that was misunderstood by Governor Chang.

G: The Generalissimo is going to speak at the meeting today at 10 o'clock and he is going to make an announcement in regard to this and he thinks that it will take at most 15 minutes or so and this will be released at about 11 o'clock.

M: 11:15?

G: 11:30.

C: Yes.

M: If agreeable to the Governor and if agreeable to General Chou I will have these press men come into the hall and in the presence of the Governor and in the presence of General Chou receive this 11:30 release.

G & C: Yes.

M: We don't have to say anything but just give them this.

(Press men invited in and told that the transmission time was 11:30⁶⁴)

761.93/1-1046 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, January 10, 1946—11 a. m.

[Received January 11—12:04 p. m.]

96. Since we note that interpretation of Soviet aims and tactics in China and of Soviet relations with Chinese Communists presented in some of material received from Washington seems to reveal imperfect understanding of this subject, we venture to set forth below survey of these questions as seen from Moscow. (To Dept 96, repeated Chungking 6, London 13, Paris 12. Dept please repeat to Shanghai and Tokyo).

AIMS

USSR seeks predominant influence in China. It does so because, by revolutionary tradition, by nationalist ambition and by kinetic nature, Russian [*Russia is an?*] expansionist force.

USSR cannot be satisfied with a neutral China because to Kremlin minds "He that is not with me is against me". Nor can USSR be satisfied with a "friendly" China in sense that Canada or Mexico are "friendly" to USA. Under real stress such relationship is, in Soviet view, politically, economically and militarily undependable. Ideologically convinced that Soviet system must eventually come into open conflict with capitalist West, strategically obsessed with concept of national defense in great depth, and incredulous that there can exist between nations any satisfactory permanent relationship not based on the recognized ascendancy of one to the other, USSR can be satisfied only with influence eventually amounting to effective control.

TACTICS

In seeking to achieve its aims USSR had always followed and will continue to follow tactics confusing to outside observers. This confusion arises in part from real nature of Soviet system—Govt and Party—both headed by same men who, unconcerned for any Govt-Party consistency in foreign operations, regularly pursue through Party's international channels policies piously foresworn by Government. In general Soviet endeavors to obtain actual but concealed domination of neighboring regimes are characterized by "non-intervention", obfuscation of real issues by special interpretations of such

⁶⁴ For text of press release, see *United States Relations With China*, p. 609.

key terms as "democracy", "Fascist", "cooperation", "loyalty", "intervention" and "free elections"; tactical retreats which are wishfully greeted in West as omens of basic Soviet good will but which turn out to be temporary respites or are followed by other more effective tactics.

Toward China thus far USSR has been patient and cautious in its tactics; patient because USSR is in many respects playing a waiting game in China—with confidence that events will some day play into Soviet hands. Even where USSR is active, tactics are cautious because of desire to avoid (1) collision at this time with USA and (2) appearance in Asiatic eyes of interference in internal affairs of an Asiatic nation at time when USSR is loudly critical of imperialist intervention in Orient.

USSR has indicated that it favors a more "democratic" regime in China, i. e., coalition. It has not yet explicitly criticized National Government as a whole. Rather it has maintained generally correct attitude toward Chungking. At same time it is not concealing its approval of program and actions of Chinese Communists. In other words USSR is for time being retaining its diplomatic mobility. It would prefer coalition to division of China because latter would probably mean definite restriction of Communist influence to a closely defined area in Northern China, leaving Moscow without direct contact with vast Southeast Asian colonial area. But even if coalition fails, USSR is still in position to make best of two possible Chinas.

If Soviet interests would thereby be served, USSR would not permit ideological scruples to stand in way of a deal with Chinese "reactionaries". USSR has at one time or another as matter of opportunism made deals with Matsuoka, Ribbentrop, and Tatarescu.⁶⁵ With equal cynicism it is capable of embracing Chinese "feudal remnants" providing consummation of such alliance is sure to be worthwhile and substantially on Soviet terms.

SINKIANG

In regions of China bordering USSR, Soviet tactics are somewhat more direct if scarcely less confusing. While granting presence in Sinkiang situation of all ingredients [of] spontaneous rebellion without outside encouragement, we hesitate to believe that USSR for first time in its history is so unimaginative and impractical as to forego an inviting opportunity to improve its position along its frontier. Soviet fissionist tactics employed in Iranian Azerbaijan may well be with local adaptations equally effective in Sinkiang (see also Embassy's 690, March 9⁶⁶). Moscow has not yet revealed any desire to

⁶⁵ Yosuke Matsuoka, Joachim von Ribbentrop, and Dr. George Tatarescu, Ministers for Foreign Affairs respectively of Japan, Germany, and Rumania at times of Soviet *rapprochement* with these countries.

⁶⁶ *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VII, p. 995.

press for any change in nominal sovereignty as was done in Outer Mongolia. In this area it probably prefers authority without responsibility.

MANCHURIA

With Red Army occupying Manchuria, USSR is there resorting to heavy-handed tactics used in occupied Europe. At same time it is outwardly deferring to Chinese Govt sovereignty. This results in alternate application and relaxation of pressure, the zig-zag politico-military course so congenial to Soviet minds. In this confused situation USSR is presumably working for eventual realization of a Manchurian regime which no matter what its form or nominal relationship to Chinese Central Govt will be fundamentally more responsive to Moscow's wishes than to Chungking's or Nanking's. It would be a mistake to assume that USSR necessarily seeks in Manchuria regime composed predominantly of Yen'an Communists. In most respects USSR can perhaps be better served by docile opportunists of all colors of political spectrum than by exclusively Yen'an personnel who are ideologically acceptable but who as result of their nationalist sentiments may prove headstrong. At present moment Moscow appears to be playing Yen'an and Chungking off against each other with respect to Manchurian matters, exploiting adroitly the basic fact that neither faction yet feels strong enough to risk consequences of a total Soviet withdrawal.

CHINESE COMMUNISTS

We frankly do not know with any degree of certainty what present relationship between Moscow and Yen'an is. Although we have received convincing evidence of Moscow control over Communist parties in Europe, our files contain no evidence either proving or disproving that Yen'an now receives and acts on Moscow orders. This is an important question because our China policy turns largely on this one issue.

We are quite prepared to believe that Chinese CP ^{66a} like other CP's is subservient to Moscow. This would be normal state of affairs with respect to any foreign Communist party of which Moscow publicly approved. And in this case Moscow's approval has been made entirely clear over course of years by Soviet propaganda machine.

Yet we hesitate to accept such an interpretation as definitive. We submit that Moscow-Yen'an relations are more subtle and obscure of [*than?*] any in [*international Communism?*] We would not be sur-

^{66a} Communist Party.

prised for example to learn that Yen-an enjoyed what might seem to be a surprising degree of independence of Moscow. Our reasons are:

1. Chinese Communists have little reason to be grateful to USSR. They have survived and grown not because of but despite relations with Moscow. Adherence to early Comintern directives resulted in near disaster for CCP. And in Sino-Jap conflict USSR supplied only Chungking which used some of those arms in blockading Yen-an. Current Soviet stripping of Manchuria is plucking plums on which Chinese Communists have long had their eye.

2. Chinese Communist Party is most mature of all Communist Parties and has developed its own brand of Marxism and indigenous traditions.

3. Chinese Communists are no fugitive band of conspirators. For 10 years they have had an established *de facto* regime, their own army and civil administration. Consequently they have developed substantial vested interests.

4. Chinese Communists have taken on nationalist coloration. From 1936 to Jap surrender they were confronted with and their propaganda concentrated against an external foe. Rapid expansion of their armed forces and civilian following was largely on basis of nationalism.

While foregoing factors would seem to represent forces tending to wean Yen-an away from Moscow, it should be remembered that Yen-an has had no latitude of choice in its foreign relations. Events have tended to keep Yen-an in—or force it back into—Soviet orbit. This situation has enabled Moscow to conduct flirtations with Chungking, confident that Yen-an could find no alternative to fidelity. Net result has been that Moscow has disarmed considerable Western suspicion of Soviet political respectability, befogged issues for Chungking, taught Yen-an not to take too much for granted and placed itself in position to capitalize on developments in China no matter what direction they take. In these circumstances Moscow's possibilities for making its influence effective in Yen-an in decisive moments are enormous and need not be too closely related to subjective sentiments of Yen-an Communists.

KENNAN

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Notes on Meeting of Conference of Three (Meeting No. 6)—General Marshall, General Chang Chun, Central Government Representative, and General Chou En-lai, Communist Party Representative—at General Marshall's Residence, Chungking, January 10, 1946, 3:10 p. m.

M[ARSHALL]: If agreeable to you, the meeting will come to order. I have here the agreed copy of the cease firing order,⁶⁷ one addressed

⁶⁷ *Infra.*

to the Generalissimo and one addressed to Chairman Mao Tse-tung. I suggest that we sign these now if that is agreeable. Is that agreeable?

G[ENERAL CHANG]: Yes.

C[HOU]: Yes.

M: I will make delivery of this to the Generalissimo through the Governor. I will make delivery of this for Chairman Mao Tse-tung through General Chou. Colonel Byroade has given you each two copies, one of the one to the Generalissimo, and one of the one to Chairman Mao Tse-tung.

I have here now the copy of the instructions for the executive headquarters⁶⁸ which similarly requires signatures. In this case, the signature of only the two of you. This copy is for the record. If agreeable to you, I will take up next the request on the Generalissimo and the request on Chairman Mao Tse-tung for certain action on their part to establish the executive headquarters.⁶⁹ The first one is a memorandum from the three members of this committee to the Generalissimo requesting certain action on his part and informing him of the general necessities.

G: Colonel Byroade is leaving tomorrow.

M: You might explain to the General the only way I know how to begin is to commence. There is one sentence in here that is incorrect. The first paragraph⁷⁰ on page 2. The last sentence of that paragraph, I will furnish a C-54 should read "General Marshall will provide his C-54 aircraft" and we will change that now. There is no "I" in this, it is all "we". That is for the whole thing.

C: On the second paragraph, second page, there is also an I.

M: There is another I down here in the second. Colonel Byroade says that someone was asleep. May I have all copies of that document. What happened was he wrote it for me and I objected and thought we should all three sign it and the corrections were on a piece basis.

G: We would like to ask a question about the second paragraph on the second page. ["The National Government and the Communist Party staff should at least from the beginning have 40 officers and 90 enlisted men."] Is that together?

M: No. Each.

G: Do you think we need the word each.

M: Yes. Has General Chou any comments?

C: No.

⁶⁸ For text, see *United States Relations With China*, p. 627.

⁶⁹ For text of request, see document No. 71 (b), *ibid.*, p. 629.

⁷⁰ Of the memorandum on the organization of Executive Headquarters, p. 9.

G: Each side would have at most—40. Then we can have less officers and men?

M: I think it would be best to send them. They have a place for all of those men. So far, when you consider those that will have to be in the offices to keep all of your business moving in Peking, and those who will be scattered around in the field absent a long time on particular trips to certain points, Canton, for example, it will require quite a number of people. We didn't want too many, but we must have a certain number to begin with and then build up from that point. I should explain that the instruction as to the date of arrival, while it looks like an unnecessary detail, I had it put in there very definitely for the reason that I did not want a confusion of individuals arriving before the preliminary arrangements had been made. I had in mind that we might make a very bad beginning. If three or four men arrived from the two sides without accommodations presently designated, they might easily be offended if they thought they didn't get exactly the place they were entitled to at the moment. Therefore, I wanted the preliminary arrangements made first so that everything would proceed in a very deliberate and orderly manner, because we must not start with hurt feelings and frankly I imagine a great many will arrive with a "chip on their shoulder".

C: General Chou raised the question of the communications facilities because the Communist staff members are scattered in several provinces and we want now to centralize them. They are now located in Kwangtung, Kiangsu, Shansi and he was wondering if you could help him.

M: We will try to do that and if you have your representative see Colonel Byroade and make arrangements, or if you have them see Colonel Caughey we will make every effort to help you in that.

I have here another communication which is to the Generalissimo only.⁷¹ It is in regard to accommodations and supplies in Peiping. Will you please read it, Gentlemen, and see if it appears to be all right.

G: Who is the commandant.

M: The commandant is, in effect, the mayor. He is the man to whom you make all your complaints. Purely an administrative man. The purpose of this next paragraph is to make certain that the officer in Peiping actually has received the order. If it is issued here by the Generalissimo so that on arriving Colonel Byroade will have the order, it might save an embarrassing delay. If the Generalissimo's order to Peiping is delayed and Col. Byroade receives a copy here he will have a copy when he arrives there and there won't be any con-

⁷¹ Memorandum by the Committee of Three to President Chiang, p. 128.

fusion, and in one sense that will be Colonel Byroade's authorization for operating there. Is there any objection?

G: No objection.

C: No.

M: I make delivery of this to the Generalissimo to Colonel Pee through the Governor. That is a copy for the Executive Headquarters.

G: The Governor is asking about the signed copy, the signed agreement relating to the executive headquarters. Will that be kept in your files.

M: We gave you a copy.

G: Yes.

M: I was going to keep that in the official records. Does he wish to have a copy of this signed. We can make as many more formal copies as are needed and circulate them for signature. We can make as many as are needed.

G: We will just sign these copies.

G: Would you want a copy of the Chinese text. You may have one.

M: That ought to be in the original record. I should think it would be a good thing. While we are waiting for the exceptions and understandings to be typed and the retyping of that badly written document, would it be agreeable to you gentlemen to allow these photographers to get a photograph of the actual signing. Is that all right.

G: Yes.

C: Yes.

M: Now before the photographers come in, I would like to say this. I think the best thing to do is to have two photographs at least taken with the Governor sitting there signing and General Chou and myself standing and then with General Chou signing and with the Governor and myself standing.

Photographs of Signing

M: This treaty has more signatures than any one treaty in history, but we are going to do this up thoroughly. We used to refer to the first war as the war of papers, but this is a war of papers as well.

M: Now I make delivery of this letter to Chairman Mao Tse-tung through General Chou and I make delivery of this letter to the Generalissimo through the Governor and that completes the business as far as I can see. Is there any other business that we should bring up at this moment.

G: (General Chang passed copy of Chinese text to General Marshall)

M: I receive these two papers in Chinese of the order for the cessation of hostilities and the instructions for the executive headquarters.

G: This is the translation of your letter addressed to the Generalissimo containing a proposed order.

G: This is the executive headquarters.

M: And also the extracts from the minutes of the four exceptions, all in Chinese, are accepted for the record.

G: The Chinese equivalent for executive headquarters is literally "Military Adjustment Executive Headquarters".

M: Military Adjustment Executive Headquarters. It will be so recorded.

G: That is the executive headquarters.

M: That is the title for your headquarters (to Colonel Byroade).

G: As a result of the personal talks between General Chang and General Chou it has been now agreed that there would be period of three days terminating on the 13, inclusive, during which both sides will issue orders for the actual cessation of hostilities so that on the following day, on the 14th, all hostilities will be expected to have ceased, at least in all the large cities, all the cities, which the order will have reached so there will be no violations.

M: I am very glad to hear that conclusion. Now, if agreeable to you gentlemen, I suggest for the immediate future of our affairs, that at your convenience when you have finished checking the minutes, you send them to me with your noted corrections and I will have those corrections for the presentation of each side made on the other copy so that at a meeting to be decided on later we can formally pass on the minutes.

I wish to question you two gentlemen as to whether you care to enter into an agreement to notify the executive headquarters on its creation that it is the desire of this committee that the commissioners of the executive headquarters send a group of three representatives to Chihfeng and Tolun to report on conditions as they exist at the time. Is that acceptable?

C: General Chou made a suggestion that the delegation not only go to Chihfeng and Tolun but also to other places in Jehol and Chahar, for example, Kalgan to investigate the actual condition.

M: I will amend my proposal to read they will send a group to Jehol and Chahar to report on conditions as they exist at that time.

G: At which time?

M: When they left. Is that agreeable?

C: I agree.

G: That is agreeable.

M: That is so ordered. For convenience may I be authorized, once that has been prepared, to sign for the committee or do you wish it circulated to each one of you for signature. You can authorize me

to sign that to the executive headquarters for the three of you or I could send it to Governor Chang and General Chou, to have their signatures as well as mine. Tell them to strike that out. I will have that resolution drafted and will submit it to you in your headquarters and to you at your headquarters, General Chou, for your approval and for your signature. In that way we may possibly be able to avoid a meeting for that one document. If there is disagreement, of course, we will have to have a meeting. I have in mind that we must have a meeting to conclude the minutes for our records and then to decide on whether or not we adjourn without further discussion.

G: The resolution is to have the executive headquarters send a committee of three to Jehol and Chahar?

M: To report on conditions as they find them at that time.

G: Have the resolution signed by all three?

M: To avoid a meeting I will send it to your headquarters.

G: How will the resolution be forwarded to the executive headquarters? Will it be sent by a letter.

M: If your commissioners are here, then I will turn it over to the commissioners.

G: With a covering letter?

M: However you so desire, but it will be signed by all three of us. If it is prepared and signed before they leave, then I think it will be sent with them. If you agree to the form of the resolution you will just sign the paper otherwise we will have to have a meeting. We should have a meeting to see that the minutes are correct, and to determine whether or not the committee ceases and of what action we have taken. Is there any further business you gentlemen wish to discuss tonight?

C: No.

M: The meeting is adjourned.

M: One moment before we do adjourn, I wish to say this. This has been a very difficult problem and I think we all agree on that and I am profoundly grateful for the manner in which you have cooperated to produce a peaceful conclusion. I felt very uncertain of my position and my future in this conference and I fully realized not only the importance of the issue to China but the responsibility I bore to my own government in the matter. Now I repeat again, I am profoundly grateful for your cooperation with me and I wish to express my extreme pleasure that we have reached so successful a conclusion. I think it bids very fair for the future and I think it may be looked upon in general as a very important foundation stone in achieving an effective unity for China, which of course means a great deal to the future peace of the world. Thank you very much.

G: I already expressed my thanks to you, General Marshall, for

what you have done and I would take this opportunity to reemphasize my grateful thanks to you for all your assistance. I am quite confident that your efforts have not been in vain and they have not only produced immediate results, but will even achieve greater results in the future, not only for the benefit of China but for the peace of the world. I am happy to recall that Colonel Byroade cooperated with us in the building of airdromes in Changtu year before last. I am very pleased to see Colonel Byroade here again cooperating with us in a greater task and I wish to congratulate him on the success which has crowned his efforts.

B: Will you thank the General very much for that expression.

C: I wish, accordingly, to express my thanks to General Marshall for his assistance and fair dealing and I also believe that General Marshall will be of great help to the cause of Chinese people and to the establishment of peace and I also may [give?] thanks to Colonel Byroade, Mr. Shepley and the others who cooperated in this joint effort. It is my hope that cooperation between the Government and the Communist party as is expressed here will be continued.

893.00/1-1746

*Memorandum by the Committee of Three to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek*⁷²

Subject: Cessation of Hostilities.

In conformance with the agreements entered into by the National Government of China and the Chinese Communist Party, it is desirable that cease firing orders be issued at once and simultaneously by yourself and by Chairman Mao Tse-tung. If this suggestion meets with your approval it is recommended that identical orders along the lines of the draft which follows be issued by you and by Chairman Mao Tse-tung.

The text of the proposed draft order follows:

“All units, regular, militia, irregular and guerrilla, of the National Armies of the Republic of China are ordered to carry out the following directive:

- a. All hostilities will cease immediately.
- b. Except in certain specific cases, all movements of forces in China will cease. There also may be the movements necessary for demobilization, redistribution, supply, administration and local security.
- c. Destruction of and interference with all lines of communications will cease and you will clear at once obstructions placed against or interfering with such lines of communications.

⁷² Copy transmitted to the Secretary of State by General Marshall with his memorandum of January 17; received January 31.

d. An Executive Headquarters will be established immediately in Peiping for the purpose of carrying out the agreements for cessation of hostilities. This Headquarters will consist of three Commissioners; one representing the Chinese National Government, one representing the Chinese Communist Party, and one to represent the United States of America. The necessary instructions and orders unanimately agreed upon by the three Commissioners, will be issued in the name of the President of the Republic of China, through the Executive Headquarters.

Signed—Chiang Kai-shek”

A similar memorandum is being submitted to Mr. Chou En-lai for transmittal to Chairman Mao Tse-tung.⁷³

CHANG CHUN
CHOU EN-LAI
G. C. MARSHALL

Signed on 10 January 1946.

Handed to General Chang Chun
by General Marshall for delivery
to Generalissimo.

893.00/1—1746

*Memorandum by the Committee of Three*⁷⁴

[CHUNGKING, January 10, 1946.]

Stipulations contained in the Minutes of Conference regarding Cessation of Hostilities Orders as agreed upon and made a matter of record are as follows:

1. Paragraph *b*. Cessation of Hostilities Order, does not prejudice military movements south of the Yangtze River for the continued execution of the plan of military reorganization of the National Government.

2. Paragraph *b*. Cessation of Hostilities Order, does not prejudice military movements of forces of the National Army into or within Manchuria which are for the purpose of restoring Chinese sovereignty.

3. Lines of communications, mentioned in paragraph *c*. Cessation of Hostilities Order, includes post communications.

4. It is further agreed that movements of the forces of the National Army under the foregoing stipulations shall be reported daily to the Executive Headquarters.

CHANG CHUN
CHOU EN-LAI
G. C. MARSHALL

⁷³ Not printed; this was drafted for signature by Mao Tse-tung.

⁷⁴ Copy transmitted to the Secretary of State by General Marshall in his letter of January 17; received January 31.

893.00/1-1746

*Memorandum by the Committee of Three to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek*⁷⁵

Subject: Organization of Executive Headquarters.

The approval by Your Excellency and Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the directive to cease hostilities makes it mandatory that the Executive Headquarters become operational at once. The Headquarters should be kept as small as possible for convenience and celerity of operation.

Mr. Walter S. Robertson, who has been nominated as the American Commissioner of the Executive Headquarters, will have initially a staff of not to exceed four persons; a political advisor, an aide, a stenographer, and a translator.

The Operations Section, under Colonel Henry A. Byroade, must contain the necessary personnel to operate various sub-headquarters in critical areas, maintain communications, furnish the required office and housekeeping overhead, etc. The American portion of this Section is initially planned to consist of approximately 26 American officers, 68 enlisted men, and 30 Chinese civilian employees.

Attached is the type of organization⁷⁶ Colonel Byroade has planned for the American portion of the Operations Section. Request that you provide, as a matter of urgency, a similar group for the National Government's staff of the Operations Section.

Colonel Byroade will go to Peiping on 11 January 1946 to establish the Executive Headquarters and to assemble the American personnel.

Mr. Robertson will be ready to depart on 13 January 1946. It would be most advantageous if the Commissioner of the National Government, as well as the Communist Commissioner, could be prepared for departure together. General Marshall will provide his personal C-54 aircraft for this purpose.

The staffs for the Executive Headquarters and Operations Section should be organized immediately. The National Government and the Communist Party staffs should each, at least as a beginning, consist of not more than forty officers and ninety enlisted men.

It is very important that adequate facilities be available before arrival of this personnel. It is therefore recommended that the personnel to be assigned to the Operations Section be scheduled to start arrival in Peiping on 15 January. At least half of this personnel should have reported in Peiping by 19 January and the remainder not later than 26 January 1946.

⁷⁵ Copy transmitted to the Secretary of State by General Marshall with his memorandum of January 17; received January 31.

⁷⁶ Not printed.

A similar memorandum is being forwarded to Chairman Mao Tse-tung.⁷⁷

CHANG CHUN
CHOU EN-LAI
G. C. MARSHALL

Signed on 10 January 1946
Handed to General Chang Chun
by General Marshall for delivery
to the Generalissimo

893.00/1-1746

*Memorandum by the Committee of Three to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek*⁷⁸

The successful functioning of the Executive Headquarters and its Operations Section is dependent upon securing adequate accommodations, office space, and subsistence for the personnel involved.

In order that necessary arrangements can be made for accommodations at Peiping, the following strengths are submitted as our estimate of the initial requirements:

	<i>United States</i>	<i>National Government</i>	<i>Communist Party</i>
Officers	25	40	40
Enlisted Men	65	90	90
Civilians	35	40	40
Totals	125	170	170
Grand Total		465	

By separate memorandum there is being forwarded to both you and Chairman Mao Tse-tung, a more detailed outline of the organization of the Executive Headquarters.⁷⁹

It is requested that you designate appropriate officials to arrange for accommodations and subsistence based on the above strengths where required. General Marshall has already had the headquarters commandant of the Operations Section, Colonel W. C. Wilson, sent to Peiping to await your direction to officials there. It would greatly facilitate arrangements if your instructions to Peiping officials regarding provision of facilities would name Colonel Wilson as the responsible officer charged with coordination of accommodations and other required facilities.

⁷⁷ Not printed.

⁷⁸ Copy transmitted to the Secretary of State by General Marshall with his memorandum of January 17; received January 31.

⁷⁹ See memorandum printed *supra*.

It is requested further that a copy of your instructions to Peiping officials be furnished General Marshall before the departure of Colonel Byroade, now scheduled at 1000 hours on 11 January. In event signal communications had not been received by your officials in Peiping, Colonel Byroade would be able to make personal delivery of your instructions.

In the interest of mutual confidence it would appear that accommodations provided should be equally desirable for all.

CHANG CHUN
CHOU EN-LAI
G. C. MARSHALL

Signed on 10 January 1946
Handed to General Chang Chun
by General Marshall for delivery
to the Generalissimo

121.893/1-1046: Telegram

*General Marshall to President Truman.*⁸⁰

CHUNGKING, 10 January 1946.

30. DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Conferences or negotiations between representatives of the National Government and the Communist Party with me had reached a point two days ago where the wording of the order terminating hostilities and the exact terms of the detailed instructions creating an executive headquarters of three commissioners with a complete staff for implementing the armistice, reopening and repairing communications, creating a railroad police organization, and proceeding with the surrender and evacuation of Japanese soldiers, had been formally agreed upon. There negotiations hung on the insistence of the National Government to continue its troop movement into provinces of Jehol and Chahar to occupy important rail points of Chihfeng and Tolun in accordance with the outline of the plan of the National Government to take over from the Soviet forces in accordance with the latter's plan of withdrawal through four phases, all to have been executed last November. A delay to January 3 was requested by National Government of Soviets and a further delay to February 1 was later requested, the line through Chihfeng and Tolun to have been vacated by Soviets on January 15.

It is not known whether or not Soviet troops are still in those two places. The Communists claim that their troops have already occupied those places.

⁸⁰ Delivered by hand of officer from the War Department to the Secretary of State or Under Secretary of State (Acheson).

Negotiations continued here at a stalemate up to meeting yesterday evening which I terminated to avoid further rather bitter discussions.

At 10 last night I saw the Generalissimo and secured his agreement to drop all reference in armistice arrangements to situation in Jehol and Chahar, which means that National Government troop movements cease in those provinces leaving that issue to later political negotiations. I suggested and Generalissimo agreed for him to make announcement of [cessation of?] hostilities at opening of Political Consultative Council at 10 this morning, to be followed at 11:30 by press release terms of cessation order, including provisos regarding certain troop movements which will be permitted. This release to be by the Government and the Communist Party representatives.

At 8 this morning a meeting of the three conferees was held and has just been completed with regard to numerous minor details to permit Generalissimo to make his announcement of cessation of hostilities at opening of Consultative Council meeting at 10 this morning.

I will start Colonel Byroade with first echelon of field headquarters to Peking immediately to be followed in about 48 hours by the three commissioners to head the headquarters, traveling in my plane. I have designated our Chargé here, the American Minister Walter S. Robertson, as the U. S. Commissioner, who will be invited to act as chairman.

Last night the Generalissimo expressed the desire for me to participate directly in conference of an already agreed upon committee of three military officials to develop the plan for the nationalization or reorganization of the armies of China. Today at the meeting both representatives, National Government and Communist, expressed the same desire. I agreed to participate. This will be the hardest problem of all and it is fundamentally basic to all other considerations, political and economic.

What I may be able to do indirectly to facilitate political agreements for coalition government is quite uncertain and must remain to be determined.

I am having the exact terms of the order, instructions and provisos regarding cessation of hostilities, sent direct to State Department.⁶¹ I am sending this through War Department channels and by hand to you in order to avoid possibility of a disastrous leak regarding this most confidential description of what has actually happened.

⁶¹ Submitted with a covering memorandum dated January 17.

II. DISCUSSIONS PERTAINING TO POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE
CONFERENCE (JANUARY-APRIL)

893.00/1-1446

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs
(Vincent)* ⁸²

SUMMARY OF A PERSONAL LETTER FROM MR. JOHN FAIRBANK
DECEMBER 6 [1945]

The most striking change since two years ago in the minds of the Chinese intellectuals appears to be their final desertion of the Generalissimo. Liberals say they see no hope in his regime: it will continue to seek political control without achieving economic and social reform.

The second phenomenon has been a marked increase in anti-American feeling. Its expression has been open and vigorous in print and makes the point that in moving Central Govt troops about the country in connection with Japanese surrenders we have in effect taken sides in the civil conflict. Although this is the Communist line, it carries a lot of weight in popular opinion.

Points of view here are varied: Soviet friends feel we are playing the bully, threatening the USSR. A US military officer (aide to a general) says we must call for a showdown with the USSR before we demobilize. The Kuomintang tell us we must check communism in China by helping keep the Kmt ^{82a} in power. Liberal Chinese feel a coalition government is the only possible solution. The Communist pursue their usual tactic of staying close to liberal opinion while trying to lead it forward.

Personally, I would base a policy on the following considerations:

1. Military force will never succeed in setting up a stable government if the gov't has to rely on military force.

2. The conflict in China is not merely political; it is economic and social and goes to the bottom of Chinese life.

3. China's revolution will produce a different political and social structure than ours; we should not look for our own image.

4. By offering the things most helpful to China we could be sure of maintaining an influence at least as strong as Russia's. The Russians appear to be taking a long-term view and keeping their record relatively clear. We cannot keep Russia out of China by bayonets.

⁸² Forwarded on January 14 by Mr. Vincent to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson) with the notation: "There is attached a summary of a personal letter from Mr. John Fairbank, Director of the U. S. Information Service (USIS) in China, which I believe will be of interest to you. Mr. Fairbank returned to China in October 1945 after an absence of about two years, having spent much of the last twelve years in China."

^{82a} Kuomintang (Nationalist Party).

5. Our positive program should continue to emphasize economic help in China, while cutting down on support of one party in the civil conflict. This can be done only if some kind of coalition government is attained.

American critics of coalition government will say that the Chinese communists cannot be trusted and will use such a government to work for the revolution. I expect they would, but I believe our only hope is to hold the political situation together long enough, in an armistice of coalition type, to allow some economic progress to be made. The alternative is to let the civil conflict absorb economic energies until China is even more bankrupt and ripe for revolution.

The essential fact is that the right-wing Kmt want to hold onto power, and their efforts to do so against the forces of change from all sides is widening the split between them and groups like the liberals and communists, who also have something to offer for national progress.

893.00/1-446

*Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in China
(Sprouse)*⁸³

[CHUNKING,] January 1, 1946.

Summary. The establishment of the Political Consultative Council was provided for during the National Government-Communist Party conversations held in September and October 1945.⁸⁴ Subsequent conversations between the representatives of the Government and various political parties have resulted in the provisional selection of 38 delegates to the Council divided among the parties as follows: Kuomintang, 8; Communist, 7; Democratic League, 9; Youth Party, 5; and non-party, 9. The scope of the authority of the PCC and the binding power of its decisions has reportedly not yet been defined but the Council is expected to discuss problems relating to peaceful reconstruction, matters relating to the National Assembly and the draft constitution to be submitted to the National Assembly. The local press is demanding that the PCC sessions be made open to the press and to the public and it is reliably stated that the Communist Party, the Democratic League, the Youth Party and non-party ele-

⁸³ Prepared for submission to General of the Army George C. Marshall, Special Representative of President Truman in China; copy transmitted to the Department by the Chargé in China (Robertson) in his despatch No. 1016, January 4; received January 30.

⁸⁴ See *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VII, telegram 1833, October 19, 1945, p. 475. For summary of the conversations, see Department of State, *United States Relations With China*, p. 577.

ments are supporting this demand. The Central Government is said to be unwilling to have all meetings open to the public. A rule of unanimity for the passage of important issues, proposed by the Communist Party, is reported to be likely to prevail at the PCC meetings. Prior to the opening of the PCC on January 10, conversations are being held at Chungking between representatives of the Government and the Communist Party in regard to the cessation of hostilities and to certain points raised by the Communists. *End of Summary.*

[Here follows detailed report.]

PHILIP D. SPROUSE

893.00/1-546: Telegram

The Chargé in China (Robertson) to the Secretary of State

CHUNGKING, January 5, 1946—8 a. m.

[Received 7:12 p. m.]

32. General reaction except in Government circles to Generalissimo's⁸⁵ New Year's Eve speech is that it is restatement of Government position and contains little that is new. Only indication of influence of President Truman's statement⁸⁶ [is?] expressing [of] Govt readiness "to invite, before convocation of National Assembly, leaders of society and representatives of other political parties to take part in the Govt either in the policy making councils or the executive branches". This offer has been previously made and it is not believed that opposition parties [will?] accept invitation, unless Youth Party does so. (Latter said by Democratic League and non-party sources to have been approached privately by Govt with offer of posts and money and while Youth Party is still nominally part of League, it has split off to extent of having five separate delegates to forthcoming PCC.) Some foreign observers describe speech as having new note of urgency not heretofore apparent. (Repeated Moscow as 5.)

Speech strongly emphasizes importance of national unity, necessity of realizing *San Min Chu I* and revolutionary role of Govt. Communists not referred to by name but clear reference to that party in explanation of prerequisite to solution current conflict: "Authority to issue military and administrative orders must be unified, and troops must serve the state, the carving up of spheres of influences, the destruction of communications and the obstruction of the work

⁸⁵ Chiang Kai-shek, President of the National Government of the Republic of China.

⁸⁶ Of December 15, 1945, entitled "United States Policy Toward China", Department of State, *United States Relations With China*, p. 607.

of returning to normalcy must be avoided". Restoration of communications and reorganization of troops placed in order of priority before reorganization of Govt.

Speech indicates no change in Govt determination to consider valid election of delegates to National Assembly in 1935 although it expressed Govt willingness to increase number of delegates. Speech also makes no mention of possibility of revision of May 5 draft constitution.

Democratic League has issued statement on speech and related matters which was reported by *Ta Kung Pao* January 2 as follows:

League demands revision [of] organization and election law for National Assembly in order to ensure representative body and feels retention of delegates elected 10 years ago not [in] accord either [with?] democratic spirit. League feels reorganization of Govt must be discussed and points out that it would be fitting to have participation in both policy-making and policy-executing Govt organs. League agrees with necessity of nationalization of armies but feels this must be achieved through "political democratization". League proposes all parties cooperate in establishment local self-govt as well as reorganization Central Govt. Regarding truce proposal, League approves cessation hostilities and restoration communications but feels all troops should remain present positions and railways should not be used for movement of troops. League proposes representation on military inspection mission by other than Kmt Communist representatives.

ROBERTSON

893.00/1-1146

*Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in China
(Sprouse)*⁸⁷

[CHUNGKING,] January 8, 1946.

Subject: The National Assembly.

Summary. In 1935 the Central Executive Committee (highest organ of the Kuomintang) provided for the convening of a National Assembly for the adoption of a constitution in November 1936 and the completion of election of delegates to that Assembly before October 10, 1936. In 1936, 1937, 1939 and 1940, the date of the convening of the Assembly was successively postponed, the earlier postponements arising from the failure to complete the election of delegates. In 1943 the Central Executive Committee provided for the convening of a National Assembly within one year after the end of the war.

⁸⁷ Prepared for submission to General Marshall; copy forwarded to Department by the Chargé in China (Robertson) in his despatch No. 1032, January 11; received January 30.

On January 1, 1945, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek stated that the National Assembly would be convened before the end of 1945.⁸⁸ During the Central Government-Communist Party conversations in September 1945, it was agreed to leave the matter to the Political Consultative Council (PCC) for decision. The Central Government has, however, unilaterally fixed May 5, 1946, as the date for the National Assembly and the Generalissimo in his speech on January 1, 1946, stated that the date must "never again be postponed". The positions of the Central Government and the opposition have been reversed since the initial discussions on the subject. Originally the minority parties and critics of the Government were anxious to convene a National Assembly and adopt a constitution even though such action was likely to be in accordance with Kuomintang terms. Now that their position vis-à-vis the Central Government is stronger, opposition groups are unwilling to accept a National Assembly and a constitution which, they charge, would perpetuate the present Kuomintang control of the Government. The struggle continues with the Kuomintang insisting on the early convocation of the Assembly and the opposition demanding the election of new delegates and revision of the organic and election laws governing the Assembly.

End of Summary.

[Here follows detailed report.]

Some independent Chinese observers point to the failure of Chinese experiments in constitutional government during the early days of the Republic and state that constitutional government, if it is to be successful, must be achieved carefully and thoroughly. These observers are of the opinion that the formation of a coalition government must precede the convocation of a National Assembly and the adoption of a constitution and that it would be desirable to entrust full governmental powers to a coalition government, which could provide for election machinery for delegates to a National Assembly, decide upon the date of convocation of the Assembly and make recommendations regarding the revisions of the May 5th Draft Constitution. These Chinese feel that the establishment of a constitutional government more representative of public opinion in China, which would be expected to result from compromise between all groups in a coalition government, including sizeable non-party representation, warrants a delay in the convocation of a National Assembly for the adoption and promulgation of a constitution.

PHILIP D. SPROUSE

⁸⁸ See memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs, January 2, 1945, *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VII, p. 153.

893.00/1-1246

The Chargé in China (Robertson) to the Secretary of State

No. 1041

CHUNGKING, January 12, 1946.

[Received January 30.]

SIR: I have the honor to enclose a copy of a memorandum under date of January 12, 1946, regarding the National Democratic Reconstruction Association, which was prepared by the Embassy for submission to General Marshall. Attached to the memorandum are a list of the representatives of the Association who are scheduled to call on General Marshall and the Organic Principles of the organization.

Organization of the Association during December is believed to be typical of the increased political efforts of various groups in China recently, who see in the present situation an opportunity of making their voices heard in the effort to break the monopoly of the Kuomintang. Some of the organizations apparently have their own "axe to grind", but this Association is felt to be one of the most respectable and honest in its aims.

Respectfully yours,

For the Chargé d'Affaires a. i.:

ROBERT L. SMYTH

Counselor of Embassy

[Enclosure]

*Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in China
(Sprouse)*

[CHUNGKING,] January 12, 1946.

Enclosed is a list of the members of the delegation of the National Democratic Reconstruction Association who will call on General Marshall on Monday, January 14, at 10:00 a. m., together with a brief statement of their background. Also enclosed is a statement of the "Organic Principles" of the Association.⁸⁹

The local press announced on December 17, 1945, that the inaugural meeting of the Association was held on December 16 and that this meeting was attended by over 100 educators, cultural workers and industrialists. According to a member of the Presidium of the Association, membership in the organization is limited to non-party and professional men. It is reported by the press that the Association contemplates drawing up a plan of an industrial area which will govern the relationship between capital and labor and the manage-

⁸⁹ Enclosures not printed.

ment of factories and that it wishes to establish a model for new industries in China.

Of the members of the delegation which will call on General Marshall one (Huang Yen-pei) is the leader of the Vocational Education Association, one of the minority groups in the Democratic League, and another (Sung Chi-meng) is the General Secretary of the Vocational Education Association. It is believed that the Democratic Reconstruction Association maintains close contact with the Democratic League although a reliable, well-informed non-party Chinese states that it is not connected with the League in any way. A member of the Association (with a reputation for great honesty) has informed me that the organization is intended for those "engaged in protective businesses and interested in national affairs". He adds that beyond a desire to be vocal on matters affecting the welfare of China as a modern democratic nation and to reflect public opinion the Association has no other motive.

PHILIP D. SPROUSE

893.011/1-1546

*Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in China
(Sprouse)*⁹⁰

[CHUNGKING,] January 13, 1946.

Subject: The May 5th Draft Constitution

Summary. China has had a long history of constitutions and draft constitutions since the establishment of the Republic in 1911. The present Government functions under a Provisional Constitution promulgated in 1931. Now under study is the May 5th Draft Constitution which is expected to be presented to the forthcoming National Assembly for consideration and subsequent adoption. The Constitution provides for a strong executive with little check on his power, the National Assembly elected by the people meeting only once every three years for a one month's session. The National Assembly does not control the purse strings of the Government, its chief power being the election of the President and Vice President of the Republic. The Draft Constitution hedges the civil liberties with the phrase that they shall not be restricted "except in accordance with law". Strong pressure for the revision of the May 5th Draft Constitution is being exerted by the opposition parties and by many non-party Chinese who charge that adoption of the Constitution in

⁹⁰ Prepared for submission to General Marshall; copy transmitted to the Department by the Counselor of Embassy in China (Smyth) in his despatch No. 1046, January 15; received January 30.

its present form would perpetuate the Kuomintang monopoly of the Government. The Kuomintang is opposing any important changes in the document. *End of Summary.*

[Here follows detailed report.]

PHILIP D. SPROUSE

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Shang Chen,⁹¹ at House 28, Chungking, January 21, 1946, 10 a. m.

Also present: Col. Caughey⁹²
Col. Pee⁹³

General Shang opened the meeting by stating that the Generalissimo had sent him to express to General Marshall various thoughts on the current political situation :

1. The PPC is not making satisfactory progress. The Communist and Democratic front are holding out to a degree that will prevent closing the meeting in two days as planned. This situation may improve in the next few days and after which the Generalissimo desires to talk to you with reference to the PPC. The Generalissimo wants to know if you have any comment.

2. The Russian attitude in Manchuria⁹⁴ is not good.

3. The Generalissimo desires to see you in his Town House at 1100 on 22 January.

With reference to the first item you indicated that you had been awaiting notice from the Military Sub-Committee with regard to reorganization of the armies prior to offering any advice. You stated that you wanted the Generalissimo to know that you were not standing on ceremony but merely wished to know where and when the Military Sub-Committee desired to see you.⁹⁵

With reference to the second item you asked if the attitude was due to failure of Russian withdrawal or was it due to participation of operational hostilities. General Shang replied that it was the latter; that Nationalist troops had been surrounded (he did not state by whom) at Yingkow and that Russians had killed a few (2) Nationalist troops.

With reference to the third item you stated that you would see the Generalissimo at 1100 at his Town House on the 22nd.

J. HART CAUGHEY

⁹¹ Personal Chief of Staff to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

⁹² Col. J. Hart Caughey, Executive Officer on General Marshall's staff.

⁹³ Col. Peter Pee, Personal Aide to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

⁹⁴ For correspondence on Manchuria, see pp. 712 ff.

⁹⁵ For correspondence on negotiations respecting military reorganization, see p. 177.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Charter for the Interim Government of the Republic of China*⁹⁶

ARTICLE I. The National Government of the Republic of China hereby enacts and promulgates the following organic law for the interim period pending the inauguration of constitutional government.

ARTICLE II. *Interim National Council*

Section 1. The Supreme National Defense Council is abolished.

Section 2. An Interim National Council is herewith established in which is vested the powers heretofore exercised by the Supreme National Defense Council as well as other powers provided for in this instrument.

Section 3. The Interim National Council shall at all times consist of twenty members to be appointed by the President of the Republic of China who shall himself be Chairman of the Council. Nine members of the Council shall be appointed by the President upon nomination of the Kuomintang, six upon nomination of the Communist Party, one upon nomination of the Democratic League, one upon nomination of the Youth Party and three upon the President's own motion from among distinguished citizens of the Republic who are members of no party.

Section 4. In the exercise of its duly established powers the Interim National Council shall act by the affirmative vote, or the negative vote, of a majority of those members present. In case of a tie, the President shall cast the deciding vote. No fewer than fifteen members shall constitute a quorum and no action may be taken by the Council unless a quorum is present. In the event a quorum is not present, the Chairman shall summon one.

Section 5. The acts of the Interim National Council shall be approved or disapproved by the President within ten days. If he approves an act, it shall be effective immediately, unless an effective date is otherwise specified in the act itself. If the President disapproves an act he shall return it to the Interim National Council for reconsideration. If fourteen members of the Interim National Council shall again approve an act which has been returned by the President for reconsideration, it shall become effective immediately. If, within the ten day period, the President has not approved or disapproved an act of the Interim National Council it shall become effective immediately.

Section 6. The Interim National Council shall meet in continuous session until the constitution of the Republic of China shall have

⁹⁶ Apparently the document handed to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek by General Marshall on January 22; see telegram No. 98, *infra*.

become operative, except for recesses, none to exceed three weeks in length, which it may take on its own motion.

ARTICLE III. The President shall appoint the President of the Executive, Legislative, Judicial, Control and Examination Yuan, the Councillors of the National Military Council, and the Ministers and Directors of the Ministries and Commissions of the five Yuan and National Military Council; fifty (50) per cent of these officials shall be nominated by Kuomintang members of the Interim National Council and thirty (30) per cent by Communist members. The remaining twenty (20) per cent of the above stated Government officials shall be appointed, with the approval of the Interim National Council, from members of other parties or persons of no party affiliation.

ARTICLE IV. *Provincial and Local Government*

Section 1. The President shall, with the approval of the Interim National Council, appoint the Governors of the Provinces of the Republic of China and the mayors of the special municipalities. The Governors of the Provinces of Jehol, Chahar, Suiyuan, Ninghsia, Shantung, Hopeh, Shansi, Shensi, Honan and Kansu, shall be appointed by the President from nominees agreed upon by a special committee of the Interim National Council which shall be composed of two Kuomintang members and two Communist members. The mayors of the special municipalities of Peiping, Tientsin and Tsingtao, shall be appointed in a similar manner. The terms of office of the incumbent governors and mayors in the provinces and special municipalities specifically referred to in this section shall terminate not later than sixty days after the promulgation of this act.

Section 2. Pending the establishment of constitutional government, the National Government shall promulgate no act affecting the administration of local government without the approval of the Interim National Council with at least sixteen members voting in the affirmative. Local government shall continue to be administered by the authorities who were in charge on the date of the promulgation of this act. In areas where local authority was in question on the effective date of this act, interim authorities shall be selected by a committee of the Interim National Council which shall be composed of two Kuomintang members and two Communist members.

ARTICLE V. No act of the National Government, Provincial Governments or local governments shall be valid which shall:

Section 1. Abridge the freedom of speech or publication or the right of people peaceably to assemble, associate, organize or communicate freely.

Section 2. Violate the right of the people to be secure in their per-

sons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable search and seizure, or which shall permit the arrest or trial of any person by other than duly constituted police or judicial authorities, or which shall permit the arrest of any person without immediate public notice of the name of the individual and the time, the place and the reason for such arrest, or the detention of any person without trial.

Section 3. Deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law or which shall take private property for public use without just compensation.

Section 4. Prejudice the equality under the law of any person for reason of sex, race, religion, or membership in a political party or other peaceful association.

ARTICLE VI. All acts of the Government of the Republic of China or of the Governments of the Provinces of the Republic of China which are inconsistent with the foregoing statements of rights of the people are herewith declared invalid. All persons detained in a manner inconsistent with the above statement of the rights of the people are herewith granted their immediate and unconditional release. All property impounded or held in confiscation in a manner inconsistent with the above statement of rights is herewith returned to its proper owner.

ARTICLE VII. *Additional Powers of the Interim National Council*

Section 1. The Interim National Council shall be directly responsible for the protection of the rights of the people herein set forth, and shall immediately create a standing commission representing all parties to investigate and report to the President and to the Council charges of violations of the rights of the people.

Section 2. The Interim National Council shall immediately create a commission representing all parties as well as persons of no party to draft a constitution for submission to the National Assembly. A draft constitution approved by the Interim National Council shall be submitted to the National Assembly by May 5 of the thirty-fifth year of the Republic. This constitution shall be initially adopted by the National Assembly in the form submitted before July 1 of the thirty-fifth year of the Republic, with a proviso for the election of new National Assembly to revise or amend this constitution before July 1 of the thirty-sixth year of the Republic.

Section 3. Upon the adoption of the constitution, the Interim National Council shall supervise the reconstitution of the Government of the Republic of China in accordance with the constitution. The new government shall be established and shall become operative no later than January 1, 1947.

121.893/1-2446: Telegram

General Marshall to President Truman[Extract] ⁹⁷

CHUNGKING, 24 [23] January 1946.

98. DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: . . .

On my return from Shanghai, the Generalissimo sent me that evening, Monday,⁹⁸ a representative to convey his view of the situation regarding agreements to be reached, political as well as military, and requested me to see him Tuesday at 11 a. m. I did so. He first discussed the procedure regarding the nationalization of the army, which I have outlined above. He favored delaying meetings until completion of political discussions but accepted my suggestion that there should be no delay.

He then turned to the political situation, the progress of the work of the Political Consultative Conference now in session which is to reach agreements on the formation of a coalition government and the question of representatives to the Constitutional Convention on May 5. This conference was to have terminated its session today but he stated its committees had failed to reach agreements regarding very important points. He asked me if I would be willing to see the Communists and endeavor to persuade them to make the necessary concessions. I replied that informally I would be quite willing to do my best to bring about a solution, but that I myself was completely confused by the debates and that no one had as yet produced a definite program or proposed action in writing; that I must be better informed before taking any personal action, both regarding the Government's proposals and the Communist proposals and by proposals I did not mean speeches. I meant written documents. In anticipation of some such situation, since the debates and exchanges of written stipulations or generalities seem to have made little headway in settling the "cease firing" problem in the past, and in the present struggles, I had prepared an extremely brief act⁹⁹ to be promulgated by the Government, setting up an interim coalition government reposing in the Generalissimo power of control as President of all China rather than as at present as head of the Kuomintang Party, over the non-Communists-held portion of China, and including a brief Bill of Rights

⁹⁷ For sections of telegram printed elsewhere in this volume, see pp. 193 and 373.

⁹⁸ January 21.

⁹⁹ *Supra.*

and a provision for the drafting of a constitution for submission to the Convention in May. This provided a definite basis for discussion and incidentally furnished at least one example of specifically how to go about the establishment of an interim coalition government preliminary to the formation of a constitutional government. The Generalissimo studied my paper overnight and discussed it with me for 2 hours this afternoon. Part he did not understand but does now. Part he thought it dangerous to concede to the Communists, etc., etc. The bulk of the document he agreed with. It did not change the governmental structure except on the highest level, but did set up a Bill of Rights. I characterized it as a dose of American medicine, to his amusement. Incidentally, he is much concerned to have the fact of my having submitted such a plan kept now and for the future completely secret. Therefore, please destroy the record of this radio, for a leak in the press would be disastrous to my mission.

The Generalissimo gave me several lengthy Government proposals¹ to study and I am to meet him again tomorrow to see just what definite proposals he will actually make to the Communists and to what degree I would be willing informally to press them to accept. I have decided that even if I am formally requested, as has now been intimated in the China press, to act as a mediator in the political struggle regarding the formation of a coalition government, I will decline to accept. But I will personally or unofficially do my best to secure the necessary concessions by both sides in order to reach an agreement.

I have told the Generalissimo that two factors in my opinion make it imperative for him to find an agreement with the Communists for a unified government and army at an early date. First, that in the present situation China is very vulnerable to low level Russian infiltration methods to the strengthening of the Communist regime and the progressive weakening of the National Government's position in Northwest China and Manchuria reference Russia, and secondly, that it is apparent that United States military and naval forces can not be continued for long in China. He is much disturbed by Russian actions the past week involving sporadic firing on Chinese troops, failure to evacuate localities and in some instances increasing local garrisons and heavy pressure to secure Chinese agreement to Russian joint participation in the operation of certain heavy industries.²

¹ Not found in Department files.

² For correspondence relating to the war booty question in Manchuria, see vol. x, pp. 1099 ff.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and Governor Chang Chun, at House 28, Chungking, January 25, 1946, 3 p. m.

Also present: Mr. Shepley³
Colonel Pee

Governor Chang called at General Marshall's residence to inform him of the progress of the various subcommittees of the Political Consultative Conference. Governor Chang stated that the subcommittee on governmental reorganization had come to agreement on the following matters:

1. That the organic law of the Republic would be amended to abolish the Supreme National Defense Council and to make the Council of State the highest policy-deciding organ; that the members would be increased to 40 of which 20 would be members of the Kuomintang and 20 members of other parties or no party. (The apportionment of the latter 20 positions had not been settled.) (Dr. Wu⁴ called later to say a hitch had developed on this agreement.)

2. That the nominees of the various parties would be sanctioned by the President and in case he disapproved, the party would be required to make a new nomination.

3. That the appointments to the council of no party affiliation would be nominated by the President and approved by the Council.

4. That the members to the Council would be responsible to the President and not to the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang.

5. That the heads of the 14 ministries and boards of the Executive Yuan would hereafter be known as Ministers of State and that between 3 and 5 additional members without portfolio would be added to the Executive Yuan. The apportionment of the Ministries between the various parties would be made after the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee had ratified the decisions of the Political Consultative Conference and the reorganization of the Executive Yuan had begun. He estimated that this would take place within a month after the conclusion of the PCC deliberations.

Governor Chang stated that the subcommittee was in disagreement on the following points:

1. Whether the appointment of government officials should reside in the President or in the National Council.

2. The government's proposals regarding the emergency powers of the President.

3. The question of whether important policy matters would have to be decided by two-thirds majority of the Council of State rather than a simple majority. He said that in informal discussions with Communist member Tung Pi-wu, Mr. Tung had proposed that the

³ James R. Shepley, member of General Marshall's staff.

⁴ K. C. Wu, Chinese Minister of Information.

United Nations formula of allowing a majority of the Council to decide on important matters and that a compromise on this line seemed probable.

Governor Chang reported that the subcommittee on the draft constitution was in agreement on the creation of a subcommittee of the PCC to be known as the Draft Constitution Reexamination Committee. The Reexamination Committee would be composed of 25 members representing all parties and citizens of no party and 10 drafting experts. It was agreed that the committee is to finish its study within two months and make a report and that the National Assembly will consider the original draft constitution, the amendments proposed by the PCC and the constitution by the Examination Committee, then the National Assembly will have the advantage of all these views in adopting a constitution.

Governor Chang reported that the Subcommittee on the Constitution had agreed to these fundamental principles:

1. That the President would eventually be elected by popular vote.
2. That the Legislative and Control Yuan will be elective and form a bicameral National Assembly with the Legislative having the power of enactment and the Control Yuan having the power of impeachment.
3. That the members of the Executive Yuan would be responsible to the Legislative Yuan in the manner of the British parliamentary system and that the Executive Yuan could ask the President to dissolve the Yuan, presumably for new elections.
4. That the Provinces would become the highest unit of self government with the power to establish their own constitution so long as it was not inconsistent with the National constitution and have the power to elect their own Governors.
5. That the constitution would contain a statement of the rights of the people.

In addition to the three points of disagreements on the reorganization of the government, only one political question remained to be settled by the PCC, Governor Chang said. That was the make up of the National Assembly. He said the government intended to make a final proposal that the Kuomintang withdraw the existing members of its 460 Central Executive Committee men from the present Assembly and that the delegates be increased [to] a number of 600, of whom the Kuomintang would appoint 230 and other parties and no partisans would represent 370.

Governor Chang left General Marshall's residence to go [to] a meeting of the Military Subcommittee to [at?] which he said he was hopeful that a decision on the remaining military questions would be reached.

He said he was optimistic that the PCC would complete its work within the next few days with agreement between the several parties on all major questions.

J. R. SHEPLEY

893.00/1-2546 : Telegram

The Counselor of Embassy in China (Smyth) to the Secretary of State

CHUNGKING, January 25, 1946—5 p. m.

[Received January 26—11: 17 p. m.]

162. Draft factual report on People's Consultative Council to date follows:

People's Consultative Council which convened on January 10 has now held nine public sessions. (Sent Washington 162, repeated Moscow 20, January 25.)

Five main topics of discussion have been (1) reorganization of National Govt, (2) reorganization of armies, (3) common administrative policy, (4) National Assembly, and (5) draft constitution. All sessions have been reported in detail in local press. On conclusion of discussion on each topic, views and recommendations have been referred to a subcommittee for drafting of specific proposals to be presented to Council for consideration. At the first session of PCC, 8 non-partisan individuals were appointed to the Military Investigation Commission; 8 other members have been appointed by Resident Committee of People's Political Council. (Coincidentally, Three-man Military Commission provided for in October 10 agreement has started work on technical aspects of reorganization of Communist armies and garrisons.)

1. Regarding reorganization, the Govt originally proposed that State Council should be expanded to 48 members instead of 36 with additional ones being representatives of other parties and should be given definitive authority on all questions of policy and administration. The President might veto any measure which he considered contrary to national interest but it has expressed unwillingness to concede autonomy at provincial level.

2. On military organization, Govt has insisted on complete nationalization of all armies with central control. Other parties have agreed to this in principle, apparently even including provision that Communist armies should be reduced to 20 divisions with 90 for the Central Govt and an overall reduction to 50 in 1947. Communist desire for local militia under control of provincial authorities and nontransferable has met Govt opposition.

3. Discussion on common administrative program has followed general lines with all parties agreeing in principle on free political activity and legalization of parties, increasing administrative effi-

ciency, guarantee of civil liberties, and reconstruction of country. No specific proposals have been made publicly.

4. On National Assembly, Govt has insisted that it must be convened on May 5 and contends that it cannot agree to new elections without violating law. It has, however, agreed that additions, and replacements for deceased members and traitors, should be made by governmental appointment upon recommendation of other parties as well as Kuomintang in order to make Assembly more representative. It is said to have agreed that a second National Assembly be held six months after May 5 assembly and that there should be new elections for it. Publicly, all other parties have insisted on new elections, claiming that present representatives were elected nine years ago and hence are no longer representative and that question of assembly is no longer a legal but a political one.

5. On draft constitution, Youth Party has proposed a new draft based on American model. This has been opposed by Govt which insists that constitution must be based on Sun Yat-sen's five-power concept. Discussion on question has been very general and without other specific proposals. Discussion in subcommittee is reported to be tending toward a compromise, consisting of a bicameral legislature, with legislative yuan as lower house (popularly elected), control yuan as upper house (elected by provincial councils), with executive yuan responsible to them.

Discussions in subcommittees which must formulate specific proposals have been confidential and there is only scattered indication of progress that has been made. Although opposing points of view on a number of questions are reportedly still far apart, considerable hope is expressed that some sort of agreement will be reached within a reasonable period of time.

One of highlights of PCC was announcement by Chiang Kai-shek in extemporaneous statement on January 14 that Govt would take measures within 10 days to grant civil liberties defined as follows: (a) Equality of all political parties before law, (b) permission for all legal political activities, (c) promotion of local autonomy, and (d) release of all political prisoners except those accused of traitorous acts. President Chiang at same time stated that political prisoners would be released within 7 days. This announcement has been subject of much comment and now of considerable concern because at end of announced time only one prisoner had been released. Communists, however, seem to feel that this action at least means that no further arrests will be made.

Public interest has been stimulated by organization by Democratic League members of Society for Promotion of PCC which after each open session has held a public evening mass meeting devoted to discussion of issues involved. Principal speakers have been delegates to PCC. Attendance gradually increased to approximately 2000;

there has been increasing heckling of speakers and disturbances, allegedly fomented by secret service men.

In general Youth Party has tended to side with Kmt and Democratic League with Communists. Democratic League delegates have been most vociferous and outspoken in debate and spend a great part of their time criticizing proposals made by other parties.

Closing date, originally scheduled for January 23, has been postponed for 3 days. Despite continued charges and counter-charges in the press of violations of truce agreement, both parties seem to feel that hostilities have in the main ceased and that activities of Executive headquarters in Peiping, established by Government Communist truce agreement, are progressing satisfactorily.

SMYTH

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

General Marshall to President Truman ⁵

CHUNGKING, 31 January 1946.

133. DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I greatly appreciated the generous expressions of approval and confidence in your radio of Jan. 25, White House 405.⁶ As yet I have not found an appropriate occasion to take advantage of your permission to quote its contents to Generalissimo and Communist leader.

Since my last radio of Jan. 23,⁷ I have been formally invited by both parties to act as advisor on reorganization of armies of China.⁸ The Communist member of committee is Gen. Chou,⁹ pronounced Joe, who is also their leader in all political dictates and agreements. He has been so busy with latter duties that he could not meet on army problems. But I proceeded to draft a complete reorganization of Chinese military forces with prohibitions and stipulations familiar to our democratic system, adapted to China and to the menace of Chinese war lords and the uncertainties of provincial officials. After several meetings with National Government Committee member and with Generalissimo I got agreement to plan and approval of procedure to be followed in negotiation with General Chou.

Meanwhile I have had long discussions with Generalissimo on political program and his views on good faith of Communist leaders. This last I will leave to Harriman¹⁰ to report on orally as he heard

⁵ Copy delivered to the Secretary of State.

⁶ *Post*, p. 380.

⁷ *Post*, p. 373.

⁸ For correspondence on this subject, see pp. 177 ff.

⁹ Chou En-lai.

¹⁰ W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador in the Soviet Union, who stopped at Chungking en route to the United States.

enough to understand the situation and General Chou flew to Yanan to get approval of party for his proposed commitments. He was to return Monday but weather delayed him until yesterday, Wednesday evening late. He telephoned at 7:30 this morning to see me at nine. There follows a report of that interview.

General Chou stated that the Communist Central Executive Committee confirmed his negotiations in PCC; that they believed the broadening of the government could well have gone farther but that they were generally satisfied with the agreements because they opened the door to the democratization of China. He stated Mao Tze Tung¹¹ had instructed him to inform the Generalissimo personally that the Communist Party was now prepared to cooperate in his government both during the interim period and under the constitution. Chou also said that the Communist Party believed in principle in socialism but for the present they regarded Socialism as an impractical system for China under present conditions and that they therefore subscribed to the introduction of a political system patterned after the US; that by this he meant that prosperity and peace of China could only be promoted by the introduction of the American political system, science, and industrialization, and of agrarian reform in a program of free individual enterprise. He stated that Mao had directed him to inform me that the Communist Party was satisfied with the fairness of my attitude and that they were ready to cooperate with the purposes of the US Government. (Whether or not he was implying that his party would cooperate with US rather than with Russia was differently interpreted by my staff who listened to the conference. Chou did say, referring to a rumor that Mao was planning to go to Moscow, that at the mention of this Mao laughed and said he had no such intention and on the contrary would like very much to go [to] the US where he believed he would be able to learn much.)

General Chou continued, that in view of the agreement of the PCC regarding the reorganization of government which gave the minority parties sufficient voice to block certain possible governmental action, Chou wished to inform me that the Communist Party would not use this power to obstruct any measure of the government which would be within the intent of the PCC agreements. He stated that they were much pleased regarding the cessation of hostilities procedure.

General Chou informed me that it had finally been agreed that the PCC would adopt resolutions implementing the agreements regarding reorganization of the government, nationalization of the army, and the drafting and adoption of the constitution. The meeting, which a

¹¹ Chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

government representative has just informed me may complete the work will convene in ten minutes. In general comment has been agreed that the organic law of the [Re]public will be amended to abolish the Supreme National Defense Council and to clothe the council of state with what amounts to full legislative powers. In this reorganization the government will no longer be responsible to the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang. The council of state will have a membership of 40 of which 20 will be Kuomintang, 14 Nationalist [*Communist*] and Democratic League, and 6 members of the Youth Party and non partisans. A definite parliamentary procedure is provided for. In general, it follows the voting pattern of the United Nations Assembly. Bills may be introduced either by the president or on the motion of any three members of the council. Nominations to the council by the several political parties must be sanctioned by the president, and if he disapproves a name, a new nomination must be made. Nominations to the council of no party affiliation are to be made by the president and approved by the council.

The president's veto may be overridden by a three-fifths majority. A reorganization of the government also provides for a reorganization of the Executive Yuan in which the heads of 14 ministries and members of the Executive Yuan will be known as ministries of state and there will be additional members without portfolio. It will be a coalition cabinet with minority party representation in the ministries. Appointments to the Yuans must be confirmed by the Council of State as must the exercise of the emergency powers retained by the president.

A "Common program" is to be adopted as an interim charter for the reorganized government guaranteeing civil rights and pledging the government to a constitutional, elective democracy.

The new draft constitution is to be written by a special commission of the political consultative council. It will be composed of 25 members representing all parties and non partisans and ten drafting experts. The committee will submit a new draft of the construction [*constitution*] to the National Assembly, whose membership will be broadened to live [*give*] minority representation.

The agreement regarding nationalization of the army provides for the integration of the present national military council and the present War Ministry in a new ministry of National Defense in the Executive Yuan, and calls for demobilization, complete separation of the military from the political and civil into a truly national army and the integration of the national and Communist parties. The details are to be worked out by the military subcommittee, which I have been asked to advise, and have accepted.

After General Chou's departure the government military representative asked me for a final conference on Army nationalization. The last hesitations of the Generalissimo were ironed out and the following procedure agreed upon: I had told General Chou that the government had informed me of the general terms of their proposals and that I had my own views. He plans to talk this over with me tomorrow if PCC conference duties permit. Then I will résumé his agreements, objections and proposals to the government representative and see to what extent my plan should be modified. Then a formal meeting will be arranged for and the two Chinese members will exchange views.

After this first meeting I will make such modification in my plan as seems to be indicated and will then send it to the government and the Communist representatives on the committee prior to the second meeting. The negotiations will then be on in full force, but with my written text as the firm basis for discussions. I will of course advise you as soon as the outcome is evident. This issue is the most difficult and critical of all, therefore the foregoing detailed exposition of planned procedure.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

General Marshall to President Truman and the Secretary of State

CHUNGKING, 1 February 1946.

137. Reference my meeting with General Chou, Communist, yesterday and my 133 of yesterday, the following translation of Chou's initial remarks was handed me by him this evening.

"This time when I came down from Yen-an, Chairman Mao requested me to forward a personal letter addressed to you, in which he sent you his regards and expressed his thanks for all your efforts. However, because I went this morning first to another meeting, I failed to bring that letter along, but I will do it next time.

When I flew back to Yen-an, I submitted to Chairman Mao and the Central Committee of our party a report on the truce negotiation and the proceedings of the PCC. Though certain aspects of the accomplishments made thus far do not entirely come up to our heart desire, yet the issuance of the cease fire order constitutes itself a tremendous success, and it must be said that much of this should be attributed to your nice efforts. As regards the PCC, a big step has also been made. The door toward democracy is now pushed open, regardless of how narrow the opening still is. Chairman Mao instructed me to communicate to you in particular that he regards the attitude you assumed in handling the truce problem being fair and just, and the Chinese Communist Party is prepared to cooperate with the United States in matters both of a local and national character on the basis as embodied in your aforementioned attitude. We believe

that the democracy to be initiated in China should follow the American pattern. Since in present-day China, the conditions necessary to the introduction of Socialism do not exist, we Chinese Communists, who theoretically advocate Socialism as our ultimate goal, do not mean, nor deem it possible, to carry it into effect in the immediate future. In saying that we should pursue the American path, we mean to acquire U. S. styled democracy and science, and specifically to introduce to this country agricultural reform, industrialization, free enterprise and development of individuality, so that we may build up an independent, free and prosperous China.

I wish to take this opportunity of relating a small anecdote which might be of interest to you. It has been rumored recently, that Chairman Mao is going to pay a visit to Moscow. On learning this, Chairman Mao laughed and remarked half-jokingly that if ever he would take a furlough abroad, which would certainly do much good to his present health condition, he would rather go to the United States, because he thinks that there he can learn lots of things useful to China.

With regard to the implementation of the cease fire order, Chairman Mao wishes to make it known that it would be highly desirable if you would continue your efforts to enforce it not only in China proper, but also in Manchuria. ["]

General Chou also handed me the following letter from the Communist leader, Mao Tse-tung, to me.

“Dear General Marshall: On arriving here, Comrade Chou En-lai has submitted to me and the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party a report on the proceedings of the truce negotiation and the political consultative conference. I greatly appreciate your fair and just attitude in the course of negotiating and implementing the truce agreement. On behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, I wish to extend to you our deepest thanks.

The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party has decided to further authorize Comrade Chou En-lai to be our representative to conduct discussions with you on various matters so as to enjoy your impartial help for the solution of many problems of both a national and local nature, which are pressing to the whole Chinese people.

By the courtesy of Comrade Chou who is coming back to Chungking I wish to send you my best regards and greetings. Yours sincerely, (signed) Mao Tse-tung.”

I think it would be harmful to me here to give any publicity to these two papers.

893.00/2-746: Telegram

The Counselor of Embassy in China (Smyth) to the Secretary of State

CHUNGKING, February 7, 1946—3 p. m.

[Received February 7—11:27 a. m.]

245. Resolutions accepted locally as first important step toward national unity and lasting internal peace. (Reference Embtel 201,

February 1¹² resolutions adopted by People's Consultative Conference.) It may be assumed that this feeling is general throughout country although national press reaction delayed by New Year holidays. Resolutions will be submitted to Kuomintang Central Executive Committee at Chungking on March 1 and to Communist Committee at Yen-an about same time. Delay attributed to transportation difficulties of members proceeding to meetings from distant points. Approval of resolutions conceded as matter of form because of prior public commitments by Gimo¹³ and top leaders both major parties. Anticipated that Govt reorganization will commence immediately following formal approval. Constitutional Committee may convene at earlier date.

Mutual distrust between Kuomintang and Communists cannot be ignored as a critical factor in future developments. General optimism is tempered by scepticism with regard to purpose of both sides faithfully to carry out commitments. However, prolongation of peace under present truce agreement will make future open break by either side increasingly difficult.

In the immediate future an intensification of political maneuvering and propaganda may be anticipated with each side attempting to infiltrate the areas of the other. In this the Communists, with better techniques and a more dynamic program, may be expected to excel, especially in major urban centers where previous Communist political activity has been rigidly limited.

Recent minor disturbances at political rallies here and some police interference with minor party delegates to PCC alleged in certain JSB [*non?*]-party quarters to indicate possibility that reactionary Kuomintang elements may get out of control as agreed measures to limit the governmental power of the Kuomintang are put into effect. There is some latent resentment at outside interference. Aside from disgruntled Rightist elements within the party, even some liberal Kuomintang members, although pleased by cessation of hostilities and basic agreement on major issues, are reported to believe that United States has forced government into agreement which may lead to eventual Communist domination of China.

Military reorganization, including demobilization, ultimate merger of all forces considered most pressing problem and probably most difficult one. At recent press conference Chou En-lai very noncommittal on question of ultimate complete merger all armies.

SMYTH

¹² Not printed; for texts of resolutions adopted by the Political Consultative Council, see *United States Relations With China*, pp. 610-621.

¹³ Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

893.00/2-1546 : Telegram

*The Counselor of Embassy in China (Smyth) to the
Secretary of State*

CHUNGKING, February 15, 1946—3 p. m.

[Received February 16—10: 07 p. m.]

304. Mass meeting of estimated 7 to 10 thousand people (reference Embtels 201, February 1¹⁴ and 245, February 7, 3 p. m.), February 10 sponsored by Democratic League and local civic organizations to celebrate success [of People's Consultative Council?] disrupted by organized hoodlums, estimated 300. Several prominent liberals beaten and suffered injuries, none believed critical. Violent press controversies are in progress. Non-Govt press alleges collusion Govt police agencies which Govt press ignores or denies. Weight of present evidence indicates at least prior planning and organization for demonstration aimed at repudiation PCC resolutions and discrediting the advocates of full implementation thereof. Airmail despatch follows.¹⁴

Incident believed symptomatic of increasing apprehension among Rightist elements Kmt as it becomes more evident that Gimo intends fully to implement PCC decisions. Main opposition PCC proposals develops from (1) concern of CC clique¹⁵ and adherents with regard future position when Kmt will no longer have sole access public funds for party support and (2) concern of Whampoa clique and associated army and division commanders regarding loss of perquisites of office as demobilization and reorganization armed forces commences.

Gimo now Nanking where he will preside at conference top military commanders from 15 to 20 February. No formal agenda announced but demobilization and reorganization armies probably major topics for discussion. Real test of power may not develop, however, until PCC resolutions presented Kmt central executive committee meeting still scheduled about March 1.

Certain liberal Chinese critics of Gimo now express opinion he has gained in stature by moderation and willingness to compromise at PCC sessions and believe him sincere in expressed desire carry out PCC agreements. Successful revolt against Gimo's authority held unlikely. There is now developing anomalous political situation of Gimo being supported on PCC issues by Communists against disgruntled elements his own party. The national press reaction PCC program favorable qualified by expressed realization that full and early implementation of decisions only real test good faith all parties. Comment in general restrained advocating watchful waiting and

¹⁴ Not printed.

¹⁵ Chen brothers, Chen Li-fu and Kuo-fu.

praising truce agreement. Press cautiously exploring its now [*new?*] charter of freedom. Increasing comment critical of local administrations which are held responsible for serious grain dislocations in Honan, Hunan and southern Anhwei where suffering is widespread and famine likely.

No apparent progress guarantees civil liberties. No release political prisoners. Constitutional committee held first meeting February 14.

SMYTH

893.00/3-246 : Telegram

The Counselor of Embassy in China (Smyth) to the Secretary of State

CHUNGKING, March 2, 1946—1 p. m.

[Received March 6—6:30 a. m.]

415. Organic general rules governing the Supreme National Defense Council enacted by Kuomintang Central Executive Committee on January 29, 1939, are being forwarded to Dept by airmail¹⁶ in Chinese text and English translation. As far as Embassy is aware these rules have never been made public. They were obtained originally from Chinese source by staff member and their authenticity has now been confirmed orally by Foreign Office.

Article 1 of rules is as follows: "Central Executive Committee during the period of the war hereby establishes the Supreme National Defense Council for the purpose of coordinating the control of the party, the Government and the military and exercising the power of the Central Political Council. The subordinate departments and committees of the Central Executive Committee, and the five Yuans of the Central Government, the National Military Council and its subordinate departments and committees shall take instructions from the Supreme National Defense Council."

Article 8 as follows: "The President of the Supreme National Defense Council may, without applying the ordinary procedure, summarily deal with all party, Government, and military affairs by issuing orders."

Embassy considers these rules to be of considerable interest as specifically setting forth supreme authority of Generalissimo which has hitherto been assured [*assumed?*]. They are especially interesting at this time when Generalissimo's authority may be subject to attack from Rightest Kuomintang elements who are disgruntled at prospect of full implementation PCC resolutions (Embtel 304, February 15, 3 p. m.) and drastic military reorganization.

SMYTH

¹⁶ Not found in Department files.

893.00/3-2046 : Telegram

The Counselor of Embassy in China (Smyth) to the Secretary of State

CHUNGKING, March 20, 1946—2 p. m.

[Received March 20—10:56 a. m.]

523. Unanimous ratification of Political Consultation Conference agreements by Kuomintang Central Executive Committee announced on 16 March.¹⁷ Validity and good faith of Kmt ratification now being questioned by Communists and minor parties because of five point resolution by constitutional question reported to have been introduced at final CEC session which, if adopted, would have effect of nullifying entire PCC constitutional agreement (full text PCC agreements in Embtel 201, February 1¹⁸).

Best information available at present would indicate that such a resolution was introduced and in essence provides for close adherence to May 5 draft constitution rather than to a revised constitution to be drafted by the constitutional reviewing committee established by the PCC agreements and in accordance with the liberal principles set forth therein. The Embassy has been informed, and considers the information reliable, that the Generalissimo was successful in having this resolution referred to the standing committee of the CEC rather than risk a vote before the full CEC session and through this maneuver it is anticipated that the resolution may be quashed. (Understood that standing committee meets this afternoon.)

In the meantime, however, the Communists have launched a violent attack against good faith of Kmt with regard to whole PCC program. Thus far the attack has not been extended to the Generalissimo personally. Minor parties are confused and concerned by new developments. It is now proposed that Steering Committee of PCC hold meeting tonight to request definitive statement from Kuomintang CEC to the effect that Government contemplates no steps which are contrary to PCC agreements.

There is danger, not yet acute, that efforts by irreconcilables within the Kmt to sabotage the PCC program may be successful and Communists would appear by current violent diatribes against Kmt to be preparing for such a contingency by an early disclaimer of responsibility therefor. Reports to Embassy from Yen-an dated 18 March indicate that Central Committee of Communist Party will not accept

¹⁷ For text of CEC ratification, see *United States Relations With China*, p. 634.

¹⁸ See footnote 12, p. 153.

any decisions made at Chungking which are not consistent with basic principles of PCC agreements.

Notwithstanding the present impasse regarding the PCC agreements, residual points of friction in North China, and the continued existence of mutual Kmt-Communist distrust [*distrust?*], the controlling factor in the whole situation is still Manchuria. In the northeast the Communists appear to enjoy at least the neutrality of Soviet occupation forces and apparent freedom of activity within the sphere of Soviet control, whereas Central Government troops cannot effectively reestablish Chinese sovereignty prior to a Russian withdrawal. Previously the Communists had expressed a desire for the despatch of executive headquarters truce teams to Manchuria. Within the past week, however, they appear to have reversed their position on this question, as General Gillem¹⁹ is reporting separately to General Marshall.

The Chinese Communists in Manchuria seem to be either (1) consolidating political influence in the northeastern hinterland for future bargaining purposes or (2) in conjunction with (1) establishing a military base and domination of strategic areas for an eventual military showdown for outright control of Manchurian provinces. In the absence of more complete and unbiased information from the northeast, (1) seems to be the more likely explanation inasmuch as (2) appears doubtful of accomplishment in the foreseeable future without undisguised Soviet assistance.

The whole effect in China proper is unfortunate because it supplies those elements within the Kmt who in any case would oppose the PCC agreements with a plausible excuse for their opposition and thus threatens the entire reform program. The Embassy considers it unlikely that there will be a complete breakdown of inter-party collaboration at this time, but such a danger will continue to exist at least until a constitution drafted in accordance with the principles established by the PCC agreements has been adopted by the National Assembly scheduled to meet at Nanking on 5 May. There appears to be no reason to doubt the complete good faith of the Generalissimo with regard to implementation of the PCC program, but whether or not he will be able to control the extreme right wing of the Kmt remains a moot question. Thus far there has been evident no effective challenge to his authority.

Further developments will be reported promptly.

SMYTH

¹⁹ Lt. Gen. Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., representing General Marshall during the latter's absence for consultation in Washington.

893.00/3-2146: Telegram

The Counselor of Embassy in China (Smyth) to the Secretary of State

CHUNGKING, March 21, 1946—6 p. m.

[Received March 21—5:35 p. m.]

541. Steering Committee of Political Consultation Conference at meeting last night (see Embtel 523, March 20) reached agreement on following points:

1. That draft constitution now in preparation by Constitutional Committee in accordance with principles set forth in PCC constitutional agreement will be definitive and the only document presented to National Assembly for acceptance.

2. That all parties are under moral obligation to have their delegates to National Assembly support draft constitution as presented.

3. That Central Executive Committee of Kmt will nominate only Kmt membership of State Council. Other members to be nominated by their respective parties and non-party membership by Gimo.

Steering Committee meeting was presided over by Sun Fo²⁰ who stated that Kmt members (Wang Shih-chieh²¹ and Wu Tieh-chen²²) had been authorized by Gimo clearly to establish foregoing points. Statement embodying these points for release to press is now being drafted and it is anticipated it will be released about 25 March when Steering Committee will hold next meeting.

Action by Steering Committee, with participation therein by such influential members of Kmt, has cleared atmosphere and reduced danger of serious disruption of whole reform program. General Chou En-lai left for Yen-an this morning, presumably to report result of Steering Committee meeting to Communist Central Committee.

Embassy considers prompt action by Kmt members of Steering Committee of PCC as additional evidence of good faith of Gimo with regard to implementation of PCC program and of his ability in final analysis to dominate Kmt actions. There still exists danger, however, from irreconcilables within Kmt and further attacks upon PCC program may be anticipated. It is felt here that serious situation of last few days was created in large part by erroneous reporting, perhaps deliberate, by Central News Agency which created general confusion among Communists and minor parties with respect to ultimate intentions and good faith of Kmt.

SMYTH

²⁰ President of the Chinese Legislative Yuan.

²¹ Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs.

²² General Wu Te-chen, Secretary General of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

General Marshall to Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr.

WASHINGTON, 28 March 1946.

82420. Reference your 373²³ Chou En-lai. Please advise me of your estimate of situation in Kuomintang Party regarding good faith in carrying out recommendations of PPC [PCC].

893.00/3-3146 : Telegram

*The Counselor of Embassy in China (Smyth) to the Secretary of State*²⁴

CHUNGKING, March 31, 1946—4 p. m.
[Received 11:45 p. m.]

600. Political impasse which threatens entire governmental reform program has been developing from failure satisfactorily to resolve issues arising from resolutions introduced and opinions expressed at recent session Kmt Central Executive Committee. (Embassy's telegram 523 March 20.) Fundamental and major problems derive from Kmt desire to effect changes in basic resolutions adopted by PCC on 31 January (Embassy's telegram 201, February 1²⁵), particularly that portion which sets forth principles to be followed in drafting permanent constitution.

2. Recent meetings of PCC Steering Committee failed to make substantial progress toward settlement of disputed points. Even though apparently personally willing, Kmt members of Committee (Wang Shih-chieh and Wu Teh-chen) were unable to agree to publish unequivocal statement of Kmt concurrence with agreements reached at March 20 meeting (Embassy's telegram 541, March 21). It is now becoming obvious that in deference to right-wing elements of Kmt the Kmt members of committee are arguing for revision (of PCC constitutional principles) which would (1) change proposed "cabinet system" of Government, wherein Cabinet is responsible to popularly elected legislative body, and substitute a "presidential system" wherein supreme authority would be vested in a president without provision for checks and balances comparable to American system, (2) create a National Assembly to meet at two or three year intervals

²³ March 27, p. 603.

²⁴ This telegram was drafted by the Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Ludden), at the request of Lieutenant General Gillem, as his answer to General Marshall's 82420, March 28, p. 158. General Marshall was informed of its contents on April 1 by the Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs (Ringwalt).

²⁵ See footnote 12, p. 153.

and with nominal powers of initiative, referendum, election and recall and (3) drastically limit provincial autonomy.

At third meeting of Steering Committee of PCC held last night some progress was made toward settlement of membership and powers of National Assembly, and discussions regarding relationship of executive authority to legislative authority indicated from all sides a greater willingness to compromise than has been evident at previous meetings. This is variously interpreted as result of private discussions between delegates prior to meeting or intercession on part of Gimo to effect settlement. However, Communists and Democratic League still maintain general position that PCC resolutions were agreed upon by top representatives all parties and should be carried out although for the time being there appears to be a somewhat better atmosphere prevailing; Communists and Democratic League will continue to oppose major changes which indicate continuation of single-party rule or threaten creation of "authoritarian" state. Consequently they both refuse to nominate members for participation in reorganized Government until Kmt publishes statement of any revisions agreed upon and definite party commitment to implement PCC program as revised. Furthermore senior Communists at Chungking have stated privately that they will not submit troop demobilization and reorganization lists until position of Kmt with regard to PCC program is clarified. Another meeting of Steering Committee will be held tomorrow night and senior Democratic League representative expressed late last night considerable optimism with regard to favorable outcome.

In the meantime Communists have postponed their central committee meeting at Yen-an, originally scheduled for 31 March to pass PCC resolutions. Constitutional Committee of PCC has suspended meetings, and preparation of revised constitution to submit to National Assembly cannot be prepared until settlement present problems is achieved.

The Embassy has reported previously that main opposition to PCC proposals would develop from (1) concern of CC clique and adherents with regard to their future position when Kmt will no longer have sole governing authority and (2) concern of Whampoa clique and associated Army and division commanders regarding loss of perquisites of office as military demobilization and reorganization proceeds. This situation still prevails and opposition to PCC program has been intensified as date for presentation of revised constitution to National Assembly (May 5) draws nearer. There are undoubtedly large numbers of Chinese who sincerely believe that China is not yet prepared for the type of popular government outlined by the PCC program, but the Embassy feels that for the most part opposition stems from the

elements referred to above, whose opposition to and distrust of popular institutions in China has long been apparent.

Even though his life and background might have been expected to place him in opposition to the governmental reform now envisaged, the Gimo has displayed throughout recent months a laudable spirit of moderation and willingness to compromise. His own public statements with regard to the PCC program place him in favor of its implementation, but changes of such a revolutionary character must of necessity be slow and opposition, sincere or otherwise, was bound to develop. In the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary Embassy does not doubt good faith of Gimo with regard to implementation of PCC program, but whether he can maintain and will use his authority as party leader in the face of strong Right wing opposition remains a moot question. Thus far Embassy is unaware of any effective challenge to authority of Gimo in spite of constant rumors to that effect. It is unfortunate that at this critical time, however, the beclouded situation in Manchuria, which creates considerable doubt with regard to the position of the Chinese Communists vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, strengthens the position of irreconcilable elements within the Kmt, which in any case would be in opposition to the PCC agreements, by presenting them with a plausible excuse for opposing any limitation of Kmt governmental authority at this time.

On the other hand the Communists, and to a lesser degree the Democratic League, maintain that the Gimo himself is behind the movement which fosters the adoption of an "authoritarian" constitution inasmuch as he has grown to consider himself indispensable to the welfare of China. They further maintain that the Gimo anticipates no improvement in Russo-American relations, and continuing American distrust of Soviet aims in areas adjacent to the Soviet Union; they maintain he therefore wishes, on his own terms, to rush into being a façade of coalition government in order to impress American opinion and thus receive immediate American financial assistance. In assessing the present situation these factors cannot be ignored.

The greatest imponderable in the current problem of governmental reform is the relationship between the expressed desire of the Gimo to implement the PCC program and the active opposition to the program from important elements within the Kmt. The Embassy is unable categorically to state whether or not elements such as the CC clique have even the tacit support of the Gimo in their present activities but it is a factor which must be considered. There is no doubt that the only opposition to implementation of the PCC program comes from important figures within the Kmt. The Gimo's dual position as national leader and party leader is a most difficult one and, granting

his good faith toward the PCC program, it might be well to consider the desirability of bolstering his position by some indication from the American side to the effect that full implementation of the PCC program is essential to lasting stability in China.²⁶

SMYTH

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by Colonel James C. Davis²⁷ to General Marshall

WASHINGTON, April 4, 1946.

1. Attached is the full text of General Chou En-lai's statement issued at a press conference held 18 March 1946,²⁸ which the General requested be forwarded to you by General Gillem. The statement is a specification of the departures from the PCC agreement which he attributes to the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee meeting. General Chou expresses his complete and continuing adherence to the agreements reached by the PCC, including the proposed constitution, and asserts his complete confidence in you and desire to cooperate with your program.

2. The specifications of bad faith leveled by General Chou at the Kuomintang may be summarized as follows:

- (a) the formation of riots, including the disturbance at the Peiping Executive Headquarters;
- (b) failure to implement agreements for freedom of the press and suppression of Communist newspapers;
- (c) failure to release political prisoners;
- (d) demands by the CEC that State Counselor nominees of the various parties should be selected by the Central Standing Committee of the Kuomintang rather than by the parties themselves;
- (e) efforts on the part of the CEC to have submitted to the constitutional convention not only the PCC draft of the constitution but also the old May 5th draft constitution and amendments suggested at the CEC, strengthening the Central Government and weakening the local governments of the Provinces;
- (f) a report by General Lin Wei, Vice-Minister of War, that the nationalistic ninety divisions will include approximately 3,500,000 men instead of approximately 1,800,000 as was represented to the PCC.

3. The general tone of General Chou's statement is summarized in the following excerpt therefrom: "As I have said, there is nothing

²⁶ In his telegram No. 593, April 4, 5 p. m., to the Embassy in China, the Acting Secretary of State said: "Dept wishes to commend Embassy on its excellent telegram 600, March 31, which is exceptionally informative, thoughtful and well-balanced."

²⁷ General Marshall's representative in Washington at the Department of State.

²⁸ Not printed; copy was forwarded by courier on March 22 by Colonel J. Hart Cahughey to General Marshall at specific request of General Chou En-lai.

amazing that the irreconcilable elements within the Kuomintang should deliberately undermine the PCC decisions, but what puzzles us is that the Generalissimo, who has personally presided over the PCC, should have allowed the claims of these irreconcilables to be passed by the Plenary Session."

JAMES C. DAVIS
Colonel, General Staff Corps

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270: Telegram

Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., to General Marshall

CHUNGKING, 5 April 1946.

433. Following statement issued by PPC for your information.

"To General Marshall, Excellency: During the past few months your excellency has with deep understanding exerted yourself to the utmost assisting our Supreme Commander to overcome the various kinds of military difficulties which have arisen following the War. By doing so, you not only have exchanged the friendly relations between China and the United States but also have made a true contribution toward the achievement of unity in China. We the members of the People's Political Council now in session, having come from all parts of China, share a common feeling of gratitude to your excellency for your enthusiasm and determination as well as your spirit of unselfish service. In accordance with a resolution passed by the People's Political Council in plenary session, we hereby address this airgram to you to convey our appreciation. From the People's Political Council of the Republic of China, April 2, 1946. Sealed People's Political Council."

S93.00/4-946: Telegram

The Counselor of Embassy in China (Smyth) to the Secretary of State

CHUNGKING, April 9, 1946—11 a. m.

[Received 7:42 p. m.]

642. Series of meetings steering committee Political Consultation Conference during past week has resulted in some progress toward settlement of disputed points with regard to revision of principles to be followed in drafting permanent constitution. Major constitutional points at issue have been:

- (1) Form and powers of National Assembly;
- (2) Relationship between executive and legislative bodies; and
- (3) Extent of provincial autonomy.

Firm agreement reached on National Assembly question on April 1. Permanent National Assembly, and not to be confused with Na-

tional Assembly scheduled convene Nanking May 5 for sole purpose adopting Constitution, will be an actual organ of Government which will meet once in 6 years, or at such other times as may be necessary in order to fulfill following powers: (1) elect President; (2) recall President; (3) initiate amendments to Constitution; and (4) pass on amendments to Constitution initiated by legislative organ of Government. National Assembly will be composed of one member from each hsien.²⁹ In place of hsien having population in excess of 300,000, one additional member will be allowed for each additional half million of population. Members of Control Yuan and Legislative Yuan shall be ex-officio members National Assembly. Generally considered that National Assembly will be organ without real authority and has been created as compromise measure to satisfy Kmt insistence that Sun Yat-sen dogma concerning powers of election, recall, initiative, and referendum be nominally included in governmental structure.

Discussions continuing on question of executive responsibility to legislature, but no firm decision reached as yet. However, it seems clear that Legislative Yuan will be accepted as supreme law-making body. It will be popularly elected and hold office for three years. Executive Yuan will be responsible to Legislative Yuan, although discussions have made it clear that, in this connection, most serious obstacle to agreement is search for formula satisfactory to Kmt which will provide specific statement of term "responsible" while retaining principle of executive responsibility to Legislature. It is now proposed by Democratic League representatives that if Legislative Yuan disagrees with any decision of Executive Yuan it may, by two-thirds majority, request President to dissolve Executive Yuan or make changes therein. Should President refuse to comply, Legislative Yuan may, by three-fourths majority, again request dissolution of, or change in, Executive Yuan and President is required to act in accordance with desires of Legislative Yuan.

Problem most difficult of solution is extent to which provinces shall enjoy legislative and administrative autonomy. In deference to Kmt desires, it has been agreed that provinces shall have "self-government laws" rather than provincial constitutions. This change in nomenclature has been [*made?*] no difference in basic problem inasmuch as Communists and Democratic League adopt position that provincial self-government laws should not be subject to approval by central authority, provided they do not contravene national Constitution. Kmt, on the other hand, maintains that central authority should approve provincial self-government laws, that the Legislative Yuan can make changes therein, and is only willing to concede that they

²⁹ District unit of government.

cannot be altered by Central Government administrative acts. Efforts now being made by subcommittee of steering committee to resolve principal autonomy problem by endeavoring to set forth specifically powers to be exercised by central authority and residual authority to be exercised by provinces.

Membership of State Council for interim reorganized Government remains to be settled. Fifty percent membership for Kmt (20 members) has been previously agreed, but agreement must now be reached with regard to proportionate membership other parties. Previous tentative agreement was: Communists, 7; Democratic League, 7; Youth Party and non-party groups, 6. Youth Party now demands equal representation with Communists and Democratic League. Kmt maintains solution this question is one for non-Kmt groups themselves. Communists and Democratic League balk at this stand inasmuch as they claim Youth Party is Kmt creature and is means of added Kmt power in State Council.

At present time State Council question is academic because until all constitutional questions are settled and, together with agreements reached on March 20, (Embassy's telegram 541, March 20 [21]) are answered publicly Communists and Democratic League continue to refuse to name members for recommendation reorganized Government and PCC Constitutional Committee unable proceed with drafting permanent Constitution.

In PCC steering committee, at least there is evident desire to reach compromise agreement and it is anticipated, granting mutual good faith and no major changes in overall politico-military situation, that substantial agreement on all basic constitutional issues will be reached shortly, preparing the way for reorganization of Government. Whether or not permanent Constitution can be drafted in short time remaining before May 5th is questionable. This and purely physical problem of transportation of delegates to National Assembly from widely separated points to Nanking by May 5th makes it appear likely that some delay in convocation of National Assembly may be necessary.

During past two weeks Democratic League appears to have emerged as only balance between extreme positions of Kmt and Communists and, as far as can be ascertained, such compromise as will be achieved will be based on solutions suggested by the League. It must be borne in mind that steering committee discussions are being conducted in a national atmosphere which makes reasoned solutions difficult. Deep mutual Kmt-Communist distrust still exists and a vicious struggle for power within the Kmt is becoming more evident, but above all the obscure situation in Manchuria governs party tempers and the political scheme.

There is no reason to be overly optimistic that decisions of PCC steering committee will be supported without additional reservations by the two major parties.

SMYTH

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in China
(Ludden)*

On April 8, 1946 the Generalissimo granted an interview to Miles Vaughn, Far Eastern Manager of the United Press. At the interview the Generalissimo expressed the opinion in very strong language that there exists no difference between Communists in China, Russia, France or any other country, that it is the objective of the Chinese Communists to Sovietize all of China, that the Chinese Communists in Manchuria appear to have the backing of the Soviet Union and that certain of their actions are possibly controlled by Moscow.

The Generalissimo also stated that the present Russian withdrawal from Manchuria eases the situation somewhat but some of the Russian forces have been withdrawn to Korea and thus constitute a veiled threat to China. He advocated that the United States take a much firmer stand against Russian aggression and a tougher attitude at UNO. The Generalissimo stated that if the United States cracked down on Russia, Russia would behave since it would take 20 years for Russia to become industrialized sufficiently to fight a first-class war. Generalissimo went on to say that at the present time Communism is China's greatest problem and that within a few years it will be the world's greatest problem because of Communists "boring from within".

The story of the interview was submitted on the morning of April 9 to K. C. Wu, Minister of Information, by messenger. It was returned in a greatly revised form and none of the foregoing observations of the Generalissimo were included in the final story as filed. The Embassy understands that the revised story of the interview was published in the United States in morning editions April 10 and in Shanghai English-language newspapers on April 11. The Embassy has not yet seen full text of the story as published nor is the Embassy aware of the reasons for the removal of foregoing points from the story other than possibility that K. C. Wu lost his nerve. It was evident at the interview, the Embassy has been reliably informed by an American newspaperman who attended, that the Generalissimo wished at that time to have his remarks on the Chinese Communists and Communism in general published. Vaughn and my informant asked him several times whether or not certain remarks could be pub-

lished and the Generalissimo's usual rejoinder of "hao, hao, hao"³⁰ was forthcoming. It is quite possible, as one explanation of the revision, that the Generalissimo may have received word from the United States of the imminent possibility of the granting of the loan. There is also the possibility that the Generalissimo was reacting with considerable anger to the *Chieh Fang Jih Pao* editorial of April 6 [7], republished in Chungking on April 8, and later decided that publication of the views expressed above would be generally detrimental to the over-all situation at this time.

RAYMOND P. LUDDEN

[CHUNGKING,] April 10, 1946.

S93.00/4-1046 : Telegram

The Counselor of Embassy in China (Smyth) to the Secretary of State

CHUNGKING, April 10, 1946—6 p. m.

[Received April 10—5:02 p. m.]

655. Meeting PCC Steering Committee yesterday ended in stalemate. Discussions bogged down on provincial autonomy questions largely because this question cannot be separated from present Manchurian situation. Prior to meeting, considerable doubt Kmt representatives would attend; fiery opinions expressed in discussions indicated further discussion constitutional issues and governmental reorganization futile when large scale hostilities Manchuria appear probable and Kmt-Communist mutual distrust of each other's ultimate intentions is increasing. Future Steering Committee meeting suspended temporarily. Democratic League representatives have offered mediation and full Kmt-Communist representation PCC will meet with League delegates tonight (without Youth Party and non-party groups) in effort to resolve differences.

As Embassy has reported previously (Embtel 464, March 11³¹), political scene has been dominated by obscure situation Manchuria and it is now becoming more evident that unless political-military problems posed in Northeast can be solved no lasting agreement affecting over-all situation China possible. During last ten days press recrimination with regard Manchuria has been intensified. Generalissimo addressed closing session PCC April 1 and evidently expressed doubt of Communist good faith and established Government position that there would be no discussion of political problems Manchuria until sovereignty had been reestablished by Central Government. On April 7 at Yen-an, *Chieh Fang Jih Pao* published vituperative personal

³⁰ Meaning "okay".

³¹ *Post*, p. 538.

attack on Gimo (republished by Communist daily Chungking April 8) accusing him of fostering civil war Manchuria for selfish reasons. Government press replied to Communist blast April 9 charging reason [*treason?*], similar anti-Communist press attacks, openly charging Communist-Soviet link, are continuing. Embassy has now been informed that interview granted by Gimo to Miles Vaughn, Far Eastern manager United Press, for publication in America this morning and release here tonight, will express Gimo's conviction of Soviet-Communist collusion Manchuria and urge United States adopt firm stand against spread Communism. None of foregoing developments has tended ease tense situation Northeast or foster progress toward internal unity.

Regardless of legality of Communist position in Manchuria, which is hardly defensible, their presence there is stern fact which must be faced. Thus far Central Government forces appear to have experienced no serious military resistance in taking over points in South Manchuria. With superior military force available, Central Government may be expected to turn [*take?*] over major urban centers and main lines communication, but control of hinterland may well remain Communist hands indefinitely, resulting in situation analogous to Communist position North China during Japanese occupation.

How far Soviet assistance to Chinese Communists has extended beyond tacit support has not been established and still remains a matter of conjecture. If there is no firm understanding in Manchuria between Communists and Soviet Union, present problems are probably capable of solution without resort to arms.

In final analysis Communist ambitions would appear to be political rather than military so that concrete steps to implement PCC agreements to broaden Government would probably go far to meet their demands and make the necessary compromise possible. If, however, Central Government proposes to create spurious national defense issue in hope of using uneasy Russo-American relations to obtain American material and financial support while it reneges by commitments limiting Kmt control of Government, civil war would seem inevitable, and international dangers inherent therein are obvious. Chinese Communists seem convinced that Gimo harbors such intention and Democratic League only slightly less so.

Present situation may also be interpreted as assumption by both sides of extreme positions in anticipation of negotiations following return of General Marshall. Reliance on American mediation is powerful factor and all groups and parties have expressed desire for early return of General Marshall. In this connection member Democratic League called at Embassy yesterday to express hope for early

return General Marshall and to voice deep concern over developments since his departure.

Embassy now considers that there has been serious deterioration of situation, but there is still ground for hope inasmuch as it seems unlikely that either side would at the time risk an open break and the onus for renewed hostilities on a broad scale.

SMYTH

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Ludden)
to General Marshall*

[CHUNGKING,] April 18, 1946.

Marked deterioration of the political situation commenced following the final session of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee on 16 March. Although the Political Consultation Conference agreements were nominally unanimously ratified, resolutions introduced and general discussion at the Central Executive Committee sessions indicated that efforts would be made by the Kuomintang to amend the basic agreements, particularly that portion having to do with the principles to be followed in revising the May 5th Draft Constitution.

Since 16 March the Communists, and to a slightly lesser degree the Democratic League, have continuously questioned the validity and good faith of Kuomintang ratification of the Political Consultation Conference agreements. Communist reaction has been in the form of a series of violent press attacks upon the good faith of the Kuomintang with regard to the whole Political Consultation Conference program. Democratic League reaction has been similar to that of the Communists, but somewhat less violent in tone.

A series of meetings of the Steering Committee of the Political Consultation Conference has accomplished little since the middle of March toward settlement of the major points at issue. These points are:

- (1) Division of State Council membership between the non-Kuomintang parties and groups.
- (2) Constitutional questions:
 - (a) Form and powers of the National Assembly. (On this point substantial agreement has been reached.)
 - (b) Degree of responsibility of executive organs of government to the legislature.
 - (c) The extent of provincial autonomy.

Within the Steering Committee there appears to have been a genuine desire for compromise, but as discussions continued it became more

clear that the fundamental problem stems from the Kuomintang desire to achieve revision of the Political Consultation Conference agreements which would change a "cabinet system" of government (wherein there is executive responsibility to a popularly elected legislative body) and substitute a "presidential system" (wherein supreme authority would be vested in a president without provision for checks and balances on his authority comparable to the American system).

Furthermore, throughout the Steering Committee discussions the overall scene has been dominated by the obscure situation in Manchuria and growing Kuomintang-Communist mutual distrust of each other's ultimate intentions. Addressing the closing session of the People's Political Council on 1 April, the Generalissimo expressed doubt of Communist good faith and established the Government position that there would be no discussion of political problems in Manchuria until sovereignty had been re-established by the Central Government. On 7 April the *Chieh Fang Jih Pao* at Yen-an published a vituperative personal attack on the Generalissimo accusing him of actively fostering civil war in Manchuria for selfish reasons.

Since that time nation wide press recrimination with regard to Manchuria has been intensified. In this same connection, the Generalissimo granted an interview on 8 April to Miles Vaughn, Far Eastern Manager of United Press, which, although eventually published in rather innocuous form, has come to be generally regarded, at least in Communist circles, as a true expression of his feelings with regard to the Chinese Communists and their position in Manchuria. A separate memorandum with regard to this interview is attached.³²

On 10 April a Political Consultation Conference Steering Committee meeting ended in complete stalemate, the Communists adopting the position that unconditional cessation of hostilities in Manchuria should be effected immediately and negotiation of politico-military problems affecting the northeast be opened; on the other side, the Kuomintang adopted the position, as stated before the People's Political Council closing session by the Generalissimo, that there would be no discussion of Manchurian problems until Chinese sovereignty has been re-established by the Central Government.

Since 10 April there has been no progress toward settlement of any of the political questions involved in implementation of the Political Consultation Conference agreements. The Generalissimo has expressed to representatives of the various parties and groups his desire that government reorganization be completed by 20 April in order

³² *Ante*, p. 166.

that the National Assembly at Nanking may proceed as scheduled on 5 May. Both of these objectives appear very difficult of attainment in the limited time remaining because both the Communists and the Democratic League seem adamant in their stands that they will not submit name lists of people for participation in the reorganized government or delegates to the National Assembly until the State Council and constitutional questions are settled. In addition, within the past week the Communists have intensified their allegations of Kuomintang failure to fulfill promises with regard to civil liberties and release of political prisoners, usually citing the case of the Young Marshal³³ who has not been released.

R. P. LUDDEN

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

General Chou En-lai to Three Kuomintang Members of the Political Consultative Council

[CHUNGKING,] 21 April 1946.

DEAR MESSRS. CHANG CHUN, SHAO LI-TZE, AND CHANG LI-SHENG: In the tea-party given by President Chiang Kai-shek for the members of the PCC Steering Committee on 15th. instant, we, the Communist delegates, have stated at that meeting that all problems must be solved simultaneously. Then, when we talked with you on the 16th again, we stressed the interdependency of the various problems and the necessity of a simultaneous solution, and assured you especially that there is decidedly no ground to expect us to consider your proposal done on behalf of the government of the apportionment of the numbers of the State Councillors, which, in our opinion, is infringing the previous agreements. Now the deadline, April 20th, for submitting the list has been passed, and we have not had the honor of being invited by you to discuss the matter further, so we presume it fairly certain that no way could have been found to solve the various problems which we talked about the other day. In view of the tense situation, and a civil war in full growth, there is no other way of backing out of danger than by a prompt cessation of hostilities and an earnest assurance for the full implementation of all the agreements. With a view to calling attention of the government, we are forwarding the attached statement.³⁴ Anxiously awaiting your reply.

Faithfully yours,

CHOU EN-LAI

³³ Chang Hsueh-liang, held since release of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek after kidnaping at Sian, Shensi, December 12-25, 1936.

³⁴ *Infra.*

Marshall Mission Files. Lot 54-D270

Statement by the Chinese Communist Delegation, April 21, 1946

Regarding the problem of submitting nominees to the National Government and National Assembly, the Chinese Communist Party has never been of the view that it can be solved isolatedly, paying no regard to the free violation of the Cease Fire Agreement³⁵ and Army Reorganization Plan,³⁶ nor in particular deemed it appropriate to join the government and convene the National Assembly under such circumstances that there is not the slightest guarantee for democracy, while the civil war is being intensified. Concerning matters of the Political Consultative Council, up to now not only the four well-known promises made by the government have not been redeemed, but on the contrary the secret police agents have been at large with double ferocity as a result of government's connivance, and thereby depriving the people of any guarantee to the freedom of rights. The government has not clarified the chaotic state of infringing the PCC resolutions caused by the Second Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Kuomintang, instead it persists in maintaining the validity of Provisional Constitution of Political Tutelage and one-party dictatorship so that the reorganization of government will lose all its significance. Concerning the Draft Constitution Amendment Principles of the PCC, the government by taking advantage of the three points agreed upon by the Steering Committee, has been attempting to alter the representative system, undermine other principles, and deny the responsible system of Executive Yuan to the Legislative Yuan by returning to the system of president dictatorship as stipulated by the May Fifth Draft Constitution of 1936. The Communist proposal with reference to the distribution of seats in the State Council and ministers of state of the Executive Yuan—that 10 State Councillors and 4 Ministers of Executive Yuan be apportioned to that party—has not yet won consent of the government; apart from that, the agreed veto power held by State Councillors is also being jeopardized. As to the representatives to the National Assembly, the government is proposing to increase their number. How could this problem be brought into discussion when the Draft Constitution Amendment Principles are impaired and the contention between democracy and dictatorship is still going on? Under the grave situation as such there is no possibility for the Chinese Communist Party to submit nominees to the State Council and National Assembly. Moreover, in view of the serious state of civil war in the Northeast and a potential danger of having the civil war spread to China proper, how

³⁵ January 10, p. 125.

³⁶ February 25, p. 295.

could the government be reorganized and the National Assembly convened at ease, when hostilities have not been ceased?

In view of the foregoing, the Chinese Communist Delegation deems it necessary to reiterate the following: only when the above-mentioned problems are completely and definitely solved, can the Chinese Communist Party take into consideration the selection of candidates participating [in?] the National Government and Executive Yuan, and submit the name-list of its representatives to the National Assembly.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Memorandum Prepared in the Chinese Ministry of Information
Concerning the Chinese Communists' Statement of April 21, 1946*³⁷

The Chinese Communists, in their statement delivered to the Government representatives on April 21 and released to the press on April 22, made several charges against the Government. As General Marshall is fully acquainted with all the facts pertaining to the execution of the Cease-Hostilities Agreement and the Programme for Military Reorganization and For the Integration of the Communist Forces into the National Army, nothing needs be said about the Communists' accusation that the Government has violated them. As regards the other charges, the facts are as follows:

I. The Communists allege that the Government has failed to carry out its four pledges. As a matter of fact, the Government has carried them out in good faith, and as of necessity step by step. The first pledge is that "the people shall enjoy the freedoms of person, belief, speech, publication, assembly and association. All the prevailing laws and regulations shall be either abolished or amended in accordance with this principle. No governmental organ other than the judicial and police authorities shall be permitted to arrest, try and impose punishment on the people." The Supreme National Defense Council has already abolished many laws and regulations and caused to be amended according to due process many others, which were enacted during the war as emergency measures. For a notable instance, censorship has been totally abolished. All these measures have been made public. The second pledge is that "all political parties are equal before the law and may operate openly within the law." This is so at present. The third pledge is that "self-government shall be vigorously promoted in all localities and general elections shall be held according to law from the lower level upward." This is being carried out by the Government, wherever feasible. And it is to be

³⁷ Forwarded on April 22 at the direction of President Chiang by the Minister of Information (Wu) to General Marshall.

understood that a nation-wide application of this principle must needs take time and that the promulgation of a permanent constitution must be its prerequisite. The fourth pledge is that "all political criminals with the exception of traitors who have been found to have injured the republic shall be released." All persons of this category whose names have been submitted by the Communists have been released. In the case of certain Communists in Sinkiang, the matter is being dealt with by the new governor Chang Chih-chung after the reorganization of the provincial government.

II. The Communists allege that the resolutions of the Second Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of Kuomintang have violated the agreements of the Political Consultation Conference. As a matter of fact, however, both in its declaration and in its resolution passed on the report on the PCC the CEC of Kuomintang openly endorsed those agreements and firmly made public that it would faithfully carry them out. True, there were certain changes it advocated in regard to the constitutional draft agreed upon in the PCC. But they were made according to the understanding reached explicitly in the PCC that "in case there are other better opinions pertaining to the constitution, they shall be referred to the different parties for consultation and agreement." Those changes were adopted in the CEC not as hard and fast resolutions which must be executed to the word, but as views "to be referred to the Standing Committee of the CEC for action,"—that is, for the Standing Committee to take up the matter with the other parties for consultation and agreement. This is exactly the course which the Government is taking in this connection.

III. As to the quota of Communist members in the State Council, the Communists did suggest that they should have ten out of twenty (the other twenty members are to be Kuomintang according to PCC agreement). The suggestion was made by them outside of the PCC and not in it. Maintaining that this matter was, as it should be, a question for all the other parties to discuss and find a mutually satisfactory formula among themselves, the Government of course could not give agreement to it. The Government, however, did repeatedly urge all the other parties to consult one another and to come to a quick common understanding on their respective quota in the State Council. But as they failed to do so, they requested Dr. Wang Shih-Chieh to intervene and mediate among themselves. When this became of no avail, the non-partizans recommended the formula of 8-4-4-4 (8 Communists, 4 Youth Party, 4 Democratic League and 4 non-partizans). In view of the apparent impossibility of these

parties to reach a concord and in view of the impartial nature of the non-partizans' recommendation, the Government also supported it and brought it forward as a good solution.

The Communists, however, were not satisfied with this plan because they maintained that between them and the Democratic League they must have 14 members (Communists 10 and Democratic League 4) in order to possess the necessary one-third membership to veto any measure in the State Council. To break the impasse, the Government countered with the proposal that since according to the PCC agreement one-third is required to defeat any measure that involves any alteration of the so-called "Programme of Peaceful Reconstruction," that stipulation can be modified so that only twelve votes are necessary to veto such a measure. This should enable the Communists to accept their quota of 8 and the Democratic League that of 4. But even this the Communists would not accept.

As to the participation of the Communists and other parties in the Executive Yuan, it is the intention of the Government to consult them on the matter after an agreement has been settled about the various quotas in the State Council.

IV. The Communists also allege that the Government wishes to increase the membership of the National Assembly. This is not the case. It is the People's Political Council that demands the increase. As the PPC has been the only popular and somewhat representative organ during the war, they deem it their right to participate in the National Assembly. The Government has referred the matter to the various parties, Communists included, for discussion, and proposed that there should be also proportional increase for the membership of the other parties in the National Assembly. That is, between the Communists and the Democratic League, they can always have one-fourth of the membership of the National Assembly so as to hold the power of veto. To this proposal, all the parties, the Communists included, have already given their agreement.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Ludden)

[NANKING,] April 23, 1946.

SUGGESTION FOR POSSIBLE STATEMENT TO BE MADE BY GENERALISSIMO

It has long been my aim to return the Government to the people. In this connection, the most immediate problem is the drafting of a per-

manent constitution for submission to the National Assembly. On January 31 the Political Consultation Conference reached agreement with regard to the principles to be embodied in the permanent constitution. It is my desire that the work of drafting the permanent constitution in accordance with these liberal principles be completed without further delay. Among others, these principles include that of executive responsibility to a popularly elected legislative body. It will then become the duty of the National Assembly to ratify this constitution.

The National Assembly will convene at Nanking on May 5. Unfortunately transportation difficulties will very likely make it impossible for all delegates to arrive at Nanking by that date. Therefore, I propose that the National Assembly, immediately after convocation, adjourn temporarily pending the arrival of delegates so that all duly accredited delegates may participate in and contribute to its historic task.

It is my hope that the National Assembly will conduct its deliberations in a spirit of national unity and mutual trust and that its labors will be no less productive than those of the Constitutional Convention of our great ally, the United States. Our National Assembly will convene with one great advantage; by the time of convocation, the basic understanding of all party and non-party representatives will have been incorporated in a definitive document which is to be the covenant of Chinese democracy.

During the interim period, in which the constitution is being drafted and placed in final effect, Government must be carried on. I do not wish to wait for the final act of adoption of the constitution in order clearly to establish the principle of multi-party responsibility for the national welfare. The fight against famine and the struggle to restore the national economy and increase production must know no party. Therefore, a multi-party committee is being appointed to supervise and to administer national finances. Moreover, representatives of the various parties and non-party representatives are being appointed to the CNRRA ^{37a} and to the Alien Property Administration to facilitate the work of those organizations. All of these measures are designed for one purpose—to speed the creation of what we all desire, a strong, unified and democratic China.

R[AYMOND] P. L[IDDEN]

^{37a} Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

[At the last meeting of the PCC Steering Committee on April 24 it was decided to postpone the National Assembly. On April 29 President Chiang Kai-shek announced indefinite postponement pending settlement of outstanding issues.]

III. NEGOTIATIONS RESPECTING MILITARY REORGANIZATION AND INTEGRATION OF COMMUNIST FORCES INTO NATIONAL ARMY (JANUARY-MAY)

121.893/1-1146 : Telegram

*General Marshall to President Truman*³⁸

CHUNGKING, 11 January 1946.

35. Reference my message of 10 January³⁹ giving detailed account of final phases of negotiations for termination of hostilities and the para headed "New subject: Last night, etc.", on rereading message I fear I may have given impression that a formal proposal had been made to me to serve on committee of 3 military officials to develop the plan for nationalization of Armies of China.

Such was not the case. Only informal expressions of sentiments on the subject occurred.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

*General Marshall to Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer*⁴⁰

[CHUNGKING,] January 13, 1946.

45. Urgently necessary for me to have the information you possess regarding possible plans for reorganization of Chinese armies. Madame⁴¹ tells me that the Generalissimo understood you to have agreed or recommended that in view of struggle with Communists no further demobilization of National army divisions should take place. Is this correct? If not, how many did you feel could safely and profitably be demobilized? Does fact of armistice⁴² alter your views. I have to move into this problem immediately. Send papers⁴³ by next plane but radio at least briefly your views.

³⁸ To be delivered also to the Secretary of State or Under Secretary of State.

³⁹ Telegram No. 30, p. 129.

⁴⁰ Commanding General, U. S. Forces, China Theater, and Chief of Staff, China Theater.

⁴¹ Wife of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, President of the National Government of the Republic of China.

⁴² See memorandum by the Committee of Three to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, p. 125.

⁴³ See memorandum *infra*.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Memorandum Prepared by the Plans Staff of Lieutenant General
Albert C. Wedemeyer*⁴⁴

[SHANGHAI,] 13 January 1946.

THE PROBLEM

To determine the feasibility of integrating Chinese Nationalist and Chinese Communist armies including consideration of:

- a. Integration within armies.
- b. Integration at the Army Group level, and
- c. The interchange of Commanders, the provision of integrated staffs and a thorough liaison system between integrated units.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

The directive initiating this study (Appendix "A").⁴⁵

The order of battle of Chinese Communist forces (Appendix "B").

The order of battle of Chinese Nationalist forces (Appendix "C").

Information on the Chinese Communists and political factors involved in any program of integration of Communist and Nationalist forces (Appendix "D").

ASSUMPTIONS

That negotiations between the Kuomintang and the Communists are successful to a degree permitting peaceful compromise of the present armed conflict.

That some form of coalition Government will evolve which will be the only source of authority controlling military forces in China, and,

That both Nationalist and Communist forces, whether integrated or acting independently, will serve only the recognized governing authority in China.

DISCUSSION

See Appendix "E" for discussion showing advantages of integration at the Army Group level and disadvantages of integration at this time at the division or army level.

CONCLUSIONS

It is concluded that any program of integration of Chinese Nationalist and Communist forces should be along the following lines:

- a. If there is to be a real compromise of differences between the Nationalist and Communist elements in China the present armed forces

⁴⁴ Forwarded by General Wedemeyer to General Marshall by courier.

⁴⁵ Appendix "A" not printed; it was a memorandum of December 21, 1945, by Brig. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, Acting Chief of Staff, U. S. Forces, China Theater, to the Assistant Chief of Staff Plans, directing that a study be undertaken to determine the best means for integration of Nationalist and Communist armies in China.

of these two factions must be brought under the control of a single governmental authority and, in time, these two forces must be integrated into a single military system. To insure the necessary unified control and to avoid further conflict the integration plan adopted must provide that neither the Nationalists nor the Communists will maintain, secret, independent military forces.

b. However, integration by units should be considered a temporary expedient pending the establishment of a modern Chinese army based upon a list system for both officers and men, without regard to territorial or political affiliations.

c. Because of the present conflicts between Nationalist and Communist forces in matters of training, equipment, language, organization and political beliefs, it would be unwise initially to attempt integration of the two forces within divisions or armies.

d. Integration must be accomplished step by step and the beginning point is in the Government itself. Before there can be integration in the field units there must be understanding and mutual cooperation in higher headquarters. After this necessary preliminary integration has been accomplished at higher levels there must be a period of reorientation of field forces before integration of basic field units is undertaken. If this preliminary step is not taken, there is a real risk of chaos which would only accentuate present misunderstanding and further delay peaceful compromise and integration.

e. Initially, integration should not be attempted below the Army Group level. Each integrated Army Group established should be composed of one Chinese Nationalist army and a Chinese Communist army of equivalent organization and size.

f. The Nationalist and Communist armies involved should retain their own commanders and staffs but there should be provision for complete liaison from headquarters down to lower units, between armies and where possible between divisions in each Army Group.

g. For each integrated Army Group commanded by a Nationalist commander there should be another commanded by a Communist commander and they should have integrated staffs. Such Army Groups should be responsible to an area commander. There again, commands should be divided as between Communist and Nationalist commanders and the integrated staff should be repeated. These area commanders should be responsible to the Supreme Field Commander of Chinese Forces who in turn should be responsible to the National Military Council. Appropriate Communist representation should be provided both on the staff of the Supreme Field Commander and in the National Military Council. The number of integrated Army Groups to be formed should be determined by the number of Communist troops to be brought into the Chinese Armed Forces. Other Communist forces should be either reorganized into local police battalions or inactivated. (See chart ⁴⁶ attached to Appendix "E").

h. Any integration program adopted should provide that Communist units will be furnished equipment comparable to that issued to Nationalist units.

⁴⁶ Not printed.

RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that this study be furnished General Marshall for his consideration.

[Enclosure 1—Appendix “B”]

ORDER OF BATTLE OF CCP REGULAR FORCES

1. During recent Kmt^{46a}-CCP^{46b} negotiations both sides have shown a certain willingness to effect a compromise on the question of integration of the two political armies into a National Army. At the Chiang-Mao talks in September⁴⁷ the Kmt, possibly feeling that (a) the CCP army had become too large and powerful for a fusion with the Kmt and (b) that the Kmt would never be able to suppress the CCP movement merely by depriving it of the use of its army, agreed to incorporate a maximum of 20 of the divisions of the CCP into a National Army, provided that other questions of national importance could be settled first. The CCP at first proposed 48 divisions but finally expressed a willingness to settle for 24 divisions or a minimum of 20 divisions, provided that they would have a voice in the National Military Council and in matters of personnel administration. Assuming that the figure of 14,000 officers and men authorized by the Central Government in 1937 for each of the three original 18th Group Army divisions (which represented the first attempt toward military unification) were to be taken as an arbitrary T/O⁴⁸ figure, the Chinese Communist Army is capable of remodeling its Army into 23 divisions.

2. Order of battle of Communist forces is a vague presumption of regular military organization. Possibly for security purposes or possibly because of the lack of complete military integration within the CCP, some forces are referred to by various designations, none follow standard T/O's or T/E's⁴⁹ and frequently only slight demarcations are made between “regular” and “local” troops. The following O/B⁵⁰ is only that of the regular forces; insufficient information and the nature of local and militia forces precludes O/B for units other than regulars.

3. The two main CCP forces are the 18th Group Army (Sometimes designated as the 8th Route Army) and the New 4th Army.

^{46a} Kuomintang (Nationalist Party).

^{46b} Chinese Communist Party.

⁴⁷ For summary, see Department of State, *United States Relations With China* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 577; for other correspondence, see *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VII, pp. 455-476 ff.

⁴⁸ Table of organization.

⁴⁹ Table of equipment.

⁵⁰ Order of battle.

[Here follows a list of the location and estimated strength of each division of two Communist armies.]

NOTES:

(1) In addition to the two above listed armies there have been reports of a New 29th Army in Yen-an but data is insufficient to evaluate. A South China Federated (or United) Army contains various independent "Corps", "Columns", "Detachments", etc., which operate in Fukien, Hunan, and Kwangtung but these troops cannot properly be classified as "regulars". There are 100,000 troops in Manchuria constituting a possible unidentified army tentatively accepted by the War Department. 125, 127, and 140 Divisions have been reported in South-eastern Hopeh but these units are only tentatively accepted without strength estimates.

(2) The lack of adequate intelligence sources does not permit a verification of the above data and exact headquarters' locations are possibly inaccurate but represent the best available information at this date. The CCP practice of seldom employing a division, instead using companies and battalions for widely scattered actions, makes it difficult to clearly establish division locations. An additional factor of confusion is the tendency of local forces to retain designations after the regulars have moved to another area; e. g. locals operating under the 1st Division will continue to refer to themselves as "troops of the 1st Division" after that unit has moved to another province.

(3) Units most likely to be of primary consideration in CCP-Kmt incorporation plans are the 155, 120, and 129 over-strength divisions of the 18 A. G.⁵¹ and the 1, 2, and 5 divisions of the New 4th Army. Estimated strengths indicated for the various divisions are those of MID,⁵² War Department, December 1945, but there is evidence that these estimates may be slightly lower than actual strengths.

[Enclosure 2—Appendix "C"]

CHINESE NATIONALIST FORCES (ALPHA UNITS)

The approximate strength of the Nationalist Army is 3,140,000. At present there are 92 armies with a total of 268 divisions; a reduction since 1 January 1945 of 28 armies and 49 divisions under the Chinese deactivation plan. Of this strength, a total of 13 armies consisting of 39 divisions are Alpha Units which are U. S. sponsored.

Present indications are that there may be 23 Communist divisions available for integration or 7 plus armies. These armies however do

⁵¹ Army Group.

⁵² Military Intelligence Division.

not exist as such at the present time although when molded into armies would be in North China. Hence 7 U.S. sponsored Chinese Armies of the Nationalist Army which are presently in or to be moved into North China or Manchuria should be the ones considered for this scheme of integration. Seven such armies would be the:

<i>Unit</i>	<i>Destination</i>
106th Army	Manchuria
101st Army	Manchuria
18th Army	North China
73rd Army	North China
8th Army	North China
74th Army	North China
71st Army	North China

Undoubtedly additional Nationalist units will be moved to North China before integration can take place in which case those units should be considered in preference for those destined for Manchuria.

[Here follows list of "Alpha Units" of the Chinese National Army, with names of commanders and locations of divisions.]

[Enclosure 3—Appendix "D"]

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON COMMUNIST AND POLITICAL FACTORS INVOLVED

1. All plans for the integration of the Chinese Communist Armies and the Kuomintang Armies into a National Army have usually fallen into two categories: (a) Those which proposed an amalgamation or fusion of the two armies under a single command, and (b) Those which proposed the incorporation of two autonomous armies which would preserve their individual identities under a unified command. The Central Government, refusing to brook any opposition in its attempt to unify China under Kuomintang tutelage, has always been adamant in regarding the submission of the Communist armies to the National Military Council (or fusion under a single command) as an immediate prerequisite to any further negotiation. The CCP, on the other hand, when the question of integration has been brought up, has stubbornly demonstrated its intention of maintaining control of its armies (or autonomous incorporation under a unified command) until such a time as they are confident that the party's political existence is no longer dependent upon them.

2. The forces of the Chinese Communist[s] may be divided into three general categories: the Field Forces, the local forces (Guerrilla Army) and the People's Militia. The Field Forces are capable of being moved from one area to another as the military situation de-

mands, and they generally wear uniforms. The Local Forces or Guerrilla Army, usually confine their operations to particular areas, and wear plain clothes. Although the equipment and training of the field forces is usually slightly better than that of local forces, both receive their orders through regular channels of command and both are supplied by regular supply organs. The two CCP armies, the 18th Group Army and the New Fourth Army, are comprised of units from both these forces. At present the regular Field Forces are estimated at close to 1,200,000 men. The People's Militia is the third general category. Unlike the other two forces, they engage regularly in production and perform their military duties as the occasion demands. They are composed of men and women throughout Communist-controlled areas selected and trained by the political commissars in that area. Their number is practically unascertainable; every person who has come in contact with CCP indoctrination is a potential member of the Peoples Militia and are capable of staging uprisings in isolated areas with or without coordination with regular field or guerrilla forces.

The organization of the Chinese Communist Army is closely linked with the political organization of the Communist Party and the political organization of the territory controlled by the CCP. The Chinese Communist Army is an army with a "Messianic complex". Its mission, in addition to consolidating military gains, calls for, (a) furtherance of mass organization through the educational medium of the political section attached to each military unit, and (b) arbitration in local civil government through the political commissar attached to each operational unit of company size or above. The territory controlled by the CCP is divided into military regions, six of which are under the jurisdiction of 8th Route Army and eight under New 4th Army command. These are further sub-divided into military districts and these districts into military sub-districts. The communal organization in each of these districts or regions is under the jurisdictions of the political commissars of the units which are stationed in that area.

These political commissars, who rank with the military commander of each army unit and who in addition to their regular duties are responsible for the supervision and political training and organization of the Peoples Militia, provide the real link between the civil government and the Communist Party. The dual influence of each political commissar enables him to occupy a key position in controlling the military and civil administration of the areas to which he is assigned. The Chinese Communist army, through its political commissars, is in a very real sense the medium through which the political organization is expanded, indoctrinated and governed.

In addition, there is a basic difference between Communist and Nationalist leaders which bears consideration. The leaders of the Nationalist army for the most part have been selected because of their ability; their promotion to the higher ranks is largely based upon military qualifications for the command to which they are appointed. Although political considerations are taken into account in the appointment of senior commanders in the Nationalist army, specified political affiliations on the part of the commander are not necessarily a requisite for that appointment. On the other hand, the Communist part [*Party*] inextricably involves its members simultaneously in military and political matters. Accordingly, any commander in the Communist army holds his position because of his political as well as military qualifications.

[Enclosure 4—Appendix "E"]

DISCUSSION

From a short range view, any plan developed for the integration of the Nationalist and Communist forces should provide sufficient military units to repatriate Japanese troops and civilians, garrison strategic areas and protect important communications facilities in China. The long range objective should provide a process under which the forces of opposing political faiths can work together to build a united, strong and independent China.

While the opposing factions should be inspired by these lofty purposes to integrate their forces and work together for the common good of all, at the same time it must be recognized that many of the existing conflicts cannot be readily swept aside and that these, of necessity, will make integration of the two forces a slow process. Such factors include differences in training, equipment, language, organization and political beliefs of the two forces.

Training: The Communist armies are known to have received specialized training in guerrilla warfare. It is not known, however, that their military program extends to offensive and defensive training in modern tactics. On the other hand 39 Chinese Divisions (CAP)^{52a} have received broad training in most aspects of modern warfare. They are considered sufficiently indoctrinated with the rudiments of military training to fit them for most military occasions that might arise, given proper logistical support. In addition, certain specified Nationalist units have been trained in Commando tactics. The remainder of the Nationalist armies have received little or no direct

^{52a} Chinese Air Patrol.

training although many of the units, under the able leadership of particularly qualified Chinese officers, can be considered as well trained.

Equipment: The differences between Communist and Nationalist equipment are well known. This problem, however, is not considered insurmountable. If the two forces are brought close enough together to permit integration, a standardization of equipment within type organizations could be worked out in time. Any program for integration developed should provide that Communist units will be furnished equipment comparable to that issued to Nationalist units.

Language: Language difficulties exist, but this factor would not deter integration since it probably would be no more serious than exists in either Communist or Nationalist armies at the present time.

Organization: The organization of Communist as compared to Nationalist armies would not appear to present difficulty if divisional and army units are to be transferred *in toto*. This of course, presumes that armies making up an integrated army group will have the same relative strength and be composed of similar units. From the Army level down, the command of Nationalist forces by Nationalist commanders and Communist troops by Communist commanders should be maintained for the time being but a system of liaison between all units in the Army Group and higher headquarters should be established.

Political: For information regarding the political factors involved in the integration of the two forces, see Appendix "D". This would probably be a deterrent to integration because it might not be acceptable to the Kuomintang or the Communists. However, this is an objection based upon possible loss of advantage rather than upon substance. From the standpoint of benefit to China it would be good to have Nationalist forces and constituency exposed to Communist doctrine. The basis for true compromise lies somewhere in between the reactionary position of the Kuomintang and Communist liberalism. Since China needs free speech and an avenue for public expression other than revolution, any lever that will force the Central Government to serve the many instead of the few and create a truly democratic state would be salutary.

Integration: If there is to be a real compromise of differences between the Nationalist and Communist elements in China the present armed forces of these two factions must be brought under the control of a single government authority and in time these two forces must be integrated into a single military system. However, any program of integration should be recognized merely as a temporary expedient and China should not lose sight of the fact that she can never have

an effective modern military force until she abolishes completely her political and territorial forces and establishes an army based upon the list system for both officers and men.

The many differences which presently exist between Nationalist and Communist forces would make it impracticable initially to place divisions or other units of these opposing forces in the same army or to attempt integration of command at the army level or below. No past experience exists upon which such action could be taken and there is a need for experience in cooperative action from the top headquarters down before such a step is taken in the basic field units. If the necessary preliminary action is not taken on the decision and higher command levels before integration is attempted at the fighting level there is a real risk of chaos which would only accentuate present misunderstanding and further delay peaceful compromise and integration. In time, after orientation and education have been supplied to both forces regarding China's future course and the military organization that is to evolve, integration should be possible in these lower echelons.

It is not necessary to determine here the future course that integration may take. Such action must be determined in successive steps. At this stage it appears that it would be unwise to initiate integration below the army group level. This means that for the time being armies contained in an army group should remain completely Nationalist or Communist forces. Of necessity, Communist armies would have to be reorganized to conform to the organization and strength of the Nationalist army, serving as its opposite number in the army group. A thorough system of liaison between units in the army group and with headquarters of the army group should be established.

Under this concept, one Nationalist army and one Communist army should be included in an integrated army group. Command of such army groups would be divided equally to the extent possible between Nationalist and Communist commanders. Each such army group would have an integrated staff including fifty percent representation by the opposing parties. This process should be repeated in the higher headquarters of the Area Commander and the appropriate degrees of Communist representation should be provided in the headquarters of the Supreme Field Commander of Chinese Forces, and in the National Military Council.

Since the Communist armies would have to be reorganized prior to integration, a schedule of integration cannot be shown at this time. However, two Communist armies could be created, using the 115th, the 120th and 129th Divisions of the 18th Army Group and the 1st, 2nd and 5th Divisions of the new 4th Army. (See Note 3 of Appendix B.) On the Nationalist side, two armies could be created, using one division

from the new 1st and new 6th and the 8th, 18th, 71st, and 73rd Nationalist armies. The number of integrated army groups to be created under the process would depend upon the size of the Communist forces to be brought into the Chinese Armed forces. The remaining Communist forces should either be inactivated or reorganized into local police battalions responsible to Central Government authority. Such action regarding excessive units conforms with the procedures presently contemplated by the Central Government for reducing the size of Central Government Forces. The attached chart ⁵³ indicates generally the process of integration that is advocated.

Any integration program adopted will require the maximum of good faith and cooperation on both sides to be successful. If either the Communists or the Nationalists withhold forces from the control of the Coalition Government, to perpetuate or advance their own interests, dissension will most certainly develop and the plan can easily fail. For this reason the integration plan devised must provide that all military forces of both factions will be under the control of the National Military Council and that neither side will maintain secret, independent military units.

Advantages: There is real advantage to limiting the initial steps towards integration of Nationalist and Communist forces to action at the Army group level and above.

To recognize this, it is necessary to keep in mind that the first objective is to bring the dissident Communist forces under Central Government control and to reorient their action to Central Government purposes. Much will have been accomplished when active cooperation by Communist leaders in the Government, the Military Council and lower headquarters has been assured.

Integration at the Army Group level and above contemplates the establishment of a single chain of command by which effective control of lower echelons can be maintained. If this is accomplished and a thorough system of intra army group liaison is created a sound basis will have been laid for the welding of the two opposing factions.

Another advantage of the proposal is its relative simplicity. It involves initial contact between the more educated elements of the two factions where the purposes of the action being taken can be more readily understood and it creates a responsibility upon leadership to make the terms of the compromise work. Further, by adopting this realistic approach, there is less likelihood of chaos at the field unit level and the way is left open for the eventual reorganization of all Chinese forces on a single list system for both officers and men.

Disadvantages: By integrating the two opposing forces, initially,

⁵³ Not printed.

at the Army Group level, disadvantages inherent in the process of integration are probably kept at a minimum. The possibility of conflict and disorder in the basic units is minimized yet an opportunity is afforded through the close liaison advocated for these units to be brought together gradually for cooperative joint action. At the same time, through the segregation of units within army groups, the danger of explosive proselytism by political commissars attached to Communist units will be avoided.

These matters could be major problems if integration were attempted at the division or army level.

Any disadvantages incident to integration at the army group level appear to be those inherent in integration itself and therefore unavoidable if any constructive action is to be taken. These include the possibility that Communist officers selected for Army Group and Area Commands and for various staff assignments may prove unsatisfactory. This could come from unscrupulousness, disloyalty and lack of ability, any of which could jeopardize the attempted integration. These, however, are human factors which cannot be avoided and should be acceptable risks.

Another disadvantage that must be recognized is that under this proposal a Communist will command a war area and also the area occupied by an Army Group. To offset this possible objection the counterbalance supplied by control from higher headquarters, integrated staffs and equal percentages of Nationalist troops in each Army Group must be relied upon.

Preliminary integration at the army group level of necessity will delay complete integration of lower units. However, since integration on an army or division level is considered impracticable at this stage the delay in the integration of basic units must be accepted.

893.00/1-1746

*Memorandum by the Committee of Three to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek*⁵⁴

We, General Chang Chun, authorized representative of the National Government; General Chou En-lai, authorized representative of the Chinese Communist Party[,], and General George C. Marshall do urgently recommend that the Military Sub-Committee, agreed to on 11 October 1945, be convened immediately to develop a plan for the reorganization of the Armies of China at the earliest possible date.

⁵⁴ Copy transmitted to the Secretary of State by General Marshall with his memorandum of January 17; received January 31.

A similar memorandum ⁵⁵ is being forwarded to Chairman Mao Tse-tung ⁵⁶ through General Chou En-lai.

CHANG CHUN
CHOU EN-LAI
G. C. MARSHALL

CHUNGKING, 14 January 1946.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer to General Marshall

SHANGHAI, 14 January 1946.

20060. Reference 45. I did not agree or recommend that in view of struggle with Communists no further demobilization of National Army divisions should take place. The commander of the New 6th Army visited me in Shanghai and intimated that part of his army was about to be demobilized and that it would affect the morale of his organization. I asked the Generalissimo to defer his demobilization plan with reference to those armies whose movement was imminent for it would disrupt our plans. I have always urged demobilization in general and still feel that the National Government could and should reduce its military force to approximately 50 divisions. This could be accomplished without interfering with the armies that are American trained and equipped and that are visualized for immediate movement or employment. In fairness to the Generalissimo I believe that he misunderstood a memorandum I sent to him recommending that his order to the New 6th Army concerning inactivation be rescinded. General Liao, the Commander of the New 6th Army, gave me the number of that order only and I did not see its contents. That order may have applied to the entire army and when I recommended that he rescind it, naturally he interpreted my meaning incorrectly. I merely did not want disruption of morale or plans for the movement within those armies that we had trained and equipped and were scheduled for movement. I am sending by courier papers ⁵⁷ pertaining to the integration of the Chinese Nationalist and Chinese Communist armies.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

General Marshall to Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer

[CHUNGKING,] 15 January 1946.

52. Refer your 20060: I am proposing to Generalissimo immediate issue of public order for demilitarization of a certain number of

⁵⁵ Not printed.

⁵⁶ Chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

⁵⁷ Memorandum of January 13, p. 178, and enclosures.

divisions during next 6 months, stating rather precisely the schedule. Also indicating that further demilitarization and demobilization will follow.

How many divisions might be nominated for next 6 months? Rush reply.

Further reference your 20060: please give me a concise statement of matter reference Sixth Army incident and including your general view on demobilization that I can quote to Generalissimo.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270: Telegram

Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer to General Marshall

SHANGHAI, 16 January 1946.

20304. In connection with your 52, I consider that 60 non-sponsored divisions should be demobilized during the next 6 months. In this connection my thought on the organization of a modern Chinese Army reenvisages progressive demobilization of 175 non-sponsored divisions.

To avoid flooding the country with potential bandits and other dissident elements it has been planned to utilize this personnel by activating 160 military police battalions over a period of 18 months, these military police battalions to be used in local security and protection of lines of communications within China. In addition personnel of deactivated divisions will be used in the formations of service and supporting units of the new Chinese Army and on various public works programs, such as road building, reforestation and irrigation and flood control. I have discussed this matter many times with the Minister of War⁵⁸ as well as the Generalissimo and the Madame.

Generally demobilization should be in consonance with well-conceived plan and should be accomplished as expeditiously as possible. Plans for use of demobilized personnel should be made at once and be completed before large scale demobilization commences. I view demobilization of the Chinese National Government forces in 3 steps as follows:

- a. 60 non-US sponsored divisions to be demobilized by 1 July 1946.
- b. 60 additional non-US sponsored divisions to be demobilized by 1 Jan 1947.
- c. 55 additional non-US sponsored divisions to be demobilized by 1 Jul 1947.

This would reduce the Chinese National Army to 75 divisions, the nucleus of which would be the US sponsored divisions.

⁵⁸ General Chen Cheng.

Thereafter there would be a progressive orderly demobilization of Chinese National Army and Chinese Communist Army divisions until the over-all strength of the Armies in China were reduced to 5 first line U. S. type regular divisions, 5 U. S. type divisions in training after 11 years, 40 reserve divisions.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Memorandum by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to General Marshall*⁵⁹

[Translation]

CHUNGKING, January 16, 1946.

Acknowledgment is made of the Memorandum dated January 14, 1946.

The National Government has now designated General Chang Chih-chung, Minister of the Board of Political Training, National Military Council, and Governor Chang Chun of Szechwan Province as its authorized representatives to participate in the Military Sub-Committee.

It is also suggested that General Marshall be requested to serve as Adviser to that Sub-Committee to give whatever assistance that may be deemed necessary.⁶⁰

GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

General Marshall to Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer

[CHUNGKING,] 17 January 1946.

67. Thanks for your complete statement of demobilization views in 20304. I still would like a concise statement from you to be quoted by me to Generalissimo regarding confusion of understanding which has arisen over your statement to Sixth Army Commander requested in first half of last sentence my 52.⁶¹ I do not think it wise to use your 20060 because of reference to armies in third sentence.

⁵⁹ Generalissimo Chiang requested General Marshall to transmit this memorandum to the "Conference" of Three.

⁶⁰ In a letter to Generalissimo Chiang on January 18, acknowledging receipt of this memorandum for transmission to the Committee of Three, General Marshall observed that General Chang Chun and General Chou En-lai "appear to be in agreement that I serve the Military Sub-Committee in an advisory capacity."

⁶¹ Telegram of January 15, p. 189.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer to General Marshall

SHANGHAI, 17 January 1946.

20945. Reference your 67. I deem it mandatory that the demobilization program adopted by the Chinese Central Government be continued phased in accordance with ability to absorb officers and men separated from the service into labor battalions, vocational schools, agricultural pursuits and any other worthwhile activities. The large number of divisions now existing are a cancerous sore which must be eliminated to stabilize economy and furthermore to insure concentration of governmental financial support upon a reasonable number of divisions which can then be made effective. I would not demobilize the Alpha armies or make any changes at this time in armies employed on important missions or scheduled for such employment in the near future. Such employment involves only a few armies and I strongly recommend that the demobilization plan with the above exceptions be continued. I would be glad to have you quote me to the above effect to the Generalissimo. My 20060 explains perhaps the reason that the Generalissimo misunderstood my request that he exempt the New Sixth Army from his demobilization order.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

General Chang Chun to General Marshall

[Translation]

CHUNGKING, January 22, 1946.

DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: I am very gratified that you have shown me the memorandum from the Generalissimo to you dated Jan. 16, 1946 and I noted with pleasure the fact that the Generalissimo proposed to invite you to participate in the military subcommittee as adviser. I am confident with your participation in that sub-committee in an advisory capacity, progress can certainly be much more easily made and final settlement will be accomplished at an early date.

I, hereby, in the capacity of the representative of the National Government wish to express my hearty welcome to you to take part in the military subcommittee.

Sincerely yours,

CHANG CHUN

121.893/1-2446 : Telegram

General Marshall to President Truman[Extract]⁶²

CHUNGKING, 24 [23] January 1946.

98. DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: . . .

.

Another subject: Here in Chungking I have moved quietly and very carefully since completion of "cease firing" mediation meetings to avoid criticism of barging into position of dictating. Formal request for me to act as advisor in three man group to determine on the nationalization of Chinese military forces had not been forthcoming, though the Generalissimo in writing had expressed such a desire to the Chinese two members of the original mediation group. Chou En-lai, Communist, had indicated his willingness to accept my services but had not addressed me formally. Today the government member sent me a formal request for my services and I am told that the Communist member had been prodded to do the same. Meanwhile the Government member of the Military Nationalization Committee called on me and stated the case from the Government side and I have provided him with a lengthy written presentation of my draft⁶³ of the necessary instructions to be promulgated by the Government after agreement by the two sides. He will discuss this with me tomorrow and he hopes to bring about a meeting with General Chou, the Communist, and me the following day.

.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

General Chou En-lai to General Marshall

No. 103.1-4

CHUNGKING, 23 January 1946.

MY DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: With reference to the recommendation of the conference of three on 14 January that the Military Subcommittee be convened immediately to develop a plan for the reorganization of the Armies of China at the earliest possible date, I have the honor to inform you that Chairman Mao Tze-tung fully

⁶² For sections of telegram printed elsewhere in this volume, see pp. 142 and 373.

⁶³ Dated January 22, not printed. General Marshall apparently drafted this telegram on January 22; the original draft in his handwriting shows no date.

approves this recommendation and has made due arrangement to facilitate the proceeding of the Sub-Committee. He further advises me to intimidate [*intimate*] to you that he entirely subscribes to the Generalissimo's suggestion⁶⁴ that you should be invited to be the advisor of this Sub-Committee.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature in Chinese]
CHOU EN-LAI

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chang Chih-chung, at House 28, Chungking, January 23, 1946, 10 a.m.

Also present: Col. Caughey⁶⁵
Col. Pee⁶⁶

1. By way of introduction General Chang stated that he had intimately known General Chou En-lai for a period of some 22 years: that 20 years ago he and Chou En-lai both served under the Generalissimo at Canton; that General Chou En-lai as an individual in the Kuomintang had taken up the Communist Party line which was shared by other members of the Kuomintang. At this point you [General Marshall] asked General Chang when the separation occurred. General Chang stated that he and Chou En-lai had been together from 1924 to 1925; that in 1926 when the Generalissimo went on a northward expedition, he, Chang, followed and Chou En-lai remained in Canton. With reference to General Chou En-lai's separation from the Kuomintang, that occurred in 1927 when the Kuomintang dismissed the Communist members in Hankow and Nanking. General Chang further stated that since 1927 he had not met General Chou En-lai for a period of ten years; that between 1937 and this date he has come in contact with Chou En-lai on four occasions, these occasions being four political conferences between the Kuomintang and the Communists.

After stating that the Communist demands increased successively at each of the four conferences, General Chang outlined the development of the present Communist Army.

In 1937 the Communists had been authorized to organize the 18th Army Group consisting of three divisions. At the first conference (1940) the Communists asked for three armies consisting of nine divisions or six armies consisting of six divisions with an extra division in each army. At the second conference (Dec. 1942-Mar. 1943) the Communists asked for four armies consisting of twelve divisions. The National Government would have authorized nine divisions but agree-

⁶⁴ See Generalissimo Chiang's memorandum to General Marshall, January 16, p. 191.

⁶⁵ Col. J. Hart Caughey, executive officer, General Marshall's staff.

⁶⁶ Col. Peter Pee, personal aide to President Chiang.

ment was not reached. During the third conference (1944) the Communists asked for five armies of ten divisions. During the fourth conference (October 1945) the Communists asked for 48 divisions, later reduced this request to 20 divisions. At this time the Generalissimo indicated willingness to authorize 16 to 20 divisions and a communiqué was issued which authorized 20. General Chang pointed out that since 1937 the authorized strength of the Communist forces has increased sevenfold.

General Chang then indicated that he was willing to describe the development of the National Army if you so desired and you indicated that he do so. In 1937 the National Government had 49 armies consisting of 179 divisions, not including the three Communist divisions. Due to the war and a broadening of military responsibilities, this sum was increased to 124 armies consisting of 350 divisions plus 31 independent brigades and 112 independent regiments (engineer, transportation, etc.) by the end of 1944. During 1945, 35 armies consisting of 111 divisions, 21 independent brigades and 83 independent regiments were inactivated. The existing strength now stands at 89 armies consisting of 253 divisions plus two cavalry armies. General Chang pointed out that the army was doubled between 1937 and 1944 and there was a decrease by $\frac{1}{3}$ in 1945.

At this point you asked whether demobilization was in process now. General Chang indicated that a plan for demobilization had been accepted in principle which envisaged reduction to 90 divisions by the end of 1946.

You then stated that the reason you asked this question was because there appeared to be a misunderstanding wherein the Generalissimo believed that General Wedemeyer had recommended cessation of demobilization in view of the Communist situation. You added that you had a written statement from General Wedemeyer⁶⁷ on this matter, and that General Wedemeyer's recommendation pertained only to the demobilization of the New 6th Army which at that time was about to be moved to North China. General Chang then stated that the demobilization program was fixed in principle but that the actual date has been delayed due to present hostilities and that this factor will be an important consideration for the Military Sub-Committee in establishing dates for demobilization. General Chang further added that the 90 division program was only for 1946 and this might be reduced further in the light of the then existing situation.

You thanked General Chang for his presentation and then asked if it is true, as you had understood, that an agreement had been reached as to choice of high commanders. General Chang answered that there had not. You then asked if the National Government had made proposals in this regard. General Chang indicated that the Government

⁶⁷ Telegram No. 20060, January 14, p. 189.

had made proposals to the effect that the Communists would recommend commanders for divisions and armies subject to approval of the Central Government. You then asked, "Suppose the government does not approve, what then?" General Chang said that the government would either accept the nomination or disapprove the nomination and accept a new nomination in its place.

You stressed the importance of complete frankness and direct dealing in discussing matters pertaining to China's affairs, stated that you wished yourself to be considered as another individual rather than an Ambassador from the U. S., and then outlined four factors which you believed are of the greatest importance to China in the present problem of reorganizing its armies:

1. Organize a "real" National Army under the National Government.
2. Develop some means whereby the Communists would give up inherent power in their organization.
3. Create an army that will not bankrupt China, but at the same time be sufficient for internal security and national defense.
4. So establish the army that it will not become an instrument of any political leader but one that would serve the Government.

You stated that it was your feeling that what the National Government feared was a possible hostile attitude on the part of the Russians and certainly, in a small way, this would be a Communist hope.

You then informed General Chang that you were preparing a paper which you would discuss in detail with him prior to discussing it with anyone else in order that you could find out what, in the paper, was wrong, impractical, or unacceptable to the National Government.

At this point General Chang likened you to a mediator in a matrimonial match and the meeting ended.

J. H[ART] C[AUGHEY]

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chang Chun, at House 28, Chungking, January 24, 1946, 11 a. m.

[Extract] ⁶⁸

Also present: Col. Caughey
Col. Pee
Mr. Shepley ⁶⁹

General Chang then stated that the PCC was not making satisfactory progress but that he hoped within the next three days agree-

⁶⁸ For first section of these minutes, see p. 374.

⁶⁹ James R. Shepley, member of General Marshall's staff.

ments could be reached. He stated that the PCC had organized five sub-committees:

1. Governmental Reorganization
2. Policy of Administration
3. Military Affairs
4. National Convention
5. Constitution

He indicated that an additional sub-committee had been set up consisting of two members from each party which would discuss the general question of the work of all five committees since this work was closely related.⁷⁰ With reference to the Military Affairs Committee, on which General Chang sits, General Chang desired to report that the Central Government had proposed a two-point program:

1. Settle the Army Reorganization in the Military Sub-Committee within one month and carry out the organization within the two months following.
2. Reorganization of the armed forces through demobilization and deactivation to 90 divisions.

General Chang stated that the Communists had submitted no proposals to the committee but instead had submitted proposals to the Sub-Committee for Policy of Administration which concerned reorganization of the National Military Council to include Communist members. The Youth Party had put in a five-point program consisting of:

1. Separate the army from the party.
2. Separate army from politics.
3. Adopt a system of conscription.
4. Demobilize and deactivate on large scale; retaining small army.
5. Set up a Minister of National Defense, abolish the National Military Council, and establish a commission to handle deactivation and demobilization.

General Chang also stated that the Democratic League had proposed a program which included:

1. A unified nationalized army.
2. Demobilization on a large scale and that a planning committee be established for the reorganization with every party represented.

General Chang stated that the Military Affairs Committee had already had three sessions. At the first session no agreement was reached. At the second session (General Chou En-lai was absent) they made satisfactory progress and unanimous agreement was reached on the following program:

⁷⁰ For correspondence on the Political Consultative Council, see pp. 131 ff.

1. Separate army from political parties.

a. Forbid political party activities openly or secretly in the army.

b. Education in the army to be independent of political influence.

c. Either dismiss from the army members from political parties or suspend their party relationships during army service.

d. Political party would not use army as instrument to attain political supremacy.

2. Organization.

a. Officers would not serve in the army and in civil service concurrently.

b. Area jurisdiction would be divided into field commander whose boundaries would not coincide with provincial boundaries.

c. Army officers not to become entangled with civil administration.

3. Reorganization.

a. Develop in one month a plan to integrate Communist with Nationalist forces and execute plan in the subsequent two months.

b. Six months after actual date of cessation of hostilities to organize into 90 divisions.

c. Possibly reorganize into 50 or 60 divisions the following year.

d. Establish organization under National Military Council for supervising and planning reorganization of the army.

At the third conference General Chou was present and negated the agreement reached by the Communist representative in the second conference. General Chou stated that he could not agree to the program until a new National Military Council had been established with Communist representation; that this would be the only guarantee under which he would entertain further reorganization planning.

General Marshall indicated that the three months period for planning and executing reorganization did not appear realistic. General Marshall then outlined his general concept for reorganization: That the army must be taken out of politics; military commanders cannot hold political positions; that approximately 20 armies should be organized each one reporting directly to the Generalissimo; that service areas should be established which had no connection with command of forces and which would furnish food, clothing, equipment, and shelter to military forces in the area. General Marshall then stated that this should be accomplished through gradual change and that the first six months would be the most difficult on account of the Communist fears.

J. HART CAUGHEY
Colonel, G. S. C.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chang Chih-chung, at House 28, Chungking, January 25, 1946, 11 a. m.

Also present: Colonel Caughey
Mr. Shepley
Colonel Pee
Captain Sung ⁷¹

General Chang commenced the meeting by discussing the various elements of a draft paper on the subject of reorganization of the armies of China previously given him by General Marshall.⁷²

With reference to *Command*, General Chang stated that he concurred in principle but that there may be technical questions with reference to wording.

With reference to *Organization*, General Chang pointed out that the Military Sub-Committee was to concern itself, according to its directive, in the reorganization of *Communist* units, but that he was very willing to permit this study to extend to, and include, a study on the reorganization of all armies. General Chang further pointed out that the ratio of two National divisions to one Communist division was far beyond the ratio previously demanded by the Communists.

With reference to *Demobilization*, General Chang again referred again to the ratio and stated that the Communists would be very happy to accept a ratio of 6 to 1; that the Minister of War wanted to announce that the armies would be organized into 60 National division[s] and 20 Communist division[s] or a ratio of 1 to 4.5 but that General Chang had recommended against this announcement. General Chang then stated that there were two alternatives:

1. Organization into 90 National divisions and 20 Communist divisions (authorized by the 10 October Gmo [-] Mao Agreement ⁷³) or a total of 110 divisions or
2. Reorganization into 90 divisions which would include 10 or more Communist divisions.

General Chang stated that since the Communists made no demands with reference to Air and Naval forces they should therefore not be mentioned in order to avoid "complexities". General Chang stated that he was in complete accord with the 8 Service Areas although boundaries may be changed due to the change in provincial boundaries. At this point General Marshall stated that Chahar and Jehol

⁷¹ Capt. John L. Soong, language officer, U. S. Army.

⁷² Not printed; it probably was draft No. 5, about January 25.

⁷³ See summary of conversations between President Chiang Kai-shek and Chairman Mao Tse-tung as issued October 11, 1945, at Chungking, *United States Relations With China*, p. 577, and telegram No. 1833, October 19, from the Chargé in China, *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VII, p. 475.

had been separated on purpose but that the remaining boundaries were immaterial; that the main object was to separate the service function from troop command.

With reference to Demilitarization and Demobilization, General Chang asked if the demobilized officers would be concentrated in a single area and be fed and paid. General Marshall remained non-committal and General Chang stated that the Ministry of War was preparing a plan for handling demobilized personnel and he asked that the following statement be included, "deactivate[d] officers will be taken care of by plans being developed by the Ministry of War".

With reference to *Development*, General Chang stated that there was a close relationship between this and the ratio of divisions in the armies of China. General Chang agreed with the general division of strategic areas and stated that there was no need for combining and mixing National and Communist divisions in areas located in the south and west of China since the Communists have made no demands of this nature. General Marshall stated that this was done in order to break up the Communist concentration.

With reference to *Administration*, General Chang agreed.

With reference to *Militia*, General Chang stated that the militia belongs to the provinces by Chinese custom and that there is no relationship between the officers of the militia and those on the active list. General Marshall pointed out that his idea was to avoid difficulties with a so-called "local army". General Chang then outlined his ideas with reference to the militia: Create districts separate from the provinces; each province to decide strength on its capability to support a militia subject to approval of the National Military Council. General Marshall stated that it was his idea to avoid provincial control so as to keep the militia away from political complications. General Chang stated that he understood the spirit of General Marshall's proposal but felt that a different approach must be made. General Chang then objected to permitting the Communists to nominate governors in Kansu, Shansi, and Ningshia Provinces since Communist control of these provinces is very small.

With reference to *Military Police*, General Chang suggested that they not be included in this study.

With reference to *Puppet Troops*, General Chang agreed.

With reference to *Secret Independent Forces*, General Chang agreed.

General Marshall stated that he would prepare a new paper based on this discussion which will contain a combined Army, Navy, and Air program and that after this was prepared those parts that are applicable could be extracted for consideration by the Military Subcommittee. General Chang agreed.

General Chang asked that the plan be kept secret and that[,] in turn, the Communists be asked for their suggestions regarding the organization of troops. General Marshall feared this procedure, due to obvious complications and great embarrassment and stated that it would be better to follow the present approach.

J. H[ART] C[AUGHEY]

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chang Chih-chung, at House 28, Chungking, January 31, 1946, 2 p. m.

Also present: Col. Caughey
Col. Pee
Mr. Shepley

General Chang opened the meeting by stating that the Generalissimo has carefully read General Marshall's reorganization plan⁷⁴ and would like to introduce certain changes.

First the Generalissimo desired to change the 15 divisions back to 20 divisions in order to avoid embarrassment to General Marshall. General Chang would then make representation to the Communists to cut it to 15, and if the Communists objected, then concessions could be made by the National Government. General Marshall stated that it would be very easy for him to discuss the plan with the Communists on the basis of 15 divisions and stated that possibly the Generalissimo was not aware of the fact that General Marshall had not shown this plan to the Communists. General Marshall also stated that if the government wanted him to say 20, he would say 20 but that he felt this may be harmful to the government in view of the previous Communist commitment indicating their willingness to accept a 1 to 6 ratio. General Chang then agreed that the government proposal should be 90-15 divisions and then asked General Marshall how he proposed to put the program up to the Communists. General Marshall stated that he proposed to talk to General Chou with reference to the Communist proposals to such a plan, then talk again to General Chang after which General Chou and General Chang should meet. At the conclusion of the meeting a new paper would be prepared in the light of the two conversations and the meeting.

General Chang stated that the second point to which the Generalissimo objected was the 9 armies in Manchuria. The Generalissimo stated that there should be from 4 to 6. It was then agreed that the plan would show 5 armies for Manchuria and this brought up the

⁷⁴ Not printed ; it probably was draft No. 5, about January 25.

question of disposition of the other 4. General Marshall asked General Chang if there were any restrictions regarding the use of National armies in Sinkiang. General Chang said that the Soviet Consul had objected to possible use of more than 30,000 troops but that this had been refuted by General Chang representing the National Government. General Marshall then suggested that General Chang see the Generalissimo with reference to sending an army to Japan.

General Chang then stated that the Generalissimo would like to have the second paragraph of Section 1 to Article III written in the positive sense and that the idea that a two-thirds vote of the National Council should be deleted since it had not yet been established how many votes would constitute a majority for such action. General Marshall then stated that he would have this paragraph reworded and would leave open for discussion the question of the two-thirds majority.

General Chang stated that Article VII should also be put into a positive sense. General Marshall stated that he would have this paragraph reworded also.

General Marshall then pointed out the differences in Western tradition and Eastern tradition with reference to military affairs and impressed on General Chang the necessity for the Central Government to accept the Western ideas in order to develop a nationalized, non-political armed force. General Chang then stated that he personally hoped that the Generalissimo would become the Washington of China by emulating Western democracy. He also referred to the Russian and German missions previously established in China and then stated that their hope was to follow the educational and training methods of the United States through the proposed Military Advisory Group.⁷⁵

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Chou En-lai and General Marshall, at House 28, Chungking, February 1, 1946, 2 p. m.

Also present: Col. Caughey
Mr. Schang⁷⁶
Mr. Shepley

General Marshall opened the meeting by informing General Chou En-lai that he had sent Chairman Mao's letter regarding his satisfaction toward the current developments to the President⁷⁷ for in-

⁷⁵ For correspondence on this subject, see vol. x, pp. 724 ff.

⁷⁶ Chang Wen-chin, secretary to General Chou En-lai.

⁷⁷ See telegram No. 137, February 1, from General Marshall to President Truman and the Secretary of State, p. 151.

formation. General Marshall then asked if General Chou wanted to talk about the reorganization of the armies. General Chou replied that he had not yet seen General Chang but that he would like to hear General Marshall's views on this subject.

General Marshall indicated that the most important point was to establish an army which would be used as a democratic army and not as an authoritative [*authoritarian?*] weapon. General Marshall then pointed out that the Western system is entirely different than the Eastern system and he then traced, beginning with Charles I and later George III, the foundation upon which the modern American army had been developed. General Marshall emphasized throughout this dissertation, and at the end, that commanders in the army must have no position in the civil government and must possess no authority except for those troops under their command. General Marshall then discussed the eight service areas which would be responsible for supplying and administering the troops within the various areas. General Marshall said the service area director would have no command over the military forces in the area. General Marshall stated that it would be important, since this individual would have the great influence through his purchase power, to check two or three ways the activities of these directors. The checks would be: no command; occupy no civil position; bi-monthly meetings to discuss expenditures; and army representatives within the area acting as liaison personnel at the service area headquarters. General Chou asked if the service area director should be responsible for conscription. General Marshall stated that he definitely should not, that this should be a function of the civil government.

With reference to service in the army General Marshall stated that service of the enlisted personnel should be limited to say: 3 years for a private; 6 years for corporals; 10 years for sergeants; and 15 to 20 years for higher grade non-commissioned officers. General Marshall stressed that in peace time there should be an excess number of 2nd lieutenants and a reduced number of top ranks so that in an emergency well qualified officers from the lower ranks could be promoted through selection and the non-productive officer personnel eliminated.

General Marshall stated: that the peace time army should consist of a number of three division armies; that each army report directly to the Ministry of War; that, depending on the number of divisions on each side, the Communist forces be integrated into the National forces by establishing some armies with two Communist divisions and one National division with a Communist leader and two National divisions and one Communist division with a National leader; that probably most of the Communist units would be in North China and some in Manchuria whereas most of the Central forces would be in

Central and South China. General Marshall then pointed out that with the cessation of hostilities it might be possible to place in Japan a highly trained and well-equipped integrated Chinese army.

In connection with reorganization, General Marshall pointed out that there would be the big problem of demobilization and re-equipping our troops. Probably some such agency as the Executive Headquarters would have to work out detailed matters concerning disarmament, reissue of armament, and supervision of demobilization.

General Chou thanked General Marshall and then stated that the proposed trip of the Committee of Three,⁷⁸ in his own opinion, would do a lot toward solving present and future problems.

In closing it was agreed that General Chou would seek an interview with General Chang, and after general agreement was reached, General Marshall would reduce the agreement to writing for further consideration.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Chou En-lai and General Marshall at House 28, Chungking, February 4, 1946, 3 p. m.

Also present: Col. Caughey
Col. Pee
Mr. Shepley

General Chou En-lai opened the meeting by stating that he and General Chang had discussed the problem of reorganization on 3 February. General Chou stated that he had carefully studied the various problems and had certain questions.

With regard to the first question General Chou stated that at the PCC and later discussions it had been decided that reorganization would be in two stages.⁷⁹ One, reorganize into 90 National and 20 Communist divisions; two, then reduce the entire army to 60 or 50 divisions. General Chou then asked General Marshall if he visualized that the total reorganization would be accomplished in one stage. General Marshall replied that his concept envisaged demobilization and integration progressively and simultaneously. He pointed out that if integration were not undertaken at the outset a great deal of time would be lost. General Marshall then stated that the Military Committee of the PCC had spoken of reduction to 90 National divisions within six months; that he felt such a rapid reduction may be confused and without proper provisions to prevent banditry, disposal

⁷⁸ For the trip of the Committee of Three through North China, see pp. 341 ff.

⁷⁹ For text of PCC Resolution on Military Problems, see *United States Relations With China*, p. 617.

of arms and equipment; that a twelve month period would permit a business-like development.

General Marshall stated that the idea of delaying the integration until the second stage had not occurred to him. He believed the program could be worked out by the Military Sub-Committee as follows: Reach agreement on the numbers of divisions to be retained and determine the periods during which other divisions were to be demobilized; prepare a schedule for movements, deactivation and integration; then get these approved by the Generalissimo and Chairman Mao Tse-tung. The Military Sub-Committee could then establish some agency like the Executive Headquarters to carry out the plans. In the meantime specific details such as the dates of demobilization, total units to be demobilized, numbers of integrated armies, army locations, organization of supply districts, principles to govern the militia, could be worked out and these agreed on for implementation by the Executive Headquarters. General Marshall stated he could have two or three officers of General Wedemeyer's staff come to Chungking for this purpose and later proceed to Peiping for duty with the Executive Headquarters.

General Marshall then asked if that answered General Chou's question. General Chou stated that he still did not understand whether the forces would be organized into 60 divisions within the first twelve months or sometime beyond the first twelve months. General Marshall said, "Beyond."

General Chou then stated that he agreed that demobilization and integration should be worked out together.

General Marshall indicated concern over the rapidity of reduction and stated that he did not wish to become a party to a plan which would create banditry or extreme discontent. General Marshall then stated that he saw no great complication to planning first for a reduction to 90 National and 20 Communist divisions and then plan for a further overall reduction to 60 divisions.

General Chou was of the opinion that a twelve month period would be required for the first stage since the National Government in reducing to 90 divisions would release two million soldiers. He then pointed out that although the 1,300,000 Communist soldiers would be reduced to about 300,000 the Communists would not have the same difficulty because most of their troops already participated in agricultural pursuits.

General Marshall then stated that when General Chou and General Chang agreed on the overall principles he would have their agreement reduced to writing for subsequent discussion.

General Chou asked if the service areas should be begun immedi-

ately. General Marshall indicated that it may be necessary to establish these gradually but pointed out that demobilization would be facilitated, integration and re-equipping made easier if the areas were established. General Chou stated that the government intends to establish military regions and then asked if this idea were to be superseded. General Marshall indicated that they would.

General Chou asked if provincial headquarters are to be abolished and General Marshall stated, "Yes". General Chou then asked about pacification headquarters. General Marshall indicated that they also would be abolished.

General Chou asked about the Manchurian problem⁸⁰ and stated that the Communists would like a field team from Executive Headquarters to proceed to Yingkow. General Marshall stated he would take this matter up with the Generalissimo immediately.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270: Telegram

General Marshall to President Truman

[CHUNGKING,] 4 February 1946.

148. MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Affairs are progressing rather favorably. The Political Consultative Conference⁸¹ did their job well and included enough of the details of the interim constitution I had most confidentially given the Generalissimo⁸² to provide a fairly definite basis for a democratic coalition government. The approach to the Constitutional Convention appears sound.

As to the nationalization of the armies, demobilization-integration-and-reorganization, I have secured the Generalissimo's agreement to my proposals and 2 [3?] days ago outlined them to General Chou En-lai, the Communist leader. This afternoon he, Chou, spent 2 hours with me asking questions and then gave a general indication that he would go through with my plan, though I cannot be certain of this until a formal meeting is held tomorrow or next day. He is discussing the plan this evening with his opposite of the National Government. Apparently the prospects are favorable for a solution to this most difficult of all the problems.

I am getting lined up to expedite the formation of the coalition government if that proves necessary, but I am moving in a most inobtrusive manner. If agreement on the military reorganization is reached and genuine progress is made towards implementing the coalition government then I will be ready to propose the resumption

⁸⁰ For correspondence regarding Manchuria, see pp. 712 ff.

⁸¹ For correspondence on the Political Consultative Conference, see pp. 131 ff.

⁸² See document entitled "Charter for the Interim Government of the Republic of China", p. 139.

or the initiation of discussions in the U. S. regarding financial loans. I am endeavoring to terminate the present higgling over the details of every transaction concerning Lend-Lease⁸³ and surplus property,⁸⁴ endeavoring to put it on a basis which will not be embarrassing to you politically.

I am collecting a small special staff to work out the details—schedules, instructions, procedure, etc.—concerned with the demobilization, integration and redeployment of the armies. When this is done and agreed to these U. S. officers will be transferred to the Executive Headquarters in Peking to form a new section of that staff which, as a whole, will be charged with the execution of the new military program. Also, as soon as the main details are settled here, Chou En-lai, Governor Chang Chun and I, the original Committee of Three, will tour the important points, meet the principal army commanders and staff officers and the three of us explain the plans and endeavor by our united presence to expedite the development of a cooperative and understanding procedure on the part of subordinate officials of both factions.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer to General Marshall

SHANGHAI, 5 February 1946.

22232. Reply to 135⁸⁵ follows:

With reference to the Army Program, it is my conviction that China cannot properly support 60 active divisions. If the Generalissimo insists upon such above program he is ill-advised concerning his economy. The Chinese would be again dissipating their equipment and budgetary allowances over such a large number of divisions, both National Government and Communist, that a really effective force could not be created or maintained. Further, the economy of the country would be jeopardized. We had successfully convinced the Minister of War of this. After considerable study my staff evolved an army program that I deem sound. The Minister of War and the Vice Minister of War appear enthusiastic. As you know it envisaged the creation of a new army with an ultimate strength of 10 active U. S. type divisions, 40 inactive U. S. type divisions and the necessary army, corps and supporting troops. The plan also provides a national constabulary of 160 battalions for the preservation of law and order and for the projection of lines of communication in China.

⁸³ For correspondence regarding Lend-Lease matters, see vol. x, pp. 724 ff.

⁸⁴ For correspondence on this subject, see *ibid.*, pp. 1033 ff.

⁸⁵ Telegram of February 1, not printed.

It has always been recognized that the present large Chinese army must be demobilized gradually. Analysis of your plan to reduce the army by the end of the first 12 months after agreement is reached, to approximately 90 National Government divisions and 15 to 20 Communist divisions, appears sound. Continued demobilization to a total of 60 divisions including 12 Communist divisions with the goal of reaching the total of 60 divisions in approximately 2 years after agreement also provides a program of reduction that I feel could be agreed to. Thereafter, these 60 remaining divisions of the old army should be demobilized progressively as divisions of the new army complete their training until ultimately all 60 old divisions have been demobilized.

In connection with the equipment from the U. S. the plan for the new army envisages complete U. S. equipment for the 10 active divisions, while the Chinese would manufacture the bulk of the equipment for the inactive divisions. The U. S. might provide that which the Chinese cannot produce. In this connection, however, I have felt that it would be inadvisable for the Chinese to stockpile for future use huge stocks of equipment which may be obsolete before the need arises for its use. This would be a wasteful expenditure which the Chinese cannot afford. Any future emergency which will require the immediate use of more than the 10 active divisions would be foreseen in sufficient time to produce or procure the latest equipment at a rate commensurate with the mobilization program.

Concerning the equipment for the present interim army, I believe equipment should be made available to the Chinese either under lend-lease or by sales of surplus stocks now in the Pacific through the Foreign Liquidation Commission. In this way certain stocks of U. S. arms, ammunition, and equipment could be made available by minimum cost to them. This will serve U. S. national interest, by putting U. S. arms and equipment in the hands of Chinese forces friendly to us, and at the same time liquidate the large stocks of surplus equipment now lying idle in the Pacific. It should be recognized that this is distinct from CAP,⁸⁶ and is in addition to it.

The Generalissimo has indicated repeatedly that he desires to use U. S. equipment throughout his armed forces. China's economy cannot support an immediate rearmament program of such magnitude. However, the program should be approved, and its implementation tied to China's economic rehabilitation. There have been indications from U. S. high level sources that Japanese equipment should be scrapped. I agree that the Japanese equipment should be scrapped, both for the peace of the world, and for simplified supply of the mod-

⁸⁶ Thirty-nine Chinese divisions, known as Alpha units, sponsored by the United States.

ernized Chinese army. However, the Chinese may not agree to destroy Japanese equipment.

I do not feel that we should differentiate one iota in allocating equipment to Chinese divisions, that is the Chinese Communists should be given the same equipment that the Chinese National Government divisions are given.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Chang Chih-chung and General Marshall at House 28, Chungking, February 5, 1946, 10 a. m.

Also present: Colonel Caughey,
Colonel Pee,
Mr. Shepley.

General Chang stated that he had had two talks with General Chou and that he would give a résumé of these talks to General Marshall:

a. General Chou expressed his view that reorganization could be conducted in two phases during the first of which the government would be reduced to 90 divisions and the Communists force to 20 and during the second of which integration would take place.

b. General Chang expressed to General Chou General Marshall's views on redeployment to which General Chou raised no objection.

c. Regarding the number of Communists divisions, General Chang informed General Chou that he was not in a position to force the Communists to reduce only to 20 divisions but he hoped General Chou would consider favorably a reduction within a previously agreed ratio of 1 to 6, or 15 Communists as compared to 90 Nationalist divisions.

d. Regarding a separation of the army from politics, General Chou suggested that active members of the armed forces should have active political membership but should not participate in party activities whereas General Chang was of the opinion that active army personnel should be dismissed from political parties.

At this point General Chang outlined the present system within the Kuomintang Party: 1000 selected party representatives in all provinces elect 460 members for the Central Committee; 25 of these are elected to the so-called Executive Committee which meets every two weeks to discuss party matters; 5 of these 25 are high ranking army officers; these same 5 are also members of the Supreme National Defense Council. The Communist Party is organized along similar lines. General Chang stated that General Chou was of the opinion that separation of army officers from party members should await the next meeting of the two parties. General Marshall indicated that there probably would have to be a compromise and handed Colonel Pee a memorandum containing his suggested compromise:

“An officer of the army while on active duty will not be permitted to hold any position in a political party, nor will he be permitted to accept membership in any committee of a political party.”

General Marshall stated that extension of this idea into more drastic terms at this particular time might create difficulties since complete severing of party relationship would probably not be accepted. General Marshall informed General Chang that his entire plan was based on the principle of separating the army from politics and although not stated in so many words in the plan, each article adhered to this general principle. General Chang was of the opinion that probably no written clause was necessary in the plan but that the question would be presented to the PCC at a later date.

e. General Chang stated that General Chou had no objection to the article regarding the militia although he stated he had not mentioned militia strengths to General Chou.

f. General Chang stated that he and General Chou were in agreement regarding the demobilization of puppet troops.

g. General Chou indicated to General Chang that the Communists would desire to retain one Pacification Headquarters in Communist territory in order to carry out demobilization and other military affairs.

General Chang then informed General Marshall that during the war National Headquarters had been placed in the field to control the activities of two or three armies; that these same headquarters were still in existence but were known as Pacification Headquarters in time of peace. It was agreed between General Marshall and General Chang that these pacification headquarters would probably have to remain at the outset of reorganization but it would be extremely desirable and important to have the service areas established at an early date to take over similar functions.

h. General Chang then indicated that he and General Chou had agreed that since General Chou must clear certain of these matters with Yen-an it would be two or three days before they could again meet after which they would meet with General Marshall to set a date for the meeting of the Military Sub-Committee.

After stressing that the entire problem of reorganization must be handled in an orderly and business-like manner General Marshall then indicated his plan for proceeding with the problem.

a. Determine the number of divisions, both National and Communist, which should be in existence at the end of 12 months; determine how many Communist divisions should be in the ultimate 60 division program; determine the rapidity with which National and Communist forces can be demobilized; reach general agreement as to phasing of integration; draw up a plan containing these and other

broad principles; have the plan approved by the Generalissimo and Chairman Mao Tze Tung.

b. After this plan is approved, prepare detailed plans for approval of the Generalissimo and Chairman Mao Tze Tung, which would include at least the following essential elements:

Provision for demobilized officers and enlisted men (build up G.S.C.,⁸⁷ I.G.'s,⁸⁸ and Service Area Directors);

Provide for the selection, proper storage and redistribution of military equipment and munitions;

Specific schedule for order and dates for demobilization;

The order in which units will be re-equipped;

Procedure for organizing service areas;

Directives for Service Area Directors;

Reduction and final elimination of Pacification Headquarters.

General Marshall then stated that he was having a small group of U. S. officers come to Chungking to assist in the preparation of these detailed plans. These officers, after the detailed plans had been prepared and approved, would then be transferred to the Executive Headquarters to establish a new section which, through the use of the Executive Headquarters and its field teams, would carry out the entire agreement.

In closing General Chang stated that the National Government would not engulf General Marshall in any plan which might be embarrassing to him. He further stated that the use of the Executive Headquarters for implementation of the plan is very logical and that he felt sure both he and General Chou would approve wholeheartedly.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Informal Meeting of Military Sub-Committee, at House 28, Chungking, February 11, 1946, 12:30 p. m.

Present: General Marshall
General Chang Chih Chung
General Chou En-lai

Also present: Colonel Caughey
Mr. Shepley
Colonel Pee
Captain Soong
Mr. Chang

General Marshall stated that he would like to hear the results of discussions which had been held thus far between Generals Chang and Chou.

⁸⁷ General Staff Corps.

⁸⁸ Inspectorate General.

1. *Scope of Military Sub-Committee*

General Chou stated that the directive from Committee of Three⁸⁹ said the Military Sub-Committee would study reorganization of *all* Armies, whereas PCC had previously directed that only the reorganization of Communist Armies would be considered. General Chou believed, however, the total reorganization of the Armies would be the better plan. General Chang agreed.

2. *Size of the Army*

General Chou said the 90 National and 20 Communist division figures were arrived at without relationship with one another; now, due to reorganization there is a relationship and the figures are set; in the second stage, however, within the 50 to 60 division Army, some new ratio less favorable to the Communists might be acceptable. General Chang stated that reduction from 250 odd divisions to 90 by Nationalist and reduction to only 20 by Communists would have bad effect on National morale and he hoped Communists would reduce below 20.

3. *Time Factor*

General Chou agreed to a 12 month period for the 1st stage in which National will reduce to 90 divisions and Communists reduce to 20. General Chang also agreed.

4. *Integration*

General Chou agreed that integration in 1st stage is desirable but he stated he had referred this question to Yen-an for decision. General Chang agreed to the principle of integration in the first stage.

5. *Conscription*

General Chou said the PCC has set the principles. General Chang said the National Council would have to work out these details.

6. *Organization*

General Chou agreed with General Marshall's concept of 3 divisions per Army, no intermediate command, and to separate service areas from command. General Chang also agreed.

7. *Deployment*

General Chou informed that Communists do not want Communist units in South China. General Chang agreed.

8. *Equipment Disposal and Distribution*

General Chou believed this question must be taken up by Military Sub-Committee. General Chang agreed.

⁸⁹ January 14, p. 188.

9. *Demobilization Officers and Enlisted Men*

General Chou said that training and employment programs for this personnel must be worked out; first separately, then combined. General Chang agreed.

10. *Education, Military and Political*

General Chou stated that the Military Sub-Committee should establish broad policy. General Chang agreed.

11. *Disarmament*

General Chou believed that Military Sub-Committee should agree to the principle that Communists should keep arms of the Japanese surrendered to Communists and that Communists would store and guard the arms until settlement was made. General Chang agreed.

12. *Puppet Troops*

General Chou believed that the Military Sub-Committee should prohibit attempts to win over from one side to another puppet troops and that puppet troops should be demobilized first. General Chang agreed.

13. *Banditry*

General Chou said that Army commanders should be responsible for respective areas. General Chang agreed.

14. *Local and Irregular Forces*

General Chou said these forces should not be considered as part of the Army. General Chang agreed.

15. *Executive Headquarters*

General Chou believed that the Executive Headquarters and team organizations was a satisfactory agency to implement decisions regarding reorganization and that the planning and control committee set up by PCC could take over later. General Chang agreed.

16. *Personnel System*

General Chang said that an adequate personnel system must be established to properly administer the reorganized Army. General Chou agreed.

General Marshall said that he would have a paper prepared and submitted to Generals Chang and Chou tomorrow for consideration. As to the subsequent procedure General Marshall indicated that it is very important to arrive at certain broad principles such as:

- a. Number of divisions.
- b. Order of procedure in reorganization.
- c. General disposition of troops.
- d. Type of command to be maintained.
- e. Organization of supply districts.

Once an agreement has been reached on these broad principles, it then immediately becomes possible to work out the details. The details would be the working basis for the Executive Headquarters and would include:

- a.* Number of divisions to be demobilized during the first, second, third, etc., month.
- b.* Divisions to be integrated into Armies.
- c.* When and where integration is to take place.
- d.* Establishment of service areas.
- e.* Exact schedule for discontinuance of high field headquarters.
- f.* Exact procedure of demobilization.
- g.* Disposition of weapons.
- h.* Completion of the equipping of divisions remaining in existence, when and how.
- i.* Regulations, stipulations as to pay and allowance from the Central Government.

General Marshall stated that he had made arrangements with General Wedemeyer for several officers with General Caraway⁹⁰ as the head to work out the details in consultation with high Chinese officials in Chungking.

General Marshall then stated that it is very important to reach agreement as soon as possible as to numbers of divisions and that Generals Chang and Chou should decide this before Wednesday. General Marshall then said that he was inclined to agree with General Chou's comment to the effect that to start integration at the same time as demobilization would be difficult and confusing. He added that integration should probably begin during the third month; that two combined armies would be created at beginning of third month; three combined armies in fourth and so on. He stated that the procedure to create service areas requires a great deal of thought and that these areas probably could not be all created at once or simultaneously. General Marshall further stated that these areas would help in handling demobilized personnel and help in the collecting and cleaning up of equipment. After the planners had done their work, they would be transferred to the Executive Headquarters as a new section.

General Chou informed that he would approach General Chang tomorrow evening about number of divisions and that, regarding integration in first stage[,], he would consult Yen-an. He added that he felt integration would be difficult even by the third or fourth month.

General Marshall concluded by saying that demobilization should start first and integration should follow later, say integrate 2 Armies the 3rd month, 3 armies the 4th month, etc.; the staffs of these inte-

⁹⁰ Brig. Gen. Paul W. Caraway.

grated armies to be integrated also. General Marshall added that service areas probably would also have to be delayed initially.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Draft Plan for Chinese Military Reorganization Prepared by the Staff of General Marshall*⁹¹

BASIS FOR REORGANIZATION OF COMMUNIST MILITARY FORCES AND
THEIR CONSOLIDATION WITH THE NATIONAL ARMY OF CHINA

ARTICLE I—*Command*

Section 1. The President of the Republic of China shall be the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic of China. He shall exercise his command through the Ministry of National Defense. The commander of each of the several armies, and the commander of each of the several areas herein provided for shall report to the Commander-in-Chief through the Ministry of National Defense. The Commander-in-Chief shall have the power to appoint and relieve all subordinate officers provided, however, that in the event it becomes necessary to relieve the Commander of any Communist-led unit or any Communist official holding other command in the Army, the Commander-in-Chief shall appoint in the place of the officer relieved an officer nominated by the senior Communist members of the government.

ARTICLE II—*Employment*

Section 1. The primary function of the army shall be to defend the Republic in time of war. In time of peace the principal function of the army shall be training. It may be employed[,] however, to quell domestic disorder, but only as provided in Section 2 of this article.

Section 2. When, in the event of domestic disorders, the governor of a province shall have certified to the Council of State that the local civil police and militia have been unable to cope with the situation, the President, in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief, shall, with the approval of the Council of State, employ the field forces to restore order.

ARTICLE III—*Organization*

Section 1. The field forces shall consist of armies of three divisions each with supporting troops not to exceed 15% of their total strength.

⁹¹ Staff work by Americans on this project resulted in 13 dated and numbered draft plans and at least 7 undated and unnumbered papers, together covering a period extending from January 21 to February 22. This draft, undated and unnumbered, was drawn after February 12 and in use on February 14; it was the paper used as the basis for discussion by the Military Sub-Committee, with General Marshall, in the decisive talks of February 14, 15, 16, and 18.

At the conclusion of 12 months the field forces shall consist of armies comprising divisions of not to exceed 14,000 men. Of these, shall be Communist-led.

Section 2. China shall be divided into 8 service areas under directors responsible to the Minister of National Defense for the following functions within their respective areas:

The supply, quartering and pay of all field forces which may be stationed within the area;

The reconditioning, storage and issue of the weapons and equipment collected from demobilized troops within the area;

The processing of demobilized officers and enlisted personnel within the area and the continued processing of demobilized officers and enlisted personnel passing through the area enroute to their homes or other designated destination;

The processing and elementary training of individual recruits received within the area as replacements for the field forces.

The supply and supervision of administration of service schools within the area [shall be?] under policies and procedures established by the Ministry of National Defense.

The service area directors shall have no authority or control over the field forces stationed within their areas and they are specifically prohibited from interfering with or influencing in any way whatsoever civil administration or affairs.

Each Army commander within a particular service area shall maintain in the service area headquarters his own representative to insure that the needs of the forces under his command are fully and expeditiously met. There shall be a meeting every second month within each service area and presided over by the service area director. These meetings shall be attended by the Army commander, or his duly appointed representative, of each Army garrisoned within that area. A representative of the Ministry of National Defense shall also be present. The instructions of the Ministry of National Defense and the state of supply and similar matters of the service area shall be presented and discussed.

Section 3. Service areas are as follows:

North China

6th Service Area—Consists of Shensi, Shansi and Suiyuan Provinces with headquarters at Taiyuan.

7th Service Area—Consists of Shantung, Hopei and Chahar Provinces with headquarters at Peiping.

Manchuria

8th Service Area—Consists of Manchuria and Jehol, with headquarters at Mukden.

ARTICLE IV—*Demobilization*

Section 1. During the 12 months immediately following the promulgation of this agreement the National Government shall demobilize all divisions in excess of 90 and the Communist Party shall demobilize all divisions in excess of The demobilization shall start immediately and shall proceed at the rate of approximately one-twelfth of the total number to be demobilized during each month.

The National Government shall prepare within two weeks of the promulgation of these articles, a list of the 90 divisions to be retained and the order of demobilization of divisions during the first two months. The Communist Party shall submit to the Ministry of National Defense within two weeks of the promulgation of this order, a complete list of its military units stating character, strength, armament, names of brigades and higher commanders and location of units. This report shall include a list of the divisions to be retained and the order of demobilization during the first two months.

One month after the promulgation of this agreement the Communist Party shall submit to the Ministry of National Defense a complete list of the organizations to be demobilized and the National Government shall prepare a similar list.

Section 2. The arms and equipment of organizations demobilized may be utilized to complete the arms and equipment of organizations to be retained in service. A detailed statement of such transfers will be submitted to the Ministry of National Defense by the Executive Headquarters. The surplus material will be stored as directed by that Ministry.

Section 3. In order to prevent large scale hardship or lawlessness arising as a result of the demobilization, the National Government and the Communist Party shall initially provide for the supply, movement and employment of their demobilized personnel. The National Government shall establish immediately a special commission to take over unified control of these matters as soon as practicable.

Section 4. During the 6 months following the first 12 months the National Army of divisions shall be further reduced to a total of 60 divisions. Of the 60 divisions shall be National divisions and Communist divisions.

ARTICLE V—*Deployment*

Section 1. At the end of twelve months after the promulgation of these articles, the National and the Communist divisions shall have been combined into the armies herein provided for; of these armies shall be integrated: that is, shall have both National and Communist divisions within the army. The staffs of the integrated

armies shall also have been integrated and shall consist of approximately one-half National and one-half Communist staff officers.

Section 2. The normal strategic deployment of the armies throughout China shall be as follows: Manchuria, armies; North China, armies; Central China, armies; South China, armies; and Japan, 1 army.

Section 3. The deployment of the armies at the end of the first twelve months shall be as follows:

Manchuria— armies consisting of 3 National divisions each, each army with a National commander, and armies consisting of 1 Communist division and 2 National divisions each, each army with a National commander—total armies.

North China— armies consisting of 3 National divisions each, each with a National commander; armies consisting of 2 Communist divisions and 1 National division each, each with a Communist commander; and armies consisting of 1 Communist and 2 National divisions each, each with a National commander—total armies.

Central China— armies consisting of 3 National divisions each, each with a National commander; and armies consisting of 1 Communist and 2 National divisions each, each with a National commander—total armies.

South China— armies consisting of 3 National divisions each, each with a National commander—total armies.

Japan—1 army consisting of 1 Communist and 2 National divisions with a National commander—total 1 army.

ARTICLE VI—*Militia*

Section 1. Each province shall be authorized to maintain a small militia in proportion to the population of the province but the strength of the militia for any one province shall not exceed 15,000 men. After it has become apparent that the civil police of any province have been unable to cope with the situation, the governors of the several provinces are authorized to employ this militia to quell civil disorder.

Section 2. The armament of the militia shall be restricted to the pistol, the rifle and the automatic rifle.

ARTICLE VII—*Special Provisions*

Section 1. Executive Headquarters

The Executive Headquarters created in the agreement of the Committee of Three, signed 10 January 1946,⁹² shall be the agency through which these articles shall be implemented.

⁹² *Ante*, p. 127.

Section 2. Common Uniform

A common distinctive uniform for the reorganized military forces of China shall be adopted for wear by all officers and enlisted men of the Army of the Republic of China.

Section 3. Personnel System

An adequate personnel system shall be established and the name, rank and assignment of each officer of the Army shall be carried on a single list.

Section 4. Secret Military Forces

Neither the National Government or any political party or any group or association shall maintain, or in any way support, any secret or independent military force after the effective date of these articles.

Section 5. Political Affiliations

Members of the Army, while on active duty[,] are prohibited from holding any office or membership in any committee of a political party.

Section 6. Puppet and Irregular Troops

All troops which were maintained in China under the sponsorship, directly or indirectly, of Japan and all troops maintained by persons or factions other than the Government or Communist Party shall be disbanded and disarmed beginning immediately after the promulgation of this agreement.

ARTICLE VIII—*General*

Section 1. Upon approval of this agreement by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and Chairman Mao Tse-tung there shall be prepared and submitted to them for approval by the Military Sub-Committee a detailed plan of the schedules, regulations and specific measures to govern the execution of the agreements stipulated in this agreement.

Section 2. It is understood and agreed that the detailed plans above referred to shall provide for the start of the demobilization at the earliest practical date; that the organization of service areas shall be instituted gradually and that the initiation of the integration of armies shall start with one Army in the fourth month, two in the fifth month and three each month thereafter.

It is further understood and agreed that during the period of transition in the first three or four months, the Government and the Communist Party shall be responsible for the good order, the supply of their respective troops and for their prompt and full compliance with the instructions issued to them by the Executive Headquarters.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai, at House 28, Chungking, February 14, 1946, 3 p. m.

Also present: Colonel Caughey
Mr. Chang

General Chou opened the meeting by stating that his representative from Yen-an had returned yesterday and brought the following information:

1. Yen-an desires 20 Communist divisions during the first stage and during the second stage 10 Communist as compared to 50 National divisions;

2. Yen-an approves of the idea of integration in the first stage, however it may be wiser in the long run to prepare for integration in the first stage and integrate in the second stage to make for a smoother operation. General Chou has been authorized to negotiate and plan on this matter;

3. Yen-an is concerned about the supply system and desires to have supply issues made by the Service Area Director direct to divisions or smaller units. General Marshall agreed that procurement of supplies should rest with Service Area Director but that it may be appropriate to issue to divisions and smaller units;

4. Yen-an would like to know if the garrison areas for armies should be stipulated and whether divisions should be separated and concentrated. General Marshall stated this would depend on existing conditions and these matters would be developed in the detailed plan.

A general discussion regarding Military Police ensued. General Chou was anxious to determine how the Military police would be directed and indicated that the question of railroad guards would also have to be considered. General Marshall stated that it may be preferable to have no Military Police as such but that some sort of constabulary may have to be worked out.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Chang Chih-chung, General Chou En-lai, and General Marshall, at the Generalissimo's Town House, Chungking, February 14, 1946, 4 p. m.

Also present: Colonel Caughey
Colonel Pee
Captain Soong
Mr. Chang

General Chang opened the meeting by asking General Marshall to act as Chairman.

General Marshall asked if there were any comments or corrections

on the re-draft of the plan on the Basis of Reorganization of Communist Military Forces and Their Consolidation With the National Army of China.⁹³ There was considerable discussion between General Chang and General Chou with reference to the Chinese translation. General Chang stated that since the command relationship pertaining to the appointment and relief of Communist Commanders was an interim measure that the last sentence of Article I should be separated from the remainder of the paragraph and made Section 2 of Article I. General Marshall recommended that the words "during the process of the reorganization of the military force" be inserted between the words "necessary" and "to relieve".

General Marshall asked if there were any comments on Article II. Since the word "employment" has no Chinese equivalent it was agreed to relabel this article, "Functions and Restrictions". General Marshall stated that he had not indicated the possibility of rebellion in this particular article since that is a matter of high political consideration and should be handled under the emergency powers of the head of the state.

General Marshall asked if there were any comments on Article III, and stated that the first issue was the number of Communists divisions desired. General Chang stated that the Communists were authorized 20 divisions at a time when the National Government had 254; that since the 254 would be reduced to 90 he felt the Communists should also reduce below 20 divisions. General Chou stated that the views of Yen-an remained firm and he suggested a possible compromise of permitting the Communists to retain 20 divisions in the first stage but to shorten the stage as far as the Communists were concerned and thus permitting a more rapid reduction on their part. General Marshall then proposed that the first stage be worked out on a 9 months basis which would leave at the end of this 9 month period about 105 National divisions and 20 Communist divisions which would then permit reduction by the end of the 12 month period to 90 National divisions and possibly 18 Communist divisions. At this point General Chou and General Chang discussed the previous agreements with respect to numbers of divisions and ratios between divisions in an effort to arrive at a number of Communists divisions that would be agreeable. General Chang then asked General Marshall to be the judge in this respect. General Marshall indicated the importance of reaching an agreement at this time and recommended that at the end of the 12 month period the Communists reduce to 18 divisions. General Chou and General Chang accepted this.

The word "processing" in Article III evoked comment on the part

⁹³ *Ante*, p. 215.

of the Chinese since there was no Chinese equivalent in translation. General Marshall stated that the word "processing" would include the moving, feeding, and paying of demobilized personnel while en route to their homes or other designated place. He further stated that this word encompasses the function of vaccinating, placing in uniform, feeding, housing, and elementary training of new recruits for the various armies. General Marshall stated that this is an extremely important function since it is through this means that the armies can maintain an adequate personnel separation and replacement service. General Marshall then asked if Article III could be considered as approved. General Chang brought up the question of school supervision by the Service Area Director. General Marshall explained that he felt this would improve the school system but that he did not feel strongly as to whether this sub-paragraph should or should not be included. General Chang and General Chou indicated uncertainty with reference to this sub-paragraph but agreed to retain it for further discussion. There being no further discussion Article III was accepted.

General Marshall stressed the importance of releasing no information concerning the reorganization until the terms of an agreed release had been approved by the Generalissimo and Chairman Mao Tse-tung. Generals Chang and Chou agreed.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chang Chih-chung at House 28, Chungking, February 15, 1946, 10 a. m.

Also present: Col. Caughey
Col. Pee

General Marshall thanked General Chang for coming on such short notice and stated that he wanted to get straightened out prior to this afternoon's meeting the question of how many Communist army commanders should be permitted in the integrated army program. General Marshall stated that he believed the Communists would ask for seven army commanders which was three more than presently shown in the integration schedule of the plan. General Marshall informed General Chang that he did not want to participate in any argument about this but that he believed General Chang should be prepared to give the Communists more than four army commanders. These additional commanders could command armies consisting of two National and one Communist division and which were located in less important areas.

General Marshall then informed General Chang that General Chou may ask for one service area director and that General Chang should be thinking about which service area a Communist commander might appropriately be assigned to.

General Marshall informed General Chang that he had not wished to draw out the conversations at yesterday's meeting with reference to the ultimate number of Communist divisions in the first stage since that might precipitate discussions as to the composition within the 15% authorized for supporting troops. General Marshall further informed General Chang that this would be a bargaining point which he (General Chang) could use in making concessions to the Communists.

General Marshall then brought up the question of military police and indicated that at the moment he did not have a solution. He stated that it may be possible to include military police battalions under the jurisdiction of the provincial governors. General Marshall offered the opinion that this problem may have to be resolved on a high government level. General Chang stated that he was collecting information and that he would like to talk to General Marshall on this problem. He further stated that he would like to have the Chief of Military Police call on General Marshall.

It was agreed between General Marshall and General Chang that the existence of military police, even though eliminated at a later date, should probably be retained during the interim period.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chou
En-lai at House 28, Chungking, February 15, 1946, 2 p. m.*

Also present: Colonel Caughey,
Mr. Chang.

General Chou thanked General Marshall for the opportunity of a short interview and stated that the reason for his visit was to discuss problems relative to Military Police organizations. General Chou evoked concern over these organizations and stated that if there were such organizations, terms should be carefully stipulated in the agreement. General Marshall stated that there would be certain Military Police organizations within the various armies but that these would have no power over civil matters. With reference to the Gendarmes, General Marshall stated that some of the states in the United States did employ a similar organization but mainly for traffic control on the highways. General Marshall then stated that he was undetermined as to how the Gendarme question should be regulated for China and

that his present thought was that organizations could be trained by the National Government and allotted to Provincial Governors for use.

General Chou stated that Gendarmes should not interfere with civil life.

General Chou then brought up the fact that he was also concerned about the 18 regiments of railroad guards that were being organized and trained by General Tai Li⁹⁴ and stated that this was more like an army and asked General Marshall's view. General Marshall indicated that he saw no objection for one individual to train this organization but he too objected to command of this force by one individual. General Marshall informed General Chou that he was aware of General Tai Li's activities during the war and added that he felt stipulations would have to [be] imposed on their use.

General Marshall then stated, with reference to Gendarmes and railroad guards, that Section 7 of Article IV might be enlarged to include the terms under which both these organizations would operate.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting of the Military Sub-Committee—General Chang Chih-chung, General Chou En-lai, Advised by General Marshall—Held at the Office of the Aide to Generalissimo Chiang, Friday, February 15, 1946, 3:30 p. m.

Present: General Chang Chih Chung
General Chou En-lai
General Marshall

Also

present: Colonel Caughey
Colonel Pee
Mr. Chang Wen Chien[-chin]
Capt. Soong
Lt. Hickey⁹⁵ General Lee⁹⁶
General Tong [Tung]⁹⁷

M[ARSHALL]: Gentlemen, where do you wish to start? Article 4.

G[EN. CHANG]: That is correct.

M: The first paragraph or Section 1, Article 4. Any comments?

C[HOU]: General Chou says that in the Army under the Communist authority there are Army units which are organized on the basis of Brigade.

⁹⁴ Deputy Director of the Bureau of Investigation and Statistics, Chinese National Commission of Military Affairs.

⁹⁵ Lt. R. C. Hickey, personal secretary to General Marshall.

⁹⁶ Chinese Government representative.

⁹⁷ Chinese Communist representative.

G: General Chang suggested that Nationalist Divisions should also include all units in excess of 90 divisions. General Chang agrees on the first paragraph.

M: As changed to read, "The National Government shall demobilize all units in excess of 90 and the Communist Party shall demobilize all units in excess of 18 divisions." The last sentence is unchanged. Is that acceptable.

G: Yes.

C: Yes.

M: Next paragraph.

G: General Chang says that at present time the National Defense Council has not been established. How about National Military Council?

M: Is that agreeable to you, General Chou? We could put that in, "National Military Council." Would that be acceptable?

C: General Chou accepts that. He has some other comments. Firstly, the procedure of submitting this list should first go through the Military Sub-Committee of Three[,] then to be sent to the Ministry of National Defense or the National Military Council because all of these lists have also to go to the Executive Headquarters so it is better through the hands of the Military Sub-Committee of Three. General Chou is thinking that two weeks might be too short for submitting this list.

M: That is what I was afraid of. These lists have to be used here by the Committee of Three. This staff I am getting together in order to prepare the detailed plan for the approval of the Committee of Three, all before it goes to the Executive Committee. What I was trying to do here was to make available the information as quickly as possible. Now, whether it would be better to say two weeks and then have you run a little late or it is better to say three weeks and have it run later. We have to get this for these men to work. Now I thought two weeks was a very short time for the Communist Party.

C: Very short.

G: How about changing to three weeks.

M: All right.

G: General Chang states that it reads, "these articles" then later on it speaks of "this agreement" and then in the title we use, "Basis for reorganization of Communist Military Forces . . ." General Chang thinks we ought to unify this term.

C: Articles?

G: How about agreements?

C: Agreements.

M: Articles of agreement or just agreement.

C: General Chou favors simply agreement for the reorganization, etc.

M: Just simply agreement. General Chang agrees to that?

G: General Chang suggested that we not change the title of that, leave it as it is. In this document change "articles" to "agreements".

M: Is that agreed? The title remains the same?

G: Yes.

C: Yes.

Then return to the second paragraph of Article 4. It is decided that the period will be three weeks and not two. Now General Chou proposes that the submission be to the Committee of Three.

G: General Chang agrees on General Chou's proposal.

M: Then we could change this to read as follows: "The Government shall prepare within three weeks of the promulgation of this agreement a list of 90 divisions to be retained and the order of demobilization of divisions during the first two months."

C: Could we say units?

M: Of units. "Order of demobilization of units during the first two months." "The Communist Party shall prepare within three weeks of the promulgation of this agreement, a complete list of its military units stating character, strength, armament, names of brigades and higher commanders." "This report shall include a list of 18 divisions to be retained and the order of demobilization during the first two months. These lists shall be submitted to the Military Sub-Committee." Is that all right the way we changed it?

G: General Chang asked whether those lists should be sent to the Military Sub-Committee for transmission to the Ministry of National Defense.

M: No. That is the basis for the detailed plan which has to be approved. There is a great deal of work to be done and before it goes to the Ministry of National Defense, this furnishes the basis for all detailed plans. That paragraph is now acceptable?

G: Yes.

C: Yes.

M: Next paragraph. I propose that in the first sentence we substitute for "Ministry of National Defense" the words "Military Sub-Committee" and the fourth to the last word change from "prepare" to "submit". "One month after promulgation of this agreement the Communist Party shall submit to the Military Sub-Committee a complete list of the organizations to be demobilized to be demobilized [*sic*] and the National Government shall submit a similar list." Now since we have changed two weeks to three weeks should we change one month to some other period, say, six weeks.

G: & C: That is agreeable.

M: I hate to do it. Is that paragraph all right.

G: General Chang likes to make one suggestion. The end of the last paragraph of the Section 1 to complete the statement, because in the previous statement it said that both the Government and the Communist Party should send a list to the Military Sub-Committee and after that the Military Sub-Committee shall forward its report or list either to the Ministry of National Defense or the National Military Council, because in the opinion of General Chang it is only the Ministry or [of] National Defense which is in the position to issue orders.

M: Yes, but somebody has to plan the details of this. Everything the committee does has got to go to the government. How do you want to put that in.

C: General Chou suggests that we put a provision in, Article 8 to this saying that all the plans and the reports should be presented to the Ministry of National Defense instead of putting it here.

M: That is all right. That is perfectly all right. What I had in mind here was to do exactly what we did in the peace . . .⁹⁸

G: General Chang quite appreciates General Chou's point of view. He is worried about the ordinary people who don't know the process of these meetings. In order to avoid any misunderstanding it is better to just put a provision in there.

M: I would like to say this. I thought we would follow the same procedure as that of the cease fire. Before anybody else sees this we reached an agreement. There are only six or seven people who know anything about the list while we worked on it. We finally reached an agreement, then we prepared a letter to the Generalissimo and prepared a letter to Chairman Mao Tse-tung and we requested their approval of this document, then they both approved it and it now changed its character—it was an approved document. Then we prepared a letter to the Generalissimo transmitting the document and requesting him to put it into effect. Now in this case it is a little more complicated, because you can't put it into effect. These are only general principles. The Executive Headquarters gets nothing until the details are worked out that we get from this paragraph. In other words the Generalissimo has no basis for issuing an order to the Executive Headquarters until these details are worked out within the Committee here. Those details once worked out are submitted again for approval to the Generalissimo and to Chairman Mao Tse-tung and they both approve them, then we transmit all of this to the Generalissimo and it becomes a paper of the government and the Military Sub-Committee presumably is out of a job. Now there is no objection

⁹⁸ Points appear in the original.

to putting in what General Chang wants. I suggest we just put it in, but I wanted to explain how this thing would go. We would have, at any rate, to make a formal request of the two high officials representing the two parties involved in this negotiation to ask them to do this, but that is a detail that we [—] any way you want to do it is all right. So if the General wishes this sentence put in here we can write it right in here, but we are, I think, a long way from the solution.

G: General Chang asks how you will put it in there.

M: I thought he proposed it?

G: Where to put it in—on the end there?

M: May I say one more thing. I think it is very important that we avoid any appearance of taking authority that is over the National Government or over the Communist Party because nobody is arguing that we have such authority.

G: General Chang has suggested to put in another statement after the last sentence of Section 1. On the above stated list and the report the Sub-Committee forming the detailed plan should submit to the National Military Council of (Ministry of National Defense).

L[EE]: Can we take the Military Sub-Committee as a subject. The Military Sub-Committee upon receiving should work out detailed plans and present the plans to the National Defense Council or to the Ministry of National Defense.

M: That is what we are trying to do.

G: The sentence may read like this. "The Military Sub-Committee after receiving all those lists and documents should work out a detailed plan and submit to the Ministry of National Defense of the National Military Council.["]

M: That won't quite work because Chairman Mao Tse-tung has to work on that too. I tell you where I think we are all wrong here. This is going to be signed by you, General, but only in the name of the Generalissimo. It is going to be signed by General Chou, but in the name of Mao Tse-tung. While your signature is on it you are signing for the Generalissimo, the same for General Chou for Mao Tse-tung. So it appears to have to be read in that light—it is their agreement. It isn't our order. Instead of their sitting down at this table, we are sitting down and doing the study as a staff, but they sign it—you sign it for them, that is all. So it is an agreement on that level. You have to read it accordingly. When we say, "The National Government shall prepare within three weeks" that isn't this Committee that says that. We certainly can't say the word "shall", but this is the Generalissimo and Mao Tse-tung agreeing to something. That is what this document is. We are just doing the staff work. The proposal you made would not do because it still has to be approved

by Mao Tse-tung. This doesn't come out and say "Headquarters, Subcommittee of Three". We have no position.

G: General Chang is still worried about the form of wrong impression created by the ordinary people after reading that. They don't know the status of the Sub-Committee. We want to avoid that misunderstanding. It is better to put in something—so the ordinary people have no doubts.

M: Have you another proposal?

G: Have the alternative suggestion to make that "The Military Sub-Committee on receipt of those lists and documents should work out a detailed plan after approval of both parties to submit to the Ministry of National Defense."

M: State it again will you?

G: "The Military Sub-Committee on the receipt of the above mentioned lists and documents should work out a detailed plan after the approval of both parties to submit to the Ministry of National Defense," "or National Military Council". That comes as a new paragraph—another paragraph.

M: Where does that paragraph go—there are some things over here that apply also.

G: General Chang thinks that provision applies to Section 2, Section 3 and Section 4, so he thinks that should come under Section 1.

M: How would this read: "On receipt of the foregoing list and documents the Military Sub-Committee shall prepare a detailed plan for the execution of this agreement and submit it for the approval of both parties. After such approval the list, documents and plans shall be transmitted to the Ministry of National Defense (or National Military Council)".

G: The wording is much better. General Chang proposes that the word "National" Government should be omitted. Just read Government.

M: That is all right with me. Where we say "National Government" we shall just say "Government".

M: That goes in as the last paragraph of Section 1. Is that acceptable.

G & C: Yes.

M: Section 2.

G: General Chang states that in the sentence, "A detailed statement of such transfers will be submitted to the Ministry of National Defense by the Executive Headquarters" there should be added after "Ministry of National Defense", "(or the National Military Council)".

M: Yes, I have already done that.

C: There is one point General Chou likes to get clarified, that is

about the arms and equipments from the demobilized organizations. You said, "The arms and equipment of organizations demobilized may be utilized to complete the arms and equipment of organizations to be retained in service". He understands that this will only serve for the first stage because in the first stage the arms and equipment are not yet out and you may use those second hand arms and equipment.

M: That wasn't the definition that you will use second hand arms. There are a great many armies who have American equipment that is scattered all over China. Because the bulk of the equipment is going to be U. S. equipment, this wasn't intended to give to any organization second-hand equipment. It was to provide for a method of handling the equipment. I wasn't thinking about what he is thinking about at all. I was thinking about the tremendous number of National Government divisions and the service area commanders and how they gather the things. As to the Communist troops I don't know what equipment they have and we'd have to have some way of putting this down saying here this is the way we put it together. I was really putting that under the Executive Headquarters to do it. They will have the Supply Section and the three-party organization and that is where I thought it would have to be worked out. The matter goes very much further than this paragraph, as to details. For example, it would be very important to know which of the 18 divisions were to be the final 10. Also which of the 90 government divisions were to be the final 50. Now my conception would be that those divisions would get the pick of all the equipment. You do the best you could for the others but you certainly wouldn't give the best equipment to a division that was going to be demobilized six months later. So that is still another consideration which I had in mind we would put in the detailed plan. You take the paragraph here regarding troops going to Japan. We certainly would make sure they had proper equipment. However, that is a detail. I do not know whether it will be practical or not, but primarily to save shipping space, I had in mind taking up with General MacArthur⁹⁹ whether we might not pick up all the heavy equipment in Japan from U. S. troops going home [and] retain the equipment here with which they trained. That would save shipping, also give China that much more equipment, but those are just details. They are all involved in that paragraph. It becomes a primary problem for Executive Headquarters and the exact provision can be included in the detailed plans. The important thing is to give Executive Headquarters the power to act. That is a combined agency.

G: We agree on that point.

⁹⁹ General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander for Allied Powers, Japan.

C: I agree.

M: I guess you are afraid I will make another speech. We have an expression in the states, "filibuster"—you talk the bill to death. Section 3. The word National appears in there twice and I struck it out.

G: How about the word lawlessness.

M: We could say disorders.

C: They favor lawlessness.

C: General Chou likes to know the capacity of the special commission.

G: General Chang would like to change the special commission to special organization.

C: General Chou would like to say this. We are going to set up the service areas and after the reorganization of the government we are going to have a Ministry of National Defense, he is questioning whether we have to set up a special organization like the special commission for a particular purpose.

M: "The Government shall take over unified control of these matters as soon as practicable." Is that agreeable? That is what you want. You want to take it over by somebody. In other words strike out "establish immediately a special commission to". "The Government shall take over unified control of these matters as soon as practicable."

G & C: Agree.

M: Section 4.

G: General Chang says no matter how you write it, General Chang would like to add a sentence to this paragraph. General Chang thinks that it appears in Section 4 of 60 divisions, 50 divisions shall be National and 10 shall be Communist divisions. It seems that there will be still discussion of National divisions versus Communist divisions which we are trying very hard to avoid, so he proposed to add another clause to the last sentence stating of the 60 divisions, 50 shall be National divisions and 10 Communist divisions to be mix-organized. There will be no further separation of National and Communist divisions—just call it a National division. General Chang says that after a period of 18 months there will be no distinction between the Communist division and a National division[,], only that the Government side will provide 50 and 10 from the Communists and put them together, organized into any number of armies and henceforth there will be no such a name as a Communist division or a National division.

C: General Chou is afraid that this is not the understanding because in the past it was the understanding that we would have to reach the amalgamation of the two armies in stages. General Chou's understanding was that in the first stage in the first 12 months the Com-

munist armies will be reorganized into 18 divisions while the National divisions into 90 divisions. Then in the second stage in the 6 months following the first 12 months, the Communist armies will further be reduced to 10 divisions either by selecting 10 or by reorganizing the entire divisions into 10 while the National armies are further reduced from 90 to 50 divisions. Now, about the integration of the two armies, General Chou's understanding was that we will have special integrated armies with 2 Communist and 1 National division with a Communist commander and we will have armies with 2 National divisions and a National commander and in this way it would try to get the armies together and we will have a combined integrated staff for most of the armies so that we may get rid of the animosities between the two armies and this proposal as we understand it. I also discussed with General Chang on this point previously and I have expressed to General Chang at the last preliminary meeting that Yen-an agrees with this method of integration of the two armies but considers that it should be carried out as a second stage.

M: That meaning what?

C: The integration of divisions.

M: I have here a proposal that Colonel Caughey has written. I will read it: "During the six months following the first 12 months, the National divisions shall be further reduced to 50 and the Communist divisions shall be further reduced to 10. These 60 divisions shall be known as the National Army of the Republic of China." I think that this brings such a delicate issue that it would be best not to settle it here at the board this afternoon, but to pass it on for consideration at the next meeting, and pass on to Article 5.

C: Section 4?

M: Section 4, I am referring to. I turned one sheet too many.

G: General Chang suggest[s] that we have a little recess and have some tea.

M: That is perfectly all right with me.

M: It is half past five now and I will have to leave at 6:20 for I have a meeting with Dr. Wang.¹ He has been trying all day to see me and that is the only time I could see him. Article 5. Section 1, first paragraph. I have scratched out the words, "herein provided for". I also struck out the words in the second sentence "shall also have been integrated and". The meaning is just the same, I just made it shorter. Have they got these figures. We just worked those up last night.

¹ Wang Shih-chieh, Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs.

General Marshall read to General Lee[:]

In section 1 combined into 36 armies; 15 of these armies . . .² Down in section 2. Manchuria, 5; North China, 11; Central China, 11; South China, 8 and Japan, 1. Section 3 is Manchuria 3 armies, and 2 armies, and then in the last total of 5 armies. North China 4 armies, then 4 armies consisting of . . . Then on next page 3 armies and total 11, Central China, 7, 4 armies after and total 11. South China 8, total 8. Japan 1.

Now those numbers were merely written in there as a basis for discussion.

C: General Chou has several points to make. Firstly, for the integrated armies which comprise both Communist and Nationalist divisions referring to this point, the question arises whether this stage is carried out in the first 12 months or in the months following that. I have stated repeatedly that we favor its execution in the second state in the months following the first 12 months because of both parties, the armies have not been trained and mentally prepared for the integration and we can expect that many difficulties will arise and if we will try to do it in a hurry we would defeat our purpose. Secondly, my understanding was, Article 5 will be put into effect in the second stage in the months following the first 12 months and that is at a time when we will have 50 National divisions versus 10 Communist divisions. Now here it is stipulated that the integration of the armies will take place in the course of the first 12 months and this seems to be different from my understanding and I think it has to be reconsidered because this would be effected not at the time when we have 60 divisions, but when we have in excess of 60 divisions. In the Chinese version of this text for the term integration of the armies they have used a term which is rather identified with fusion of the armies. Now this term has been under dispute in the PCC and finally it was agreed by PCC that we should rather use the word integration of the armies than fusion of the armies and later on from what General Marshall has explained to me it seems to me that his idea was rather close to the position of the PCC, which stipulated that in the first stage of the reorganization we will have 90 National divisions against 20 Communist divisions and the second stage we will have 60 divisions which we call integrated armies at that time and we would use the term fusion and I think General Marshall's idea was very close to the idea of the PCC and I agree with his views. In the PCC decision they have only laid down for the first stage of the reorganization would have certain number of National armies and saying that the Communist armies should be reorganized and

² Points appear in the original.

in the meetings to reorganize to 90 divisions.^{2a} Referring to the second stage, it has only used the term integration to have integrated armies but they have not elaborated on this point. Now later on General Marshall has laid out, has given us a concrete idea about what kind of armies we will have in the second stage and we think it is proper at the present time to work out concrete plans for the second stage and we [are] perfectly willing to have it put down in papers and compared with the decisions of the PCC and I may say that we have made the largest stride forward in that we have already put down in, or tried to put down, the concrete matters for the second stage for the PCC only stipulated to work out the concrete steps for the first stage and after that they will use the plans for the second stage. Now all in all I still ought to say that previous understanding was that the formation of integrated armies will take place only in the second stage and at any time during the first stage by the stipulation here in the document and from my view I think we need reconsideration of this point.

M: I find myself in a rather embarrassing position. While we have left the previous section to be considered later, yet it refers to the discussion General Chou has just presented. My embarrassment is that I do not agree with General Chang that that would be the time to start a fusion instead of an integration. I do not think the personnel would be ready for that. I think we would have to go along further before attempting that. I think it will probably arise through the gradual change of the men in the ranks and the casualties among the officers—resignation, sickness or other reasons. It will be effected more by replacements than any other way. So I am not in agreement, or rather I do not think it would be wise to attempt a complete fusion at so early a date. Now on the other side, my embarrassment is that I do not agree with General Chou's proposition. As I recall the PCC spoke of reduction to 90 divisions in the first 6 months. Well if it were possible in an orderly manner to reduce to 90 divisions in 6 months then I think it might be all right to try the first steps of integration until that period had elapsed, but I think we all agree it is impracticable to reduce to 90 divisions in 6 months. It would entail too much of a confusion and a possibility of, not only disorder, but a bad effect on the country. However, I think to delay the integration for a year and a half defers unification so far beyond the political unification that it is unwise. Therefore, I think the integration should start mildly at a much earlier date. I am sorry if I misled General Chou as to what my idea was, but I never had in mind any such long delay as that. I had proposed here I think that in the 4

^{2a} The sentence is apparently incomplete.

months, we would start with two armies. Maybe that is too early, but to delay it all a year from now, I think that would be unwise. I think the basis of compromise is what month we start the first unification. So in the light of what General Chou has just said, I would suggest that we commence the discussion tomorrow on a basis of 6 months. It is too formidable a subject to attempt to settle it here in 30 minutes. I think that would be unwise. Maybe tomorrow is too soon. My suggestion is that we would delay any further discussion until tomorrow.

G: General Chang says it will be all right to discuss it tomorrow.

C: General Chou agrees.

M: I am going to coin a new word. We have reached a "Chihfeng".³
The meeting is adjourned.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting of the Military Sub-Committee of Three, Held at the Office of the Aide to Generalissimo Chiang, February 16, 1946, 3 p. m.

Present: General Chang Chih Chung
General Chou En-lai
General G. C. Marshall

Also present: Colonel Caughey Gen. Lee
Colonel Pee Gen. Tong [*Tung*]
Mr. Chang
Capt. Eng⁴
Lt. Hickey

G—Chang

C—General Chou

M—General Marshall

G: The class is now in session.

M: Then if we will take up the business here of Article 5. When we adjourned yesterday General Chou had made a statement regarding Article 5 and had followed that with a statement and has General Chang any comments on that?

G: Do you refer to Section 1 of Article 5 or do you refer to Article 5 as a whole.

M: We were just starting on Article 5. These two statements were made. The actual deployment of Section 3 was also discussed. The discussion hinged around the first sentence "At the end of twelve

³The town of Chihfeng in Jehol province; this had reference to the phase reached about January 8 in the talks of the Committee of Three leading up to the Cessation of Hostilities order of January 10.

⁴Horace Eng, language officer, U. S. Army, and interpreter.

months after the promulgation of this agreement, the National and the Communist divisions shall have been combined into 36 armies; 15 of these shall be integrated: that is, shall have both National and Communist divisions within the army." The discussion pertained to that sentence. General Chou, as I understood it, stated that his understanding was that the process of the demobilization and integration should be in two periods—the integration to follow the demobilization. In effect, I understood him to mean that the integration should not commence until the end of 18 months.

C: General Marshall, did you understand that integration should not commence until 12 months after the commencement of the reorganization of the armies.

M: I understood him to say 18 months because he spoke of the 60 divisions.

C: With reference to the 18 months General Chou is of the opinion that what he meant by 18 months, the first 12 months will be devoted to demobilization and starting with the 13th month until the 18th month will be devoted to integration.

M: The minutes of the meeting confirm what General Chou has just stated.

C: General Chou's idea was that during the first 12 months they will be devoted to demobilization and beginning from the 13th month we will start the integration of the armies which will be completed at the end of the 18th month, by that time there will only be 10 divisions of the Communist Army.

M: I understand.

G: General Chang understands that General Chou's idea is to carry on the integration after 12th month and that means that starting from the 13th to 18th month the further deactivation and integration will take place at the same time. Your proposal is to start integration after the fourth or the 6th month so it is a difference of a period of 6 months. That is the time factor. Second, General Chang thinks that integration is only a preliminary step towards fusion of the armies. To see a complete fusion of the armies of this country and in the future there will be no demarcation between Communist and National troops, but he likes to say that there will be a single army—army of the country. No distinction between this Army or that army. That will be a step towards that final goal. General Chang said that in regarding the time factor he favors the original plan drawn up by you stating integration from the 6th month, he favors that original arrangement. Considering his views to those of General Chou, there are only two differences of opinion. The first is the time factor which he just explained there is a difference of 6 months and the second is he likes to see a complete fusion of the armies of this country.

Regarding the time factor, being the representative of the government he doesn't want to insist on the first point in order to make difficulty for the progress of the meeting.

M: You mean the second point don't you—the fusion of the armies. The time factor is the first point. Is that right?

G: General Chang explained that those two points he differs from General Chou. He doesn't like to see that the progress of the meeting will be jeopardized so he likes to listen to what is your opinion and he will respect your suggestions or your opinions.

M: General Chou, have you any further comment to make?

C: Referring to the two points mentioned by General Chang, I wish to state the following: Firstly, regarding the time factor. Now the time factor is rather connected with the execution of the integration and I wish to first to recall the peace pact. I must say that the integration of the armies was first raised by General Marshall. In fact at the PCC this point was not worked out until a previous talk between the Government and Communist representatives. It was not mentioned then because at that time we had only thought of reorganization of the Communist armies into 20 divisions and both sides agreed that after this has been accomplished we will discuss the next step. The reason why we reached such an agreement at that time was because those armies had been hostile to each other for 18 years and they are both brought up under different systems and training so it is not possible to put them together in one stroke and we are very much afraid that we would pursue the same path which we have followed shortly after the outbreak of the war, we have to be very careful in tackling this problem and I lay special emphasis on the problem of the training and therefore that was the reason why in the previous talk between the two parties we only laid down provisions for completing the first step and we also in that agreement we talked about unified training problems, but we leave everything else to be discussed later on when that has been accomplished. Now at the PCC we have made another step forward. It was agreed that the reorganization of the Communist armies into 20 divisions will be left to the Subcommittee of Three to be taken up and it has further stipulated that after the Nationalist troops have been reorganized into 90 divisions and the Communist troops into 20 divisions then we will commence with the integrated reorganization into 50 of the 60 divisions, but of course it has not been clarified on what is meant by the integrated reorganization. Then after than [*that?*] General Marshall has for the first time given a definition to the term integrated reorganization by working out a formula that is to integrate both armies with divisions as units into armies. This is a new formula for us and so at this juncture we not only have definite methods for the demobilization but we further

have concrete methods for the integration, of how to tackle the problem of integration. So on learning General Marshall's formula I have made the report to Yen-an and because that was something entirely new to us and so in my report to Yen-an I have stated that the integration will commence only after the first 12 months, and I also repeatedly stated in our preparatory talks that I have made a very favorable interpretation of General Marshall's formula to Yen-an and it was my hope that by gradually carrying out the integration we may finally ultimately reach the unification of the armies. Now under this understanding Yen-an has approved my suggestions and therefore in the document before us now I think that it is within the scope of my responsibility simply to agree to such an extent that is: Firstly, the integration of the armies will only commence at the conclusion of the first 12 months, and secondly that at the conclusion of the 18 months the Communist armies will be reduced to 10 divisions. Anything going beyond that limit would not be within my power. I mean that the following may be beyond my power. Firstly, to commence the integration at an earlier period say at the beginning of the 7th month and secondly that if we should also work out provisions for the fusion of the two armies which I consider as a third step because the first step is demobilization, the second step, integration and then the fusion apparently will be the third step. I am very much afraid that by raising the question of the fusion that our whole discussion might be jeopardized and right now we are all making our best efforts toward the unification of the Chinese armies. We must fully realize that the armies in China have been hostile to each other for 18 whole years. If we can now bring them together within 18 months then in fact we have accomplished something extraordinary and if both the National Government and the Communist Party shall come to an agreement then I can say responsibly that we will carry it out with 18 months and we will carry it out fairly well so that we may pave the way for further unification of the armies. If we try at the present instant also to lay down a scheme for the fusion then I must say sincerely that it goes beyond my power and when saying this I am thinking of the country and I am saying it with a sense of responsibility. I want to add one more word. I think everybody is aware of the fact that during the past 18 years even armies under the same flag have not reached complete fusion. So this illustrates the difficulty we have to face. If from now on we can accomplish this in 18 months, this may be considered abroad as very slow, but for China it must be considered as very quick and something extraordinary.

G: General Chang has the feeling that since yesterday when we touched the point about Article 5 he has noticed that General Chou talked about that point with some seriousness and unpleasantness.

C: Only seriousness—not unpleasantness.

G: General Chang is very reluctant to add some more unpleasant remarks and furthermore General Chang understands General Chou has trouble with his nose, but I cannot help but just explain on two points. He mentioned the fact that in the October 10th talk⁵ between the Government and the Communists only the demobilization had been touched and integration was not stipulated at all in last year's talk. In one sense General Chou's statement is true, but in last year's talk it was with the understanding that how to nationalize the army in this country is the prime objective. With that in mind we talk about the demobilization first, so we leave the Military Sub-Committee to decide how to work out the plans for the nationalization of the armies within this country. Secondly, General Chou has said that the Communists have made one step forward to meet the discussion of these matters. In other words it may imply that he meant the Communist side had made a big concession in that respect, but General Chang likes to call General Chou's attention to the fact that the Government has made greater concessions on that point. General Chang would like to make it crystal clear that in last year's discussion under the subject of reorganization of the Communist troops was in the agenda but mentioned nothing about the demobilization of the National troops and in this present meeting General Chou has made concession to reduce the number from 20 to 18 divisions. That is a concession that he has made, but on the government side we had made concessions to reduce the National troops from 260 divisions into 90 divisions. I think that concession is far greater than the concession made by the Communists. This is a statement of facts and I hope those facts will not increase the unpleasantness of General Chou.

C: No unpleasantness.

M: I was very much impressed by General Chou's statement. I must admit that today I have a very much better impression of the difficulties involved in integration than I had two months ago. I think I recognize more than has been said here in regard to the difficulties of reorganizing and developing the training of the units of the Communist armies, and equipment to bring them on a parity with the divisions already equipped and carefully trained of the National armies. I had a number of discussions with various American officers who were somewhat familiar with the conditions in China regarding the basis on which to initiate integration. In all of these matters I have been giving most serious consideration to what happens during a long period following an agreement of this sort, before there is a genuine unification in process. I have been weighing the difficulties

⁵ See *United States Relations With China*, p. 577.

of the hazards of the delay in initiating integration with the hazards of a long continued period following the development of the coalition government and during a constitutional reorganization of large forces totally separate in effect, in control. There will be bitter disputes politically throughout the constitutional period of reorganization. There will be bitter feelings generally of those whose position has been completely changed or, to put it more bluntly, those who have lost position. All these, of course, will necessarily affect the spirit and morale of the troops, so we have to consider how much feeling there may be of small hostilities between organizations and their feeling growing into serious hostilities in their actions. We have to weigh that against this long continued period of total virtual separation of forces. In determining the basis of the level at which integration should start, there was much discussion among my people, of the Army group, meaning a Communist army and a National army in one group. That was felt to permit consolidation with a minimum of irritation because of the size of the units involved and the fact that they would be physically well separate on the ground, whereas an Army even though the integration is on a divisional basis does involve a more intimate association of the troops than in an army group. Now all these matters have to be settled here on the basis of negotiation and implies compromises. As we have explored this matter it appears that certain high commands such as the Pacification Headquarters, such as previously referred to will have to be continued for some little time. It might be possible to make use of this unavoidable condition in the way of a compromise. Suppose, for example, that for process of integration on an army basis, we only had in mind the 10 Communist divisions that are to be on the rolls in the end of the 18th month, that there would be no effort during their existence to integrate the remaining 8 divisions. Suppose as a basis of compromise it were proposed to start the integration on an Army group level. That is, a Communist army of 3 divisions—a National army of 3 divisions and that the army integration would not start until the 13th month. For example, say it was agreed that beginning with the 7th month say one army group would be formed, 6 divisions, 3 of them Communist; in the 8th month another army group; in the 9th month 2 army groups and the 10th month 2 army groups. How many does that make? That's too many isn't it. Say one in the 7th month and one in each month thereafter up to the 10th, that would be 12 Communist divisions, 2 more than tentatively agreed upon. Now the integration would start with the divisions of the first army group organized in the 13th month and so on up to the 18th month. I would like to have General Chou's comment on some such idea as that, it being understood that as the army integration was initiated the army group disappeared, so that at the

end of the 18th month there would be no army groups in the National Army of China except as were formed for some specific operation or condition.

G: Did you say that the army group would disappear as we proceed with the integration starting with the 13th month or that this army group would disappear at the conclusion of the 18th month?

M: It disappears gradually. Now one more point. I understand there was some misunderstanding about the 2 odd divisions involved there. I would compromise on those 2 immediately so instead of organizing a group in the 10th month we would add one Communist division to the Communist army in the group of the 9th month and you would have 8 Communist divisions in their original state and their demobilization would begin with the 13th month. The concentration of effort would be made on the 10 divisions. The Communist concentration would be on those in the 7th month, those 3 divisions in equipment and training and so on. What is General Chou's reply or impression of such a procedure. I realize he has apparently no authority to commit himself at this time.

C: I appreciate very much General Marshall's effort to present the picture that we are doing our best to integrate the Chinese armies instead of leaving them in independent states and that we are leaving no stone unturned in finding out a solution. As to your proposition, I would like to pay consideration personally and will also submit report to Yen-an. In my previous comments I have laid special emphasis on difficulties on our side in order to let you be acquainted with our difficulties, but when I was talking about the integration it certainly affects both armies and on the Government side they will also face many difficulties because we are trying to put two hostile armies together and so we will, we are aware that the government has the same difficulties. In my previous talk with General Chang we have considered seriously the work of preparation needed to effect the integration and we must work out plans for the training and education of both armies so that we may reach a solution.

M: What is General Chang's reaction to my proposal?

G: General Chang says he has expressed the fact that he will respect your suggestion and your opinion provided General Chou will accept your suggestion.

M: Well then, I suggest that while General Chou is considering the rough outline I gave that we discontinue our discussion of Article 5 and move on to Article 6. Is that acceptable?

G & C: Yes.

M: What are General Chang's comments on Article 6.

G: General Chang has no remarks to be added.

M: General Chou?

C: In China we have two separate things; one is militia and the other is Peace Preservation Corps. The Peace Preservation Corps are the professional soldiers and we are wondering whether we could change the term into Peace Preservation Corps.

M: I think so, because that was what I was talking about—anybody that can get a gun.

G: Yes.

M: We have, every citizen in our country is a member of the unorganized militia—every citizen. Every male citizen who is not in the professional army is a member of the militia but we use the term organized militia by stating National Guard. Under the Constitution you are all liable to the militia, but you may not have a gun, but when we organize the militia we call it the National Guard. So you call this Peace Preservation Corps.

G: Yes.

M: Might I have a little discussion on that; who raises the Corps, who has the power over the Corps, who furnishes the arms for the Corps—how is that done in China?

G: The Peace Preservation Corps are supplied and equipped and controlled by the Provincial Government.

M: By the Provincial Government. There is no limit on the strength?

G: It varies according to different provinces.

M: Who decides it. Who decides how strong it will be?

G: It is decided by the Provincial Government, but submitting its strength to the Central Government for approval.

M: It is sent to the Central Government.

C: General Chou asks about the present strength of the Peace Preservation Corps. General Chou has the following question. If the strength is limited to 15,000 men per province, would there be much to be demobilized?

M: What do you think about this strength of 15,000? Is that too little. You will understand that I had to put down some figure. I am just starting the discussion.

G: General Chang thinks that 15,000 is enough—not exceed 15,000. If the Corps is maintained by the Provincial Government then the people would have to pay more tax.

M: Well, I am thinking about some provinces that have very large cities. Are Nanking and Shanghai in the same province?

G: Yes.

M: The governors of those provinces would need more than the provinces with very small population. Is Canton in the province of Kwangtung—is that a large province.

G: Nanking, Shanghai, Tientsin, Canton—they are all special municipalities.

M: Oh yes, I had forgotten that. Then I would like to ask about this second sentence. "After it has become apparent that the civil police of any province have been unable to cope with the situation, the governor of that province is authorized to employ the Peace Preservation Corps to quell civil disorder." Is that too much of a restriction on the governor? How frequently does the governor have to use the Peace Preservation Corp[s] troops?

G: Very often.

M: Well, is that too close a restriction?

G: It may be too restrictive because the police are very inefficient, so at times the governor has to depend on the Peace Preservation Corps.

M: Well, I was thinking of poor communications, the distance of the governor from the place and inefficient police. Is there any local man who can authorize the Peace Preservation Corps troops before the governor speaks. No matter how bad the situation, no matter how poor the communications are (meaning slow) do they have to wait for the governor before they can do anything to stop the riot?

G: We have a sort of prefecture. The prefect sometimes is given the authority to direct and control the Peace Preservation Corps stationed in that place, but at other times he is not authorized. It depends on the arrangements he makes with the governor. In the first case of a riot, there is no question whatsoever. A serious riot breaks out [and] he can direct the Peace Preservation Corps to quell this riot. However this man has to be given the authority to act.

M: They think this second sentence is all right?

G: General Chang suggests you scratch out, "After it has become apparent that the civil police of any province have been unable to cope with the situation" and put another clause that goes, "If any disorder happens within the province the governor of the province will authorize the use of the Peace Preservation Corps."

M: That means then that there is no expression of limitation at all. What we are trying to get at is—in a military force in a democracy there is always a limit, there are certain qualifications. That is what we are trying to get, but I was afraid I might have an impractical plan. The whole theory, as I understand it, is that it is the desire of the PCC to get the military into a suitable posture in a democracy. You don't always give a free hand. So we say the governor can limit it, we say that the civil police has to be used first.

G: I see.

M: Then is this first section acceptable as written?

C: There is another question raised by General Chou that if it has

been stipulated that the Peace Preservation Corps would not exceed 15,000 men then any number in excess of that figure has to be demobilized then we must put it down as a time factor when it has been completed.

M: What does he propose.

C: General Chou is not familiar with the present status of the Peace Preservation Corps.

G: We were discussing the various aspects of the Peace Preservation Corps in different provinces.

C: We both agree that it need not be provided here.

M: Then is that first section acceptable?

C: It is not clear to General Chou why you first say these provinces and then say the "several provinces". Would it not be better to say, "the governor of that province is authorized"?

M: "The governor of that province is authorized", that is much better, "to employ this Corps to quell civil disorder."

M: Is the second paragraph acceptable?

G: General Chang agrees to it.

M: Then this is acceptable in its present form.

C: General Chou has another point to raise about the military police or the gendarme[s]. At the present time we have two kinds, the nature of military police in China have two aspects. The one is to look after the discipline of the armies and he thinks that the military police should go around with the army and attached to the Army. For this purpose its normal need would not be large and since we have now fixed the strength of the armies we should also fix the number of the military police. Now secondly, apart from that the Chinese military police is not equipped to look after discipline of the armies especially in the large cities and military police also interfere with civil affairs and the numbers of special kind of military police is considerably higher. Especially in the large cities they are playing an important part in addition to the Peace Preservation Corps. According to his idea, in the future, the military police should have nothing to do with civil order and civil affairs. The military police should not form an independent unit as far as the Army in China and maybe we should also stipulate for the large municipalities that they have some Peace Preservation Corps and the military police would have nothing to do with that. He is asking whether that would come under Section 1 or under some other Article.

M: I think in some other place. I should think under the special provisions, Article 7. Section 4 is secret military forces. I[t] might not be in paragraph in or under Section 4, but in that neighborhood.

C: The first thing, we should decide whether we should put down here that the special municipalities might also have their own Peace Preservation Corps.

G: General Chang said that regarding the secret police which should be integrated part of the army that would be provided in that 5 per cent of the Army troops but regarding the other military police, General Chang said that it is better included in the plan for the re-organization of the national troops and not included in the present plan.

M: What about the Peace Preservation Corps for the special municipalities?

G: General Chang said that there is no Peace Preservation Corps in the existing, in the special municipalities and it depends on the police to handle the situation in those municipalities so he doesn't think it is necessary to have it in that article.

M: Well, if it is I have the paragraph.

G: General Chang understands that the Article 6 is very necessary because with that provision than [*then?*] we cannot take advantage that for those deactivated personnel to be entered or included in some militia organization—it will prevent that happening in the future. So he thinks that is a very good provision. Very good restriction and we are ready to accept that restriction so that deactivated personnel may have a, may not go and organize in other local forces and then regarding gendarme[s], the existence, the function, whether we should have gendarmes and what functions should be allowed to them, General Chang doesn't think it needs to be provided in this plan. That can be discussed and worked out by the Ministry of National Defense or at some other occasion.

M: Do I understand that Article 6 is accepted?

G: General Chang accepts.

C: General Chou likes to comment that General Chang has just stated that there is, it is not necessary to provide Peace Preservation Corps troops for the special municipalities. He thinks the police are perfectly capable of handling the situation and with this understanding General Chou agrees with the article and he reserves the right to discuss military police further.

M: Article 7, Section 1, any comments? Last line should read "this agreement" instead of "these articles". Is that acceptable.

G & C: Yes.

M: Section 2.

G: General Chang accepts.

C: General Chou accepts. General Chou points out here an omission here of weapons, equipment[,] of uniformity of equipment. Whether that has to be separate.

M: I think that has to be separate. One outfit might have British and another might have U. S. artillery. That is going to be down in the details. We merely want them to all look alike here.

M: Section 3.

G: General Chang accepts.

C: General Chou suggests after "an adequate personnel system" that the following be put in there, "without discrimination of party affiliation".

G: General Chang suggest[s] an "adequate and a fair personnel list shall be established without discrimination or a political party."

M: Without political prejudice.

G: General Chang thinks that [should] any ordinary person read it it will not create a very good impression if it is not a fair list.

M: It is assumed that if we don't write fair in here we will do something devilish and we don't want to say that. I would like to make this observation. The real dynamite here is in this word "rank". No one has commented on that. When you come to a military merger that is very difficult. I don't know how you would determine rank at the present time. If you have 10 Generals[,] who is number one; if you have 200 Colonels[,] who is number one and who is number 200. I don't know how you would do that. We have this difficulty in the U. S. at this moment. We are taking a great many temporary officers into the permanent Army. This sounds paradoxical but the great difficulty is because the army is non-political. Tremendous political influence is used. Here are 2,000 Captains—how are they going to be arranged. I don't think that has to be covered by this instrument, you could work out the details of that. The interpretation of the word "rank"[,] it should read "grade". Grade means Colonel or Major or Captain or what. I am avoiding the difficulty at the moment.

M: Is that acceptable without change.

C: Do you mean the second clause or do you mean the whole sentence.

M: I was referring to the whole sentence with the word "grade" in there.

C: General Chou doesn't think that you can skip that political affiliation.

M: Do you want to put in the words "without political prejudice"? Is that acceptable to General Chang?

C: General Chou has raised this question because the grades now in the Communist armies have no legal basis because they will have trouble in obtaining the formal grade from the National Government. General Chou just recalled that he got the grade of Major General in 1925.

M: Does he want these words in here, "without political prejudice"?

C: Yes, because in the PCC they have the same clause "without political prejudice".

M: Shouldn't that go on the end, "and the name, grade, and assignment of each officer of the Army shall be carried on a single list without political prejudice." I was recorder of a board for five months in 1922 trying to straighten out the rank from the first World War. We had 400 witnesses testify. It took us five months. So this is a very gentle looking paragraph, but it's dynamite. It now reads, "An adequate personnel system shall be established and the name, grade, and assignment of each officer of the Army shall be carried on a single list without political prejudice." Is that acceptable.

G & C: Yes.

M: Section 4, scratch out the word "National" and the last two words and change "these articles" to "this agreement". Is that acceptable?

C: We say "secret military forces" then we refer down there to "secret or independent". Wouldn't it be better to say "Special military forces".

G: "Special armed forces".

M: "Special armed forces". Change the word to "armed" down there after the word "independent".

G: How about not changing the contents of the Article, but just to change the title. What is the difference between military and armed.

M: Armed force is very good, it doesn't allow you to avoid the issue. We are talking about an armed force of any kind. The doctor is in the military force but he is only armed with a knife.

G: General Chang thinks that because it is getting late we should adjourn.

M: When shall we next meet.

G: What time do you suggest?

M: I am at your disposal. General Chou has a meeting Monday morning.

C: Monday afternoon at 3:30.

M: All right.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting of the Military Sub-Committee of Three, Held at the Office of the Aide to Generalissimo Chiang, February 18, 1946, 3:30 p. m.

Present: General Chang Chih Chung
General Chou En-lai
General G. C. Marshall

Also present: General Lee
General Tong [*Tung*]
Colonel Caughey
Colonel Pee
Mr. Chang
Capt. Eng
Lt. Hickey

G—General Chang

C—General Chou

M—General Marshall

M: We broke off yesterday ⁶ at Section 5 of Article 7.

C: Regarding Section 4 of Article 7, I have two other questions to put forward. The first one is regarding the military police, whether it should be discussed here or by some other arrangement. Secondly is regarding the railroad guards. On this point I wish to be clarified. I mean if later we are only to have railroad police then, of course, it is not necessary to be discussed here because that has nothing to do with the military forces but if there will be established railroad guards then I think it is necessary to have some provision here, as I am informed they are to be organized into 18 regiments of railroad guards which actually constitute a regular army. I mean after the order has been restored it is not necessary to have railroad guards. Under the present situation when order has not yet been established it is a point of necessity to guard the roads between two armies but when that problem has been settled I think it would only be necessary to have railroad police to be put under the administration of each bureau of each railway line.

G: Regarding the first point raised by General Chou, regarding the military police, General Chang said recently that in the future there will be plenty of occasions that this point may be discussed. There will be numerous occasions in the future so he doesn't think it is necessary to put in this, to put a provision in this present plan as it will not have direct relations to the reorganization of arms. Regarding military police, General Chang intended to have bilateral discus-

⁶ February 16 is meant.

sion between the two but in these last two days he hasn't had a chance. He likes to explain a few points regarding that problem. General Chang thinks, or he infers that, why does General Chou raise the point. Maybe he is aware of the fact that at present there are more than 20 regiments of military police which will constitute a force now as the ratio between the Nationalist troops and the Communist troops is set at one to five. Maybe General Chou has doubt in his mind regarding whether the military police will be carried in the National forces in order to determine the ratio. Firstly, although there are more than 20 regiments of military police (the commander of the Military Police is not now in town and General Chang cannot get the exact data) from information in the past, in every regiment of those military police regiments they are under strength. Only one-half strength. A regiment comprised of three battalions and each battalion comprised of three companies. In one company is only about 50 or 60 soldiers. Furthermore those regiments are not concentrated in one area. Not even a company will be employed in one locality. The unit of employment will be one squad or one section. Only a few soldiers employed in one locality so that dispositions of military police will not constitute any force at all. The equipment they have had are only rifles and pistols. They have no heavy machine guns at all. They are very lightly equipped. Following on what General Chang has described, the military police will not constitute a force at all, still less a concentrated military force, for it is scattered and lightly equipped. So he hopes that General Chou will not take very seriously the point of military police and hopes that General Chou will be assured again that in the future there will be many occasions for him to bring up this point for discussion and he hopes that General Chou will not insist on talking military police at this time.

M: You use the expression military police. General Chou was talking about railroad guards.

G: The first point is regarding the gendarme and the second point is relating to railroad police. General Chang is now talking about the railroad police.

M: What are the duties of the Military police?

G: General Chang likes to give an example. When he went to Sinkiang, he found there is a regiment of police with regimental headquarters in Lanchow, with a battalion headquarters in Tihwa city which is over 1,000 miles from the regimental headquarters. There were one and a half companies in Tihwa city. With that force, one company stood sentry duty in the provincial government and the rest were employed in bus stations to maintain order and then that is the example. In other big cities, military police may be employed

to maintain discipline of soldiers. When the war was on, of course, military police were also employed to guard airfields. So, in one sense they are only to supplement the civil police in handling these disorders caused by soldiers. They are the only people that can deal with soldiers and civil police cannot deal with the soldiers.

M: Who organizes them?

G: It is under a National commander of MP.⁷

M: Who gives them orders, for example, the one the general gave?

G: The MP Headquarters is under the control of the Board of Military Operations—the Ministry of War.

M: In time of peace? Did the Ministry of War assign them in that town 1,000 miles away from regimental headquarters?

G: The allocation of an area for their responsibility is under the Ministry of War. As to the order as to which area they should actually be located in, it is the responsibility of MP Headquarters.

M: I don't quite understand. Under whose orders do they operate when they are out in the province. Under who—who determines their specific duties?

G: The regimental commander. In a particular area they are under the guidance of the local government.

M: By guidance, does he mean subject to his orders?

G: Information as to the duty of MP includes the maintenance of the normal flow of communications and peace and order. It does not damage the peace and order of that locality. In this sense, guidance includes orders from the local government.

M: Do they have the power to arrest civilians—imprison them. I am talking about in time of peace.

G: The specific duty of the MP is covered by a set of regulations, the exact nature of which General Chang is not familiar with.

M: Do they recruit locally or do they get their personnel from some central point?

G: The members of the MP are recruited locally but they are trained centrally and then after training they are dispatched in units to various localities. Normally upon assignment to a locality they stay there for a reasonable period of time. In general the duty of the MP is to maintain military discipline among the soldiers and then another point General Chang points out is that at no other time have MP been known to have participated in any war duty direct. Their duties mean to maintain peace and order.

M: I interrupted General Chang before he spoke about the railroad police. He made no comment about railroad police. Is he going to make any comment about that?

⁷ Military Police.

G: General Chang started by saying that he was not familiar with the nature of the railroad guards—whether they remain railroad police or railroad military forces. He will have to get information from the Ministry of Communications. The second information was it has been decided that 18 groups, in effect, regiments of railroad guards have been decided to be organized under the control of the Ministry of Communications.

M: Do you wish to add any comments at this time, General Chou?

C: Answering General Chang's comments I wish to point out, first, referring to the military police. My emphasis was not on those two points just said by General Chang, namely, I do not lay emphasis whether the military police participate in war operations or not and secondly I do not lay emphasis whether the military police are used concentrated so that they form an independent unit after the reorganization of the armies. Whether they are used concentrated or are scattered. What my desire was, is what kind of system for the military police we are going to set up. If the duty of the military police is simply to maintain order and discipline of the army, I think it not to be large and if we are using the form of the military police to let them interfere with civil affairs then I feel much worried for setting up a democratic system in China. I am not familiar with the orders and the regulations governing the military police but from the facts of the past over ten years it appears that our military police do not follow those of the democratic countries but, rather[, the system?] imitates the gendarmes of Japan. For example, about the inspection of the passengers and personnel, it is not charged with the duty of simply to inspect soldiers. They inspect civilians as well so they are interfering with civilians, regardless as to whether it is on the railroad, highway, harbor or airfields. Secondly, the arrests made by the military police is not restricted to soldiers but also applies to civilians, students and other kinds of people. Thirdly, the military police also conduct house searching of private homes, though according to regulation they can only search the homes of military personnel, but actually they also search the homes of private persons, sometimes together with civil police. Therefore, it is my opinion that we should distinguish sharply the military police from the civil police and that their duty is strictly restricted over the military personnel. Only in this way may we set up a proper democratic system for China. As the actual fact now is we have in China an independent system of military police comprising over 20 divisions just like a regular army.

M: 20 divisions?

C: Regiments instead of divisions.

C: This, I think, is not proper. We should sharply distinguish

that they should only have duties over the military persons—not over the civil persons. Referring to the railroad guards, I have been informed that the Ministry of Communications is going to set up an independent armed force just like a regular army for the purpose of protecting the railroads. I think this is no good for China just as in the past it was no good that the Ministry of Finance has its own “so-called” tax police regiments. In democratic countries it cannot be considered proper that every agency may have its own armed forces to perform a particular duty or assignment. It is my opinion that if we approve that under each railway administration we shall have railway police to maintain order all right, but I take exception to have such a large force all under the direct control of the Ministry of Communications, thus you form an independent system.

M: I recognize these two questions, particularly the military police or gendarme as presenting a very delicate issue in the establishment of a truly democratic system. Having in mind the present conditions in China and those that will probably exist during the next two or three years, I am not at all clear in my mind as to how this particular matter should be handled. To repeat, it involves a very delicate issue of government. Just what authority the individual and the local commanders should have by law and just how much of a force would be considered permissible. I think in the main, the issues involved must be settled on a higher level than this committee. However, we have put in here, we have included in this document, several prohibitions that in one sense cannot apply directly to the regular military establishment, but in principle they secure the people against interference by the military establishment in time of peace. As I have already said, I am not at all clear on this issue. Possibly as to the gendarmes or military police with clearly defined authorities as relates to their power of arrest over the civilian they might possibly be allowed by the National Government in certain numbers according to the conditions and area to provincial governors, and increased, reduced, or removed at the will of the Central government, but this presents rather serious implications connected to [*connecting?*] the military to the civilian in time of peace and also to the restriction of the government in its ability to maintain good order. Considering the entire question rather superficially at this particular time, I am inclined to think that the decision in this matter should be on a higher level. However, I would suggest that General Chou attempt to formulate a paragraph for our consideration stating a very general policy or prohibition, or both, as a section of this document or as a recommendation aside from the document by this committee. In any event, I suggest that we pass this by for this afternoon and go on to the next paragraph. Is that acceptable?

G: General Chang accepts but with these additional remarks. The first point General Chang recognizes all the facts in connection with MP's stated by General Chou, but he also recognizes that in time of war the military police are to add [to] the insufficiencies of the civil police. In time of peace, of course, the power of the MP should be restricted. General Chang likes to make it clear that he has no objection on [to?] discussion on the matter of military police or on railway guards, but he agrees with General Marshall's suggestion that it is better to be discussed on a higher level. For instance, the military police under the control of the Ministry of War and the railroad guards under the control of the Ministry of Communications. These Ministries are all under the Executive Yuan. With the reorganization of the Executive Yuan in the near future the Communist representatives will have many changes to put forth [for] these matters for discussion. It seems to General Chang it is not necessary to be discussed here because if we will include everything in our present discussions of this meeting it will be beyond the scope of the committee. He has no objection in discussing that matter at all, but he made repeated assurances that Communist have plenty of changes in the future to be discussed on some other occasions or on higher level. If it meets with General Chou's agreement then how about proceeding to the next section.

M: That was my proposal.

C: General Chou agrees with General Marshall's proposal and he will try to put it down on paper as a formal proposal.

M: Section 5.

G: On Section 5, General Chang had a previous talk with General Chou some time ago. In the previous talk, General Chang and General Chou agreed to the point that in the PCC decision both the Kuomintang and Communist Party will not dismiss the Communist Party members or the Kuomintang members from the parties. Will not dismiss those officers on active duty who have party affiliation. Are not dismissed from the party by holding active duty in the army.

M: I get that.

G: Furthermore, they agreed that any military officers on active duty who are now holding the post as the members of the Central Committee of both parties will not be dismissed from the committee because the members of those committees are elected by the representatives of both parties congress, which is held every year or two, so they have to wait until the next meeting of the Congress to implement the present article—not to elect any more of the officers on active duty to hold any membership in any committee.

M: Do they want this section to remain in, or strike it out?

G: General Chang and General Chou agree to omit that particular

section because the PCC decisions provide that any officer on active duty who have party affiliation should not participate in any party activity or in any organization or party.

M: Section 5 will be struck out then.

LEE: Colonel Pee has left out a very import[ant] section of General Chang's statement, that is if the "Two parties have struck a compromise you as umpire would temporarily be out of a job."

M: You tell General Chang that any time he finds a similar compromise I will welcome it. Night before last we had a piece of music in the symphony concert entitled "Ducks Playing on the Water." We put that on frequently up here. Section 6. Section 5 has been struck out. I am taking it as Section 6 here to identify it. Any comments?

G: General Chang asks General Chou to express his view, but General Chou says he has nothing to add. General Chang agrees with the principle of this section, but the last sentence, General Chang asks whether it is necessary to have a time limit[,] to put a time limit on this section? When should the whole thing start and when should the whole thing be over.

M: Is he asking for comment or asking a question?

G: Asking the question. He is afraid that it is too short.

M: I rather think that myself, but we have an expression that we use, "with the least practicable delay". That would leave it to the detailed workers, to the workers on the detailed plans, to secure, or figure out according to the circumstances as they develop them. How rapidly this can be handled. The issue would then, in a sense, pass to the Executive Headquarters but the policy covered by the expression "with the least practical delay".

LEE: Is the expression, "with the least practical delay" the same as, "as soon as possible"? Are they identical in fact?

M: We use the first in military documents.

LEE: I asked the question in view of the fact that "as soon as possible" is more easily translated.

M: That is all right. You could say "as soon as practical".

LEE: In Chinese that will be all right.

M: You tell General Chang that they ruin his jokes in translation, I hope they don't ruin this one.

G: General Chang suggests two points. Firstly, he thinks that we should work out a competent plan applicable to both the National troops and the Communist troops within a certain period of time, all those puppet troops should be disbanded and disarmed. Actually restrictions should be stipulated so that puppet troops in the Communist army after the disarming and disbanding cannot pass over to the National troops and vice versa. General Chang says they are very

amphibious. They switch from side to side. We must have some restriction to stop that.

M: Does he want all that in this or does he want the staff to work up the details.

G: General Chang and General Chou agree that to be more concrete the last sentence should read, "As soon as the agreement is reached, a detailed plan for execution should be worked out at once and put into effect and the plan should be accomplished in a definite limited time or period."

M: As soon as the agreement is promulgated?

G: Yes.

M: Now how would this sound. The paragraph to read as now written down to and including the word "Communist Party" then as follows: "shall be disarmed and disbanded as soon as practicable. The detailed plan shall provide for the execution of the provisions of this section in a definitely limited period of time." One more thing, after the word "the detailed plan" add "(Article 8, Section 1)". That explains what the detailed plan is. I think where I used the word "practicable" in view of what has been said, it should be "as soon as possible." Is that acceptable?

G & C: Yes.

M: Then that should be changed to read Section 5.

G: General Chang said that in the detailed plan we must incorporate the restrictions in order to stop the effect of the puppet troops in the Nationalist and Communist armies after disbanding and disarming from passing over to the other army. We must have a restriction in the detailed plan.

M: I do not know. I should think that would be in here. That was agreeable to me.

G: We can put down in the minutes the idea.

M: The minutes will definitely show that in the disbanding of puppet troops the individuals concerned shall not be permitted to change from one side to the other and it is so understood and agreed. Article 8, Section 1. In the last few words, I suggest we strike out the words "agreements stipulated" and substitute therefore the words "provision of". The latter part of the sentence will then read, "the regulations and specific measures to govern the execution of the provisions of this agreement". Is there any comment about that section?

G: Both General Chang and General Chou accept.

M: That section is accepted.

G: General Chang raised the point of the names referred to. The Generalissimo and Chairman Mao Tse-tung[,] because President and Chairman in Chinese are the same.

M: How do they want that?

G: General Chang suggested that we use the Generalissimo as President and Chairman should be Chinese Communist Party Chairman to be differentiated from the Chairman of the Central Government.

M: Chinese Communist Party Chairman Mao Tse-tung. Is it all right now?

G & C: Yes.

M: Section 2. The last 10 or 12 words beginning with one army in the fourth month. Scratch all of that out to the end of the sentence. The section will then end temporarily with the word "start". What is to appear after the word "start" is yet to be decided upon. Now I would like to have your comments on the preceding portion of the section.

G: They both accept.

M: It is then understood that Section 2 is accepted down to and including the word "start", but the remainder of the section is to be determined later. The second paragraph of Section 2.

C: Responsibility means for the respective troops?

M: During the period of demobilization you are going to have a lot of things happening. You see there will be involved in there a great many soldiers who will be individuals in the process of demobilization and somebody has to be responsible for them. There is no question about the troops. Of course, they are responsible for them. Is that acceptable as written?

C: General Chou asks whether we should leave out the words "in the first three or four months", just to say "during the period of transition" leaving out three or four months.

M: That is better. Now it should be understood in the minutes, I think, that at some point in this transition the government will take over the problem of supply of these troops. We will be involved in a transition here for 18 months.

C: We could add, "during the initial part of transition".

M: We don't say how long but just "initial"—that is better. Is that acceptable as modified?

G: Yes.

C: General Chou just raised another question to General Chang personally that for the time of setting up of supply regions that the government would also employ Communist officers and General Chang said he agrees.

M: Now are there any other general provisions that apply to the implementing of these agreements that you gentlemen think of? This article is the general implementation of all the agreement. They have no more provisions to propose?

G: General Chang has nothing to add.

C: General Chou has nothing to add.

M: Is General Chou ready to discuss the question of integration at this time?

C: General Chou is not ready now.

M: Then as I understand it now except for Article 5 on integration and the issue of gendarmes and railroad police, we have cleared the agreement in its present form. I have here General Chou's suggestion regarding the gendarmes and railroad police. I would like some time to look that over rather than discuss it this evening.

G: General Chang likes to reiterate that the proposed article raised by General Chou is better to be raised to the Executive Yuan during and after its reorganization. In this present plan he really doesn't think it is necessary to include that section.

M: Well[,] is there anything else to be taken up this afternoon.

C: General Chou likes to have an estimate when we may finish with this paper. His own estimate is we may possibly finish in three days. He hopes that after this paper has been passed, he will be able to raise the question of supply to military units which are much jeopardized such as those in Hupeh^s and he hopes that after passing this paper we will discuss on their redistribution to some other places to be assigned.

M: It seems to me that the time required to finish this will depend entirely on when General Chou is ready to discuss integration again. It is possible, I should say, that we might be able to finish in one afternoon, once we get at that. I hope so.

C: General Chou is asking whether some other question will be put to this committee except of those contained in this paper.

M: As far as I understand my position, there is nothing further relating to this paper except the detailed plans which come much later. I would like to report that General Caraway who has been General Wedemeyer's Chief of Staff and three other officers are working on these detailed plans generally on a tentative basis now but trying to get the framework or arrangement in shape as quickly as possible for the discussion by them with the corresponding Chinese officials in order to present the complete details of the plan for submission to this committee at as early a date as possible. I have taken the liberty of going ahead on that basis in order to save time. About all they have been able to do the last three days is try to figure out just how to approach the problem and once the general agreement is reached here, particularly as to integration, then they can prepare a tentative outline as a basis for discussion with the staff officers of the

^s For correspondence on the situation in the Hankow area, see pp. 613 ff.

Chinese forces. As I see it, we will practically have to have here in China for a brief period a combined staff until they get this draft of this detailed plan ready for us to look at. I thought the quickest way was to let the Americans try to take a crack at it by themselves and then start all three sides together discussing it. Now I would suggest that various items here regarding which there is no debate, regarding which the decision is reasonably certain, that the data should be in process of being gathered right now without waiting for the formal approval of this document. For example, on the Communist side, it has been agreed that there will be 18 divisions at the end of a year and 10 divisions at the end of 18th month. Now the earliest date we could know where the first five of those divisions are that are to be in existence at the end of the 18th month the quicker we can work out these plans. The earliest date that we can learn where and what is to be demobilized first will be very helpful. That is particularly important from the Communist side because we know nothing of their dispositions and their locations and organization. The same information is equally important from the Government headquarters, but there should be no difficulty in obtaining it quickly. Again we should know as quickly as possible what are the first divisions to be demobilized during the first two or three months—what are they and where are they. At the same time, if the Ministry of Public Works or whatever the appropriate agency knows to what extent it can make use of these demobilized men the planners should know that and where the work is because that will help them in outlining the procedure. What I am trying to explain is, if we can proceed in this manner, as we do in our army preliminary to a battle, which is to get started on all the things that we have agreed on. We do not wait for the formal issuing of the completed document. Are there any other issues tonight. Could I speak to you, General Chou, a few minutes before your leaving.

C: Yes.

M: If there is no further business, we are adjourned.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai, at House 28, Chungking, February 18, 1946, 8 p. m.

Also present: Colonel Caughey
Captain Eng
Mr. Chang

General Marshall explained to General Chou that the reason he wished to speak to him was to outline his ideas with respect to assisting the Communists in giving selected officers and non-commissioned offi-

cers basic training prior to integration of the armies. General Marshall stressed that the training would be short and would consist only of basic principles but that was all that could be done in such a short period. General Chou welcomed this offer of assistance and stated that he would take it up with Chairman Mao Tse-tung.

General Chou asked General Marshall what his ideas were with reference to the commander and the staff of the army groups which General Marshall had proposed. General Marshall first stated that the organization of army groups was an expedient in order to overcome the Communist objection to a more hasty integration; that he had not carefully considered all the aspects of the problem but that the staffs of the army groups should consist of approximately half National officers and half Communist officers. General Chou then stated that he was giving his personal support to General Marshall's proposal for integration in order that China may more quickly get rid of the war lord system and create a unified democratic army. General Chou added that the reason for Communist delay had been due to certain difficulties which they foresaw with reference to the preparation and training of Communist forces for integration.

General Marshall then informed General Chou (confidentially) that his mission probably would terminate in August or September and that in the meantime he proposed to visit the United States for approximately four weeks for the purpose of adjusting loans for China and consummate procedures for the disposal of surplus property.

General Marshall then said he would trust General Chou with one more bit of confidential information; that he believed he could arrange to have General Wedemeyer made Ambassador to China.

General Chou brought up the question of the trip by the Committee of Three and stated that he would like to go to Hankow, Nanking, Canton, Suchow, Peiping, Hsinghsiang, Taiyuan, Yen-an, Mukden, and Changchun.

General Marshall stated that he did not want to get involved in a difficult situation by making an untimely visit to Manchuria. He indicated that his presence might precipitate a new crisis. General Chou stated that "we Communists" and later corrected himself to say "we 'Chinese' Communists", are very anxious to have the Manchurian question settled, that the Communists desire to have teams move into Manchuria to settle the question in order to facilitate the taking over of Manchuria by the government. General Chou pointed out that inasmuch as the reorganization of the armies included both Communist and Nationalist troops, he did not believe the Russians would object to the entrance of teams into Manchuria; that he could not understand why the Nationalists did not want to go in.

121.893/2-1946: Telegram

General Marshall to President Truman

[CHUNGKING,] 19 February 1946.

[205] DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Regarding the unification of Chinese Armies, after numerous individual conferences with General Chang Chih Chung and with General Chou En-lai there have followed four formal conferences, one just concluded this evening.⁹ I can now report that an agreement has been reached on practically all of the critical issues of my plan for the demobilization, reorganization and integration of the military forces. I am hopeful that a full committee agreement will be reached within the next few days and that the final approval can be secured from the Generalissimo and Mao Tse-Tung. When this is done I will endeavor to have a joint press release issued outlining in full the fundamental principles agreed upon.

There will then remain for preparation, and approval on a joint basis, the numerous details involved in the demobilization of some 250 divisions, the reduction of the total military forces to 60 divisions, the actual integration of Communist and National Army Forces, the set up of an [entirely new] and a democratic system of command and control in time of peace, in divorcing military commanders and armies from control over the civil population. The Executive Headquarters, now in action in Peking, will be the agency utilized to carry out these measures. The details also will have to be formally approved. They will then be sent to the Executive Headquarters in Peking for execution.

I have assembled a small very special staff of American officers from Shanghai and Chungking who are working on these detailed plans. It is a most difficult and intricate staff job, in many respects without precedents for guidance. When the approved procedure is sent to Peking, I will transfer this small staff there as an additional section of the Executive Headquarters. Incidentally, that headquarters is the first step beyond our Chungking committee of three in obtaining a homogeneous military establishment. Its purpose when first proposed by me was neither understood or appreciated by the Chinese. However, having quickly demonstrated by operation that it provided the only method practical for terminating the actual fighting over a tremendous area with all the bitterness and feuds and misunderstandings of such a fratricidal struggle, it is now being recognized as the logical medium for carrying through to completion all plans and procedures for the unification of the military forces. The framework of the staff consists of Americans and the operating procedure

⁹ Apparently February 18.

is directed by Brigadier General Byroade as executive. Once the combined policy has been agreed upon the 21 teams of three representatives each sent into the field give effect to the policies and are gradually in one respect and rapidly from another point of view, bringing the opposing military forces and the general populace to an understanding of the beneficent purpose of the Executive Headquarters. The reception of the American officer on each of these teams by the civilian communities is one of tumultuous acclaim and almost overwhelming expressions of gratitude. He seems to represent their one hope for the return of peace and security. We have only had one really disagreeable incident and that developed out of a starved people clamoring for supplies then available in the railroad yards, and also clamoring for justice against puppet officials whom they accused of murder, brutality and raping. The incident was well handled, I believed, by our representative and the situation has now been regularized.

As soon as the detailed plans have been agreed upon here in Chungking I plan to start on a trip through the troubled areas in company with Communist Chou En-lai and the National Government representative General Chang Chi Chung. We are to visit the Executive Headquarters and are to meet the principal Army leaders in various localities so that they may have a demonstration in our appearance of the cooperation and reorganization we represent, also, so that their leaders accompanying me can explain to their people direct the why and wherefore of most of our decisions. I hope this procedure will promote confidence and a better spirit of understanding, although I suppose there will be some rough moments since most of the high members are not only bitter partisans but will be losing their jobs in the process of reorganization we are proposing.¹⁰

I am sending Chou En-lai to Communist Headquarters at Yen-an this morning by American plane to reach a decision regarding final issue remaining in debate on unification of armies. The Generalissimo has been away a week first endeavoring to bring the members of his party around to a full acceptance of the PCC resolutions. He is now in Nanking endeavoring to line up his generals to accept the terms for the unification of the armies. He is in an extremely difficult position struggling with the ultra conservative and determined wing of each group, many if not most of whom will lose position and income all or in part by the changes proposed. I hope for the successful outcome of his efforts and especially hope that I will not be compelled to move in more or less in the open to intervene in this phase of the

¹⁰ For correspondence on this trip of the Committee of Three through North China, see pp. 341 ff.

matter. The conservative political and military are naturally rather bitter against me. I have avoided public statements in order not to give them an opening.

Faithfully yours,

G. C. MARSHALL

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Chang Chih-chung and General Marshall, at House 28, Chungking, February 20, 1946, 5 p. m.

Also present: Colonel Caughey
Captain Eng
Mr. Chang

General Marshall thanked General Chang for coming on such short notice and stated that he had informed General Chou of his ideas with respect to establishing an elementary training school for those Communist forces to be integrated. General Marshall stated that General Chou had received this idea enthusiastically and he (General Marshall) was investigating the possibility of borrowing from General MacArthur sufficient qualified officers and non-commissioned officers to establish the school.¹¹

General Marshall then asked General Chang what his ideas were with respect to dates and manner of integration. General Chang stated that the present dates and manner of integration appeared to him to be sound. General Marshall then asked General Chang what should be done if General Chou returned from Yen-an with proposals that would further delay integration. General Chang stated that he would respect General Marshall's decision in this regard. General Marshall then stated that the new army group organization would require adjustment in the location of the various armies and suggested that the deployment paragraph of the present paper be omitted. General Chang stated that he would prefer this paragraph to remain in and General Marshall replied that he would attempt to re-work the paragraph and send General Chang a copy. General Marshall then informed General Chang that General Chou was anxious to go to Manchuria when the Committee of Three made its Northern trip. General Marshall added that he would have to hold this for later decision since he did not want to give the Russians a new opportunity for conjecture and possible propaganda lines that might be injurious to his present mission. General Marshall then stated that he might decide in favor of going to Mukden if the Russians had withdrawn.

¹¹ For correspondence on this subject, see pp. 341 ff.

General Marshall then raised the question of sending a team into Manchuria in order to stop possible conflicts and to lay the ground work for demobilization. General Marshall stated that he felt sure General Chou's desire to send a team to Yinkow was prompted by the fact that Chou needs U. S. and National Government assistance in handling his own people.

General Marshall stated that he had not come to a satisfactory solution with respect to MP's and Gendarmes. General Marshall felt sure that the Communists would raise this point since it was their desire to make adequate provisions for alleviating military oppression over the people in time of peace.

General Marshall presented General Chang with a brief case.

General Marshall suggested that the new deployment not include a Communist army in Manchuria. General Chang stated that he was afraid that the Communists would accept but that he was afraid that they would later claim that the 18 divisions which they had been reduced to were for China and that they would have to have additional divisions for any reorganization in Manchuria. General Marshall stated that he would make adequate provision to preclude any such action.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chou
En-lai, at House 28, Chungking, February 21, 1946, 10 a.m.*

Also present: Colonel Caughey
Captain H. Eng
Mr. Chang

General Chou En-lai opened the meeting by informing General Marshall that he had returned from Yenan yesterday afternoon and said that the program of integration in two stages as proposed by General Marshall had been accepted in principle by Chairman Mao of the Chinese Communist Party.

General Chou said that Chairman Mao hoped to have two Army Group commanders in 3 Army Groups. The request was made on the ground that such appointment would only be for the interim. General Chou also said that Chairman Mao had requested integrated staffs for the Army Groups.

General Chou reported Chairman Mao's enthusiastic acceptance of General Marshall's proposal for the establishment of transitional training school for Communist officers and men. Three month train-

ing as now envisaged by the plan would not be enough, General Chou added. He inquired if such training courses could be extended to 2 or 3 years, covering more intensive and extensive training. General Marshall outlined the scope of this basic training and said that the longer courses would be worked out under the Military Advisory Group.

General Chou said that the personnel to attend the training schools would be carefully selected and that the units chosen to fill the quota of 10 divisions to be integrated would be their best. General Chou added that the Communist Party would welcome training cadres assigned by the MAG to its divisions, when and if the MAG materialized.

General Chou said that the title, "Basis for the Nationalization of the Armies of China" would be preferable to the existing title of the paper.

General Chou, referring to Article I, Section 2, asked if the President would exercise his function of command through the National Military Council. General Marshall confirmed this interpretation.

General Chou said that he had talked with Chairman Mao concerning Manchuria and had come to the following conclusions:

- a.* That he desired the Committee of Three to visit Manchuria,
- b.* That the cease fire order was applicable to Manchuria,
- c.* That the reorganization of the army would take in Manchuria, as General Marshall's proposal had envisaged, though the stand of the National Government in this regard was not clear.¹²

General Chou reported that Central Government troops under the command of General Chang Fah-kuei at Canton had violated the terms of the cease fire order and that because of this he may be forced into the necessity of publicly revealing the facts. He then requested that General Marshall request the Executive Headquarters to issue instructions to the Field Team at Canton to continue efforts to contact Communist forces and to prevent further difficulty.

General Chou said that Chairman Mao had expressed the hope that General Marshall would go to the United States to report to the President after the situation in China,—constitutional reform, and the reorganization of the Army—became reasonably stabilized. General Marshall then informed General Chou that he would only be gone for about 4 or 5 weeks and that he would return to China as soon as he had completed urgent business regarding loans for China, shipping, etc.

¹² For correspondence on this subject, see pp. 712 ff.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting of the Military Sub-Committee of Three, Held at the Office of the Aide to Generalissimo Chiang, February 21, 1946, 4 p. m.

Present: General Chang Chih Chung
General Chou En-lai
General G. C. Marshall

Also present: General Lee
General Tong [*Tung*]
General Kuo¹³
Colonel Caughey
Colonel Pee
Mr. Chang

G—General Chang

C—General Chou

M—General Marshall

M: Shall we commence with the discussion of Article 5 and I will ask General Chou if he has any report to make regarding the last proposal which I submitted?

C: Referring to Section 1, Article 5,¹⁴ the idea of integration of the two armies and the group army is acceptable, but the integration should be effected one each in the 7th month, one in the 8th and one in the 9th. There might arise some difficulty due to the training of the officers to handle altogether. I am afraid that if the integration should proceed one after another every month there would be some difficulty for their training and therefore I propose that the integration should be effected every two months for each group army; that is, one during the 7th, the second in the 9th month and the third in the 11th month.

M: General Chang?

G: General Chou's proposal makes a difference of two months and General Chang has said many times before that he will respect your opinion and if General Chou so desires he will respect your opinion regarding that.

M: Since our conversation this morning, General Chou, I have talked to General Caraway regarding this particular point which you mentioned. He tells me that they have their plans now drawn so he thinks the matter can be conveniently handled according to the schedule we have here. However, I would suggest that to make it

¹³ Perhaps General Kuo Chi-chiao, Deputy Chief of Staff.

¹⁴ Special drafts, undated but undoubtedly February 21, of this particular section and articles under discussion at this meeting, not printed.

reasonably safe that we have it read the 7th month, the 9th month and the 10th month. One additional month there would make it a little simpler, but the way they now have their schedule drawn there is no occasion for the further extension and I think it is desirable to have completed the integration of the third group an appreciable period of time before we start on the reorganization in the next six months.

G: General Chang is inclined to think that since the integration will not start until the end of six months time to prepare for the integration, he thinks the 7th, 8th and 9th will give plenty of time.

M: It isn't the period at the end, it is our lack of officers—U. S. officers to attend to the schooling of the officers and it is all right to manage the first one. When you come to the next month you are dealing with a three-month course in a one-month interval. If we could have enough U. S. officers we could do them all in the 7th month, but we don't have the people. I believe it is not objectionable and makes it a little easier to do to skip the 8th month. Is that agreeable?

G & C: Yes.

M: Section 2.

C: There is one question which General Chou likes to be clarified on; whether North China includes Northwest China?

M: What is Northwest China?

C: Such as Shansi, Kansu, Sinkiang, because it seems not to be the proper place for those provinces.

M: I think the intention in this was that West China came under Central China. The boundary between North and Central China was a straight line from Shantung province to Lanchow.

C: The Chinese conventional understanding is not the same.

M: What is your understanding?

C: Conventionally we separate by province.

M: I have sent Colonel Caughey over for the map on which they made this calculation. It is a rough approximation anyway. My recollection is that is from some point south of Shantung province then a line gradually northwest. They didn't attempt to go into Western China because that was beyond us to calculate—where the divisions should be. We knew too little about the situation. We knew pretty definitely what was required in Manchuria and we had a pretty fair idea about that concentrated portion of North China and we had a pretty fair idea of South China—Central China got the remainder. Aside from this accurate definition of the meaning of North China, have you any comments to make, General Chou?

C: General Chou says it will be better if we mark the line of demarcation there along the boundaries of the provinces—that would give them much better definition.

M: I think so, too.

C: Referring to the disposition of Communist troops in Manchuria, General Chou says that according to your original proposal there was some Communist troops in Manchuria in the first stage. In the new plan there is no Communist forces in Manchuria at the end of the first 12 months there and he suggests that one Communist Army should be included in addition to the 5 armies of the Nationalist forces. This will be deducted of one army either from North China or Central China. In section 4 you mentioned that in Manchuria there will be one Communist division and General Chou thinks that is acceptable. Now by saying all this he only wished to explain that the Communists do not desire a large force to be stationed in Manchuria but since there are now some Communist forces there and they must also be demobilized and reorganized, it is desirable that one Army of the Communist forces should be in the first stage and one Division in the second stage.

M: What is your comment, General Chang?

G: General Chang agrees to that proposal put forward by General Chou.

M: I would suggest that when we come to the defining of North China we put the provinces in the minutes. How do you want to do it?

G: Both General Chang and General Chou are of the opinion that we should have five areas: Northeast China, North China, Northwest China, Central China and South China.

M: We have got to put Northwest in. Northeast is Manchuria, all we do is change the name. Have you the areas fixed now?

G: Yes, tentatively.

M: Please don't omit Chihfeng.

G: General Chang asked whether he is correct in stating that after studying the provinces which will come under the different areas, then those will be put into the minutes and not to be included in the plan.

M: My thought was to avoid this being too lengthy, we would include a special paragraph in the minutes with the provinces in each area.

C: General Chou thinks that there certainly has to be Communist forces in Central China, but where the boundary line should be, it doesn't matter very much.

M: I mentioned Northwest China but what General Chou would be primarily interested in here would be the definition of North China and of Northwest China, and of course that gives you the boundary of Central China. We can put them all in if you want to but I was trying to get it as brief as possible.

C: General Chou suggests that the definition of the five areas be put in the minutes; what constitutes North China, Central China, South China, Northwest China and Northeast China.

M: Did you decide on the boundary of North China?

G: General Chang will study on the definition of the different zones.

M: They will do that today?

G: Yes, right now. Manchuria is the nine provinces.

M: That is the Northeast.

G: North China will comprise Jehol, Chahar, Suiyuan, Shansi, Hopeh, Shantung. Northwest China will be Shensi, Kansu, Tsinghai, Ningsia, Sinkiang. South China will be Fukien, Kwangtung, Taiwan, Kwangsi, Yunnan, Kweichow. Central China all other provinces.

M: Is that all right?

G & C: Yes.

M: I have Northeast China 5 armies. (At this point General Marshall and Colonel Caughey recalculated the armies to conform to change of boundaries). Here is the way we have it:

Northeast China	5 armies 1 army	3 National divisions each 3 Communist divisions,	total 6;
Northwest China	4 1	National Army, Communist Army,	total 5;
Central China	7 1	National Armies Communist Army,	total 8;
North China	4 3	National Armies Army groups, 1 Commu- nist & 1 National divi- sion,	total 10:
South China	6	National Armies	
Japan	1	National Army,	total 36

I took one National Army from North China and moved it into Manchuria. I took one Communist Army from Central China and moved it into Northwest China, that leaves the Communist deployment as one army in Northeast China; three armies in North China, one Army in Northwest China and one army in Central China, this is at the end of twelve months.

G: General Chang thinks that the Northwest area is too big and he thinks it is better to put Shensi in Central China instead of Northwest China. After the constitution has passed we shall introduce a new declaration, a new demarcation of the province and that province, very likely, is to be split in two provinces. Then the northern province can be included in North China and the southern province in Central China.

M: This would now change the boundaries. Is that all right.

C: Yes.

G: In that case the Communist army to be integrated in Northwest China can be moved to North China.

M: Is that change of province acceptable to General Chou?

C: Yes.

M: Then that will make this change in the deployment I gave you.

Northwest China	4 armies all National
North China	As I read it with 1 Communist army added which is the way I originally had it written there.

Now this is the way the matter now stands:

Northeast China	5 armies, National and 1 Communist
Northwest China	4 National armies
North China	4 National armies, 1 Communist Army, 3 army groups (half and half)
Central China	7 National armies, 1 Communist Army
South China	6 National armies
Japan	1 National army

Is that acceptable?

G & C: Yes.

M: It is understood that the decision regarding Japan has not as yet been taken by the Generalissimo.

G: General Chang said we would not have to worry[,] that would not have a very serious effect whether we will send the army to Japan or not.

M: My statement is that it is understood that a decision had not been made regarding the sending of the army to Japan.

G: Both General Chang and General Chou agree to scratch that out and incorporate it into the six National Army in South China. If we will decide to send the Army to Japan then we can send it from South China.

M: All right. South China will be seven armies.

G: As a matter of fact the embarkation point will be Shanghai, so the army should be in Central China.

M: Let us change the Central China, that will be eight National armies in Central China and six National armies in South China. Returning to Section 2, Article 5, I have left blanks down here as to group commanders. General Chou proposed to me this morning that as the Communists have very few places for their previous group and higher commanders, he would appreciate if of these three groups two group commanders should be Communists and that all groups should have a vice commander of the opposite side. Is that correct, General Chou?

C: Yes.

G: General Chang said that as he understood the three army groups would be formed previously and he thinks it is very difficult for either the Communist or the Government side to explain if we agree to have Communist officials or to put the army group commander. It will be very difficult for General Chou to convince the Communist side so he proposes that in Northern China there will be four National armies and one Communist army apart from the three army groups. He proposes to form another army group—form a fourth army group so that they will be square.

C: General Chou just explained to General Chang that General Marshall had in mind that those nine Communist divisions to be incorporated into the Army groups and form the basis for the 10 divisions which are going to be incorporated into the armies in the second stage and therefore it is not necessary to form a fourth group army because it would be difficult to train the officers of the extra army and therefore he thinks that since the third group army would only exist for approximately three months, he thinks that the government might make the decision of dispensing with the 4th group.

G: General Chang said that he himself doesn't want to insist on what he just said but stated it is very difficult for him to explain this to the government, so he proposes the following; the first army group to be set up will be commanded by the Nationalists, the second by the Communists and then regarding the commander of the third, then we will leave to future discussion with that understanding.

M: What do you mean by that understanding?

G: General Chang has to [two?] points of view. First he still hopes that the first proposal he made, that is to organize a fourth army group[,], will be adopted and that if that is not adopted he thinks it is better to put in the paper that the first army group commander will be held by a National, the second by a Communist and the third commander will be decided in the future.

M: I am afraid that that exception regarding the third will produce an unfortunate result publicly. It will not complicate matters a great deal if we say in the second sentence of Section 1 at the end of the sentence, another the 10th month and another the 11th month, because by that time it will be more or less a form rather than a fact. We would say in the first sentence "4 army groups" and in the end of the sentence, that is the second sentence, "and another the 11th month", scratching out the word "and" preceding the 10th month. So the first sentence says 4 army groups, the other carries the integration up to the 11th month and in Section 3 we would speak of 4 army groups referred to shall be reorganized and at the end of the sentence the expression is used, "an additional Communist division being furnished for this purpose". That would be strick[en] out because there would

be one extra Communist division. Now making that change I propose as a compromise that the first group have a Communist commander, the second a National commander, the third, a Communist and the fourth a National commander. In other words, we have added a fourth group for General Chang and reversed the order of appointment for General Chou. I probably do not please anybody. Is that acceptable? I did not intend to put in this who would be first and second, that would be a detail.

G: General Chou and General Chang together compromise[,] that is, the Communist officer would be first appointed in the 7th month followed with a National official to be assigned on the 9th month and the 10th month and the 4th army group will be held by a Communist officer.

C: General Chou says that this may be acceptable provided that the appointments are made all at the same time.

M: You don't get the groups all at the same time. The baby isn't born. Somebody accused me of being a midwife the other day, but this is getting to be a little stiff. It is understood that none of this is published. That is in the detailed plan. It will not be released to the press.

G: It is understood that the deputy commander of the army group will be held by the officer from the other party.

M: Yes. North China will now ready three armies, each consisting of three National divisions. Four army groups consisting of 1 National and 1 Communist army of three divisions. Two army group commanders shall be Communist and 2 Army group commanders shall be National commanders. In section 3 there will read, "During the following 6 months the 4 Army Groups," and at the end of the sentence "an additional Communist division being added for the purpose" will be struck out. Can I ask General Chou his comment on the deployment in Section 4. Five armies each consisting of three national divisions.

G: Northwest region has to be rearranged in this section.

M: Are we ready to start? In section 4 the word "Manchuria" should be changed to Northeast China and the proposal under that would remain the same.

(General Chang left meeting for short phone call).

I will read to General Chou this next. Northwest China, two armies each consisting of three National divisions, North China, three armies each consisting of 1 National and 2 Communist divisions, each with a Communist commander and (insert this) 1 Army consisting of 2 National and 1 Communist division with a National commander, and 2 armies each consisting of 3 National divisions, total 6 armies.

(General Marshall then read it to General Chang who returned to the meeting.)

Then Central China, 1 army consisting of 1 National and 2 Communist divisions with a Communist commander and (here is the change) 3 armies consisting of 3 National divisions with a National commander—total 4 armies.

South China—3 armies of 3 National divisions each. That is all.

LEE: The last sentence “stationed in Japan” shall be struck out?

M: Yes.

G: General Chang has this in mind. When talking of section 2, 4 armies were allotted to the Northwest region which comprises four big provinces. The territory is too extensive. He intended to raise the point to increase from four armies to five armies then he did not in order not to make any detailed discussion, but now comes to section 4, only 2 armies allotted to the Northwest. He thinks the area is too extensive and besides that there are other complications so he hopes that in both section 2 and section 4 there can be made some increase of one army that is in section 4 make it three armies. In section two change the number of troops from 9 to 8.

M: You want to make it 8 now?

G: Move that National Army into the Northwest.

M: Make it to the Northwest—that will be 5. Does that come out all right.

C: Yes.

M: Then over in section 4, that will be three armies in the Northwest. Take that army from where?

G: Central China.

M: Central China, or do you want to take it from South China, because the army for Japan must go from Central China. South China? Is that all right, South China?

G: General Chang agrees to move it from South China.

M: That would leave two, would it not?

G: Yes.

M: Northeast, 5 armies; Northwest, 3 armies; North China, 6 armies; Central, 4 armies and South China, 2 armies. Is that acceptable, General Chang and General Chou?

G & C: Yes.

M: Then that Article 5 as multilated is accepted. Then I will ask you to return to Article 8. We left the first part of Section 2 in an incompleated sentence. The last clause should read, “and that the detailed procedure of the integration of the armies.” That is somewhat of a repetition, but the preceding part of that paragraph sums up two other factors and I thought it best to put them all three together. When we finished with Section 8 the other day it was agreed

that we would not complete the sentence of the first paragraph of Section 2 until we settled on the deployment. Now we have gotten that straightened out so I have just put in this final reference to the procedure of integration. It doesn't change anything in the paper. Is that acceptable in that form?

G & C: Yes.

M: I will ask you to turn to Article 1. Since we have introduced [d] army groups the second sentence should now read, the third sentence, "The commander of each of the separate armies, the commanders of the army groups, and the director of each of the several areas herein provided for."

C: That is director of the several areas.

M: That is right.

"shall report to the Commander in Chief through the Ministry of National Defense," should we put in there (or National Military Council)?

G: Yes.

M: Is that inclusion of commanders of army groups acceptable and the inclusion of the (or National Military Council).

G & C: Yes.

M: In Article 2, Section [2], first sentence. The word militia occurs, it should read "the Peace Preservation Corps" and in the last five words the expression "field forces" is used and it should read, the "army", the word "army" for "field forces". Is that acceptable?

G & C: Yes.

M: Are there any other proposals in connection with this?

G: Article 4, Section 4. That section was reserved from the last time.

C: General Chou is referring to Section 4 of Article 4. It should be brought up now.

G: There is some changes in the English version but the Chinese version has not been changed accordingly, they have continued on the translation now.

C: Suggest that the last sentence of Section 4 should read "these 60 divisions shall be the National Army of the Republic of China".

G: General Chang made the proposal that we scratch out the last sentence, "these 60 divisions shall be known", because it may give some interpretation that on the first stage of the 108 divisions is not known as the National Army of the Republic of China. So he proposes be further reduced to 50 National and 10 Communist divisions making a total of 60 divisions, to be organized into 20 armies.

M: What is your reaction to that, General Chou?

C: General Chou has no comments—that is agreeable to him.

M: Scratch out the last sentence "these 60 divisions shall be

known . . .”¹⁵ and add to the first sentence this statement, “make a total of 60 divisions to be organized into 20 armies.” Now are there any other points to be discussed.

C: General Chou recalls the last proposal regarding the gendarmes and railroad police.

G: General Chang said that after reading General Chou’s proposal regarding gendarmes and railroad police, he thinks regarding the military police (gendarmes) it is a matter of terminology to call it railway guards or railway police so he doesn’t see any direct relationship between that and the plan presently before us. He asks General Chou to raise the original proposal on higher government level in the National Council, or the Executive Yuan—not to be discussed here. General Kuo has made an investigation of the matter and found that they are called railroad police and not called railroad guards. General Chang suggests to settle this affair between themselves and not to bother you, General Marshall.

(There was a long animated discussion in Chinese at this point not translated.)

General Chang says these details will be further discussed between General Chou and himself. General Chang is sure that he can reach a compromise with General Chou and not bother you. General Chang stated that he will introduce the matter up with the Executive Yuan for the Executive Yuan to discuss on this point and if the Executive Yuan appoints him as a representative then he himself will talk it over with General Chou. General Chang has the idea that General Chou is getting rather narrow-minded.

C: General Chou says that he is willing to accept General Chang’s proposal that he will be responsible to recommend to the Executive Yuan to conduct negotiation with General Chou provided that before the settlement of this problem the military police of the Ministry of Communications will not enter the Communist controlled territories.

G: General Chang said that he would try every means to get a compromise with General Chou on this problem.

(There was a long discussion in Chinese at this point not translated)

C: They both agreed that regarding the question of gendarmes and the railroad guards General Chang will responsibly refer it to the Executive Yuan to confer with General Chou and for the interim period the regulations covering the restoring of communications will hold.¹⁶

M: That is acceptable to both of you?

G: They reached a compromise.

M: What is it?

¹⁵ Points appear in the original.

¹⁶ For correspondence on the restoration of communications, see pp. 341 ff.

G: They reached a compromise, that is, General Chang will recommend General Chou to discuss the matters of gendarmes and railway guards to be discussed and settled in the discussion between General Chou and the Executive Yuan.

M: I don't understand. General Chang recommends General Chou to discuss those matters.

G: General Chang is obliged to recommend. General Chang will be responsible for recommendation to the Executive Yuan to discuss the matter of railway guards and gendarmes with General Chou for a settlement.

C: General Chou will make another statement in the interim period before it is settled. General Chou recommends that for the interim period before the settlement is reached the restoration of communications should still hold.

M: He is merely comment[ing] on that. Nothing else. Gentlemen, are there any other comments. I will have that carefully recorded in the minutes. Are there any further comments on this paper?

C: On going back to Yenan, the friends there have raised the question of the title of this whole plan because in the past there are two bases of reference for the present discussion. At the conference of three for the cessation of hostilities an agreement was reached to make a recommendation to the Generalissimo as well as to Chairman Mao Tse-tung that the conference recommend the speedy meeting of the Military Sub-Committee to work out a plan for the reorganization of the armies of China and this agreement was signed by all three representatives and sent to the Generalissimo and Chairman Mao Tse-tung. The Generalissimo has accepted this recommendation and has also requested General Marshall to be their adviser. On the other hand Chairman Mao Tse-tung has also accepted and welcomed General Marshall as adviser and therefore the present plan for the reorganization of the armies has a reference in that document. General Chang has also said that this is only a matter of formality for we have another reference. That is during the previous discussions between the government and the Communist Party it was stated that a Military Sub-Committee of Three will be called to discuss on the reorganization of the Communist forces into 20 divisions only and so there is some disparity about the subject of our meeting. Since the discussion we have now so far completed provides for the reorganization of Communist forces into 20 divisions, but also provides for the reorganization of some National forces, it therefore is actually a plan for the reorganization of the armies of China so he thinks that it, the title, is rather inconsistent with the conditions of our discussion. To meet the difficulty, General Chou proposes as a compromise formula that

we would adopt the title, "Basis for the Nationalization of the Armies".

M: General Chang, any comment?

G: If that title suggested by General Chou, "Basis for the Nationalization of the Armies" would be adopted, I am afraid many complications will be raised. With that title, that means we must work for some arrangement for the fusion of the two armies because in the previous meetings, General Chang did bring up that point repeatedly, that is, he hoped to see in the future no demarcation between the Communist and Nationalist forces. So if that title is used it is rather inconsistent with the paper because in the paper it mentioned nothing about the fusion of the armies in this country so this is actually an interim plan for the ultimate goal of nationalization. He did not insist on fusion being in this plan because he hopes that will be in the future, that this is but an interim plan. General Chang quite sees what General Chou has in mind regarding the title. General Chang feels that General Chou raised this point because it may not sound very well to the Communist side, reorganization of the Communist forces, it may imply loss of face and if that is the case General Chang thinks it really doesn't matter so much because in the contents it is really a reorganization of the Communist troops so he doesn't think it is necessary to change.

C: General Chou says it is not a matter of saving face because as it was discussed at the conference of three that the present committee will not only discuss about the reorganization of Communist forces but also of the Nationalist forces. The present plan does not cover all the military forces, navy, air forces, etc., it does cover every respect of the Army and it therefore is not only the Communist forces that will be reorganized but the National forces will do the same thing and the plan is intended that on the basis of the reorganization it may reach the goal of nationalization of the armies so he thinks that both parties are actually committed by this plan [by?] which the Executive Headquarters in Peiping will later on not only be in charge of reorganization of 18 Communist divisions, but it will also be responsible for the reorganization of the 90 or 50 Nationalist divisions, otherwise the reorganization of the two armies will not go at the same rate and therefore if we consider the contents of the plan we will see that the title is not consistent. I am making this proposal as I actually have in mind the concrete difficulties we will face if we do not change the title and that is the reason I made the proposal.

M: I would like to make this suggestion and have you consider this as a title, "Basis for the Demobilization of the armies of China

and for their integration into a National force". What are the comments on that proposal?

C: General Chou accepts.

G: General Chang says that there is no doubt that General Chou will accept but he has to face many difficulties.

C: General Chou asks General Chang to be broadminded.

G: The jurisdiction regarding the status of this Military Sub-Committee is based on the talks between the Government and the Communists and in the communiqué issued, that is in Article 9 of that document, stipulate that the Military Sub-Committee should be convened to draw the reorganization of the Communist forces and in the present meetings, although the reorganization is also incorporated in this plan, it is a big concession on the government side, so the conditions regarding it, General Chang can't decide whether such an article can be decided [by] himself.

M: I suggest that we adjourn until sometime tomorrow and that I will have a clear copy made of this paper by Colonel Caughey without the title. That matter can be settled tomorrow. Is that agreeable?

G & C: Yes.

M: I want to give you a draft of the first part of a proposed press release¹⁷ to consider before we meet tomorrow. This is only an introduction. It is to be followed presumably by the document. I am wrong, according to General Chang, in stating the basis for the Military Sub-Committee. However, that is a detail and you can tell me tomorrow. I think it will be very important that there be an absolute agreement as to the type of agreement and the time of release by both General Chang and General Chou to be a joint agreement as to exactly what is to be said and when it is to be released. That is important here in China, but it is very important all over the world, so I ask you to look very carefully into that rough proposal of mine, because we will have to be very careful with what is said. You will have to have in mind that nobody thought this could be done. If they had heard us they would still think so. So if you will please look at that and then advise me tomorrow as to how it should be done. Shall we meet tomorrow.

G & C: Yes.

M: What time.

G: 4 o'clock.

M: I am very sorry that General Chang has to go through this meeting feeling badly. I hope very much that he will feel better tomorrow.

G: Thank you.

M: We are adjourned until tomorrow afternoon.

¹⁷ Not printed.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting of the Military Sub-Committee of Three, Held at the Office of the Aide to Generalissimo Chiang, February 22, 1946, 4 p. m.

Present: General Chang Chih Chung
General Chou En-lai
General G. C. Marshall

Also present: General Lee
General Tong [*Tung*]
General Kuo
Colonel Caughey
Colonel Pee
Mr. Chang

G—General Chang

C—General Chou

M—General Marshall

G: General Chang said this semester seems to have come to an end in the class.

M: I hope so. If we are ready to proceed, I think the first thing to be discussed is the question of the title of this paper.¹⁸

G: General Chang suggests that we make the title, "Basis for Reorganizing the Communist Forces into National Army of China." With that title it will give everyone the impression we are organizing to do away with any force belonging to any single party and the National Army will be created. He thinks that will give the best impression.

C: General Chou still supports General Marshall's original proposal for the title because that is consistent with the contents, and seems to be acceptable to both sides because it both deals with the integration [of Communist Forces?] and the integration of the armies.

G: General Chang said that after studying the title suggested by General Marshall "Basis for the Demobilization of Armies in China and for their integration into a National Force", he would like to make a comment as to the second part, "and for their integration into a National Force". In the past, accusations were made by the Communist side against the National side and the National side against the Communist Party, and although they are only accusations, but the National forces are now the forces of the legitimate government so if we say for their integration that means integrate the Communist troops as well as the Communist Party—that will jeopardize the status

¹⁸ The draft (not printed) used in this discussion was unnumbered and undated, but apparently of February 22.

of the National forces, so he is trying to think that some title must be worked out without jeopardizing either side. That title entails that there is a jeopardizing of the status of the National forces.

M: I have this suggestion to make. "Basis for Military Demobilization and for the Integration of the Communist forces into the National Army."

G: General Chang said that just for this title alone we will have to impose on you for some more consideration. He feels very uneasy about it. General Chang is willing to accept that title.

M: I don't quite understand.

G: Just by that title alone, we have to impose on you again to enter into more consideration about that because he has an uneasy feeling about that.

C: I don't want to elaborate on the theoretical foundation but I would like to recite a few references for adopting the present title. In the PCC, it was in the decision of the PCC, which said the nationalization of the Chinese forces would not only be the Chinese Communist forces, but also the Nationalist forces. This has been definitely stated in the PCC decision and there is no point of argument about that and it is of this decision, I think, General Chang will have no difficulty about it, because the decision was personally accepted by the Generalissimo and also by the other government representatives. So it is very clear that the nationalization of the forces not only applies to the Chinese Communist forces. Secondly, the recommendation passed by the conference of three also said that the plan should be worked out for the reorganization of the armies of China for which General Chang needs not to take the responsibility and that I have explained yesterday, so I don't need to repeat it here. Therefore, I still concur with the proposal General Marshall made yesterday. If despite all this basis we had for reference, General Chang still finds difficulty to accept this title then I would suggest that we simply dispense with any title, because with reading through the paragraphs everybody will notice the contents of our agreement and the title is unnecessary.

G: General Chou just said he doesn't want to elaborate any more arguments, but as a matter of fact he really started the argument. General Chang feels that the legitimate basis for this Military Sub-Committee is from the talks of last year, October 10 last year, because in that joint communiqué issued last October¹⁹ it is very clearly stipulated in Article 9 of that document that Military Sub-Committee should be set up to study and work up a plan for the reorganization of the Communist troops. The references made by General Chou are true regarding a letter sent by the Committee to the Generalissimo

¹⁹ See *United States Relations With China*, p. 577.

and the PCC decisions about the reorganization of the forces in this country, but they are also based on the talks of last year. Of course, in the PCC and in the letter written by the Committee of Three the members may not have—a casual wording made by them cannot be taken as the legitimate basis. The legitimate basis for this Committee is that of the discussions of last October. Although it was stipulated in the communiqué issued that only the reorganization of Communist troops will be discussed, the Government has now made a concession that we are willing to bring about the reorganization of the National troops as well as the Communist troops. Now General Chou is very reluctant to make a minor concession and General Chang doesn't see what harm it will do if the title raised by General Marshall this afternoon will be adopted. He doesn't see any harm that will be done to them, but it will be stipulated that the Communist troops will be integrated as National troops. So based on all those arguments, he still thinks that the second proposal made by General Marshall should be adopted.

C: General Chou says it is not the point of the integration that he refused to accept but rather it is the fact that the latest title suggested would not cover the whole contents of the agreement, because the integration actually affects all the armies and he has cited that we have references for the integration of all armies. We have points such as the PCC decisions and also in the recommendation of the Conference of Three. Though in the last discussion between the Government and the Communist Party they have stated about the reorganization of the Communist forces into 20 divisions, but now we have exceeded the scope of that discussion. We are going to discuss about the demobilization of both armies to much smaller figure, which also affects both armies. Therefore, he thinks the old title no longer suits to the present situation. However, as a compromise he suggests the following title, "The Basis for the Reorganization of the Chinese Armies and the Integration of the Communist Armies into the National Forces."

LEE: Military Reorganization? Put just a change of one word in your original proposal. Instead of "Demobilization" put in "Reorganization".

G: General Chang doesn't like to raise any complications. He would ask your advice.

M: Is that acceptable to him?

G: Yes.

M: Then it is agreed and understood that the title of this paper shall be, "Basis for Military Reorganization and for the Integration of Communist Army into the National Forces."

G: General Chang said he would like to leave the matter to you. Whatever you said would be agreeable to him.

M: I think that is satisfactory. I would like to make this additional comment. If something like the introduction I submitted last night for the press release is adopted, no title would ordinarily appear. The articles of agreement follow. You just put the articles down. I wasn't going to bring that up for discussion now, I was just commenting on it. Are there any comments on this revised draft of the articles. I would suggest we say Communist forces into the National Army.

LEE: We have checked up on the Chinese translation and we have come across several points which might be of interest to you. We say basis of agreement. Would it be better to say basic plan?

M: That doesn't mean the same thing to us.

LEE: Both of them agree that we use "the agreement" in the articles but we maintain "basis" for the title.

M: That is the way it is now.

LEE: In translating service area into Chinese, we think that Chinese translation may not cover all the functions. There is nothing wrong with the English[,] it is in the Chinese translation.

LEE: What about supply areas instead of service areas.

PEE: It is more than supply, it is supervising military schools, the administration, taking care of demobilized personnel.

G: General Chang raised the point, military administrative areas.

M: Does that translate easier. If you use the words, "Military administrative areas"[,] that is all right in English if it will help in Chinese.

G: They agreed to drop that proposal. General Chang now suggests that we just retain the service areas in Chinese.

M: Does "military administrative area" translate easier.

G: That will imply the power to administer over personnel, to get the personnel for change of personnel.

M: These people are going to have something to do with that, sending personnel to the areas.

G: That implies jurisdiction over the personnel and that will give the wrong impression.

M: I never liked our word service area. We took that for the lack of anything else.

LEE: They agree to keep the Chinese translation of service areas.

General Marshall, there is a little ambiguity in the last sentence of the last paragraph of Article 3, page 4, last sentence. "The instructions of the Ministry of National Defense and the state of supply and similar matters of the service area shall be presented and dis-

cussed.” Does it mean that during the meeting, instructions from the Ministry of National Defense as well as the state of supply or similar matters to be discussed—does it mean that the instructions from the Ministry of National Defense, they will have the jurisdiction to discuss the intent?

M: I will tell you the intention and you can discuss it. I was trying to make certain that all the information of what the Ministry of National Defense had placed at the disposal of this director was on the table that he and everyone could see it. He had been given so many invoices or [of?] stores of clothing and all the various things concerned, so that the people that come in could comment on them. It was not the understanding that they were authorized to change the orders from above. This was done so that if the divisions and armies were not getting all that they should receive the commander would be able to determine what had been given to the director so that the army and divisions commanders could protect their own interests. Now a representative from the Ministry of National Defense was to be present to keep them aware of all that was going on. It wasn't intended that they were going to revise the instructions, just comment on them. The instructions of the Ministry of National Defense shall be presented and the state of supply and similar matters of the service area discussed. Is that all right.

G & C: Yes.

LEE: We have a few changes in the English text, and as we read along we will present our suggestions.

M: Yes.

LEE: Page 1, fourth line, add (or National Military Council).

M: I was wondering about the first sentence. He the Commander-in-Chief[—] instead of “shall be”. Is that he “shall” or he “will” exercise his command.

C: Just he exercises his command.

M: Has he been exercising his command through the National Military Council?

G: Yes.

M: Then you would say he exercises his command.

PEE: In the capacity of the Chairman of the National Military Council.

M: It is a more tactful expression to say he exercises his command.

LEE: Next sentence, the army groups should go first according to the rank, and the armies, the separate armies.

M: We have got to have separate armies because the commanders of the army in the group wouldn't report direct.

C: And of the separate armies.

M: "The commanders of the army groups and of the separate armies and of the directors of the service areas", leave out "each of".

LEE: Section 2, line 5, is it Communist officer or official.

M: Do you want that officer changed from official?

It has got to be an officer or this thing doesn't apply to it, and he is going to be out of the political thing.

C: General Chou understands that after the integration we may not consider the whole integrated unit as a Communist-led unit. For example in the army group you may have the vice commander to be a Communist or certain chief of staff or staff members who are certainly not commanders of any Communist-led units and therefore it may be necessary to have some other clause to apply to them.

M: We are in a little bit of trouble there. At an integration he has a lot of National people in there. How does he wish it written.

C: He proposes no change.

M: Does he want "command" there or "position".

C: He prefers "position".

M: You don't have to have "in the Army" do you?

C: No.

M: That reads now "communist-led unit or any Communist officer holding other position, the Commander-in-Chief shall appoint in the place," etc. A staff position isn't a command you see. Any other changes.

LEE: Article 2, Section 1, line four, "domestic disorders". Article 3, Section 1, end of third line to make it uniform, change field forces to armies.

M: With us the field forces are the ground troops out in the field. The army with us refers to either the U. S. Army or a specific army out in the field. It doesn't matter to us, just what is the best translation into Chinese.

LEE: The armies is the best translation. The next line, "shall consist of 108 divisions of not to exceed 14,000 men." May we add, "each".

M: That is all right.

LEE: Section 2, line two, add (or National Military Council). This is proofreading actually. Regarding the functions of the directors of the service areas, "The supply, quartering and pay of all field forces." May we make that military units?

M: Yes. In the next line we use the expression, "which may be stationed," should we use, "located".

LEE: Yes. In the second paragraph may we put storage ahead of reconditioning?

M: We always recondition before storing, I want to make certain you don't store them before reconditioning them.

LEE: The last two words of page three, "field forces" should read "armies". Page four, third line insert (or National Military Council). The fifth line, we use "field forces" which should read "armies".

M: Yes. Change "stationed" to "located".

LEE: Next line change "our" to "or". Regarding the second paragraph starting on line four with the words, "There shall be a meeting every second month", I think that should be a new paragraph.

M: That is all right.

LEE: Fourth line from the bottom add (or National Military Council).

PEE: On page four, the first line from the top, "The supply and supervision of administration of any schools within the area[""] come back to the other argument and it is inconsistent with the present organization of the National Military Council because the administration of the schools is charged to another organization.

M: "The supply of military schools within the area." You would remove, "under policies and procedures established by the Ministry of National Defense". That would all go out. That paragraph will then read, "The supply of military schools within the area." Should we put in that the word located within.

G: It is not necessary.

LEE: Page five, third line from the bottom, "the organization to be demobilized". Should we say army units for organization?

M: That is all right. We found our use of the word "organization" was totally different from the British.

LEE: On page six, the fifth line and sixth line, change organizations to the army units. End of Section 2 add (or Council). The last sentence of Section 2 may we use the French word matériel?

M: That is all right.

LEE: Second line, page 8, 6 armies, shall we say "each" and delete "each" in next line.

M: All right.

LEE: Page 9, end of Section 1, should read disorders. Page 10, Section 4, I think should read, "Neither the Government nor any political party nor any group, etc." Page 12, Section 2. I think the construction could be improved a little. "It is understood and agreed that the detailed plans above referred to shall provide that the demobilization shall start at the earliest practical date, etc." I think that is all I can suggest.

M: You have done a good job. We should have you as the Professor of English.

G: General Chang said that the Minister of War had the opinion that the Central China area being comprised of 11 provinces with only 8 armies, while South China has only 6 provinces with 6 armies,

needs more strength. So they like to take two armies from South China to reinforce Central China. In the first 12 months.

M: That is all right. That will be 9 armies each consisting of 3 National divisions, and that will be a total of 10. One of those goes out eventually if it goes up to Japan.

G: Yes.

M: Any other changes.

G: There are no other changes.

M: Then is it all right to pass to discussion of this press release?²⁰

G: Yes.

M: Is that first paragraph all right.

G: General Chang and General Chou both agreed to put the names in that document. We, General Chang Chih Chung, representative of the government and General Chou En-lai, representative of the Communist Party. How about you.

M: No, I am an advisor.

G: General Chang thinks it is better for your name to appear as an advisor.

M: Do you think it is a good thing for me to [be] announcing something in China. I didn't the last time as a member of the committee. I was chairman of the committee and yet I wasn't in the press announcement. It has this great disadvantage that will pertain. Possibly out here there will be many that resent my participation like this, but the principal objection is this. It will go to the United States and naturally they will play me up and they will not mention General Chang and General Chou. That will all come back to China. That was my reason for thinking it was inadvisable and that was the reason why I stayed out as chairman of the other committee, but I am not chairman of this committee. I may be the professor, but I am not the chairman. If they want my signature I will put it on, but I don't want to push myself forward in this thing.

G: General Chang and General Chou both agreed that they would like very much to have you sign.

M: I will sign as an advisor as the last signature, so if we are going to be hung I will hang with you.

G: General Chang said that he quite understands and appreciates the points you have just discussed about the objections of including your name in the press release, but he is concerned about something else for the Chinese papers don't understand the nature of the meeting and as they always call this the Military Sub-Committee of Three or the Committee of Three all putting your name in publica-

²⁰ Not printed

tions, so if we do not include your name in the press release then the people will not understand that you are participating in this meeting.

M: All right, add my name as an advisor.

That would read, "We, General Chang Chih Chung, representative of the Government and General Chou En-lai, representative of the Chinese Communist Party, constituting the Military Sub-Committee of which General Marshall was advisor have been authorized to announce that an agreement has been reached on the basis for military reorganization and for the integration of the Communist forces into the National Army." I think it ought to be put in there without putting all my name in, just say General Marshall. The second paragraph, what about it? Please do not hesitate to change my language. I naturally had more in mind an American reaction than a Chinese reaction, so do not hesitate to carve this up. I have no pride of authorship.

G: We would like to eliminate "confusion" in the third paragraph and say difficulty.

M: Omit, hardship?

G: Yes.

LEE: Regarding the fourth paragraph, since this is not a plan for the nationalization of the armies of China, it is only a preliminary step towards that goal, the objectives of this agreement are to furnish the necessary measures for the development of effective military force capable of safeguarding the security of China.

M: Would you say the objects of the agreement furnishes the necessary basis instead of measure for the development.

L[EE]: That is better.

M: The agreement furnishes the necessary basis for the development of an effective military force capable of safeguarding the security of China.

LEE: Do you think it will be better to drop the last sentence, "The terms of the . . ."?²¹

M: Whatever you like.

G: General Chang raised one point on the third paragraph. First sentence, third paragraph. The agreement will facilitate the economic rehabilitation of the nation and furnishes the necessary basis for the development of a military force for economic rehabilitation so he thinks it will make a better impression among the common people.

M: Will you repeat that again, please.

G: The objectives of this agreement is to facilitate the economic

²¹ Points appear in the original.

rehabilitation of China. General Chang feels that we should put the economic rehabilitation first as that will create a better impression in the mind of the public in a positive way.

C: General Chou agrees.

M: It would read like this then, "The object of agreement is to facilitate the economic rehabilitation of the nation and at the same time furnish a basis for the development of an effective military force.

That will be "to furnish". What about that next sentence of the fourth paragraph. May I again back up, "The object of the agreement is to facilitate the economic rehabilitation of China capable of safeguarding the security of the nation.["] Shall we discuss this last sentence?

C: General Chou said that he understands the idea of what to put down in this sentence is that we are going to form an army democratically and he thinks that the present system is too much negative. To safeguard the people, that is too negative. He likes to see something positive. We are going to establish an Army democratically and he thinks it is too negative.

M: We have got to be careful that we don't intrude too much on the prerogatives of the PCC and the National Council and all those things. I had changed it to read this way the terms of the agreement include certain principles. That is a milder way of putting it. I think General Chou's proposal would be more calculated to arouse the reaction of the PCC people and the constitutional people than this rather negative expression. I thought when I wrote that they would object saying that it wasn't any of our business. It was our business to see that the military system was covered by the democratic system. We can change that any way you gentlemen want it. It is a very important statement, I admit that. We could make it even briefer by saying, "Certain principles are included to safeguard the freedom of the people from military oppression."

C: Regarding the word "oppression" General Chou just suggested to change it to read "interference."

M: I think that is better. It puts it in a little milder tone.

G: General Chang is afraid that the general rank and file will not understand. In that plan it has no specific provisions to forbid the military forces to interfere with the freedom of the people.

M: There are no specific provisions for the freedom of the people? Yes there are. You don't recognize them then. Article 2 is a very specific provision. Take the last sentence of section 1, that is very specific.

G: It is rather a restriction on the power of the government more than a restriction on the freedom of the people.

M: It is a restriction of power to protect the people. That is the way every democracy works.

G: Then wouldn't it be more accurate to say the restriction of the power of government for the protection of the people?

M: I wouldn't want to say that.

G: Certain principles are included to restrict the powers of the government.

M: Isn't that a bad thing to say. Restrict the Generalissimo. We lay down methods to restrict the army to do these things, but it seems to me that it would be tactless to put the other in there. I should think that would be strongly objected to. We could say provisions. How would it do if it read like this. "The force capable of securing the safety of China, including provisions to safeguard the people from military interference." Is that acceptable.

C: Yes.

G: General Chang said that the word articles appearing in this press release, he thinks it would be better to put in the basis. In the third paragraph the "object of the agreement" wouldn't it be better to have it the "object of this basic plan" and then the last clause, "the articles of agreement follow", and then in the second paragraph, the Military Sub[-]Committee is now preparing the detailed plan for the agreement to be carried into execution. The terms of the plan and the execution.

They are talking about the title of the Executive Headquarters, because in Chinese the Executive Headquarters is an executive headquarters for handling military readjustment so in the future if they carry on the work of reorganization, the name of that headquarters should be changed.

M: It is going to be doing these other things at the same time.

G: They are not to change anything at all.

M: Now as I understand this, the press release will be published as they have just agreed and it will be followed immediately by the articles without the title, as the title appears up here in the second paragraph and then at the close of the articles will be the signature of General Chang and General Chou.

G: Also General Marshall.

M: I thought you had enough of me.

G: General Chang requests that General Marshall sign too. General Chang just [makes?] the point that if any instructions are to be sent to the Executive Headquarters, those instructions will be [by?] three names instead of two.

M: I am not quite so certain. It seems to me that when this press release comes out by the instructions under the agreement [they?] would go out from the Generalissimo. This basis has to be confirmed in some way. I should imagine that we ought to have a letter of transmittal of this, sending it to the Generalissimo and to Chairman Mao Tze-tung. Now then we should have some statement somewhere that they agree. Now the moment that they agree, it then becomes the function of the government to put this down to the Executive Headquarters.

G: In the future when the Executive Headquarters refers it back to Chungking, in that case however we ought to give them any subsequent instructions as necessary.

M: If they want to refer to higher level, I am fully willing to put my name on. I am not a member of this committee. The Executive Headquarters is composed of three people. How does he wish it?

G: He wishes that in the subsequent instructions to be given to the Executive Headquarters, he hopes you shall also sign it.

M: I am willing to do so. I would like to ask one or two more questions. Has General Chou the authority to confirm this now in the name of Chairman Mao Tse-tung?

C: Yes.

M: It doesn't have to be sent to Yen-an.

C: No.

M: What is General Chang's position in regard to that?

G: General Chang said that the Generalissimo will be back in the next day or two. He will be back in town so he thinks that he should present this paper to him to look over.

M: Then we will have to also await on the press release too.

G: Yes. After the formal signature of that paper then that press release ²² will be issued.

M: General Chang doesn't feel that he can sign the paper until he has spoken to the Generalissimo. Is that correct?

G: General Chang says in retyping and rewriting of both English and Chinese version it may take a little time and he is obliged to present it to the Generalissimo.

M: The understanding is that this awaits General Chang's formal approval. There is no occasion then for a formal meeting tomorrow. They want the corrected papers but nothing further than that. Is that correct?

G: Yes. No meeting tomorrow.

M: No meeting tomorrow until some other word is received.

²² For text of press release issued on February 25, see *United States Relations With China*, p. 622.

121.893/2-2346 : Telegram

General Marshall to President Truman

[CHUNGKING,] 23 February 1946.

[233.] DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Yesterday afternoon the Committee on Demobilization, Reorganization and Integration reached a final agreement on all points, carefully checked the phrasing and translation and agreed on the form for the press release. Mao Tse-Tung has given Chou En-Lai authority for final approval but absence of Generalissimo for past 10 days leaves his representative, General Chang Chih Chung, without similar authority. Generalissimo had previously approved my draft but there have been some changes, none I think compromising his position. He returns today or tomorrow and unless his state of mind over the Manchurian issue upsets his previous views and willingness to compromise, there should be no trouble in securing approval.

Another subject: James Shepley, who accompanied me to China in status of State Department Attaché and acted as my assistant in all negotiations, frequently dealing direct for me with various principals, is returning home on expiration of leave given him by Time Corporation. He arrives in Washington Monday the 25th and can give you a complete picture of the complicated situation and various influences and of my views.²³

G. C. MARSHALL

121.893/2-2546 : Telegram

General Marshall to President Truman

[CHUNGKING,] 24 February 1946.

[244.] DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The Generalissimo returned from a 10-day trip this afternoon, Sunday, stopping at his country place. He asks me to motor down to talk to him and dine with him tomorrow.

Meanwhile, I am informed that he has approved our agreement for demobilization, reorganization, and integration of the Chinese armies. The meeting to sign the agreement by my committee is set for 4:00 PM tomorrow. A complete press release will probably follow shortly, I suppose.

Executive Headquarters in Peiping is charged with the execution of the agreement. I will radio full details later.

Faithfully yours,

G. C. MARSHALL

²³ Notation by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent) on February 28: "I had an hour and a half talk with Shepley yesterday."

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Signing of the Basis for Military Reorganization and for the Integration of the Communist Forces Into the National Army, Held in the Office of the Aide to Generalissimo Chiang, February 25, 1946, 4 p. m.

GENERAL MARSHALL: (Speaking to General Chang previous to arrival of General Chou). When would you like to have the next meeting to decide on the next steps to be taken? General Chou spoke to me today about possibly meeting this afternoon. I told him that was all right with me, but that I would prefer tomorrow because I would have prepared some papers on any suggestions I might have to make.

GENERAL CHANG: I will do as you do.

GENERAL MARSHALL: When tomorrow?

GENERAL CHANG: Inasmuch as you will spend the night with the Generalissimo, it may be more agreeable to you to have the meeting in the afternoon.

GENERAL MARSHALL: What hour?

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang is not very clear about the nature of the next meeting.

GENERAL MARSHALL: We have to prepare certain detailed plans in order to get the basis for carrying this into execution. I will have a rough draft of the first papers to get that underway and I think we should decide whether the form of those preliminary papers is acceptable and then how you are going to organize to have that worked out in detail. The work, as I see it, will have to be done in two steps. There are certain minor directives that we should agree upon here and I think the staff officers who are to go to Executive Headquarters should take those minor directives and commence the work on the details for our approval before they go to Peking. I assume that we would attach and make a part of the Executive Headquarters a new section to that staff whose sole job is carrying these agreements into execution, but I think that new section should be formed here and not in Peking and do a portion of its work here before it goes to Peking. Peking is busy with many things now and we should not give them the task of organizing the section up there and setting it to the preliminary work on the details. Their present people know nothing about this at all. I have had General Caraway, General Wedemeyer's previous Chief of Staff with a group of four or five officers at work on the various aspects of this problem. Now I would like to have their first proposals considered here by yourself and General Chou so that we can have your modifications or your counter proposals and then you can bring your officers in to

form this section right here to start to work. This is a tremendous task if it is done in an orderly manner and it will require very able staff work so I think we must make the most careful approach.

(At this point General Chou entered the meeting)

GENERAL CHOU: I am very sorry that I couldn't wear a uniform but I couldn't find the insignia.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I see you got a haircut anyway. I think you will photograph very nicely.

GENERAL CHANG: General Chou was once Deputy Director of Political Training Department²⁴ when General Chen Chin²⁵ was the Director.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I would like to suggest that you allow us to have one English copy signed for our record and I would suggest that we sign that up here and just deal with the Chinese copy downstairs. I don't want to introduce an English copy downstairs. One copy for our record. Is that agreeable?

(General Chang and General Chou both agreed.)

GENERAL CHOU: General Chou points out that later if there is any difference in interpretation of the Chinese text then they would use the English text as the basis.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Don't tell the people of China that though.

(The signing of three original English texts²⁶ then took place, one copy given to General Chang Chih Chung, one to General Chou En-lai and one to General Marshall).

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang asks if there is any other advice or any comments you would like to give them.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I think school can be dismissed until 4 o'clock tomorrow.

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang asks whether the classroom will be changed.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I leave that to the students to decide.

GENERAL CHANG: We will leave the classroom the same.

GENERAL CHOU: General Marshall! General Chou understands you will have the outline prepared and asks if you would send over a copy to him for preparation for the meeting.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I will do that and if you desire to have General Caraway explain it I will have him make an appointment. I will send it over first and then he can probably help to make explanations.

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang and General Chou think that after the signing of the document they both will speak a few words to the

²⁴ Of the Chinese National Military Council.

²⁵ General Chen Cheng, Chinese Minister of War.

²⁶ *Infra.*

correspondents explaining the significance of the signatures this afternoon and at the same time to express their appreciation of your advice and that they also hope that you will also speak a few words to the press.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Yes.

(Party then proceeded to first floor where signing was to take place).

(Signing took place at 1615 with General Chang Chih Chung signing first, then General Chou En-lai and then General Marshall).

GENERAL CHANG: This afternoon is the occasion of the signature of the basis for military reorganization and for the integration of Communist troops into National Army reached in the Military Sub-Committee consisting of the Government representative, General Chang Chih Chung; the representative of the Communist Party, General Chou En-lai, with General Marshall as an advisor and this has great significance indeed. In the past 18 years the Government and the Communist Party has been hostile to each other. The so-called Communist problem or civil war problem in this country in the struggle in the last 18 years has cost the lives of millions of people, the delay in the reconstruction of this country for a very considerable period of time. The signatures this afternoon put an end to the long struggle between the Government and the Communists. Henceforth we are entering into a new period of peaceful reconstruction of the country and we will give up the military force as an instrument for political supremacy. By the signing of the papers this afternoon the democratic, unified and peaceful period will lie ahead. That is the hope of everybody in this country and by the signing of the paper this afternoon, that will all materialize. In the successful accomplishment of the PCC were laid the firm basis for democracy in the politics of this country and the signing of this document this afternoon will lay a foundation for the nationalization of the armies in this country. Henceforth everyone in this country will contribute in the establishment in the reconstruction of this country to the ideal goal of the three principles of Sun Yat Sen and from these signatures this afternoon that will be carried on by everyone and it will, of course, have some hope for early accomplishment. I, being the representative of the Government, can say categorically that the Government side will carry out the plan signed this afternoon 100% and will spare no effort to carry out the contents of the plan in order to reach the goal of the nationalization of the armies in China. For what we have accomplished here today, and I think General Chou will share my opinion, we owe so much to General Marshall. For his advice as advisor to the Military Sub-Committee. The people in this country have created several titles for General Marshall. Certain people call

General Marshall the midwife of the unification and peaceful reconstruction of China. Certain people call General Marshall the go-between of the Communist Party and the Government. Certain people call General Marshall the great ambassador of peace sent by the American government and the American people to China. I am of the opinion that no matter which you like best every one will suit General Marshall completely. Now the materializing of the unification and reconstruction of the country will be in sight and we must say that we owe so very much to the greatest friend of China, General Marshall. Everyone will know that General Marshall being the leading strategist in the world, he being the Chief of Staff of the U. S. and on the Chiefs of Staff for the United Nations, under his able leadership he won the victory for the United Nations. I, representing the Government, would like to express my sincere thanks and appreciation to General Marshall.

GENERAL CHOU: General Marshall, General Chang and all the friends here. Today is a great day of success because now we have signed the basis for the reorganization of the Chinese armies and for the integration of the Communist forces in the National Army. As all you friends may recall, though this year has only passed a very small portion of time still we have accomplished many big things. First, on January 10 in the residence of General Marshall, we have signed the agreement for the cessation of hostilities, then on January 31st at the Hall of the National Government, we reached five decisions of the PCC and now today we are signing the basis for the reorganization of the Chinese armies. All this explains that during this short time we have accomplished many great things and thus laid down the basis for the big task ahead of us. Now with these [*this?*] basis of decisions and agreements we may say just as General Chang has just stated that we have made a big step toward the democratization of politics, the nationalization of the armies and the equality of the parties. In carrying out these agreements and decisions you may expect that there will be some difficulties and obstructions, but on the other hand we also feel confident that all these difficulties can be overcome and the obstructions will be swept away if the Government and the Chinese Communist Party and particularly the Chinese people would firmly uphold these agreements and basis and in this way I feel confident that no difficulty and obstruction can impede our marching forward. Now standing here as the representative of the Chinese Communist Party I can assure the friends present, the Chinese people and all the Allied Nations that we will carry out all the documents and particularly the basis one hundred per cent and without reservation. Now this basis stipulated—provided for the reorganization of the Chinese armies and for the integration of the Communist forces

into the National armies. This basis is applicable throughout the country without any exception with respect to any particular area and without exception to any particular armed forces. This basis, just as General Chang has said, will be a safeguard of the people of China and I feel confident that by the execution of this basis we will completely change the picture which has been dominating in China for the last 18 years which is characterized by armed fighting and this basis will lay down the peaceful foundation for the democratic system, economic reconstruction and unification of the country and the unification of all forces in China and this will bring China up to the level of a modern country. In the same way as General Chang has said, I think this time, as similar to the last time when we reached the agreement on the cessation of hostilities, that this should be attributed to General Marshall's assistance and efforts and we wish to express our thanks to him. I personally am very honored to work together with the world's well-known strategist in accomplishing this plan. Similarly I wish to express my thanks to General Chang who has cooperated for many times with me during the past twenty years and General Chang has equally made a great contribution for this plan toward the peace and military reorganization for China. Also as all the newspaper friends and the press friends are here I wish—I am aware that this plan will be distributed throughout the country and to the world abroad and I hope that through your efforts you will call all the Chinese people and foreign friends to encourage and to supervise our work and to have it put into effect.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I am deeply grateful to General Chang and General Chou for the generous expressions regarding me and I am even more grateful for the generous matter [*manner*] in which they met me throughout these negotiations. This agreement, I think, represents the great hope of China. I can only trust that its pages will not be soiled by a small group of irreconcilables who for a separate purpose would defeat the Chinese people in their overwhelming desire for peace and prosperity. Thank you.

893.00/3-446

*Basis for Military Reorganization and for the Integration of the Communist Forces Into the National Army*²⁷

ARTICLE I—*Command*

Section 1. The President of the Republic of China being the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic of China exer-

²⁷ Copy transmitted to the Secretary of State by General Marshall with his covering memorandum of March 4; received about March 18.

cises command through the Ministry of National Defense (or National Military Council). The commanders of the army groups and of the separate armies and the directors of the service areas herein provided for shall report to the Commander-in-Chief through the Ministry of National Defense (or National Military Council).

Section 2. The Commander-in-Chief shall have the power to appoint and relieve all subordinate officers provided, however, that in the event it becomes necessary during the process of the reorganization of the military forces to relieve the commander of any Communist-led unit or any Communist officer holding other position, the Commander-in-Chief shall appoint in the place of the officer relieved an officer nominated by the senior Communist member of the government.

ARTICLE II—*Functions and Restrictions*

Section 1. The primary function of the army shall be to defend the Republic in time of war. In time of peace the principal function of the army shall be training. It may be employed[,] however, to quell domestic disorders, but only as provided in Section 2 of this article.

Section 2. When, in the event of domestic disorders, the governor of a province shall have certified to the Council of State that the local civil police, and the Peace Preservation Corps have been unable to cope with the situation, the President, in his capacity as commander-in-chief, shall, with the approval of the Council of State, employ the army to restore order.

ARTICLE III—*Organization*

Section 1. The army shall consist of armies of three divisions each with supporting troops not to exceed 15% of their total strength. At the conclusion of 12 months the armies shall consist of 108 divisions of not to exceed 14,000 men each. Of these, 18 shall be formed from Communist Forces.

Section 2. China shall be divided into 8 service areas under directors responsible to the Minister of National Defense (or National Military Council) for the following functions within their respective areas:

The supply, quartering and pay of all military units located within the area;

The storage, reconditioning and issue of the weapons and equipment collected from demobilized troops within the area;

The processing of demobilized officers and enlisted personnel within the area and the continued processing of demobilized officers and enlisted personnel passing through the area enroute to their homes or other designated destination;

The processing and elementary training of individual recruits received within the area as replacements for the armies;

The supply of military schools within the area ;

The service area directors shall have no authority or control over the armies located within their areas and they are specifically prohibited from interfering with or influencing in any way whatsoever civil administration or affairs ;

Each army commander within a particular service area shall maintain in the service area headquarters his own representative to insure that the needs of the forces under his command are fully and expeditiously met ;

There shall be a meeting every second month within each service area and presided over by the service area director. These meetings shall be attended by the army and division commanders, or their duly appointed representatives, of each army located within that area. A representative of the Ministry of National Defense (or National Military Council) shall also be present. The instructions of the Ministry of National Defense (or National Military Council) shall be presented, and the state of supply and similar matters of the service area discussed.

ARTICLE IV—*Demobilization*

Section 1. During the 12 months immediately following the promulgation of this agreement the Government shall demobilize all units in excess of 90 divisions and the Communist Party shall demobilize all units in excess of 18 divisions. The demobilization shall start immediately and shall proceed at the rate of approximately one twelfth of the total number to be demobilized during each month.

The Government shall prepare within three weeks of the promulgation of this agreement, a list of the 90 divisions to be retained and the order of demobilization of units during the first two months. The Communist Party shall prepare within three weeks of the promulgation of this agreement, a complete list of its military units stating character, strength, armament, names of brigades and higher commanders and location of units. This report shall include a list of the 18 divisions to be retained and the order of demobilization during the first two months. These lists shall be submitted to the Military Sub-Committee.

Six weeks after the promulgation of this agreement the Communist Party shall submit to the Military Sub-Committee a complete list of the army units to be demobilized and the Government shall submit a similar list.

On receipt of the foregoing lists and documents the Military Sub-Committee shall prepare a detailed plan for the execution of this agreement and submit it for the approval of both parties. After such approval the lists, documents and plan shall be transmitted to the Ministry of National Defense (or National Military Council).

Section 2. The arms and equipment of the army units demobilized may be utilized to complete the arms and equipment of the army units

to be retained in service. A detailed statement of such transfers will be submitted to the Ministry of National Defense (or National Military Council) by the Executive Headquarters. The surplus matériel will be stored as directed by that Ministry (or Council).

Section 3. In order to prevent large scale hardship or lawlessness arising as a result of the demobilization, the Government and the Communist Party shall initially provide for the supply, movement and employment of their respective demobilized personnel. The Government shall take over unified control of these matters as soon as practicable.

Section 4. During the 6 months following the first 12 months the National divisions shall be further reduced to 50 and the Communist divisions shall be further reduced to 10 making a total of 60 divisions to be organized into 20 armies.

ARTICLE V—*Integration and Deployment*

Section 1. During the first 12 months after the promulgation of this agreement there shall be organized 4 army groups each consisting of 1 National and 1 Communist army. Each army shall consist of 3 divisions. The schedule for establishing these army groups shall be as follows: One army group shall be organized during the 7th month; another the 9th month; another the 10th month; and another the 11th month. The staffs of the army groups shall consist of approximately one half National and one half Communist staff officers.

Section 2. The deployment of the armies at the end of the first 12 months shall be as follows:

Northeast China—5 armies each consisting of 3 National divisions, each army with a National commander and 1 army consisting of 3 Communist divisions with a Communist commander—total 6 armies.

Northwest China—5 armies each consisting of 3 National divisions each with a National commander—total 5 armies.

North China—3 armies each consisting of 3 National divisions, each with a National commander; and 4 army groups each consisting of 1 National and 1 Communist army of 3 divisions. 2 army group commanders shall be National officers and 2 army group commanders shall be Communist officers—total 11 armies.

Central China—9 armies each consisting of 3 National divisions, each with a National commander; and 1 army consisting of 3 Communist divisions, with a Communist commander—total 10 armies.

South China (including Formosa)—4 armies each consisting of 3 National divisions, each with a National commander—total 4 armies.

Section 3. During the following 6 months the 4 army groups referred to in section 2 above shall be reorganized, creating 4 separate armies each consisting of 1 National and 2 Communist divisions and 2 separate armies each consisting of 2 National and 1 Communist divi-

sions. Thereafter, the organization of army groups shall be terminated.

Section 4. The deployment of the armies at the end of the second 6 months (i. e. at the end of a total of 18 months) shall be as follows:

Northeast China—1 army consisting of 2 National and 1 Communist divisions with a National commander and 4 armies each consisting of 3 National divisions, each with a National commander—total 5 armies.

Northwest China—3 armies each consisting of 3 National divisions each with a National commander—total 3 armies.

North China—3 armies each consisting of 1 National and 2 Communist divisions, each with a Communist commander; 1 army consisting of 2 National and 1 Communist divisions with a National commander; and 2 armies each consisting of 3 National divisions, each with a National commander—total 6 armies.

Central China—1 army consisting of 1 National and 2 Communist divisions with a Communist commander and 3 armies each consisting of 3 National divisions, each with a National commander—total 4 armies.

South China (including Formosa)—2 armies each consisting of 3 National divisions, each with a National commander—total 2 armies.

ARTICLE VI—*Peace Preservation Corps*

Section 1. Each province shall be authorized to maintain a Peace Preservation Corps in proportion to the population of the province but the strength of the Corps for any one province shall not exceed 15,000 men. After it has become apparent that the civil police of any province have been unable to cope with the situation, the governor of that province is authorized to employ this Corps to quell civil disorders.

Section 2. The armament of the Peace Preservation Corps shall be restricted to the pistol, the rifle and the automatic rifle.

ARTICLE VII—*Special Provisions*

Section 1. Executive Headquarters

The Executive Headquarters created in the agreement of the Committee of Three, signed 10 January 1946, shall be the agency through which this agreement shall be implemented.

Section 2. Common Uniform

A common distinctive uniform for the reorganized military forces of China shall be adopted for wear by all officers and enlisted men of the Army of the Republic of China.

Section 3. Personnel System

An adequate personnel system shall be established and the name, grade, and assignment of each officer of the Army shall be carried on a single list without political prejudice.

Section 4. Special Armed Forces

Neither the Government nor any political party nor any group or

association shall maintain, or in any way support, any secret or independent armed force, after the effective date of this agreement.

Section 5. Puppet and Irregular Troops

All troops which were maintained in China under the sponsorship, directly or indirectly, of Japan and all troops maintained by persons or factions other than the Government or Communist Party shall be disarmed and disbanded as soon as possible. The detailed plan (Article VIII, Section 1) shall provide for the execution of the provisions of this section in a definitely limited period of time.

ARTICLE VIII—*General*

Section 1. Upon approval of this agreement by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and Chinese Communist Party Chairman Mao Tse-tung there shall be prepared and submitted to them for approval by the Military Sub-Committee a detailed plan of the schedules, regulations and specific measures to govern the execution of the provisions of this agreement.

Section 2. It is understood and agreed that the detailed plans above referred to shall provide that the demobilization shall start at the earliest practical date; that the organization of service areas shall be instituted gradually and that the detailed procedure of the integration of armies shall be carried out under the provisions of Article V.

It is further understood and agreed that during the initial period of transition, the Government and the Communist Party shall be responsible for the good order, the supply of their respective troops and for their prompt and full compliance with the instructions issued to them by the Executive Headquarters.

GENERAL CHANG CHIH CHUNG

Representative of the Government

GENERAL CHOU EN-LAI

*Representative of the Chinese Communist
Party*

GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL

Advisor

CHUNGKING, February 25, 1946.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Draft Plan for Directive to Executive Headquarters Prepared by the
Staff of General Marshall*²⁸

[CHUNGKING, February 25, 1946.]

1. The Basic Agreement, "Basis for Military Reorganization and for the Integration of the Communist Forces Into the National Army",

²⁸ Discussed by the Military Sub-Committee, with General Marshall, on February 26 and 27.

constitutes the general directive to Executive Headquarters covering demobilization, redeployment, and integration.

2. Executive Headquarters will be the medium for the execution of the Basic Agreement. The Headquarters will form immediately a Control Group for planning, and to supervise the execution of the orders of the Executive Headquarters in these matters. This group will be composed of Government and Communist personnel in equal numbers, assisted by U. S. military personnel. Executive Headquarters will utilize combined field teams to supervise on the ground the demobilization, redeployment, and integration of the Government and Communist Party troops.

3. The reports required by the Basic Agreement will form the basis for detailed plans and schedules prepared at Executive Headquarters.

4. The demobilization will require the gradual elimination of Provincial, Pacification, or other high Military Headquarters.

5. The demobilization of Puppet units will be completed by D-Day plus 3 months. Military equipment and munitions in the hands of these units will be turned in to the local Service Area if established, or as directed by the Ministry of National Defense (or National Military Council).

6. Captured Japanese equipment may be issued to units to be retained in the National Army, but when this is done complete battalions will be so equipped.

7. Executive Headquarters will direct each division designated to be retained by the Government and the Communist Party to assemble in its general area by one month from date of notification of retention, reorganize as an Alpha Plan Division, and initiate a 12 weeks' basic training program pending receipt of more detailed instructions.

8. A school of elementary instruction for the 10 Communist Divisions designated for Army integration in the second 6 months period, will be organized under the guidance of the Interim Military Advisory Group of the U. S. Army to conduct a series of basic courses of 3 months duration in organization, training procedure and administration. Planning for the schools will be coordinated with Executive Headquarters.

9. Movements to effect the necessary redeployment and integration will be directed by Executive Headquarters in accordance with the general directive of the Ministry of National Defense (or the National Military Council). The logistic requirements for the demobilization, redeployment, and integration will be coordinated with the Ministry of National Defense (or the National Military Council). Executive Headquarters is authorized to deal direct with Directors of the Service Areas regarding logistics problems.

10. Executive Headquarters will prepare the detailed logistic and administrative plans for personnel to be demobilized to cover:

- a. Movements prior to separation.
- b. Separation procedures.
- c. Assistance to the Demobilized Manpower Commission in initial movements and supply.
- d. Disposition of equipment.
- e. Procedures for turn-over of demobilized personnel to the Demobilized Manpower Commission.
- f. Such other supply and administrative details as are essential to the accomplishment of its mission.

Plans will be coordinated with the Directors of the Service Areas and with the Demobilized Manpower Commission.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall, General Chang Chih-chung, and General Chow En-lai, at the Office of the Aide to Generalissimo Chiang, Chungking, February 26, 1946, 4 p. m.

Also present: General Kuo General Tung General Gillem²⁹
 General Lien Mr. Chang General Caraway
 General Lee Colonel Caughey
 Colonel Pee Captain Eng

[Here follows discussion of plans for trip to North China by the Committee of Three.]

[GENERAL MARSHALL:] Do you care to discuss these papers. First one is the directive to the Executive Headquarters.³⁰

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang remarks that they haven't been completely translated. Will we discuss item by item?

GENERAL MARSHALL: I thought there might be some general remarks that you might like to make then we can go down item by item.

GENERAL CHANG: No comments.

GENERAL CHOU: No comments.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Is it agreeable if we start in paragraph by paragraph?

General Chang and General Chou agreed.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Paragraph 1.

GENERAL CHANG: We have a little doubt on the interpretation of the word "redeployment" into Chinese.

GENERAL MARSHALL: How about "distribution"?

General Chang and General Chou agreed on "redeployment".

²⁹ Lt. Gen. Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., who was assigned to General Marshall's staff, and who arrived at Chungking about February 22.

³⁰ *Supra.*

GENERAL MARSHALL: That is all right then. That paragraph is all right.

General Chang and General Chou agreed.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Second paragraph.

GENERAL CHOU: General Chou is inquiring about the Control Group. On what level would it be. Would it be on the level of the Operations Division of the Executive Headquarters or on the level of the Combined Staff?

GENERAL MARSHALL: It will be under the Operations Section. What would you say[,] General Gillem?

GENERAL GILLEM: I would say this would be under the Operations Section.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Of course, we have to keep in mind that that entire staff is charged with this responsibility and we are adding to it. This work in part which has no independence of action, but is an integral part of this main staff. It may be when they begin to operate that they would find it more convenient to make some other adjustment and that should be easily authorized accordingly up here. What we are trying to do here is actually do a great deal of their work for them before the responsibility is passed to them. So where this sentence says "The Headquarters will perform [*form?*] immediately a Control Group for Planning", actually as I see it that Control Group is going to be performed up here and turned over to them complete. I think, in view of the fact that the major organization of the group will occur here that the word "immediately" should be struck out. The immediately applies more to us than it does to them and they will be told when they receive this that the organization of that Control Group will occur up here. Are there any other comments on that paragraph?

GENERAL CHANG: With regard to English would it be better to make it uniform and have it read "for planning and for supervising". These two are the first functions of the Control Group.

GENERAL MARSHALL: "for planning and supervision [*supervising?*] the execution", that reads better.

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang suggests to have a slight change on the third sentence, "this group will be composed of Government, Communist and U. S. Military personnel", without specifying that they are of equal number. That is his idea. It is understood that they are of equal numbers.

GENERAL MARSHALL: That is agreeable to me. There won't be equal number of U. S. personnel probably. Take out the words "in equal numbers, etc." It reads, "Government, Communist and U. S. military personnel."

GENERAL CHOU: Of course it is understood that the Government

and Communist personnel will be composed of equal numbers as it is in the other party of the Executive Headquarters.

GENERAL MARSHALL: That is recorded in the minutes. I should explain here for the minutes, our U. S. conception of the work here in relation to the field teams. This Control Group will have certain reports that will be furnished them, you will have the government report of divisions and units, locations, etc. and we will have the Communist list of units, locations, etc. Judging from our experience in such matters, you never can leave any of these things to the report and they will have to check and see if everything is according to the reports. Is the division in this particular location and is all the data confirmed in the report. If they begin issuing orders they must know where it will be. We do that in all our procedure. This paragraph indicates the means of going about that business. In the ordinary routine, the minute they get the list they will start making the plan. While they are making the plan, they will have an inspection confirming the exactness of the data and that will then confirm the plan and the plan will be issued. Then we would finally come to the execution of the plan as issued and again the field teams go out to perform execution. Any other comments on this paragraph?

General Chang and General Chou had no further comments.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Third paragraph.

GENERAL CHOU: In this connection, General Chou likes to point out the significance of going to Hankow and Canton in this trip because when he goes to the field then he will contact the field commanders and explain to them the importance of submitting the necessary reports and he, of course, will collect some of the data at his presence, but the others will be prepared and sent up to him and also they will send staff members to Peiping Headquarters submitting their reports and unless he has some of these people it might be difficult for him to get the necessary reports.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I understand. Third paragraph?

General Chang and General Chou agreed.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Fourth?

GENERAL CHANG: "The demobilization will require the gradual elimination of Provincial, Pacification, or other high Military Headquarters." What does that mean?

GENERAL MARSHALL: As we understand it, in some of the Provincial Governments, they have large military headquarters. Under this system they would not be authorized to have large headquarters.

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang and General Chou both agreed to have Section 4 read, "The demobilization will require the gradual elimination of those headquarters higher than Army Group headquarters."

GENERAL MARSHALL: It will eventually lead to getting rid of higher than army headquarters itself. Army headquarters is the base.

GENERAL CHANG: "The gradual elimination of military commands higher than army headquarters."

GENERAL MARSHALL: The way this reads now is "The demobilization will require the gradual elimination of military commands on a higher level than Army Headquarters." That translates all right?

GENERAL CHANG: Yes.

GENERAL CHANG AND GENERAL CHOU: That is acceptable.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Fifth paragraph. The basic agreement stated the termination for the rapidity of elimination of puppet units. This puts an actual time limit on it. The expression used was "as soon as possible". Now we give them a limit.

(General Chang and General Chou discussed in Chinese on the three month period)

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang and General Chou agree on the three month period.

GENERAL CHOU: General Chou is suggesting whether before the establishment of service areas all the equipment taken from the puppet units should be sealed up—frozen. Whether the equipment should be inventoried and put in the store houses, before the establishment of the service areas.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I don't know what has been taking place here, but I have this comment to make. It seems to me there are two issues here. One is the case of Japanese equipment and one is the case of the other equipment. Now certainly in the latter case of other equipment it should be possible to utilize that to complete the deficiencies of the divisions. Now as to the Japanese equipment you can take that as it is right now and settle on a policy and then try to straighten out the paragraph. We might put an exception in here in the case of Japanese equipment it will be sealed until a formal decision is made as to its disposal. That is concerned in the next paragraph where a provision is made for at least its temporary use. Now all of that is in direct disagreement with the terms of the allied agreement in which I do not think the Chinese Government was consulted. We have destroyed all German equipment and the American troops and the British troops are destroying all Japanese equipment. So we are not perpetuating in any way the production of that equipment on Japanese standards. However, of course, your situation here is quite different from elsewhere because of the dearth of equipment—the shortage. One way to solve this fifth paragraph, at least temporarily, is to place the decision in the hands of the Executive Headquarters, which is a combined group then we can cease our arguments for the time being and let them fight. Is that all right.

General Chang agrees.

General Chou agrees.

GENERAL MARSHALL: "or as directed by Executive Headquarters." That will then read, we will scratch out the words regarding the Ministry of National Defense (or National Military Council) and substitute therefor, Executive Headquarters.

Paragraph 6. I would propose to insert these words after the word "issued", "if necessary as a temporary measure". The paragraph then would read "Captured Japanese equipment may be issued if necessary as a temporary measure to units to be retained, etc."

Discussion in Chinese between General Chang and General Chou.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Would it help matters if we inserted after the word units the four words, "of the 60 divisions to be retained in the National Army". Is that acceptable in that form, "Captured Japanese equipment may be issued, if necessary as a temporary measure, to units of the 60 divisions to be retained in the National Army."

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang raised the point that the problem of how to issue captured Japanese equipment to units seems non-existent now so he doubts whether we should have such an article in this directive. He favors to just scratch the whole paragraph out.

GENERAL MARSHALL: It is rather bad, I think, to just leave that up in the air, and everybody begins disputing whether it is in use. If there is none out it does no harm. If there is some issued, this tells them what to do with it.

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang does not find any such reference in the basis.

GENERAL MARSHALL: These are the detailed plans. We did not put all the details in the basis. The basis says we will reduce the army and equip it. This is a part of the machinery. We are trying to give the Executive Headquarters a basis to solve the problem. Theirs is a concrete proposition.

General Kuo just explained how we had handled the Japanese equipment. The artillery pieces have been issued to units but the Ministry of War is of the opinion that we should not use the Japanese rifles at all because there is a different bore. It is not very advisable for us to use the Japanese rifles because of the difference of the barrel so we may use the Japanese artillery pieces but we will not use the rifles nor the automatics.

GENERAL MARSHALL: How would this change of the paragraph be considered. "the use or employment of Japanese equipment may be directed by the Executive Headquarters, if found necessary as a temporary measure, etc." Now General Chang, as I understand, states that they are using some artillery and they do not wish to use rifles or automatic rifles. Now if we do not have a paragraph in there,

they do not know whether they can use the artillery or whether or not they use the rifles. Now if some such paragraph as I have just suggested is included then so far as the Government is concerned they all have to notify their one commander that they do not support any use of the rifle and automatic rifle. Otherwise, we have got to say here, you can use certain artillery and you can use this equipment and you cannot use other equipment and that becomes a highly involved matter. Perhaps we do not know the total stores of ammunition. There has to be a stock taking of all this equipment. We can strike out this paragraph, but we will have to do it later if we don't do it now, because Executive Headquarters is going to be faced with this problem. On the other hand, they should have some basis for their decisions and on the other hand we are not prepared with the data for detailed decisions and I do not think we should make detailed decisions anyway. The Government has a means of notifying its commanders in elaborate detail of its policy about this and he just stands by that statement. Unless the decision is taken here that no Japanese of any kind anywhere is to be used and then we just make the flat statement. If we do not decide to do that then we have to do something like this or we have just left a vacuum. Now my last proposal was that we have been very definite where the division comes from and we make it dependent on the necessity and under the wording I proposed it would be perfectly possible to restrict the use of rifles or automatic rifles. I don't know what the situation is in regard to trench mortars. I will read again the wording I proposed. ["The issue of employment of Japanese equipment may be directed by the Executive Headquarters, if found necessary as a temporary measure to units of the 60 divisions to be retained, etc."]

GENERAL CHOU: Directed or issued.

GENERAL MARSHALL: ["The issues of employment of Japanese equipment may be directed by the Executive Headquarters if—"]

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang had two remarks to be made here regarding that section. First, it did not appear in the basic plan any provision about captured Japanese equipment. Secondly, if some provision would be provided here it would be extremely difficult to carry it out. As a matter of fact it is a very delicate point because the Communist troops may have some Japanese equipment, but the Government troops also accepted a part of the Japanese equipment. They issued those to the respective units and we have to collect them and re-issue those equipment to the different units that will constitute a very complicated task. General Chang laid emphasis that is a very difficult and complicated thing to do. General Chang suggests to omit that whole section with a view that the Executive Headquarters may come across extreme difficulties in handling that point of issue

because being very delicate it is now very difficult to find out where the equipment is now, to which units they were issued. It would take ages for the Executive Headquarters to do that work alone. General Chang suggest that we omit putting some sort of provision in the minutes that if that point of issue will arise then we will refer to the minutes then as to the issue and until that time we will just drop the subject.

GENERAL MARSHALL: In the first place, this referred to the 60 divisions to be retained in the service. The divisions to be demobilized present no problem. Their equipment is collected when they are demobilized by the terms of the agreement. This paragraph doesn't refer to change the equipment around among those divisions who are now in the service who are of the 60. It is perfectly agreeable to me to put a statement in the minutes.

What is General Chang's definite proposal for the minutes.

[**GENERAL CHANG:**] General Chang adopted your last proposal to be added in the minutes.

GENERAL MARSHALL: In other words all that is said here will go into the minutes and not put in the instructions to the Executive Headquarters. Is that acceptable to General Chou?

GENERAL CHOU: Of course, the minutes will be transmitted to the Executive Headquarters.

GENERAL MARSHALL: It is understood and agreed that in the case of Japanese equipment, the issue or employment of this equipment may be directed by the Executive Headquarters, if found necessary as a temporary measure to be retained to units of the 60 divisions to be retained in the National Army, but when this is done complete battalions will be so equipped.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Seventh paragraph. After the word "Government" in the first sentence substitute "or" for "and".

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang and General Chou they are both facing the same sort of difficulties and General Chang likes to explain the common difficulties to you. The students are out of control. General Chang and General Chou both understand that it is in your mind that in the second state of the deactivation they have to pick out 50 divisions out of 90 divisions on the government side and 10 divisions out of 18 Communist divisions to be retained, then deactivate the rest. From there will arise some sentimental difficulties—national difficulties, but out of the sentimental because of the peculiar Chinese temperament. We should carry out according to the method raised by you that is pick out 60 divisions out of 108 divisions, but as the sentiments of the officers and men and the personal relations is concerned there will be some difficulties. Take for instance on the reduction of the 18 Communist divisions into 10 divisions as an example. The disposi-

tion of the Communist troops in the coming 12 months will be 3 divisions in the northeast region and 3 divisions in the Central China, 12 divisions in North China and then in the next 6 months then the Communists have to pick out 10 divisions out of those 12 divisions in North China to be retained and deactivate the remaining 8 divisions. Then in the next 6 months a disposition will be one division for northeast region and 2 divisions in Central China and 7 divisions in North China. That means those 3 divisions in Northeast and those 3 divisions in Central China should all be deactivated and then from North China send 1 division to the Northeast and 2 divisions to the North.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Why one division to the Northeast?

GENERAL CHANG: Because in the next 6 months it is stipulated that one division will be sent. You have 3 Communist divisions.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Why?

GENERAL CHANG: Because it is stipulated that [of?] 6 army group those 12 divisions will be the ones picked out.

GENERAL MARSHALL: In other words the 6 army group has you involved. I understand now.

GENERAL CHANG: In that case those 3 divisions can be deactivated [and?] the officers of the 3 divisions will be very resentful and will cause much friction and difficulties. If we try the other way around if the Communist 3 divisions in Northeast China instead of divide them all we reduce it and into one division and apply the same to Central China for those three reduce to 2 and then for those 12 divisions reduce and integrate into 7 divisions then that will be more amicable solution. The same is true to National troops. We cannot just separate the 90 divisions into 50 divisions to be retained and 40 divisions to be deactivated because it would be much better to just reduce the 90 divisions and integrate them into the 50 divisions and that will be a much better solution.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Well I see no objection to doing it like that according to the plan. What I am thinking about is the issue that have been raised specifically as to the Manchurian army of 3 Communist divisions as the best example. In the discussion of the organization of the Army groups I did not think through the matter to the adjustment of reduction from 18 to 10 and from 90 to 50. Before getting going on General Chang's proposal I would like to discuss with you the restrictions which we have imposed that make it impossible to do the easiest thing, for example, in the case of the Manchurian Communist army. I am very hesitant about proposing any modifications so soon after the adoption of the formal agreement, but I don't like to see the Communist forces and the National forces greatly embarrassed by a term of agreement its effect we did not consider in regard to this particular procedure. Now Section 3 of

Article 5 of the basic agreement provides that during the following 6 months, the 4 army group shall be formed and lists the divisions. Now the purpose of this paragraph, of course was to produce army integration that particular time. Do you think it very unwise to consider a modification of the terms of that in the light of this discussion which we would agree to and that would be understood then by both the Government and Communist Party and by the Executive Headquarters which would permit an exception to be made of the basic plan. We would not have to make a public change of these instructions, but it would be a detail of execution. Is it unwise to consider such a matter.

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang agrees. He thinks it is a wise step to be taken not to change the basic plan, put it into the minutes today and in the detailed plan that is with the understanding of the three sides that such a step will be taken. That is in the north-east those 3 divisions will be reduced to 1 and in Central China those 3 divisions will be reduced to 2. Put it into the minutes and embody in the detailed plan instead of changing the basic plan as it is in conflict to the spirit.

GENERAL MARSHALL: It does not change the spirit at all, it is just the execution.

GENERAL CHOU: General Chou has this to comment. Firstly, when he accepted this proposal of forming 4 army groups he was already aware of this difficulty. However, at that time he was thinking that it can be overcome because as General Marshall has explained to him that all the 10 divisions to be retained should undergo a short course of training within the next 6 months and he has thought that we have to call in the divisions in Manchuria and the 2 divisions in Central China to somewhere near the training camp so they can be trained and then sent back at the end of the 18 months so he thought there is no difficulty in accepting this proposition. He thought that this difficulty can be overcome in some way though it is not so easy because at the time when he accepted your proposition he was trying to coordinate it with your training program so he thought that by moving the troops and then sending them back this can be settled. Actually as to the government side he can make the statement that he agrees that the government will not be restricted by this clause because he is fully aware of the difficulty on the part of the government in demobilizing the other 40 divisions and so they would not be restricted by this. Thirdly, he wants to state that at the present time as he has expressed his idea of how the armies should be sent in and others dissolved he still likes to reserve for the time being until after he has talked to the field commanders and he would be much more sure.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Then my understanding is that we will re-

serve decisions as to whether we would formally in our detailed plan modify the terms of this section 3, Article 5. In the meantime we have to consider paragraph 7. I do not believe the way it is written that it proves any difficulty with regard to section 3 of Article 5. It would force us to delay in the general terms of that paragraph. The provision here is very general. I think it is applicable to whatever changes we direct. Unless we strike out the words, "the general area". I would suggest that the expression "by one month from time of notification of retention" be struck out.

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang still has this doubt in his mind. We cannot just list the designation of those 50 divisions to be retained because those 50 divisions will have to be amalgamated, and form the 50 divisions. We may amalgamate number one and number two into one division.

GENERAL MARSHALL: All you have to give us is the number of the divisions and then you go about your own formation. You designate that you are going to keep the 35th division. The Government tells us, and the Communists tell us the number of the divisions and their designation. Now they themselves are going to decide what divisions are going to flow into that. The Executive Headquarters does not tell them you will amalgamate this division and you will amalgamate that. We want them to know the number of that division and then have an agreement with you as to where it is to be located. We can arrive at that by saying where it is eventually to be stationed and where the troops are that are going to compose that division. Executive Headquarters hasn't anything to do with how to put them together.

GENERAL CHANG: Does this number refer to one of the 60 divisions.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Both stages. You have two different phases. You are going to have 90 from 250 and you are going to have 50 from 90. It is the same thing repeated although the Executive Headquarters is at present primarily interested in the 50. That is, it is interested only in the 50 as to organization and is also interested in the fact that you are only to have 90 at the end of 12 months. The organization of the 50, the limit of 90 in 12 months. On the Communist side they are interested in the 10 for retention and they are interested to see that you only have 18 at the end of 12 months, and we say here that those that are to be retained would take a certain type organization, and will start with a certain type of training. Now when they start would depend on when you get them together.

General Chang and General Chou agreed.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Paragraph 8 and I will also say, "shi shi".³¹

GENERAL CHANG: After all, the professor is in full control of his students.

³¹ Meaning "okay."

General Kuo brought up another point. It is stipulated in section 7, organized as an Alpha division and the strength of that sort of division will not have the strength of 14,000. Believes in the first stage we can reduce to Alpha division.

GENERAL MARSHALL: The strength is more than that of the Alpha division. 14,000 is more than the number of the Alpha division, I understand.

GENERAL CHANG: The strength of the Alpha plan is only 10,993.

GENERAL MARSHALL: In other words it is 11,000 so you will have 3,000 there to be accounted for.

GENERAL CHANG: The proposal is that we shall adopt a division comprising 2 brigades, each brigade with 2 regiments. That means 1 division will be 4 regiments. According to the Alpha plan infantry regiment consists of 2,650 officers and men so adding 2,650 to the 11,000 you will come to just less than 14,000.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Before you decide on that I would like to make a comment. I do not know what the eventual type of division for China will be. If you have already made up your mind about that that throws this light on the matter. We have not yet done that about our divisions. We are still trying to figure out what is the correct division and we are going to make quite a few changes. Now if you have already determined your future type division, has that been determined?

GENERAL CHANG: No.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Then if you have not determined that, then all you have to permit is overstrength.

GENERAL CHANG: General Kuo just said that the National forces now organized into 90 armies so we have to have some means to bridge over the difficulties from organizing those 90 armies into 60 divisions, so we adopted an interim organization of two brigades of four regiments. That doesn't mean that that would be the ideal division.

GENERAL MARSHALL: It is all right to change this from Alpha plan to new divisions. I wish also to add this comment to the future of Chinese armies. We have a war strength and a peace strength. We cannot afford to maintain units at their war strength. If your division had a total strength of 14,000 I should imagine that a few would be reduced to, we will say 10,000. Ours will probably run between 8 and 9,000 because we won't be able to get enough money to support a larger unit. However, as I understand this it is an interim arrangement. We could scratch out that whole thing. Reorganize as an Alpha Plan division. We would scratch out the words "reorganize as an Alpha Plan division" and it remains a limitation of 14,000. Then you have the type division you want. Now unless there is objec-

tion by General Chou it will greatly add to convenience of arrangements if the Communist divisions were of the same type, so as soon as the National Government gives us a formal statement of the type division they wish during the interim period, we could turn that over to the Communists and they could produce the same kind of division.

Then in this paragraph after the words, "general area" all is struck out down to the word "and". "To assemble in its general area and initiate." Is that acceptable as amended. Is that correct?

General Chang and General Chou agreed.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Paragraph 8. The expression is used in the first sentence, "in the second six months period". It should read, "in the final six months".

GENERAL CHANG: Do you mean by school, a school for officers or for enlisted men?

GENERAL MARSHALL: It will be both.

GENERAL CHOU: It is not the whole division.

GENERAL MARSHALL: No.

GENERAL CHOU: General Chou asks if the 3 months is for each course.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Yes, that is just the length of the course.

GENERAL CHOU: General Chou has no further comments.

General Chang agreed.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Paragraph 9. In the first sentence the expression is used will be directed by Executive Headquarters. It should be changed to read "ordered".

GENERAL LEE: In the last line the word logistics should be logistic, shouldn't it.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Yes. Any comment?

General Chang had no comment.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Paragraph 10.

GENERAL CHANG: Shouldn't that be 9 instead of 10.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I am using this reference on the paper. We will have to renumber them all afterwards. I haven't the numbers yet. In paragraph *c*, it refers to a Demobilized Manpower Commission. Now we have another paper separate from this to be considered which is the request for the reorganization of such a commission. So this paragraph, of course, not only depends on that paper but it depends on the approval of the proposition by the government. That would have to be the understanding in considering this paragraph. Have you any comment to make.

GENERAL CHOU: Can you just briefly explain the nature and the functions of the Demobilized Manpower Commission.

GENERAL MARSHALL: In order to provide adequate work for large number of demobilized army personnel, it is recommended that a

Demobilized Manpower Commission be established immediately. This commission should coordinate its activities with the government, the Communist Party, the civilian and the relief agencies and with Executive Headquarters. It should be prepared to operate in all parts of China. It should classify demobilized personnel as employable or unemployable. A special effort should be made to place demobilized personnel in private industry. The unemployed should be given adequate care. Now the government has a plan for governmental work such as dike construction, restoration of communications, road construction and a great many things of that character. However, that is largely engineering that pertains to job of working. It seemed to us there should be some group that deals with the personnel with relation to the work. This is in the form of a suggestion for action by the government and it only deals with the general character of the commission. We advise the government the commission should be prepared to operate in all parts of China. We give three very general directions or suggestions as to functions. To classify the personnel as employable or unemployable. To make a special effort to place individuals in private industry. That takes a burden off the government work which possibly cannot care for them all and then another provision is suggested that the unemployable should be given adequate care. All those three suggested provisions refer to decisions which will have to be taken on a higher governmental level, and I would assume it is not for us even to suggest. We do say that we think this commission should be ready to operate within a certain time because we are going to release a flood from the demobilization, by our action a flood of individuals begins to flood out of the army into China for general employment somewhere. We do know the rate of the flow of that flood. Therefore we advise that the commission should be prepared to operate within 2 months. Does that answer your question, General Chou?

GENERAL CHOU: Yes.

GENERAL MARSHALL: That expresses in comparatively few words what we are writing a book about in the United States and fighting on every page. We call it the Veterans Bureau.

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang asks about the paragraph *a*. Whether by movements prior to separate you mean the assembling of troops.

GENERAL MARSHALL: That is right. That is the assembling of troops who are to be demobilized getting them into collection points where they will then be demobilized. That is before he will be demobilized.

General Caraway accepts this modification of *a*. "Movements of units prior to demobilization."

GENERAL CHOU: The second point, *b*, is still separation.

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang likes to raise the question whether the Executive Headquarters will handle the demobilized personnel or they just draw up a plan and leave the supply districts to handle them.

GENERAL MARSHALL: It will be handled by the army commander or the division and then as the personnel leave the division, and becomes merely an individual then he would pass into the area command. Part of the procedure is a divisional procedure. Part of *a* is divisional. Most of *b* is divisional. All of *d* is divisional. Part of *e* may be divisional. Now after these schedules and regulations have been approved the Executive Headquarters then issues to the units concerned through whatever command channels still remain in existence. In other words, there are certain higher commanders that are in existence now and they do not all cease at the same time so Executive Headquarters issues its instructions through the proper channels. The division commander carries out a certain portion of those until the man has separated himself from the division and is moving on his way to wherever he is to go and in whatever manner he is being handled, that is all within the divisional staff. The last phase of the divisional part would be the division commander and his staff remaining—nothing else left. Suppose the men of his division come from several parts of the country. Does that exist?

GENERAL CHANG: Yes.

GENERAL MARSHALL: He would be directed to group them according to the part of the country they come from and see that they had commanders who came from that part of the country. Now he starts them on with orders which have to be in liaison with the area director. To the men there to go on engineering work of some kind. He groups the[m] accordingly. He starts them off in accordance with the directives and they are picked up by area commanders so they will get to the proper place without confusion. He has taken in the weapons and those are turned over to the area director or some such procedure as that. It might be that one division commander was directed to turn over all his equipment to an adjacent division which might be retained in service. Part of it is divisional and then it is in accordance with where they are to go and what the method is to handle them. This is merely a rough outline. Now when the Chinese members join this group they have to interpret this into the manner that is acceptable to your practices. This merely outlines a responsibility of the Executive Headquarters. For example, in the last sentence it directs the Executive Headquarters to coordinate all they do with the directors of the Service areas and also with the Demobilized Manpower Commission if there is such a commission. This is merely a very

general statement which has to be translated into Chinese practice and Chinese custom.

GENERAL CHANG: Regarding the employment of demobilized personnel they will certainly constitute a very important question. The government has worked out a plan to employ the deactivated personnel. General Kuo will give a description of that plan.

GENERAL KUO: In this country the deployment of enlisted men will not constitute a very serious question because they come from the land and they just go back to the land. But the officers are professional soldiers, they come from all over the country. So we have to take care of the officers more than the enlisted men. National forces have undergone deactivation in the past here. We have deactivated 111 divisions and 29 brigades. We had no difficulties in handling the enlisted men but all the officers we organized them into Officers Corps and more than 20 of those establishments have been set up accommodating 100,000 officers. Then out of those 100,000 deactivated officers, we have to resort to individual employment. That is, find some places in the civil police, as officers, or in the Ministry of Communications, to be officers of communications police. What you have mentioned just a minute ago about finding employment at private industry is more or less out of the question because in this country very little private industry is in operation. The remainder which cannot find any place to go have undergone some sort of vocational training so they are fitted to do some other business. They have to get a training and find employment in some other respect. In the past we can well state that after the deactivation is carried out according to this plan there will be over 100,000 officers which we have to find positions for. Putting together the 100,000 mentioned in the deactivated officers in the past and those in the future there will be over 200,000 officers. We can only have 10,000 of them to have more military training in order to [make?] them into officers in the retained army. The balance have to find positions either in the Ministry of Communications, Ministry of Interior—a certain number will find employment in those Ministries. Then the remainder will have to have some vocational training. That is as far as the deactivated officers are concerned and the individual redeployment is concerned. We will handle it in that way. Then in the deactivation to be carried out in the 18 months, we will again have the officers, there will be some deactivated enlisted men—however those in the whole are ready to go back to the land, but there will be some left, so the government is now preparing a collective redeployment plan for those enlisted men. The collective redeployment for enlisted men will be organized into some form of units to be led by the deactivated officers to a specific area to do some construction work or engineering, such as repairing

roads, railroads, etc. As to the number of those enlisted men which we will include in that collective redeployment plan we cannot figure that out until we can find out who is going to get a civilian job and who are to go back, then we can calculate the exact number.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Thank you.

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang thinks that it is sound for us to give the Executive Headquarters some policies regarding the deactivated personnel, but regarding the implementation, perhaps we have to leave that to the combined staff to work out a detailed plan and by doing that the Ministry of War can provide some very able data, judging from our past experience.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I suggest that it is so late we reserve any further discussion on this paragraph until tomorrow and I would be interested in having the General make a draft of how he thinks it ought to read and if General Chou has any conception he wishes to make I would appreciate his having a draft. Will you meet tomorrow.

GENERAL CHANG: How about 10 o'clock?

General Chou agrees.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Fine.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Minutes of Meeting of Military Sub-Committee, February 27, 1946,
10 a. m.*

Present:	General Chang	General Chou	Gen. Marshall
Also present:	General Lee	General Tung	General Gillem
	General Kuo	Mr. Chang	General Caraway
	General Lien		Colonel Caughey
	Colonel Pee		Capt. Eng

GENERAL MARSHALL: We would like to hear General Kuo's suggestion regarding this paragraph 9.³² In paragraph 7 of the English revision, the second line, the word "first" should be "last". Have you any comments?

GENERAL CHANG: General Kuo is representing the Ministry of War in making a tentative section 10. Executive Headquarters will prepare the detailed and logistic plan for the submission to the government.

a. Statistical study of the demobilized personnel classifying them into retired, individual employment and collective employment classes. (When retired they go back to the land; individual employment

³² Of the draft of directive to Executive Headquarters for the implementation of the agreement of February 25 on military reorganization, not printed.

is in the Government or in the police or other vocation; and collective employment is the building of dikes, railroad construction, etc.)

b. The supply and care of demobilized personnel together with the collection of their equipment.

c. The handling of demobilized personnel including the issue of traveling allowance and other procedures.

d. The organization and the processing of those demobilized personnel which will be classified into individual employment and collective employment. To organize them in the process. The concentration, organization and processing of those demobilized personnel into the individual employment and collective employment categories.

e. The training and employment of the personnel under the individual employment category. The transportation and redeployment of the collective employment personnel.

f. Attend to the supply and other administrative details that are necessary in the accomplishment of its mission.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Are any of those stipulations that might not be appropriate for Executive Headquarters to be concerned with?

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang and General Kuo understand that Executive Headquarters will prepare a detailed plan covering those points. They will not actually be responsible for execution. General Kuo suggests that we have an organization for handling the demobilized personnel. The responsible officer may be included in the combined staff to study the detailed plan so that he can coordinate the plan worked out by the Executive Headquarters to that worked out by the Ministry of War.

GENERAL MARSHALL: In paragraph *e* of the original paper it states "procedures for turn over of demobilized personnel to the Demobilized Manpower Commission". Now it seemed to me that some of the matters that General Kuo had in his list pertained to things that Executive Headquarters should not do or should not plan for. It seemed to me there were matters included there that pertain to a higher level of governmental planning. I think we have to keep Executive Headquarters very clear of things that pertain directly to the Ministry of National Defense or other governmental agencies. With us it would not be the Ministry of National Defense that would attend to those matters that we visualize under Demobilized Manpower Commission. That would be another agency of the government because it is not war making. We should be very careful to give Executive Headquarters only the things that are necessary to carry out this general program of demobilization, reorganization and integration, but at the same time we ought to be very careful not to give them authority that does not pertain to their direct business. I would like to have General Caraway have an opportunity to study General Kuo's suggestion and in the meantime I would suggest that we take what was paragraph 10 and which is now paragraph 9 and

terminate it with a period after the word "demobilized" in the first sentence. Then we can get into the details. You strike out the words "to cover" at the end of the first sentence and all that comes after that. Then that leaves these details to be worked out. I presume General Kuo will have to deal with the details as will General Caraway. Is such a procedure acceptable to General Chou?

GENERAL CHOU: Yes.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Have you any comments to make about this matter we are striking out, General Chou? I asked you yesterday for some.

GENERAL CHOU: General Chou has first intended to say a few remarks on the Demobilized Manpower Commission, but since this is to go out now he has no comments.

GENERAL MARSHALL: We would be very glad to have his comments when we take that single paper. Is this directive as now modified acceptable?

General Chang and General Chou agreed.³³

GENERAL MARSHALL: I would like, if agreeable to you gentlemen, to discuss next a proposed letter to the President of China regarding the organization of the service areas.³⁴ Is that agreeable? Are you agreeable to sending a letter on this subject to the President? I am not discussing about the contents, just the letter.

GENERAL CHANG: After the signing of the basic plan, General Chang submitted it with a report from himself to the Generalissimo requesting the Generalissimo to issue instructions to the different responsible agencies—Ministries to carry the terms out.

GENERAL MARSHALL: That is agreeable to General Chou?

GENERAL CHOU: Yes.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Any suggestions regarding the first paragraph?

GENERAL CHANG: There is a change of Chinese translation. (After a brief discussion in Chinese General Chang agreed with paragraph 1). Does this service areas "will be organized" mean that 8 service areas [are?] to be organized and set up simultaneously?

GENERAL MARSHALL: Paragraph 3 states that. The service areas will be prepared to function on duties specified by Executive Headquarters. They have to start to do it now. We are making a distinction between the procedure of setting them up and the time they start to operate. The longer they are in a position of being set up and not having to operate, the more efficient they will be when they start.

³³ For text of directive to Executive Headquarters, signed March 17 but dated March 16, see *United States Relations With China*, p. 626.

³⁴ Draft paper entitled "Organization of Service Areas" of February 27, not printed.

GENERAL CHOU: General Chou suggested to change the first sentence. "The preparation for organization of the service areas shall be started immediately", because as it is with Chinese translation [it] will imply that all those service areas will be organized and will be in the field.

GENERAL CHANG: General Kuo just pointed out that we have in existence 10 service areas, so it implies only a process of reorganization.

GENERAL MARSHALL: The first sentence will then read, "The preparation for the organization of the service areas will be started immediately." I want to strike out four words in the second sentence so that it will read "they will have functions" and the words "be established and will"—the next is unnecessary. Is that all right now as modified? "The preparation for the organization of the service areas will be started immediately under the Ministry of National Defense (or National Military Council). They will have functions as specified in Basis for etc." Is that acceptable?

General Chang and General Chou agreed.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Paragraph 2—is that all right?

General Chang and General Chou agreed.

GENERAL MARSHALL: This paper then is adopted. I suggest that we next consider the proposal to the President regarding the Peace Preservation Corps.³⁵ Paragraph 1. I suppose you want to strike out the words, "the basic agreement."

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang and General Chou both share the feeling that they have to collect some data first before considering that paper so they both like to ask you to postpone on this paper.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I would like to make this one comment, for your later consideration of the paper. It has been suggested to me that the limitation in strength be set to a basis of one battalion for each two million people which might not be satisfactory for some extensive areas with small population. It would be my suggestion to meet that if there is such a necessity by adding a sentence to paragraph 2 stating in effect that "exceptions to this provision would be made on the specific direction of whatever agency you think is proper". This is the general rule then. The exception would have to be specifically authorized. Then my understanding is that we put this aside for later consideration.

Would you care to discuss the proposed memorandum to the President regarding Demobilized Manpower? ³⁶

GENERAL CHANG: Both General Chang and General Chou agree that

³⁵ Draft paper entitled "The Peace Preservation Corps" of February 27, not printed.

³⁶ Draft paper entitled "Formation of Demobilized Manpower Commission" of February 27, not printed.

they would like to study the Demobilized Manpower further. They will collect some data. The government side—the Ministry of War—has worked a long time on that and we re-request that we discuss the paper when we return from the inspection trip.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Then if it is agreeable we will set that paper aside for later discussion. Now at this time I would like to outline what appears to me to be the best procedure in going ahead with the measures we have now approved. There is a slight difference of opinion as to what is the best way to manage this and I am stating my views and I would like to have very frank statements from you gentlemen and also from General Gillem who will be concerned with it and General Caraway who has been working on the details without any hesitation with disagreeing with me.

I think that at the present time, the Government should designate some officer, I should imagine, General Kuo, and General Chou designate some officer or more than one if they are available to start work with this small group of American officers that have been struggling with this problem. They have not the data at this time for specific schedules, but they can begin to draft regulations. I think it is very important that the regulations and general instructions be very carefully considered here where their proper integration with the method and procedures of the Chinese military headquarters, the National Military Council and the administrative headquarters of the Communist party in military matters, so that the language is understandable both in Chinese and English as to its exact meaning and so that the matters directed are in keeping with the existing methods of the Chinese in so far as possible. These conclusions will be the actual operating basis for a tremendous conversion in the Chinese Army. I am concerned to see that as far as it is possible to carry into effect some of the American ideas we have put forward that it should be done in accordance with the Chinese methods and procedure. All of our American officers have been very carefully and extensively educated—all of them in a system of operating procedure and in a system of military education and instruction. Their methods and general procedure are so well established that they are almost habits of life. I wish to be certain that in the generous manner with which you meet our various proposals we do not become involved in directives or procedures that would be very awkward according to the Chinese habits and systems. The entire procedure and task before us is a monumental one. You are accepting the proposition of westernizing your armies according to our democratic system and at the same time undertaking a vast demobilization, so I think it is very important to give the most careful consideration to an effort to solve this problem with as little variance to Chinese methods and traditions as possible. Now for

these reasons I would like to see this group gradually integrated here with the American officers and the representatives of the National Government and of the Communist Party and the problem very carefully considered on a combined basis before transfer to Peking. I think the time for such transfer should be in a very few days after the receipt of the first schedules. I think the representative of the Government with this group and the representative of the Communist Party with this group should endeavor to obtain advance information regarding the units that are to be demobilized in the first month. We have a time limit on the data for the first two months or [*of?*] three weeks but any advance information that would help us with the first month would greatly expedite the entire procedure. It should be very easy to establish a liaison basis with the Executive Headquarters during this interim period whereby we could call on them for field information when it is desired. General Chang, I would be interested to have your comments.

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang thinks those remarks made by General Marshall are very sound and we should carry it out according to the spirit he has just described. It is very clearly stipulated in Article 4 in the basic plan³⁷ that within a certain period of time special lists or reports should be sent to the Military Sub-Committee so that now it is a question that both sides have to carry the terms out without any reservation and within the time stipulated. It is further stipulated that within the stipulated period, that is 3 weeks and 6 weeks, we have to submit to the Military Sub-Committee data (lists and reports) and then the Military Sub-Committee on receipt of that data has to work out a detailed plan and after approval by both sides then it should be submitted to the National Military Council (or Ministry of National Defense) for execution. So now it boils down that what we should do is to stick to the provisions in that article and carry that out without reservation. General Chang thinks it would be a very good idea to have some sort of detailed plan by the combined staff. He feels that there are bound to be some difficulties that will certainly arise, but if every party concerned will stick to the spirit in reaching that basic plan, he doesn't think there is much difficulty in complete accord and working out some plan. General Marshall just explained that all the American staff officers have undergone strict training and careful study in the process of handling things and General Chang quite appreciates that fact, but he says that in the future relations among the family of nations, it will be more closely a matter of military cooperation between many countries and we should admit that Chinese staff officers may not have reached such

³⁷ Agreement of February 25, p. 295.

a high standard as American officers. General Marshall is very considerate to state that American staff officers should take notice of existing practice of handling things by the Chinese staff officers, but in the other respect the Chinese staff officers, being not so well trained, have much to learn from American staff officers. We should not stick to our standards without making any progress. General Chang reiterates that General Marshall is so kind to state that the American staff officers should respect or take notice of the existing Chinese practice. Referring to that, General Chang wishes to express his thanks on behalf of the Chinese Army to the American staff officers for they are working hard for us—not for themselves, but for us. General Chang appreciates their hard work very much and General Chang further states that all the staff officers of the Ministry of War or the Department of Military Operations will have the greatest extent of cooperation to arranging things with the Communist officers and at the same time they will also show greatest respect for the opinions and views of the American staff officers that a very amicable result will be reached. Now the Government officers, and General Chang thinks also the Communist officers, will make a careful study based on the data and make a study for the preparation of a detailed plan. General Chang likes to assure you that we will never cherish prejudice in this direction and we will work for the Chinese Army. We hope that the plan worked out will be in complete accordance and we will not be prejudiced and we will make things easy.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I appreciate very much what General Chang said. I am going to impose on him to give him my own education of this sort of business. In the First World War, I was Chief of Operations in an Army of about a million men. They were fighting in the Meuse Argonne battle. Tremendous artillery requirements were part of such a battle. We were almost completely blocked by a destroyed zone 6 kilometers wide and 40 kilometers long. I don't think there was a space the size of this table that hadn't been struck by a very heavy shell. Roads had vanished and villages were completely levelled and could hardly be located, so the most urgent requirement of the battle was a railway line across the 6 kilometers. I had one of our greatest railway engineers carrying out the construction. The French objected very strenuously to what he was doing. He thought they were insisting on a type construction that would give them a good railway after the war. There was a complete failure to understand each other. It resulted in the delay of the battle by five days. The Frenchman was never able to make him understand what the real trouble was that he foresaw. Just as I am afraid that some of your officers in their politeness may fail to make clear as to what the trouble is. We opened up the railroad and started forward with the ammuni-

tion and every train went off the tracks. The French coupling is about that long (holding his hand up to denote the length) and is held about 21½ feet and an American train could have gone right over that track. So the rough places in the track threw the cars right off the track. So we had to reconstruct the entire line. It took five days. Our advance was completely stopped as we had limited ammunition for the guns. The American was outraged that the Frenchman hadn't told him what the trouble really was. The Frenchman said he thought anybody would understand that, but they stopped the battle for five days. I am not trying to encourage argument here, but I do think you have to be very careful that you see that you have made clear the picture on what the situation and methods are and the American officer will have to be very careful to make clear what he is trying to get at, what is the purpose for this particular thing. I do not want Chinese methods unnecessarily disrupted. On the other hand I think some of the systems should be probably completely changed. General Chou?

GENERAL CHOU: I agree with General Marshall's comment that in many things we want to have smooth cooperation, but we must first make everything clear so that the work can go on smoothly. On our side we have many weaknesses and therefore we must make it very plain that in order to change the Chinese military system and to adopt the westernized democratic system this change is tremendous for the Chinese Army and I share General Chang's view that the Chinese officers have much to learn and I also feel confident that they will get to learn all this, but while we make a study of this, there will be many matters which will not be understandable to them and that must be very clearly explained. Now China is economically backward country and accordingly their habit of living is also low and the efficiency is also low and many things they do are not accurate and all this should be overcome. As to the Chinese Communists they have been staying a long time in the rural areas and therefore it can be expected that they will do things rather slowly and sometimes it is also difficult to collect all the data and their accuracy is rather low. Therefore, we must make all efforts to overcome this. I hope the American friends will understand this point and will help them to overcome it. We will try to select those best officers who are eager to learn and have determination to overcome the difficulties and are hard working fellows. They will then cooperate with the government and the U. S. officers and I am confident that they will have the spirit of study and at the same time our people will be frank and so as to promote mutual understanding and have all the problems settled. They will not be purely polite. During the time when we will be on the

inspection trip General Tung will be here and tomorrow as soon as I arrive at Peiping, I will send the Vice Chief of Staff of the 18th Group Army from Peiping to Chungking so that they will stay here to work with the Government officers as well as with General Gillem and General Caraway so that the work will not be stopped during this week so that they can go on to the details.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Have you any comments, General Gillem?

GENERAL GILLEM: I am very grateful to General Marshall for letting me attend these meetings. My being present at the time the policies are formulated gives me a better impression of my mission later. I give assurance that I will give every consideration in those problems which concern our mutual interest and I hope that when you know me better you will understand that we can approach the problems without regard to each other's personal feelings. I have seen the problems with regard to demobilization of the American Army and therefore have some idea of what we could do in our country—in America. We have some procedures that might be useful here, but every endeavor will be made to adjust to meet the conditions which exist in China.

GENERAL MARSHALL: It might be well for me to state that General Gillem at one time was the commander of all armored forces in the United States and the head of the mechanical and armored schools. Later he commanded an army corps of 150,000 to 200,000 men that cross[ed] the Rhine and advanced to the Elbe River to the Northwest of Berlin. He met the Russians there and extended his left to the Baltic Sea cutting off the Germans from retiring into Denmark. So he has a very good understanding the school system and the working out of the system on the ground in combat. General Caraway, have you any comments?

GENERAL CARAWAY: No comments, sir.

[Here follows discussion regarding trip to North China by the Committee of Three.]

GENERAL CHOU: Now when we go out on this trip we may expect correspondents and other people to ask us about the status of the Manchurian situation.³⁸ With respect to this and since this basis actually covers Manchuria, I suggest that we give them a uniform answer saying that Manchuria is included in this basis, but as to the settlement of the detailed problems pertaining to the reorganization and demobilization and to the cease fire problem, we will take it up as soon as we get back to Chungking.

³⁸ For correspondence regarding Manchuria, see pp. 712 ff.

GENERAL CHANG: Regarding that point, General Chang has no comments to make. He would like to listen to General Marshall's opinion.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I agree with General Chou's idea, but I would prefer that any question regarding the application of the cease fire order in Manchuria, we merely state that we are considering the matter rather than that we are delaying decision until we return to Chungking. I think General Chou's statement is accurate because we must consider it then, but I do not see any advantage in informing the people the specific moment when we are going to do it.

GENERAL CHOU: Would you say that this is applicable to Manchuria but as to the detailed settlement, we are just considering it.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Here is the way I think we should say it. This basic agreement applies to the Northeast province[s]. Now as to answering any questions regarding the cease fire order as relates to the Northeast province[s] we merely state that we are considering that matter. The question as to when we are going to do certain things in the Northeast province[s] should be answered as exactly as I think it should regarding any other portion of China. That is a detail. The basic agreement is the general terms. The problem is a tremendous one and it will take a great amount of staff work to develop the detailed procedure.

GENERAL CHOU: General Chou has been inquiring about his proposal with regard to the publication about the cessation of publicity fighting.

GENERAL MARSHALL: You mean the battle in the press.

GENERAL CHOU: Last time General Chou has made a proposal and another problem has to be looked forward to.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I thought that was an agreement that had been completed and he was showing me.

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang says the reply is ready and will be forwarded and in principle it agrees with General Chou's proposal.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I have nothing to say except that I hope you agree and that you don't come out the same hole you went in. It seems to me that there has been some improvement except in isolated spots. I am hopeful that the American correspondents that slipped into Manchuria will be able to slide down a railway where the National Army is. I don't know where they are going. They are footloose. I think they have gone to Changchun. I notice they are coming out in releases to the United States with very full details on the situation. Are there any other details?

GENERAL CHANG AND GENERAL CHOU: No.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Then if agreeable to you gentlemen we will adjourn until we meet at the plane.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Meeting Between General Chou En-lai and Others, Chungking,
March 14, 1946*

[Present:]

General Chou En-lai
General Tang [*Tung*]
Mr. Chang Wen-chin

General A. C. Gillem
Colonel Caughey
Captain Horace Eng

Interim Training for Communist Troops for Integration

General Chou said that during the recent inspection tour of the Committee of Three he had discussed at length with Communist commanders in the field the interim training program for Communist troops for integration into the National Army, and that he would summarize the results and impression of such discussions.

Firstly, with respect to the number of trainees, General Chou said that it was his understanding that General Marshall indicated once the feasibility of including company officers in the training program, although the present called for only battalion officers and above, totalling 430. The inclusion of company officers, General Chou said, would more than double that number, as there were 600 company commanders and deputy commanders in the 10 Communist divisions. He continued that if more American instructors were available there would be no problem, otherwise the problem could be solved by training such company officers by the officers who were being trained.

General Chou said that according to the Government's plan for the reorganization of the army, during the process of reorganization, brigades would be formed. According to the present plan, the training of the brigade commanders was not contemplated. If brigade commanders were to be included, then the 40 brigade commanders and deputy commanders of the 10 Communist divisions would be added to the number of trainees.

Secondly, with respect to the 3 month training period, General Chou said that it was his understanding that the first 6 weeks would be devoted to training, and the following month to manoeuvres in the field. General Chou said that a 6 week training period was, in his opinion, too short, and that past training of Communist officers consisted of only tactical training and no staff or organizational training. He asked if it was feasible to combine two classes to be trained, and to make the period of training 6 months.

General Gillem said that the present training plan was designed to give only basic training to the divisions, during the interim period, before they were integrated, and that more detailed and comprehensive

training would become available as soon as the MAG³⁹ was set up. In connection with the number of trainees, General Gillem said that the present plan might be modified to take in more trainees, but that the plan was designed to insure the assimilation of training methods by the commanders of battalions and above who would return to their respective units to spread instruction to their subordinate echelons.

General Gillem pointed out that this was the plan outlined to him by General Marshall, and that the plan envisaged three procedures elementary in nature, namely, infantry, cavalry and staff training, much after the manner of training followed by the United States Army. It was admitted, he continued, that the plan constituted the orientation of the Communist commander to American methods, and that the plan in general would take in three aspects, explanational, demonstrational, and imitational.

General Chou said that he questioned the adequacy of 6 weeks as a period of training on the following ground:

- a. That the translation of instructional materials would require more than half of the stipulated 6 weeks;
- b. That the shortness of the 6 week period would not be sufficient to take in also company commanders;
- c. That the training program under the MAG would cover only training in specially established school, thereby depriving the company commander the opportunity to be trained.

General Gillem said that in drawing up the training plan, the question of the amount of time required for translation work had been considered; that the inclusion of company commanders in the training plan would be discussed with Colonel McClure; and that the training program under the MAG would include special schools for infantry, artillery, and armored training, and a combined school for staff training. General Gillem reiterated that the present training plan represented only an interim training pending the integration of the Army and the establishment of the MAG.

General Gillem continued that the amount of equipment requested was not great; that there was no equipment presently available in the China Theater; and that the amount of equipment requested to arrive in increments according to a schedule would barely meet the requirements of the plan. It was visualized that by the time the divisions were ready for integration, service areas would have been set up, & units would have been demobilized thereby releasing equipment for reallocation.

When asked how long were periods of training for Nationalist troops, Colonel Caughey said that the period of training for Nationalist troops formerly conducted in Kunming was staff training 9 months

³⁹ Military Advisory Group.

and that infantry, field artillery, and mechanical training 6 months; and that the general principle was that American instructors would not go into the field but remain in centrally located training centers.

General Gillem added that the durations of the above mentioned periods would form the basis for determining the length of instruction in school under the MAG, and that the preliminary work to set up these schools would take some time. It might be possible that trainees be sent to the United States for training. Meanwhile, the scope of corresponding schools in the United States would be studied with a view to introducing similar training curricula in China.

General Chou said that he wished to summarize his understanding of this meeting as follows:

a. That the present plan constituted only an interim training for integration;

b. That Communist staff officers would be selected to attend the more advanced schools under the training program of the MAG;

c. That with respect to the number of trainees, General Gillem would discuss with Colonel McClure;

d. That interim training would be instituted on or about the 15th of April;

e. That equipment would arrive in increments according to a schedule, and that necessary equipment would be issued to the divisions for training purposes;

f. That the training center would be located at Kalgan where ample Japanese-built barracks could be utilized.

General Gillem said that with respect to (*a*), (*b*), and (*c*), he agreed, but with respect to (*d*), he was afraid that the target date of April 15 might not be met, and that with regard to (*e*), equipment for unit training in the division would have to come from the reallocation of equipment after the demobilization of divisions, inasmuch as equipment requested would meet only the needs of the training plan for Communist troops for integration into the National Army.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Memorandum by the Chinese Minister of War (Chen Cheng) to
General Marshall*⁴⁰

No. 1480

[CHUNGKING,] March 26, 1946.

In accordance with the provisions under Section 1, Article 4 of the Basis for Military Reorganization and for the Integration of the Communist Forces into the National Army, we are forwarding to you a list⁴¹ of the 90 divisions to be retained by the National Govern-

⁴⁰ For Lieutenant General Gillem in General Marshall's absence.

⁴¹ Not printed.

ment and the order of demobilization of units during the first two months.⁴²

GENERAL CHEN CHENG

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Memorandum by Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., to
General Chou En-lai*

CHUNGKING, March 28, 1946.

MY DEAR GENERAL CHOU: I am informed by my representatives of the Control Group, Executive Headquarters, presently located in Chungking, that the Communist members have had insufficient time to prepare their comments on the Organization of Service Areas⁴³ although that information has been made available to them by you immediately upon your return from Yen-an.

In view of the fact that the organization of the Service Areas appears to be the most important and vital aspect of our demobilization, integration and reorganization plans, I urgently request that you impress upon your representatives in the Control Group the necessity for their immediate consideration and discussion of this matter.

Sincerely,

A. C. GILLEM, JR.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Memorandum by General Chou En-lai to Lieutenant General Alvan
C. Gillem, Jr.*

CHUNGKING, March 30, 1946.

DEAR GENERAL GILLEM: With reference to your memorandum dated March 28 the following is submitted:

a. I have just obtained assurance from General Tung, my present representative of the Control Group, that materials prepared by him pertaining to the Organization of Service Area shall be ready for submission at the coming Monday meeting.

b. In accordance with our conversation on March 27th,⁴⁴ it is my understanding, that for the initial period the Government and Communist forces shall maintain separate SOS systems. Since the Government has now eight SOS areas, the Communist forces need at least to maintain two. As to what measures should be adopted, once the integration is put into execution, General Tung has just worked out

⁴² On March 31 Lieutenant General Gillem replied approving the Chinese plan.

⁴³ Draft (not printed) prepared by General Marshall's staff about February 27 but not acted upon.

⁴⁴ See minutes of meeting of Military Sub-Committee on March 27, p. 606.

a proposition which he will submit to the meeting of the Control Group.

c. I have assigned General Chen Shih-yi to be my representative of the Control Group, when the latter is moved to Peiping. General Chen shall appreciate if you can arrange for him an appointment with Colonel Middleton.⁴⁵

Sincerely yours,

[Signature in Chinese]
(CHOU EN-LAI)

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., to General Chou En-lai

CHUNGKING, March 31, 1946.

DEAR GENERAL CHOU: I have just received the National Government's list of the 90 divisions to be retained and the order of demobilization of units during the first two months.⁴⁶ This list has been submitted in accordance with the provisions of Section 1, Article 4 of the Basis of Military Reorganization and for the Integration of the Communist Forces into the National Army.

It is my earnest hope that your list soon will be submitted in order that the control group here in Chungking may proceed with its detailed planning.

Very sincerely,

A. C. GILLEM, JR.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by Colonel J. W. Middleton to Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr.

[CHUNGKING,] 1 April 1946.

The approved directive to Executive Headquarters contains a statement that each organization to be retained in the Chinese Army will institute a twelve (12) weeks' basic training program. It is believed that such a program can best be prepared by the group now in Nanking under General McClure.⁴⁷ It is suggested the following radio be transmitted:

"To: Commanding General, Nanking Headquarters Command.

Request you prepare a 12 weeks' basic training program for units of Chinese Army to be retained after demobilization. This program is

⁴⁵ John W. Middleton, U. S. A., American representative in Army Reorganization Section.

⁴⁶ Neither printed.

⁴⁷ Maj. Gen. Robert B. McClure, acting head of the Military Advisory Group being organized at Nanking.

for interim training to keep troops occupied during period in which they have nothing else to do and must be capable of being operated entirely by Chinese. Request such a program be delivered to Chungking in one week. Colonel McClure,⁴⁸ of your headquarters, is familiar with the requirements.

Signed, Gillem.”
J. W. MIDDLETON

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by the Chinese Minister of War (Chen Cheng) to Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr.

[Translation]

No. 1719

[CHUNGKING,] April 10, 1946.

DEAR GENERAL GILLEM: Your memorandum dated April 1, 1946, is duly received.

I am sending to you for your reference a tabulation⁴⁹ of the following facts which are now in consideration: the thirty armies, the divisions which constitute the thirty armies and their locations.

Of the thirty armies 15A, 18A, 21A and 26A are to be integrated with Communist troops into army groups. The 18A and 26A must be moved from Central China to North China.

CHEN CHENG

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., to General Chou En-lai

CHUNGKING, 12 April 1946.

DEAR GENERAL CHOU: A recent radiogram⁵⁰ from General Maddocks⁵¹ indicates that a great deal of equipment for the Communist Training Program will be in Peiping by 15 April and that the major portion of the equipment will probably be there by 20 April. Certain items which were not procurable either in the Theater or from the Pacific must come from the United States and that equipment is being collected for immediate shipment. This entire program has been handled as a matter of greatest priority in order to meet the 15 April date.

General McClure, during his recent visit, stated you had informed him that the program could probably not commence before 1 June

⁴⁸ Col. Clinton I. McClure, U. S. A.

⁴⁹ Not printed.

⁵⁰ Apparently No. 28021, April 9, from Shanghai, not printed.

⁵¹ Maj. Gen. Roy T. Maddocks, Chief of Staff, U. S. Forces in China Theater.

due to the difficulties in assembling Communist personnel. Your early comment would be appreciated.

In arriving at your estimate as to your ability to assemble personnel in the training center, please keep in mind that the 15 April date was set in order to allow sufficient time for training personnel of units which later would be integrated in the 4 Army Groups to be established the 7th, 9th, 10th and 11th months according to the Demobilization, Integration and Reorganization plan. General Marshall will be disturbed over any appreciable delay beyond the 15 April date.

For General Gillem :
J. HART CAUGHEY
Colonel, G. S. C.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Chou En-lai to Colonel J. Hart Caughey

CHUNGKING, 14 April 1946.

Your Memorandum dated April 12th has been received. With keen interest we are paying attention to the proceedings of all the preparatory works in regard to the inauguration of the Training Center under the assistance of the United States. However, we are lack of experience, it is desirable that every coordination be proceeded after consultations.

General Chang Tsun-sun, about whom I had informed General Alvan C. Gillem before, had arrived Peiping at the end of March and has since been waiting there for negotiation. General McClure told me that he would go to Peiping on the 10th instant to consult with Chang Tsun-sun, and then both of them would fly together to Kalgan to investigate and prepare every proceeding. But whether they have arrived or not I am not yet informed.

According to General Gillem's estimation the Training Center will start on May 1st, while General McClure said that it would not start earlier than June 1st. I have no idea about this because everything will be decided by substantial conditions, particularly, by the result of investigations made by General McClure and General Chang. I know only that due to inadequacy of communication facilities the officers to attend the Training would not be able to proceed there in time without being transported by planes. All the interpreting officers who would work in the Training Center will also be transported by planes from Chungking, but the exact date of flying has not been scheduled.

The remaining matters will be decided through consultation between General Chang Tsun-sun and General McClure when they meet.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature in Chinese]
GENERAL CHOU EN-LAI

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., to the Chinese Minister of War (Chen Cheng)

CHUNGKING, April 15, 1946.

The Control Group here in Chungking is nearing completion of its detailed planning and will soon move to Peiping to join Executive Headquarters.

It is General Marshall's desire that this Group proceed to Peiping completely organized. It is therefore requested that you designate by name the three or four officers you wish to serve with the Control Group and inform this office.

A similar memorandum has been sent to General Chou En-lai.⁵²

For Lieutenant General Gillem:

J. HART CAUGHEY
Colonel, G. S. C.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by the Chinese Minister of War (Chen Cheng) to General Marshall

No. 1820

[CHUNGKING,] 15 April 1946.

According to article 3, section I of the basic plan of military reorganization and the integration of the Communist forces into the national army the entire army will consist of armies each with three divisions and with supporting troops not to exceed 15 per cent of its total strength. On the basis of organizing altogether 108 divisions the entire army strength should be about over 1,400,000, and the strength of supporting troops accordingly, should be over 220,000.

According to the explanation of U. S. military representatives, the supporting troops of each army includes units directly under that army, units directly under the army headquarters and also SOS units. To avoid difficulties in the actual execution of the plan, it seems that it might be better not to include SOS units in the explanation. In other words, the unarmed SOS units are not to be counted as part of the supporting troops which are not to exceed 15 per cent of the total strength of the army.

The above is brought to your attention with the hope that the matter may be given reconsideration.

CHEN CHENG (SEAL)

⁵² Not printed.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Marshall to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek

CHUNGKING, April 20, 1946.

YOUR EXCELLENCY: There has been brought to my attention your views regarding the supplying of certain equipment for the school to be organized at Kalgan for the preparation of Communist divisions for integration, and the eventual distribution of this equipment among the 10 Communist *divisions* selected for integration into armies during the final six months of the program.

There are two special considerations involved in this matter. First, the origin of the school and second, the procurement of equipment from the United States.

The school had its origin in a suggestion made by me to General Chou En-lai: In the negotiations for the integration of the armies, the Communists steadily maintained that the earliest moment for actual integration would be at the end of the first 12 months. This was unacceptable, in my opinion, because too many changes might occur in the period of a year and I regarded it as very important that the earliest possible start be made to bring Communist troops under a unified command. I had first proposed that the actual integration into *armies* should commence in the 4th month. However, as I gradually learned of the character of the Communist troops—their lack of formal organization, lack of trained staff and lack of normal equipment—I came to the conclusion that a possible explanation of the reluctance of the Communists to undertake integration earlier than 12 months was due to their appreciation of the difficulties to present a division at an earlier date in a state of organization and appearance that would not involve serious loss of face. I therefore experimented by suggesting to General Chou En-lai that it might be possible to arrange for an elementary school for some company officers and higher commanders and their staffs at some point within the Communist zone of occupation, in which a short course would be given by American officers to prepare the Communist officers concerned to effect the formal organization of their troops into regiments and divisions that could at least march and parade in a presentable manner. It was stated that tactical training for field operations was not the purpose of such a school and could not be undertaken.

General Chou En-lai flew to Yen-an the morning following the suggestion and came back with approval for the proposal and, what was more important, the agreement to start the integration in the 7th month instead of the 13th month. The proposal was discussed in

the negotiations of the Military Sub-Committee, of which I was the advisor, and received formal approval, I thought, at that time.

It was plainly evident to me that without such assistance the Communists themselves could not get together their people in an acceptable state of organization in the month specified—the 7th—for the initiation of integration. At the same time I thought it was of high importance that the integration begin at that time and not be delayed.

Such a school requires certain equipment, otherwise it is without purpose, therefore, the urgent necessity for procurement of such equipment in time to get the school promptly started. There follows a statement of the complications and considerations involved in that procurement.

Unless the necessary matériel for such a school is landed in China prior to June 30th, next, there is no hope, I think, of bringing the transaction under lend-lease and it therefore would not only be a complicated procedure but very expensive. I, therefore, while in Washington, made a special effort to arrange for the shipment of the equipment from Japan, the deficit being made up from the United States, all to be landed in Shanghai prior to June 30th. Some 600 tons has already arrived. Now I find your instructions which would terminate that procedure. This would also definitely terminate the implementation of the agreements for the reorganization and integration of the armies and this, of course, would be a very serious matter.

I am submitting this statement in writing in order that you may have a general understanding of the situation prior to a personal discussion I would like to have with you in regard to the matter.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Memorandum by Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., to the Chinese Deputy Minister of War (Lin Wei)*⁵³

CHUNGKING, April 21, 1946.

Reference is made to my memorandum for General Chen Cheng, dated 15 April 1946.

It is contemplated that the Control Unit of Executive Headquarters will move to Peiping, possibly as early as next week. This fact makes it a matter of urgency that the National Government members be appointed to this unit immediately. It is highly desirable that the members to be appointed participate in the planning in Chungking before proceeding to Peiping.

The importance of the duties to be undertaken in Peiping must be kept in mind. Since Executive Headquarters will supervise the

⁵³ A similar memorandum was sent on the same date to General Chou En-lai.

entire reorganization of the Chinese army, the personnel will exercise a great amount of authority and therefore must be highly capable.

A. C. GILLEM, JR.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., to General Chou En-lai

CHUNGKING, April 22, 1946.

Reference is made to my previous memorandum to you on this subject dated 31 March 1946. I again inquire personally of you for the list of Communist units to be demobilized.

It is a matter of urgency that such a list should be in the hands of the Military Subcommittee in order to permit them to continue with detailed planning and in order to fulfill terms of the agreement reached by the Military Subcommittee.

Inasmuch as the National Government list has already been presented⁵⁴ it is requested that the list of Communist units to be demobilized be submitted at once.

A. C. GILLEM, JR.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Hsu Yung-chang to General Marshall

No. 25

[CHUNGKING,] 23 April 1946.

I have the pleasure to inform you that his Excellency, The Generalissimo, has appointed me as acting representative for the National Government on the Sub-Committee of Three. Representatives of the Chinese Communist Party are, too, being informed of the matter.

HSU YUNG-CHANG (SEAL)
*Government Representative,
 Sub-Committee of Three*

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., to General Marshall

CHUNGKING, 24 April 1946.

In response to your request as to the method of settlement for equipment for Communist Training, "War 82174" states that "Equipment transferred for Communist Training will be under straight

⁵⁴ See memorandum by General Chen Cheng to General Marshall, March 26, p. 329.

Lend-Lease.”⁵⁵ Inquiries have been made regarding where to store Communist Divisional equipment until needed.

A. C. GILLEM, JR.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Memorandum by General Shang Cheng*⁵⁶ to General Marshall

No. 86

[CHUNGKING,] 25 April 1946.

Reference is made to your memo of 21 April relating to the equipping and training of ten divisions of Communist troops.

I have the pleasure to inform you that the memorandum was handed down to this Department by His Excellency, The Generalissimo, with the following note:

“As the matter concerns the reorganization of the Communist forces, I would like to confer with General Marshall and examine it before decisions should be made.”

For General Shang Cheng

YU CHI-SHI

Chief of Bureau of Military Affairs

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Memorandum by Colonel J. G. Shinkle*⁵⁷ to Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr.

CHUNGKING, 25 April 1946.

1. There have been submitted to your office in the past two months certain papers which it was anticipated would be acted upon by the Military Sub-committee. These papers are as follows:⁵⁸

a. “Regulations for Demobilization” together with “Annex A” to that regulation.

b. “Regulations for Reorganization, Redeployment and Integration”.

c. “Interim Plan for Formation of Service Areas”.

2. It is contemplated that members of the two Chinese Parties will be appointed in the near future to the Reorganization Section of Executive Headquarters that they and together with those Americans already appointed, will proceed to Peiping. It is suggested that those

⁵⁵ Not found in Department files; it was received at the Shanghai headquarters of the U. S. Army in China on March 29.

⁵⁶ Chief of the Department of Military Protocol, Chinese National Military Council.

⁵⁷ Chungking Army Liaison group, U. S. Army in China.

⁵⁸ None printed.

papers listed above be considered for approval by Executive Headquarters with the object that an attempt be made to have each paper approved by that agency rather than by the Military Sub-committee.

3. It is requested that the suggestion above be approved, that all but one copy of each paper listed above be returned to this office and that no further consideration of the papers be made by the Military Sub-committee unless further requested by Executive Headquarters.

J. G. SHINKLE
Colonel, G. S. G.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Conference Between General Marshall and General Chen Cheng, at No. 5, Ning Hai Lu, Nanking, May 7, 1946, 3:30 p. m.

Also present: Captain Soong
Mr. Shen

General Chen Cheng opened the meeting by informing General Marshall that he was faced with the major task of reorganizing the Chinese army and that he wished General Marshall's advice.

General Chen said that his greatest difficulty was the handling of demobilized officers since these officers, being professional army men, would have no jobs to return to. For instance, out of the 135 divisions reorganized last year, there still remained 30,000 discharged officers without employment. The new army reorganization will create additional difficulties. By the end of the first stage the new army will be reduced to 90 divisions with 490,000 officers. At the end of the second stage, the army will be reduced to 60 divisions with an officer strength of 150,000. This alone creates a surplus to army needs of approximately 300,000 officers.

General Chen stated that the National Military Council consists of 1,180,000 employees. This organization too would have to be reorganized and personnel released who, although not professional soldiers, hold the equivalent rank and have no civilian jobs to which to return. In connection with the reorganization of the National Military Council, General Wedemeyer assisted personally, and more recently with a staff of officers, the Chinese Government in developing an appropriate plan. General Chen stated that a plan typical of U. S. organization had been accepted and that he favored the American system because, (1) military control was separated from political control and (2) there is a distinct separation between planning and execution.

General Marshall asked General Chen what was being done to meet the problem of demobilized officers. General Chen replied that a plan had been developed which envisages placing demobilized officers in

civil governmental agencies; that the Minister of War is coordinating the placing of this personnel. The plan provides for handling certain personnel in a second category which in effect would be a pool from which civil agencies could draw. It is hoped that through this procedure qualified personnel can be put to advantageous use in order that waste might be developed into National production.

General Marshall stated that General Chen had covered a tremendous subject and although he would like to think over the matter he had a few comments. With reference to the reorganization of the National Military Council he cautioned General Chen to apply the plan furnished by the U. S. officers in an intelligent manner in order that it would be suited to the Chinese system. General Marshall indicated that probably the most important consideration was the separation of the military from the political. General Marshall pointed out that ever since the Civil War in the United States the Secretary of War had been a civilian; the reason for this was to further emphasize the separation between the military and the political.

General Marshall stated that one of his principal concerns with reference to the military system in China was the burden of the army on the government. He pointed out that 70% of the total budget—which he understood was the present military allocation—was exorbitant to the point of inviting financial chaos.

With reference to the demobilized personnel, General Marshall suggested the use of colleges and schools to train excess personnel in civilian trades and occupations. This would create the healthy condition of permitting Chinese school system to reap benefit for the good of China at the same time, it trained many citizens. General Marshall stated that consideration should be given to the use of some already organized civilian organization to handle the problem of demobilized personnel; it would be more advantageous to utilize an existing civil organization instead of creating a new army organization to handle demobilized personnel.

General Chen asked General Marshall's advice on the possibility of using military personnel for performing certain civilian jobs such as handling freight on river and rail traffic. He pointed that such a procedure would preclude unreasonable charges now levied for these services. General Marshall pointed out that such a procedure would not assist in demobilizing the army which it seemed to him was the major consideration. He further pointed out that this would tend to involve the army in big business which must be avoided since this would be the first step toward involving it in politics.

General Marshall concluded that he would like to see General Chen Cheng again for the purpose of discussing this matter further.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Memorandum by the Chinese Minister of War (Chen Cheng) to
General Marshall*

No. 1288

[CHUNGKING,] 21 May 1946.

In response to your letter dated 21 April 1946, relegated to this Ministry by the Generalissimo, I wish to present the following opinions:

(1) It seems that the training of cadres of Chinese Communist troops and the equipment for the Communist forces should be taken up separately as a separate problem.

(2) Concurrence is with the establishment of a school at Kalgan first for the training of the cadres of the Communist troops.

(3) Equipment needed for the training school may be supplied to the necessary extent for training of the cadres of the Communist troops which will participate in the general reorganization.

(4) Equipping of the Communist troops could be started after the reorganization when a unified command is established.

(5) In regard to the equipment listed in General Wedemeyer's memorandum,⁵⁹ with the exception of that part required for training which may be issued, they may be turned over to the National Government (as they are Lend-Lease materials) for temporary keeping.

CHEN CHENG
General, CA

**IV. INITIAL PROBLEMS ARISING IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENTS AND THE SITUATION IN MANCHURIA;
RECALL OF GENERAL MARSHALL FOR CONSULTATION (JANUARY-
MARCH 13)**

893.00/1-1346 : Telegram

The Counselor of Embassy in China (Smyth) to the Secretary of State

CHUNGKING, January 13, 1946.

[Received January 13—11:02 a. m.]

99. Three Commissioners, Walter S. Robertson (American), General Cheng Kai-min (Govt.), and General Yeh Chien-ying (Communist) left by plane this morning for Peiping to establish Executive Headquarters to carry out agreements for cessation of hostilities.⁶⁰

⁵⁹ Refers apparently to Lieutenant General Wedemeyer's memorandum No. 901-7 (not found in Department files), presented to President Chiang by General Wedemeyer on his "last trip to Chungking", and "which outlined in general the equipment for the Communist Training Program and requesting [*sic*] that Nationalist Government accept transfer of this equipment for the Communists on a cash reimbursable lend-lease basis."

⁶⁰ Signed January 10, p. 127.

Robertson was accompanied by Sprouse⁶¹ and Miss Davidson. Each Chinese Commissioner was accompanied by staff of 4 persons.

SMYTH

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

General Chou En-lai⁶² to General Marshall

[CHUNGKING,] January 13, 1945 [1946].

DEAR GENERAL: I beg to call your attention to the letter which I wrote to General Chang Chun⁶³ this morning referring to the hostilities actions taken by government troops in Jehol and East Hopei since the signing of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement. You will find enclosed a copy of this letter. As you have been expressing a deep concern over the state of civil strife in China, and the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement was largely brought about through your kind efforts, I trust you will have a deep interest to see that this agreement is not violated. Any influence you may exercise to get the matter promptly straightened out will be highly appreciated.

Thanking you for your kind assistance and cooperation in this matter, I remain

Very sincerely yours,

[Signature in Chinese]
(CHOU EN-LAI)

[Enclosure]

General Chou En-lai to General Chang Chun

[CHUNGKING,] January 13, 1945 [1946].

DEAR GENERAL CHANG: Urgent telegrams just reached me from Jehol and East Hopei via Yenan saying that the fiftysecond Army pushing into Jehol had occupied on the eve of January tenth town capital Lingyuan, and in its continued drive occupied on January eleventh Weichangtze, a village on the midway of Lingyuan and Pingchuan. A second unit of the government troops after previous occupation of Chianping captured on January eleventh village Taiping-chuang, due southeast of Chihfeng. The aforementioned two units are now pushing toward town capitals Pinchuan and Chihfeng. In addition to that the Twentysecond Division and two divisions of the Ninetysecond Army were still marching toward Kupeikou on the twelfth instant, and most heavy fighting was taking place there. As

⁶¹ Philip D. Sprouse, Second Secretary of Embassy.

⁶² Chinese Communist Party member of the Committee of Three.

⁶³ Chinese Government member of the Committee of Three.

regards the Tangshan area, one division of the Ninetyfourth Army is still advancing toward Fengyun, and fought ferociously at the Changchuang village due southeast of Fengyun.

That such most regrettable circumstances should have occurred was either because the Peiping Generalissimo's Headquarters and the headquarters of General Tu Li-ming are purposely delaying the further transmission of the Cessation of Hostilities Order, or because some high-ranking officers at the front are designing at capturing certain advantageous positions,—may be even Chihfeng—and consequently violating the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement. It is my most earnest desire that you will kindly transmit the aforementioned matters to the Generalissimo, and request him to order by the speediest means all troops in Jehol and East Hopei to immediately cease attack and to evacuate places they had occupied after the promulgation of the Cessation of Hostilities Order on the tenth instant.

Thanking you for your cooperation in this matter and awaiting your prompt reply, I remain

Sincerely yours,

CHOU EN-LAI

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

*General Marshall to Colonel Henry A. Byroade*⁶⁴

[CHUNGKING, January 13, 1946.]

42. Incident of Chihfeng and Tolun is subject. I have today received the following copy of a letter from Chou En-lai to Chang Chun:

[Here follows text of General Chou's letter, printed *supra*.]

I suggest that you endeavor to organize and send at the soonest possible moment a sub-headquarters team to Chihfeng to contact the Nationalist column and the Communist armies and advise them of the cease fire orders and to insure that hostilities cease immediately. You will note that units of the Twenty-second Division and Ninety-second Army are reported to be marching toward other places. This sub-headquarters team should proceed to all trouble spots in the area to inform the units involved of the cessation order. It is imperative that these units of both armies now engaging in hostilities be informed of the cessation order without delay to prevent continuation of serious incidents which may jeopardize the entire truce. I suggest that you begin your arrangements to seek an agreement in the Executive Headquarters and dispatch a sub-headquarters team to the above areas immediately on receipt of this message. I desire to

⁶⁴ Subsequently promoted to Brigadier General, in charge of Operations Section of Executive Headquarters.

be informed of all developments in this matter and to be advised of your action by urgent reply. Please acknowledge receipt this message immediately.⁶⁵

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*General Chang Chun to General Chou En-lai*⁶⁶

[CHUNGKING, January 13, 1946.]

MY DEAR GENERAL CHOU: Acknowledgement of receipt is made of your letter dated January 13th, 5:00 a. m.

According to the report received from the Board of Military Operations, National Military Council, orders for cessation of hostilities were issued in the afternoon of January 10th, which were expected to reach the headquarters of the higher commands in that very evening. Since there are too many units and since there are difficulties in communications due to the present over-crowding of telephone and telegraphic lines, such orders for cessation of hostilities will not be able to reach the headquarters of the other Armies and Divisions. But it is estimated that the great majority of them will be able to receive such orders around the 12th, and as soon as they are received, all hostilities will come to an end.

I have previously informed you of the fact that the Communist troops are continuing their fierce attacks on Chaochwang and Lencheng and have requested that such attacks be stopped. According to the report of the Board of Military Operations, the New 4th Army numbering more than twenty thousand men have on the 11th attacked and occupied Chaochwang Coal Mines and Nantaching and thoroughly destroyed them. Recently they have again completely destroyed the railroads in that vicinity, and on the 12th attacked fiercely the Chiawang Coal Mines. More than ten thousand of General Liu Po-cheng's troops have also on the morning of the 12th surrounded Siuwu and Tachihfang south of Siuwu, the attack growing more intensified in the afternoon. Another ten thousand men surrounded Tasiaopo north of Anyang and Wangchia on the 12th, with the clear intention of occupying Northern Honan. It is requested that they be telegraphically instructed to cease the attack at once in order that the order for cessation of hostilities may become effective.

⁶⁵ In telegram No. 43, January 14, not printed, General Marshall telegraphed text of General Chang Chun's reply to General Chou, *infra*, and, referring to telegram No. 42, requested Colonel Byroade to "take immediate similar action in this instance".

⁶⁶ Copy of translation transmitted on January 13 by General Chang to General Marshall.

The above mentioned hostilities must absolutely come to a stop within the prescribed time of 12 o'clock midnight, January 13th, so as not to affect the general situation.

Yours sincerely,

CHANG CHUN

893.00/1-1746

*Memorandum by the Committee of Three to the Executive Headquarters*⁶⁷

We, General Chang Chun, authorized representative of the National Government; General Chou En-lai, authorized representative of the Chinese Communist Party and General of the Army George C. Marshall do hereby instruct the Commissioners of the Executive Headquarters to dispatch immediately a group of three representatives to Jehol and Chahar to report on conditions as they exist at that time.

CHANG CHUN

CHOU EN-LAI

G. C. MARSHALL

CHUNGKING, 14 January 1946.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and Governor Chang Chun, at House 28, Chungking, January 14, 1946, 1: 30 p. m.

Also present: Col. Caughey⁶⁸
Col. Pee⁶⁹

1. Governor Chang Chun opened the meeting by referring to the exchange of correspondence between himself and General Chou En-lai on the 13th of January. (The correspondence in question is General Chou En-lai's letter to Governor Chang Chun stating there was continued fighting as of the 13th on the part of the 42nd Army whose objective appeared to be Chihfeng. Governor Chang Chun answered this letter and in turn, stated the Communists' New 4th Army was also as of that date still fighting.)

2. Governor Chang Chun then gave the following information:

a. Information available to him and stated as being of reliable source indicates presence in Chihfeng of approximately 10,000 local peasants, laborers and farmers organized by Chinese Communists into a military force. That a certain Japanese by the name of Tanaka is responsible for training this force. That armament for this force is supplied

⁶⁷ Copy transmitted to the Secretary of State by General Marshall with covering memorandum of January 17; received January 31.

⁶⁸ Col. J. Hart Caughey, G. S. C., Executive Officer on General Marshall's staff.

⁶⁹ Col. Peter Pee, personal aide to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

by Soviets including 20,000 rifles, 150 heavy machine guns and 25 field pieces. That Soviet troops are present in Chihfeng which exercise command over this local force.

b. That puppet forces at Suchow under command of Ho Pang-chu are being agitated by the Communists and the Central Government is fearful that these forces will join the Communists.

c. Lincheng and Tsaochwang (20 miles due east of Lincheng and location of important coal mine), both towns on Tientsin-Pukow railroad in Shantung province are reported as containing Nationalist troops surrounded by Communists. Air drop is only means of supply to these forces because ground communications, except wireless, are cut off. Central Government is anxious that this block be reduced.

3. Governor Chang Chun then brought up the question of the activation of the Military Sub-Committee to study reorganization of the Armies of China which had been agreed to in the minutes of the 5th meeting⁷⁰ of the Committee of Three.

4. Governor Chang Chun next brought up the question of agreement in the 6th meeting⁷¹ of the Committee of Three to direct the Executive Headquarters to send three-man teams into Jehol and Chahar for the purpose of investigating circumstances existing at that time.

5. With reference to paragraph 1 above, General Marshall was able to inform Governor Chang Chun that action had already been taken on the exchange of letters between Chang Chun and Chou En-lai by forwarding the sum and substance of these letters (42 and 43⁷²) to the Executive Headquarters directing that it send three-man teams to investigate the conditions.

6. With reference to paragraph 2 above, General Marshall informed Chang Chun that he would pass this information to the Executive Headquarters (49⁷³ was dispatched immediately after the meeting). 49 also informed Col. Byroade and Mr. Robertson that General Marshall had gotten agreement from the two sides to refrain from press accusations of failure to observe armistice agreements and asked that the three commissioners should reach similar agreement.

7. With reference to paragraph 3 and 4 above, General Marshall was able to present to Chang Chun for his perusal drafts to accomplish the terms of agreements reached. General Marshall informed Governor Chang Chun that he proposed to sign these agreements then forward them to Chou En-lai for signature and that upon the accomplishment of this would ask General Chang Chun to sign. (At this point General Marshall signed the two agreements, dispatched Colonel

⁷⁰ January 10, p. 104.

⁷¹ January 10, p. 119.

⁷² Telegram No. 43 not printed, but see footnote 65, p. 344.

⁷³ Not printed.

Caughey with the agreements to get General Chou's signature. Colonel Caughey returned with the signed documents at which point Governor Chang Chun signed them. The two agreements, i. e., the directive to the Executive Headquarters⁷⁴ and the memorandums to the Generalissimo and Chairman Mao Tse-tung with reference to development of plans for the Military Sub-Committee for reorganization of the Armies of China⁷⁵ were dispatched this date.)

8. There was an exchange of platitudes and the meeting adjourned at 1550.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai, at House 28, January 14, 1946, 8:30 p. m.

Also present: Col. Caughey
Chou En-lai's Interpreter.

1. General Chou opened the meeting by making the following allegations:

a. That the Nationalist Government issued instructions on the evening of 9 January 1946 to the effect that its field forces should attempt to capture strategic points especially in Jehol such as Chengteh and Chihfeng prior to issuance of the order to cease hostilities.

b. That the Ministry of Operations issued secret orders on the evening of 10 January 1946 stipulating that the cessation order would become effective on 16 January 1946 on all fronts.

c. That General Tu Li-ming issued orders to the 54th Division of the 13th Army to the effect that after occupation of Kienping and Heishui, 40 kilos SE of Chihfeng, this force would then without further orders try to seize Chihfeng prior to the 15th and cease fighting on the 16th and that planes would be furnished to replenish supplies.

2. General Chou En-lai then informed General Marshall of following specific actions on the part of the Nationalist troops:

a. On the 13th of January at 1500, the 52nd Army occupied Pingchuan, due east of Chengteh.

b. The 92nd Army and the 16th Army are still attacking Kupehkw, on the great wall east of [apparent omission] yesterday (13 January) and that General Hu Ching-jou, Peiping garrison commander is personally at the front supervising the operations.

c. National Government troops are still fighting in Kwangshan in Southeast Honan with destination not certain.

⁷⁴ January 14, p. 345.

⁷⁵ January 14, p. 188.

3. General Marshall informed General Chou En-lai that he would do two things:

a. Get this information quickly to Peiping (accordingly, 50⁷⁶ was dispatched immediately after the meeting).

b. Take these matters up with the National Government representatives in Chungking.

4. General Marshall then informed General Chou En-lai that he had been assured by the Generalissimo that hostilities would cease, that if difficulties were being experienced he would assume that actions on the part of both sides by local commanders probably are causing the difficulty. General Marshall then informed General Chou that he could assure him that the Generalissimo feels thoroughly that he (the Generalissimo) would be in an impossible position if activities on the part of the Nationalist troops were not in conformity with the agreements already reached. General Marshall then pointed out that if, and he stated he did not believe it, one side is taking unfair advantage of the other, it would be a completely preposterous action since the action would come to light, a fact of which the leaders of both parties are aware. General Marshall then told General Chou En-lai that he hoped these reports were exaggerated and that he could assure that he would use his every influence to insure that actions in the field are in conformance with the agreements; that he (General Marshall) did not doubt that he could enforce adjustments in view of the evidenced good faith by the American Government, the National Government and the Communist Party; that minor actions on a low level could be straightened out by the Executive Headquarters; that his great hope was that equitable arrangements would hold forth for the period of the next three days. General Marshall then pointed out that he would probably have sufficient officers at Peiping to permit the Executive Headquarters to dispatch three-man teams to all focal points and that that was the reason he had insisted on establishing the Executive Headquarters immediately and as rapidly as possible with sufficient personnel. General Marshall then assured General Chou that he felt that these difficulties cropped up on a low level and that the Executive Headquarters could smooth over the matter very rapidly.

5. General Chou agreed that the "accidents" (incidents) were caused on a low level, but he wished to call General Marshall's attention to the fact that if Chihfeng was taken by the Nationalist troops that this action could not be interpreted as "action on a low level". General Chou then suggested the possibility of sending parties to Chihfeng and Chengteh and that if the plane could not land, it could ob-

⁷⁶ January 14, not printed; it requested Colonel Byroade to send a team from Peiping to Chengteh, there to contact hostile units and to inform them of the cease-fire order.

serve from the air and drop leaflets. General Chou En-lai also expressed the hope that no major action would occur in the next three days since serious action could destroy the initial efforts and interfere with the successful continuance of the PCC and the study for the reorganization of the armies of China.

6. Action taken as a result of this message included the dispatch of 50 to Colonel Byroade stating General Chou En-lai's allegations and citing the incidents referred to by him, and stating, as suggested by Chou En-lai that the Executive Headquarters should observe activity from the air and to drop leaflets. In this connection a message was also sent to the CO Nanking Liaison Group (see 51⁷⁷), stating that leaflets at Nanking, if not already distributed to Peiping, should be sent there immediately. A similar message was proposed to present these allegations to Chang Chun for the purpose of determining the true facts. A memorandum⁷⁷ was also addressed to General Shang Chen setting forth the allegations and indicating the action taken. Colonel Caughey presented the memorandum to General Shang and submitted a report⁷⁷ on the results of this conference (copy in Truce Incident file).

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Colonel Henry A. Byroade to General Marshall

PEIPING, 14 January 1946.

Re 42. Was aware of situation described in Chou En-lai's letter to Chang January 13 but have been unable to dispatch team as Chinese representatives have not arrived. Knowing that Communist representatives were to arrive this afternoon and that Central Government could borrow man locally I held conference this morning with General Yeh and General Cheng explaining that we must not be lost in organization and housing details and that immediate action was necessary in the dispatch of a team to this feud. They both agreed whereupon I picked up Robertson and 14 of us called on Marshal Lee.⁷⁸ He explained that while the Nationalist troops advancing on Chihfeng were under General Tu Li Ming's command and not his own, he believed lack of communications in the Chihfeng area was the reason fighting still continued. Plan now as follows: Early tomorrow morning aircraft will drop leaflets signed by three commissioners on the city of Chihfeng, its airfield, and on Central Government troops approaching Chihfeng. These leaflets will contain the cease fire order as well as the information that aircraft will land at Chihfeng tomorrow carrying field team from Executive Headquarters, consisting of one Central Government member, one Communist member, and one American.

⁷⁷ Not printed.

⁷⁸ Marshal Li Tsung-jen, Director of President Chiang's headquarters at Peiping.

In order to insure that Central Government troops have orders from their commander, the field team with General Tu Li Ming's representative aboard, will depart here at 0900 hours landing at Chin Chow to send formal orders to troops signed by General Tu Li Ming prior to proceeding on to Chihfeng. They should arrive in Chihfeng tomorrow afternoon. In the afternoon a second C-47 will carry radio equipment into Chihfeng.

Above is still plan although I have just received word that Chihfeng airfield is most likely unusable. Have sent Polo to check this report if as the field is reportedly covered with snow I may for safety sake send empty plane to accompany representatives and land first. General Cheng seems to be sincere in doing all possible to get team to Chihfeng tomorrow.

To counteract any possible rumors that Central Government might not be obeying cease fire orders, our combined press section will release tomorrow that communications are out in the area in question and that the Executive Headquarters has swung into action to inform the commanders and giving brief story of flights mentioned above.

Three commissioners were met last night with appropriate reception parties and the four of us with few others had dinner together.

Now have report from Marines that General Uand [*sic*] of the 8th Chinese National Army has stated that he has received Top Secret orders to immediately resume his march on Tsinan. While this report is doubted, next team will be sent to Tsinan and as quickly as possible. For your information 11th War Area commander, whose headquarters is here states he received formal cease fire instructions only yesterday January 13. He stated he could have all fighting stopped by this afternoon.

Since members are now just arriving and headquarters is not yet organized Dahlr ⁷⁹ Geiorms ⁷⁹ not yet started this if [*is?*] for you only.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Colonel Henry A. Byroade to General Marshall

PEIPING, 15 January 1946.

3. Plans to enter Chihfeng 15th as reported in previous message ⁸⁰ are not cancelled. First 20 [*sic*] reconnaissance pilot did not return nor send back message. Will search for him on 15th. However still planned to carry out schedule when General Yeh requested one day's delay which was concurred in by General Chang. Yeh's delay based upon lack of suitable field man for job. Also he wanted to contact Commanding General of Chihfeng area whose headquarters is at Kalgan.

⁷⁹ As decoded. [Footnote in the original; obviously a garble.]

⁸⁰ *Supra*.

Plans now are as follows: Leaflets will be dropped on 15th as planned. They will be augmented to request immediate repair of field which most reports indicate is unusable. We will send a team Tuesday to see Communist commander in Kalgan and bring back 20 Communist members for Executive Headquarters. Plan to attempt Chihfeng run next day Wednesday by way of Chinchow.

Have requests from field commanders to send teams to Kalgan and Tsinan. Plan now changes to send teams to Kalgan Thursday and Tsinan Friday.

Headquarters not functioning yet due to lack of Chinese opposites throughout staff. Hope to make progress on this Tuesday.

Sincerity of Chinese of staff already here convincing. Greatest trouble at moment is setting up mechanics to get this machine in motion.

121.893/1-1646: Telegram

*General Marshall to President Truman*⁸¹

CHUNGKING, 16 January 1946.

60. DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Since issuance of orders for cessation of hostilities strenuous and immediate efforts have been made to build up executive headquarters in Peking of some 125 officers and 300 men, with radios, planes, jeeps, trucks, etc. To enforce and coordinate execution of order and get started on reconstruction of communications, organization of railroad military guards and evacuation of Japanese. Difficulty of assembling quota of Communist officers has been main stumbling block with poor radio communications to their scattered commanders.

Meanwhile commanders on the ground have pushed ahead in many instances to get every advantage of final positions. Severe fighting has resulted. Both sides appeal to me. I think I have the situation in hand now, with improved condition in Peking executive headquarters and additional and peremptory instructions I have gotten each side to issue from Chungking. Also I have now gotten agreements to refrain from press comments. The distances are great, the areas tremendous and the communications miserable or completely lacking. We are using 15 Marine planes today dropping leaflet instructions in all troubled areas. Chinese planes insufficient for this purpose. I hope that by tomorrow peace will really reign over China.

Another subject: For nationalization of all Chinese armies a committee of three was tentatively agreed upon last fall but a meeting could not be obtained. My committee for cessation of hostilities signed an urgent recommendation to Generalissimo and Communist leader to convene committee.⁸² It will probably meet within the next few

⁸¹ Copy delivered to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson).

⁸² January 14, p. 188.

days. Generalissimo proposes me as advisor of committee. I think Communist will probably accept me, but I will know shortly. This is the most difficult problem of all and the great fundamental requirements for a peaceful China.

I have not yet disclosed my views on a method to accomplish this objective and will not until I see how far the two sides can succeed in getting together.⁸³

Another subject: For present public negotiations or debates regarding procedure to form a coalition government⁸⁴ seem to be proceeding with fair prospect of successful agreement and implementation. I am holding aloof on this so far until an impasse appears to be reached.

There are hundreds of details involved in these matters all delicate and of great importance but details nevertheless. I am trying to treat them and handle them accordingly.

MARSHALL

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Chou En-lai to General Marshall

No. 101.2-1

CHUNGKING, 16 January 1946.

Although the final hour of complete cessation of hostilities expired at midnight 13 January, Government troops were continuing their attacks on Communist-led troops and territories after 12 p. m. of the same date. Despatches received here revealed:

(1) Hopei The Ninetysecond and Sixteenth Armies had massed three divisions and continued their attacks on Hsinkailing, Hsiaho-chuang, and Hsiangshuiku (all south of Kupeikou) at 11 p. m. 14 January; their aim seems to be the occupation of Kupeikou.

(2) Shansi-Suiyuan (a) At dawn 14 January, a unit of the Shensi-Suiyuan Army located at the northeast of Tsining (on Pingsui Railway) under the command of Tsao Kai was still attacking the Tsining town capital, and fought a heavy engagement with the Communist-led troops garrisoning the town, the fighting did not cease late in the evening. (b) On the same day the Shansi-Suiyuan Army at Tatung also advanced along the Tatung-Hunyuan (southeast of Tatung) highway, and after occupying Chichiachuang was still on its march.

(3) Jehol On 14 January the Thirteenth Army again occupied Heishuichen due northwest of Chianping and was approaching Chih-feng.

(4) Shantung At 6 a. m. 14 January the Fiftyninth Army of the Thirtythird Group Army located at northeast of Chiawong (Shantung-Kiangsu Border) suddenly attacked Communist-led troops in the vicinity. With vain efforts our special messengers tried to secure a truce. The fighting continued all day long.

(5) North Kangsu Four Regiments of the Sixtythird Division of the One Hundredth Army, coordinated by puppet troops at Tai-

⁸³ For correspondence, see pp. 177 ff.

⁸⁴ For correspondence, see pp. 131 ff.

hsien, launched a fierce assault on Communist-led troops at Chiang-an (east of Taihsien). The battle raged from 12 January to the forenoon of 14 January, and was still going on.

(6) South Honan Four armies of the Fifth and Sixth War Zones (the Fortyfirst, Fortyseventh, Sixtysixth and Seventysecond Armies) occupied the Communist-held Kwangshan town capital (southeast Honan) at noon 14 January, and was intensely tightening the belt around the Communist-led troops in that region, the battle front covered over one hundred li.

From the reports above it may be seen that although the hour of complete cessation of hostilities had expired, Government troops in various places are still deploying large forces to launch fierce attacks on Communist-led troops; and they have occupied Kwangshan in Honan, and Heishuichen in Jehol. It should be concluded therefore that in many places the Cessation of Hostilities Order has not been obeyed by Government troops.

Very sincerely yours,

CHOU EN-LAI

893.00/1-1846

*Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in China
(Sprouse)⁸⁵*

MEETING OF EXECUTIVE HEADQUARTERS WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 16, 1946,
4 P. M.

The following were present:

Central Government:

Lt. Gen. Cheng Kai-min
Lt. Gen. Tsai Wen-chih
Col. Tang Yen-sheng

Communist Party:

Gen. Yeh Chien-ying
Hwang Hwa
Li Ke-nung, Secretary General of the Communist Hq.

American:

Walter S. Robertson
Col. Henry A. Byroade
Col. E. B. Ely, G-3, Operations Section
Col. L. W. Haskell, Chief of Staff
Philip D. Sprouse
Capt. Jack Young

The meeting was originally scheduled for 2:00 p. m., but was postponed until 4:00 p. m. at the request of Gen. Yeh (CP), who stated that he needed more time to study the problems to be discussed.

⁸⁵ Copy transmitted to the Department by the Chargé in China (Robertson) in his unnumbered despatch of January 18.

Mr. Robertson opened the meeting and stated that the first question on the agenda was a matter of great urgency—the dispatching of three teams to the field on the morning of January 17. Col. Byroade had reported that all operational plans were completed for the flights, and Mr. Robertson wished to know whether Gen. Cheng (CG) and Gen. Yeh (CP) would have their representatives ready to take off at 10 a. m.

Col. Byroade said that he understood the points to be visited were Chihfeng, Kalgan and Tsinan. The representatives should leave the city at 9 a. m., in order to be at the field for the 10 o'clock take-off. Information had now been received that the plane could land at Chihfeng.

Gen. Yeh (CP) asked whether there was any likelihood of a repetition of the previous incident at Chihfeng. (He referred to the internment of the first plane by the Russian forces.)

Col. Byroade said he would like to get the opinion of the Commissioners on that. The plane to be sent on the 17th would carry both Central Government and Communist representatives, and it seemed to him that would take care of the situation. Gen. Yeh asked whether the first plane had returned. Col. Byroade said it was still on the ground at Chihfeng. There was nobody aboard except an American pilot, who had no identification or orders to land there. It seemed to him that, since the leaflets had already been dropped, and since the next plane would carry the representatives of both parties, there would be no danger of the Russians' interning the plane.

Col. Ely said that the Russians had given assurances that they would not intern it. When the second plane had flown over Chihfeng on the 16th, the Russians tried to wave it in, because they were expecting the delegates' plane and thought that was it. The pilot of the first plane had reported that the Russians had no objection to the delegates' coming.

Col. Byroade said that, since so much time had already been lost, he would like to suggest that the proposed stop at Chinchow on the way to Chihfeng be eliminated. Gen. Cheng (CG) said that he had no definite opinion to express on this; it seemed to him that, since leaflets had already been dropped, it might not be necessary to stop at Chinchow. Col. Byroade said that by eliminating this stop they could make sure that the pilot would arrive at Chihfeng on the 17th.

Gen. Yeh (CP) asked whether the plane sent to Kalgan to pick up Communist personnel had reached its destination or not. Col. Ely replied that it had reached Kalgan and was expected back on the 16th, but he did not believe it was in yet. Gen. Yeh said that whether the teams left on the 17th or not depended on the arrival of the plane from Kalgan. Col. Byroade asked whether both sides agreed that, if the plane arrived from Kalgan, the three teams could go out on the 17th.

Gen. Yeh replied that much depended on the number of people on the Kalgan plane. If the delegate selected for Chihfeng arrived, the team could go to Chihfeng, and the same with the other places. There was also the question as to whether the delegate would bring with him a radio set for Chihfeng; however, if he did not, the Communist Army set could be used in Chihfeng. He added that, since contact had been established with the Communists in Kalgan and the respective commanding officers at Chihfeng, he felt that it would be worth the few hours' delay for the plane to stop at Chinchow to contact the Central Government troops there.

Mr. Robertson said that at a previous meeting Gen. Yeh had agreed to send a temporary representative from Peiping with the team for Chihfeng, with the expectation of exchanging him there for a member of the forces on the ground. Could he not still do this, so that the team could go on out on the 17th, whether the plane from Kalgan arrived or not? Col. Byroade concurred in this suggestion. Gen. Yeh said that there must have been a misunderstanding. He had never said that he would send a representative to Chihfeng whether or not the plane came from Kalgan. Mr. Hwang (CP) said that the man they had thought of as a "temporary" representative was one of those now in Kalgan. Gen. Yeh added that what he had said about Chihfeng previously was based on his understanding that additional Communist personnel was arriving immediately; when the people he had in mind came, they turned out to be technicians.

Gen. Yeh went on to say that, while he did not insist on the stop at Chinchow, he knew from experience that the only way to be certain of stopping fighting was to get orders from the commanders involved. If the stop could be made at Chinchow, the success of the mission would be assured. Col. Byroade said that he thought it was already agreed that this stop should be made. All concurred. Asked how long it would take for the plane to get to Chihfeng if a two-hour stop were made in Chinchow, Col. Ely replied that a C-46 could do it in something short of five hours, including the stop.

At this point Col. Byroade telephoned the air-field and reported that the plane from Kalgan had arrived five minutes before, with 16 or 17 Communists aboard. At this news, Gen. Yeh and Gen. Cheng agreed that they would have their representatives ready for a 10 o'clock take-off on the 17th for Chihfeng, with a stop at Chinchow.

There was some discussion of the proposed mission to Kalgan. Gen. Yeh (CP) asked that further discussion of other places be postponed for two hours, until he could find out which Communists were on the Kalgan plane. Col. Byroade said that he would get one of the newly arrived Communists on the telephone, so that Gen. Yeh could talk with him and get the necessary information. Capt. Young telephoned, and

reported that the Communists had left the field and were on their way to town.

Mr. Robertson explained that he felt the dispatching of the teams to be a matter of the greatest urgency. It was the only thing the Executive Headquarters could do towards stopping the fighting, and they would be falling down on their job if there were any further delay. All he and Col. Byroade wanted at present was an agreement that the three teams should go out tomorrow; the representatives would have all night, if they needed it, to choose and brief their personnel.

Gen. Yeh (CP) said that he fully agreed on the importance of getting the teams out immediately. However, he had just received his first reports from zones of conflict and desired an opportunity to read them. Hitherto all reports received had been from National Government sources; it might be that the Communist reports might reveal some situations which were more urgent than existed in the areas for which teams had been proposed. Col. Byroade said that, if so, more teams could be sent; it would be possible to get out only three teams on the 17th, but others could be sent the following day.

Gen. Yeh (CP) and Gen. Cheng (CG) discussed the situation around Tsinan and Shuchow. It was suggested that it might be preferable to send a team to Shuchow instead of Tsinan. Gen. Yeh felt that the sending of a team to Kalgan would not have much effect, because the fighting was some distance away. Gen. Tsai (CG) maintained that a team should be sent to Kalgan. Gen. Yeh (CP) suggested that the first three teams be sent to Chihfeng, Tsinan and Chining, leaving out Kalgan. After considerable discussion, all agreed.

Gen. Yeh (CP) asked whether, in the event the Communists had insufficient personnel to send representatives with all the teams, it would be satisfactory for the teams to leave Peiping without Communist representatives; a Communist representative for each team could then be selected from Communist forces on the ground. Mr. Robertson said he had no objection, if the Central Government representatives agreed. Gen. Tsai (CG) said that such a plan might create difficulties, because a team arriving without a Communist representative in the plane would have trouble contacting the Communist forces. Gen. Cheng (CG) said it would be much better to send an impartial representative from Headquarters than to select somebody who had been engaged in the actual fighting in the area. Mr. Robertson agreed with Gen. Cheng. Gen. Yeh concurred.

Mr. Hwang (CP) said that he wished to make a statement on behalf of General Yeh. The General felt that, when the teams went out, equal facilities should be given to all parties. The Communists were

handicapped because their facilities were limited. At Chihfeng, for example, they would not have their own radio equipment. The members of each team would wish to report back to their respective superiors, particularly in case of disagreement. Gen. Tsai (CG) said that there should be no cause for disagreement, but that, in any case, the Communists could use Central Government radio facilities, using their own code. Col. Byroade said that it would not be possible for anybody to take in radio equipment on the 17th; it would have to follow in another plane the next day. Mr. Robertson said that the Communists could use American equipment, with their own code, if they so desired. Mr. Hwang said that General Yeh had no desire to create difficulties for Gen. Tsai or Col. Byroade; they felt that they were always having to ask for some sort of assistance. He had brought this question up simply because it was an actual problem and had to be considered on a realistic basis. It was possible that some argument might arise among the representatives in the field and they would feel it necessary to ask for a decision on a higher level. In that case, the group which had no radio facilities would be at a disadvantage. Gen. Tsai (CG) repeated that there should be no reason for argument; all were agreed on the function of the teams—to stop the conflicts. But the Central Government representatives would be glad for the Communists to use their radio. Gen. Yeh (CP) said that, in that case, the problem was solved.

Col. Byroade said that it was agreed between Governor Chang Chun and Gen. Chou En-lai in Chungking that it was important to get a team into Kalgan. Would the Commissioners agree that a team should be sent to Kalgan on the 18th? Gen. Tsai (CG) agreed. Gen. Yeh (CP) said he would like to discuss this matter on the 17th. Col. Byroade said that changes of destination, such as the one made today, created considerable difficulties from an operational standpoint. He would go ahead and make plans for a mission to Kalgan on the 18th, recognizing that it might be changed.

Col. Ely asked how large the field was at Chining. Gen. Tsai (CG) said that he did not know the length of the runway, but he was sure a C-46 could land there.

Gen. Yeh (CP) said that he now wished to read the telegrams he had received from Yen-an concerning zones of conflict reported by his Communist sources. Mr. Hwang (CP) then read in English four messages, which may be summarized as follows:

1. A report signed by Gen. Nieh Jung-chen, commanding Communist forces, Kalgan, and dated January 16, stated that at 1 o'clock on the morning of January 14 over 700 Japanese troops moved southwest of Tatung and occupied Chichiachuang. They were now moving toward Huiyuan and Lingchow. He requested that Executive Head-

quarters send representatives to that area to supervise the disarming of the Japanese and punish these activities of the Japanese. He requested a reply.

2. A report from Gen. Ho Lung, dated January 16, reported that Government forces stationed east of Chining suddenly attacked the Chining garrison, and that fighting was also going on in Fengchen and surrounding area, and around Yangkow. He requested Executive Headquarters to send a mission to order Gen. Fu Tso-yi to stop such warlike activities. A reply was requested.

3. A report from Gen. Li So-yu, commanding Eastern China Military District, dated January 16, stated that three Central Government armies were attacking Communist forces in the central Kiangsu and Huai River area. He requested that measures be taken at once to cause these forces to obey the cease fire order, control their units, and return to their original positions.

4. A report from the Vice Commander of the Eastern Hopeh Military Area, dated January 16, stated that the cease fire order was received with hope and jubilation by the people of the Eastern Hopeh area. They felt that peace and unity were about to be established. The Communist forces were sincerely carrying out the order, but the Nationalist troops (95th Division of the 94th Army) were at present taking advantage of the Communists' friendly attitude. At 1400 hours on the 12th they attacked and occupied Tungyun. On the 14th at 9 a. m. they occupied Yutien. The 42nd Division of the same army, which is replacing the 43rd Division, occupied Chentzechen. At the present time this Army was still making preparations for a drive northward. The Communists wished to protest against such activities of the Nationalists in violation of the cease fire order and hoped that the Executive Headquarters would immediately check the troop movements of the 94th Army and order them to evacuate the positions which they occupied since the cease fire order was issued. A reply was requested.

Gen. Yeh (CP) said that the reading of the above telegrams was for the purpose of enabling both sides to compare notes and reach an agreement as to where teams should be sent. New reports were coming in all the time, and it might be necessary to change the list of places to which teams were to be sent.

Mr. Li (CP) said that a message had just been received saying that there were still Russian forces at Chihfeng. He was concerned as to whether the plane carrying the team might not also be interned and about the safety of the delegates. Col. Byroade and Col. Ely explained the situation, as outlined earlier in the meeting, and said that the Russians had assured the pilot of the interned plane that they were willing for the delegates to come; their only concern was about the bringing in of Nationalist troops, not about the bringing in of individuals. Gen. Tsai (CG) said he thought the Soviet forces would welcome the coming of the team, since they too were in the position of neutral observers. Gen. Yeh (CP) asked whether the interned

plane had yet returned; Col. Haskell suggested that the Russians were probably waiting until the team arrived before they released the plane. Gen. Yeh said that, from what he had just heard, he assumed the safety factor was taken care of.

Mr. Robertson recommended that, before each meeting of the Commissioners, their respective chiefs of staff confer together as to the matters they wished discussed and draw up an agenda, so that all parties would know beforehand what subjects would be brought up at a given meeting. Gen. Yeh had said that he had not received the agenda of today's meeting; this was an error and would not occur again, since the Operations Sections were now moving into their offices and a workable system could be set up. All agreed.

Col. Tang (CG) asked how it had happened that the press release of January 14 (which the Commissioners had decided to hold up until Gen. Yeh was ready to appoint a representative for the Operations Section) had after all been released, and had appeared in the newspapers this afternoon. Out of 11 papers, 3 had carried that statement instead of the proper "first press release" which had been authorized; the name of the Communist representative was left blank. One of the papers carrying it was the *Ta Kung Pao*. Mr. Robertson said that he would find out immediately from Major Brittain, press relations officer, but it proved impossible to contact him before the end of the meeting.

It was agreed that the team members to be sent out on the 17th should meet in Mr. Robertson's suite at 9:00 a. m. (January 17) for briefing and proceed from there to the air-field.

It was further agreed that the chiefs of staff should meet at 10:00 a. m., January 17, to prepare an agenda for a meeting of the Commissioners to be held the afternoon of the 17th.

The meeting adjourned.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270: Telegram

Colonel Henry A. Byroade to General Marshall

PEIPING, 16 January 1945 [1946].

Re 53.⁸⁶ Conference as explained in my message January 14 was necessary as neither party yet had representatives to send. Once people become available I will train them to limit by taking decisive action without resorting to conference and discussion.

Up to now Communist Party is represented by General Yeh, his aide, and a few radio mechanics. Central Government is in little better

⁸⁶ Not found in Department files.

shape, nominating late last night a Mrir Ho Bo TCIR [garble] representative to Chihfeng.

Yet, cannot afford to get off on wrong foot by sending Americans only to the trouble spots. I have had my planes and personnel standing by all day to proceed with team to Kalgan. General Yeh insisted that we not take off until he could establish radio contact and clear our entrance. We decided to go anyway but could not make it due to weather.

Communists will have no qualified representatives here until we get into Kalgan and bring their personnel out. His staff is scattered all over North China. I began pressing him in Chungking for locations and members so I could set up aircraft to bring them to Peiping. Have asked him every day since but still do not have data.

Do not feel above is Yeh's fault. He has not succeeded in getting his radio station here in operation as yet and is out of contact with his headquarters. He informed me in Chungking that they could provide entire radio equipment for main station here. I ordered complete set for him anyway after arrival here but this equipment we desire had to get from Pacific and it has not yet arrived. He hopes to get his radio in operation tonight.

Reconnaissance plane reported yesterday as lost has been located on Chihfeng airfield. We contacted this plane on ground and were informed that pilot and crew were being prevented from take-off by Russian major in charge. This proves Russians still in Chihfeng but incident not alarming as pilot was not armed with proper identification and orders. Russian major requests we obtain clearances for pilot to leave with Red Army headquarters in Chan Chun [*Changchun*,] Manchuria. Do not believe this necessary as leaflets were dropped there this morning and next plane will carry representatives of all three parties. If they intern National Government and Communist representatives then we will have story.

General Yeh insists he does not have man to go to Chihfeng until we bring in some of his personnel from Kalgan. This we will do soon as weather permits. Prospects favorable for tomorrow and team will proceed Chihfeng next day via General Tu li-ming's headquarters in Chinchow.

Being unable to put teams in field as yet we are sending Marine planes as well as our own to 15 trouble areas in morning with locally prepared leaflets.

Central Government here has only communications as yet to field commanders. Consequently [comments?] are received all day long from them of Communists violations of orders. Am aware that in Chungking both sides are complaining. Most complaints have been

dated January 14 or before. I am convinced that both sides have been jockeying for final positions in last two days. Believe also that while main headquarters on both sides, as well as commissioners here, may be sincere, that local commanders may be making final pushes on their own authority. If this suspicion correct we may expect decrease of incidents soon.

Appreciate your concern. The Americans are ready. Teams will depart at earliest moment Chinese can accompany. In meantime leaflet battle and orders to commanders who are in radio contact with Central Government here are all that is at our disposal. Know fully my duty to send out teams to critical areas.⁸⁷

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by Colonel J. Hart Caughey to the Committee of Three

[CHUNGKING,] 17 January 1946.

Following is Trusum No. 1, dated 15 January 1946:

"From Army Headquarters, Peiping to Chungking Liaison Group pass to Generalissimo action and to Marshall info to Yen-an Observer Group pass to Chairman Mao Tse-tung action."

"This is the first daily report to be submitted by Executive Headquarters and contains summary of activities to date. Hereafter reports will be submitted each day. This series of reports will be known as the Truce Summaries. Abbreviation 'Trusums'. This is Trusum No. 1 as of midnight 15 January.

"Colonel Byroade arrived 11 January as initial member of Executive Headquarters. General Yeh, General Cheng, and Mr. Robertson, the three commissioners, arrived on 13 January. As of midnight 15 January total strength of each party in Executive Headquarters was as follows:

- a. Communist Party consisted of one commissioner, four staff workers, and thirteen technicians. Total 18.
- b. National Government Party. Total 18.
- c. American. Total 94.

"Operations Section will occupy its permanent office space in the Peiping Medical College 16 January. The three commissioners will establish their office same location 17 January. Suitable living accommodations have been provided for all parties.

"National Government has already established radio communications. American radio communications will be in operation 17 January. Communist Party having trouble with radio equipment but

⁸⁷ The gist of this message was communicated on January 16 by Colonel Caughey to General Chou En-lai.

plan operation to start also by 17 January. The Communist Party was unable to contact outlying areas to obtain operating personnel and information for making plans which in turn has made it unable to take part in setting up and dispatch of field teams to critical areas.

"By unanimous agreement the area selected for dispatch of first field team was Chihfeng, Jehol Province. Field was reported destroyed. American aircraft sent on reconnaissance landed at field on 15 January and is prevented from returning by the Russian Military. This is not considered serious incident as pilot should not have landed and did not have proper identification and orders. With recent arrival of Communist field team personnel it now appears possible to send teams 17 January to Chihfeng, Kalgan and Tsinan.

"Numerous reports from Central Government field commanders have been received indicating coalition [*violation?*] of cease fire orders and requesting immediate dispatch of field teams. Such reports will hereafter be included in the daily Trusum. Finding it impossible to dispatch teams as yet due to lack of communications and personnel, plan to drop leaflets on 16 January in the vicinity of the following named towns: Yung Nien, Liu Cheng, Tzu Yang, Chu Fou, Ssu Shui, Feng Chi, Chining, Cho Tzu Shan, Kuei Sui, Nan Shan Ku, Ku Pee Kou, Tsang Hsien, Pao Tou, Tang Kuang, Lien Chen. The above leaflets contained a cease fire order and in certain cases special instructions to repair airfields, allow passage of food into towns, etc. These leaflets were signed by all three commissioners.

"Above is brief summary of important events during the primary organization. For convenience daily Trusum will be submitted thru American radio channels to Chungking and Yenan. They will, in each case, be agreed upon by the three commissioners. Signed L. W. Haskell"⁸⁸

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Mr. Walter S. Robertson and Colonel Henry A. Byroade to General Marshall

PEIPING, 17 January 1946.

17. It is obvious that General Yeh does not want teams sent either to Chihfeng or Kalgan. We opened conference today with statement that it was imperative that sufficient personnel be provided for immediate dispatch of teams to Chihfeng, Kalgan and Tsinan. General Cheng agreed and said he was ready. General Yeh offered objections on ground he had no representatives to send. About this time we were informed from the airfield that our plane which had been sent to Kalgan at Yeh's request for the expressed purpose of bring-

⁸⁸ The American colonel serving as Chief of Staff to Colonel Byroade at Executive Headquarters.

ing back team representatives had landed with 14 Communist representatives aboard. General Yeh then agreed but suggested it might not be safe for our plane to land at Chihfeng. We talked him out of this position by reminding him that our reconnaissance plane had established radio contact with pilot of first plane interned there who reported that Russians would welcome landing of representatives. Yeh then agreed on Chihfeng but stated there was no necessity of sending a team to Kalgan as there was no trouble in that area. This was surprising as Chou En-lai in Chungking had suggested these two locations. At General Yeh's insistence General Cheng agreed to a third location, Chining (west of Kalgan on railway) to replace Kalgan tomorrow but we held out for definite schedule to Kalgan on next day January 18. General Yeh reluctantly agreed.

We are now informed by officer who made Kalgan trip that the party of Communists landed here on our plane this afternoon consisted of 1 General and 13 bodyguards for General Yeh. In addition much of cargo loaded on plane consisted of propaganda leaflets for distribution in Peiping.

It therefore appears that Communists may not be able to furnish but one representative for three teams scheduled to leave here tomorrow morning for Chihfeng, Tsinan, and Chining, respectively. Will report further tomorrow.

We have received approximately same number of reports concerning cease fire violations from both sides. General Cheng seems anxious to send teams to all areas affected. All delay so far has been due to General Yeh's failure to furnish representatives.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by Colonel J. Hart Caughey to General Marshall

[CHUNGKING,] 17 January 1946.

As instructed by you I conferred with General Chou En-lai this date and showed him a copy of 17, a message from Mr. Robertson and Col. Byroade which indicated that there seemed to be some reluctance, and lack of cooperation, on the part of General Yeh in the Executive Headquarters.

Before handing the message to General Chou En-lai for his perusal I stated that you did not propose to take this matter up with the National Government; that at this point it was for General Chou En-lai's information only. After General Chou En-lai read Dove 17 he stated that the Communist personnel was short because their people had to be gathered from so many different areas and that he hoped that Col. Byroade could make appropriate arrangements to get these people to Peiping.

With reference to a team at Kalgan, General Chou En-lai stated that possibly there was a misunderstanding in General Yeh's mind after his departure from Chungking. General Chou En-lai said that General Yeh left with the understanding that one team (later he stated "one group") would go to Jehol and Chahar as agreed to by the Committee of Three. General Chou En-lai stated that General Yeh's reluctance to send a team to Kalgan (Chahar) was probably due to the fact that a team was already set up for Chihfeng (Jehol). A discussion ensued during which General Chou En-lai differentiated between a "team" and a "group" wherein he stated that a team was to report to specific areas for the immediate purpose of causing hostilities to cease, whereas a group, as agreed to by the Committee of Three for Chahar and Jehol, was to study overall conditions in broader areas, including opening of railways and repatriation of Japanese. He stated that he would forward a radio to General Yeh through U. S. Army facilities to this effect in the hope that it would obviate subsequent misunderstandings. I stated that I saw no objection to informing General Yeh of this differentiation providing that the basic principles were also established whereby specific teams would report to critical areas regardless of the number of teams required or their destinations. General Chou En-lai saw no objection to this providing the Communists had the privilege of designating critical areas to which teams would report if agreed by the commissioners.

New Subject: I showed General Chou En-lai the Generalissimo's letter dated 16 January 1946⁸⁹ which suggested that you be requested to serve as advisor on the Military Sub-Committee. General Chou En-lai, after reading the memorandum in Chinese, nodded and said, "That is fine." He then, reading the memorandum in Chinese, said, "This will make us come to agreement."⁹⁰

New Subject: I then asked General Chou En-lai when he would be ready to approve the minutes of the Conference of Three. He stated, "Two days."

J. H[ART] C[AUGHEY]

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270: Telegram

General Marshall to Mr. Walter S. Robertson, at Peiping

[CHUNGKING,] 17 January 1946.

70. Pass to General Yeh Chien-ying.

"General Yeh Chien-ying, Executive Headquarters Peiping. Please note following points:

⁸⁹ *Ante*, p. 191.

⁹⁰ General Chou did not communicate formally with General Marshall on this matter until January 23 (see telegram No. 98, January 23, p. 193); for further correspondence on the subject of military reorganization, see pp. 177 ff.

1. Immediate dispatch of a group of three representatives to Jehol and Chahar to perform overall tasks commissioned by Executive Headquarters was agreed upon by Conference of Three on January 10th at Chungking. The group may first proceed to Kalgan but may also go to other places in Jehol and Chahar.

2. In order to effectively cease hostilities, teams may be sent to critical spots for taking immediate actions. Teams shall not only be dispatched to Chihfeng, Chining, and Tsinan, but we should also propose to send others to Kwangshan, Kupeikou, Yutian, Hunyuan, Tsoyun, Pingchuan etc. However it is up to you to decide in the light of actual situation what arrangement should be made to this effect.

3. Inasmuch as you are short of personnel please arrange immediately with Colonel Byroade about sending planes to various places to pick up our representatives and for the moment you may select your personnel from Kalgan. Signed Chou En-lai January 17th."

For Robertson and Byroade: You sent 17. I contacted Chou En-lai. The above is his resulting statement which should ease difficulties to which you referred.

893.00/1-1846: Telegram

Mr. Walter S. Robertson to the Secretary of State

PEIPING, January 18 [17], 1946.

[Received January 21—7:40 p. m.]

1. Today United States planes are taking two teams for the purpose of keeping executive headquarters informed. Each team is composed of one Communist Party, one Central Government and one American representative in addition to U.S. communications personnel and they have been sent to the following places where fighting was reported: Chihfeng (omission). On the morning of 14 January, the executive headquarters three commissioners made a call on Marshal Li Tsung-jen who is the director of the Generalissimo's Peiping field headquarters and discussed a plan to send as soon as possible the team to Chihfeng. It was stated here by Communist representatives that the airfield at Chihfeng had been destroyed by the Communists but there was no data regarding that airfield at executive headquarters.

On the afternoon of 14 January a reconnaissance plane of the U.S. Marines was sent to Chihfeng but it did not return. The following day another U.S. plane was sent in that direction with leaflets and the pilot reported upon his return that he had made contact by radio with the missing plane's pilot who stated that he was being detained by the Russian CO at Chihfeng. The leaflets gave the details of the cease-fire order that was issued last week at Chungking and which contained the endorsements of the three commissioners and requested that markers be displayed that would indicate the airfield's condition

and also gave details regarding the arrival of the team by plane. On 15 January a U.S. plane that was over Chihfeng made radio contact with the detained pilot who stated that the Russian commander had given his assurance that he would not detain the plane bringing the team and also that the commander now approved of his landing. According to Robertson's message number 1, 17 January,⁹¹ the original delay in sending teams resulted from failure of the Communists to provide personnel and from the inability to determine the conditions of the Chihfeng airfield.

On the afternoon of 16 January, the return from Kalgan of a U.S. plane provided Communist personnel for the participation of two teams that were sent today to the places named above. On 15 and 16 January and before sending teams, Marines planes dropped leaflets that bore the cease-fire order from Chungking in the name of the Generalissimo and the three commissioners. These leaflets were dropped at points in or along the Tsinpu Railway near Shantung and at points West and East of it at South Hopei points and at Jehol. Conflicts have been reported at the above places. The Central Government's side had earlier reported conflicts to executive headquarters and blamed the Communists. The Communists indicated that their failure to receive these reports was due to the lack of radio communications. On the afternoon of 16 January at a meeting at executive headquarters the Communists gave the first reports of a conflict in East Hopei and in Central Kiangsu and they blamed the Central Government for this. After these reports were received an effort was made as soon as possible to send teams. It has been noted that there is a good spirit of cooperation and it is doubted that these reported [omission]. Because of inadequate communications on both the Central Government and Communist side, such conflicts are considered to be inevitable. Representatives of the Central Government have been very cooperative and the major delays up to this time are due to the lack of personnel on the part of the Communists.

ROBERTSON

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

*General Marshall to Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer*⁹²

[CHUNGKING,] 18 January 1946.

73. Reports of continued Communist hostile activity on the part of the Communist New Fourth Army in Shantung continue to reach me. Since Byroade is short on personnel, particularly Communists, and since the area of these particular hostilities is Shantung and

⁹¹ See telegram No. 17, January 17, p. 362.

⁹² Commanding General, U. S. Forces in the China Theater.

Anwei Provinces, I propose to dispatch a balanced team from Shanghai to Suchow in an effort to cause hostilities to cease. I am therefore bringing with me tomorrow to Shanghai⁹³ one Communist and one Nationalist representative which I hope can depart from Shanghai for Suchow together with an American representative for this purpose as soon as possible.

Could you designate an appropriate American representative to accompany this team which will report to General Ku Chu Tung, Commander Suchow Pacification area and also arrange for appropriate aircraft and weather check? Would like the team to depart Sunday.

General Chou En-lai is sending a message to General Chen Yie, Commander Communist New Fourth Army, instructing that he designate a representative to report to the commander of the Nationalist Ninety-Seventh Army at Lincheng, Southern Shantung Province, for safe conduct to Suchow to assist in, and expedite, continued negotiations.

General Shang Chen is sending a message to the commander of the Nationalist Ninety-Seventh Army and to the commander Suchow Pacification area regarding the reporting, and safe conduct, of the Communist representative referred to above.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

General Chou En-lai to General Marshall

CHUNGKING, January 18, 1946.

MY DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: I beg to inform you that I have decided to send General Wang Shih-ying, Deputy Chief-of-Staff of the Eighteenth Group Army to Hsuchow tomorrow on your plane.

From the latest report I have received here (dated 17 January) fierce fighting was still going on at Kwangshan in southeast Honan. Four government armies, the 41st, 47th, 66th and 72nd Armies are massed in this small sector. I am very much afraid that if the hostilities are not checked at once, serious consequence might ensue. Consequently I find it imperative that a team should immediately be dispatched to that particular area, either by the Executive Headquarters or by the group due in Hsuchow or directly from Chungking. As you have always contributed your best efforts to the peace in China, I feel confident that you will decide what is the most appropriate action to be promptly taken on this matter.

Anxiously awaiting your reply,

Yours sincerely,

CHOU EN-LAI

⁹³ For a brief summary of General Marshall's week-end visit on January 19, 20, and 21 to Shanghai, see telegram No. 98, January 23, p. 373.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Chou En-lai to General Marshall

No. 101.2-3

CHUNGKING, 18 January 1946.

Herewith I am submitting for your reference a list showing attacks being made by government troops on Communist-led troops and areas between 10 and 13 January:

[Here follows list of thirteen incidents.]

Faithfully yours,

CHOU EN-LAI

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Chou En-lai to General Marshall

No. 101.2-4

CHUNGKING, 17 [18?] January 1946.

Notwithstanding the final time limit of complete cessation of hostilities expired at midnight of 13 January, government troops at various places continued their attacks on Communist-led troops and areas. The following table summarizes the incidents occurred at different places on 14, 15 and 16 January:

[Here follows list of twenty incidents.]

Faithfully yours,

CHOU EN-LAI

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Brigadier General Henry A. Byroade to General Marshall

PEIPING, 20 January 1946.

37. After much debate and reluctance on part of National Government side, have agreement now to send field team to Canton.

We need capable U. S. Colonel to handle with finesse the Canton hotcake. Except for one complete team which we must hold in reserve for North China area for a couple more days, there is no one available here.

Request that one Colonel, one clerk, and one jeep driver be detailed for American element of Canton field team. (On request for additional Colonels see Ourad 25 to ComGen China ⁹⁴)

We can send Chinese members on Tuesdays regularly scheduled flight to Shanghai along with officer from this headquarters to brief at Shanghai United States Army representatives. Our briefing officer will have other business in Shanghai also.

Additionally request airlift of party estimated 8 to 10 to Canton as soon as practicable after assemblage in Shanghai.

⁹⁴ Not found in Department files.

We plan dropping of 100,000 leaflets in Canton area which will take one plane a couple of days. Leaflets will accompany personnel from here.

Can you furnish personnel, airlift to Canton and plane leaflet dropping? Please advise.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270: Telegram

Brigadier General Henry A. Byroade to General Marshall

PEIPING, 21 January 1946.

45. Reports of conflicts were presented by both sides in commissioners meeting today with indicated bitterness. Central Government expressed firm belief that Communists were now launching the strongest sabotage and guerrilla campaign of the war against railway communications. Communists denied that such was case and cited violations by Central Government.

In every matter to date except one General Cheng of Central Government has agreed on all proposals submitted by U. S. His cooperation has been remarkable under circumstances. His one exception has been on matter of sending team to Canton and today he agreed to this.

General Yeh has in many matters sought delay. Experience here is direct contrast to conferences in Chungking where Chou En-lai was willing to agree on all small matters and Governor Chang fought the small issues. General Yeh appears sincere but am beginning to doubt his ability. So far he has poor staff and it appears that Communists are generally weak in staff procedure and ability to handle large scale military problems. This can probably be attributed to the guerrilla nature of their past operations.

Both sides are especially eager to get teams to the areas where they are outnumbered and have reason to fear the other side. For instance the type and number of objections of Central Government to sending team to Canton was in my opinion due to their obvious ability to handle this situation and slowly displace Communists. I myself think that the Canton situation can never become serious because of lack of organized Communist strength in that area.

Central Government meanwhile is urging more teams for north China. Although additional teams in this area would undoubtedly be to the Government's advantage I feel that the major issues are there and that the need for the teams definitely exists.

Am beginning to doubt the ability of the Communists' leaders to control their various guerrilla bands. This is opinion which has not yet been verified from field reports. While Central Government of

course has better control it may be as well that their local leaders are trying to get last minute gains without authority.

Last night Robertson had dinner with Madame.⁹⁵ We did not know she had arrived and I was not located until later in the evening. I explained situation as regards field teams, leaflet dropping, etc., and this morning gave her a memo covering the same points. I expressed few opinions and reported display of apparent sincerity and general enthusiasm by personnel of all groups without dwelling on our difficulties.

Your plan that we remain small for early operation has been sound. It has not been possible however to study our detailed needs. Our coverage of North China leaves many blank spots in areas of importance. Am sending officer tomorrow to see Wedemeyer and present requisition for approximately twice the personnel in the original plan.

Realize that daily reports to the Generalissimo and Mao from this Hqs are not entirely satisfactory. The results you see are those agreed to by all three parties. As organization and confidence grow hope to improve the quality.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Chou En-lai to Colonel J. Hart Caughey

No. 101.2-5

CHUNGKING, 21 January 1946.

The following information has been reported to me regarding violation of cease fire order on part of government troops in North Kiangsu and South Shantung:

1. 136th unit Japanese 72nd Brigade, stationed at Hsin-an-chen, sixty miles east of Hsuehchow on the Lunghai Railway, was besieged by Communist-led troops for some time. However, just when negotiation was under way to effect the surrender of the Japanese, one regiment of government troops at Hsin-an-chen, of the Third Reserve Division of the 98th Army under Tuan Mao-lin, joining hands with Japanese troops there, launched repeated attacks upon the position of the Communist-led troops at Ho-tun on 15 and 16 January, inflicting upon them twenty-odd casualties. For the sake of avoiding conflicts, the Communist-led troops did not shoot back, but only firmly retained their position. In the meantime, Tuan Mao-lin rushed the entire Third Division to Hsin-an-chen on 16 January as reinforcement. Being supported by the Japanese he launched a big assault on the Communist position under cover of heavy gunfire, and attempted to sandwich the Communist-led troops by coordinating with the Japanese troops surrounded at Shihchuang village. With utmost patience Communist-led troops retreated again and again, and finally withdrew to

⁹⁵ Madame Chiang Kai-shek.

Wa-yao townlet, ten miles west of Hsin-an-chen. But the Third Division and the Japanese troops kept on advancing, with the object of seizing Wa-yao and wiping out the Communist-led forces. From dawn till noon of 17 January, Communist-led forces suffered over two hundred casualties; one regiment commander and one battalion deputy commander were also killed in action.

2. Government troops of the American-equipped First Division stationed between Hanchuang townlet and Lincheng town on the Tientsin-Pukow Railway, laid on 14 January all day long a heavy barrage upon the Communist position in the adjacent area, notwithstanding the Communist-led forces had forwarded a short while ago a truce message to them. Over thirty casualties were inflicted upon the Communist-led forces, including three political commissars and one deputy regiment commander. At 10 o'clock of 17 January the government troops also sallied out toward the Communist position.

3. Around 300 men of government troops at Lincheng sallied out and captured Yuochwang village on 14 January, from where they made several attacks upon the Communist position under cover of armored train. At 8 pm the same day, they further advanced to Hungchiaya village and attacked Communist position at Tsaochuang (twenty miles east of Lincheng on the branch railway line). Subsequently a unit of American-equipped troops, 1000 men strong, also attacked Communist position at Mushan on the same day, while a third unit machinegunned Communist troops stationed at Tsochuang.

4. Puppet troops at Tzeyang town led by Wu Hua-wen attacked Communist position outside the west gate of the town under cover of machinegun. As of 15 January, the puppet troops kept on harassing Communist troops stationed outside the city with infantry and cavalry units.

In view of the aforementioned accidents, it is desired that you will kindly inform the U. S. representative attached to the Hsuchow team about them, and request him to bring these up to the team, so that such actions shall come to an end.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature in Chinese]

CHOU EN-LAI

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270: Telegram

General Marshall to Mr. Walter S. Robertson, at Peiping

[CHUNGKING,] 21 January 1946.

86. I am concerned over reaction of American press men in Shanghai over announcement that Executive Headquarters had no authority to act in Manchuria. What was the basis for that announcement? Who

do the Commissioners assume will act to settle any sporadic or serious fighting or differences between Chinese factions in Manchuria?

Do not disclose this statement or questions to other Commissioners.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Mr. Walter S. Robertson to General Marshall

PEIPING, 22 January 1946.

48. Reurad 86. At joint press conference Jan. 18, both General Cheng and General Yeh, in reply to questions, stated that Manchuria was not included within scope of operations of Executive Headquarters. Later on in the conference, in reply to a question about sending a team to Yingkou, I made the same statement. Unfortunately all three of us had received the same impression from our conversations in Chungking. After the press conference, Byroade questioned our replies, stating that he understood that Executive Headquarters did have jurisdiction over Manchuria.

There are two reasons which would have kept me from doubting the accuracy of our understanding had not the question arisen. First, our teams are sent into areas of conflict not only to deliver cease fire orders, but to halt troop movements, order evacuation to positions occupied at midnight on Jan. 13, and, if fighting continues after receipt of cease fire orders, to investigate and report which side is guilty of violation. With the exception of delivering cease fire orders, such activities do not seem appropriate for the Manchurian situation. Under the agreement reached in Chungking between the two factions and in the text of the cease fire order, itself, the movement of National Government troops in Manchuria to restore sovereignty, is specifically authorized. Therefore it would seem that, if such troop movements are opposed by Communist troops, the Communists *ipso facto* become the violators of the truce agreement, posing a problem for consideration and action Chungking. The second is the presence of Russian troops in Manchuria and the agreement between the Russian and Chinese Governments providing for the transfer of authority to Chinese National troops. Under such circumstances it seems our plans easily could become involved in embarrassing situations.

I regret my misunderstanding but the situation is one which should also be clarified for the benefit of the other two commissioners by their respective principals.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Brigadier General Henry A. Byroade to General Marshall

PEIPING, 22 January 1946.

57. Field teams have started reporting their findings which will not be summarized this message. It appears that both sides are greatly exaggerating their claims of violations. This may be prompted by desire of each side to build up propaganda so that each could blame the other in event of complete collapse of cessation of hostilities. About 90% of such claims reaching here are Communist violations alleged by Central Government. This one-sided picture may be due to better communication facilities of Central Government. General Yeh says that Yen-an has further evidence of Central Government violations. We stated that this should be furnished the Executive Headquarters. Our teams will strive to obtain factual evidence to disprove claims if they are false.

Now working on matters of railway police and railway reconstruction. It appears agreement of the former may be one of our most difficult problems.

121.893/1-2446 : Telegram

*General Marshall to President Truman*⁹⁶

[Extract]⁹⁷

CHUNGKING, 24 [23] January 1946.

98. DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The following are the developments since my last message⁹⁸ dated January 16: My time was largely consumed last week in furthering special actions to suppress fighting in isolated regions, which finally culminated in my taking in my plane with me National and Communist officers to Shanghai, securing and instructing American officers there to head two field teams or groups, procuring radio equipment and operating personnel, also planes, and starting these two teams off last Sunday one due north to Suchow and one north of Hankow to Kwanghsian. The Peking headquarters was unable to reach these two trouble spots due to bad weather and great distance. Reports now indicate that the general situation is getting well under control, and that the three commissioners in Peking headed by our man Robertson are working in commendable harmony and sufficient three-man teams have been organized and gotten into the

⁹⁶ Copy delivered to the Secretary of State or Under Secretary of State (Acheson).

⁹⁷ For sections of telegram printed elsewhere in this volume, see pp. 142 and 193.

⁹⁸ Telegram No. 60, p. 351.

field. Bad weather at first hampered all movements, assembly of staff and dispatch of teams.

My short time in Shanghai Saturday evening to Monday morning was also devoted to numerous rehabilitation and reorganizational details with General Wedemeyer; also agreements with Admiral Cooke commanding Seventh Fleet involved in handling Chinese troops to Manchuria and repatriating Japanese. I went over UNRRA⁴⁹ situation with Kizer¹ and heard views of leading American businessmen in Shanghai.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chang Chun at House 28, Chungking, January 24, 1946, 11 a. m.

[Extract]

Also present: Col. Caughey
Col. Pee
Mr. Shepley²

General Chang asked General Marshall if he had been informed of the recent situation at Chihfeng. General Marshall replied that he had not and General Chang outlined the situation. General Chang first explained that he and General Chou En-lai had already discussed this matter without reaching a decision. It appears that on the 21st General Tu Li Ming sent a Col. Wang to Chihfeng where he was received by a Russian officer and had a conference with the American member of the field team at Chihfeng. Together this group drew a map, signed the map and sent it to Peiping with a U.S. captain. On the map were stipulated four areas in which the Russians had no objection for entry by Central Government troops after they had withdrawn. One of the areas included the town of Chihfeng. The commanding general of the 54th Division stationed in the vicinity of Chihfeng desired to move into Chihfeng but the National representative stated that this movement should have approval of Generalissimo. Communist representative stated there would be no objection of Central Government troops moving into the suburbs. General Chang contacted General Chou in Chungking and General Chou verified this concept by stating that the local militia could take care of the internal situation in Chihfeng. (General Chang stated that this local militia had Communist Party members among it.) General Chang had then spoken to the Generalissimo who said that further action should await submission of a report of the field team.

⁴⁹ United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

¹ Benjamin H. Kizer, UNRRA Director in China.

² James R. Shepley, member of General Marshall's staff.

General Marshall explained that there had been some difficulty with reference to the furnishing of daily reports; that he had not been informed of this situation; and that he would take necessary action to see that everyone was informed of daily operational matters.

At this point General Marshall passed to General Chang a memorandum³ containing his proposal regarding the dispatch of a team to Yingkow. General Chang stated that he would have to refer this memorandum to the Generalissimo and General Marshall indicated his assent. (Later in the afternoon an identical memo was submitted to Chou En-lai by Col. Caughey.⁴ General Chou indicated that he would have to consider the matter further.)

At this point a telephone message was received from General Chou which General Marshall handed to General Chang. The telephone message concerned the Chihfeng incident and General Chou's request that General Marshall dispatch a message to the Executive Headquarters informing it to take no action. (Copy of telephone message attached.⁴) General Marshall then asked General Chang's opinion as to the agreement that should be reached in this case. General Chang replied that he had already spoken to General Chou and that they had not reached agreement and that the Generalissimo was of the opinion that the matter should rest until a report from the Executive Headquarters was received.

General Marshall stated that General Byroade had requested additional personnel (59⁴) for the Executive Headquarters. Col. Pee stated that he would look into this and let Col. Caughey know.

General Marshall then stated that the Executive Headquarters had appealed to him to cause "the paper war" of accusations [to] cease (59). General Chang stated that he had already contacted General Chou in this regard. He further stated that K. C. Wu and Mr. Lu, Communist propaganda man had already conferred, wherein he (K. C. Wu) stated that if the Communist accusations ceased today, the 24th, the Nationalist accusations would cease the 25th. General Chang then stated that he would discuss this matter with General Chou again.⁵

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Marshall to General Chang Chun

[CHUNGKING,] January 24, 1946.

While I do not find reference in the official documents concerning the truce agreements to the effect that the Executive Headquarters

³ *Infra.*

⁴ Not printed.

⁵ For the remainder of these minutes, see p. 196.

has no jurisdiction over hostilities in Manchuria, I am informed by Mr. Robertson, the U. S. Commissioner in Peking, that the Commissioners are of the opinion and have publicly announced that the Executive Headquarters has no jurisdiction in Manchuria.

In this connection, I have received reports of serious conflicts around Yingkow.⁶ I recommend that we here agree to direct Executive Headquarters to dispatch immediately a team to Yingkow.

I propose that further action in Manchuria under the terms of the "cease firing" order be directed by us from Chungking in each instance, but to be carried out by the Executive Headquarters.

If you indicate your agreement I will dispatch the enclosed message⁷ to the Commissioners in Peking.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Chou En-lai to General Marshall

No. 101.2-6

CHUNGKING, 24 January 1946.

The Chinese service of the Central News reported to-day that the Soviet troops at and in the vicinities of Chihfeng are going to withdraw and that the garrison duties of these areas will be taken over by the government troops. According to the same source, Wang Ting-hsuan, liaison officer of the government army was reported saying that "the National Army would follow the directive of the Executive Headquarters and even after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops the National Army will proceed to Chihfeng only by order of President Chiang Kai-shek."

In this connection may I recall that at the Conference of Three the government representative has declared that the government would not claim the sovereignty over Chihfeng and Tolun for the time being, but rather leave it to be solved later on as a part of the overall problems relating to Jehol and Chahar. By virtue of this statement I wish to point out that should Chihfeng be now taken over by the government troops, it would constitute a breach of our previous understanding. Inasmuch as this should be adhered to, and the government liaison officer had declared that the government troops would follow the directive of the Executive Headquarters at Peiping, I therefore propose, pending your approval, that we instruct the Executive Headquarters to the effect that the garrison duties of places evacuated by the Soviet troops at Chihfeng should solely be taken over by the

⁶ Reported in memoranda of January 17 and January 19 by the Military Attaché at Chungking, neither printed.

⁷ Not found attached to file copy of memorandum.

local existing Peace Preservation Corps, so that any complication liable to entail serious consequences might be forestalled.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature in Chinese]
CHOU EN-LAI

893.00/1-2546 : Telegram

Mr. Walter S. Robertson to the Secretary of State

PEIPING, January 25, 1946.

[Received January 28—5:37 p. m.]

[3.] Repeated to the American Embassy at Chungking.

The greatest part of the cease-fire order violations which have been brought to date to the attention of the Executive Headquarters have come from the Central Government. On 21 January at a meeting the Commissioner of the Central Government, General Cheng Kai-min, charged that an all-out offensive was being launched by the Communists against railway lines of communication. The Communist Commissioner, General Yeh Chien-ying, stated he was of the opinion that the fighting was decreasing and he promised to give complete information based on Yenan reports at a later meeting. There is an inclination among American military observers to agree that there is less fighting and they point out that there is a tendency among the Chinese to exaggerate in military communiqués. The general belief is that each side exercises caution in maintaining a foundation for claiming its position is correct concerning the responsibility for conflicts in the event of any possible failure to consummate the ending of hostilities.

In some cases the Communists are still delaying action by their failure to furnish personnel to take part in teams, and at times action in meetings has been delayed by the tendency of the Communists to exercise extreme care on all points and to very often ask for an opportunity to study a matter further before giving their final answer. However, some part in this attitude may be played by the difficulties of translation. Usually the Central Government readily agrees with all American suggestions, the only opposition so far being their reluctance to agree on the Canton area team. In this connection General Cheng showed some resentment, the Government Chief of Staff, General Tsai, apparently not having advised Cheng of this agreement for a team to Canton which was arrived at an earlier meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

My No. 1 of 17 January. At the recent meetings the Communists have gone out of their way to express their confidence in the impartiality and fairness of the U. S. side, and in pointing to this con-

fidence in the Americans, suggested that American observers be sent to investigate whether there was government personnel available for the Canton team. (Since the basic principle of our procedure necessitates a three way responsibility I did not approve of this.) When General Yeh approved the issuance of a safe conduct letter by Headquarters for the signal equipment shipped to the Jap forces in the Taiyuan areas by U. S. Marines, he stated he doubted the wisdom of such action but that he strongly believed the U. S. would be impartial and fair in repatriating and disarming the Japanese. In a meeting on 23 January, General Yeh in this connection said he desired to consider simultaneously the repatriation and disarming of the Japs and the restoration of communications. He was informed by General Byroade and myself that at Chungking a definite order had been set up for assuming Headquarters duties and that repatriation must be preceded by the restoration of communications since the matter was far too complicated to risk the delay involved in taking no action before trying to arrive at a decision on all its phases.

[ROBERTSON]

893.00/1-2546 : Telegram

Mr. Walter S. Robertson to the Secretary of State

PEIPING, January 25, 1946.

[Received January 27—3:30 p. m.]

4. Executive Headquarters has established following principles and procedures to implement cease-fire order: Orders to be issued (via radio to local commanders, in leaflets dropped by planes and in newspapers and broadcasts) to commanders of troops engaged in fighting since issuance of cease-fire order as follows:⁸

(1) If one side occupies city, opposing force to withdraw 1 day's march from points of contact;

(2) If opposing forces both in or at city, both to withdraw 1 day's march from points of contact;

(3) If in open, both sides to withdraw 1 day's march from points of contact;

(4) Cease-fire order to be communicated to all troops and enforced immediately;

(5) After separation of forces and cessation fighting, positions held as of midnight Jan. 13 to be restored in accord with foregoing;

(6) Opposing commanders in field to appoint liaison units to work with Executive Headquarters field teams;

(7) 1 day's march to be considered as 60 miles but field team and local liaison units may make by common consent possible adjustment of this distance in accordance with local conditions etc.; and

⁸ This was Executive Headquarters General Directive No. 2, January 20.

(8) Final judgment on responsibility for conflict and final adjustment of positions to be made later.

Teams have now been sent by Headquarters to following points through January 22:

Chining (east Suiyuan), Chihfeng (Jehol), Tatung, Hsuchow, Kalgan, Tsinan, Canton.

Team has also been sent from Hankow to Sinyang-Kuangshan area (south Honan) and additional team sent to point 10 miles south of Peiping to make brief investigation of alleged Communist attack. U.S. member latter team reports Communists and guerrilla forces in surrounding areas are preventing shipment food stuffs into Peiping. Teams at Chining, Tatung, Chihfeng and Taian (south of Tsinan) report cessation of conflict these areas and Hsuchow team reports decrease in conflict. U.S. planes have carried out extensive leaflet dropping missions covering about 50 points in Kupeikou and Tatung areas and along Pinghan and Tsinpu rail lines from Peiping south. (My No. 3, Jan. 25.)

Following priorities for field teams established under principle decided upon by Executive Headquarters for sending senior teams to central points in agreed upon zones with secondary teams to operate from these points in surrounding areas in respective zones:

Senior teams—1 Chining, 2 Tsinan, 3 Hsuchow, 4 Canton, 5 Kuangshan, 6 Chiaotso (north Honan), 7 Chengteh (Jehol), 8 Taiyuan, 9 Shihchiachuang.

Secondary teams—1 Chihfeng, 2 Kalgan, 3 Tatung, 4 Houma and Wenhsi (south Shansi), 5 Tehsien (north Shantung).

Crew and plane detained by Soviets at Chihfeng Jan. 14 released and returned Peiping Jan. 20. Crew reports cordial treatment by Soviet military authorities who explained detention arose from crew's lack of credentials, establishing identity and purpose of mission. Soviets welcomed field team's arrival which was preceded by leaflet dropping mission Jan. 15 and were friendly to U.S. Correspondents who later visited Chihfeng. Soviets informed crew first plane and field team they planned withdrawal Jan. 23 to be completed Feb. 1. According U.S. Correspondents, Soviet Forces [at] Chihfeng withdrew from that city Oct. 20 but returned Oct. 31, at request of Chungking. Chinese forces Chihfeng said by local authorities there to be Peace Preservation Corps unit of about 1200 men under Jehol Provincial Govt. and not part of 8th Route Army or of other Communist units. 8th Route Army Forces reported by field team to be to north

and at point about 15 miles west of Chihfeng and Central Govt. Forces 8 to 12 miles east of that city.

Sent Dept, repeated Chungking.

ROBERTSON

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

President Truman to General Marshall

WASHINGTON, 25 January 1946.

405. MY DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: I have read with interest and admiration your telegram of January 24 [23], 98. The Acting Secretary of State joins me in expressing full approval of the action and position you are taking in this difficult situation. I wish to tell you that my confidence in your judgment and ability is again being amply justified by the manner in which you are handling this mission.

If you feel that a useful purpose would be served thereby, you may show the foregoing message to Chiang Kai-shek and to the Communist representative, telling them that I have requested that you do so.

With best wishes,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

The Committee of Three to the Three Commissioners at Peiping

[CHUNGKING,] 25 January 1946.

103. The Committee of Three, consisting of Governor Chang Chun, General Chou En-lai and General Marshall, desire that an immediate detailed report of the situation in and around Chihfeng in the province of Jehol be submitted, together with your recommendations. Please expedite action.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Mr. Walter S. Robertson to General Marshall

PEIPING, 25 January 1946.

86. At Commissioners' meeting this afternoon General Cheng Kai-min read radiogram from Generalissimo quoting message which Gimo had received from General Tu Li-min stating that, upon request of Russians, Tu Li-min was moving troops into Chihfeng upon evacuation by Russians in accordance with Sino-Russian agreement. The Gimo added instructions to General Cheng to see that this movement was carried out. We strongly protested that such action was an open violation of cease-fire order and that Executive Headquarters, with all due respect to the Gimo, could not recognize authority of either side to take unilateral action contrary to terms of agreement. General

Cheng stated that Gimo was taking up question with you in Chungking. We took position that, until we had received official word to the effect that our directive had been modified by mutual consent, we must consider any such movement of troops by General Tu Li-min to be violation of truce agreement. During discussion we received a message from our team in Chihfeng reporting that there was probability of peaceful settlement and urging that order given 13th Army by Tu Li-min be revoked. We stated to General Cheng that Executive Headquarters could not take cognizance of personal telegram to him but suggested that he advise Gimo immediately to have General Tu Li-min revoke order. Executive Headquarters has just dispatched message to Tu Li-min ordering him not to carry out movement.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

The Three Commissioners to the Committee of Three

PEIPING, January 26, 1946.

95. Following situation Chihfeng from official team reports.

Russian troops scheduled to evacuate Chihfeng January 23. Communist Army headquarters reported on 22 January at Peiching (0554-0064) on road west and southwest from Chihfeng 10 miles distant. 1,000 Communist troops reported at Peiching. 68th Communist regiment 1,500 strong at Ko Ju Ho and Ching Jah Ying, both near Peiching. 69th Communist regiment with 1,950 men at Laifu, 40 miles southwest of Chihfeng. 66th Communist regiment at Songmao, 8 miles north of Chihfeng. All above data prior to January 23.

Nationalist troops about 8 miles east of city of Chihfeng with orders from General Tu Li-ming to occupy Chihfeng upon evacuation of Russians. This action was ordered suspended by direction of the field team.

Local Pacification troops numbering 1,200 are now in control of Chihfeng. These Pacification troops are responsible to the Provincial government of Jehol and can therefore be termed Communist-led troops. Date of their arrival in Chihfeng has not as yet been determined by our field team. Pending an investigation they have been directed by the team to retain the town but not occupy other positions vacated by the Russians.

In view of the fact that the National Army apparently had orders to reoccupy Chihfeng when vacated by the Russians, the Commissioners last night sent instructions to General Tu Li-ming to cease movement and specifically directed that he should not occupy the town of Chihfeng. Instructions have likewise been sent to the field team at Chihfeng stating that the movement of either side into the city of Chihfeng would be a violation of the truce agreement. They

were further instructed to determine the date of entry of the local Pacification troops into the city of Chihfeng and to report the status of the Russian withdrawal.

In view of the above action already taken by the Executive Headquarters, the commissioners have no recommendation to submit for consideration in Chungking. If it is found that Pacification troops occupied the city or other positions after midnight, January 13, they will be ordered to evacuate to positions held as of that hour and date. The commissioners will retain the position that no troop movements will be allowed in the area in question as agreed in the cessation of hostilities conferences in Chungking and will enforce this stand with all means at their disposal unless further instructions are received.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Mr. Walter S. Robertson to General Marshall

PEIPING, 26 January 1946.

96. The following information contained in personal reports of Colonel Tourtillott, American team member in Chihfeng, was omitted from Commissioners 95⁹ sent in response to your 103:¹⁰

It is reported that elements of Eighth Route Army are now infiltrating toward Chihfeng. General Chou Fu-shing, in command of so-called Pacification Troops now in control of city, stated that Executive Headquarters had no authority over him and he would not withdraw his troops. Stated he took orders only from Governor of Jehol. On January 25 situation was still tense. If Communists fail to cooperate fighting is likely to result. Nationalists have been correct and proper and have offered every cooperation. The Communist representative has been frequently absent, has refused to assume responsibility, and has been evasive. When pinned down he stated he did not have authority. He was to be replaced, but replacement did not report in area. Reported driven back by bandits. End of summary.

On January 25 Executive Headquarters issued orders to Generals Tu Li-min and Shiao Ke to cease all movement toward Chihfeng.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by Colonel J. Hart Caughey to the Committee of Three

CHUNGKING, 26 January 1946.

Following is Trusum No. 10, dated 24 January 1946:

"At a Joint Conference at Loshan, Honan, town east of Hsinyang and of the Peiping-Hankow railway, it was decided by the leading generals of the region that the cease fire agreement would be strictly

⁹ *Supra.*

¹⁰ January 25, p. 380.

adhered to. Nationalist and Communist troops will remain in their present areas, but the Communists will be permitted to move food from one area to another. The conference was held on 23 January, with the American representative of the Kuangshan team present.

"Colonel D. Q. Harris of the Hsuchow team flew over the Lunghai railway, between Hsuchow and the eastern end of the line at Haichow (Tunghai) and noted considerable damage. The many cross ties which have been removed cannot be locally replaced. The Nationalist garrison commander at Haichow reported continued Communist activities in the immediate area.

"Another air reconnaissance observed that large stretches of the Tientsin-Pukow line were destroyed. This was noted by a mission returning from Shanghai on 22 January. The mission also observed troop concentrations near Tungkuang, Tehsien, Pingyuan and Yencheng, and a troop train of 10 carriages headed north toward Tsinan.

"Original cease fire leaflets were dropped on 22 January along a coastal strip between Peiping and Shanghai, and as far west as Tsinan. The total number scattered over towns and villages was 85,000.

"A joint meeting was held at Chining, Suiyuan Province, on 20 January, when recent hostilities in that area were discussed by Communist, Nationalist and American representatives. The field team at Chining will seek to interview General Fu Tso Yi at Kuisui to learn the Nationalist view of the matter."

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

General Marshall to Mr. Walter S. Robertson, at Peiping

[CHUNGKING,] January 27, 1946.

115. Reference to 103 is understood. Your 96 received but no record here of 95¹¹ to which it refers. Therefore don't fully understand situation but suggest you send either a senior American representative or another team to Chihfeng and check report of Tourtillott which report sounds somewhat hysterical in view of Executive Headquarters order to Tu Li Ming to cease movement. Advise of your action promptly.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Brigadier General Henry A. Byroade to General Marshall

PEIPING, 27 January 1946.

102. Lack of information from me in last 3 days due to struggle on problems incident to reopening lines of communications, the results of which were not conclusive enough to report. Believe now that we

¹¹ Telegram No. 95, originally sent to Chungking on January 26, was re-sent on January 28.

will either get agreement tomorrow or have to refer matter to Chungking. In any event will give you full info on this hardest problem to date very soon.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

General Chou En-lai to General Marshall

CHUNGKING, 28 January 1946.

DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: Enclosed I am submitting for your information three memoranda concerning matters relevant to the execution of the Truce Agreement. I hope that they will be helpful to you for searching the true light of the field situation since deadline of the Cease-Fire order.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature in Chinese]
CHOU EN-LAI

[Enclosure 1]

Memorandum by General Chou En-lai to General Marshall

No. 101.2-8

CHUNGKING, 28 January 1946.

Subject: On Attacks made by the Nationalist Troops on Communist-led Troops and Areas.

Following table compiled from reports received here for the period ending 2400 January 25th shows major incidents of truce violation on part of Nationalist forces since the truce deadline:

[Here follows list of twenty-three incidents.]

[Enclosure 2]

Memorandum by General Chou En-lai to General Marshall

No. 101.2-9

CHUNGKING, 28 January 1946.

Subject: On Receiving Surrender of Japanese Troops Which Are Surrounded by Communist-led Forces.

With regard to the receiving surrender of Japanese troops it has been understood in the Truce Agreement that the disarmament and movement of Japanese soldiers should be effected upon the instruction of the Executive Headquarters. However, I received lately reports from various places stating that the Nationalist forces, instead of consulting the Communists, have either upon their own initiative received surrender of those Japanese forces, which are surrounded by the Communist-led troops and by right should have surrendered to the latter, or have upon the instruction of the Nationalist military authority or-

dered concentration of the Japanese to certain places paying no regard to Truce Agreement. The cases of such violation are as follows:

1. After the 15,000 Japanese of the 65th and 72nd Brigades have been disarmed at Hsinpu, Haichow (also named Tunghai), a part of them, numbering 1,200, was ordered to march westward at 1000, on January 14th. As the Communist-led forces were not consulted with beforehand, armed clashes ensued. This is the fact, upon which the Ministry of Military Operations has based its charges against the Communist-led forces asserting that they have attacked Paitafu railway station (14 miles west of Haichow).

2. Around 3,000 Japanese soldiers at Tsangchow, Hsingtai, Tsinghsien and Tungpochen (within 70 miles south of Tientsin on Tientsin-Pukow Railway) were ordered by the 97th Army on January 14th to be disarmed, and after changed into civilian clothes to move on January 16th to Tientsin.

3. Japanese soldiers in the vicinity strongholds of Shihchiachwang (railway junction in West Hopei) were ordered by Nationalist troops on January 18th to concentrate at Shihchiachwang.

It is desired that such actions shall immediately cease, and the Peiping Executive Headquarters will decide in each case which Chinese army shall execute the acceptance of surrender at that particular area.

[Enclosure 3]

Memorandum by General Chou En-lai to General Marshall

No. 101.2-10

CHUNGKING, 28 January 1946.

Subject: Denial on Government Charges of Truce Violation on Part of Communist-led Forces.

With reference to the recent charges made by the Ministry of Military Operations that Communist-led troops at Yuanshih (railway town south of Shihchiachwang), Anyang (railway town south of the Honan-Hopei border), Hsiuwu (railway town west of Hsinhsiang, North Honan), Chü-ao (111°30', 35°39'), and Chungyang (also named Ningshiang, 111°13', 37°14') have violated Truce Agreement, I have upon my enquiry received the following reports from Yenan:

1. Yuanshih town was purely garrisoned by Japanese and puppet troops. It was encircled by Eighteenth Group Army and local people's militia forces ever since days prior to the overall Japanese surrender. Throughout the past month, the Communist-led forces have only besieged the town, but never conducted any operation.

2. Anyang town, purely garrisoned by puppets, was besieged by Communist-led troops since quite a long while. However, the Communist-led troops have taken no aggressive action. Since the truce deadline hostilities have completely ceased.

3. Hsiuwu town was first liberated by Communist-led troops in last September; subsequently it was wrested away by Nationalist forces. Since the truce deadline the Communist-led forces suspended their attack on puppet troops in the southeast suburb and withdrew. No effort has been made to attack the town.

4. Chü-ao town was abandoned by the Communist-led forces right on receipt of the Cease-Fire order. No offensive action has been taken subsequently.

5. Chungyang (Ningsiang) town was in the hands of the Communist-led troops since a long time. The charges made by Nationalist military authority that Communist-led troops had attacked the town on 14 and 16 January are entirely without foundation.

From the above reports it may be seen that the charges made by the Ministry of Military Operations and the Central News in the aforementioned cases are devoid of any factual basis.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by Colonel J. Hart Caughey to the Committee of Three

[CHUNGKING,] 28 January 1946.

Following is Trusum No. 11, for period ended 2400, 25 Jan :

“Executive Hqs field team number 8 left Shanghai at 0800 hours 25 January for Canton, chief city of Kwangtung Province, where it will establish its base. Colonel Paul Miller heads the American section of the team.

“A joint meeting was scheduled to be held at Hankow, Hupeh Province, at which the recent agreement reached at Loshan,¹² Honan Province, will be brought before General Koh, vice commander of the Sixth War Area, for approval. The Kuangshan, Honan Province, field team arrived in Hankow on 24 January for the conference. It will return to its base as soon as the meeting has been concluded.

“A summary of the situation at Chihfeng, Jehol Province, will be forwarded in Trusum No. 12.”¹³

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of the Conference Between General Chang Chun and Colonel Caughey, in the General's Office at the National Military Council, January 28, 1946, 3 p. m.

Also present : Captain Soong.

Colonel Caughey presented the current truce summary (Trusum No. 12¹³) to General Chang and then proceeded to discuss the situa-

¹² See Colonel Caughey's memorandum of January 26, p. 382.

¹³ Not printed.

tion at Chihfeng. Colonel Caughey pointed out that the field team at Chihfeng was experiencing certain difficulties with respect to the Communist commander who was reluctant to assume responsibility and to negotiate, and then pointed out that, on the other hand, the National representative had evidenced an attitude of complete cooperation. Colonel Caughey next referred to the Generalissimo's order to General Tu Li Ming which, it had been reported, was issued by the Generalissimo and instructed Tu Li Ming to move into Chihfeng rapidly. Colonel Caughey pointed out that if the Executive Headquarters orders for cease movement were not adhered to in spite of the Generalissimo's order, a situation could be created which would "split China in half", due to precipitated civil war.

General Chang said that the Generalissimo's order had been issued prior to the decision of the Executive Headquarters (inferring that it had been superseded). General Chang volunteered the information that he had been debating all morning with the Ministry of War with reference to Chihfeng and that the Ministry of War could not understand why Central Government forces should not move in promptly to Chihfeng in accordance with the terms of the Russian-Chinese agreement. General Chang stated that it would be necessary for him to debate with these same people again this afternoon as soon as this meeting was over. (Although General Chang did not so state, it was apparent that it was his influence and attitude which had prevented thus far the Generalissimo or the Ministry of War from moving Tu Li Ming's forces into Chihfeng.)

General Chang then brought up the question of the team for Yingkow and stated that the reason the Generalissimo did not desire to send a team to that place was that the presence of an American with the team would create complications with the Russians. General Chang requested that any further consideration with reference to the Yingkow team be coordinated by the Committee of Three before any action would be taken. Colonel Caughey assured General Chang that this would be done.

J. H[ART] C[AUGHEY]

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270: Telegram

General Marshall to Mr. Walter S. Robertson, at Peiping

[CHUNGKING,] 29 January 1946.

121. I have had several difficult and lengthy interviews with Generalissimo regarding Chihfeng situation and probable procedure of team and commissioners in handling the matter. He assures me that National troops will not be sent into Chihfeng by his direct orders.

Your 109¹⁵ leaves us in confusion as to why your team did not attempt to contact the plane of 26th with radio equipment. Was there an interpreter with plane?

The situation in Chihfeng is so serious in its possibility of establishing unfortunate precedents as well as possibly disrupting the armistice that Colonel Tourtillott in my opinion should be given the prestige of the presence of immediate United States assistance of rank. Possibly Byroade should go if he can get back without too much delay. The issue there is critical in its effect everywhere and must be handled accordingly.

Another subject: I noted today your report of January 27 [25?] to State Department. Please do not make any reports to Washington reference the work, situation or your duties in Executive Headquarters. I am carefully refraining from giving Washington such details to avoid destructive leaks in the press. Besides, this business of Executive Headquarters is an establishment under Committee of Three and not under the Embassy. Your channel is to me direct and probably for my eye only. Press releases are matter for unanimous agreement of commissioners and are not referred to in foregoing.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by Colonel J. Hart Caughey to the Committee of Three

[CHUNGKING,] 29 January 1946.

Following is Trusum No. 13, Part 2, based on dispatch received from Hsuchou covering conference of Hsuchou field team with Communist General Chen Yie held at Yihsien, 24 January.

“Points covered are as follows: Communication and rail lines be restored, attacks by Communists cease, Communist troops withdraw to positions held at cease fire deadline, medicines and rations provided for Nationalist troops Lincheng, disarming of Japanese and the[ir] repatriation, coal mines to be safeguarded and resume operation, salt mines to be handed over.”

¹⁵ Not printed.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Document Prepared in Executive Headquarters at Peiping

PEIPING, 29 January 1946.

The following is a list of existing Field Teams as of 29 January:

<i>Team Number</i>	<i>American Member</i>	<i>Location</i>
1	Col. Craig, David W.	Chi-Ning, Suiyuan Province
2	Col. Tourtillott, R. R.	Chi-Feng, Jehol Province
3	Col. Holly, U. W.	Tai-Yuan
4	Col. Harris, D. Q.	Hsu-Chow (Suchow)
5	Col. Harris, L. V.	Kalgan
6	Col. Ferguson, J. M.	(Still in Peiping)
7	Col. Lake, J. P.	Tsinan (Chi-Nan)
8	Col. Miller, P.	Canton
9	Col. Ford, D. H.	Kuang-Shan Honan Province
10	Col. Cummings, A. H.	Hsin-Hsiang Honan Province
11	Col. Graves, E. M.	Cheng-Te
12	Col. Gripper, P. C.	Shih Chia Chuang
13	Col. Mullen, V.	Ta-Tung
14	Col. Bell, F.	Hou-Ma
15	Col. White, F. G.	Te-Hsien

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Mr. Walter S. Robertson to General Marshall

PEIPING, 30 January 1946.

142. Reference your 121. Our initial difficulty in Chihfeng was due to unwillingness of Communist representative to assume any authority. Apparently he had been given but little. Our next difficulty was attitude of commander of so-called pacification troops who took position that Executive Headquarters had no authority to give him orders, and that he recognized only those orders which came from Governor of Jehol. Our information now indicates that both difficulties have been overcome. Following personal report from Colonel Tourtillott was received this morning over our own radio station:

"Situation now satisfactory. No immediate danger of conflict now seen. Pacification troops have now withdrawn from outlying small cities around Chihfeng occupied after midnight January 13 as directed. National troops now 20 miles southeast of city and 8th route army troops 10 miles southwest of city. Situation at the moment is most favorable."

In answer to specific questions Tourtillott replied in further message this morning

"Russians left city of Chihfeng on January 23. Pacification troops first entered city on August 17 and thru several reorganizations have remained since that date. Subsequent to midnight January 13 pacification troops occupied five small cities outside of Chihfeng. Team directed withdrawal from these positions on January 23 and withdrawal was completed on January 26. These troops until January 28 were under control of Governor of Jehol. On January 28 control passed to Communist General Shao Ke commander of Forces in Hopeh-Jehol-Liaoning Military region."

In view of this information it is the unanimous opinion of us here that it would probably be a mistake to send Byroade or another team to Chihfeng at this juncture. Of course we do not know what position the Generalissimo is taking in his conversations with you and there may be other elements in the situation of which we are not aware. We therefore await further advice as to whether or not you still think it advisable to send Byroade for personal investigation and report. From standpoint of present Executive Headquarters directive it appears to us that military problems in Chihfeng area are well under control. We realize, however, a problem may still exist in Chungking as Governor Chang Chun indicated in opening remarks of meeting number 5, Committee of Three, that question Jehol and Chahar occupation might again come up for future discussion. Our position as outlined in 95¹⁶ will be maintained unless present directive is modified.

Due to unwillingness of Chinese representatives to make statements which might indicate truce violations on their sides personal reports from American team members are almost essential to realistic appraisal of situations. It was for this reason that I supplemented commissioner's report Dove 95 with personal report to you (96¹⁷), summarizing information contained in the personal reports of Colonel Tourtillott to Executive Headquarters, which, according to your 115¹⁸ signed by Caughey, seemed to you "somewhat hysterical". Due the fact that I was engaged in long sessions with commissioners upon receipt of your 115, it was answered by operations (109¹⁹) without reference to me. Reply was inadequate in that it did not give full story concerning plane carrying radio supplies which had to return without making delivery. While team was not advised by radio that plane was enroute (our own radio set at Chihfeng was not yet on air and communications over Nationalist radio were too slow) and no

¹⁶ Telegram of January 26, p. 381.

¹⁷ Telegram of January 26, p. 382.

¹⁸ Telegram of January 27, p. 383.

¹⁹ Not printed.

official interpreter was aboard two accompanying Chinese newspaper men who spoke English made clear the purpose of mission. As later reported difficulty was with so-called pacification troops who did not recognize authority of Executive Headquarters and would not allow passengers to leave plane. The next day two more planes were dispatched, one picking up Communist commander of pacification troops in Jehol at Chengte who arranged delivery of supplies without difficulty.

New subject. In accordance with your instructions, all informational reporting to State Department from Executive Headquarters is discontinued. Following telegrams to department, repeated to Embassy, have been sent to date: No. 1 January 17, Summary of Headquarters and team activities; No. 2 January 18,²⁰ concerning translation of General Yeh's speech; No. 3 January 25, sent in two par[t]s, *a.* Summary of activities, *b.* Summary of Communist and Nationalist attitudes shown in meetings.²¹ The following dispatches, with copies to Embassy, have also been sent: No. 1 January 18,²⁰ Subject: Executive Headquarters established at Peiping in connection with cease fire order issued at Chungking, with enclosures; No. 2 January 24,²² Subject: Remarks critical of the U. S. incorrectly attributed by the "Shihchiehjih Pao" to General Yeh Chien-Ying, Communist commissioner, enclosing separate memo on this subject.

All of this material was prepared by Sprouse and approved by me as routine informational reporting to the Department. I now understand your position but the Department will no doubt make inquiry as to why such reporting has ceased, in which event inquiry will be referred to you for reply. In this connection, Byroade is sending copies of daily Trusums to C. G. China Theater and also to W. D. Washington. Do you also wish latter discontinued for same reason?

893.00/1-3046 : Telegram

The Consul at Peiping (Stevens) to the Secretary of State

PEIPING, January 30, 1946.

[Received January 30—9:40 p. m.]

25. According to a press item published yesterday, the Sino-American Executive Headquarters in Peiping in its sixth joint communiqué January 28 announced it had been informed by its field team at Tatung that all fighting had ceased in northern Shansi, western Hopei, and

²⁰ Not printed.

²¹ Mr. Robertson also sent telegram No. 4, January 25, describing the principles and procedures established by Executive Headquarters for the implementation of the cease-fire order, p. 378.

²² Not found in Department files.

parts of southeastern Suiyuan and southern Chahar. Sent Chungking as 20; repeated to Department as 25, January 30. Various Chinese circles here are expressing more optimism over probable success of the executive headquarters than heretofore.

STEVENS

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by Colonel J. Hart Caughey to the Committee of Three

CHUNGKING, 2 February 1946.

Following is Trusum No. 17, dated 31 January 1946:

"The Chihfeng, Jehol, situation has now clarified and it is confirmed by the field team there that the pacification troops (Communist) have entirely withdrawn from all areas which they occupied after 2400 hours 13 January. They had taken over certain villages east of the town upon this withdrawal of the Russian garrison on 23 January, but they had been in Chihfeng and vicinity ever since August 1945. The strength of the pacification corps in Chihfeng city is now reported as 800 (a field team was dispatched from Peiping to Chengte, Jehol Province, on 31 January). ["]

[Here follows report of activities of certain other truce teams.]

J. HART CAUGHEY

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270: Telegram

Mr. Walter S. Robertson to General Marshall

PEIPING, 3 February 1946.

181. Story on Tolun (Chahar Province) follows: Nationalist charged large concentration of Communist troops were being assembled Tolun area preparing for move into Manchuria. As compromise between immediate demand of Nationalists to send Executive Headquarters team to area and opinion of Communists that UWAQV [None] should be sent, since there was no fighting and since there were other more critical areas, an American observer, Colonel Ferguson was dispatched on 28 January 1946 with status of observer only. Ferguson carried Executive Headquarters letter signed by each commissioner, entitling him to carry out his mission. He was dispatched in a plane with Signal team. Upon his arrival at Tolun at 1400 hours 28 January 1946, senior military officer this end (Communist) would not recognize Executive Headquarters authority since it had not come through Communist army military channels. Colonel Ferguson was interned, [and] after receipt of instructions from Communist brigade

headquarters located 135 miles west Tolun Ferguson was released and departed for Peiping 1600 hours, 31 January 1946.

He reported only 6 to 700 Communists in area. Air observation of several reconnaissance flights has shown barren country with no signs of troop concentrations or movements. This incident is closed. It is good indication of communication and command organization within Communist army.

ROBERTSON

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Mr. Walter S. Robertson to General Marshall

PEIPING, 3 February 1946.

182. American field team Number 1 based at Chining, makes report in person at this headquarters that team has secured evidence from Communists at Chining and from Nationalist Headquarters 12th War Zone at Kueisui. From this evidence he is convinced Nationalists pushed offensive operations after 10 January until utmost legal limit 2400 hours on 13th. He thinks Taolin a place questionably in Nationalist hands at critical hour. Taolin is 40 miles north of Chining. He secured statements from both parties claiming Chining at critical hour. Unable to check veracity of these opposed claims, he proposed a compromise and action under Executive Headquarters General Directive No. 2, that Nationalists withdraw Taolin and Communists withdraw Chining, final disposition to be decided later. Communist member would not agree. Nationalist member agreed. Team issued such directive based on majority vote. Team directive issued to National Government commander but Communist representative did not deliver directive to Communist commander. A query was sent to this headquarters with regard to necessary [*necessity*] for unanimous vote in acting "jointly", to which a reply was dispatched requiring unanimous action. National Government commander on ground aware of situation indicated willingness to comply if Communists would comply.

Result: There is no compliance [by] either commander. To obtain more details, team was called into Executive Headquarters on 31 January. American reports he has not taken civilian evidence in Chining as same is completely dominated by armed Communists. He reports Communist representative as being prone to advocate Communist justification and unwilling or unable to cooperate or compromise. American representative states he gets a degree of cooperation and cold consideration of facts and evidence presented, from the National member, but only one-sided consideration from Communist.

New Subject: In discussions here Communists take obdurate posi-

tion against proposal to temporarily clear Chining of troops while Executive Headquarters team conducts investigation among townspeople. National Government side states willingness to vacate Taolin if Communists vacate Chining.

New Subject: Negotiations to get settlement of Chining and Taolin cases being presented may be impossible to get unanimous rule procedure. In Chining, team members can leave compound only after arranging for guard escorts and are accompanied by guards wherever they go. Local Communists state that this is necessary for proper assurance of safety of the team members. Obviously the arrangement is not conducive to free and [im]partial investigation. Communists' representatives here have now agreed to remove this restriction.

ROBERTSON

893.00/2-546 : Telegram

The Counselor of Embassy in China (Smyth) to the Secretary of State

CHUNGKING, February 5, 1946—8 a. m.

[Received 11:21 a. m.]

217. From General Marshall. During the progress of my negotiations and especially while getting under way the delicate business of integrating and reorganization of the Chinese armies, I have instructed the Chargé, the Consular Officials and the Attachés to leave reporting to me alone of military matters and related complications of a political nature.

Robertson was submitting reports to Department on activities of Executive Headquarters in Peiping. As that is a headquarters operating under a Committee of Three (Governor Chang Chun, General Chou En-lai and myself) here in Chungking, and as Robertson represents me, I instructed him to submit such reports to me. I pass this information on as an explanation of the cessation of his reports.

SMYTH

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Mr. Walter S. Robertson to General Marshall

PEIPING, 7 February 1946.

251. The status of Executive Headquarters' intended policy regarding bandi[ts], irregulars, and puppets is best presented by quoting the document now under consideration by the three commissioners (provisions therein are primarily translated from proposals worked

out on operational level and is latest revised copy of that believed carried by Byroade) [:]

“Measures dealing with definition of troops and the responsibilities of Nationalist Government and Communist Party:

All troops, whether they are Nationalist, Communist, regular or irregular, should observe the cease fire order, keep within their original positions, stop fighting so as to assure the realization of peace.

Any troops that violate the cease fire order issued on 10 Jan. by launching attacks, no matter whether they are Nationalist, Communist, regular or irregular, should be duly punished according to military laws.

Both the Nationalist and Communist armies should be responsible for the following unit[s]:

a. The regulars, nationalist-recognized puppets (refer to paragraph 4), local Pacification Corps, anti-Japanese guerrillas and various forces under the Nationalist control.

b. The 8th route and New 4th armies, Kwan[g]tung anti-Japanese column, Pacification Corps, guerrillas, militia and other armed forces under the leadership of the Communists. The highest Nationalist or Communist commander in any given area should take the responsibility to control those independent troops who have made their contributions to the cessation of civil war and realization of peace (such troops who have ceased civil war voluntarily). The highest commanders of the garrison forces in any given area shall be responsible to control respectively the troops mentioned in *a* and *b* to keep them within positions they now occupy. Unless it is agreed by both parties, no troops are allowed to advance beyond that position under any pretext. Acting otherwise, they should be ordered to withdraw to their original positions immediately and the commander of that unit should be duly punished.

Puppet troops will remain in the positions they now occupy and will not move. The Communist troops will maintain their positions as determined by the field teams and will not attack the puppets. This is an interim arrangement only and has been agreed to pending the long-term agreement to be worked out by the Committee of Three in Chungking.”

Comments follow:

1. If approval this document by 3 commissioners obtained 8 February, it will be furnished as revised to all teams as Executive Headquarters General Directive Nr 3.

2. The quoted document sets forth an interim policy only pending urgent decision Chungking [on] following essential points:

- a.* Final disposition puppet and irregular troops.
- b.* Which side will gain control of cities now held by puppets.
- c.* Disposition puppet arms and equipment.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Memorandum by General Chou En-lai to General Marshall and
Brigadier General Henry A. Byroade*

No. 101.2-11

CHUNGKING, 8 February 1946.

Subject: The Canton Team and the Truce in Kwangtung.

1. According to General Yeh Chien-ying's report, General Chang Fa-kwei, Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist Forces in Kwangtung denies even now the existence of Communist-led troops in the various places of Kwangtung, such as along the East River, in Hainan Island, Luichow Peninsula, at Nanhsiung and other places, by merely branding them as bandits;²³ and suppression campaigns against them have not yet ceased on February 4th. Such deliberate actions on part of the Nationalist military authority in Kwangtung, aimed at annihilating the Communist-led troops, is a direct violation of the Truce Agreement. Apart from sending a written protest to the National Government representative, I beg herewith to notify you on this matter.

2. According to a radio despatch from General Tseng Sheng, commander of the Communist-led Kwangtung East River Detachment, dated February 4th, the 53rd Division of the Nationalist Army was still attacking the base of the East River Detachment at Tapeng Peninsula (situated between the Bias and Mirs Bays) on the same day, while the 186th Division drove from Huiyang ($114^{\circ}25'$, $23^{\circ}05'$) and Tzuchin ($115^{\circ}13'$, $23^{\circ}40'$) toward the northeast of the Tapeng Peninsula, the objective of both being to push the Communist-led troops to the sea and to wipe them out.

3. In view of this situation, I beg to suggest the following for your actions:

(a) To wire the Peiping Executive Headquarters that it should immediately discuss the serious situation existing in Kwangtung and to take accordingly effective and prompt actions.

(b) To wire the Peiping Executive Headquarters that it should immediately send by airplane Communist signal officers to the Canton team so that they may operate on the radio station brought along by the Communist team member.

(c) To instruct by radio the American member of the Canton team that he should immediately drive out in motor-cars with the Nationalist and Communist members to the critical spot at Tapeng Peninsula, in order to stop the advance of the Nationalist Armies, contact General Tseng Sheng, commander of the Communist-led forces, and try to reach a settlement on the spot. Should General Chang Fa-kwei raise objection to this action, it would leave no doubt of his aforementioned scheme. In such case, it is desired that the American team

²³ See press release by Central News Agency on February 12, p. 431.

member would strictly carry out the Cease Fire Order, with a view to prevent further aggravation of the situation.

(d) Should, on account of sabotage and violation of the Cease Fire Order on part of General Chang Fa-kwei, the Communist-led East River Detachment and other forces suffer heavy losses or even annihilation, then the government side should be wholly responsible for these losses, and the Chinese Communist Party reserves her full claim over this accident.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature in Chinese]
CHOU EN-LAI

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

General Marshall to Colonel Paul R. M. Miller ²⁴

[CHUNGKING,] 8 February 1946.

166. Information in Chungking indicates that General Tseng Sheng is Commander of Communist-led forces in the Canton area. He is supposedly located on Tapeng Peninsula. Your team should proceed to the Tapeng Peninsula area and attempt contact with General Tseng Sheng whose title is Commander of the Communist-led Kwan[g]tung East River Detachment. Send report direct to the Executive Headquarters as to conditions found in that area. Tapeng Peninsula is situated between the Bias and the Mirs Bays.

To Haskell: ²⁵ Communists here indicate that they would like to send signal personnel from Peiping to Canton to operate radio station taken there by the Communists. Check this with Communists in Executive Headquarters and if report is correct see that their personnel are sent to Canton.

893.00/2-946 : Telegram

The Counselor of Embassy in China (Smyth) to the Secretary of State

CHUNGKING, February 9, 1946—8 a. m.

[Received 11:55 a. m.]

251. Military Attaché's report dated February 1 summarized below: Reports of clashes between Central Government and Communist troops decreased markedly after January 20 and by January 25 had practically ceased.

Shantung is principal remaining area of conflict where disarm-

²⁴ Colonel Miller was American member and chairman of the Executive Headquarters' Canton Liaison Group, Canton, Kwangtung.

²⁵ Information copy sent by Brigadier General Byroade to his Chief of Staff in Executive Headquarters at Peiping, Colonel L. W. Haskell.

ment of Jap garrison troops is chief obstacle. These units stationed along Tsinpu and Chiaochi²⁶ Railroads had been ordered to Tsinan to be disarmed but Communists who have surrounded the units insist that before proceeding to Tsinan they surrender their arms to Communists.

In Suiyuan and northern Shansi, Communists have retaken Chining, Tsoyun and Hunyuan, reported lost by them on January 14.

Central Government forces in Jehol had advanced as far as Pingchuan in their drive on Chengte before cease fire order. Russian garrison at Chihfeng has withdrawn, leaving city garrisoned by locally organized force of Peace Preservation Corps troops.

SMYTH

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Notes on Conference Held by General Marshall, General Chang Chih-chung and General Chou En-lai, at 28 Niu Kuo Tao, February 9, 1946, 10:10 a. m.

M-General Marshall

G-General Chang Chih Chung

C-General Chou En-lai

[B-General Byroade.]

M: Are you gentlemen ready to proceed? The meeting will come to order. I understand that we have gathered here this morning following several conferences with individual members with General Byroade to attempt to reach an agreement regarding the problem of management of restoration of communications. I have here a draft of documents that General Byroade has given me which were first prepared by him in Peking. They have been somewhat modified since the original preparation, both in Peking and since the conversations here. However, no agreement was reached in Peking. I understand now from General Byroade that there is a general agreement to the present terms of these documents,²⁷ but there may be differences regarding the exact phrasing. Now, if there is no objection I think we might proceed with a discussion between the representatives of the National Government and the Communist Party. Is that agreeable, General Chang and General Chou?

G: Yes.

C: Yes.

C: Prior to the discussion, I have one comment to make, namely

²⁶ Tientsin-Pukow and Kiaochow (-Tsingtao)-Tsinan.

²⁷ Agreement on Restoration of Communications, Documents "A", "B", and "C", February 9, pp. 422, 423, and 424.

these proposals only apply to the interim period. With this understanding I agree to proceed to the discussion, since this point has already been laid down in the documents here. With regard to the administration of the eight railways in North and Central China, I reserve the right to conduct further discussion either at the conferences of three or by directly approaching the Government representative.

G: General Chang says that after careful study of document C, of course there is a number of points the Government will not be ready to agree upon. Originally agreed on this [*these*] points, but in order to expedite the reopening of rail communications, the Government now is ready to consider the plan favorably, subject to a few minor changes. The Government will agree to the main principles set forth in that document. As to the proceedings shall we proceed on document C item by item?

M: Is that the General's preference, that we should start with document C?

G: What was that?

M: I understood the General to ask me if we should start with document C. Now I ask him a question, is that his desire. Is that agreeable?

G: We are agreeable to that procedure.

C: General Chou asks whether documents A and B are going to be passed here.

M: What we are talking about is which one we shall take first. Which is agreeable to General Chou to start the discussion with document C with the understanding that all of them are to be discussed.

C: That is all right.

M: Is that agreeable.

G: Yes.

M: The discussion then will start with regard to document C. I wish to make a preliminary statement. Everybody else has made one so I think I am entitled to one. I have been worried by what has been happening at Executive Headquarters, because they were becoming involved there with matters that did not pertain to Executive Headquarters. I have found on both sides what appear to me some misunderstanding on what was agreed upon for the Executive Headquarters. That Headquarters, so far as I understand, or understood when I signed the agreement, pertains to a particular region and to specific things on a temporary basis. One was the cessation of hostilities. One was the resumption of communications of all kinds and one was the repatriation of the Japanese. My impression has been that it seemed in the discussions up there the representatives were becoming involved in matters pertaining upon the PCC, or what the PCC did here. Mat-

ters that really related to the coalition government. I think we should be very careful to keep that Executive Headquarters clear of the business which is not properly its business. We have agreement for certain purposes, to stop hostilities and of course that means to continue keeping the peace and to reopening communications and has a great deal to do with maintaining cessation of hostilities and has even more to do with repatriation of Japanese prisoners. So, as far as I am concerned personally as a signer of that agreement, I do not feel that I can be party to matters that do not pertain specifically to the functions of the Executive Headquarters. I would like also to say this. The problem, the task, of the Executive Headquarters is extraordinarily difficult. I doubt if there has ever been a military headquarters in the history of the world that has quite such a difficult job. I know of no precedent for such a headquarters under such conditions, so I think we will all have to work very hard to keep in the clear regarding its business and to support the people up there, so far as it is within our power. Now, of course, my position is simpler than General Chou's, for example. Of necessity he works in the morning here but he works in the afternoon on the coalition government, and I imagine to a certain extent General Chang is in the same predicament. I am not. I want to see the Executive Headquarters tend strictly to its business and the order of business here is the resumption of communications. I am very glad to know that there is a probable agreement here. Unless there are some more general comments we are ready to get down to details in document C. Is that agreeable.

C: Yes.

G: General Chang suggests you read item by item.

M: "In reaching mutual agreement to issue orders to all commanders regarding restoration of lines of communications and to request immediate resumption of the task of reconstruction of communications by the Ministry of Communications, the following principles are adopted and hereby made a matter of record." Are there any comments on that paragraph?

C: No comments.

G: No.

M: Paragraph A. For purposes of this agreement the term interim period is defined as that period of time proceeding [*preceding*] the formation of and subsequent order by an agreed form of the National Government.

G: Yes.

C: All right.

M: Paragraph B. The Ministry of Communications will initially be under the general supervision of the Executive Headquarters for matters of reconstruction and operation in North and Central China.

C: Agree.

G: General Chang likes to make it specific that the term Ministry of Communications will refer to an organization to be sent by the Ministry of Communications in Chungking, not referring to the Ministry of Communications.

M: What about "representatives of the Ministry of Communications."

G: General Chang said it is, of course, representing the Ministry of Communications.

M: The representatives of the Ministry of Communications for matters of railway reconstruction in North and Central China (back up to first line) will initially—

G: Did you say matters of railway reconstruction and operation?

M: For matters of railway reconstruction and operation will initially—Is that agreeable to General Chang[?]

G: General Chang asks what the definition of "Central China" is? General Chang and General Chou have been talking about that term but there seems to be no difference on their views now.

M: But I'd like to know what it is, we're trying to get this down in the record.

G: General Chang says that it should be all those railroads north of the Yangtze River. Not south, but north of the Yangtze River.

C: General Chou says there is no specific definition in Chinese for Central China.

M: Have they reached an agreement on that yet?

C: General Chou says that Central China in our particular case would refer to north of the Yangtze River.

M: I am asking this question. We use the expression here, "in North and Central China." Why not change that to "north of the Yangtze River["]?

C: All right.

G: He also includes the Lunghai Railroad, that is the railroad that—

M: My question is, why say "North and Central China?" Why not say, "North of the Yangtze River"?

G: General Chang would like to know if you mean to say anything from south of what. To define the term of Central China.

M: I think General Chang misunderstands the term "North China." The term "North China" would not appear in the document.

G: The General wants to know how far north from the Yangtze River to what degree? Including Manchuria?

M: That is for them to decide.

G: General Chang says that there is no question as to the principle of the thing, just mention specifically all those railroads. The rail-

roads should be discussed by the Communist Party and the Nationalist Government, mentioning them specifically on the document. General Chang says it is all right to have North and Central China as it is on the paper.

M: With the understanding that that refers to north of the Yangtze River?

G: General Chang says that although these terms may be ambiguous, but then there will be an agreed terminology.

M: I asked a question, translate it.

C: General Chou agrees.

M: Then it is agreed that the wording in the first two sentences of paragraph *b* shall be as follows: "Representatives of the Ministry of Communications for matters of railway reconstruction and operation in North and Central China will initially be under the general supervision of the Executive Headquarters. Control by the Executive Headquarters over the representatives of the Ministry of Communications for the above-stated purposes shall cease at the termination of the above-defined interim period." And in the minutes it is stated that the expression "Central China" will be understood to mean north of the Yangtze River.

G: General Chang says the term of Central China means north of the Yangtze River and south of the Yellow River.

C: General Chou agrees.

M: It is so agreed.

G: General Chang suggests that if it were possible to mention specifically all the names of the railroads.

B: My objection to General Chang's recommendation on that would be that we refer to North and Central China in the other documents which apply to all communications, so we should define that term and not necessarily specify all the railroads. It would be necessary to define the term in Document A anyway, so we should stick to a definition of the area and not specifically the eight railways instead of that. We refer to all communications in North and Central China, so it is very important that we get a definition of that.

C: You mean all the communications?

M: General Byroade comments on General Chang's proposal that it is important to have this general definition of the area as written in this paragraph because it refers back to Document A which relates to all forms of communications. Now what I do not quite understand is whether or not General Chang is proposing that we abandon this paragraph as now written and merely recite all the railroads, or does he mean that in some other place we list the railways either in this document or in the minutes?

G: General Chang says it would be all right in the minutes. General Chang says that up to date he hasn't had this very clearly in mind, that he thought this applied to the railroads only.

M: This particular item does, but A is involved in all of them so we have to keep a certain balance between the two in our English.

G: General Chang says it would be all right just to have them mentioned in the minutes.

M: Then we can return to the listing of the railroads in the minutes, in a minute. In the meantime, what is the will of the representatives here regarding those first two sentences I read? Are they acceptable as I read them?

G: Yes.

M: General Chou?

C: Yes.

M: It is so ordered. I will now read the last sentence. "However, by unanimous agreement the Commissioners may relinquish this control at any other time or for any other reason." Is that acceptable?

G: Yes.

M: Is that acceptable, General Chou?

C: Yes.

M: Then the entire paragraph is acceptable as read by me. "Paragraph *c*, Railroad Control Section. For proper and efficient action,"—let's omit the "proper". "For efficient action on matters relating to railroad reconstruction and operation in North and Central China, a Railway Control Section shall be established within the Operations Division of the Executive Headquarters." I have omitted two words "proper and." Is that sentence as read by me acceptable?

G: Yes.

M: General Chou?

C: Only the railroad control—how about the other kinds of communications?

B: Here in Document A we give commanders certain responsibilities for all communications. Then the only other specific step we are taking at the moment is to set up a railway control section. The next step will probably be highways, but it does not appear essential immediately to establish a separate section for highways and rivers and telegraphs and so on. Those matters will be handled by the Commissioners, our present organization, until the work contained in those grows to the point where we have to establish another separate section.

M: General Byroade feels that all the other matters can be handled in the general headquarters, but the railroad reconstruction is such a technical matter that it requires a special section. I should say that if General Chou would like it would probably be all right to modify this to include all other communication matters.

C: General Chou says he accepts General Byroade's judgment.

B: I believe it is more convenient for our organization already set up with its Operations Section, its Chiefs of Staff, and its Commissioners, to handle the problems on roads, waterways, telephone, telegraph, etc. However, if it appears later that this section should be expanded, it can be done up there without referring here.

C: Yes.

M: That first sentence then is acceptable?

C & G: Yes.

M: It is so ordered. "In general the Railway Control Section will not interfere in technical matters of reconstruction and operation, but will devote itself to matters concerning policy with a view toward accelerating the task of reconstruction." Any comments on that sentence?

C: General Chou asked General Byroade to give a more exact definition to the two clauses: first, in "interference in technical matters of reconstruction and operation.", what does General Byroade understand under "technical matters", and secondly what he understands under the term "policy", so that later on there would be no misunderstanding of their interpretations.

B: I would like at the beginning to read the next sentence, because the three sentences go together. "A prime function will be to prevent undue advantage being obtained by either the National Government or the Communist Party during the interim period." It is not the purpose of the Railway Control Section to staff itself with experts on technical matters of reconstruction and operation. By that I mean, it will not attempt to decide how much stone should go under the ties on the railway, or in operations of the railway it will not attempt to decide technical matters, such as, how many cars a locomotive can pull, or does it have the proper type of coal, or flues in the boiler. That is a matter for the operation and construction technicians, not the Headquarters.

B: This section first of all would attempt to determine priorities for reconstruction. It would investigate any local reasons for delay in reconstruction. If there is trouble due to lack of railway materials it would attempt to straighten that out. If there is lack of cooperation between local commanders of either side it would present that problem before the commissioners. In general, the Railway Control Section and the small teams or boards assigned to each railway therein are the "watch dogs" to see that the third sentence is carried out. If there is trouble in truce operation, unnecessary detention of people of all communications they would investigate and report to the commissioners. Does that give General Chou an understanding?

C: Yes.

(General Chang left meeting at this point for telephone call.)

C: General Chou asks General Byroade to clarify the railroad lines in North China whether there are only eight lines in North and Central China or more as he is more acquainted with the railway conditions. These [*sic*].

B: The term eight railways [was] agreed by the commissioners in Peiping.

C: What was the understanding on branch lines. Did they mean to include them.

B: The eight railways include all railway lines [in] North and Central China including their branches.

(General Chang returned to meeting.)

M: Now what is General Chou's reaction to the portion that I have read.

G: Agreed.

M: The Railway Control Section will consist of representatives of the National Government, Communist Party, and the U. S. with organization and procedure similar to the other sections already established within the Operations Division. Is that acceptable?

G: General Chang has a comment on the paragraph before. He is sorry he had to go out. It seems to General Chang the words should be [to?] prevent any point of issuance and dispute.

C: General Chou says General Byroade's idea is all right.

B: I would suggest that the wording is more in line with the spirit of what we are trying to do in North China, which is maintain a *status quo* until the major problems are settled in Chungking.

C: General Chou comments that the wording of General Byroade is more specific than General Chang's.

B: The Railway Control Section is there to handle disputes as they arise.

G: General Chang says the primary function of this section is to handle and to settle the disputes arising from both parties.

M: Would this wording be acceptable? Primary function will be to avoid misunderstandings and disputes between the National Government and the Communist Party.

G: General Chang agrees.

C: General Chou asks whether General Byroade believe[s] that such wording would present any difficulty to the Executive Headquarters?

M: I think that wording would be workable.

G: General Chang agrees with your wording. The following sentence, General Chang agrees.

M: Now the sentence as I have reconstructed reads as follows: "The primary function would be to avoid misunderstanding and dis-

agreements between the Nationalist [Government] and the Communist party during the interim period." Is that acceptable? That is agreed. Also agreed to the next sentence?

G: Yes.

C: General Chou agrees.

M: Next sentence accepted. I will read further: "It will include subsections composed of three members similar to the present field team organization for each of the eight railway lines and their branches in North and Central China."

G: General Chang wants to know how many branches there are.

M: Every rail line has as many branches as we have veins. A branch line going into a coal mine.

G: General Chang says it should be understood that these branches are included, and there is no need of adding, and the branches, in there.

M: General Chou asked me that question.

C: General Chou said there is no need to take it in.

M: Is that all right to take it out? Is it acceptable as written.

G: Yes.

C: Yes.

M: These sub-sections are a part of the office force, but may conduct such inspection trips as are agreed upon by the Railway Control Section. Is that acceptable?

G: Yes.

C: Yes.

M: I might inject that these are the instructions to be given up there to the staff, but it has been pushed up to this committee of three. "In addition to the regular field teams, will handle such railway matters which are assigned to them." Is that acceptable?

G & C: Yes.

M: So ordered. "Such matters that cannot be agreed upon by unanimous vote in the Railway Control Section will be referred through channels to the commissioners for decision." Is that acceptable?

G & C: Yes.

M: So ordered. An organization chart of the Railway Control Section is attached. Is that acceptable?

G & C: Yes.

M: The whole paragraph as read is accepted.

G: Perhaps we should put some changes, "the representatives of the Ministry of Communications."

B: Same change should be made here as previously made in the document.

M: "representatives of the Ministry of Communications."

The organization chart is approved as amended. "D. Railway Pro-

tection. In the interim period, the commanders of both the National Government and the Communist Party will be responsible within their respective areas for the protection of the railway repair units consisting of technicians and laborers and for prevention of further disruption." Is that agreeable?

G & C: Yes.

M: So ordered. "Any troop movements necessary for this purpose must be approved by the Executive Headquarters." Is that acceptable?

G: General Chang asks [whether this?] includes protection of railways.

B: Yes.

M: The preceding sentence reads, "In the interim period, the commanders of both the National Government and the Communist Party will be responsible within their respective areas for the protection of railway repair units." Now it says in the next sentence, "Any troop movements necessary for this purpose." I read the purpose in the preceding sentence. Is that acceptable?

G & C: Yes.

M: That paragraph is accepted as a whole as written. "Paragraph E. Train guards, Administrative Control and Operating Personnel. The general control of the Executive Headquarters over representatives of the Ministry of Communications for the purpose stated herein makes further discussion of matters of unarmed train guards, administrative control and operating personnel unnecessary. General Chang? I inserted the words, "the representatives". That is not a directive to us, that is a directive to the junior members of the staff.

G: General Chang agrees.

C: General Chou thinks that this sentence should be considered jointly with the next sentence.

M: Personnel of these classifications will all be under the direct control of the representatives of the Ministry of Communications. Is that agreeable? That is accepted as amended.

C: General Chou wants to make it clear that the train guards are just as explained by General Byroade yesterday, namely the train guards are like conductors in the United States.

G: General Chang says that this armed trained guard is just to see that everything is all right on the train just like a conductor back in the United States. The number of these armed guards should not be too large.

B: Failing agreement in the Executive Headquarters on the formation of railway police, it was decided to divide what we had been speaking of as railway police into two parts and part of the personnel to ride on the train. These people must be able to go straight through

as far as the train goes. They are those personnel over and above the operating personnel that are necessary for control of the passengers and general order in the trains. The second part of the railway police is that part who protect the physical railway part and the construction thereof. This includes the stations along the railway. That portion of the railway police it was agreed should be given during the interim period to the commander whose troops are now in the area. Is that sufficient explanation?

G: General Byroade, will you explain the first category of the police.

B: The train guards, unarmed.

G: General Chang has a question as to whether these guards are following the train or riding.

M: They are riding on the train and going the entire length of the journey.

B: They are unarmed and a very small group, probably one or two per railway car.

G: General Chang asks the question whether these people are under the control of the Ministry of Communications.

B: That is correct.

G: General Chang asked the question of how about the guards along the railway stations. Who do they come under?

B: They are under the commander who has command of the area involved, control of the area.

G: General Chang wants to know if General Chou has any comments.

C: General Chou says the armed guards are those at the station and along the railways whose job is to protect the railways. On the train, on every car they shall need somebody to keep everything in order. Therefore on every train they must have some people on the train to perform these functions. However, they don't need to have many people—just a few and they are unarmed.

B: And are civilians.

C: Is General Chou En-lai's understanding correct.

B: Yes.

C: General Chou says he has no further comments. General Chou only wants to have the mission of the train guards clarified.

G: The train guards mentioned before. General Chang agrees with this section.

M: That paragraph as amended is agreed to—Paragraph E. I will read the next, Paragraph F: Priority of Construction. Priority for initiation of reconstruction and operation of the various railway lines will be based upon their bearing on the economic recovery of the country with full consideration given to railway requirements to

facilitate the disarmament and repatriation of the Japanese. Is that acceptable?

C & G: Yes.

M: That paragraph is accepted as read. That then completes Document C, together with the chart. Now, if agreeable to you gentlemen, we will go to Document A. Is that agreeable?

G: Yes.

M: General Chou, is that agreeable?

C: Yes.

M: It is entitled: "Restoration of Communications. Document A. To: All National Government and Communist Party Military Commanders in North and Central China. First paragraph: All commanders will take immediate steps as a part of their cease fire obligations to assist in the reconstruction of lines of communications." Is that acceptable?

C & G: Yes.

M: So ordered. "These lines of communications include all roads, railways, waterways, postal service facilities, telephone lines, telegraph lines or radio installations." Is that acceptable?

C: In Chinese, the highway should be roads. That should be corrected in the Chinese translations.

G: General Chang says that highway is sufficient to mean all roads.

C: General Chou is discussing the Chinese text, but instead of saying "highway" in the Chinese text it should be "roads."

G: Highway in Chinese text means all roads.

B: Is there any objections to making it "all roads and highways?"

M: We can do anything to please in English here.

C: General Chou says there is no need to change the English text. He is only discussing the Chinese translation, and they have agreed now on roads.

M: This second sentence then is accepted as written?

C & G: Yes.

M: First paragraph is accepted. All right, second paragraph: "Commanders will remove or destroy at once all mines, blockhouses, blockades, fortifications or other military works on and along lines of communications which interfere with the operation of such lines." Is that acceptable?

C & G: Yes.

M: Accepted, second paragraph is accepted as read. Third paragraph: "All interference with civilian travel and passage of goods such as peremptory inspections, destruction of personal goods or commodities and interference with mail and telegraph under any unlawful or false reason whatsoever will be removed and barred." Is that acceptable?

C & G: Yes.

M: Accepted as read. Fourth paragraph: "Commanders will be responsible for the protection of lines of communications repair units of technicians and laborers. Troop movements for this purpose will not be made without prior approval of the Executive Headquarters." Is that acceptable?

C & G: Yes.

M: 4th paragraph is accepted as written. You have a Chinese translation of this, haven't you?

G: Yes.

M: Is it necessary for me to read anything? Can't I just take up the paragraph and see what the comments are without having to translate it?

C & G: Yes.

M: Is there any objection to the 5th paragraph, which starts, "Commanders will be responsible for local assistance," etc.

G: General Chou has two questions on this paragraph. Firstly, referring to the rails and material removed they only mean those which are still available, and this, of course, should be made certain by investigation.

B: That is why "to the maximum extent practical" was added to the sentence. Executive Headquarters is a reasonable organization. If the rails have been made into plow shares, they can't bring them back.

C: Referring to the materials, General Chou says during the war much has been removed by the people under large efforts, and when they return them, whether the Executive Headquarters would also give them some compensation as for the transportation, etc. He wonders if it has been discussed at Executive Headquarters?

B: It was discussed on a low level, but no agreement was reached, with the thought that the Railway Control Section is going to supervise to see that nothing unreasonable is done, and it did not appear that we should make a specific point of it in the document.

C: General Chou agrees with your explanation.

M: I understand that the Minister is already doing that in some way. Anything further, General Chou?

C: No.

M: That paragraph is accepted as written. Paragraph 6, which starts, "Commanders will be responsible for the above functions," etc. Any comments?

G: General Chang says that this has 13 January, today is February 9th, is there anything about those dates?

B: Any movement, or any changes in area after 2400 hours January 13th is illegal. Any change in area of control subsequent to

midnight January 13th is illegal and cannot be recognized by the Executive Headquarters.

C: The Chinese translation is not correct. General Chou says that is why it is not clear to General Chang. There is no question about the English text, however.

B: I would like to explain that these translations were finished at 2:30 in the morning just before we left, and we will get an agreed translation of the English document by the Commissioners.

C: General Chou says there is no question about the English text. General Chou has some more questions. One point which is not clear to General Chou is that certain areas are still garrisoned by the Japanese or the puppet troops, so which troops should take care of those areas, whether by the troops surrounding them or there is some other arrangement, and he wishes to know what decisions have been made by the Executive Headquarters on this point?

B: The problems of disarmament and repatriation will be started immediately after agreement on this. We cannot foresee at this time what the details of the agreements we reach on that will be, but until agreements are reached it would seem that the troops that are there is the only practical way to start this immediately.

M: Puppet troops?

B: Any troops. In other words, we do have Japanese along certain of the railways. The first day that can't change, that must change just as quickly as possible and we will solve that in our discussions on disarmament and repatriation.

C: In Shantung there are such cases where the town itself is garrisoned by the Japanese or puppets, while being surrounded by the Communist troops, and sometimes it so happens that the railway line runs outside the town, and is at the present time under the occupation of the Communist forces. General Chou understands that these railways, since they were held prior to 13 January, including some railway stations, should be retained by the Communists. Is that understanding correct?

M: What you are saying is what they had on the 13th.

C: Yes, but Directive #2²⁸ said that they have to evacuate certain areas.

B: But #2 also says that positions will be restored as of 2400 hours, January 13th. So that situation will take care of itself.

C: So that means that you approve the Communist forces being retained along the railway lines and at stations which they held as of 2400, January 13th?

²⁸ January 20. not printed; its provisions were set down by Mr. Walter S. Robertson in his telegram No. 4, January 25, p. 378.

M: The answer is "yes." Paragraph 6 is accepted as written. Paragraph 7: the paragraph which starts, "Reconstruction will be accomplished by" etc. General Byroade has several changes to propose.

B: "Reconstruction will be accomplished by the representatives of the Ministry of Communications."

M: All right, here is the amendment: "Reconstruction will be accomplished by representatives of the Ministry of Communications under the general, etc." Any comments on the paragraph as amended?

C & G: No.

M: Agreed then that the paragraph as amended is accepted. Paragraph 8, "Additional instructions will be issued from time to time as appropriate." Is that acceptable?

C & G: Yes.

M: Paragraph 8 is accepted. Are there any comments on paragraph 9?

C & G: No.

M: That is accepted. Paragraph 10—any comments?

C: To the last sentence of this paragraph, General Chou wishes to add, "no troops and armament." After "No troops" to add "and armaments."

M: He means no movement of troops or armaments? "No movements of troops and armament will be allowed over reopened transportation lines except as authorized by the Executive Headquarters."

G: General Chang is raising the question of whether the transportation of Japanese armaments obtained from disarming the Japanese is included too?

C: General Chou says that this can be approved by the Executive Headquarters.

M: That is within the power of the Executive Headquarters.

G: General Chang says the transporting of troops here including armament and all other things, that is these are small details can be taken up by the Executive Headquarters and not, do not need to be discussed here.

M: As I understand it, this sentence prohibits the use of the railroads for any means of making war during this interim period, except by agreement at Executive Headquarters, so from that point of view, I can see no objection to the wording suggested, because it is implied anyway. These are instructions down to subordinates, so that avoids the question being raised in their minds and dispute arising, which we are trying to avoid.

G: General Chang perfectly agrees with the principle. He just thinks we are getting into too detailed things.

M: My own comment on that is this. This was not written for us.

This was written for subordinate officers down the line, so it is a detailed document. I quite agree with General Chang that it is a small item for us up here. We were not supposed to have seen this, but it boiled up to a higher level. Now we are trying to turn off the steam. We are not involved in principles here, but in the details which General Byroade wishes to have issued to subordinates. Is the paragraph accepted now as amended?

C & G: Yes.

M: It is so ordered. The next paragraph, "The restoration of China's long time severed lines" etc. Is that acceptable?

C & G: Yes.

M: The next to the last paragraph is accepted as written. The last paragraph, any comments? It is accepted as written. Very good. Then Document A is accepted as amended?

C & G: Yes.

M: If agreeable to you gentlemen, we will take up Document B. Is that acceptable?

C & G: Yes.

M: It is headed "Restoration of Communications. Document B. To the Generalissimo: Agreement has been reached by the three Commissioners that reconstruction of lines of communication shall be started immediately. Orders are being issued to all commanders, National Government and Communist Party, as follows: Document A to be inserted here." Is that first paragraph acceptable? Now we are telling the Commissioners what they are agreed to.

C & G: Yes.

M: First paragraph is accepted. Also the quotation of Document A. Second paragraph: "In view of the above," I wish to change a word in the second sentence where it reads "the headquarters of this organization" it should read "the" organization.

C: There is no difference in Chinese.

M: [" "] In view of the above, official request is hereby made for the National Government to supply the necessary technical staff for the accomplishment of railway reconstruction. For convenience the headquarters of the representatives of the Ministry of Communications"—insert "representatives of the Ministry of Communications."

C: Strike out "Headquarters of the organization" and insert "representatives of the Ministry of Communications?"

M: General Byroade says that infers that they will all be there, have their headquarters there.

C: General Byroade can make a suggestion?

B: I would say "For convenience the headquarters of the representatives of the Ministry of Communications."

M: Otherwise, it means everyone you have must be there and not go out on the road.

G: They are discussing about the set-up of the Executive Headquarters because General Chang is not acquainted with them.

C: He is explaining we have four layers.

M: You'll have to read history for that. If there are no more comments, I'll read it then: "In view of the above, official request is hereby made for the National Government to supply the necessary technical staff for the accomplishment of railway reconstruction. For convenience the headquarters of the representatives of the Ministry of Communications selected by you for accomplishment of this task should be located in Peiping and should establish liaison at the earliest possible date with the Operations Division of Executive Headquarters." Change that "Section" to "Division." They have too many sections up there. Is that acceptable as read?

C & G: Yes.

M: That completes Document B. It apparently completes the problem so far as the Executive Headquarters is concerned. Is that right?

C & G: Yes.

M: That is agreed.

C: General Chang has suggested before that we should list in the minutes the names of the railroads.

G: General Chang wanted to have the names of the railroads mentioned in the minutes, but now he doesn't see any necessity for it.

M: Then it is understood the listing of the railroads will not be necessary. Is there any other business you want to bring up?

C: Regarding the administration of communications, General Chou En-lai hasn't conferred with General Chang Chih Chung whether it should be discussed in the Three-man Committee or directly between [General] Chang Chih Chung and General Chou En-lai. He is asking General Chang's opinion of how it should be discussed.

M: He doesn't want my opinion first?

C: Regarding the administration of the railways, General Chou says that there might be two ways for settlement. The first one is, the representatives of the Ministry of Communications may approach separately the bureaus of the different railways, for at the present time some, such as the Peip'ing-Suiyuan, is largely controlled by the Communists, and the Communist Party has its own operating personnel, and some kind of settlement should be reached. On this point I have some proposals to make. Firstly, it would be best if the representatives of the Ministry of Communications going to be created would absorb local personnel in the Communist areas who are now operating the railroads, so that the operation and administration

might be eased. Secondly, the headquarters of the representatives of the Ministry of Communications should find out a reasonable arrangement with the existing railway personnel in the Communist territories related to road maintenance or mechanical divisions, that is the headquarters of these representatives would in some way recognize their position & to give them appointments. Thirdly, as to the reorganization of the Ministry of Communications, that will be taken up in the over-all reorganization of the Executive Yuan, so it does not need to be discussed here. Consequently there are only the first two points to be discussed, and I would like to know the opinion of you two whether it should be discussed at this conference or through some other channels.

G: General Chang understands clearly as follows: In the interim period, General Chang stated or asked for two principles. 1. The headquarters of the representatives of the Ministry of Communications to absorb some of the administrative personnel from the Communist side. 2. The existing Communist administrative personnel in their area, the headquarters of the representatives of the Ministry of Communications shall contact them and discuss and work out some formula for the continuation of their work in their area.

C: General Chang just said it seems to him rather a minor problem and he wondered whether it should be discussed here or in the lower levels. But General Chou thinks the Executive Headquarters in Peiping has no power to discuss this subject which might have to be referred to the two Chinese representatives or the conference of three in Chungking.

G: General Byroade, how do you think that General Chang's suggestion that if this personnel could be absorbed in the number of officials would [they?] be divided here in the headquarters of the representatives of the Ministry of Communications or among the three commissioners in Peiping. Instead of brought to the conference.

B: The Executive Headquarters can only work on the directives that are given them by the committee of three. We have no instructions on that so we have not consider[ed] that is part of our problem. As to whether decision is reached here by the committee of three or in your political discussions makes no difference to us in the Executive Headquarters.

G: General Chang thinks along this line, that is about the personnel to be included in that organization sent out by the Ministry of Communications to Peking that the commissioners or the representative of all sides can discuss as it is in accordance with the progress of the formula of work and there is no need to discuss it here because we may interfere with your work in Peking. It seems to General Chang that the, it may not be advisable to make this the [more?] complicated to

introduce the details on the personnel to this conference and because this is a temporary arrangement in this interim period and before long the reorganization of government will certainly decide the organization of the different ministries.

M: I have these comments to make. I have listened to the discussion and I have hesitated to advance an opinion because of the peculiar position I sit in. I do not think it is for me to propose the reaching of a decision here in this group on which I am a member unless it develops that all progress under the cessation of hostilities order has ceased. I would say there are two immediate approaches to this problem. The first one would be rather in line with what General Chang has said that as the work develops the Executive Headquarters, this issue will undoubtedly arise because they cannot restore railroad communications without either continuing or discontinuing the use of these Communist railway employees. Therefore I would assume that the Commissioners following the proposals of the representatives of the Ministry of Communications would have before them the question of whether or not there should be an absorption, or during the interim period the operation [be?] rather complete in those sections that are now so operated. Now if the commissioners do not agree it would come here, or if they felt that they did not have the power they would submit their recommendations here knowing the details. Among the details to my mind would be these. Presumably these representatives of the Ministry of Communications are experts. They presumably know their business and they may feel that they cannot operate efficiently under the existing conditions and they would therefore prefer to absorb that portion of the personnel of the Communist Party that appeared efficient or it might be that they would decide that the most immediate effective course would [be] to take over the whole unit complete. In any event the minor arrangement could be handled there. Any disagreement or any failure to reach an agreement on any issue that was before them would be sent forward to Chungking. Now the other course might be this. That General Chang and General Chou discuss the question on the basis of just a general policy but in its detailed application for the better guidance or influence of the representatives of the Ministry of Communications. If they reach an agreement that could be done, but it would still remain for the details to be settled by the Executive Headquarters. If it were felt absolutely necessary to reach an agreement on this level then no agreement could be reached by the two officials I just mentioned then it would be brought up here before the committee but it seems to me that is not indicated at the present time.

G: General Chang thinks that the first suggest[ion] you made is the best way to handle the problem.

M: To handle or to enter.

G: To handle. The reasons General Chang gives are as follows:

1. At this top level we will determine policies. It seems to him that there is no necessity to enter into details regarding technical matters of personnel and we have several levels under us to handle these problems.

2. The second reason is that the headquarters of the representatives of the Ministry of Communications will be under the supervision and the control of the Executive Headquarters. The three commissioners are their immediate boss so we may just as well let the three commissioners to exercise supervision so there is no need for the top level to interfere with the representatives of the Ministry of Communications while there is a level just above them to give them guidance.

3. There will be a Railway Control Section to be set up in Peking, representing three sides and if they cannot decide they can present their views in that section.

If those matters were referred here that means that we are in three capacities, as the representatives of the committee of three, as the representatives of the Commissioners and representatives of the Railway Control Section.

M: I will make the following statement. In the first place, I would like to interpret General Byroade. He didn't say this, but I know he was thinking it. I am certain he agrees with all the principles General Chang has just said, but I am equally certain he probably feels that any agreement he can get up here one way or another saves him a battle down there. So he is looking for the easiest way out. My second comment is that we have been indulging this morning in lower level business all morning. The reason of which to me is this and I am repeating what I recall saying to General Chou a long time ago. So much of this so far as the Executive Headquarters is concerned depends upon how much leeway or latitude your representatives have. Do they negotiate or do they merely carry out orders from above. In other words have they a general directive or have they specific orders. For example, I had a general directive. Now the more confidence and latitude you can place in your commissioners the easier, of course, all these problems are. Where General Byroade finds it difficult is where the individual cannot negotiate or rather he is free to negotiate because he is told precisely what he is to do. However, I must say this that I have been very much surprised at the difficult problems that have already been overtaken. So, I should really submit an apology to them for my comments in view of what they have already accomplish[ed]. Along with the implication that maybe they are too rigidly held in check. I don't think my remarks add anything to the decision, but you at least know what I am thinking.

G: General Chang says that the three man committee here should

not interfere with the second or third level. General Chang says that an Army commander should not interfere with a division commander and furthermore he should not interfere with a regimental commander. However, General Chang says that as you just mentioned, the director[s] of the Peiping Executive Headquarters have solved so many difficult problems already, therefore we should not restrict [them?] as to what they are supposed to do.

C: General Chou comments that he had to refer this problem to Chungking because it is not a dispute of (whether) being of high or low level, but is rather a problem of whether it is within the power of the Executive Headquarters. For in the document C, paragraph E, we have just passed it has been stated that general control of the Executive Headquarters of the representatives of the Ministry of Communications for the purpose stated herein makes further discussion of the matters of unarmed troops, administrative control and operating personnel unnecessary and therefore it would prohibit the Executive Headquarters from dealing with the operating personnel questions unless we issue some general directive to serve as a basis for further discussion.

G: Item E of Document C, last sentence, these are all put under the direct control of the representatives of the Ministry of Communications. He is questioning the jurisdiction of the representatives of the Ministry of Communications to decide who to employ. If the Communists, in certain positions, would provide technicians and engineers to the representatives of the Ministry of Communications, of course they may be employed, because there is a lack of technicians. We may even employ American or Japanese technicians, so it is not a matter of policies so he doesn't think it is necessary for us to discuss it here. Furthermore, General Chang has this in mind; that we will not interfere with the work of the lower levels but wait until they have reached an impasse or something and report to the Conference of Three for us to give a solution, but not until then should we interfere with them. General Chang furthermore likes to make the statement, if it should be put in the minutes, he will make the statement now that he never entertained in the slightest way any idea that the representatives of the Ministry of Communications would not employ any Communist technicians or personnel in any railways now occupied, now garrisoned by Communist troops. But he thinks regarding details of employing certain personnel, it seems not necessary to be brought up to the top level as the lower level should be able to decide it. General Chang would like to get General Chou's concurrence that we pass this document as the guiding principle and will not enter into any details of the personnel, and that is the immediate result of today's meeting.

C: And consider the mission completed?

G: Yes.

C: General Chou wants to point out that paragraph E, in Document C, makes further discussion of personnel matters by the Executive Headquarters impossible and therefore he has to raise this question here, and because of this particular reason, he has to raise this problem here.

M: As I understand the situation which brought about this document called C, and paragraph E, the use of the expression already agreed to here[,] that the general control of the Executive Headquarters over representatives of the Ministry of Communications for the purposes stated herein, makes further discussion on matters of train guards, administrative control and operating personnel unnecessary. The reason for that was that all procedure was blocked by continued discussions without any agreement. Therefore the matter came up to us. Now General Chou raises the point that this forbids discussion by the Commissioners of the Executive Headquarters of the point raised by General Chou. General Byroade, on his part, is trying to get ahead with the resumption of the communications, and he views with great concern a resumption of the debate which has blocked all progress. However, I have this to suggest. That we reconsider paragraph E, and use the following wording: "Train Guards, Administrative Control and Operating Personnel. Personnel of these classifications will all be under the direct control of the representatives of the Ministry of Communications, under the general supervision of the Executive Headquarters." Now General Byroade says that the latter part of that statement is a truism—is a fact anyway and therefore needs not be repeated. However, in view of this discussion I included it and his feeling, I think, is that the discussions will immediately be resumed in Peking. Well, maybe it will. I don't think they will block all progress, but if it is continued without an agreement, then it seems to me the issue should be brought to us immediately. Any comments on that?

G: General Chang agrees that the revision of item 5 of Document C may be made.

M: Then it may be made a matter of record that paragraph E of Document C[,] previously agreed to, is reconsidered, and the following substituted therefor: "Train Guards, Administrative Control and Operating Personnel. Personnel of these classifications will all be under the direct control of the representatives of the Ministry of Communications, under the general supervision of the Executive Headquarters." That settles that issue. Is there any further business?

B: I would like to know at what time this afternoon I could bring

the agreed documents to the two commissioners for signature? It should be between 3:30 and 5:00 if possible.

C: 4:00.

G: Either 3:30 or 4:30, at General Chang's residence.

B: And General Chou will be in his office?

C: Yes.

B: One more remark. I ask you to consider the timing of these documents. I will carry all three of them back to Peiping tomorrow, and we probably will not get the field order to the Commanders until Monday. Immediate action on Document B, therefore, might cause misunderstandings in the field. I therefore propose to leave this signed document with General Chang for delivery to the Generalissimo, with the remark made on it that it should not be acted upon before Tuesday.

M: What General Byroade really meant was this: to make certain that the Ministry of Communications does not begin moving people in the field before Tuesday, because otherwise they will be ahead of the order from Peiping. This communication, which is supposed to be from the Commissioners, will be delivered to General Chang here. We have made up the Commissioners' minds for them, and we have done some of the staff work for the sections.

G: Who will sign that memorandum?

M: The Commissioners will sign up there, but we have the agreement here, so we will sign it here.

B: As I understand it, the Committee of Three will sign on that. I must carry a copy of it back with me to show that it is signed here and is an agreed document, so I want to have it signed here.

M: But aren't you going to have the Commissioners down there sign all these things, because they have been ordered to do so by this.

B: Except that Document B will be delivered to Chang here. But I can send a duplicate back from Peiping signed by the Commissioners.

M: These have all been written in the form of instructions or letters from the Commissioners, so that they would not get into any debate over the wording. Therefore, we have to follow a rather peculiar procedure, but I am accustomed to that. But you don't differ much from the Combined Chiefs of Staff that I worked with. You just have continued my operations beyond the Armistice, that's all. The procedure here is very much as it was there, and if I were Confucius I would say that we all seem to be human beings too. Is there any other business?

C: I wish to thank General Byroade in particular for his hard job to make the trip down here.

M: General Chou made a famous trip here the other day.

G: General Chang has some remarks to make. In order to reopen

the communications which is very, very urgent, he hopes that on every part they will spare no effort to reopen the communications, and if some difficulty comes up we should on every part make our best effort to get over the difficulty to accomplish that. General Chang likes to take this opportunity to assure you and General Chou that regarding the reopening of communications, in order to accomplish that, the Government will not be so narrow-minded as to make this task difficult. General Byroade took back those three documents together with another from General Cheng Kai-min, the Government Commissioner, from Peiping, and in comparing those documents he found that there is a tremendous distance of the point of view of General Cheng Kai-min and the project put forward by General Byroade. Disregarding that, General Chang made careful study of those papers and after careful study, he did not hesitate to make suggestions to the Generalissimo to accept General Byroade's plan. General Marshall just mentioned the point that the procedure here is not very different from that of Washington of the Combined Staff, and General Chang hopes that the accomplishment made by us will be as great as you have made in Washington under your able leadership and guidance. General Chang shares the same view of expressing gratitude to General Byroade for his everlasting hard work and the work he already accomplished in Peking. General Chang also likes to take this opportunity to express his thanks to General Chou En-lai, for he felt very sure that the Communist Commissioner's point of view is entirely different from what he has agreed upon today, and must be tremendously different from the Communist point of view to this, but also General Chou showed such cooperation and sincerity, and of course the Government side did the same, so that General Chang wants to thank him for all the cooperativeness and sincerity shown by General Chou.

C: I thank General Chang for his compliments, and I also wish that General Byroade would show to Peiping that we have reached complete agreement here.

M: I am in agreement with General Chang on the importance of our getting along with the reopening of the communications with just as few issues as we can manage, and I have understood and appreciated his own personal attitude just as I have that of General Chou, so I felt very much reassured on the fact that this matter would be continued with their membership, and I also want to express my appreciation for what General Byroade and his staff have done. I gather that they are gradually developing a staff that is really both efficient and highly cooperative, and in view of what we are doing now and what we hope to do next that is of vast importance to China. It is a unique headquarters, and I think every week it will be more

apparent how very important it is to peace and accord here. If there is no further business, that's all.

893.00/5-2846

*Agreement on Restoration of Communications: Document "A"*²⁹

To: All National Government and Communist Party Military Commanders in North and Central China

All commanders will take immediate steps as a part of their cease fire obligations to assist in the reconstruction of lines of communications. These lines of communications include all roads, railways, waterways, postal service facilities, telephone lines, telegraph lines or radio installations.

Commanders will remove or destroy at once all mines, blockhouses, blockades, fortifications or other military works on and along lines of communications which interfere with the operation of such lines.

All interferences with civilian travel and passage of goods such as peremptory inspections, destruction of personal goods or commodities and interference with mail and telegraph under any unlawful or false reason whatsoever will be removed and barred.

Commanders will be responsible for the protection of lines of communication repair units of technicians and laborers. Troop movements for this purpose will not be made without prior approval of the Executive Headquarters.

Commanders will be responsible for local assistance in every practicable way in the form of labor, food [,] housing, information, material for reconstruction, transportation, shop facilities, and such other supplies and services as are required by the construction agency. Labor and services will not be conscripted without adequate compensation. They shall also be responsible to the maximum extent practical for the return of rails, equipment, and supplies removed incident in the defense in the war against Japan or as defensive measures subsequent thereto.

Commanders will be responsible for the above functions within the areas controlled by them as of 2400 hours, 13 January 1946.

Reconstruction will be accomplished by representatives of the Ministry of Communications under the general supervision of the Executive Headquarters. Field teams from the Executive Headquarters will be dispatched to the major areas of lines of communications re-

²⁹ Copies of Documents "A", "B" and "C" transmitted to the Secretary of State by General Marshall with his covering memorandum of May 28; received about June 17.

pair and will be available to proceed to such other areas as may be necessary.

Additional instructions will be issued from time to time as appropriate.

At this time, it is desired to convey to all Commanders this highest responsibility next to cessation of hostilities in reestablishing peace and prosperity for China.

It is agreed between the Commissioners of the Executive Headquarters with sanction of the conferees of the National Government and Communist Party at Chungking that no military advantage is to be gained by either the National Government or Communist Party through the restoration of the lines of communications. No movements of troops or armaments will be allowed over reopened transportation lines except as authorized by the Executive Headquarters.

The restoration of China's long time severed lines of communications and the cooperation required to effect the restoration will be considered by all society and the world at large as evidence of the sincerity of the National Government and the Communist Party to establish a genuine and definite cessation of hostilities.

All Commanders are enjoined to place this motive above all others in this present opportune occasion to effect a lasting peace.

Approved:

GENERAL CHANG CHIH CHUNG
GENERAL CHOU EN-LAI
GENERAL G. C. MARSHALL

CHUNGKING, February 9, 1946.

893.00/5-2846

Agreement on Restoration of Communications: Document "B"

To the Generalissimo:

Agreement has been reached by the three Commissioners that reconstruction of lines of communications shall be started immediately. Orders are being issued to all commanders, National Government and Communist Party, as follows:

(Document "A"³⁰ to be inserted here.)

In view of the above, official request is hereby made for the National Government to supply the necessary technical staff for the accomplishment of railway reconstruction. For convenience the headquarters of the Ministry of Communication[s] selected by you for accomplishment of this task should be located in Peiping and should establish liaison

³⁰ *Supra.*

at the earliest possible date with the Operations Division of Executive Headquarters.

Approved:

GENERAL CHANG CHIH CHUNG
GENERAL CHOU EN-LAI
GENERAL G. C. MARSHALL

[CHUNGKING, February 9, 1946.]

893.00/5-2846

Agreement on Restoration of Communications: Document "C"

In reaching mutual agreement to issue orders to all commanders regarding restoration of lines of communications and to request immediate assumption of the task of reconstruction of railways by the Ministry of Communications, the following principles are adopted and hereby made a matter of record:

A. For purposes of this agreement the term "interim period" is defined as that period of time preceding the formation of, and assumption of authority by, an agreed form of National Government.

B. Representatives of the Ministry of Communications for matters of railway reconstruction and operation in North and Central China will initially be under the general supervision of the Executive Headquarters. Control by the Executive Headquarters over the representatives of the Ministry of Communications for the above-stated purposes shall cease at the termination of the above-defined interim period. However, by unanimous agreement the Commissioners may relinquish this control at any other time or for any other reason.

C. *Railway Control Section.* For efficient action on matters related to railway construction and operation in North and Central China, a Railway Control Section shall be established within the Operations Division of the Executive Headquarters. In general, the Railway Control Section will not interfere in technical matters of reconstruction and operation, but will devote itself to matters concerning policy with a view towards accelerating the task of reconstruction. A prime function will be to avoid misunderstandings and disagreements between the National Government and the Communist Party during the interim period. The Railway Control Section will consist of representatives of the National Government, Communist Party and the United States, with organization and procedure similar to the other sections already established within the Operations Division. It will include subsections composed of three members, similar to the present field team organization, for each of the eight railway lines in North and Central China. These subsections are a part of

the office force, but may conduct such inspection trips as are agreed upon by the Railway Control Section. In addition, the regular field teams will handle such railway matters as are assigned to them. Such matters as cannot be agreed upon by unanimous vote within the Railway Control Section will be referred through channels to the Commissioners for decision. An organization chart of the Railway Control Section is attached.³¹

D. *Railway Protection.* In the interim period, the commanders of both the National Government and the Communist Party will be responsible within their respective areas for the protection of railway repair units consisting of technicians and laborers and for prevention of further destruction. Any troop movements necessary for this purpose must be approved by the Executive Headquarters.

E. *Train Guards, Administrative Control and Operating Personnel.* Personnel of these classifications will all be under the direct control of the representatives of the Ministry of Communications, under the general supervision of the Executive Headquarters.

F. *Priority of Construction.* Priority for initiation of reconstruction and operation of the various railway lines will be based upon their bearing on the economic recovery of the country, with full consideration given to railway requirements to facilitate the disarmament and repatriation of the Japanese.

Approved:

GENERAL CHANG CHIH CHUNG
GENERAL CHOU EN-LAI
GENERAL G. C. MARSHALL

[CHUNGKING, February 9, 1946.]

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Marshall to General Chou En-lai

CHUNGKING, February 9, 1946.

Subject: Critical Situation in Tai-an

The following personal report of Colonel Lake, U. S. Army of the Tsinan team has been forwarded to me from Peiping:

“Communists claim the right to disarm what they call puppet troops in Tai-an and the other cities in this area. They refuse to follow the terms of Executive Order No. 2. Their tactics have changed and they are now slowly starving the people and the soldiers in the surrounded cities.

General Chen Yi promised me that he would allow food to be brought in provided I (Colonel Lake) supervise its distribution. I

³¹ Not found in Department files.

took two cars of food to Tai-an from Tsinan and had to release one to the Communists. Fought a mob of about 10,000 Communists for more than two and one-half hours whose mission was to lynch the magistrate of Tai-an, who was a member of my party, and get the food we were taking to civilians in the besieged cities. Two bricks were thrown through the window of the coach while I was pleading with the mob to let things be settled lawfully. Plenty of soldiers around but they did not do a great deal to stop them.

I am of the opinion that above question is grave enough to use every means possible to get the situation cleared. The Communist officers with me did a lot to quiet the people. Thought that I would be able to get the officers to relieve the tension in the town but I failed entirely. I have tried to use reason but it cannot be done.

Steps should be taken at once to require the Communists to withdraw to Tai-an, Yenchow, Changtien, Ti Chow and Liao Cheng. The mob refused to let our train proceed until I would promise to meet two demands: one, give food to the New 4th Army and the 8th Route Army and two, to issue an order allowing the troops inside Tai-an to be disarmed immediately. A close call but luckily everything turned out without bloodshed."

Colonel Hill, U. S. Army on his return from Tsinan on February 4 reported that General Chen Yi, commanding New 4th Army, Shantung Province, stated substantially, "The provisions of General Order No. 2 are a good thing, but they do not apply in Shantung Province because conditions in Shantung are exceptional. Here we are opposing puppet troops who should be disarmed and the traitors executed."

Is there any action you could take which would enable the Executive Headquarters teams to carry out their duties without the turbulence and danger of distressing incidents which now threaten?

For General George C. Marshall:

J. HART CAUGHEY
Colonel, G. S. C.

893.00/2-1146 : Telegram

*General Marshall to President Truman*³²

[CHUNGKING,] 9 February 1946.

[170.] DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The Chinese Foreign Minister, Dr. Wang Shih Chieh, called on me last night to inform me of the increasing critical developments in Manchuria. He reported that he had called in the Russian Ambassador, Petrov, several days before to inquire of him why Soviet Forces had not completed their withdrawal from Manchuria by February 1st, in accordance with the Sino-Soviet Treaty and subsequent corollary agreements between the two govern-

³² Copy received in the Department from the Office of the Chief of Staff, War Department, on February 11.

ments. Petrov replied that he would have to consult Moscow and would then report to the Chinese on the status of the Soviet withdrawal. (Petrov had not reported by the time Dr. Wang called on me last night.) Dr. Wang then commented to Petrov that Soviet authorities in Manchuria had "informally" suggested to the Chinese authorities that the Soviet withdrawal could be expedited by Chinese agreement to Russia's demands for economic concessions, which she claims as Japanese war booty.³³ These economic concessions or "war booty", as the Soviets call them, involve 50% Soviet ownership, or participation, in virtually every phase of Manchurian economy. They include joint ownership of natural resource developments, such as coal mines and hydro-electric systems, future air transport systems and virtually every important industrial establishment in the country. It is quite clear that the Soviet is demanding tremendous economic concessions in Manchuria for the present and the future rather than anything that could reasonably be called "war booty."

Dr. Wang informed Petrov that the Chinese Government could not meet such Soviet demands and that, in any event, could not negotiate a settlement of legitimate war booty until Soviet troops had withdrawn. He recalled that the Chinese Government had already made major concessions in the Chinese-Soviet Treaty and could pay no additional price for Manchuria under threat. Dr. Wang said the Chinese Government now has several courses of action in mind. In brief they are:

1. Seek to effect a reasonable settlement with the Soviets on part ownership of industrial establishments in Manchuria which were bona fide Japanese properties as a recognition of Soviet claims for war booty. This settlement would be by informal understanding prior to Soviet withdrawal and negotiated formally after withdrawal.

2. Propose to the Soviets that the entire issue be put to the Far Eastern Commission as Molotov³⁴ had suggested to Dr. Wang in the first meeting of Foreign Ministers at London. Wang believes that Molotov may have made the proposal as an empty gesture since at the time the United States refused to agree to the principle of a Far Eastern Control Commission.

He then asked for my views on what might be done. I first asked him what he thought the United States might do to assist China in this matter and he had no specific proposals. I then told him I thought first of all China must proceed with her projected unification at the fastest possible pace so as to eliminate her present vulnerability to Soviet undercover attack, which exists so long as there remains a

³³ For correspondence on this subject, see vol. x, pp. 1099 ff.

³⁴ V. M. Molotov, Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

separate Communist Government and a separate Communist Army in China.

Secondly, I told him that I believed he should make no commitment, formal or informal, with the Soviet which would recognize her claims that war booty consisted of the kind of economic concessions she is demanding. I suggested that if a settlement seemed possible on the type of concessions that were implicit in the Chinese-Soviet Treaty, such limited concessions might be made.

I told Wang it was my belief that time was running against the Soviet, since the longer her troops remain in Manchuria the more clearly she becomes a deliberate treaty violator in the eyes of the world. I suggested further that this psychological weapon could be sharpened by the entrance of American and Allied correspondents into Manchuria.

Dr. Wang said he concurred completely in my point that a speedy execution of the unification was essential. He agreed with me that time was running against the Soviet and said that the idea of turning the spotlight of publicity on Manchuria was already under consideration.

Harriman³⁵ has already probably told you the Generalissimo is duly concerned over the steadily increasing dilemma his officials and his troops find themselves in Manchuria. He is opposed to combined teams of the executive headquarters going into Manchuria because he fears the Russians would demand representation on such teams, since Russian troops are usually present if not directly involved in the troublesome incidents. It was reported to him that when his small National Force entered Yingkow in Manchuria, it was attacked by some 400 Russian soldiers with armored vehicles and heavy weapons along with an overwhelming Communist force. I have been unable to check on the accuracy of this report as he declines to agree to the dispatch of a team to Yingkow.

I have reported this situation to you in detail because I feel that it not only involves me in matters beyond my mission but is perhaps more dangerous to world accord than any other present issue. It is clear to me that the survival of much of what has been accomplished in China this past month will depend to an important degree on an early disposition of the festering situation in Manchuria. I also believe that our Government must shortly do more for China in this matter than give advice. Just what action might be taken with reasonable hope of success I do not know, but the following thoughts occur to me:

1. First of all China must speed up on her unification—nationalization of her armies, actual development of the projected coalition government and restoration of communications.

³⁵ W. Averell Harriman, the retiring American Ambassador in the Soviet Union, returned to the United States via China.

2. We must clear our hands out here as quickly as possible in order to avoid the inevitable Russian recriminations similar to those today regarding the British troops in Greece. I mean by this, we must terminate the "China Theater of Operations" and in its place quickly develop the military advisory group. (Wedemeyer on my urging is actually but unofficially organizing this group in Nanking.) Also, in this connection, we must move all of the Marines out of China but some reconnaissance and transportation and some housekeeping and local guard units. The timing of this last move requires a critical decision. I have been having it planned for some time but there is still a grave question in my mind as to the effect on both the Kuomintang and the Communist groups. I am not prepared to advise this action now, but I hope I will be ready to do so in another month. Meanwhile I have agreed to considerable reductions in Marine strength.

3. China should announce her intention to send troops into Japan. Generalissimo was previously forced to state his inability to do this, but under present and prospective circumstances I think he will make the offer shortly, on my suggestion, the movement to be initiated about May 1.

4. China would now be ready to carry the Manchuria issue to the Far Eastern Commission, with definite evidence of unification, with the embarrassment of the presence of American combat troops removed, and with her status dignified by the fact of her troops having joined the Allied Occupation Forces in Japan.

Another subject: Negotiations regarding nationalization of Chinese Armies progressed well at first but have been delayed by necessity of Chou En-lai having his views confirmed by Yen-an. Also, he is so deeply engaged with initial discussions for actual formation of National Council, etc., that he has been prevented from proceeding rapidly with military conferences. Incidentally he and the National Government representative were in conference with Rue [*me*] for three hours and a half this morning straightening out serious differences which had continued ten days in Peking over problem of control of railroad operations in Communist territory. An agreement was reached.

Faithfully yours,

G. C. MARSHALL

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by Colonel J. Hart Caughey to General Marshall

CHUNGKING, 11 February 1946.

The following message has just been received and is quoted for your information:

"To all field teams and team members info Marshall, Chou En-lai, Gov. Chang Chun, from the commissioners signed Robertson.

"This message will be sent thru Executive Headquarters Chinese branches channels to senior field commanders in National Government and Communist military areas. Message begins:

“All troops, whether or not they are called puppet troops as long as they are recognized by either Government or Communist forces, are included in the cease fire order. Such troops and the forces opposing them will maintain the positions held as of 2400 January 30, or, if necessary, as determined by Executive Headquarters field teams. This is an interim arrangement pending final decision by the Committee of Three of all questions relating to the status of troops. End.”

Similar memorandum furnished General Chou En-lai and Colonel Pee.

J. HART CAUGHEY
Colonel, G. S. C.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Brigadier General Henry A. Byroade to General Marshall

PEIPING, 11 February 1946.

328. Report on Canton area is subject. While in Chungking I issued instructions to Canton team to proceed to Tapeng Peninsula and action reported fighting there.

Following this order latest report from U. S. team leader is that when General Chang Fa Kwei was informed that General Tseng Sheng commanded East River Communist forces with headquarters in the Tapeng Peninsula he stated in an informal off record conference that “If Generalissimo recognized Canton Communist forces that would constitute his (Chang Fa Kwei’s) authority to withdraw troops.”

Communists here report current fighting and possible annihilation Tseng Sheng’s forces and have requested urgent action.

Request that National Government urgently confirm to Chang Fa Kwei its recognition of the General Tseng Sheng force as a Communist unit falling within the purview of the cease fire order. This will facilitate movement of and action by our team.³⁶

893.00/2-1246 : Telegram

The Counselor of Embassy in China (Smyth) to the Secretary of State

CHUNGKING, February 12, 1946—2 p. m.

[Received February 13—6 : 41 a. m.]

277. Disarmament of Japanese in North China is proceeding slowly. Japanese troops in Hopei are reported to have been completely dis-

³⁶ Notation: “G[eneralissi]mo Order issued to allow team to proceed to disputed area. Interpreted by [Col.] Pee[,] also got info[rmation] from [General] Chang [Chih-chung] that this recognizes troops.” See telegram No. 186, February 13, from General Marshall, p. 431.

armed. Considerable numbers of Japanese in Shantung and Shansi, particularly the latter, are reported still under arms. (This is summary of Military Attaché's report dated February 8, 1946.)

Chinese occupation of Manchuria had proceeded with reported withdrawal of Russian troops from Mukden on February 3. With exception of Communist recapture of Yingkou about January 14, Central Government is reported not to have encountered combat resistance worthy of comment from Communists or other forces. However, they are proceeding very slowly because of reported attitude of Russians.

SMYTH

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Press Release Issued by the Chinese Central News Agency

[CHUNGKING,] February 12, 1946.

COMMUNIST CLAIM UNACCEPTABLE, SAYS GEN. CHANG

Canton, Feb. 12 (Central): "I cannot accept the Communist contention that bands of roving bandits and former puppet and Japanese troops still at large in Kwangtung are regular units of the Communist army," said General Chang Fah-kwei, Director of the Generalissimo's Headquarters at Canton, at a press conference held here this afternoon. He said he had received no information whatsoever regarding the existence of regular Communist troops in any area under his control.

To accept the claim, the general said, would mean that all bandits and law-breakers throughout the province would come under the Communist banner and could continue their depredations with impunity. Peace in Kwangtung could never be restored then.

This is the first press conference given to local pressmen by General Chang Fah-kwei since the abolition of the 2nd Area Army Headquarters, of which he was the Commander, and the establishment of the Generalissimo's Headquarters on February 1.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270: Telegram

General Marshall to Brigadier General Henry A. Byroade, at Peiping

[CHUNGKING,] 13 February 1946.

186. Following, your 328³⁷ refers, information received from General Chang Chih Chung through Colonel Pee regarding Canton area. Generalissimo has issued order to General Chang Fa Kwei to allow Executive Headquarters team to proceed to disputed area. This is

³⁷ February 11, p. 430.

interpreted by Pee as recognition by the National Government to General Tseng Shang's forces as Communists.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Mr. Walter S. Robertson to General Marshall

PEIPING, 13 February 1946.

336. This is Trusum No. 28 for period ended 2400, 11 Feb: Documents A, B, and C of the railroad agreement³⁸ drawn up at Chungking by the Committee of Three have been received at Executive Hq. in Peiping. Document A is being issued as General Directive 4A of Executive Hq. Document C and a résumé of Document B will go to all teams for information on 12 February. Official copies in English and Chinese will follow by courier mail.

Lt. Col. Drake will proceed to Tolun on 12 Feb as Executive Hq observer, to determine the facts concerning alleged large scale troop movements in that area. He will be accompanied by a Communist representative and an American enlisted man.

At a meeting held by Team No. 15 on 10 February, Nationalist and Communist commanders in the Tehsien area signed an agreement which provided as follows:

- a. The cease fire order will be strictly obeyed.
- b. Troops will not be moved from the areas now occupied.
- c. The food blockade will be lifted immediately for civilians, allowing them free movement outlying areas.
- d. The Communists will lend Nationalist troops 50,000 catties of food.
- e. The agreement will be effective indefinitely unless changed by Executive Hq.
- f. Both Nationalists and Communists will abide by all future decisions of Executive Hq. in Peiping as they apply to the Tehsien area. The area covered by this agreement includes the town of Tehsien and the outlying districts to the South and East.

Team No. 7, which departed this morning for Tsinan, was forced by adverse weather to return to Peiping.

Additional information: A meeting was held in Peiping on 10 February, and attended by Communist Commissar Yao Shan Shih, General Yeh Chien Ying, Communist commissioner, and Col. John P. Lake, American member of Team No. 7. After discussion, the following points were agreed to as the Communist position:

- a. The cease fire order will be observed to the letter.
- b. Food will be permitted to enter all areas in Shantung Province without restriction and will be distributed by a committee, the size and

³⁸ The restoration of communications agreements of February 9, pp. 422, 423, and 424.

composition of this committee will be decided by field Team No. 7 at Tsinan.

c. The railroad between Changtien and Poshan may be reconstructed immediately. Pending final decision on railroads from Peiping or Chungking, this line will be under Communist management.

d. Coal may move from the Poshan area without interruption provided it is bought and paid for by the person or firm using it. This statement of position will be a basis for negotiation by Team No. 7 at Tsinan.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Mr. Walter S. Robertson to General Marshall

PEIPING, 13 February 1946.

357. Please refer to 328³⁹ regarding the Canton situation. Col. Miller now reports that General Chang Fa Kwei states that he had not been instructed by the Gissimo or General Ho Ying Chin⁴⁰ that authority of Executive Hq. is applicable in his area or that Communist forces in that area have been recognized by Chungking. Col. Miller then informed General Chang Fa Kwei that he had been informed that Communist forces had been recognized in Chungking (Miller was quoting CFBX 22639 from Comgen China⁴¹ to Canton and Peiping, not addressed to you, which stated that the East River guerilla column is a Communist force and has been recognized as such by the War Department, Yenan Supreme Headquarters and the Central Government). General Chang Fa Kwei seemed surprised and said that his orders would have to come from his superiors. General Chang Fa Kwei then announced that he was leaving the Canton area February 13 for conference with General Ho Ying Chin.

In subsequent message today Col. Miller stated that he has been informed in writing that the Executive Hq. team will receive no assistance from General Chang Fa Kwei since he had no information as to the authority of Executive Hq. in his area and since Communist forces in his area had not been recognized by Chungking. Further that it was understood that Executive Hq. had authority only in areas north of the Yangtze River.

The SISBE [*problem?*] in the Canton area reported in 328 has now been extended to question of the authority of the Executive Hq. south of the Yangtze. Request your personal assistance to insure that both General Ho Ying Chin and General Chang Fa Kwei receive immediate instructions from the Gissimo.

³⁹ February 11, p. 430.

⁴⁰ General Ho was Commander in Chief of the Chinese Army and Chief of Staff of the National Military Council.

⁴¹ Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, Commanding General, U. S. Forces, China Theater, and Chief of Staff, China Theater.

As background info, the Communists here are extremely worried about annihilation of their forces in Canton area. Central Government here states that only a small force of bandits is involved and that they have no military organization or insignia. China Theater and Americans here feel that this guerilla force is Communist and entitled to protection under cease fire orders. Further the defiance of Ho Ying Chin's command to our orders cannot be tolerated.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

President Truman to General Marshall

WASHINGTON, 13 February 1946.

WH 460 [406]. MY DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: The Secretary of State and I have received and read with great interest and appreciation your most recent telegram ⁴² in regard to Manchuria. I approve the tentative course of action you outlined.

With regard to a Military Advisory Group for China,⁴³ a revised J. C. S. paper on the subject is expected soon and their recommendations will be sent to you for comment.

I am much interested in your suggestion with respect to deactivation of the China Theater and should be glad to have your views as to the timing of such deactivation.⁴⁴ General Wedemeyer's recent reports indicate that under his present plans movement of Chinese armies to Manchuria will not be completed until September 1, 1946, and that logistical support for these Chinese forces will not be discontinued until October 31, 1946.

Inasmuch as the movement of Chinese forces into North China is dependent on the development of your mission, I realize that no information on possible timing of this phase of theater activity is yet available and am hopeful that the success of your mission will render this activity unnecessary. I shall await with interest your further recommendations with regard to the withdrawal of the Marines from North China.

Current developments in connection with the presence of British troops in Indonesia and Greece, to which you refer, increase my anxiety to get American armed forces out of China just as soon as they are no longer essential to implement our policy in China.

With regard to your references to the Far Eastern Commission in relation to the Manchurian issue, I believe that the only practicable consideration that the Commission could give to the situation in Man-

⁴² No. 170, February 9, p. 426.

⁴³ For correspondence on this subject, see vol. x, pp. 810 ff.

⁴⁴ General Marshall proposed a timetable in his telegram No. 231, February 23, to Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Chief of Staff; for text of telegram, see vol. x, p. 848.

churia would be in connection with repatriations [*reparations?*]; that is, disposition of Japanese external assets in Manchuria. I assume that you have the same idea. It is our idea that the Far Eastern Commission shall limit itself to consideration of problems and policies directly connected with the surrender, disarmament and control of Japan and that its scope of activity should not be extended to consideration of Far Eastern problems of a more general character.

With renewed assurance of my confidence and high regard,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Brigadier General Henry A. Byroade to General Marshall

PEIPING, 14 February 1946.

359. Disarmament problem which caused concern while Headquarters was occupied by cease fire and repatriation of Communist [*Japanese?*] problems has now virtually solved itself. In accordance with your desire, immediately upon my return, we endeavored to locate an isolated group of armed Japs to make test case of disarmament by Communists. No such group could be found.

Nationalists here informed yesterday that all Japanese are now disarmed. Communists do not as yet accept this report. In the last few days evidence from teams sent to substantiate the Nationalist claim. In any event it appears now that the Japanese are disarmed to a point where the disarmament question will no longer be an issue. The military truce and presence of field teams has apparently created a degree of stability in North China which has induced the Nationalists to greatly accelerate disarmament in the last 3 weeks.

Staff studies on the problem of repatriation are now fully under way in the American group. Wedemeyer's repatriation experts arrived here today for conference. You will be informed of further developments.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Memorandum by General Marshall to General Chang Chih-chung
and General Chou En-lai*

CHUNGKING, 20 February 1946.

General Directive No. 5 has been issued on 18 February to all field teams, field team members, and all National Government and Communist Party military commanders in North China.

Directive begins: All National Government and Communist Party military commanders in North China and all field teams and field team members.

The following document regarding repatriation of the Japanese has been agreed to and signed by the three Commissioners of Executive Headquarters.

[“]Repatriation of Japanese

In the overall problem of repatriating Japanese, which has been undertaken by the Allied powers, the responsibility with respect to China lies with the Chinese National Government. The United States has assisted and is continuing to assist in this task through the United States Forces, China Theater. These forces include the United States Marines in China. A complete plan for repatriation from port of embarkation has been agreed to between representatives of the Supreme Commander Allied Powers in Japan, and the United States Forces, China Theater. Representatives of the National Government of China have endorsed this plan.

In the cessation of hostilities documents approved by the Committee of Three in Chungking, a responsibility for repatriation of the Japanese from the areas of conflict was also placed on the Executive Headquarters. The presence of large numbers of Japanese is a disturbing factor in North China which makes the release of these Japanese from present locations and the insurance of their orderly movement to ports of embarkation a matter of direct concern to the Executive Headquarters. This movement must furthermore be at such a rate as is consistent with port capacities and availability of shipping.

The best available information indicates that in North China there are approximately 120,000 Japanese military and 189,000 Japanese civilians to be repatriated. Of the above it appears that a total of 81,500 Japanese military and 154,000 Japanese civilians should be repatriated through the port of Tangku. The remaining 37,500 Japanese military and 35,000 Japanese civilians should be repatriated through the port of Tsingtao.

Executive Headquarters will take the necessary action to arrange for the establishment of food dumps and the method of movement of Japanese repatriates to ports of embarkation in coordination with the Chinese Government and the China Theater. It will take such steps as are practicable and necessary to insure the availability of coal for railroad use in connection with these movements. It will determine the priority of Japanese movements from areas, based upon the availability of rail facilities, or living conditions along the route of evacuation, and food availability in their present areas.

Shipping now scheduled and port facilities are capable of handling a rate of flow of 3,000 per day through the port of Tangku and 1,500 per day through the port of Tsingtao. It is anticipated that this rate can be increased at a later date.

It is agreed that both National Government and Communist Party forces will assist, and not interfere with in any way, the movement of Japanese to insure the agreed rate of movement through ports of embarkation. It is further agreed that the repatriation of Japanese from North China shall be effected at the maximum rate possible consistent with the availability of shipping. No other factors, including any assigned responsibilities, will be permitted to retard this movement.

Subject to later agreement, it appears that the repatriation of Japanese military and Lao Yao and Hsuchow areas will require no action

of coordination by Executive Headquarters. The repatriates in the Lao Yao area will be repatriated through the port of Lao Yao. The repatriates west of the railroad break at Yun Ho will be moved by rail to Shanghai via Hsuchow.

Signed General Cheng Kai Ming, General Yeh Chien Ying, Mr. Walter S. Robertson." End of document.

In compliance with the above agreement all commanders, in absence of further instructions, will, of their own initiative, assist in the repatriation of Japanese from or through their areas. Routes of movement and the timing thereof will be established by the Executive Headquarters. Such further information and instructions as may be necessary will be provided commanders concerned at a later date.

Signed General Cheng Kai Ming, National Government Commissioner, General Yeh Chien Ying, Communist Party Commissioner, Walter Robertson, United States Commissioner.

End of directive. New Subject: This directive will be confirmed in English and Chinese to all field teams by courier.

For General George C. Marshall:
J. HART CAUGHEY
Colonel, G. S. C.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

General Marshall to General Chang Chih-chung

CHUNGKING, February 20, 1946.

DEAR GENERAL CHANG: General Byroade has again informed me that the National Government has not yet submitted reports of troop movements to Executive Headquarters. I am concerned about this since the terms of the agreement by the Committee of Three specifically provided that such reports be submitted. It is very embarrassing to me, as a signatory to this agreement, to accept this failure to comply with the explicit terms of the agreement.

I would appreciate your advising me of the intentions of the Government in this matter.

Faithfully yours,

G. C. MARSHALL

740.00119PW/2-2046 : Telegram

The Counselor of Embassy in China (Smyth) to the Secretary of State

CHUNGKING, February 20, 1946—9 a. m.

[Received 10:30 p. m.]

331. Military Attaché report summary week ending February 16 follows:

Unconfirmed report February 3 stating Russians evacuated Mukden that date only recent news any progress neutral [*toward?*] govt re-occupation Manchuria. To contrary comes report Russians have postponed evacuation Manchuria until May 1.

North China situation generally quiet especially Jehol-Chahar-Hopei area. No serious fighting Shantung reported although deadlock said continuing.

General compliance with cease fire order secured by truce teams although difficulties being experienced in obtaining withdrawals from areas occupied since promulgation of order.

Conflicting reports continue to be received with regard to disarmament Japanese First Army in Shansi. With this exception, however, Japanese disarmament appears generally completed.

Rate of repatriation Japanese during past week reported as 6 to 7000 daily.

SMYTH

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270: Telegram

*Brigadier General Henry A. Byroade and Mr. Walter S. Robertson to
General Marshall*

PEIPING, 21 February 1946.

474. On afternoon of February 23 [20] Executive Headquarters premises and inner offices were twice invaded by a noisy mob of 500 or more demanding to see Commissioner Yeh. They were purported to be country people from outlying Hsiens of Hopei demanding means to return to their homes, restoration of communications, cessation of Communist grain levies and other protests directed toward Communist administration in the outlying areas. Apparently no effort was made by civil or military authorities to prevent entry of the mob into the corridors of the building. Police on outskirts of the mob stated that they had been alerted in regard to the demonstration early in the morning. There is no other evidence of possible National Government organization of the mob, possibly in retaliation for reported inspired Communist demonstrations in the field. If inspired, demonstration may have gone further than intended. Because the Headquarters cannot proceed in orderly operation in the face of such rowdiness, strong representation was made to the National Government branch. Approach was along lines that we and Communists were guests here with[in] Nationalist area and they were responsible for maintaining order. Three Commissioners are making formal protest to Mayor to the appropriate military authorities and both Chinese commissioners suggest that Three Commissioners should also address

communication to Gimo. No action indicated by you unless further advised.

Communists last night stated their reluctance to do business on the premises. General Yeh, in a spirit of righteous indignation, indicated that the matter was so serious he would have to consider until this morning what action he would take. He indicated that he might go to Yen-an but that in any event he would make a complete report to General Chou En-lai. This seemed opportune time to present evidence we have collected of Communist propaganda activities within Peiping and in outlying field team areas. He and his politicians who were present were considerably taken aback. There have been many reports from American team members of excessive Communist membership of field teams and of activities of their field team members outside Executive Headquarters work. It is obvious that they have organized mass meetings in outlying team areas. Some of our teams have received a deluge of petitions from people who cannot read or write and of such similarity as to indicate instigation by the Communists. While the Communist field teams are greatly overstrength, the Communist portion of Executive Headquarters is understrength to the point of retarding our operations. We have transported sufficient personnel to Peiping but they are not all working here with Executive Headquarters, although we have just learned they wear Executive Headquarters badges and live with Communist members of Executive Headquarters.

We had prepared the above evidence for presentation to the Communists today and had intended a simultaneous report to you. General Yeh was apologetic and admitted certain things of a propaganda nature of which we had not heard. He promised to take immediate action to correct situation of which we complain (on specific matters in this line which we will present today).

Pending further report on developments believe you should take no action on Communist activities in this organization.

893.00/2-2346 : Telegram

*The Counselor of Embassy in China (Smyth) to the Secretary of State*⁴⁵

CHUNGKING, February 23, 1946—11 a. m.

[Received February 24—3:07 a. m.]

357. University students numbering more than 10,000 on 22 February conducted orderly public demonstration demanding return of

⁴⁵ Repeated by the Department to the Embassy in the Soviet Union as telegram No. 340, February 27, 3 p. m.

Manchuria to Chinese control and immediate evacuation of Soviet troops from northeast. Following passage of parading students, offices of Communist *Hsin Hua Jih Pao* and Democratic League *Min Chu [Jih] Pao* were destroyed by group of approximately 100 rioters. Several employees of Communist paper were assaulted and three seriously injured. Headquarters of Communist Delegation forcibly entered and disturbance created by same group. Best information indicates students not responsible for violence but that demonstration was publicized by disgruntled Kuomintang elements, such as CC clique, to attack supporters of PCC agreements and by injection of national security issue to divert attention from efforts to disrupt implementation of PCC program. Second student demonstration scheduled for today to coincide with Soviet Embassy celebration of Red Army Day.

Increasing Chinese concern with regard to Manchurian situation is becoming daily more evident. Chinese returning from northeast state that wartime industrial development of south Manchuria was on larger scale than was anticipated in Soviet Union and this is offered by them as partial explanation of Russian reluctance to withdraw.

Whatever the cause, however, bewilderment at and distrust of ultimate Russian intentions in Manchuria is receiving increasing nation-wide expression in all but Communist press. Press accounts are largely speculative, but express grave concern with regard to reported Mongolian autonomy movement in western Manchuria and alleged Russian demands for additional rights in northeast including inland navigation and major participation in revitalization of industries. As yet no open accusations of Russian bad faith have been made. General press attitude is that China, having paid the price exacted by Russia at Yalta, expects unmolested restoration of Manchuria conditioned only by terms of Sino-Soviet treaty.

Situation was further beclouded by Yen-an statement 14 February by spokesman of Central Committee Communist Party to general effect that Central Government should recognize 300,000 troops of [apparent omission] Kuomintang press is making political capital thereof and even some neutral observers, normally well disposed toward Communists, tend to accept it as evidence of Communist-Soviet collusion in Manchuria. There would appear to be some justification for this attitude inasmuch as there is ample reason to believe that Communist activity and strength in Manchuria prior to Japanese collapse was negligible. On the other hand, there is no substantive proof that such collusion exists and Chou En-lai and other Commu-

nists here appear genuinely anxious that Russian withdrawal be effected immediately.⁴⁶

With regard to Mongolian autonomy movement in Manchuria, Communists claim that Government is deliberately permitting garbled version to continue current. Communists offer explanation that Barga Mongolians have merely expressed wish to retain their own banner organization under Chinese rather than be subject to Chinese *hsien* district [apparent omission]. Explanation seems reasonable in view of history of past treatment of Mongolians by Chinese and autonomy movement could well exist without Chinese Communist or Soviet instigation.

SMYTH

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Brigadier General Henry A. Byroade to General Marshall

PEIPING, 24 February 1946.

495. Field Team 8 states that National Govt headquarters at Canton has not received formal recognition of the Communist forces in the Canton area. Team states that without this recognition it cannot implement cease-fire order on Tapeng Peninsula. Your 186⁴⁷ states that Gimo has issued orders to General Chang Fa Kwei to allow Ex Hq team to proceed to disputed area but was not specific on recognition of East River column. Please furnish results of any action taken on our 357.⁴⁸

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai at House 28, Chungking, February 25, 1946, 12 Noon

Also present: Col. Caughey
Mr. Chang

General Chou opened the meeting by stating that he was glad the Generalissimo had approved the Basis for Reorganization of the National Armies⁴⁹ and then asked General Marshall if it would be appropriate for the Military Sub-Committee to discuss, immediately after the formal signing of the document, the general aspects of the detailed plans or should these first be worked out by staff members.

⁴⁶ For correspondence on the "Yenan Statement" of February 14, see despatch No. 1166, February 28, from the Counselor of Embassy in China, p. 448.

⁴⁷ February 13, p. 431.

⁴⁸ February 13, p. 433.

⁴⁹ See pp. 177 ff.

General Marshall stated that he had no objection to discussing the details but believed it more appropriate for the staff to work out the matters first.

General Chou then asked about the proposed trip to North China. General Marshall replied that he would discuss the trip with the Generalissimo and establish the schedule by tomorrow.

General Chou then stated that the agreement on Cessation of Hostilities and the present agreement on Reorganization both included jurisdiction by appropriate agencies over Manchuria; that he had explained his views to General Chang who was attentive but noncommittal; that it would be desirable to establish a policy now in order to avoid subsequent misunderstanding. General Marshall stated that he too was anxious about Manchuria and that it was very important to arrive at a peaceful solution rather than creating additional trouble. General Marshall continued that the actions on the part of the Communist representative of Executive Headquarters would do much to overcome apprehensions on the part of the National Government concerning possible ulterior motives on the part of the Communists; that the Communist Party has everything to gain by causing government people to believe in their sincere good faith. General Marshall continued by stating that he believed the Yen-an statement⁵⁰ regarding Manchuria was harmful and that the recent Communist-inspired demonstrations at Executive Headquarters may do much to destroy mutual confidence. General Marshall informed General Chou that it was for these reasons he had spoken to the local press editors the day before. He said that if his frank discussion with them would not produce results, he would consider again making a public statement.

General Marshall reminded General Chou that after the signing today, three big matters designed toward the unification of China, would have been completed and that through these and other means he was struggling every day to convince each side of the good faith of the other. General Chou assured General Marshall that he too desired to build confidence between the two parties and that the Communists would, in good faith, demobilize three million [300,000?] troops in Manchuria; also that Communist good faith is proven by the fact that they had not objected to five National armies in Manchuria. General Chou concluded by stating he realized cliques within the Kuomintang were trying to disrupt the agreements and that he understood their general plot.

⁵⁰ February 14; see despatch No. 1166, February 28, from the Counselor of Embassy in China, p. 448.

740.00119PW/2-2646 : Telegram

The Counselor of Embassy in China (Smyth) to the Secretary of State

CHUNGKING, February 26, 1946—3 p. m.

[Received 10 : 30 p. m.]

272 [372]. During my conversation with Foreign Minister Wang Shih-chieh last evening (see Embassy's 368, Feb. 26⁵¹) he said that the Russians were very difficult to deal with and had given no indication of date on which their troops would leave Manchuria; he said that on Feb. 1 and again on Feb. 19 he had inquired of Soviet Ambassador Petrov in this regard and each time Petrov replied that he had no information.

Dr. Wang said that the Chinese Govt. has not replied to the Russian proposal (this proposal is mentioned in Foreign Office note of Feb. 25 as "another memo presented to the officials of the Generalissimo's Headquarters in Changchun"). Dr. Wang's private secretary has informed me that this memo was undated and was handed informally on Jan. 15 or 16 in Changchun to Dr. Chang Chia-Ao,⁵² Chairman of the Economic Commission of Generalissimo's Headquarters in the Northeast, who has been the Chinese negotiator with the Russians in Changchun. The Secretary added that Dr. Chang returned from Changchun to Chungking Feb. 2 since which time no discussions have been held with Russians.

Dr. Wang said that Chinese Govt. forces are in effective control of railroad from Chinwangtao to a point near Mukden; that two Chinese divisions are in suburbs of Mukden and could move into the city if the Russians would depart. He said that the Russians have perhaps 10,000 troops in Mukden and are in control of city; a Chinese appointed mayor is in Mukden, but has not been able to take over administration. Dr. Wang said the Chinese have about 3,000 military police in Changchun and a few civil officials in Harbin; both places remain in Russian control. He remarked that if the Russians would leave these three cities the Chinese could easily move in sufficient troops to assure safety. Dr. Wang said the Chinese do not know how many Russian troops are now in Manchuria.

Dr. Wang referred to the "patriotic demonstrations" by students and other Chinese which are now taking place in China and which seem to be increasing. He said that the Chinese Govt. desired to keep these under control as they might embarrass relation with the Russians. He stated that after the Feb. 16 demonstration by some Manchurian

⁵¹ Vol. x, p. 1109.

⁵² Known as Chang Kia-ngau.

groups in Chungking the Russian Ambassador had "incidentally and informally protested"; Dr. Wang said that he told the Ambassador that if the Russians would remove the cause of the demonstrations by evacuating their troops from Manchuria, the demonstrations would not occur. Dr. Wang appeared very much concerned over the possible Russian reaction to these continuing demonstrations; he expressed the opinion that the Russian reaction would probably be known within a few days.

Dr. Wang said that he would continue to keep us informed regarding developments in Manchuria.

SMYTH

740.00119PW/2-2646 : Telegram

The Counselor of Embassy in China (Smyth) to the Secretary of State

CHUNGKING, February 26, 1946—8 a. m.

[Received February 27—7:47 a. m.]

364. Pending further negotiations between Central Govt. and Russia with regard to withdrawal Soviet troops, Chinese program for reoccupation Manchuria restricted to places not held by Russians. Meanwhile, augmented by arrival new Sixth Army from Shanghai, Central Govt. forces are enlarging area under their control both sides Pei-Ning railroad. (Military Attaché summary report week ending 23 Feb.) China conditions remain relatively quiet. Satisfactory progress enforcement cease fire order in Shantung where previous difficulties had been encountered. Truce teams difficulties are now in Northern Honan and Shansi.

Best available information indicates all Jap troops China now disarmed. Still some doubt with regard to accuracy of reports concerning disarmament Jap First Army in Shansi.

SMYTH

121.893/2-2646 : Telegram

General Marshall to President Truman

[CHUNGKING,] 26 February 1946.

[251.] DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Yesterday, Monday, at 4 p. m. a ceremony was made of the formal signing of the agreement for the demobilization and integration of the Armies of China.⁵³ There were speeches by the Government and Communist representatives each emphasizing the great importance of the agreement and of the occa-

⁵³ See pp. 177 ff.

sion, including most generous references to me. However, I felt it necessary in my brief comments to make a direct reference to the destructive efforts of certain cliques composed of men who will lose power, position, and income as a result of the modernization of the Government. I felt it necessary to put those responsible for the recent disorderly occurrences here in Chungking and at Peking and other points on notice that I understood the character and purpose of their efforts.

The Generalissimo discussed matter[s] with me last night until midnight and again this morning at 9 o'clock.

1) He wishes to delay the announcement of Chinese troops taking part in the occupation of Japan until the successful conclusion of the meeting of the Kuomintang Central Committee, presumably between March 10th and 15th.

2) He wishes to delay sending combined teams into Manchuria until I return from a trip to be referred to later.

3) He requested me to shorten my trip in order that I would be in Chungking during the latter half of the meeting of the Central Committee, that is from March 5th to 10th so that he could consult with me regarding the drafting of the constitution in particular and also in case the meeting developed precariously. He also wished Chou En-lai to be here at the same time.

The meeting of the Central Committee of the Kuomintang Party starts March 1st and is for the purpose of formally indorsing the recent resolution of the Political Consultative Conference. By this action, if it is taken, the Central Committee vacates its present power of governmental rule over China. The action of this committee would be the acid test of whether or not the Government is to proceed in good faith towards the establishment of a genuine democratic coalition.

I am scheduled to start on an inspection trip Thursday in company with my committee associates, General Chang and General Chou, to visit Executive Headquarters in Peking and in turn the critical points in North China. We will meet and talk to the principal military leaders, endeavor to compose their difficulties and will explain to them the agreed upon procedure of demobilization and unification. We will also visit Communist Headquarters at Yen-an.

Chou En-lai wants us to visit Mukden and Changchun. I will not agree to go to Mukden if the Russians are in control there, because I feel certain that they would attribute to my appearance there every implication but the real purpose, which might create a situation more embarrassing than helpful.

I will return to Chungking March 5th to be on hand for the Central Committee meeting and to advance certain plans preliminary to the demobilization program.

About March 12th I think I should return to Washington for a short visit as there are a number of aspects of the situation I would wish to discuss with you and the Secretary of State, but I am particularly anxious to go directly into the details of certain matters regarding transfer of surplus property and shipping and with regard to loans. Also I wish to make a personal presentation of the situation here regarding UNRRA and famine conditions. I should be back in China in time to balance differences that are bound to rise over the major adjustments that will then be getting under way, political as well as military.

If you approve of the foregoing I suggest that as soon as I indicate to you a definite time for my departure that you formally recall me to Washington, announcing that action at a press conference indicating the general purpose of my visit and that I am to return again to China.

Faithfully yours,

G. C. MARSHALL

121.893/2-2746 : Telegram

President Truman to General Marshall

[WASHINGTON, 27 February 1946.]

WH 409. Replying to your message of 26 February ⁵⁴ your expressed desire to return to Washington for a short visit for the purpose outlined by you and your return to China upon completion of the visit is approved.

Please let me know definite date when you wish to be recalled for consultation.

TRUMAN

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Mr. James R. Shepley to General Marshall

WASHINGTON, 28 February 1946.

98786. The President was harassed by an appointment jam and an upcoming cabinet meeting when I saw him yesterday. I told him briefly what I had to say and he directed me to give him a memorandum by today, which I have done. He said he wanted to see me again early next week after he had had a chance to digest it. His praise of your achievements was glowing. He indicates a strong desire to leave China to you and is interested largely in determining what, if any, further support he can give you.

In my memorandum I outlined briefly the situation as you found it and how you proceeded to get your results. The entire emphasis

⁵⁴ Telegram No. 251, *supra*.

is on the critical necessity of a long range American program in China, to be directed by a top flight man in the post of Ambassador. I have explained how difficult it is for the Chinese to understand the technique of implementation and how you have been hand feeding this technique through the machinery of the Executive Headquarters.

When I arrived I learned from press accounts that Stassen⁵⁵ is on the point of announcing his candidacy for the Senate. With this in mind and guided by your 218,⁵⁶ I have mentioned General Wedemeyer to the President as a man who meets the many-sided qualifications that will be required in the Ambassador.

[Here follow brief reports on other subjects.]

740.00119PW/2-2846: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, February 28, 1946.

[Received February 28—9: 50 p. m.]

579. Soviet press Feb. 27 carries statement made to Changchun papers by General Trotsenko, Chief of Staff to Malinovski, refuting reports in certain organs of Chinese and foreign press of intentional delays in withdrawal of Soviet troops from Manchuria. These reports are described as "fruit of slanderous machinations of reactionary anti-democratic elements hostile to Soviet Union, thereby attempting to destroy confidence and friendly feelings of Chinese Govt. towards Red Army."

Withdrawal of Soviet troops was begun in November, but in response to two requests of Chinese Govt. was stopped and postponed until Feb. 1. Withdrawal was resumed Jan. 15 and is now continuing so that considerable proportion of Soviet troops have already left Manchuria. However, withdrawal is somewhat delayed because Chinese Govt. troops are moving extremely slowly into evacuated districts. In number of cases there has been no one to whom Soviet Command could turn over territory. It is recalled that Chinese authorities last fall complained that Soviet troops were withdrawing without awaiting arrival of Chinese troops; that Jap destroyed railways and rolling stock in Manchuria; that lack of coal and winter conditions have seriously impeded normal railway traffic; and that

⁵⁵ Harold E. Stassen, former Governor of Minnesota.

⁵⁶ Dated February 20, not printed; but it was intended for Mr. Shepley and included the following passage at the outset: "I have spoken to Wedemeyer regarding Ambassadorship to China. He will accept this position if he is asked. I may in the near future, recommend Wedemeyer to the President. I understand that Mr. Byrnes questioned him on this point last October. Also, Generalissimo expressed desire for appointment. Use your judgment regarding discussion of the matter with President and Byrnes."

bandit remnants of Jap and puppet armies hinder communications by diversionary acts.

Nevertheless Soviet Command estimates it will complete withdrawal of its troops from Manchuria before or in any case not later than date when U. S. Command will be able to withdraw its troops from China.

Sent Dept as 579, repeated Chungking as 31, and Frankfurt.

[KENNAN]

740.00119PW/2-2846

The Chargé in China (Robertson) to the Secretary of State

No. 1166

CHUNGKING, February 28, 1946.

[Received March 15.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to the Embassy's telegram number 357 dated February 23, 1946 and to enclose for the information of the Department the full text of a press release with regard to recent developments in Manchuria issued at Yen-an on February 14, 1946 by the spokesman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

The release includes a statement that there exists in Manchuria a local force of approximately 300,000 men, styled the Manchuria Joint Democratic Army, which is said to have been organized by cadres from the Communist Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies. Local Communist sources state that this Army is a loosely knit guerilla organization composed of democratic Manchurian elements interested in fostering local self-government; they also state, however, that most of the officer personnel and directing agencies are Communists. In this latter connection it is interesting to note in the release that for the first time the Communists refer to Chang Hsueh-shih, brother of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang,⁵⁷ as an Eighth Route Army general.

If the statement in the release with regard to numerical strength can be relied upon, it would indicate truly remarkable Communist expansion in Manchuria since the collapse of Japan. During the winter of 1944-45, Secretary Raymond P. Ludden, now serving at the Embassy, was informed by senior field commanders in the Shansi-Suiyuan and Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Communist Base Areas that Communist expansion into Manchuria was impossible at that time. These commanders stated that the Japanese had been in effective occupation for such an extended period and had developed the "protected village" and "pao chia" systems so extensively that Communist operations were too

⁵⁷The "Young Marshal" who was in charge of Manchuria in 1931 when the Japanese occupation began; detained as a result of kidnaping Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in December 1936 at Sian.

difficult. The limited areas of southwestern Liaoning and southern Jehol in which Communist units were operating at that time were for all practical purposes considered as parts of eastern Hopei.

It will be noted that the Communist release recognizes the right of the Central Government to reestablish Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria and reiterates that restrictions on troop movements under the truce agreement⁵⁸ do not apply to Central Government forces proceeding to Manchuria. In general the release does not go beyond previous Communist claims for recognition of democratic local self-government in liberated areas and is not bellicose in tone. Its issuance, however, in the face of increasing nationwide expression of bewilderment at and distrust of ultimate Russian intentions in Manchuria appears to have been inept and unfortunate.

The relationship of the Manchuria Democratic Joint Army to Russian occupation forces is unknown, but the Communist release has been accepted in many quarters as evidence of Chinese Communist-Soviet collusion in Manchuria. There is no proof that such collusion exists and the Communist delegation in Chungking appears considerably chagrined with regard to reaction to it in the United States as well as China. General Chou En-lai and other Communists here appear genuinely anxious that Russian withdrawal from the northeast be effected without delay.

Any ulterior motives for the Communist press release at this time are difficult to establish and it may be related to developments in Manchuria about which the Embassy has no information, but on the surface at least it seems to be a wordy Communist restatement of their position that the establishment of a Kuomintang monopoly of power in Manchuria will be unwelcome to the Communists.

In any event the release has created widespread disapproval of and attacks on Communist policy in the democratic and liberal press as well as in Kuomintang organs. There is ample reason to believe, however, that the present obscure Manchurian situation, coupled with the Communist release, has been made use of by disgruntled rightist elements of the Kuomintang, opposed to full implementation of the resolutions adopted by the People's Consultation Conference on January 31, 1946 and to drastic military reorganization, to inject into the scene a national security issue in order to divert attention from the urgent necessity for immediate internal reforms.

In fairness to the Communists it must be pointed out that during the past few months their willingness to cooperate with all parties and groups and their evident trust in American efforts to advise and assist

⁵⁸ January 10, p. 126.

in the solution of Chinese administrative and military problems leaves little to be desired.

Respectfully yours,

For the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim

ROBERT L. SMYTH

Counselor of Embassy

[Enclosure]

Press Release Issued by Spokesman of Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party

Yenan, February 14, 1946:—

The spokesman of the central committee of the Chinese Communist Party made the following statement about the general conditions, armed forces and policy of the Chinese Communist Party in Manchuria when interviewed by our correspondent today:

Question: What are the present general conditions in Manchuria?

Answer: After the Red Army entered Manchuria and annihilated Japs and puppets, sovereignty over the Manchuria has been restored to China. The National Government has sent armies and officials to take over these provinces and the national disgrace of the past fourteen years has been wiped out. But owing to the fourteen years of the ruthless Jap rule people's life in Manchuria, which were richest in natural resources and most developed in industries and mining, is hard. The industries, commerce and finance have more or less become stagnant or chaotic. The most urgent needs of the people are therefore cleaning up of remnants puppet and Jap forces and establishment of peace and order to restore and develop the economic reconstruction on the foundation of broad democracy. The key issue of this problem hinges on how Kuomintang troops and administrative officials carry out the peaceful democratic cooperation with the local population, local troops, Eighth Route Army and local popularly elected government in Manchuria according to the cease fire agreement and principles laid down by peaceful reconstruction program.

Question: What forces are there in Manchuria? What is the state of the local government?

Answer: Manchuria has always had the largest number of people's forces in China. The people in all places of Manchuria flocked to arms to exterminate Jap and puppet troops after the Soviet Army entered Manchuria. The officers and troops of the former Anti-Japanese Joint Army were most active and swiftly grew in numbers. The troops under Chow Pao-chung, leader of the former Anti-Japanese Joint Army, have increased to several tens of thousands spread over east and north Manchuria and have formed Yang Ching-yu

detachment and Chao Shang-chih (Yang and Chao were both Manchurian heroes fallen in the Anti-Japanese War—Edit.) detachment. The large numbers of the Eighth Route Army officers and men, guerrillas and People's Volunteers in the North China taken prisoner by the Japanese troops have also actively joined the work of extermination Jap and puppet troops after being liberated. The troops under the Manchuria Eighth Route Army generals Chang Hsueh-shih, Lu Cheng-tsao and Wan Yi and other Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army units ordered to march into Manchuria to exterminate Jap and puppet troops have in the course of their fighting become closely linked with the people. The Eighth Route Army troops under General Li Yun-chang who fought the Japs in Hopei-Jehol-Liaoning Border Region are now in West Liaoning. Under the leadership of these forces, the Manchurian people have organized a Manchuria Democratic Joint Army nearly three hundred thousand strong disposed in areas not garrisoned by the Soviet Army or evacuated by the Soviet Army in Manchuria. In addition, there are Peace Preservation Corps and police who are also working for mopping up of Jap and puppet troops and safeguarding local peace and order.

In the area where Jap and puppet troops have been wiped out, the local population have elected upright persons to form democratic county governments. The leadership of these troops and local governments are participated by the Chinese Communists whose organizations were long ago destroyed by the Japs and puppets, the action of the Communist members were at first not wholly unified. It was not until the arrival of Peng Chen, Chen Yun, Lin Feng, Lin Piao and Lo Yung-wheng—members of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party—that the supreme party leading organ was set up in Manchuria to connect up the local party organizations and unify the action of the party members.

At present in all places where the Chinese Communists are operating, peace and order has been or is established. The bandits have been gradually cleaned up, industry and commerce are reviving and traitors are being tried and punished. The excellent beginning in improving the livelihood and awakening the political consciousness of the people has been made through the impeaching and settling accounts with traitors by the people. But the bandits and remnants of the puppet forces still disturb peace and order in certain outlying places. Some Japanese whose ambitions have not been checked are still attempting to wreck peace and democracy in Manchuria and preserve their forces of aggression. The Manchurian people hate them to bone and hope that the Democratic Joint Army will swiftly clean them up so that they may again live in peace and security.

Question: What is the policy of the Chinese Communist Party towards Manchuria?

Answer: Like the policy of the Chinese Communist Party for the whole country, the policy of the Chinese Communist Party towards Manchuria may be summed up in four words—peace, democracy, unity and reconstruction. The Chinese Communist Party has never been against sending of personnel by National Government to restore sovereignty over Manchuria. This has been clearly stated by the Commander-in-Chief Chu Teh on November 28th last year. The cease fire order issued by the Kuomintang and Communist Party on January 10th also formally stated that the cessation of all troops movements did not apply to sending of troops by the National Government to restore the sovereignty over Manchuria. But in order to realize peace, democracy, unity and reconstruction in Manchuria we hold that the following principles should be laid down:

(1) The National Government organs which are now taking over Manchuria are monopolized by the Kuomintang Party and are therefore contrary to the popular will in Manchuria and the whole country. Consequently all organizations from Generalissimo's Administrative Headquarters and its Political Committee and Economic Committee down to the provincial governments should be reorganized. They should take in all democrats in Manchuria and all parties and groups and non-partisans within the country so that all the democratic elements will enjoy the fair and effective representation.

(2) All Anti-Japanese Democratic Forces now in Manchuria should be recognized and reorganized so that they may jointly preserve local peace and order with troops sent there by the National Government and exterminate the puppet troops and bandits and avoid the military conflict.

(3) All the democratic county governments in Manchuria should be recognized. If it is felt that their basis is still not broad enough, the reorganization measures should be adopted through the joint deliberation or reelections held. They should not be left unrecognized and it is advisable to replace democratic measures of the popular election by non-democratic measures of appointment.

(4) At present China is on friendly terms with Soviet Union, civil war between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party has ceased. Since the local troops are helping to maintain peace and order in Manchuria, the Kuomintang forces entering Manchuria to recover the sovereignty should be restricted to stipulated strength so as to alleviate the burden of the people and be conducive to peace. The reorganization of the puppet troops in Manchuria and employment of the North China puppet armies (such as the New 27th Army under Chiang Peng-fei) to take over the sovereignty in Manchuria should be forbidden.

Question: Can above policy of the Chinese Communist Party be put into practice? What attitude has the National Government towards this policy?

Answer: We believe that under the present international and domestic situation and the demands of the Manchurian people, only such a policy is correct and can be materialized. The diametrically opposed policy will inevitably be incorrect as well as impossible of realization. A grave mistake will be made if the democrats and Chinese Communists in Manchuria refuse to recognize the status of the Kuomintang in Manchuria and are unwilling to cooperate sincerely and work together with the Kuomintang for peace, democracy, unity and reconstruction. Likewise, if the Kuomintang refuses to recognize the status of the democratic forces and Chinese Communist Party in Manchuria and is willing [*unwilling?*] to cooperate and work sincerely with them, it would also commit a grave mistake.

The Kuomintang has in the past resorted to settling Manchurian question through use of military force. We are resolutely against such a policy. But for the sake of peaceful settlement in Manchuria, Chinese Communist-led troops have made many concessions to solve all disputes about the local government in just and democratic manner. We believe that this is also applicable to Manchuria. All in all, if overall agreement is not reached by parties concerned and military conflict thereby arises in Manchuria which occupies such important positions in the country and where such complicated conditions exist, this would be a blow to the longing for peace and democracy of the Manchurian people who have been trampled for fourteen years and the longing of the entire nation for peaceful settlement of the Manchurian question.

The Chinese Communist Party has already requested the National Government to conduct negotiations on this question. We sincerely hope the government will in accordance with the cease fire agreement and the spirit of the Political Consultation Conference enable such negotiations to be promptly conducted so as swiftly to attain the satisfactory results.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Briefing of Committee of Three and Commissioners, Thursday,
February 28, 1946, 4 p.m.⁵⁹*

Mr. Robertson, United States Commissioner, opened the meeting with the following statement:

“My Chinese colleagues have asked that I act as spokesman in welcoming the members of the Three-Man Committee to Executive Headquarters, which was born of their agreements in Chungking. I take

⁵⁹ At Peiping, the first stop of the Committee of Three on its North China tour.

great pleasure in doing so. We are not only honored by your presence, but you have come at a particularly opportune time.

"We have endeavored to implement your agreements in the spirit in which they were made. We have had some measure of success, but there are still trouble spots in the field which are hindering and, if uncorrected, may even thwart the great purposes for which you have labored so faithfully. We feel that your presence here and in the field may lend the influence necessary to straighten out these difficulties.

"According to our information, the fault is not on one side. Apparently there are officials on both sides who have not yet fully accepted the authority of the Chungking agreements and therefore are not lending their full cooperation. However, I am glad to report to you, General Chang, and to you, General Chou, that we have observed no such spirit among your representatives here. There have been differences of opinion, sometimes sharp differences of opinion, but we Americans have been much impressed by the evident sincerity and earnestness of your representatives in their desire to reach agreements which they consider to be fair and equitable and within the scope of our terms of reference.

"The courteous, friendly cooperation shown the Americans by General Cheng and General Yeh has extended down throughout their organizations and has made our work with them a very real pleasure.

"I now present General Byroade, our very able Director of Operations, who, with his chiefs, will brief you on the situation as it now exists. General Byroade."

General Byroade said:

"The Operations Division of this Headquarters has prepared a brief presentation for your Committee. It is our purpose, in this presentation and in other presentations to follow in the field, to be entirely frank in our statements of the accomplishments, difficulties and problems of this Headquarters. In the brief period of time allotted today it will of course only be possible to touch the highlights of the situation in each team area. Full appreciation of the exact situation in those areas can only be obtained after further discussion and after your visits to the field.

"The first presentation will be made by Colonel Ely, of the Plans and Operations Section. Following Col. Ely, Col. Hill, of the newly organized Railway Control Section, will present in brief the problems connected with railways. The last speaker will be Col. Perrine, who will present briefly the repatriation situation. Col. Ely."

Col. Ely said that he would present briefly the current situation as shown in team reports, and proceeded to do so, as follows:

"Team No. 1 arrived at Chining on the 16th of February. There it has stopped fighting and has been engaged in investigating breaks in the railway and establishing railway communications from Paotou to Fengchen. It is currently engaged in investigating breaks reported west of Chotzushan.

"Team No. 2 went to Chihfeng on the 17th of January. It has stopped fighting and has made a number of trips in this general area to investigate troop movements. It has found many minor troop movements, but no fighting of any consequence. It has made an agreement on the railway; however this agreement has not been completely implemented as yet. There are still barricades up and still inspection of people moving back and forth along the roads; that condition is improving but has not yet been solved.

"Team No. 3 is now at Taiyuan, but originally went to Tatung on the 19th of January. While it was at Tatung it made some agreements for opening up food supply into Tatung and communications north and northeast of Tatung. It made agreements for the reopening of the Tatung-Taiyuan railway. On the 3rd of February it moved to Taiyuan and has been concerned primarily with the disarmament census of Japanese and the investigation of certain reports of attacks on the railway. On the 20th of February it was supposed to go to Ch'ingsien, but was unable to get there because a bridge was out on the railway. It returned to Taiyuan on the 25th of February and is now engaged in investigating reports of breaks in this railway and National Government troop concentrations in that area. It is also concerned in raising the reported siege of Chungyang.

"Team No. 4 went to Hsuchow on the 20th of January. Fighting there has stopped, and the team has made certain basic arrangements for the reopening of the Lunghai Railway and certain mines in this locality. It is currently engaged in food relief for the garrison at Tsaochuang and in removing all blockhouses and other fortifications on the railway south of Hsuchow.

"Team No. 5 is at Kalgan, having arrived there on the 19th of January. It entered into agreements to open up the Kalgan-Tatung communications and later the Kalgan-Peiping communications. It is now engaged in implementing the Kalgan-Tatung agreements and seems to have made great progress.

"Team No. 6 has been used for special missions and has just returned from Kueisui, where it was investigating alleged Communist concentrations near that point. In the opinion of the team there were no concentrations of any consequence. It has also assisted Team No. 1 in investigating breaks along the railroad.

"Team No. 7 went to Tsinan on the 20th of January. It has charge

also of Teams No. 15 and No. 16. Fighting was stopped. Arrangements for opening up the Tsinan-Tsingtao railway are in progress and for opening mines and railway near Poshan.

"Team No. 8 has gone to Canton, arriving there on the 20th of January. It has made attempts to get in contact with General Tseng Sen or his representative and has made one field trip with that aim in view. It made this field trip on the 20th of February and returned to Canton on the 24th of February. It is continuing to attempt to get in contact with the Communist representatives, but does not believe it can make any progress until General Chang Fa Kuei is authorized to recognize the Communists in that area.

"Team No. 9 went to Hankow on the 20th of January and is currently engaged in relieving starvation in the general area of Loshan and Kwangshan. Certain special directives have been issued to stabilize the situation where nobody was benefitting by troop movements, but many were very nervous about them.

"Team No. 10 arrived in Hsinhsiang on the 28th of January. It stopped fighting and succeeded in making certain arrangements to open up the Chiaotso-Hsinhsiang branch of the railway. I believe they have the highway operating and have made some arrangements on mines. The feeling in this area has been high, and there has been considerable hard feeling in the Menghsien-Chiaotso-Hsinhsiang area. Unfortunately the American member of that team was sick, and his replacement, taken from Team No. 6, was unable to reach the area with the team today because of weather. The team had been in Peiping for conference.

"Team No. 11 went to Chengte on the 31st of January. It has been investigating alleged disturbances in the area of P'ingch'uan, Lingyuan and Lingnan. The fighting in that area has been stopped, but they found a barricade on the railway at P'ingch'uan. The team returned to Chengte three days ago to investigate reports of further outbreaks of fighting to the east. Steps are being taken by this Headquarters to allow coal and food to come into Chengte and possibly to open up the railway on the way to Peiping.

"Team No. 12 went to Shihchiachuang on the 4th of February. It has been engaged in opening up mines in that area. Its principal problem has been to stop local fighting, which, while not on a large scale, is scattered over the whole area.

"Team No. 13 arrived in Tatung on the 2nd of February. It took over the work of Team No. 3 and has done very good work in opening up communications in that area. It is also attempting to get food into Tatung, but there has been a harvest failure in that area and they are having difficulty in getting food in.

“Team No. 14 arrived at Linfen on the 2nd of February. The fighting in that area was in the vicinity of Houma, but the situation is now stabilized and there has been no fighting since the arrival of the team. There was considerable discussion on the withdrawal of troops and possession of towns and villages. At present the situation is stabilized and there seems to be no chance of fighting breaking out.

“Team No. 15 went to Tehsien on the 2nd of February. It has been engaged in relieving the siege of that city and in general making economic arrangements in that area for feeding the troops. It has made valuable local agreements and is now trying to work out some sort of money exchange rate to facilitate commerce.

“Team No. 16 went to Tsinan on the 10th of February and to Taian on the 14th of February. It has been engaged in relieving the food situation in Taian and in keeping the situation stabilized. Due to the shortage of railway teams, it has taken over some railway work there also. It is currently engaged in food distribution.

“Team No. 17 was organized on the 19th of February. It was sent immediately to Paoting, near the railway, and it investigated some threatened fighting and also stopped the fighting further north on the railway. It was originally organized to operate out of the Peiping area, but it appears it will have to go to some other point. This other point would appear to be Ch'iahsien, although there have been several other places where teams have been requested. The National Government would like one at Yenchow (shown on the map as Tzuyang). The Communist Party would like one at Huaiyin to investigate reported difficulties in southern Kiangsu.

“Now, Gentlemen, so far I have given you reports from entire teams that can be justified and verified from reports signed by all three parties. Unfortunately it is impossible to get a strong report signed by three persons. Very often the team member—and this applies to both sides—will be a local man of the local unit and he will not wish to sign anything which is contrary to the interests of his own side. On other occasions he will operate under directives from this or other headquarters—I mean, under directives from his own branch of this headquarters, which are not always in accordance with directives from the Headquarters as a whole. In Shantung Province—what I give you now is from American reports—there is a series of cities down the railway which are in various stages of siege: Tehsien, Tsinan, Yenchow and others. Some are under close siege, others much less closely besieged. Various local agreements have been made in regard to these cities and have not always been kept. The general difficulty is that the Communists claim the troops inside the cities are not entitled to various provisions of the Cease-Fire Order. This Headquar-

ters, and, I am sure, the Communist Branch of this Headquarters have attempted to correct that, but it does not always take effect in the field.

"I have another report which is so new that Captain Young has not seen it, so I must give him a copy to familiarize him with it. It has not yet been presented to the Commissioners because it came in so very recently. It has been typed in English and translated and should be ready for transmission now. However, in order to save time, I am going to cover it. This is a report from Colonel Holly, American member of the team at Taiyuan. He went on a trip to Ch'inhsien, but stopped about 90 li north of Ch'inhsien. Col. Holly writes a comparatively complete report and makes some very serious charges. He states that Gen. Yen Hsi-shan, the National Government Commander, has refused to establish contact with Gen. Liu Po-cheng and has refused to receive Gen. Liu's liaison officers. He further states that Gen. Yen repeats the orders received from Executive Headquarters to his Field Commanders, but does not issue directives of his own to see that they are carried out. He states that Gen. Yen considers it the team's duty to make all decisions and issue all the orders for execution of the Cease-Fire Order. He states that Gen. Han Tuan-pei, Army Commander, at the time he interviewed him (which I believe was the 25th), had received no order since Directive No. 2."⁶⁰

In reply to General Marshall's question, Col. Ely said that it was about a month since Directive No. 2 was issued; January 20 was the official date, but it was hard to say just when it was actually received in the field. Col. Ely then continued:

"Col. Holly further states that the places he visited were known ahead of time and things were always dressed up so that he could neither see anything nor could he get reliable information.

"Col. Holly's charges against the Communist Party are substantially as follows: (a) that Gen. Lee Ta was to meet the team in the Ch'inhsien area and would not come to the Funshuiling area where the team had been set up; (b) that the Communist Party is still tearing up the railway tracks and tore them up while Col. Holly was there; (c) that in his opinion the Communist Party representative may be evading contact with the field team—this refers not to the regular team representative, but to a special representative for the Ch'inhsien area.

"Col. Holly sees no possibility of any satisfactory solution and no object in sending a team to Ch'inhsien. He considers this worthwhile only if Executive Headquarters—to use a colloquialism—"cracks down" on the field commanders and makes them issue directives clear down to the lowest unit and see that those directives are carried out.

⁶⁰ Executive Headquarters General Directive No. 2, January 20, not printed; see telegram No. 4, January 25, from the Chargé in China, p. 378.

He believes also that the commanders should be forced to contact each other and maintain liaison."

Col. Ely asked whether there were any questions on his part of the presentation; there were none, and General Byroade introduced Col. Hill.

Col. Hill made the following statement :

"The Railway Control Section has assumed jurisdiction over all lines of communication in North and Central China. Of these, of course, the railways are the first and pressing consideration. There are a total of approximately 1,000 kilometers of railroad which require reconstruction or repair within the North and Central China area. Given free rein it would be possible to have an effective railway net within three months. However, a complete and thorough job of reconstruction will require perhaps 18 months.

"The Chiefs of the Railway Control Section have agreed to assign Priority 1 to the Tientsin-Pukou road. On this road there are a total of 322 kilometers which require repair, in four different sections. The sections marked in red on the map are those which are non-operative, and those in blue are operative. Our Field Team No. 18 was dispatched to Potou on the 18th of February. That team reports a great deal of difficulty encountered in the past ten days. For one thing, the National Government member of the team was almost lynched in a little town just south of Potou. On the other hand, the Communist Party member has resigned from the team and returned to Peiping, refusing to serve with the team. In spite of these difficulties, the American member reports he has established contact with the local commanders. They have agreed to permit extension of telephone lines as far as Potou, and he believes he may have further success. That last report was received from the team this morning. The Combined Chiefs of Section agree that there should be set up immediately field teams for these three points (Yucheng, Taian, Hsuchow). Departure of those teams has been delayed due to the fact that we have been unable to secure United States members for the teams.

"Second priority has been assigned to the Tsinan-Tsingtao railway. On that road there are a total of approximately 100 kilometers of breaks in three different, short localities. Our field team No. 21 was dispatched to Kaomi, at the eastern extremity of these breaks, on 22 February. Although there are men and materials available for the repair, the field team has been unable to accomplish any results yet, due to the fact that the Communist Party member of that team has not reported. Immediate repair of that road is very important due to the repatriation problem, which will be explained in a few moments.

“Third priority is assigned to both sides of the Lunghai Railway, particularly from Hsuehchow east. I have not shown the total amount of distance of breaks in that road, because repairs are now going on just east of Hsuehchow, and I don't know how far that repair has gone. The problem at that point has been handled up to now by our Cease-Fire Field Team No. 4. This field team has reported considerable difficulty due to disagreement between National Government and Communist members, but those disagreements were handled by direct order from this Headquarters day before yesterday. A report received this morning states that work is now progressing satisfactorily on the road north of Hsuehchow, or first priority road, and east of Hsuehchow on the Lunghai railway. No field team from the Railway Control Section has been dispatched there for various reasons, among which is the fact that the American member of Field Team No. 4 indicates he believes he can handle the situation.

“Fourth priority has been assigned to the Peiping-Suiyuan railway. On this railway there is a small break of 23 kilometers between Peiping and Kalgan. There are also breaks to the northeast and northwest of Tatung, which are now in process of repair. Our Field Team No. 20 was sent to Nankou on the 25th of February. The team reports they have been unable to arrive at any agreement for the reconstruction of this break due to the fact that the Communist member of the team has not reported. The Communist member of the party, however, left Peiping this morning to join the team at Nankou.

“Fifth priority has been assigned to the trunk line from Peiping to Hankow. On this line there is one very serious break 190 kilometers long where the railway has been almost completely destroyed. Materials and men are available at each end of this break to effect repairs. Our Field Team No. 19 was sent to Anyang, at the south end of the break, on February 20. I have not received a report from this team for several days, and I am not sure what the situation is. The last report, received about three days ago, states they were unable to begin repairs. The north end of the break is being handled by Field Team No. 12. A report from that team received this morning says that they are unable to effect repairs on the north end because the Communist member of that team has not received instructions from his higher headquarters.

“Other railways on which a lower priority has been assigned are: Priority 6, Tungpu Railway; Priority 7, Chengtai Railway; Priority 8, Pingch'eng Railway.

“The chief difficulties which the Railway Control Section has encountered so far are: first, that the National Government personnel either fail or refuse to destroy military works along the lines of com-

munication; the second big problem is the fact that Communist Party personnel frequently fail or refuse to obey orders issued by this Headquarters.

“Are there any questions?”

General Marshall inquired how many more American officers were needed by the Railway Control Section. Colonel Hill replied that he needed four immediately, and should have five altogether—three for the field teams mentioned, one for Headquarters, and one other for the proposed Team No. 25. General Marshall asked whether these officers had to be engineers; Colonel Hill said it made no difference whether they were or not, so long as they had sufficient rank—that is, Lieutenant Colonel or higher.

Gen. Byroade then introduced Col. Perrine.

Col. Perrine presented a chart showing figures on Japanese to be repatriated, as follows:

“Total Japanese in North and Central China	388,400
“To be shipped from following ports:	
Shanghai	60,000
Laoyao	20,000
Tsingtao	72,800
Tangku	235,600

He then made the following statement:

“An overall plan for repatriation of the Japanese was agreed upon by the Supreme Commander Allied Powers, Japan, and United States Forces in China. Responsibility for moving the Japanese through the areas of conflict in China was assigned to the Executive Headquarters under the agreement for cessation of hostilities as signed by the Committee of Three in Chungking. On February 14 in Peiping, at the direction of the Commanding Officer, Executive Headquarters, a meeting was held and it was decided that the responsibility for the moving of Japanese repatriates to ports of embarkation would be the responsibility of Executive Headquarters. At the ports of embarkation the Navy and the Marine Corps would assume responsibility. The National Government and Communist Party Commissioners in the Executive Headquarters have agreed that they will not interfere in any way and will assist in the movements of Japanese repatriates to meet the shipping schedules at the ports. A large number of Japanese in some areas are creating food and coal problems in addition to those already existing in those areas. In other areas they are causing disagreements between the local troop commanders. Therefore it is of extreme importance that the Japanese repatriates be moved at the earliest possible time.

“The total Japanese in North and Central China to be repatriated are 388,400. They will move through the following ports: Shanghai, Laoyao, Tsingtao, and Tangku.

“Those located in Honan Province and west of the railway break at Yunho will be shipped through the port of Shanghai.

“Those east of the break of the Lunghai railway will be shipped through Laoyao.

“The 72,800 located in the Tsinan-Tsingtao area will be shipped through the port of Tsingtao. As explained by Col. Hill, there are several breaks in this railway, and it requires the establishment of camps one day’s march apart in this area. These camps are not completely established, but the repatriates are moving over this line at the present time.

“Repatriates located in the Peiping-Taiyuan-Tatung areas will be moved out through the port of Tangku. To do this it is necessary to establish a camp at Shihchiachuang, because this part of the railway is operating with a different type of rolling stock from the rest of the line.

“The last report for the ten day period ending 24 February showed that we have shipped out through Tangku 11,710 Japanese during the ten day period. The same report indicates that 10,075 have been shipped out through Tsingtao.

“Are there any questions?”

General Marshall asked what were the last reports on repatriation through Shanghai. Col. Perrine replied that reports from Shanghai were not furnished this Headquarters.

General Marshall asked whether the figures referred to soldiers only. Col. Perrine said they covered both civil and military.

General Byroade then stated :

“Gentlemen. That concludes the presentation. The combined staffs of this Headquarters are now assembled in an auditorium a short walking distance from here, just opposite the main gate of this compound. They are of course most eager to have the pleasure of being presented to the members of the Committee of Three. If it is agreeable to you, therefore, we will now walk over to the auditorium. On the stage there are chairs for the Committee of Three and the three Commissioners. The remainder of the personnel in this room should take seats in the front rows of the auditorium. I will there introduce you to the staff and request each of the members of the Committee of Three to say a few words to the personnel of the staff.”

The meeting adjourned to the auditorium.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Remarks by General Marshall at Meeting of the Committee of Three
With Commissioners and Officers of Executive Headquarters*

[PEIPING,] February [28,] 1946.

As a member of the Committee of Three responsible for creation of this Executive Headquarters, I wish to express my thanks to the Commissioners personally and to all the members of the staff for the splendid manner in which you have carried out your difficult duties up to the present time. Your task was extraordinarily difficult; you had to organize yourselves and become acquainted with each other at the very moment it was most necessary that you bring to bear your influence and direction to terminate hostilities. The tremendous area of country involved and the general lack of communications have added much to the difficulty of your mission. I wish, particularly, to express my personal thanks to the members of the field teams who have really had the hardest and most important task of all. It is not so very difficult to reach a general agreement on a policy gathered around a table at Chungking, or Washington, or London perhaps. The real test is in carrying that policy into successful execution, which the little teams of three men from this headquarters have succeeded in doing. They have individually and as a small group made an inestimable contribution to the peace and future prosperity of Eastern Asia.

What I wish particularly to say to you is this. Your headquarters, I think, is somewhat unique in the world's history. Two warring factions with the assistance of a neutral agency have actually formed a large and highly efficient administrative and executive headquarters, whose agencies reach over great distances and into remote regions. Your headquarters is rapidly becoming a unified group operating with remarkable efficiency. The continued development of this unity of purpose and this efficiency of execution is becoming of greater and greater importance to China and that means to the world because the peace and prosperity of China is of outstanding importance to the world at large.

You are soon to be given an additional task. One even more important and more difficult than that of terminating hostilities. In Chungking an agreement has been reached for the unification of the armies of China and for the demobilization of most of the troops. Extraordinary to report, it was not very difficult to reach an agreement on this problem which many feared was almost insoluble by peaceful means, but such an agreement has been reached and it will become, at an early date, the mission of this headquarters and its

field teams to transmit the orders and supervise the execution of the demobilization and reorganization involved.

I am confident that with the experience you already have had and with the daily increase of your regard and respect for each other and your spirit of cooperation that this exceedingly important and complicated task will be carried out with high spirit for the good of the Chinese people and for the prosperity and dignity of China.

Many individuals will be called upon to make what may seem to them at this time, great personal sacrifices. Some must sacrifice but I think the majority will profit greatly. The prosperity of China is directly dependent upon your execution of this new mission. The prosperity of China will mean the prosperity and happiness of all Chinese. The tremendous resources of China, the industry of its people, the demand of the world for its products all should combine to free the people from their present distress and lift China to its rightful position among the nations of the world.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Meeting at Chining (Tsining), March 1, 1946

COL. CRAIG: "This is the present situation.

"Fighting, except for small corn raids, has been stopped since January 18.

"Restoration of the rail lines within the Communist area up to the breaks, but not including the breaks, is going forward. The means available are very limited.

"No steps have been taken to restore any other form of communication.

"Repatriation is not a problem in this area. There are no Japs.

"Liaison ordered has been accomplished, but no additional liaison beyond that directed has been had.

"The team arrived January 18 and held a meeting that day. Other meetings were held on the 20th and 21st. These were largely devoted to hearing the Communist story. The Communists then and now maintain that the cessation of hostilities order has not been faithfully observed by the Nationalists. On January 25, the team visited Kuei Sui and met to hear the Nationalist story.

"Alleged by the Communists and verified by the Nationalist Chief of Staff 12th War Area was the fact that a general nationalist offensive had taken place commencing on January 11. This ran through January 14 in several cases and continued as a defensive at Chi'Ning until the 18th.

"The Communists charged the Nationalists with failing to observe

the 'immediately,' part of the cessation of hostilities order and electing to take advantage of the '2400 hours January 13' clause.

"The Nationalist position is that the 2400 hours on the 13th is the effective part. They claimed difficulties in communication as being responsible for some troops continuing the offensive through the 14th.

"The city of Ho Lin Ko Erh was captured by the Nationalists on the 12th and Tao Lin on the 13th. These two places the Communists consider to be unjustly in the hands of the Nationalists.

"The Nationalists claimed to have entered the city of Chi'Ning before dark on the 13th. This is stoutly denied by the Communists. The American member does not consider evidence of the townspeople trustworthy as long as the city is garrisoned by Communist or other troops.

"After the meeting in Kuei Sui, and with facts as sketched briefly above, the Nationalist and American team members thought that both sides should be required to withdraw from Chi'Ning and the Nationalists from Tao Lin. This was under the terms of Directive HO-2. The Communist member would not agree and would not sign a directive to this effect drawn up by the other members. Nothing was done and nothing was changed.

"Subsequently the team was advised that any action had to be unanimous. The whole matter was laid before the Joint Chiefs of Staff on February 13, the team proceeding to Peiping for this purpose.

"At Kuei Sui on the 25th, both sides had agreed to exchange liaison locally. At a meeting in Chi'Ning on February 5, the restoration of communications as directed by HO-2 was discussed. At this time, the Communist member was not prepared to discuss this subject in detail because the principles of restoration had not been announced. He stated that he feared Nationalist attacks along restored roads and railways. He agreed to ascertain the amount of rail, telephone and telegraph equipment available in Communist hands. This was done subsequently and the data forwarded to Peiping.

"On February 12, Special Directive Number 1 and 2⁶¹ were received by radio. Liaison at two specific places, one of which subsequently proved to be not in Communist area, was directed. This was shortly accomplished at Ta'Tung, the one place we were responsible for.

"On February 12, Team Six passed through here enroute to Kuei Sui to investigate Nationalist charges that large, dangerous Communist concentrations were being built up in that vicinity. The Communist member here denied this and Team Six verified this later,

⁶¹ Neither printed.

I believe. Team Six had been placed under this team except for the accomplishment of its primary mission.

“By February 12, General Directive 4-A⁶² had been received. A meeting was held with the Nationalist member absent sick. The American member considered this directive to be sufficient enunciation of the principles governing the restoration of communications. The Communist member did not consider that it was sufficiently explicit as to details of payment, control, etc.

“On February 15 the team received a report from Team Six to the effect that Communists had been destroying the railroad west of Fu Shen Chuan. The Communist member said that this had been so before the cessation of hostilities order had been received. This information was forwarded to Team Six.

“On February 17 the team received allegations of Nationalist raids and attacks from General Yao Chi, Communist commander of the Sui Yuan-Mongolia area. Two additional like allegations have been received since. These raids and attacks are all alleged to have occurred since the cessation of hostilities. The first two such accusations were sent to Team Six for Nationalist comment or rebuttal. To date no reply has been received.

“Team Six has been withdrawn due to urgent necessity elsewhere. On the 25th of February, Team Six radioed that no railway destruction had occurred since February 13. Inquiry as to the correctness of the date was at once radioed to them as the effective date of the cessation of hostilities order was January 13 and the Communist member had previously asserted that destruction ceased with the cessation of hostilities. To date no reply has been received.

“Both sides have recently been urged to establish interim postal service of some sort, to the west with Kuei Sui and to the south with Ta’ Tung. The Nationalist member refuses unless all mail is handled by National Government personnel under the Ministry of Communications. The Communist member is willing to exchange mail pouches at the points of contact but is unwilling to permit the entry of central government postal personnel until higher headquarters so directs.

“Both sides remain definitely suspicious of the other. This is improving slowly.

“Neither side will compromise in the least degree, and this has been carried to the point where team members will not agree to refer an issue to Executive Headquarters as team measures if proposed by the other side.

“This team meets, holds its temper, and talks amicably, but is unable to take action. Personal relationships remain of a high order.

⁶² Not printed; it transmitted orders for restoration of communications. See the agreement of February 9, pp. 422-424.

"I will be glad to answer such questions as I am able."

GEN. MARSHALL: "I have no questions."

GEN. CHANG CHIH CHUNG: "If there is any issue that cannot be settled here, it should be forwarded to Executive Headquarters and the members of the team, both Nationalist and Communist, should observe and carry out the directives and issues sent to you from the Headquarters.

"In the event that you have any difficulty in reaching agreements here in the implementation of the Directives from Executive Headquarters, you should use your judgment and report issues as you see them here to the Executive Headquarters."

GEN. CHOU EN-LAI: "I have two points to bring out to you for the benefit of the team. First, you must have a clear understanding as to the interpretation of the Directives sent to you from the Executive Headquarters. You should make a thorough study, and secondly, you must carry them out effectively and immediately. Second, if you see the necessity of establishing mutual confidence between the members of your field team. The cessation of hostilities has been carried out by both sides and the developing of mutual confidence between the Central Government and the Communist members in your team is very essential, particularly in view of the fact that pretty soon we will have another work added to our team; that is, the reorganization of the Chinese army. That spirit of mutual confidence should also be extended to the local army commanders as well. If we can observe those two points, then I see that your work in the future will be very smooth. I have full confidence in your future work here and that you will be able to carry it out very successfully and very smoothly. What has been done in the past may be difficult to settle, but for your future work, if you have any difficulties, you should report immediately to Executive Headquarters."

GEN. MARSHALL: "That is a personal report to the Commissioners, and not to the American officers.

"I am very much gratified to hear the comments of General Chang and General Chou En-Lai to these various ways to agree. I imagine that, after what they have said, that they will have time to talk to their own people, that a great deal of the difficulty will be washed away.

"I think the important thing here is that we are not interested in the past now, but we are interested in the future, and until conditions have been restored to normal, personal feelings will have to be buried. The general objective we are working for is far too great and far too important to be stopped by small disagreements, no matter how large they appear on the ground.

"I trust very much the Commissioners who have heard this meeting and have heard General Chang Chih Chung and General Chou En-Lai will wipe out among themselves these small issues and get down to larger business. If we are going to do something for the good of China, we cannot stop with small items in the field.

"I suggest to General Byroade that we find an opportunity here for these gentlemen to confer with their own people."

GEN. BYROADE: "For safety's sake, we have to take off in about 15 minutes."

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Meeting at Tsinan, March 2, 1946

COL. LAKE: "General Marshall, distinguished guests, our team came here on January 19. When we came here we were confronted with a very bad situation. We hardly landed before I heard that I had to take off for Taian. There were many hot spots in the area, and when I say we were a 'Field team', I mean all that the word implies because we were on the go night and day from the 19th until the present time. There were very ugly situations at T'ai-An, at Chang-tien, at Yen Chou, and also Ta-Wen-K'ou, and also at Yao Chou: We started in at T'ai-an and we thought we had the thing settled there on the 20th, so we immediately went to Chang Tien which was reported to be very hot. We got to Chang Tien on the 22nd and we finished there on the 23rd and started back. Consequently, as we started back, we ran into a Jap battalion that was marching into Tsinan. I stopped the Jap battalion there, and, much to the satisfaction of the Communists.

"I made an agreement with the Communists there that we could find out whether or not the Communists had the right to disarm the Japanese. So after they stopped, the agreement was that we would get a decision from Peiping as to whether or not they had the right of disarmament. To facilitate getting the message into Peiping, I stopped at the first station here at Lung Shan and called by telephone to Lt. Holliday here and asked him to send the message to Peiping. When I talked with him he said they were fighting at T'ai An again. So, just as soon as I could, I rushed back to T'ai An. The Communists were determined to take the city and disarm the so-called puppet troops. All the time we were in conference there, there was fighting going on all around the area around T'ai-an. It looked to me like a hopeless situation so I went into the city and at that place there the two lines were not over 50 yards apart. When I went into the lines, I looked down the Nationalist rifle barrels and when I came back, I looked at the Communist rifle barrels.

“I came back to the train to report it to our Headquarters in Peiping. But I must say that General Chao, the Communist there, had a change of heart while I was waiting there, and he said to me that they were not going to fight any more.

“Our next hot spot was Wen Kou and we went there by plane and up until this time, we had never been able to contact anybody in authority with the Communist troops. We were unable to contact any Communist generals and we could not contact them at T'ai-an. So consequently I decided our only way out was to contact General Chen Yi at Lin-I. So on the 31st of January I flew to Lin-I and General Chen Yi was not there at the time, but they said he would be back either the next day or the following day. So, on Chinese New Years, February 2, I flew to Lin-I again and contacted General Chen Yi, and from that time on, I must say that our road has been very, very easy sailing.

“General Marshall, I want to say right now, I appreciate from the bottom of my heart the help that I have gotten from General Chen Yi and also General Wang Yao Wu. On the 5th of February, I was called back to T'ai-an again.

“There I ran into a mob and my team had to fight the mob for two and one-half hours to keep them from lynching the magistrate. During the course of the argument, they threw a couple of bricks through the window, but that was all right—nobody was hurt. I know that if it had happened a little later after I contacted General Chen Yi it would never have occurred. From that time our problem has been one of enforcing the cease-fire order and allowing food to come to and from the cities. Also to allow the reconstruction of the railroad to go on. All these cities that you see here are surrounded and the conditions there are all the same in every one of them.

“At Yen Chow, the airfield is ‘No man’s Land.’ The Nationalists are on one side and the Communists on the other. Now the situation at Lau Chung was very bad—almost as bad as T'ai-an. As far as withdrawal of troops was concerned, I didn’t insist on it because I knew it would not be complied with. My mission was to keep them from fighting, allow the food to come in and the construction of the railroad. We have been unable to [do] anything except those things, pending the decision from your Committee on what was going to happen to the so-called puppet troops.

“I want to compliment the two members of my team, General Kuang Jen-Nung and Colonel Tu Shu-Wu. They have done the work and I have sat idly by. We worked under all kinds of difficulties and we

worked night and day, and I say that I am just as optimistic now as I was pessimistic on the 5th of February.

"I want to express again my appreciation for the fine cooperation that has come from the Governor of the various places and all the people I have come into contact with. I will say frankly that we have the problem in Shantung Province whipped. There will be several rough spots that we will have to smooth over, but with the cooperation that we have developed and with the earnestness with which they are going, there will be no question about it. As I said, the biggest problem we have got here is how to break down the feeling of distrust that has existed in the past between the Communists and the Nationalists. And, General, we can do it."

GENERAL CHANG CHIH CHUNG: "We appreciate the consideration and hard work that Colonel Lake and the other officers on his team has undergone. All those difficulties you have come across you have managed to overcome them with your earnestness and sincerity, I wish to express my thanks.

"The Government member and the Communist member as just heard from your briefing are both making efforts to solve their problems with sincerity and of course, are also to be commended.

"I have the same point of view that I have just heard about the mutual confidence and mutual understanding is very important, and the representative of the Government side will spare no effort in reaching an amicable effort to reach a mutual understanding of the Communist side. With that spirit and with that understanding, I am sure we can overcome these difficulties. It is vital for both sides to give up their interests of their respective armies and should let the main interest be for the welfare of the people to alleviate the suffering of the people. If both sides will keep their eyes on the interest of the people the mutual understanding and confidence can be better.

"The reasons for the people being unable to get food is due to the hostile attitude made by both armies and because of the communications. In order to help the people get food, we must relieve the hostile stand made by the two sides and we must repair and reopen the communications, therefore food can be brought in. If both armies make some sacrifices in order to help the people in their suffering, the people's wants would not be so much."

COL. LAKE: "We only have one place where we have a little difficulty and that will be straightened out tomorrow or the next day. It all goes back to this one thing about what is going to happen to puppet troops, and the reorganization is going to take care of that and all our problems will be solved."

GEN. CHANG CHIH CHUNG: "We are not in time to assist the right or wrong in the past and we have no such thought in our mind, but I

ask that on both sides they pay the greatest attention to the welfare of the people. I hope that the accomplishment made by this particular team will be well ahead of the other teams. I wish to reiterate my thanks and appreciation of your work very much."

GEN. CHOU EN-LAI: "In the first place, I wish to point out that the area under the jurisdiction of this team and the problems confronting this team are of a very vast scale and very complicated. Therefore, the team in which Colonel Lake and the Government and Communist representative have accomplished so many things during this period shows this team is very distinguished in its work and I wish to extend my appreciation and thanks to Colonel Lake and to the Government and the Communist representative in this team.

"Many problems confronting this team are actually problems which cannot be solved by the team itself, such as the puppet troops which have been incorporated by the Government forces. This is not a problem which can be solved by the team and therefore the team, under the leadership of Colonel Lake has overcome many, many difficulties and finally brought about this cessation of hostilities and this is a highly admirable accomplishment and the team also has overcome such difficulties as the people coming to them with petitions.

"After the first problem, this problem arises from the opposition of cities to villages which has been established from the cities which is characteristic in war time. This is a peculiar situation, but today we are facing a change of this situation. We have to bring the villages and the cities together and let the food be imported. This is also a task which is not so easy to be solved.

"Furthermore, we have here the railway problem. From the map, we can see that the railways are actually cut into short sections and now we have to start repair work from both ends and finally we shall accomplish it so that the trains may operate. This is also a quite difficult problem.

"To solve these problems we need mutual confidence and mutual trust just as General Chang has commented. In solving these problems we are likely to be brought to the question as to who was right and who was wrong in the past and also we are making it confident that as to whether the present status is to be changed or not, but we have to lay aside all this, and I feel sure that we can find a way out if we would connect this problem with the other decisions we have so far reached such as the cessation of hostilities, restoration of communications, and basic agreement of Nationalization.⁶³ If we take all these agreements as a whole section, we see a complete picture of the problem facing us and in light of this we will feel sure that all the

⁶³ For the agreement of February 25, see p. 295.

problems can be solved under the direction of the Peiping Headquarters.

"Another peculiarity of this team is just as Colonel Lake has said. This team is a field team in its true sense because the team is moving day and night around and it tries to be at the hot spots itself and this is a true model of the other teams and I notice that Colonel Lake has not dreaded to go himself to all the places by train or other facilities and he tries to certify for himself the actual situation and also tries to solve the issues at the spot and this is worthy to be commented. I think that the spirit to solve the problem at the spot and to conduct a survey of the actual situation should be endowed to the other teams.

"I also share Colonel Lake's view that we are likely to have more difficulty ahead but at the occasion of the conference of Three [who] have come here, I would like to take the liberty of introducing General Wang Yao-Wu and General Chen Yi and they will cooperate and assist Colonel Lake and the field team and all the difficulties will be overcome and we will have smooth sailing henceforth.

"Lastly, I want to thank Colonel Lake very much."

GEN. MARSHALL: "Colonel Lake, Gentlemen, I am very much gratified to learn that the great difficulty in this region is approaching a solution. I would really like to emphasize what has already been said—that we have an agreement of the cessation of hostilities, restoration of the communications, and the evacuation of the Japanese. That lifts the matter above local difficulties, above the arguments of the past, and places it on a plane with the interests of the people. The hostilities have ceased and the reopening of communications should be pursued at top speed. We have to lift this situation out of its local aspect as soon as possible to one of national significance.

"The way has been cleared for that by the more recent agreement or the demobilization of the armies. That is a tremendous problem and it has to be carried out in much the same way as these other problems have been carried out—that is, a decision on the highest level of the Government and of the Communist party. Everything else, all of us, and local circumstances sink into insignificance.

"It is not human nature to expect individuals to forget the events of the past but they haven't time now to cogitate on that. They have something else to do for the good of China. The rights and wrongs of the past 18 years will be debated for 18 years to come. We have something now that demands that we look entirely in the future. I am tremendously encouraged by what I have learned here and I wish to express my direct personal thanks to the three members of the team for their arduous and most admirable labors. And I wish to express my appreciation to the Commanders of the two factions, especially for

their consideration with which they treated the officers of the United States Army.

"Our position is difficult at best. We are always open to the feeling on the part of those who are antagonistic that we are interfering into something that is none of our business, and especially that we are unfamiliar with China and therefore cannot judge things on a sound basis. I know my associates understand that we are merely trying to help and that we were requested to help; that we will assist and that we will help and that, and nothing else.

"This is a very serious occasion, but I am going to risk a comment less serious by way of illustration. Back in the United States, all the people love a game called baseball. There are two teams in the contest. There is very bitter feeling for the day, and there is an umpire to interpret the rules. Everybody disagrees with the umpire. He is the most unpopular individual in the United States on the day of the game. But the game can't go on without him. It becomes a riot. We have not the authority of an umpire, but we endeavor to interpret the rules and agreements that have been arrived at in Chungking. And baseball goes along with American democracy.

"The time is short and we have to proceed to Hsuchow and I therefore suggest that before lunch we adjourn to the rooms for General Chang and his people and General Chou and his people and they can meet at the table.

"It is so ordered."

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Meeting at Hsuchow, March 2, 1946

COL. HARRIS, D. Q.: "General Marshall, distinguished guests, on behalf of the Hsuchow Field Team we wish to welcome all the distinguished guests to Hsuchow and I hope your stay here will be enjoyable. I will spend no more time on thoughts of welcome.

"Going to the railroad problem, this line (East section of Lunghai) is in repair and operating and this line is in repair and operating. From Hsuchow to this point, the railroad is in repair. That is a distance of about 20 miles. At this point there is a blockade across the railroad guarded by Communist sentinels. From this point to the Grand Canal, intermittent breaks amount in all to about 2 miles."

GEN. BYROADE: "What does that blockhouse consist of?"

COL. HARRIS, D. Q.: "The blockhouse consists of a little sand heap, and the other, a sand bag blockade with two or three sentinels. Since you mentioned that, I will say that I visited that about three or four days ago. I asked the officer in charge of that place why the obstacles

had not been removed and he said he had not received the orders from higher headquarters. He said he knew about the order to repair the railroads however. I personally presented those orders to General Chen Yiat Lin Yi on the 13th of February. As I say, this road is not in a bad state of repair. There are about two kilometers to two miles intermittently, but traffic cannot go over it. The bridge over the Grand Canal is in.

“From the Grand Canal to Pai Tu Pu the railroad has been repaired and the Communist Party running trains and having a passenger service over that portion. From Pai Tu Pu for about three kilometers there is a break and then in here it is about a 50-yard break which occurred according to reports, about the 9th or 10th of February. From this point to the Coast the railroad is in operation.”

GEN. BYROADE: “Who operates that section?”

COL. HARRIS, D. Q.: “It is under the Railroad Administration. This information was obtained as we flew over this railroad and we have been down the railroad in scooter cars and we even had a hand car and pumped part of the way down to the breaks. The latest information we have, the Chief Engineer of the Hsuchow railroad area sent a junior engineer, who walked all the way to Haichow and has given a very detailed report. The chief engineer estimates that if the way is clear, this railroad can be put into shape in the next couple of weeks. The situation on the Tsin-Pu railroad is not as good as it is on the other one. The bridge over the Grand Canal near Hanchuan has been out.

“The National Government troops have been along the south bank and the Communist Party troops on the north bank. However, after several personal visits there and visits by the field team, the railroad has been permitted to work on that bridge—for some reason though, only in the day time.

“No repair work has been permitted north of there. From this point to this point here, a distance of about 20 kilometers the railroad is about half gone. The roadbed has been cut up, about half the track has been taken away, and most of the sleepers. From this point to Lincheng, the track is in existence and could be operated.

“From this point to the next town up here, it is a distance of about 60 kilometers. The Chief Engineer reports in that distance, there are 900 rails left. The roadbed has been cut up, dug up, and there are no sleepers. From this section on up, the situation is even worse. He estimates that a minimum of two or three months to get that section in repair. The other railroads that we are interested in are what I call the ‘coal mine railroads’.

“I can dismiss this section here with the simple statement that it does not exist any more. The rails have been removed, the sleepers

have been removed, and the roadbed has either been dug up or leveled off. This section can be repaired.

"For about 5 kilometers out of Lincheng, the road is in existence. To about this point, there are rails alongside, sleepers and the roadbed is in a fair state of repair about halfway. From this point to Tsaochuang there isn't much left of the railroad. For some reason, along the railroad, they would cut down about 3 or 4 feet out of the road and this has happened along here to a great degree. I asked the military reason for it, and they said that they had armored cars and that would prevent armored cars from running over that section.

"As I mentioned before, this section of line which goes to Nanking is in daily operation and heavily guarded and this section here is also going in operation. Before I go into the problem of the coal mine, are there any comments or questions?"

GEN. MARSHALL: "That northern strip you said that nothing is being done about to repair that end. Are they permitted to do it?"

COL. HARRIS, D. Q.: "I'll answer it this way. I presented passes for railroad workers and also a memorandum which I prepared to troop commanders along these areas not to interfere with railroad workers, and I was not able to get a unanimous agreement of the team."

GEN. MARSHALL: "What was the objection?"

COL. HARRIS, D. Q.: "The Communist member would not sign the passes and memorandum because he stated that there were National Government blockhouses and fortifications along the south portion of the Tientsin-Pukow railroad. He stated that the fortifications along here divided the two portions of his liberation areas and that the people from over here could not communicate with these people over here."

GEN. MARSHALL: "Did you report that to the Commissioners?"

COL. HARRIS, D. Q.: "Yes, Sir."

GEN. MARSHALL: "What was their reply?"

COL. HARRIS, D. Q.: "The answer was to follow Directive 4-A.⁶⁴ The Railroad Control Section said that the Communist member would issue the passes and that the National Government would cease building fortifications and would destroy such fortifications along the lines."

GEN. MARSHALL: "What was the result of that?"

COL. HARRIS, D. Q.: "I just got that yesterday, Sir."

GEN. MARSHALL: "As I understand it, meanwhile, there is no repair work going on the north."

COL. HARRIS, D. Q.: "There is repair work at the bridge. I asked the Communist Commander in this side what he would do if the rail-

⁶⁴ Regarding the agreement of February 9 on restoration of communications, see pp. 422-424.

road sent repairmen to start working on this section. He said that he would prevent any work. As I see it, I got that radio yesterday and I asked the Communist member this morning if he would sign those passes and memorandum, and he said he would consider it."

GEN. MARSHALL: "Was there any statement made that he would not consider the instructions of Executive Headquarters as authoritative?"

COL. HARRIS, D. Q.: "He made no such statement, but he did not sign the passes.

"Are there any other comments or questions on the railroads?"

GEN. CHOU EN-LAI: "The Executive Headquarters has also issued directives to destroy all the blockhouses along lines of communications. Has the Central Government representative in your unit been able to carry out his instructions?"

COL. HARRIS, D. Q.: "As I say, I just got that radio yesterday, and I referred it to the National Government member yesterday and so far he has made no comment one way or the other on the fortifications. There has been a question on those fortifications, whether it meant fortifications along lines to be repaired or fortifications along lines that had been operating even before the cease-fire. That question has not been settled. My interpretation, of course, is that it means all fortifications. However, I would consider that the primary consideration was to get the railroads that were broken repaired."

MR. ROBERTSON: "Why was that directive subject to interpretation? It said that all fortifications along lines of communications would be removed."

COL. HARRIS, D. Q.: "I can't answer that question. As I said, my interpretation meant fortifications along all lines."

COL. ELY: "In connection with the second paragraph of that directive number 4-A, it states very clearly that all fortifications on and along lines of communications which interfere with communications will be destroyed. The question is on the word 'interfere.' One side maintains that only fortifications physically obstructing the track must be destroyed. The other side claims that any blockhouse or fortification that commands a line of communication by fire interferes with communications and should be destroyed."

COL. HARRIS, D. Q.: "That has been the difficulty as Colonel Ely mentioned. The one side said that if it does not impede the running of trains, although there are blockhouses along railways, that does not come under paragraph 2. The Communist member says that fortifications along here are a threat to peace since his people cannot communicate with each other. If we could have a clear decision on that, it would clarify the situation as far as this team is concerned."

GEN. BYROADE: "What is meant by the expression, 'to communicate

with each other'? Does that mean the passage of troops or individuals?"

COL. HARRIS, D. Q.: "Inasmuch as all troops are supposed to be frozen in place, it is assumed that it means staff officers to come from one place to their Headquarters. One of the objections to that is that the troops in this area are generally armed civilians and carry their weapons under their gowns and any great number of them coming across could not be noticed.

"Does that answer your question? Are there any other comments or questions about railroads?"

GEN. MARSHALL: "Go ahead."

COL. HARRIS, D. Q.: "Our other sore point is the coal mine at Tsao Chuang. I have this chart here. We have three main pits—the south, north and the east mine. These are the main mines in the area. There are about seven smaller mines, four of which are shown on this map. This is what we might call the main mine and contains all the works—the electric plant, mechanical plant, and the power plant. This is held by the Government troops. The Government troops are commanded by General Wang Gong who is vice-commander of the 97th Army. His troops are composed of Government troops, militia, and troops formerly under the command of General Wang Shu Ma. The Communist Party members claim that Wang Shu Ma is a former puppet who was stationed at a little town out here[,] did much destruction and caused much unhappiness in the area. In this area are those troops plus about 30,000 civilians. We surveyed this area and 30,000 was my estimate. The Government estimated 50,000 and the Communist estimate is over 20,000. There are also Government troops in the flour mill in this location here."

GEN. BYROADE: "Will you give us an indication of the scale of that map please? How large is the yellow area?"

COL. HARRIS, D. Q.: "I think that is about a mile across there."

COL. ELY: "General Sung, Plans and Operations Officer of the Communist Branch at Executive Headquarters states that that is one and one-half li across there."

COL. HARRIS, D. Q.: "It is more than that. It takes about 10 or 15 minutes to walk the length of it. This is the east mine here which is occupied by Communist troops. The north mine is also occupied by Communist troops. Along this line here, Communist troops and National Government troops are facing each other at not more than 200 feet. Underground the National Government reports that it is held by National Government troops. The Communist representative states there are no troops there. In our next investigation we will determine the truth of this. The National Government reports

that the people in this inclosure are very short of food, water, and medical supplies. They have asked to obtain a permit to send food, water and medical supplies to this encircled garrison. The Communist representative has countered with the proposal to permit certain parties go out and buy food in the vicinity. He states that the feeling is so high against the puppet troops that food cannot be brought in without being seized by the local population. That question has been discussed for some days and has not been settled.

“The other question with the mine is saving the north mine and therefore saving the whole mine. The pit in the north mine is deeper than the pits in the other two mines and the north mine has started to flood. If the north mine is allowed to flood, the level will come up and will overflow in the south and east mines. The water pump in the north mine is under water and cannot pump the water out itself. The Government troops and the mine officials in this area do not wish to turn on the power to operate the hoist in the north mine. This hoist could be used to get out the water. The reason for that is, if the hoist is put into operation, the Communist troops could get into the lower level and come up into the south mine. The Government member proposed that temporarily the Communist troops evacuate these mines to permit the removal of water from the north mine. The Communist member said he saw no reason to remove his troops. The Government member then proposed that the Communist member stay in place and promise not to go down into the pits. The Communist member would not make this promise since they occupied it above ground and they had the right to go below the ground. I made a mention that the proposal, since this is a city with both troops within the city, to evacuate the troops from 60 li was presented. Any troops in the area include troops within 5 or 6 li of this area could not be removed since they were not encircling troops. This is a very dangerous situation, first, because of the number of people inclosed in this area without proper food, and second, because of great danger of ruining this mine, which is one of the largest in China. Third, because of the close proximity of the troops.

“Before I go on, are there any comments of [or?] questions on the mine situation?

“This information I have given has been obtained by personal visits by airplane to these various places, conferring with General Chen Yi at least 3 or 4 times, the field team has visited the places and conferred with the local commanders. We have flown over various sections of the railroad and we have driven by jeep through here and we have been by rail and motor car along these various railroads. We are in close touch with the Railroad Administration Headquarters in Hsuehchow.

"That is all I have, Sir."

GEN. MARSHALL: "Is there any fighting going on now?"

COL. HARRIS, D. Q: "The only fighting I have any reports of are along the Yangtze River. The Communist reported small scale fighting down there with the Nationalist Troops on the offensive and the National Government countered with reports of Communist offensive. I have not investigated down there because of the distance and lack of transportation, but my observation is that before the cease-fire, this section was seized by the National Government troops. Any action that might be going on there is to get choice villages. When I first came here there was a report from National Government sources of a large scale attack on Haichow. The Communist forces repudiated any attacks on this area and there were no more reports of attack. The town of Pikeapu was taken on January 20 by Communist troops.

"I might mention that this portion of the railroad was occupied by Communists after the cease-fire order. The Communist troops who stated that they were in this general vicinity and that they were attacked by puppet troops and Japanese troops. They stated that they drove them out and occupied this railroad. Since that time about 150 unarmed Japanese have come down and were taken over by the National Government troops at Haichow. I have not investigated the fighting along the River because of the reports [they] were small scale skirmishes of 20 or 30 people. I found out when I investigated the fights, you could see nothing because they generally come up at night and then the people disappear.

"Are there any other comments?"

COL. ELY: "Colonel Harris, did you ever get any directive from Executive Headquarters concerning the withdrawal of the lines or the food to the National Government garrison in Tsao Chuang?"

COL. HARRIS, D. Q: "We got such a directive⁶⁵ and that has been called to the attention of the Chinese members of the field team. So far as the withdrawal of the troops, we have been working at that and attempting to get a solution. Unfortunately, both sides seem to pay more attention to present military advantage than the solution of the problem. So far as the food, the National Government proposed to send food to Lincheng. I might add that, although this road is in Communist hands, that passage of food is permitted from here to the garrison encircled. In spite of the Directive, the Communist member would not permit free passage of food from Lincheng to Tsao Chuang. His contention was that because of the feeling of the population in this area, the trucks would be seized and the food

⁶⁵ Executive Headquarters' Special Directives Nos. 1 and 2, February 9, neither printed.

stuffs taken away. Various methods of guarding such truck convoys were proposed; guarding them with Communist troops; guarding with 50 percent Communist and 50 percent National troops, or guarding them with all National troops were all proposed. Food has still not been permitted to be carried to the garrison. I might also add that the radio of the National Government troops at Tsao Chuang has been out of operation for about the last week. We have no up-to-the-minute information on the situation. The Communist member has consented to send a radio to Lin Yi and ask for information from the Nationalist troops so this Headquarters can get the information.

"Compliance with Special Directives Number 1 and 2, the National Government has a liaison officer ready to send to Tsao Chuang. So far, we have not been able to get safe conduct for that liaison officer. When the field team makes a visit there in the near future, we will take him along with us.

"Are there any more comments?"

GEN. MARSHALL: "I would suggest that, if it is agreeable to General Chang and General Chou that before dinner they have an opportunity to talk with their people here, and then the Committee of Three have a meeting.

"Then we will adjourn."

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Meeting at Hsinhsiang, March 3, 1946

COL. FERGUSON: "In the name of Team Number 10 I wish to greet our distinguished guests and, though I am a newcomer here, I will give you the notes of Colonel Cummings, the previous member, and the information I have received since I have been here, a brief of the situation.

"The general situation here can be reported as quiet at present. Communist troops occupy the area west of Tsui Wu except for a small place just north of the Yellow River. This group north of the Yellow River is the group which is causing the present stalemate in this area—occupied by Communists except for a small group of Nationalists in Tung-Ming. All of the railroad cities south of the Yellow River are reported to be occupied by the National Government.

"There are four areas that can be described as critical points. The number one which I mentioned is Meng-Hsien. Number two is the An-Yang to Lui Ho Kou area—this running into the coal mines. The other two and of equal value and importance are Yung-Ning and Tung-Ming, both Nationalist forces surrounded by Communist forces.

"A brief history of this team as taken from the notes of Colonel Cummings. Team Ten arrived at this city on the 29th of January; moved out promptly and held a conference at Chiao-Tso on 1 February. The following points were discussed at this conference: The first was the Meng Hsien situation. No ground for agreement has yet been found and the matter is still under consideration.

"The second point was road repair between Tsui Wu and Chiao Tso—about 20 miles. It was agreed that the road would be repaired and opened to civilian traffic and not to aggressive action. The road is now barely passable to jeeps.

"Another point discussed was the release of so-called innocent captives. Colonel Cummings' written notes state that both sides agreed to release these people; however, when this was brought to the attention of the Communist and Nationalist members, there was much discussion about it. I have no written and signed agreement.

"Item four which was agreed by both sides was the cessation of hostilities throughout this area. Since that date, February 1, there have been a number of reports of small conflicts, but nothing of any importance.

"The fifth and last item taken from Colonel Cummings' handwritten notes was that the Communists had agreed to stop executions, but that they will continue to try people, but will take it to the Government Court before the sentence is carried out.

"At our conference last night, the National Government [representative] stated that his record read the same as Colonel Cummings'. However, the Communist representative stated that the agreement was not according to his records; that he had stated at the time that the people had demanded the trial and execution of the traitors. It was the duty of a democratic government to accept the demands of the people.

"On the 3rd of February it was agreed to cease all hostilities in the 85th Army and to exchange liaison officers. On the following day, it was agreed to cease hostilities in the entire 31st Army Group. On the 8th, pledges were reiterated to cease hostilities.

"During the period of the 9th to the 15th, there were conversations relative to Meng Hsien again, with the final suggestion being made by Colonel Cummings and the agreement being come to by the Communist member, that if the Nationalists would withdraw across the Yellow River, the Communists would withdraw from Tsui Wu to Ta Wang Chien. The Communist representative also states that it was also that the Nationalists draw back toward Tsui Wu from their position which was a short distance outside of Tsui Wu. The Na-

tionalist member would not agree to this combined stipulation. As this was one of the most important situations locally, this failure to agree was reported to Executive Headquarters, and the following day the entire team was ordered to Executive Headquarters for conference. I joined the team on March 1 and brought the team back here to Hsin Hsiang. There are now many claims of unauthorized troop movements to be considered by this team.

GEN. MARSHALL: "I would like to interrupt. Are you going to cover the results of the visit to Executive Headquarters?"

COL. FERGUSON: "In just a moment. These claims happened during the absence of the teams in Peiping. During the meeting in Peiping, Colonel Cummings was hospitalized in Shanghai and I was unable to consult with him before coming here. I have talked the situation over with the National and Communist members and it appears that no decision was reached on Meng Hsien at the Executive Headquarters. To my personal knowledge I have no notes from Colonel Cummings."

MR. ROBERTSON: "It was considered that there was agreed that [in view of?] the policy of no fighting and the National Government having the strong position, it was unfair to make them withdraw across the River and at our meeting we agreed to let these forces stay as they were."

GEN. BYROADE: "May I add a statement. This problem of separation of forces was considered along with the same problem in two other areas. Three teams were at Executive Headquarters at the same time on the problem of separation of forces. In consideration of all three of those and others that have been reported, the action Mr. Robertson just described was arrived at."

COL. FERGUSON: "I am very glad to hear these statements from the Executive Headquarters because I believe that it will make our task here possible.

"There is a great deal of want and hunger. I have reports of people starving and dying in Yung Nien and Tung Ming. Only last night we received a radio from Executive Headquarters directing that our team look into the matter of the starving situation and the blockade of the cities causing it at Yung Ning—to investigate, lift the blockade and report. However, at the meeting, the Communist representative on my team stated that under the instructions he had received from his Headquarters he could do nothing until Meng Hsien was settled.

"I have also other stalemates with this same explanation. This comes under the Railway Section and I will ask Colonel Cole to give you the situation of the railroad situation. Colonel Cole."

LT. COL. COLE: "Team number 19 was sent from Executive Headquarters to supervise carrying out the General Directive Number 4 in the area of An-Yang. In particular, the team is to supervise the

reconstruction and especially of the Peiping-Hankow railroad. This railroad is operating as far north as An-Yang. But from there to the North, a distance of about 120 miles, it is completely torn up. The team contacted the Commanding General of the 40th National Army at An-Yang and obtained from him the necessary data for the procedure. On 28 February, the team met at Lieu Ko Chen with the Commanding General of the Communist General involved. General Liu stated that he had received General Directive Number 4 and he was enroute to direct carrying out the cease-fire order. He also stated that until these matters were settled, he could not discuss the reopening of communications. Accordingly, Team 19 has come to Hsin Hsiang to consult with Team 10 and obtain further information. As the situation now stands at An-Yang, neither side has started to carry out Directive 4 [4A?].⁶⁶ The railroad engineers have stated that they are ready to commence reconstruction immediately.

"That is all I have."

GEN. MARSHALL: "Aside from disagreements—no other comments on the program?"

LT. COL. COLE: "The problem at An-Yang is so unfortunately connected with the problem in this whole area that it cannot be solved separately."

GEN. MARSHALL: "I don't think you understood my question. You must have some opinion aside from these difficulties as to the extent of your problem."

LT. COL. COLE: "All the rails, sleepers, telegraph poles, everything is missing. The roadbed is dug up, and it is estimated that the repair of that stretch will take approximately three months."

GEN. MARSHALL: "Is there any material in sight?"

LT. COL. COLE: "I have personally seen that there are some rails left along here. I have not been able to get to go into this territory. I have a verbal report from the officer of the Railroad Control Section who made an aerial survey that there is nothing up in here. The railway engineers have stated that they have enough on hand to repair 80 li immediately."

GEN. MARSHALL: "Is there any expectation of receipt from the outside?"

LT. COL. COLE: "Yes, Sir."

GEN. MARSHALL: "Do you know where that is?"

LT. COL. COLE: "No, Sir. I was informed that the technical matters were left to the railroad men, and I was to assist if they asked for supplies."

⁶⁶ Apparently a reference to the agreement of February 9 on restoration of communications, pp. 422-424.

GEN. MARSHALL: "Do you know anything about the rest of the track?"

LT. COL. COLE: "The track is in operating condition from An-Yang to Hsin Hsiang. I have ridden over it personally. There is one train a day running."

GEN. MARSHALL: "Does there seem to be ample rolling stock?"

LT. COL. COLE: "Not in evidence."

MR. ROBERTSON: "There were no strings attached whatsoever to our agreement to leave troops in this area. Both sides have taken the position that the legal position of troops was that occupied as of midnight of January 13. Not only in this area, but everywhere else over which we have jurisdiction. There are many instances where it has been impossible for us to determine where those positions were because we have gotten violently conflicting reports from both sides. General Cheng and General Yeh and I agreed that where there was no fighting that we would not press for an evacuation of troops until we could determine to our satisfaction what was the legal position as of midnight January 13. In the meantime we would go ahead with our other program with no restrictions. Insofar as Executive Headquarters is concerned there is no situation here dependent upon the withdrawal of troops in any part of this area. That is all."

GEN. CHOU EN-LAI: "Since the American representative of Team 10 is here for a few days, and Mr. Robertson has just made the supplementary statement about the decision of the Three-Man Committee, I think this decision is well grounded, because only in this way can the work proceed; because only in this way the repair work will not be delayed by other disputes and the repair work can be started immediately and to execute the General Directive Number 4 which stipulates the immediate starting of the repair work and the construction will not be used for military reasons. Apart from the repairing of the railroad communications, all other kinds of communication should also be restored. When this has been completed, the food can be sent to the towns and the villages, to also buy goods from the towns, and communications will be restored between the towns and villages. With such an understanding, I think the work of the field team can go on smoothly and it will facilitate Colonel Ferguson to lead the field team to go ahead and the disputes will be smoothed over.

"At the same time, it is my hope that both the Government and Communist representatives of this field team will take up the position of mutual confidence and cooperation. They should try to solve all problems with the actual facts as basis, and they should conduct investigations and try to solve the problems on the spot. At the same time, I wish to point out that both the teams covering the cessation of hostilities and the team for restoration of communications, they have new

agreements issued by the Executive Headquarters, but in particular, I wish to call their attention to the basic agreement in Chungking which is much better basis for their future work if they are aware of the fact that now we are all working toward the demobilization and integration of the armies and soon all the problems will disappear.

“Last and finally, I wish particularly to speak to the Communist member on the team that he should have a careful study of these agreements and understand their full significance, and, after the meeting, I will have a talk with him.”

GEN. CHANG CHIH CHUNG: “Colonel Cummings may have worked too hard and so he got his recent illness. If this is the case, I and I am sure General Chou, express our gratitude and thanks. We can observe the situation here is somewhat similar to others in Hsuehchow and Tsinan. The point of issue is that cessation of hostilities on both sides should be carried out without reservation. In these areas, although the two sides may not open fire, but the state of siege in certain localities still remains; stop traffic on the civilians, stop food into towns—that state still remains in localities. They cause famine and cause inaccessibility to buy things and vice versa. I hope this state should be relieved as soon as possible, because although both sides may not open fire, this is contrary to the fundamental spirit of the cease-fire order.

“Talking about the release of siege—of course, there are many technical problems to be solved. I concur with General Chou that we should have mutual confidence, but in addition to that, I hope that the spirit of making concessions on both sides should be cultivated. If we are armed with those spirits—mutual understanding and mutual concession—I think it is not impossible for us to overcome our difficulties.

“I would like to take this opportunity to make a recommendation to the members of both parties. That is, don’t care so much about the Army interest; don’t be shortsighted; don’t be narrow-minded. We must have a broad view and foresight. Don’t care about trivial things. We must care for the people of this country. We must make concessions on both sides. It is not to lose face to make concessions. Then everything will come out amicably.

“The repair and the reopening of the communications is the second step we take after the cessation of hostilities. It is decided in Chungking in the Conference of Three that the repair and reopening of the communications should be carried out as soon as possible. Destructions should be repaired immediately and the operation of railways should be done at the earliest possible time. No other point of issue or dispute should be hinged on that. We must do that immediately without involving any other disputes and points on this vital step.

That is the fundamental spirit we reached in Chungking. Both the cessation of hostilities and the restoration of communications were signed by the Three Gentlemen in Chungking and those agreements should be carried out without reservation.

“All this trivial local disputes should be solved in the primary work of restoration of communications. I hope both sides will consider and reconsider all these agreements and get an earlier amicable solution.

“I have just remarked that starting from the agreement of cessation of hostilities, the agreement of the restoration of communications, and then at last, the basis of reorganization and disintegration, were three agreements that were actually three steps in one overall plan. If the members of both sides were to study those three agreements together, then these local disputes will be no longer. I hope everyone will have such an understanding. I reiterate to everyone that they should have foresight and broad sight, not only for local interests on these disputes [which] can be solved very easily.

“I would like to call the attention of both parties to the agreement on cease-fire agreement, on restoration of communications, and the basis of reorganization and disintegration [which] have been reached on the highest level in Chungking and those agreements and instructions will be sent through the Executive Headquarters in Peiping to the field teams concerned, and in a sense, it is like a military chain of command from the highest level to Executive Headquarters to the field teams. Executive Headquarters has the authority, and the field teams should carry [out] these orders very loyally. I hope everyone understands that.

“I realize that the problem at hand still needs some effort on the part of Colonel Ferguson, Colonel Cole, and I wish to express my appreciation of the hard work and effort these American officers have done for us and I wish to thank you gentlemen.”

GEN. MARSHALL: “I have no comments to make in addition to those of General Chou and General Chang. I suggest that we adjourn now so that General Chang and General Chou may meet with their own people. And I suggest you delay the lunch hour until one o'clock. We have another visit, and we should all be very prompt at one o'clock. I would like, at the same time, to see the American representatives of the Commission and Executive Headquarters, and the team.

“If it is agreeable to General Chou and General Chang, then we adjourn.”

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Meeting at Taiyuan, March 3, 1946

COL. HOLLY: "Committee, Commissioners, and others. I am going to divide my talk into four parts. First, I shall discuss the committee and its problems. Next, say a few words about Shansi Province; violations of cease-fire order; state of communications, and the Japanese prisoner situation and civilians.

"I arrived with the Nationalist member of the committee on 3 February in Taiyuan. We were alone at that time without a Communist member, so we merely tried to gather data and decide on a common viewpoint in trying to solve this problem. On the seventh of the month, the two of us sent a letter to General Liu Po Chen. In this letter we informed him that the Communist member was not present, but would like to make arrangements for a meeting with him at such time and at such place as would be convenient for him. The letter was taken by General Tsu, Army commander in the Taiyuan area to Lin Fen and then carried to a Communist member to give it to General Liu Po Chen. He came back, and the letter was returned about a week later because no one would take the letter through to General Liu Po Chen. On the 15th, the Communist member and his team arrived.

"We spent many hours trying to get a working agreement on the solution of this problem. The Communist member seemed very sensitive, and every time we mentioned guilt or blame on the part of the Communist side, he seemed to take offense at that. In fact, night before last, I was accused of unfairness in trying to settle this problem. We talked about this matter yesterday morning, and it developed that if we issue an order to our Communist commanders that we have not even talked with and could not reach, that we must also issue the same order to a Nationalist commander. There was a tendency to stick to the letter of each paragraph rather than trying to get a broad interpretation to get a solution. He made the definite statement in the committee meeting that a statement by General Ho Lung was proof that it had taken place. We have no proof as yet that any of the Communist commanders have received any of the orders issued by Executive Headquarters. We do have over Governor Yen Hsi Shan's signature that he issued an order to all his people that they follow Directive Number 2,⁶⁷ or be court-martialed. I have made the practice

⁶⁷ Apparently General Directive No. 2, January 20, not printed.

of giving copies of all our radios for information to each of the Committee. We do not get any from the Communist Branch and he says he is not authorized to do so unless it says so specifically in the radiogram. As a result, we have no idea of the reactions or viewpoints of the Communist commanders.

"The Communist member does not know the name nor the location of any subordinate commanders in this area. He has no direct contact with either General Liu Po Chen or General Shih. All communications with them go direct to General Ho Lung. As yet, we have no overlay of a map showing the positions and the organizations and their locations of the Communist positions as of 2400 January 13. We have no information of Japanese situations in the Communist territory, either. And, of course, we know nothing of the present locations of the troops or commanders of the Communists. All these have been asked for from the Communist member.

"The committee recently took a trip to the Lin Shin areas. We had received word that General Liu Po Chen knew that we were coming and that he directed his Chief of Staff to meet us in that area. We went to Liayuan which we thought was the closest station to one of the Communist commanders. At this time, we had with us a liaison group from General Liu Po Chen, which came here at my request and they were supposed to talk about the railroad running down to the southeast. We also had the Army commander in that area, General Chao Chen-Shou, with us. We sent one of the liaison officers from this group along with the Nationalist officers to the Headquarters in that locality to take word to the General if he would come down to see us and bring a liaison group and a radio, that General Chao would desire liaison. I was asked to contact the General and ask him to meet us there with his liaison team to meet us the next day for a swap, and they were also trying to contact General Li Ta, Chief of Staff of General Liu Po Chen.

"Our orders were that if the trip took more than four days, another team would be sent down there and that was the reason for that request. The next morning the liaison officers returned with the information that neither of the two Generals were in that area. They said they had been called to the south for a conference with General Li Ta. They did not know where the place was that the conference was being held. At the same time, they were given another story that his car had broken down and had been late for the meeting. On the way to this Headquarters, the guide and the Nationalist officer saw a group of people, some 200 estimated, with tools on their shoulders. That night, the track was torn up north of us, and the bridge was attacked. Inasmuch as it seemed hopeless to get in touch with any of the com-

manders, the committee decided to return to Taiyuan. This we were able to do the following afternoon when the tracks were repaired.

"Inasmuch as Governor Yen Hsi Shan would not discuss the railroad situation, the committee decided to return. On the morning of the 21st, before we went down to Chin Hsien area, we requested an interview with the Governor and he was represented by his Chief of Staff. He said that they had received some orders from the Nationalist Branch, Executive Headquarters, but he did not enumerate which ones. About a week before this time, although it had not come from them officially, I took our copy of 4-A⁶⁸ and had it translated. That directed that commanders contact their opposite numbers and establish liaison. At this time, these radios were in their hands, although they did not come to them through their official channels.

"General Kuo said the Governor acknowledged general responsibility for carrying out the cease-fire order. He refuses to contact any of the Generals direct. He repeated the orders received by him to his field commanders, but gave them no policy as to how he wished them to be carried out. Questioning General Chao on this trip, he said the only order he received had been an exact copy of General Directive 2. He had received no other orders in respect to this matter. General Kuo said that the Governor believed in letting all his field commanders solve their problems and only those they could not solve were they to take up with him. He believed no liaison necessary other than that already directed. He refused to discuss the matter of Chin Hsien area railroad with this detail that had been sent up, that he was not in contact with General Liu Po Chen and that no effort had been made to get in contact with him. He believed it was the committee's job to make all decisions and make all orders in this matter. We pointed out to him that the responsibility rested with the field commanders to settle all these problems. He still remained of the same opinion despite that. He said that Wang Chen Kuo was directed to establish liaison. We asked if he had contact through this liaison with General Liu Po Chen and he said, 'Yes.' I then wrote out a radio and asked him to transmit it and let us know when he got a reply. We were then informed that he did not have any contact.

"We have been told since then by the Governor's representative that they are now willing to negotiate with qualified Communist generals in this area. I now have that in writing. Two days ago, we received a report that a certain officer was in Ta'Tung as a liaison. The field team called on the Governor and turned this message over to him. This afternoon I received a translation of a letter sent by General

⁶⁸ See the agreement of February 9 on the restoration of communications, pp. 422-424.

Kuo to the effect that they are willing now to establish this liaison and that both sides will contact each other by using the field team radio communications; the names, number, and missions of the liaison team members should be given. In addition, the members must be responsible and authorized to make decisions for their commander. After [being] agreed upon by the other side, they will begin to establish the liaison group. I am sorry to give you this before I have been able to straighten this out. Then the next is really a matter of getting the team into where liaison is to be established.

"I might say that the field team here has sent back many reports with a request that they tell us what the status of the liaison is in those cases. This was done to try to emphasize this liaison business and to get some one who was a witness that we could see when we go to investigate these things. I believe that this is in reply to that request, rather than to Special Directives 1 and 2 and 5,⁶⁹ which this field team gave them day before yesterday. This committee has spent many hours trying to explain liaison and how it would help solve our problem. I believe it is a very difficult thing to explain, probably in the Chinese language. We have also tried to explain it to the Governor on occasions. This letter would indicate that they still think it is the field team's problem to establish liaison and to make decisions. Except for the case of this representative of Ho Lung, this committee is not aware of either side making an effort to establish liaison.

"The Shansi Province is high, cool, and bad for farming. The industries are farming, raising grains, fruit, and iron ore and coal in quantities. Food in the big cities is the most pressing problem. The Chamber of Commerce reports a reserve of about 3 days in the warehouses. Family reserves are unknown but they are thought to be for about a month when the family is well-to-do. The shortages are rice, wheat, beans, meal, oil, pork, mutton, beef, cloth, and fire wood. The reasons given are poor communications and also the fact that food is not permitted to come into the big cities. This charge was made against the Communists where they surround the big cities. When I was in Ta'Tung, I can personally verify that, because I investigated it. Prices have risen very greatly recently, reflecting this shortage.

"There are 36 regiments of the Peace Preservation Corps which are disarmed and there are 12,000 district police. We have the following violations of cease-fire orders reported by the National Government side that they have made a record of and we will give you some general statistics on it. In some cases they report the duration of attacks. We will first take the National Government reports: 14 attacks which have lasted one hour; 18 attacks lasting from one to 6 hours; 2 attacks lasting from 6 to 12 hours; 2 attacks lasting from 12 to 24 hours;

⁶⁹ Of February 9 and February 20, none printed.

and more than 24 hours, there are 4. The type of attacks: against troops—34; against villages—14; against buildings—1; against civilians for purpose of looting—16; against railroads—17; against ambulance train—1; against bridges—7; aided by Japs—2; telephone lines—9; disarmed Japs—1. The figures for casualties are negligible. Now for the size of these attacks: fewer than 100—14; 100 to 500—38; 500 to 1000—10 attacks; 1000 to 3000—4 attacks; 4000 to 5000—1 attack.

“The Communists reported similarly. They have only given 6 instances of duration of attack, but as for type of attacks against troops—9; against villages—50; against buildings—3; against civilians for looting—23; against railroads—3; against bridges aided by Japanese—15. The size of these attacking units: less than 100—24; 100 to 500—35; 500 to 1000—4; 3000 to 5000—1. Now the comparison between types of attacks in the number of reports made by the Nationalists and Communist Party. The attacks against troops the Nationalists report 35; the Communist[s] report 9; against villages, Nationalists report 14 and the Communist[s] 50; against buildings, the Nationalists report 1 and the Communists 3; looting, Nationalists report 16 and the Communists 23; attacks against railroads, Nationalists 17; Communists 3; Japanese aided attacks, Nationalists have 2 and the Communists 15. Very few attacks were reported by both sides at the same place on the same day. At the town of Chung Yang which is west of here, [it] is reported under siege. When we were in Liayuan, the committee tried to send a radio to General Ho Lung to direct him to lift the siege at once if they were true. It is quite certain that that city is under siege and has been for a long time. The Communist member refuses to sign it and we could not send the order. We sent it to Executive Headquarters for the decision. The field team was to go there after this party leaves. We have made a request from the Communist commander to see if he will contact the Communist commander there. This request has been made in writing, and as yet, we have received no reply.

“We haven’t many maps. We have had nothing from the Communist side, so all these maps have been presented by the Nationalist side. We are here now in Taiyuan. Chung Yang is the city under siege; and of course, Ta’ Tung is up there. Now the Nationalists have given us a map showing the area occupied by them as of 2400 January 13. Not having a similar map from the Communists, we cannot decide where the line should be as of that date. This is also a map provided by the 2d War Area showing where they thought the Communist troops were as of 2400 January 13. This one shows troops movements between January 13 and 31. I might say that the three Communist prisoners we interviewed that said that their route was this here.

They moved north and fought a battle up here and at that time were captured. That was not more than 20 days ago. There were three regiments involved in a similar movement. They gave us the name of their regimental commander. We asked if they knew about cease-fire and they said they did. We asked if they were told why they were fighting after the cease-fire order. They were told that it was their orders given by their regimental commander transmitted from a staff officer, and that they would continue to destroy communications and fight the Nationalists wherever they met them. These are the troop movements as reported by the Nationalists of the Communists from February 1 to 25. This is also their estimate of the Communist situation as of 1 March.

“As for the status of communications, the railroads run north from here to Ta”Tung. It runs very poorly and it takes about 2 days and nights to make that trip. To the east on the Chengtai railroad which goes to Peiping, that runs very poorly also. I would estimate that the average speed is about 3 miles per hour or less. From Taiyuan south the line is interrupted down in the Wen-Shi area.

“We have not the complete information on the railroads, but from here east on the way toward Peiping there is one passenger train a day of 8 to 10 cars. There is a mixed train of 4 passengers and 10 freight cars that goes about 150 miles east each day. There are 2 freight trains that leave each day with a capacity of about 800 tons. The telephone system is very, very poor. This map shows the telephones—mostly along the railroads. The solid line indicates perfect lines and the lines with crosses over it indicates that the lines are not very good and most of them are that way.

“The roads that are motorable are very few and this map will show that.

“This map will simplify and show quickly where communications have been damaged. Those numbers refer to a comment in here and the comment is in both English and Chinese.

“Here are three maps that will show where the Nationalists report that attacks have been made.

“Next is the Japanese Prisoner of War situation. They are kept in six main areas and in 24 sub-camps, mostly along railroads. Officers of all grades are with the men, even up to the grade of General. They are fed by the Chinese. The six places in which they are located are there. The organizations are military organizations and they total 42,417; of whom 922 are sick. This figure has been verified from several sources and I think the average is about right. About 5 January, some 61,660 Japanese were disarmed. By 15 January some 8200 had been repatriated. That leaves a balance of 10,540 to be accounted for and they are accounted for as sick, wounded, died, or missing.

There are some 2,000 now in the process of repatriation. About 11,000 are being worked on these railroad lines, keeping them in repair. There are some 5,000 on the southern section of this Tungpu line directly south. 3,000 are in the northern section to Ta Tung, and 3,000 on the Chengtai railroad which runs east from here. All are reported to be disarmed. That report is as of the 15th of January. On the 31st of January the Japanese civilians totaled 11,981. Of this number, 6,793 are men and 5,188 are women and children. They are located in four places. No further concentration is being planned that we can learn of. The reasons given being the difficulty of transportation and food problems. The Governor said that even though these people are working, if an order comes out, they will be repatriated.

"We have a map here showing the main camps and the sub-camps.

"I think that is about all I have, Sir."

GEN. CHOU EN-LAI: "Were all this data being submitted given by the Government or was it collected by the field team?"

COL. HOLLY: "The material for this talk was worked up by this committee. The maps and overlays were submitted by the 2d War Area."

GEN. MARSHALL: "The meeting will adjourn so that General Chou and General Chang can meet with their own people. The Three Commissioners and the Committee of Three will meet in my sitting room at 6:45—about 15 minutes before dinner."

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Supplementary Meeting Held at Taiyuan, March 3, 1946, 6:45 p. m.

GEN. MARSHALL: "Have you two gentlemen any suggestions as to how we should proceed in trying to adjust matters here in this region?"

GEN. CHOU EN-LAI: "The time is very short and I will only briefly say a few comments. It appears to me that [we?] have also to approach Governor Yen Hsi Shan. I think Gen. Chang had opportunity to talk with Governor Yen and after liaison can be established, then the cessation of hostilities can be effected. Colonel Holly has just referred to General Ho Lung as liaison officer sent to Ta Tung, coming to Taiyuan, and no reply was obtained. As a matter of fact, all these other generals have sent liaison representatives and waiting ten days but finally he was refused."

GEN. MARSHALL: "Would General Chou think it a good thing or bad thing to have Colonel Holly hear this?"

GEN. CHOU EN-LAI: "It is all right, but for the limited time. I would like to present preliminary remarks and if there is any further discussion, I will be glad to talk."

GEN. CHANG CHIH CHUNG: "Would General Marshall agree to postpone the dinner date for 15 to 30 minutes?"

GEN. MARSHALL: "It is not my dinner. I will be ready to postpone it an hour."

GEN. CHOU EN-LAI: "The Communist member has also sent a representative to Ming Ying and is still kept there and all four Communist commanders have sent liaison officers down there. Colonel Holly also stated in his report that Governor Yen is not clear about the liaison officers. I have asked my officers here regarding this cessation of hostilities and they have assured me that they can send liaison officers to all the places that are needed to effect cessation of hostilities. In accordance with directives of Peiping Executive Headquarters regarding the cessation of hostilities itself, Colonel Holly has also made the statement that all overlays and maps were submitted by Governor Yen. The problem Colonel Holly presented was that fighting has taken place along the Pai-Chin railroad to the southeast of Taiyuan which took place in February. That is true, but we must find out the cause of the clashes. The Nationalists troops attempted to march from Taiyuan to a garrison of Japanese and puppet troops and were surrounded by Communist troops and they want to cut through Communist troops which implies movement of troops and while actually there were only Japanese and puppet troops in those areas. He sent 30,000 men for the engagement and they arrived at Ch'in Hsien. Regarding this, the Communist member in the team has submitted a report to the team but this was not mentioned in the today's report. And, therefore, on our side, we can definitely assure you that the responsibility for the clashes that took place after January 13 was not on our side and I can definitely assure you personally that henceforth, we will not, under any pretext, start any more clashes. I think, regarding this restoration of communications, we are perfectly willing to abide by the directives and we can pledge the execution of these agreements. According to the map, we see that the restoration of communications is not yet opened up, but to effect this we have to establish liaison and then this matter can be easily solved. The point of issue now is that even if decisions were made, there would be no free communication. For example, in Ta Tung, we have reached a decision on the food problem and requested liaison officers be sent to our side so that we can make discussions, but that officer was rejected. As to the siege of the town, it can be easily settled and food can be sent in, provided liaison officers are established to work out the details. As to the Communist member of this team, it is true that he is not very well acquainted with the present situation because he was sent from the northwest, so that he is only familiar with the northwestern part. He was sent as an emergency member and therefore he has not

had time to make a preliminary study of his function and he also had difficulties in setting up the radio station. He was not able to establish very intimate relations with Colonel Holly and therefore they are having some misunderstandings. That is what I have found out. On this, I think improvements should be made. As to the exchange of radio messages, the Communist team member has promised to furnish Colonel Holly with information, but actually he has received very little information. That is a fact. On the other hand, it appears that it is not necessary and proper to convey all the directives he may have obtained. As to the military movements on the part of Governor Yen, he has also informed the team about it, but this was not presented in today's report. When saying this, I have only in mind to improve the relations between the team members. It is perfectly agreeable to me if General Marshall will later show the minutes here to Colonel Holly. But what I am particularly concerned with is the relations between the team members to be improved. I am doing my best to the Communist member, using every means that we can find out, as to how we can be assured that all directives will be carried out. I have for this specific purpose asked General Chen Keng to come here and I also have a representative of General Ho Lung here and I can assure you gentlemen on the Communist part we will do our best for its execution but I think it is also necessary that we should make some endeavor on the part of Governor Yen.

GEN. CHANG CHIH CHUNG: "I ask you to permit me to tell you a joke before hand. When General Chou seems to have a little temper, and since the trip to Tsinan, I have some temper, I have tried to restrain it. Before this conference, I was talking to the Government officer and in the conversation I drank 4 glasses of water to quell my temper.

"From my experience, we come across one common problem. That common problem is in all those field teams there seems to have failed to execute all instructions given by Executive Headquarters. As least, that is my understanding. From the day I left Chungking, I repeated that I do not want to find out which side was wrong or which side is right. The facts lay before us show evidently that in many field teams, they failed to carry out instructions given by Executive Headquarters; for instance, HO-2 and HO-3, etc. For instance, about the repair of roads in these areas. The Communists seem to insist on the destruction of those towers. It does not comply with the basic spirit of the restoration of communications.

"The question is the interpretation of the orders. General Yeh thinks it is a question of orders. As I said once before, I am not concerned with who is right or wrong. I simply pointed out the facts.

"In this area we have visited many towns still in a besieged state. For instance, Shen Hsien, there are refugees at the airfield and asked for the lift of siege because the food is very scarce. They eat grass and human meat."

GEN. CHOU EN-LAI: "That report is a rumor."

GEN. CHANG CHIH CHUNG: "Based upon the information I have, the directives have been sent to the field teams for those troops which are surrounding any cities should withdraw 30 kilometers, but in none of these instances have the Communists complied with that directive so the state of siege will [*still?*] exists everywhere. At this moment, we should not argue about which side is right and which side is wrong. In order that the hostilities cease and the communications be restored, I hope that the Executive Headquarters will handle those problems based on the spirit which created a spirit in the Committee of Three in Chungking [and?] will work out a practical plan to solve these problems. Let us have a cool mind. Don't be disturbed by prejudices. I will try very hard to have a cool mind to make things cooperative. I hope every side will have a mutual understanding and let us not talk about right or wrong.

"This is my view and I would like to listen to your views or comments."

GEN. MARSHALL: "What I would like to know is what is the best policy to pursue here for the rest of the evening and for possibly tomorrow morning?"

GEN. CHOU EN-LAI: "It appears to me that it is not necessary to postpone our meeting to next morning and I think there are three points we have to reach and make a decision. First, it should be no question about it since General Chang also concurs with me that all directives from Executive Headquarters should be implemented. Second, the liaison system should be established at places as assigned by the Executive Headquarters and in accordance with its directives. Third, I think we can find some method to improve the relations of the team members. I would like to hear some suggestions from you gentlemen—particularly General Marshall. I have one suggestion to make. I have the impression that it seems necessary that the team should have chance to move around so that it can go to the area of one party and then to the other party. Then we could have the whole picture. If we reach a decision on these three points, the whole matter can be solved."

GEN. MARSHALL: "I am very glad to have that suggestion. We only have about two minutes left. We can't settle this in two minutes. Should we meet after dinner here? Who would attend the meeting?"

GEN. CHANG CHIH CHUNG: "I agree to carry on the meeting after dinner."

GEN. MARSHALL: "It is not advisable to bring the commanders in."

GEN. CHANG CHIH CHUNG: "I have no comment."

GEN. CHOU EN-LAI: "Probably in the dinner there will be a lot of Commanders there. If General Marshall will take that opportunity to explain to them, that will serve the purpose."

GEN. MARSHALL: "Should we bring the team members in here after dinner? Maybe at the end of our talk, because no opinion has been expressed to them at all."

GEN. CHOU EN-LAI: "They shouldn't be present at the discussion but should come in after the discussion."

GEN. CHANG CHIH CHUNG: "I have no comment."

GEN. MARSHALL: "It will be arranged that the team members will be available to come in on call when we have completed our discussion. We will meet after dinner just as now.⁷⁰ Have you any comment other than that?"

MR. ROBERTSON: "Now is the time to clear up this misunderstanding. I don't think we can clear it up by dodging the issue."

GEN. CHANG CHIH CHUNG: "I suggest that after dinner to have one hour rest before we call the meeting so that General Marshall can have time to rest. I will make use of the extra hour to talk to my people to gather some data."

GEN. MARSHALL: "That is agreeable to me, but you may not be able to wake me up then."

"General Chou made a suggestion that I do a bit of talking about this at the dinner tonight."

GEN. CHOU EN-LAI: "To emphasize the necessity of spirit to abide by various agreements not only for the good of people of Shansi, but for the people of China as a whole."

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Meeting Augmenting the Scheduled Meeting at Taiyuan March 4, 1946, 8:30 a. m.

GEN. MARSHALL: "We don't want to lose any time because of General Chang's early departure. Nevertheless, I think that we should hear from him first. Have you any further comments to make regarding the situation?"

GEN. CHANG CHIH CHUNG: "May I reiterate that the field teams should carry out the E. HQ. orders and instructions. If there is any different interpretations, then we can sit down and make a careful study. I mean that the team in the field should make a careful study

⁷⁰ Record of conversation at scheduled evening meeting not found in Department files.

and if they cannot [agree?] then, they may refer it to Executive Headquarters to get an interpretation."

GEN. MARSHALL: "Is it General Chang's proposal that in the event of unanimous agreement the team members report individually to the Commissioners? I am making a distinction between the report of a team member to his own superior among the Commissioners and the report to the Commissioners as a whole. At the present time, if there is a disagreement, there is no report. The basis of our agreement in Chungking was that everything had to be done on a complete agreement—field teams, commissioners, and ourselves in Chungking. Of course, individual members, just as individual commissioners, I presume, make reports direct to their own superior and those did not become general property and therefore could not be the basis for a discussion. In brief, is General Chang's proposal that when there is a disagreement should the team members report as a whole to the Commissioners? I assume that in most instances two members would agree and one would disagree. It is quite possible that they all might disagree."

GEN. CHANG CHIH CHUNG: "I brought up the difference of interpretation this morning because last night General Yeh said that on the withdrawal of 60 li from the besieged town is a different interpretation so I brought this point up because of the difference in interpretation so the state of siege and the restoration of communications will not be delayed. That is a fact. I feel that the problem today is that mutual confidence and mutual understanding has not been cultivated. So both sides still remain suspicious to each other. General Yen will carry out the instructions and orders sent from Executive Headquarters without reservation. He is honest and sincere to have peace. I think, of course, under present conditions, whoever stopped the restoration of communications is to be blamed and if we can cultivate the spirit of confidence many matters can be solved very easily. We will make personal contact with commanders and their subordinates. HO-2 dealt with separation. From the Government side, the interpretation is all those troops surrounded by the opposite troops would not withdraw, but for those troops which surround the city should withdraw 30 kilometers. If that instruction could be carried out, then the state of siege will no longer exist, but evidently this has not been carried out. I think that the besieged towns should be settled as soon as possible because it is not so much of the interest of the troops but of the civilians. They are starving. They cannot get food, water or medical supplies. They are suffering tremendously. We should not care so much about the interests of the troops but of the welfare of the people. Even if we cannot get an interpretation of HO-2, some-

thing must be done to lift the siege. We must make mutual concessions on both sides in order that the state of siege will be lifted.

“The last statement I made is that taken from the standpoint of the Communists, I think the state of siege would be lifted as soon as possible because in a besieged town the troops are in smaller numbers than the civilian population. The Communist side always claim that in a besieged town those are puppet troops so that they want to surround the city and disarm the puppet troops. In many cases, we have found this to be the opposite. They may be militia or Government guerrillas. Those people in the town don't hate the people in the town so much but those troops that surround the city and will not let in the food and water. That will bring a hostile feeling between the people and the Communist troops. The Communists pay such a cost that I do not think it worthwhile.

GEN. MARSHALL: “I assume the Commissioners have had many discussions regarding this fact. I would like Mr. Robertson if he will give us an outline of the discussions from the various points of view and also his own.”

MR. ROBERTSON: “Gentlemen, this has been a very complicated situation particularly from the American standpoint. Our team here got off to a bad start due to the fact that Colonel Holly and the National Government representative stayed here for 12 days without the Communist representative on the team, and for some reason [of] which we are not aware, the Communist team did not send a representative for 12 days. According to our information there also have been difficulties in getting Nationalist commanders to carrying out the directives. In other words, in providing the establishment of liaison between the two factions. This situation, like many others where there are violently different points of view, it is impossible for us to know what is the proper course of action because we have not been able to determine the situation from all different views. In regard to the directive providing for the withdrawal of troops, we have been informed and we have no reason to doubt that often if they try to interpret that directive literally, you create more problems than you solve. The question of puppet troops has been probably the greatest obstacle in our being able to reach an agreement in this area. I had a very frank and free talk with General Yeh concerning reports that his commanders were not cooperating in this area and he said he did not approve of that and he was sending out directives to them to cooperate with the teams and to raise the siege and let food go in and out of these besieged cities and we could stipulate [*stabilize?*] the situation until we could decide what to do about the puppet troops. The Commissioners have been unable to reach unanimous agreement

about what should be done just as the teams have been unable to reach unanimous agreement. We have been getting in food and keeping present positions stabilized so that there was no fighting and to await a decision from Chungking. One sentence and then I am through. This is a situation here apparently [where] the commanders of both sides have not fully recognized the authority of either the Chungking agreements or the Executive Headquarters directives. Each side has apparently taken the position that his is sort of a special situation and does not come wholly under those directives."

GEN. MARSHALL: "Thank you very much, Mr. Robertson. I would like to hear General Chou's recommendation regarding these encircled cities or towns. I mean by that, I would like to confine ourselves to trying to settle that one issue and see if we cannot reach a decision this morning."

GEN. CHOU EN-LAI: "The situation is like Mr. Robertson has just stated. It has many complications, but in other teams, I have made some suggestions and those suggestions have been accepted. I think in line with that acceptance [*acceptance*], we can also solve the problem here. My suggestion was that communication between towns and rural areas should be restored regardless of whether the town itself was garrisoned by Nationalist troops, puppet troops, or others. People should be allowed to move freely to the outside or to go in. Food should also be allowed, to have free transportation, and the antagonistic attitude should be wiped out so that we may have freedom of transportation, of food, and freedom of trade. We should have liaison officers by the two parties regardless of whether they are puppet troops in the town, the same liaison system should be established."

GEN. MARSHALL: "Is that acceptable to General Chang? It is so ordered. I ask you to personally tell the local people and the Commissioners [to] see that those instructions go to all teams in the simplest language you can phrase. I am very much relieved to get that difficulty out of the way and I believe that solves many others along with it."

"Now as to General Chou's comment yesterday regarding the teams and the necessity of developing a more harmonious relationship and also the desire of having the teams make more contacts with the side other than where they have their Headquarters, I am in entire agreement. I want to intervene to say General Chang has to leave and I would like everyone after this meeting has adjourned, [to] arrange to have completed their goodbyes and be in the plane at 10 o'clock. I presume that we will proceed independently to the airfield so that we will have up to the time of the departure to talk to our own people. General Chang is leaving and the Committee will continue its discussion."

GEN. CHOU EN-LAI: "I am going to be engaged in discussions with my people here."

GEN. MARSHALL: "I do not think it advisable as I did think it was yesterday to bring in the members of the team here at this conference but I will speak to Colonel Holly and make plain to him about our desires and I am sure General Chou will do the same with his representative and so will General Chang do the same with the Nationalist representative.

"As we have to leave very shortly for the airfield, unless General Chou has some other point he wishes to discuss now, we will adjourn our debate."

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and Chairman Mao Tse-tung at Yen-an, March 4, 1946

Mr. Mao thanked General Marshall for his assistance and effort in the restoration of peace in China and the unification of the two contending political factions. He assured General Marshall that the Chinese Communist Party would abide wholeheartedly by the terms of the Agreement for the Cessation of Hostilities, the Resolutions of the Political Consultative Council, and the Basis for the Demobilization of the Army and the Integration of Communist Forces into the National Army, and that under the leadership of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and the encouragement and assistance of American friends, all the Agreements would no doubt be translated into positive action which was *sine qua non* in China's program of reconstruction.

General Marshall said that he was gratified with the spirit of the Chinese Communist Party and was particularly appreciative of the fine show of cooperation, straightforwardness, and friendliness of General Chou En-lai during the entire course of negotiations. He added that standing in the middle, between the two rivaling parties, he had been subjected to pressure from both sides, and had noticed on both sides a sign of considerable reluctance and evident distrust. He said that irreconcilable elements for selfish reasons had been obstructing the course of China's national unification. He explained that as the Kuomintang was the ruling party, it was natural that the selfish cliques in it would be conservative in surrendering its power. These obstructing elements, General Marshall added, were to be expected but definitely not tolerated.

General Marshall said that he did not intend to meddle with China's internal affairs but that he had come to China to help as a friend and on China's request. He continued that he had talked very frankly

and confidentially with General Fo Cho-yi ⁷¹ at Kweisui, and General Yen Hsi-shan at Taiyuan both of whom pledged unreserved cooperation. He said that it was urgently necessary for China to achieve without delay a degree of unification before the world in order to secure her rights. American assistance, Army, Navy and Air, could not remain in China indefinitely. It would be very difficult and almost impossible for China to get along without American help at the present time, and American public opinion had been clamoring for the recall of American aid unless and until justified by stability and unification.

Mr. Mao said that with respect to the agreement for the restoration of communication, his Party would do everything to carry out the terms and that he sincerely hoped the Agreement for the Cessation of Hostilities would be applicable to Manchuria and that Field Teams would be sent there.

General Marshall replied that it was his understanding that the Agreement for the Cessation of Hostilities was applicable to Manchuria. He said that he was embarrassed by the Yen-an statement to the effect that Manchuria was not within the scope of the Agreement for the Cessation of Hostilities. He explained that he did not mean to interfere with political measures which might be considered expedient by the Communist Party, but that his effort had been embarrassed by the Yen-an statement, adding however that he did not wish Mr. Mao to comment on the matter.

General Marshall said that in keeping with Mr. Mao's statement that Manchuria came within the scope of the Agreement of the Cessation of Hostilities, he had been contemplating the dispatch of Field Teams to Manchuria. The Generalissimo, however, was reluctant, for fear that American presence in that area might give the Russians excuses and precipitate international complications.

Regarding the question of Chihfeng, General Marshall said that the situation there would be settled by the reorganization of the Army and the redistribution of forces, and that to retain the Field Team at Chihfeng would be beneficial.

General Marshall said that China has come to the time when political difference must be set aside for future discussion, argument, and debate; when interest of the individual must yield to that of the majority. At the present, all efforts must be directed to the good of China and her people, to cease hostility, to restore communications, and to repatriate Japanese.

General Marshall concluded that having been assured of cooperation from both Parties, he would do everything within his power to expedite [matters?].

⁷¹ Fu Tso-yi.

740.00119PW/3-546 : Telegram

The Counselor of Embassy in China (Smyth) to the Secretary of State

CHUNGKING, March 5, 1946—8 a. m.

[Received 9:45 a. m.]

427. Progress Central Government reoccupation Manchuria negative. Communist-Kuomintang fighting continues in Liaoning but no real change evident since middle February. No further withdrawal Russian troops reported. Chinese G-2 reports arrival Manchuria by sea from Shantung [of] Communist reinforcements in considerable numbers.

Inner Mongolia and North China relatively quiet. Unconfirmed Chinese G-2 reports continue to place strong Russian forces in Chahar north of Great Wall. (Summary Military Attaché's report week ending March 1st.) Northern Honan and Shansi continue to be areas of tension. Chinese G-2 reports build-up of Communist strength in Honan near Anyang and area northwest and west of Hsinhsiang. In southeastern Shansi, Communists accuse Yen Hsi-shan of mounting offensive against their forces. In southwestern Shansi, Communists reported continuing efforts expand control along Tung-Pu railway in Houma area. Communist forces Shantung reported concentrated [garbled group] zones especially neighborhood Tsinan.

Total Japanese repatriated from China Theater as of 15 February was 406,161; military 271,298; 134,863 civilian.

SMYTH

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Meeting at Hankow, March 5, 1946

GEN. MARSHALL: "Gentlemen, if it is agreeable, we will proceed with the meeting. I took the liberty of arranging that the press release would be made at 4 o'clock. I don't think that we should hold a press conference. It is rather difficult in view of the multitude of questions they will ask. Anything of that sort you wish to hold yourselves, do it on a personal basis. I don't think it would be a wise thing for the three of us to coordinate a press conference. Then it is so agreed."

COL. GRAVES: "General Marshall, General Chang and General Chou. On 12 February I replaced Colonel Donald H. Ford as chairman of Team #9. I will discuss briefly the agreements entered into with the Government and Communist Party military leaders by Colonel Ford, and the remainder of my information will be the happenings since 12 February and will be more detailed.

"On 23 January 1946 the Loshan Agreement was signed by Maj.

Gen. Wang Chen, Chief of Staff of Central Area Headquarters of the 8th Route Army and the new 4th Army, Lt. Gen. Cheng Tai-hsun, Vice Commanding General of the 22nd Army Group and Commanding General of the 47th Army, Lt. Gen. Sung Jui-ko, Commanding General 66th Army, and Lt. Gen. Koh Tsai, Vice Commander in Chief of the 6th War Zone and Commander in Chief of the Hankow Garrison Command. The signatures of these officers were witnessed by the three representatives of Team #9, who also affixed their signatures to the Agreement.

“Briefly, the Loshan Agreement provided that Government and Communist troops would remain where they were as of 23 January until the solution of political problems had been agreed upon. The Communist Party troops[,] with previous liaison with the Government Commanders, would be permitted to move food by unarmed food parties from one area to another of their areas without interference from Government troops.

“This agreement applied to regular troops, irregular troops, and people’s armies.

“In the meantime, Directive #2⁷² from the Executive Council at Peiping was published. But as Directive #2 would be difficult to comply with in the areas under the jurisdiction of Team #9, due to the complicated positions of both Government and Communist Party troops, another agreement was entered into on 29 January and was known as the Luwangcheng Agreement.

“This agreement provided that all commanders concerned would follow the terms of the Loshan Agreement rather than Directive #2 until the Team could personally report the situation to the Executive Council. This agreement was signed by Lt. Gen. Li Hsien-Nien, Commanding General Central Area Headquarters of 8th Route Army and new 4th Army and Lt. Gen. Koh Tsai, vice commander in chief 6th War Zone.

“After a visit to the Executive Council at Peiping, at which time the reason for the unfeasible application of Directive #2 to the situation in this area was given, the Executive Council issued an interim directive on 4 February, which authorized the Team to follow the Loshan Agreement until further decision had been reached by the Executive Council.

“On 7 February, shortly before the departure of Colonel Ford from this area, the Communist Party member requested that the Team seek authorization from the Executive Council to move 25,000 Communist party troops to Wuho, in Eastern Anhwei Province. However, through error in the preparation of the radiogram, the name of the town was misspelled as Wuhu. No decision from the Executive

⁷² Apparently General Directive No. 2, January 20, not printed.

Council has as yet been received, but a subsequent radiogram was sent correcting the area to which the movement was desired, and requesting that the number of troops be increased from 25,000 to 40,000. This was to relieve the food situation in the Central Area. Under existing Directives and Agreements, Team #9 had no authority to act itself on such a proposal.

"On 11 February Gen. Koh Tsai and Lt. Gen. Li Hsien-Nien entered a verbal agreement which permitted the movement of 6,000 Communist party troops from the area south of Kwangshan to Chiulikwan and Sekwantien. In arriving at this agreement, Gen. Koh wanted it understood that the purpose of the movement was to relieve the food situation and to make supply easier and that in consenting to the movement, he considered the area to be neutral and that the Government did not waive its rights as to the future status of the area.

"On 18 February, Headquarters 6th War Zone reported that on 7 February over 400 Communist troops had moved into Sunchiatien, approximately eight miles east of Sinyang, and feared that the Communist party troops would attempt to cross the Sze-ho River and the Sinyang Hwang-shuen Highway. General Wang, Chief of Staff of the Central Area Headquarters, was in Hankow at the time and knew nothing of such a move, but said that he would contact his headquarters for verification and proper action. Also on 18 February the Communist party reported movements of two regiments of the 13th Division of the 66th Army from Yingcheng. One regiment passed through An-lu and ultimately arrived at Tapongtien on 14 February. The other regiment moved to Sui-hsien on 10 February. Headquarters 6th War Zone admitted having ordered the move, but did not notify the Communist Party Commanders within the area as the headquarters considered such a movement not a violation of the Loshan Agreement, as the 6th War Zone had no information of Communist Party positions south of An-lu, and the 13th Division had been cautioned to remain at least 10 li from reported Communist positions enroute to the town of Sui-hsien. The 6th War Zone Headquarters further stated that these movements were in connection with the reorganization of the 66th Army and were not made for the betterment of the military strategic positions of the 66th Army.

"No action could be taken by the Team at that time as the Team was preparing to depart on a trip through Communist party and Government areas to the north of Hankow. An-lu was included in the itinerary and the Team decided to study the problem first-hand. The team agreed that if upon study the Loshan Agreement had been violated, a report would be made to the Executive Council.

"At this time General Wang recommended to the Team that in the future all contemplated movements of troops by either Government

or Communist Party should be cleared through Team #9. The Team decided to accept Gen. Wang's recommendation, and the 6th War Zone Headquarters and the Central Area Headquarters were notified that in the future all movements of armed troops, regardless of whether the commanders concerned considered they were moving within their areas or not, would be cleared through Team #9.

"On 20 February the Team departed on an inspection trip through the territory to the north. The tour was to take us by highway to Suanwotien, the headquarters of the Central Area, Loshan, Sinyang, Kwangshui, Hsiao-kan, and An-lu. The journey to Sinyang would be made by highway. From Sinyang to Hsiao-kan would be via rail, and the remainder of the trip from Hsiao-kan to An-lu and back to Hankow would be by road. The reason for travelling by rail from Sinyang to Hsiao-kan was to give the Team an opportunity to study the application of Directive #4, [4-A?] ⁷³ along the Pin Han Railway. The journey was made at a poor time, it later developed, as all Army and Division Commanders had not returned from the Nanking Conference.

"The Team arrived at Suanwotien the evening of 20 February. Conferences with Gen. Li were held on 21 February and 22 February. Gen. Li stated that he had received Directive #4 and was carrying out the provisions of the Directive. He further stated that all lines of communication within his area were open.

"When asked about the reported movement of 400 troops to Sunchia-tien, Gen. Li disclaimed any knowledge of the movement and declared that he would move the troops back if the report was found to be true.

"To aid Team #9 in executing its decision to authorize all movements of armed troops, it was agreed while at Suanwotien that maps and information showing positions of troops should be furnished the Team by the Government and Communist Party military headquarters. It was decided that immediately upon our return to Hankow a master map would be prepared showing the positions of all units. This is our master map.

"Gen. Li requested that some action be taken to move 40,000 rather than 25,000, of his troops out of the Central Area and up to Wuho. The Team assured Gen. Li that a radiogram requesting information would be sent as soon as the Team reached Hankow, which was the nearest radio installation. On 23 February the Team proceeded to Loshan where it conferred that evening with Maj. Gen. Ho Chang-Chung, Chief of Staff of the 47th Army, and Maj. Gen. Chen Lin, vice commander of the 125th Division; both organizations in the 5th War Zone. General Ho stated that 20,000 Communist Party troops had moved from Chiulikwan and Sekwantiem to the east and that the

⁷³ See the agreement of February 9 on the restoration of communications, pp. 422-424.

Communist Party lines had moved to a position just south of the river at Lungchenchen. Gen. Ho had not received any information on the agreement reached by the Generals Koh and Li to move 6,000 Communist Party troops from south of Kwangshan to the Chiulikwan-Sekwantien area. It was pointed out at this time, however, that the agreement only permitted the troops to move from south of Kwangshan to the Chiulikwan-Sekwantien area and that they were to remain in position after completing the move. Gen. Wang stated that he would verify the movement and have the information soon after the return of the Team to Hankow.

“Gen. Wang admitted that Communist Party troops occupied the area just south of the river at Lungchengchen, but stated that that had been the Communist Party position at the time of the signing of the Loshan Agreement. Gen. Ho claimed that the Communist Party troops had moved into this position on 18 February. Gen. Ho agreed to furnish the Team documentary proof that the Communist Party troops had taken up this line on 18 February and would present it to the Team before its departure. Gen. Wang also claimed to have documentary proof that the line had been taken up prior to the signing of the Loshan Agreement. Gen. Wang promised to dispatch a courier to Gen. Li’s headquarters the following day with the request that the information be forwarded to Hankow immediately, where the Team would meet to decide the position.

“The following day, 24 February, the Team arrived at Sinyang where it was met by Maj. Gen. Chou Tien-chien, vice commanding general of the 66th Army and Maj. Gen. Wang Shih-chiao, vice commanding General 185th Division. Neither of these generals had any reports regarding violations of the Loshan Agreement, but the Team pointed out that Directive #4 had not been complied with as there were block houses just east of Sinyang, one of which was in process of construction. Gen. Chou promised that these block houses would be destroyed. On 25 February the Team proceeded to Kwangshui where it conferred with Maj. Gen. Siao Ping-yin, vice Commanding General 185th Division. Gen. Siao reported three violations of the Loshan Agreement, the first being a movement of forty men on 17 February that attempted to pass the Government lines east of Chengchiakai, but were refused passage by the Government, so returned to their lines. The second, that more than 100 Communist Party troops on 20 February attempted to move west across the railway between Pengchiachae and Wangchiatien. These troops were also refused passage, and they turned back. The third related to a reported movement of Communist Party troops across the Pin-Han Railway northeast from Ta Miao Fan. Gen. Wang promised to advise Gen. Li that the first two reports indicated improper movements under the terms of

the Loshan Agreement. Regarding the third case, Gen. Wang declared that he had ordered the troops to assemble at Tamiofan to wait his further orders to move northeast. In Gen. Wang's opinion, the troops misunderstood the assembly order and thought it was a march order. Gen. Wang assured the Team that he would inform Gen. Li that the commander responsible for the move should be punished. The team agreed that as this was undoubtedly part of the previously reported movement from the Chiulikwan-Sekwantien area, that the entire matter should wait until the Team's return to Hankow so that all reported movements could be settled at one time.

"The following day the Team departed from Kwanghui at 1800, arriving at Hankow the following morning at 0400.

"The reason for not visiting Hsiao-kan and An-lu as scheduled was because of two unfortunate incidents that had arisen at Loshan and Sinyang that strained the heretofore amicable relations and cooperative spirit of Team #9. At Loshan the Team was invited to attend a tea party, given by local senators and elders from the surrounding villages. The people assembled, took advantage of the presence of the team, and expressed grievances against the Communist Party and the meeting developed into an anti-Communist meeting. The Team cut the meeting short by saying that we were only interested in the carrying out of Cease-Fire agreements, and not political discussions.

"At Sinyang, posters stating 'Make the Communist stop their atrocities', were observed. These were signed by the Middle School, Local Court, and District Peace Preservation Corps. The Communist Party member nearly staged a walk-out upon seeing these, but was mollified when he was assured by the priests of the Catholic Mission at which we were staying, that the posters were not in evidence when the priests had been on the street an hour before. After lunch, the Team met to discuss how the incident should be handled. It was agreed by the Team that the posters were put up by Minority Groups and were not reflections of the general attitude of the area. We decided that the incident should be reported to the Executive Council and that Gen. Chou, the Magistrate, and the Head of the Education Department, should be admonished of the gravity of such occurrences. Gen. Chou was informed, but the Magistrate and the head of the Education Department were out of town. The Team then transmitted the admonition to their assistants. These officials were quite concerned and expressed their regrets.

"These unfortunate occurrences created such animosity that I felt that it was mandatory that the Team return to Hankow, so that the former good will that existed in the Team could be restored. The Team agreed that this suggestion was wise and that we would visit Hsiao-kan and An-lu within a few days.

“On the subject of the compliance of Directive #4, it was noted on the trip that many block houses were to be seen in the Government territory along the highway, as well as along the railway, and a few block houses were observed within Communist Party-controlled territory. It should be stated here in defense of the local commanders, that in some cases, they had just received copies of the radiogram, in some cases they did not understand that the radiogram as such was authority for them to act, and in one instance, the 47th Army, 5th War Zone, at Sinyang, had not received any kind of Directive. A copy of the Radiogram outlining Directive #4 was left with the Acting-Commander. All commanders advised that the lines of communications as well as postal facilities, were open in their areas.

“That, Sir, is the report of everything up to date.”

GEN. MARSHALL: “It seems to me that, with the exception of the one issue of the movement of troops, that the issues that have arisen here are of a minor nature and are well within the control power of the team. The team seems to have been functioning in a businesslike manner and with the necessary cooperation, and so far as I can ascertain in this brief presentation, the commanders in the area have also cooperated. I congratulate the team on the manner in which they have carried out their mission. We recognize the difficulties and it makes a tremendous difference when you really have cooperation in judgment and action. So I know I speak for General Chang and General Chou when I express our thanks to the team. I have suggestion to make: that before we have a discussion regarding the movement of troops that General Chang have an opportunity to discuss the matter with his own people if he hasn't already done so. General Chang will remain in this room, General Chou in the other room, and the Americans will vacate, and when you are ready to meet, just notify General Byroade and I will be on hand. I suggest that nobody be present at that meeting but the Committee of Three and the Commissioners with the interpreters only of the Committee of Three. Is that agreeable to General Chang?”

GEN. CHANG CHIH CHUNG: “It is agreeable to have a talk to our representatives first and then the meeting later.”

GEN. CHOU EN-LAI: “I wish to state that this field team, under the leadership of Colonel Ford and Colonel Graves has been very successful and I would like to commend the field commanders in this area. I think that their efforts of this team can set an example in this respect to the other field teams and also that they have investigated all the places on the spot. This complies with the suggestion I have made before that the teams should go to the hot spots and settle it on the spot. I am very impressed and feel grateful to the spirit of this team. Therefore, I fully agree with General Marshall's estimate of this team. I feel sure that General Chang also concurs.”

GEN. CHANG CHIH-CHUNG: "I fully concur with General Marshall and General Chou's remarks and I wish to express my thanks to the members of the team and thank Col. Ford as well as Col. Graves for their efforts."

121.893/3-646 : Telegram

*General Marshall to President Truman*⁷⁴

CHUNGKING, 6 March 1946.

282. DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I returned today from about a 3,000 mile flight through North China to the borders of inner Mongolia taking with me my two associates on the Committee for the Cessation of Hostilities and the Committee for the Demobilization and Reorganization of the Army, also the three Commissioners from Executive Headquarters at Peking. We saw almost all the principal commanders in the field. We found a number of difficulties which could have soon become dangerous situations. All of these I think have been straightened out and a general understanding promoted throughout the region. There was every indication that affairs would clear up quickly and communications be reopened and normal life for the poor civilians actually gotten under way. A number of field commanders were feeling deeply over local matters and we were able to lift them to an appreciation of the much larger issues at stake. They all promised complete cooperation. I had a long talk with Mao Tze-tung at Yen-an and I was frank to an extreme. He showed no resentment and gave me every assurance of cooperation. My reception everywhere was enthusiastic and in cities tumultuous.

I think we are now ready to start on the demobilization and reorganization. Shortage of American officers to be present as the middle men at the scene of these various procedures is my greatest difficulty at this time. The presence of an American in such circumstances will be mandatory for some time to come. The officers we have had on these little teams of three men scattered about at isolated posts in China have performed an amazing task. A single American with a communist and government representative of his committee and with communications almost non-existent will have to dominate a region larger than Pennsylvania and bring factions who have been at war for 18 years to a peaceful understanding and communications restored. Airplanes have made the work possible, but what has been done in the field has been really astounding in its magnitude and importance considering the small number of Americans who have made the task possible of realization. Our men have been splendid

⁷⁴ Copy transmitted to the Secretary of State.

and are performing a great service for China and for American prestige. I will take this officer shortage up with the War Department on my return.

I request that you send a message recalling me home on receipt of this radio and that announcement be made to the press accordingly as suggested in my previous message (251).⁷⁵ I am planning to leave here between the 10th and 12th and to fly straight through without overnight stop.

121.893/3-746 : Telegram

President Truman to General Marshall

[WASHINGTON,] 7 March 1946.

WH 410. Replying to your message dated 6 March you are hereby directed to return to Washington for consultation.

In view of Mr. Churchill's⁷⁶ desire to see you and in view of his departure from Washington on March 12 it is desired that you arrive prior to 12 March if practicable.

TRUMAN

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Mr. James R. Shepley to General Marshall

WASHINGTON, 7 March 1946.

99691. I saw the President again this morning after he had read my memorandum.⁷⁷ He had a number of questions and we had a full discussion on the important points. The President was acutely interested in your estimate of Russian intent with regard to China. I discussed at length your thinking on the matter and the extreme difficulty of making an exact estimate. He agreed completely that regardless of how accurately we can judge Russian intent it is of paramount importance to the United States that the unification which your efforts have brought about must succeed. He is ready to support this objective to the limit in every way that he can, whether in the Administration or before Congress. He feels that your trip to the U. S. will be [of] great value in keeping Congressional and public opinion solidly in line with this policy. He fully understands the necessity for liberal American assistance to the Chinese Government in money, materiel and personnel. He also understands the difficulty of implementation in China and the significance of the Executive

⁷⁵ February 26, p. 444.

⁷⁶ Winston S. Churchill, former British Prime Minister.

⁷⁷ Not found in Department files, but see telegram No. 98786, February 28, from Mr. James R. Shepley to General Marshall, p. 446.

Headquarters. He agrees with you completely that U. S. efforts in China during the critical period ahead must be coordinated and administered by a most capable man and that such an Ambassador must be in full charge. The President said he is most anxious to find the right man for the job and questioned me in detail about General Wedemeyer. There has been a great deal of press comment here about the extent to which military men are being placed in diplomatic posts. Since your mission, General Smith ⁷⁸ has been selected for Moscow and General Hilldring ⁷⁹ has been made Assistant Secretary of State in charge of occupation affairs. The President stated, however, that he felt there were much stronger arguments in favor of appointing military men to such posts than against, since for the last few years the best talents of the nation has been drawn to the Army and Navy and that these men have had the best kind of practical experience in dealing with the very problems which now confront the nation. I told the President that you have been considering the comments on your return that in contrast to the difficulties created for your mission by Congressional filibusters, strikes, soldier riots, etc., was the great assistance that came from the President's statement of policy and his strong support. He seemed highly pleased that you wanted the U.S. public to realize this. I told him also of your efforts to get our aid to China on a basis that could be subject to the least amount of political sniping and of your troubles with Soong ⁸⁰ on the offset.⁸¹ The President said if this country only had some more men like you it could lick this period of crises every hour on the hour. He said he fully appreciated your desire to wind up your mission in China and that he will cooperate with you doing so in any way you want him to.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

The Committee of Three to the Three Commissioners, at Peiping

CHUNGKING, 9 March 1946.

305. The Committee of Three directs that Executive Headquarters should immediately require the railway control section to confer with Ministry of Communications on question of unified administration of all railroads. It is the view of the Committee that Communist personnel who are proving their qualifications by active performance of such duties at present time should be given favorable consideration for continued employment.

⁷⁸ Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, U. S. Army (ret.).

⁷⁹ Maj. Gen. John H. Hilldring.

⁸⁰ T. V. Soong, President of the Chinese Executive Yuan.

⁸¹ See telegram No. 294, February 14, 11 a. m., from the Counselor of Embassy in China, vol. x, p. 939.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

General Marshall to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek

CHUNGKING, March 9, 1946.

DEAR EXCELLENCY: Last night I received a radio from President Truman directing my return to the United States for a conference. He wished me to leave immediately to arrive there before the 12th, but of course this is impractical for several reasons. I am, therefore, planning to make my departure the evening of Monday, the 11th.

In a message from Mr. Shepley,⁸² my former assistant out here, summarizing an interview with the President on March 8th [7th], he gave me the following expression of the views of the President. I am making these known to you without the authority of the President because I think that it is very important that you should have his point of view at the present time. However, in view of my informal action in this matter, I trust that you will hold it confidential to yourself.

The President felt that regardless of how accurately we can judge Russian intent in Manchuria, it is of paramount importance that the unification of China be speeded to a successful conclusion. He is ready to support this objective to the limit in every way that he can, whether in the Administration or before Congress. He understands the necessity for liberal American assistance to the Chinese Government in money, material and personnel. He feels that my trip to the United States at this time "will be of great value in keeping Congressional and public opinion solidly in line with the foregoing policy".

GEORGE C. MARSHALL

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Ludden)
to General Marshall*

[CHUNGKING,] March 9, 1946.

During the past few weeks it seems to me that there has been considerable change in the attitude of the Chinese Communists toward events in China, particularly with regard to Manchuria. It has been my experience with the Communists that there has always been a tendency in public statements and the Party press to follow fairly closely the Soviet Communist Party line. Generally speaking this similarity has been confined largely to broad ideological generalizations, such as, agrarian reform, taxation, worker's rights, etc.

⁸² March 7, p. 511.

In recent weeks, however, I have arrived somewhat reluctantly at the conclusion that this general tendency is becoming more and more a matter of firm policy. It is manifested most obviously in Yen-an statements which follow closely recent Soviet releases and statements concerning specific problems in the Far East and events in other areas of the world. I have likewise noticed this same change in recent conversations with Chinese Communist friends, with some of whom I have been closely associated in north China.

Yen-an broadcasts of late have been adopting the attitude with regard to Allied victory that the Soviet Union was the nation mainly responsible for the defeat of Germany and Japan; the part played by the United States and other Allied powers has recently been ignored completely and the Soviet Union has become the sole savior of the world from fascism.

This change seems to have commenced with the Communist statement on policy with regard to Manchuria, released by a spokesman of the Central Committee of the Party at Yen-an on February 14th. The change has become more noticeable following a statement by Malinovsky's chief of staff at Changch'un to the effect that "reactionary elements" in China were being encouraged by the Chinese Government to foment anti-Soviet feeling in China. The Chinese Communists have now commenced to follow this line in all of their releases. It is also interesting to note that the Chinese Communists are now using the word "Fascist" in a completely Russian sense—that is, anyone who is in opposition to Russian, and now conversely [*likewise?*] Chinese Communist, wishes. There is also notable a Chinese Communist fulmination against "remnant Japanese fascists" in union with "Chinese fascists"—another recent Russian innovation with regard to Manchuria.

In a recent conversation with several old Communist acquaintances, Po Ku, editor of the *Chieh Fang Jih Pao*, the Communist Central Committee organ at Yen-an, expressed great bitterness at the movement of Central Government forces into the north by American air and water lift. He then went on to say that we could not expect the Russians to withdraw from Manchuria while we maintained Marines in north China, occupied Japan and southern Korea, and proposed the permanent occupation of island bases in the Pacific. He went on to point out that even though we had withdrawn our forces from Iran we still maintained missions there for the purpose of reorganizing the Iranian police force and army. All of this conversation followed closely Russian statements on the same issues.

At the same time other Communists pointed out to me that they had nothing to do with the situation in Manchuria because they did not control the foreign relations of China and that settlement in

Manchuria depended upon diplomatic negotiations. They went on to say that they had proposed an extension of the "truce-team" technique to Manchuria, but when questioned as to how this could operate in the face of Russian occupation they immediately returned to the point that this was a diplomatic question for the Central Government and they had no authority nor responsibility. They also professed to have no knowledge of reported Russian stripping of Manchurian industries or Russian demands for joint Sino-Soviet development companies for Manchuria.

Although Chou En-lai has stated to me, and later to Til Durdin of the *New York Times*, that he wished an immediate withdrawal of Russian troops from Manchuria, General Chu Teh⁸³ at Yen-an stated to another foreign correspondent that General Chou was mistaken in this announcement. Chou's statement, as far as I am aware, has received no publicity in the Communist press.

During the past two years as more information became available about their areas in the north, the Communists have built up in China and abroad a vast fund of good will among non-Communists; in China this has even extended to many members of the Kuomintang and was particularly true within the Democratic League. At the present time the Communists appear to be alienating this good will because of their silence concerning Russian activities in Manchuria and playing directly into the hands of the CC Clique or other Chinese elements who are disgruntled with the PCC and military reorganization programs. There are two possible broad explanations:

(1) Collusion with the Russians in Manchuria in order eventually to establish a satellite state similar to those of eastern Europe.

(2) Conflict within the Party itself between pro-Russian and nationalist elements with the former in temporary ascendancy.

I hesitate to accept either explanation completely in the absence of more evidence than that now available, but certainly recent trends in Chinese Communist propaganda and news releases shows a closer connection with Soviet policy statements than has been evident in recent years. No Communist leader has been able to present me with any reasonable explanation of the phenomenal expansion of Communist strength in Manchuria. In January of 1945 I was in a Communist area close to Peiping and the Political Commissar of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Communist Base area informed me that Communist operations were impossible in Manchuria at that time. He also stated that on at least six separate occasions they had sent parties into Manchuria to attempt to contact guerilla units reported to be operating in eastern Manchuria in the Long White Mountain range; these parties

⁸³ Commander in Chief of the Chinese Communist armies.

were unsuccessful in making any contact with any organized guerilla activity in Manchuria and Communist plans for expansion into Manchuria were abandoned as hopeless.

Local Communists, including General Chou, now profess to have no knowledge of where the arms for 300,000 men in Manchuria could have been obtained, and when questioned there is a marked tendency to weasel out of the Yen-an statement of February 14th by suggesting that large bodies of these troops may not possess arms at all.

It seems to me that the time has arrived for the Communists to make it clear whether they are primarily Chinese nationalist-reformers following Communist ideology or whether they are a satellite force of Russian expansion in Asia, but it is extremely doubtful that such a clear-cut definition of position can be obtained from any Chinese. Mutual suspicion, always present on the scene, is now being intensified and may well wreck the good work already accomplished in China proper.

RAYMOND P. LUDDEN

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting of Military Sub-Committee, Held at the Office of the Aide to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, March 9, 1946, 3 p. m.

Present: General Chang Chih Chung
General Chou En-lai
General Marshall

Also present: General Kuo Mr. Chang General Gillem
Colonel Pee Colonel Shinkle
Colonel Caughey
Captain Eng

GENERAL MARSHALL: I understand General Chou wanted this meeting.

GENERAL CHOU: General Chou says that we have left two problems behind. The one is the transfer of Communist troops in the Hupeh-Honan area to some other place and second one is regarding the Communist forces in Kwangtung province and he asks whether we should take it up today.

GENERAL CHANG: If General Chou likes to bring up this point today, of course there will be no objection from General Chang. Regarding the situation in Kwangtung area, the Commanding General, General Chang Fa Kwei is here in Chungking, but he is ill at this time so General Chang has not yet had a chance to talk to him so he doesn't think it is necessary to bring it up today, but to wait until he sees General Chang Fa Kwei, then he can talk this over with him. General Chang thinks the reconstruction, the reopening of railroad

seems to need our discussion today. General Chang is of the opinion that it is better to arrange a meeting of General Chang, General Chou, and General Chang Fa Kwei to have a discussion first. If we can make an agreement, there is no need to bring up to this committee. If they cannot reach some agreement then they will refer to the Military Sub-Committee.

GENERAL MARSHALL: What about the discussion on Communist troops north of Hankow?

GENERAL CHANG: Regarding the transfer of troops in Hupeh area, that had been discussed in Hankow. During part of that meeting, General Marshall was absent so he didn't hear the proceedings of that meeting. General Chang thinks just for both sides to bring up the points, the reasons and their arguments, this afternoon again, so we will try to reach some sort of agreement.

GENERAL CHOU: The reasons for the request for transfer has been explained in the meeting in Hankow and I am only repeating in brief the main points. The area controlled by the Communist forces is very narrow. It runs east-west only 180 lis and north-south 180 lis and in certain places the strip is only 60 lis. In this small area 40,000 to 50,000 troops are concentrated. Then in the western part to the west of the railway line there are also two small pieces of land controlled by the Communist forces, each reported to the American representative of the field team, so the total number of Communist troops amounts to 60,000 men and that has also been put down on the map shown to us that day. The Government forces surrounding this Communist force amount to 9 armies and the food supply was very difficult and the situation is tense and since we have in mind that both armies should be reorganized and demobilized so it is very difficult to carry it out in such a small strip of land. Not only because of difficulty of food, but also because of the intense situation. Therefore, we suggest that in the initial stage of reorganization, 40,000 of the Communist troops should rather be transferred to some other places to carry out reorganization and demobilization. We can leave a balance of about 20,000 men there which we are thinking to be demobilized and sent back to the adjacent places of that region according to the demobilization plan. As to the rest of the 40,000 they shall be transferred to other places and we have the following references for carrying out this transfer. Firstly the personnel themselves are mostly native from other places. Mostly from north and also a part from northeast and at Hankow we have suggested that they should be transferred to Wuho but that is only a proposed place. If the Government should have difficulty in letting them pass through the places controlled by the Nationalist forces, then we can also consider to transfer them to some other places controlled by the Communist forces.

Secondly, in the talk between the Communist and Government representative they agreed to withdraw from, that Communists should withdraw from, Honan-Hupeh. Thirdly, if the troops are transferred to some other place, then food will be readily available because in other places under Communist troops they are the local authorities and they have stores of food. Of these troops a part will be reorganized into the regular forces and the rest will be gradually demobilized. So they can easily find employment. In this way we can work it out in accordance with the reorganization plan and also decrease the burden imposed upon the people. Otherwise if the time goes on, the burden will be too heavy for the people. Before I departed from Hankow we have made a loan from the Government but that will only last for a few days and after that food still has to be bought from the people and this cannot last for a long time. Now on our side we have worked out a plan as to the date of transfer, place of transfer, and hour. If the Government entertains fear that it might create uneasiness among the people and army located in the line of transfer, then we can also consider to carry out the transfer by railroad. In that case we will work out plans on how to get them out of Chaotsu and to speed up the repair work of the railroad. If the transfer is made on railroads then, of course, we will save the passing through the area covered by Government forces. If we have agreed to a certain principle here then we can work out a detailed plan for the transfer. I also suggest that the field teams should go together when the transfer is going to be carried out. The field team will then supervise the movement of the troops. Afterwards, the 9 armies of the National Government garrison in the neighboring region can also be reorganized and we have to work out some sort of plan so they can also be transferred because it appears to me that it would be difficult for the Government side to carry out the reorganization at that place because I think it would be easier to effect the reorganization in some cities.

GENERAL MARSHALL: General Chang, what is your observation regarding the plan of movement by railway to gradually evacuate these troops having in mind General Chou's proposal to use all necessary methods to expedite the production of coal for the reestablishment of the railroads?

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang views the point, the reason for the Communist side bring up the question of transfer of those troops in Honan to some other places because there is a lack of food in that area. He thinks if we can relieve the food situation, if we can solve the supply problem, then there is no need for such a movement because such a movement would involve so many complications and create so many problems. General Chou suggested two places for the discus-

sion. One is Wuho, Anwha and Anyang, Honan. That is the latter place by movement by rail.

GENERAL MARSHALL: That is north of Taiyuan.

GENERAL CHOU: North of Hsinsiang.

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang understands that in both places there is not an abundance of food stores at all, so by movement he doesn't think we can solve the supply problems. The first place General Chou mentioned, Wuho, is well over 400 miles en route. En route the solution will be difficult because there will be very little food and the distance is great.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I only asked about the railway movement.

GENERAL CHANG: On the movement to Anyang, General Chang says he hasn't enough data for that, but according to his information that he got in Hankow saying that the transport capacity of that railroad is very limited and rolling stock and coal is very limited so even if we stop all civilian traffic on that railroad it may take several months to move 40,000 men.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Won't coal be moving south and the empty cars moving north?

GENERAL CHANG: As far as transport is concerned, General Chang has to make inquiry about the capacity of the railroad so that we can discuss intelligently. That is as far as food and transportation capacity are concerned, General Chang mentioned those difficulties. Then, furthermore we take this point of view of the movement of those Communist troops from Hupeh to somewhere else which is different from that of the Communists. The first consideration is that no matter where they move their troops they have to pass the area garrisoned by National forces and it has to cover long distances taking several months, so we can hardly guarantee that disturbances and uneasiness will not occur during that long period over that long distance. Furthermore, in that long period, it will be bound to create uneasiness among the people and among the armies. The second consideration is that we, or most of our field commanders, do not think that the Communist proposal is to solve the food problem. They think that the movement is only to concentrate the Communist troops, concentrate their troops in another area. The National commanders in the past have asked repeatedly for troop concentrations in the area under their command, but we did not grant their request.

(General Chang then cited several cases where various commanders had asked for troop movements, but had been denied their request.)

In view of the situation we can hardly convince our commanders that we stopped them to have their troops concentrated, if we allow those 40,000 Communist troops to concentrate in some other area. So

in that case it will jeopardize our effort in cessation of hostilities movement of our troops. General Chang did not bring up this point in Hankow but he thinks it is time to take it up because it is too paramount a point so we must take care of it. So General Chang thinks the best way out is to try by every means to relieve the situation and to supply the Communist troops with food instead of moving those troops out to somewhere else. General Chang thinks that in Hankow the second largest city in this country with all its communications we can solve that problem more easily than anywhere else in this country. In other words, if we can not get food in Hankow then it would be more difficult to solve that problem somewhere else. So he hoped the Communist will give up their idea of transfer of those troops and General Chou likes to make the statement that he proposed that because he does not like to create more problems. He has no other prejudice or other meaning behind his statement. It will jeopardize our effort we have made in the past. Before General Chang left Hankow he gave very specific instructions to General Kang in that area, the commanding officer in that area, for him to contact the Communist officer to solve the problem and to assist the Communists to solve the food problem. So, regarding that problem, if we work on the angle that we only try to solve the food situation there it is much more simpler and easier than to consider the problem of transfer of troops.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I assume that in the process of demobilization, extensive movements of individuals, even troops, will become necessary under the instructions to be carried out by the Executive Headquarters. Within 10 days we should receive a list from the Communist Party of the first troops to be demobilized during the first 2 months. General Chou, I believe, stated that 40,000 of the 60,000 men were to be demobilized.

GENERAL CHOU: Demobilization will be carried out in two stages not the 40,000 men at one time.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Is 40,000 the total of people he has down there. That is over the 20,000 he is leaving down there.

GENERAL CHOU: Altogether there are 60,000.

GENERAL MARSHALL: 40,000 to go, 20,000 to remain. Let us suppose that on the list to be supplied by the Communist Party within the next 10 days appears units representing 40,000 for the initial demobilization. I am just supposing this. Then what is General Chang's solution for that situation. Do we demobilize them or do we leave them there indefinitely in the future or is Executive Headquarters permitted under the plans to move them somewhere. Is everyone that is to be demobilized to remain in the same place he is demobilized—demobilization should start within the next 10 days. Are the Commanders in the field going to resent any movement or demobilization.

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang thinks that for the movement of demobilized personnel it will come under the over-all plan of demobilization, but the point raised by General Chou this afternoon is to move troops from one place to another place at a particular area. In the over-all demobilization plan we will move troops of deactivated personnel, that will be undergone presently, there will be no distinction of spot at all, but this advises a particular spot, so he says it is different. General Chang mentioned in Hankow that it is better to leave that problem until the carrying out of the over-all plan of demobilization, that is solve that problem within the scope of the demobilization plan, so he thinks his idea is very close to that of yours. So General Chou thinks that the problem under question will not exist when we carry out that detailed plan of demobilization.

GENERAL MARSHALL: General Chou, you have within your option to designate a certain portion of that group for demobilization. You have it within your privilege to state when and the process of demobilization implies the movement of individuals to their home districts. That process should commence in the next two weeks. If the food question is solved during the interim period would not the demobilization procedure permit a solution on a principal part of the problem. I would assume it is not desired to leave these men there in a demobilized state in that particular region.

GENERAL CHOU: I think there are two considerations involved in this problem. Regarding the plan for demobilization we should have a separate plan applicable to the Hupeh region and this has to be fixed and the demobilization in this part will be carried out at an earlier time. In connection with this question, the demobilized personnel will not remain in that area, but have to be sent to other places and which involves a quite large number of people and before their departure the personnel in those areas still have to be fed there in this narrow area and this problem still has to be solved. Now the second consideration is a large part of the troops now stationed in this area will be reorganized into the regular army because these troops have a high fighting strength and is rather well-equipped and after the reorganization has started it is not conceivable to leave this army as a division in this place because it appears to me that the division has to at least be located in the vicinity of the city, since the city is not within the control of this army so it seems rather impossible, so we still have to consider the problem of transfer of Communists to some other places, because it is very unlikely that the reorganization can be carried out in the rural area as it is now, because it would be difficult to have them all assemble to one spot. So today we have the problem of supply food and tomorrow we will consider the problem of reorganization and all this has to be solved in order to reach complete solution of this matter

and General Chang has just said that the headquarters at Hankow will assist in provisioning food to the troops, but that would only assist in some way to solve the problem, but it would not give a certain ultimate solution to this problem, otherwise a serious situation will occur. In raising this problem I have in mind to reach a solution satisfactory to all and since we have to solve it once and for all, I think we better solve it either today or some time in the future.

GENERAL MARSHALL: General Gillem, you have been working on this problem of demobilization procedure, have you any comments to make on this?

GENERAL GILLEM: It seems to me that a temporary solution could be arrived at by the transportation of food in the area available through transport in this area. Within several weeks the lists of units to be retained will be received at the headquarters here in Chungking. At that time it can be determined whether the units involved in the area under discussion are to be retained.

GENERAL MARSHALL: It will be on the list wanted.

GENERAL GILLEM: The disposition of remaining troops must be determined at that time. Can this problem be postponed until those lists are examined and the units designated? If that is so, the decision as to the disposition of the remaining troops can be arranged at that time. It seems obvious that in the reorganization we will incur troop movements. Therefore in the interim the commanders in command should be informed of this change or other changes and instructions can then be issued. Does General Chou think the postponement is too hazardous to await this time, several weeks?

GENERAL CHOU: General Chou inquires about the food problem. It seems to him that your statement has not clearly indicate on [*defined?*] the food problem.

GENERAL GILLEM: General Marshall conferred with the UNRRA representatives the morning we left Hankow. Assurance was given at that time that priority effort would be made to relieve the situation in this area. If this city and the surrounding transportation systems is utilized, the situation should be simpler of solution than the other areas where transportation is not so varied. Can we await the period which will bring in the lists without jeopardizing the situation. In the meantime efforts will be made to determine the status of the UNRRA assistance.

GENERAL CHOU: Now as General Chou understands the UNRRA is only to supply the civilians but is not the agency to feed the armies. When General Chou was in Hankow he made inquiry as to the supply and they have told him that the food situation is very difficult. We should take definite matters for the food supply of those troops and if the army should take food from the people which obtained the food

from the UNRRA then the relation between the army and the people would be very bad. General Chou is especially anxious about the food matters which we will have to work out so as to insure the supply to the troops.

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang thinks the problem is rather simple. Let us not get into making it complex. Regarding movement of troops, wait until the detailed demobilization plan has been worked out then the movement will also of course be solved. When the over-all plan has been worked out then we will carry that plan out then that movement will be a part of the over-all plan. So the point to settle now is the food problem. Regarding the food supply, General Chang promised to discuss with General Chou in order to get effective solution. The food problem does not exist in just one spot, that is the Hupeh area, nor has it existed for the past few weeks. It has been a problem for the past six months. That is a problem to many many localities. General Chang thinks that to tackle the food problem in Hupeh is far easier than to tackle those problems somewhere else in some other areas in this country. General Chang wishes to make this proposal. Regarding movement of troops, wait until the implementation of the demobilization plan. There is no need to discuss at this moment. Regarding the food supply he will get responsible officers in the Ministry of War together and work out an effective plan with General Chou.

GENERAL MARSHALL: That would seem to take care of the food problem. Is General Chou willing to delay the solution of movements until the lists are in?

GENERAL CHOU: General Chou says that if the food problem can be solved within the short interim period before the detailed plan on demobilization will be worked out in two weeks then he thinks that is acceptable, but if the food problem is still left unsolved at that time he would raise the question again.

GENERAL MARSHALL: What is the next issue to be discussed?

GENERAL CHOU: Regarding the Kwangtung problem General Chou has before commented, but was then interrupted by General Chang, but he thinks that while General Marshall is still here, it is very important to settle the question in relation to that. This time we have cancelled part of our trip to cover Canton in accordance with the Generalissimo's directive that General Chang Fa Kuei come here so it can be discussed in Chungking. I have contacted General Chang Fa Kuei the commander in the Canton area, this morning and so far as I could determine he does not recognize the directive issued by the National Government to him, directing him to recognize the status of Communist troops there and to reach a solution. He told me that the part south of the Yangtze River does not come under the provision

of the cease fire order and I told him that the cease fire order does not come into effect only in certain extent as far as it affects the troop movements only for the purpose of troop reorganization, but it does not justify him to fight the Communist troops even though the Communist troops are only a very small number. Only at the end he conceded that if the Government would give him a new directive then he would act accordingly. Therefore, I wish to repeat my suggestion that even though the Communist troops in Kwangtung are very few they should be recognized. One of the men of the Communist side has arrived in Chungking yesterday and he knows the whereabouts of that unit, but I regret to say that he is not in a position to state possibly where they are right now because if he reveals their location they probably would again be attacked since they only amount to a very small number, but I can state that we can find them and we are willing to evacuate them from that place because if they would remain there they would again be attacked as bandits and they would have to resist. I would suggest that the restoration be done by sea so we would avoid any conflict. I hope that I can have General Marshall's assistance in this matter.

GENERAL MARSHALL: It seems to me that this problem resolves into 2 or 3 different considerations. The first one is General Chang Fai Kwei who according to General Chou, maintains that the cease fire order does not apply south of the Yangtze. It seems to me that it is not for him to interpret—it is up to the Government to interpret and as far as I am concerned the basic plan did include south China. In the second place, if the comments of General Chang Fa Kwei that these men are not Communists, that is a matter for discussion here between General Chang and General Chou or the Government and the Chairman of the Communist Party will become involved. However, it seems to me there is no excuse in the delay in the interpretation. If it does not apply to that region, it does not apply to a lot of other regions where I think it is intended to apply. I wrote most of the paper myself. Now it seems to me at the present situation the quickest way to solve the delicate situation is to do as General Chou has suggested. To transport these people to some other place by sea, say Chefoo or some other place. If that were an acceptable solution I would undertake to find out from Admiral Cooke if he could arrange the shipping. I brought up that problem first myself with Chairman Mao Tse-tung to see if they would entertain any such procedure before I considered the matter with Admiral Cooke. Now I brought it up to the meeting. If that were to be done we would have to designate a specific time and with the American representative as the head should have the authority to arrange the procedure of collection and embarkation. Any comments?

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang raised no objection to either General Marshall's or General Chou's views, but according to his understanding that before we took the trip that it was intended for him and General Chou to confer with General Chang Fa Kuei, but unfortunately General Chou went to see General Chang Fa Kuei without notifying him so he understands nothing of the situation at all and today he gets all these reports and he regrets very much that he is not intimate with the situation he cannot give any better explanation. It is not a question of interpretation of the cease fire order. Of course it will govern south of the Yangtze River and the field team is now at Canton and the Government has sent instructions for the field team to proceed to work there. So at this moment we have to consider how to solve the problem. It is not a matter of interpretation of the paper.

GENERAL CHOU: General Chou comments that he agrees with General Chang's views that there is no use to argue now, but we should try to reach a solution.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I proposed one. I assume that General Chang would still like to consult with General Chang Fa Kuei.

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang likes to contact General Chang Fa Kuei simply to find out the situation and he is not to leave Chang Fa Kuei to decide on these matters.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I don't understand what he meant. I proposed a solution, but I assumed that he would like to speak to General Chang Fa Kuei before he makes his decision.

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang heard from General Chang Fa Kuei that we have difficulty in locating the Communists.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I understand General Chou promises to locate them.

GENERAL CHOU: Provided General Chang Fa Kuei will give him freedom to meet them.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I assumed the located would wish to do it in the presence of the team. The team would be a guarantee of what we call safe conduct.

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang thinks there is not a point of issue for it only involves 2 or 3 thousand men.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Well, if they are being shot at it is quite an issue with the 2 or 3 thousand men. If I were one of them I would be greatly interested. Now if agreeable to you gentlemen I will go ahead and make an inquiry of Admiral Cooke as to what the possibilities are. It will save that much time.⁸⁴

General Chang and General Chou agreed.

⁸⁴ See telegram No. 306, March 9, from General Marshall to Lieutenant General Wedemeyer, p. 613.

GENERAL MARSHALL: We would probably have to have a stipulated area to collect because the Navy will not take men that have not had certain injections. If we could find some place where a LST could put its nose in that would suffice. We need a little more than a protected beach. What is the next subject to be discussed?

GENERAL CHANG: Regarding the reopening of railroad communications we have received report from the Ministry of Communications up to the 7th of this month.

Colonel Pee then read a list of accusations against the Communists for setting up in various area railway administrative areas.

General Chang thinks that the administration should be done by the Ministry of Communications. General Chang thinks it is urgent to abolish those jurisdictions on those strips in order that the administration will not be divided.

GENERAL CHOU: On this problem I think there will be no question for the repairing work there will be no objection to that for the various parties it has already been made clear and the Executive Headquarters on coming back to Peiping will also issue orders and according to this report they also admitted in certain places that repair work is under way and it did not need orders from Yen-an. Secondly, as the railway administration and the personnel problem I have raised this question at the discussion on the restoration of communications and at that time I suggested that we should lay down some principle here to avoid dissension in the lower level, but that time we referred it to the Executive Headquarters and the Executive Headquarters in its turn again delayed the matter saying that it should be taken up after the repair work has been started and so no solution has yet been reached and according with this table it has raised many points regarding separate administration set up. However, I note that a large section of this the Communists have set up a bureau and I don't understand why it has not been included on the list. Probably I assume that the Ministry of Communications is willing to cooperate with that Communist bureau. I suggest that the railway problem should be considered as a whole and the Railway Control Section of the Executive Headquarters should get together with the representatives of the Ministry of Communications in Peiping. There is no doubt that the personnel should be selected according to their abilities and I regret that up till now no solution has yet been made. Therefore, I still suggest that the Railway Control Section of the Executive Headquarters should immediately confer with the representatives of the Ministry of Communications to reach a solution about the administration.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I am writing instructions for the Executive Headquarters.

Captain Eng then read the text as follows (translating it into Chinese):

“The Committee of Three directs that Executive Headquarters should immediately require the Railway Control Section to confer with Ministry of Communications on question of unified administration of all railroads. It is the view of the Committee that Communist personnel who are proving their qualifications by active performance of such duties at present time should be given favorable consideration for continued employment.”

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang suggests to add the following: “Abolish the existing Communist administrative organizations.”

GENERAL MARSHALL: I understand. What is General Chou’s comment?

GENERAL CHOU: It is not the station organization but the administration because some of those stations are still actually within Communist territory.

GENERAL MARSHALL: My proposal implies directly a unified control so unless General Chang feels that it will all be placed under the Communists it will, of necessity, be either accepted or abolished.

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang insists on addition of the sentence.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I think that sentence confuses the issue as represented in this paragraph. This directs an immediate conference with a railway administration [to] produce a unified administrative control. The question is whether it is the view of this committee that those Communist individuals who are now discharging the duties efficiently should be given favorable consideration for employment. Now the addition of that sentence throws a confusion really into what this is. The sentence settled it before they confer. This says a unified control, this says Communist individuals shall be considered, given favorable consideration and it puts it on the basis of an arrangement between the Railway Control Section and the Ministry of Communications. That single sentence that General Chang proposed obviates the necessity of saying anything of this. It is a mandatory order. Otherwise there is no possibility of having any of this as we just say the Communists are out. There is no basis of conference then. I think this makes it possible for them to arrange the thing in an orderly manner. I don’t mean that this wording is as correct as it should be, but that is the idea. I am sorry to say that the Generalissimo wishes to see me and I will have to withdraw. I have to go down to the country to see him. If you wish to have a meeting with me Monday some time, I will be very glad to meet. If you decide now on Monday morning and let me know I will arrange my

day accordingly. Meanwhile if you will excuse me and continue your meeting.

General Marshall then departed and turned the meeting over to General Gillem.

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang says that he has to report to the meeting in the morning.

GENERAL GILLEM: What time suits his convenience.

GENERAL CHANG: 3 o'clock.

General Chou agreed.

GENERAL GILLEM: Then we shall continue this on Monday at 3 o'clock.⁸⁵ It is also the desire of the committee to send this message?

General Chang and General Chou agreed to send the message to Executive Headquarters.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum of Conversation, by General Marshall

INFORMAL STATEMENT BY THE GENERALISSIMO TO GENERAL MARSHALL
JUST PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE ON MARCH 10TH

The Generalissimo made the following statement regarding Government-Communist relations in China, the Manchurian situation and the attitude and intentions of Soviet Russia: He is convinced that the Communist Party is loyal to Soviet Russia and in the final test, on the side of the Russians. He thinks that their intention is to infiltrate into the Government positions primarily for the purpose of gaining control of foreign policy in order to play the Soviet hand. He considers that the Communists look on General Marshall as, in effect, their protector while building up influence in the Government and reorganizing their armies. He feels that their acceptance of the demobilization and reorganization plan is largely for the purpose of obtaining well-trained, organized and equipped 18 divisions. In other words, he is unalterably of the opinion that the Communist Party is for the Communist theory of life and the Soviet-Russia regime.

The Generalissimo is loath to have any representative from Executive Headquarters in Manchuria for the reason that he assumed Communist desire for such representation was based on the idea that the Russians would demand and secure equal representation along with American officers. He considers that the Russians have favored the Communists in every way possible in Manchuria and the Communists on their side have taken every possible advantage of the opportunity afforded to the disadvantage of the Central Government.

⁸⁵ For minutes of meeting on March 11, see p. 543.

The Generalissimo stated, he will be sitting on pins and needles for the next 18 months while the demobilization and reorganization of the armies is being made effective. (In all of his interviews with General Marshall he has voiced the same opinion regarding the intentions of the Communist Party and their dependability.)

The Generalissimo stated that he felt the American policy regarding China announced by the President ⁸⁶ was 99 and a fraction percent correct, but the fact that there was a condition mentioned [precedent?] to a loan, of certain requirements in the political reorganization of China, has defeated the entire effect of the message except in so far as it was of great advantage to the Communist Party. He hoped that any loan which might be granted China would have no conditions attached to it. At least there would be no public announcement of such conditions.

The Generalissimo stated that he felt that the outcome of the Manchurian question now depended on the strength of the American stand towards Russia on this subject and that of Iran; that any weakness would mean virtual emasculation of Manchuria as a part of the Chinese nation.

(NOTE: Despite the pessimistic view of the Generalissimo regarding the Communist position he has accepted the terms of the agreements regarding the Cessation of Hostilities and the Demobilization and Integration of the Army. He is using his great influence to bring the recalcitrant leaders of the Kuomintang Central Committee into line, their determining meeting has been in session since March 1st. These leaders have been exceedingly difficult to handle and have capitalized on the Manchurian situation in every way possible, utilizing anti-Soviet demonstrations to stir up Communist retaliation, at least in editorials and radio comments.)

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Statement Made by General Chou En-lai to General Marshall Regarding Chinese Communist Position Toward Manchuria, March 10th, 1946 ⁸⁷

Regarding the Northeastern problem it was not our party that was to be blamed for giving rise to it. From the very outset we have been willing to see it solved along with the overall problem of China, and we have drawn a sharp distinction between what is domestic and what

⁸⁶ For statement issued December 15, 1945, see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 16, 1945, p. 945, and *United States Relations With China* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 607.

⁸⁷ Prepared by General Chou's secretary-interpreter.

is external affairs. Such was our consistent attitude. Accordingly we have never interfered with the negotiation conducted between the National Government and Soviet Russia; this you can readily verify from government people in charge of the negotiation. As to the domestic aspect of the matter, we have never rejected consultation. If the opponent party would only express a desire for settlement, we had been eager to meet that desire. For example, in early December, when the Nationalist troops are moving along the railway section between Chinchow and Mukden, the government representative in the Northeast Chang Chia-ngau called on Tung Pi-wu, one of our representatives here, to talk the matter over. Tung Pi-wu then made it very clear to him, that if the Nationalist troops are moving toward Mukden for the purpose to take over the sovereignty of places under Soviet control, then the Chinese Communists shall not meddle in their business. But he also warned them not to move westwards, with a design to attack the Communists, and thereby unleash the war. This shows that at that time the government forces would meet no opposition, if they were bound for Mukden. But what actually happened later was that the Nationalist forces changed the course of their troop movement and launched an attack westward toward Jehol, which was stopped only shortly after the issuance of the Cease Fire Order. This testifies that even before the truce we have never refused to discuss directly with the government over the Northeastern problem, though, we have strong objection to any complication of the domestic affairs with the external affairs.

However, the propaganda of the Kuomintang was since the very beginning directed to the opposite end, they confuse the domestic with the diplomatic aspect of the matter. Ever since the situation of the Northeast has become critical, the government in the last three months—not in February alone—has deliberately endeavored to mix up domestic matters with matters relating to diplomacy. To all these moves we kept silent, instead to voice any reaction, because we were then concerned to bring the PCC to a successful end. This again proves that from the very beginning we have not been inclined to let the Northeastern problem grow to such alarming proportions as to jeopardize the success of the PCC.

As to the speedy growth of the Communist forces in Manchuria, it will be easily apprehended, if a frank explanation is made to you. When the Japanese surrendered, the government denied the Communist troops any area of receiving surrender, or the right to participate in receiving surrender. All the large cities were taken over by the Nationalist forces with U. S. assistance of transportation means. Under such circumstances, the Communist forces in seeking a way out moved northeastward across the Hopei and Jehol border. At that

time the Northeast was largely a vacuum, seeing that the Soviet forces were mainly distributed along the railways, consequently there was much room left for the Communist forces to conduct activities. As a result we disarmed many puppet troops there, managed to get the people organized, and before the Nationalist forces moved in, set up many local popularly-elected civil authorities. All this is very logical to the situation. And yet the Chinese Communists have not because of that ignored the point that the Nationalist troops may enter Manchuria to effect the taking over of sovereignty from the Soviet troops. Provision to this effect has in fact been laid down in the truce agreement. Nor have the Chinese Communists asserted that hostilities should not be stopped there. This was also provided for in the agreement. Since we have been willing to commit ourselves to that agreement, it readily proves that we have never entertained the intention of demanding a separate status for the Northeast. To your suggestion made toward the end of January that a field team should be sent to Yingkow, we have promptly expressed our agreement, this further proves that we have not considered the Northeast as an exceptional case not to be covered by the general agreement. However, the despatch of field team was delayed for over a month, without a decision having been made. Meanwhile National forces kept on pouring into Manchuria. Whereas following the stipulations of the truce agreement, the government should have reported daily to the Executive Headquarters about the troop movements there, that has never been complied with. These incidents show that the government is deliberately evading any discussion on the Northeastern problem, and denying us any chance to raise that question. The result then was that the issue has been hanging for over a month, and we were left in such a situation that somehow we have to clarify our position in Manchuria ourselves. But in clarifying our stand, we definitely adhered to the following principles:

(1) We will not have ourselves involved in the external affairs in connection with the Northeast, instead we draw a sharp distinction between the domestic and external aspects of the matter.

(2) We desire a simultaneous solution of the military and political matters pertaining to the Northeast. Since in the military field we have assented to the despatch of field teams, it implies of course that the five armies sent up by the government are entitled to take over certain places, and it further implies that after peace is restored in the Northeast, we may take the next step of reorganizing the armies. In the basic agreement we have conceded, that the government may maintain five armies in the Northeast, even down to the final month, which by that time would constitute one fourth of the total armed strength of China. It means that we have conceded to an overwhelming military supremacy on part of the government in Manchuria, and laid no claim over the maintenance of a strong regular

Communist force there which would have appeared rather well-grounded, seeing that right now we are maintaining a huge force in that part of China, instead, we demand only for political democracy, the application of the PCC decisions to the Northeast, the reorganization of the Northeastern Political Council and the various provincial governments, and the implementation of the provisions of the Joint Platform⁸⁸ with respect to local self-government.

In view of the above, it appears to me, that there has been nothing wrong with our party to publish such a statement.

As to the situation prevailing in the last three weeks, all can be easily understood. Even before the announcement of Yen-an, the CC clique of the Kuomintang has in February attempted to link up everything pertaining to Soviet Russia with us. As I have stated, for three whole months we have completely ignored the propaganda and the allegations of the Kuomintang. I even have not cared to talk about it to the pressmen. But in the demonstrations staged in February, many things without slightest connection with the Chinese Communist party, were charged upon us. At this instant, a series of incidents occurred, thus we have had the mass rally bloodshed, the demolition of the Hsin Hwa Jih Pao and Democracy press, the mob action at Peiping Executive Headquarters, the destruction of the Hsin Hwa paper agency in Chengtu, and the disturbance at the Sian office of the Eighteenth Group Army. These rowdy elements have taken no action whatsoever against the Soviet embassy and consulate, instead they made us their sole target. All the time we remained reticent, until we made a last reply only recently. For two months the irreconcilables have misused us, followed by illicit actions, and the sole reason given by them for their actions was that we have advocated separate status for the Northeast, that we want the Northeast to be exceptional not to be covered by the general agreements. As a matter of fact, our desire is just the very opposite of that; we strongly oppose the view that Northeast should be an exceptional case not to be covered by the general agreements; we want to make all the agreements governing cease fire, army reorganization, protection of people's rights, reorganization of the government, joint platforms etc., etc. applicable to the Northeast. While they allege that we rely on Soviet Russia, the actual truth spoke the very opposite. If we had really relied on Soviet Russia, then the Chihfeng incident would never have occurred and we would never have requested the despatch of field teams and your personal trip to the Northeast. Just because in the past we had been so extremely reluctant to give explanation on this matter publicly, it became possible for the irreconcilable elements to mobilize

⁸⁸ Apparently a reference to the summary of conversations between representatives of the National Government and of the Chinese Communist Party, made public October 11, 1945; see *United States Relations With China*, p. 577.

scores of newspapers to slander the Chinese Communists, to hoodwink the people, and to stage a series of demonstrations against us.

For example, in front of the building of the Chinese Communist Delegation, demonstrations passed by for many days incessantly, and every one of us was insulted by them. But even in the afternoon of February twenty second, when the Hsin Hwa press was demolished, I came amid the big mass to the meeting of the military sub-committee. Through four hours' efforts, we reached final settlement on the terms of the army reorganization plan. On the following Monday, we signed the official document.⁸⁹ But in all those days, our people were condemned and beaten by the irreconcilable element. By then, the Central Committee meeting of the Kuomintang was not yet convened.

As I do not want to bother you with those domestic strifes, I have not cared to talk about it to you, nor to furnish you with any kind of materials in connection with that. However, the CC cliquers, and a part of the San Min Youth Corp elements have maliciously misused us for two whole months. Being thus insulted and beaten, Yen-an finally replied; a part of those statements have subsequently been reprinted in the *Hsin Hwa Jih Pao*. However, all of them were of a defensive nature. As to myself, I have never made any public statement on the Northeastern problem yet. Even before we took the trip, I specifically asked what unanimous answer there should be when questioned by the press on the Northeastern problem. My motive then was that I like to avoid anything that might be construed to be a piece of propaganda.

From the above it is clear, that the responsibility of the provocations for the last two months lay solely on the party agencies of the Kuomintang.

As to the Kuomintang Central Committee meeting, their attempt is to upset all the decisions laid down by the PCC; they are opposing not only the Chinese Communist Party but also all the people within Kuomintang who are for peace, democracy and unification. In the Session of the past few days the CC cliques upbraided others almost everyday. This is something which not even General Chang Chih-chung cared to deny. The other day Dr. Sun Fo and Mr. Shao Li-tze also did not deny this when we were discussing the Draft Constitution at Dr. Sun Fo's residence. It is therefore not the Communist propaganda and statement that would have spoiled some of the achievements of the past; the case is: these reactionary elements first started the fuss, and they even demanded to recall the Kuomintang PCC delegates. Mr. Chen Li-fu, though he himself is a PCC delegate, directed the reactionaries to oppose the PCC from behind the scene. They are opposing Dr. Wang Shih-chieh, Mr. Shao Li-tze, General Chang Chun

⁸⁹ February 25, p. 295.

and Dr. Sun Fo, and they even oppose General Chang Chih-chung, Dr. T. V. Soong and Dr. Wong Wen-hao. In fact they oppose everybody who does not belong to their clique. All these have no direct relations with the Chinese Communist Party and the Northeastern problem. The CC cliques are aiming to overturn the decisions of the PCC; they deem that these decisions are to the disadvantage of their own clique. Because of these very facts, I am afraid that these PCC decisions may be overturned by them. They want to change all the PCC decisions, especially the Principles for Revision of Draft Constitution so that the constitution will become something to maintain a totalitarian rule instead of a democratic one. As to the government reorganization they want, on the one hand, to expel those Kuomintang members who are in favor of peace and democracy out of the government; on the other, they want all the lists of the non-Kuomintang members who are to take part in the government, to be passed by the Kuomintang Central Committee. As to the National Assembly they want to change the apportionment of representatives. As to the Joint Platform, they want the Communist controlled areas to be taken over by their despatched officers and forbid general election. They further demanded that the decisions of the PCC should not be binding on the representatives of various parties of the National Assembly. All these also have nothing to do with the Northeast.

So in my opinion, the Northeastern problem is only their pretext, and as a matter of fact, the irreconcilables are reluctant to give up the power of one-party dictatorship. This is the essential cause. It is because of my anxiety over the future of China, that I find it necessary to work out a solution on the Northeastern problem, and I hope to work it out before you leave China. Our party has no intention of making the Northeast an exception or to have a separate status there. This has no connection whatsoever with the diplomatic problems. If objection is made to the solution of this problem then it is tantamount to let the Northeastern problem form an exception, and this entails the danger of civil war. But this is not our inclination, and to this we have been persistently opposing.

I like to explain our attitude with two examples. One month ago several American correspondents came to me to ask about our attitude about the question of Soviet withdrawal from the Northeast. These correspondents were well acquainted with me so I told them frankly that if we are only considering our own interest, we think the sooner the Soviet troops withdraw the better. Because if the Soviet troops withdraw and the government troops are not yet arriving, of course the places from which the Soviets have withdrawn will be taken over by our troops. If the Soviet troops will not withdraw, then at last the places will certainly be taken over by the Government troops.

However we don't like to announce this publicly lest we might be giving others the wrong impression as if we want to monopolize the whole Northeast. The next day, the A. P. correspondent made a brief report on this saying that I am in favor of the withdrawal of the Soviet troops. But this had never been mentioned nor published by the Kuomintang papers, because it could not fit into the pattern of their propaganda.

Besides, during this tour you have received many anti-Communist materials while we declined to offer you the anti-Kuomintang materials. In fact I also got many materials to that effect, which are at hand to give you to read. However I did not do so; the reason is in case the Northeastern problem has already been solved, there will not be any need to mention it. I have talked with you in the same way; that is to try to solve the problem and not to make the problem more complicated or to cause trouble. I think you will admit it is true.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Marshall to General Chang Chih-chung

CHUNGKING, March 10, 1946.

I am leaving for the United States tomorrow, Monday evening, March 11th, for a short absence. I request that Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., U. S. Army be accepted as my representative on the Committee of Three and as advisor to the Military Subcommittee during the period I am absent from China.

G. C. MARSHALL

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Minutes of General Chou En-lai's Interview With General Marshall*⁹⁰

CHUNGKING, March 11, 1946.

To the measures with regard to the Northeast which you have conveyed to me yesterday,⁹¹ I have given careful considerations, and duly reported to Yen-an. I am of the opinion that the big problem lies in the separation of military and political aspects of the matter. This makes it difficult for us to accept, and particularly difficult in convincing our armed forces in the Northeast. Since the truce, our party has made many decisive concessions in the military field, so as to assure the government that it may have a firm hold on the Northeast, the purpose of making these concessions is to expect in return political

⁹⁰ Received from the Office of the Chinese Communist delegation at Chungking.

⁹¹ Apparently a reference to the "Draft of Instructions for Executive Headquarters Regarding the Entry of Field Teams Into Manchuria", March 11, p. 543.

democracy in the Northeast. If now the political problems are not solved along with the military problems or simply put aside, then it would again set the entire Northeastern people under the one-party rule.

Therefore I am inclined to think that these questions should be brought up in the Conference of Three. Because, on our part, there is perfect confidence in General Marshall, and any person he trusts. Such a way of solution (i. e. to solve the political and military matters simultaneously) would decidedly stabilize the situation in China. In advocating this, we have full confidence that American participation in this matter would stabilize the situation in the Northeast, and consequently would stabilize the whole nation.

And secondly, in regard to the military problem, if we can solve the political and military matters simultaneously, with the participation of US representative, General Marshall, then in the problem of cessation of hostilities and movement of troops, we will certainly try our best to achieve a settlement for the reasonable demands raised by the government, just as we have done with our endeavour in the Basic Agreement of Military Reorganization and the Truce Agreement. However for the sake of making everything desirably done, I think it would be necessary for me to go to the Northeast personally to consult and work out some concrete measures with the local people on our side, and I hope that our American friends could go together. What I am striving for is the cessation of hostilities and the stability in the Northeast so that the whole nation will not be affected.

Thirdly, since hostilities have not been ceased in past months, a state of war has been resulted, in which both sides were preparing for fight. But now new circumstances may change such state: (1) Generalissimo Chiang has agreed to send field teams to the Northeast; (2) It is reported that the Soviet troops have withdrawn from South Manchuria. We should as a first step take this chance to stabilize the areas from which the Soviet troops withdrew, and then to extend the work northward. We agree with General Marshall's opinion, that is, that clear distinction between domestic problems and problems of Sino-Soviet relations should be made in solving the matters and then it will be easier to achieve a settlement. It will also be convenient for U. S. to take part. And make Generalissimo believe that his formula of a solution will be fair to all.

Now what the government is practicing in the Northeast is still military control; the Administrative Commission and other government organs are under Generalissimo's Headquarters there. In order to find a solution, the administration portion of the problem must also be discussed clearly and solved simultaneously. For instance, the reorganization of the Administrative Commission and various pro-

vincial government[s]. This will make the people from all quarters have a chance to cooperate, especially for Northeastern people to participate in the administration, in order that the Joint Platform and county (hsien) self-government can also be carried out in Northeast.

General Marshall has repeatedly said that U. S. hopes for China's peace and stability which will make possible for the American loan to and investment in China. Then it will benefit both China and America. We are in favor of cooperation between China and America. It is for this very reason that we feel this is the way to solve the Northeast problem and to make the Northeast stabilized. If we only solve the problem of the cessation of hostilities without touching upon other problems, then wherever the government troops go, all possibilities for the people's participation in governmental administration through election will be checked and removed. And then even if the Chinese Communist troops withdraw from certain places, the people there will still be resisting and not at rest. This is no good. Now I am talking about this problem with responsible attitude. I have anxiety over this matter and I hope to see the Northeast become stabilized.

Another question that I did not answer you yesterday is the relation between the Chinese Communist Party and the Soviet Union. I think what you said is quite true that there are some similarities in theoretical aspects between the Chinese Communist Party and the Soviet Union, but these two are definitely of two nations. During this war Soviet Union did make great sacrifices in Europe, and played an important role in the victory of anti-Fascist war. We ought to be thankful to it just as in the Far East we ought to be thankful for the tremendous effort exerted by America. Therefore we cannot share with the anti-Soviet sentiment of some of the Kuomintang people, which even went so far as to insult the leader of the Soviet Union. We believe that our American friends, likewise dislike that sort of happenings. As to diplomacy direct negotiation between the National Government and the Soviet Union is under way, and we have never expressed our own opinion about it. Therefore, in solving the Northeastern problem, we have tried our utmost best to avoid touching upon diplomatic problem. As to the domestic problem of the Northeast, we welcome our American friends to assist us for a solution. Our attitude has been very clear: The whole policy of the Chinese Communist Party is for the interest of the people and the nation.

However, today I like to point out the gravity of the present situation. I hope, before you leave this evening, specific measures can be worked out so that General Gillem following your footsteps will assist us to achieve a settlement for the Northeast. We believe that only you have the capacity to promote the fulfillment of this matter. We have worked together for more than two months, and I appreciate your

ability and prestige very much. So before you leave, I would like to present my views, and beg you to give a prudent consideration to it. If it cannot be solved today, I hope you will still render a great help to it from afar after your leaving. The coming month is indeed the critical period as you have said. During this period, the resolutions of PCC will have to be carried out, the Northeastern problem will have to be solved. There are so many cruxes in the problems of China, so we want your greatest assistance to solve them.

I agree too, if, in priority to all, we can despatch the field teams to Northeast, to attain cessation of fire, and consult about the problems of the areas where the Government troops are to be stationed. If we cannot solve the problem today, I hope we can work out some measures to let the field teams to proceed work there above all, and at the meantime, we ourselves can likewise go there, in order to stop the conflict, to consult about the entire measures of taking-over and reorganization of armies. Thus, it will be of good influence towards the governments and people there.

893.00/3-1146: Telegram

The Counselor of Embassy in China (Smyth) to the Secretary of State

CHUNGKING, March 11, 1946—2 p. m.
[Received 8:05 p.m.]

464. Political scene dominated by present situation in Manchuria. Uncertainty as to ultimate Russian intentions in northeast and increasing suspicion with regard to Chinese Communist connection therewith tend to retard and jeopardize recent progress toward settlement of internal political and military problems.

Even after discounting sensational aspects of American correspondents' early stories from Manchuria, there can now be little doubt but that large scale Russian stripping of the Manchurian industrial plant, at least in the Mukden and Anshan areas, has occurred. Reasonable explanation would seem to be that Soviet Union does not intend annexation or creation of satellite state, but has removed heavy industry war potential and will demand domination of future industrial development in Manchuria for security reasons.

On the other hand Russians appear to be adopting attitude of obstruction toward Central Govt. in Manchuria although Chinese Communists seem to enjoy at least Russian tolerance which has effect of tacit support. Chinese Communists have failed to explain satisfactorily their phenomenal Manchurian expansion since V-J Day and avoid question of source of arms for 300,000 men referred to in Man-

churian policy statement of Feb. 14 mentioned in Embtel 357, Feb. 23 and despatch 1166, Feb. 28. (No unbiased estimates of Communist strength in Manchuria are available.) Furthermore in recent weeks Chinese Communist press and radio have shown more marked tendency toward closer adherence to Soviet Party line concerning Asiatic-Pacific questions than was evident previously. General effect in China proper has been to alienate good will developed by Communists in liberal quarters during recent successful negotiations and to strengthen position of disgruntled rightist elements of Kuomintang who wish to obstruct implementation of PCC resolutions and military agreement.

Heated discussion of Manchurian issues at current plenary session of Kmt Central Executive Committee has frequently interrupted meetings devoted by regular agenda to other topics. It has been reported to the Embassy by a well-informed Chinese source that there has been sharp criticism of the caliber and integrity of Central Govt. officials sent to Manchuria and of failure on the part of the gov't. to take sufficiently into account strong regional consciousness in Manchuria. The same source indicated that newly appointed northeastern officials are largely adherents of the so-called CC⁹² clique interspersed with agents of Gen. Tai Li and neither hearty welcome by Manchurian Chinese nor Communist cooperation could be expected.

A movement for Kuomintang reformation from within the party which was launched by extreme rightist members, largely of the CC clique, on Feb. 10 has been widely interpreted as a potential attack on the authority of the Generalissimo and an attempt to obtain a reversal of his position regarding the PCC resolutions and military reorganization. Thus far there are no indications of any serious challenge to the Generalissimo's authority or of any change in his apparently firm stand for full implementation of the PCC resolutions and military reorganization agreement.

At the CEC session the main point at issue now seems to be the question of constitutional revision. The session is reported to be adamant in demanding presentation of the May 5 draft constitution to the National Assembly without revision. With this possible exception it may be anticipated that the CEC will approve the resolutions of the PCC. Any exception, however, will be unfortunate inasmuch as it will offer the central committee of the Communist Party, scheduled to meet at Yen-an in late March, an excuse to bring forward exceptions of its own.

Meanwhile the signing of the military reorganization agreement⁹³ has received nation wide press acclaim as a major forward step toward

⁹² Chen brothers, Li-fu and Kuo-fu.

⁹³ February 25, p. 295.

lasting peace and national unity and stability. The more responsible newspapers, however, point out the need for continued good will and cooperation from all groups and factions if the paper plan is to be made effective. But in the non-Communist press there is growing an implied scepticism with regard to the entire reform program as the Manchurian problem becomes more acute and forces in opposition to any change embrace the national security issue raised thereby as a means to foster their own desires for preservation of power. In this connection, CC clique has elected a majority of the presidium of Central Executive Committee.

SMYTH

121.893/3-1646

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to President Truman

CHUNGKING, March 11, 1946.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: As General Marshall is returning to America, I am taking this opportunity to convey to you my sincere thanks and those of the Chinese people for having sent a man of his intellectual stature and sincerity to help us in our post-war reconstruction period. What General Marshall has been able to accomplish during the short period that he has been here, I feel certain, fulfills your expectations. As you know him so well, I will not mention the great qualities he possesses which eminently fit him for his task, a task at once delicate and withal so vital to the maintenance of world peace.

I hope that he will return to China immediately upon completion of his mission to America, for the seed that he has sown needs his presence to bring it to germination. I would like to add moreover that, to my mind, not only is General Marshall's speedy return to China of urgent necessity, but his continued presence here for the next three years will play an important part in the stabilization of the Far East.

I have discussed at length with General Marshall certain subjects such as the importance of Manchuria in the broad picture of world security and peace; the basis of Sino-American co-operation, and the present political situation in China. I have asked him to convey to you my views and I shall appreciate it deeply if you would give them your full consideration.

With all good wishes,
Yours cordially,

CHIANG KAI-SHEK

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Memorandum by General Marshall to President Truman*⁹⁴

EN ROUTE TOKIO TO WAKE ISLAND
13 March 1946.

Subject: Oral Statements of Views of Chinese Central Government and Communist Party Reference Situation as of 10 March 1946, in Personal Conversations with General Marshall.

There are attached a statement by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek⁹⁵ and another by General Chou En-lai⁹⁶ made to me in my final conversations with these two officials just prior to my departure from Chungking for the United States. I dictated my recollection of the Generalissimo's statement and had Chou En-lai's Secretary-Interpreter write up his notes of Chou's oral statement.

In reading these papers it should be borne in mind that they represent views expressed during a most critical situation in Manchuria and in the heat of a political struggle within the governing Central Committee of the Kuomintang Party—a Committee which *rules* China and whose officials and subordinates down the line hold their position of power and personal income by virtue of that Committee's rule, now due to be abdicated to a coalition government.

Another fact bears on the interpretation of these statements. So far *no measures have been taken* to suppress the fighting and the struggle for favorable position in Manchuria. It has required two months and a personal visit by me to bring all the Central Government and Communist leaders in the field into line in accordance with the terms of the Cease Firing agreement—halt of all movements, restoration of communications and evacuation of Japanese. Lack of communications makes it very difficult not only to reach leaders, but especially to reach the commanders of brigades, regiments and independent or guerilla groups.

In Manchuria the situation as to communications and leadership is far more difficult than in North China. The Communist forces are large—about 300,000, but little more than loosely organized bands. It has been all but impossible for the Yen-an headquarters to reach the leaders. On the Central Government side the leaders have been free

⁹⁴ Notation by General Marshall: "Read to the President and copy delivered to Sec. of State."

⁹⁵ See memorandum by General Marshall, p. 528.

⁹⁶ *Ante*, p. 529.

to place their own interpretation on orders or agreements—complicated by the Government public announcement that the Executive Headquarters had no jurisdiction in Manchuria. This was an unjustified statement, as the agreement of January 10th for Cease Firing included Manchuria.

Now, on the night of my departure from Chungking, I succeeded in getting an agreement for the immediate entry of field teams from Executive Headquarters into Manchuria. I was notified the same evening that the American Consul was amicably received in Dairen. The Consul for Mukden is enroute by rail, which the Russian troops have evacuated.

I will make no predictions at this writing—enroute Tokio to Wake Island, delaying such report until the further developments of the situation become known to me on my arrival in Washington.

V. AGREEMENT TO SEND TEAMS INTO MANCHURIA, MARCH 27, 1946

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Document Prepared by General Marshall*⁹⁷

[March 9, 1946.]

BASIS FOR ENTRY OF FIELD TEAMS INTO MANCHURIA

1. The teams should accompany Government troops, keeping clear of places still under Russian occupation.
2. They should proceed to points of conflict or close contact between government and Communist troops and bring about a cessation of fighting and the necessary readjustments to avoid future trouble.
3. The government troops are authorized to occupy any places necessary to the re-establishment of the sovereignty of China and are to exclusively occupy a strip 30 kilometers wide either side of the two railroads mention[ed] in the Sino-Soviet treaty.⁹⁸
4. The Communist troops will evacuate any places to be occupied by the government troops for the re-establishment of sovereignty, communities, coal mines, utilities, etc.
5. The Communist troops will not be permitted to move in and occupy places evacuated by Russian troops.

⁹⁷ Apparently the form in which President Chiang Kai-shek approved in principle the entry of field teams into Manchuria; drafted in long-hand by General Marshall about March 9 at Generalissimo Chiang's country place outside Chungking.

⁹⁸ Signed at Moscow, August 14, 1945; Department of State, *United States Relations With China* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949), pp. 585, 593.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Draft of Instructions for Executive Headquarters Regarding the Entry of Field Teams Into Manchuria*⁹⁹

[CHUNGKING, March 11, 1946.]

Field Teams, with carefully selected personnel, will be sent into Manchuria immediately under the following conditions:

1. The mission of the teams will pertain solely to military matters.
2. The teams should accompany Government troops, keeping clear of places still under Russian occupation.
3. Teams should proceed to points of conflict or close contact between the Government and Communist troops to bring about a cessation of fighting and to make the necessary readjustments in order to avoid future trouble. They should visit Communist Commanders and headquarters.
4. The Government troops are authorized to reestablish the sovereignty of China in Manchuria. Specifically, they are to exercise exclusive control of a strip 30 kilometers to either side of the two railroads mentioned in the Sino-Soviet treaty.
5. Communist troops will be required to evacuate such places as are necessary for the occupation by Government troops in reestablishing the sovereignty, including coal mines. Communist troops will not be permitted to move in and occupy places evacuated by Russian troops.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting of the Committee of Three, Held in the Office of the Aide to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, March 11, 1946, 3 p.m.

Present: ¹	General Chang ²	General Chou ³	General Marshall
Also present:	General Kuo	Mr. Chang	General Gillem ⁴
	General Lee		Colonel Caughey
	General Hsu		Captain Eng
	Colonel Pee		

GENERAL MARSHALL: What is the first subject you wish to take up?

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang said it is rather out place for a student to make a beginning.

⁹⁹ Prepared by the Staff of General Marshall and used as the basis for discussion at the meeting of the Committee of Three on March 11, *infra*.

¹ Names listed in three columns in these and other similar minutes are respectively those of representatives and their assistants of the Chinese National Government, the Chinese Communist party, and the United States.

² General Chang Chih-chung, Chinese Government representative in the Committee of Three.

³ General Chou En-lai, representative of the Chinese Communist Party in the Committee of Three.

⁴ Lt. Gen. Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., designated by General Marshall as his representative in the Committee of Three during the temporary absence of General Marshall in the United States.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Has General Chou any suggestions?

GENERAL CHOU: General Chou said he would like to take up the field teams and the service areas.

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang thinks the teams to be sent to Manchuria seem to be more important—how about starting with that.

GENERAL MARSHALL: General Chou, may we have your comments?

GENERAL CHOU: I have received the draft⁵ only this morning and I have made a study myself at the same time informed Yen-an about the contents of this draft. Since the matter of cessation of hostilities in Manchuria has been discussed for over a month and the situation there seems to be more complicated than at other places it needs an appropriate solution. First of all, I wish to extend my welcome to the Government concurrence of sending field teams to Manchuria and so that the conditions there can be stabilized. To the acquiescence of these principles by the Government, I extend my welcome because this was the desire expressed from our side from the beginning. Right now I am not going to discuss it paragraph by paragraph, but rather I would put forward a few points for general consideration. Firstly, in the stipulations it is said that the mission of the field teams would only govern the military matters. Of course, all the field teams so far have only cared for the military matters and not for anything else. This is also the mission of the field teams. But with regard to the truce in the Northeast, right following the truce we will have matters in connection with the political affairs. If we deal with them separately, inevitably complications will arise. This morning I have just told General Marshall⁶ that it seems to me that the Conference of Three should not only issue military instructions with regard to the Northeast to the Executive Headquarters, but should also issue instructions pertaining to political matters to the Headquarters, because as to the military aspect of the matter it seems to be quite obvious in the cease fire agreement⁷ we have agreed that the government troops may enter Manchuria to take over the sovereignty and in the basic plan we have further agreed that the Nationalist forces should enjoy an overwhelming supremacy in the Northeast so that the Nationalist troops will have a firm hand over Manchuria and that there would be no question about the sovereignty of the Northeast. In making these concessions we have had in mind that in return we shall have democracy, democratic institutions in the Northeast without exception in comparison with other parts of China. Under the democracy we have particularly in mind, the reorganization of the Northeast

⁵ See draft of instructions for Executive Headquarters regarding the entry of Field Teams into Manchuria, *supra*.

⁶ See minutes of General Chou's statement on March 11, p. 535.

⁷ January 10, p. 125.

Political Council would be required. That the joint platform should be applied also to the Northeast with regard to local self-government. In this way we would have a fair way of settling the matter. Not only will there be large forces in Manchuria to protect the sovereignty against external aggression, but the people will also enjoy democracy as well as in every other part of China. On the other hand, if we divide the military from the political matters, then inevitably problems will arise because in that case we will have these political systems in the different places and this will cause administrative confusion and that would be bad to China. Therefore, I propose that from the highest level we should reach an agreement so that in the lower levels they would confront no difficulty. The only agency which I think can discuss this matter is the three-man committee as the field teams have no jurisdiction to discuss on this matter. Therefore, I am hoping that it can be settled here. Secondly, regarding the taking over the various places. On this point we have two procedures. The first one is the taking over of the places by the troops at the present moment. Of course the troops which are now in the Northeast are not yet sufficient for that mission as far as I know and will have to be sent up, but it appears to me that we should here fix the number of troops to be sent up and also to make an arrangement as to what places shall be taken over by those troops and consult on these points to be made here and complete concrete plans to be worked out so that the government troops can take over those places and the schedule. Secondly, regarding the reorganization and integration of the armies, the plan of which will be ready after two weeks.⁸ In this plan it will be laid down as to which troops should garrison what places. If we have the two plans, the one for the taking over of the sovereignty and the other for the reorganization of the armies, then the two plans can be coordinated and we can, in a harmonious atmosphere, settle all the questions. In that case we will not simply state abstractly that the Government troops have the right to take over the sovereignty and not only that, they can take over the necessary places, but we can concretely pin down the places to be taken over and the procedure of taking it over. So, if we have these procedures concretely worked out, then it would facilitate the matter of the whole problem. Now at the present time, it seems to be advisable to have the hostilities stop at once even before the previous two problems have been solved. It seems therefore, that the field teams should be sent out at once to accompany troops in that place—to stop any hostilities that might take place and there to establish close contact with both armies. Therefore, it is an interim settlement of the matter. Apart

⁸ See draft document of March 16, p. 564.

from that, I think it best to do it according to the suggestion I have advanced before and which I am advancing again—that is, that in order that the problem can be solved, it would be best for the Conference of Three to make another trip to the Northeast and seeing that General Marshall will not be here for the trip, I think we would like his representative to go on that trip for if the Conference of Three make this trip then we can explain on the spot to the field commanders and there clarify the whole situation. As to my part, I will make my best efforts to clarify the situation and also that Communist field commanders there would have a thorough understanding of the general policy of the Communist Party now. Certainly even before the two previous problems have been solved we will confront no difficulty. It may be that we can solve the other two problems right up there and effect our return. Anyway, our purpose is to seek stabilization in the Northeast and after the general policy has been laid down there, then we can assume the responsibility to carry it out.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I will not be here, of course, but at the places where the Russians are not in occupation, Mukden for example, and where the Chinese government armies have now advanced, I see no objection to General Gillem representing me on such a trip. I would like General Chou to state his idea of what the instructions would be for the field team in order that they might leave without delay.

GENERAL CHOU: General Chou likes first to know the general attitude of the Government representative toward his suggestions for if his suggestion is to be adopted, then some amendment will be made to the original draft.

GENERAL MARSHALL: General Chang?

GENERAL CHANG: General Chou raised the point that the Military Sub-Committee should also deal with the political problems in Manchuria. General Chang rather doubts whether the Military Sub-Committee have such jurisdiction in solving the political problems. Furthermore, General Chang represents the National Military Council. Whether the Military Council have the legal rights to solve political questions, General Chang is very doubtful of that. General Chang thinks in dealing with political problems in Manchuria, perhaps some other form of conferences should be formulated. They would deal with the political questions. That organization and this Military Sub-Committee to coordinate. He doesn't think it is safe for this Military Sub-Committee to deal with political and military affairs.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I assume that when we are discussing the field teams, it is the Committee of Three, and not the Military Sub-Committee. The Military Sub-Committee was not charged at all with the cessation of hostilities and this is what we are talking about.

GENERAL CHANG: It is true that today we are having a meeting of the Conference of Three instead of the Military Sub-Committee. I am not certain whether the Conference of Three have the jurisdiction to discuss civil and political affairs. General Chang thinks that the situation in Manchuria is rather serious, so it is most urgent for us to do something to clarify the situation in that area so that the feeling of the people, both in Manchuria and of this country, will be eased. As this is an emergency case, he thinks the field teams sent there may clarify the situation. After the situation has been clarified, General Chang thinks the political problems can easily be solved. There will be changes later for the political questions to be brought up and discussed. The most important thing for us is to do something now to clarify the situation, in that area. General Chang suggest[s] that we discuss item by item of this proposed draft.

GENERAL CHOU: General Chang has just expressed his view that he thinks it not to be within the capacity of this conference to discuss on the political aspect of this matter and therefore he, General Chang suggests that some other agency should be created to discuss on that and it is rather unfortunate that he didn't have time to contact General Chang before the meeting so that we could exchange our views between ourselves. The draft contains five points and it seems rather difficult for me to accept it right now without discussing the political aspect of the matter because if we publish this document without making any reference to the political side then the burden on my shoulders will be too great and it cannot be understood by our people in the Northeast and within our party, and consequently confusion will take place. With this in view, I have, therefore, suggested that we should take up the two aspects of the matter simultaneously. The intention was to bring about stabilization instead of confusion and disorder. Of course it seems also difficult for General Chang to give his consent on this problem right now. I guess that General Chang has first to ask the Government whether such consultation can be made and therefore it is also difficult for me to give concrete views on these five points because it appears to me that it has close connection with the political matters. Therefore, I am thinking whether we both agree that some method has to be worked out to put the people at ease. Since General Chang has not had the chance to read over the document beforehand I also obtained it only this morning, it seems difficult for both of us to give a reply now. As to the political side of the matter it has not yet been taken up and no decision has been made. I am thinking that if we agree to an announcement that field teams should be sent to the Northeast, only to make such an announcement. I don't know whether the Government can give an agreement to it right now and as to the

concrete matter pertaining to the field teams, we can have it settled within a day or two. Of course, the best method, it appears to me, is to solve the political and military matters altogether and if General Chang finds definitely that, then we can also separate the two matters but we have to work out some concrete matters so it would be possible to tackle both the problems. Otherwise if I should go on as General Marshall has suggested to make an amendment on the present draft it seems rather difficult because if I add something pertaining to the political matters then General Chang would certainly also have difficulty to agree on it right now because of this difficulty, so I have not concretely put down any amendment to this document.

GENERAL CHANG has just asked General Chou what he was thinking to add and General Chou told him that he was thinking to add a clause saying that all political matters will be taken up by the Committee of Three for settlement. Until decision the present status in Manchuria should be maintained. General Chou is afraid that this would not be acceptable to General Chang therefore he is not raising this point.

GENERAL MARSHALL: If agreeable to General Chang, I suggest that this further consideration be postponed until a later meeting, but that the later meeting be held at an early date.

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang will agree to your suggestion, but he likes to clarify on two points. The first point regarding the draft, which points would General Chou be willing to accept and which he likes to alter or make changes. General Chang would like to learn from General Chou what concrete measures he has in mind on how to solve the political problems. The reason for General Chang raising those two questions is that it is his understanding that the cease fire order will apply to every corner of this country. The spirit of the cease fire order is to solve the military questions or alleviate the military conflict and no political matters are attached to that. So if he is talking about Manchuria, it seems not advisable to attach the political affairs with military affairs. Regarding the political matters, there will be plenty of occasions for General Chou to bring it up for solution. Not necessarily in this conference, but in other conference[s], he can bring up that point, because those political problems have to be solved anyhow.

GENERAL CHOU: In answer to General Chang, General Chou has two points to raise. First, regarding the missions of the field teams. Of course he agrees that in a certain situation the mission of the field team is restricted to military matters but if the field team would not contact any matters outside the military subjects then everywhere political questions will immediately arise and this will have no means of settlement. Secondly, he says that in the fourth point, it has been said that the Government troops will be sent up but he thinks that

definite amount of the Government troops should be fixed and it should also be stipulated what points are going to be taken over. There two points have to be arranged by consultation here so that field teams may have definite instructions in dealing with this matter and after the definite arrangement has been made here then the Communist troops will then, of course, evacuate from certain places according to plan and he thinks that this has also close connection with the reorganization plan because in that case, Communist troops can be assembled for the purpose of reorganization. It would also be helpful to the movement of the Government troops. These are the points which he thinks should be definitely fixed. Regarding the second question raised by General Chang about General Chou's views on the political affairs, General Chou says that he has expressed his views on the political affairs for several times already and he likes to repeat it here. His main idea was that agreement should be reached on the top level and then it would be carried out down to the lower level. At the present moment we have a military control in the Northeast and we have a Northeast Administrative Council under the military headquarters there. General Chou, therefore, suggests that a unified method should be worked out for the reorganization of the Northeast Administrative Council under the military headquarters and also the reorganization of the various provincial governments so that people from all quarters can participate and that the procedures of the joint platform to be carried out. In that we [*way?*] we will set aside confusion in the lower levels and we can carry into orderly effect the reorganization procedures from top to the bottom levels.

General Chang has just pointed out that it would be better to deal separately with the political and military affairs as we have done in the past regarding the cease fire by the Conference of Three and political matters by [*sic*] be taken up by the PPC. Of course it would be well if the two matters can be separated, but there is one difference between the situation in China Proper and in Manchuria. In China Proper all troop movements are practically frozen up but in Manchuria troop movements continue. I think that the Government's considering the question of sending field teams to Manchuria for over a month was certainly also due to consideration of this point. Now the situation in Manchuria is rather complicated as to the diplomatic aspect of the matter. We can just leave that aside, not to be discussed here, but I still want to call to your attention that there is some difference between the situation in Manchuria and in China Proper. In China Proper all troop movements have ceased so we can wait for political decisions, but in the Northeast, we cannot do so. As soon as the Communist troops have evacuated from certain places then the local civil administrations set up at the time under the Communist

control has to be looked out for—some arrangement has to be made for them. Particularly in Manchuria we have now military control over certain provincial governments. This is another phase of the differences than China Proper and, therefore, we have to have the political affairs settled also. As to through what agency and by what method it can be solved that is all the same to me. I have not yet found out myself an appropriate method for solving this problem and through my discussion with General Marshall, no such satisfactory method has yet been worked out and I would willingly accept General Marshall's proposal that we postpone the discussion for the next meeting which will take place as soon as possible and in the meantime I will contact General Chang separately so that we shall try to work out some formula and then bring it up jointly at the Conference of Three.

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang understands clearly on General Chou's reply to those two questions, but in order to simplify the discussion, General Chang thinks that regarding the cessation of hostilities we should just carry out the cease fire order in Manchuria in the same way and same spirit as we did in the other points in this country. Regarding the political questions we should stick to the provisions of the agreement in the PCC. That will simplify matters. If we classify Manchuria as a special area—as a special status, if we must attach a relation between the military affairs and the political affairs it will delay any accomplishment. In that case it is not only disadvantageous to the country as a whole, it may be disadvantageous to the Communist Party as well. So the most urgent thing for us to do is to clarify the situation in Manchuria, to stop hostilities. We can settle political questions in some other location.

GENERAL MARSHALL: As I understand it, it is acceptable to both you gentlemen that this be discussed at another and early meeting. I have only 30 minutes so what do you wish to take up next. I would suggest that we take up this paper entitled formation of service areas.⁹ It is quite essential that the work be got underway by the Government in the preliminary organizations concerned. Is that agreeable?

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang thinks that in the first case, you only have 30 minutes, therefore, it may not be possible to get this paper through and then General Kuo just said that the Ministry of War has also prepared a plan along the same line and he likes to study this plan and that plan together and see the points and make a comparison and then he can put forward their recommendation.

GENERAL MARSHALL: In other words, he would prefer not to discuss it today.

⁹ Not printed.

GENERAL CHANG: Yes.

(General Chang and General Chou spoke at length in Chinese.)

General Chang still is trying to persuade General Chou to have the field team in Manchuria to be settled if possible today then we will relieve the serious situation in Manchuria.

General Chang suggested that we send the team first in order to clarify the situation and then regarding the political problem we can get together the representatives of the PPC on both parties and work out a solution on that until the political question is solved.

General Chang said that the students will try to arrange a compromise and while doing that they will just leave the professor alone.

GENERAL MARSHALL: It is all right with me if they will just effect a compromise. I will never speak as long as they agree.

GENERAL CHANG: I hope that some agreement will be reached on that paper then you may get on board the plane with an easy mind.

GENERAL GILLEM: My mind will be easier too.

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang suggested that the political solution will further be protected by the army reorganization and also the plan for the coalition. Last sentence, paragraph 5, can be subject to interpretation.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Would it facilitate matters if the first sentence of paragraph 5 were omitted. That is implied in paragraph 4, therefore, there seems to be no objection. The first sentence of paragraph 4 gives the Government the right to go into such regions or places as may be necessary to reestablish the sovereignty of China in Manchuria. Paragraph 5 will just begin with, "Communist troops will not be permitted, etc." What is General Chou's comment.

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang suggests to General Chou to pass all those five articles, but with the remarks saying that detailed arrangement for implementation of article 4 and article 5 will be discussed and settled later. General Chang suggests that for [now?] he has this in view. The longer we delay the issue—the more lives will be sacrificed because Soviet troops withdraw and Communist troops and National troops will go in to take over and there is bound to be a clash and many people will be killed.

GENERAL MARSHALL: But 4 and 5 will operate, or will not operate.

GENERAL CHOU: General Chou is still worried about the political matter. It is not mentioned in that.

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang says it seems improper to incorporate any clause pertaining to the political matters in that draft so he suggested to put in the minutes that political matters will be settled by another conference on both sides.

GENERAL LEE: There seems to be agreement in principle between General Chou and General Chang. Article 4 and Article 5 are liable

to a liberal and a strict interpretation. They wish to work out some sort of agreement to stipulate the places and cities which are to be taken over by National Government and which are to be assigned by consultation.

GENERAL MARSHALL: What does the team do that goes out immediately. The team does not go until that is decided upon.

GENERAL LEE: Without specifying the places that are to be taken over, the teams cannot start work.

GENERAL CHOU: There is no question about the following points: Firstly, that hostilities should be ceased immediately, and secondly, that the team should be immediately dispatched and the immediate mission of the team shall be first to take care of taking over the sovereignty of the places now withdrawn by the Russians, and second, the railway line of those two railways in connection with the Sino-Soviet treaty shall be taken over and these are definite. The question he has in mind is regarding the clause that regions and places as may be necessary to restore the sovereignty of China in Manchuria will be occupied by Government forces. He thinks that would have such an all-inclusive clause that it would mean difficulties are bound to arise as to number of Government troops, the places to be occupied and the redistribution in connection with the Army reorganization and especially the administrative affairs in connection [with] the redistribution. It seems to him perfectly agreeable if field teams are sent out now for the specific purpose. For example, to send a team to Mukden, that can be immediately dispatched, but if we send all the field teams then complications will arise and they would be difficult for him.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I have this one comment to make and I have only about three minutes left. I think it is very important to get the teams up there. With reference to General Chou's comment regarding these stipulations as to how many troops are to go there and what they will occupy, General Chou spoke to me this morning on what he had heard about different Government divisions going to Manchuria. I inquired on that with General Wedemeyer¹⁰ and those troops could not be moved in 4 or 5 months. What we are laboring with is the troops that are now up there. Meanwhile, trouble is brewing. I see no relation between the movement of troops of the Government there at this particular moment with this particular paper. I think we ought to find the simplest way of getting those teams up there immediately. Now I don't want to terminate this meeting by my departure. I hope very much, that you will go ahead, but I have to leave now myself as I have a meeting with the Generalissimo [for] which I am

¹⁰ Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, Commanding General of U. S. Forces in China.

already a little late and I have no time left. (General Marshall left the meeting.)

General Chou comments that with regard to the taking over of the localities there will be no difficulty. The present problem now is to have the right wording so that he will have no difficulty when this is public.

Meeting was adjourned.

893.00/3-1346 : Telegram

The Counselor of Embassy in China (Smyth) to the Secretary of State

CHUNGKING, March 13, 1946—11 a. m.

[Received March 13—9:27 a. m.]

478. New Communist line which began shortly after publication in Yen-an of communiqué on Manchuria February 14¹¹ has further developed in Yen-an broadcasts for week ending March 8. This involves drastic change in approach and interpretation of developments in political situation. Whereas previously opposition had been referred to as reactionary or die-hard or conservative all opposition is now referred to as Fascist and interpretation of developments not only in Chinese political scene but also in Manchuria is interpreted on straight Moscow party line. Attacks on Soviet Union or Manchuria as well as disturbances in Chinese [cities?] are labeled as anti-Soviet, anti-Communist, anti-democratic and anti-PCC. It is charged there can be no peaceful solution in Manchuria unless wishes of people are taken into consideration and Fascist elements in China are suppressed but no direct stand is taken on presence of Russian troops in Manchuria.

One editorial from *Emancipation Daily* is quoted as stating that Chinese Fascist clique is challenge to Chinese people, principles of Sun Yat-sen and PCC and like all Fascist groups everywhere it is against peace and democracy and desires war and despotism under name of unity. Another item alleged that Jap Fascists are trying to stir up trouble in China for their own purposes. Another editorial from *Emancipation Daily* was quoted as stating that Chinese Fascist clique has freedom of terrorism. Chinese people have lacked freedom from fear since April 12, 1927,¹² that this same group stopped all patriotic moves after Mukden incident¹³ and now, just when people's

¹¹ See despatch No. 1166, February 28, from the Counselor of Embassy in China, p. 448.

¹² Reference to the break between Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang regime then at Hankow, which was allied to the Chinese Communists and other left-wing factions.

¹³ September 18, 1931, when Japanese troops seized Mukden.

freedoms are legally recognized, Fascists adopt new methods to break PCC agreement. "Why do Chinese Fascists hate the Soviet Union and Stalin? Obviously this is because the Soviet Union forces with Stalin at their head are the main force of world anti-Fascism and because Stalin and Soviet Union defeated Fascism". (Sent Department 478; repeated Moscow 38.)¹⁴

An item on March 7 quoted General Kao Hsu-hsun, Kuomintang General of the New Eighth Army who deserted to or was captured by Communists as attacking anti-Soviet and anti-Communist demonstrations as vicious designs of secret police to sabotage peace and democracy following success of PCC. General Kao is alleged to have charged authorities not only did not stop these demonstrations but they encouraged them. Soviet Union liberated Manchuria. "The anti-Soviet movement is Fascist in nature and serves only Jap imperialist interests." Same broadcast further reported that protests are pouring into Yen-an against Govt. connivance with Fascists and die-hards who are working for war by stirring up anti-Soviet and anti-Communist demonstrations and activities.

Other items reported continued attacks on Communist troops, particularly by Yen Hsi-shan,¹⁵ 16 billion CN dollar loan to liberated areas for rehabilitation, Gen. Marshall's visit to Yen-an and Kalgan, protest against beating up or [of] professor at Chungking Futan University and greetings sent by Chinese groups in Perak and other Malayan centers to Communists. One item reported that Manchurian people now having full democratic rights are busy establishing county and town govts and cites specific instances where this has been done.

SMYTH

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting of Military Sub-Committee, Held in the Office of the Aide to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, March 13, 1946, 5:15 p. m.

Present:	General Chang	General Chou	General Gillem
Also present:	General Lee	General Tung	Colonel Caughey
	General Kuo	Mr. Chang	Capt. Eng
	General Hsu		
	Colonel Pee		

GENERAL GILLEM: Gentlemen, are we ready to discuss the point that was still in abeyance last week?

¹⁴ In telegram No. 993, March 29, 6 p. m., the Ambassador in the Soviet Union noted "that the new and more uncompromising line of Chinese Communists . . . coincided with a perceptibly sharper note in such Chinese materials as have appeared in Soviet press since February 14" (893.00/3-2946).

¹⁵ Nationalist commander in Shansi.

GENERAL CHOU: Regarding the Manchurian problem, since we have had no meeting yesterday I have reported to Yen-an about the proposal presented by General Chang and the views of General Marshall and the discussions we have had here. I hope that we can not only solve formally the Manchurian problem, but also the practical matters. Now there are two problems which constitute difficulties to me. Firstly, it seems obvious that at the present time we cannot solve the political and the military aspects of the Northeast province at the same time, and on the other hand the Government is eager to first take over the sovereignty by sending in troops. That is, that the military problem has to be solved first and secondly, regarding the taking over of sovereignty in Manchuria by the Government forces, the principle of that has been laid down in the cease fire order, that the sovereignty has to be restored and to have that presents no difficulty, but as to the concrete matters for the taking over as to what places shall be evacuated by the Communist troops and all these have to be discussed here or on the ground. General Chang has suggested last time that we should first [make?] public the principle as it is in the directive for the stipulations and then we will work out concrete matters later on. General Chang suggested that we can put those problems into the political matters that have to be discussed by a special agency created for that purpose and that the concrete plans for the redistribution shall be discussed but once the stipulations are published, then the problems in Manchuria will be readjusted accordingly and the field teams will be discussed and since by agreeing to this stipulation I have not yet obtained any reply either from our people in the Northeast or from Yen-an. So I feel very unsure to do so. Of course, on day before yesterday we also had other counter-proposals like the one prepared by Colonel Caughey and I am also aware that is hard for General Chang to accept. So speaking concretely, I am very much afraid that if the present stipulations are published, then we will have difficulties up in Manchuria. The original proposal¹⁶ was to solve the political and the military matters at the same time, but now that seems impossible and therefore before I get instructions from Yen-an and I am deeply concerned by this trouble, but still I am prepared to find a solution. Therefore, I wish to forward the following proposal which might seem to be difficult to carry out, but actually it is not so difficult as it seems. My proposal is that we should bring the directive with us and go up to the Northeast so that we can solve it on the ground there. On my part, I am very eager to go to Mukden as speedily as possible. Originally General Marshall did not want to go to Mukden because of the presence of Soviet troops, but now we have learned that Soviet troops have withdrawn, and Government troops have taken

¹⁶ See draft instruction, p. 543.

over the city of Mukden. So it seems that the matter can be easily taken up and I feel confident that if we can also have the Government representative to go with us with the spirit that we have displayed on the trip, then we can solve the matter on the ground and that would also facilitate the work of the field teams. Because on our side, we have very poor communications, so it is very difficult for us to wait for telegraphic reply either from Manchuria or from Yen-an because I feel that the procedure will be that Yen-an has first to make inquiry to Manchuria before it is going to reply to me and therefore I come to the idea that we should go directly to Mukden. There is no longer the trouble of the presence of Soviet troops and I also feel that the Government has not much difficulty because the principle for the restoration of sovereignty by the National troops has been laid down in the cease fire order and the present job is only to take up the concrete matters. If we publish the stipulations here right now without explaining to our people in the Northeast, trouble is bound to occur and at that time I shall be held responsible and that is the reason why I feel that I cannot do so before I get instructions from Yen-an. My present proposal seems very simple and very clear and I am forwarding it with the sense of responsibility and to have the whole matter amicably solved.

GENERAL GILLEM: General Chang?

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang likes to know whether it is General Chou's view that he has to wait for the reply from Yen-an before we can discuss the Manchurian question?

GENERAL CHOU: I have just put up two proposals. First, await reply from Yen-an. Second, the committee to proceed to Manchuria to study the problem on the spot.

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang's views are that he thinks: first, in principle he agrees for the committee to proceed to Manchuria, but he thinks it is not the opportune time because it is better to have the field teams proceed there first to lay a basis and collect some data and then we will proceed there and can solve the matter more quickly.

GENERAL GILLEM: How does General Chou feel about such a procedure on sending the field teams first. Then [they] can be on the ground and they can form the background on which the committee might work, rather than have the committee go without an advance agent to make arrangements and to have the necessary data for the committee to proceed to function.

GENERAL CHOU: General Chou says that he has agreed from the very outset that the field teams should be sent immediately. But at present about the instruction, General Chou has not quite understood what General Gillem has in mind. If you are thinking by first sending the field teams which are to collect the data and material and wait for

the directive of the committee of three which will be dispatched later—in that case he, of course, perfectly agrees.

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang thinks that if we do send the teams to Manchuria we must give them directives, otherwise there will be no guiding principle for them to follow. He hopes very much that we can pass this directive and then send the teams and not mix the political affairs with the military affairs.

GENERAL GILLEM: What is General Chou's comments on such a proposal.

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang is explaining to General Chou that if he insists on the solution of the political affairs before we may send the field teams, then it will cause a long delay. Then he believes that all the efforts made in the past in the cease fire cannot be accomplished in the near future. As a matter of fact, General Chou has agreed that the railway zone shall be exclusively controlled by the Government and those localities evacuated by Soviet troops should be taken over by Government troops. General Chou has already agreed on these two points so he doesn't think it will cause any dispute. He doesn't think it will cause any dispute on points because the Government haven't enough troops to take over every place in Manchuria and it is mentioned in the draft that the *status quo* should be maintained in Manchuria. General Chang is very concerned that a very bad reaction will be created among the people which will be very disadvantageous to both the Government and the world. He thinks that the five points should be approved.

GENERAL CHOU: General Chou refers to two points. First one, is regarding the instruction of the field teams. If we start back to discuss the discussions then we just return to the status on day before yesterday. General Chang proposes that we adhere more or less to the original instruction, but put down in the minutes regarding those two points regarding the political matters and the concrete plan for the redistribution of troops. To this proposal General Chou has no other way out than to await for Yen-an's instruction because he feels that Yen-an's instructions might be delayed for several days, therefore he put forward the proposal to go immediately to Mukden and if the Government has difficulty to accept his proposal then, of course, we have to await for Yen-an's instruction. As regarding the field teams which General Gillem has just raised, if the field team is to be sent there to collect the information then, of course, that is all right. If it is not for that purpose then of course the field team has to wait for the instruction and we have to discuss the instructions first before the field team can be sent out. Regarding the explanation made by General Chang, General Chou perfectly understands, but that is only an understanding by the two of them. This is hard to understand up

in the Northeast and in Yen-an. That will take some time and in order to cut that time, he thinks that the committee should go to Mukden so that we could establish a personal contact and explain to them. Now as to the point that special efforts should be made for political settlement, General Chang has just assured to General Chou that such an opportunity will be given and General Chou has also agreed with what General Chang has said, but he is afraid that if that is not put down in words, the Government might send some other representative to replace General Chang and in that case new troubles will arise and General Chou further points out that there is, of course, a difference between the understanding he has and what Yen-an has. If the understanding is only between the two and he can't get it put down in words, then, of course, if new representatives were appointed they would have no references to carry on the discussions and since the Manchurian problem is of tremendous importance, the leading members of the Communist Party are very eager to have it solved once and for all. By the settlement it must be made very clear, so that no new trouble will arise.

GENERAL GILLEM: I think his points are very well taken. I would like to see General Chou's reaction to just a suggestion for the modification of this original paper that we presented, that is the one, "the mission of the team" and find out if he could subscribe to that entering in the record of the points that he made about an outline in the minutes of the agreement that has been made here about the political settlement. If we can send the teams with a certain instruction which does not involve the political aspect the team on the ground can arrange the troops so that there will not be hostile conflicts which might be pending, then the Committee of Three can go and spread the information. Meanwhile, the political aspect is being worked out by the second group. How does General Chou feel about such a program. The suggestion as to the modification of this original set of principles I will present to General Chou to see how they react to a possible modification of this first part. The first three paragraphs remain unchanged. Paragraph 4 after the word troops, delete from there to include line three at the word and. In other words it will read. "The Government troops will assume exclusive control of a strip 30 kilo on either side of the two railroads mentioned in the treaty." In paragraph 5 delete the entire first sentence and it reads. "Communist troops will not be permitted to go in and occupy places evacuated by Russian troops."

GENERAL LEE: What you wish deleted is that part relating to the sovereignty in China.

GENERAL GILLEM: I simply offer that [as] a suggestion to get the teams in there[,] then when the teams have gotten in on the ground

the conflict which might be pending [would?] be averted. The Committee of Three then go into the area equipped with all possible political information that has been received and we settle the points that are now at variance. The teams go first and separate troops that might be conflicting. This simply gets the teams in there for the same thing they have done at other places. I would like to have General Chang's comments on such a proposal.

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang is afraid that with such a modification there will create a misunderstanding that only that strip around the railroads and only those cities evacuated by the Russian troops may be taken over by the Government troops. It may imply that in the remainder of the areas or localities the Government has no jurisdiction at all to recover sovereignty, so General Chang proposes that the paragraph 4 be retained as it is, but add specifically they are to assume exclusive control of a strip 30 kilos to either side of the two railways mentioned in the Sino-Soviet treaty and the coal mines. To insert and the coal mines. In the paragraph 5 we will delete the first sentence. Just keep the second sentence. General Chang thinks that with omission of the first sentence in paragraph 5 that will meet the difficulties entertained by General Chou because that sentence is implied in paragraph 4. It implies that Government troops may proceed to those localities mentioned in paragraph 4 and those places evacuated by Soviet troops and all the remaining areas a *status quo* be maintained. Although it is not stated specifically, it will imply that the *status quo* will be maintained.

GENERAL CHOU: General Chou explains again that with such a modification that will be more or less along the same line as Colonel Caughey's proposed draft of paragraph 4 and 5 but while in Colonel Caughey's draft it stated specifically that a *status quo* should be respected but in General Chang's modification it implies that meaning without making such a specification. It will get the same results.

GENERAL GILLEM: How does General Chou react to such a suggestion?

GENERAL CHOU: General Chou points out that the proposal just made by General Chang actually is the same as what General Marshall has proposed so we have just returned to the original status and no progress has been made and in that case he still has to wait for Yen-an's instruction.

GENERAL GILLEM: Would the suggestion be in order with the first three paragraphs only and follow up with the committee of three to settle the matter?

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang thinks that as with omission of paragraph 4 and paragraph 5 there will be no slightest chance of cessation of hostilities at all because as soon as Soviet troops withdraw

then it seems very difficult to restrain the Communist troops to try to get into those localities and then of course the Government troops will also move towards those places and hostilities are bound to happen, so the field team cannot do anything. The cessation of hostilities cannot be achieved at all. Furthermore, the situation in Manchuria is different from that in China Proper because in China Proper the situation is static, no movement, while in Manchuria Soviet troops are on the move, everyone is trying to get to the area so it will cause dispute and confusion if no provisions are included in this paper.

GENERAL CHOU: General Chou suggested that in article 4 we make it read something like this: "Government troops are authorized to occupy such regions or places as may be necessary to establish sovereignty of China in Manchuria, but the places occupied by Government troops should be discussed by the Government and the Communist Party."¹⁷ General Chang said he can hardly concur with that idea and as General Chang has just proposed to delete the first sentence of paragraph 5, he thinks that is the greatest concession the Government can make because in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities it is stipulated that the number of Government troops may proceed anywhere they like.

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang, or the Government, appreciates the difficulties on the spot, so we are willing to make such a concession, so if that proposal just made by General Chang cannot be accepted, he doesn't think he can make further concessions and as no provisions are included in this paper for the Government to recover sovereignty then he is afraid that hostilities in Manchuria will start. As he just said after Soviet withdrawal, both armies will try to reach those spots and hostilities will soon arise.

He cannot understand what more anxiety should be entertained by General Chou as the coalition government will be effected by sometime next month and Manchuria doesn't belong to any political party—it belongs to this country as a whole. It is not for any political party to restore sovereignty, but the Chinese people as a whole to restore sovereignty. So it seems to General Chang that disputes should not exist unless the Communists are interested in getting control of the railroads in Manchuria. He sees no reason why General Chou should raise any dispute on these points and then General Chou said that he doesn't want to argue, but he has to get approval from Yen-an. General Chang said in that case then we cannot proceed on with our meeting and perhaps we will have to dismiss.

GENERAL CHOU: General Chou comments that from the very beginning, he has explained that he has two alternative proposals, the

¹⁷ Apparently at this point General Chang's comments began.

first to wait for instructions from Yen-an and the second for the Committee of Three to go to Manchuria. He has gone over the arguments with General Chang and he personally believes in what General Chang says and he has brought this up to Yen-an and he has now to get instructions from Yen-an before he can make such an agreement and therefore he put forward the second proposal that is the Committee of Three would not wait for Yen-an's reply and try to make use of the time for coming few days in having the Committee of Three go to Mukden to try to reach a settlement and he has made this point very clear at the very beginning. Now the Government has difficulty to agree that the Committee should go to Manchuria immediately before the field teams are sent out so, of course, the second proposal cannot be realized. Then General Gillem made the proposal to issue the instructions without paragraphs 4 and 5 and General Chou fully understands that General Gillem made that proposal with good intention so that some agreement may be reached. However, the Government has trouble to accept that. Now we reach a position that all the proposals are not acceptable to all. General Chou has to wait for Yen-an's instruction. However, they have shown the desire that they want to find a solution. It looks like the solution cannot be found today.

GENERAL GILLEM: I would like to cite an example of the last war. We had a new air force and they were trying to incorporate in the same airplane the bomber and the fighter, with the result that we never had an airplane at all at the end of the war. My thought is that if we are not careful and prepare some instructions, there may be so much difficulty in Manchuria that anything we write will be useless. So it was for that reason that I was making a proposal that would enable us to get an initial effort started. As General Marshall says, "begin at the beginning" and then we could [get?] settled the political aspects by consultation of the experts or by movement of the Committee of Three following the teams. We are trying to help—we all are. So if we can reach some agreement to keep the difficulties in Manchuria from culminating, I think we will be very fortunate.

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang wishes to express his thanks to your thoughts in order to present a beginning, but from his point of view it seems that [from?] any angle there seems that there is no reason for General Chou to object to inclusion in this draft directive a paragraph, as he has explained a minute ago, to restore the sovereignty in Manchuria under the Government. It is not for any political party to restore the sovereignty. Manchuria has been occupied by the Japanese for over 14 years so everyone in this country likes to recover the territory and restore sovereignty. If the directive will not include any provision, like paragraph 4 and 5, then the field teams have no guiding principle for implementation. It will be more or less

useless for their usefulness in sending that team to Manchuria will be lost. Furthermore, if it is not prescribed in the directive, the Communist troops will try to rush and grab for cities and localities and naturally hostilities will arise in Manchuria instead of cessation of hostilities. General Chou is now awaiting word from Yen-an and under that condition should we adjourn today and await until General Chou has gotten approval from Yen-an to have another meeting.

GENERAL GILLEM: My only thought, and I am sure that both of you gentlemen realize it, is that the time is very important. I have no intention of attempting to expedite General Chou's request from Yen-an. There is a crisis that might develop and time is very important. Then we await reply and if the reply is favorable we accept the document. Is that correct?

GENERAL CHOU: There is no question about the sending of the teams. The only point of issue now is the kind of instructions the field team will have as a basis of activity. General Chou is waiting for a reply on whether we should put the fourth and fifth points in the minutes and arrangement for political settlement.

GENERAL GILLEM: Well I assume that we had better adjourn until we get the reply. I would like to ask in the event that the reply does not come before tomorrow or the next day, can we meet and discuss some of the other matters so that we could get these papers cleared?

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang is a member of the Central Committee of the Kuomintang and he is rather fully engaged in the next two days—the 14th and the 15th. The Committee will close on the 15th, so after the 15th he will be free and during those two days he states that if General Chou gets a reply from Yen-an he will try his best to find some time to solve this problem, but otherwise he likes to have himself present at the Central Committee because the other problems, the formation of the supply area and the demobilization, seems not to be so urgent so he asks to have that discussed at a later time.

GENERAL CHOU: Agree.

GENERAL GILLEM: Gentlemen, this reminds me of a poker game. We have lost the first hand so maybe everything will be all right.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., to General Marshall

CHUNGKING, 15 March 1946.

328. Problem of getting field teams to Manchuria is running into opposition due to expressed political interests on both sides. General Chou has not yet heard from Yen-an and therefore is not anxious

to arbitrate one way or the other. In the meantime he has proposed that we three go to Manchuria prior to the dispatch of teams. I have resisted this proposal since I feel that the arrival of the Committee of Three in Manchuria without someone on the ground to make the necessary arrangements and contacts would result in ineffectiveness and loss of dignity. General Chang stands steadfast on the five points which you initially wrote and, due to the fact that these five points in effect express the Generalissimo's views, he resists any amendment, amplification, or deletion. At a meeting on 13 March I proposed several modifications in order to arrive at a satisfactory solution which would eliminate objections on both sides. My modifications consisted of eliminating controversial points and ending up with a simple set of instructions to the field team which would at least permit the field teams to enter Manchuria. Neither Chou or Chang could accept. The meeting terminated with the understanding that we would again convene on this matter after General Chou had received instructions from Yen-an. Byroade is ready with 3 teams for Manchuria with a fourth and main team for Tu Li-ming's Hdqrs. He will not use marines in Manchuria at least initially.

893.00/3-1546 : Telegram

The Counselor of Embassy in China (Smyth) to the Secretary of State

CHUNGKING, March 15, 1946—3 p. m.

[Received March 15—12:02 p. m.]

495. Situation Manchuria shows little change. Central Government showing increased concern regarding Russian intentions in northeast. Central Government sources continue to report increase Russian garrisons Dairen area and northern Manchuria. Some sources report Chinese Communist strength northeast in excess 300,000, including 7 fully equipped divisions, and continued reinforcement from Shantung.

Sporadic Central [Government]-Communist clashes reported in Jehol and Shansi. Shantung quiet, with Communist concentrations vicinity Central Government held areas, notably Tsinan. In general North China situation shows steady improvement.

Water lift of new First Army, Canton to Chingwangtao, continues. Lift of 71 Army from Shanghai should commence soon.

Second war zone report states approximately 11,000 troops Jap First Army still under arms in Shansi and employed to guard and repair railroads.

SMYTH

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Memorandum by General Chou En-lai to Lieutenant General
Alvan C. Gillem, Jr.*

General Chang Chih-chung and General Chou En-lai, before they got instructions from their respective higher authorities, had worked out this draft of three points, but in the first point, the word "now" was not yet agreed upon.¹⁸ (March 15th)

Revised Draft of Instructions for Executive Headquarters Regarding
the Entry of Field Teams into Manchuria

Field teams, with carefully selected personnel, will be sent into Manchuria immediately under the following conditions:

1. To reestablish the sovereignty of China in Manchuria, the Government is authorized to send troops to occupy such regions and places as are "now" being evacuated by the Soviet Troops, including a strip 30 kilometers to either side of the two railways mentioned in the Sino-Soviet treaty.

2. If it becomes necessary for the Government troops to move into places now being garrisoned by the Communist troops, it shall be effected through mutual agreement.

3. The subsequent redistribution of troops in Manchuria will be worked out in accordance with the "Basis for Military Reorganization".¹⁹

CHUNGKING, March 15, 1946.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Draft Prepared by General Chou En-lai*²⁰

INSTRUCTIONS FOR EXECUTIVE HEADQUARTERS REGARDING THE ENTRY
OF FIELD TEAMS INTO MANCHURIA (DRAFT)

Field teams, with carefully selected personnel, will be sent into Manchuria immediately under the following instructions.

1. The teams will carry out their mission in accordance with the instructions of the Executive Headquarters.

2. The teams should be established within the areas of the Government troops as well as the Communist troops, keeping clear of places still under Russian occupation.

3. Teams should proceed to points of conflict or close contact between the Government and Communist troops to bring about a cessation of fighting and to make the necessary readjustments.

¹⁸ General Chang objected on the grounds that inclusion of the word "now" would not permit Chinese Government troops to take over areas subsequently evacuated by Soviet troops.

¹⁹ The agreement of February 25, p. 295.

²⁰ Forwarded by General Chou to Lieutenant General Gillem.

4. While reestablishing Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria the Government is authorized to move troops into the localities now ²¹ being evacuated by the Soviet troops, viz: the railway line between Mukden and Changchun, with a strip of 30 li on both sides of that railway section.

5. If it becomes necessary for the Government troops to occupy those localities now held by Communist troops, it should be effected through discussion among the field teams and if an agreement cannot be reached it will be settled by higher authority.

6. The future disposition in Manchuria of all armies will be fixed according to the reorganization plan.

7. The Government assures that it will immediately discuss the political matters pertaining to Manchuria with the Chinese Communist Party in line with the decisions of the Political Consultative Council. As an interim measure the Government will maintain the present status of the popularly-elected local governments without any obstruction or interference, pending a settlement of the political matters.

CHUNGKING, March 17 [16], 1946.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., to General Marshall

CHUNGKING, 17 March 1946.

339. At a special conference at 9 o'clock Saturday evening directed by the Generalissimo I discussed with him the status of field teams for Manchuria. Four conferences on this subject have failed to attain this objective. However, I am optimistic after an all morning session today, Sunday the 17th, and hope the question may be resolved in a second conference to be held this evening.

The Generalissimo last evening requested that I forward to you the following which I quote.²²

a. The Plenary Session of the Central Committee of Kuomintang will close Sunday. The situation and the atmosphere of Saturday's session was very favorable and optimistic. My concern over the political issue has been much clarified.

b. The members of that Committee entrust me with full power to

²¹ General Chang objected also to this draft because of the word "now".

²² In a memorandum of March 18 to President Truman, General Marshall quoted this message from Generalissimo Chiang and commented: "I notice in the press this morning his statement on the completion of the meeting of the Central Committee, which would seem to indicate that they have acted in good faith." (121.893/3-1946) A copy of General Marshall's memorandum was forwarded to the Secretary of State.

handle the Manchurian problems. They passed a motion not to interfere with me in any way pertaining to Manchuria.

c. Originally the atmosphere in that Committee was very unsatisfactory. They wanted to overthrow the arrangements made in the past regarding Manchuria but now it turns out to be much more favorable.

d. You need not worry about the anxieties I expressed to you before you left Chungking."

New subject. Will comply with your direction for brief outline of political and military situation.²³ At present there is no indication as to breach of faith of PCC commitments.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Minutes of Meeting of Military Sub-Committee, March 17, 1946,
8 a. m.*

Present:	General Chang	General Chou	General Gillem
Also present:	General Lee	General Tung	Colonel Caughey
	General Kuo	Mr. Chang	Capt. Eng
	General Hsu		
	Colonel Pee		

GENERAL GILLEM: I am leaving today and I understand General Chang is leaving and I hope we can leave with a free mind.

GENERAL CHANG: That is the hope of General Chang. He will probably remain in Chungking until Thursday.

GENERAL GILLEM: I hope that will have no bearing on this morning's business. By nature I am very optimistic and hope things will work out. If the two gentlemen are ready I am ready to proceed.

GENERAL CHOU: How about the signature of the directive to the Executive Headquarters.

(General Chang left at this point for a telephone call.)

GENERAL GILLEM to General Chou: I had a talk last night with General McConnell²⁴ about the possibilities of increasing the contact by means of light aircraft with the different field teams. We had been discussing that upon the trip and I hope that we can make some arrangements when I get to Peking. That will be of great assistance in communicating between the teams and for the team officers to go from point to point where it is very difficult by automobile.

Could I speak to General Chang a minute outside here. It is about

²³ See telegram No. 600, March 31, 4 p. m., from the Counselor of Embassy in China, p. 159.

²⁴ Brig. Gen. John P. McConnell, Commanding General of Air Division, Nanking Headquarters Command, U. S. Forces in China.

a little business we have down below. (General Chou and General Gillem left the room for a moment and then returned followed by General Chang.)

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang is very sorry to interrupt the meeting.

GENERAL GILLEM: He is a busy man and we have plenty of time.

GENERAL CHANG: Should the Chinese copy of the directive be signed as well.

(Committee then signed directive to Executive Headquarters on reorganization.)²⁵

GENERAL GILLEM: If the gentlemen are ready, we will proceed with this uncompleted business.

GENERAL CHANG: Is it concerning the sending of field teams into Manchuria?

GENERAL GILLEM: I think that that is the thing we should clear up if it is agreeable to you gentlemen.

GENERAL CHANG: First of all, General Chang likes to describe to you those talks he has had with General Chou. On the eve of day before yesterday, General Chang and General Chou talked on the draft and they agreed on the first three paragraphs. Regarding paragraphs 4 and 5 General Chang is in favor of the original draft by General Marshall with omission of the first sentence of paragraph 5, but General Chou finds it difficult to agree with that. General Chang asked General Chou what he would like to have the paragraphs 4 and 5 read. General Chou proposed a new paragraph 4 and 5 and with additional paragraph 6. General Chou's revised paragraph 4 reads something like the following. "For the restoration of sovereignty in Manchuria, Government troops are authorized to take over those localities evacuated by Soviet troops now including the railway zone of the Changchun railway, on both sides of the railway. If it becomes necessary for the Government troops to enter into those localities now garrisoned by Communist troops then it must be done by discussion." The proposed paragraph 6: "The future garrison area in Manchuria should be fixed according to the reorganization plan." It ended with the understanding that General Chou will report those paragraphs to Yen-an and meanwhile General Chang will have detailed discussion of those paragraphs with responsible Government departments. Then General Chang brought up some proposed amendments on General Chou's proposal. In paragraph 4, the original reads: "For the restoration of sovereignty in Manchuria, Government troops are authorized to take over those localities now evacuated by Soviet troops including the railway zone." Gen-

²⁵ See *United States Relations With China*, p. 626.

eral Chang proposed to change it. "For the restoration of sovereignty in Manchuria, Government troops are authorized to take over those localities evacuated by Soviet troops." Omitting the word "now" "and including railway zones". Those localities and railway zones should be garrisoned by Government troops only. "The Communist troops shall not enter those localities and those railway zones."

GENERAL GILLEM: Is that the amendment suggested by General Chang?

GENERAL CHANG: Yes.

GENERAL GILLEM: What was the reaction?

GENERAL CHANG: I think General Chou will give the reactions. In other words, General Chou's proposed amendment is to delete the word "now" and the most specific statement that Communist troops shall not enter those localities and those railway zones. If it becomes necessary for the Government troops to enter those localities and railway zones we mentioned in paragraph 4 held by Communist troops those movements should be done through the field team but for the restoration of sovereignty in Manchuria. Those localities which must be occupied by the Government shall be determined in the Military Sub-Committee. Those localities which are vital for the restoration of sovereignty in Manchuria should be determined by the Military Sub-Committee, rather the Conference of Three. So the difference in General Chang's and General Chou's amendments lies in the fact that by General Chou's proposal, if it becomes necessary for Government troops to enter those localities now held by Communist troops it should be held by discussion.

GENERAL GILLEM: On the ground?

GENERAL CHANG: That is not stated—just discussion.

General Chang's statement says those movements should be done through the field team. That is an organization of three sides. The local affair will be determined by the field team. The general overall movements and dispositions then should be determined by the Military Sub-Committee in Chungking. Those localities vital for the restoration of sovereignty which must be held by Government troops should be determined by the Military Sub-Committee. General Chou's idea is to make it more specific.

GENERAL LEE: General Chang's amendment is that those localities does not include the places evacuated by Soviet troops nor include the railway zones. The railway zone and places evacuated by Soviet troops, if the government troops were to march into those places, those movements will not be done through discussion. Regarding General Chou's proposed paragraph 6, that is the future disposition of troops in Manchuria, General Chang concurs with that with no other comments. General Chang's last words with General Chou were that he

hopes very much that General Chou will accept the original draft proposed by General Marshall. If General Chou will find it difficult to accept that draft he hopes that General Chou can accept the amended paragraphs 4 and 5. General Chang's point of view is that his amendments in comparison of General Chou's proposal does not differ in principle, the only difference is in some details. In paragraph 4, General Chou agrees in the statement that the Government is authorized to take over those localities evacuated by Soviet troops and the railway zone. General Chang likes to insert a next statement. "Communist troops shall not enter those localities and those railway zones". That means the same but putting it more exact. In paragraph 5, General Chang's amendments are just to describe how those discussions shall be held, that is, by the field teams. Last night General Chou still was of the opinion that in paragraph 4 that statement should be deleted. That is, the Communist troops shall not enter into those localities and those railway zones. It should be omitted. In paragraph 5 the sentence, "Apart from the above mentioned localities etc." Just omit that sentence. So although General Chang and General Chou have had a long discussion, they still haven't reached an agreement so General Chang is ready to hear your views and your comments on the proposals and counter-proposals.

GENERAL GILLEM: Has General Chou any comments? Maybe he has changed his mind in the night.

GENERAL CHANG: That was a statement that General Chang has made last night in parting. General Chang hoped that he would reconsider and change his mind overnight. General Chang hopes sincerely that General Chang [*Chou*] can accept the paragraphs in the amended form. If General Chou will be able to accept the amended form then agreement can be reached this morning and we can send instructions to the field teams immediately.

GENERAL CHOU: Last Sunday, General Marshall has shown to me a draft of instructions to the Executive Headquarters.²⁶ Presenting that draft, General Marshall has pointed out that the main ideas are included in the points 1, 4 and 5 which are the main conditions for the dispatch of the field teams. As we know, all the other field teams have had no condition imposed, nor was there any condition in General Marshall's original proposal of sending teams to Yingkow. In presenting this draft, General Marshall told me that these conditions were put forward by the Government. On that occasion I stated the difficulties on my part as I have stated for several times in our discussion, that the difficulties mainly lie in the following two points. First, the separation of the political affairs from the military affairs. Sec-

²⁶ *Ante*, p. 543.

ond, if, under the present circumstances, the Government troops may go into any place which has been evacuated by the Soviet troops without consulting the Communists, then hostilities are bound to occur and cannot be stopped. In the subsequent discussions we have argued back and forth on these points without achieving result. Day before yesterday I discussed with General Chang trying to reach a first step compromise between ourselves so that we will have matters for the field team as a guiding principle. So we worked out the points 4 and 5 and 6 as General Chang has just reported. Point 4 has the purpose that it would assure the Government to take over the places evacuated by the Soviet troops. Point 5 is to protect the Communist troops that in case it becomes necessary for the Government troops to move into places garrisoned by them, that would be effected by mutual agreement. Further, point 6 is to insure the future in Manchuria saying that when the reorganization is going to be implemented a solution will be found for the redistribution of the troops. I further wish to state that the revised draft of instructions was actually prepared by General Chang and myself together and General Chang has asked me to put it down in words and it constitutes a compromise between both sides. It does not express simply the opinion of General Chou, but of course that compromise is subject to approval from the superior agencies of both sides. Now after discussion with the responsible person of the Government, then General Chang after the first revised draft²⁷ agreed upon by the two Generals, General Chang has then prepared a second revised draft as General Chang has just reported which bears certain difference with the first revision. As General Chang has pointed out there are only two main differences. The fourth point states that places evacuated by Soviet troops the Communists should not move in. In accordance with this the Government troops are then entitled to move into any places which has ever been occupied by Soviet troops and which may now be occupied by the Communist troops. Under these circumstances the situation might arise that the Government forces would not [*now?*] move, not only into those places being evacuated by the Soviet troops, but would also move into places now under Communist control so hostilities are bound to occur. The second revised draft states that no consultation will be made with the Communists and therefore hostilities are also liable to occur. Our understanding of the present agreement regarding the instruction to the field team is that it is purely a temporary nature. In submitting such a draft we have in mind that it is difficult for the Government now to solve the whole question regarding Manchuria, both the military and the political affairs. Therefore, General

²⁷ *Ante*, p. 564.

Chang has assured that there will be some special agency to discuss between the Government and the Communist representatives on the political aspects of the Manchuria problem. Therefore, we are working to find out some interim arrangement so that the field teams can go there and start to work. Therefore, we reached an understanding that the Government forces would first take over places now being evacuated by the Soviet troops. As to the places now being occupied by the Communist forces, if it becomes necessary that the Government forces shall move in then that has to be effected by mutual agreement. Then we have the sixth point and which assures that in the future all the questions will be solved by redistribution of the troops. So our understanding was that this instruction is purely of a temporary nature just to serve the present purpose. Now the revised draft prepared by the Government seems unacceptable to me, because it has definitely fixed on all the points that have to be taken up later and it is not of an interim nature. I don't want to take too much of General Gillem's time. I only want to point out that the three points were actually compromises reached between General Chang and myself on evening of day before yesterday and now the Government did not approve that formula and has now forwarded a revised draft which is not acceptable to me. As I have only up to now reported to Yen-an about the compromise draft reached between General Chang and myself and so far I have not obtained a reply. Still I am prepared to devote all my efforts to work for the acceptance of that proposal.

I have now in the meantime some new problems here and I find it very difficult to handle the affairs. Therefore, I have discussed with General Chang that he would do his best to try and secure acceptance of the Government to the compromise proposal we both reached, but apparently General Chang has great difficulty in doing so. Therefore, General Chang advocates that today either the original draft or the second draft prepared by the Government shall be accepted which puts me into a very difficult position. It appears to me that it is rather difficult to get results today and we don't want to take too much of General Gillem's time without achieving any substantial result. I still hope that the Government shall reconsider the compromise formula reached between both of us on day before yesterday and if that is not possible, then maybe it is advisable that we await for General Gillem's return and then to take up the matter. It is most unfortunate but I am prepared to continue my efforts in solving that problem.

GENERAL GILLEM: My time is not important. This is the important thing.

What is General Chang's comment on the original compromise. Can he accept that now or does he have to modify it as later stated.

Before he makes a comment I would like to just point out that I am sure that all are in agreement that it is desirable to get these teams in Manchuria at the earliest possible time. It would appear that the longer the delay were made, that more difficulties are likely to arise and if difficulties become general it is quite possible that the whole problem of reorganization might be jeopardized. It might not be possible to resolve those local problems if delay were extended. I trust that we can reach some agreement and get the teams on the field. Then [they] can lay the preliminary work for problems which this Committee, upon visiting the area later, may be empowered to solve. I simply make those comments because I hope that we can reach an agreement and get the teams on the ground, but I hesitate to report to General Marshall that we are unable to fulfill what seems to be the desire of both the parties when he departed. That is, to get the teams on the field at the earliest moment. Is there any comment from General Chang?

It would appear that subsequent to the original compromise that possibly additional matters have arisen which have forced General Chang to make a slight adjustment.

GENERAL CHANG: No matter whether it is regarding a serious problem like this or even in private conversation he also holds himself responsible for what he said and General Chou just said that the proposal made on the day before yesterday was a compromise between General Chang and General Chou. It is not quite the fact. It is not quite a compromise. On the day before yesterday, General Chang made the remark that he hoped that the original draft may be agreed upon. Then General Chou expressed his difficulty to agree to that original draft so General Chang asked General Chou if he would like to draft the paragraph 4 and 5. Then General Chang had a discussion with General Chou over a few of the words. The main principles implied in the proposal are General Chou's ideas. Anyway, General Chang and General Chou discussed the new proposal in a very free atmosphere. They both wanted to achieve some result very very much. They have to submit to their respective higher level for approval. General Chou hasn't gotten any decision from Yenan yet but General Chang being near to the Government gets the Government's amendments which he just reported this morning. When parting on day before yesterday, General Chang arranged with General Chou to communicate with telephone to see whether there is any possibility in getting the new proposal agreed so they could agree. Today General Chou thinks that the amended proposal and the original proposal present tremendous differences. From General Chang's point of view there is only a difference of detailed points. The broad principle remains the same. Of course, there are different

points of view so General Chang still hopes that his amended proposal can be accepted by General Chou.

In recording the talks General Chang has had with General Chou we are trying to find out—both of them are keen on reaching a compromise and just stated that when General Marshall was still here, when we presented the draft instructions it seems highly possible for the two parties to reach an agreement, and even as late as the evening of the 11th, General Chang and General Chou both wished to have a short talk in General Marshall's house when they went to see General Marshall off in order to achieve an agreement, but then General Marshall was hurrying to the airfield and they haven't got a chance to talk, so General Chou has to refer this matter for Yen-an and the reply was in the negative. That is why a new proposal was brought up by General Chou. After that the Government put some amendments in that and made an amended proposal. It may be that the two sides have different points of view, but General Chang is also trying to convince General Chou that with provision of paragraph 6, it seems that no matter how we write paragraphs 4 or 5 or stick to the original draft or use the amended form, it will not make a great issue in the future. General Chou is in favor of taking the new proposal as basis of discussion and General Chang is in favor of taking General Marshall's original draft as the basis of discussion.

GENERAL GILLEM: How does that appeal to General Chou? We have agreed upon 1, 2 and 3. By the acceptance of which we have eliminated one of the features that was brought up[,] that is, the separation of political and the military because the field team has been told that their mission will prescribe only the military. So we have eliminated one of the points of issue. That may be apparent.

GENERAL CHOU: The first one had been modified by General Chou.

GENERAL GILLEM: I was reading in accordance with the original agreement. It would be modified in accordance with instruction from Peiping. I discussed that already with him one minute before he left and he said that in his opinion that was what we call in America "passing the buck". In other words, the settlement should be made here and not put it to some lower headquarters.

GENERAL CHOU: According to the compromise reached by the two Generals, it has no bearing with the political matters. Stipulated in all the six points. Therefore it would not put the Executive Headquarters in a position that it has to be involved in political affairs.

GENERAL GILLEM: The thing that occurs to me is that if the Executive Headquarters gets that particular specific directive and worked out their plan to publish that they might instruct the field team in a way that might not be acceptable to the three here. So it would seem desirable to specify military for the time being and let the political be

settled subsequently here. For that reason I suggested the original draft which automatically separates the political from the military. They settled only on the ground the separation of the forces—cessation of fighting. Subsequently we should settle any political or economic questions in area which they have separated. Were I a local commander and I received a directive like this, I would say that under paragraph one I was granted broad powers, concurrently with the mission in accordance with instructions given me by Peiping. If we separate the original 1, 2 and 3, we have automatically separated the political and the military. Then by a general instruction in paragraph 3 we direct them to make interim instructions which cover the commander in part and would prepare the way for our coming up. If we can come to some agreement on a broad principle as to 4 and we have already deleted by agreement the first sentence of 5, we have added paragraph 6, we may be reaching some type of agreement that is agreeable to both parties. I would like the comments on my comment.

GENERAL CHOU: General Chou thinks regarding the first point is not so very important and if General Gillem thinks that the clause that the field teams should carry out missions in accordance with the instructions of the Executive Headquarters would impose upon the Executive Headquarters too heavy a responsibility then of course we may revise it to say that the teams will carry out their missions in accordance with instructions of the Committee of Three or leave it like the original draft.

GENERAL GILLEM: That was my suggestion. It seems that the original draft seems to achieve the results we desire more than subsequent amendments.

GENERAL CHOU: General Chou says that the difficulty seems to lie in points 4 and 5.

GENERAL GILLEM: Now we are closing in on 4 and 5. Let's attack those two.

GENERAL CHOU: As to the 4th and 5th paragraphs, General Chou says that it cannot be called a formula compromise. Now the Government put forward a new amended draft which is unacceptable to me because in the talk with General Chang day before yesterday I have already sent report to Yen-an regarding the revised draft. I felt that both of us had reached a proper understanding on that draft that I would be able to convince Yen-an on that draft. However the new draft would harm the situation because Yen-an would feel that the Government is changing its mind on it, so I delayed sending a report last night and asked General Chang if he would make further effort to obtain Government acceptance of that proposal. For my part it is rather hard for me to accept the revised Government proposal.

GENERAL GILLEM: What success could General Chang have in

achieving the Government approval of the original compromise that was reached?

GENERAL CHIANG: It would appear in that paper, the amendment made by the Government is the last part.

GENERAL GILLEM: What is about to occur is that an increasing number of points which will be disputed and must be settled will arise if this delay is prolonged. If we can arrive at some conclusion it will at least stop the potential points of contact as troops are moving constantly in that area. I think it would be highly desirable, otherwise we can write a very complete document here that cannot be implemented. This paragraph as written the first part, and that was agreed upon, now this is just a double check and if we can eliminate the double check this is a basis for the field team to operate. I just wonder if that has been considered.

GENERAL CHOU: In discussion with General Chang we have reached the following conclusion. 1. The function of the Government troops would be first to take over the points evacuated by the Soviet troops. 2. The Government troops would also need to move to places other than those evacuated by the Soviet troops then it can be settled in accordance with the 5th paragraph. 3. In the meantime, I think within the month of March we will work out in Chungking an over-all plan for the redistribution of the armies and which will then be redistributed in Manchuria. Therefore I entirely agree with your explanation. The present Government revised draft is not an instruction for the field team to carry out the mission, but it is an over-all instruction for Manchuria. It is not possible to solve the whole question within the scope of the present instruction.

GENERAL GILLEM: That is right. I think it is impossible in the present instructions. Then again coming back to the original can we specify, as prescribed in the second paragraph of paragraph 4 which reads specifically they will exercise control of the railroad, and then can we put by agreement, certain prescribed areas or towns in this directive and leave the remainder for settlement at a subsequent period in order to get the field teams out. I am again trying to accomplish that one thing.

GENERAL CHANG: It goes right back to the first meeting.

GENERAL GILLEM: In the cease fire order I believe certain of these provisions are visualized, that is, about the railroad. Certainly the cease fire order will not be effective in the area under dispute unless we get some directives to get them there to insure that that is being carried out. Therefore in an endeavor to actually executive [*execute?*] the directive which the gentlemen have signed with General Marshall, we should make every endeavor to get some instructions out which are in accordance with that agreement and then settle the political issues after we have taken steps to stop the contact.

General Gillem repeated his warning about letting the matter be delayed and suggested that the subject be allowed to cool and to have another meeting shortly, in the meantime to take up another subject.

General Chang explained that while this important issue was before the Committee he would not be able to intelligently discuss another subject as his mind would be on Manchuria and suggested that the meeting be adjourned.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270: Telegram

General Marshall to Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr.

[WASHINGTON,] 18 March 1946.

80978. Acknowledging your 339, please express my appreciation to the Generalissimo for his message which I have just transmitted to the President and the Secretary of State. You may also tell him that I have been in conference with the President and the Secretary and also with the Import Export Bank head, the Under Secretary of State²⁸ and the Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Clayton, regarding Chinese matters. I am to have an interview Wednesday with the National Advisory Council on international monetary and financial problems and should then be able to clear the way for early negotiations regarding all matters financial and material relating to China.

Personal. If you have not gotten an agreement regarding teams in Manchuria having in view the fact that the Sixth Army has taken over Mukden, I do not think it wise for you to delay your trip to Mukden any longer. It is urgently necessary to get someone on the ground quickly and if there is to be a prolonged bickering over the agreement you had best precipitate the matter by going yourself with Chou En-lai and with or without General Chang. Further delay may be fatal.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Minutes of Meeting of Military Sub-Committee, March 18, 1946,
8:10 a. m.*

Present:	General Chang	General Chou	General Gillem
Also present:	General Lee	General Tung	Colonel Caughey
	General Hsu	Mr. Chang	Captain Eng
	Colonel Pee		

GENERAL GILLEM: Gentlemen, we have been trying to get together without success so far. I appreciate very much the way you have responded and your consideration. If they will give me their indul-

²⁸ Dean Acheson.

gence I would like to point out a few facts which I think history, if it is truthful, will include. A great many stories are told; a great many articles are written; most of this will be verified in a truthful history. 222 days ago the last bomb was dropped on Tokyo and it was by a B-29. 96 days before that Germany was beaten to her knees and the things that did it by and large were American bombers and American troops which stopped 50 miles from Berlin—I was there. Now America has marched in 4½ years across the Pacific and certainly had contributed in years what other allies had in a few days to restore to you a lost province—one in 9 days. I think it will show in history that our fleet was in all the seas. We had troops in 27 countries and our air force was the biggest in the world. The Army had 7½ million men with modern equipment and [one?] more thing—the atomic bomb. Now the man who directed this terrific Army through the war was General Marshall and he is a leader throughout the world. Though he was tired after the war, his work here is well-known by all these officers. His endeavors to get help for China has reached tangible form already for I have received a wire that he is sending 100 officers to assist in the reorganization of the Army and the first leaves America next week. General Marshall appeared before the American Congress²⁹ yesterday, and he made these statements which I am going to quote which are of common interest to the people here. “The U. S. is I think at the present time best able to render material assistance to China. We are asking no special preferences of any kind whatever regarding economic or similar matters. We are placing no price on our friendship. I must say though that we have a vital interest in a stable government in China, and I am using the word in an accurate sense. The next few months are of tremendous importance to the Chinese people and I think to future world peace.” Now, General Marshall is in Washington to try [to] assist and I am going to Nanking today to try and assist in two ways: First, to place the officers in the framework that will assist here and, secondly, to arrange the details of a school for General Chou. I think, and it is a very humble opinion, I will admit, that we have been living so close to this problem that we have lost some of the bigger features among the small ones. I will admit that you gentlemen have a vital interest in this area and I am trying to be thoroughly aware of that at all times. I think we are all trying. We are all directly concerned with the restoration of peace and tranquility to China as a whole and Manchuria in particular because of its economic and other values. Now we have for seven days, one week since General Marshall left, attempted to resolve this problem without success

²⁹ See statement released to the press on March 16, Department of State *Bulletin*, March 24, 1946, p. 484.

so far. That it is very critical in the opinion of General Marshall that we get teams up there can be told from this paragraph that I will read out of his speech: "Up to 10 minutes before my departure we were reaching agreements regarding sending teams into Manchuria. It is of great importance that they get there as soon as possible. In Manchuria they have no representative of the headquarters up to this time. The situation is very fluid with troops moving here and there and all sorts of minor clashes occurring. In many instances, particularly on the Communist side, there is no doubt that they are almost unaware of the agreement that we have reached. Therefore, it is most important that we have these teams appear in the country as quickly as possible." Now we have added a little on one or two sentences in different places in paragraphs 4 and 5 but I am sure that if you looked at it from the broad point of view and refreshed your memories back to January 10 when certain stipulations were signed by the two officers concerned, you will find in [a] paragraph that the statement that military movements do not prejudice the movement of forces of the National Army into or within Manchuria for the purpose of restoring Chinese sovereignty. It was with this in mind that General Marshall prepared his original draft which we have been unable to agree upon. Now, Gentlemen, we have made certain changes in here and these I hope will prove to be all that is necessary to get it signed and the teams in the field. I think it is critical that we do so, and I ask you to please reach an agreement this morning and to sign the papers to send these teams so that we can dispatch them and settle the problems which if they have not already occurred they will occur if we go along without them. I have left two papers. I would like to leave them with you and I will step out on the porch and see if you can settle it by the smarter men here and any little problems can be left to the field teams or submit to higher authority as I have written in the paper. I have taken 5 minutes longer than I expected. I apologize.

I have no choice in either one, we have made certain changes that we made about liaison and the other one is a copy of the stipulation with the other changes. I hope that we can arrive at some conclusion.

GENERAL CHOU: I have had a talk with General Gillem yesterday and I have explained that [*to him?*] the actual conditions of my position. I have had several talks with General Chang making an effort to reach a solution. Both General Chang and myself have been working along that spirit and especially I feel grateful to General Gillem's efforts in this matter. However, after several days of efforts and yesterday General Gillem put forward a new proposal, I only thank him for his cooperation in this matter. I feel very grateful to both of you gentlemen. After the efforts made on all parts,

General Chang has finally withdrawn the amended proposal. However as to the present proposal we still have the difference on the word "now" in paragraph 4. On the evening when I was talking to General Chang, he has not agreed on that. However, I have not withdrawn that word that is the point of dispute. As to all the other points I can say that both of us do agree, but of course I have to make a statement that this still has to be approved by higher authority. Now General Chang has talked it over with the Government and it seems that on every point there is no argument except the word "now" which the Government would not accept. As on my party the instruction I have received from Yen-an is far more restricted than my proposal. Now if the word "now" still has to be deleted that will differ still more from Yen-an's instruction. Therefore, it is not within my power to sign on this paper because the reason is that in that case if such kind of a paper is issued then dispute will take place on the Communist side. It would be more preferable if we sent the field teams first with only the instructions of paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 so that we will have more than to discuss on the other points. However, such a view seems not possible to be accepted. If now I should be pressed to delete the word "now" from the document then the responsibility on my shoulders are two-fold. One is it has gone beyond my power because it has gone beyond the instruction of Yen-an and secondly, if the word "now" is again deleted then my responsibility is too great. I have two points to relate. First one is before that I have discussed with General Chang. I said that if a plane was available we would send up people to Yen-an to consult personally. However because of some trouble of the plane it is not possible for us to send up people. However, this shows that I have had the best intention. Secondly, regarding the stipulations in the supplement to the cease fire order, that is about the movement of troops in certain areas as exceptions. The stipulations have particular reference to the clause in the cease fire order dealing with the movement of troops. However I also recall that in the same stipulation it is stated that the Government has to report to the Executive Headquarters about the movement of those troops. However, this has never been carried out. Yen-an has inquired on this matter for several times regarding how many Government troops are in Manchuria. My guess would be that the figure agreed upon has not yet been exceeded. However, I actually have no basis for making such a guess because it is not stated in any document. We don't want to complicate the situation. I only wish to point out that there still [are] points in the cease fire order that have not yet been carried out on the part of the Government. Now besides that we recall the efforts in Kwangtung area. It certainly cannot be said that our side is to blame in that matter because the Government

authorities in Kwangtung still refuse to carry out the cease fire order in that part. We had planned to go to Canton on our trip, however, that was cancelled because we wanted to find a solution here. The Communist troops are now being attacked and scattered. I still have the burden on my shoulder to [have] settled that question.

As to the problem north of Hankow, 40,000 to 50,000 of our men are still besieged and we have asked for their transfer. However, General Chang thinks that he finds difficulty in doing that so we made the concession and we do not raise the question of the transfer at this moment. However, they are now urgently in need of food and this is another of the burdens that I have to carry on my back. We must take all this into consideration. The matter north of Hankow was intended to be settled when we went to [on] the trip. However, because the government has difficulty settling the matter on the spot so we agreed that it should be settled when we come back to Chungking. So I said we would wait for another two weeks to see how the things are happening. Now later I have seen Mr. Hsu Kan, the Minister of Food, and he said he needs food in the large cities like Peiping, Tientsin, Tsinan and other places and I have told him we are quite willing to send food into those cities and in return we hoped he would supply food to the Hankow area as we hope that would be a settlement. However, I learn that the Food Ministry is instructed by the Government that there will be difficulty in carrying that out so if we take all this into consideration it creates such an impression as of anything which we have made concessions we would suffer in the end. Now regarding the present document I would not refer to the political affairs because that might be put down in the minutes. As to the document itself we can either adhere to the Yen-an principle that we only use the first three paragraphs and send out the field teams immediately without the rest of the documents or we can also follow the idea of General Gillem that we put down the places concretely which are to be taken over right now and in the meantime we can continue our discussion on the military and political matters.

Since all these proposals seem not to be acceptable to the Government and therefore it is beyond the discussion here, so we have worked out a proposal like this one. However, I cannot further consent on the point of the word "now". I will take the responsibility to report to Yen-an on the whole discussion and as I understand that General Gillem is also to come back on Wednesday and General Chang is leaving on Thursday so I think I will still [make] my best effort in those two days to reach some kind of solution.

GENERAL CHANG: According to what General Chou has just said it seems impossible for us to have the document signed today. The

dispute really lies on the word "now" appearing in paragraph 4 and I don't like to make any guess, but if the Government has really made such a major concession in withdrawing all its amendments put forward yesterday but we failed to get General Chou's agreement to deleting one word "now", I feel it is very regrettable. General Chou has just said he will make every effort in these two days and General Chang is very pleased to hear that. He sincerely hopes that agreement may be reached on Wednesday when you come back.

GENERAL GILLEM: I have cancelled my trip today. Could General Chou send his dispatch to Yen-an and get it back so we can approve this.

GENERAL CHIANG: I have seen much criticism in the newspapers and among the people and I regret to see this. Some of the time they are aimed at the Communists. If these are proved to be facts it would be very regrettable so as to jeopardize the Communists. He hopes that an agreement may be reached so those rumors will be baseless. If those rumors turn out to be facts in the end it would be very disadvantageous to the country as a whole—to the Government and to Manchuria, but most of all it may be as disadvantageous to the Communists as well. General Chang likes to repeat the statement that he appreciates General Chou's effort in order that results may be achieved and the document may be signed. He has great hope and he appreciates that, thus he sincerely hopes that an agreement may be signed.

Regarding the other points of issue made by General Chou regarding the situation in Canton area and north of Hankow and in the Government failing to notify the Executive Headquarters, General Chang wonders what aim did General Chang [*Chow?*] have in mind in making such a statement in this present meeting. He likes to make some clarification. Under the present situation General Chou said very definitely that he cannot sign this document and then at the same time he mentioned those points which is a list of accusations made by the Communists to the Government. They seem to be very unnecessary in this case. It may waste too much time if General Chang [should] try to answer to every accusation made by General Chou and furthermore it seems totally unnecessary for him to make such an explanation to every point. Anyway from the very start, General Chang said repeatedly that there is no time for us to argue about the right and wrong. The most urgent thing to do is to try to use our brain to solve practical problems with the spirit of mutual confidence and making mutual concessions. This is the attitude General Chang has had in the past and he will still stick to that spirit in the future. In any discussion he will have that attitude. General Chang was greatly touched by the example given by General Marshall saying that nearly 100 years have elapsed from the civil war in the United

States—still people are arguing about the right and wrong of the civil war.

General Chang regrets very much that he has to leave this conference now as his subordinates are getting together at 9 o'clock to have a farewell meeting and General Chang had them postpone it to 10 so he has to leave now.

GENERAL GILLEM: I realize you gentlemen have many difficulties and we have passed through the same thing. As a matter of fact my country was not sure which war we were talking about when we came back this time. I think it is probably very good for both of them to have gotten that out rather than keeping it inside. I have now cancelled my trip again to have this document transmitted to Yen-an and see if we can get an approval of the question involved and meet again either tonight or tomorrow morning and settle the problem.

GENERAL CHOU: General Chou is not arguing about what is right or wrong. He simply put up questions and would like to get the solution. He is not clear about what people are thinking about the Manchurian problem raised by certain quarters because that is a problem regarding who is right and who is wrong. As to the Kwangtung problem that is almost [*also?*] not a question of who is right or wrong. It is simply that the troops are not recognized by military authorities and that has to be solved. As to the problem north of Hankow, he himself has endeavored to make a solution with the Ministry of Food. However that formula was not approved by the Government. All this shows that he has many things on his own shoulders which has to be resolved. Regarding the draft³⁰ which you have shown to him last night, General Chou does not feel sure that he can definitely get a reply from Yen-an today. In fact General Chou has reported to Yen-an last night after talking to you regarding this draft but as our communication is quite poor with Yen-an he is not certain when the reply will be back.

GENERAL GILLEM: Have you any suggestions to make. I will plan to leave tomorrow and come back Wednesday if possible and possibly you can arrive at some conclusion between the two and we can settle it and get the teams out. I am sure they are set to go. We have made arrangements with the Marines and they are set to go north on call. I see no recourse except to inform General Marshall that so far we have [been] unsuccessful but I am still hopeful that we can do something within two or three days. I am very sympathetic to General Chou with the responsibilities on his shoulders because I am trying to carry General Marshall's, so if we can attempt to get that settled the next couple of days.

³⁰ Presumably the same draft, text of which was transmitted by Lieutenant General Gillem to General Marshall in telegram No. 200300Z, forwarded from Nanking on March 20, p. 584.

GENERAL CHANG: Yesterday General Chou request[ed] General Chang to exert all his efforts and today it is his turn.

GENERAL GILLEM: I request both of them to lend themselves to the problem.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., to General Marshall

CHUNGKING, 18 March 1946.

341. Daily conferences, which included a session last night with General Chou until 0100, have not produced an agreement on the dispatch of field teams to Manchuria. The restraint [*sic*] of General Chou to approve the document is opposed by Yen-an. General Chou is now awaiting reply from Yen-an to an amended draft and the reply should be received either today or tomorrow. Indications lead to possible conclusion that delay in sending teams is the objective. Efforts being made on all sides on legal scene to expedite approval of this document. In this morning's session, I quoted portions of your press conference³¹ pertaining to Manchuria and reiterated the compelling necessity for a speedy agreement on this vital document and dispatch of field teams which are now standing by. I feel that document will be approved in a few days.

The following eulogy was delivered by the Generalissimo [at] the closing session of the plenary session of the Central Committee of the Kuomintang:

"Here I wish particularly to mention the contributions General George C. Marshall has made. Ever since his arrival in China 3 months ago, he has worked indefatigably and sincerely as a friend to help us attain peaceful national unification. He has striven hard to enable us to begin the task of peaceful national reconstruction so that China might contribute to the peace in the Pacific and to world peace. The United States policy is in accord with our national policy.

Completely objective in outlook and cautious in approach, General Marshall has sought with us ways and means of finding a solution. The fair and practical views he advanced have mastered many problems. Our gratitude and admiration for his sincerity and the pains he has taken and our confidence in him are unbounded."

New subject. Nanking trip postponed because of weather and urgent conferences. Weather permitting, will depart Tuesday returning Wednesday night or Thursday.

New subject. General Chang Chih-chung is being sent to Sinkiang the latter part of this week to settle some difficulties that are now prevalent.³²

³¹ On March 16, Department of State *Bulletin*, March 24, 1946, p. 484.

³² For correspondence on Sinkiang, see vol. x, pp. 1201 ff.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Draft Prepared by General Chou En-lai ^{32a}

Field teams, with carefully selected personnel, will be sent into Manchuria immediately under the following conditions:

1. The mission of the teams will pertain solely to readjustment of military matters.
2. The teams should be established within the areas of the Government troops as well as the Communist troops, keeping clear of places still under Russian occupation.
3. Teams should proceed to points of conflict or close contact between the Government and Communist troops to bring about a cessation of fighting and to make the necessary readjustments.

It is entered as a matter of record into the minutes of these conferences that

Regarding all political and military matters pertaining to Manchuria, the Government representative assures to discuss them with the Communist representative in order to reach an early settlement.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., to General Marshall

NANKING, 20 March 1946.

200300Z. Recent writing of agreement regarding entry of field teams is as follows:

"Field teams, with carefully selected personnel, will be sent into Manchuria immediately under the following instructions.

1. The teams will carry out their mission in accordance with the instructions of the Executive Headquarters.

2. The teams should be established within the areas of the Government troops as well as the Communist troops, keeping clear of places still under Russian occupation.

3. Teams should proceed to points of conflict or close contact between the Government and Communist troops to bring about a cessation of fighting and to make the necessary readjustments.

4. While reestablishing Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria the Government is authorized to move troops into localities now being evacuated by the Soviet troops, via: The railway line between Mukden and Changchun, with a strip of 30 miles on both sides of that railway section.

5. If it becomes necessary for the Government troops to occupy those localities now held by Communist troops, it should be effected through

^{32a} Drafted by General Chou En-lai about March 19 or 20, and apparently discussed by him with General Chang on one of those dates.

discussion among the field teams and if an agreement cannot be reached, it will be settled by higher authority.

6. The future disposition in Manchuria of all armies will be fixed according to the reorganization.

7. The Government assures that it will immediately discuss the political matters pertaining to Manchuria with the Chinese Communist Party in line with the decisions of the Political Consultative Council. As an interim measure the Government will maintain the present status of the popularly-elected local governments without any obstruction or interference, pending settlement of the political matters."

Difficulty hinges on word "now" in instruction 4. As written this instruction permits Communist forces to move into places not now being but later possible to be evacuated such as Harbin. Hence we are again in heated debate and deadlock. In connection with this point and with the rest of the instructions, I have impressed upon Chou the fact that political and economic problems that are envisaged by the Communists can be settled later. Chou counters with the statement that he has referred the matter to Yen-an, and cannot assume responsibility of deleting the word "now". On Monday night after an 11 p. m. conference, Chou and Chang promised they would work out the problem and give me this decision on Thursday. I feel quite optimistically that their decision will be acceptable all the way around. The first team in will go to Mukden immediately after decision is reached.

I flew to Nanking Tuesday morning for conference with Theater Headquarters, Peiping Headquarters Group, Shanghai Port Command and Nanking Liaison Group pertaining to over-all personnel problems after Theater inactivation. I shall return to Chungking Thursday evening.

With reference to your 80978, I have talked over with Byroade my visit to Mukden. We both agree that it would be unwise and non-productive to go in before the teams get in since the presence of teams on the ground is necessary in order to locate commanders and to make necessary arrangements for contacting the mob Anders [*commanders?*]. We feel strongly also that the Committee of Three would lose prestige by such a move not only because of possible non-productiveness but because the arrival of the Committee of 3 would in effect appear as though that Committee had arrived to do the work of a lesser agency. Subsequent corrective efforts on the part of both Executive Headquarters and the Committee of 3 probably would suffer thereby. I likewise recommend not going in without a national representative for both Chang and Chou have expressed desire to accom-

pany me but neither wishes to precede field teams. I therefore recommend that you reconsider my going in ahead of the teams.

740.00119 PW/3-2046 : Telegram

The Counselor of Embassy in China (Smyth) to the Secretary of State

CHUNGKING, March 20, 1946—5 p. m.

[Received March 20—12: 23 p. m.]

526. Evacuation of Mukden by Russians, which commenced on 7 March and was completed on 14 March, most significant development of week. Later reports from Harbin indicate possibility that further withdrawals are contemplated. (MA summary report for week ending March 16.) Any Communist attempt to forestall Central Govt. occupation of Mukden, if contemplated, failed to materialize. Central Govt. occupation accomplished with little difficulty.

Situation North China generally quiet. Some difficulty has developed in Jehol where Communists are reported to have been increasing their strength presumably to forestall Central Govt. attempt to occupy Chengte. Conditions in Shantung improving with good progress reported in efforts to restore communications and lift Communist food blockades of Central Govt. garrisons. Communists in Shansi appear to be continuing sporadic attacks on Central Govt. held positions along Tung-Pu railway according to Chinese G-2 reports, but the evident determination of Yen Hsi-shan to retain a considerable force of Japanese under arms within Shansi is not helping the situation.

Water lift of new 1st Army from Kowloon to Shanhaikuan is reported two-thirds completed. Water lift of 71st Army from Shanghai to Shanhaikuan commenced on 11 March.

Repatriation Japanese proceeding at accelerated rate with greatest progress reported from Formosa. Daily average repatriates, civilian and military, now in excess of 13,000.

SMYTH

Marshall Mission Files. Lot 54-D270

General Chou En-lai to Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr.

CHUNGKING, March 20, 1946.

DEAR GENERAL GILLEM: I am very much impressed by your message relayed to me by Captain Eng³³ expressing General Marshall's and your anxiety for the immediate dispatch of the field teams to Manchuria. I wish to assure you that I am just as eager to have

³³ Ernest K. H. Eng, U. S. Army language officer.

it done as you are, and, I believe, General Chang is of the same feeling. As you may have imagined, during your absence we have had a long talk together. But, on account of the delicacy of the situation, the sore spot has not yet been ironed out, despite the hard effort exerted by both of us.

Please, excuse me, when on your arrival here you will find me away. You are probably aware, that on account of the poor communication, it has been most difficult for me to converse freely with Yen-an; consequently for over a week I have been thinking of taking a trip down myself, in order to reach a thorough understanding. I believe, such an arrangement might greatly expedite the progress of our discussion. However, the trip was repeatedly delayed, because of the non-availability of either the plane or pilot. Since by now the plane is ultimately ready to go, I decided not to miss that chance. I have consulted with General Chang, and he agrees to my decision. Now, I expect myself to be back in a day or two, and ready for our meeting by the weekend.

Also, I feel sorry to tell you that I have not been able to submit the lists called for by the reorganization plan³⁴ in due time. In fact, the critical situation in Manchuria generated during the last two weeks, and the complete blockade of our forces in Kwangtung have rather upset my original working schedule. On top of that, there is an interruption of air transportation with Yen-an for over a fortnight, which has also contributed much to the delay. This is a second reason for me to take the present trip. Certainly you would fully understand, I trust, that this delay is brought about by unforeseen circumstances, and not out of deliberation or negligence on our part. However, I shall see to it, that while in Yen-an I shall get the available data on hand, and arrange a speedy deliverance of data by the others. On coming back here, I shall let you know how much headway I have made, and also about my arrangements.

During the few days that you were replacing General Marshall, I have come to know a great deal more about your brilliant personality. Particularly do I admire your enthusiasm for work and your eagerness to cooperate, which have reinforced my belief that despite our unlucky start we might be just as successful as we have been with General Marshall. In conveying my thanks to you for your efforts, let me also make known the desire that I may further be favored with your cooperation, as General Marshall and you have so generously shown to me in the past.

Faithfully yours,

(CHOU EN-LAI)

³⁴ February 25, p. 295.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Meeting of Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., With
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek*

[CHUNGKING,] 21 March 1946.

Present: Madame Chiang Kai-shek
Colonel Pee Chung-kan,³⁵ Aide to the Generalissimo
Captain [Ernest K.] Horace Eng

Anent the present impasse between the Government and the Chinese Communist Party in arriving at an agreement to send Field Teams to Manchuria

General Gillem reported that he had radioed General Marshall the night before, the proposed agreement verbatim, explaining that the Communists had been laboring at the punctilious niceties of including the word "now" in Paragraph 4, with a view to procrastinate.

Madame Chiang remarked that the crux of the problem was that there were very few places "now" evacuated by the Soviet.

General Gillem said that it was more clear than apparent that during the intervening time, the Communists were massing troops at strategic points for future moves.

General Gillem continued that General Marshall had directed the Committee of Three to proceed at once to Manchuria. He added however that he had asked General Marshall to reconsider this measure on two grounds:

- (a) That too much time would be spent by the Committee in locating the situs wherein conflicts had been reported;
- (b) That the move would tend to lower the level of the Committee; and that the Committee could go in much better grace if groundwork for its presence had been laid by Field Teams.

General Gillem reported that General Chou En-lai had flown to Yenan this morning, to return as soon as practicable, to consult his Party in connection with the dispatch of Field Teams to Manchuria under the conditions set forth in the proposed agreement, and that Field Teams were being held in readiness for immediate dispatch.

Asked if General Chou, before his departure, had indicated the reason for his departure or the probable course for the future, General Gillem said that General Chou had intimated his lack of authority to sign the proposed agreement with the word "now" deleted. Repeated discussions with General Chang having been proved fruitless, General Chou left Chungking for Yenan. General Gillem continued that he had no previous knowledge of General Chou's going to Yenan, and that he had attempted to impress General Chou of the importance of the immediate dispatch of Field Teams, whose primary mission was

³⁵ Also known as Peter T[song] K[an] Pee.

to separate the two contending forces. Political and economic issues would be settled separately on a higher level here in Chungking.

In support of the Central Government's move in Manchuria, General Gillem cited a specific provision in the Cease Fire Order, which read, "Cessation of Hostilities Order does not prejudice military movements of forces of the National Army into within Manchuria which are for the purpose of restoring Chinese sovereignty."

The Generalissimo said that this was the most salient point in the Cease Fire Order and that it should be emphasized wherever feasible.

General Gillem said that the specific provision above-mentioned had been incorporated in his proposed agreement, which General Chou declined to accept.

General Gillem pointed out that since the Cease Fire Order was signed, the conditions in Manchuria had changed, and that the Communists could now afford to flout the agreement. He reiterated however that it was highly desirable to send immediately Field Teams to Manchuria to separate the contending forces, leaving the political and economic issues to be solved in Chungking.

Madame Chiang said that since political and economic issues were intimately connected with the Cease Fire Order, American participation in discussions would be in order.

General Gillem said that his duty was to advise in military matters, but that he would abide by whatever instruction General Marshall might see fit to give.

The Generalissimo informed that prior to his departure for Yen-an General Chou had indicated to General Chang that the Chinese Communist[s] had no objection to Central Government troops moving into the railway area from Mukden to Changchun.

General Gillem said that the point at issue at the time of his departure for Nanking involved places north of Changchun, as it was assumed that the Government was in complete control of places south of Changchun.

The Generalissimo pointed out that the recalcitrance of the Communists in jockeying for positions for the control of places north of Changchun had been instigated and encouraged by the Soviet.

General Gillem said that it had been his opinion that the Communists were actually jockeying for the control of Harbin.

The Generalissimo said that he had instructed General Chang to postpone his departure for Sinkiang for a day or two pending the return of General Chou from Yen-an.

General Gillem said that he hoped that General Chang would remain in Chungking until the present deadlock was solved, since General Chang, having taken part in the negotiations from the beginning, was better informed than any other to see the matter through to a solution.

The Generalissimo said that he would retain General Chang in Chungking as long as practicable.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., to General Marshall

CHUNGKING, 21 March 1946.

344. Returned to Chungking today 21 March 1946, to find that Generals Chang and Chou had conferred on three occasions during my absence; the last meeting ending shortly after midnight last night. Chou then arranged for air transportation through my Aide and departed early this morning for Yen-an to obtain instructions relative to dispatch of Field Teams to Manchuria. He left for me a letter explaining that he was very eager to get Teams into Manchuria and that he regretted "The sore spot had not yet been ironed out on account of the delicacy of the situation". General Chou attributed the reason for his trip to lack of communications and his difficulty to converse freely with Yen-an. He promised to be back in a day or two and ready for a meeting by the weekend. In this same letter General Chou stated that he was sorry the troop lists had not yet been turned in and that he would investigate this matter also while in Yen-an.

Shortly after my return I was informed that the Generalissimo desired to see me. During a very brief conversation, the Madame was present, he evidenced great concern over the fact that the Communists had not yet agreed to the dispatch of Field Teams to Manchuria. He spoke of the dilatory effect on the economic situation because of this present impasse and asked if I were going to arbitrate with the Communists concerning this matter. I carefully explained that I was not in a position to review or discuss economic or political matters and that these matters would have to be handled through existing Chinese political organs when they come up. I then explained that the matter of prime importance at this time was the entrance of teams in order that the military situation could first be brought under control.

The Generalissimo informed me that General Chang Chih-chung probably would not go to Sinkiang until after General Chou had returned.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

General Marshall to Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr.

[WASHINGTON,] March 21, 1946.

81547. Have just read your 344 you will have to force an agreement quickly regarding entry of teams into Manchuria. Remember I worded those stipulations, hurriedly dictating them after a conversa-

tion with the Generalissimo. It seems to me that you could get a concession from each side sufficient to permit entry of teams. You will have to force the issue. We cannot delay any longer. If there is to be further delay over the teams I feel you yourself must go to Mukden. I am not in agreement with the opinion of Byroade and you that the Committee of Three loses face in the matter. Face will be lost if the fighting develops more seriously in Manchuria and spreads south into Jehol. That will be the serious consideration, not face.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270: Telegram

*Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., to General Chou En-lai at Yen-an*³⁶

[CHUNGKING,] 21 March 1946.

346. Additional word from General Marshall which I have just received indicates that it is extremely important for you to return, as soon as possible, to Chungking to continue discussions regarding entry of field teams into Manchuria. I will send my C-54 to pick you up on Saturday if C-47 that took you up to Yen-an has returned. Please advise.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270: Telegram

Mr. Walter S. Robertson to Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr.

PEIPING, 21 March 1946.

1082. It has developed that, when specific instructions for investigations have not been transmitted from Executive Headquarters and when unanimous decision cannot be reached by the team as to the trouble spots within their area to be investigated and the priority therefor, the team has remained immobilized for indefinite periods. To eliminate this situation, we prepared a procedure whereby the American team member as chairman of the team would, in such cases, make the decision on the locations to be investigated and the priority therefor, thereby breaking the deadlock. He would not decide individually on the action to be taken based on the investigation, but only on the movement of the team to a location. If, after investigation, unanimous agreement could not be reached as to action to be taken, the report of investigation would be taken in accordance with our normal procedure to the commissioners for their consideration and action. This procedure was readily approved by the Government Commissioner, the Communist Commissioner has been delaying action for several days on issuing such an order and today said, after two

³⁶ Transmitted through Col. Ivan D. Yeaton, Commanding Officer of the U. S. Army Observer Group at Yen-an.

hours discussion, he did not have authority to approve the proposal. He said however he would submit it to Chou En-Lai for consideration and advice. For your background information in event question is discussed the text of your paper our proposed directive follows:

"All instructions issued to the field teams as team messages are transmitted only after unanimous agreement of all three parties in Executive Headquarters, in accordance with principles agreed upon by the Commission of Three in Chungking. Therefore, all three members of a field team will put all directives and orders received from Executive Headquarters into effect without hesitation or delay.

Field teams will make personal investigations and settle problems on the ground. First priority on these investigations will be given those directed by Executives. In the absence of such specific instructions and in cases where unanimous agreement cannot be reached between three members of a team on the sequence of the investigations, it is hereby directed that the American member, as chairman of the team, will arrive at a solution on the locations to be investigated and the priority thereof. In such cases, the Government and Communist party members will comply with the decision of the American member." End of directive.

The action proposed is simply a question of procedure in line with the principles agreed upon by the Committee of Three at Chining and other places on recent inspection trip where paralyzing deadlocks were to be broken. Without such action our effectiveness will be greatly handicapped.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., to Brigadier General Henry A. Byroade, at Peiping

[CHUNGKING,] 22 March 1946.

348. Just received word that C-47 which took General Chou En-lai to Yen-an is returning today, 22 March 1946, to Chungking without General Chou En-lai. Was informed by General Chou En-lai's secretary here in Chungking that General Chou En-lai proposed to remain in Yen-an for 4 or 5 days. It is not likely therefore that we can get an agreement for dispatch of field teams prior to Tuesday or Wednesday. In the meantime however I am sending Caughey³⁷ to Yen-an on the 23rd in my C-54 to impress on General Chou the importance of his immediate return to Chungking. Suggest in meantime you collect airfield and local condition information for field team entry or possibly my trip to Mukden in which case you may desire to accompany me. Another message from General Marshall³⁸ overrides our objection to proceeding prior to entry of teams. I will keep you informed.

³⁷ Col. J. Hart Caughey, Executive Officer on General Marshall's staff.

³⁸ Telegram No. 81547, March 21, p. 590.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., to General Chou En-lai at Yenan

CHUNGKING, March 22, 1946.

DEAR GENERAL CHOU: I appreciate deeply the kind sentiments you expressed in your 20 March letter to me and very gratified for your expression that you too are eager to have field teams dispatched to Manchuria as soon as possible.

Your absence from Chungking upon my return was a great disappointment, since I had hoped we three would have been able to reach immediate agreement on the terms of instructions for the field teams. However, after I learned that you and General Chang had worked so hard in attempting to solve the matter, I understood the reasons why you must have felt the necessity of going back to Yenan. I sincerely hope that you will soon be able to reach an understanding that will enable us to get on with this most important task.

I am seriously concerned in any further delay and it weighs heavily on me—not only because that concern also weighs heavily on General Marshall who has entrusted me with carrying on his mission, but also because the slightest additional delay could bring about catastrophic conditions in China.

Just yesterday I received word from General Marshall indicating his anxiety concerning the conditions in Manchuria. It is his fear that if we do not soon take active steps to control the situation in Manchuria developments may take place to the great detriment of China.

For these reasons I have asked Colonel Caughey to come to you to stress the urgency of your return to Chungking for the purpose of continuing discussion with the Committee of Three. We must reach agreement which will permit the entry of field teams into Manchuria.

May I take this opportunity to ask you to convey to Chairman Mao Tze-tung my best wishes for his happiness and continued good health.

Sincerely yours,

A. C. GILLEM, JR.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., to General Marshall

CHUNGKING, 23 March 1946.

351. Received your 81547. General Chou is still in Yenan which makes it impossible at this time to reach agreement on the Committee of Three level of the dispatch of teams to Manchuria. General Chou was supposed to have returned the 22 or 23 March using plane in which we sent him to Yenan. On 21 Chou's secretary called to say that the

plane was returning with 14 Communists aboard but that Chou was remaining behind. In an effort to stop this apparent stall I dispatched messages through the Communists and Yen-an observer group urgently suggesting plane await Chou. However, the plane returned 22 without Chou and the pilot informed me Chou had told him to return since he would not be ready either 22 or 23. Contact with Chou En-lai's secretary indicates Chou's present plan is to remain in Yen-an "4 or 5 days". Later Yeaton confirmed this by radio.

Upon receipt of your message I immediately contacted General Chang and gave him the gist of your message. His reaction was favorable to most any course of action which the Committee of Three could develop in an effort to solve this problem. After our meeting Chang went to see the Generalissimo and we again met the 22 at 2100. Chang first informed me that the Generalissimo had instructed him to postpone his Sinkiang trip until the Committee of Three had had an opportunity to proceed to Mukden. General Chang stated that the Generalissimo was prepared to dispatch teams into Manchuria without stipulation or instructions and that the Committee after its visit to Mukden could consider appropriate instructions further. General Chang stated that the Generalissimo's view was that the Government would make any concessions in order to expedite entrance of the teams into Manchuria providing there was an understanding between General Chang and myself which provides for:

1. That the cease-fire order would obtain, i. e., National Government forces' movements in Manchuria is not precluded and
2. Provisions of Sino-Soviet treaty be observed.

General Chang further stated that the Generalissimo was willing to make this drastic concession in lieu of the concern indicated in your message.

I am prepared to go to Mukden but I am faced with the difficulty that General Chou En-lai is still in Yen-an. I have therefore decided to send Caughey to Yen-an on Saturday, 23 March, in my C-54 to see Chou and impress upon him the importance of his return to Chungking with Caughey on Sunday. If Chou returns and is prepared to sign an agreement I will immediately instruct Byroade to dispatch teams. Chou may return but still be unprepared to sign an agreement in which case I will depart with him and Chang for Mukden and at the same time hope to send teams 1 or 2 days ahead without specific instructions. If Chou will not return from Yen-an I plan to proceed to Mukden as instructed and hope that Chang will accompany. Byroade arrives today, Saturday, and will be oriented as to situation and necessity for immediate departure of teams upon advice from here.

740.00119 PW/3-2346 : Telegram

The Counselor of Embassy in China (Smyth) to the Secretary of State

CHUNGKING, March 23, 1946—2 p. m.

[Received March 23—11:12 a. m.]

550. Summary Military Attaché's report for week ending March 23.

Indications accumulating that Russians intend evacuation Changchun and possibly Harbin. Meanwhile Communists have occupied important positions along Mukden-Harbin railroad and may succeed in occupying Changchun in event Russian withdrawal. Central Government has been building strength rapidly in Mukden area and now reported to have 4 to 5 divisions in city and vicinity.

North China remains relatively quiet with truce teams experiencing no more than normal difficulties in implementing truce agreement. Particular success in Shantung where communications are being restored and restrictions on trade and movement of individuals being lifted.

No marked improvement Shansi where clashes between Yen Hsi-shan and Communist troops continue to be reported. Chinese G-2 continue to report arrivals Communist reinforcements Shansi and serious trouble may develop.

First echelon 71st Army troops from Shanghai arrived Chinwang-tao 18 March.

SMYTH

740.00119 PW/3-2346 : Telegram

The Counselor of Embassy in China (Smyth) to the Secretary of State

CHUNGKING, March 23, 1946—4 p. m.

[Received March 23—8:25 a. m.]

552. This afternoon Dr. Liu Chieh, Vice Minister [for] Foreign Affairs, invited me to Foreign Office and said that yesterday afternoon Soviet Ambassador handed Foreign Office a note, stating that Soviet forces would be withdrawn from all Manchuria by end of April. Soviet note said delay in withdrawal had been due to climatic condition. Dr. Liu said this was first Soviet reply to the several Chinese requests for information about Soviet withdrawal. Dr. Liu said Soviet note gave no schedule of withdrawal; he commented that in case of Soviet withdrawals from Mukden area, no notice had been given Chinese Government by Soviets, thus causing difficulties for Government and making it possible for other forces (obviously Communists) to create trouble. Dr. Liu appeared somewhat apprehensive that, if further Soviet withdrawals should be without notice, "other forces" might be able to move in ahead of Government troops.

He said Chinese Government was considering answering Soviet note, and, although he did not say so, inference was that contemplated Chinese note might raise questions of schedules and definite notice of withdrawals from definite localities.

SMYTH

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Colonel J. Hart Caughey to Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr.

YENAN, 23 March 1946.

General Chou will return Sunday if Chang agrees to signing of short 3 paragraphs agreement³⁹ with following change :

Insert words "and fair" in front of word "Readjustments" in paragraph 3 and inclusion in minutes of statement in bottom of page.

Chou favors this and I believe Chang will agree. Please contact Chang so you can let me know urgent. Chou's return depends upon your reply. Chou redrafted 7 point agreement³⁹ as follows :

First paragraph same as first paragraph of short agreement.

Paragraph 2, no change.

Paragraph 3, insert "and fair" before "Readjustments".

Paragraph 4, no change.

Paragraph 5, no change.

Paragraph 6, delete.

Paragraph 7, delete, and then enter it as a matter of record.

This is Chou's alternative and may be used as basis for further discussion. Another less urgent message follows.⁴⁰

CAUGHEY

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Colonel J. Hart Caughey to Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr.

YENAN, 23 March 1946.

(This is second message.) Return to Yen-an caused by two grievances. Lack of agreement and definite action with reference to Canton Communists and 60,000 Communists North of Hankow. Chou was bitter and said his contemporaries blame him for lack of resolution those two points at same time he made concessions to Nationals in North China. While his return to Chungking is not predicated on solution these points, solution would tend to alleviate future trouble. Please impress this on Chang, since it may prove desirable now that teams are on verge of proceeding for committee to delay one day Chungking to resolve.

³⁹ See draft prepared by General Chou En-lai, March 16, p. 564.

⁴⁰ *Infra.*

Re Canton situation—note paragraph in Wedemeyer's last message requiring certain action on part of Chang Fa-kwei.

Re Hankow situation—There are two recent letters from Kizer ⁴¹ in our files or Embassy files.

In leaving Chou this afternoon he said he was sure Mao ⁴² would agree with his commitment regarding the 3-paragraph agreement but he would have to check with Mao—plans to leave for Chungking.

I did not bring up the idea of teams going in without instructions but he did and indicated agreement to that idea. However, since Chou's return Chang [*Chungking?*] is predicated on Chang's approval of short agreement I saw no reason to bring up at this time other solutions you and I discussed since if Chang agrees the trick is done and Chou will be back. If he doesn't we have lost no time and can branch out from there. Please advise me in detail if Chang balks.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., to Colonel J. Hart Caughey at Yen-an

[CHUNGKING,] 24 March 1946.

359. Good work. General Chang agrees to 3-paragraph directive that he and General Chou had prepared and discussed previously.⁴³ General Chang also agrees to the inclusion of the words "and fair" in paragraph 3. Inform General Chou that I am presenting General Chang with the memorandum reference Canton and Hankow.⁴⁴ Team has returned to Hankow area.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Colonel J. Hart Caughey to Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr.

YENAN, 24 March 1946.

Received your 359 and showed same to General Chou. Believe there is unfortunate wording therein. At least Chou balked. Message says "He and General Chou had prepared". Chou is afraid there is some inference in this and that there is actually a reference to a different agreement than the one he meant. There is only one agreement that he is in agreement with and that is the one that he alone prepared, with a second paragraph reading "The teams should be established within the areas of the Government troops as well as the Communist troops, keeping clear of places still under Russian

⁴¹ Benjamin H. Kizer, director of UNRRA in China.

⁴² Mao Tse-tung.

⁴³ See draft prepared by General Chou En-lai, p. 564.

⁴⁴ March 24, p. 617.

occupation". Your message did not refer to the "matter of record" clause and he is also afraid of that. In other words Chou will come with me tomorrow morning at 9 o'clock only if he is assured that Chang has in effect agreed to the agreement that he prepared as referred to above and agreed also to the matter of record clause. Please clarify, urgent. Yen-an Observer Group radio will stay open beginning at 4 a. m. to get your answer. If we are thinking of the same agreement all is well. If not, there will be some delay because Chou is not now in agreement with the idea that the teams should go in without instructions.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

*Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., to Colonel J. Hart Caughey,
at Yen-an*

[CHUNGKING,] 24 March 1946.

362. The agreement that General Chou prepared is the one with which General Chang agrees. The addition of the words "and fair" is likewise agreed to. With reference to the inclusion desired as a matter of record, General Chang states that matters are included therein which have never been discussed in conference or with General Chang individually. This pertains specially to the second sentence. Invite General Chou's attention to fact that this exceeds my authority likewise. General Chang cannot agree to include in record without further discussion. I urgently recommend that General Chou accept General Chang's concurrence in 3-point directive and return with you for further discussion on matter to be entered in record. I must carry out mission directed by General Marshall if General Chou refuses to return to Chungking. The Government member likely will accompany me. Invite General Chou's attention to his responsibility as a member of the Committee, and his obligation to aid China at this critical time.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

*Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., to Brigadier General Henry
A. Byroade, at Peiping*

[CHUNGKING,] 24 March 1946.

361. Believe agreement will be reached tomorrow for dispatch of teams. Formal directive will follow in separate radio. I know you share concern of all parties for expeditious entry so I need not stress

the urgency of this case. Prior to departure for U. S. General Marshall dictated the following:

“Instructions are being sent to cover the dispatch of field teams into Manchuria. These instructions are self-explanatory. I desire that great care be taken in the selection of the U. S. membership of the teams and that the American officer be given these secret instructions:

“In the event that a Russian demand is made for representation with the team during its transaction of business, the American will acquiesce with casual politeness, not consulting the Russian as to detailed procedure, but merely informing him of when a meeting is to be held or a visit is to be made by either party. The representative from the Central Government will make no comment whatever. It is hoped that the American can carry the ball without discussion. Should the Russian object to the procedure or the decisions in such a manner as to create an issue, the American should make certain that that issue is clearly defined, and if it is important and there is not, in his opinion, reasonable justification for the Russian attitude, the matter will be reported to the Executive Headquarters and in turn to the Committee of Three for consideration on this level[’].”

Another subject. Information received from War Department approving request for four key officers—details as to qualifications will be forwarded later.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54—D270: Telegram

Colonel J. Hart Caughey to Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr.

YENAN, 25 March 1946.

Chou and I returning at 1100 this morning with 10 other Communists. Your plane has breaks and therefore must get to Shanghai prior to trip to Manchuria. Repair will take 12 hours. Suggest it take off immediately for Shanghai upon return to Chungking and message be prepared to ComGenChina asking shops be held open tonight for that purpose. Technical information can follow after my arrival Chungking if this fits into your present plans. By this means plane can be in Peiping Tuesday for Wednesday Manchuria team trip which is earliest apparent possible date since Communist General involved is here awaiting for Tuesday ride to Peiping. Chou is returning with the following 3-point understanding; that the agreement is the one [he] prepared: that the inclusion of the matter for record will be discussed in Chungking; and that the Canton and Hankow situations are resolved in these same discussions. Don't know what effect these 3 points will have on the dispatch of teams but do know that Chang will have to be dealt with firmly if we are to accomplish ends. At least I have Chou.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., to General Marshall

CHUNGKING, 25 March 1946.

367. Instructions for Executive Headquarters regarding the entry of field teams into Manchuria have finally been agreed upon. General Chang Chih Chung, General Chou En-Lai who got back from Yen-an this afternoon, and I attended a 4-hour meeting beginning at 2100 this evening at which we reached the following agreement:

“Field teams, with carefully selected personnel, will be sent into Manchuria immediately under the following instructions:

1. The mission of the teams will pertain solely to readjustment of military matters.

2. The teams should operate within the areas of the Government troops as well as the Communist troops, keeping clear of places still under Russian occupation.

3. Teams should proceed to points of conflict or close contact between the Government and Communist troops to bring about a cessation of fighting and to make necessary and fair readjustment.”

It was also agreed to enter as matter of record into the minutes of the conference that “separate discussion will be held on Manchurian political matters to reach an early settlement. As to military matters, they will be further discussed by the Committee of Three.” We will have another meeting at 1600, 26th March for the purpose of signing the agreement and issuing press release. Teams have been alerted. Special instructions dictated prior to your departure have been sent today ⁴⁵ by separate eyes only radio.

740.00119 PW/3-2646 : Telegram

The Consul General at Shanghai (Josselyn) to the Secretary of State

SHANGHAI, March 26, 1946—6 p. m.

[Received 7 : 25 p. m.]

517. For Military Attaché from Rigg,⁴⁶ Mukden.

“ONION 21. Soviet troops withdrawing from Changchun. Malinovsky's headquarters reported already left. No indications Russians are leaving Harbin. Chinese military in Mukden complaining of too rapid Soviet withdrawal from Changchun plus usual failure of Soviets to inform them. BLUE's ⁴⁷ Chief of Staff at Changchun reported to have ordered Central Government agencies to return Peiping

⁴⁵ March 24.

⁴⁶ Maj. Robert R. Rigg, Assistant Military Attaché in China.

⁴⁷ Chinese Government.

as his military was to retreat south. However, BLUE Headquarters denies report here (sent to Embassy as 245, March 26, 6 p. m., repeated to Dept. as 517, copies by courier to Nanking, Peiping and Tientsin) admits possibility some army officers fleeing in fear Reds may arrive before BLUE's army can. Indications that Reds can occupy Changchun before BLUE army marching from Mukden can reach there. Chinese Headquarters Mukden estimates it will be 2 weeks before troops near Ssupingkai can reach Changchun and I estimate they correct in saying that Ssupingkai can be taken from Reds within 5 days. Sushan was taken from Reds.

According reliable Soviet sources, Soviet Union has submitted protest to Chinese Govt. over failure of nationalist military to provide security of Changchun Chinese railway. Note reportedly states that China and Russia each lose 26 million Manchurian dollars daily as long as railway does not operate. Russia asks to be permitted to garrison 6,000 troops in Mukden and proportionate number Russian soldiers at other railway town so as to protect rail lines.

Trains still not running north or south from Mukden. Nationalist forces moving north on foot. Badly handicapped by lack motor transport. This details last message."

JOSSELYN

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270: Telegram

*Mr. Walter S. Robertson to Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr.*⁴⁸

PEIPING, 26 March 1946.

1237. Reference 1224 this date.⁴⁹ It is the Communist members of teams at Potou, Tsinan, and Nankou who have stopped reconstruction on rail lines. Yesterday Communist Commissioner agreed to dispatch of messages from commissioners to those teams instructing that, in accordance with agreement reached by Committee [of] Three on recent inspection trip, reconstruction should not be held up pending clarification by Committee of Three as to what fortifications should be destroyed under Directive 4A Paragraph 2. Dispatch of these messages was afterwards held up by Communist Representative in railway section although such representative attended meeting at which agreement was reached. When approached again today Communist Commissioner frankly stated that overall situation had changed, that National Government was engaged in large troop movements, and he was unwilling to order reconstruction of railways until

⁴⁸ Relayed on March 31 to General Marshall from Chungking.

⁴⁹ See memorandum of March 27, *infra*.

Committee of Three had reached a decision regarding the destruction of fortifications. As our railway reconstruction program is seriously jeopardized by this development, it is earnestly hoped that Committee of Three, despite other urgent problems now under consideration, can reach decision on this question without delay.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., to General Chang Chih-chung

CHUNGKING, March 27, 1946.

Following has been received from the Three Commissioners for the Committee of Three:

[1224.] Reports from our teams indicate that railway reconstruction is progressing in most areas. However, American reports from Kaomi, Tsinan and Nankou state that reconstruction work is being stopped. One of the reasons given by Communist team member is that military fortifications have not been destroyed in accordance with instructions given in Directive No. 4A.⁵⁰ Executive Headquarters is also in receipt of message from twelve teams requesting interpretation of that provision in Directive 4A reading as follows: "Commanders will remove or destroy at once all mines, blockhouses, blockades, fortifications, or other military works on and along lines of communications which interfere with the operation of such lines." This statement has been given different interpretations by Nationalist and Communist representatives both here and in the field. The Communists contend that all fortifications on and along lines of communication interfere or potentially interfere with the operation of such lines. The Nationalists contend that only such fortifications should be destroyed that actually block operation and that certain pill-boxes are necessary to protect lines from banditry.

The last evening in Hankow at a meeting⁵¹ attended by the Committee of Three and the Three Commissioners, the U. S. Commissioner informed the Committee of Three of this situation and requested that Executive Headquarters be advised of the correct interpretation of the above statement. This is urgent unsettled problem which is creating many difficulties and we would appreciate your early consideration and advice.

Similar memorandum submitted to General G. C. Marshall and General Chou En-lai.

For General Gillem:
J. HART CAUGHEY
Colonel, G. S. C.

⁵⁰ See agreement of February 9 on restoration of communications, p. 422.

⁵¹ See meeting at Hankow, March 5, 1946, p. 503.

893.00/5-2846

*Memorandum by the Committee of Three to the Three Commissioners at Peiping*⁵²

INSTRUCTIONS FOR EXECUTIVE HEADQUARTERS REGARDING THE ENTRY OF FIELD TEAMS INTO MANCHURIA

We, General Chang Chih-chung, authorized representative of the National Government; General Chou En-lai, authorized representative of the Chinese Communist Party and General A. C. Gillem, Jr., acting for General G. C. Marshall; have agreed that Field Teams, with carefully selected personnel, will be sent into Manchuria immediately under the following instructions:

1. The mission of the teams will pertain solely to readjustment of military matters.
2. The teams should operate within the areas of the Government troops as well as the Communist troops, keeping clear of places still under Russian occupation.
3. Teams should proceed to points of conflict or close contact between the Government and Communist troops to bring about a cessation of fighting and to make the necessary and fair readjustments.

It is further agreed that included as a matter of record in the minutes of the Committee of Three conferences will be the following statement:

The Committee of Three will further discuss the military matters pertaining to Manchuria. As to political matters in Manchuria separate discussion will be held with a view to reaching an early settlement.

CHANG CHIH-CHUNG
*Representative of the National
Government*
CHOU EN-LAI
*Representative of the Chinese
Communist Party*
A. C. GILLEM, JR.
Representing General G. C. Marshall

CHUNGKING, March 26 [27,] 1946.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., to General Marshall

CHUNGKING, 27 March 1946.

373. Generalissimo called me for conference at noon yesterday, 26 March 1946, and asked that I pass to you the following information [:]

“As a result of U. S. attitude in refusing to accede to Russian request of postponing UNO the Russians have softened their attitude toward

⁵² Copy transmitted to the Secretary of State by General Marshall with his memorandum OSE 53 of May 28; received June 12.

Manchuria. The Soviet Ambassador presented to the Chinese Government a note to the effect that withdrawal of Soviet troops will be completed by the end of April. This note is quite unprecedented since Russians had not replied after repeated requests of the past 3 months to notes bearing on this matter.

To prove Soviet softening. The discussion on Sino-Soviet economic cooperation was conducted in Changchun Soviet Headquarters between the Soviet commander and Mr. Chan Chai-shi. Since Soviet troops did not withdraw by 1 February, Mr. Chan was ordered by Chinese Government to leave Changchun. Later Soviet authorities requested Chinese to return to continue discussions but Chinese refused and asked that discussions be held in Chungking. Soviet authorities then refused saying discussions should be in Changchun[;] yesterday, 25 March, the Soviet Ambassador visited the Chinese Foreign Minister saying that the Soviet Government was now willing to continue discussion [*discussing*] in Chungking the problem of economical cooperation in Manchuria.

Up to 2 days ago Soviet troops and Communist troops in Manchuria tried to create the atmosphere that when the Soviet troops withdrew they were not going to return sovereignty to the National Government troops. However a report received just yesterday indicated that when they withdraw they will return sovereignty to National troops and abide by the Sino-Soviet Treaty."

Generalissimo concludes from the above matters that Committee of Three should adopt firm attitude with respect to Russian activities in Manchuria and insure that any arrangements made are in furtherance of the Sino-Soviet Treaty.⁵³

New Subject. General Chou En-lai called on me at 1400 yesterday, 26 March 1946, and asked that I forward to you the following message[:]

"I deeply appreciate your cooperation and therefore, I wish to tell you frankly that before the accomplishment of the reorganization of the Government and the enactment of the draft Constitution, China cannot yet be said to have been insured of democracy and stability. On account of that, I am of the opinion that unless the loan ⁵⁴ is signed by the recognized Government, it will not be to the interest of the Chinese people and the cooperation between China and the United States of America."

In presenting this matter General Chou stated that in a previous

⁵³ General Marshall submitted this information to the Secretary of State in a memorandum of March 28, not printed.

⁵⁴ See vol. x, pp. 911 ff.

conference with you, you had informed him that loans to China would be predicated on (1) a stable Government and (2) peace in Manchuria.

Another Subject. I have been informed through sources which I have not yet been able to evaluate that the Communists do not propose to submit their demobilization and reorganization lists until they are assured that the reorganized Government will be satisfactory to them. At the same time I hear from low level National officers that the National Government does not intend to present formally its list, which is already prepared, until the Communists submit theirs.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., to General Marshall

CHUNGKING, 27 March 1946.

[379]. After a difficult series of meetings with the Committee of Three, we finally reached agreement regarding the instructions for field teams. We did not, as I indicated in my last message,⁵⁵ reach agreement by 4 o'clock yesterday due to the fact that Chou found it necessary to refer small changes, insisted upon by Chang the evening before, back to Yen-an for decision. Although we reached tentative agreement at 4 o'clock yesterday it was necessary to await Yen-an's reply. Early this morning Yen-an submitted favorable reply and by 10 o'clock the three of us had signed the agreement; the Directive to the Executive Headquarters was agreed on and dispatched; and a public announcement was prepared and issued for 11 o'clock release.⁵⁶ The agreement reads as follows:

[Here follows text of document printed on page 603.]

Committee of Three meets again this afternoon to continue discussions regarding the Canton and Hankow situations. These too will present difficulties although I remain optimistic as to an early solution. General Chou conditioned his return to Chungking upon satisfactory arrangements regarding these matters. It is my hope within a very short time these problems will also be resolved and the Committee of Three can then visit Manchuria. It may prove desirable to visit Hankow and Canton immediately upon return from Manchuria.

⁵⁵ Telegram No. 367, March 25, p. 600.

⁵⁶ Not printed.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting of Military Sub-Committee at House 28, General Marshall's Residence, Chungking, March 27, 1946, 4:15 p.m.

Present: General Chang Chih Chung
General Chou En-lai
General A. C. Gillem, Jr.

Also

present:	General Kuo	General Tung	Colonel Caughey
	General Lee	Mr. Chang	Captain Eng
	General Hsu		
	Colonel Pee		

GENERAL GILLEM: Will you express to the gentlemen my appreciation over the signing the papers this morning and getting that settled. It was a very great satisfaction to have completed that important mission and we have notified General Marshall that that has been done.

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang and General Chou both join to thank you for the efforts you have made for the past to [have] settled that problem.

GENERAL GILLEM: It is impossible for one man—it must be three. I was a little bit afraid that I was going to have to go to Manchuria by myself.

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang said that the two horses are giving you a little difficulty driving the carriage.

GENERAL GILLEM: We have settled that one problem, now we have two more.

GENERAL CHANG: This seems to be General Chang's last class to attend. That is, he has to go to Sinkiang day after tomorrow. The representative of the tribe arrived at Tihwa and is waiting for General Chang and he asks if perhaps you would let him graduate.

GENERAL GILLEM: If he performs well this afternoon we will do so. The problem that concerns us now, will be presented by General Chou. I will sit back and listen to the discussion and see if we can arrange matters satisfactorily.

GENERAL CHOU: I wish to say a few words on Manchuria and particularly since General Chang may be leaving for a short period soon I want to bring it up here. Regarding the mission of the teams it has been definitely stated by the Committee of Three and we have further agreed that military matters pertaining to Manchuria will be further discussed by this Committee while the political matters will be discussed separately. It therefore means that this Committee will continue to discuss on the military matters to bring about the cessation of hostilities and also on other matters after cessation of hostilities.

After the cessation of hostilities other problems will arise and there is one difference between Manchuria and China proper. That is if Government troops are going to enter certain places, there is a complete freezing in China proper. However this morning I have read a statement by the spokesman of the National Military Council. It seems to me that there is some question in this statement. This spokesman flatly denied that there is hostilities in Manchuria. We know this is not the view of the Committee of Three. Our view is that all hostilities have to be ceased and a solution should be found. If according to this spokesman, the fact that the Government attacked Communist troops cannot be called hostilities or if on the Communist side if they defend themselves, it should not be called hostilities, such assertions are not true. Our view is that whenever there are attacks or fighting these are hostilities and have to be ceased and I wish to make sure that this Committee of Three and the field teams all may have such an understanding. Now secondly, in the past when the Government started to move troops into Manchuria, the erstwhile Government representative, Chang Chun, has stated that the number of Government troops will not be large and on the U. S. forces side it has also promised to move only 5 armies. Now that figure has already been reached. However, I learn since there are hostilities now in Manchuria the Government intend to send more and we wish here to call the attention of the Government that if the troops to enter Manchuria are simply for the purpose of taking over then the present figure is large enough for this purpose. The present figure has also reached the amount fixed by the Army reorganization plan⁵⁷ to be disposed at [*in*] Manchuria and we also take into consideration the fact that all those divisions are Alpha divisions, fully equipped and trained. If more troops are sent up then there is the danger of further hostilities. According to the agreement, the stipulation of the cease fire agreement [*is*] the Government should inform the Executive Headquarters about the movement of troops and on the one hand as the amount of troops sent into Manchuria are unlimited then there exists the danger that the conflicts will be augmented. Since the field teams are going to be dispatched into Manchuria then in their presence everything should be brought up to the field team for discussion and both parties should report the military situation to the field team and the Committee of Three so that the Committee of Three have a reference to settle all the conflicts and other military problems. Therefore, it is my view and I formally propose that the Government would not send more troops into Manchuria and hope that the solution would be beneficial. Now regarding the dispatch of field teams to Manchuria

⁵⁷ The agreement of February 25, p. 295.

I hope that we will instruct the Executive Headquarters that they would first send the teams all to Mukden and there try to establish contact with troops of both parties. Try to get their representatives to Mukden and so that when the Committee of Three arrives in Mukden they can immediately contact their own people. After the three men arrive there they shall decide to what places the field teams shall be further dispatched. It seems to me only when the three man committee is getting familiarized with the actual situation would it be easy for them to make decisions.

GENERAL GILLEM: General Chang?

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang says that according to the reorganization plan the Government troops stationed in Manchuria will be five armies. The Government has no intention to exceed that number after reorganization. No intention to increase the troops in Manchuria after reorganization. After reorganization there will be only five armies in Manchuria. Furthermore, any movement of troops into Manchuria the Government will inform the Executive Headquarters in Peking so it will not be kept as a secret and it can't be a secret. General Chang talked to the responsible departments of the Government and the responsible officers of those departments have told General Chang that we have no intention at all to exceed that number, 5 armies, after reorganization. General Chang hasn't had a chance to bring it forward to the conferences. The responsible Government departments just informed General Chang that there are movements from Shantung Peninsula near Chefoo to Dairen of Communist troop movement by steamer and wooden barges carried out very secretly. We have received word that Communists moved troops overland in Shansi province. General Chang likes to take this opportunity to bring to General Chou's attention this information. It seems that the Government will move into Manchuria and will make a report on every movement to Executive Headquarters in Peking—there is no secrecy. It seems that if Communist troops are moved into Manchuria they can do it secretly without informing the Executive Headquarters in Peking. As both sides are all concerned to solve the Manchurian problem amicably so that is why General Chang is being very frank to make this statement this afternoon at this conference. He hopes that both sides will particularly stick to the agreement upon which both sides signed and not in any way violate the provisions and the spirit of those agreements. If we have farsightedness, we may see that after the demobilization and reorganization the Government will only have five armies in Manchuria while the Communists will have one army in Manchuria. If either side will bring many additional units into Manchuria it will create a problem of how to dispose them for there is no need to increase the forces into

Manchuria. If both sides will carry out the demobilization plan carefully then the so-called increasing numbers in Manchuria will cease to be a problem. Regarding another point raised by General Chou, whether the Government troops attack, or either side attacks, we now have shortly teams in Manchuria and they can act as the umpire to make study and observe which side is attacking and which side will be attacked and we can have that in the near future. Regarding the third point raised by General Chou about the teams after arriving in Mukden they will maintain liaison to all concerned, General Chang thinks that is a very good point and he has nothing to add.

GENERAL CHOU: With reference to the movement of Communist troops into other places the situation in Manchuria is that before January 10th the Communists have moved certain troops from Shantung, Jehol and Hopeh to Manchuria and the information received by the Ministry of Military Operations is true but after January 10th no troop movement whatever has been made. There may be some officers have individually come from Manchuria to China proper, but there have been no troop movements. It has been alleged that Communists have moved troops from Shantung to Manchuria and on this allegation the field team has surveyed this and found it untrue. This is evidence that such kind of allegation is not correct. Since the field teams will now be dispatched to Manchuria and they will be located in the areas of both armies and they can see the situation they can find out for themselves.

GENERAL GILLEM: I have made one point here that I would like to see if it has the concurrence of both of the representatives. That is that all the teams go initially to Mukden and from there they will be dispersed to areas where they can supervise and report for the benefit of the Committee of Three. Is that the wish of the two gentlemen?

General Chang and General Chou indicated that was the agreement.

GENERAL GILLEM: I believe it would be unreasonable to expect other than rumors from any source with reference to what actually is occurring inside Manchuria. We have no accurate information. Therefore the importance of the field teams is brought home at once. We must get them in to get accurate information. This will dispel some of the movements and allegations. Likewise the reports as to attacks and defenses, or in other words combat, can be verified which will be helpful to all concerned. If troop movements are reported as required by the stipulation, the Committee of Three can keep informed as to any violation of any agreement to which we are all party. I am sure that open and aboveboard methods are desirable from all points of view. Whether this committee can do more at this time with reference to these matters is somewhat questionable. We must depend

upon information at this time from first hand, accurate reports on the ground. I am open to any suggestion as to any action. We have settled the matter of the teams. Are there any other comments with reference to any of the other points made by either of the gentlemen?

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang agrees with General Gillem's view to have the teams go as soon as possible and then try to settle the situation down there. That seems to be the best way.

General Chou agrees.

GENERAL GILLEM: We are now preparing the necessary instructions to Peking. In view of the fact that General Chang said something about going day after tomorrow and that there may be a need for the Committee of Three to go shortly after the team can you give me any suggestion as to who will be his replacement?

GENERAL CHANG: Regarding General Chang's going to Sinkiang he had a talk to General Chou prior to the conference and he intended to discuss with General Gillem. He wishes to inform General Gillem that his departure was decided very suddenly, only by 11:30 this morning. The Government decided he should proceed to Tihwa because the representatives have already arrived on the 25th and General Chang must go to solve the problems. Before that he himself thought he would have time to go to Manchuria. There are at least five others named as successors and among them are Chen Cheng, Chang Chun. The Generalissimo is considering General Chang's successor.

GENERAL GILLEM: I would like to ask if the replacement to take General Chang's place will be given all the background on all the problems that have been discussed and all the problems that are confronting us in the future?

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang says he will discuss with his successor what has happened in the past, but if he leaves anything out, his staff can make any addition.

GENERAL GILLEM: I think General Chou will also bring it up if anything is left out. We are having a copy of the telegram drafted for the team and while we are waiting on that I would like to get some idea as to a suitable time that we might depart. We must allow the teams a few days to get in there and be oriented and we can make up a tentative time so necessary arrangements can be made for air transportation.

GENERAL CHANG: What is the opinion of General Gillem?

GENERAL GILLEM: It will take the team, this being the 27th, until at least the 29th to get to Mukden because we must transmit information there to them, at best the 28th. They must then go and from the information they have and contact the officers there. I think that

will take a day or two more. They must then join the units to which they propose to go. I do not believe it will be less than about 10 days. I think it will take that long before we could do any good. Suppose we tentatively set the time as about the 5th, around that would be two days and five days—one week approximately. As a target date, it may be one side or the other by a day or two because this is the 27th and that is out of the picture and that leaves three days more this month and 5 days making about one week as a target date. It is very important that we get there at the earliest time. However, we might get there too early as to be of no use because arrangements had not been made. I think about one week or eight days would be the target date. We do not know the weather conditions and reports indicate very heavy rains a day or two ago making movements very difficult so it might be a very difficult thing for the teams to get to their initial points and back in less time. We have a copy of the telegram now and in view of the importance of getting the teams in very early, please notice the second sentence.

(Captain Eng read the following: "Committee of Three met this afternoon and agreed that all teams for Manchuria initially proceed to Mukden and from there move out to critical areas after surveys in the Mukden area indicate which areas are most critical. (From Gillem for Committee of Three.) This is to be considered as a recommendation and not binding in case this will disrupt plans or delay departure of teams. In this connection the Committee of Three will soon visit Mukden in which case the Committee will assist in determining the critical areas and will make recommendations as to any readjustments of the field teams it deems necessary." [])

General Chang and General [Chou] agreed to dispatch of message.

GENERAL CHOU: General Chou calls your attention to the fact that you said the Committee of Three will proceed to Mukden after ten days. By that time General Chang might be back already.

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang hopes that he may be back in ten days so that he may take this trip to Manchuria. He has never been to Manchuria before. He certainly was looking forward to going. The Generalissimo also made the same remark—after a fortnight you may have come back to Chungking.

GENERAL GILLEM: I hope so. We shall miss him on this trip very much making his fine speeches like he did at Yen-an. What is the next item. Is there any other comments on this before we take up the next. Colonel Caughey is going to send the telegram.

(Had a short intermission at this point.)

[For remainder of text, discussing problems of Canton and Hankow areas, see page 621.]

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

*Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., to Brigadier General
Henry A. Byroade, at Peiping*

[CHUNGKING,] 27 March 1946.

381. Committee of Three met this afternoon and agreed that all teams for Manchuria initially proceed to Mukden and from there move out to critical areas after surveys in the Mukden area indicate which areas are most critical. This is to be considered as a recommendation and not binding in case this will disrupt plans or delay departure of teams. In this connection the Committee of Three will soon visit Mukden in which case the Committee will assist in determining the critical areas and will make recommendations as to any readjustments of the field teams it deems necessary.

740.00119 PW/3-2746 : Telegram

The Consul General at Mukden (Clubb) to the Secretary of State

MUKDEN, March 27, 1946—noon.

[Received April 6—3:40 a. m.]

4. Fushun was recaptured by Govt. forces 22nd evidently without battle. Chinese official states Soviets occupy India station with about 20 civilians and base property claim on ground mine belonged to railway. Related electric power plant now produces 30,000 kw of which only 3,000 supplied Mukden. City now without electricity except intermittently, water supply has failed and regular telegraph service stopped.

Please repeat Chungking [and] Moscow.

Soviets are allegedly demanding Peiping-Mukden Railway repair shops at Huangkutun on ground they need them. Aforecited source states Chinese have had no success in getting back industrial enterprises taken over by Soviets who merely refer matter Moscow without ever reply returning.

ReConstel March 24, 9 a. m. Rigg now informed by previous source that Soviet representations re traffic stoppage were oral with demand for compensation. Soviet rate dollars 26 million daily for loss suffered thru stoppage, and that Soviets fixed April 15 as a deadline for restoration traffic. This denied by Chinese Military. Inadvertently Soviet official indicates Soviet Army Headquarters is still maintained in Mukden.

Chinese official stated that although headquarters personnel has removed, it maintains an "administrative office". Uniformed Soviet officers without unit or rank insignia are frequently met and [apparent omission] activity is to be assumed.

CLUBB

740.00119 PW/3-2746 : Telegram

*The Counselor of Embassy in China (Smyth) to the Secretary of State*⁵⁸

CHUNGKING, March 27, 1946—3 p. m.

[Received 9 p. m.]

577. This afternoon Vice Minister [for] Foreign Affairs Liu Chieh informed me that Foreign Office replied today to Soviet Ambassador's note (see Embassy's 552 March 23), stating that Chinese Govt. agreed to date, end of April, for withdrawal Soviet forces from Manchuria, but requesting that Soviet Govt. furnish definite schedule of Soviet troop withdrawals.

SMYTH

VI. AGREEMENTS TO REMOVE TO COMMUNIST AREAS COMMUNIST TROOPS NEAR CANTON AND HANKOW WHO WERE SURROUNDED BY GOVERNMENT TROOPS

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

*General Marshall to Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer*⁵⁹

[CHUNGKING,] 9 March 1946.

306. We have a dangerous spot in vicinity of Canton, about 3,000 Communists driven into hiding by Government troops under Chang Fa Kwei⁶⁰ who declares them bandits. The proposal is to remove Communists by water to Chefoo. Please query Cooke⁶¹ as to availability of LST or other vessels for such evacuation at an early date. I would suggest that a small port distant from Canton be selected for assembly, medical examination and preparation, etc. General Chou⁶² has man in Chungking who knows present hide-outs of Communist personnel.

⁵⁸ Repeated by the Department to the Embassy in the Soviet Union in telegram No. 590, March 30, 1 p. m.

⁵⁹ Commanding General, U. S. Forces, China Theater.

⁶⁰ Commanding Chinese troops in Kwangtung.

⁶¹ Vice Adm. Charles M. Cooke, Jr., commander of the U. S. Seventh Fleet.

⁶² Chou En-lai, Chinese Communist representative on the Committee of Three.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

*Mr. Walter S. Robertson*⁶³ to General Marshall

PEIPING, 11 March 1946.

810. Subject is the Canton situation. Conditions as reported in our 328, 357 and 495 remain unchanged.⁶⁴ We still have no indication that General Chang Fa Kwei recognizes either the authority of the Executive Headquarters or the presence of Communist troops in his area. The position of our team there is untenable as they have been able to accomplish nothing during their stay of approximately 6 weeks. Believe you have all background information concerning situation. Request action by the Committee of Three to break stalemate before your departure for United States.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr.,⁶⁵ to *Mr. Walter S. Robertson*,
at Peiping

[CHUNGKING,] 13 March 1946.

326. Prior to General Marshall's departure to the United States he had on many occasions mentioned the unsatisfactory condition in the Canton area to Generals Chang⁶⁶ and Chou collectively and individually. 810 refers. On 9 March at a Committee of Three meeting⁶⁷ the overall situation was discussed with the following result. General Chou was very anxious that something be done to alleviate the situation and at the same time General Chang remained noncommittal as to "recognition" of these forces as Communists. General Chou stated that there were some 3000 Communist forces involved and that these had been forced into isolated places the locations of which only he and a few other Communist leaders knew. Chang Fa Kwei is in town and Chou and Chang have seen him without satisfactory results. Seeing no immediate solution to the idea of "recognition" of these forces, General Marshall dispatched, with Chang's and Chou's knowledge, a radio⁶⁸ to Commanding General China asking him to query Cooke as to availability of LST's or other vessels for evacuation by water to Chefoo at an early date. In this same radio General Marshall suggested that a small port distant from Canton be selected for assembly, medical examination, preparation, etc. General Wedemeyer has not replied. You will be kept informed.

⁶³ American Commissioner at Executive Headquarters, Peiping.

⁶⁴ February 11, 13, and 24, pp. 430, 433, and 441, respectively.

⁶⁵ Acting for General Marshall who left China on March 11 for consultation in Washington.

⁶⁶ General Chang Chih-chung, Chinese Government representative on the Military Sub-Committee and the Committee of Three.

⁶⁷ For minutes of meeting of Military Sub-Committee, see p. 516.

⁶⁸ See telegram No. 306, March 9, p. 613.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Chou En-lai to Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr.

CHUNGKING, 15 March 1946.

Regarding the implementation of the Cease Fire Agreement⁶⁹ in Kwangtung, and the withdrawal and demobilization of the Communist-led troops in that province the following memorandum has been forwarded to General Chang Chih-chung:

"1. Owing to the fact that the military authority in Kwangtung has failed to recognize the due status of the Communist-led East River and Hainan Anti-Japanese Brigades in time, the eighth field team, which has arrived at Canton on January 25th, has at no time been able to establish connection with the Brigades mentioned above. Nor could the latter, being rounded up and dismembered, send representative to Canton or Weichow to contact the field team.

"2. Seeing that agreement has now been reached by the Conference of Three to the effect that the Communist-led Anti-Japanese units in Kwangtung should come under the Cease Fire Agreement and that General Marshall has promised to see what arrangement can be made on the U. S. part to provide shipping facilities for the movement of the over three thousand armed officers and enlisted men of the two Brigades from Kwangtung coast to Chefoo, Shantung, a basic agreement has thereby been reached on the problem which has heretofore been facing the eighth field team.

"3. In view of this fact, I am submitting herewith to you four concrete proposals, which, upon your approval, I beg to be transmitted to General Chang Fa-kwei in Canton for action:

a) The Nationalist troops in Kwangtung are requested to cease attacks on the Communist-led Anti-Japanese units in Kwangtung, allow the eighth field team in Canton to establish free and unrestricted contact with the East River and Hainan Anti-Japanese Brigades, and render assistance and safe conduct for their free movement.

b) In order to contact and assemble the East River and Hainan Anti-Japanese Brigades, which have been rounded up and dismembered, the eighth field team in Canton shall through General Tseng Sheng, Commanding general, and General Lin Ping, Political Commissar of the East River Anti-Japanese Brigade, and General Feng Pai-chu, Commanding General of the Hainan Anti-Japanese Brigade or their representatives transmit the demobilization and redistribution order with reference to these units, and request the Kwangtung military authority to guarantee the safe conduct of the afore-mentioned persons in those places.

c) After the afore-mentioned persons have established contact with the Communist-led troops under reference, the field team shall despatch representatives to places reported by Generals Tseng Sheng, Lin Ping and Feng Pai-chu or their representatives to supervise the implementation of the Cease Fire Order, and to

⁶⁹ January 10; see memorandum by the Committee of Three to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, p. 125.

arrange within the shortest time the assemblage of the dismembered units along the East River and in Hainan, to Tapeng Peninsula and Tanhsien, Hainan, respectively, pending withdrawal on board of U. S. naval vessels.

While the afore-mentioned units are on move to locations assigned for assemblage, the military authority in Kwangtung shall be requested to guarantee the safe conduct of those units, the provision of transportation facilities, their unrestricted purchase of food and supplies. Also, liaison officers shall be exchanged to facilitate the field team work and the successful completion of the troop transfer.

When the troops have completed assemblage at the Tapeng Peninsula and Tanhsien, pending withdrawal to Chefoo, the Kwangtung military authority is hereby specifically requested not to launch any military attack or raiding action, nor to impose a blockade on food purchase, trade, communication, telegraphic and post service under whatever pretext.

d) In addition to the over three thousand men to be transferred, the Communist Anti-Japanese units in Kwangtung shall further have some 3000 men to be demobilized owing to age or physical unfitness. These persons shall after demobilization be sent home or employed otherwise, in accordance with the Demobilization Plan.⁷⁰ With reference to those demobilized persons, the Kwangtung military authority is requested to extend full protection for their security, and prohibit persecution under any pretext. In adherence to the Demobilization Plan, those demobilized officers and enlisted men shall each receive a discharge paper, enjoy a treatment in common with the other demobilized officers and enlisted men, and have the full freedom of residence and employment.

"4. It is further requested that you will duly instruct the military and civil authorities in Kwangtung to release all the personnel of the Communist-led Anti-Japanese military units or local civil authorities, who have been arrested or captured during or after the War of Resistance, and are still in custody.

"Your comments will be highly appreciated."

Faithfully Yours

[Signature in Chinese]
(CHOU EN-LAI)

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

*Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer to Lieutenant General
Alvan C. Gillem, Jr.*

SIANGHAI, 22 March 1946.

26361. Cite 306. Admiral Cooke advises he cannot make commitment to accomplish requested lift until completion of study of LST availability resulting from directives Seventh Fleet has just received.

⁷⁰ February 25, p. 295.

Boca Tigris anchorage approximately 30 miles south of Canton appears to be best POE.⁷¹ Staging area is available but Chinese controlled lighterage will be required for loading.

Movement cannot be accomplished without cooperation from General Chang Fa-kuei. If Chang is given very firmly worded directive by Gimo⁷² believe he will cooperate, at least to point of not obstructing move.

In event Communists are in Tai Peng Peninsula area Navy may consider Tai Po (11410-2226) as POE.

Following information required for joint planning :

a. Are women and/or children included in the strength estimate? If females are with the group will they be moved?

b. Who will provide rations and medical supplies for this group while in the staging area and during the water lift? Estimate at least 3 weeks will be required at staging area to accomplish medical inoculations required if U. S.-manned shipping will be used.

c. Will Chefoo landing be acceptable to CCP⁷³ forces now in control of Chefoo?

d. Approximate present location of subject forces needed here to assist in final selection of POE and estimate of closing date at POE.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem to General Chang Chih-chung

CHUNGKING, March 24, 1946.

MY DEAR GENERAL CHANG: I have received the following report from General Teng Tai-yuan, Chinese Communist Party, with reference to the Hankow situation, which is furnished to you in connection with our conference of this date:

1. On the 13th inst., one regiment of the Government 13th Division in Ying-shan (113° 50', 31° 38') attacked on Chang-chia-tien, Liu-chia-tien, Chen-chia-po, Min-chia-chung in the New Fourth Army area, south of Ying-shan. The Communist-led troops are forced to retreat from those places and the Government troops are still advancing.

2. At 6 a. m. of the 14th inst., one regiment of the Government New 15th Division in Hwang-an (114° 40', 31° 25') and Hokow (114° 30', 31° 25') attacked on the troops of the 5th Division in Big Chin-shan and Small Chin-shan south of Hwang-an and occupied these places on 15th. The 5th Division suffered a casualty of more than twenty

⁷¹ Port of embarkation.

⁷² Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, President of the National Government of the Republic of China.

⁷³ Chinese Communist Party.

men with the commander of the Second Battalion of the Seventh Regiment heavily wounded. Now, six regiments of the Government troops in that area have concentrated and started a new attack.

3. On the 14th inst., the 44th and 45th regiments of the Government troops attacked on the troops of the 5th Division in Ong-chia-tien, Kuo-chia-ho and Yang-tze-shan, all in the south of Hwang-an ($114^{\circ} 41'$, $31^{\circ} 25'$). The battle is still going on.

4. On the 15th inst., one regiment of the Government 135th Division of 76th Army attacked Ta-tze-ho, north of Sui-hsien ($113^{\circ} 27'$, $31^{\circ} 42'$). Chow Bing [*Pin*], an officer of the 5th Division, who was sent to negotiate for a cease-fire, was detained in the Headquarters of the 135th Division. He has not been released up to now, and nobody knows what happened to him. The Government troops are still attacking on that area.

5. On the 18th inst., the troops of the Government New 15th Division coming from Liu-chia-ho, twenty kilometers northeast of Ho-kow ($114^{\circ} 30'$, $31^{\circ} 25'$) attack on the 4th Regiment of the Independent 2nd Brigade in Kuo-chia-shan, northeast of Liu-chia-ho.

6. On the 20th inst., the troops of the Government 34th Division of the 72nd Army, coming from Ho-kow ($114^{\circ} 30'$, $31^{\circ} 25'$), attacked on Wu-tze-tan, northeast of Ho-kow. The battle is still raging and the government troops have reached a place only half a kilometer from Yu-wang-miao, the rear of the 5th Division.

General Teng proposes that in order to remedy the critical situation, the following measures should be taken:

1. A strict order which provides the immediate cessation of assault on the 5th Division and the withdrawal to the original position be issued as soon as possible to the Government troops. This is to be followed by the investigation of the Field Team of Hankow in the areas of confliction.

2. The routes for the transportation of foodstuff be opened and permission be given to the purchasing officers. The security of the 5th Division officers, as well as that of the purchasing officers, be ensured. It is requested that the purchasing officers who were sent to Kwang-ying-tang to get food and arrested without any provocation, the sixteen officers, including Lee Hsien Hwa and Tai Chieh, and three soldiers who were sent by the Eastern Hupeh Military District to the south of Lo-an, and the liaison officer, Chow Pin, who was sent for negotiation and arrested by the Government 135th Division, all be released. An apology be made to the Communists by the Government.

3. The CNRRA ⁷⁴ is requested to take good care of that area accord-

⁷⁴ Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

ing to a previous arrangement by sending enough food and necessary articles for the people concerned.

4. It is requested that a loan of 1,000,000,000 be granted by the Government to the 5th Division to meet the emergency of the food shortage.

5. An immediate arrangement be made for the borrowing and exchange of food.

Sincerely,

A. C. GILLEM, JR.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Draft of Directive to the Executive Headquarters and the Eighth Field Team, Prepared by General Chou En-lai

(1) The eighth field team shall immediately establish contact with General Tseng Sheng, Commander, General Wang Tsue-jae, Vice-Commander, and General Lin Ping, Political Commissar of the East River Brigade, and through Generals Lin and Tseng establish contact with General Feng Pai-chu, commander of the Hainan Brigade. It shall further notify the military and civil authorities in Kwangtung to provide transportation facilities for the aforementioned generals and their representatives and staffs.

(2) After establishing contact with the commanders of the aforementioned Communist-led units, the team shall immediately send liaison officers to the locations of the scattered Communist-led units along the East-River and in Hainan Island, to undertake the collection of those units, and their further assemblage at the ports of embarkation in East Kwangtung and Hainan. During and after the assemblage, pending embarkation, the team shall notify the Kwangtung military and civil authorities to give them facility without any restriction in regard to transportation, food purchase, and telegraphic and postal service.

(3) The Tapeng Peninsula on East Kwangtung coast and Tanhsien in Hainan are tentatively assigned as the ports for embarkation. The Executive Headquarters shall arrange with the U. S. Forces as to the number of ships required for the transportation of the over three thousand men, and the date of the ships' arrival, while the field team shall find out with Generals Feng, Tseng and Lin the exact figure of armed personnel to be transported.

(4) While the units are moving towards and awaiting embarkation at those two ports, the team shall notify the Kwangtung military and civil authorities to adhere strictly to the provisions of the Cease Fire Agreement, and to protect those units for safety. In order to be perfectly sure on this point, the Executive Headquarters or the field team

shall send liaison team to the locations of assemblage to supervise the execution of the order, and to instruct the Nationalist and Communist-led troops to exchange liaison officers with each other so as to avoid any untoward accident.

(5) The field team shall pay full consideration to, and assume the responsibility, in conformity with the demobilization plan, for the disposition of the remnant persons of the units, who are to be demobilized. The team shall notify the Kwangtung military and civil authorities, that the demobilized persons of those units be treated without any prejudice, and protection be granted for their safety.

Marshall Mission Files. Lot 54-D270

Draft of Directive to the Executive Headquarters and Field Team, Hankow, Prepared by General Chou En-lai on March 26, 1946

1. With a view to facilitate the execution of the Army Reorganization plan,⁷⁵ it is decided, that, of the 60,000 Communist-led forces in the Central Military Region, 40,000 armed officers and men shall be moved to North-Kiangsu or North China, for securing food supplies and being ready for reorganization, 20,000 shall be demobilized on the spot, and 3,000 unfitted for service owing either to age or health condition—shall be shipped from the Yangtze port to North Kiangsu for health restoration. The completion of the movement is set for one month. The line of transit and other detail matters pertaining to the movement shall be worked out by the Executive Headquarters within ten days in accordance with the directive of the Conference of Three, and be executed under the supervision of the field team.

2. The Government assumes the responsibility for making loans, both in the form of food and money to the subject troops, so as to meet their supply needs over the entire period of preparing for and executing the movement and demobilization. The Communist Party shall return those loans in the form of food at other agreed places. For the above purpose a detail plan shall be worked out by the Conference of Three.

3. With a view to facilitate this movement, the field team shall notify the Generalissimo's Headquarters at Wuhan and the Pacification Headquarters at Chengchow to the effect that, being in conformity with the Cease Fire Agreement, they should immediately issue orders to all government troops concerned to lift the siege and blockade over the Communist troops in that area, and to destroy all fortifications in its vicinity. The field team shall also notify all military and civil authorities in Hupeh, Honan, Anhwei, and other provinces through

⁷⁵ Agreement of February 25, p. 295.

which the subject Communist troops shall pass to extend such facilities, as labor supply, food purchase, quartering etc. along the entire line of transit, to strictly abide by the terms of the Cease Fire Agreement and to give safe conduct to the subject troops. The Communist troops shall also promise that while on the move they would at no place make any delay other than those being specified. To ensure the adherence of the foregoing points the Executive Headquarters, or the Field team, shall send, for supervisory purpose, liaison teams to accompany the troops movement, and also to effect the exchange of liaison officers between the relevant troops of both parties, making sure of having no unforeseen incidents.

4. To effect the demobilization of the 20,000 men, the Chinese Communist Party shall set up on the spot a Demobilization Committee, which deals with the detail matters according to the demobilization plan. The Executive Headquarters shall have two additional field teams located at Hsuanhwatien and Sangshutien, to supervise the implementation of the demobilization plan. The Government authorities shall refrain themselves from such actions as showing disfavor to the demobilized personnel of the subject troops. They should issue explicit orders for the protection of the life and property of the latter.

5. In order to accomplish the lift, the 3,000 unarmed, non-abled men shall be assembled at Hankow, and the Executive Headquarters shall make arrangement with the U. S. Forces or the Chinese Government with regard to the number of boats required and the date on which the boats will arrive at Hankow. The field team shall accompany the lift, and supervise the arrival of those men at the Communist area in North-Kiangsu.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting of Military Sub-Committee at House 28, General Marshall's Residence, Chungking, March 27, 1946, 4:15 p. m.

Present: General Chang Chih Chung
 General Chou En-lai
 General A. C. Gillem, Jr.

Also present:⁷⁶ General Kuo General Tung Colonel Caughey
 General Lee Mr. Chang Captain Eng
 General Hsu
 Colonel Pee

[For first part of these minutes dealing with the entry of teams into Manchuria, see page 606.]

⁷⁶ Names listed in three columns in these and similar minutes are respectively those of representatives and their assistants of the Chinese National Government, the Chinese Communist Party, and the United States.

GENERAL GILLEM: I think it is time for the school to come to order.

GENERAL CHOU: Regarding the Kwangtung problem. In the past I have submitted a memorandum⁷⁷ to General Chang and General Marshall and General Chang had a discussion with General Chang Fa Kuei on this matter and the same thing has been done by me. General Chang Fa Kuei said he must get an official order from the Government. Of course at this juncture whether there is anything wrong in the past I do not want to recall that. It seems that the Government should issue an order to the General Chang Fa Kuei giving instructions on the transfer and demobilization of the Communist troops in that part. In addition to that the Executive Headquarters should also issue specific order to the field team regarding matters pertaining to integration and demobilization. The transfer of those troops will be carried out in two parts, one in east of Canton and the other in Hainan to Chefoo. The demobilization personnel require the protection from the local government authorities and supervision on the party of the field team for the implementation of the transfer and demobilization. For this purpose it is necessary that a directive should be issued to the field team. A directive has been prepared by me some time ago⁷⁸ and I wish to submit it for discussion and we can proceed to discuss the Hankow matter.

GENERAL CHANG: When General Marshall was in Chungking, in one of the meetings of the Committee of Three,⁷⁹ the following principle had been agreed upon. The Communist troops in the East River in Canton should be evacuated to Chefoo, from 2 to 3 thousand. The Government should agreed to designate a port for embarkation and General Marshall also said he would approach Admiral Cooke to get necessary transportation. General Chang has reported the foregoing to the Government and the Government has already taken action. Regarding the detailed arrangements, General Chang thinks that could be discussed by the 8th field team because the team is already on the spot—they can make those arrangements more practically. General Chang thinks the proper procedure should be as follows. The team on the spot [should] try to solve those detailed technical problems. If they get into some difficulties they will refer them to Executive Headquarters. If Executive Headquarters fail to solve those points then they will refer that to Chungking. That is the proper procedure. We haven't received any request or any report from the Executive Headquarters or from the 8th field team so why not let the field team deal with the local situation. If now on the highest level we make some decision it may not be practical to the local.

⁷⁷ Memorandum of March 15, p. 615.

⁷⁸ Undated draft, p. 619.

⁷⁹ On March 9; see p. 516.

situation and circumstances. The points proposed by General Chou seem to be those technical arrangements of detailed arrangement on the spot. If we issue that to the field teams, it seems that the highest level are doing the job of the team. General Chang understands that General Chou is very concerned with the situation in Canton. So he proposed that the Committee of Three send a message to the Executive Headquarters asking them what had been done in Canton. What is the present status in Canton and have them report back.

GENERAL CHOU: General Chou says it is true that the draft he has prepared contains many points of a technical nature. However, the work of a field team in Canton has had many handicaps because the Communist troops in that area have not up to now been recognized by General Chang Fa Kuei, therefore, the teams are not permitted to move freely to contact troops. In the field team it has been raised that the Communist troops are stationed in two places, along the East River and Hainan Island. However the field team could not yet establish liaison with those troops. We must now send General Chang Fa Kuei instruction so he definitely recognizes the status of the Communist troops. After the Government has instructed him on this matter, if it has not already done so, we must ask the Government how the present situation is. It is not so important to ask Executive Headquarters in comparison to asking the Government. General Chou has some officer here to go down to locate the Communist troops, but he is a little afraid to send him down to General Chang Fa Kuei if he insists on his original attitude.

GENERAL CHANG: General Chou says that General Chang Fa Kuei in Canton does not recognize the status of the field team down there—the jurisdiction of the team[—]and General Chang thinks that we must get first hand information regarding the current status from the Executive Headquarters as a basis for discussion.

GENERAL GILLEM: I would just like to make one comment after listening to both sides. It seems to me that there is a considerable amount to be said on both sides to date. I believe that the solution suggested by General Chang has considerable merit. That is the team should do it, but on the other hand, I think the situation in this particular place is unusual. First of all, we must insist that the subordinate headquarters, General Chang Fa Kuei, recognizes the fact that he must conform to orders like any other officer, in so far as cease fire is concerned.

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang would like to assure the gentlemen here that the Government has already sent instructions to General Chang Fa Kuei to recognize the presence of Communist troops in Canton area and have sent instructions to him to comply with the

cease fire order. General Chang believes that there is no fighting in Canton area at present. If there should be any fighting the team on the spot they [*there?*] can wire to the Executive Headquarters and then in turn to the Committee of Three informing us of the situation down there. Up to date there is no report of that sort and it follows clearly that there is no fighting in that area so the only thing for them to do is to make the arrangements of a technical nature for evacuation.

GENERAL CHOU: General Chou says the situation is different from what General Chang has just stated. As a matter of fact the field team is not in a position to submit any report because they are unable to establish liaison with the Chinese Communist troops and therefore they have nothing to report and nothing to do. At that time the field team has asked the Executive Headquarters for instruction and in accordance with reports the Executive Headquarters was awaiting for the Committee of Three to go down to Canton to settle the matter. However, we later cancelled the trip down to Canton so the field team has been awaiting all the time and have no report. If we don't find a solution for them they would continue to wait. Another cause for delay is General Chang Fa Kuei's coming down to Chungking on March 20th, so [was absent?] nearly two weeks and the field team had no commanding general to contact. Now General Chang Fa Kuei has returned to Canton, but it is still unknown whether he has recognized the Communist troops and allowed the field team to establish contact with them. So a decision has to be made here. Otherwise we can visualize that the field team would simply go on waiting and do nothing.

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang has two points in mind. He doesn't think that the situation in Canton is a very complicated problem. He views the correct steps to take as follows: Firstly, the Committee of Three to wire Executive Headquarters and they in turn forward a message to the 8th field team asking what the situation is in Canton area and the difficulties they come across. If, by any chance, the three members of the field team cannot agree upon a report then either the American member may report directly to the Executive Headquarters or the three members report to their superiors of the situation and then we will be informed of the situation. With that information we can proceed to discuss the problems more intelligently. Secondly, General Chang is willing to approach the responsible Government departments to send orders to General Chang Fa Kuei again directing him to allow the field teams to proceed to the disputed area and make necessary readjustment. Regarding this particular problem a basic agreement has already been reached so the present problem is how to carry it out. By asking the field team and General Chang

to report back it will only take a few days and then we can get ahold of the data and the real situation in that area.

GENERAL CHOU: General Chou says, of course, we can go through the proper procedure and the proposal made by General Chang, but on account of the fact that in the past General Chou has talked personally with General Chang Fa Kuei and the result was practically nil and General Chang Fa Kuei refused to see General Chou for a second time and now General Chang has again returned he does not know his present attitude toward this matter. Therefore, General Chou is thinking that he should send a representative down from Chungking to Canton. This officer has come here from the Communist troops in Kwangtung so he knows the whereabouts and the exact actual conditions and General Chou will send one person to accompany him and General Chou asks the Government to give him a passport so that he can introduce him to Chang Fa Kuei so that they might talk personally on this matter and through General Chang Fa Kuei to accompany the field team to contact the Communist forces.

GENERAL GILLEM: I have a possible solution. I would try to present this just as a point. I think we might be able to work it out. General Chang has said that the problem is very easy so we can expect his help. Obviously the cessation of hostilities order applies to all parts of China, therefore it applies to Canton. It appears that General Chang Fa Kuei has not completely carried out the order from information which has been given to me. Therefore, I suggest that the necessary instruction be given directly by the necessary higher headquarters to General Chang Fa Kuei to recognize the Communist troops. My information indicates that General Chang Fa Kuei desires a direct instruction to so inform him that he must recognize the Communists. Step two. The Government give a safe conduct to the Communist officer to proceed to this area and contact General Chang Fa Kuei and I suggest that Colonel Caughey accompany him. Step three. General Wedemeyer will be here tomorrow and I will see whether the ship has been arranged for so the ship's officers can contact the field team. Based upon the report from Colonel Caughey and the Communist officer we will issue a directive to Peking tell them to so inform and direct the field team. This is merely a point of discussion and I have not consulted General Chou whether he wants Colonel Caughey to go or not. That is merely my suggestion, the solution which I think will solve this problem. This is not submitted with the idea that we cannot get correct information but in a desire to help to solve this problem.

GENERAL CHOU: General Chou entirely accepts General Gillem's proposal. He says that in this way we can on the one hand inform

the field team about the decision of the Committee of Three and on the one [*other?*] hand we may wire Peking of our decisions and General Chang will also inform General Chang Fa Kuei about it. As to the matter that Colonel Caughey shall accompany General Lin to go to Canton, General Chou fully concurs. In this way they may establish contact with the Communist representatives as well as with General Chang Fa Kuei. The liaison might be quickly established with the Communist troops. If General Chang Fa Kuei agrees that he will carry out everything in accordance with the cease fire agreement then, of course, the subsequent work can be taken up by the field team. General Chou has now in his mind to send down two persons. The one is the one who came up from Kwangtung who knows the whereabouts of the forces and the other person will talk to General Chang Fa Kuei to improve the relations with him so that it would facilitate the work of the field team.

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang agrees with General Gillem's proposal in principle but he likes to clear himself on several points. Firstly, if Colonel Caughey will accompany the Communist representative to Canton then how about a Government representative in that party to make it a sort of a representation of the Committee to make a cessation of the Canton situation. If that idea can be adopted then one of the steps is not necessary as the Government representative may take with him the necessary directive to General Chang Fa Kuei. General Chang agrees in principle on sending some officers to Canton to find out the situation down in that area, but he still feels little concerned over one respect. That is, when General Chang commanded troops in the field he himself would not feel right if a superior did something without notifying him, disregarding him. If now we are sending a group from the Committee of Three without informing Peking that will jeopardize the prestige of the Executive Headquarters in Peking. So [he] has in mind in order not to jeopardize the status of the Executive Headquarters will it be more advisable for the Committee of Three to send a directive to the Executive Headquarters in Peking instructing them to send another party consisting of three sides to Canton and to help the team already down there. If that can be adopted then General Chang thinks that will ease his mind over the Executive Headquarters, but if General Gillem thinks it is better to send a party from Chungking he also [will] have no objection.

GENERAL GILLEM: I would like to present a point which may assist in clearing up the situation. I am thoroughly in accord with the principle he has just made about a commander being informed of someone else coming in. I would feel the same way. Possibly you recall that before General Marshall left he told me that he wanted me to visit Canton.

GENERAL CHANG: No, I didn't.

GENERAL GILLEM: Well, he did want me to go there. I think Peking is going to be very busy with Manchuria for the next few days. It is always possible that information is not correct and General Chang Fa Kuei may conform definitely to the orders. Therefore as a representative from this group may go and determine that our information is incorrect and as this committee works as a whole rather than as individuals it might be desirable if General Chou has no objection, as I nominated one man I will nominate Colonel Pee as the representative. We are very anxious to get this problem settled. I think that by this preliminary mission we can make our directive in an intelligent way and accomplish the problem. I am not trying to usurp General Chang's prerogative of nominating his officer. I started and I was just completing it. He can, of course, assign anyone else. If that solution is reasonably satisfactory to the two officers concerned I suggest that we suspend school and we can take the other problem tomorrow. Will that be all right.

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang said that he has no other jurisdiction over the person of Colonel Pee inasmuch as Colonel Pee is the personal aide to the Generalissimo.

GENERAL GILLEM: I apologize, but I was simply trying to bring this to a head.

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang just pointed out the indispensability of Colonel Pee.

(At this point Colonel Pee plaintively pleaded his plainness.)

GENERAL GILLEM: I recognize that indispensability.

GENERAL CHOU: General Chou says it is very well that now we have decided to send representatives to Canton to get the correct information on the spot and try to solve the matter and so that the Committee of Three would also be well informed about the actual conditions. Now since the [cessation of] hostilities has to be applicable to all areas I would like to take this opportunity to point out that on Hainan Island the Communist forces have been there for 8 years during the war so we have therefore also suggested that they should be evacuated together with those to the east of Canton. At the present time we only deal with troops to the east of Canton. Maybe I have not stressed accurately the presence of Communist troops in Hainan Island. It seems to be desirable to send one representative from each party so they can work as a group and cooperate with each other and they should come back again. So on my part I desire I [to] send another another [Communist?] representative so he will be able to come back to Chungking.

GENERAL GILLEM: Is there any objection on it.

GENERAL CHANG: No. General Chang said it is not a question of

whether the Government will recognize the Communist troops in Hainan Island or whether the Government has already recognized the Communist troops along the East River, but when in discussing the problem of the Canton area General Chou only raised the East River brigade. He did not mention any Communist land troops in Hainan Island so when General Chang reported to the Government, he also only reported the fact that the Communists [would] like to evacuate their forces along the East River so if the Hainan Island problem is raised that means that the Government is not informed of that—the presence of Communist troops in Hainan Island.

GENERAL CHOU: General Chou says this is easily to be settled because when the team was sent down to Canton it was explicitly stated by Executive Headquarters that there were two places where Communist troops were stated to be. General Chou suggests that we also take up the Hankow problem now because General Chang might be very busy before his departure.

GENERAL GILLEM: I would like to make a suggestion as to procedure. In view of that fact that General Chang may go away day after tomorrow we can break up for 30 minutes to go home and wash up for dinner and then be available here for a meeting after that.

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang has four conferences tonight, starting from 9 o'clock.

GENERAL CHOU: General Chou asks if we can continue the discussion until 8 o'clock, then have dinner.

GENERAL GILLEM: I am agreeable.

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang agreed.

GENERAL CHOU: Now the Communist area[s] to the north of Hankow are still besieged and although local provisions for food have been made that would only last for a matter of a few weeks. The problem still has to be solved. The method for solving this matter which I have in mind are the following. Since the Army has to be reorganized and during the reorganization the troops have to be assembled at one place from the various places to which they are now scattered; since it is not possible for the Communists to have a big place to be assembled they should be transferred to some other place to undergo reorganization. As to the rest they will be demobilized. If they are not transferred the problem cannot be settled and the food problem will be existing all the time. Even now we know that Hupeh is suffering badly from famine. In the PPC⁸⁰ session the delegates have raised this point very sharply. Now if 2/3 of the Communist troops in that area are transferred and the rest demobilized then the Government troops surrounding this area can also be transferred.

⁸⁰ People's Political Council.

Once the Army have been sent to another point the food would be more available for the people. Otherwise there will be no way to solve the problem. Now we may recall this Hankow problem has been unsettled for 20 days after our tour. At the first meeting after our tour I stated that if the problem cannot be settled within two weeks that I would bring up this problem again. I have submitted a draft of my proposal⁸¹ and I have in mind the best way to transport the troops is by train. I am thinking that we may set aside one or two train runs which will run from the coal mine area in north Honan down to Hankow to bring down coal and on return they may take Communist soldiers up to North China. In this way the Communist troops would dispense with the marching by land and would avoid causing excess anxiety among the population. The field team would accompany the troops on the train and there would be no trouble on the way. So after some time the Communist troops would all be transferred to North China. Otherwise if we stick to the present circumstances there is a heavy line around the Communist troops and hostilities are bound to occur. Now we have to solve the food problem everywhere in China. North China, the Communist areas are going to send food into areas where food is needed. We have the same situation in Hupeh in view of shortage of food.

GENERAL CHIANG: Regarding the problem in Hankow area, General Chang recalls that when General Marshall was still in town the representatives reached some agreement as General Chang makes clear the movement of troops will be effected as a part of the demobilization and as regards food supply to the Communist troops north of Hankow, Government should assist effectively to relieve the food situation there. Now General Chou raised the troop movement points again. The reasons against troop movement at this juncture and the seriousness and complications involved have been explained in past meetings so there is no need for him to repeat. It seems to General Chang the problem now at hand is how to solve the food problem effectively. That is the first point. Second point. I wish to solve the over-all problem of food and movement as a part of the demobilization and integration process. If we finish the problems in that way it will be much easier and [more] effective without any complications or dangers involved.

GENERAL CHOU: General Chou says the previous arrangement was only of a temporary nature and we have reached the understanding that the movement of troops will be incorporated into the Army reorganization plan. At that time he has made the statement that he hoped the food problem can be solved within two weeks and if it

⁸¹ *Supra.*

cannot be, he will bring up the same question again. Now three weeks have already elapsed and the problem is still unsettled. He has asked Chinese SOS⁸² whether they have reserves of food supply and they say they have not. As to the Ministry of Food this problem has not even been talked about by the Ministry so in urgent need we borrowed some money and we assure that the money can be returned by delivering food from Kalgan to places assigned by the Government. However, we have to take in view that the place where the Communist troops are stationed north of Hankow it is very difficult to buy food even if they have money so the food problem is still present and some way of settlement has to be found. Now since we all agree that when the reorganization starts the troops will be moved to some other places and we also know the Communist troops in Hupeh and Canton are those which will be reorganized in the initial period of reorganization so they have to be withdrawn anyway. In the brief discussion between the Government and the Communist Party it has been agreed that the Communists would withdraw from 8 points and 2 points are left, that is in Kwangtung and north of Hankow. General Chou cannot visualize that the reorganization can be effected in such a small area. He takes the view it seems safe to have the troops transferred and that we will use a plan for the movement so that we can carry out the plan which will take some time. That is one more reason why we have discussed beforehand so that we would have less trouble in supplying food for the troops in the future. Even if the troops are to be transferred by train that would at least take half a month. With all these in view it seems to him very sound to have the transfer carried out, at least to have the plan worked out now for the transfer.

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang made a statement that in the reorganization and integration troop movements are bound to have to take place. That is after we have worked out a detailed plan for the implementation of the reorganization then at that time both the National troops and the Communist troops have to go to their designated localities for reorganization and for demobilization so it seems that it is much more advisable to just await the working out of that plan the [*that*] the troops all over this country will all start the movement to their designated area. If at the present moment we allowed that particular Communist area to move it will cause misunderstanding and confusion. The Government has already demobilized a number of units. The Government has submitted the data and the lists of demobilization to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, while the Communist side hasn't submitted their list to the Combined Staff yet. So at the present moment, the problem is only [as] to how to solve the food problem.

⁸² Services of Supply.

The troop movement problem will be settled when the detailed plan has been worked out. That is, wait for a short time for that plan to be finished and then the troop movement can take place according to that plan. The point of view of General Chang differs from General Chou's in this respect. The troop movement under the detailed plan for demobilization will not cause any complication or misunderstanding. It seems to General Chang that waiting for that two weeks there is nothing to lose on the Communist side as effective means of supplying food will be arranged. Regarding the effective means of supplying food to Communist troops in the area north of Hankow, General Chang is willing to propose to form another sub-committee[,] that is a member from the Communist, a representative from the Government to work jointly with the Ministry of Food to solve the food problem. At the same time General Chang wishes that General Chou will also contemplate to relieve the food situation in those places surrounded by Communist troops especially at Linyang which is in the south part of Hunan where it is reported that several tens of thousands of civilians have already starved to death.

GENERAL CHOU: General Chou says in this connection we actually have two problems to solve. One, regarding the reorganization plan and secondly regarding the food plan. Regarding the first, General Chang has admitted that it would be easier to move the troops under the reorganization plan and then General Chou raises the point that it must be understood of course that the Communist troops in the area north of Hankow should have the first priority to move to another place as soon as the reorganization plan takes place and General Chang agrees. If that principle is recognized then of course we can expect to work out the plan within a week[,] then it can be immediately put into execution, then the movement of Communist troops in this area. As to the food problem, General Chou agrees with General Chang's proposal that the Executive Headquarters should try to contact both sides to establish a commission for dealing with the food problem. The committee will survey the food situation in all the places and try to readjust the food situation in all places and to take food away from those places where it is in surplus. In this way they would help to solve the present food problem. Of course, that may be only a temporary solution but still it would help.

GENERAL GILLEM: In that connection has General Chou designated the Communist member who is going to work on the Control Group. I know the Control Group has a list from the Government, but none from the Communists. If you put your representative on there this is a critical area and could be one of the first to be considered. Is the solution agreeable to both gentlemen as worked out?

GENERAL CHANG: General Chang would like to state his understanding.

1. To expedite the detailed plan of demobilization. After that plan had been decided[,] then the troop movements in the area north of Hankow have first priority.

2. A subcommittee should be formed consisting of members from the Ministry of Food and member from the National Military Council and a member from Chinese Communist Party to make a tour over all the country to find out the real situation in order to formulate an over-all plan for alleviating the food situation over all China.

GENERAL GILLEM: I understand. Is that satisfactory then?

GENERAL CHOU: General Chou suggests that the committee should be formed within three days.

GENERAL CHANG agreed.

GENERAL GILLEM: I think that is a good day's work. I wish to express my appreciation to both of them. Now if you will all stay around we will have dinner in a few minutes. This meeting is adjourned.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Chou En-lai to Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr.

CHUNGKING, March 28, 1946.

1. Reference your letter of March 22nd,⁸³ the following is submitted:

a. Your attention is called to the fact, that since the Communist-led forces in Kwangtung are distributed at two places—the East River and the Hainan Island—, it calls for at least two POEs, instead of one, as was suggested in your letter.

b. The total strength estimate of the subject forces is over 3,000. Probably a number of women and children shall be moved along. The women, some being family dependents, others being medical and political workers, have not been included in the afore-mentioned strength estimate. However, the total number of women and children shall not exceed 500.

c. Boca Tigris anchorage seems not suitable to be POE, since it is too far away from the locations of the subject forces. Instead, we deem Mirs Bay and Tanhsien, Hainan Island, to be the most appropriate POEs in question.

d. The rations and medical supplies for this group while in the staging area and during the water lift should be provided by the government, in accordance with the general demobilization plan.

e. There can be no doubt, that the Communist forces in Chefoo shall welcome their landing at Chefoo.

⁸³ Not found in Department files; apparently it referred to telegram of March 22 from Lieutenant General Wedemeyer to Lieutenant General Gillem, p. 616.

f. The closing date at, and the definite locations of, POEs, and the exact number of persons to be moved, shall be subject to a survey of the Eighth Field Team at Canton, and ultimately determined at the conferences with Generals Lin Ping, Tseng Sheng and Feng Pai-chu.

2. In this connection, I wish to inform you, that I have decided to send Mr. Liao Chen-chi as the Communist representative to the 3-man group set up here. He will also take two signal officers—Capt. Wang Tsun-sheng and Lieut. Chiu Wen-sung—and radio equipment along. General Lin Ping, political commissar of the East River Brigade, who is momentarily here, shall accompany the group down to Canton and the Communist area.⁸⁴

Faithfully yours,

[Signature in Chinese]
(CHOU EN-LAI)

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54—D270 : Telegram

Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., to Brigadier General Henry A. Byroade, at Peiping

[CHUNGKING,] 29 March 1946.

400. Committee of Three meeting developed the following agreement regarding the Canton situation. (This should not be construed as vitiating the authority of the Executive Headquarters, but instead assisting Field Team number 8 in solving a difficult problem—since the delegation from here will depart with instructions from [*for?*] General Chang Fa Kuei and safe conduct for Communist members of delegation.) That a representative group be dispatched to Canton to discuss the over-all situation with General Chang Fa Kuei and the Field Team in an effort to clarify the situation, locate Communist forces involved, arrange for necessary transport from China Theater for transfer of Communist forces, etc. The delegation will consist of Colonel Caughey,⁸⁵ Colonel Pee,⁸⁶ and four Communists one of which will proceed to areas where Communists are located in order to render a more complete report. This delegation will attempt, with the help of the 8th Field Team, to resolve the problem immediately. It will submit a report to the Committee of Three with a carbon copy to the Executive Headquarters.

In case you do not concur in dispatch of this delegation please wire me urgent stating reasons. Notify 8th Field Team of the probable

⁸⁴ See telegram No. 402, March 30, from Lieutenant General Gillem to Lieutenant General Wedemeyer, p. 634.

⁸⁵ J. Hart Caughey, Executive Officer on General Marshall's staff.

⁸⁶ Peter Tsong-kan (Chung-kan) Pee, personal aide to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

arrival this delegation in Canton Sunday afternoon about 1 o'clock by C-47 aircraft.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Memorandum by Colonel Peter T. K. Pee to Lieutenant General
Alvan C. Gillem, Jr.*

[CHUNGKING, March 29, 1946.]

Points Inviting General Gillem's Attention:

1. Generalissimo wishes Gen. Gillem to contact Gen. Chow En-lai and explain to him the party sent from Chungking is to survey and solve the problem of "Communist East River Brigade." They will have no jurisdiction over Hai-Nan Island.

2. The number of Communist troops to be shipped is limited to 3000 men.

3. Ask Gen. Chow to furnish the data of the location of the "East River Brigade".

4. The party or the 8th field team after receiving that data should proceed to those localities to survey and to contact the Communist troops.

5. After contacting the troops, they should be ordered to concentrate at Ta-pong Bay waiting for embarkation. The whole process, from the time of making survey to the time of embarkation shall not exceed one month.

PETER T. K. PEE

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

*Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., to Lieutenant General
Albert C. Wedemeyer, at Shanghai*

[CHUNGKING,] 30 March 1946.

402. General Chou En-Lai's answers to questions in 26361⁸⁷ are as follows.

[Here follows text of General Chou's memorandum of March 28, page 632.]

In view of the fact that General Chou En-lai has now brought up the question of Communists on Hainan Island and due to the fact that this proposal is protested so violently by the Generalissimo it is likely that immediate arrangements in the Canton situation are the only ones feasible at this time. The question of Communists on Hainan Island will have to be taken up later but as early as possible.

⁸⁷ March 22, p. 616.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., to General Chou En-lai

CHUNGKING, March 31, 1946.

MY DEAR GENERAL CHOU: Acknowledging receipt of your letter of 31 [28?] March 1946, with reference to the handling of Communist forces in the Canton area, I have discussed this matter with General Wedemeyer who has been in Chungking for the past two days. Further, I have discussed this matter first hand with the Government representatives on the highest level. This was done in view of the fact that General Chang Chih Chung had been forced to depart for his new assignment and was not available.

As you know, I have been anxious to resolve the problem incident to the movement of Communist forces from the Canton area. For your information, General Wedemeyer stated to me that:

Pursuant to our request of March 9th, which request was made as a result of your posing the problem of the Canton Communists to General Marshall on March 5th at Hankow,⁸⁸ he had consummated arrangements with the Navy officials in Shanghai to dispose of the Communist-led forces in the vicinity of Canton by moving them by water to Chefoo;

He was prepared to move at a designated time the forces allegedly near Canton;

At the time of the March 9th request, no evidence had been submitted that there was any Communist group in jeopardy in the Canton area other than those on the mainland;

Therefore, he consulted the Navy and completed preliminary plans for the movement from a POE tentatively set as Boca Tigres;

Further that separate arrangements must be made for any subsequent movement as another service, the Navy, was involved;

He could not, at this time, obligate the Navy in any movement involving ships as obviously they control such equipment;

Shipping was set up by the Navy in accordance with priorities, therefore, arrangements involving an additional contingent must be processed anew;

He could not at this time determine what, if any, shipping could be made available for evacuating Communist forces on Hainan Island.

In view of the above your request for two POE's, one on the mainland and one on Hainan Island, can only be met in part, that is the Hainan Island POE cannot be utilized at this time.

You recall that your communication officially mentioning the Hainan Island group was dated March 15, 1946. In connection with this particular matter I would like also to inform you that I have been unable to get concurrence from the Government to complete arrangements for

⁸⁸ See meeting at Hankow, March 5, 1946, p. 503.

the movement of any Communist forces which might be located on Hainan Island.

The stand taken by the Government in this matter is that of concurrence in the efforts that had been made by the Commanding General, China Theater and the Navy for the movement of the mainland forces provided there were any Communists in the Canton area for, as you know, the Government has frequently questioned the status of the Communist forces in Kwangtung. This concurrence, therefore, is dependent upon the result of the investigation now being made by a group approved by the Committee of Three to which Colonel Caughey is a party.⁸⁹ As you know this group is charged specifically with contacting Field Team No. 8 and then to contact the Communist forces, then complete detailed arrangements for the processing and embarking at a specified place at a specified date for movement to Chefoo. This port was requested by you as the debarkation point.

I regret that the second contingent, stated by you as located on Hainan Island, cannot be disposed of at this time for the reasons stated above. I have had a third conference with the Government representatives on the afternoon of March 30th with reference to this matter and at that late date have still received no encouragement as to resolving the matter of the Hainan Island Communists.

Therefore, movement of the Hainan Island elements cannot be consummated at this time. I desire to inform you that I regret this fact but efforts will be made to resolve the problem.

Very sincerely,

A. C. GILLEM, JR.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

*Colonel J. Hart Caughey to Brigadier General Henry A. Byroade,
at Peiping*

CANTON, 2 April 1946.

Met with field team evening of 31 March at which I explained mission of Chungking delegation, i. e., to present Generalissimo's new order to General Chang Fa Kuei through Colonel Pee and to assist field team in solving problem. Col. Miller explained the problem as he had found it and stated that: It had been referred to higher headquarters; field team would cooperate to fullest extent; and no authority yet existed for establishing Communist radio to Chungking and Peiping. After this meeting Colonel Pee had private conference with Chang at 2100 and presented Generalissimo's new order.

At 1030, 1 April, delegation met General Chang Fa Kuei who promised his full cooperation. At 1400 met with field team and

⁸⁹ This group arrived at Canton on March 31.

General Wang who was deputized by Chang for this purpose. At this time the Generalissimo's order was made known to all. It includes the following points: You shall lend your assistance to the Communists and grant to them authority to make survey of East River region. It has been decided that (1) embarkation point is to be Ta Pang Bay (agreed to by all), (2) number of personnel evacuated to be between 2 and 3000 (Communist agreed that figure is in neighborhood 2400 including approximately 300 women), (3) field team to survey and if facts are found to be true to direct troops to Ta Pang Bay, and (4) from the date of making the survey until embarkation the time should not exceed one month.

Conference lasted 5 hours. First difficulty cropped up when it was found that Chang Fa Kuei's interpretation included only those Communists in an area approx[imately] 30 li north and 30 li south of East River. This point was resolved only after I read from every reference I brought to show that from the first in the minds of all persons considering this problem it was one of removing Communists from Canton area and not one of special geographic locations with respect to the East River. This automatically brought up point that Chang refuses to recognize any Communist unit or leader. It was finally agreed that those forces would be known as "Communist armed forces". The "date of survey" was next hashed out. It was agreed that General Tsien who came with delegation would fly to Hong Kong on 2 April to get General Tseng Sheng and return to Canton by 5 April. In the meantime General Fang Fang, Communist representative on field team, would assist in preparing general principles with field team and Chang Fa Kuei's representative; and that the detailed plan would be worked out 3 days after Tseng Sheng arrived. This date, or 8 April, would be considered as the "date of survey" at which time field teams and liaison teams would proceed to designated areas to implement the movement and embarkation to begin 1 month later.

For Gillem: Reserved for Chungking decision is the point that teams leaving from Canton proceeding to northernmost Communist area and then return to Ta Pang Bay could not assure arrival of Communists within 1 month time limit. Certain tolerances may have to be entertained for this northern area. Other areas are in vicinity of East River and therefore can easily abide by 1 month limitation.

For Byroade: Both sides insisted on regular teams. Miller says he can use liaison teams of 2 members equipped with radio from Chang's Hqs to assist. Minimum requirement is 3 more Americans to make up teams which would act as control points in 3 main areas to regulate any liaison teams that are necessary. The American personnel could be in company grade and in good physical condition for protracted march, particularly in northern area. Northern area is

approx 200 kilos north of Canton and east of North River. These 3 Americans should be in Canton by 8 April, the date of survey.

For Wedemeyer: Depending upon availability LST should be made available as follows at Ta Pang Bay, 1 on 2 May, 1 on 8 May and 1 on 14 May. This is my own estimate and takes into account possible delay of over 1 month for those Communists moving down from north. Estimate is made on lift of approx 900 per LST.

For all: Chang has assured all possible assistance within Generalissimo's instructions. He will assist with trucks where possible and junks, he will provide food on a loan basis and insure safe conduct. Reconvened 2 April results of which will be forwarded.

New subject. Party will depart Canton Wednesday 3 April. ETD 0900 local time, ETA 1200 Chungking time. Request transportation for 6.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Memorandum by General Chou En-lai to Lieutenant General
Alvan C. Gillem, Jr.*⁹⁰

CHUNGKING, 2 April 1946.

MY DEAR GENERAL GILLEM: Your letter dated March 31st was duly received. With reference to the Communist forces in Kwangtung there are two problems that need settlement, viz: (1) the recognition of those Communist forces by the Government; (2) the movement of those Communist forces to some other area.

By virtue of the Cease Fire Agreement of January 10th, all Government and Communist-led forces, regardless of their position and regardless whether they being regular, militia, irregular and guerrillas, should immediately stop hostilities actions. In the light of this provision, there may only arise the question, as to whether the Government or the Chinese Communist Party would admit a particular unit at a particular location to be under its command or not. There could not arise such question, that the Government or the Chinese Communist Party would not recognize a certain unit which has already been admitted by the opponent party to be under its command. For, once the Government or the Chinese Communist Party admits that a certain unit at a certain location is actually under its command, then the respective party would assume the responsibility to instruct that unit to abide by the commitments and provisions of the Cease Fire Agreement, and the cease fire mission will be carried out. There is no need to question whether the opponent party has admitted that unit to be under its command or not, and at what time such recognition was made. Therefore, with reference to the East River Brigade and

⁹⁰ Marginal notation: "Action has been taken with reference to radio to Caughey and reply made to Gen. Chou—2 April 1946."

Hainan Brigades, once they are admitted by the Chinese Communist Party to be under its command, attacks against them should immediately cease, with a view to reaching settlement in accord with the Cease Fire Agreement and the Army Reorganization Plan. It is both logically and factually unjustified for the Government to recognize the Communist-led East River Brigade alone, but not the Communist-led Hainan Brigade. Even granted that the latter Brigade was mentioned only in the later documents, yet it is undeniable that it has been in existence since a long time. If the Government would, making no effort to get over its prejudice, firmly resist to recognize the subject forces, then we are even far more justified to refuse recognition of all the puppet troops now being under Government command, and we may reserve the right to disarm all the puppet troops surrounded by our forces. In that case the Government would not only have no right to interfere, but ought to view such actions as a matter of course.

Since without any exception all Communist-led units should be recognized by the Government, the issue of the Hainan Brigade should be resolved in the light of the Joint Communiqué of the Government and Communist representatives on October 10th,⁹¹ the Cease Fire Agreement and the Army Reorganization Plan. By taking any of these documents as our reference, the Communist forces in Kwangtung are equally justified to be partly evacuated and partly demobilized. Speaking on the evacuation, it of course infers the movement of these forces from Kwangtung to North-China, and there is no other way to carry it out except by sea lift. Inasmuch as time is needed to undertake the arrangements with reference to shipping availability and date of lift, it is agreeable to us to make the statement, that as long as food can be made available to the subject troops, we will have not objection to see the northward movement of the Hainan Brigade being carried out at a later date than that of the East River Brigade.⁹²

In short, unless the Government endeavors to take advantage of this opportunity to exterminate the Communist-led troops, I see no slightest reason for them to refuse recognition of the Hainan Brigade which we have admitted to be under our command.⁹³ Nor, when contact has

⁹¹ For summary of conversations, see Department of State, *United States Relations With China* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 577.

⁹² Lieutenant General Gillem, in his telegram No. 426, April 2, to Colonel Caughey, quoted the last sentence and commented: "These troops are recognized by the Communist Party and entitled to the safety requirements of the cease fire agreement."

⁹³ Lieutenant General Gillem, in No. 426, quoting the second half of this sentence, observed: "Therefore, endeavor to have field team determine facts so that when Government recognizes existence of Hainan Island Communists through medium of Committee of Three Directive arrangements can be completed to meet the requirements of first, foodstuff and secondly movement northward if and when arrangements for lift are agreed upon and settled."

been established by the Communist representatives with the Hainan Brigade, do I see any reason for the Government to prohibit the movement and demobilization of the subject Brigade.

In view of this fact, it is my request that you would based upon the foregoing comments send a wire to Colonel Caughey calling his attention to this matter, and you will also arrange a discussion by the Conference of Three with a view to resolving this matter.

Please, accept [etc.]

[Signature in Chinese]
GEN. CHOU EN-LAI

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270: Telegram

Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer to the Commander of the Seventh Fleet (Cooke), Then at Chungking

SHANGHAI, 3 April 1946.

27351. Communists in Canton area is subject. Following is paraphrase of comments received from General Chou En-lai reference 26361, 221130Z:

a. At least two POEs will be required as Communists are located in two areas—the East River area and Hainan Island.

b. Estimated total male strength is over 3,000. In addition women and children shall not exceed 500.

c. Boca Tigris is too distant from present Communist locations to be a satisfactory POE. Mirs Bay and Tanhsien, Hainan Island are better located POEs.

d. Rations and medical supplies for use in staging area and during water lift should be furnished by the Government (Chinese) in accordance with the general demobilization plan.

e. Communist forces in Chefoo will welcome the landing of this unit at Chefoo.

f. Closing dates and definite locations of POEs as well as exact numbers to be moved shall be the subject of survey by the 8th field team at Canton and ultimately determined at conference with Generals Lin Ping, Tseng Sheng and Feng Pai-chu. End of paraphrase.

General Gillem states that Generalissimo protests violently any proposal for repatriation of Communists from Hainan Island. Therefore, Gillem considers that immediate arrangements on the Canton situation are the only ones feasible at this time. Hainan Island situation to be taken up later but as soon as possible.

Request your comments reference possible POEs in Mirs Bay area and suitability of Tanhsien, Hainan Island.

Further information will be furnished you as available.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Memorandum by the Chinese Minister of War (Chen Cheng) to
Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr.*

[Translation]

[CHUNGKING,] April [3?] 1946.

I have the honor to inform you that I was appointed as Acting Government Representative by His Excellency the Generalissimo to the Committee of Three to continue the discussion during General Chang Chi Chung's absence.

GENERAL CHEN CHENG (SEAL)

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Memorandum by Colonel J. Hart Caughey to Mr. Liao Cheng-chi*⁹⁴

CHUNGKING, April 9, 1946.

For your information the following instructions from the Generalissimo have been issued to General Chang Fa-kwei with reference to the status of Field Team Number 8 and use of the Communist radio in Canton.

"You should recognize the legal status of the Eighth Field Team and press on them to finish the evacuation of the Communist armed personnel within one month. During this month you should grant the request from the Communist team member to establish a radio station."

Also for your information I have dispatched a radio to Colonel Miller⁹⁵ embodying this information.

J. HART CAUGHEY

893.00/4-1346 : Telegram

The Counselor of Embassy in China (Smyth) to the Secretary of State

CHUNGKING, April 13, 1946—8 a. m.

[Received 3:15 p. m.]

672. About 2 weeks ago I heard from fairly reliable source and it has now been confirmed by an unimpeachable source that Generalissimo has issued secret orders to local military authorities to eradicate completely but quietly by whatever means necessary the pocket of

⁹⁴ Member of Gen. Chou En-lai's staff.

⁹⁵ No. 474, April 9, not printed.

Communists immediately North Hankow. Communists do not seem to be aware of this yet but are getting worried and feel that something is in the wind.

Chief of Staff, Wang Chen, of New Fourth Army informs me that they are having difficulty demobilizing because when men return to homes in Nationalist territory they are murdered by Govt. troops.

This is Hankow's 13, April 10 to Embassy, sent to Dept. as 672, April 13, 8 a. m.⁹⁶

SMYTH

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Marshall to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek

CHUNGKING, April 19, 1946.

During my absence the Committee of Three dispatched a delegation to Canton to assist in resolving the Communist problem in that area. I have just read a report made by the American member of that delegation⁹⁷ and also your instructions to General Chang Fa-kwei dated 5 April 1946⁹⁸ which resolves the major portion of the difficulties that existed prior to the visit by the delegation.

However there remains one aspect of the matter which still requires corrective action. General Chang Fa-kwei continues in his attitude of non-recognition of Communist Forces in Kwan[g]tung Province, which is not in keeping with the spirit of the 10 January Cease Fire agreement.

I intend bringing up this entire question to the Committee of Three at an early date. Prior to doing so I would greatly appreciate your comments in the matter.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Memorandum by General Marshall to General Hsu Yung-chang*⁹⁹

CHUNGKING, April 22, 1946.

I have received the following message from General Byroade which is forwarded for information:

"The American member of Team Number 8 reports that movement

⁹⁶ In telegram No. 657, April 16, 7 p. m., to the Embassy in China, the Secretary of State requested the Counselor of Embassy to show telegram No. 672 to General Marshall "immediately upon arrival" of the latter in China.

⁹⁷ See telegram of April 2 from Col. J. Hart Caughey to Brig. Gen. Henry A. Byroade, p. 636, the most comprehensive report to be sent on this problem.

⁹⁸ See memorandum by Col. J. Hart Caughey to Mr. Liao Cheng-chi, April 9, p. 641.

⁹⁹ Director of the Board of Military Operations of the Chinese National Military Council. Copy also forwarded to Gen. Chou En-lai.

of Communist personnel to port for evacuation can be effected in D plus 40 days allowing for medical screening and inoculation. Move is set up for 2,400 including original estimate of about 300 women and children in 3 groups. The staging area recommended is Shayu-Chung at the head of Mirs Bay. D day would be:

- a. When cash for evacuation is made available.
- b. When certain National Government troops withdrawals to allow for safe and unthreatened Communist movement are agreed upon.

Team Number 8 is in disagreement and has not been able to reconcile the cost of evacuation. Estimates by National Government calculation is 272,570,000 CNC and by Communist calculation is 987,600,000 CNC. Further the team is in disagreement over Communist demands for certain withdrawals of National Government forces away from the routes over which the Communists must evacuate. Team negotiations are still proceeding on the withdrawals but assistance of Executive Headquarters has been asked for settling financial arrangements.

American branch cost estimate will be submitted to the three Commissioners, 22 April, with view to having the three Commissioners recommend approval to the Committee of Three."¹

G. C. MARSHALL

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr.,² to Brigadier General Henry A. Byroade, at Peiping

SHANGHAI, 24 April 1946.

29320. Subject is Communists in Canton area. Following steps have been taken by ComGenChina to assist Field Team 8 in the movement of subject forces:

1. A 14-man team under command of Colonel Trent has been alerted for the past 10 days awaiting further word from Field Team 8 prior to departure from Shanghai. This team will include signal, medical and army troop movement personnel.
2. Serums have been made available in Shanghai through Central Government channels. U. S. DDT power and sprayers are available.
3. Com Seventh Fleet will furnish water transportation for team to the Mirs Bay Area.

¹ In telegram No. 2124, April 24, the three Commissioners at Peiping repeated substantially the same message to the Committee of Three, with the recommendation, regarding the financial estimates, that the figure of 323,686,000 CNC be set to cover the withdrawal costs of the Communist forces; in addition, it was recommended by General Tsai, the Government Chief of Staff, that this amount be "replaced" by the Communists in the form of grain in North China.

² Acting Commanding General, U.S. Forces, China Theater, during the absence of General Wedemeyer.

Upon notification here from Field Team 8 as to staging area selected and date movement team is desired, team and equipment will be started south. In this connection probably not less than 48 hours notice to the Navy will be required for provision of necessary transportation from Shanghai.

Our contemplated directive to Col. Trent restricts the activities of his team to the staging area and the port of embarkation. It is estimated that 5 days or more will be required for the water trip from Shanghai to Mirs Bay, thus it is desirable this headquarters be advised at least 7 days prior to the date movement team is desired at Mirs Bay.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by Mr. Liao Cheng-chi to Colonel J. Hart Caughey

CHUNGKING, 24 April 1946.

DEAR COLONEL CAUGHEY: The affairs referring to the Communist forces in Kwangtung have been delayed for two whole weeks, and the latest development there proves that the Generalissimo's Headquarters at Canton is tending to augment the difficulties for settlement, as it is shown by the following facts:

1. Under the pretext that the liaison teams are not yet ready for despatch, since that depends on the arrival of the American team members, the Generalissimo's Headquarters in Canton refused to issue order for cessation of military actions. It insisted that order to this effect can only be issued one day prior to the despatch of the liaison teams. This implies that the Communist forces in Kwangtung are still exposed to the danger of being attacked by forces under the jurisdiction of the Kwangtung authority.

2. Seeing that there is no sign of abatement of Nationalist aggressive activities, the execution of, and preparation for, the concentration of the Communist forces at the staging area—Tapeng Peninsula—are sure to be jeopardized, or at least seriously affected. Furthermore, according to the reports received here from Canton, the Generalissimo's Headquarters has made a public statement saying that it has set ready five regiments to continue the "pacification work" along the East River, and that the "pacification actions" shall in no way be impaired, which infers that such actions would not be restrained on account of Executive Headquarters or the Eighth Field Team.

3. The Government insists that two places, Tamshui and Lung Kang, having a great bearing on the staging area—Tapeng Peninsula—should be heavily garrisoned. The Government even took exception to the proposition prepared by Colonel Miller of the Eighth

Field Team, that not more than one battalion (five hundred men) should be stationed at Tamshui, and one company of gendarmes at Lung Kang. In view of this fact, the menace over the assembled Communist forces pending embarkation is not removed.

4. These circumstances show that the Generalissimo's Headquarters at Canton is still lacking faith in resolving the Kwangtung problem. That they have refused to issue order of cessation of action, that they have declared that the "pacification" along the East River shall not be affected, and that Tamshui and Lung Kang should be heavily garrisoned are all out of keeping with the Truce Agreement. Apart from lodging a protest to the Generalissimo's Headquarters at Canton through the Eighth Field Team, I wish to call your attention to this state of affairs, and request that you will kindly report the same to General Marshall and General Gillem.

Faithfully yours,

LIAO CHENG-CHI

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Chou En-lai to General Marshall

CHUNGKING, 26 April 1946.

MY DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: Your memorandum dated April 22,³ concerning the situation in Kwangtung is referred. With exception of the Hainan problem, which is subject to further discussion among the Committee of Three, I wish to submit the following for consideration at this moment:

1. As a matter of urgency, the financial needs of the 2,400 men to be evacuated must be settled in the first place. According to Colonel Caughey, General Byroade has informed him that Executive Headquarters will initiate immediate action to procure 1 billion CNC dollars for this purpose. Now, with a view to expedite the evacuation, I wonder, if Executive Headquarters may not first arrange with the Government to allocate 500,000,000 CNC dollars for this purpose, while the monetary needs of the demobilized personnel will be met at a later time.

2. It seems advisable that Tamshui and Lung Kang, the two places bordering on the Tapeng Peninsula, should not be garrisoned with a heavy force (not more than one battalion at Tamshui, and one regiment of gendarmes at Lung Kang), lest the evacuating troops shall be threatened en route, and untoward incidents happen.

3. Owing to the poor health of the Communist personnel resulted from the hardships they had gone through during the war, the Communist troops in Kwangtung request, that the medical screening shall not be carried to such a measure as to prevent the boarding of those

³ See footnote 1, p. 643.

physically weak or slightly-illed, it being understood though that those suffering from infectious disease should be withheld.⁴

Your comments on the foregoing points shall be appreciated.

Yours faithfully,

[Signature in Chinese]
(CHOU EN-LAI)

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Mr. Walter S. Robertson to General Marshall

PEIPING, 27 April 1946.

2192. Executive Headquarters has received message from Team Number 8 at Canton that agreement cannot be reached between members of that team on the movement of National Government troops to increase the present corridor for Communist movements which is approximately 12 miles wide. In commissioners meeting this morning the following message was agreed to between the commissioners and has been dispatched in the clear:

"This message refers to movement of Communist forces from the Canton area and is addressed to General Chang Fa Kwei and to all members of Field Team Number 8 from the Three Commissioners of Executive Headquarters signed Robertson, Chairman, 2989.

According to team report General Chang Fa Kwei has guaranteed safe conduct for the Communist forces already agreed to be evacuated from the Mirs Bay area. He is requested to acknowledge acceptance of such responsibility in a message to Three Commissioners of Executive Headquarters. He is further requested to send liaison and staff officers to accompany the movement and embarkation.

The Communists have expressed concern over the width of the corridor through which their troops must move to the evacuation points. In order to remove this last barrier to complete and satisfactory agreement, General Chang is urged by this headquarters to consider widening the present corridor between his troop locations.

Field Team Number 8 with lists added supporting liaison sub teams will supervise and accompany the movement and evacuation of the Communist troops with a view to insure their security."

In addition the National Government and Communist commissioners agreed between themselves to each send a message to General Chang Fa Kwei requesting that he reconsider his previous stand of not moving his forces to provide a wider corridor for Communist movement.

While the above solution is not ideal it is hoped it may result in satisfactory solution of the problem and permit initiation of the Communist evacuation.

⁴In telegram No. 608, April 29, General Marshall repeated paragraph 3 to Brigadier General Byroade, requesting the latter to "take appropriate action."

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to General Marshall

[CHUNGKING,] 29 April 1946.

Reference is made to your letter dated 19 April 1946. According to General Chang Fa-kuei's report, on 17 April a discussion on this subject was held with Field Team No. 8 together with its Chinese Communist Representative. It was then decided to concentrate the armed Chinese Communist troops of Kuangtung Province in three different localities. The following four suggestions were also advanced for consideration by the Three-Men Committee:

(1) A group of representatives or the Field Team should proceed to and investigate to confirm the location where armed Chinese Communist troops are to be concentrated as recommended by the Chinese Communist in Kuangtung during the conference held on 7 April. Chinese Communist troops may move to concentrate at Ta P'eng Wan after confirmation.

(2) The number of personnel to be moved is to be limited to 3,000.

(3) Ta P'eng Wan is to be designated as location for concentration of the armed Chinese Communist troops.

(4) Time from the commencement of investigation to the date of embarkation must not exceed one month.

CHIANG KAI-SHEK

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Marshall to General Hsu Yung-chang

CHUNGKING, April 29, 1946.

MY DEAR GENERAL HSU: I addressed a memorandum to the Generalissimo on April 19 regarding non-recognition of Communist forces in Kwangtung Province by General Chang Fa-Kwei (copy attached). In the meantime the situation continues increasingly difficult.

There are two outstanding problems regarding the Kwangtung Communists. First; the amount of money and terms of repayment which is the subject of my memorandum to you and General Chou En-lai on the 27th of April.⁵ Second; the non-interference with the Communist evacuation. I am told that the Government proposes to retain large garrisons at Tamshui and Lung Kang while the Communists desire that these forces be reduced to one battalion and one company of gendarmes at the two locations respectively in order to preclude interference with their evacuation. I am inclined to agree with them. Will you please let me have your comments.

G. C. MARSHALL

⁵ Not printed; it dealt with substantially the same matters as memorandum by General Marshall of April 22, p. 642.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Chou En-lai to General Marshall

CHUNGKING, 29 April 1946.

MY DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: According to reports I received from Yen-an and the Headquarters of General Li Hsien-nien, commander of Communist forces in the Hankow area, Government troops under the command of the Hankow military authority and General Liu Chih of Honan, about nine armies strong, are being feverishly engaged in redeployment, with a view to tightening the belt around the Communist forces and to annihilating those 60,000 men. The present situation has become so critical, that the offensive against the Communist forces seems about to be unleashed at any hour. In addition to that, General Kuo Tsien, of the Hankow Generalissimo's Headquarters, has denied the entry of UNRRA and CNRRA officials into the Communist area, while Communist personnel are prohibited to procure food from outside. Outgoing Communist personnel and demobilized wounded soldiers are either arrested, or mishandled or murdered. As to the 1,200 aged, young, sick and wounded, they are not permitted to evacuate despite previous agreement to the contrary. I wish to point out that all these instances show the deliberate design of the Government forces to instigate a new civil war in China proper and to wipe out the Communist forces referred to.

You may recall, that at the time when we were in Hankow while on our tour, General Li Hsien-nien by his conduct in preserving peace and complying with the truce terms has won your particular commendation. I may therefore presume that you are quite well aware of the predicament into which he is now placed.

While drawing your attention to this critical situation, I request you, as the chairman of the Committee of Three, to warn the Government representative, that in the event the pending offensive is launched, it will be viewed by the Chinese Communist Party as the signal given by the Nationalist forces for unleashing a nation-wide civil war, for which and its far-reaching aftermath the Government will be held responsible.

You are further requested that you would, in furthering your efforts toward bringing about peace and stability to China, extend your assistance toward giving protection to the security of those Communist personnel, making the Communist area accessible to the UNRRA and CNRRA officials, and allowing Communist personnel to procure food from outside, and the aged, young, sick and wounded to evacuate. In view of the seriousness of the situation and being

aware of your immense concern over the Chinese people, I feel confident that you will exert the best efforts for the good of China.

Any reply you favour me would be appreciated.⁶

Faithfully yours,

[Signature in Chinese]
(CHOU EN-LAI)

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270: Telegram

The Commanding Officer, Liaison Group (McKinley)⁷ to General Marshall, at Nanking

CHUNGKING, 2 May 1946.

1210. The following is message from General Chou En-lai repeated to you in paraphrase. Original document follows by mail.

"The following information which is most reliable was sent to me from Yenan: Central Government forces are planning for the extermination of Communist troops stationed in the area North of Hankow under command of General Li Hsien-nien. Preparations are being made personally in Suchow and Kaifeng by General Pai Tsung-hsi⁸ to close in on and annihilate subject Communist forces. The offensive is scheduled to be launched, in the form of staged banditry and people uprisings, between May 5 and May 9. This information shows that, in the indefinite period prior to their wished-for occupation of Changchun, the Central Government is entertaining a strong design to renew large scale civil war in China proper. I have strong reason to believe, had on bitter personal experience 18 years ago when General Pai Tsung-hsi overnight blitzkrieged and disarmed Shanghai workers battalion under my command, that General Pai Tsung-hsi hatched the above plot and the plot was tacitly approved by Supreme Military Authority of National Government. A side-evidence of the authenticity of this information is that General Pai Tsung-hsi is now in Suchow in the event an all-out assault in this area is launched. Yenan wishes to tell you that the 60,000 Communist troops there will be forced to resist firmly. The National Government must assume complete responsibility for the total civil war and its serious results caused by this assault. I urge [you] to radio the Generalissimo to issue stop orders against such actions, as they are contrary to the truce agreement. I am unable to locate the Generalissimo and this needs his personal attention. Also I have recommended to General Hsu Yungchang that he and I, together with Americans, tour places North of

⁶ A marginal notation reads: "Copy to Gen. Yu Ta-wei who said he'd see Gimo immediately—further said UNRRA proposition would be worked out immediately and aggression (1st paragraph) would be straightened out providing Com[munists] abided by Cease Fire." General Yu, Chinese Minister of Communications, was acting representative of his Government on the Committee of Three.

⁷ Lt. Col. James F. McKinley, United States Army.

⁸ Deputy Chief of Staff of the Chinese National Military Council.

Hankow where close contact is being maintained by Government and Communist forces, so as to keep the situation under control. I hope that an American representative will be delegated by you to accompany us. All help given by you to forestall an incident of this type will be appreciated. Your kindness in arranging airlift for our headquarters is greatly appreciated. It worries me to find that your special airplane couldn't land at Chungking this afternoon because of the weather. My associates firmly approved [*have disapproved?*], because of the weather, my leaving on a Navy airplane tomorrow. I plan to come in plane you have scheduled for me."⁹

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Marshall to General Chou En-lai

OSE 10

NANKING, May 3, 1946.

DEAR GENERAL CHOU: I handed a copy of your letter dated 29 April 1946 concerning the Hankow situation to General Yu Ta-Wei. Immediately upon arrival in Nanking, General Yu Ta-Wei contacted appropriate Government officials with respect to this situation.

General Yu Ta-Wei reported to me that General Ho Ying-chin¹⁰ has sent a message to the area to determine the facts. General Yu assured me that instructions had been issued to facilitate the entrance of UNRRA and CNRRA supplies into the area; and that Government forces would not attack the Communists providing the Communists abided by the Cease Fire Agreement and launched no attacks themselves.

This same information is being furnished me by memorandum¹¹ a copy of which I will forward to you upon receipt.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Conference Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai, at General Marshall's House, Nanking, May 4, 1946, 10 a. m.

Also present: Colonel Caughey
 Captain Soong¹²
 Mr. Chang

General Marshall stated that he had received General Chou's message¹³ concerning the critical situation North of Hankow and unless

⁹ A marginal notation reads: "Relayed to Peiping urgent"; sent on May 4. A memorandum repeating General Chou's message was also sent to General Hsu Yung-chang on May 4, not printed.

¹⁰ Commander in Chief of the Chinese Army.

¹¹ Not found in Department files.

¹² Capt. John L. Soong, language aide to General Marshall.

¹³ See telegram No. 1210, May 2, p. 649.

General Chou had objection, a copy of this message would be sent to General Yu Tai Wei for the Generalissimo's eyes. General Marshall further stated that he would talk to the Generalissimo himself.

General Chou agreed and said that he heard of this situation while in Chungking. General Chou called on General Hsu Yung Chang and discussed the problem. General Chou said that his information indicated that General Pei Tsung Hsi, while touring from Hsuehou, through Kaifung, to Hsian was planning an all out attack on the Communist position between the fourth and ninth of May. General Chou further stated that General Pei not only planned for this attack but also planned to sabotage the railroads and blame the Communists. General Chou suggested to General Hsu while in Chungking, that they together should go to North Hupei. He added that he had received a telegram from Yen-an to the effect that General Li, the commanding general of the Communist forces there had been instructed to defend himself; that in the meantime it is urged that representatives be sent there to prevent hostilities, but should this fail, the Communists would stage counter-attacks. General Chou continued by saying that Communists had been reported as "creating trouble" in Shantung Province near Nan-Tung but that he investigated that situation upon arrival in Nanking to find it false.

General Marshall stated that the trouble in Hupeh is due south of Loshan. He said what he was trying to do is to locate the trouble area so that the representatives can go there immediately.

General Chou said that if they can get to Hankow they can get to Hsinyang by truck in one day's time where the Government troops are being concentrated.

General Marshall informed General Chou that he would make certain there would be some responsible Kuomintang representative there with whom General Chou could deal. He also stated that he would arrange to have General Byroade there upon their arrival. He then asked General Chou what General Hsu had to say about the situation.

General Chou replied that General Hsu did not believe that attacks were being planned but that he would wire the Generalissimo. After General Chou's explanation to General Hsu, the latter expressed personal willingness to visit the area.

General Marshall then stated that he wanted General Byroade and an extra team to go there in any event; that he would arrange for General Hsu to accompany General Chou from Nanking by airplane.

General Marshall then stated that movements probably were being undertaken by both sides and that the situation is becoming more serious every hour.

General Chou stated that the feeling among the Communists of mistrust and possible breakup does exist. However, the Communist side

has no intention of causing a breakup. The Communists have always wanted cessation of hostilities and unconditional truce in Manchuria. In China proper, they have not started any provocation or any attack on towns even occupied by National troops, though they have encircled some of these towns for a long time. The misunderstanding toward the Americans, particularly among lower members, is due to lack of American personnel at various places to see for themselves. The Americans are located only at the places where National Government forces are. This is the cause for the greatest dissatisfaction among the lower ranks in the Communist Party.

General Marshall then stated that most of the information came to him from the Communists who had requested that their names be withheld. Communists have never objected to any unfairness in any local settlement by any field team. What they objected to most was the equipping and transporting of the Kuomintang troops.

General Chou then said that this is very true. At first Kuomintang troops were sent to Northeast to take over from Russians, but now they were sent to fight a civil war. This feeling is not only present among the lower party members but higher ranks as well.

General Marshall then asked if there was any other problem General Chou would like to bring up tonight.

General Chou expressed thanks for the help General Marshall had given him in locating a house in Nanking; the lending of General Marshall's personal plane which made the trip from Chungking to Nanking extremely comfortable and enabling the Communists to set up a radio station the night of their arrival. He further stated that they must try their best to prevent the Hopeh [*Hupeh?*] situation from enlarging and also wished in the future to exchange opinions and viewpoint on the Manchuria issue although at the present he had not yet found any new solution.

General Marshall said he wanted General Chou to know that he got himself into an embarrassing position by lending him cars while he (General Marshall) borrowed cars from the Central Government. General Marshall then said that he would prefer to go to Hankow with General Chou but he did not think it wise to get out of touch with the Generalissimo at the present time. Therefore, he had to leave it to General Byroade at Hankow and himself here. General Marshall said he wanted General Chou to tell General Byroade that it is essential for them to go to the Communist Headquarters. Transportation may have to be borrowed from the Government; a very delicate matter due to the natural resentment on the part of the senior Government officials toward the Communist accusation in this respect.

General Chou then said that he appreciated all the efforts General

Marshall had made and understood the difficulties he had encountered, particularly after his arrival here at Nanking. General Chou stated that if General Marshall wished to speak to him further, he would be available tonight or tomorrow morning.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

General Marshall to Brigadier General Henry A. Byroade, at Peiping

[NANKING,] 4 May 1946.

638. Want you to proceed urgently to Hankow on 5 May (tomorrow) to reach there by about noon. Bring an extra field team. More follows in code.¹⁴

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

General Marshall to Brigadier General Henry A. Byroade, at Peiping

[NANKING,] 4 May 1946.

636. Your instructions for Hankow trip follow: You are to avert a dangerous situation reported by Chou En-lai as developing north of Hankow commencing today. Am sending General Chou En-lai and trying to arrange for National General Yu Ta Wei or another to make up, with you, a high-powered 3-man committee. If difficulty is encountered in getting National agreement to field team do not delay for this reason but bring American head of the team. If I should encounter difficulty here in getting General Chou off with National representative you should proceed to investigate situation on basis of a report made to me by General Chou. Chou's report in 1210¹⁵ is being relayed urgently.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Brigadier General Henry A. Byroade to General Marshall, at Nanking

PEIPING, 4 May 1946.

2383. Have received your 638 and two subsequent messages¹⁶ reference Hankow situation. Will arrive Hankow with team at 11:30 Sunday.

¹⁴ See telegram No. 636, May 4, *infra*.

¹⁵ Dated May 2, p. 649.

¹⁶ Reference is to telegram No. 636, *supra*, and to the message which relayed General Chou's report contained in telegram No. 1210, May 2, p. 649 (see footnote 9, p. 650).

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Presentation by Colonel Briggs to the Acting Committee of Three at Hankow, May 5, 1946, 4 p. m.

The following were present:

Members of Team #9

Gen. Hsu Yung-Chang (NG)

Col. Pee (NG)

Gen. Chou En-lai (CP)

Mr. Chang (CP)

Gen. Henry A. Byroade (U. S. A.)

Capt. J. T. Young (U. S. A.)

GEN. BYROADE: "Gentlemen, I have asked Colonel Briggs to make us a presentation of the situation here in this area. I find after my arrival that the message I sent that we were coming has still not arrived, so he has had very little time to prepare this presentation. Colonel Briggs has been at this station since March 15 which is shortly after the last visit of the Committee of Three here. He will present the situation from that date forward."

COL. BRIGGS: "Gentlemen, I will deal only with the time, as the General said, that I have been chairman of the team.

"On the 19th of March, Colonel Graves and I went to Peiping at the request of the Executive Headquarters to make a report there of the progress of the team until that date. The details of that trip are not important at the moment. We made our report and we were told to proceed, immediately upon our return, to Ying Shan where severe fighting was reported to be in progress. We were given all the information relative to the alleged conflict at that time and returned at once to Hankow. However, upon our return to Hankow, we were told that we should contact both Chinese members of the team to find out whether or not conflicts that were reported in Ho Kow Shien area were more important to be investigated than the fighting in Ying Shan. On the morning of 23 March, the team had a meeting, at which time this information was presented to them, together with what information we had on the fighting in the Ho Kow Shien area—that is, from An-Yang to Huang Pei. The team unanimously agreed that the Ying Shan area should be given top priority, so we proceeded there as originally planned and suggested by the Executive Headquarters.

"On the afternoon of the 24th of March, we left by plane from Hankow, and arrived about an hour later at Ying Shan. Shortly after we got there, the weather got so bad that travel south of Ying Shan was almost impossible—even by horseback. So we sent a message to the Communist Party leaders south of Shan Yang Tien to ask whether

or not it was possible for them to meet us at Ying Shan. That message was sent, and they arrived on the morning of the 27th. We had an open meeting on the 27th and a team meeting on the 28th. At the meeting on the 27th all the evidence relative to the alleged violations of the Cease-Fire Agreement was taken.

“As a result of that evidence and at the team meeting on the following day, an agreement was reached by the team and signed by all members of the team and distributed to the principal commanders concerned. The agreement was substantially this, if you are not already familiar with it. That the Government troops should withdraw to a line north of but including Shan Yan Tien. The Communist Party troops should withdraw to a line south of but including Tai Ping Shen—a distance of about 20 li, and the area in between was to be a neutral zone.

“This agreement was to become effective at noon on the first of April. All movement in that area was to be completed by that time. One provision of the agreement was that the team should be notified when the movement was completed. The team received notification from both parties in due time that the movement had been completed on the first of April. On the 30th of April, we returned and drafted a radio—a team report—which we sent to Executive Headquarters, and with which you are probably all familiar.

“Realizing when we returned that the area in the vicinity of Ho Kow Shien could bear investigation, we left for that area on the 2nd of April, travelling by jeep. We arrived at 6 o'clock p. m. that day and had a meeting the following morning. General Jen Chu Ping was, I believe, the high-ranking officer there from the Communist troops. We ran into a little difficulty however. We had a disagreement, not only among the team, but among the officers we had invited to help us in gathering evidence, to such an extent that we had to discontinue the meeting that day and continue it the following morning. In spite of all efforts on the part of the team chairman, that attitude still prevailed on the following morning, but we had the meeting just the same.

“While the team is not in a position to say that a definite settlement was made at that time, we collected sufficient data that we can use in applying and clearing up Directive Number 6 as it pertains to that area.”

GEN. BYROADE: “I would like to ask Colonel Briggs to explain very briefly to these gentlemen what this difficulty was.”

COL. BRIGGS: “The argument started over the alleged misrepresentation of facts in one of the memorandums that was presented to the team bearing on this subject, and a quarrel started within the team itself and spread to everyone else that was there, too. It seemed to be contagious. Since that time, I would like to mention the fact that our

difficulties have been forgotten and everything has been patched up. I merely explained that to let you know why we did not reach an agreement at that time. The temper of everyone there was such that there was no possibility of reaching an amicable agreement.

"After our return from Ho Kow Shien we received approval from the Executive Headquarters authorizing the movement of 1,000 troops who were sick and wounded to An Yang. That movement was to be made by rail. We have spent the intervening period in clearing up the multitude of details necessary to make such a movement. The details are now complete. It was originally intended that this movement was to be implemented and completed in the first week of May. However, to do that we had to get additional rolling stock from the northern division of the railroad down to Hankow to augment what we have here to complete the movement in one trip. We have received a memorandum yesterday however stating that it will be impossible to complete this movement before the first of June due to the fact that both the northern and southern division of the railroad are utilizing the entire amount of rolling stock they have in the program of repatriating the Japanese.

"Last Wednesday night, the first of May, about 10:30 o'clock, we were informed by the Communist Party member of the Peace Team that there was a concentration of National Government troops in the Macheng-Shen-An Yang area. The Communist Party member had none of this information in writing other than the notes he had taken over the radio, which were in Chinese. I asked him to translate them the first thing in the morning and I further asked the National Government member to get all the information he could on this alleged movement. It was not until the afternoon of the following day that we received a radio stating substantially the same information from our own Headquarters in Peiping.

"We had a long meeting yesterday morning based on this information, and it was the intention of the American member to take a small group and go into that area the first thing this coming week based on the information we had at the moment. I realized of course that it would take 3 days travel to get up into this area south of Hsuan Hwa Tien and north of Macheng.

"This brings my report up to date. During all this time, it has been the constant thought of the chairman of the team to be as impartial and fair as he possibly could be. If the team has had any success, it is due to the cooperation I have received from both representatives of the team and their staff officers."

GEN. BYROADE: "I would like to ask General Hsu if he has any questions or comments on the presentations."

GEN. HSU (NG): "I want to know when the Communists brought up the question about the alleged movement of National Government

troops in this area. What was the reaction of the National Government team member?"

COL. BRIGGS: "He was very much surprised. He knew nothing at all about it."

GEN. CHOU (CP): "I want to express my thanks for this report. I would like first to have some time to make a study of the situation here, and also to receive reports about the present circumstances as well as the outstanding problems which have not yet been resolved. I hope I will first have time to discuss it with my own people so that I can get a preliminary understanding of the situation and then have a discussion."

GEN. BYROADE: "I remember that when the Committee of Three was here in March they were all gratified as to the working relationship of the members of this team. I have been here about 3 or 4 hours, and I feel that that relation still exists. I believe that we have already agreed to re-convene this evening at 6:30. I would like to ask General Hsu and General Chou if they would want the team present or prefer to have the team stand by in another room or not to have the team at all."

GEN. CHOU (CP): "We should follow the usual procedure. We will have the team and General Ho in readiness."

GEN. BYROADE: "I will see that you are notified of the meeting place. I think this is the dining room. I will check up."

GEN. CHOU (CP): "How about meeting in your own room at 6:00 o'clock?"

GEN. BYROADE: "I would be delighted to have you. Are we adjourned?"

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Meeting of the Acting Committee of Three at Hankow,
May 5, 1946, 6 p. m.*

The following were present:

National Government:
Gen. Hsu Yung-chang
Col. Peter Pee
Communist Party:
Gen. Chou En-lai
Mr. Chang
United States:
Gen. Henry A. Byroade
Capt. Jack T. Young

GEN. BYROADE: "I am afraid I am rather junior to be a member of such a distinguished Committee. But I suppose to follow our custom and for smooth operation, I should act here as temporary chairman.

I find that in the type work we are doing the American usually ends up in the undesirable position of being in the middle.

“This meeting today is a little different from anything we have had before because we are here to discuss a problem which has not been reported by the field team and of which the two gentlemen present know more, I am sure, than the Executive Headquarters does or than I do. It seems to me, though, that there are certain things here that we can logically discuss this afternoon. One is the general situation that brought this committee here. Another is the proper disposition of the field team that we brought, to make sure that it is used properly; and another is the schedule for this committee—what shall be our activities. So, from now on, I would like to listen and see if I can learn more of this situation myself. I would like to ask General Hsu if he would like to make the opening comments.”

(General Hsu declined and indicated that General Chou should speak first.)

GEN. CHOU (CP): “The reports submitted by the field team here are based only on the information they have received and the problems they have had to undertake. However, they are sending more recent information they have received and we have also received certain information through General Lee and through Yen-an. I would like to make a few comments on that. Regarding the Communist area to the north of Hankow, it is different from other areas in the sense that it is entirely surrounded by Govern[ment] troops on all sides. As General Hsu may not have familiarized himself with this situation, I have submitted two overlays to show the disposition.¹⁷ This overlay was prepared by the Communist Party Branch of the Executive Headquarters; and General Byroade has, I am sure, seen these charts.

“You can see the disposition of the troops that are surrounded. This situation was reported to the Committee of Three when it made the last trip. The field team has also conducted several investigations, particularly to the east of the railway. The field team has also inspected a part of the area to the west of the railway. Since the Communist area[s] are surrounded by the Government troops, which amount to 11 armies in the adjacent area of that territory, of course the Communist troops feel they are in constant danger, and it is an actual fact that such danger exists. The Government troops have repeatedly made advances and some places have been occupied by the Government troops. That is the reason for the fear.

“Of those 11 armies, only one is stationed rather far away in the southwest part of Honan. As to the rest, they are in the neighboring Communist area. This is, in general, the situation with respect to this area.

¹⁷ Not found attached to file copy.

“Previous to the Cease Fire agreement, an agreement was reached between the Government and the Communist Party in October of last year, in which the Communist Party promised to evacuate their troops from this subject area and, even when the Cease Fire agreement was signed, the Communists again stated that they would lift their troops in that area. The Army Reorganization Plan was made accordingly. Because this is a big area—with about 60,000 Communist forces involved—of course, there is some difficulty involved in the evacuation of those troops.

“It has been pointed out that the personnel in this area have come down from the North. Since demobilization has to be carried out and because of political complications, it would not be possible for those northerners to stay in this area, and their families and dependents will have to go with them. So it would be best if those 60,000 people could evacuate at an early date; particularly as food is getting very scarce. Under the present circumstances, food is exceedingly scarce and there is a massing of troops, both on the Communist side (because they are all concentrated in this area) and also on the part of the Government troops that surround this area.

“At the time the Committee of Three came to Hankow, it was suggested that the Communist troops be evacuated from here to the north or to the east. However, the Government side feels that such evacuation would cause confusion among Government troops. Since it will take 80 days, many complications are involved. When the Committee of Three went back to Chungking, the question of evacuation was again discussed with General Chang, who replied that it can be done only during implementation of the Army Reorganization Program.

“Since the second plan discussed was not agreed upon, they arranged a third procedure—that is, to try to adjust the food problem. A loan has been made by the Government side of 400,000,000 to the Communists, which will be reimbursed in North China. The loan is not sufficient to solve the food problem, and the food problem still exists. Eventual evacuation seems indispensable. It has been reported recently by the Government side that the Communists have not used this money to buy food, but to buy munitions. In reply to this report, I can assure you that it is not true. Our troops are quite well equipped and they have enough weapons and munitions. Since they have to be demobilized there is no need for them to buy munitions. The population in this area are very poor, and in order to procure food, they have to pay for it. I can state definitely that that report is not true.

“Furthermore, this area differs from the other areas in the respect that an effort has been made to determine the disposition of the troops on both sides. For example, the American representative has reported that statements have been made where each regiment is stationed or

where its unit is. In this area, we have a definite picture of the disposition of troops. In case there is some trouble, however, it is very difficult to establish the true fact.

“After the latest developments, the situation has been aggravated due to the fact that toward the end of April the following has been reported: First, in certain places the Government troops have been massed or moved so that the Communist forces feel themselves to be in danger. For example, the 72nd Army has massed two divisions in the neighborhood of Macheng, and it has also been reported this afternoon that some hostilities have taken place in that area. In addition to that, the 80th Army has massed its troops around Ho Kou. The American representative has also reported that hostilities ceased after the trip by the Committee of Three. But right now, the hostilities have again been resumed. The people who came back yesterday from Communist headquarters reported that they also heard gun fire on the way back, so this is proof that some fighting is still taking place. As we know, to the west of that place, the 80th Nationalist Division is stationed. The 50th division of the 72nd Army is stationed to the North. We know that some concentration of troops has taken place there. Coming to the second part of the railroad, we also found some massing of troops and we heard about troop movements. For example, the 6th division of the 71st Army has undertaken movement toward Hankow. It was also reported that in the last few days troops have been sent to the northward from Hankow. No report has been given to the field team about those movements, despite the fact that the field teams are supposed to be notified of troop movements and the approval of the field teams obtained. We find, in general, toward the end of April, movement of troops and concentration of troops, as well as attacks.

“Regarding the attacks made toward the end of April, we received reports from several sides that the Government has made advances. For example, the 72nd Army has occupied Ho Kou and surrounded the Communist troops to the south of Ho Kou. It had been determined by the field team previously that the area was under Communist control. Furthermore, it has been reported that attacks have been launched from Hsin Yang eastward and that an attack was undertaken by the 72nd division of the 66th Army. Other fighting to the west of the railroad has also been reported.

“In addition to the attacks made by the regular troops, there are also disturbances caused by the bandits. If those bandits have entered the Communist area and have been annihilated then, of course, there will be no further consequences. Sometimes the bandits were repelled, but the Communists could not go beyond their boundary lines, so that the bandits continue to make repeated provocations against the Commu-

nists. Sometimes it has been determined that these "bandits" were disguised Government troops. Another problem is the purchase of food. Since it is not possible to buy all the necessary food within the Communist area, certain places have been designated where the Communists may go out to buy food. The number of persons sent out for that purpose is very small and they are clothed in civilian clothes. Still they have been arrested by Government troops or mishandled so it was not possible for them to carry out their mission. Those instances have been reported to the field team as well as to the local authorities.

"Another point which the American representative reported is the agreed deportation of about 1,000 Communist sick and wounded to the North. Arrangements have been set up for their deportation because those sick and wounded cannot be well taken care of under the present situation. The date of departure has been fixed for the first days of May. Now on account of the repatriation of the Japanese, that matter has to be delayed. This delay has increased the uneasiness of the Communists.

"In view of these circumstances, the Communist troops are afraid that a general offensive will be launched against them, and, in addition, we know that the situation in Manchuria is serious and the situation in China proper is also not stable.

"Toward the end of April, we received information, both from General Lee and from other sources that a certain representative of the National Military Council was making preparations to annihilate the Communist troops in this area. According to this plan, disguised bandits and staged civilian disturbances will be organized in that area and cause great confusion. In any case, the Communist troops will try to resist and to force a way out of the encirclement. This information has been received both in this area as well as in Hsuehchow and was further confirmed by Yen-an, which learned that orders to this effect have been issued to the Nationalist troops. In addition, we have evidence of a troop movement so that everything indicates that the situation in this area has become serious. I immediately approached General Hsu and he told me he was not aware of this situation, but that he would report it to the Generalissimo. I wired General Marshall and he inquired about this matter. This was the situation yesterday morning. Therefore, when I saw General Marshall yesterday, I told him that I felt much worried about this area, because we have learned that an offensive would be launched between May 4th and May 9th, and I hoped that such an unfortunate incident would not occur, because these would cause undesirable consequences for both parties if such an unfortunate incident took place. Since our area is very small, we would have to take defensive measures. We would lose many troops and then our troops in other areas would deem this to be a start of a new large-scale

civil war. It would affect the situation in North China. On the other hand, when we are fighting with the bandits, the Government may deem that we have endeavored to try to force our way out of this area. They would try to stop the Communist troops. This would also affect other areas. So far as I have learned, preparations have already been made on the Lunghai railway to stop any eventual movements of Communist troops. In that case, the fighting would become very fierce. In either case, it would be bad and therefore it appears to me that the best way is for the situation here to be stabilized. On our side, if we really intended to force our way out of this area, then I would not need to take care of this. I would just leave it alone. Since I have come to try to solve this matter, it shows that we still intend to solve the problem of the movement of the Communist troops by negotiation. On the Government side, if they will send a representative down here to solve the matter, it will appear that the Government desires that no such incident should happen.

“After talking with General Marshall, he told me that General Hsu was prepared to come down with me. I appreciate it. As we know General Hsu is very able, and is quite an old man. He nevertheless takes the trouble to come down here, and I appreciate it. Since we are now in Hankow I hope we will take effective measures to stabilize the situation here, as it is rather complicated. We can hear the report of the field teams as well as the local military authorities. I further propose that we go north to the Communist headquarters. We can come back to Hankow to work out some arrangement for this area. Of course, it is a rather bad trip if we go by truck, but in my opinion that is the best way to do. We should decide later as to the arrangements. Of course, both sides should make no attacks. Places occupied since January 13 should be evacuated. The most important thing, of course, is that the field team should not permanently stay in Hankow but should inspect all points of conflict. This committee cannot proceed to all those places, so we hope the field teams will inspect those areas, determine the disposition of the troops and investigate the hostilities, as well as the complications involved in the purchase of food, so that the whole situation can be stabilized.

“I think it might be advisable to have 3 field teams in this area: one in Hankow; the second in the Hsuan Hwa Tien area; and the third one in Hsin Yang. After another month, I think, when the Army Reorganization plan is going to be implemented, of course, the Communist troops in this area can be moved away so that the problem will no longer exist.”

GEN. BYROADE: “I would like here, for purposes of the record, to correct what is most likely a misunderstanding in the presentation

today. The fighting northeast of Hankow that was reported by the American member of the team was sent in as a Communist report. It was not a team report, or an American report, because the team has not gotten out there. Also, when General Chou refers to reports of violations here in the last few days, I assume he means reports through his own channels and not through the field team. Is that correct?"

GEN. CHOU (CP): "Regarding this area, the reports were furnished by the Communist side. Regarding the Ho Kou area, the American member has just reported that some hostilities have taken place and a meeting was held in that area. But because of bad feeling, the problem was not resolved. As to the area west of the railway, information has been submitted by the Communist member but was not brought out in discussion among the field team members."

GEN. BYROADE: "I would like to ask General Hsu if he has any comments."

GEN. HSU (NG): "I summarize General Chou's speech. First, the concentration and movement of Government troops; second, the purchasing of food; third, the disposition of sick and wounded; and fourth, the so-called plan of annihilation. I would like to deal with the first thing first.

"Regarding the alleged accusation that the Government has attacked the Communists. The local commander has provided data to the field team repeatedly regarding Communist attacks on the Government troops from one to seventeen times. The furthest distance for the Communist troops to advance and occupy some places is over 100 kilometers from the original position held on January 13. We have figures and dates and we can make a survey of these, and, regarding the alleged Government troop movement and concentrations, we can also make a survey in different places to see if this is a fact. Right now it may be advisable to ask General Ko (Deputy Director, Wuhan Headquarters of the Generalissimo) to report the disposition of the Government troops. But I would like to point out that those accusations made by General Chou are totally groundless.

"Regarding the second point, the purchasing of food, General Chou said that the Communist personnel, when they come out of their areas are arrested by the Government troops. Regarding that point, General Ko just mentioned the fact that the Communists fail to send designated personnel to the designated area to purchase food, so that the case is just a technical point. General Ko assures me that he will do everything to help the Communists get food. If better liaison can be maintained it will cease to be a problem. If a central market is designated as the place to buy food, the Communists can wire to Hankow, and they can send orders to the local commanders for them

to do the purchasing. The purchase of food is connected with the relations between the troops and the civilians. General Ko has showed frankness and sincerity in wanting to help the Communists purchase food, and I will discuss again with him the making of arrangements to prevent further arrests in the future.

“Regarding the sick and wounded, General Ko mentioned to me that he proposed to organize a field hospital to be sent to the Communists but General Lee turned this offer down. Prior to the departure from Nanking, the Generalissimo told me that if the Communists would like to send their sick and wounded to Hankow, we can designate a very good hospital to treat those personnel. With the presence of American medical personnel and personnel from UNRRA in Hankow, the execution of that proposal will relieve the suffering of the sick and wounded personnel of the Communists to a great extent.

“Regarding the fourth thing, the alleged intention of the Government to concentrate over 20 divisions with the idea of annihilating the Communist troops in this area, I had a talk with General Chou on the evening of 1 May. I then assured General Chou that, as I am director of operations, such a movement of troops cannot happen without my knowledge, and I have no information of such movement. I tried to convince General Chou that this alleged report is entirely without foundation. Both sides state their own points of view so that the talk comes to an impasse. The Communists are making the pretext that it is a violation and that the Communists would never do a thing like that. I believe in General Chou’s sincerity and frankness. I propose to General Chou that facts will prove in the next 10 days whether the report [*be*] true. If it is not true, then that will constitute a proof that I am a trustworthy man and do not intend to cheat. General Chou is still concerned over that report. I know it is not true. I am the Government representative and I have to wire to the Generalissimo about this although I know it is not true, because my counterpart asked me to do something, I must do it. So I did wire to the Generalissimo on that. I hope that we won’t work ourselves up too much or get excited over this false alarm. It seems very unnecessary for the Committee of Three to proceed to the field, so I suggest that we let the field team brought in by General Byroade proceed to observe whether there is any troop movement. I think that will be enough assurance to General Chou.”

GEN. BYROADE: “We have heard the very serious situation and charge here presented by General Chou En-lai and a very reassuring answer presented by General Hsu. I would like, in order to expedite our

business, to take up the points one by one and see which ones we can readily deal with and get an agreement.

"Taking the specific comments as I have them here, one by one, General Chou's first point was that all present conflict should be stopped. This, of course, has been agreed to in Chungking and ordered many times in Executive Headquarters. I am confident of sincerity of the two gentlemen here and that they will contact their commanders in this area and enforce the decision to stop all this local conflict that may spread.

"The second point was a suggested move back to the January 13 positions. I would like to raise for your consideration the fact that we have an unusual situation in this area in that respect. On January 23, what we called the Loshan Agreement was signed which fixed the position as of January 23.¹⁸ That was a local agreement made here and has many other provisions. It has been a very satisfactory agreement. This agreement was made here on the ground, before the Executive Headquarters had published its Directive to fix the January 13 positions. The matter came up to the Three Commissioners of Executive Headquarters as to whether we should throw overboard the Loshan Agreement, in view of the instructions then being drafted by Executive Headquarters. In both of these cases, the Executive Headquarters decided that considering all the good points of this agreement and since there was a difference of only 10 days the Loshan Agreement should be left in effect and in this area we should stick to the January 23 position. I would like to ask, therefore, if it is agreeable that we retain that agreement and that in this area, we speak of the January 23 Agreement instead of the January 13 Agreement. Would that be agreeable to General Chou En-lai?"

(Gen. Hsu (NG) spoke first when prompted by General Chou.)

GEN. HSU (NG): "As the Loshan Agreement was agreed to by both parties, it is suitable and advisable to retain the positions as of January 23."

GEN. CHOU (CP): "Directive Number 2¹⁹ was originated before we reached the Loshan Agreement."

GEN. BYROADE: "I think, as a matter of fact, they crossed in the mail."

GEN. CHOU (CP): "With respect to the relation between the Loshan Agreement and Directive 6,²⁰ that is not the crucial problem in this

¹⁸ See memorandum by Colonel Caughey, January 26, p. 382.

¹⁹ Dated January 20, not printed, but see telegram No. 4, January 25, from Mr. Walter S. Robertson, p. 378.

²⁰ Dated March 22, not printed; it re-emphasized the need to observe the January 10 cease-fire agreement. For text of agreement, see Memorandum by the Committee of Three to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, January 10, p. 125.

area, because the Communist personnel in this area will be removed to some other place. The present day problem is this—the fighting should be stopped, and reorganization of the Communist troops should be effected. The legal position should be the basis of the disposition of the troops. I realize that it is hard to carry that out. What concerns us at the present moment is whether the fighting is stopped. When we are evacuated, the whole problem will be removed. Regarding any controversy over the January 13 or January 23, I have not received any report.”

GEN. BYROADE: “I hope you will explain to General Chou that it is past our dinner time and I am tempted to go through the minor points now, leaving only the big issue for our next meeting, and please remind him that the minutes here become our working Bible for the future. We can bring up the Loshan Agreement at the next meeting or dismiss the matter to be handled by Executive Headquarters.”

GEN. CHOU (CP): “I agree.”

GEN. BYROADE: “Would General Chou care to have it presented tomorrow or let the Executive Headquarters make a decision?”

GEN. CHOU (CP): “Regarding the legal position, I do not deem it so important and I would like to leave it to Executive Headquarters to settle.”

GEN. BYROADE: “I can have a list made of the points presented today on which no agreement was reached and we can take them up at another meeting or I can run through the remaining minor points before we have dinner. I would like to leave that up to the other two gentlemen.”

GEN. CHOU (CP): “It all depends on the program for tomorrow whether we can continue discussing it.”

GEN. BYROADE: “I propose, therefore, that we take up those two matters right now and discuss whether this Committee shall make a trip as proposed by General Chou En-lai. I do not as yet have all the details as to the travel involved. I think we can land a small airplane at Hsin Yang. I am not informed about the condition of travel here, but I understand it is quite difficult because there has been considerable rain. However, I will continue to gather the data for that trip if it is agreed here that it is desirable that this Committee goes. On the matter of the trip, I am certainly agreeable to any agreement that is reached here between General Hsu and General Chou En-lai.”

GEN. HSU (NG): “I believe there is no necessity for us to make the field trip. I think that since General Chou is concerned over the report of a big Government troop concentration for the purpose of

annihilating the Communists troops in this area, it will serve no purpose for us to go to this spot. In any single spot, you can't find out whether there is a concentration of troops on all four sides. I have assured General Chou that the report is a false alarm. What we need is mutual trust. Then that will facilitate the settlement for this controversy. I share the point of view that teams should travel around in order that both sides will get assurance from the teams that the opposite side is not moving to attack and will feel at ease. By having more than one team to go around on regular schedule, it will clarify all these false alarms."

GEN. BYROADE: "I would like also to say that anywhere that the two generals here may decide that I personally should go, I will be very glad to go. Both of our field teams here are mobile and I have two more American officers coming down Thursday. I say this to give you a picture of what we have available."

GEN. CHOU (CP): "General Hsu says the situation seems not to be serious. But from our people's point of view, the situation is rather complicated and concerns over 60,000 men. If the situation had not been complicated here, the Army Reorganization plan should have been implemented long ago. This delay shows that there are actually difficulties. Because of the complications involved, there is constant fear on the part of our people that they might be attacked. I believe all General Hsu has told me. We have also to keep in mind that he has received his information from one side and it has been pieced together to give a certain impression. If the Government representative can go himself to the Communist area and reassure them and tell them about the actual outside conditions, that would let the people feel easy in their minds. When we made the previous trip, we traveled mostly to the places under Government control, with the exception of two places under the Communist control. Our people have very poor contact with the outside. If we can go this time, they will have a better picture of what is happening outside. The difficulties involved are in transportation and, so far as the technical side is involved, we should consider again what is the best arrangement to be made, so I suggest that maybe after dinner we have a short meeting to solve that problem."

GEN. BYROADE: "Is that agreeable to General Hsu?"

GEN. HSU (NG): "We will resume studying the situation afterwards."

GEN. BYROADE: "The Committee of Three was always late for the dinners that were given for them."

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Brigadier General Henry A. Byroade to General Marshall

[HSUANHWATIEN,] 6 May 1946.

Arrived Hankow with complete team Sunday noon. General Hsu, General Chou and party arrived shortly after. Schedule Sunday consisted of team presentation of situation followed by two conferences between committee members only. General Chou presented list of grievances this area since original [cease] fire agreement ending with acquisition [*allegation?*] of present plot on part of National Government for annihilation of local Communists forces. General Hsu countered all charges effectively ending with statement that on his word of honor no such plot existed as now claimed by Communists. A few minor matters developed during the above discussion on which agreement can be reached during future conferences. Question of future activities of this committee presented greatest problem. Chou insisted we travel by road 90 miles north to Communist Headquarters while Hsu emphatically maintained that nothing could be accomplished by such a trip. Compromise consisted of Hsu nominating General Wong of Generalissimo[']s Field Headquarters to be his representative on field trip. Hsu promises to remain here for final conferences on our return.

General Chou insisted that best deployment for extra team was at Communist Headquarters (which is far removed from any possible area [of] conflict), Hsu indicating that Chou should decide under the circumstances. I requested the reason for this unusual deployment in the face of previous charges of reported trouble at certain areas of contact but received no logical explanation. However in view of the agreement between the other two I agreed also and team followed us north. The team already here will move out to reported trouble spots to the northeast of Hankow vicinity Macheng upon our return.

Regret circumstances prevented my seeing you Sunday night.²¹ I would like to have explained to you why in my opinion Chou has presented such charges and is emphasizing this situation far beyond its relative importance compared to other critical problems facing you and Exec[utive] Headquarters at present.²² I shall return to render full report.

²¹ Notation by Colonel Caughey for General Marshall: "This refers to a message [May 5, not printed] you did not see. Byroade said that if Chou and Hsu were delayed in departing from here he would like to come here Sunday and return Hankow Monday. I sent Byroade a message saying they would be on schedule and suggested he come via here for Peiping."

²² General Byroade had said, "Am extremely eager to see you regarding Hankow situation."

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Meeting of the Acting Committee of Three at Hsuan Hwa T'ian,
May 8, 1946, 3:15 p. m.*

The following were present:

National Government:

Gen. Wong—Deputy Chief of Staff, Wu Han Headquarters
of the Generalissimo, Representing General
Hsu Yung-Chang.

Gen. Lu —Deputy Director of Operations, Wu Han Head-
quarters of the Generalissimo.

Communist Party:

Gen. Chou En-lai

Gen. Li Hsi[e]n-Nien—Commanding General, Communist
Party Central Area Forces.

Gen. Wang —Chief of Staff, Communist Party
Central Area Forces.

Mr. Chang

United States:

Gen. Henry A. Byroade

Lt. Col. W. D'ettore

Capt. Jack T. Young

GEN. WANG (CP): "Generals, I appreciate very much your coming
in spite of all the difficulties.

"The meeting is called to order. General Li (CP) will give a report
of the present situation here."

GEN. LI (CP): "On behalf of the Central China Region of the
Communist Forces, I express our welcome to General Byroade, Gen-
eral Wong, General Lu and General Chou. I will now submit a report
on the present situation in this area.

"I personally feel that the situation in this area is rather serious.
That means that hostilities are pending in this area. As a basis for
my estimate of the situation here, I have information which shows
that movement of the Nationalists' troops around this area is very
heavy. This movement is from both a strategic and tactical point of
view and is of an offensive character. For example, the 34th Division
of the 72nd Army which was stationed before the Cease-Fire agree-
ment in Shih Hui Yao, below Hankow on the south bank of Yangtze
River, according to our latest information arrived at Macheng, to the
east of the Communist area on April 28.

"As another example, the two regiments of the New 13th Division
of the 72nd Army—which are the 38th and the 39th regiments—
originally stationed at Sung Pu to the south of Macheng, have arrived

at Shiao Kai Ling on March 24 and launched attacks on the Communist forces. The 43rd Regiment of the New 15th Division of the 72nd Army entered the town of Chinfu on May 4. In the town of Shan Cheng in South Honan when the cease-fire agreement was signed there was only one regiment of the 48th Army. Now that place has been reinforced to four regiments, this movement taking place toward the end of March. The 47th Army, which originally had its Headquarters at Loshan on May 3, moved into Huang Chuan, southeast of Honan. Furthermore, the 125th Division of the 47th Army, originally stationed at Loshan, has also moved to Huang Chuan. One division of the 41st Army has moved from Ch'ueh Shan toward Huang Chuan. Coming to the Peiping-Hankow railroad, we noticed that the 596th Regiment of the 199th Division of the 66th Army, which was originally stationed at Hwa Yuan, has now moved to Hsin Yang. When we move on a little further, we find that the New 10th Division, which was originally stationed at Hsuehchow and Suo Hsing, has now moved around the middle toward Tai Ho and Fu Yang. According to other information, the 404th Regiment of the 135th Division, which was originally stationed at Li Shan in North Hopeh [*Hupei*], on May 3 moved to Ma Ping and Hwa Yuan. At the same time, the 15th Army, stationed at Pi Yang in Honan, moved partly toward Hsin Yang. As to the 10th Army, which around January 10, was stationed in Han Chun, in March moved toward Lao Ho Kou, and then moved to this Communist area.

"Therefore, it can be concluded that the movement of Nationalist troops is both strategically and tactically of an offensive nature with the purpose of annihilating the Communist forces. Not only the movement alone emphasizes the seriousness of the situation. Many engagements launched by the Nationalist troop[s] have indicated its seriousness. What is most surprising to us is the attacks launched by the Nationalist troops at Shiao Chih Ling to the north of Macheng and to the south of Shang Cheng. During this attack, two regiments of the 72nd Army launched an offensive at 5 o'clock a.m. on April 25. That started out in four routes; from Fu Tian Ho and Liang Lu Ko toward the Communist position in Shiao Chih Ling; the Shiao Chih Ling is already occupied by the Nationalist troops. Since this location is garrisoned by the main forces of the Communist troops, it shows that the Government aims to start a large scale battle at this place.

"On April 15, one company of the Nationalist troops 174th Division launched an attack from Shang Cheng and Yu Chia Chi and attacked one platoon of Communist patrols. These two engagements differ from the other engagements in the far-flung areas in this respect: that they were fought with the main forces.

“Coming to the Hsin Yang area. On April 14, the 554th Regiment of the 185th Division launched an attack setting out from Fung Chia Chuang, 40 li west of Hsin Yang toward Wang Kwang, and occupied that place. Now the National Government controls that position and has erected blockhouses.

“On April 14 at 9 o'clock a. m., two battalions of the 13th Division of the 66th Army started out from Ying Shan and occupied Er Shih Li-Pu, Ma Chia-ho and Hen Tien to the north of Ying Shan. Again, in the forenoon of April 24, the 596th Regiment of the 199th Division of the 66th Army set out from Hsin Yang and occupied the Communist position in Chin Shih Chiao.

“One battalion of the 595th Regiment of the 199th Division attacked on April 24 from Hsin Yang eastward toward Tu-cheng, 30 li to the east of Hsin Yang. During this engagement, 8 men of one of our platoons were captured by the Nationalist troops. We lost 6 rifles and one light machine gun.

“The 13th Division of the 66th Army sent the 38th Regiment and two battalions of the 39th Regiment with local troops to attack at 10 o'clock a. m. on April 23 the Communist positions in An-Lu and Ying Shan. They occupied Lau Chia Tien, Li Chia Tien and Ying Chia Tien. They also occupied the strategic point of Chi Yang Shan.

“Up until now, the two armies are staying in close contact with each other. Previously, there had been some dispute over this area. After the intervention of the Field Team, the line of separation between the two armies was determined. Due to the latest action on the part of the Nationalist troops, that agreement has been broken. The neutral zone has been occupied by the Nationalist troops. In addition to that, they occupied Chi Yang Shan, which is acknowledged to be the base of Communist forces.

“In coordination with these engagements, the National Government at An-Lu conducted many activities. I will prepare a memorandum on this subject to be submitted to Executive Headquarters as well as to the Committee of Three.

“In the vicinity of Huang An and Huang Pi, the Nationalist troops on March 17 occupied the following places in the neighborhood of Huang An: Chang Tien, Kao Chiao Ho, Miso Chi Wan and Ta Tsin Shan and Hsiao Tsin Shan. The Communist forces in the area between Huang An and Huang Pi have been restricted to a very small place with only two townlets, Shih Tse Shu Tian and Ta Er Kang. But even so, on April 2, the Nationalist troops launched a four route attack on this Communist area and, up until now, the two armies are still opposing each other.

"This gives a general outline of the situation here during the last fortnight. During this fortnight, the attacks made by the Nationalist troops have been rather frequent and so far as I can judge, the Nationalist troops seem to be motivated by two aims. The first one is to carry out the annihilation plan; particularly from the movements and the attacks by Nationalist troops, their annihilation plan has become obvious. Also, we have submitted a report to the Peiping Executive Headquarters as well as to Yen-an regarding the situation here. We received information here from Yen-an about the Nationalists around this area. They reported that a National Government general made a tour through Hsuehchow and made preparations for an overall attack on the Communist area here.

"According to our information, the command system of the Nationalist troops has also undergone some change. The 47th Army and the 41st Army was under the Command of General Liu Chih and the 48th Army was originally under the command of General Hsia Wei, but they now all come under the unified command of General Chow Ai, under the Hankow Generalissimo's Field Headquarters. Particularly, the command post of General Chow Ai, has moved to a place near Hua Yuan, and we cannot understand this, particularly since the cease-fire agreement is in effect.

"Furthermore, Directive 4²³ of Executive Headquarters provided for the removal of blockhouses. Also, when Field Team 9 arrived I raised this question. It was agreed by the field team and the agreement has been published here that all blockhouses should be removed, but in actual practice, this was never carried out. On the contrary, the number of blockhouses has been increased. According to a rough estimate, there are altogether over 6,000 blockhouses around the Communist area here.

"Our further information told of Nationalist troops being issued rations to be carried in battle, and they were all equipped so that they are ready for combat. In addition to that, recently we have found lots of bandits in the far flung areas as well as in the vicinity where our main forces are stationed. As I see the matter, these bandits are not bandits of the usual kind, but have a political background. Furthermore, the information we received said that the Nationalist troops are trying to carry out the annihilation plan in the form of banditry and staged people's disturbances; not only military preparations were made.

"Furthermore, with regard to the political aspects of the situation public opinion has been mobilized by the National Government. They

²³ This was General Directive No. 4-A, February 12, not printed; see agreement for the restoration of communications on February 9, p. 422.

had reported that we attacked Ho Kou and at another time attacked southeast Honan. The most amazing thing was that I even received notification from Executive Headquarters, saying that 20,000 men under my command had moved toward Fu Yang and I was even blamed by the Communist Commissioner for moving the Communist troops without receiving an order. The Communist Commissioner said he received the message on April 2, from General Chang (NG Commissioner) to that effect. So I asked General Yeh how the Communist could move so large a force, and I asked for the destination of the alleged movement of Communist troops. I asked that Executive Headquarters investigate the matter. In case there are 20,000 Communist troops there, I would like to have them suppressed by the Nationalist troops. I deem this kind of allegation as being entirely without foundation.

“Coming to the deportation of wounded and sick soldiers, this question was first brought up by the Hankow Field Team to Executive Headquarters, suggesting that 1,000 sick and wounded be sent out. This was approved by Executive Headquarters. The field team agreed that this movement could be made by May 1. Under the pretext that there was not enough rolling stock, the movement of those Communist personnel has been delayed. This led us to suspect that the National Government was not willing to move these personnel. Since the cease-fire order, we cannot yet notice any kind of peaceful atmosphere in this vicinity.

“The Communist personnel sent out from this area for the purpose of purchasing food or for communications purposes have been arrested many times. The number arrested amounts to a total of over 360 men. When we have all this information pieced together it shows that the Nationalist troops intend to annihilate our forces, and this annihilation plan is to be carried out in various forms. In case we should make counter-attacks, the Nationalist troops would [have] alleged that we were trying to force our way out. Under such circumstances, our losses would be very heavy and we would never try to make any kind of counter-attack.

“Of course, I, myself, would like to give assurance that, so long as the Nationalist troops do [not] carry out the annihilation plan, we will not undertake any large scale action against them. Therefore, I wish to make this request to the Committee of Three and Executive Headquarters—that they try to adjust the situation on the basis of the conditions here. In case they find my report not true, then I would like them to undertake a survey. My present report is confined to activities during the last fortnight. As to attacks made between January 13 and a fortnight ago by the Nationalist troops, I will not mention

them here, but I will mention them in a separate memorandum to be submitted to Executive Headquarters and to the Committee of Three.

"In view of the above, it seems to me that our military region is subjected to very difficult circumstances. I think that both the Committee of Three as well as General Byroade of Executive Headquarters are aware that, militarily, we are placed in an inferior position in this area. So, obviously, the allegations made by the National Government that we are trying to break the cease-fire agreement and that we are trying to launch attacks are not true. These allegations serve no other purpose than to slander the Communist forces here. In order to avoid conflict, as early as the time when General Marshall was in Hankow, I proposed to the Committee of Three that the Communist forces here be moved. In view of the serious circumstances now prevailing, it seems to me indispensable that I raise this question again.

"We have the following reasons for requesting the movement of our forces. According to the Army Reorganization plan, there should be a reorganization of all units. As the Communist force[s] here are half under the command of the New 4th Army and half under the 8th Route Army, we deem it necessary that the Army be permitted to move. In addition to that, we have financial, as well as food difficulties in this area. It is alleged that we are conscripting food from the populace here, but actually we have stopped conscripting food from this area. We now depend on money supplied by the Communists in North China to purchase food in this area. As to what should be the destination of our move, I will not go into this question here, though previously we have proposed that we would like to have our forces moved to North Kiangsu. However, I would leave it to the Executive Headquarters and the Committee of Three as to where our forces should be moved. The junior officers as well as the enlisted men of our forces are rather inclined to stay in this area since this area was established and developed and cultivated by them in the days of the war against the Japanese. They feel very much attached to this area, but now, to obey the reorganization plan, we would like to move our troops to some other area. Though this question has been brought up over two months ago, it has not yet been resolved. Now this question can be easily settled, and, if the Government is not willing to have our forces move away, then it seems to us that their purpose is to starve our army and then carry out their annihilation plan. There can be no other interpretation.

"Therefore, I wish seriously to bring up the question of the movement of our troops to you. Of course, the movement of the forces will take some time even if provisions for it have been made by the Committee of Three or Executive Headquarters; it cannot be expected to

be carried out in a day or two. There are 60,000 men in this area, so I wish to submit the following to the Committee of Three and Executive Headquarters: This first thing is that assurance should be made that there will be no further hostilities. On my part, I will personally take responsibility that no attacks will be made by the Communist forces. Secondly, seeing that the Communist forces are confined to such a small area, in order to carry out Directive 2, it is proposed that both armies should withdraw to their positions as of midnight January 13 and that the Nationalist troops will do likewise so that they will evacuate the town of Kwang Shan which was occupied by them at 8 o'clock a. m. on January 14. Of course, not only the town of Kwang Shan itself is involved. Subsequent to January 13, many places have been occupied by the Nationalist troops. It is requested that the Nationalist Government evacuate all places mentioned in a memorandum prepared by me. When this has been carried out, the Communist area will become larger and it would be easier for us to procure food. The third request is that Directive 4 be thoroughly executed and that all blockhouses be removed and all lines of communication be reopened. The fourth request is that the decision of Executive Headquarters to move 1,000 sick and wounded and 100 dependents to An-Yang will be put into effect. The fifth thing is that demobilization has already been under way in this area. So far, 15,000 men have been demobilized, but on account of the fact that many of them have been arrested by the Nationalist Government, they feel that there is no security and many of them have come back. I request that their security be protected. The sixth request is, seeing that summer is here and it is now more likely that there will be an increase of sick soldiers, and since we are so greatly [in] lack [of] medicines and medical supplies, we hope that this problem can be settled. Lastly, there is a very great difficulty with regard to finance and food. Some of our troops have only two meals of porridge a day and in one of our units it happened that the man in charge of the kitchens and mess felt very helpless. We wish that arrangements be made to alleviate financial and food conditions. This is the report I wish to make to you gentlemen. Regarding the requests, I think the best way is for our troops to be permitted to move at an early date. Right now, the National Government is suspicious that we have some kind of plan. If our troops can move to some other place, they will have no cause to suspect us.

“One more request I wish to mention is that the people arrested by the National Government troops be released. I would like to know if General Wang Chien (CP) has any supplementary report to make.”

GEN. WANG (CP) : “Shall we have a five-minute rest?”

(The meeting recessed for five minutes and reconvened to report the following):

GEN. WANG (CP): "We earnestly hope, with confidence, that General Byroade, General Wong (NG) and General Chou will agree on effective measures to resolve the problem here so that the situation can be stabilised through peaceful means.

"To supplement the report of General Li (CP), I wish to state that, since January 13, hostilities have not ceased in this area. The Nationalist troops have undertaken measures to annihilate several tens of thousands of Communist personnel in this area. I will stand by the statement of General Li (CP). According to a Directive of Executive Headquarters to Kuang Shan and the agreement reached at Loshan and due to the responsible attitude of Colonel Ford, we have, in general, brought hostilities in this area to a stop. Despite all that, the Nationalist troops have, by besieging and blockading the Communist areas, repeatedly gained positions and reinforced their troops.

"The second chairman of the 9th Field Team, Colonel Graves, for the purpose of carrying out Directive 4, has made a long tour through this area and the Peiping-Hankow railroad to make a survey. He then specified that many blockhouses in this area should be removed and no new ones should be permitted to be erected. In actual practice, however, the Nationalist troops have been stalling in carrying out Directive 4. On the contrary, they have erected several thousands of new blockhouses in this area. All these facts I am sure Colonel Graves has seen himself, as they were also seen by the American council [*consul*] who came along with him.

"Previously, the Communist area here was still connected with the Communist area in Honan and in East Hopeh [*Hupeh*], but, during the last two or three months, they have been isolated by the Nationalist troops by virtue of those blockhouses, and the Nationalists have moved into positions between those Communist areas. Now the Nationalist troops are adopting tactics of besieging and blockading the Communist area. For example, a junior officer of the Nationalist troops in the neighborhood of Huang An and Huang Pi has told us confidentially that they have received orders to suppress Communist troops, and the same thing happened to the west of the Peiping-Hankow railroad. Once the erection of the blockhouses for the purposes of besieging and blockading the Communist area has been completed, then a plan worked out by General Pai Chung Hsi and General Ho Ying-Chin will be put into effect, which they have been carrying out since May 5.

"We have prepared an overlay to show the details of that scheme and it will be submitted. Several army units have been brought from the Third War Area and sent to the front lines around the Communist

areas; these are: the 48th Army, the 47th Army, the 41st Army, the 72nd Army and the 66th Army. The massing movements of those forces are not for the purpose of strengthening the blockade but rather they are disposed for launching major attacks along several lines. They have been assembled in certain concentrated places. The 66th Army, the 75th Army and a part of the 18th Army are under the Command of General Chou Ai and are disposed along the Peiping-Hankow railway toward Hsuan Hwa Tien. The 72nd Army, under the command of General Fu Yi, is moving from Macheng and Chin Fu toward the north. The 47th Army, under the command of General Cheng Ting Shun, is attacking from Kwang Shan and Hwang Chuan toward the south. The 48th Army is assembled at Shang Cheng. In the neighboring Nationalist troop areas labor and bridge material are being conscripted, and transportation activity is heavy.

“Were it not for the coming of the Committee of Three and the General from Executive Headquarters, I believe the offensive would have long ago broken out. In particular, we have received reliable information from Nationalist troops in adjacent areas saying that the suppression campaign will be launched on May 5. Recently, among the soldiers and junior officers of the Nationalist forces, as well as among the civil administration, the Communists were called ‘bandits’ or ‘traitor bandits’ and when I asked by [*why?*] they say this, they reply that they have received orders that the Communists will be suppressed. The allegations made by the Central News saying that we are attacking different places or that we are moving to other places like Fu Yang are all measures designed to prepare mentally the large scale annihilation campaign so that they will have a pretext to launch attacks. I wish to state frankly that at the time General Marshall, General Chang Chih Chung and General Chou En-lai came to Hankow, General Li (CP) and myself made a trip to Hankow to ask for movement of our forces. At that time, in my confidential talk with Colonel Graves, he told me that the best way to resolve the situation were [*there?*] was to evacuate the Communist troops. Colonel Graves also expressed the opinion that the wisest and most reliable assurance of peace would be to evacuate the Communist forces. At that time, no decision was made on the point of evacuation. We made serious preparations to overcome all the difficulties ahead of us, and when I was coming back by instruction of General Li (CP), I made an inspection tour in this area. I saw that all our forces are deeply engaged in rural productive work. They went into the hills to collect wood. They have also cultivated vegetables so that they may sustain themselves for a long time. This can also be seen by the Nationalist troops in the surrounding areas.

"We firmly upheld the peace principle and the cease-fire agreement, as well as the Army Reorganization Plan. Seeing that our requests have not been agreed upon by the Committee of Three, the only way out for us is to try to sustain ourselves by planting vegetables and to raise hogs so as to maintain the health of our soldiers. This is why we cannot understand their alleging that we are trying to find a way out. Evidently, these statements are not made because they are ill-informed, but rather because they are deliberately trying to libel the Communist forces so that they can have a pretext to annihilate our forces.

"To firmly uphold peaceful policy and adjustment by peaceful means, we again request the Committee of Three and the Peiping Executive Headquarters as well as the Government representative here that, in view of present conditions, they will speedily solve the question of evacuation of the Communist troops. I personally wish to state, in a frank manner, that if the Government thinks that they can annihilate the several tens of thousands of Communist forces, I think they have enough experience and lessons in the past so that they can understand that, despite so many lines of blockhouses, they will not prevent the Communist forces from going wherever they want to. We can even go to those places where we are least desired by the Nationalist troops, because those blockhouses cannot prevent the Communist forces from going through.

"The only reason we can truly explain why the Government does not want the Communists to evacuate is that they are engineering a large scale civil war and they wish to have that civil war started from this point. I personally feel confident that on the Communist side unless they give up the peaceful policy, they will not be annihilated. (This last sentence was repeated at the request of General Byroade.) Even if we are branded as bandits, blockaded and our demobilized soldiers arrested, all our soldiers realize this: that in order to sustain themselves, in order to maintain their honor that they have established during the anti-Japanese War, in order to preserve themselves, the nation and the Chinese people, and in this anti-Fascist War, they must not let themselves be annihilated as bandits or traitors.

"In view of the present situation, in order that the peace aspired to by the Chinese people can be realized, it is imperative that Directives 4 and 6²⁴ of Executive Headquarters be immediately carried out.

"Lastly and most fundamentally, I hope that the problem of evacuation of the Communist troops can be speedily settled; otherwise, I personally feel that there is no way to stop the Communist forces. Therefore, I hope that the Nationalist generals will consider my personal views on this matter and the solemn statement I have just made.

²⁴ General Directive No. 6, March 22, not printed.

“An overlay has been prepared regarding the disposition of troops in this area and a report submitted to Executive Headquarters and the Committee of Three. I wish to request that the representative of Executive Headquarters and the Committee of Three, as well as the Generalissimo’s headquarters in Hankow, send representative officers to survey the situation in the neighboring area and determine the disposition of the troops, the strategical key points captured by the Nationalist troops, as well as the large scale military fortifications in this area, [which] are all factual evidence.”

GEN. BYROADE: “Thank you. I would like to know if General Wong (NG) has any comment to make on this presentation.”

GEN. WONG (NG): “I will ask my assistant to give a brief résumé of the situation from the National Government point of view touching the points that the Communist generals have just raised.”

“GEN. LU (NG): “After listening to the report by both the Communist generals here, I feel that my coming here has great significance because I feel that when you come face to face with people concerned, you can always solve problems. I, myself, am responsible for the operations in the Generalissimo’s Wu-Han Field Headquarters. The thing that concerns me most is the contemplated move of the New 5th Division of the Communist Army. There are several possibilities in connection with this contemplated move of the Communist Army: One is that they say that the National Government plans to launch attacks on this region. Another is the alternative of reaching an agreement that will move them out peacefully. Another is that they may move out without detection and they will move in small units one at a time. In accordance with the Loshan Agreement, troops of both sides should remain where they are and maintain the *status quo*. Unless we have new directives from Executive Headquarters, the National Government will not agree to any movement of Communist troops in this area. The most difficult issue that we are facing is that we have no way to comply with the Communist request for evacuation. The report we have heard from these two generals here coincides with our estimation of the situation and our predictions. Their report touches all three possibilities in connection with moving. The fortunate part of it is that the Committee of Three arrived here at a good time to see that peaceful conditions here still prevail. We read the May 1 issue of the Liberated News and we gathered the impression that the Communist troops would move out of here without previous warning. Now the Communist troops are still in here waiting for further disposition. I feel that this question can easily be resolved.

“With respect to the question of evacuation that they brought up, I have one statement to make. I feel that we are facing great difficulties after hearing the remarks of General Wong, the Chief of Staff

(CP) has made. The remark he made was that all the Chinese in China are looking for peace. The only reason is the Government wants to fail to gratify this wish of the people is that they want to stop us from going out of this area. The General also made the remark that if he wants to go to any place, he can get there without any difficulties in spite of this blockade that the National Government has established here. I hope, however, we will sit down here and discuss this situation in a more quiet tone. I can assure you, being a representative of the National Government, that the Government will not launch any attack on the Communist forces in this region.

"First, we can see what the Government troops' dispositions were as of January 13. The National Government troops of the 66th Army were stationed near Hsin Yang along the railway line. A part of the 66th Army was stationed at Ting Yuan-tien and Chow Tang-fan. A small group of this 66th Army was stationed in the neighborhood of the Hsuan Hwa Tien area. This small force was attacked by the Communist forces in this region and as a result they were dispersed into the mountain region. Because of this, the regimental commander was dismissed.

"The National Government 72nd Army was stationed at Huang Pei Tsan and Chin Fu and Fu Tien Ho and Liang Lu Kou. A part of them were stationed at Sha Wo. Between January 14 and 17th, the Communist forces attacked and occupied Huang Pei Tsan and Fu Ho. The 48th Army is not under our chain of command.

"The 48th Army was stationed in Shang Cheng and Ku Chih. The general just mentioned two places and both of these places were occupied by the Communist since January 17—Yu Chia Chi and Kwan Miao Pu. The 47th Army is also not under my chain of command. Therefore, I do not know the exact disposition of the 47th Army. But their front lines are to the south of Loshan and Kwang Shan. The positions of few armies I have just mentioned coincide with what General Li (CP) has just reported. It is true that they are surrounding the Communist forces in this area on all sides. Since the cease-fire order of January 13, there were some changes in the disposition of troops, but there is no large-scale troop movement to change stations or positions. In this cease-fire order, no limit is placed on change of garrison duties. However, the Communist forces changed the garrison troops from one station to another very frequently. For instance, the 15th Brigade of the Communist Army has two regiments that moved from the east side of the railroad track to the west side of the railway track. The 13th Brigade withdrew from the front lines to the interior regions of this area. Also, there is some troops that moved from this area to Shang Cheng. I will now disclose the National Government troop dispositions in this area, regardless of disclosing a secret, but for the sake of China, I will do it.

“We now have two field headquarters in two different areas for each a division. We also have two command posts for each Army in each regiment. We have three area headquarters in each pacification area. In one War Area, we have it flexible in accordance with the need of the situation. Therefore, this accounts for this report that General Li (CP) just said that one pacification area Headquarters’ command post in Hwa Yen.

“Now about the conflict. The three memoranda that our field team 9 has received from General Li (CP) containing his report are as follows: One memorandum conveys the same thing that appeared in the Liberated News. This memorandum concerns an alleged attack by 26 National Government divisions composed of about 300,000 troops. They think that this attack is the starting point of a civil war in China. Another memorandum concerns the attack from all sides in the area called Tai Er Kang. The next one at Su Chih Tien. I am not very sure whether General Li’s (CP) remark referred to this situation or not. This involves attacks from all four sides, the first from Chien Yen; the second from Yao Chia Chi, by a force consisting of one company; the third from Chang Tien; the fourth attack from Shan Tien involving one platoon. The total forces engaged in this four-front attack numbered one battalion and two companies. They were engaged in combat for two hours. The conflict took place on April 28. We have received a report that on April 18, 1,000 Communists attacked Ta Chen Tun. However, we had only four soldiers stationed at Ta Chen Tun. As a result of this report we recalled these four men from that place. We have received no report of our own on this alleged conflict that took place on April 28.

“The third memorandum concerned a conflict in Hsiao Chih Ling. According to the report we received on April 19, there was a small scale conflict did take place in that area. Our sentry posted in Hsiao Chih Ling was attacked by the Communists. This fighting went on for a very brief period of time. As soon as the attack was stopped, we took no further action. On our side we received only these two reports. This one and the other one of the conflict on the 18th of April. With the exception of these two, we have received no reports of large-scale fighting from our side. Therefore, we were very much surprised at hearing about the report in the Liberated News and from Yen-an. Executive Headquarters Field Team 9 was also surprised.

“Lastly, whether the Communist force in this region can be evacuated, to other regions is not within my power to discuss. I want to make one more supplementary remark. That has to do with the disposition of the 75th Army. I can definitely assure you that it is not stationed along the railway line. General Wang (CP) brought up the question of having the field team investigate the situation here;

it is for this reason that we are here, so we will welcome investigations by the field team.

"This concludes my report. I will ask General Wong (NG) to make any additions or corrections he may desire to the remarks I have just made."

GEN. WONG (NG): "I asked General Lu (NG) to make this report because it concerned military operations. You can see, there is some difference in the reports rendered by the two sides. General Li (CP) also reported conflicts that occurred in some regions, but all of these conflicts are of a minor nature. However minor these conflicts may have been, they are still conflicts and I express my regrets that these conflicts should have happened.

"Being a National Government representative, I want to assure you that these conflicts are not originated or contemplated by the Central Government. I hope that there will be no further conflicts, so that we can proceed with negotiations.

"Gen Li (CP) also touched the question of evacuation which is at issue. Not only General Lu (NG) is not in a position to discuss this—I am not myself. I will take this question to Hankow and discuss it further. However, I want to make one more remark on this question of evacuation. That the Communist forces are confined to this area is not due to the wish of the Wu Han garrison area. They are being confined here by an agreement reached by both sides. Any evacuation will violate the truce agreement signed in Chungking and also the agreement reached in Loshan. This will have to be discussed thoroughly in Hankow.

"With reference to the other minor problems that the Communist generals brought up, we will not spend much time discussing them here. For instance, the various terms they used like calling the Communist personnel 'traitor bandits'. No general with common sense would issue an order calling his opponents 'bandits'.

"I want to conclude my remarks by saying that the National Government's wishes are the same as those of the people—we all want peace. The reason is simple. If the Government did not advocate peace but wanted to fight, it would not have the support of the people. Therefore, we should continue our efforts toward peace and settle all outstanding disputes, not only in Executive Headquarters, but in our field teams. We can avoid many of these disputes if we discuss everything in a free spirit as though we were in college."

GEN. WANG (CP): "I wish to make some supplementary comments touching on points which General Lu (NG) has referred to. I want to state frankly that after January 13, certain conflicts took place at Chow Tang Fan. At that time, the 61st, 41st and 47th and 42nd Armies contemplated to [*sic*] annihilating General Li's (CP)

forces at Kwang Shan and Hsuan Hwa Tien, beyond that line of January 13. That report was furnished by a captured National Government battalion commander.

"We have several conferences with General Lu (NG) together as well as many personal interviews. According to the Loshan Agreement, all hostilities should cease regardless of whether they are being carried on by regular or irregular troops. At that time, the Generalissimo's field headquarters would not recognize the Communist troops to the west of the railroad in Shuang Shu Tien, because they meant to attempt to annihilate the Communist forces in that area. In order to avoid any more conflict, I have requested that field teams go to the points of conflict in order to ascertain whether they are regular or irregular Communist troops.

"General Lu (NG) has just referred to the fact that the Generalissimo's field headquarters at Hankow is particularly concerned that the Communist forces may try to secretly move away from this area. Now I ask General Lu (NG) what other design does the Government have than to lay an iron belt around the Communist forces? The reason why we have brought up the question of the move is that despite all the agreements and the negotiations, all conflicts have not been settled since January 13, and the work has not succeeded in stopping them. In order to put a stop to all conflicts, we have brought up the question of moving our troops. I wish to recall that, in the initial talks we have had in Hankow, the Generalissimo's headquarters tried to establish that there were no Communist troops in this or that area. But lately, it was determined that there were still Communist forces in that area. Now it can certainly be stated that those forces were not parachuted down. It puzzles me why the Headquarters would not recognize the existence of those troops. So it appears to me that the contemplated annihilation plan was prepared a long time ago."

GEN. BYROADE: "I would like to say that I am deeply concerned about the presentation made by General Li (CP) and his deputy, General Wang (CP) this afternoon. I am concerned for two reasons: The first is the gravity of the situation as presented. I would like to say that there is little that Executive Headquarters or the Committee of Three can do about an anticipated future plot, because there is little to investigate. In this connection, I would like to thank General Wong (NG) and his deputy, General Lu (NG) for their assurance that this plot was not a reality. I would like to say that I was personally assured by Gen. Hsu (NG), Director of Operations of the Chinese Armies, that on his word of honor there was no such plot of annihilation. Likewise, General Marshall has been so assured by National Government representatives in Nanking.

"In regard to this future plot, we can only rely on integrity of the

persons of high level of the National Government who have put on the record these denials.

"The reports of conflict within the last two or three weeks is another matter, because it is a factual matter than [*that*] can be investigated on the ground. In this respect, I come to my second concern, which is the lesser of the two, I found, upon getting to Hankow, that our field team had been doing little for the past two weeks, except working on details of the evacuation of the sick and other matters of minor nature. This leads me to believe that there is not enough confidence placed in the field teams and they are not being properly used in this area. For instance, I have determined, and I believe my dates are correct, that this information of serious disturbances here in the last two or three weeks reached the field team a day after it was presented to the Executive Headquarters in Peiping. We want our field teams to receive information promptly and act quickly so that they can investigate and correct such situations as have been reported today.

"We now have two field teams in this area. They are here at the disposal of the two commanders. We want them to move promptly and investigate quickly the situations reported to them. It is only in that way that we in Executive Headquarters can help you. We in Executive Headquarters and General Marshall, have been long concerned about the problems that face you in this area. We have all felt a really serious concern over the food situation. General Marshall personally has diverted U. S. landing craft to Hankow to bring food. I hope, as I know he hopes, that that has been of some aid in your food problems in this area. All that could be done from outside sources was small, we know, and I hope the food crop that I see about ready to be harvested here will aid materially. I do not believe from the evidence I have seen back in Peiping that there has been a sincere enough effort between commanders to establish liaison in order to gain mutual confidence and prevent some of these minor occurrences that are happening. I feel certain that the sincerity of the commanders involved and their spirit which produced the Loshan Agreement can produce other good effects if we can bring their people close together in this area. I hope I can initiate steps while on this trip to improve this liaison.

"You have raised many serious problems today. These will be discussed here now among the Committee and later in Hankow and, if necessary, in Nanking. I am sure that all concerned are sincere in trying to arrive at solutions to better this situation.

"In a desire to get to work on these problems I suggest that we adjourn this meeting and have a Committee meeting to insure that we can finish our work tonight."

GEN. CHOU (CP) : "I agree with the suggestion made by General

Byroade. Some of my comments I would rather reserve for the Committee of Three meeting.

"A short while ago, the Communist general made a presentation and expressed his views. My points can be discussed later on by the Committee of Three. Some of the views expressed showed diversity between the Communist and Nationalist commanders. The coming of General Wong (NG) and General Lu (NG) indicates that there is no intention to launch an attack on the Communist force. For myself as well as for the Communist Party, we hope eagerly that this is true. I have in mind all the outstanding issues which need to be settled if we want to reach a stable situation in this area. Otherwise the circumstances will become more and more complicated and the problems will be more difficult to solve.

"The Government has entertained a suspicion that the Communists want to fight their way out of this area. If we are motivated by this point of view, it may lead us to some large conflicts in the future. Therefore, with that in mind, it seems indispensable that we solve all the outstanding issues, and I hope that in working together, with the spirit which has been showed at the conference today, we can solve all the problems. On our side, we have asked the National Government representative as well as the United States members to come down here. That shows that we want to settle it peacefully, and the presence of the Nationalist generals shows that the Government likewise wishes to act in a similar way. In following this spirit, we can solve all the outstanding issues. I wish also to take opportunity to express my thanks for the coming of General Byroade and his assistants.["]

The meeting adjourned at 1850 hours 8 May 1946.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Meeting of the Acting Committee of Three at Hsuan Hwa Tien,
May 8, 1946, 7 p. m.*

The following were present:

National Government:

Gen. Wong—Deputy Chief of Staff, Wu Han Headquarters of the Generalissimo, Representing General Hsu Yung-Chang.

Gen. Lu —Deputy Director of Operations, Wu Han Headquarters of the Generalissimo.

Communist Party:

Gen. Chou En-lai

Mr. Chang

United States:

Gen. Henry A. Byroade

Capt. Jack T. Young

GEN. BYROADE: "It appears to me that the largest issue brought up today was the evacuation of the Communist forces. I remember General Wong's (NG) remark that he did not have authority to deal with this issue and also our agreement in Hankow that we would only take up emergency matters here, but I would like to bring it up at this time so that we can formally decide the disposition of that question."

GEN. CHOU (CP): "Of course, I feel that the question of the evacuation cannot be solved here, but, before coming to this point, I would like to ask a few questions. On the Communist side, they think they have certain foundation for their belief that some attack has been contemplated against them, while on the Government side, General Lu (NG) has just pointed out they are worried that the Communist forces may want to fight their way out of this area. General Lu (NG) has just referred to three kinds of possibilities. Regarding the second one, which suggests that the movement may be effected through negotiation, of course, that is not a point which the Government will be worried about, since in that case, it will be done legally and peacefully. Regarding the first and third ones—whether we want to fight out or whether we want to move out in a secret manner—the Government still entertains suspicions. I feel that such suspicions might be removed by the fact that the Communists have asked the National Government representative as well as the United States representative to come down here. This shows sincerity on the part of the Communists. We don't want to solve the question by force. If we had had those intentions we would not have asked you to come down here. I want to get clarification about certain points which have been under suspicion.

"The Government representative just now assured us that there is no intention on the Government's part to launch an offensive against the Communist force. I believe it, but still I would like to get more data so that I shall be able to convince my own people. In the previous meeting, General Li (CP) brought out certain information that indicated that there had been certain intentions on the Government side. I would like to get enough data from the National Government so that I may be able to convince my people. Also, when I go back to Nanking, I can tell Marshall about it, and my trip will have brought positive results.

"In the previous meeting, General Li (CP) brought up the point that, as first evidence, there had been some movement of Nationalist troops. General Lu (NG) admitted that, saying it was for the purpose of changing positions among National Government troops. The National Government representative on the field team 9 also admitted that these moves were made without notification to the field

team, so it can be concluded that it is a fact that there are some changes in garrison duties. I would like to know whether the facts coincide with the Government's information that the Nationalists have made movements. For example, it was stated that the 34th Division of the 72nd Army has moved from Shih Hwei Yao in the south of the Yangtze River to Macheng. I would like to know whether that is true or not.

"Secondly, the 41st Army has moved one division from the Peiping-Hankow railway to Hwang Chuan and put it under the command of the 47th Army.

"Thirdly, the 66th Army has moved one division from the Peiping-Hankow railway to Loshan.

"Fourthly, the 66th Army originally stationed at Kwang Shui and Ying Shan, to the west of the Peiping-Hankow railway, has now been assembled at Chin Yang and Loshan. For example, General Lu (NG) referred to the fact that the Government has set up two command posts under the pacification command in Shang Cheng and Hwa Yuan, all under the jurisdiction of the Hankow Generalissimo's field headquarters. These points are of importance and when coordinated with the other information regarding combat actions, they have to be considered as military operations."

GEN. LU (NG) : "In reply to the first question, the 34th Division of the 72nd Army was originally garrison-stationed in a stretch from Shih Hwei Yao to Macheng and Chihui and that is where they are now. This is the position that they occupied as of January 13 and they are still there now.

"In regard to the second one, the 1st Division of the 41st Army moved from the Peiping-Hankow railway to Hwan Chuan. We have no report of this movement as yet, but I see no necessity for such a move. However, a movement of one division of troops cannot be disguised and could be witnessed, and we can investigate it to establish its truth.

"On the third charge regarding the movement of one division of the 66th Army from the Ping Han railway line to Loshan, my answer is that there has been no such move. Part of the 66th Army moved from their position, which is Kwan Shui and Ying Shan, to Loshan and Chin Yang areas.

"The last one concerns the establishment of two command posts. One is the Huan Yuan command post of one pacification area. Another is the Shang Cheng, also a pacification area command post and put under the command of the Wu Han Generalissimo's field headquarters. At Huan Yuan, we had one post originally located. There is no such command post established at Shang Cheng.

"In another charge, involving a location some distance from here, General Chou said that the New 10th Division moved from Hsuchow to Fu Yang. I do not know anything about this."

GEN. CHOU (CP): "Secondly, two days ago the Communist representative of the Field Team reported that they had noticed at the Hankow railroad station that several train loads of troops had been sent up to the north. I would like to know whether that is true or not."

GEN. LU (NG): "A Mr. Mar, Secretary to the Hankow Field Team, brought this fact to my attention on one occasion. At the time he brought it up, he expressed the hope that I would accompany him to the station to investigate this immediately. According to my opinion, this Mr. Mar must have been mistaken, because there are 2,000 Japanese repatriated troops moved out of Hankow every day. He might have mistaken these for National Government troops. On each of the trains that moves northward the Central Government has one platoon of soldiers as guard. Based upon this, I believe that Mr. Mar is definitely mistaken. Furthermore, I told him on the spot that he was definitely mistaken. At that time, Mr. Mar insisted that the 18th National Government Army was moving northward. The 18th Army is the garrison army of the Wu-Han area and cannot be moved to other places.

"I further wish to express the opinion that the Government has no plan for any encirclement and general attack on this area. The present strength of the National Government troops stationed in this area is not sufficient to launch a vicious program like this. At the present time we are facing overall problems in China. Suppose we should settle the question of the Communists in this area by annihilation. It would not help to solve the entire problem. Further, I express the hope that the Communist forces in this area will settle down here, stay here peacefully and not be afraid of any contemplated move on the National Government part to wipe them out. We figure that the intelligence reports that the Communist forces here gather are not reliable.

"At the same time, I want to take this opportunity to express my full acceptance of the proposal that both sides should establish liaison and mutual confidence."

GEN. CHOU (CP): "Shall we go on to the details?"

GEN. BYROADE: "First I would like to ask whether General Lu (NG) has any suggested program as to how to establish better liaison."

GEN. LU (NG): "At the present time, there are 28 members of the Communist delegation at Hankow. There is not a single National Government representative in Hsuan Hwa Tien. I hope that the National Government will be able to dispatch a few liaison officers to Hsuan Hwa Tien."

GEN. BYROADE: "How would you suggest?"

GEN. LU (NG): "If you send liaison people here, 8 will be more than sufficient, but I am thinking of this new field team that comes here.

If it stays here more or less permanently, that will take the place of the liaison people."

GEN. BYROADE: "It isn't General Chou's idea that the field team will stay in the city permanently, is it?"

GEN. CHOU (CP): "I wish and hope that this team will stay in Hsuan Hwa Tien and its immediate vicinity."

GEN. BYROADE: "Isn't it a matter of liaison also among the units that face each other? Isn't that really the point where the establishment of liaison counts?"

GEN. CHOU (CP): "I know that other places have adopted this method very successfully. Particularly in this place, it may be very effective. I am very agreeable to establishing liaison between the commanders."

GEN. BYROADE: "I see no point in this Committee is [*sic*] making up the details. If both General Chou and General Wong (NG) will speak to their commanders we will have the field team which comes here work out the details."

GEN. CHOU (CP): "General Wong (NG) has to wait until he gets back to Hankow, but I can do it right here, particularly because the National Government has more units surrounding the Communists here."

GEN. BYROADE: "Does General Wong (NG) agree on the principle and that we will let the field team carry it out?"

GEN. WONG (NG): "That is correct."

GEN. BYROADE: "As another subject, the movement of 1,000 sick has been discussed for the past two months and, as I look back on it, I am inclined to believe that two or three parties may be equally guilty in delaying it. I think our team in Hankow discussed the matter too long without referring it up to higher authorities for decision. I have no way of investigating the delays in trains, etc., and do not know what the true status of that is. I do know, however, that after it had been agreed, there was almost three weeks delay in gathering the necessary statistics and data from the Communist forces here. It was finally agreed to move before May 10. Just as we arrived at Hankow, the field team was informed that the trains could not be ready until the first of June. So, with all of this past delay, I will ask General Wong (NG) if he can take any steps to allow that move to go through right away."

GEN. WONG (NG): "On that part, I will rush preparations to evacuate the sick and wounded. As to the changing of the date, we have our reason for that. It is a time limit set up for the repatriation of Japanese in order to meet the American schedule for their shipping."

GEN. BYROADE: "How much interference with the repatriation program will this move cause?"

GEN. LU (NG): "It takes 8 trips for one trainload a day in order to evacuate 2,000. In order to evacuate those 1,000, plus their families, it will take 10 days from the point of embarkation to the point of debarkation. It will delay the movement of 4,000."

GEN. BYROADE: "Repatriation is the responsibility of the National Government. I know that there is every reason in the world to push it as fast as we can. However, if it is agreeable with General Wong (NG) I will take the responsibility for the delay in U. S. shipping."

GEN. WONG (NG): "If you will be responsible for the delay in shipping, I can start to move the wounded first."

GEN. BYROADE: "I will be. I will notify General Marshall when I get back to Nanking. Then it is agreed that we will move the 1,000 sick and 100 extra people as quickly as possible. I will inform the field team in Hankow to that effect, and I would like to request that General Chou speak to his people to make sure there will be no delay in meeting those trains. I wonder whether we can make a tentative date here?"

GEN. CHOU (CP): "I suggest May 15."

GEN. WONG (MG): "The tentative date is set at May 15."

GEN. BYROADE: "It is so agreed."

"I find here in the points presented by General Li (CP) that the Communists had started demobilizing and their ex-soldiers were not given security, and he requested provisions for their security. Also the point that fits in with that is the release of those people arrested by the National Government. Can we discuss that next? I am not sure that I have expressed that properly. Is that satisfactory to General Chou?"

GEN. CHOU (CP): "Regarding the arrest of personnel, the Communists have a list ready showing all the names. Those people are divided into two classes. The first are those arrested before January 10, and the second covers those arrested after January 10. Those coming under Class 2 amount to about 70 people. All together, there are about 360. Regarding those arrested after January 10, I think it might be easy to arrange for their release, because, on the basis of our list, the Government can easily ascertain whether they are kept in custody. There seems to be no other cause for the Government to arrest them than the fear that they may conduct activities against the Government. As to those arrested before January 10, they may have been arrested for various reasons. For example, they may have been arrested as political prisoners. If they come under that class, the Government has also asked the Communist Party to give them a list of political prisoners."

“Coming to the demobilized personnel, the Communists have issued an identification card to those people and they bring with them nothing else. Since they are sent out for no other purpose than to go home, I think that the Government can also release them right away.”

GEN. BYROADE: “Does General Wong (NG) have anything to say on this problem?”

GEN. WONG (NG): “With reference to this point, first if the Communists will present us with a name list, I will make a thorough investigation and study as to the reason why the people were detained, and those that are found to be detained without reason will be and should be released immediately. So far as the safe conduct and security of demobilized personnel is concerned, if they are given a proper form of demobilization certificate, the National Government will not hinder their movement. However, I want to make a comment on these two points. So far as I know, there is no case reported of detention of demobilized personnel.”

GEN. BYROADE: “Do I understand that the list of these people has not previous[ly] been given to the National Government representative?”

GEN. CHOU (CP): “I do not know, but I will ask. I presume such a list has not been presented.”

GEN. BYROADE: “I would like to ask if General Wong’s (NG) remark satisfied General Chou about this problem.”

GEN. LU (NG): “On this case of arrested personnel, there were 18 detained who came out to purchase food. They came out armed with rifles, but, as soon as we found out what their mission was, we notified the Hankow field team. Up to the present time, however, Communists have not gone there to take their personnel back. Also the National Government has four people from the village Government and 9 Japanese puppets that were detained by the Communists forces here and have not been released.”

GEN. CHOU (CP): “How did the Japanese captives come over there? They were sent up the hill to get fire wood and were captured. I suggested that the memorandum should be submitted by each side to the opposite party regarding the arrested personnel. If the personnel were arrested for the simple reason that they belonged to the opposite party, they should be released. Only if they have committed criminal acts should they be detained.

“Regarding demobilized personnel, the situations in various localities are not the same. In some places, they left quietly. In other places there might have been trouble with them. First, they will carry no arms and second they should have demobilization identifica-

tion cards, and then they will go back to their homes. In that case, they should be left alone. I cannot make any promise about their dress. They may still be dressed in their uniforms."

GEN. BYROADE: "It seems to be a problem that proper liaison could work out. Can we set our May 15 date here as a date by which time lists of prisoners will be exchanged?"

GEN. LU (NG): "I have something I have not said yet. I would like to bring up the question of demobilized personnel. If the Communist Party will notify the National Government the number of the demobilized personnel, where they are going and the route they will take, not only will they not be molested but we will accord them all types of facilities in our power."

(Both parties feel that May 15 is not enough time because they may have to investigate. May 30 is considered a reasonable date and it is so agreed between them. This matter will be put in the hands of two units—both the field team and the team in Hankow.)

GEN. BYROADE: "Then it is agreed."

"Another point that was brought up was the execution of Directive 4 regarding blockhouses. That question has been discussed many times in Executive Headquarters and has been referred to the Committee of Three for decision. I propose, therefore, that we not try to solve that here tonight, if it is agreeable to you."

GEN. CHOU (CP): "I am rather helpless. These people here are very anxious to have it settled."

GEN. BYROADE: "We in Executive Headquarters are equally anxious to have it settled."

GEN. WONG (NG): "I want to make a few comments on the destruction of blockhouses. If they will interfere with the lines of communications, I am all for doing away with them. At the same time, we must take into consideration how the population around here look upon blockhouses as a matter of security and self-protection. It will more or less give them confidence to leave them alone. A blockhouse is not like a tank. It is only a defensive weapon. They were built before the cease-fire agreement."

GEN. BYROADE: "Is it agreeable to defer that question here tonight?"

GEN. CHOU (CP): "The blockhouse problem has to be viewed in connection with the evacuation problem. Because, once it has been decided, the Communists will look on blockhouses as a blockade. Of course, I am aware that on the National Government side they built up those blockhouses because they are afraid that they might be attacked by the Communist Party. For defensive purposes, they felt the necessity to erect them. I feel that it is necessary to have the three problems solved simultaneously. One is that hostilities should be stopped, and another order should be issued to this effect to em-

phasize the importance of cessation of conflicts, and we should also assign the field teams to go to points of conflict whenever conflict has been reported either by the National Government or the Communist side. That would cause a lot of trouble to the field team, but I feel confident that it would like to take up those troubles. I suggest that the field team to be stationed here may take care of the area to the east of the railroad tracks and the team at Hankow will take the western part. As a second step, we may leave the other Committee of Three to decide regarding the removal of blockhouses and evacuation. On the Hankow Executive Headquarters side, they will decide whether the Communist forces should go away, for that would eliminate trouble for them. As the Generalissimo has no other purpose, they will certainly be glad to have those forces moved away.

"It would be most desirable to have three field teams in this area, but that seems not to be possible at the present moment. We would like to have two field teams to take care of the eastern part and the western part respectively. The order should be issued from both sides that there must be no further movement of troops. Under such circumstances, I would accept General Byroade's proposal that we leave the question of removal of fortifications to be discussed by the Committee of Three. I think if the conflict could be stopped, it would be easy to settle the other questions. We could have solved the problem of the fortifications separately, but since now they are so tied in together, for this moment I would suggest that we can do four things:

"The first thing is that hostilities should be stopped, and orders to reinforce the previous agreements should be issued.

"Secondly, there will be no future movement of troops on either side—movement for the change of garrison troops should be reported to the field teams beforehand.

"Third, no further blockhouses will be constructed henceforth. This is to get rid of any suspicion or fear.

"Fourth, we should instruct the field teams and the liaison officers of both sides that the present separation lines should be determined, because there should be no more change of separation lines henceforth. It may be rather complicated to determine the positions as of January 13. It has been argued for a long time regarding these lines. General Li (CP) has just mentioned that the Communists would claim the legal positions as of January 13. The National Government also has certain claims to make. We can make the Field Teams responsible that no further conflict will occur henceforth, that no blockhouses will be established, and that they will go to the point of any reported conflicts.

"Regarding whether we should adopt the Loshan Agreement for this area or whether we will stick to Directive 6, that can be solved

later on. We have the remaining problems of evacuation, the removal of blockhouses and the question as to which agreement should be adhered to in this area. They can be left for the Committee of Three or Executive Headquarters. Once the evacuation has been decided upon, the legal position as well as the fortifications will lose their significance."

GEN. BYROADE: "Could you give me a very brief summary of the Number 2 point again?"

GEN. CHOU (CP): "There will be no further movement of troops—even garrison commands."

GEN. BYROADE: "What are General Wong's comments on those four immediate points?"

GEN. WONG (NG): "I agree that these are the logical steps to be taken."

GEN. BYROADE: "Is it believed the best procedure that we write that into an agreement and sign it here?"

(Both the National Government and Communist Party indicated their approval.)

GEN. BYROADE: "Does General Chou think that it should be signed here or in Hankow?"

GEN. CHOU (CP): "It is immaterial."

(After a short discussion in Chinese, they agreed that the agreement should be signed in Hankow as it was late, and this would give General Byroade more time to prepare it.)

GEN. CHOU (CP): "We have the problem of getting money in to our people in this area. There are two ways to get money in here—either by air transport or by trucks from Hankow."

GEN. BYROADE: "Is there any special action that General Chou would like the Committee or myself to take on that matter of money?"

GEN. CHOU (CP): "I just pointed out the two immediate things. This falls into another category."

GEN. BYROADE: "The money and the food should come under UNRRA's supervision, but I see no reason why it cannot be brought in by the transportation serving the team. However, the air-drop of money present[s] a little different problem. We are so limited in aircraft that we have tried to avoid using our aircraft to take care of administrative matters of either side. If this drop is approved, I would not want it to establish a precedent, because we cannot do that. I do not believe that is a proper function of Executive Headquarters, and we do not have the aircraft to continue carrying on that practice."

GEN. CHOU (CP): "I do not mean by air-drop actually. I mean by using our courier plane when there is available space."

GEN. BYROADE: "I think we can do that all right."

GEN. LU (NG) : "To avoid any new developments of conflict here, I hope the Communists in this area will issue orders not to levy any taxes in the form of money or grain in this area. We would like to put this into the list of problems, among the four immediate things to be taken up."

GEN. CHOU (CP) : "I have not inquired about this point from General Lee, but he was informed today by the Highway Section at Ho Kow that the levy of taxes concerns both parties. In the neutral zone between the Armies, the National Government troops also came to levy taxes. The Generalissimo's field headquarters has issued orders to this effect. That was the cause of the continued conflict between the two armies. I think that both parties should restrict themselves. However, there is one basic point beneath this issue. If the Communist troops are permitted to evacuate, of course, that operation will depend on money sent in from outside. If that is not permitted, we have to try to pin ourselves on the soil. Our present scheme is aimed at eventual evacuation, and we have arranged everything accordingly. Of course, we will not try to support ourselves from the local people, but in case evacuation is not permitted, we will have to somehow try to support ourselves. The Communist forces will try to create productive works in order that they can sustain themselves."

GEN. BYROADE : "I would suggest that the matter of taxation had better not become a matter for Executive Headquarters or the Committee of Three, but should be dealt with by the commanders themselves."

GEN. WONG (NG) : "The system of taxation enforced by the Government is handled through the administrative function. We have the provincial government. The troops themselves have no right to tax directly."

GEN. CHOU (CP) : "This problem can further be taken up within the basic issues which will be resolved later."

GEN. BYROADE : "Are there any other problems to be brought up here tonight?"

GEN. CHOU (CP) : "That seems to be all that can be dealt with today."

GEN. BYROADE : "I have one thought. We have a lot of press people up here. What is to be our policy toward the press?"

MR. CHANG (CP) : "I think we should say we have reached an agreement, but the details will be disclosed when we reach Hankow."

(Both sides indicated their approval of this plan.)

GEN. BYROADE : "Is it agreeable to adjourn the meeting?"

GEN. CHOU (CP) : "I wish to express my thanks and appreciation to the National Government and American members for coming here. I asked you to make this very special and hard trip here."

The meeting adjourned at 2050 hours, 8 May 1946.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

The Three Commissioners of Executive Headquarters to the Committee of Three, at Nanking

PEIPING, 9 May 1946.

2543. Implementation of Canton evacuation is at a standstill. Following dispatch of our 2124²⁵ we received from Canton Team Number 8 the following information: Generalissimo's Hqrs at Canton has received instructions that Govt. can give cash loan installments only after having received radio confirmation of repayment in food stuff by Communists in North China. (2) That Generalissimo's Hqrs can lend food supply and supplementary food fund for 2400 personnel only under present authorization. (3) General Fang points out fixation of loan for 2400 does not include rations for demobilization.

As agreement has been reached in this Hqrs that the Communist Party will pay back to the Government in grain amount of loan prior to July 1946, the Three Commissioners Executive Hqrs recommended that: (a) National Govt. grant 100 million CNC immediately as installment on loan, (b) Balance of loan to be made available as soon as satisfactory agreement is reached upon amounts, schedules and places of grain deliveries, and grain deliveries are actually started. (c) Committee of Three arrange for prompt designation of Communist Party and National Government representatives to negotiate agreement indicated in (b) above. (d) Committee of Three state policy with respect to demobilization personnel.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Meeting of the Acting Committee of Three at Hankow,
May 10, 1946, 1 p. m.*

The following were present:

National Government:

Gen. Hsu Yung-Chang

Col. Peter Pee

Communist Party:

Gen. Chou En-lai

Mr. Chang

United States:

Gen. Henry A. Byroade

Capt. Jack T. Young

The meeting was called to order and General Hsu made the following statement.

²⁵ April 24, not printed; but see memorandum by General Marshall, April 22, p. 642.

GEN. HSU (NG) : "With regard to point 'a' of the agreement, the ideal thing is to delete this altogether, because the primary job of the Committee in this area is to ascertain the facts concerning alleged concentration of Government troops in this area. If we publish something like this, issuing orders to stop fighting, that means that the Government agreed that there will be [*is?*] fighting and the accusation of intended annihilation may be true. In order not to jeopardize both sides, we should not publish anything. As to the Chinese translation, General Chou wants it to read 'orders to be given to stop fighting.' That would jeopardize the Government side."

GEN. CHOU (CP) : "I want to make a brief comment. I want to point out that this particular document gives no answer to the question whether there has been an attack or any contemplation of attack. What is included in this document is only a temporary measure which will be adopted to solve the emergency problem. It is not necessary for us to go into details about the plan which is alleged to be under contemplation. The press statement issued by General Ho Ying-Chin ²⁶ yesterday is evidence that the Communist stand has some foundation. General Ho Ying-Chin said that the Communists are planning to move toward the East; therefore, he has disposed troops to garrison the sector and prevent any eventual movement of the Communist forces. The evidence he gave all applies to locations which are actually within the Communist area. There is no point to show that the Communists have moved out of their own area. That proves, therefore, that while General Li (CP) has not sent his troops outside the Communist area, the National Government forces have been sent there as garrison. No mention is made here about this incident. When we sign this agreement, we should not have this particular incident in mind as a basis.

"Regarding the fear that General Hsu may have that it may be misinterpreted in connection with the present incident, I want to point [out] that in this paper we have particularly emphasized the words 'both parties'. That means that not one party only is made responsible, but both parties. That has been agreed upon by General Wong (NG), General Hsu's representative at Hsuan Hwa Tien. I am concerned here only with solving the whole matter, not particularly with the present incident. As a matter of fact, this present paper has no direct bearing on that incident. For example, the field team has already reported that north of Macheng some hostilities have taken place. This shows that some hostilities exist. In connection with this, according to General Li's (CP) report, three Communist places were occupied by Government troops. At this moment, I do not want to raise this question again. I would like to point out that, on this

²⁶ Commander in Chief of the Chinese Army.

situation, both parties should issue such orders. I do not want to be narrow-minded about phraseology. We can use the present English text and then use the Chinese translation as General Hsu (NG) and Colonel Pee would like to suggest."

GEN. HSU (NG): "I would like to quote my conversation with the Generalissimo on the afternoon of the 4th of May. He asked what was General Chou's opinion of any intended break out of General Li's (CP) troops. I replied very frankly that General Chou was very sincere in stating that if Communist troops broke out that it would be a breach of faith. The Generalissimo said that was fine and that also it would be a breach of faith on the Government side. The Generalissimo is very sincere about keeping good faith with regard to the Agreement. It is the desire of everyone to have peace, to stop fighting. The statement on stopping hostilities may apply to some hostilities in the future. I am very cautious regarding this point and about the impression given in the press release.

GEN. BYROADE: "Do I understand that the English text is agreed upon?"

COL. PEE (NG): "Yes, there is no change in the English text at all."

GEN. BYROADE: "I would like to definitely determine whether this English text is agreed upon now. Is General Chou agreeable to the English text as it is now written?"

GEN. CHOU (CP): "Yes."

GEN. BYROADE: "As I understand it, General Hsu has agreed to the English text."

COL. PEE (NG): "Yes, it is agreed upon."

GEN. BYROADE: "The English text is therefore agreed upon.

"Has there been an agreement reached as to the Chinese text in its entirety?"

(General Hsu and General Chou both expressed their approval of the Chinese text.)

GEN. BYROADE: "It is then agreed. Are there any further comments before signing this document?"

GEN. HSU (CP): "The intention of the three parties that have come here is to accomplish the peaceful settlement of differences. That is a fine spirit. I expect that this spirit will be enlarged to cover those other areas which have the same disputes. It is hoped that the present skirmishes and troop movements in the areas in Northern and Central China, where the cease-fire order has already been put into effect, will cease in a similar manner as in the Hankow area. Liaison officers should be exchanged in confronting areas.

“The Communists should solve the following problems in the Communist-besieged areas, along the same line as provided in the Hankow agreement, viz:

1. The supply of food stuff in the said areas.
2. The evacuation of Government sick and wounded personnel.
3. The safe conduct of the Government demobilized personnel.
4. The release of prisoners of war and political prisoners.

GEN. CHOU (CP): “The views expressed by General Hsu seem acceptable to me because everyone wants to establish peace. I concur with the idea presented by General Hsu. We also have to take care of procedural matters. Regarding the solution we have reached for this particular area, there are points that are peculiar to this area. We should inform Executive Headquarters about certain matters here, and the agreement reached here. In all places where these same problems exist they should be solved in a similar manner. For example, with regard to the blockhouses, we stressed the importance of no erection of new blockhouses, because we have in mind that these Communist troops may be evacuated; but in other areas, blockhouses in general seem to be a matter of great concern to the Communist forces. We can advise the Executive Headquarters that they should follow the policy we have adopted here. General Hsu has expressed that he agrees to use that as a guide. I, myself, will be willing to go to all places, whenever conflict is reported, for example, in Nantung; but, seeing that General Hsu may not be available, maybe we should give instructions to Executive Headquarters to solve such problems in a similar vein.”

GEN. BYROADE: “Copies of these minutes will be supplied the Executive Headquarters as well as the Committee of Three.

“Does General Hsu have any further comments?”

GEN. HSU (NG): “No.”

GEN. BYROADE: “Does General Chou have any further comments?”

GEN. CHOU (CP): “I want to further remark that, though the field teams have done very good work, I express the hope that Executive Headquarters will issue orders to field teams that they will go to the scene of conflict whenever reported so that they can solve the problems on the spot. They should follow the example of General Byroade who has taken the trouble to make the trip to Hsuan Hwa Tien.”

GEN. BYROADE: “I can assure General Chou that Executive Headquarters will do all it can to insure that field teams will be active and will investigate all situations possible that are brought to their attention. I would like to suggest that the agreement be formally signed in four copies.”

(The agreement was signed by General Hsu, General Chou and General Byroade.)*

GEN. BYROADE: "I would now like to ask in what manner the press waiting downstairs should be handled."

(It was agreed that the three members of the Committee would go down and present a Chinese copy of the Agreement to the press.)

GEN. BYROADE: "I would like to express my appreciation for the courtesies extended this junior representative of the Committee of Three on this trip.

"I suggest that, since it is getting late and we have a trip ahead of us, we adjourn the meeting and go down to see the press very briefly."

GEN. CHOU (CP): "I would like to thank General Byroade for all the trouble he has taken."

GEN. BYROADE: "It was a pleasure."

GEN. HSU (NG): "I feel that I do not deserve any thanks from General Byroade, because General Byroade is doing everything to help us."

GEN. BYROADE: "Thank you very much."

The meeting adjourned at 1500 hours[,] 10 May 1946.

893.00/5-2846

Memorandum by the Acting Committee of Three

HANKOW, 10 May 1946.

This message from the Committee of Three is addressed concurrently to the Three Commissioners of Executive Headquarters and to the Director General, Wu-Han Headquarters of the Generalissimo and the Commanding General Central Military Area of the Communist Party.

By agreement between the Committee of Three, the following instructions are hereby issued to the above commanders for compliance within the areas of their respective commands north of the Yangtze River:

a. Both commanders as listed above will issue orders immediately to insure the cessation of skirmishes and disturbance between outposts in the above area.

b. The above commanders will cause all troop movements contrary to the original cease-fire agreement of January 10 to cease immediately. Minor troop movements of administrative nature as authorized in the original cease-fire agreement may be continued providing each such move is previously reported to the appropriate Executive Headquarters Field Team in the area.

*For text of agreement see Appendix A of these minutes. [Footnote in the original; see memorandum by the Acting Committee of Three, May 10, *infra*.]

c. Construction of additional blockhouses or other permanent fortifications within the above area shall cease immediately.

d. The above commanders will establish without delay the necessary liaison between their respective headquarters and between their confronting field units. Such liaison officers, in conjunction with field teams of Executive Headquarters, will have as one of their primary functions, the establishment of definite lines of separation between the opposing forces.

e. It has further been agreed that the evacuation of 1,000 sick personnel plus 100 family members and 60 administrative and medical personnel from the Central Military Area to An-Yang will commence on May 15. The detailed plan and procedure for this movement will be as agreed among the members of Field Team #9. Commanders of both sides are instructed to insure that this move is accomplished without delay.

f. It has been further agreed that the above commanders will immediately exchange lists of personnel of the opposing sides now being held in arrest or restriction, and that all such personnel determined to be political prisoners or prisoners of war will be released by both sides on or before June 1, 1946.

g. It is further agreed that security shall be provided for demobilized military personnel of the Communist Party during movement from the Central Military Area and after arrival at destination, provided they are returning to their homes, are unarmed, and have in their possession the proper identification certificates. The Communist Party shall provide the Wu-Han National Government headquarters with the necessary statistical data relative to personnel, routes and destinations involved to permit fulfillment of this responsibility.

This present agreement does not prejudice or jeopardize previous Executive Headquarters directives or any future agreement that may be reached by the Committee of Three on basic issues involved in this area.

This agreement is signed by General Hsu Yung Chang, representative of the National Government, General Chou En-lai, representative of the Communist Party and General Byroade, acting on behalf of General Marshall, United States representative.

HSU YUNG CHANG

CHOU EN-LAI

HENRY A. BYROADE

893.00/5-2846

Memorandum by the Committee of Three

NANKING, May 11, 1946.

This message from the Committee of Three is addressed to the three commissioners of Executive Headquarters. The following agreement has been reached by the Committee of Three and will be placed into effect without delay.

It is agreed that effective implementation of the cessation of hos-

ilities agreements reached by this committee or by the commissioners of Executive Headquarters requires that field teams of Executive Headquarters be permitted to investigate without delay any violation of such agreements as may be reported to them.

To insure prompt investigation of such reported violations, it is agreed that:

1. The military and civil authorities of both the National Government and the Chinese Communist Party shall render all possible assistance to the activities of the field teams, without imposing any delay or restriction.

2. The military and civil authorities of both the National Government and the Chinese Communist Party shall assure the personal freedom and security of the field team members.

3. Equal opportunity for investigation shall be afforded to both the National Government and Communist Party within any team area, but this policy shall not be permitted to delay action or to interfere with the overriding principle that priority of investigation should be based upon the apparent seriousness and urgency of the violations reported to the team.

4. The procedure regarding priority of areas and matters for investigation shall be as worked out by the U. S. representative as the chairman of the team and unanimously agreed upon by the team members for implementation. In case of disagreement the American member will immediately report the disagreement to the Commissioners, who will within twenty-four hours either render a unanimous decision or report their disagreement to the Committee of Three.

5. In the event it is established that a false report of violation has been submitted to a team for investigation, a report of the incident will be submitted by the Commissioners to the Committee of Three for corrective action.

HSU YUNG-CHANG
*Representative of the National
Government*

CHOU EN-LAI
*Representative of the Chinese
Communist Party*

G. C. MARSHALL
United States representative

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Chou En-lai to General Marshall

NANKING, May 14, 1946.

MY DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: In reply to your memorandum No. OSE 31, dated May 11, 1946,²⁷ concerning the Kwangtung affairs the following is submitted:

²⁷ Not printed; it transmitted to General Chou and to General Hsu for consideration copies of telegrams Nos. 2543 May 9 (p. 696), and 2544, May 9 (not printed).

1. I wish to state responsibly that the Chinese Communist Party is willing to return the money required by the Communist forces in Kwangtung to the Fifth Service Area before July 1, 1946, in the form of grain.

2. I agree with the recommendation of the three Commissioners, as presented in your enclosure No. 2544, that the total estimate of the evacuation expenses be increased to 374,086,000 CNC, though I wish to point out that disparity does exist between this figure and the one given by General Fang Fang, Communist member of the Eighth Field Team, General Tseng Sheng and General Lin Ping, who presented a total of 600,000,000 CNC, of which 400,000,000 CNC comes under evacuation, and 200,000,000 CNC under demobilization. However, being solicitous for an early settlement of the Kwangtung affairs, and a swift implementation of the Canton Agreement, I shall see to it that whatever uncovered expenses be met by the Chinese Communist Party directly, which will turn over the money to Executive Headquarters for transmittance to General Fang Fang through the Eighth Field Team.

3. Regarding the distribution of the money among the different units and groups, it is suggested, that Executive Headquarters shall instruct the Eighth Field Team, that, in close contact with Generalissimo's Field Headquarters at Canton, and based on the circumstances on the ground, such as the monetary requirement of the units, the number of sub-units to be moved, the method of movement, and the moving schedule etc., it will make decisions at its own discretion. On receipt of the money, the Field Team shall distribute them among the various sub-teams which in turn shall redistribute them among the evacuating troops to the south and north of the East River, and in Northern Kwangtung.

4. It is earnestly desired, that the various sub-teams shall proceed to the field without delay, while instruction is being sent by myself to General Fang Fang to urge on the early despatch of the sub-teams. It is further suggested that swift measures be taken to charge the Field Team and the various sub-teams with the task of mobilizing, assembling, moving and concentrating the Communist forces at the staging area, i.e. Tapeng Peninsula. In equal measure, it is desired, that the Government authority shall in keeping with the statement of General [Chang] Fa-kwei render protection to the Communist forces in the different areas while they are on assemblage or move, and to issue instruction to all Government forces along the marching routes and around the staging area that no attacks and raids shall be made against them under whatever pretext.

I wish to lay special emphasis on this point for this reason that the spokesman of Generalissimo's Headquarters at Canton recently branded publicly the Communist northern Kwangtung Detachment

as "bandits", notwithstanding the Canton Agreement has definitely specified the North Kwangtung forces as being regarded among the evacuating troops. At the same time, General Fang Fang reported that there are still instances of raids conducted by Government forces against Communist East River units; thus on May 10, the Tsechin-Hailufeng battalion of the South-of-East-River Detachment (see Decision 6 of Canton Agreement) was attacked, resulting in the killing of Kuo Chien-chung, political commissar of the detachment, while attacks by Government troops against North Kwangtung Detachment resulted in the death of commanders of Liu He-tse and Su Kwang-po. It is imperative that such truce-violating actions on part of the Government forces be ceased, and reassurance be given that no similar incident will reoccur.

5. Inasmuch as the assemblage of the Communist forces at the point of embarkation will not be completed before the middle of June according to the procedure specified by the Canton Agreement, even if the sub-teams are despatched right away, it is most desirable, that the American LST shall be held up there until the middle of June, so as to ensure coordination with the evacuation plan.

Any comment you may have thereon shall be appreciated.

[Signature in Chinese]
(CHOU EN-LAI)

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Marshall to General Hsu Yung-chang

OSE 36

NANKING, May 15, 1946.

The enclosed memorandum from General Chou En-lai²⁸ concerning the Canton Communists is forwarded for your information. This memorandum shows that General Chou En-lai has approved the amount of 374,086,000 CNC which is to be set aside for handling the expenses incident to the evacuation of the Communists from that area. The memorandum further indicates that the Communist Party will probably be able to furnish any additional sums which might be required.

I would like to point out that there are at present three U. S. Navy LST's at Canton for the purpose of evacuating the Communists, but that these LST's must be released by 20 May. It is apparent from this that the shipping now available cannot be used to evacuate the Communists unless evacuation commences prior to 20 May. However, it is requested that you inform General Chang Fa Kwei of General Chou's approval in order that all arrangements can be facilitated in the hope

²⁸ *Supra.*

that in the near future other shipping can be made available when the Communists assemble at the port of embarkation.

Executive Headquarters has been informed of General Chou's approval and it too is expediting action.

For General Marshall:
 J. HART CAUGHEY
Colonel, G. S. C.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

General Chang Fa-kuei to Mr. Walter S. Robertson, at Peiping

[CANTON,] May [15,] 1946.

Expect that radios sent on 28 and 29²⁹ have reached you. The problem on evacuating the Communist armed personnel is not yet settled. American personnel assisting the sea transportation also arrived. Taking into consideration the difficulties on the Communist side and extending once more facilities to them, the Generalissimo's Headquarters has decided that: (1) The corridor be widened for the march of troops (2) one battalion be preserved for Tam Sui and only one company of gendarmes for Lung Kang and (3) Peiping Headquarters has decided to give a loan for provisions to the amount of CNC \$323,686,000. But there is still no indication of evacuation on the part of the Communist Party with the result that the sub teams are unable to set out and begin their work. If it is further delayed, responsibilities must be held by the Communists. All possible efforts have been exerted by me and I wish to draw your attention to the facts mentioned above.

CHANG FA-KUEI
General, Inf.
Director of Generalissimo's HQ
Military Council, Nat. Govt.

Marshall Mission Files. Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by Mr. Liao Cheng-chi to Colonel J. Hart Caughey

NANKING, May 19, 1946.

MY DEAR COLONEL CAUGHEY: Regarding the evacuation of the Communist troops in Kwangtung, I wish to bring up the following points for your consideration:

1. Up till now General Chang Fa-kuei has not yet confirmed the sum of 374,086,000 CNC as recommended by the three Commissioners, and

²⁹ Apparently Nos. 3967 and 4044, neither printed.

agreed upon by General Chou En-lai in his memorandum to General Marshall, dated May 14, 1946. It is requested that you will urge upon General Chang Fa-kwei to appropriate that sum to team 8 in two instalments.

2. Generals Fang Fang and Tseng Sheng have promised that the evacuating troops will commence the march as soon as that money is made available. Inasmuch as General Chang Fa-kwei promised as an initial step to loan necessary food and 100,000,000 CNC, General Chou En-lai wired to Generals Fang and Tseng to get part of the troops immediately on the move. However, the current problems seem to be:

a. Seeing that Communist forces in northern Kwangtung are still being attacked, I suggest that sub-team C with the American members will rush to the spot, investigate the matter and immediately commence to collect and move the Communist troops, so as to avoid any further delay.

b. It is requested that as soon as team 8 has agreed upon the timetable for the commencement of evacuation, collection of troops, and their assemblage at the staging area (which in general should take place not later than at the end of June), the number of LSTs and date of their arrival at Tapeng will be fixed.

c. General Chou accepts the arrangement suggested by General Chang Fa-kwei and transmitted here by Executive Headquarters with regard to providing safety passage of the evacuating Communist personnel, which provides that the Independent 1st Regiment stationed at Lung Kang be replaced by one company of gendarmes, that Tam-shui be garrisoned by one battalion and that a five li withdrawal be made by the Nationalist troops along the route of march.

Any comment you may have shall be appreciated.

LIAO CHENG-CHI

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by Mr. Liao Cheng-chi to Colonel J. Hart Caughey

NANKING, May 23, 1946.

MY DEAR COLONEL CAUGHEY: With reference to the evacuation of the Communist troops in Kwangtung, reports received here from Generals Fang Fang and Tseng Sheng indicate:

1. Team 8 has decided that the sub-teams shall depart for survey on May 25, 1946, which will thus be the D day for effecting the evacuation.

2. On May 22, 1946, General Chang Fa-kwei has appropriated 100,000,000 CNC and 1,000 piculs of foodstuff. You are requested to

see to it, that Executive Headquarters will urge General Chang Fa-kwei to appropriate the remnant fund to team 8 within a fortnight, so that the arrangement for the evacuation can be completely set.

3. Team 8 has further decided that Lungkou will be the point of concentration for the northern Kwangtung Communist troops, and the marching route will be the same as previously agreed upon. Since it is far away from Tapeng, an extension of ten days, i. e. D plus forty days, seems necessary for their arrival at Tapeng. It is therefore requested, that you will arrange the LSTs to arrive at Tapeng around July 2, 1946.

Your comments will be appreciated.

LIAO CHENG-CHI

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

*Colonel J. Hart Caughey to Brigadier General Thomas S. Timberman*³⁰

[NANKING,] 8 June 1946.

852. In letter to General Marshall from General Chou dated 6 June³¹ he says that General Fang Fang, Communist representative in Canton, reports that many obstacles by National Government, concerning food and money, is delaying Communist assemblage at Tapeng Peninsula 1 week. General Chou requests "U. S. vessels at Tapeng to stand by until embarkation is effected". Request that you take appropriate action.³²

J. HART CAUGHEY

Marshall Mission Files. Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Chou En-lai to General Marshall

MM 024

NANKING, June 9, 1946.

DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: I just received report from General Fang Fang, Communist representative of Field Team 8, that on June 2, 1946, the 6th day following the commencement of Communist evacuation movement, Nationalist 457th Regiment of 153rd Division had in a sudden move attacked Communist forces at Nanshetung on the southern bank of the East River, who were en route to Tapeng

³⁰ Acting Director of Operations of Executive Headquarters at Peiping, during Brigadier General Byroade's absence at Changchun.

³¹ Not printed.

³² General Chou was informed of this action by General Marshall in his memorandum No. OSE 137, June 8, not printed.

Peninsula, resulting in the capture of 7 Communist armed personnel, missing of another five, and killing of Commander Wang Lin. During this raid the Communists suffered a loss of one machine-gun, 9 rifles, 27,000 CNC, and the knapsacks and bedrolls of forty men.

While your attention is drawn to this agreement-violating action of the Nationalist troops, you are also requested to communicate to General Hsu Yung-chang that such actions should be stopped at once. In the meantime I have also instructed General Fang Fang to file a protest to the Nationalist Headquarters at Canton.³³

[Signature in Chinese]

CHOU EN-LAI

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Chou En-lai to General Marshall

MM 025

NANKING, June 11, 1946.

I just received a message from General Li Hsien-nien saying that Col. Brussel (transliteration from Chinese) and Col. Chen Chien, Nationalist representative of Team 32, Hsuanhwatien, by taking advantage of the opportunity of making an inspection tour to the south, had departed for Hankow through Macheng and Hwangpi on June 7. On same day, the Nationalists sent trucks to Hsuanhwatien to take the American and Nationalist signal officers away. These moves betray that they were planning to withdraw Team 32 from Hsuanhwatien, yet the Communist representative and General Li had not been consulted with. General Li, apart from protesting against this move, suggests that Team 32 should not be withdrawn from its present base, for the situation in East Hupeh area provide[s] ample reasons necessitating the continued operation of the team in the area now under its control. Furthermore, the location of this base has been agreed upon by the Committee of Three on May 8.

I fully endorse General Li's proposal, and request that you will instruct Executive Headquarters to issue order to Team 32 that all team members should return to Hsuanhwatien and resume their team activities. Should the team members fail to do so, the absent team representatives should be held responsible for any attack that might be

³³ In his memorandum No. OSE 142, June 10, to General Hsu Yung-chang, General Marshall gave in detail the Communist charge, adding: "This movement of Communists from Mirs Bay is an agreed troop movement. I have provided two United States Navy LSTs to facilitate this movement. I request that you take the necessary action to insure that there is no further interference with this evacuation of Communists."

launched by the Nationalist troops on General[Li]'s forces on account of their unauthorized absence.

Any comment you may have thereon shall be appreciated.

[Signature in Chinese]
(CHOU EN-LAI)

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

General Marshall to Mr. Walter S. Robertson, at Peiping

[NANKING,] 12 June 1946.

876. Chou En-lai requests that I instruct Executive Headquarters to order Team 32 to return to Hsuanhwatien and resume their team activities. Chou En-lai intimates that American and Nationalist members of Team 32 are on an unauthorized tour to the south towards Hankow. What is your knowledge of this situation? Can you do something to get Team 32 reassembled and functioning together, preferably at Hsuanhwatien? ³⁴

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Chou En-lai to General Marshall

MM 029

NANKING, 12 June 1946.

DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: Reference is made to my memorandum MM 028 [025] dated June 11, 1946,³⁵ in which I brought to your attention the fact that by taking advantage of conducting survey of truce violation actions to the south of Hsuanhwatien, the Field Team 32 withdrew to Hankow on June 7 without notifying General Li Hsien-nien and the Communist member of the team.

A recent message just received from Hankow reported that there was indication of the team not to return to Hsuanhwatien and the United States member intended to convert the team into a mobile one.

Under the present conditions confronting the Communist Central Military Area, which you know pretty well, the withdrawal of Team 32 in defiance to original instruction will in all probability give rise to augmented hostilities, if not unhappy incidents of more serious nature. You are therefore requested to secure the issuance of an

³⁴ In telegram No. 2900, June 12, Mr. Robertson informed General Marshall that "there is no information available to us here now that indicates team 32 has left its station at Hsuan Hua Tien nor that its team personnel is incomplete." Mr. Robertson added that the American member of the team had been asked to submit a report.

³⁵ Not found in Department files.

instruction to the team for its return to the base at Hsuanhwatien as was originally instructed.

[Signature in Chinese]
CHOU EN-LAI

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Brigadier General Thomas S. Timberman to Colonel J. Hart Caughey

PEIPING, 20 June 1946.

Subject: Status of Evacuation of Communist Armed Personnel from Kwangtun[g].

1. In order that you may be conversant with current status above subject, the following facts are presented:

a. Sub Field Teams A, B, C, and D have been in the field since 25 May. Groups A, B, and C (evacuees) are reported at the concentration staging area at Shayuchung, and Group D is expected in time to embark 28 June. Group D was granted a seven-day extension on arrival at staging area on 7 June due to bad roads.

b. Three LSTs have been requested to arrive at Hongkong.

c. Navy plans survey of loading facilities at Chefoo around 4 July.

d. Information here, as to finances, is that: Communist Party has had an initial advance from National Government of one hundred million C. N. C. and 100,000 cattles of foodstuffs at Canton up to 17 June. The Communist Party has repaid in grain 1,700,000 cattles and has ready for repayment 1,100,000 more cattles of grain. The total of the above amounts will repay two hundred million C. N. C. of the National Government Loan for Canton of three hundred seventy-four million, eighty-six thousand C. N. C. The National Government Branch received a radio from Nanking, 18 June, informing them that Canton had been instructed to pay the entire balance of 274,086,000 C. N. C. as soon as possible.

2. In view of the above, it appears that the evacuation should go off as planned; however, in order to forestall possible costly last minute delays, will you kindly call these matters to the attention of General Chou En-lai advising him of the current situation and of the serious import of needless delay as far as our shipping is concerned.

T. S. TIMBERMAN
Brig Gen, U. S. Army
Director of Operations

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Chou En-lai to General Marshall

MM 050

NANKING, 22 June 1946.

General Fang Fang's message from Canton dated June 19 and transmitted through Colonel Miller just came to my attention. I also un-

derstand that all the Communist evacuees have by now arrived at the staging area at Tapeng, pending embarkation on LSTs on June 26. Request therefore that you would kindly take the following actions on this matter :

1. That the Government military authorities be advised not to station more than one battalion at Tamshui and one company at Lungkang as has previously been agreed upon, and that those troops would refrain themselves from taking any aggressive action.

2. That the U. S. vessels be instructed to stand by at Tapeng prior to June 26, ready to receive the Communist evacuees, should they not have already done so.

3. That Colonel Miller be instructed to watch closely the latest development in that area, and to take every precautionary measure to prevent any untoward incident.³⁶

[Signature in Chinese]
CHOU EN-LAI

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Chou En-lai to General Marshall

MM 065

NANKING, June 29, 1946.

DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: Reference your memorandum OSE 240 dated June 28,³⁷ I notified General Fang Fang, Communist representative of the 8th field team, to the sense that he will complete the embarkation according to schedule time. I hope there will be no more unnecessary delay of the ship's departure.

Regarding the repatriation of 32 Catholic nuns in Chefoo on board the U. S. S. George and the survey of seacoast to look for a landing, I already cabled to General Chen Yi asking him to render every possible assistance.

[Signature in Chinese]
(CHOU EN-LAI)

[Embarkation of the Kwangtung Communists in three United States Navy L. S. T.'s was completed at Mirs Bay on July 2, the group consisting of 2081 officers and men and 419 women and children. Debarcation of the party at Chefoo, Shantung, was accomplished in the evening of July 6.]

³⁶ A notation stated that a message on June 22 was to be sent Admiral Cooke to the effect that General Marshall desired the Canton Communists to be evacuated at the earliest possible date consistent with safety.

³⁷ Not printed.

VII. THE MANCHURIAN CRISIS (MARCH 28—MAY 22, 1946)

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54—D270 : Telegram

*Brigadier General Henry A. Byroade*³⁸ to *Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr.*³⁹

PEIPING, 28 March 1946.

1285. Just informed by National Government representative here that Committee of Three will arrive here tomorrow with detailed instructions on Manchuria. Is this true? Please give me urgent answer in clear. Also informed same source that Generalissimo⁴⁰ Headquarters in Chinchow has as yet received no word from Generalissimo on our entry into Manchuria. Am pushing for entry of teams tomorrow weather permitting. Will go myself for couple days.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54—D270 : Telegram

Brigadier General Henry A. Byroade to *Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr.*

PEIPING, 28 March 1946.

1289. Developments since 1285⁴¹ follow. Cannot get agreement to dispatch field teams until Saturday.⁴² Communists cannot produce personnel. Weather has prevented picking them up at outlying stations for past several days. Nationalists say that the Generalissimo's Headquarters at Chinchow has received no word from the Generalissimo of any agreement on Manchuria and that they cannot deal with Executive Headquarters until such word is received.

Here is my plan to start ball rolling. I will leave here tomorrow for Mukden stopping enroute at Chinchow. General Yeh, Communist commissioner, has wired the top Communist leader in Manchuria, General Lin Piao, that he is to come to Mukden for conference with me. By return wire Lin Piao is to designate airfield where he can be picked up for lift to Mukden. On same day, probably Sunday, if we are able to get Lin Piao in Mukden etc., will have General Cheng, military commander of Gimo's headquarters at Chinchow, brought into Mukden. Personnel and equipment for teams will begin arriving Mukden Saturday.

Feel one day's delay on arrival of teams not critical if this plan to get commanders together is going forward. By time we get them

³⁸ Director of Operations of Executive Headquarters at Peiping.

³⁹ Representing General Marshall during the latter's absence from China.

⁴⁰ Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, President of the National Government of the Republic of China.

⁴¹ Telegram of March 28, *supra*.

⁴² March 30.

together I hope for more instructions along lines which will be presented by Robertson.⁴³ If such instructions have not arrived I will try to hold commanders together, stop fighting, and radio Chungking direct the answers we need.

This plan will be put in effect only if I can be assured that commanders listed above will meet with me in Mukden. Communists here have already acted in this respect. Request you insure without delay that Generalissimo inform Chinchow of Manchuria agreement and get me quick answer.

For your own info[rmation] I am certain Nationalists are stalling hoping to take city of Changchun by force before our arrival as they fear Executive Headquarters will stop all movement. Robertson knows our stand in this. You must give us answer however.

[Here follows information relating to proposed air transportation for the movement of teams into Manchuria.]

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Brigadier General Henry A. Byroade to Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., and Mr. Walter S. Robertson

PEIPING, 28 March 1946.

1322. Communist Commissioner, General Yeh has just requested that the Executive Headquarters take action on the excessive movement of Chinese National Armies into Manchuria. He stated that, according to his information, 6 armies were now in Manchuria and 5 more were enroute. He listed the 52d, 13th, New First, New 7th, 71st, 94th, and New 27th as being all or in part already in Manchuria. Those armies enroute he listed as the 93rd, 2d, 5th, 60th, and 88th. Our information indicates that 3 armies are in Manchuria (52nd, New 1st and New 6th) with the 71st Army now debarking at Chinghuang Tao [Chinwangtao]. Two armies (93rd and 60th) are enroute according to our information. The 13th is in Jehol near Manchuria border.

General Yeh requested that Executive Headquarters take action to stop those armies now enroute before teams departed to Manchuria. He indicated that agreement reached while Marshall was still in Chungking specified only 5 National Armies in Manchuria. I replied that, to my knowledge, the agreement he spoke of was part of the army reorganization program which listed 5 National armies in Manchuria at the end of 12 months. I also stated that this agreement as to the eventual number of armies in Manchuria could not,

⁴³ Walter S. Robertson, American Commissioner of Executive Headquarters, at Peiping.

in my opinion, be used as the criteria for deciding number of armies that should move to Manchuria at this time for the purpose of reestablishing Chinese sovereignty. I further indicated that Executive Hqs did not have the necessary information or instructions to properly handle this request. I stated that, if the Communist Party desired to make representation on this matter, it should be done by General Chou En-lai in Chungking. General Yeh agreed. This is the tip-off on another matter that may come before your committee. The question of course is how many armies are required to reestablish Chinese sovereignty.

New subject: As matter of interest to Robertson, General Yeh today volunteered to dispatch of railway teams directives with which he is familiar.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270: Telegram

Brigadier General Henry A. Byroade to Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr.

PEIPING, 28 March 1946.

1323. Your 386⁴⁴ noted. Please refer to my 1289.⁴⁵ My urgent recommendation is that Committee of Three depart Chungking Sunday for Peiping, remain overnight Peiping, depart Peiping with Commissioners Monday morning, lunch at Chinchow Monday noon, pick up General Hsuing Shih Hui and military commander at Chinchow and arrive Mukden Monday afternoon. By that time I can have Communist General Lin Piao in Mukden. If you can do this and have answers to Robertson's questions you will greatly improve the situation.

Recommendation above based upon rapidly moving edicts this afternoon. General Tsai, senior Nationalist here, stated he could not agree to allow teams to depart for Manchuria. This was based upon many contacts today by him with Chinchow. General Hsuing Shih Hui there insists he has no instructions from the Generalissimo and that teams should not enter Manchuria. However, he welcomes my visit there tomorrow. For your own information (request you do not quote), General Tsai clearly stated they did not want us to enter until they had captured Changchun. He further stated that our presence in Manchuria would stop fighting and movement and prevent National troops from occupying Manchuria. He also stated that the Nationalists would not meet with Communist General Lin Piao until they received instructions from the Generalissimo. I told him our

⁴⁴ March 28, not printed: it dealt with technical arrangements for the projected trip of the Committee of Three to Manchuria.

⁴⁵ Telegram of March 28, p. 712.

orders from the Committee of Three were clear regarding putting teams immediately into Manchuria and that they must depart on Saturday schedule.

I am departing tomorrow to carry out plan in 1289. I have informed both sides here on my request for Committee of Three to follow schedule above. Both agree it was good plan. Details of trip will be worked out by Headquarters in my absence. I repeat if your committee can arrive Monday in Mukden you may ease up [*us?*] over our greatest pitfall. If you can not do this, send any further agreements on Manchuria to Peiping which will be forwarded to me safehand Mukden. Also have Generalissimo instruct Chinchow on Manchurian agreement. Also wish me luck.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., to Brigadier General Henry A. Byroade, at Peiping

[CHUNGKING,] 30 March 1946.

403. At Committee of Three meeting General Chang⁴⁶ assured me that instructions regarding the field teams would be passed to Northeast Headquarters. 1289 refers. Again yesterday morning Colonel Pee⁴⁷ assured me that instructions had been issued. Last night I saw the Gimo who said he would personally take up the matter.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., to General Marshall

CHUNGKING, 30 March 1946.

409. Forwarded all paragraphs, except the last, of your 82259⁴⁸ to Wedemeyer,⁴⁹ McClure⁵⁰ and Byroade for information. Following is answer to last paragraph wherein the "Political jam" affects negotiations by the Committee of Three. (Political situation with reference to high governmental negotiations is being reported upon separately as

⁴⁶ Gen. Chang Chih-chung, Chinese Government member of the Committee of Three.

⁴⁷ Col. Peter T. K. Pee, aide to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

⁴⁸ March 27, not printed; it dealt with officer personnel problems of Executive Headquarters. In the last paragraph, General Marshall said, "I am glad to see the teams are at last going into Manchuria. Let me have an estimate of the present political jam between the Kuomintang and the Communists. That cannot be allowed to brew up to an explosion. Something positive will have to be done."

⁴⁹ Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, Commanding General, U. S. Forces in China Theater.

⁵⁰ Maj. Gen. Robert B. McClure, U. S. Army.

requested in your 82420.⁵¹ I am having Mister Ludden⁵² prepare the reply.) The "jam" is reflecting itself directly in Manchuria. The principal question is, of course, the gaining of strategic control by one or the other side in an effort to improve their eventual economic and political set up. In this respect it appears that the Communists are definitely the aggressors and that they, during the past several months, have been improving their military situation by one means or another in order that their bargaining position in Manchuria will be favorable. The basic fact is that there are an estimated 300,000 Communists in Manchuria as of today where on V-J Day they had approximately 30 to 40,000. The increase appears to have built up from that day to this, notwithstanding the cessation of hostilities agreement⁵³ which precluded movement of forces in all of China except in certain specified areas. The only specified area was Manchuria and in this instance the basic agreement permitted only National Government forces to move into or within Manchuria for the purpose of re-establishing sovereignty. In other words Communist forces in Manchuria which, at this date, are giving us so much trouble appear to be there through illegal means. It is likely that the difficulties will increase as the Nationalists move northward. At the same time there is the strong contention that the Communist Party is actively cooperating with the Soviets and that this cooperation is destroying the possibility of fully consummating, by the National Government, the terms of the Sino-Soviet agreement. The Communists appear to be concentrating their attention on northern Manchuria. Reports continue to be received also, of Communist preparations to shift considerable bodies of troops from north China to Manchuria.

The National Government is not aware of this situation and the Generalissimo has recently ordered 2 additional armies to be moved to ports of embarkation for movement by U. S. resources to Manchuria. General Wedemeyer has asked me, "If these armies are accepted for movement will it result in a violation of any basic agreement between Communists and Nationalists in recent conferences?" It would seem that the solution is quite simple in view of the basic agreement. However, the situation has changed to a degree in that General Chou

⁵¹ March 28, p. 159. For reply, see telegram No. 600, March 31, from the Counselor of Embassy in China, p. 159.

⁵² Raymond P. Ludden, Second Secretary of Embassy in China.

⁵³ See memorandum by the Committee of Three to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, January 10, p. 125.

En-lai,⁵⁴ bolstered by the fact that Communist forces are present in Manchuria in strength, now has me under pressure to resist National movements on the grounds that:

(1) The movement is for the sole purpose of liquidating Communists, thus increasing probability of armed clashes and

(2) The agreement for demobilization and reorganization contemplates only 5 National Armies in Manchuria after first 12 months; therefore the increased force will not only jeopardize a peaceful solution but will necessitate readjustment of large numbers of demobilized personnel. The Communists also are exerting pressure in the Executive Headquarters.

Have conferred with Wedemeyer in this matter and have informed him that additional movements to Manchuria are justified. I will placate Chou by referring to basic agreement and pointing out that there are to be only 5 National Armies after the first 12 months and that this vast area can absorb profitably discharged soldiers. At the same time I will constantly remind the National Representative on Committee of Three that there are to be only 5 after first 12 months. I conferred with General Chen Cheng on this subject today.

New subject. Generalissimo has designated General Chen Cheng, Minister of War, as temporary replacement for Chang Chih-chung on the Committee of Three. Chang is now in Sinkiang. Chen Cheng cannot physically stand trip to Mudken so General Yu Ta-wei will substitute for that party. Trip is set up for 5th April. Byroade has already gone in.

Another subject: Caughey⁵⁵ is going to Canton tomorrow to attempt to resolve Kwangtung Communist problem.⁵⁶ Colonel Pee and a Communist will accompany. They will be armed with new instruction from Generalissimo to Chang Fa-kwei.⁵⁷ Regarding Soochow situation, Committee of Three decided to send a National-Communist Committee to that and other areas for the purpose of working out a solution. So far Chou En-lai is satisfied with the above two arrangements.

New subject: Today the Generalissimo adopted additional defence organization which will replace the National Military Council and will be similar to the U. S. wartime system. He ordered it done by the end of April. Generalissimo stated he personally would sit in on the writing of the reorganization.

⁵⁴ Representative at Chungking of the Chinese Communist Party.

⁵⁵ Col. J. Hart Caughey, Executive Officer on General Marshall's staff in China.

⁵⁶ See pp. 613 ff.

⁵⁷ Chinese commander in the Canton area.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Mr. Walter S. Robertson to Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr.

PEIPING, 31 March 1946.

1387. Urgent message from Byroade at Mukden follows:

"Transmit following to Gillem and Robertson from Byroade. Conference with Consul⁵⁸ and Major Rigg⁵⁹ here leads me to believe a call on Marshal Malinovsky⁶⁰ at Changchun may be advisable. Purpose would be to inform Russians officially of Executive Headquarters' presence. My attitude would be straightforward explanation of our work and based upon assumption that no official connections exist between Russian and Chinese Communists here although such connection obviously exists. As National Government would probably frown on such a visit believe it should be cleared with Generalissimo. Delay of trip for clearance with General Marshall in Washington might be advisable and might as well result in some valuable guidance from there. What is your advice? Limited radio facilities prevent transmittal of more information on conditions here at this time."

It is my strong opinion that Byroade should not go into Changchun or any other Russian-occupied area without previous specific authority from either the Committee of Three or General Marshall. Byroade has been so informed. As stated to you in Chungking, my own view is that the National Government rather than a representative of Executive Headquarters would be the appropriate agency to inform Russian authorities of proposed activity of cease fire teams in Manchuria particularly in view of provisions of Sino-Russian treaty⁶¹ with regard to the joint Sino-Soviet administration of certain railroads along which our teams will be certain to operate. Once this had been done a proper basis for liaison would be established. Of course, this is a decision for Chungking but in view of Byroade's proposal I suggest that question be considered without delay. You will know whether or not General Marshall should be consulted.⁶²

New Subject: Minutes given me by Caughey only cover last meeting of Committee of Three and do not give the information desired as to the positions taken by opposing sides in the discussions leading

⁵⁸ O. Edmund Clubb, American Consul General at Mukden.

⁵⁹ Maj. Robert B. Rigg, Assistant Military Attaché in China.

⁶⁰ Commanding general of Soviet forces in Manchuria.

⁶¹ Signed at Moscow, August 14, 1945; Department of State, *United States Relations with China* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 585.

⁶² Substance of the preceding portion of this telegram transmitted to General Marshall in telegram No. 421, April 1, not printed; General Gillem added the following comment: "Generalissimo stated that his decision as to do so would not be made until definite information was received that Communist members were accompanying Field Team . . . [when] he would make further study of question before arriving at decision to communicate with Soviet Government. In view of Byroade's query have you any comments or instructions?"

up to the issuance of the Manchurian directive. Until agreement is reached in Chungking on the basic questions involved, permitting a clear directive from the Committee of Three to Executive Headquarters, such information would be extremely helpful in avoiding decisions here and in the field which might later be repudiated. Would appreciate your forwarding as promptly as possible.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Chou En-lai to Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr.

CHUNGKING, 31 March 1946.

Subject: To protest against further entry of Government forces into Manchuria in violation of Truce Agreement and to request the United States to immediately withdraw transportation facilities in this connection for the sake of implementing truce and army reorganization

1. Prior to the signing of the Cease Fire Agreement on January 10th, General Chang Chun, the former Government representative, has declared that the Government forces to be sent into Manchuria would not comprise a large figure. On subsequent discussions between the Government and the U. S. Forces, it was decided to send only five armies into Manchuria. Then, in February, the official document of the Army Reorganization Plan⁶³ specified that the Government may have only five armies to garrison Manchuria, and when General Marshall was discussing with me on the implementation of Cease Fire in Manchuria in March, I was told that, according to General Wedemeyer, it would need at least three to four months before the Government's desire of sending one or two additional Government armies into Manchuria can be complied with, and it would therefore constitute in no way an impedance to truce implementation at this moment. In connection with the signing of the Directive to the Executive Headquarters⁶⁴ regarding the Entry of Field Teams into Manchuria I have again repeatedly stated that Government forces in Manchuria should not exceed five armies, and in response, General Chang Chih-chung remarked that the Government forces in Manchuria would only consist of five armies.

2. However, in the light of the present situation, the Government has already violated this statement seeing that the Government forces in Manchuria have by now actually exceeded the pre-assigned figure, and reached seven armies, which are: the 13th, 52nd, 94th, New 6th,

⁶³ February 25, p. 295.

⁶⁴ March 27, p. 603.

New 1st, 71st, and New 27th armies—the dominating part of which are American-trained and equipped. Even in the light of the Army Reorganization Plan, it has exceeded the strength of five armies.

3. Furthermore, according to a memorandum of General Cheng Kai-ming, Government commissioner of the Executive Headquarters, and a notification of General Byroade, the U. S. Forces Headquarters shall move by sea four additional Government armies, viz: the 2nd, 5th, 93rd, and 60th armies into Manchuria. In this way, Government forces in Manchuria shall soon reach eleven armies. No matter what explanation is given for this move, it cannot be denied that this constitutes a violation of the general spirit and principle of our agreements, and an aggravation of the civil war crisis in Manchuria, thereby turning the truce agreement into a piece of sheer waste paper.

4. In view of this fact, I am lodging herewith a protest against the foregoing actions, and I propose that a meeting of the Conference of Three be immediately convened with a view to resolve this matter. It is our aspiration that the Government forces in Manchuria should not exceed five armies, and any force in excess of that strength should be withdrawn, while others, which have not yet been moved, should be stopped from movement, so that the thorough execution of the Cease Fire Agreement might be facilitated and the field teams be eased of the complications in making fair readjustment. In case the U. S. Forces Headquarters shall continue to move Government troops into Manchuria, we would deem such action as a change of the U. S. policy toward China, and lack of faith on the part of the Government to implement a real truce in Manchuria. Consequently we shall feel obliged to contemplate seriously what countermeasures we shall have to take.

I would deeply appreciate if you would favor me with your comment on this matter.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature in Chinese]
(CHOU EN-LAI)

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., to General Chou En-lai

CHUNGKING, April 1, 1946.

MY DEAR GENERAL CHOU: With reference to our conversation this morning I submit in writing my comments on your letter of March 31st.

I am somewhat surprised that you take the position as outlined in reference letter in view of your signature on:

a. The cease-fire directive with its stipulation 2 which was made a matter of record in the minutes.

b. The provision of Section 2 of Article V of the Basis for Military Reorganization and Integration of the Communist Forces into the National Army which prescribed the strength at the end of 12 months.

I am concerned over your allegation that the policy of the U. S. Government with reference to China is undergoing, or has undergone, a change as exemplified by concurrence in movement of additional troops into Manchuria. This constitutes a charge which cannot be ignored. Furthermore, I am certain that General Marshall will feel keenly the implications contained therein in view of his efforts to help China.

I have noted that you have made no reference to the question of the size and manner of entrance of Communist troops into Manchuria.

I regret that you felt it necessary to use the wording contained in the last sentence of paragraph 4 which might be interpreted as a threat especially in view of the fact that the directive which authorized the entrance of truce teams specifically prescribes in the footnote thereto that the Committee of Three will discuss problems concerning the military features incident to Manchuria.

I wish to express my appreciation for the generous manner in which you met me this morning and have accepted my frank comments.

Very sincerely,

A. C. GILLEM, JR.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., to General Marshall

CHUNGKING, 1 April 1946.

418. Gen. Chou En-lai has submitted memorandum to me dtd March 31 strongly protesting move of more than 5 National Armies to Manchuria and making the following allegations:

[Here follows summary of memorandum printed on page 719.]

My reaction to this memorandum was stated verbally to General Chou at conference this morning which follows: I expressed surprise at position General Chou had taken in view of his signature on:

1. The cease fire order with the second stipulation agreed for the record that cessation of movements in China does not prejudice military movements of forces of National Army in Manchuria for purpose of restoring Chinese sovereignty and,

2. The basis for military reorganization and integration of the Communist Forces into the National Army, article 5 section 2 of which provides that deployment at end of 12 months shall be 5 National Armies in Northeast.

Further, I expressed surprise at his allegation that the policy of the U.S. Government with reference to China is undergoing or has undergone a change as exemplified by concurrence in movement of addi-

tional troops into Manchuria. This constituted a charge which could not be ignored. I stated that I was sure General Marshall would feel keenly the implications contained in General Chou's memorandum in view of his efforts to help China.

I noted that General Chou has completely avoided the question of the size and manner of entrance of Communist troops into Manchuria.

I expressed my concern that General Chou had felt it necessary to resort to the wording in his last paragraph which might be interpreted as a threat especially in view of the fact that the directive which authorized entry of truce teams specifically prescribes in the footnote thereto that the committee of 3 will discuss problems concerning the military features incident to Manchuria.

General Chou thanked me for my frank expression and agreed that this matter would be the subject of an early meeting of the Committee of Three. I will inform you of this discussion as it progresses.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

*Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., to Mr. Walter S. Robertson,
at Peiping*

[CHUNGKING,] 1 April 1946.

420. Conferred with Generalissimo this afternoon reference notification to Soviet Government as to presence of field team in Manchuria re 1387. Generalissimo informed me that he would not make request until assured that Communist members were accompanying team. Further that upon receipt of this information he would further study the question before making official request of Soviet Government. You will be informed at earliest moment when his decision concerning this matter is made.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Memorandum by Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., to
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek*

CHUNGKING, April 1, 1946.

I have received information from General Byroade of the Executive Headquarters who is now located in Mukden with reference to conditions there. General Byroade indicates that the Russian Commanding General in this area, Marshal Malinovsky, should be officially informed as to the presence of truce teams in Manchuria. General Byroade queries as to whether he should make this call on Marshal Malinovsky at Changchun.

General Byroade has been informed by Mr. Robertson of the Executive Headquarters that he should not at this time call on Marshal Malinovsky or contact the Russians. Mr. Robertson recommends that the National Government in Chungking inform the Russians officially of the presence of the teams and their purpose in being in Manchuria. I concur in Mr. Robertson's recommendation and make the following recommendation to you: That the Russian Government be officially acquainted with the presence of the teams in Manchuria and their purpose, that is, to implement the cease fire agreement. It would greatly facilitate the execution of the missions assigned to the teams if this information could be transmitted to the Russian Government at the earliest practicable moment and that I be informed so that, in turn, I can inform the Executive Headquarters. General Marshall is being acquainted, this date, with the above suggested procedure.

A. C. GILLEM, JR.

121.893/4-146 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in China

WASHINGTON, April 1, 1946—7 p. m.

570. There is quoted hereunder, for transmission to appropriate Chinese authorities, text of letter dated Mar 29 addressed by President Truman to Gimo.

"My dear President Chiang: General Marshall has handed me your letter of March 11.⁶⁶ At the same time he went over the numerous details regarding the critical situation in Manchuria and the general development of affairs in China.

"I am gratified that you feel his mission was successful and that you are so generous in your expressions regarding him personally.

"He is carefully going over with me and with the Secretary of State a number of matters directly concerning China and is also engaged in meetings with other officials of the Government in regard to financial and materiel considerations.

"The General tells me he plans to return to China in about 3 weeks, assuming that his work here in your interest can be concluded.

"With expressions of my esteem and high regard, and with assurances of my deep interest in the rehabilitation of China under your leadership, Sincerely yours"

General Marshall will present original letter to Gimo on his return to China.

ACHESON

⁶⁶ *Ante*, p. 540.

740.00119 PW/4-246 : Telegram

*The Counselor of Embassy in China (Smyth) to the Secretary of State*⁶⁷

CHUNGKING, April 2, 1946—11 a. m.

[Received 3:58 p. m.]

606. Proceeding rapidly is advance Central Govt. forces Manchuria in wake Russian evacuation. No effective Communist opposition reported.

Deploying from Mukden three Central Govt. armies have occupied Tieh-Ling, Fu-Shun and Liao-Yang. Occupation of Ssu-Ping-Chieh expected shortly. Entry Central Govt. forces Chang-Chun not expected before further 2 weeks. There is strong probability of Communist occupation Chang-Chun and Harbin unless use of railroad for transportation Central Govt. troops consented to by Russians. Effective employment railroads by Central Govt. will depend on return by Russians of rolling stock employed in their own evacuation. (Summary M[ilitary] A[ttaché's] report for week ending March 29.)

Northern Manchuria appears to be focus of Communist attention. In addition reports continue to be received of Communist preparations move considerable bodies of troops from North China to Manchuria.

Situation North China, with exception of Shansi, remains quiet although progress restoration of communications slow. In Shansi intervention by Taiyuan truce team resulted in lessening threat of serious fighting along Tung-Chin railroad.

Reported complete is evacuation of Japanese from Tsinan. However, Central News Agency report dated 20 March states that 1,400 technicians and families, making 4,000 Japanese, employed by Central Govt. still remain.

SMYTH

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

*General Marshall to Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr.*⁶⁸

[WASHINGTON,] 2 April 1946.

82907. Reference your 421.⁶⁹ I agree with Robertson that Byroade should not go to Changchun. With reference to your conference with Generalissimo, I am uninformed as to whether or not Communist

⁶⁷ Repeated by the Department as telegram No. 618, April 3, 5 p. m., to the Embassy in the Soviet Union.

⁶⁸ Substance transmitted in telegram No. 432, April 4, to Mr. Walter S. Robertson, at Peiping.

⁶⁹ See footnote 62, p. 718.

members went into Manchuria with teams from Peiping. I assume that they did but you do not tell me. If they did go into Manchuria with our teams, what is the basis for the Generalissimo's statement?

I am somewhat concerned as to the Generalissimo leading off with a notification to the Russians which in effect amounts to a request for permission. It seems to me that the Committee of Three on the ground in Mukden with Chou present might be able to resolve matters better than in any other fashion. My understanding of the terms of entry of the teams was that they did not enter that portion of Manchuria in occupation by the Russians.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., to the Chinese Minister of War (Chen Cheng)

CHUNGKING, April 3, 1946.

MY DEAR GENERAL CHEN: On the evening of April 2nd I received, from General Chou En-lai, a communication⁷⁰ with reference to an incident involving Government forces which occurred at Yen-an at 10 AM on April 1st.

General Chou reports that, and I quote, "8 fighting planes with Kuomintang insignia came over Yen-an, flying at a low altitude and in a demonstrative manner, and they did not get away until half an hour later. On this account, I am instructed to lodge a strong protest to the governmental military authority, with a view to finding out its true intention, and securing assurance that no similar accident will happen henceforth".

General Chou further states that since the departure of General Chang Chih-chung, the governmental military representative, he had not yet been informed as to who will be his successor. Therefore, he forwarded this protest to me with a request that I, being the representative of General Marshall, will kindly transmit it to the Government.

In connection with the above request, I had previously informed General Chou that I had been informed verbally that you would represent the Government on the Committee of Three. I am therefore, at his request, transmitting this information to you for such action as you deem appropriate insofar as the planes are concerned, and such explanation as you deem necessary to General Chou.

I shall appreciate your assistance in this matter in view of General Chou's request.

Very sincerely,

A. C. GILLEM, JR.

⁷⁰ Not printed.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270: Telegram

*Brigadier General Henry A. Byroade to Lieutenant General
Alvan C. Gillem, Jr.*⁷¹

[MUKDEN,] 3 April 1946.

After complete arrangement for a reception of Communists rather serious incident occurred here today when bulk of Communists were not permitted to leave airfield. In fact at the time I heard of this incident they were being ordered to return to Peiping. Reason given was that some personnel arrived without proper credentials. I went to Chinese Air Force Headquarters to ground planes, then to see Gen. Peng, garrison commander. He could not be located; eventually found him (I think hiding from me) in his bedroom. He stated that he had corrected situation but must insist that personnel arriving in future have proper credentials. Do not know as yet of credential story but this action was inexcusable on part of National Government. They were held at airfield over 4 hours. This was a most regrettable incident to start us off on a very touchy situation. Communists are demanding formal apology. I will call Chinchow tonight on this. Suggest both Robertson and Gillem make the necessary representations as matter will undoubtedly reach both places thru Communist channel.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270: Telegram

*Brigadier General Henry A. Byroade to Lieutenant General Alvan C.
Gillem, Jr.*⁷²

[MUKDEN,] 3 April 1946.

This message for Gillem and Robertson from Byroade: Robertson please forward his comments to Gillem.

Held long conference this afternoon with General Yao, head Communist team member, immediately after his arrival. I requested his frank views on situation so proper understanding could be reached before teams departed. His presentation and answers to my questions were illogical. He stated that, in principle, they would not prevent National Government forces from moving into and within Manchuria according to January 10 agreement. What followed however indicated quite the contrary. He stated that Generalissimo's delay in sending teams to Manchuria, violations by National Government of cease fire agreements in Manchuria, and movement of more than 5 armies into Manchuria all combined to make the January 10 agreements not

⁷¹ Relayed via Executive Headquarters, Peiping.

⁷² Relayed via Executive Headquarters, Peiping; repeated as telegram No. 444, April 6, to General Marshall, p. 734.

applicable to Manchuria. He was emphatic that the only instructions applicable to our teams were those contained in recent agreement of March 27.⁷³ He believes teams must stop all movements of both sides. He admitted also that National Government forces could later move into area evacuated by the Russians under certain conditions. If this movement called for moving through Communist area (and in all cases it will) there must be agreement on a political basis (msg was garbled here) authorizing National Government troop movements into and with[in] Manchuria would include the 8th Route Army as they were part of the National Government forces.

Throughout this discussion I had him on completely unsound ground many times, but could not change his stand as he is obviously instructed and does not have the power of negotiation. In the end I told him categorically that unless and until further instructions were received by Executive Headquarters the Cease Fire Agreement of January 10 fully applied, that its provisions were clear, and that it must be enforced.

The statements of General Yao were not those of an uninformed team member. He had just returned from briefing on his duties as Head Communist Representative in Manchuria. It is obvious that no team agreements can be reached on any matter of importance.

Circumstantial evidence leads me to believe that direct contact and coordination [*coordinated*] strategy exists between the Communists in Manchuria and the Russians. Recognition and protection of a Russian-sponsored force in Manchuria and Communist obstructionism in the prevention of National Government movements would place the Executive Headquarters in a position of aiding the establishment of a Manchuria virtually dominated by Russia and we would thus ironically be aiding to violate our own foreign policy. I state the above knowing the full import of such statements.

There is only one solution to this problem. The Communists in Yen-an must be informed that we now consider that they have and are now further attempting to violate both the letter and spirit of the basic January 10 agreements as regards Manchuria. I respectfully suggest that only General Marshall with position and prestige can handle this situation and recommend he be requested to return without delay due to its importance. His scheduled time of return is so near that immediate departure at this time should not cause any comment.⁷⁴ This recommendation is based not only upon the comments of this message but as well upon the obvious fact that failure to arrive at a solution on Man-

⁷³ See memorandum by the Committee of Three, p. 603.

⁷⁴ General Marshall returned to Chungking on April 19 by way of Peiping, where he arrived April 18.

churia will put China North of the Yangtze back into its pre-January 10 condition.

Added: Am trying by phone tonight to get Nationalist team leaders from Chinchow here tomorrow, also am trying to push two teams out on Thursday but doubt if Nationalist team members will agree to accompany. I now know in strictest confidence where Communist General Lin Piao is located. Send me a C-47 tomorrow, Wednesday. I will see him Thursday. If at that time Committee of Three arrival is definitely scheduled at early date will bring him to Mukden.

Here is the question for you to consider. If Committee of Three does not have agreement on major issues before arrival here, will its visit do more harm than good? I don't know the answers. Please consider.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Mr. Walter S. Robertson to Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr.

PEIPING, 3 April 1946.

1467. Byroade's garbled Eyes Alone message⁷⁵ to you and me received this afternoon was sufficiently decipherable to indicate that our teams will be helplessly immobilized in Manchuria until agreement can be reached at the highest levels upon the basic questions in dispute. The Communists here have been following a similar line as Chou in Chungking and Yao in Mukden. A few days ago in conference General Lo, Communist Chief of Staff and acting for Commissioner Yeh who is ill, took the position that the cease fire order and the jurisdiction of Executive Headquarters did not originally apply to Manchuria and therefore new agreements would have to be reached covering the situation there. Evidently this is the line which has been laid down in Yen-an. Is there any information you can give me as to the probable decisions which will be reached by the Committee of Three governing the activity of our teams in Manchuria and are there any suggestions as to the instructions we should issue teams pending further Chungking decisions?

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Mr. Walter S. Robertson to Brigadier General Henry A. Byroade, at Mukden

PEIPING, 3 April 1946.

1468. I understand that only 2 of the 40 Communists arriving Mukden on April 2 carried proper credentials. It is possible that

⁷⁵ *Supra.*

National Government officials were suspicious that some of this personnel was being transported to Mukden for propaganda work and not for work on teams. You will remember our experience in the past where Executive Headquarters badges, transportation, and housing facilities were used by Communist personnel have [*having?*] no connection with Executive Headquarters. In view of the explosive situation in Manchuria, National Government officials will no doubt continue to insist that all Executive Headquarters personnel carry proper credentials. To those individuals who arrived without them, we are endeavoring to furnish by safe hand of Captain Young⁷⁶ on 4 April the names of those individuals who are entitled to them.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., to Mr. Walter S. Robertson, at Peiping

[CHUNGKING,] 4 April 1946.

435. Chou En-lai has brought to my attention alleged incident which occurred in Peiping on April 3rd when several Communist buildings were searched and 39 people were arrested. What is your version?

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Chou En-lai to Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr.

CHUNGKING, April 4, 1946.

MY DEAR GENERAL GILLEM :

1. On arrival of the Communist members to the Manchurian field teams—Generals Jao Szu-shih,⁷⁷ Hsu Kwang-ta, Keng Piao, Chang Ching-wu and their party numbering over forty men—at Mukden from Peiping at 13.00 April 2nd, and the leading members being escorted away by the U. S. officers, the Government Mukden Garrison Commander groundlessly detained the rest of the party numbering over 40 persons, and ordered them to fly back to Peiping on the same planes which have carried them to Mukden. Only through the interference of the U. S. officers, the Communist personnel was released after a three hours' detention. The Communist representatives feel very indignant over this incident, and have thereupon lodged a protest to the Government authority.⁷⁸

⁷⁶ Capt. John T. Young, American staff officer of Executive Headquarters, Peiping.

⁷⁷ Also known as Yao Shu-shih.

⁷⁸ In a memorandum of April 5, General Chou submitted to Lieutenant General Gillem a report on the incident, which he had received from General Yeh, Communist Commissioner at Executive Headquarters.

2. As regards the sending of field teams to Manchuria, the agreement bearing that subject has been signed on March 27th, and General Byroade on flying to Mukden on March 30th has especially made a stop-over at Chinchow to interview General Hsiung Shih-hwei, Director of the Northeastern Generalissimo's Headquarters. On the following day, he further conferred with General Peng Shou-sheng, Head of the Mukden command of the Northeastern Peace Preservation Headquarters, and Mr. Tung Wen-chi, Mayor of Mukden. Furthermore, the Central News has also repeatedly released informations from Mukden and Peiping reporting on the despatch of field teams and the departure of Communist members for Mukden. Therefore, Government officials cannot claim that they know nothing about the whole matter, and I am the more surprised to find that such a senseless accident to occur at the moment of our representatives' arrival in Mukden. In view of the present situation, one feels obliged to suspect that such an action is aimed to delay the work of the field teams, and to facilitate the furtherance of the armed attacks and occupation.

3. In view of this fact, I am lodging hereby a protest against this incident, and insist that the Committee of Three shall discuss this matter. I further propose that

a. The Mukden Garrison Commander make a formal apology to the Communist representatives;

b. Assurance be made to the Communist representatives and their party for their absolute safety and freedom of action in future.

c. The field teams in Manchuria be instructed to proceed immediately to the points of conflict for making readjustments with a view to forestalling the aggravation of the situation.

I would appreciate your comments.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature in Chinese]
(CHOU EN-LAI)

893.60 Manchuria/4-546

*The Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent) to
Colonel James C. Davis*⁷⁹

[WASHINGTON,] April 5, 1946.

DEAR JIM: AS I told you yesterday, there are some phases of the situation discussed in 409, March 30, which trouble me.

As you know, prior to V-J Day Communist troops in China were variously estimated as between 500,000 and 800,000. Now we are told

⁷⁹ General Marshall's liaison officer in the Department of State.

that there are 300,000 Communist troops in Manchuria. I cannot get away from the feeling that the major portion of the so-called Communist troops is comprised of old northeastern or Manchurian army contingents which want to get back into the picture now that the Japanese are out of the way and prevent the introduction of National Government troops largely from south China. The fact of their opposition to the National Government occupation places them in the dissident camp of the Communists.

I realize that the seriousness of the problem from the standpoint of Chinese unity is not altered even if my deductions are correct, but if they are correct I believe that a somewhat different approach to the problem might bring results. For instance if Chiang Kai-shek could see his way toward making some favorable gesture toward the old northeastern crowd without impairing the objective of unity, I have a feeling that much of what is called a Communist army in Manchuria might dissolve into thin air.

Mind you, I see serious difficulties in solving the problem in Manchuria even though a large portion of the troops there could be weaned away from the Communists because I think that what there are of bona fide Communist troops will try to concentrate in the area north of Changchun, particularly around Harbin, in an endeavor, probably with Russian support, to have political predominance in northern Manchuria. As General Marshall said yesterday, the struggle in Manchuria is primarily one for political preferment; jobs, as we would say; or rice bowls, as the Chinese would say. But I do think that an attempt to treat the northeastern group separately from the Communists might prove helpful.

With regard to reported numbers of troops, it is well to remember that the Chinese Government had around 200,000 Communists opposing them outside of Shanhaikwan last autumn and yet when the showdown came a relatively small contingent of Chinese Government troops moved forward with very little fighting. The same was true with regard to recent reports at Mukden when a reported Communist army of 300,000 put up practically no fight to keep National Government troops out of Mukden. It is an old Chinese game (or perhaps just a human game) to report an overwhelming opposition so that you have a good excuse if you lose and glory if you win. My purpose in saying this is to caution against taking too seriously Chinese Government reports on the formidable opposition they are meeting in Manchuria.

If you think it would be helpful to do so, will you please discuss this matter with General Marshall.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Memorandum by Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., to
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek*

CHUNGKING, April 5, 1946.

You asked that I inform you when Communist members of Field Teams had gone into Manchuria. I am now informed by Mr. Robertson that 40 Communist Team members proceeded to Mukden on 2 April 1946.

A. C. GILLEM, JR.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Memorandum by Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., to General
Chou En-lai*

CHUNGKING, April 5, 1946.

I desire to make the following comment on your letter dated 4 April 1946 concerning the incident at the Mukden airfield. I have been informed by General Byroade of this incident. General Byroade told me that the Communist members had been detained for approximately four hours on the pretext that they did not possess proper credentials. General Byroade stated that this was a most regrettable incident due to the delicate situation in Manchuria and requested that I take proper action. Accordingly I prepared and dispatched a memorandum to the Generalissimo on 4 April 1946,⁸⁰ stating that it appeared that the action on the part of the National Government representatives was uncalled for.

Shortly after receiving General Byroade's message I received an additional message from Mr. Robertson on this same subject in which he stated that he was dispatching by safehand of Captain Young, credentials for all Communist personnel. He further stated that credentials would be provided in the future to avoid subsequent difficulties.

A. C. GILLEM, JR.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., to General Marshall

CHUNGKING, 5 April 1946.

437. Mr. Robertson (82907) has been informed of your views with respect to Byroade's visit to Changchun. I have informed Mr. Robertson and the Generalissimo of your views with respect to seeking Soviet permission to enter Manchuria.

⁸⁰ Not printed.

Concerning the second paragraph of 82907, I believe the Generalissimo's attitude was based on erroneous information implying the possible failure of Communists to put in an appearance from Yen-an to make up Manchurian field teams. In the meantime field teams have entered Manchuria with full complement on all sides.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

*Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., to Mr. Walter S. Robertson,
at Peiping*

[CHUNGKING,] 5 April 1946.

446. Have decided trip be postponed temporarily in order that Committee of Three can attempt to resolve the question of additional appropriate instructions to the field teams. Hope to reach a satisfactory basis of negotiation by Monday. I feel that a visit at this time by the Committee of Three without means to resolve matters with which it is faced would be undesirable. General Marshall has been informed.

740.00119 PW/4-546 : Telegram

The Consul General at Mukden (Clubb) to the Secretary of State

MUKDEN, April 5, 1946.

[Received April 5—4:20 p. m.]

12. Changchun news item April 1 published 3rd locally stated that although Soviet side had already expressed agreement regarding transport Chinese Government troops north by railway, actual difficulties were such that early realization was doubtful. Difficulties included blown-up bridge at Kungchuling where Soviet troops are stationed and three breaks south that point, although it is reported that trains could now proceed from Mukden to Tieh Ling. Traffic Harbin-Tchita said resumed from March 16th one passenger train daily. Entire line from Port Pogradichnaya has been altered to broad gauge.

CLUBB

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Hsu Yung-chang to General Marshall

[Translation]

No. 7649

[CHUNGKING,] 5 April 1946.

On 3 April, General Tung Yen-ping, Deputy Chief of the Generalissimo's Northeast Headquarters, had a conversation with Lt. General

Telochinko (romanized) of the Soviet Army when the latter made the following statements regarding the dates of withdrawal of the various Soviet units.

(1) General Malinovski's Headquarters with all its staff officers will leave Chang-chun and proceed to Soviet Russia on 6 April.

(2) Soviet troops in Chang-chun will complete withdrawal by the 14th or 15th of April. City garrison Commander Karlov (romanization) will leave Chang-chun last. Chang-chun city and suburb disease prevention posts and army planes at the airfield will be withdrawn on the 10th of April.

(3) Soviet troops of Harbin will complete withdrawal by 25th April.

(4) Soviet city troops at Chi-lin will complete withdrawal from the 13th to 16th, April.

(5) Soviet troops at Chichihar will complete withdrawal by the 26th or 27th, April.

(6) Soviet troops on Mau-tan-kiang will complete withdrawal by the 28th or 29th, April.

(7) Soviet troops at Pei-an, Chia-mu-szu, Pu-li and other places to the north will complete withdrawal by the 10th of April.

HSU YUNG-CHANG

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., to General Marshall

CHUNGKING, 6 April 1946.

444. Following message was received from Byroade and is quoted in full for your information :

[Here follows text of telegram of April 3 printed on page 726.]

In view of Byroade's consideration in this matter I have wired Robertson to the effect that the trip for the Committee of Three to Mukden will be temporarily delayed. I feel strongly that it is necessary for the Committee of Three to adopt basic principles for the activity of the field teams in Manchuria prior to our visit there. I feel that a visit to Mukden prior to the adoption of basic principles for the field team operations would prove nonproductive and would result in a trip which would provide us only with information already in our possession. Accordingly I am approaching the Communist and National sides individually in order to determine what common ground can be adopted for the basis of a satisfactory agreement. Both sides appear at this time willing to accept the terms of the basic agreement with reference to cessation of hostilities as applicable to Manchuria. The big question remains however of movements "into and within

Manchuria" which of course is opposed by the Communists. I believe, however, that this matter can be resolved by a compromise which would indicate that the National Government would discuss with Communist representatives the question of National Government movements in Manchuria. I realize that this is a departure from the original intention of the basic agreement but because of existing circumstances it appears to me to be necessary in order to resolve this question. I feel that the important question is to have accepted and publicly announced the matter that the cease fire order is applicable to Manchuria, which question thus far is in abeyance because of commissioners' public announcement in January to the contrary. In my contacts with General Chou En-lai and General Chen Cheng I have stressed the importance of agreement in principle. I feel that by early next week we can have a workable solution which does not jeopardize the intent of the basic agreement.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

*Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., to Mr. Walter S. Robertson,
at Peiping*

[CHUNGKING,] 6 April 1946.

451. My 446 partially answers your 1467. I cannot give you the desired information at this time. Am pressing for resolution of this matter. National side changing members again due to illness of Gen. Chen Cheng. My hope is that we will be able to get both sides to agree that the cease fire order is applicable to Manchuria in principle and then negotiate on that basis regarding the difficult Manchurian situation. There was never any question in General Marshall's mind that the order was applicable and I am using that as a basis of approach. However, if I am successful in getting order to apply to Manchuria, National side may insist that it apply as of the 10 January in accordance with its terms and insist that Communist forces be moved out. On the other hand the Communists will press for its application commencing as of this date and demand official recognition of all area now occupied by them. Will keep you advised.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Mr. Walter S. Robertson to General Marshall

PEIPING, 6 April 1946.

1576. It is my carefully considered opinion that the situation is so serious and is deteriorating so rapidly that your immediate return

to China is necessary to prevent your mission being dangerously jeopardized.

I assume General Gillem has kept you fully advised as to developments. As it would take a long, rather detailed message, no doubt duplicating information already given you, to present the picture, I will not burden you with it unless requested.

740.00119 PW/4-646 : Telegram

The Counselor of Embassy in China (Smyth) to the Secretary of State

CHUNGKING, April 6, 1946—1 p. m.

[Received April 7—5: 10 a. m.]

633. Summary Military Attaché's report for week ending April 6.

Executive Headquarters truce teams numbering 4 have arrived Mukden. Meanwhile central government reoccupation Manchuria continuing. South of Mukden, Yingkou, Anshan and Haicheng reported occupied. Effective Communist resistance has [not] materialized thus far. Evacuation Changchun and Harbin appears to have commenced. Complete evacuation Changchun expected after 10 April; total evacuation all Manchuria by 30 April.

Chinese continue express anxiety over reported concentration Communist forces neighborhood Changchun and Harbin. Several towns vicinity Harbin reported occupied by Communists following Russian withdrawal. Chinese G-2 reports Tsitsihar threatened by Communists. Chinese G-2 continues report Communist troop movements to Manchuria via Jehol.

North China situation remains quiet although little progress reported on restoration rail communications. Repair work several areas suspended by Communists pending settlement their demands that central government blockhouses be destroyed. There is possible connection between Communist reluctance to permit repair North China communications and recent developments Manchuria.

Agreement reached for evacuation Communist forces East River Region Kuangtung Province. Agreement provides for Communist concentration at Bias Bay during May for American water lift to Chefoo.⁸¹

American water lift of 60 army from Haiphong to Chinwangtao commenced on 25 March. 93 army reported closing on Kowloon for movement Manchuria commencing 15 April by American water lift.

SMYTH

⁸¹ See pp. 613 ff.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., to General Marshall

CHUNGKING, 6 April 1946.

453. Organization of the Committee of Three again in state of flux. General Chang Chih Chung was ordered to Sinkiang by the Generalissimo over my protest on 29 March. Several days ensued, in spite of my insistence to the contrary, before Generalissimo appointed General Chen Cheng.

General Chen Cheng is a sick man and although I met with him individually on three occasions and conference on two occasions he has now been removed from the Committee by the Generalissimo on account of his health. General Yu Ta Wei was pinchhitting for and assisting General Chen Cheng, but he now tells me he does not desire to serve on the committee and so recommended to the Generalissimo because he is "A military man with no ability towards political negotiation."

This afternoon I met Chen Cheng who graciously volunteered to carry on until new man is appointed. He is seeing Chou in the morning to attempt to lay ground work for Manchuria solution. In meantime I have asked Generalissimo for prompt replacement.

Communists interpret Chen's removal as a stall in furtherance of a "wait and see" policy with respect to the Manchurian situation. Chou is also concerned over three recent incidents :

- (1) Four-hour detention of 40 Communist team members upon arrival Mukden Airfield on pretext of lacking proper credentials. Byroade resolved matter locally and Robertson is fixing up credentials.
- (2) Arrest and detention in Peiping of several staff and newspaper Communist personnel. Have not gotten report from Robertson as yet but am informed by Communists that all personnel are now released.
- (3) Eight CAF¹ fighters buzzed Yen-an for half hour 3 days ago.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

General Marshall to Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr.

[WASHINGTON,] 6 April 1946.

83602. Reference your 444, April 6. If you can force an agreement early next week then I consider that you should delay the departure of the Committee of Three until you reach that agreement. However, I think it might be fatal to delay over a longer period in making your appearance in Manchuria even though you have not a complete basis of agreement. The teams are there and the trouble is there and we can't just sit back and let that affair stew. You will have to use strong measures to bring about a sufficient understanding to go ahead.

I am inclined to think that Byroade cannot further negotiate effectively on this matter without the presence of your rank and prestige.

Another subject: Chou in his public statements is recommending against any loans, etcetera, to China until the Kuomintang Central Committee has carried out in good faith the agreements of the PCC. I am proceeding here on the basis that to do at this moment what he recommends would be cutting the ground from under the Gimo who is having a struggle with the recalcitrant members of the Central Government. What is your view on this?

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Memorandum by Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., to
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek*

CHUNGKING, April 7, 1946.

On 27 March 1946, the Committee of Three in Chungking signed an agreement providing for the entry of field teams into Manchuria. Due to bad weather and other minor difficulties within the Executive Headquarters, field teams were unable to proceed to Manchuria until 2 April 1946. Shortly after General Byroade's arrival, 3 April 1946, I received a message from him stating that he was of the opinion that he would be unable to get National members of the field teams to proceed from Mukden into the field. On 4 April 1946, I received another message from General Byroade indicating that the Communists were prepared to proceed with field teams out of Mukden, but that as late as 3 April 1946 the Government team representatives stated they lacked authority to move into the field because their team leader remained in Chinchow. General Byroade stated that he then insisted that they move out from Mukden with the teams but the National representatives insisted and decided to wire for guidance. Late in the evening of 3 April General Byroade had still been unable to persuade the National member to proceed out of Mukden with the field teams.

While I have received no additional information with reference to the National team representatives I have read today a press report dated the 6th of April which states that the American and Communist members of the four cease fire field teams are ready to take the field from Mukden, but that the four top National members were still not prepared to depart. The press report, although not necessarily authoritative, pointed out that the reason the National representatives were not prepared was due to the fact that they were delaying to give the National forces time to take Changchun before the cease fire team could halt the advance. This report may not be true although I am inclined to believe that it is from other circumstantial evidence I have received from both General Byroade and Mr. Robertson.

If this attitude on the part of the National representatives is true, however, I would like to point out that it is based on an erroneous conception since the cease fire order agreed to by the National Government and the Communist Party on 10 January 1946 contains a stipulation to the effect that Government forces can go into or within Manchuria for the purpose of restoring Chinese sovereignty. I would like to further point out that in view of the absence of appropriate instructions which the Committee of Three has as yet been unable to work out, in spite of my pressing for a satisfactory solution, General Byroade has the intention of implementing the terms of the 10 January 1946 cease fire order since he, as did General Marshall, had no question in their minds during the conferences leading to the signing of this agreement, or since the signing of the agreement, that it would not apply to Manchuria.

Regardless of the reasons for the apparent non-cooperation of the National team members, I feel that I must strongly urge you to issue immediately appropriate instructions to the persons involved in order that some control can be maintained over the critical Manchurian situation. This, I feel, is necessary in order that peace in China, which is at present hanging in balance, can be maintained.

A. C. GILLEM, JR.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Mr. Walter S. Robertson to Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr.

PEIPING, 7 April 1946.

1579. Communist New China News Agency English language release, Peiping, April 3, states Nationalist armies in Manchuria under terms of army reorganization program cannot at any time during 18 months reorganization period exceed 5 armies. Release adds, "in every settlement discussed in the three-man committee, the Government representative and the American representative confirmed that Nationalist troops which would enter the northeast would not be over the number of 5 armies." This is same line being taken here by Commissioner Yeh and in Mukden by Lt. General Yao Shu Shih, senior Communist representative there. Suggested Committee of Three may wish to publicly correct foregoing misstatement before it comes to be generally accepted.

New subject. National Government commissioner has been absent from Executive Headquarters for 2 weeks. Communist commissioner for 1 week. Latter reported ill but there are indications that his illness may be diplomatic. I strongly protest absence of two commissioners at this critical time.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Mr. Walter S. Robertson to General Marshall

PEIPING, 8 April 1946.

1629. Reur 83548.⁸² The Committee of Three has been completely deadlocked on basic Manchurian questions ever since your departure. No agreement of any kind has been reached with the exception of the March 27 Directive ordering out the teams in wording so general and vague as to be entirely meaningless for practical implementation. Although above Directive was issued 12 days ago, the Committee of Three is still unable to agree upon clarifying instructions. In the meantime our teams in Manchuria are completely immobilized insofar as effective action is concerned because of the impossibility of obtaining team agreements. We had hoped to clarify the situation for the teams by an early visit of the Committee of Three. However, the Committee is still stalled in Chungking because of inability to agree upon what instructions to give teams once it arrived on the ground.

Apparently something happened which changed the Communists' former position favoring sending teams into Manchuria, and in Gillem's opinion Chou has been deliberately employing delaying tactics. My own opinion is that the Communists feel prepared, by arrangement with the Russians or otherwise, to take over large parts of Manchuria upon evacuation by the Russians, and that early arrival of our teams would by freezing their troop movements limit the territory which they would be able to occupy. In any event agreement in Chungking was held up by Chou's strong contention that the movement of Government troops within Manchuria to restore Chinese sovereignty should be limited to those locations then if evacuated by the Russians (which at the time he was making the contention would have meant only Mukden). He now contends that, as the National Government already has Armies in Manchuria, the transportation of additional troops there would be a violation of the Army reorganization agreement, which allocated the Government only 5 Armies for Manchuria. This position, evidently directed from Yen-an, is being stoutly maintained by Communist representatives here, by the senior Communist representative in Mukden. Chou recently addressed a letter to Gillem⁸³ charging a change in U. S. policy as evidenced by U. S. concurrence in the movement of additional Nationalist troops beyond the 5 Armies. Similarly in a memorandum⁸⁴ last week Commissioner

⁸² Not found in Department files; apparently General Marshall had requested an appraisal of the situation referred to by Mr. Robertson in his telegram No. 1576, April 6, p. 735.

⁸³ March 31, p. 719.

⁸⁴ Not found in Department files.

Yeh charged that 700 American troops had been landed at Chinwangtao and had pushed on into Manchuria, that Americans were building an airfield northwest of Tangku from which Americans were transporting huge amounts of ammunition into Manchuria, and expressed the hope that American authorities would not continue to transport additional Central Government forces into the northeastern provinces. Further, the Communist news agency English language release, Peiping, April 3, carries the following statement: "In every settlement discussed in the 3-man committee the Government Representative and the American Representative confirmed that National troops which would enter the northeast would not be over the number of 5 Armies." I cite these details as indicating concerted propaganda effort to place the American side in the light of a supporter of Central Government violation of the Army Reorganization Plan. Ariyoshi,⁸⁵ recently returned from Yen-an, reports the Communists are now saying that America wishes to set up a Kuomintang State in Manchuria as a buffer state against Russia. Yen-an broadcasts have been increasingly bitter against the Kuomintang and recently included a statement attributed to Owen Lattimore⁸⁶ headlined "U. S. Errors Lead to War", one charging that America wished to dislodge the Russians in Manchuria so that they could take over.

The following disturbing statement was received from Byroade after a few days in Mukden:

"Circumstantial evidence leads me to believe that direct contact and coordinated strategy exist between the Communists in Manchuria and the Russians. Recognition and protection of a Russian-sponsored force in Manchuria and Communist obstructionism in prevention of⁸⁷ Manchuria virtually dominated by Russians we would thus ironically be aiding to violate our own foreign policy. I say the above knowing the full import of such statements. There is only one solution of this problem. The Communists at Yen-an must be informed that they now have and are now further attempting to violate both the letter and the spirit of the basic January 10 agreements as regards Manchuria."

He strongly concurred in opinion stated in letter to him of March 30⁸⁸ written immediately upon my return from all day conference with Gillem in Chungking that the situation demanded your immediate return from America.

⁸⁵ Lt. Keiji Ariyoshi, U. S. Army language specialist detailed to the Army Observer Group at Yen-an.

⁸⁶ Professor at Johns Hopkins University and former political adviser to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

⁸⁷ Part of sentence omitted, as follows: "National Government movements would place the Executive Headquarters in a position of aiding the establishment of a". See telegram from General Byroade to General Gillem, April 3, p. 726, fifth paragraph.

⁸⁸ Not found in Department files.

Other indications of deterioration in the general situation are:

(1) The failure of the Central Executive Committee to approve all the resolutions passed by the Political Consultative Conference and the strong attacks on the PCC by the CC clique and other diehards among the Kuomintang leaders.

(2) Reported criticism of General Chou En-lai by Yen-an authorities for what were considered as too great concessions by him at the time of modification of some of the PCC resolutions.

(3) The refusal of the Communists to participate in the recent People's Political Council meetings.

(4) Sharp criticism of the Communist Party and their action in Manchuria by the Generalissimo in his speech to the PPC.

(5) Recent raid by Peiping police on Communist newspaper headquarters and the arrest of approximately 50 Communists on charges of failure to register with police authorities.

(6) The action of National Government troops in Mukden in detaining for several hours Communist personnel arriving there for duty as team members and released only after strong personal protests from Byroade.

The National Government has been unrepresented by a Commissioner at Executive Headquarters for more than 2 weeks (General Cheng departing for Chungking immediately following Tai Li's⁸⁹ death) and the Communist Commissioner has been absent from his office here for over a week, making it virtually impossible to reach decision on any controversial problems. Both Byroade and I greatly fear that unless an agreement can soon be reached regarding Manchuria our entire operation is likely to break down.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., to General Marshall

CHUNGKING, 8 April 1946.

461. Regarding first subject in your 83602.⁹⁰ Have been in continued conference with General Chen Cheng and Gen. Yu Ta-wei relative to the Manchurian situation. This afternoon at 4 o'clock we have a committee meeting at which I hope to come to some sort of an agreement. I have an appointment with the Generalissimo just before this meeting and my discussions with him will be based on the information contained in your 83602. If it develops during the meeting that Chou is the resister, I will also attempt to see him this evening after the meeting. That will give me tomorrow to try to pull loose ends together sufficiently to take off for Manchuria. Regardless of the

⁸⁹ General Tai Li, member of the Kuomintang and National Government, in charge of secret service activities.

⁹⁰ April 6, p. 737.

outcome, I am going to Manchuria Wed. and I intend to take both Chou En-lai and Yu Ta-wei, acting for Chen Cheng, with me unless some presently unforeseen circumstance precludes one or both of them going. Received a message this morning indicating that Byroade returned Peiping yesterday for medical treatment but is returning to Mukden in 2 or 3 days.

Regarding second [*third*] paragraph of 83602, I feel as you do that the sound basis is to adequately support the Generalissimo. However, I would like to point out on the political side (Smyth and Ludden concur) that it would be desirable to wait a few weeks before any official announcement of loan is made or any definite commitment is made to Chinese Government. Full implementation of PCC agreements must necessarily be a long term procedure. The first definitive step, however, must be interim reorganization of Government and adoption of constitution. It is felt that this could be accomplished within a few weeks if genuine mutual good faith is present, but until this is accomplished there can be no assurance that PCC agreements will ever be made effective. Granting good faith of Gimo with regard to PCC agreements, it is believed that his position vis-à-vis recalcitrant elements within the Kmt would be strengthened rather than weakened by a statement from you of American interest in early implementation of PCC agreements, particularly with regard to adoption of constitution by National Assembly scheduled to meet at Nanking on May 5th.

On the military side I would like to point out the possibility that the National Government is not acting entirely in good faith. The Gimo continues to support Chang Fa-kwei and his non-recognition of Communists in Kwangtung Province (which includes Hainan) although certain arrangements have already been concluded with reference to reducing the Canton area problem. The National Government has not assisted materially as it had promised in alleviating the situation northwest of Hankow. These two points have caused burning resentment on the part of General Chou who is accused by his party for failure to resolve Central and South China military problems while at same time making concessions to National Government in North China. Generalissimo has become alarmed and adamant over equipment to be given to Communists (this is old Stilwell⁹¹ fight). National Government Commissioner has been absent from Peiping over 2 weeks. Up until morning 4 April, according to official report, National Government Team representative in Manchuria have refused to go into field from Mukden and still refused until afternoon 6 April according to press.

⁹¹ Lt. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces in China, Burma, and India Theater, concurrently Chief of Staff, China Theater, until October 1944.

In view of the political and military situation outlined above I then (Adler⁹² concurs) recommend that economic strings be attached to the loan to give U. S. sufficient loophole to hold up making more specific credits for specific projects under the loan (after some have been granted, of course), if at any stage after the loan has been announced it becomes evident that implementation of the PCC or military agreements are being seriously retarded.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Document Prepared by Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr.

[CHUNGKING, April 8, 1946.]

BASIS FOR DISCUSSION BY COMMITTEE OF THREE IN CONNECTION WITH
THE PROBLEMS WHICH HAVE OR MAY ARISE IN MANCHURIA AND
WHICH MUST BE RESOLVED

The principles outlined herein are drawn in accordance with the procedure visualized in first sentence of the stipulation to the agreement reached by Committee of Three on 27 March, 1946.⁹³ The underlying purpose of the inclusion of this sentence was to assist in the resolution of problems which could not be definitely foreseen at the time of signature. A wide variety of situations were perforce visualized as incident to reoccupation of Manchuria by Chinese National forces subsequent to the withdrawal of allied Russian troops. The presence of Chinese Communist forces in the Northeast must likewise be considered in the premises.

As a prelude, it is essential that both sides recognize and acknowledge that as a basis the "Cease Fire Agreement" must be accepted at least in principle. A special stipulation of that agreement has been accepted as a legal means for directing movements into and within Manchuria of the National forces. Therefore, the document to which this stipulation is appended must be recognized in its entirety, also portions thereof do not warrant utilization.

Likewise the document agreed to and signed on 27 March, 1946, by the Committee of Three contains an appended statement designed for circumstances that have arisen in Manchuria, and which now warrant remedial action. The purpose of both of these aforementioned documents was to assist in eliminating hostilities between the Communist and National forces. Therefore, it is deemed the primary duty of the Committee of Three to examine both and derive therefrom a means of implementing and achieving the desired objective. The

⁹² Solomon Adler, U. S. Treasury Representative in China.

⁹³ *Ante*, p. 603.

presence of the field teams in Manchuria is of itself prima facie evidence that forces of both parties are present in the Northeast, regardless of methods of entrance and aside from any claims false or accurate, as to how or why their presence exists within the Northeast area. Therefore the following procedures are utilized as a basis for determining ways and means of avoiding bloodshed. All procedures must be recognized as interim measures designed to meet exigencies of a critical, though by no means insoluble problem.

It is visualized that legal procedures properly authenticated by authorized government agencies, should at the earliest moment, execute their normal functions, (lacking the military agency known as Military Government). Both forces must accept situations which have grown up during a period of uncertainty and irregularity. Likewise consideration must be given by both sides to the fact that pending the completion of the coalition government the National Government as constituted has authenticated with the Russian Government an agreement known as the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 14 August, 1945.

For purposes of facilitating the execution of the missions of the Field Teams and with a consciousness of stipulation 2 of the original cease fire and the stipulation to the agreement of 27 March, 1946, the guiding principles set forth in the Appendix hereto⁹⁴ will be utilized in the solution of problems arising in the field.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Draft of Additional Instructions for Field Teams Entering
Manchuria*⁹⁵

[CHUNGKING, April 8, 1946.]

We, General Chen Cheng, Representative of the National Government of China, and General Chou En-Lai, Representative of the Communist Party, have recommended to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and Chairman Mao Tze-tung and have been authorized by them to announce that the Cease Fire Order agreed to and issued publicly by us on 10 January, 1946, is applicable to Manchuria as well as to the remainder of China.

We are further authorized to announce that due to temporary non-application to Manchuria of this order certain modifications in its terms are necessary in order to account for the situation currently found in Manchuria. These modifications are:

a. Further movement of Communist-led troops in Manchuria will cease.

⁹⁴ *Infra.*

⁹⁵ This is a third draft; two earlier drafts, undated, are not printed.

b. Communist-led troops presently occupying positions on or near railroads referred to in the Sino-Soviet treaty of 14 August, 1945, will withdraw from these positions at least one day's march to either flank in order to permit free passage and use of those railroads by National Government forces.

Communist-led troops will evacuate all towers and cities astride of or along railroads referred to in the Sino-Soviet Treaty.

All other terms of the Cease Fire Order dated 10 January, 1946, and the terms of the agreement to the entry of Field Teams of the Executive Headquarters into Manchuria remain in force.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Mr. Walter S. Robertson to Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr.

PEIPING, 9 April 1946.

1611. Re your 451. I fully appreciate the extreme difficulty of your position. However may I suggest that, lacking specific instructions from General Marshall, there be no recession from our firm position that cease fire order January 10th applies to Manchuria in all respects. In that agreement the Communists specifically recognize the right to move National Armies into and within Manchuria to restore Chinese sovereignty. The movement of Communist troops into Manchuria after January 13th violates both the letter and spirit of that agreement. I strongly feel that it would be better to reach no agreements pending General Marshall's return that [*than?*] to make compromises on principle which might later prove to be embarrassing in his negotiations. The Communist contention that the agreement on demobilization and reorganization of the armies, to be effective at the end of 12 and 18 months respectfully [*respectively*], limits the movement of National troops into Manchuria to five armies is in my opinion an absurdly indefensible position and should be strongly resisted whenever and wherever used. The same agreement is being advanced in Peiping and Mukden as well as Chungking and evidently is the line laid down by Yen-an.

893.00/4-946 : Telegram

The Counselor of Embassy in China (Smyth) to the Secretary of State

CHUNGKING, April 9, 1946—4 a. m.

[Received 8:40 p. m.]

646. Developments in Manchuria held first place in Yen-an broadcasts for week ending April 5. One report announced that Liaoning

local democratic govts had eliminated 25,000 bandits, puppets and Japanese up to middle Feb. Another report charged Kmt troops were conducting large-scale military operations against Manchurian democratic joint army along Changchun railroad north and south of Mukden and alleged that Kmt secret police have clamped gestapo rule over Mukden. One item protested continued movement of Kmt troops into Manchuria for civil war purposes, alleging violation of military agreement which provided for 5 Kmt armies, whereas there are already 6 in Manchuria, with fighting going on in 4 different sectors. It is alleged that bandits along river north Manchuria have been eliminated by Communist-led people's self defense army, formerly known as Tung Pei volunteers. Another broadcast protested commissioning of Chiang Peng-fei as high Central Govt. official in Manchuria because even before Mukden incident⁹⁶ he was Japanese running-dog and his troops are now attacking popular local forces.

Item quoted New China News Agency rebuttal on National Military Council denial of new Fourth Army Fifth Division being blockaded and starved north of Hankow. Agency release alleged Communists obey truce agreement which Kmt consistently violates. Another military item charged Kmt with violating military agreement by putting all demobilized officers into Govt. police force which is being used against Communists. Numerous instances cited to prove puppet military and civilian officials are still in power throughout central China.

One broadcast carried protest of border region govt. against Govt. plan to change Yellow River course back to old bed since this will cause suffering to people, mostly Communists, now living in old bed. Implementation of plan would flood 866 villages, 200,000 houses, 181,000 acres of land, and make 380,000 people homeless in four counties alone.

Other items charged that PPC sessions have shown Kmt corruption and continued power of CC clique therein. One broadcast attacked exploitation of Shantung salt workers in Govt., a condition now remedied since Communists have taken over industry. Another broadcast announced convocation of Third People's Congress of Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia border region on April 2 in Yen-an at which General Chu Teh⁹⁷ said that despite blockade of reactionaries border region has notable record of achievement and warned people to be alert to efforts of reactionaries to sabotage PCC agreements in order to preserve their own power. He also stated that 8 years of border

⁹⁶ September 18, 1931; *Foreign Relations*, 1931, vol. III, p. 10.

⁹⁷ Senior Chinese Communist army commander.

region administration have laid down democratic tradition of responsiveness to interests of all groups and classes.

SMYTH

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., to General Chou En-lai

CHUNGKING, April 9, 1946.

DEAR GENERAL CHOU: I have been informed that the English language Communist New China News Agency released in Peiping on 3 April an article stating that, "in every settlement discussed in the three man committee, the Government representative and the American representative confirmed that Nationalist troops which would enter the northeast would not be over the number of 5 armies." I wish to deny the statement issued by this Communist news organ in so far as the statement pertains to commitments made by the American representative on the Committee of Three. I have never made such a statement and I can speak for General Marshall to the same effect.

In this connection may I recall your letter of 31 March and my answer dated 1 April 1946.

A. C. GILLEM, JR.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Memorandum by Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., to the Chinese Minister of War (Chen Cheng)*⁹⁸

CHUNGKING, April 9, 1946.

DEAR GENERAL CHEN: I have been informed by the U. S. Commissioner of the Executive Headquarters at Peiping that the National Government Commissioner has been absent from Headquarters for two weeks. The absence of this Commissioner has seriously interrupted the continued implementation of the cease fire order and has come at a time which is very critical to China.

I wish to indicate that I strongly protest the absence of the National Government Commissioner. Further, I respectfully submit that it is to the interest of China that appropriate orders be issued at once to cause his return.

A. C. GILLEM, JR.

⁹⁸ Similar message sent to Gen. Chou En-lai.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Mr. Walter S. Robertson to Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr.

PEIPING, 9 April 1946.

1671. Interim reply to Urad 435⁹⁹ re arrests of Communists. Communist Commissioner lodged verbal complaint in commissioners' meeting on 3 April. Both Chinese branches were requested to furnish in writing their respective versions of the affair. Investigation to date had produced no denial of the occurrences but rather a difference in viewpoint of the circumstances. General Yeh's written complaint is full of righteous indignation but specified only 5 persons arrested, none of whom appears on Communist roster of Executive Headquarters personnel furnished American branches of 26 March. Moreover, Communist[s] only claim one of these 5 was Executive Headquarters' man. Others were allegedly visiting in Peiping for business or personal reasons and were residing at the home of General Teng, military advisor to Yeh. Supplemental list enumerates 45 as arrested including 5 previously referred to but fails to include anyone of Executive Headquarters' roster. By Communists' own admission, bulk of arrests were connected with new Chinese News Agency (Communist). Pending complete check of National Government allegations, it is my opinion both sides are at fault: The Government for the manner of its procedure and Communists for their apparent transgression of registration regulations. Final report will be forwarded when all data requested has been received.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Conference Between Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., and General Chou En-lai at House 28, Chungking, April 9, 1946, 2 p. m.

General Gillem opened the meeting by stating that he had decided to leave one officer and 2 enlisted men at Yen-an for the purpose of maintaining liaison with Communist Headquarters. General Chou En-lai stated that he appreciated this action.

General Chou asked General Gillem if he proposed to go to Manchuria under any circumstances. General Gillem stated that it was his earnest hope that a basic agreement in the form of additional instructions to the Field Teams could be reached prior to going to Manchuria, but in any event he personally proposed to go and hoped that General Chou and a National Government representative would ac-

⁹⁹ April 4, p. 729.

company him. General Chou stated that he firmly believed, as indicated in yesterday's Committee of Three meeting, that carrying out the intent of 27 March agreement for entry of Field Teams into Manchuria would solve the problem since there is contained in the agreement an injunction toward cessation of hostilities. General Chou added that this would provide for a temporary peace. A lasting peace could be arranged for between the two parties.

General Chou stated that he was sorry that he could not accept General Gillem's proposal as to the additional instructions for the Field Teams¹ because:

(a) The points proposed were, in effect the same points to which he objected previously.

(b) Although the basic agreement provides for movement of National Forces into and within Manchuria the basic agreement also says that hostilities will cease. Hostilities have not ceased.

(c) Government forces are not in a position to occupy some places being evacuated by the Russians. If it is argued that only Government forces can take over such places, the Communists must retaliate by asking why their forces also cannot take over.

(d) Communists fought Japanese during the Japanese aggression, and should enjoy comparative rights with Government forces which now enjoy a favored position due to the support rendered them during the "Hurley² and Wedemeyer regime".

General Gillem countered by informing General Chou that he was apprehensive as to a peaceful solution in Manchuria in the absence of a firm basis for continued operation of the Field Teams.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Conference Between General Chou En-lai and Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., at House 28, Chungking, April 9, 1946, 3 p. m.

General Chou opened the meeting by stating that General Chen Cheng had called on him yesterday and discussed two points. The first point was with reference to the restoration of communications in North China. General Chou stated that General Chen Cheng had expressed the opinion that the best way to resolve this matter would be to begin immediately the reorganization of the army plans. General Chou stated that while he had no objection to this idea he was of the opinion that it would not resolve the immediate problem which is facing us at this moment. The second point was with reference to the Manchurian problem. General Chou stated that his view was

¹ See two documents prepared by General Gillem on April 8, pp. 744 and 745.

² Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley, former Ambassador in China.

that since teams are already in the critical areas and that therefore hostilities will cease, it would soon be possible to discuss the various matters connected with the critical situation there. General Chou stated that General Chen indicated that he couldn't accept this position since the situation in Manchuria was so critical. General Chou had then stated that the Committee of Three should immediately proceed to Mukden to obtain first hand information on the ground and bring back to Chungking the various problems for discussion. General Chen had indicated his approval of this idea but stated that due to his illness a substitute would probably have to be provided.

General Gillem then informed General Chou that in respect to these two problems he considered the Manchurian problem paramount; that in this connection he had a draft³ prepared which he would submit at the 4 o'clock meeting today which draft involved concessions on both sides and which he hoped could be accepted as a means to stop the bloodshed in Manchuria.

General Chou agreed in this principle since, as he said, this spirit was identical to his own when he had signed the original agreement.

General Gillem added that his proposal takes into account the new situation in Manchuria regardless of how and why that situation developed.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Draft of Additional Instructions for Field Teams Entering
Manchuria*⁴

[CHUNGKING, April 9, 1946.]

We, General Chen Cheng, Representative of the National Government of China, and General Chou En-Lai, Representative of the Communist Party, have recommended to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and Chairman Mao Tze-tung and have been authorized by them to announce that the following provisions are applicable to the situation in Manchuria:

a. Further movement of Communist-led troops in Manchuria will cease.

b. Communist-led troops presently occupying positions on or near railroads referred to in the Sino-Soviet treaty of 14 August, 1945, will withdraw from these positions so that the nearest element is at least one day's march to either flank in order to permit free passage and use of those railroads by National Government forces.

c. Communist-led troops will evacuate all towns and cities astride

³ Apparently General Gillem's fourth draft, *infra*.

⁴ Prepared by Lt. Gen. Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., as a fourth draft on this subject for conference with Gen. Chou En-lai.

of or along railroads referred to in the Sino-Soviet Treaty so that the nearest element is at least one day's march therefrom.

d. National troops will not pursue or harass withdrawing Communist troops or Communist troops which, complying with terms *a*, *b*, and *c* above, are in the vicinity of railroads and towns and cities referred to within those terms.

The aforesaid measures are offered as an interim solution. Problems and questions not covered will continue under discussion of the Committee of Three.

893.00/4-946 : Telegram

The Consul General at Mukden (Clubb) to the Secretary of State

MUKDEN, April 9, 1946—8 p. m.

[Received 11:15 p. m.]

18. Students of middle and upper schools demonstrated here today demanding Government take over at once and annihilate "illegal elements". It is reported similar demonstration occurred Chinchow.

Am confidentially informed by Chinese source, affair was inspired by local military headquarters and that larger demonstration including governmental staffs is scheduled for tomorrow. Intention bringing pressure against U. S. position re Manchurian conflict obvious.

CLUBB

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Chou En-lai to Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr.

CHUNGKING, 10 April 1946.

At yesterday's meeting, the government representative, having shown complete disregard to the present situation in Manchuria which was brought about by government refusal for three months to implement truce in Manchuria, has expressed the viewpoint, that Kuomintang troops would effect the taking over of the Changchun Railway by all means, without paying any regard to the presence of Communist forces. Such an attitude, which would obviously lead to the intensification of hostilities actions, is a strong indication showing the reluctance on government part to implement the Directive of March 28th [27th], and may even amount to nullification of the effectiveness of that document. This matter now constitutes a cause of my deepest concern. Should the government persist in this attitude toward Manchuria, I have a strong fear, that exertions made by the Committee of Three toward cessation of hostilities would hardly gain any

positive result. Still let me hope that the present trip to Mukden may prove to be a success.

Inasmuch as further movement of Kuomintang troops and armaments under American assistance to Manchuria would, under present conditions, only augment hostilities, instead of being subservient [*subordinate?*] to the taking-over, I deem it necessary to lodge a second protest over these actions. I further hope that you will realize, that unless such kind of assistance is immediately ceased, the aspiration of the United States government and people for a total peace in China, and a truce in Manchuria in particular, will find no way toward realization.

In order to help you to reach a better understanding of the course of events, I wish particularly to call your attention to the dispute over the receiving of surrender in the last year. Had [it] not been because of the assistance of the U. S. Forces led by General Hurley and General Wedemeyer, the Kuomintang troops would, pursuant to the Japanese surrender, never be able to reach the large cities in North and Central China, of which almost all were then surrounded by Communist forces. Under the pretext of receiving surrender, the Kuomintang troops launched attacks eastwards and northwards on the Communist forces, subsequently leading to the civil war in China. Only upon General Marshall's arrival in China initial steps were taken to terminate the bloodshed tragedy in China proper. This however does not alter the fact that those large cities were retained in the hands of the Kuomintang troops. If now the Kuomintang government should attempt to reproduce that page of the history in Manchuria, then I wish to state categorically, that that would never be approved by us.

Faithfully yours

[Signature in Chinese]
CHOU EN-LAI

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Colonel J. Hart Caughey to General Marshall

CHUNGKING, 10 April 1946.

481. Committee of Three departed this morning for Peiping at 0930. Nationals are General Chang Chih Chung,⁵ Deputy Director Board of Operations, representing the National Government, General Yu Ta-wei assisting and Colonel Pee. Communists are General Chen Shih-chu and Mr. Chang Wen-chin. General Gillem took Major Berger and Captain Soong. General Chen Cheng, recently re-assigned by the Generalissimo to the Committee of Three, would not

⁵ Error for General Chin Teh-chun.

accompany because of ill health. General Chou En-lai could not accompany due to the fact that General Yeh, who could have taken Chou's place on the military side and Mr. Chin Pang-hsian upon whom Chou was depending to continue on political matters here in Chungking were lost on U. S. C-47 arranged for by this office between here and Yen-an 2 days ago. Twelve other Communists aboard. Shanghai, Chungking and CAF still searching. General Chou has made arrangements for Commissioner Yeh to accompany party from Peiping to Mukden to represent the Communist Party. This was a surprise since a message from Mr. Robertson yesterday protested Commissioner Yeh's apparent voluntary absence from Executive Headquarters for a period of 1 week. When this was mentioned to Chou he acted surprised.

After a gruelling series of meetings, Committee got virtually nowhere with reference to an amplification of instructions for field teams in Manchuria. National Government representative and General Gillem pressed for appropriate arrangements to implement the basic agreement concerning reestablishment of sovereignty in Manchuria by National Government. Communists remained adamant, however, and fell back always on the 27 March agreement for entry of the teams (see 379^e) stating that this agreement should provide sufficient basis for the cessation of hostilities. In other words, a complete deadlock remains as to area jurisdiction, particularly Changchun.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., to General Marshall

PEIPING, 10 April 1946.

1715. Arrived in Peiping today with second rate representatives of other two branches. General Chen Cheng could not make the trip due to illness. At 7 A. M. this morning General Chou En-lai stated he could not accompany because of following:

Two days ago a Chinese Air Force transport hauling 10 Communists including 2 high-ranking political representatives disappeared en route from Chungking to Yen-an. Search has been made with no results. Chou En-lai had previously felt that with the presence of his top-flight political representatives in Yen-an he could spare time for the trip. With the disappearance and apparent death of these members he could not see his way clear to leave Chungking as constitutional matters were pending and indicated he might be called immediately to Yen-an to handle political matters which the ill-fated group were scheduled to undertake. Chou En-lai indicated that Commissioner Yeh of Executive Headquarters would represent him on

^e March 27, p. 605.

this trip. Upon my arrival in Peiping I find that General Yeh is without doubt too ill to make this trip.

The above facts leave the Committee of Three represented by General Chin as National Government member and General Chen as Communist member. They are without authority, power or prestige.

Under the above conditions I am certain it would be a grave mistake to continue this trip on to Manchuria. Such a trip could accomplish nothing and would certainly have some deleterious effects. Due to failure to arrive at any agreement on Manchuria before leaving Chungking with the principal members of the Committee of Three, present delegation, being unable to issue clarifying instructions, would present only an attitude of weakness in conferring with commanders and field teams. Two teams have departed Mukden but only to observe disposition of troops. They were unable to reach any agreements on action to be taken pending decisions on basic questions involved by Committee of Three.

The illness of General Chen Cheng, the plausible excuse for General Chou En-lai's failure to accompany the Committee, and the illness of Commissioner Yeh give us an excellent out in connection with the press for not continuing our trip to Mukden. I will delay present committee here in Peiping in conference on other and important problems of Executive Headquarters until instructions are received from you regarding continuation of this trip. I repeat that I am convinced that continuation of trip with present personnel and under present conditions into Manchuria would be a mistake. Both Robertson and Byroade emphatically concur.

893.00/4-1146: Telegram

The Consul General at Mukden (Clubb) to the Secretary of State

MUKDEN, April 11, 1946—10 a. m.

[Received April 11—7:10 a.m.]

21. Against background of report USSR is withdrawing forces from Manchuria before April 30, I offer on basis, far from completed, the following tentative estimates situation.

Opposition in Manchuria to Kmt regime apparently comprises, with some overlapping, four main groups, namely: Communist Eighth Route, Chang Hsueh-shih⁷ autonomists, New Fourth Army and group closest of all to USSR. It is true none of four was present in force at time Jap surrender but they are here now with 8 months' growth behind them. Eighth Route represented here by Lin Piao and

⁷ Younger brother of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, who controlled Manchuria prior to the Japanese occupation of 1931.

Peng Chen undoubtedly believe their continued existence depends on their skill in power politics rather than on *bona fides* Kmt but their base and strength being south of Wall and their education having been along nationalistic lines for past decade, there is good probability they would be relatively conciliatory re Manchuria. Chang's autonomists, adhering loosely to Communism for convenience' sake, have for their part elements of Manchurian forces who fought and lost to Japs 1931-32. Group supports seemingly lost cause of effecting return Chang Hsueh-liang and are important chiefly because of use to which they may be put by others. New Fourth on other hand, with different background from Eighth Route, reputedly has diverged from Yen-an line and come closer to Soviets in Manchuria. Present Communist representative here on field teams, Yao Nei-shih, who has already shown much intransigency, is New Fourth man. That army, like Eighth (Route Army), has some arms from Japs and trustworthy British source Shanghai told me without my yet having been able confirm it locally that New Fourth forces have been augmented by turnover to them of General Amakasu of Kwantung army with 200,000 troops. USSR supported Communists in north and east Manchuria include such figures as Li Chu-lin (recently assassinated at Harbin) and "Huang", Kirin provincial chairman who is alleged by Chinese officials to be, as was Li, a lieutenant colonel in Soviet Army.

Generalissimo Chiang's recent speech demonstrated that, 1, there is no Kmt-CCP agreement re Manchuria and, 2, Kmt has been lulled into false feeling strength at results American aid to date. Removal Soviet troops will be major shift in balance [of] forces. When final reconciliation Kmt and CCP is yet to be effected, and dispute over procedure in Manchuria is yet to be resolved, Soviet action brings matters [to] open issue. That action accords to Chinese desire and (latest) schedule but even as Sov[iet] withdrawals in Sinkiang [in] 1943 [in face?] of Kmt Govt. with situation too unwieldy to handle, the projected move here will confront Kmt authority with difficult problems, primary is that of logistics; without transport and moving on foot Govt. forces in 3 weeks have covered 100 miles from Mukden northwards to where they are stuck near Szuping kai. Even if Govt. forces were truly fighting only bandits, they would be facing difficulties. In fact there is probably more opposition strength in countryside than Govt. armies, limited probings have thus far uncovered. Not secondary in importance is political problem: Chiang states one local Kmt official tells him that matter is simply one of regaining sovereignty and not one of recognition of "illegal organizations". On basis outlined by Chiang, Communists have little choice but to fight

if they desire influence in Manchuria. Open conduct would probably show hitherto unsuspected Com[munist] strength in Manchuria.

Please repeat Chungking, Peiping, Moscow.

Dept. will of course note that Com victory or forced compromise in Manchuria would more or less vitiate Chinese charges of Sov looting and change nature negotiations for joint Sino-Sov operation economic undertakings Manchuria.

CLUBB

893.00/4-1146 : Telegram

The Consul General at Mukden (Clubb) to the Secretary of State

MUKDEN, April 11, 1946.

[Received April 12—6:30 a. m.]

22. Yesterday some 2 or 3,000 student demonstrators proceeded local hotel housing Chinese Army officers and expressed following slogans per handbill and report: (1) oppose special setup for northeast, (2) welcome quick takeover northeast by Government army, (3) desire only extermination bandits and no mediation, (4) energetically seek national integrity, (5) northeast wants no bandits, beat the bandits out, (6) eliminate enemy influence from northeast? (indistinct type).

Deputy Commander 52nd Army received demonstrators informing them no Communists were present. Observer reports seeing printed slogan Chinchow to effect "Stop Big Three from coming to northeast". Editorial April 1 issue local *Sino-Soviet Daily News* (Kmt) on subject "Manchurian problems—what our American friends should know" expressed Chinese gratitude friendly concern shown by Americans by participating in visit truce teams "which occurs at moment when China is taking over Manchuria from Soviet Union"; stating that primary problem in Manchuria is one of diplomatic nature, that of taking over, editorial observes that Chinese National troops are unable smoothly effect duty of taking over territory due to obstruction "renegades recruited from Japanese and puppet remnant evil-doers". "We wish to stress that the Manchurian problem arises first from delay Soviet withdrawal which has delayed China from taking over Manchuria and secondly from fact that although Soviet troops have begun withdrawal by degrees, these renegades have stepped in to block way of National troops in their assigned task of taking over." Editorial further states that after Japanese surrender certain schemers created extraneous force from former Manchoukuo Army for purpose undermining Sino-Soviet friendship. Those schemers, it continued, have tried to use this force to hinder takeover by National troops with intention turning Manchuria into "special area" in viola-

tion Nine Power Pact.⁸ For faithful realization Sino-Soviet and Nine Power Pacts it is incumbent upon National troops exterminate these Japanese and puppet evildoers. Final point adduced for attention Americans is repatriation Japanese military and civilians from Manchuria. "Task of allied Soviet Army in Manchuria is confined to disarming Japanese troops and accepting their surrender while concentration Japanese and repatriation is China's task". It is exigent that National troops proceed quickly to areas evacuated by Soviets and subject Japanese to strict surveillance in specified areas. "American assistance is needed for repatriating those Japanese." Editorial concludes, "We hope that our American friends, after a short stay in Manchuria, will come around to our point of view and agree with us."

Sent Department, repeated Chungking as 7; Peiping as 4.

CLUBB

893.00/4-1346: Telegram

The Counselor of Embassy in China (Smyth) to the Secretary of State

CHUNGKING, April 13, 1946—2 p. m.

[Received 5:35 p. m.]

680. Summary Military Attaché report for week ending April 13.

Communist forces reported resuming attacks on Pei-Ning railroad in northeastern Hopei and southwestern Liaoning in attempt delay progress Central Government forces to Manchuria. Seems probable that Communist cessation railroad reconstruction Shantung and elsewhere result of recent development hostilities Manchuria.

Central Government troops advancing slowly toward Changchun. Appears doubtful they will arrive Changchun before Soviet evacuation scheduled for April 15. Advance elements Central Government new First Army last reported 20 miles south of Ssuping kai.

Concentrations Communist troops reported by Chinese G-2 between Ssuping kai and Changchun and north of Changchun. Same source also reports 15,000 Communist troops entered Harbin although no fighting appears to have developed; Communist troops also reported to have occupied additional points vicinity Tsitsihar.

Communist resistance to Central Government forces advancing east and southeast Mukden reported stiffening.

Water lift 71st Army Shanghai to Manchuria reported virtually completed. First Division 93rd Army reported arrived Canton for water lift Manchuria commencing April 15.

SMYTH

⁸ Signed at Washington, February 6, 1922: *Foreign Relations*, 1922, vol. I, p. 276.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Meeting of Acting Committee of Three and Three Commissioners
With Members of Team 27 at Mukden, April 14, 1946, 3 p. m.*

The following were present :

National Government:

Lt. Gen. Ch'in Teh-chun
Lt. Gen. Cheng Kai-min
Lt. Gen. Yu Ta-wei
Lt. Gen. Chao Chia-shan
Maj. Gen. Tang Yen
Col. Peter Pee
Col. Sammy Yuan

Communist Party:

Lt. Gen. Lo Jui-ching
Lt. Gen. Yao Shu-shih
Maj. Gen. Ch'en Shih-chu
Hwang Hwa
Chang Wen-chin
Ko Pai-nien

American:

Lt. Gen. Alvan C. Gillem, Jr.
Walter S. Robertson
Col. Raymond R. Tourtillott
Col. K. K. Lau
Major L. W. Berger
Capt. S. Karrick
Capt. J. T. Young
Philip D. Sprouse

Col. Tourtillott, presiding, called the meeting to order and said that, as chairman of Team No. 27, he wished to welcome all present to Mukden. He would introduce first Mr. Robertson, the United States Commissioner from Peiping.

Mr. Robertson said that the Executive Headquarters regretted very much that it had been impossible to bring the Committee of Three to Mukden. Due to circumstances of which all were aware, none of the original Committee could be present here today. But he knew that the members of the Headquarters teams would be delighted to welcome General Gillem and the representatives of the National Government and Communist Party who were present to listen to the problems of the teams and gather information to be presented to the Committee of Three immediately upon the arrival of General Marshall within the next few days. He took pleasure in presenting Gen.

Gillem, who, as all present knew, had been acting for Gen. Marshall during the latter's absence in the States.

Gen. Gillem said that, on behalf of his colleagues, the acting Committee of Three, he would like to express appreciation for the reception tendered them on arrival. Speaking personally, it was a great pleasure for him to be able to extend his personal friendship with many of the officers in this area. As Mr. Robertson had said, at the time of leaving Chungking unfortunately none of the original members of the Committee of Three was available, for one reason or another. The delay in Peiping was due to the illness of Gen. Yeh and also because he (Gen. Gillem) expected definite information from Gen. Marshall with reference to his movements. When it was definitely determined that he was en route to China, then the group could move and attempt to bring to him first-hand information from the sources available to them in Mukden as to the situation in Manchuria. So, the plan was to get this briefing at the present meeting. Tomorrow teams would be brought in from the field, from the North and East, probably in the morning and afternoon. The group could extend their knowledge through briefing from those teams. In addition to the time spent in these general meetings, the respective members could consult with the echelons of their parties in this area, and in that way the three original members of the Committee of Three would be posted upon the return of this group to Chungking. Personally, speaking as an American, he (Gen. Gillem) hoped that it would be possible to arrive at a solution of this problem that would benefit China.

Col. Tourtillott said that, before proceeding with the briefing, he would like to introduce his fellow team members, "so that you will know whom to throw the rocks at". He then introduced the National Government representative, Gen. Chao, and the Communist Party representative, Gen. Yao, and said that he and they had spent many hours wrestling over their problems and were in hopes that the visiting group would be able to carry back the story of their difficulties and give them a clear and definite directive.

Col. Tourtillott then introduced Gen. Chi'n Teh-chun, Gen. Ch'en Shih-chu and Gen. Yu Ta-wei, and Mr. Robertson introduced Gen. Cheng Kai-min and Gen. Lo Jui-ching.

Col. Tourtillott said: "Now that we all know each other we are ready to go to work." He then gave a summary of the situation, as follows:

When Gen. Byroade, Director of Operations, left Mukden on April 6 (Col. Tourtillott said), he left certain instructions with the teams in Mukden. At the time he left, the Communist Party delegates for

all the teams were in Mukden ready to go, and the last contingent of National Government representatives were expected to arrive that afternoon. Gen. Byroade desired that teams go into the field on the morning of Sunday, April 7, if it was possible to get them into the field. It was his desire that Team No. 27 exercise operational jurisdiction over the other Manchurian teams and that Team No. 27 have a joint meeting on the evening of April 6 to establish that jurisdiction and to issue instructions to the teams to go into the field. He felt that one team should be dispatched to the North of Mukden and one to the South, but further details he was willing to leave to the discretion of Team No. 27.

The National Government representatives (Col. Tourtillott continued) did arrive on the afternoon of the 6th of April, and a meeting was held that evening. In this meeting it was established that Team No. 27 had operational jurisdiction over the other teams. They then proceeded to establish the interpretation by the team of the directives which were at hand. First it was discussed whether the team agreed on the interpretation that the Manchurian directive of March 26 [27] should be accepted and should govern the activities of all the field teams in Manchuria. All agreed that it should be applied and that the teams should be governed by its provisions. Next the meeting proceeded to establish the interpretation of the Cease-Fire Order. After long hours of discussion—to make a long story short—the proposal that the Cease-Fire Order apply and govern all activities of the Manchurian teams was voted on. The National Government representative and the United States representative voted for the proposal that the Cease-Fire Order, with its “Remarks” in paragraph 5, should apply to the activities of the Manchurian teams. The Communist Party representative voted that it did not apply unless the paragraph 5 remarks be deleted therefrom. The team then agreed unanimously on a radio to be sent to the three Commissioners in Peiping, asking for clarification on this matter. It was then determined that Team No. 28 would go to the area between Changtu and Ssuningkai, and that Team No. 29 should go to the area between Fushun and Penhsi. It was next discussed when the teams should go. The National Government side contended that the teams should not go unless they were instructed to be governed by both the Cease-Fire Order and the Manchurian directive. The Communist Party representative expressed the desire that they not go into the field unless they operated only under the Manchurian directive. These reasons, Col. Tourtillott said, were, he believed, obvious to everyone and need not be discussed further. However, after many more hours of discussion, it was unani-

mously agreed that the teams be given a temporary mission to get them into the field. Pending further instructions from Peiping, the teams were given all that could be unanimously agreed upon to work with. So, it was finally agreed that the teams should go into the field as early as possible on the morning of the 8th of April, instructed only to investigate troop dispositions, pending receipt of detailed instructions. As chairman, Col. Tourtillott said he regretted very much that the interpretation of the directives which he felt were at hand could not be unanimously agreed upon. He felt that the Cease-Fire Order and the Manchurian directive went hand in hand and should not be separated. But this was not the unanimous interpretation.

Team No. 29, Col. Tourtillott went on, got away the next morning at 8:45, by truck. Team No. 28 got away at 9:30 that morning, also by truck. Team No. 28 encountered some little difficulty as it reached the field; there was some discussion as to whether the Communist Party side should be permitted to use their radio; there was some restriction placed on the personnel of the team, as well as on the team activity in the Kaiyuan area. These matters, Col. Tourtillott said, had been presented informally and formally to the National Government representative, who gave assurances that steps would be taken to correct the situation. No serious problems were encountered by the team (No. 29) sent to the Fushun area, although both teams had encountered some difficulty in accomplishing their mission of getting the order of battle of both sides.

Col. Tourtillott said that he thought further details at this time were unnecessary. He had notified all members of the teams in the field and expected Team 28 personnel to arrive in Mukden on the evening of the 14th and Team 29 personnel perhaps on the morning of the 15th. He believed this was as much detail as we desired from him, inasmuch as the field teams were coming in and could personally present their stories. He would now like to ask the National Government representative on Team No. 27 to give his idea of the situation and a brief summary from his point of view.

Gen. Chao said that he fully agreed with Col. Tourtillott's account of the action taken by Team No. 27. Col. Tourtillott's story was impartial and went into detail of how that team had carried out its work. Teams going into the field would of course meet with difficulties, but every effort would be made to straighten them out. So far as was now known, they were working very smoothly. He hoped that from time to time the team would be given guidance in its work.

Col. Tourtillott then asked Gen. Yao (Communist Party member of Team No. 27) to make a few remarks on the activities of the team from his viewpoint.

Gen. Yao said that he agreed with Col. Tourtillott's account of the situation, but wished to add a few remarks. When Communist personnel for the teams reached Mukden airfield, 42 of them were detained by National Government authorities for three and a half hours. He (Gen. Yao) appreciated very much the help given by the American representatives in this situation, especially Gen. Byroade, but up to now no reply had been received from the National Government authorities in Mukden about this incident. About Directive No. 1 (the Cease-Fire Order) he considered that directives by the Committee of Three should be the basis for the field teams' activities in the Northeastern Provinces. The teams were sent here under the special Manchurian directive. The Communist members of Team No. 28, sent to the Kaiyuan area, Gen. Yao continued, still, up to the present time, had no freedom of radio communication. Their freedom of movement was also hampered. A platoon of armed soldiers and two plainclothes men were posted in the house where they lived. When Field Team No. 29 reached Fushun, both the American and National Government representatives were well treated by Communist authorities there. Gen. Yao went on to say that he appreciated very much the cooperative spirit and the friendliness of the American and National Government representatives while they were all working together. He hoped that more help and more instructions would be given by the Committee of Three in Chungking and the three Commissioners in Peiping.

Mr. Robertson said that, on behalf of the three Commissioners of Executive Headquarters, he would like to say how sorry they were that the representatives in Manchuria found themselves in the predicament of trying to decide among themselves instead of having instructions as to what directives did or did not apply to their operations. Under the plan of operation the Committee of Three in Chungking made Chinese agreements. Those agreements were then sent to Executive Headquarters, so that the Headquarters could then issue directives to the teams as to how these decisions should be implemented. He thought all would agree that under no circumstances should it be possible for team members to decide which directives should be obeyed and which disobeyed. However, in this case, he would be the first to admit that the confusion was not the fault of the teams,

but the fault of their superiors, the Executive Headquarters. The reason that the Executive Headquarters had not been able to issue clarifying instructions to the teams was that it had not been able to obtain clarifying instructions from the Committee of Three in Chungking. Just as Chinese sometimes reached agreements, so they also sometimes reached disagreements. The directives issued to Executive Headquarters by the Committee of Three were certainly (speaking for himself, at least) the directives on which the Headquarters operated until contrary directives were issued by the Committee of Three. The representatives of Executive Headquarters were very glad to hear of the fine spirit existing in personal relationships between the team members while they were discussing these controversial subjects, and hoped that very soon this whole issue could be clarified to the satisfaction of all concerned.

Col. Tourtillott said that he would now like to ask the National Government representative, Gen. Ch'in, to express his thoughts in this meeting.

Gen. Ch'in said that he was very glad to hear Col. Tourtillott's report. After hearing it he was very much gratified by the earnestness and the effort made by the team representatives, especially the American representative. Such difficulties as had arisen were technical difficulties, and he was sure that, with such earnestness and effort as were being shown by Col. Tourtillott and the other representatives, they could all be overcome. It was particularly fortunate that Gen. Marshall was now on his way back to China. It was a pleasure to him (Gen. Ch'in) to accompany Gen. Gillem and Mr. Robertson to Mukden to determine the facts in the field in order that information might be given to Gen. Marshall. With his able guidance some sort of satisfactory solution would be reached. He (Gen. Ch'in) would like to take this opportunity to express to all members concerned, and especially the American member, his appreciation for their earnestness and effort and his hope that the problem would be solved.

Col. Tourtillott said he would now like to call on Gen. Lo to say a few words as Communist Party representative for the Committee of Three. (Gen. Lo's interpreter had explained to Col. Tourtillott that Gen. Lo, rather than Gen. Ch'en, would speak for the Communist representative on the Committee.)

Gen. Lo said that he regretted that Gen. Chou En-lai and Gen. Yeh Chien-ying had both been unable to come to Mukden. Gen. Chou had at first intended to come himself, but because of the unfortunate

incident of the missing plane, in which many Communist leaders were killed, he was unable to leave Chungking. He then authorized Gen. Yeh to represent him, but Gen. Yeh was ill and so asked Gen. Lo and Gen. Ch'en to accompany Gen. Gillem. On behalf of Gen. Chou and Gen. Yeh, he wished to express their appreciation for the efforts made by the members of the teams in Mukden. Of course there were many difficulties, but in the short period they had been here the teams had accomplished so much that their work should be greatly appreciated. The purpose of this trip, as Gen. Gillem, Mr. Robertson and Gen. Ch'in had said, was to collect first-hand information. Although there were difficulties, the teams should carry on their work and do their best. Particularly since Gen. Marshall was coming back within a few days, he (Gen. Lo) felt confident that, once the first-hand information for the Committee of Three had been collected, they would be able to overcome the difficulties. In the whole world, in China and in Manchuria, everyone needed peace, and for that purpose further efforts would have to be made. He felt sure that the difficulties could be overcome and hoped that the work in Manchuria would have greater success.

Col. Tourtillott then called on Gen. Cheng Kai-min, National Government Commissioner from Peiping, to present his comments.

Gen. Cheng said that Mr. Robertson had said all that he wanted to say.

Col. Tourtillott then called on Gen. Ch'en. Gen. Ch'en said that Gen. Lo had spoken for him.

Col. Tourtillott asked Gen. Yu if he had any comments, and Gen. Yu said that he had nothing to add to what Gen. Gillem had said.

Gen. Gillem commented that the present meeting did not indicate that "long-winded discussions" were held in Mukden.

Gen. Gillem then continued that it seemed the group had traveled a long way only to find that everybody was very friendly and all problems were apparently solved. We [*Was?*] he to believe that? He would like to express his appreciation to all these officers for their very earnest effort to help in meeting this problem. The Committee also appreciated the fact that the representatives had in their minds very definite understandings—or misunderstandings—and that they were men enough to present those points of view. He thought it was a very good principle to express differences of opinion, because by so doing, those opinions were brought forward and the differences could

be adjusted. In the brief time he had been in China it had become quite evident to him that frequently discussions were held and reports exaggerated on the basis of inaccurate information, because information was bound to be difficult to obtain in a country as big as China. In Gen. Marshall's press conference in the States⁹ he expressed the same opinion—that it was quite possible that a thorough understanding did not obtain in Manchuria insofar as the opinion at hand was concerned. He (Gen. Gillem) trusted that, by getting first-hand information, it would be possible to at least minimize some of the reports that had largely been exaggerated. He had frequently heard that one of the outstanding characteristics of the Chinese was patience. Ink was also cheap and was used very freely over here. It was his earnest wish that lots of ink would be used, also plenty of words—and the powder be conserved. He hoped that in the two days the group was here they would become well-informed and, through the channels available to each of them, could pass back available data which the Committee of Three could use effectively.

Col. Tourtillott then said that Gen. Gillem had suggested that the meeting now adjourn, each side going to its own conference room to talk to its own representatives and get all the first-hand information it was possible to get.

The General had also suggested, Col. Tourtillott went on, that all press release[s] gotten out here be agreed to by all three branches before being released, in order that a unified, agreed document might be presented to the public. All such documents should be coordinated by him (Col. Tourtillott) and he would then release them to the press.

Mr. Robertson said that, for the information of the Committee of Three, he would like to mention that this had been a long-standing rule of Executive Headquarters. In the early days of operation the rule had been adopted that no press release should be issued except by unanimous agreement.

Gen. Gillem said that the same rule was followed by the Committee of Three. Col. Tourtillott said it was also followed by Team No. 27.

Col. Tourtillott then said that, as the time of arrival of the field teams was rather indefinite, Gen. Gillem had asked him to say that the next meeting would be announced as soon as the time of arrival was known. He suggested that everyone hold himself in readiness from about 9 a. m. tomorrow on and he would notify them individually of the meeting time.

As there was no further business the meeting adjourned.

⁹ March 16, regarding American assistance to China; see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 24, 1946, p. 484.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Meeting of Acting Committee of Three and Three Commissioners
With Members of Teams Numbers 27, 28, and 29 at Mukden, April
15, 1946, 9 a. m.*

The following were present :

National Government :

Lt. Gen. Ch'in Teh-chun
Lt. Gen. Cheng Kai-min
Lt. Gen. Yu Ta-wei
Lt. Gen. Chao Chia-shan
Lt. Gen. Chao I
Maj. Gen. Wang Chao-kun
Maj. Gen. Kuo Chi
Maj. Gen. Chang Ming-hsin
Maj. Gen. Tang Yen
Col. Peter Pee
Col. Sammy Yuan
Lt. Pei Yu-feng

Communist Party :

Lt. Gen. Lo Jui-ching
Lt. Gen. Yao Shu-shih
Maj. Gen. Ch'en Shih-chu
Maj. Gen. Keng Piao
Maj. Gen. Hsu Kuang-ta
Hwang Hwa
Chang Wen-chin
Ko Pai-nien
Chen Shu

American :

Lt. Gen. Alvan C. Gillem, Jr.
Walter S. Robertson
Col. Raymond R. Tourtillott
Col. H. A. Davenport
Col. F. C. Culley
Col. K. K. Lau
Lt. Col. R. R. Drake
Major L. W. Berger
Captain S. Karrick
Captain J. T. Young
Philip D. Sprouse

Col. Tourtillott, presiding, called the meeting to order and stated that the senior members of Teams No. 28 and No. 29 had arrived in Mukden the previous afternoon and evening respectively and were

now present. He would like first to introduce Col. Culley, chairman of Team No. 28 and ask him to introduce his team-mates.

Col. Culley introduced Lt. Gen. Wang Chao-kun, National Government representative on Team No. 28, and Maj. Gen. Keng Piao, Communist Party representative on that team.

Col. Tourtillott then introduced Col. Drake, chairman of Team No. 29, and asked him to introduce his team-mates.

Col. Drake introduced Maj. Gen. Kuo Chi, National Government representative on Team No. 29, and Maj. Gen. Hsu Kuang-ta, Communist Party representative on that team.

Col. Tourtillott said that now he would call on the team chairmen to make their reports, which would be in the form of a résumé of activities from the time they started out until they left their respective areas to come to Mukden. He wished to remind them that there were many things which these officers could not tell this group, because they were in the nature of confidential matters which had been given to the team chairman by both sides and which could not be disclosed at an open meeting. Both these teams had been doing splendid work in the field under most difficult circumstances. Team No. 27 had not been able to give them the directives it would like to have given them. These teams in the field were the ones who were going to determine the success of the Executive Headquarters in Manchuria. So it was most important that as soon as possible they be given definite interpretation of directives. Col. Tourtillott then called on Col. Culley to make his team report.

Col. Culley said that Team No. 28 departed Mukden on 9 April, last Tuesday, and arrived at Kaiyuan that evening at 6:30. The team was complete in all of its components, 12 National Government members, 10 Communist members, 5 U. S. members. Three radios were carried, one for each of the component elements. The mission of the team was to proceed to investigate the troop dispositions in the Changtu-Ssuping kai area. The trip was uneventful, and the team arrived at approximately 6:30 on the evening of the 9th. The team was met at the station by the Deputy Commander of the NECC,¹⁰ Kaiyuan, Maj. Gen. Wang. The first night was spent in the headquarters of the NECC at Kaiyuan. The next morning, Col. Culley said, he, as team chairman, called to pay his official respects to General Liang. He explained the mission of the team to Gen. Liang, and asked for a formal conference with the team as soon as it was convenient to the General. He explained the plan of operation of the team, which had been agreed on by the team members. The team would interview the senior commander in the Kaiyuan area, and would

¹⁰ Northeast Chinese Command.

call upon him to give an account of the tactical situation, with a troop disposition map or overlay. With that information available, the team would then decide which division and lower echelon commanders should be interviewed in the Changtu-Ssuping kai area. Next the team members would decide which other specific tactical areas should be visited to complete the first phase of their mission. The second phase would be identical on the Communist side. The appointment with Gen. Liang (Gen. Tu Li-min's deputy at NECC) was arranged through the National Government team representative, Gen. Wang. Gen. Liang was informed in advance what the team would ask that evening, namely his troop dispositions and a résumé of the military situation. At the formal conference that evening, very little information of a tactical nature was given the team, and no troop dispositions were given. Gen. Liang stated that the situation was very tense and fluid. Realizing that situation, the team pressed for permission to move forward into the Changtu area. Gen. Liang promised to take that under consideration and advise them on the next day. He also promised to furnish a disposition map the next day. Neither one of these promises had been fulfilled up until the departure of the commanding officers of the various components last night at 5:15. Definite restrictions were placed upon the operation of the team immediately after the first night in Kaiyuan. The radio of the Communist Party representatives was officially closed down on the night of April 10 by order of Gen. Liang. The Communist members in their quarters were placed under armed guard. They were not allowed access even to the local telephone in Kaiyuan. Col. Culley said he immediately called upon Gen. Wang, the National Government representative on Team No. 28, and asked him to talk to Gen. Liang to have him rescind his order. Gen. Wang exerted great effort to that end, but was unsuccessful. Col. Culley next called on Gen. Liang and made the same plea, and was finally successful in having the Communist delegation moved to a separate set of quarters for their own use. However, up until the time of departure from Kaiyuan last night, they were still under armed guard and radio restriction. The latter was only lifted as the team boarded the train. Col. Culley said he asked Gen. Liang for an explanation of his actions with regard to movement of the Communists and the closing down of their radio. He stated that the military situation was very tense in the Kaiyuan area and that since the arrival of the team in the area Communist activity had been renewed. He closed the radio station to prevent the possibility of the Communist Party representatives on Team No. 28 communicating with Communist forces outside of Kaiyuan. He further claimed that he had received no instructions as to

the mission of the team. This, Col. Culley said, completed his résumé of the situation.

Col. Tourtillott then called on the National Government representative on Team No. 28 to give his reaction.

Gen. Wang said that the team was dispatched, arrived and started work as Col. Culley had reported. To supplement Col. Culley's report, he wanted to mention that the team went about 20 kilometers north of Kaiyuan to investigate the destruction of a bridge on the railway line. The results of the investigation had already been given in the team's written report. The reason the teams had not been able to go forward to carry out their mission was that they had not obtained the chart of troop dispositions. Gen. Liang told him (Gen. Wang) that the delay in furnishing this information was due to need for security. That was one reason he did not want to give the troop dispositions right now while conflicts were still going on. Another reason the team could not go further was that the bridges on the railway line north of Kaiyuan had been destroyed between the 25th and 29th of March. The very night the team arrived in Kaiyuan, there were sounds of explosions which destroyed a small bridge. Gen. Liang had agreed in principle to giving the troop dispositions. He just wanted to wait a few days until the situation was not so critical.

Col. Tourtillott then asked the Communist Party representative on Team No. 28 to speak.

Gen. Keng Piao said that he fully agreed with Col. Culley's report. He only wanted to add that the reasons given by Gen. Wang as explanation for Gen. Liang's unwillingness to produce the troop dispositions did not cover the whole ground. There were two reasons why the purpose of the team was not accomplished: (1) Gen. Liang was asked to give troop dispositions, and he did not; (2) Gen. Liang was asked to furnish a map, and he did not. Also, the order issued by the Three-man Committee regarding use of radios by the team and freedom of movement for team personnel was violated.

Col. Tourtillott said that some of those present might wish to ask questions regarding the Team No. 28 report. It would simplify the procedure if, in asking a question, the person asking it would state to whom he addressed the question. Were there any questions?

Gen. Gillem said he would like to ask Col. Culley whether he ever contacted the Communist general in that area and if so with what result.

Col. Culley said that he did not contact the Communist commander, because the Communist radio was shut down and that was the only means of contacting the Communist forces. He had planned, immediately upon completion of inspection on the Nationalist side, to estab-

lish liaison with the Communist commander through the Communist radio so that the team could move into the Communist area.

Gen. Gillem asked whether he was to understand that the team had so far been unsuccessful in making any contact with the Communist army or leader in that area.

Col. Culley replied that the team had had no success at all in this regard.

Gen. Gillem asked whether he had said that the radio was opened last night when the team left.

Col. Culley said that about four o'clock on the afternoon of 14 April he received a telephone call from one of Gen. Liang's staff officers, who stated that the radio would be permitted to operate from then on. He (Col. Culley) asked him to send that order over Gen. Liang's signature. The staff officer said that was not possible, because Gen. Liang was not present, but he was passing on a verbal order. Before the team departed, Gen. Liang's Chief of Staff went to the Communist quarters and officially declared the radio open. (Gen. Wang here corrected Col. Culley's statement, saying that it was not the Chief of Staff but one of the senior staff officers.)

Gen. Gillem asked whether the original contact with the Nationalists was established through radio, or was the team informed of the location of their headquarters.

Col. Culley replied that that contact was established by the senior team in Mukden and immediately upon arrival the team went to the Headquarters of Gen. Liang, who was the senior NECC commander in that area.

Gen. Gillem asked: "Now that the radio is open, what is your plan with reference to the Communists?["]

Col. Culley said they intended to follow the original plan—that is, immediately on return to Kaiyuan, to establish liaison with the Communists and move into their area as soon as reconnaissance in the Nationalist area was completed. The Communist representative had assured him that there would be no difficulty.

Col. Tourtillott asked whether there were any other questions; as there were none, he asked Col. Drake to report on the activities of Team No. 29.

Col. Drake said that Team No. 29, composed of 12 National Government members, 8 Communist Party members, and 6 American members, left Mukden last Monday morning, April 8, at approximately 9 o'clock. It arrived in Fushun shortly after 12 o'clock, where it was met by Gen. Lu, the National Government's Second Division commander. The mission of the team, as he understood it, was to investigate troop dispositions south of Mukden, particularly in the Fushun

and Penhsi areas. The team was escorted to the Second Division headquarters, where its mission was explained to Gen. Lu. It was explained to Gen. Lu that the team desired to go to the headquarters of the 52nd Army. Gen. Lu stated that he did not know the whereabouts of the headquarters of the 52nd Army, although he did have radio communication with them. Gen. Lu did, however, furnish information as to the whereabouts of the Second Division. He also gave information as to Communist activities in that area. He stated that he would contact 52nd Army headquarters by radio and attempt to determine their whereabouts. It was then decided that the senior members of the team would proceed on into Communist territory over the road leading from Fushun to Penhsi. The team was warned that it would be difficult and dangerous for it to attempt to get through the lines. However, that afternoon the team did proceed into Communist territory for a distance of about 16 miles. It arrived at the brigade headquarters of the Peace Preservation Corps, where the mission of the team was explained to the Chief of Staff of the brigade. The brigade headquarters furnished the team with their troop dispositions. It was explained to the Chief of Staff at brigade headquarters that the team would attempt to go to Penhsi to the headquarters of the Communist army on the following Tuesday. The team returned to Fushun Sunday night. It was decided that the team would attempt to reach 52nd Army headquarters the following day. Gen. Lu, the Second Division commander, promised to furnish a guide. The following morning the National Government representative was unable to accompany the team because of illness. It was decided, however, that the team would proceed, with a junior member of the National Government branch. There was some delay in finding a junior member from the National Government side. The team was further delayed by being unable to locate the drivers of the vehicles. The team finally left late Monday morning for 52nd Army headquarters. The guide was very unfamiliar with the route. It was necessary to make numerous stops at villages along the way to pick up new guides. The team was stopped several times by members of the Communist army. The vehicles were mired in the mud numerous times. Late in the afternoon it was decided that it would be impossible to reach 52nd Army headquarters that day, and the team returned to Fushun. The following day, Tuesday, was the day that had been set to go to Penhsi. However, the National Government representative informed him (Col. Drake) that his orders were that he was not to leave the Fushun area. After much discussion and sending of radiograms back and forth to Mukden, it was decided that the team would proceed early the following day to Penhsi. Early Wednesday morning the team left for

Penhsi. About 10 miles out of Penhsi the team was stopped by guerilla forces and held for about three-quarters of an hour. After the team's identity was established, it was allowed to proceed and was assisted to move on. Local villagers along the entire route assisted in filling trenches which had been dug across the highway. The team arrived in Penhsi about 4 o'clock Wednesday afternoon. It was met by a delegation of about 30,000 people. The team was conducted to quarters, where it was later met by Lt. Gen. Shao, the political commissar for the area. The mission of the team was explained. Gen. Shao promised to give all possible aid. The following day the promised data was collected. It was given to him (Col. Drake) early Saturday morning. It consisted of complete troop dispositions of all Communist forces in the area. Saturday the team returned to Fushun. Yesterday afternoon (14 April), just before the team left for Mukden, the National Government member turned over to him (Col. Drake) the troop dispositions of the 52nd Army. This, Col. Drake said, concluded his report.

Col. Tourtillott asked the National Government member of Team No. 29 for his comments.

Gen. Kuo said that Col. Drake had reported the results of the mission of the team, and he fully agreed with the report. He would like to add a few remarks. The first day, when the team arrived in Fushun, Gen. Lu behaved very frankly and discussed with the team the equipment of the Nationalist armies and their troop dispositions. Also he told the team very frankly the activities of the Second Division. But when the team arrived in Penhsi, the Communist headquarters, it did not find the same kind of frank discussion. When asked about their equipment and troop dispositions, the Communists would not tell. When Col. Drake received this information, he received it privately; the National Government representative did not know about it. But the National Government commander discussed these things openly. Furthermore, when the team left Fushun, about 10 kilometers out, they were met by Communist troops and were fired upon. That was an insult and also a hindrance of the team's work. Also the manner of the Communist troops was rude and their language abusive. There were two vehicles; the second was also fired upon. This incident showed a threatening attitude toward Executive Headquarters teams. If the Communists were to go on that way, it would be very difficult for the teams to get into Communist territory and do their work. On the team's first trip towards Penhsi the highway was in good order; on the second trip they found trenches dug across the road about 10 meters apart.

Col. Tourtillott then asked the Communist Party member of Team No. 29 for his comments.

Gen. Hsu said that he completely agreed with Col. Drake's report, but had a few words to add. The team arrived at the headquarters of the Second Division of the Nationalist Army on the 8th. When the team asked Gen. Lu to give the locations where fighting was taking place and locations of the 52nd Army, he said he did not know. He said the Second Division was in Fushun and there was no conflict around Fushun. He talked about activities of the Communist Army. It was not true that he told the team about the equipment and troop dispositions of the Nationalist Army. When the team asked to go to the headquarters of the 52nd Army he did not agree. He said in the first place that he did not know where the headquarters was and that in the second place the road was bad. Third, he said he could not guarantee the safety of the team. But Col. Drake was very anxious to press forward the same day. It was quite an accident that the team found the Communist troops. The Nationalist representatives said there was no point in going to Penhsi. It was only after receiving instructions from the central team in Mukden that the team finally went to Penhsi on the 11th. When the party reached the Communist outposts they were questioned. The reason why they were questioned was that they had first intended to go on the 10th instead of the 11th, and in several places fighting was going on. But, having passed the outposts, they reached Penhsi smoothly. In Penhsi the Communist commander gave the team all detailed information. Col. Drake had told him (Gen. Hsu) that the Nationalists had supplied information, but whether they had or not, he himself did not know. In his opinion the mission of the team was to stop the fighting; since it was not doing that, it had very little to do. The work it was doing had of course little significance. Since the team was not stopping the fighting, its moving about between the two fronts placed the security of the team in question. The area of conflict was far from Fushun, and so he thought the team should be stationed in Fushun.

Col. Tourtillott asked whether Col. Drake had anything to add before he asked for questions.

Col. Drake said he would like to add that, while the Second Division commander did tell the team that his Division was stationed in Fushun, the brigade commander of the Peace Preservation Corps also gave his troop dispositions on the same day. It was later agreed in a meeting among the team members that the information given to the team chairman by each side would be kept secret and would not be disclosed to the other party. It was for that reason that Gen. Kuo

had not been able to see the Communist troop dispositions given at Penhsi, as he mentioned a few minutes ago.

Gen. Gillem said he would like to ask a little more detail about the shooting and conduct of the Communists toward the team.

Col. Drake said that the shots were fired by what he would call militia forces, not uniformed soldiers. About five shots were fired into the air. He did not think that the shots were directed at the team's vehicle. He stopped the vehicle; all the occupants got out and were approached by the Communist troops and forced to hold their hands in the air for about five minutes. The regular Communist forces were scattered on the hills nearby and saw what had happened and came on the scene immediately. They requested the team to remain in the area until the battalion commander was contacted. The battalion commander did not come himself, but sent word it was all right for the team to proceed, and it was then allowed to go on.

Gen. Gillem asked whether the vehicles were marked by American flags. Col. Drake said they were, but the guerrilla forces said they did not recognize the American flag.

Gen. Gillem asked whether the knowledge that the teams were operating in these areas seem[ed] to be general. Col. Drake said it did.

Col. Tourtillott asked whether there were other questions, and as there were none, continued that he would like to thank all the team members for their splendid reports, and for the splendid work they were doing in the field. He asked whether they [*there*] were any other matters to be brought before the meeting.

Gen. Gillem said that he wanted to express his very great appreciation to the members of these teams. He was sure that all here realized the delicate nature of the mission of these teams. He was certain that all could fully understand the caution that both sides felt must [be] observed in regard to exact details of troop dispositions. He himself could understand perfectly the feeling of the respective party members about security. The security of the detailed reports made by the commanders to the team chairmen must be scrupulously preserved. So long as this unfortunate situation of at least threatened hostilities existed, the team chairmen must be doubly cautious to see that the data they received should not in any way get into the possession of those who should not have it. They must take every measure to preserve the confidence of the respective leaders with whom they had contact.

Gen. Gillem continued that the members of the acting Committee of Three and the Commissioners must now be fully aware—though he assumed they were aware before—of the difficulties being met by

the teams. It was quite obvious that there was an over-all necessity for an understanding at the heads of both parties. The "ends of the fingers", which were the heads of these respective teams, could not be expected to settle policies which they were obviously not empowered to settle. The maximum judgement must continue to be exercised in these areas of immediate contact or hostilities. So, again he wanted to express his appreciation to the American officers and the officers of the two Chinese parties and to ask them to continue on their mission to the best of their ability pending the receipt of more detailed and definite directives. He further wished to request the leaders now present to urge those with whom they were associated that all exercise the maximum tolerance at this time. It was true that China was now facing a trying period, but he was not convinced that she could not meet this as she had met periods of difficulty in the past.

Gen. Gillem went on to say that the visiting group planned to return to Peiping sometime on the morning of the 16th. The exact hour was not yet known, but, if all members of the group would keep in contact with Col. Tourtillott's headquarters, the hour of departure would be announced. It had been found necessary to change planes, so another plane was awaited at the moment. Were there any other matters to be brought up before adjournment?

Mr. Robertson said that he wished to say, on behalf of Executive Headquarters, a word of appreciation to the teams for the manner in which they were trying to carry on under very difficult circumstances. They were entitled to have not general directives, but clear, detailed instructions. As Gen. Gillem had said, this group had come on a fact-finding mission, with the purpose of making a report to the original Committee of Three immediately upon Gen. Marshall's arrival in Chungking, in the middle of the coming week. Executive Headquarters hoped very much that the leaders in Chungking would soon reach agreement on the questions which now made it impossible for Executive Headquarters to give the teams the detailed instructions they should have. If the teams would carry on as they had been doing, for a few days more, Executive Headquarters felt confident that in a short time they could help resolve the many difficulties now facing the teams.

Col. Tourtillott said that, if anyone desired to contact the Committee of Three, they could be reached through him at his house at 6 o'clock that evening. The purpose of the visit of Teams Nos. 28 and 29 to Mukden having been accomplished, he would now direct them to return with their personnel and carry on the splendid work they had begun and were doing.

As there was no further business, the meeting adjourned.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Memorandum by Colonel Ivan D. Yeaton, United States Army*¹¹

[Extract]

FINAL REPORT OF YENAN OBSERVER GROUP, 15 APRIL 1946

THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

I. *General.*

1. Communism is international!

[Here follows report on general aspects, on the Communist border region government, on Communist party military districts, on the 18th group army headquarters, and on aims of the party in China.]

V. *Apparent Physical Aspects and Future Aims of the Chinese Communist Party.*

4. Chinese Communist Party members have indicated beyond any question of doubt that their daily thinking and planning for the predictable future is towards the accomplishment of a divided China. One half of which, they will completely dominate. This, instead of the free, independent, democratic China which they ostensibly acclaim as their goal of lofty achievement. This apparent attitude may be due to the fact that in their opinion, no amalgamation with the Kmt is possible. However, it is considered to be equally certain that should a new China government ensue as a result of such amalgamation, the Communists would immediately endeavor to secure one party domination of all China while engaging in free, and open political competition with the Kmt who are not in position to meet it.

5. This conclusion is engendered as a result of frequent conferences during the past ten months with members of the Politburo, with lesser lights in the Central Committee and through daily contact with the members of the 18th Group Army Headquarters and the Liaison Group living in the Yen-an Observer Group compound.

VI. *Liaison Between Chinese Communist Party and Moscow.*

1. All aid, both advisory and material, rendered by the Soviet Union to the Chinese Communist Party is clandestine in nature. This status is of necessity occasioned by the ostensible relationship of Moscow to both the United States and China as indicated by secret and open agreements with these countries.

¹¹ Commanding Officer, U. S. Army Observer Group at Yen-an, Shensi, from July 31, 1945, until April 11, when the group was withdrawn except for one officer and two enlisted men. Lt. Gen. Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces, China, forwarded this report to General Marshall in his letter dated May 9, not printed.

2. Prior to three months ago, the Soviet Union maintained a three man mission in Yen-an which was known as the "Tass Agency".¹² Objective of the mission was obviously the rendition of both political and military advice.

3. Communication between the mission and the Soviet Union was through coded messages. These messages were transmitted through the Yen-an radio station and then relayed into the Soviet net at some point probably in Manchuria. Proof of the fact that communication with the Soviets was maintained was noted in the fact that invariably the arrival of a Soviet plane at the Yen-an airport would be anticipated twenty-four hours ahead of time. The Soviet mission conveyed such information to the Chinese Communist Party members through Poku,¹³ their liaison contact.

4. Members of this Soviet mission attended political meetings of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party at times when even members of the Central Committee were not admitted. They were present at all official banquets and it was significant that the chief of the mission always sat next to Chairman Mao.¹⁴ They consistently abstained from contact with other nationals.

5. Within the past nine months, three Soviet missions have been flown into Yen-an for the purpose of discussing the future plans of the Red Army in Manchuria and undoubtedly to coordinate the movements of the Red Army with those of the Chinese Communist Army and the Manchuria underground.

6. At the present time one member of the former mission with a new helper is constantly attendant on Chairman Mao. The chief of the present two-man mission is, ostensibly, Chairman Mao's personal physician although Mao, contrary to general belief, appears to be entirely rested and in perfect health.

7. Proof relative to the rendition of military aid and coordination of military effort is obvious. In substantiation of this premise, it is to be noted that the defense of Szuping-kai and its attendant effective halting of the northern advance of the Central Government Armies into Manchuria was apparently the result of the following:

(a) Large stores of captured Japanese war material, including ammunition and weapons were furnished by the Soviets to the Chinese Communist Armies.

(b) Coordination of the withdrawal of the Soviet occupational forces on a schedule favorable to the Chinese Communist forces thus enabling the latter to make timely and accurate tactical consolidations.

¹² Official Soviet news organ.

¹³ Chin Pang-hsien (known as Boku), member of the Chinese Communist Party's Politburo.

¹⁴ Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Party's Central Committee.

8. Direct positive proof based upon personal observation together with much circumstantial evidence definitely establishes the fact that the Soviet Union is guiding the destinies of one of its strongest satellites, the Chinese Communist Party, as it has in the past and will in the future.

IVAN D. YEATON
Colonel, GSC
AC of S, G-2

893.00/4-1746: Telegram

The Consul General at Mukden (Clubb) to the Secretary of State

MUKDEN, April 17, 1946—noon.

[Received 9:30 p. m.]

31. Am informed (ReConstel April 9, 9 a. m.¹⁵ penultimate paragraph) that Chinese on April 11 obtained control Fushun mine from Soviets.

Whether this recovery was unqualified is still unclear.

Please repeat Chungking, Shanghai.

CLUBB

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Memorandum by Colonel J. Hart Caughey to Lieutenant General
Alvan C. Gillem, Jr.*

[CHUNGKING,] April 18, 1946.

Colonel Pee called on me the evening of 17 April and gave me the following information which he said was given to you orally by General Hsiung Shih-Hui, Mukden on April 16th:

1. It is reported that the Communist troops taking advantage of the cessation of hostilities are now collecting 60 regiments of their best troops from North China ready to be transferred to Manchuria.

2. Communists are purposely delaying the repair work of the rail-ways in North China.

3. Chinese Communists promised a certain agency that within a short period they are able to obliterate the National troops within Manchuria.

4. The field forces of the Communists in Shansi-Charhar-Hopeh area has already sent 20 regiments into Manchuria.

5. The main body of Communist General Ho Lung's troops originally stationed in Jehol are now marching into Manchuria.

¹⁵ Not printed.

6. Communist troops in Hopeh-Shantung-Honan border area under General Chen Tsai-Tao numbering 4 regiments together with 4 regiments of Communist New 4th Army are now moving toward Eastern Hopeh with Manchuria as their final destination.

J. H[ART] C[AUGHEY]

893.00/4-1846 : Telegram

The Consul General at Mukden (Clubb) to the Secretary of State

MUKDEN, April 18, 1946—noon.

[Received April 19—9:13 a. m.]

37. Was informed today by official of General Hsiung's headquarters that it has been unofficially but credibly reported that there have been captured by Government forces in present fighting Changchun 7 prisoners, of whom 1 or more are Russians.

Please repeat Chungking and Peiping for Ambassador.

Hsiung himself stated attacking forces outnumber defenders 3 to 1, latter comprise only about 7,000 Peace Preservation Corps plus civil militia without any regular forces (previous information had indicated presence small regular Army force), tanks of Soviet and Jap manufacture and artillery are being used in attack whereas defenders lack both air support and artillery, planes with Soviet markings have made low flights over city in course fighting, and other "unidentified" (Chinese Communist?) air craft have been observed at both Changchun and Ssuningkai which latter point still untaken. Stated heavy fighting Manchuria at present confined those two points.

Today's local press described situation Changchun slightly easier but this without confirmation in impression given by Hsiung.

CLUBB

893.00/4-1846 : Telegram

The Consul General at Mukden (Clubb) to the Secretary of State

MUKDEN, April 18, 1946—2 p. m.

[Received April 19—9:13 a. m.]

38. French newsman who witnessed take over Fushun by Chinese (ReConstel 31, April 17, noon) states the whole combine tin subsidiary enterprises was involved in action and that in effect Chinese took over from Soviet personnel by force. This is confirmed by Soviet newsman who states that action was taken while Chungking negotiations (Constel April 9, 9 a. m.¹⁸) were still in train.

¹⁸ Not printed.

Please repeat Chungking, Shanghai.

This Chinese action will, of course, constitute element of some importance for current Sino-Soviet relations.

CLUBB

893.00/4-1846 : Telegram

The Consul General at Mukden (Clubb) to the Secretary of State

MUKDEN, April 18, 1946—6 p. m.

[Received April 26—9:47 a. m.¹⁷]

40. Soviet source gives report that Changchun fell to Communist Eighth Route Army yesterday. (ReConstel April 18, noon.) Member USIS staff informed by communications official that Government division badly beaten west of Szuping kai and by Counselor of Government First Army that orders have been received to launch general offensive against Communists in Manchuria.

Please repeat Chungking and Peiping for Ambassador.

Commander-in-Chief Tu Yu-ming arrived Mukden today.

[CLUBB]

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

General Hsu Yung-chang to Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr.

No. 9528

[CHUNGKING,] 19 April 1946.

Your memorandum of the 1st of April, 1946, to His Excellency, The Generalissimo, regarding formally notifying the Soviet government on the entering of the Executive Sub-committee into the Northeast and their mission to carry out the Cease Fire Order was handed to this Board with the instruction that the matter be attended to by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs jointly with this Board.

Whereas [notice of] the entry of the said Sub-committee into the Northeast and their mission therein have already been given by General Tung Nien-ping, Chief of our military representatives in the Northeast, to Gen. Malinovsky, the Russian Commander; and whereas the Soviet Embassy has also been reminded verbally by the said ministry, we are sending you this reply for your reference.

GENERAL HSU YUNG-CHANG,
Minister,
Board of Military Operations

¹⁷ Delayed in transmission.

893.00/4-1946 : Telegram

The Consul General at Mukden (Clubb) to the Secretary of State

MUKDEN, April 19, 1946—3 p. m.

[Received April 20—6 a. m.]

41. Official from General Hsiung's headquarters late last night called first U. S. Army officer and then USIS representative with evident intent lay design for foreign news story regarding manner of fall Changchun which event can now be assumed nearly certain (re Constel April 18, 6 p. m.). He tried impress idea that Soviets had participated, charging specifically that they had directed artillery and had brought train load of Communist reinforcements from Harbin. He stated further that Government troops had captured Soviet troops fighting with Communist troops in trenches.

A desire on part of Chinese to enlist United States against Soviets in Manchuria must be assumed. Would remark in passing re fall Changchun particularly that if Govt. strength was as stated by General Hsiung (Constel April 18, noon) there would have been no need for direct Soviet participation to achieve Communist victory at that point. Would recommend reserve re Chinese charges unless supported by good evidence.

Please repeat Chungking, Peiping.

CLUBB

893.00/4-2046 : Telegram

The Consul General at Mukden (Clubb) to the Secretary of State

MUKDEN, April 20, 1946—9 a. m.

[Received April 20—6:25 a. m.]

42. U. S. officer and I were informed by Executive Headquarters' Communist Delegate General Yao late yesterday that Changchun fell to Communists at 5:30 p. m. on 18th with majority local troops, which included non-regular troops, surrendering and some abandoning arms and fleeing (reConstel April 18, 6 p. m.). Information received shortly before from General Hsiung's headquarters was that situation at Changchun was "grave" but details were lacking.

There was some emphasis by Yao of circumstance that no Govt. troops were involved, it being stated that they were chiefly former "puppet" troops transported there by Govt., apparent implication being that their presence there was in first instance irregular by reason of former associations. Their number was indicated as 12,000.

Report from Hsiung's headquarters stated that presence of Russians among prisoners captured has now been "confirmed". If Govt.

forces allegedly making capture have in turn been wiped out or captured, their production of evidence will obviously be blocked.

Information emanating from Communists is to effect that Govt. division reputedly beaten west of Ssuninghai was 87th, now stated annihilated at Pamiencheng on 16th.

Please repeat Chungking, Peiping for Robertson.

CLUBB

893.00/4-2046 : Telegram

The Consul General at Mukden (Clubb) to the Secretary of State

MUKDEN, April 20, 1946.

[Received April 22—11 p. m.¹⁸]

43. Army organ *Peace Daily*, Mukden, yesterday carried item designated as Mukden "military news" which with reference Changchun situation stated *inter alia*, "troop strength of bandit forces exceeds ours by 3 times and, moreover, have 4 or 5 medium-type battle vehicles. Tanks? (With drivers and artillery men of the battle vehicles all being military officers of a certain quarter.) Battle vehicles of their artillery must have been supplied by a certain quarter."

Leaders of Communist forces were named as Chou Pao-chung, Tsao Li-huai and Chang Ching-ho. Item reported further that one Soviet plane made low level flight over Changchun on 16th, and that "bandit troops" were destroying railway and highway between Ssuningkai and Kungchuling and Pamiencheng.

Editorial in yesterday's (Kmt Youth Corps) *Youth Daily*, referring to the disturbed conditions following upon victory with Communists taking advantage of opportunity and with unemployment and doubling of prices in 10 months resulting from stoppage of business and industry, said that agricultural villages had been transformed into hell on earth since occupation by "bandit troops." Asserted that time of spring crop rains had come but that requisition or splitting up of peasantry's animals and vehicles, and recruitment into army of peasantry was interfering with spring planting. It was asserted necessary that Government troops quickly restore order in agricultural villages so that planting should not be delayed, with wiping out of bandits and local vagrants, with restoration of order in villages and exchange of goods, commodity prices would naturally fall, and industry and business revive in the towns. Present moribund condition of metropolis (Mukden) said due, in first instance, to economic blockade against it; secondly, because of damage to factories and complete stoppage of goods output with resultant reliance only

¹⁸ Delayed in transmission.

on existing stocks which daily being depleted, with consequent daily price rise.

Sent Department, repeated Chungking as 15, Peiping as 15, Peiping as 8 for Minister.

CLUBB

893.00/4-2046 : Telegram

The Consul General at Mukden (Clubb) to the Secretary of State

MUKDEN, April 20, 1946.

[Received April 23—12:57 a. m.]

45. RE CONSTEL 43. Highlights in editorial carried today by (Army) *Peace Daily* under title "Suppress Bandit Disorder, Save the People" are as follows: re attack on Changchun by several tens [of] thousands bandit troops half hour after Soviet withdrawal, we wish to ask—whence came battle vehicles and heavy artillery of these bandit troops, whence drivers battle vehicles and heavy artillery men, what finally is their reason for use battle vehicles and heavy artillery in attack on people and Peace Preservation Corps? Bandit troops by use shameless poisonous means have achieved aim of attacking towns and seizing territory and Changchun is presently in bandit hands. It is questioned whether these bandit disciples still have men's hearts and if their mad influence is not quickly annihilated wind of banditry will be aided to grow and northeast fellow country men cause longer to suffer ravages [of] banditry. "Therefore we cannot but call forth today slogan, 'suppress bandit disorder, save the people'." Scheme bandit troops by shameless poisonous means wrest control northeast is entirely a dream, for can bandit disciple enemies of people escape control by people, escape punishment of national law? National troops should give bandit disciples bitter blow and protect peace of northeast. "Not in slightest should there now be regard for any place or regard for any time." This is glorious duty [of] national troops. Northeast belongs to state, to people of whole country and there can be no giving in before mad violence of bandit disciples. Northeast fellow countrymen did not die by hands enemy puppet but die under artillery fire bandit troops. Offense bandit troops definitely unpardonable, and now there is only strafing of them that will check their violence. It's useless discussing clauses with bandit disciples. Authorities should adopt decisive measures for despatch quickly of heavy forces north to recover Changchun and suppress bandit disorder. End survey editorial.

Repeated Chungking as 16; Peiping as 10 for Minister.

CLUBB

893.00/2-2046: Telegram

The Counselor of Embassy in China (Smyth) to the Secretary of State

CHUNGKING, April 20, 1946—3 p. m.

[Received April 21—3:02 p. m.]

714. Rapid deterioration of Manchurian situation dominated Yen-an broadcast for period April 14 to 19 with numerous accounts of fighting between Kuomintang and Communist troops and latter invariably winning. Similar Communist victories also reported in other border areas. Continued hostile activity by Yen Hsi-shan's troops reported. Particular point is made of defeats inflicted on American equipped divisions in Manchuria.

One item reports Kmt 14th Division of American equipped New 6th Army annihilated. Similar developments reported north of Tientsin. One item reports Kmt troops surrendering in Manchuria in large numbers due to heavy casualties. These casualties not attributed to inferiority of American equipment but to lack of morale in war-weary Kmt troops, reluctant to continue fratricidal strife. Two items report continued demobilization of Communist troops in the border regions with big celebrations to commemorate victory over Japan.

Other items reported include condolences received on plane crash which killed Wang Jo-fei, Tong Fa, Yeh Ting and other prominent Communist leaders; report of student demonstration in Mukden allegedly organized by Kmt reactionaries to protest mediation in Manchuria; long report on comments by Democratic League leaders stating Manchuria is domestic not diplomatic problem and should be solved by political means through implementation of PCC resolutions; reported formation of additional democratic governments in Liaoning; and issuance by Communist Party Manchurian Political Bureau of a directive designed to initiate large scale production movement in Manchuria.

Sent Dept as 714, repeated Moscow as 53.

SMYTH

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

General Marshall to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek

[CHUNGKING,] April 20, 1946.

YOUR EXCELLENCY: There has been brought to my attention your views regarding the supplying of certain equipment for the school to be organized at Kalgan for the preparation of Communist divisions for integration, and the eventual distribution of this equipment among

the 10 Communist divisions selected for integration into armies during the final six months of the program.

There are two special considerations involved in this matter. First, the origin of the school and second, the procurement of equipment from the United States.

The school had its origin in a suggestion made by me to General Chou En-lai: In the negotiations for the integration of the armies, the Communists steadily maintained that the earliest moment for actual integration would be at the end of the first 12 months. This was unacceptable, in my opinion, because too many changes might occur in the period of a year and I regarded it as very important that the earliest possible start be made to bring Communist troops under a unified command. I had first proposed that the actual integration into armies should commence in the 4th month. However, as I gradually learned of the character of the Communist troops—their lack of formal organization, lack of trained staff and lack of normal equipment—I came to the conclusion that a possible explanation of the reluctance of the Communists to undertake integration earlier than 12 months was due to their appreciation of the difficulties to present a division at an earlier date in a state of organization and appearance that would not involve serious loss of face. I therefore experimented by suggesting to General Chou En-lai that it might be possible to arrange for an elementary school for some company officers and higher commanders and their staffs at some point within the Communist zone of occupation, in which a short course would be given by American officers to prepare the Communist officers concerned to effect the formal organization of their troops into regiments and divisions that could at least march and parade in a presentable manner. It was stated that tactical training for field operations was not the purpose of such a school and could not be undertaken.

General Chou En-lai flew to Yen-an the morning following the suggestion and came back with approval for the proposal and, what was more important, the agreement to start the integration in the 7th month instead of the 13th month. The proposal was discussed in the negotiations of the Military Sub-Committee, of which I was the advisor, and received formal approval, I thought, at that time.

It was plainly evident to me that without such assistance the Communists themselves could not get together their people in an acceptable state of organization in the month specified—the 7th—for the initiation of integration. At the same time I thought it was of high importance that the integration begin at that time and not be delayed.

Such a school requires certain equipment, otherwise it is without

purpose, therefore, the urgent necessity for procurement of such equipment in time to get the school promptly started. There follows a statement of the complications and considerations involved in that procurement.

Unless the necessary matériel for such a school is landed in China prior to June 30th, next, there is no hope, I think, of bringing the transaction under lend-lease and it therefore would not only be a complicated procedure but very expensive. I, therefore, while in Washington, made a special effort to arrange for the shipment of the equipment from Japan, the deficit being made up from the United States, all to be landed in Shanghai prior to June 30th. Some 600 tons has already arrived. Now I find your instructions which would terminate that procedure. This would also definitely terminate the implementation of the agreements for the reorganization and integration of the armies and this, of course, would be a very serious matter.

I am submitting this statement in writing in order that you may have a general understanding of the situation prior to a personal discussion I would like to have with you in regard to the matter.

G. C. MARSHALL

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

The Chief of Staff (Eisenhower) to General Marshall

WASHINGTON, 22 April 1946.

85297. When General Wedemeyer left China he committed himself to the Generalissimo to come back as soon as he was physically able to make the journey. It now appears that somewhat more time would be consumed than Wedemeyer first estimated and he is most anxious that proper explanation be made to the Generalissimo so that there will be no doubt that Wedemeyer is doing his best to fulfill his commitment in this regard. The story is about as follows: General Wedemeyer has had a successful operation on his sinus. Upon recommendations of the surgeon he will be restricted in or in close proximity to the hospital for continued treatment and observation for at least a month perhaps longer. In these circumstances I feel that it is in General Wedemeyer's interests to continue for an extended period for recuperation in order that he can recover completely his health and regain his strength.

I will be most appreciative if you can find either a personal opportunity or through a trusted assistant, to present these facts to the Generalissimo so that he will not lose any of his confidence in General Wedemeyer.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Yu Ta-wei
at House 28, Chungking, April 22, 1946, 2 p. m.*

Also present: Colonel Caughey
Captain Soong

GENERAL YU: I am not an official spokesman although I shall be glad to offer all assistance possible in any of your problems or considerations.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I am not ready to issue any comment yet. I talked to the Generalissimo yesterday on the political situation and I will talk to him tonight on the military situation. I have heard the Communist's side this morning, and have also heard reports from Colonel Caughey, General Gillem, General Byroade and some American team members. I have read all the minutes of meetings up to date. The following comments are for your ears only. The situation is very serious and it is very difficult to find a solution which will be accepted by all, particularly from the view point of the Chinese people. A great part of these difficulties could have been avoided by the National Government but now the whole situation is reversed. The troubles seem to come from the feeling of distrust and lack of faith on both sides. It is always thought that there are evil motives behind all proposals. I have tried for seven weeks to send field teams to Manchuria, but this was delayed because the Generalissimo was afraid that the Russians may complicate the situation. Three weeks after I left, the situation was completely out of hand. Earlier, General Chou wanted to go to Mukden but I did not because the Russians were there. General Chou insisted also that Cease Fire Order applied to all China, but the Government said it did not. Meantime, Nationalist troops were moved into Manchuria. I do not know who the Generalissimo's advisors are but whoever they may be, they are very poor ones. Instead of constructive action they got the Government into trouble. Many instances have occurred where the Government has offered opportunity to allow the Communists to make accusations. As an example National Troops moved toward Chifeng contrary to the original agreement. The Canton situation is another example of failure to abide by the agreement. In reorganizing the army I originally placed 9 armies in Manchuria but the Generalissimo wanted them reduced to 4 since it would be less offending to the Russians. I then suggested 6 and it was finally compromised by General Chang Chih Chung to 5. Now the Communists want to hold you to 5 armies.

Coming into the present situation no one has offered any alternative except a great war and you can not support a great war. It is not

going to be supported by Americans or the Seventh Fleet or Executive Headquarters. The Communists have very strong positions in Manchuria and on this basis it has even been suggested that National forces abandon Manchuria. The question to my mind is what basis now can you do business with the Communists? They put fingers on all faults made by the Kuomintang. I had a loan already set up before I left the United States. Then the Generalissimo's speeches came—one to PCC¹⁹ and one to United States.²⁰ They murdered my effort. The Generalissimo accused the Communists of sabotaging the loan but it was what he said that ruined it. What should be suppressed in his speeches has been published. Things like that ruin the public opinion in the United States and it is a terrible price to pay. I am trying now to find a way out.

GENERAL YU: (Spoke but does not want to be quoted—Gist of his speech was his desire for peaceful settlement.)

GENERAL MARSHALL: The Kuomintang had a good chance to have peace in Manchuria but it did not utilize this chance. The Communists are taking advantage of their positions and are becoming stronger every day. The Government has gotten into a bad spot and I have to figure a way out. Regarding the trip made by the Committee of Three in March, General Chou wanted to go most because he knew some of his commanders were not complying with orders. He wanted to talk to them personally and he did. But now the Communists may say that the situation has entirely changed. They wanted the Cease Fire Order to apply to Manchuria, and that field teams be sent there; the Kuomintang did not. All the world is watching and we cannot ignore the position of the United States. China cannot at present get along without United States assistance, physically and financially. For example, we had difficulty in sending a team to Hsuechow and the Communists demanded a team north of Hankow. The Communists did not want to send teams to Hsuechow and the Nationalists did not want to send teams north of Hankow. After I persuaded both parties to send team members to both places, they found identical conditions in reverse: North of Hankow Communists were surrounded, near Hsuechow National troops were surrounded.

The Central Government has gone through some bitter experiences with the Communists. I was here when the present situation got

¹⁹ For reference to speech to the People's Political Council on April 1, see memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in China, April 18, p. 169, fifth paragraph.

²⁰ For interview on April 8 with the United Press, see memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in China, April 10, p. 166.

under way; that was when Borodin²¹ was eliminated in 1927. I have sat in the middle the past few months and watched the situation develop. I believe I know what I'm talking about.

893.00/4-2246 : Telegram

The Counselor of Embassy in China (Smyth) to the Secretary of State

CHUNGKING, April 22, 1946—5 p. m.

[Received April 22—9:32 a. m.]

718. Greater part Changchun reported in possession Communists. (Summary of M[ilitary] A[ttaché's] report week ending 20 April.) Progress Central Government forces moving north from Mukden slowed considerably by stiffening Communist resistance. Elements new First Army reported entered Szuping kai 15 April. Communists reported moving reinforcements toward Changchun from North Manchuria and preparing defenses along line Tehui-Nungan in event their withdrawal from Changchun forced.

Peining railroad northeast of Shanhaikuan now reported repaired and in operation.

Military situation north China remains relatively quiet. Aside from minor clashes reported in Shansi and eastern Shantung, cease fire agreement appears well observed. Little progress however reported in restoration of communications.

Sixty-five percent of all Japanese, military and civilian, had been repatriated as of 12 April. Major portion unrepatriated Japanese military personnel in North China are in Shansi province.

SMYTH

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai at House 28, Chungking, April 23, 1946, 10 a. m.

Also present: Colonel Caughey
 Captain Soong
 Mr. Chang

General Marshall opened the meeting by informing General Chou that he had had an opportunity to familiarize himself with General Chou's four-point statement to the Government²² concerning political reform and that he also had now in his possession the Government's

²¹ Communist adviser from Moscow to the Kuomintang regime at Hankow until after the break with General Chiang Kai-shek's regime at Nanking in 1927. See despatch No. 1161, August 17, 1927, from the Chargé in China, *Foreign Relations*, 1927, vol. II, p. 19.

²² See statement by the Chinese Communist Delegation, April 21, p. 172.

reply²³ to those four points. General Marshall stated that he had not had an opportunity to study the Government's reply but would talk over the matter with General Chou En-lai at a later date.

General Marshall continued by informing General Chou that he now had exact data, from the U. S. side, of National forces movements into Manchuria. The 13th, 52nd, New First, New Sixth and 71st or a total of 145,000 troops have been transported. The North-east Garrison Headquarters consisting of 6,500 troops and 12,000 service troops were also moved for establishment of a major supply base at Chinwangtao and/or Hulutao. The 60th Army (32,000 troops), the 93rd Army (30,000 troops), the First Army Group Headquarters (2,600 troops) remain to be moved under present commitments. If completed, this would make a total of 228,000 troops moved with U. S. resources by 1 June. General Marshall continued by stating information he had received indicated that elements of the 92nd and 94th Armies had been used in Manchuria but that at the present time the only element of these two armies in Manchuria is the Fifth Division and it is now being moved back into North China.

General Marshall informed General Chou that he had a discussion with the Generalissimo the previous evening with reference to his proposal for a peaceful solution in Manchuria. General Marshall stated that his major difficulty was eliminating the distrust between the Kuomintang high officials regarding Communist motives and vice versa. General Marshall informed General Chou that the National Government was fearful that a redistribution, redeployment and readjustment of Communist forces in Manchuria probably would further complicate the Manchurian situation as related to the coalition government. General Marshall stated, however, that he wished only to discuss the military phases of the problem which was much more in his line.

General Marshall stated that before he proceeded further he would appreciate receiving from General Chou the general nature of Communist proposals with respect to the military situation in Manchuria.

General Chou admitted that Communists' accounts of National Army movements were not very accurate and that General Marshall's information was much more reliable. He added that puppet troops, not recognized by the Government as its troops, may account for a substantial difference.

General Chou continued by stating that the situation in Manchuria is very complicated; that at the outset of negotiations he had not anticipated anything like the situation that exists today. General Chou explained himself by stating that prior to the 27 March agreement, Manchuria was occupied by Russians, National Government and

²³ See memorandum of April 21 by the Chinese Ministry of Information, p. 173.

Communists but that now, with the Russian withdrawal, it has become a race between the National and Communist troops to occupy the vacuum. Occupation of strategic areas makes it more difficult to discuss redistributions. General Chou reminded General Marshall that in November of last year the Communists had urged the National Government to move into Manchuria but instead they attacked Communist forces in Jehol; that after the 10 January agreement National forces were again asked not to attack Communists but to march to Mukden to negotiate with the Russians; that as late as 15 March the Communists urged the Government to take over Mukden and the Changchun railroad. General Chou added that the Communist Party had no intention of monopolizing Manchuria but instead wanted international cooperation. General Chou stated that due to difficulties with respect to the current situation his ability to negotiate was growing less and less. General Chou stated that the National Government is now insisting on taking Changchun by force and then negotiating whereas it is the Communists' view that fighting should cease immediately to be followed with negotiations. In elaboration of his lessening ability to negotiate General Chou pointed out that his Manchurian leaders were now concerned as to how they will fit into the reorganization plan; that Yen-an is now of the opinion that a ratio of 1 to 14 divisions in Manchuria is no longer appropriate.

General Marshall stated that he had just completed a draft for the immediate cessation of hostilities.²⁴ (Handing a copy to Chou) General Marshall asked General Chou's reaction and informed General Chou that he proposed to give a copy to General Hsu Yung-chang who is the new National member on the Committee of Three. General Chou indicated that he was not ready for comment and stated he would have to refer the matter to Yen-an. He further stated that although the principle was very good and he wished to cooperate he would have to reserve comment due to the fact that Yen-an wished to restudy the ratio of troops in Manchuria and was adamant with respect to further movement of any National forces into Manchuria.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Draft Prepared by General Marshall for the Immediate Cessation of Hostilities in Manchuria*²⁵

[CHUNGKING,] April 23, 1946.

We, General Hsu Yun[g]-Chan[g], authorized representative of the National Government; General Chou En-lai, authorized repre-

²⁴ *Infra.*

²⁵ Copy handed General Chou En-lai on April 23. Notation on the original by General Marshall: "Submitted by me to the Generalissimo but not accepted. Drafted in view of his estimate of his probable decision as to military withdrawal."

sentative of the Chinese Communist Party; have recommended to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and Chairman Mao Tse-tung and have been authorized by them to announce that in furtherance of the agreement reached on 27 March 1946 pertaining to entrance of field teams into Manchuria, the following general principles are applicable as an interim measure until the military and political situation can be adjusted by peaceful negotiations.

a. Orders will immediately be issued by the National Government and the headquarters of the Communist armies directing their commanders in the field to cease firing twenty-four hours after the signing of this agreement. Further direction will be given that all movements of troops, National and Communist forces will cease, except as specifically provided herein.

b. The further disposition in Manchuria of all armies, and units of those armies will be fixed in accordance with the reorganization plan agreed to on 25 February 1946. The specific areas of occupation will be determined by the Committee of Three. The movement of the 60th and 93rd armies now enroute to Manchuria will be completed.

c. The further movement of the National Army troops in Manchuria for the purpose of reestablishing sovereignty and providing for the security of the main railroad lines will be only as specifically authorized by the Committee of Three.

d. Political matters pertaining to Manchuria will be discussed between representatives of the National Government and representatives of the Communist Party. Until these political matters are settled the present status of the popularly elected local governments will be maintained without obstruction or interference.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Hsu Yung-chang at House 28, Chungking, April 23, 1946, 2:30 p. m.

Also present: General Yu Ta-wei
Colonel Caughey

General Hsu explained that he had just been appointed as the Government representative on the Committee of Three.

General Marshall told General Hsu that it would be very necessary for him to know what was going on in his (General Marshall's) mind in order that they could meet the situation together. General Marshall stated that today, since the Government is in a dangerous position, compromises are necessary. This is a tragedy because the Government had had several opportunities during the past negotiations, beginning in December, to resolve matters satisfactorily but failed to take advantage of these opportunities. Now the Communists are in a position where they can present excessive demands on the Government. In effect the National Government has educated the Communists with a new sense of power which the Communists recognize

although they are not aware of the degree to which the National Government is forced to compromise. The principal difficulty in the negotiations to date has been the stubborn attitude on the part of both parties toward the military and political situation; the two are poles apart and refuse to alter their course through a fear that the other party would obtain a favorable position. The fear on both sides appears to have wiped out all logic and the fear is at its worst on the Nationalist side. Neither can agree with me. General Marshall stated he was in the middle and feels that he understands the causes which motivate both.

General Marshall explained that his position was difficult because of the National Government's adamant attitude toward minor matters such as:

The Canton situation.

The Hankow situation.

National Government failure to turn in troop movement reports.

Damage to Communist radio in Canton.

Searching of Communist houses in Peiping.

CAF aircraft "buzzing" Yen-an.

Detention of Communists at Mukden airfield.

The National Government has gained little in these matters and lost a lot.

General Marshall stated that General Chou's attitude during these months is the best evidence of the true situation. At first the solution appeared simple and the Communists would have accepted a satisfactory solution to the Central Government. Now circumstances have altered and the Communists have become bolder. General Marshall indicated that he was on the horns of a dilemma; that his major concern at this moment was to protect the honor of the Central Government and at the same time find some way of establishing a unified China.

General Hsu stated that he appreciated General Marshall's frankness and pointed out that there is a Chinese saying to the effect that a "bystander sees clearly". General Hsu stated that, as Chief of Operations, he understood the situation clearly and pointed out that Communist opposition had not been anticipated in the coming months since the Sino-Soviet agreement provided control in Manchuria. At this point General Marshall emphatically asserted that the National Government showed poor judgment in seeking the control referred to by General Hsu; that instead National Government troops attacked the Communists at Chifeng and later refused to permit Field Teams into Manchuria. General Marshall said that he would require from General Hsu full cooperation in handling of certain details, one of which faced him immediately. That was the question of providing

movement and housing facilities for the Communists at Nanking which to this date, in spite of the necessity for such arrangements, the Generalissimo's past promises in this regard, and the importance of doing so with respect to solving the present situation, had not yet been done. General Hsu said he would look into the matter immediately. At the termination of the meeting General Marshall handed General Hsu a paper²⁶ containing his (General Marshall's) most recent statement of principles for arriving at a sound basis in resolving the Manchurian situation. General Hsu thanked General Marshall and said he would study his proposals.

893.00/4-2346 : Telegram

The Consul General at Mukden (Clubb) to the Secretary of State

MUKDEN, April 23, 1946—5 p. m.

[Received April 24—7 a. m.]

47. About 40 Chinese officials most of whom were Central Govt. arrived here in 2 Chinese planes from Harbin on 20th, another group arrived today and it is rumored more are coming. They will reputedly stay for present at Mukden.

Please repeat Nanking.

Movement presumably connected with Chinese belief that Harbin will go way of Changchun after withdrawal Soviet troops scheduled for noon tomorrow.

CLUBB

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Proposal by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek for the Cessation of Hostilities in Manchuria*²⁷

[CHUNGKING, April 25, 1946.]

A. The Cease Fire Agreement and its appendix reached on 10 January 1946 should be fully carried out in Manchuria.

B. The disposition in Manchuria of all armies and units of those armies should be fixed in accordance with the reorganization plan agreed to on 25 February 1946. The movement of the 54th and 99th armies now enroute to Manchuria should be completed.

C. The entire line of the Changchun Railways in Manchuria and areas within thirty kilometres on both sides of the Changchun Rail-

²⁶ *Supra.*

²⁷ Made "in modification of" General Marshall's draft of April 23, p. 792, since General Marshall had written in a marginal notation on that draft, "Not acceptable to Chou En-lai the not actually submitted to him."

ways should be taken over by the Government troops. The Communist troops should not obstruct the re-establishing of sovereignty by the Government.

D. Except item C, the political matters pertaining to areas under the control of Communist troops will be settled by negotiations between representatives of the National Government and representatives of the Communist Party.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Marshall to General Hsu Yung-chang

[CHUNGKING,] 26 April 1946.

On inquiry of General Chou En-lai as to when he would be available in Nanking for negotiations I learned that his movement plans were somewhat indefinite because of the probable non-availability of quarters in Nanking for about ten days and the fact that he has not been advised by the government as to when transportation would be made available. I am interested in view of the serious situation in Manchuria and the continued impasse in negotiations. It would be impracticable for me as a member of the Committee of Three to perform any useful service if General Chou is in Chungking and the Generalissimo and other members of the Committee are in Nanking.

I have offered to help out with some air transport and I think I can manage to transport the minimum number of people required by General Chou for his immediate assistance and his communications—about 50 persons and 1,500 pounds of baggage. But I am powerless to render any assistance regarding accommodations in Nanking.

I hope something can be done to permit the early establishment of General Chou and his principal people in Nanking. A delay can be very serious in its consequences.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Chou En-lai to General Hsu Yung-chang

CHUNGKING, 26 April 1946.

According to reliable report received on April 15th, considerable movement of government troops and ammunition has recently taken place along the Paochi-Sian-Loyang-Chengchow line eastward, and planes have been assembled at Sian, specifically:

- a. 24 heavy and light tanks have been moved through Shanchow (west of Loyang) to Loyang on 10 April;
- b. The 6th Motor Supply Regiment has employed 50 trucks to carry ammunition through Sian eastwards;

c. Several train loads of Nationalist troops, equipped with howitzers and U. S.-made army trucks have passed Paochi during these successive days toward the east of Sian;

d. Early April, one new combat flight of Chinese Air Force, comprising 18 planes, appeared at the Sian airfield, and conducted thenceforth repeated reconnoissance over the vicinity of Sian.

Under the circumstances, that the hostilities in Manchuria has not been put to a stop, with skirmishes appearing here and there in China proper, the repeated illegal movement of Nationalist troops and ammunitions in China proper, apart from the large-scale troop movement into Manchuria, would gravely affect the situation in China proper, not to say, that the conflagration in Manchuria will be further flared up.

In view of the above I am lodging hereby a protest to the Government, requesting that such actions be stopped.

[Signature in Chinese]
CHOU EN-LAI

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Notes of Conference Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai at House 28, Chungking, April 27, 1946, 10:30 a. m.

Also present: Col. Caughey
Mr. Chang Wen Chin ²⁸

General Chou stated that the proposals submitted by the representatives of the Democratic League ²⁹ seemed superficial; that the main problem had to do with control of the railroads. General Chou stated that his idea with respect to this was:

- (1) Either to depend on some sort of a local civilian garrison,
- (2) Full military control, or,
- (3) Establishment of a commission.

General Marshall stated he had spoken to the Generalissimo about the Democratic League proposal and that the Generalissimo had prepared a new proposal ³⁰ to stabilize the Manchurian situation:

- (1) Carry out the cease fire order.
- (2) Fix strengths in accordance with the reorganization plan.
- (3) Reestablish sovereignty by control of the railroads mentioned in the Sino-Soviet treaty together with the strip 30 li on each side.
- (4) Further discussion of the political matters.

General Marshall pointed out that there was confusion at the moment between military and political questions; that when the politi-

²⁸ Gen. Chou En-lai's secretary.

²⁹ Not found in Department files.

³⁰ April 25, p. 795.

cal situation is resolved the military confusion would subside and the situation become entirely different. General Marshall said the Democratic League proposed that the military commander, presently chairman of the Political Council, be relieved and three non-partisan representatives be placed on that committee; that this committee provide government representatives at key points, such as Harbin, Changchun and Tsitsihar, and along the railroads. At the same time no National troops would move along the railroads and Communists would withdraw 30 li beyond. General Marshall continued by stating that during the entire negotiations he had been searching for a quick solution for the Manchurian problem, a solution which would provide necessary control and authority to the National Government and one that was also satisfactory to the Communist Party. The difficulty thus far had been that he was trying to work out a solution amid mistrust and differences in fundamentals.

General Chou stated that throughout the negotiations he, too, had been working for a satisfactory solution; however, the situation was continually getting worse and that, therefore, the solution had to take into account existing circumstances. General Chou pointed out that it appeared the National Government wanted to fight and then talk, whereas the Communist view was to cease fighting and to discuss the over-all problem. General Chou reiterated that he was willing to discuss the general situation, but that he could not accept the Generalissimo's view to fight and then discuss. General Chou stated that he had wired the various Democratic League proposals and General Marshall's proposal to Yen-an and although he had no desire to stall the matter, he must await the reply. General Chou stated that after receiving the reply from Yen-an he would exchange views and hoped that within one or two days, a solution could be worked out. General Chou added that he did not want to burden the field commanders and therefore felt it necessary to talk directly to Yen-an.

General Marshall said he proposed going to Nanking Monday ³¹ and that he was concerned over General Chou's movement to Nanking. General Marshall offered to assist in moving 50 people and asked General Chou if he had heard anything with reference to the housing. General Chou stated that he had sent three representatives to discuss the situation with the mayor of Nanking and hoped appropriate arrangements would be made soon.

General Marshall stated that he had hoped to get definite proposals from General Chou for the purposes of discussion with the Generalissimo that evening; that his difficulty was a disagreement in basic terms, both sides remaining adamant. General Marshall asked General Chou if he had any comment on the Democratic League proposal with reference to the reorganization of the Political Council.

³¹ April 29.

General Chou stated that he believed separating the military commander from that Council would be a great assistance in furthering negotiations.

General Marshall asked General Chou if he believed this should be mentioned to the Generalissimo; that is, is the reorganization of the Political Council important to any cease fire agreement. If not, he would not discuss it with the Generalissimo at this time. General Chou stated he would leave that to General Marshall's discretion as his discussion with the Generalissimo developed.

General Marshall then sought General Chou's comment regarding troop dispositions in case some agreement was reached. General Chou outlined the following four points:

- (1) Separate the two armies from close contact.
- (2) No troop movements on either side.
- (3) Solve the communications problem.
- (4) Dispatch teams to points of close contact and along the main railroad lines.

General Chou continued by stating these four points needed immediate action and that after this had been done the following four points could be discussed:

- (1) Review the military situation in Manchuria.
- (2) Put into effect the demobilization plan.
- (3) Redispose the forces.
- (4) Readjust army strengths.

General Marshall stressed the importance of providing adequate instructions for the teams. General Marshall illustrated by saying, suppose we specify that the various units be separated by 60 li. He then pointed out that this would immediately create difficulty if National Government troops were within that distance of Changchun, which circumstances would necessitate withdrawal of Communist forces from Changchun. General Marshall continued by stating that the cessation of all movement would apply to all units in Manchuria and all the way to Shanghai. This would create a difficult situation and was the reason he had specifically provided for movement of the 60th and 93rd armies in order to avoid dispute. General Marshall stated that the situation with respect to Harbin, Changchun and Tsitsihar might require different treatment suggesting that it may be appropriate for Communists to remain in Changchun, but not in the other two places during negotiations.

After lunch, General Marshall informed General Chou that his main difficulty was to present a proposal to the Generalissimo that would not deny him authority in Manchuria and at the same time make certain that the Communist Party receives certain appropriate rights. General Marshall continued by stating that the Communists presently

hold the advantage due to military troop dispositions; this would make it difficult in his negotiations to place the National Government in a dignified position and at the same time not deny the Communists their right for political demands. General Marshall again stressed that any agreement must be sufficiently specific to avoid team debate such as expressed understandings regarding key points.

General Marshall told General Chou that if he, in turning over this discussion in his mind, could come to a definite proposal, another meeting could be held in the morning in order to come to a solution before the Generalissimo left Chungking.

General Chou stated that one of his main concerns with reference to the railroads were secret police organizations stationed along the railroads and referred to the movement of the 18th regiment into Manchuria under a recent Tai Li order. Since Chang Kai-Ming, present National commissioner at Executive Headquarters, has recently taken Tai Li's place, General Chou expressed fear that Executive Headquarters would have difficulty in cooperating smoothly regarding the railroad problem.

General Marshall asked who General Chou considered would be an appropriate replacement as commissioner. General Chou replied that it should be General Lin Wei, Vice Minister of War.

General Marshall asked General Chou who he believed should be the National representative on the Committee of Three. General Chou replied that he had not considered this carefully, but there were two necessary qualifications:

- (1) Sufficient authority to adequately represent the Generalissimo.
- (2) Enthusiastic desire for rapid and peaceful settlement.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Colonel J. Hart Caughey to Mr. Walter S. Robertson, at Peiping

[NANKING,] 28 April 1946.

601-A. General Marshall sent following letter to Chou.

"This morning I note in Trusum No. 98,^{31a} first paragraph, that the Communist member of Team 2 is restricting the movements of the U. S. members. Will you please ascertain the basis for such restriction."

Chou's reply says he has dispatched a telegram to Communist general in charge of Jehol area asking about restriction of Americans. Any reply will be forwarded for information.

J. HART CAUGHEY
Colonel, G. S. C.

^{31a} April 22, not printed.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Draft Prepared by General Marshall for the Immediate Cessation of Hostilities in Manchuria*³²

[CHUNGKING, April 28, 1946.]

We, the Committee of Three, have reached the following agreement regarding the Manchurian situation, with the approval of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and Chairman Mao Tse-tung:

a. The terms of the Cease Fire agreement of 10 January 1946 apply to Manchuria except as specifically modified hereinafter.

b. Orders will immediately be issued by the National Government and the headquarters of the Communist forces to their military commanders in Manchuria to bring to an end all fighting and firing within twenty-four hours of the signing of this agreement.

c. The troops now in hostile contact will withdraw each 30 li in rear of their positions at the time of receipt of these instructions.

d. All troop movements will cease except:

(1) As provided in *c* above, and

(2) As are involved in the sea movement of the 60th and 93rd Armies, or

(3) Are agreed upon by the Committee of Three for the purpose of facilitating supply, shelter or control.

e. The railways included in the Sino-Soviet treaty will immediately resume operation under the present direction.

f. A commission consisting of the following individuals will proceed at once to Manchuria:

Chang Kia-ngau³³ Chairman
General Chou En-lai
Mo Te-hui³⁴

This commission will investigate the situation and conditions in Manchuria and will submit recommendations to the National Government regarding the following matters:

(1) Redisposition of the military forces.

(2) Restoration of communications.

(3) Organization of the present political and economic councils and the political organization and administration of provincial governments and cities.

In its recommendations the commission will consider interim measures to reestablish peace and an early return to normal conditions, as

³² Marginal notation by General Marshall: "Submitted to Gimo but not accepted. Part *f* submitted as proposal of Democratic League, which had been checked by them with Chou En-lai."

³³ Chairman of the economic commission of Generalissimo Chiang's Headquarters in Manchuria.

³⁴ Member of presidium of People's Political Council.

well as measures for a permanent establishment of domestic affairs. It is authorized, in its discretion, to submit its recommendations piecemeal while reaching an agreement on all matters concerned.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai, at House 28, Chungking, April 29, 1946, 10:30 a. m.

Also present: Colonel Caughey
Mr. Chang

General Marshall opened the meeting by informing General Chou that he would assist him in moving 50 key Communists to Nanking within the next few days and also offered the use of U. S. signal communications (using Chinese code) during the period necessary to establish Communist radio communication. He then asked General Chou if he had anything to take up. General Chou stated he had wired Yen-an regarding the main points of General Marshall's proposal and also those of the Democratic League. He added that after thinking over the latest Democratic League proposal he was inclined to accept the idea of a joint commission being sent to investigate the situation after general cease fire orders had been issued. The Commission to take up problems of:

1. Separating the armies.
2. Control of communications.
3. Political and economic reorganization.
4. Consideration of various provincial governments.

General Marshall informed General Chou that he had been in conference with the Generalissimo the afternoon and evening before and had presented the Democratic League's new proposal³⁵ for cessation of hostilities. The Generalissimo would not accept that proposal. General Marshall said that it was his view that the fundamental difference between the Generalissimo and General Chou relates to the matter of "what constitutes sovereignty". The fact remains that sovereignty implies control and control could not be had by the Government without its possession of Changchun. General Marshall continued that Communist opposition to further movement has no foundation in any agreement; that Communist opposition is based probably on two considerations: (1) resentment over action by Government troops against scattered Communist forces; (2) the seizing of the opportunity to force desired negotiations in Manchuria (mili-

³⁵ Not found in Department files.

tary) and in Chungking (political). General Marshall stated that the Generalissimo would concur in a proposal which provided:

“That cessation of hostilities be dependent upon evacuation of Changchun and its occupation by Government troops.”

Thereafter the Government would be willing to have the various aspects, military and political, considered by the Committee of Three. General Marshall recalled that General Chou had made a similar proposition during his absence. General Marshall stated that he had discussed with the Generalissimo at great length the newest proposal introduced by the Democratic League, but the Generalissimo declined acceptance. General Marshall pointed out, however, that in effect the Generalissimo had compromised over his previous view by agreeing to negotiate for settlement of matters in Manchuria to the North of Changchun.

General Marshall then informed General Chou that he had given deep thought to his (General Marshall's) final discussion with the Generalissimo and to his (General Marshall's) reply to General Chou. He notified General Chou that he regretted having to make the following statement but it was necessary at this time:

“I have done the best I can in an effort to negotiate this critical situation. The matter, with this statement, virtually passes out of my hands. I do not see anything more I can do in the way of mediation and I think it best this be understood. I've exhausted my resources in an effort to compromise the various positions and views and I cannot see how I could gain any more by further discussion of this particular issue with the Generalissimo. As I told you, before, my position is greatly changed because in all previous agreements I was continually confronted by the statement of the Government that whatever agreement I brought about would not be carried out by the Communists. At the present time my position in endeavoring to persuade various lines of action by the Government have been heavily compromised by the Communist action in Manchuria. I repeat again, I am intimately familiar with your résumé of actions of the Government not in accordance with agreements. For instance: the Canton situation; the question of jurisdiction of Executive Headquarters in Manchuria; the action by Government troops in fighting in Manchuria without recourse to the presence of teams to stop fighting. But the fact remains I've exhausted my resources and I have tried to give you the basis of what I think could be a Government agreement.”

General Chou stated that he was aware of General Marshall's concern over the catastrophe confronting the Chinese people. He added that it has been General Marshall's concern over this matter which has led him to consider possible means to resolve the difficulties. General Chou stated that it has been the Generalissimo's attitude of fighting for Changchun that has caused the difficulty, but he is not

at all surprised over the Generalissimo's course of action. The reason for the attitude taken by the Generalissimo is that he is a difficult man to convince: in the first place he will not recognize Communist forces and refers to them as bandits; second, he desires to use military force when he fails at negotiations; third, the Generalissimo desires to exercise authority of the Central Government and he makes concessions only when forced to do so. In this connection, he added that even the past agreements were accepted by the Generalissimo with reluctance. General Chou alleged that the Generalissimo's position was no different than the "irreconcilables and renovationists" referred to frequently by General Marshall. General Chou felt that this view seemed reasonable to him since the Generalissimo never censored or rectified their actions but instead gave them a free hand.

Speaking of the Manchurian problem General Chou reminded General Marshall that he had said on many occasions that the Government could have the railroads of Manchuria. Instead the Government chose to fight the Communists. General Chou continued by stating that even as of 27th of March he had said that if hostilities would cease the Government could be assured of the status of Changchun, Harbin and others, but the Government continued to violate the 10 January and 27 March agreements thus permitting the situation to build up.

General Chou asserted that that never was contemplated by the Communists; in fact they had tried to prevent the development of this situation. Regarding the Communist position with respect to United States, General Chou stated that after careful study he had determined the Communists have never attacked the United States in propaganda; that Communist action with respect to the United States loan to the National Government was made in good faith and based on their firm belief that a temporary suspension of the loan is one of the surest means of averting civil war in China. General Chou added that the continued movement of the Government troops and the obtaining of the loan is destined to create the opposite effect from the effect hoped for by the United States. General Chou concluded from this that the Communist attitude was not in opposition to the United States but rather an effort to assist in the proper application of United States objectives in China. As the situation now stands, General Chou stated, loans from the United States would be administered by the New Banking Corporation of National Reconstruction under Dr. T. V. Soong which in effect would promote economic monopolies under bureaucratic application.

General Chou reiterated to General Marshall that the Communists had been doing everything possible to avert civil war; that the Generalissimo's attitude with respect to taking Changchun by force will,

if accomplished, create additional problems, the outcome of which General Chou could not predict. For instance, an easy conquest of Changchun would tempt the Government to drive for Harbin. General Chou stated that the complexion of the problem of taking over sovereignty in Manchuria has changed considerably in that, when conceived, consideration[s] were based only on taking over from the Japanese and Soviets; that the Japanese and Soviets no longer present opposition; and that since Communists have occupied some of the places thus far evacuated, the basic considerations regarding establishing of sovereignty are no longer applicable.

General Chou stated that the Communists did not wish to monopolize Manchuria, they wished only to assist in administering Manchurian affairs as part of the new National Government. He added that if this were kept in mind, together with the new situation as presently found in Manchuria, a solution of the present difficult situation could easily be found.

General Marshall stated that his difficulty throughout was dealing with the lack of confidence on both sides. General Marshall stated that it was his opinion that the Generalissimo had made a great concession to the Communists through his willingness, providing Communists evacuated Changchun, to hold open for negotiation problems with respect to the rest of Manchuria. General Marshall stated that he understood the difficulty General Chou was having in handling his victorious field commanders in Manchuria.

General Marshall stated that he was attempting to bring both parties together in order to avoid further hardships on these millions of Chinese people. General Marshall again stated that he had exhausted his means and was leaving for Nanking the following day.

General Chou stated that he was moved by General Marshall's efforts, that he had wired to Yen-an the various proposals in hope for an early reply; that he would come to Nanking as soon as possible.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Mr. Walter S. Robertson to General Marshall

PEIPING, 30 April 1946.

2234. New China News Agency releases following datelined Yen-an April 19:

"According to reliable sources, United States is now busily helping Kuomintang to train two Bombing Squadrons for certain purposes. Every Squadron consists of 48 B-25 Bombers, totalling 96 Bombers in 2 Squadrons with 10 Training Planes in addition. All these planes are recently transported from America."

Believe that as result of your apparent strong protest to Chou En-lai Communist anti-American propaganda is likely to be soft-pedaled. General Yeh stated in personal conversation with me today he deplored such attacks, that he thought Americans had made every effort to be impartial and helpful, and that he had been requested by Yen-an to investigate and report on anti-American propaganda in Peiping. He further stated that he had received from Lin Piao, Communist General in Manchuria, report that 2 American planes attacking Communist positions had been shot down and body of American found among crew, with request that he make strong protest to Commissioners, Executive Headquarters. General Yeh stated he had filed the message without action as he had no confidence in truth of report, adding that he well knew American soldiers wore identification tags and no such tags had been found on body. While Yeh is always cooperative and friendly, General Sun Shih-lun, Communist Plans and Operations Officer now Acting Chief of Staff in absence of General Lo, is such an obstructionist that we have seriously considered asking General Yeh to replace him. However, we deem it expedient to await further developments before taking such action.

893.00/4-3046

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs
(Vincent) of a Conversation With the Chinese Ambassador (Wei)*

[WASHINGTON,] April 30, 1946.

Ambassador Wei called at his own request. He seemed to have nothing in particular on his mind except the desire to discuss the situation in China. The sum and substance of our long conversation was that Wei felt (1) that Chiang Kai-shek would not, as a result of the temporary failure of negotiations over Manchuria, resort to military force to bring about a solution; (2) that Chiang was under strong pressure from the conservative Kuomintang elements to resist any further concessions to the Communists; and (3) that a cooling-off period devoted to discussion might bring about a peaceful solution. However, Wei was pessimistic that any solution between the Communists and the Kuomintang would be lasting. He had considerable to say regarding the undesirable, and quite obvious, fact that Chinese Communist predominance in northern Manchuria would have a most unwelcome influence on Chinese-Russian relations. He didn't seem to think there was much chance of success for my suggestion that the National Government endeavor to wean the old Manchurian politico-military element away from the Communists by making some concessions to their desire for a restoration of their former position in Manchuria.

Wei discussed the FEC ³⁶ in relation to reparations problems along lines of our previous conversations. I showed him a copy of the recent reply from the Soviet Government in regard to removal of Manchurian industries.³⁷

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Marshall to General Chou En-lai

OSE 2

NANKING, May 2, 1946.

DEAR GENERAL CHOU: I have been informed by Mr. Robertson that Colonel Humphrey of Team number 26 proceed[ed] to the town of Pei Piao (in eastern Jehol) on 1 May for the purpose of investigating a reported massing of Communist troops. Colonel Humphrey, accompanied by one interpreter and 2 Communist civilian guides attempted to contact the local Communist commanders. During this trip the party was fired upon by Communist party snipers and one civilian was killed. Colonel Humphrey received a slight wound. I have been further informed that this is not the first instance of U. S. team members being fired upon by Communist troops. Mr. Robertson protested this matter to Commissioner Yeh who expressed his deep regret, promised immediate investigation and promised to send messages to all Communist commanders to prevent recurrence of such incidents.

This situation has been complicated, if not caused, by the refusal of the Communist member of Team 26 to accompany it from Chengtu in defiance of the order of Executive Headquarters.

The American officers whose lives or security have been placed in jeopardy by these incidents are engaged solely in an effort to avert war and they are doing so under orders for which I alone am responsible.

G. C. MARSHALL

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270: Telegram

Mr. Walter S. Robertson to General Marshall

PEIPING, 3 May 1946.

2264. From Robertson and Byroade. In 601 [601-A] there is quoted a letter from you to General Chou En-lai requesting explanation detention of American Team member at Chihfeng by Communist personnel as reported to you in our Trusum number 98. In a letter from Colonel O. K. Pressley, United States Marine Corps, American

³⁶ Far Eastern Commission.

³⁷ Telegram No. 1307, April 23, 7 p. m., from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, vol. x, p. 1122.

Team 2 at Chihfeng, just received here, he furnishes me with substance of statement made by General Toanf [*Tung?*] Shu Chuan, Communist Party representative on his team who is also second in command Communist troops in that area. This statement followed a 24-hour conference on the subject of restriction of American Team member movements and was made on a highly personal and confidential basis. Request you do not reveal source of this information as it would result in extremely difficult future team relations in this area of Jehol. The statement follows:

"Now what I have to say I want you to consider as personal information. We consider that you have always tried to be fair in your work. You I consider a personal friend of mine. I sincerely hope that what I am about to say will not affect our personal friendship. The reason why you were not permitted to leave the city I will assume responsibility for that. It is like this, your Government's policy toward China is not one of a friendly attitude toward the Communist Party. Your Government is furnishing ships and planes to transport National Government troops. You are furnishing arms to kill Chinese with. You are lending money to the National Government to wage war on the Communist Party. The Communist Party does not favor any aid to China in any form at the present time. This struggle that is going on in China is something for the Chinese people to settle and the United States will not be able to settle it for us. No results can be achieved until the United States leaves [*ceases?*] to give aid to the National Government. Further you landed Marines in areas occupied by the Communist[s], later turning these areas over to the National Government. This was done to push us out of the areas. The people of China have lost faith in the American people. We do not subscribe to the policy of General Wedemeyer. We still have confidence in General Marshall but due to the policy of the American Government we cannot state that [*what?*] he will be able to accomplish. Not only the American members of Field Team 2 are affected, but all teams are about the same. I did not know of your arrest by the soldiers and did not order it, but I believe it to be due to the feeling of the people at present toward the American Government. I assure you that there is nothing personal, that it was caused by Government action. I hope that what I have told will not "interfere with out [*our*] personal friendship."

The above statement is the most straightforward we have obtained of present Communist attitude toward Americans. It is believed quite significant as it undoubtedly reflects the propaganda being spread throughout the Communist branch here and in the field. It may well be the cause of their present uncompromising attitude and resistance on practically all attempts at negotiations on even the most unimportant and insignificant details.

Pressley reports the above informant has very limited education but has been for many years an officer in the Communist army and has apparent good knowledge of Communist Party political and military

aims. It appears obvious that such an individual would not express such definite opinions on a subject such as our Governmental policy if he were not voicing information furnished him by his superiors in the Communist Party.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Mr. Walter S. Robertson to General Marshall

PEIPING, 4 May 1946.

2372. As previously reported freedom of field team movements has at times been restricted by interference of military and civil officials, but more often by refusal of Chinese team member to investigate situations involving reported violations by his side. Particularly has this latter been the case during the past weeks, with the Communist members being the chief offenders. The result has been an appreciable reduction of accurate information to Executive Headquarters. The problem is serious since it is believed extensive troop movements have been and are now going on unobserved and therefore unchallenged. We endeavored to correct situation on 21 March along lines suggested by you, as reported our 1082,³⁸ but, as indicated, we were blocked by Communist Commission[er] who insisted that proposal would have to be submitted to Chou En-lai for decision. Gen. Gillem later reported verbally that he was unable to obtain Chou's concurrence. Again Friday morning the Commissioners considered an American proposal: (a) To issue appropriate orders prohibiting either military or civil officials from delaying or obstructing in any way the movement of field teams; and (b) After requiring the full team to visit any particular area chosen by the vote of 2 members of the team. The Government Commissioner leading concurred in these proposals. The Communist Commissioner concurred in proposal (a), but regarding (b) again took the position that he did not have authority to agree since any action taken by other than unanimous agreement of the three members of the team involved a principle which would have to be submitted both to Yen-an and Nanking for consideration and advice. We are now awaiting high level Communist reply.

It is my opinion that General Yeh would have agreed on both occasions but from [for?] the restraining influence of the political commissars by whom he is surrounded and who, during his illness of the past 4 weeks, have unvaguely [*sic*] been acting for him. The principal Communist representatives both here and in the field are now employing every kind of tactics to prevent any action other than what is proposed by them. This general attitude makes it appear that in-

³⁸ March 21, p. 591.

structions must have been issued at the highest level to employ such tactics pending outcome of Manchurian discussions.

The foregoing is for your background information in event question should be raised by Chou En-lai in Committee of Three.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Chou En-lai to General Marshall

NANKING, May 4, 1946.

MY DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: I learned that the spokesman of Generalissimo's Headquarters in Sian has released a statement to the Central News at 1700, May 1, 1946, on arrival of Generalissimo at that city. I wish to point out that there are three points in that statement which do not conform with the true facts:

a. On April 29, 1946, the eve of your departure, you communicated to me the views of Generalissimo that (1) the proposal of the Democratic League³⁹ being unacceptable to him; and (2) the cessation of hostilities being dependent upon the evacuation of Communist troops from Changchun and the occupation by Government troops. As far as I understood, you merely presented the above as the views of Generalissimo, without stating this being yours. Therefore, it appears to me that the spokesman quoting you as having proposed that "at this moment the Communist troops should evacuate Changchun, for the purpose of having the city taken over by the Central troops, before everything else can be negotiated upon" is telling something which is not in conformity with facts.

b. The spokesman's allegation, that the "Government has never rejected any proposal" also does not correspond to truth. As a matter of fact, the Government rejected the proposal of the Democratic League, as well as your four-point proposal,⁴⁰ which is principally acceptable to us, but not to the Government.

c. On our part, we never raised any other claim except the consistent desire for an unconditional truce. Whereas we are firmly upholding the March 27 Agreement, the Government has violated it.

In view of the above, the spokesman's statement released on day of Generalissimo's arrival and disseminated by the Central News all over China and abroad appears to be inconsistent with the true facts. While expressing my regret over this statement I wish to draw your attention to this matter.

[Signature in Chinese]
(CHOU EN-LAI)

³⁹ Not found in Department files.

⁴⁰ April 23, p. 792.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Chou En-lai to General Marshall

NANKING, 4 May 1946.

MY DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: Referring to your memorandum dated April 25, 1946,⁴¹ enquiring about restricting movement of the U. S. team members, it was reported to me that there had been two instances of misunderstanding:

a. On April 18, 1946, Colonel Farris (transliteration) on proceeding to Nationalist garrison area at the Moli River, without accompaniment of any Communist officer or credential, was halted by the sentinel.

b. On April 20, 1946, Colonel Farris, Lt. Col. Orson and a third American were stopped from taking photo picture. The reason for this intervention was that on a previous occasion some misunderstanding was caused by Colonel Tourtillott, when he took some picture; thereupon he promised that no recurrence of such incident be made. So this time, when the American officers did not notify the Communists beforehand, they were stopped by the sentinel.

Though these misunderstanding[s] appear to be rather of no consequence, I have instructed our people in the field, that such instances of misunderstanding should possibly be avoided.

[Signature in Chinese]
(CHOU EN-LAI)

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Chou En-lai to General Marshall

NANKING, 4 May 1946.

MY DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: The Government's rejection of the various proposals of the Democratic League and the Chinese Communist Party for an immediate truce in Manchuria as well as the statement that the Government would not confer on anything else until the occupation of Changchun by Government troops is completed disclose the Government's intention to further and enlarge the armed conflicts in Manchuria. Meanwhile the battle of Szepingkai is reaching its height, and additional Government forces are sent up from China proper to Manchuria for causing more bloodshed. In addition to the 60th Army which has by now completed its movement, and the 93rd Army whose movement is nearing completion, the Government is planning to move eight other army units from South and Middle China, and two army units from North China to Manchuria,

⁴¹ Not printed, but see telegram No. 601-A, April 28, p. 800.

the movement of which will largely depend upon the assistance of the U. S. Navy and Air Forces. With the entry of these forces into Manchuria, not only the offensive of Government troops in that area will be intensified, but there is an increasing danger of having the war spread to China proper. As the matter now stands, offensive around the Communist area to the north of Hankow is being launched. Should these circumstances be furthered, the Chinese people, no doubt, will be thrown into a most tragic disaster.

During the two weeks since your return here your anxiety and efforts reinforced my belief that you have a firm desire to see the hostilities in Manchuria brought to an early end. Notwithstanding the fact, that on account of Government's stubbornness, you find great difficulty to convince the Government representative of the highest level with your words, we highly appreciate your efforts toward bringing about truce and wish to take this opportunity to assure you that we will continue to cooperate with you toward that end. Being too eager to see your mission crowned with an early success, I hope that you would not mind, if I venture to remind you that you still have other resources at your hand which would add immense weight to your talk with the Government. As we are all aware, it is almost unthinkable how the Government could have launched such a big-scale offensive in Manchuria, were there no transportation facilities provided by the U. S. Navy and Air Force. In this respect, the U. S. transportation assistance constitutes a decisive factor to the present situation in Manchuria. Having this in mind, Yen-an asked me to formally make this suggestion to you, that the U. S. Navy and Air Forces will immediately withdraw their assistance of transporting Government troops and ammunitions to Manchuria.

Seeing that President Truman has declared that "United States support will not extend to United States military intervention to influence the course of any Chinese internal strife",⁴² and that the Moscow communiqué,⁴³ on which the United States Government has put its signature, has stressed "the need for a cessation of civil strife", I feel confident that you will pay full consideration to this suggestion and decide as to what are the most effective measures toward the implementation of those statements.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature in Chinese]
(CHOU EN-LAI)

⁴² *United States Relations With China*, pp. 607, 608.

⁴³ *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. II, pp. 815 and 821.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Conference Between General Marshall and General Hsu Yung-chang at General Marshall's House, May 4, 1946, 8: 15 p. m.

Also present: Colonel Caughey
Colonel Pee
Captain Soong

General Marshall informed General Hsu that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss the situation North of Hankow. General Hsu said that he did not believe a critical situation was developing although General Chou had insisted that there was. General Chou believed an attack would take place between 4 and 9 May using 20 divisions of National troops which were massed for that purpose. General Chou insisted that General Hsu wire the Generalissimo, General Pei Chung Hsi and General Ho Ying-chin. General Hsu told General Chou that he would wire the Generalissimo but not General Pei and Ho since he himself is director of military operations, and knew that the accusation was not true.⁴⁴

General Marshall said that he was convinced that Chou was truly worried. He said he was not in a position to take any action regarding Manchuria and his main interest at this point was to see that the situation did not explode in North China. General Marshall stated that General Chou wanted General Hsu to go with him. General Marshall added that under the circumstances it is best to get to the Communist leader in the area to prove or disprove the point. General Marshall further stated that it is important to place this team in the Communist headquarters.

General Marshall digressed for a moment to discuss with General Hsu the Manchurian situation to illustrate the misunderstandings that can develop. General Marshall stated that the Communists were completely misled as to the number of units moved by U. S. shipping resources; that when General Marshall was able to acquaint him with the facts, General Chou appeared satisfied. General Marshall added that the National Government had been extremely alarmed with reference to possible Russian participation with the Communists' forces in their attacks against Nationalist troops but that Major Rigg, and an American officer, reported facts quite to the contrary indicating that instead of Russian soldiers it was Japanese soldiers and instead of Russian tanks it was Japanese tanks and instead of Russian arms

⁴⁴ For correspondence on this subject, see pp. 613 ff.

it was Japanese arms. In this connection General Marshall added that Major Rigg also reported the death of several Russians in Changchun at the hands of Nationalist forces; that it was easy for him to understand why this may have happened, but he was considerably concerned as to the Russian reaction and possible reprisals.

General Marshall then discussed the fear evidenced on each side toward the other side. He stated that a great deal of the fear on the Communist side was caused directly by the National Government's failure to report troop movements as agreed to in the 10 January Cease Fire agreement. He added that this fear aggravated by other fears directly attributable to National Government actions or failure to act was what gave them concern with respect to the present situation in North Hupeh. Elaborating on the fears of both the National Government and the Communist Party, General Marshall stated that the National Government feared Communist alliance with the Soviets. He added that a fear of the Communists concerned their belief that the National Government did not intend to carry out the agreements of the PCC; another Communist fear concerned the National Government's secret police. General Marshall stated that he, in all his deliberations, attempted to dispell these fears and further attempted to clarify the situation on both sides in order that negotiations toward peace could be continued. General Marshall then added that the overall situation was as difficult as it could be and that it would require the patience and skill of all concerned to improve the relationship and to find a solution.

General Marshall stated that he had one possible solution with reference to the Manchurian situation. He said that since the Communists would not evacuate Changchun and at the same time permit the entry of National troops and since the Government wanted the Communists to evacuate Changchun so their forces could move in, it may be agreeable to both sides for the Communists to evacuate Changchun and the National Forces refrain from moving in. An advance echelon of Executive Headquarters, including General Byroade, the Chiefs of Staff and possibly the Commissioners would then be established in Changchun for the purpose of establishing peace. General Marshall stated that while he disliked putting an American officer in such a position, he would overlook the undesirability of such a move in order to reach a solution. In addition to the establishment of Executive Headquarters in Changchun, the mayor in the city possibly could organize a peace preservation corps. General Marshall asked General Hsu to keep this proposal in mind in his discussions with the Generalissimo.

121.893/5-646: Telegram

*General Marshall to President Truman*⁴⁵

NANKING, 6 May 1946.

651. DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have delayed in sending this report in the hope that I would have reached an agreement on Manchuria before this. The following describes the situation on my arrival and the developments to date.

I found a complete break between the Government and the Communists on the Manchurian question with hostilities increasing in intensity and threatening to spread south into China proper. In my opinion the situation grew from the following circumstances: The Communists became fearful of the good faith of the government party in carrying out the Political Consultative Conference written agreements for the formation of a bona fide coalition interim Government and the drafting of a constitution to be submitted to the constitutional convention scheduled for May 5th. This Communist doubt was stimulated by the anti-Communist demonstrations which at times resulted in physical attacks on Communist meetings, newspaper offices and individuals. In Manchuria the situation was aggravated by the prolonged unwillingness of the Government to send field teams from Executive Headquarters into that region to suppress sporadic fighting. At the same time the conditions under which the Government had to proceed to re-occupy Manchuria were made exceedingly difficult because of the fact that transportation of their troops by rail to occupy points as evacuated by the Russians was denied them while the Communists appeared free to move in themselves. Also they apparently gained access to Japanese military equipment and stores, including medium artillery and tanks, which steadily strengthened their military power while the Government military position grew weaker due to the great distances over which its small force of troops had to advance in proceedings northward.

The Communist matched their doubts or fears as to the good faith with which the Government political leaders would carry out the Political Consultative Conference agreements by insisting on some representation in the local government of Manchuria which has been turned over to National appointees from Central and South China.

On the purely military side, the Government Generals evidently felt that they had far more military power of action than was actually the case and I think influenced the Generalissimo accordingly. They then precipitated themselves into a seriously weak and dangerous

⁴⁵ Copy transmitted through the War Department to the Secretary of State or Under Secretary of State (Acheson).

military position of which the Communists were fully aware and seized the advantage accordingly. Changchun was taken from a small National Garrison which had been flown in and at the same time and to date the northern advance of the Government forces was successfully blocked to the south of Changchun.

I have endeavored since my arrival to bring about a cessation of fighting and negotiate the disputed points in Manchuria. The Communists have clearly broken the plain terms of the cease firing agreement of January 10 last regarding the freedom of action to be accorded the Government in the establishment of sovereignty in Manchuria. On the other hand the Government itself, up to the time of my return to the States, did not proceed in strict accordance with the terms of the agreement in that it did not admit teams to control the sporadic and I think unnecessary fighting during the northern advance of Government armies, which fighting finally developed into successful Communist opposition. The Communists have joined with me in my proposal to send teams into Manchuria. The Generalissimo stated to me his opposition was based on the fact that the presence of an American officer might cause the Soviet Government to demand equal representation. It was not until the day of my departure for the United States on March 11th that he finally agreed to the entry of the teams but numerous conditions were stipulated which finally brought about the breakdown of this agreement, and when the teams were finally cleared for entry into Manchuria on March 27th, their directives were not sufficiently broad to enable them to bring about a cessation of the fighting, which meanwhile developed into a dangerous situation for the Government forces.

In addition to the foregoing there has been a justified complaint by the Communists that the Government Commander at Canton has not observed the terms of the cease firing agreement and the Supreme Headquarters of the Government armies at Nanking failed to carry out the specific stipulation of the January 10th agreement to report all movements of Nationalist Troops to Executive Headquarters in Peiping. There have, of course, been a number of minor infractions of the agreement by subordinate commanders on both sides.

On my return I found the irreconcilable members of the Government Party were firmly in the saddle and the Generalissimo took the position that the Communists were in league with the Soviet Government and could not be relied upon to keep any agreements. In other words, he meant that my efforts in the past to bring about agreements were based on a faulty conception as to the dependability of the Communist representatives.

The Communists in turn had been stirred by the fighting in Manchuria to direct their propaganda against the United States transporting any more troops to Manchuria or ammunition, or the use of troops armed with U. S. equipment (issued during the war against Japan) against the Communists or the granting of any loans to China. The impasse was complete except that the Communists were willing to submit sure future military dispositions and local political reorganizations to negotiations if fighting would be terminated. The Generalissimo declined such compromises on the grounds that the agreement of January 10th clearly gave National Troops the right to proceed anywhere in Manchuria necessary to establish sovereignty and took the stand that negotiations regarding political matters would only be considered after sovereignty had been established along the railroad mentioned in the Sino-Soviet Treaty, but was militarily powerless to enforce his demands. A proposal was made by me in Peiping, I thought at the time [in agreement?] with the view of the Generalissimo that he could not and would not advance further north, but I found the next evening that he had again in mind the use of military power to seize Changchun and overpower the Communist Forces in that region. In this connection he was intensely interested in the transportation of two additional armies to Manchuria. One army had just completed its transit by sea to Manchuria in our shipping and another was partially enroute. I have permitted the movement of the latter to continue but I declined to authorize the movement of the two additional armies, first, because I could not then tell, and still am in doubt, as to the capability of our Seventh Fleet to move the armies in view of demobilization conditions in June and the complications involved in the change of date for CROSSROADS, the atomic tests in the Central Pacific—also the urgent necessity to move UNRRA food up the Yangtze River towards Hankow—and secondly, because I would not authorize such a movement—the two additional armies—without taking the question to my Government as it amounts in effect to supporting under the existing circumstances, a civil war. He is greatly concerned over the possibility that his supply communications with Manchuria might be cut off by the withdrawal of Seventh Fleet support and that the provision of munitions might likewise be shut off. I have not expressed myself on this point, but it is my conviction that it would be most unfair for our Government to leave, as it were, his troops now in Manchuria completely in the lurch as the Chinese Government for some months to come will not possess sufficient transportation to maintain their armies in the north. Of course the Communists are appealing or demanding that we do cut off the Government armies.

Meanwhile, the Generalissimo finally came to the point some days ago of proposing the same conditions for the Manchurian settlement that the Communists had actually proposed about 6 weeks earlier, except that the Communists now hold Changchun, which they did not then. He demands that they evacuate Changchun and permit the National Troops to occupy it, thereafter matters to be negotiated both as to military dispositions and political reorganizations.

The successful Communist generals in the Changchun region, jubilant over seizing the place, were armed with Japanese equipment and in a very strong strategic position [and] are now, I feel sure, dominating the negotiations of their representatives. They do not accept such an arrangement and Chou En-lai urges me to withdraw shipping support to force the Generalissimo's hand. The Generalissimo's political advisors or backers, and I think his military leaders also, urge a policy of force which they are not capable of carrying out even with our logistical support and presence of Marines in North China Ports of Tsingtao, Tientsin and up railroad towards the Port of Chinwangtao from which the important coal is shipped south.

In brief, we are now at an impasse with the Generalissimo insistent on his demand for the evacuation of Changchun and his occupation of the city and the Communist refusal, possessing as they do the power to hold the place. I had hoped to break the deadlock day before yesterday, but was not successful. The outlook is not promising and the only alternative to a compromise arrangement is, in my opinion, utter chaos in North China to which the fighting will inevitably spread. I have been laboring the past 2 weeks, and particularly the past 2 days, to hold the peace in North China and have had to take many measures to meet the critical issues as they arise. All are related in Manchuria and North China, to the fear on the side of the Communists that the stalwarts of the Government Party do not mean to go through with genuine coalition government, and the fear on the part of the Government of Soviet Russian influence or assistance, with the successful Communist Military operations in Manchuria strongly influencing all Communist Party action.

I am in the midst of the problem. At this moment I submit no recommendations. I am merely submitting a too long delayed report of the situation. I am going ahead in the hope that I can resolve the difficulties without troubling you and while I am taking many diplomatic liberties I am trying to do so in a manner that will keep the skirts of the U. S. Government clear and leave charges of errors of judgement to my account.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Hsu Yung-chang to General Marshall

[Translation]

No. Ti (35) Fa Wen 35

[NANKING,] 6 May 1946.

The following is forwarded for your information :

Troops of T'ao Yung, Commander of the Chinese Communist 8th Column Group in Central China were originally stationed at Yu-Yi, southwest of Pao-Ying. They moved to Huai-Yin on 4 April; to Pao-Ying on 6 April; passed thru Hsing-Hua on 8 April; reached the vicinity of Nan-T'ung on 20 April; and in the evening of 26 April, approximately 20,000 of these troops raided Government troops at Kuan-Yin-Shan, Hsiao-Hai-Chen (southeast of Nan-T'ung) in two routes from Shih-Chiang-Chen (north of Nan-T'ung). As the result of unpreparedness of Government troops thereat, both these places were occupied by the Chinese Communist troops. On 27 April and morning of 28 April, the Chinese Communist troops attacked the town of Nan-T'ung with no success. On 29 April they retreated toward the direction of Shih-Chiang-Chen. The Government troops then restored and re-occupied the positions held prior to 26 April and did not pursue to attack the retreating Chinese Communist troops.

Casualties inflicted on Government troops were over 300 officers and men killed and/or wounded including 1 regimental commander killed and 1 assistant regimental commander and 2 battalion commanders wounded.

A protest has been sent to General Chou En-lai, Chinese Communist Representative.

HSU YUNG-CHANG

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Hsu Yung-chang to General Marshall

[Translation]

No. 52

NANKING, 8 May 1946.

We are in receipt of a telegram from General Ku Chu-tung, dated 20 April 1946, to the following effect :

"The Tsao-chuang Coal Mine Area has been for a long time under the siege of the Communist force, and has sustained great losses. When General Marshall, General Chang Chih-chung and General Chou En-lai, the Committee of Three, last came to Hsuehchow, we were directed to start to work for saving the mine from being entirely ruined. As was arranged, both the Government and the Communist forces were to withdraw from the mine area, the mine was to be

turned over to the owner, and no armed forces be permitted to remain therein with the exception of the mine garrison. This arrangement was to be put into implementation by the Twenty-second Field Executive Team. Thereafter, the owner of the Chung-Hsin Coal Mining Company sent their man, carrying with him necessary certificates to us, asking us to take action in regard to their mine field at Tsao-chuang which is being under occupation of the Communists. The Communists, however, refused to discuss this matter.

Moreover, as, according to the resolution of the Twenty-second Field Executive Team, both parties, the Government and Communists, were to evacuate their respective forces according to a three-phase program, beginning 1st April 1946, and as our first-phase and second-phase evacuation were under implementation, the Communists went so far as to have inspected and confiscated properties of our withdrawing troops. The question of mine garrison was discussed by the Twenty-second Field Executive Team, before the third-phase evacuation of our troops took place. The Communists declined to consider the maintenance of the garrison unit originally organized by the said Mining Company, and maintained that the Bureau of Mining Affairs and its Mine Protection Corps organized by them should not evacuate.

The question has become a deadlock and no result obtained even though the Senior Team put up much effort for its settlement. Today, the Communist's attitude is becoming more and more menacing. They are still maintaining the siege of Tsao-chuang, and pondering [*plundering?*] any supplies we would send to the besieged troops. A very critical situation indeed. In view of the fact that the Chung-Hsin Coal Mining Company is a private enterprise, there is no reason for us not to turn over the garrison duty to said company, and for the Communists not to evacuate their Bureau of Mining Affairs. Mine-protection Corps and troops at Tsao-chuang. May I therefore request that decision be immediately made by the Committee of Three and action be taken to abstain the Communists from committing any more illegal acts."

I have the pleasure of informing you this case and request your immediate action in regard thereto.

Hsu Yung-chang (SEAL)

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Yu Ta-wei and General Marshall at 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, May 8, 1946, 3 p.m.

Also present: Colonel Caughey

General Yu Ta Wei opened the meeting by stating that he had had a conference with the Generalissimo regarding the letter which General Marshall said he had received from General Chou.⁴⁶ General Yu Ta Wei asked whether this letter was a request that General Marshall reenter mediations for peace in Manchuria. General Marshall

⁴⁶ May 4, p. 810.

replied in the negative indicating that the letter merely requested that he use his influence to solve the problem. General Yu then said that the Generalissimo was of the opinion that the time was not propitious for General Marshall to reenter mediation. General Marshall then pointed out to General Yu Ta Wei that if the basis of the Generalissimo's request was to afford National Forces time to attack Changchun, then the Generalissimo's action was ill-advised and definitely in the wrong. General Marshall further pointed out that an attack on Changchun was a great hazard in that its success or failure would preclude further negotiation for peace.

General Yu Ta Wei stated that the Generalissimo was interested in receiving from General Marshall his views on the conditions for peace in Manchuria and desired General Marshall to reduce to writing these thoughts. General Marshall indicated that he was at a handicap to express his views without first knowing the views of the Generalissimo and he was further handicapped in that he was not too familiar with the political aspects of the Manchurian situation. General Marshall stated, however, that militarily speaking he was of the opinion that Communist occupation west of Harbin toward Manchouli would probably be the best scheme, but this may not be concurred in by the Communists since they most likely would desire territory adjacent to Jehol and Chahar including Changchun or parts of the railroad. At this point, General Yu stressed the importance of placing small government forces in critical areas such as Harbin, Tsitsihar and along the railroads from Changchun toward the Northwest as symbolic of the National Government occupation. General Marshall pointed out the precariousness of such a policy and stated that the National forces should concentrate in Southern Manchuria, balancing their aspirations as to zones of occupation with realistic considerations as to logistical support and probable Communist reaction to occupation elsewhere.

General Marshall told General Yu that it would be necessary for the Generalissimo to make concessions to the Communists regarding political appointees in Manchuria. General Marshall suggested appointment by the National Government of non-partisan representatives who, because of their non-partisanship, would not aggravate the Communists. The Communists should be permitted to appoint a few of these appointees to act as a counter-balance.

General Yu said he was of the opinion that the Government and the Communists were approaching a peaceful solution. He added that the most important consideration was relative strength and suggested a Government troop disposition as follows:

- Two armies in Mukden with detachments along the railroad;
- One army in Changchun;
- Two armies south [*north*] of the Great Wall including Hulutao.

He then stated that the one Communist army could be located in the vicinity of the railroads but not in any of the key towns along the railroads. At this point General Marshall indicated that General Yu's symbolic visions for occupation north of Changchun would get the Government into serious trouble. General Marshall then outlined his concept of reaching a peaceful solution by causing Communist evacuation of Changchun and placing in Changchun an advance echelon of Executive Headquarters without permitting—say for six months—entry of Government forces. General Marshall then asked General Yu for his opinion on the political aspects of the Manchurian situation and stated that the reason for this request was based on the Generalissimo's desire that the Committee of Three pick up political matters in addition to military affairs. General Yu replied that he was unable to offer any suggestions since he was a military, rather than a political, man.

In closing, General Marshall emphasized the necessity for an early resolution regarding the control of railroads and control of puppet troops since these two matters were of deep concern to the Communists.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

General Hsu Yung-chang to General Marshall

[Translation]

No. 51

NANKING, 8 May 1946.

According to a telegram from Mr. Liu Chieh, Member of the Political Committee, dated 22 April 1946, majority of the Government Officials at Changchun have been arrested by the Communists, and Chen Chia-chen, Commanding Officer of the Defense Forces was wounded by the same. The telegram further requested that suggestion be made to the Communist representative to permit the Government despatching three planes there for air-lifting said personnel from Changchun to Mukden. Having already contacted the Communist representative for releasing said personnel, I am sending this information to you for your attention.

HSU YUNG-CHANG (SEAL)

893.00/5-1046 : Telegram

The Counselor of Embassy in China (Smyth) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, May 10, 1946—10 a. m.

[Received May 10—9:08 a. m.]

779. Summary M[military] A[ttaché's] report for period 21 April through 6 May.

Control of Changchun in Communist hands following defeat numerically inferior Nationalist force. Assistant Military Attaché at Changchun during action reports Communist forces young, well disciplined, battle experienced, with excellent morale and well indoctrinated with Communist principles. Communists employed 6 Jap tanks operated by Japanese and were armed with high ratio automatic weapons most of which were Japanese.

Communist sources report Communist occupation Harbin 28 April. Little change reported in Szuping kai area; Govt forces penetrated suburbs on 26 April but were repulsed. Govt forces stormed and occupied Penghsihu on 3 May.

Chinese G-2 reports, 110,000 Soviet troops in Dairen-Port Arthur area and states 50,000 Soviet troops transferred from Manchuria to northern Korea. Remainder Soviet force Manchuria state[d] concentrated Manchuli.

Recurrence Govt-Communist clashes eastern Shantung. Reported fighting has also broken out in northern Hupei and southern Honan, but not confirmed.

Govt anxious to commence repatriation Japanese from Manchuria. Reports indicate 300,000 Japanese in Mukden area and 30,000 at Chinchow.

SMYTH

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Yu Ta-wei and General Marshall at 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, May 10, 1946, 11 a.m.

Also present: Colonel Caughey

General Marshall handed General Yu Ta-wei a list itemizing the ammunition which had already been delivered and ammunition yet to be delivered to National Armies in Manchuria on United States requisition by United States resources. General Marshall told Colonel Caughey to investigate further with Theater Headquarters the basis upon which the "day of fire" was calculated.

General Marshall told General Yu that he had just seen two American correspondents who recently returned from Changchun. General Marshall explained briefly to General Yu their reactions to the experiences they had had during the attack on, and occupation of[,] Changchun by Communist forces in late April.

General Yu Ta-wei said that the reason for his coming this morning was to obtain from General Marshall his written comments with respect to the basis for a solution to the Manchurian problem which he asked for the previous day. General Marshall indicated that he

had already prepared a statement⁴⁷ but he was not satisfied with it and, therefore, would read to General Yu Ta-wei that part pertaining to the military situation. He promised General Yu to rework the memorandum with respect to the political aspects and give it to him as soon as possible. At this point General Marshall read from the Memorandum to the Generalissimo previously prepared by him. General Yu thanked General Marshall and said he would come back later this afternoon to get the revised memorandum.⁴⁸

General Yu, in retaliation to a comment made by General Marshall in his memorandum to the Generalissimo (which he had previously read to General Yu), attempted to clarify his position with reference to occupation of places north of Changchun by Government forces. He stated that he had no idea of occupying in force, but visualized the use of one battalion deployed along the railroad from Harbin to Manchouli out of an army whose headquarters and major proportion of troops would be located at Harbin. General Marshall stated that he still did not concur with this proposal since the position of the forces would be precarious.

General Yu asked General Marshall to be more explicit in rewriting his memorandum to the Generalissimo regarding the zones of military occupation of Communist vis-à-vis Nationalist forces in Manchuria and also more explicit about the proposed alteration of the ratio between Communist and Nationalist forces in Manchuria.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Marshall to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek

OSE 27

[NANKING,] May 10, 1946.

Subject: Possible Basis for Agreement Regarding Manchurian Issues.

General Yu Ta Wei requested me to reduce to writing suggestions of mine for a possible basis of reaching an agreement to put a stop to the fighting in Manchuria. I lack the necessary foundation of knowledge to base with any assurance suggestions regarding the political aspects of the problem. I am better informed, of course, as to the military considerations. With regard to the entire problem, I am taking into consideration the possibilities for agreement on the part of the Communist Party though I have made no proposal to them since April 23d other than to transmit the proposition stated by your Excellency just prior to our departure from Chungking. In other words, whatever in the following discussion I suggest as a possible basis of compromise in order to reach an agreement for terminating the fighting has not been suggested to General Chou En-lai by me.

⁴⁷ Not printed.

⁴⁸ *Infra*.

MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS

In my opinion, the deployment of the Government forces in Manchuria should not be determined on the basis of an effective resistance to possible offensive action by the Soviet Government. Sufficient Government forces and supplies cannot be maintained in Manchuria adequate to a substantial defense of that nature. Therefore, the decision as to the disposition of the Government forces should, in the first place, I would think, be based on the Government's uncertainty as to future action of the Communist Party and the possible reactions of the Soviet Government in connection therewith. The deployment should also be based on the facilities for supply and maintenance.

These two considerations would seem to indicate the concentration of National troop strength in the southern portion of Manchuria, with the major concentrations in the vicinity of Mukden and to the northward of Hulutao.

Another consideration is the probability of Communists insistence on a reconsideration of the final military strengths in Manchuria to increase their present agreed upon proportion of one Communist division to 14 National Army divisions. Just what their demand might be I do not know, but my guess would be that they will insist on one army. If that proved to be the case, the National Government might raise its total by one division which would make the comparison 5 Government armies to 1 Communist.

If this adjustment were to be acceptable, then the next consideration would be the final disposition of those forces and it is in regard to this matter that my lack of basic knowledge regarding the political significance of the areas and other factors makes it difficult for me to formulate a proposal. Off-hand it would seem that the Government should hold its forces to the south of Changchun and might well accept the Communist army (as a future part of the National army) to be disposed in the area to the west of Harbin and toward Manchouli. General Yu Ta Wei has insisted that one National army should be distributed between Changchun and Manchouli as a sort of symbolic recognition of the power of the Central Government. I think such a disposition not only would be seriously weak, even from a symbolic standpoint, but that it would probably block negotiations, and even if agreed upon, would be a future source of constant disturbance. I am inclined to think that the Government would do better to accept a Communist army in principle as a portion of the Government forces and agree to locate it in this region.

With regard to the dispositions along the railroad there are three factors, it seems to me, that must be considered. First is the Sino-Soviet treaty provisions which the Central Government is intensely interested, from an international viewpoint, in strictly carrying out.

The second is the fact that the Soviet military in Manchuria have, at least by negative action, made it exceedingly difficult for the Central Government to carry out its responsibilities under that treaty. And the third is the question as to whether or not that particular treaty relationship regarding the railroad is of such overwhelming importance that a calamitous civil war must be accepted rather than to compromise the execution of the agreement, or that it is of such importance that rather than compromise the treaty agreement the Central Government would surrender any possibility of influence over the greater part of Manchuria.

In the present troop situation, I am of the opinion that should a northern advance of the National army on Changchun be carried out, before a possible basis of agreement is reached regarding the cessation of hostilities, there would remain small prospect of reaching any agreement, except by the destruction of the Communist military forces in Manchuria, which I do not think is within the power of the Government. Incidentally, if such an advance should be undertaken and it should be repulsed, then the Government's position would, in my opinion, be so seriously compromised that little could be done towards a peaceful solution without an unacceptable sacrifice of prestige on the part of the Government.

I have not been informed as to whether or not the Communist Party would accept the proposal of your Excellency for them to evacuate Changchun and agree to the occupation of that place by troops of the Central Government before any agreement for the cessation of hostilities would be signed and before any negotiations regarding future military dispositions and political reorganizations would be entered into. It is my impression that the Communists will not agree to the immediate occupation of Changchun by the troops of the National Government. I do not know whether or not they would agree to the evacuation of Changchun by their forces, but it is my hope that they might be prevailed upon to agree to that phase of your Excellency's proposal and could be induced to accept some compromise arrangement regarding the actual occupation of Changchun. If that proved to be the case, it is my suggestion that the issue be met by the proposal to have an advance headquarters of the Executive Headquarters, established in Changchun to control that city during the period of negotiations with the authority to organize Peace Preservation troops and to take such other measures as might be necessary to facilitate the operation of the railroad and restore local conditions to a normal basis. It might be that an agreement could be found for the eventual occupation of Changchun by National forces, say in three months after reaching an agreement in the negotiations.

Your Excellency has stated that you would not entertain any compromise regarding the proposal of conditions that I communicated to

General Chou En-lai in your name, however, it seems to me that if an agreement cannot be secured in a very few days to that proposal, it is greatly to the interest of the Central Government to attempt to find some acceptable basis of compromise because I feel that time is definitely working against the Central Government and in favor of the Communists. And also I feel extremely concerned about the situation in North China which is trembling on the verge of a serious break which would inevitably involve a general civil war.

POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS

I have already referred to my uncertainty regarding these matters and therefore submit my suggestions with considerable hesitation. I am informed by American members of the press who were in Changchun and had lengthy interviews with Communist leaders, that the military, political and propaganda headquarters in Manchuria have been established in that city and that elections of some character have been held to select governors for eight of the nine provinces. From conversations which have already taken place between the representatives of the Democratic League and myself and between General Chou En-lai and myself, it would appear that the reorganization of the Political Council and the Economic Council in Manchuria would facilitate all other negotiations. What apparently is desired is the removal of the Council from military domination and representation on the Council of both Communists and residents of Manchuria. I assume that domination of the Council by the Government would be acceptable provided that there was reasonable representation of the other groups.

The Communists have definitely stated their insistence on having the local governments which have been elected, presumably under their supervision continued in force until the negotiations have determined the future political arrangements in Manchuria. I suppose they would probably endeavor to maintain at least a portion of these local governments under the final arrangements, but I also suppose that they will make a point of insisting on some representation in the matter of provincial governors. Here, specifically, I am without the necessary knowledge to submit suggestions with any assurance of their soundness, but reasoning from a map, the possibility occurred to me that the compromise in these matters might be related to the region in which Communist military forces were to be disposed, that is, to the provinces of Nunchang, Hsingan, Liao-pei, and Heilungchiang. Such a concentration of Communist influence might well be considered highly undesirable, but this undesirability would have to be weighed against the possible effects of a scattering of Communist influence throughout the region and, what apparently you regard as inevitable, contact with the Soviet influence along the border. In view of the present establishment of Communist control in almost all portions of

Manchuria from Changchun north, I fear they will be inclined to drive a hard bargain, but that is the problem to be faced unless the larger part of Manchuria is to be completely abandoned—which also involves, I think, a complete disruption in North China.

GENERAL COMMENTS

With regard to all of the foregoing, we are confronted with a definite and serious weakness in the Government's military position and a strategic military advantage of the Communist forces. We are also confronted with the profound desire of the Chinese people for peace and a similar desire on the part of the people of the world. In the circumstances, I do not agree with General Yu Ta-wei that the psychological effect of a certain compromise on the part of the Central Government to achieve peace would be ruinous to the prestige of the Government. On the contrary. I feel, that if it becomes necessary, such a compromise as I proposed for the utilization of the Executive Headquarters—not merely a team—in Changchun would be unmistakable evidence to the world that your Excellency was making every effort to promote peace, particularly in utilizing an agency that was created solely for that purpose.

In connection with the immediate arrangements for the cessation of hostilities there remains the question of whether or not the Soviet Government would oppose the American participation. There have been no indications that I know of that they were antagonistic to the entry of our teams and I think the necessity for the presence of American mediation is so evident that the risk of Soviet resentment or insistence on representation should be accepted.

Finally, I would submit this thought, some compromise must be achieved, and that quickly, or China is faced with a chaotic situation, militarily, financially and otherwise economically.

G. C. MARSHALL

893.00/5-1046: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in China*⁴⁹

WASHINGTON, May 10, 1946—3 p. m.

107. Following from President. Eyes Alone General Marshall.

Thank you for your reasoned and informative report of May 6.⁵⁰ I have read it with full appreciation of the difficulties that confront you, with approval of your methods and logic in meeting them, and with admiration for your determination to overcome them.

⁴⁹ Drafted by John Carter Vincent, Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs.

⁵⁰ Telegram No. 651, p. 815.

From your account of recent events, it seems to me that Chiang must soon become aware that his agreement to your proposals for achieving peace and unity cannot realistically be viewed as a self-denying relinquishment of Kuomintang power but should on the contrary be viewed as a means of preserving for him and the liberal element in the Kuomintang a place and influence in the government of a united China which otherwise might only be secured, and this doubtfully, by all-out civil war.

With regard to the Chinese Communists, it is apparent to me that the chances of unity would be greatly enhanced if there could be assurance that the opportunistic disregard for agreement which characterized their recent move in Manchuria would cease.

You may make such confidential use of these opinions as you may deem useful.

You may eliminate from the heavy burden you are carrying so well the concern expressed in the final paragraph of your message in as much as our confidence and support are not conditional.

The Acting Secretary of State joins me in the foregoing views and has sent a copy of your message to Secretary Byrnes.

With best regards and wishes,

Harry S. Truman.

ACHESON

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Conference Between General Marshall and Professor Chow, at General Marshall's House, Nanking, May 10, 1946, 2:30 p. m.

Also present: Captain Soong

Professor Chow opened the meeting by stating that he is the representative of the Young China Party and also the editor of a daily newspaper at Chengtu called *Hsin Hua Jui Pao*.

General Marshall asked Prof. Chow the reason for his visit. If he were a newspaper man requesting an interview General Marshall would conduct himself accordingly. Prof. Chow then said that his visit to Gen. Marshall was as a member of the Young China Party. Then he inquired about Gen. Marshall's viewpoint as to the present situation.

Gen. Marshall stated that the situation in China at the present is extremely tragic. It is largely due to the fear and mistrust of each side toward the other. Gen. Marshall said the main obstacle to an agreement was the lack of appreciation on either side of the fears of the other party. Each is only aware of its own fears and neither realizes that the other party is equally fearful. Whenever a proposal is made, both parties immediately doubt the intention of the proposal. Gen. Marshall further stated that at the present, the Kuomintang believes that the Democratic League is subservient to the Communist Party and at the same time, the Communist Party believes that the Young

China Party is subservient to the Kuomintang. The representatives of the Democratic League have spoken to Gen. Marshall during his last few days in Chungking and begged him for suggestions as to what the Democratic League could do in order to help solve the political stalemate in China. General Marshall had suggested that the three minority groups—the Democratic League, the Young China Party and a third Non-Party group[—]should combine together and form one single independent and neutral political party and give its full support to General Marshall in his effort to mediate between the two major contesting parties. General Marshall said the situation is so tragic that it seems none of the political parties in China is for the moment representing the desires of the people and that the circumstances have made him in a sense their representative. He further stated that he spent a great deal of effort in the United States to obtain urgently needed help for China for which he has subjected himself to criticism from all sides.

Professor Chow then attempted to clarify the position of the Young China Party by saying that the founder of this party originally also founded the Democratic League. But later, due to political differences, a group branched out and formed the Young China Party about 5 or 6 years ago in Paris. He further said that this party was formed to represent the interests of the people and to help to build a new China. He also attempted to clarify that the Young China Party is in no way affiliated with the Kuomintang. He then asked Gen. Marshall what can be done at the present in order to break up the political stalemate.

General Marshall replied that the simplest way is by getting the three minority groups together to form a neutral political party. This is not a permanent measure but an interim method in order to hasten the two major contesting parties to reach an agreement.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Conference Between General Marshall and General Yu Ta-wei at General Marshall's House, May 11, 1946, 9:45 a. m.

Also present: Colonel Caughey
Captain Soong

General Marshall handed General Yu Ta-wei a memorandum for the Generalissimo⁵¹ concerning the conditions for a peaceful settlement in Manchuria. General Yu suggested to General Marshall, if

⁵¹ May 10, p. 824.

it were possible, to allow a National army to occupy Changchun with symbolic forces sent out along the railroad to Manchouli. To this General Marshall replied that symbolism matters little if the area is dominated by the Communists. It is a matter of weighing the symbolic gesture against the actual power. Gen. Marshall stated that Gen. Byroade believed the situation in North China is even more serious than he had thought. As far as the time element is concerned, the situation is becoming more advantageous to the Communists.

General Marshall continued by saying the entire situation may wind up in the partial withdrawal of the National forces from Manchuria and probably an outbreak of civil war in North China. The big question is, how is the National Government going to meet the situation. With the Communist radicals and militarists in power, General Chou has lost a great deal of his power to negotiate thus making it problematical whether we can restore the balance we had on 1 March. There are still two major irritations in North China: one is the railroad fortifications, and the second is the failure of the National Government to report its routine movement of troops. It seems that both sides are maneuvering against one another and such maneuvering must be stopped now or else it can't be stopped at all. The situation in North China is entirely dominated by the outcome in Manchuria. Failure to solve this situation will render Executive Headquarters ineffective. General Yu then said he was merely trying to pave the way for a discussion between the Generalissimo and General Marshall although he himself was of the strong opinion that symbolic occupation was necessary. General Marshall said that while in Chungking, the Generalissimo had repeatedly stated that he would not sign or agree to anything that did not provide evacuation of Changchun and National troop occupation. General Marshall outlined his proposal of an advanced echelon of Executive Headquarters in Changchun to supervise the Communist evacuation and avoid the necessity of occupation immediately by Government troops.

General Yu then stated that the Generalissimo's feeling is shared by many other Chinese. He further stated that we must not be confused between the resumption of negotiations and the period after the negotiations. He proposed that the area north of Changchun not be discussed until later and that provisions be made for occupation of towns along the railroad from Changchun to Manchouli as a symbolic gesture. General Yu continued: the National Government is authorized five armies in Manchuria which should be deployed as follows—two between Changchun and Hulutao; another in Changchun; another in Harbin and the fifth stationed along the railroad toward

Manchouli as a symbolic gesture. This presupposes that the symbolic forces will be arranged for after the agreement has been reached through negotiation to have the Communists evacuate Changchun. General Marshall then made it clear that he would not be a party to the negotiations as chairman, knowing that there was no basis for agreement by the Communists. He further stated that he thought the symbolic force would not be accepted by the Communists and that General Yu's proposal for such a symbolic force would not demonstrate the power of the National Government. General Marshall said he was certain that it would invite trouble later.

General Yu reiterated that his suggestion was to work out a solution for Changchun first and then to have a National army in Changchun and a symbolic force along the railroad. General Marshall then said that if such a symbolic force would be accepted by the Communists, it would be fine, but he did not want to enter into negotiations feeling certain that the terms stipulated by the Generalissimo would not be acceptable. General Marshall felt that he would be blocked before he could get it started since the Generalissimo has repeatedly stated that he would not take anything less than complete sovereignty in Manchuria. General Marshall stated that he was not objecting to the symbolic detachments but he was objecting to being placed in a position where he would have no power to avoid an almost certain stalemate.

General Marshall continued by stating that if the situation in Manchuria is not resolved, then there inevitably soon would be civil war in North China; that there would be no coalition government; and that all previous agreements would be vitiated.

General Yu summarized the points made in General Marshall's letter and asked that they be written down for his use in discussing this matter with the Generalissimo. (See attached.)⁵²

General Marshall said he was considering asking General Chou to go to Manchuria alone so he would become intimately familiar with his leaders there and have an opportunity to familiarize them with the danger of the situation. General Marshall also suggested the possibility of sending General Chou first to Yen-an and then to Manchuria with Chairman Mao for the same purpose. By this means it might be possible to convince the Communists—who are too keenly aware of their favorable military situation in Manchuria—that their immediate gains may well lead to their eventual loss.

⁵² *Infra.*

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Summary of General Marshall's Proposals for a Compromise Solution
of the Manchurian Issues*⁵³

[NANKING,] May 11, 1946.

1. General Marshall suggests that he propose that the Communists withdraw from Changchun and that an advance echelon of Executive Headquarters be established therein as a basis for terminating the fighting preliminary to entering into negotiations.

2. When arranging for acceptance of (1) above, General Marshall would have an understanding with the Communist representative that Government troops *would subsequently* occupy Changchun, within a maximum time of six months, preferably a much shorter delay.

3. Also, General Marshall would reach a preliminary understanding with the Communist representative regarding a revision of the troop ratio in Manchuria on the basis of not to exceed one Communist army to five Nationalist armies.

4. General Marshall would use his influence to preclude occupation of key cities north of Changchun by Communist forces.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

General Marshall to the Chief of Staff (Eisenhower)

NANKING, 11 May 1946.

679. Please deliver following by hand of an officer to hand of Secretary of State or Under Secretary. "Please delay until further receipt of notice from me Wedemeyer's nomination."

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Draft of Directive Regarding the Movement of Field Teams, Prepared
by Brigadier General Henry A. Byroade*

NANKING, May 11, 1946.

This message from the Committee of Three is addressed to the three commissioners of Executive Headquarters. The following agreement has been reached by the Committee of Three and will be placed in effect without delay.

It is agreed that effective implementation of the cessation of hostilities agreements reached by this committee or by the commissioners

⁵³ Notation: "Handed to Yu [Ta-wei] 11 May."

of Executive Headquarters requires that field teams of Executive Headquarters be permitted to investigate without delay any violation of such agreements as may be reported to them.

To insure prompt investigation of such reported violations, it is agreed that:

a. The movement of field teams shall not be delayed or obstructed in any way by military or civilian officials of either the National Government or the Communist Party.

b. Areas for investigation and the priority thereof should normally be as agreed between the members of a field team after full consideration of the overall situation within the area under jurisdiction of the team. In case of disagreement on this matter between members of a field team after such deliberation it is agreed that the American member as chairman of the team may render decision which will be obeyed by all members of the team. This authority granted the American chairman extends only to selection of areas for investigation and the priority thereof and does not prejudice in any way the unanimous agreement principle on any action to be taken as a result of such investigation.

This agreement is signed by General Hsu Yung-Chang, representative of the National Government, General Chou En-lai, representative of the Communist Party and General G. C. Marshall, United States representative.

[Signature in Chinese]

GENERAL HSU YUNG-CHANG
Representative of the National Government

[blank space for signature]

GENERAL CHOU EN-LAI
Representative of the Chinese Communist Party

G. C. MARSHALL

GENERAL G. C. MARSHALL
United States Representative

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Conference Between Brigadier General Henry A. Byroade and General Chou En-lai at General Chou's House, May 12, 1946, 10 a. m.

Also present: Mr. Chang
Captain Soong

General Byroade opened the meeting by expressing his concern over the field teams to make progress and to operate effectively. The major difficulty is the inability of the team to decide as to where they

should go and what area should have the priority. The inevitable result is that they don't go anywhere. It took the field teams to debate three days on the subject as to where they should go; then they fail to reach agreement, they refer it to the Executive Headquarters where it rest[s] for another two or three days and due to the lack of facts, which ordinarily were available to the field teams, this may have to be referred to the Committee of Three. Frequently, this subject could not be decided by the Committee of Three. Consequently, much time was wasted. In early March a long discussion was held and the only solution after a long consideration is to let the American members in the teams decide which area to go and which area should have the priority. General Byroade expressed that he himself was very much against this solution because it put the Americans in a very difficult position and subjected them to serious criticism. However, he was willing to risk that criticism because the field team then probably could investigate on both sides much more effectively. At that time no agreement could [be] reached on this solution and it was referred to the Three Men Committee on March 16 and no reply had been received. Later, the situation became more serious and the Commissioners in the Executive Headquarters and General Byroade were completely unable to make the field teams to move. About two weeks ago, the problem was again brought up among the Commissioners and Gen. Yeh stated that he had to report to Gen. Chou and Yenan for decision. Gen. Byroade then stated that Gen. Hsu has already agreed to the solution. He then presented the document⁵⁴ to Gen. Chou for his consideration.

After reading the paper, Gen. Chou stated that he had received a report from Gen. Yeh and this problem would have to be discussed in Three Men Committee Conference but to date, no such conference had been held. Gen. Chou then said that to solve this problem some other procedure must be adopted other than the one presented in the paper. He then elaborated that in the past investigations were held wherever was necessary and that the field teams should investigate the areas where violation existed. Kuomintang always accused the Communists of violating the truce agreement but actually there was no truth to all these accusations. Then he cited numerous examples, one of which was that the Communists were accused of violating the truce agreement in Paoting and Kweisui areas. Consequently two teams were sent there to investigate and the result was negative and the two teams had to be withdrawn. He further cited examples of alleged troop movements accused by the Kuomintang in Chifeng, Kalgan, Koumi, Toulon [*Tolun*] areas but they were all found to be

⁵⁴ *Supra.*

untrue. Gen. Chou then complained about the unfairness in dispatching field teams and that teams were not sent to the areas where the Communists accused the nationalists of violating the truce agreement. He cited the 5th division of the Nationalist army moving to Manchuria thru Jehol; the movement of the 72nd division in northern Hupei. Gen. Chou further said that Gen. Lo reported from Peiping recently that a field team was sent to Chefoo in Shantung because the Government accused the Communists of moving troops to Manchuria through that port. If that was the case, a team should also [be] sent to Shanhaikuan to investigate the movement of elements of the 94, 92 and 16 armies. But no team was sent there. Gen. Chou then reiterated on the frequency of false accusations made by the Kuomintang, and that investigations were conducted with negative results. Meantime, Communist accusations were not met with any degree of fair consideration. He then said originally, the Communists members had the complete confidence in the field team but now such confidence had turned into doubts and suspicions particularly among the lower levels. Now the Kuomintang is accusing that incidents are taking place in the middle of Communist dominated areas, and even for this, the Executive Headquarters wanted to send field teams to conduct investigation. Gen. Chou then stated that frequently after an investigation was conducted on a reported Kuomintang truce violation, it was found that such troop movement had already become an established fact. He cited the elements of Gen. Tong En Poa's 100th Army moving cross the Yangtze toward Nantung area. The field team advised these elements not to fight but it was ignored. Now the Kuomintang is accusing the Communists of attacking their positions. General Ho Ying Chin also admitted that the National troop movements in Hopei was in anticipation of a Communist outbreak. Gen. Chou then mentioned numerous other unfounded Kuomintang accusations, and that the field teams' energy was greatly wasted in conducting investigations as a result of these false accusations. He further stated that this is Kuomintang's strategy in dealing with the Executive Headquarters and the fact that the National Commissioner Gen. Cheng Kai Ming is the leader of Chinese secret police offers a great deal of doubts on Kuomintang's sincerity in dealing in this matter. Gen. Chou then said that the present paper would not solve the problem, and it would only create more difficulties for the American members on the field teams. Since the paper has already [been] signed by other members, Gen. Chou felt very much embarrassed.

Then Gen. Chou offered a six points counter proposal:⁵⁵ (1) He

⁵⁵ *Infra.*

agreed to the first point in the paper that the local authority, civil or military will not interfere with the field teams' movement; (2) The field team members' individual freedom and movement will be protected; (3) about reported troop movement and other violations, as long as it is important and above a minimum number of troops, a team should immediately [be] sent there. A system of punishment should be established if the report is found untrue. The punishment should be for the first untrue report, the following report would be ignored by team. If a second report were found untrue, then the next two reports would be ignored; and if a third report were found untrue, then the next four reports would be ignored; and so forth. (4) The places to be investigated must be those places where physical troop contacts exist. If no physical contacts exist, and a violation is reported, then it must be discussed by the upper level as to whether an investigation should be conducted. Should such an investigation be conducted and were [it] found to be untrue, same punishment set forth in point (3) applies. (5) The priority in conducting investigation, regardless whether it is a reported conflict or reported troop movement, should be based on the reports made by both sides. In other words, this time the investigation is conducted on the base [*basis*] of the Nationalist report; then the next time, it should be conducted on the base of the Communist report. This excludes the time when one side has no report to make. (6) The above five points must be agreed by all and General Chou assures that if this procedure is adopted, it will be much more effective, and will be very helpful to the teams. He further assures that the Communists will give as much assistance as possible in [*to*] carry out this procedure. He further stated that if these six points can be made into a directive, it will become regulation and the teams must carry it out.

General Byroade then stated that he appreciated Gen. Chou's overall presentation of the situation. General Byroade then emphasized on the importance of getting an agreement and that Gen. Chou may not have been informed on some of the events [which] happened in the field. Many incidents mentioned by General Chou on the failure to reach agreement in dispatching field teams to investigate on alleged Kuomintang violations did not correspond to the reports available to the Executive Headquarters. Gen. Byroade expressed that he did not want to take up these incidents because it was the principle that was involved. According to records, there was a great deal of refusal on the part of the Communists in dispatching field teams. Gen. Byroade agreed that punishment must be dealt against false reports. He further stated that in the past month the refusal by the Communist members to investigate reports against their own side has increased and in many cases, the Communist team members absent

themselves without permission for days when an urgent investigation should be conducted. General Byroade said he is very much concerned for two reasons: (1) our field teams are not operating [with] any where near the efficiency they should be; (2) if this continues, try as he may, he can't keep among the American members in the Executive Headquarters the inference that the present refusal of the Communists plus the refusal to sign the agreement for the team to go any where they want to go indicate that the Communists don't want to be seen by the teams of certain areas. Gen. Byroade then said that he was hesitant in making this statement because he knew General Chou's sincerity in this matter. He further emphasized his absolute conviction of Gen. Chou's sincerity but just wanted Gen. Chou to know the facts. He explained that the principle in the paper was worked up by the Americans without suggestion from either side. It was worked out on account of desirability and necessity. He did not think that he had over-emphasized the importance for field teams to move without hesitation or delay.

General Chou then stated that there was a difference of opinion. (1) The procedure set out by General Marshall for all three parties to agree must be adhered [to] and he had complete confidence in that, and he could not divert from it. He expressed the desire for General Byroade and Mr. Robertson to understand. (2) Some distinction must be made as to the places [which] may be investigated by the field teams. If a hostility is reported at a place where physical troop contact exists, then the investigation should be conducted. But if an alleged violation is reported at points where such condition does not exist, then it will just be a waste of effort in conducting an investigation. Gen. Chou then cited numerous instances of accused hostilities in Northern Chahar and Jehol where Communists were in full domination and none of the national troops ever existed. He further stated that he probably could also make many accusations in areas south of the Yangtze River. (3) Gen. Chou said that he could believe that many requests by the Kuomintang to dispatch field teams had been refused by the Communist[s] because there were too many false reports. (4) General Chou admitted that the Communist team members did not cooperate to the fullest extent because they are greatly dissatisfied with the Kuomintang team members. However, General Chou is willing to wire the commissioner in Peiping to instruct the Communist field team members to cooperate more fully and disregard the attitude of the Kuomintang team members. Gen. Chou then said that based on these, he would like to have Gen. Byroade's consideration of his six points presentation. He further stated that he could not accept Gen. Byroade's paper because: (1) he wanted to follow Gen.

Marshall's principle that all agreements must be agreed upon by all; (2) he regreted that the paper was signed before he was consulted. He reiterated that he wanted to solve this problem and that if his six points could be made into a directive then no one dares to violate. Gen. Chou then explained that the Communists are not anti-American although they lack the understanding of the American people due to lack of contact. Much of the anti-American [reports?] by the Communists are propaganda of the Central Government in an effort to weaken the relation between the Communists and the American people.

General Byroade closed the meeting by saying that he would be the last one to recommend the abandonment of unanimous agreement. Also he is very much concerned in getting a workable, practicable, and reasonable solution. His first reaction was that Gen. Chou's suggestion was not workable; however, he has to make a study before making any recommendation to General Marshall.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Draft of Directive Regarding the Movement of Field Teams, Prepared by General Chou En-lai ⁵⁶

1. The military and civil authorities of both the National Government and the Chinese Communist Party shall render all possible assistance to the activities of the field teams, without imposing any delay or restriction.

2. The military and civil authorities of both the National Government and the Chinese Communist Party shall assure the personal freedom and security of the field team members.

3. Upon receipt of any report rendered by the National Government or the Chinese Communist Party regarding truce violating troop movement, which involves a strength of over men, the field team, or Executive Headquarters, shall immediately conduct investigation. In case the report is found untrue, the party rendering this report shall be punished either on the unanimous agreement of the representatives or by the decision of the higher level. The punishment shall be dealt out in the following manner: The party rendering its first false report will be deprived of its next turn to request investigation; after rendering its second false report [it] will be deprived of its next four turns to request investigation; after rendering its third false report [it] will be deprived of its next six turns to request investigation, and so forth.

4. Upon receipt of any report rendered by the National Government or the Chinese Communist Party referring to hostilities, which occurs

⁵⁶ Submitted on May 12 to Brigadier General Byroade.

in places of close contact of Government and Communist troops, the field team shall immediately conduct investigation. In the event the report refers to places which are within the area of one party, and the field team cannot resolve the procedure among its members, the case shall be referred to Executive Headquarters, which will then issue instruction to the team for action. If a report is found untrue, the party rendering this report will be punished, the procedure of punishment is same as specified in paragraph 3.

5. In conducting investigation on reported hostilities or truce violating troop movement, the following two principles shall be jointly adhered to: (1) Priority be arranged in the light of the seriousness and urgency of the case; (2) Equal chance be granted to the requests of the National Government and Chinese Communist Party, so that if the first investigation is made at the request of the one party, the next investigation will be made at the request of the other party. Unless one of the parties makes no request for investigation, or is deprived of its turn to make a request owing to punishment, no consecutive investigation based on the reports of the same party shall be made.

6. In case the Government or Chinese Communist member refuses to implement the foregoing provisions, the American representative as the chairman of the team is authorized to charge him directly to Executive Headquarters and request his punishment.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Conference Between Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and General Marshall at the Generalissimo's Residence, Nanking, May 12, 1946

The Generalissimo informed me ⁵⁷ that early last week he had been notified by the Soviet Embassy through his son ⁵⁸ that Stalin ⁵⁹ would like to see him in Moscow as soon as the National meeting in Paris ⁶⁰ had been completed. The Generalissimo replied, through his son to the Russian Embassy, that in the present critical condition of affairs in China he could not leave but he would consider the matter.

The Generalissimo then discussed the memorandum I had submitted to him at his request regarding a possible basis for settlement in Manchuria. In general so far as the military terms were concerned he voiced agreement but made specific proviso to the effect that the Communist troops should not occupy Harbin. As to the political

⁵⁷ General Marshall.

⁵⁸ Gen. Chiang Ching-kuo.

⁵⁹ Marshal Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union.

⁶⁰ The Council of Foreign Ministers met from April 25 to May 16; see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 2, 1946, p. 950.

factors he only expressed himself to the following effect. First, that the military headquarters and the Central Military Headquarters in Manchuria should be terminated and also the political and economic councils. Thereafter the Central Government should control matters directly through the nine provincial governors.

As to negotiations with General Chou En-lai leading to a possible settlement, he desired to wait for the present leaving the first move to General Chou En-lai. He desired that I do not discuss with Chou a basis for Manchurian settlement until Chou came to me on his own initiative.

I then stated my deep concern over the critical status of affairs in North China which I feared might break up into open conflict also any moment. Therefore, it appeared to me delays would be very dangerous because once breaks appear it would almost be impossible to resolve the situation peacefully. I explained to the Generalissimo that Byroade was now with Chou En-lai discussing the proposition to have a formally signed agreement by the Committee of Three authorizing teams to go anywhere without restraint.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

General Marshall to President Truman and the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)

NANKING, 12 May 1946.

681. Most confidentially, Generalissimo informed me today that early last week Attaché Russian Embassy here requested him to have his son, who speaks Russian and made special trip to Moscow last winter, call on Russian Ambassador. Son was in Peiping, so Generalissimo proposed to send Secretary Foreign Affairs. Russians said no, that the matter was secret and personal. Son was then brought from Peiping and saw Russian Ambassador Thursday last. He was told that Stalin desired Generalissimo to go to Moscow immediately on completion of meeting now in progress in Paris. Generalissimo replied that the situation in China was so serious that he could not leave China at this time.

He said that he had not told me of the affair until he had given his answer as he did not wish to run the risk of embarrassing me.

I replied that, speaking purely personally and without any guidance from my Government, I wished to say that our interest was for peace in China, for a united China; that as for Manchuria we of course wished to see Dairen a genuine free port and American business to have access to Manchuria in common with others, but that peace was our great purpose. We would have no suspicions whatever as to his motives and no resentment regarding such a conference with Stalin.

That, as a matter of fact, if Stalin should propose the good offices of the Soviet Government to bring the Chinese Communist[s] in Manchuria to a reasonable agreement with Chinese Central Government provided no U. S. officers were utilized in adjustments or negotiation of Manchurian difficulties I personally would favor his agreement with Soviets. We were working for peace and not special privileges, and I for one would welcome a helpful intercession by Soviets to compose Manchurian crisis.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Brigadier General Henry A. Byroade to Mr. Walter S. Robertson, at Peiping

[NANKING,] 13 May 1946.

685. Held long conference with Chou En-lai yesterday with negative results to obtain agreement on freedom of team movement paper hand carried by Captain Young back to Peiping. He submitted as an alternate a 6-point document for agreement which was apparently worked up in conjunction with General Sung and may be presented by him for discussion in Executive Headquarters. In conference this afternoon Chou En-lai requested Marshall to consider his 6-point paper in preference to that submitted by me. Marshall informed him that he considered his proposal to be unworkable and, in a most emphatic manner, presented many of our grievances against Communist attitude and action during the past several weeks. He requested Chou En-lai to reconsider seriously the proposal submitted by me. If the 6-point program is submitted for decision in Peiping, Marshall desires you state that it is unacceptable to him.

In this same conference Chou En-lai stated that he agreed that that amount of money recently approved by the Central Government for the Canton evacuation was sufficient and that any additional needed could be provided by the Communist Party. General Marshall informed him that he had just held a conference with Admiral Cooke and that the shipping for this move could not be held beyond May 20. He stated that there was no point in further negotiations and that if the Communists desired evacuation it must be before May 20.

There is considerable discussion here with both sides claiming violations by the other side in the area immediately north of the Yangtze River between points approximately north of Nanking to Nantung north of Shanghai. The National Government representative of the Committee of Three has requested team investigation. Chou En-lai requested that a special committee be dispatched to that area. We do not know here the exact location or occupation at the present time of team 17. Marshall has indicated his desire of having investigation in that area. Recommend therefore that you send team 17 to

that area without delay if practicable. He also considers it desirable that a special committee from Executive Headquarters visit this area. Cannot judge from here but Middleton ⁶¹ might be spared as the American member of this committee. Please inform if above is possible or if you have an alternate suggestion.

Chou En-lai sees Marshall again tomorrow afternoon. Marshall has withdrawn from negotiations on the Manchurian situation. The details of this aspect are too complicated to convey by radio message. No immediate solution is in sight. There is no lack of awareness here however that the solution must come within the next few days. I do not know when Marshall will release me to return to Peiping but am hoping to return Wednesday.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Hsu Yung-chang to General Marshall

No. 469

[NANKING,] May 13, 1946.

According to radio from General Cheng Kai-min, Executive Headquarters, Peiping, dated 8 May, the Communists, using negotiation as pretext in moving Nationalist and American representatives in the Potou Field Team to Nanpee, fiercely attacked the railroad station at Potou at 0120 hours on 6 May. The fighting continued throughout the night till 1100 hours with 2000 men. Reinforced units surrounded and repeatedly attacked the station. The casualties on our side were heavy. On 7 May, the Communists have not relaxed their attack. Due to lack of troops and ammunitions, we are not expect[ed] to hold the place. Radio requesting that Field Teams at Potou and Techow be dispatched there to investigate. It was further reported that the location of the 7 members is not known.

GEN. HSU YUNG-CHANG

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Conference Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai, 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, May 13, 1946, 3:30 p. m.

Also Present: General Byroade
Colonel Caughey
Lt. Col. Hutchin
Captain Soong
Mr. Chang

General Chou stated that he had not yet found any solution for the Manchurian problem but wished to put a stop to any further expan-

⁶¹ Col. J. W. Middleton, U. S. Army.

sion of the ever-increasing difficult problem in North China. He cited numerous instances where the Communists were accused of violating the truce agreement. He further stated that the Kuomintang was trying its utmost to stir up trouble and eventual civil war and lay the blame on the Communists. General Chou then expressed the Communists' wish to minimize all the difficulties in China and to remove all problems confronting Executive Headquarters. With respect to the situation in North China, General Chou stated: (1) the six point counter proposal (See incl 2)⁶² he made regarding the free movement of the field teams would be effective and practical. (2) Hostilities must be effectively stopped and he requested a field team be sent to Nantung area. (3) Hostilities in the Peiping and Tientsin area should be investigated. (4) He was willing to accept the Government's proposal in the increased monetary allowance for the Canton evacuation. (5) Regarding all other matters, such as the situations existing in Potou and Liaochen areas, he said he had already requested field teams to be sent to Potou to investigate the situation.

General Marshall explained that he and General Hsu signed General Byroade's original proposal (See incl 1)⁶³ without meeting or discussion because it was a reasonable solution. He then said General Chou's six point counter proposal was too complicated to be carried out. For instance, the third point, which permits inspections of troop movements of a certain size only, may prevent inspections of critical situations. He also stated that possible difficulty might arise in connection with the punishment system suggested by General Chou. Regarding the Canton situation, General Marshall said he was glad to hear of General Chou's willingness to accept the Government's proposal. He stated that the deadline on shipping would be May 20 and the work in evacuating all Communists should begin without delay. If it would be agreeable to General Chou, General Marshall would like to consider the matter closed. In regard to the Nantung situation, General Marshall was willing to send a team there to find out the true situation. He also would be willing to dispatch a field team to Potou. In this connection, however, General Marshall expressed concern over the diminishing effectiveness of the field teams caused by various disagreements. General Marshall said he had hoped to obviate further difficulties by the agreement previously referred to which General Chou would not sign.

At this point, General Marshall excused General Byroade, Colonel Caughey and Colonel Hutchin.

General Marshall continued by saying the diminishing prestige of the Executive Headquarters and the field teams was most serious. All

⁶² May 12, p. 839.

⁶³ May 11, p. 833.

trusums⁶⁴ of the past 3 or 4 weeks showed the complete opposition of the Communist members toward any common sense action which should be taken by the teams. Many matters have been agreed to by the Committee of Three and the Commissioners but blocked by the next lower echelon—meaning the chiefs of staff. Even if the matter got through the chiefs of staff, it would be further blocked by the field teams, either by the members' absence or unwillingness to carry out instructions. The present situation is actively promoting suspicion and the resulting mutual distrust is causing the situation to become almost hopeless.

In regard to the problem in Manchuria, General Marshall stated that he had exhausted his resources in dealing with the Generalissimo. The Generalissimo was convinced that the intention of the Communists in Manchuria was totally different from the original agreement. General Marshall believed that the Generalissimo was wrong in not agreeing to the dispatch of the field teams to Manchuria in the beginning and at the same time allowing General Tu Li-ming to proceed with fighting which led to the chaotic situation today.

General Marshall then said that he is trying to get the Americans out of China as quickly as he could, leaving only those necessary to help in reorganization and other necessary work. General Marshall further stated that if his impartiality is in doubt, then we should terminate his role of mediator.

General Marshall then mentioned the possibility of solving the Manchurian problem by the Communists' withdrawal from Changchun and establishment of an advance echelon of the Executive Headquarters therein. The Nationalist troops would remain where they were. Further negotiations as to military disposition and political problems could then begin. General Marshall then said that even if General Chou would agree to such a proposal, he would not take it to the Generalissimo unless he knew in advance what the Communists' demands would be in connection with necessary adjustments of the military and political situation in Manchuria. He would not be placed in the position of mediator where a stalemate was in prospect.

General Chou expressed his appreciation of General Marshall's frankness in this matter. He agreed that the situation in North China is closely tied up with the problem in Manchuria. He stated he was very much distressed over the possibility of a civil war.

General Marshall interrupted by saying that whatever agreement could be reached in solving the Manchuria problem, a parallel solution must be found for the destruction of fortifications along the com-

⁶⁴ Truce Summaries.

munication lines in North China and for the free movement of field teams. In other words, it required an overall solution.

General Chou said that he had worked hard and that his efforts had been in vain in trying to find a solution for the Manchurian problem. He said he would transmit General Marshall's view regarding the Manchurian problem to Yen-an. He agreed that the situation in North China must be prevented from worsening and the prestige of the Executive Headquarters and the field teams must be restored. He further stated that the Communists would not relax their effort in finding a peaceful solution in spite of the Kuomintang's insincerity and efforts to stir up civil strife in China. The Kuomintang's scheme in sabotaging the peaceful effort appears to be promoted by such Generals as Ho Ying Chin and Pei Chung Hsi. Even the Generalissimo had said in his speech to army officers in Sian that the Communists must be destroyed by force. He then expressed his view that the problem in North China must be solved first as a beginning point in solving the Manchurian problem. General Chou further stated that he would not want General Marshall to resign his effort.

General Marshall then said he hoped that General Chou would take definite steps to meet the dilemma in North China to restore the confidence in American officers. In the recent past, the Communists had a very favorable press in the U. S.—more favorable than the Kuomintang. General Marshall believed that American officers certainly were impartial and they were very impressed by Communist cooperation in their earlier career in the Executive Headquarters. But the Communists' present policy of blocking progress had caused the Americans' confidence in them to diminish materially. General Marshall said that he found radicals on both sides—Nationalist radicals are in the higher echelon and the Communist radicals are in lower echelons. It was comparatively easy to deal with Communist higher officials of whom he had knowledge, but their lower echelon blocked the execution of agreements by various delaying methods. This was particularly the case on the operation level in Peiping and with field teams.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

President Truman to General Marshall

[WASHINGTON,] 13 May 1946.

87818. I have read and discussed with the Acting Secretary of State ⁶⁵ your 681 of May 12. We approve your reply to Generalissimo and concur in your statement regarding our objective in China and

⁶⁵ Dean Acheson.

in your opinion regarding utility of proposed conference, it being understood by Chiang of course that final decision rests with him only.

Regards,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Conference Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai at General Marshall's House, Nanking, May 14, 1946, 3:30 p. m.

Also present: Captain Soong
Mr. Chang

General Chou referred to General Byroade's initial proposal⁶⁶ concerning operations of the field teams and insisted that unanimous agreement on the part of the field team originally adhered to by General Marshall should be followed. General Chou could not agree to any proposal giving the American chairman on the field teams final authority in making decisions regarding investigations. However, he stressed that a satisfactory procedure must be obtained to enable the field team to recover the original confidence and to work effectively. Then he submitted a proposed change⁶⁷ which modified General Byroade's original proposal and which required unanimous agreement by team members regarding investigations.

After consultation with General Byroade, General Marshall stated that, as now written, General Byroade would prefer there be no new agreement because he felt General Chou's new proposal would take matters out of the hands of the three Commissioners, and it would handicap the Executive Headquarters. General Marshall then expressed his own reluctance in this matter.

General Chou emphasized the importance of such an agreement and stated that it would work to the advantage of all concerned. He requested General Byroade's reconsideration.

General Marshall then altered the fourth item by adding that in case of continued disagreement, the American member of the teams will report directly to the Commissioners who will either reach a unanimous decision in 24 hours or report the matter to the Committee of Three. To this General Chou agreed.

General Chou then suggested that a special delegation of the Committee of Three should investigate the Nantung situation by going to Huaiyin [*Huaiian*] first to listen to team reports and thence proceed to Nantung to investigate actual conditions. To this General Mar-

⁶⁶ May 11, p. 833.

⁶⁷ May 12, p. 839.

shall agreed, except that it had to wait for concurrence from Executive Headquarters.

The meeting was closed by the signing of the agreement (attached)⁶⁸ by General Chou.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

The Committee of Three to the Commissioners of Executive Headquarters, at Peiping

NANKING, May 14, 1946.

This message from the Committee of Three is addressed to the three commissioners of Executive Headquarters. The following agreement has been reached by the Committee of Three and will be placed into effect without delay.

It is agreed that effective implementation of the cessation of hostilities agreements reached by this committee or by the commissioners of Executive Headquarters requires that field teams of Executive Headquarters be permitted to investigate without delay any violation of such agreements as may be reported to them.

To insure prompt investigation of such reported violations, it is agreed that:

1. The military and civil authorities of both the National Government and the Chinese Communist Party shall render all possible assistance to the activities of the field teams, without imposing any delay or restriction.

2. The military and civil authorities of both the National Government and the Chinese Communist Party shall assure the personal freedom and security of the field team members.

3. Equal opportunity for investigation shall be afforded to both the National Government and Communist Party within any team area, but this policy shall not be permitted to delay action or to interfere with the overriding principle that priority of investigation should be based upon the apparent seriousness and urgency of the violations reported to the team.

4. The procedure regarding priority of areas and matters for investigation shall be as worked out by the U. S. representative as the chairman of the team and unanimously agreed upon by the team members for implementation. In case of disagreement the American member will immediately report the disagreement to the Commissioners, who will within twenty-four hours either render a unanimous decision or report their disagreement to the Committee of Three.

5. In the event it is established that a false report of violation has been submitted to a team for investigation, a report of the incident

⁶⁸ *Infra.*

will be submitted by the Commissioners to the Committee of Three for corrective action.

Hsu YUNG-CHANG
*Representative of the National
Government*

CHOU EN-LAI
*Representative of the Chinese
Communist Party*

G. C. MARSHALL
United States Representative

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Chou En-lai and General Marshall at General Marshall's Residence, Nanking, May 17, 1946, 10 a. m.

General Chou stated that he would like first to discuss a few points and then come to the Manchurian problem separately. The first problem is the one in North Kiangsu. General Chou learned from Colonel Caughey day before yesterday that the Government seems not enthusiastic about going now and they would go if General Marshall insists. Yesterday he read the message from Peiping which said that the field team was in Nantung and everything is quiet, but no details have been given. However, the newspapers are still making a lot of propaganda about that area saying that the Communists are going to attack the Kuomintang, but actually from the information General Chou has received there are to the north of the Yangtze River five National Armies and that there are also troops north of Hsuchow. General Ku Tu Tung [*Chu-tung?*] who came down a few days ago returned yesterday and General Pai also left for Manchuria. As far as General Chou has learned they are planning their schemes of attack. At this moment General Chou is not informed as to the Government's intention toward North Kiangsu, whether the situation can be stabilized at this time when we are working toward the settlement of the Manchurian problem. General Chou hopes that no more confusion will arise in North Kiangsu.

General Marshall asked for identification of North Kiangsu.

General Chou stated it was the Nantung area up to a point south of the Lunghai railroad. The whole area. General Chou suggested that a special committee fly to Huai-an the afternoon of 17 May and have a briefing by the field team. He stated that he thought the Government side have a lot of information about their own side, but he could learn

the information about his side. General Chou stated that it might be possible to reach some sort of an agreement, or we can bring all the problems back for discussion in Nanking, but in any event, a true picture of the situation in North Kiangsu would be obtained. General Chou stated that he thought that sort of an arrangement would not delay the discussion about the Manchurian problem, about which General Chou would discuss with General Marshall individually.

General Marshall asked Colonel Caughey's opinion on flying to Huai-an.

Colonel Caughey stated that he believed Executive Headquarters would think they were being circumvented when the Committee of Three would send a special committee to this area, however the importance may warrant the dispatch of the committee. However, a full report should be in today from the Executive Headquarters. It may be very difficult to set up an airplane for a trip this afternoon.

General Marshall told Colonel Caughey to inquire as to the availability of the plane and then find out from General Hsu if he is agreeable to flying up there today, probably to be there about two hours.

General Chou stated that he had learned that the airfield at Huai-an has been strafed by the Kuomintang planes recently and the field team went out on hearing the roaring of the planes and they collected one or two American bullets from the ground. At the same time, about one or two days previous, another plane strafed a point south of Huai-an. General Chou stated he was afraid that the field team may not be able to terminate fighting and the papers are still making propaganda and the situation actually is getting more and more serious.

General Marshall stated he was a little confused as to General Chou's presentation. The field is within the Communist-controlled area. General Marshall asked if that was correct and General Chou replied in the affirmative. General Marshall stated that if a plane was sent in without careful preliminary arrangements, fire might be received from the field. He asked General Chou if that was a possibility.

General Chou felt certain that no incident will occur from the ground like firing because it would be an American transport plane and that can be easily determined. Also General Chou had sent wires through Peiping to Huai-an saying that probably he may come in the near future.

General Marshall stated that he was having Colonel Caughey inquire about the plane and to inquire about the Central Government individual. He inquired as to whether General Chou felt the matter so urgent that it should be this afternoon rather than tomorrow.

General Chou stated that it was immaterial to him, but he was thinking if we could go today he could have a talk with General Marshall tomorrow evening, therefore he would prefer to go today. However, if it is a physical impossibility to go today, of course, we should go tomorrow.

General Marshall stated that Col. Caughey feels that the team has not got back from Nantung by jeep. It would possibly take 24 hours to get a report from the team because we would have to go through Peiping and down to the team and back through Peiping.

General Chou stated that in that case it might be better to wait for a message from Peiping.

General Marshall told Colonel Hutchins to tell Colonel Caughey to make inquiry about the plane but not to contact the Central Government people yet, also to get off immediately a rush message to Peiping to find out where that team is.

General Marshall asked General Chou if his delegates arrived and General Chou replied affirmatively indicating that they had an unusual experience for when the plane came down all the engines were dead. The plane was a CNAC plane with an American pilot who was able to bring the plane in safely. General Marshall stated that it was his opinion that the American pilot would be rather dubious about his position and that the Americans were having a lot of difficulty with the servicing of planes due to the demobilization and that it would not be until June that trained men would be coming back in.

Coming to the Manchurian problem, General Chou stated he had conveyed General Marshall's idea to Yen-an and Yen-an is still contemplating his idea, but at the same time they have to ask the opinion of the Communist leaders in Manchuria. General Chou stated he would like to use this interval to hear more of General Marshall's opinions in order that he may feel more assured in his discussions with Yen-an. For example, General Marshall mentioned that troops of both parties should keep away from Changchun and that the Executive Headquarters should send certain persons into Changchun. Regarding this matter, General Chou wanted to clarify his understanding that after cessation of hostilities, a branch headquarters of the Executive Headquarters will be set up in Changchun to deal with the matters there. However, the withdrawal of the Communist troops may take some time and it will be a little while before Executive Headquarters will work. In the meantime field teams will be sent into Manchuria to stop fighting.

Regarding the administration of Changchun General Chou learned from the Democratic League their three points :

1. Regarding the reorganization of Political and Economic Council in Manchuria, a ratio of 3-3-3 should be adopted and a suitable man

should be selected as the chairman. The Democratic League have suggest[ed] Mo Tuh-hui or Chang Kung Chuan. The office of the reorganized council will be set up in Changchun.

2. Regarding the magistrate of Changchun, the mayor should be neither Kuomintang or Communist Party, but a middle man. However, both the Kuomintang and the Communist Party will participate in the magistrate council.

3. Regarding the social security the Democratic League suggest that the security will be handled by the police organized by the magistrate and to be essentially neutral in character. No secret police will be absorbed into this organization.

The Democratic League has conveyed these three points to General Chou, but he has not contacted them again and he would like to know what comments you may have on these points which refer to Changchun itself.

General Chou stated that General Marshall in their last meeting had stated that the cessation of firing in Manchuria will be dealt with in connection with all the problems in Manchuria. General Chou requested General Marshall's further views regarding these matters. General Chou stated that his own ideas were stated in Chungking, which in the main were: regarding the political council of Manchuria and various provinces, they should be reorganized. Right now the Kuomintang has appointed their own Governments and the Communist Party has also conducted elections of provincial governments and now remains the problem of how to reorganize those governments. Regarding the different tsien [*hsiens*] or counties, General Chou stated that self-government can be introduced according to the joint platform adopted by the PCC.

Regarding communications, all kinds of communications should be restored and the communications should be put under interim administrative council of Manchuria.

Regarding the military aspects, General Chou thought that discussion of the army reorganization plan for Manchuria had to be based on the actual conditions in Manchuria. However, it would be necessary to discuss the adjustment of the ratio of strengths of garrison troops in Manchuria.

In the economic aspect the interim administrative council will distinguish between what should be run by the people and what by the Government, which again may be divided into state council or provincially operated. Regarding the above General Chou would like to continue to discuss with General Marshall as well as with the Democratic League.

The third subject General Chou brought up was the situation in China proper. General Chou stated that he understood that General Marshall the other day mentioned that the solution of Manchurian

problem will be taken up in connection with the cease fire agreement, the PCC decisions, the army reorganization plan, the draft constitution and the freedom of rights. All these problems should be solved as a whole and that as soon as the Manchurian problem is solved, all the other problems should be solved at the same time. General Chou stated he would like to know how it can be arranged that while the Manchurian problem was being discussed, the steering committee of the PCC can also solve all the other problems relating to China as a whole. General Chou said the above was his understanding of General Marshall's statement and desired General Marshall's comment as to whether it was a correct interpretation.

General Marshall stated that in the first place, what he endeavored to explain to General Chou the other day was in regard to his withdrawal from the position of a mediator in connection with the Manchurian problem. General Marshall had told General Chou that he would, or had, thought of possible compromises, but that his position, particularly with regard to the Government had been made so difficult through the Communist attack on Changchun that General Marshall had felt it was no longer possible, or politically desirable with relation to the U. S. Government for him to remain in the public eye as the mediator on the Manchurian question. General Marshall stated that perhaps the expression, "public eye" is not just what he meant. He had reference, really to the eye of the officials concerned in the Communist side and the Central Government. He stated that in further explanation of his position he endeavored to point out that it would be impossible for him to resume the role of an attempted mediator unless he was sure in a very definite manner what the position of the Communist Party would be regarding both military and political issues. In other words, General Marshall could never again place himself in the position of being a party to an agreement which included in its provisions an arrangement for the negotiations regarding vital matters unless he knew at the time what actually were the prospects of reaching an agreement in these negotiations rather than the almost certainty of the development of a stalemate. It was in explanation of that point of view that he referred to the various issues—Changchun, the future military strength of the Government and the Communist Party in Manchuria, the dispositions of forces later on, the political arrangements for the interim period and possibly in the future. Now in the interest of peace, General Marshall did not mind discussing these various details with General Chou, but General Marshall stated he must reserve his right in doing so to refrain from stepping again into the role of mediator.

At this point Colonel Caughey reported that a message had been received from Peiping.

General Marshall said that the radio stated that the Huai-an people are not in contact with the team. The National people in Nantung report that the team went out on the 13th to a point 32 miles north west of Nantung and that is the last they have heard. They also report that the team was fired on and the interpreter was hit in the shoulder. Hence, the team's location is not known right now. General Marshall asked for General Chou's opinion in the circumstances.

General Chou asked Colonel Caughey the filing time of the message which was sent to him and Colonel Caughey stated that the message said that team 17 left Huai-an for Nantung on the 10th and arrived on the 11th. This other message said they left on the 13th.

General Chou stated that it looked like we would have to await a report from the team until we learned their whereabouts.

General Marshall told Colonel Caughey that it would be best for a reconnaissance to be made and also to call up Admiral Cooke, as General Marshall was talking to him about sending out a picket boat.

General Marshall stated that with regard to Changchun, what was in his mind was, that once a state of oral agreement had been arrived at by the Central Government and the Communists, arrangements should be made by General Chou for the immediate reception in Changchun of the various elements of the headquarters to be set up by the Executive Headquarters in Changchun. At the same time, the Central Government and the Communist Party should issue orders for their field commanders that an arrangement was about to be reached for the termination of hostilities and that in the interim there would be no advances, attacks or pursuits. In other words, we would not endeavor to issue a cease firing instruction without having a very careful arrangement for its execution, but all aggressive action would be stopped. Now, the Executive Headquarters being set up in Changchun the procedure of the withdrawal of the Communist troops would be initiated and as they withdrew the Executive Headquarters in Changchun would take the necessary steps to secure an orderly government in the city. At the same time the various teams, of which there should certainly be at least three or four, would be deployed from Changchun to carry into effect at an agreed time the complete cessation of hostilities and the necessary readjustments of troops to secure such cessation. It would also be the duty of that advance section of the Executive Headquarters to direct the action of the teams throughout Manchuria to bring about a cessation of hostilities and necessary readjustment of troops.

General Marshall continued by stating as to the character of government to be either continued or installed in Changchun, he had not gone into that in his own mind except that it should be an impartial

government and that it should be either confirmed or installed by Executive Headquarters.

General Marshall stated that his next thoughts were related to the military agreements that would have to be reached in the subsequent negotiations. General Chou had spoken of the reconsideration of the eventual strengths and had said that from General Marshall's point of view he would have to know what they had in mind beyond a mere general statement. General Marshall stated he would have to know what the Communist Party would insist upon in relation to future dispositions of troops. How would this new strength of the Communist troops be disposed, in what areas, under what conditions. There are two phases one of which is the interim arrangement during which a demobilization on the Communist side as well as reduction of troops on the Government side would have to be carried out simultaneously. There would not only have to be an agreement as to this, but so far as General Marshall was concerned there would have to be a very precise agreement as to supervision because neither side would trust the other. Therefore, neither side would reduce unless they had positive evidence that at the same time the other side was making a corresponding reduction. In order to bring about such a new situation, it would apparently be necessary to expedite action beyond the original demobilization and reorganization schedule, in order to reach a troop disposition in the near future rather than 18 months later. In relation to troop dispositions, General Marshall would have to know in considerable detail what would be the insistent demands of the Communists, both as to the gradual development of the new dispositions and what those dispositions were to be in the end.

Now as to the political aspects, there the necessity for a detailed understanding of the Communist demands would not only be necessary, but there would be the further difficulty of General Marshall's own ignorance as to the points of view in the matter. The proposal of the Democratic League for the reorganization of the political council and economic council was reduced to writing⁶⁹ by Gen. Marshall at Chungking after Mr. Lu and Carson Chang presented it and he handed it to the Generalissimo. The Generalissimo would not commit himself for the reason that he would not consider any matters until the Chang-chun issue was settled, but General Marshall gathered a rather definite impression that either the Generalissimo did not welcome the general proposal or it may have been the names proposed. General Marshall stated he did not know which.

General Marshall stated that so far as he was concerned he had no basis at that time or has none today for discussing the above, except

⁶⁹ Not found in Department files.

to say this. General Marshall understood General Chou to suggest that the reorganized political council would in turn handle the reorganization of the local governments. General Marshall asked General Chou if the last impression was correct and General Chou stated that the political council would in turn handle the reorganization of the various provincial governments.

General Marshall stated it was his opinion that at the moment the above would theoretically look good, but he would be fearful of it as a practical proposition, except for mere details. He stated that by that he meant there would have to be a detailed understanding on the highest level as to, in general, what would be the nature of the reorganization. General Marshall stated that he spoke, the other day, of the fact that General Chou had referred to the fact that the Government has appointed 9 governors and the Communist Party has elected 8. General Marshall asked what their firm intentions were. General Marshall stated that with the suspicions, fears and animosities, the general procedure of the negotiations by a reorganized political council, there would be, General Marshall thought, little chance of either reaching a satisfactory agreement in these matters or providing one which the two parties would confirm. In other words, going back to General Marshall's first statement, as far as he was concerned, he would not enter into this with the probability of a stalemate following the cessation of hostilities. There is nothing which General Marshall more urgently desires, at the present time than a cessation of hostilities, but General Marshall stated he was forced to refrain from aggressive action to bring about such a cessation unless he had good reason to feel that the subsequent negotiations could be successfully concluded. The present difficulties being met on a much lower level in Peiping regarding where the teams will go and when they will go is the best evidence of the extraordinary difficulty in conducting negotiations regarding such vital matters as those to be handled in Manchuria, on a basis of unanimous agreement. General Marshall stated he was even doubtful about the practical aspect of an advance section of Executive Headquarters being able to carry out its functions in Changchun on a unanimous agreement basis. The distrust is so great, the suspicions are so far-reaching regarding even the most trivial matters, the propaganda on both sides is so intense that a solution on an ordinary basis is almost impossible, unless somebody could be found who would be trusted. General Marshall stated he was talking then about Changchun. He asked General Chou in conclusion if he had made his position and thoughts clear.

General Chou stated that regarding the first subject, General Marshall intimated that he would withdraw from the role as a mediator and General Chou wished to be cleared on that point. Does that mean that General Marshall would not mediate unless some way has been

reached to solve the Changchun problem or does it mean that he must have an over-all solution of all the problems relating to Manchuria.

General Marshall stated he meant that he did not feel that he could place his Government in the position of again becoming involved in a stalemate. He felt that it was not only useless for him to attempt to influence the Generalissimo to abandon his fixed idea regarding Changchun, but that it was probably a bad thing for the continuation of a hope that General Marshall was still in the position of possibly bringing about a solution. General Marshall stated that he also meant that regarding the over-all problem in Manchuria that he would not involve himself in the matter unless he had a fair hope of a practical basis of solution without a stalemate because he felt that another stalemate would not only still more depreciate any influence he might have but it would also inevitably result in the resumption of hostilities. General Marshall stated that he felt that if he were to go into the matter in Manchuria in a definite way he would have to be assured in his own mind that there was a reasonable hope of a successful negotiation rather than to find a basis for the termination of hostilities by merely establishing the principle that there would be a negotiation. General Chou kindly outlined at General Marshall's request in Chungking, four points that would be covered in special negotiations. What General Marshall was talking about would be the stand of the Communist Party in regard to these several issues. The only definite thing General Marshall had at the present time was the basis for the reorganization of the economic and political council and there General Chou has been quite definite, at least in representing the views of the Democratic League, but when it comes to a new proposition of the troop strengths in Manchuria, General Marshall would not put himself in the position of being involved, unless he knew pretty well what the demands of the Communist Party would be, so that he could have the opportunity of debating the matter with General Chou before he ever got himself involved with the Generalissimo, which would be approximately the procedure he had followed in connection with the military reorganization.

When it comes to the provincial governors, that is a hard nut to crack, with, I imagine [said General Marshall], each side taking a very decided stand. Possibly so decided that it could not be resolved by negotiation. Therefore, General Marshall would not involve himself in that unless he had a pretty good understanding of whether there was a possibility of reaching an agreement without a stalemate. He stated that possibly his position had not been clearly understood by General Chou because he may have failed to tell General Chou in discussing his proposal that there be a negotiation after the cessation of hostilities and in presenting the proposal of the Democratic League as to the creation of a special committee of three, the Generalissimo's

comment to that was that he didn't think he could accept such a committee arrangement, that he would want the Committee of Three, which of course would not only involve me [*him*], but would put me [*him*] in as chairman. That, in the region of Manchuria and in the nature of the existing situation, immediately caused General Marshall to feel that he would have to be very careful of the position in which he placed the U. S. Government and he could not lead them, through his presence, into the unfortunate predicament of another stalemate.

General Marshall stated that that may explain his position a little better to General Chou, but he wished to add another point. General Marshall felt that in settling the Manchurian problem, we would have to go, as was said the other day, clear across the board, which involves the steering committee of the Kuomintang, involves railroad fortifications, involves what we tried to cure the other day,⁷⁰ but General Marshall doubted whether the cure was effective, the handling of teams, and would certainly involve the problem of continued troop movements in North China. Now, to what degree he could successfully exert an influence on the steering committee he did not know. General Marshall stated that frankly, he thought the political leaders in the Kuomintang feel that he had lead them into the present situation and that they certainly do not look on him with favor. He stated he did not see it that way, but the hostility evidently remains.

General Chou asked if General Marshall meant the steering committee of the Kuomintang.

General Marshall stated he meant the controlling members of the Kuomintang. He stated that he might add this regarding the steering committee of the Kuomintang. He was not certain that he even knew who the members are and that he had never talked to them. He has been told their feelings, that General Marshall's advice to the Chinese Government has been proven wrong and, of course the implication to that is don't take any more of his advice. Further, the consequence of that feeling is that General Marshall must be very certain that he doesn't land in another stalemate. He stated in conclusion that he wanted General Chou to understand that he was perfectly willing, glad as a matter of fact, to discuss all these various details with him to see if within his own mind he could feel he had a basis of possible mediation and negotiation which would work out successfully. If so, General Marshall stated he would be glad to do his part. So far as Manchuria is concerned, the discussions would have to be with General Chou because the Communist Party has taken the aggressive role and are in a position of bringing to a halt the Central Government's efforts. In the present situation, General Marshall would be unwilling to discuss these matters in the Committee of Three.

⁷⁰ See the directive of May 14 regarding movements of field teams, p. 848.

He would confine his action on the Committee to North China, to try to keep that quiet while efforts were being made to see whether anything could be done in Manchuria to terminate the fighting.

General Marshall stated he had thought of discussing with the Government and with General Chou the question of suppressing this propaganda campaign. However, he decided he must not do that at the present time. He deplored it, but unless some basis for stopping the fighting could be reached, he did not feel that he could take any measures in regard to that. For example, the Chinese Government has secured the services of a Mr. Beal as an advisor in relation to their public relations. They did that largely at my [*his*] suggestion, but General Marshall felt that since Mr. Beal's arrival that he could not even discuss these things with him because of his, Beal's, status with the Central Government and General Marshall's peculiar position at the present time.

General Chou stated that after listening to General Marshall he realized his difficulty and he guessed that certain people in the Government do not look upon him with favor because they are not willing to work out measures on a genuine basis for the peace and democracy in China. General Chou stated that not only some political leaders, but some military leaders as well, have the same idea. General Pai has now departed for Manchuria and General Chou stated he is sure his mission is not toward the end we are working for here. Certain troops are trying to provoke war in China proper, such as in North Kiangsu, in Shantung, in Hopeh. General Chou stated he shares the same feelings that there is not enough protection for the field teams right now and General Chou stated he was afraid that there are plots to injure the field teams and therefore to provoke war.

Regarding the press, General Chou understood when you [*General Marshall*] told him the other day that you [*he*] could not step out to correct the comment of the Sian spokesman. However, yesterday the Central Daily News editorial again emphasized this point, that General Marshall offered that proposal. General Chou is sure their design is simply to place General Marshall in a difficult position and to cause dissension. That is the tactics they use for propaganda, but General Chou stated he would like to call attention to the fact that the Chinese people are still looking hopefully toward peace and he hoped that General Marshall could find comfort in their sincere desire for peace. At least, General Chou stated, we are trying to improve the situation, to find some way of settlement in spite of the difference of views. General Chou stated they would try their best to correct the propaganda situation. General Chou stated that while we are trying to solve the Manchurian problem, efforts would be made to try to localize the war in North China and China Proper so that it will not flare up. In the meantime, views will be exchanged on the

Manchurian situation with an end to find a solution and to make the proposal to the Generalissimo.

General Chou said that what General Marshall has said to him today had given him quite a clear picture, but he wished to make another study and then to see if he could bring some detailed points for discussion. All efforts will be made for an over-all settlement, but General Chou expressed his fear that while discussions are in progress, the situation will become deteriorated because he knew and he could tell General Marshall confidentially that while General Pai was still here and General Ku was coming here they discussed action to be taken to prolong the war in Manchuria. The plan is that the Government troops would assemble in South Manchuria and then make an over-all attack on Changchun. That will also provoke war in North China along the Tientsin-Pukow railway. Outwardly they would make it appear that the Communists were attacking and they were meeting the attack. There has been a meeting attended by Gen. Pai at which Mr. Chen and T. V. Soong attended and they discussed measures that would be taken if no financial assistance from the U. S. were forthcoming—how they would overcome the financial difficulties in the three or four months for supporting the civil war. They are contemplating how to procure money which will be a further strain on the Chinese people. Since General Ho was criticized by all sides he is replaced by General Pai, but General Pai is only a scapegoat in this arrangement. If he fares well, he will be used but if he does not meet success, he will be kicked out at any time.

General Chou stated that no matter what happens, he will do his best because that is his mission. Regarding the point referred to he would like an opportunity to study it. At the same time, we must try to get the best efforts to stop the fighting in Manchuria before it conflagrates into China proper.

General Marshall stated he would like to add one thing. Several times he has talked of what, to his mind, is one of the greatest difficulties in finding a solution. That is the lack of appreciation of each side of the fears of the other. Instead of evaluating the fears, he stated he thought each side consulted its own fears and then estimated the other man's intentions. General Marshall stated he said this apropos of what General Chou had just told him regarding the Government plans of action, and also in relation to the conference that T. V. Soong and Chen Li Fu attended. Gen. Marshall stated he heard the Government side of these things. He didn't hear all they were doing, but he did hear all their fears and what they thought the Communists are doing. Then General Marshall hears General Chou, but he didn't hear all his people are doing, but he does hear all their fears as to what the Government is doing. He stated General Chou would recall the Communists' estimates on the troop situation in

Manchuria. There, General Marshall happened to be in a position to know very accurately what had happened. General Marshall stated that he assumed that as a practical proposition in North China, that each side is very fearful of what the other is going to do and in any event proceeds to take measures to offset that possible action or at least be prepared for it. General Marshall said he would assume, for example, that the commander of the Government troops in Hupeh north of Hankow would certainly have a plan of action against that Communist army—that would be the natural military procedure, but it would only be a plan. Now when the Communist fears as to what the Government may do are considered it is very easy to reach the feeling that it is a “will do” rather than a “may do”. The difficulty is to separate the wheat from the chaff. General Marshall said he thought that there was almost a perfect equal distribution of fears at the present time in North China. When he hears both sides, he is constantly impressed with that and I lack [*he lacks*] an X-Ray to photograph what each side is doing. General Marshall’s only hope was in scattering enough Americans around to see, so I [*he*] can keep the ship trim, that is about all.

Col. Caughey reported to General Marshall at this point on the availability of the picket boat.

General Marshall stated that he agreed completely with General Chou in his desire for a speedy solution, and on his part, he would do everything to expedite a solution.

General Marshall in closing asked General Chou when he would next like to meet and General Chou said he would desire to telephone General Marshall.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Conference Between General Marshall and Mr. Chang Nat Teh and Prof. Chen Ping Hsieh at General Marshall's House, May 17, 1946, 2: 30 p. m.

Also present: Captain Soong

Mr. Chang expressed his appreciation of General Marshall’s effort in obtaining peace for China and asked if there was any hope of success. He stated that Prof. Chou who visited General Marshall previously represented his newspaper and he also was a member of PPC.

General Marshall stated that he had been asked this question many times before by members of the Young China Party. He then stated that an immediate help would be for the minority political parties to get together on an interim basis in order to meet the urgent situation. He further stated he had also mentioned this to members of the Democratic League who had appealed to him for help. General Marshall

said it would be necessary for the small groups to unite and to meet the emergency by using their influence to bring these two opposing parties together. The Kuomintang felt that the Democratic League was in union with the Communist Party and the Communists felt that the Young China Party was dominated by the Kuomintang. In this emergency, it is necessary for these minority political parties to get together and to assist in solving the problem. He then stated that the newspapers on both sides published articles calculated to make the situation more difficult and that the mutual fear and distrust evidenced in these articles were making the situation more hopeless. General Marshall then suggested that all the minority party members join in an effort to influence newspaper editors and individual Kuomintang and Communist party members toward a more tolerant point of view. General Marshall then said that certain leaders in the Kuomintang were saying that he had misled the Government to its present position. On the other hand, Communists were saying that he was in back of the Kuomintang to destroy the Communist Party. The Democratic League also attacked him in effect by radio appeals to the U. S. General Marshall reiterated that the greatest assistance the Young China Party could give would be to combine with the Democratic League at the present time to influence people to solve the problem and not confine themselves to bitterness and intolerance.

General Marshall then said that there was no one in China, he thought, that understood the meaning and working of a two-party government. He explained that the attack of one against the other in a two-party government is an ordinary manifestation of a democracy, and that a party not in power always tries to better its position by an assault on the ruling party. The Kuomintang members could not see that point. He added that the troops of the Kuomintang could not destroy the Communist army, and the reverse was also true. However, between them, they could destroy China. General Marshall further stated that the most valuable weapon at this time would be to influence public opinion in the high levels.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Chou En-lai to General Marshall

NANKING, May 19, 1946.

DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: I received the following reports from General Yeh, Communist Commissioner of Executive Headquarters:

1. At 6.00, May 15, 1946, Government troops stationed at Yangtsun railway station on the Tientsin-Peiping line, jointly with those at Langfang station, totaling 8,000 men suddenly lay assault on Com-

munist troops stationed at Antze town ($116^{\circ} 43'$, $39^{\circ} 25'$) lying to the west of the railroad, and after bitter fighting occupied the town at 14.00 of same date.

2. At 9.00, May 15, 1946, a part of the Nationalist 16th Army, numbering over 1,000 men, who are stationed at Hwangtsun railway station on the Tientsin-Peiping line, suddenly attacked the Communist forces stationed at Pangkehchuang (south of Hwangtsun). The battle was still raging in the evening of that day.

3. Of same date, puppet troops stationed at Lianghsiang railway station, 25 Km due southwest of Peiping on the Peiping-Hankow line, moved toward the Communist area, and has by now reached Shangyao area on the western bank of the Yungting River.

In forwarding these reports, I request that you would wire to Executive Headquarters to take effective measures without delay, in order to check the furtherance of such warfare, and to determine as to who is guilty of violating truce.

[Signature in Chinese]
CHOU EN-LAI

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Chou En-lai to General Marshall

NANKING, May 19, 1946.

DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: 1. According to reports sent to me by General Yeh, Communist Commissioner of Executive Headquarters, Government troops are launching vehement attacks against Communist troops in the northern part of provinces Kiangsu and Anhwei. Following are the details of those truce-violating activities:

a. Nationalist 88th Army at Hsuchow attacked and occupied Communist-held Hsiaohsien town ($117^{\circ} 02'$, $34^{\circ} 15'$) and Mutsi village on April 27, and Hsiayi town ($116^{\circ} 10'$, $34^{\circ} 16'$) on May 10. (see Map I ⁷¹)

b. Since April 11, 1946, Government troops around Pangpu ($117^{\circ} 24'$, $32^{\circ} 56'$) attacked along four fronts toward the Communist area lying west of Tientsin-Pukow railroad track in Central Anhwei. The Nationalist 77th Division occupied Chihochen townlet, Hsiayuan-shi and Sanhochi villages due east of Tingyuan ($117^{\circ} 42'$, $32^{\circ} 30'$) on April 11, the 138th Division occupied Liangchiakang, Yinchiachien townlets on the same date, and Tsailangpu townlet on April 12 (all north of Tingyuan); another unit of the 138th Division, coordinating with the 3rd Regiment of the Peace Preservation Corps occupied Changchiao and Wang Hweikang townlets due south of Tingyuan town on April 12, while the 3rd Regiment is attacking from Chuchiahsiang townlet due north of Hofei ($117^{\circ} 18'$, $31^{\circ} 51'$) toward the Communist-controlled Hsiaotientse, Chanchikang townlets. The Government troops, with a combined strength of seven regiments, have

⁷¹ Not reproduced.

according to the latest report occupied the Tingyuan town at 10.00, May 13, 1946. Right now the fighting is still raging, with more Nationalist troops rushing up for reinforcement. (see Map II ⁷²)

c. In the Nantung sector, since April 15, 1946, Government troops attacked on Changlochen, Hsingjenchen, Hsiaohaichen and Kwanyinshan townlets due east of Nantung (120° 53', 32° 01') and seized the foregoing places on April 29, inflicting 268 casualties on the Communist troops. At the same time, the 79th Division of the Nationalist 49th Army, stationed at Chingchiang (120° 15', 32° 01'), coordinated by war vessels, assaulted Hsinkang (immediately on the northern bank of the Yangtse River), but was repelled by the Communist forces on April 15; on April 28, on arrival of fresh reinforcement they seized that place by a second assault.

2. The well-planned attack of the Government troops on this area which is sandwiched between the Yangtse River, and the Lunghai Railway and lying on the two sides of the Tientsin-Pukow Railway should be viewed as an overture to all-out offensive in this coastal area. The present circumstances show evidence that the Government troops are endeavoring as an initial step to drive away and wipe out the Communist forces stationed along the two sides of the Tientsin-Pukow railroad and the Hwai River, so as to facilitate the future attack along the middle section of that railway while the Government troops on the immediate northern bank of the Yangtse River close to the mouth attempts to make a frontal attack along the entire line of separation to spread out their position in order to ease the landing of reinforcements as a preparation for fresh attacks. On the other hand, newspapers are inspired by the Government to stage a propaganda campaign, charging the Communist forces being contemplating an attack on Nantung, Chingchiang and Kiangtu sector, which they would exploit as a pretext for launching all-out offensive. (see Map III ⁷²)

With a view to terminate such hostilities and to prevent any untoward consequences, I now propose that

a. instruction be sent to Commissioners of Executive Headquarters that it sends teams to Tingyuan and Nantung respectively without delay, for termination of hostilities and necessary military readjustment. In the event that there is no airfield in Tingyuan, that team may also be sent to Pangpu and proceed thence to Tingyuan for making survey.

b. the present whereabouts of the Hwaiying team be immediately located, so that the Committee of Three may pass decision as to whether or not a committee of representatives should be sent to Hwaiying for hearing briefing and to undertake the readjustments.

Your comments will be appreciated.

[Signature in Chinese]
(CHOU EN-LAI)

⁷² Not reproduced.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Statement to the Press by General Marshall

[NANKING,] 20 May 1946.

General Marshall is daily engaged in discussions with representatives of the Chinese political parties and others concerning the restoration of peace in Manchuria. He is deeply concerned over the critical situation in North China and is endeavoring by every means within his power to avoid the spread of the fighting in Manchuria to this region. The present publicity or propaganda campaigns conducted by both sides naturally inflame feelings and increase the possibility of some hot-head precipitating a general conflagration. This reckless propaganda of hate and suspicion seriously aggravates the present serious situation and can lead to results that would be disastrous for the people of China.

Operation of truce teams has been made especially difficult by the spreading of the propaganda among the officers and soldiers of both sides and it is on the success of these teams that China must largely depend for the effort at least to localize, if not suppress, conflict. The American members of the teams are coping with conditions that involve, not only hardship, but the risk of their lives in a determined and impartial effort to better the situation.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram*Brigadier General Henry A. Byroade to General Marshall*

[PEIPING,] 20 May 1946.

2872. Upon return I delivered to General Yeh your personal message regarding movement of teams and the agreement signed in Nanking.⁷³ The next morning I again saw him at his home on status of teams in Jehol province. All three teams in that area are completely blocked either by absence of Communist team member or refusal to investigate any report against their own side. This has been a most serious case as Communist team member had openly refused to obey agreed directives of this headquarters. In the meantime large scale troop movements and fighting have been reported within Jehol which have been confirmed to our satisfaction by our team members even though they have been so restricted in movement that satisfactory investigation has been impossible. I requested General Yeh to send a senior officer of his branch to Jehol to correct such conditions. Immediately he agreed and Major General Li accompanied by American and National officers are now in Jehol. This group is to carry absentee Communist team members now in Chengte to the other two

⁷³ May 14, p. 848.

team locations. Yeh admitted to me that the fault was not with the team members but that the local Communist commander had undoubtedly given them orders to remain absent or block team movement. He promised as well to correct this aspect. I found also upon my return that the National Government branch here would not agree to dispatch team to area of conflict just south of Peiping unless Jehol situation was corrected and a team was sent to Chefoo. As result of above action on Jehol compromise was reached to send team south of Peiping and an American observer to area of Chefoo as he can remain there and investigate past troop movements by talking to the great number of missionaries et cetera in the area. I am certain that a team would be called out of Chefoo very quickly after its arrival to investigate nearby conflicts. Suggest Caughey notify Colonel Pee of Chefoo arrangement as both the Generalissimo and General Hsu requested I take action to locate a team there. Will keep you informed of progress in attempt to secure unrestricted team movements.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Mr. Walter S. Robertson to General Marshall

[PEIPING,] 21 May 1946.

2942. Your [*you are?*] referred to 2872 which outlined in detail the steps taken to correct team conditions in Jehol Province. Message from American team members today and from Colonel Drake who accompanied Communist General Li on his mission to correct team conditions indicate the following:

Communist[s] still refuse to send representative to Team 26 at Chao-Yang upon excuse of lack of radio set and interpreter for his use. Offer was made of use of American radio and interpreter which was refused. This offer has been repeated several times during the last few weeks. Communist[s] have made decision that their member of Team 2 at Chihfeng who has been absent in Chengte for a long [time] will return to join the team [apparent omission] insist, however, that he move by vehicle instead of utilizing the aircraft that was offered for this purpose. They have stipulated that even after arrival of this Communist member at Chihfeng that this team will not be allowed to investigate the alleged violations of troop movements and fighting in the critical zone between Ping-Chuan and Pei-Piao. They state that Team 26 at Chao-Yang can make these investigations when the Communist member arrives there. The Communist General Li who was to rectify all conditions in Jehol refused to visit Chihfeng although late reports from there still indicate our team is under restriction by armed guards. Efforts of Team number

11 at Chengte are still balked by refusal of Communist Party member to accompany investigation on the reason that he has not heard of any violations in the area in question and considers it unnecessary to investigate. The American representatives in Jehol feel that the Communist Party is attempting to block all investigations in that area until after their troops movements and attacks can be accomplished. They believe Communist Party troop movements converging on Ping-Chuan are of such magnitude that a large concentration is under way in that area and a pending attack of considerable proportion is indicated.

Upon receipt of the above information we again visited General Yeh in his quarters. He offered no excuse for the attitude and action of the Communist[s] in Jehol. Informed him that situation was one which the Communist Party themselves would have to correct, that we had repeatedly requested action and offered assistance and facilities towards that end. He [*We?*] asked what we could [*do*] without avail and the only course left was to report the situation to you in detail for action in Nanking. He agreed.

The intention of the Communist[s] in Jehol Province are obvious. There is no doubt that they are attempting to move across the National Government supply line. This move would make their victory in Manchuria virtually complete. Only the inferior Port of Ying-kao would remain and it is doubtful if the National Government could hold this port from Communist forces in southeastern Manchuria. National Government reports from General Tu Li-ming indicate that very serious fighting involving large numbers is now in progress in the Chao-Yang area. No action can be taken, of course, upon surmises and reports of conflict that cannot be confirmed. The deliberate obstruction of team operations in Jehol during the past month is however about matter of fact which we believe justifies the strongest action possible by you with Chou En-lai. We are taking action here on a flagrant case where the Communist member of team enroute after many weeks of delay to the besieged city of Yung-Nien north of Hsin Hsiang on the Peiping-Hankow railway stopped enroute with the entire Communist section, refused to enter city or attend any meetings. He turned out to be the commander of the forces besieging the city and whose removal together with the National Government commander within the city had been strongly recommended by a previous team. Late National Government report tonight also indicates that all Communist members of the senior team at Tsinan have left the team and that attack upon this large and important city appears imminent. We are checking this tonight with the American team member in that location.

Also as an item of interest, that National Government Branch here has long predicted the present Communist movement in Jehol. General Tsai recently gave Byroade a report obtained in same manner as those he showed you in Nanking which indicated that General Chu Teh in Yen-an had ordered offensive [apparent garble] of Great Wall and Communist team member has been instructed not to allow team interference.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Conference Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai at 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, May 21, 1946, 10: 40 a. m.

Also present: Col. Hutchin
Mr. Chang Wen-Chin
Capt. Soong

General Marshall asked General Chou what happened about the plane for his people from Peiping and when would they get in. General Chou replied that he understood Colonel Caughey had sent off a message to General Byroade. General Marshall inquired when they were coming down and General Chou stated it was being arranged at the other end and the time is not set. General Marshall asked if General Chou expected them in today. General Chou stated he hoped they could come today or tomorrow, but that the decision for that is left at the other end. Colonel Hutchin informed General Marshall that the message had been dispatched to Peiping, but that no reply had been received.

General Chou stated he had read over the press release issued yesterday by General Marshall and he agreed with that and had wired it to Yen-an. He remarked that the propaganda campaign was getting worse.

General Marshall stated that it had gotten so bad he determined that he had to do something. He stated that frankly he was undecided as to whether it might not be harmful for him to be making a very drastic statement as to how the Chinese should run **their own affair**. General Marshall thought it quite possible that he would be critically attacked for having the effrontery to endeavor to instruct the agencies of the two parties as to how they should conduct their affairs. Nevertheless, he decided that something had to be done and apparently he was the only person that was free to do it; therefore, the statement. The new Minister of Information called on General Marshall evening of 20 May to meet him for the first time, but especially to assure General Marshall of his cooperation and to ask him what he thought the Minister of Information should do. General Marshall told him

that he didn't feel free to advise him as to just what to do because there were two sides to this affair—the Government side and the Communist side and therefore General Marshall could not very well advise the Government as to what to do without specific knowledge of what the Communist action would be. General Marshall stated that he did say that he was certain that the effect of the propaganda procedure was exceedingly harmful to both parties outside of China. It undoubtedly was convincing, certainly the American people, that this was a free for all fight with little regard for the actual facts in the reports to the world. Of course such a reaction discredits both sides. What its effect was here in China, General Marshall would not have the temerity to interpret as they should know that much better than he could, but he did know that it made negotiations almost impossible and all must concede that negotiations were of the greatest possible importance to China at the present time. Now if General Chou has any specific ideas that he would like to reach with the Central Government News Agency, General Marshall stated he would be very glad to try to help in the matter, but that he did not feel as free to propose as he did in Chungking when there was a period of agreement.

Regarding this matter, General Chou said that he would like to call on the new Minister of Publicity and see what he can learn about his views. He thinks that it would be a good time and it would be a good thing if at least the news that does not correspond to facts could be eliminated. That would help a great deal to avoid stimulating the feelings. General Chou originally proposed in Chungking in February that all the reports would be confined to reports of facts. Only regarding military reports, it would be confined to the official press release of Executive Headquarters. At that time the Kuomintang would not agree to that. They said that the political and military matters were inseparable. Therefore, they could not agree to the proposal. In addition to that, we have now another difficulty. The Executive Headquarters press release is confined to what is going on in China Proper while Manchuria is not under the control of the Headquarters and therefore General Chou wanted to see the new Minister and find out if he has some idea to decrease the paper attack, or even to cease it completely. Because the Minister has just assumed his position, plus the statement General Marshall made, General Chou thought it would be a good opportunity to make efforts to work toward this direction. General Chou admitted that now the situation is more difficult than when he made the proposal in February. In addition, General Chou stated, the Kuomintang itself is not unified within itself. Even if the Ministry of Information can agree on something, still there are other Kuomintang papers which are not under the con-

trol of the Ministry of Information. They may not be able to hold them to an agreement, but anyhow General Chou stated that he will spare no efforts.

General Marshall stated that he appreciated General Chou's statement and that he would much prefer that General Chou and the Minister of Information confer together rather than that he be drawn into the picture. He stated that he would make one observation, that when a statement is made that they are to confine themselves to facts, the question is, who determines the facts. If military reports were left to Executive Headquarters there would be decided differences of opinions as to facts. General Marshall stated that that would mean less said in the press—the disagreement would mean silence which he said would not be a bad thing.

General Marshall stated that he had three letters that had come in from General Chou, and were brought to his attention that morning. He stated he would try to pass on them here.

The first is dated May 19th⁷⁴ and is regarding a report on Japanese prisoners Colonel Culley of Team 28 recounted. General Marshall stated he would do as General Chou requests, calling Colonel Culley's attention to what General Chou says and see if a more complete investigation can be made.

The second letter is dated May 19th and quoted a report from General Yeh of Executive Headquarters on the subject of three fights at Yangtsun, Kwangtsn, and Lienshan [*Lianghsiang*]. General Marshall stated he would take the matter up immediately with Mr. Robertson and General Byroade. He stated he supposed they had already seen General Yeh's statement. The best he could do is to call on them immediately as to what they thought the situation was and what could be done to remedy it.

The third letter, General Marshall stated, is a lengthy statement by General Chou of May 19th again reporting from General Yeh regarding the situation in Kiangsu and Anwhei. Before discussing that in detail, General Marshall stated he would give General Chou a report that just came in from Colonel Drake of Team 17.⁷⁵ (General Marshall handed General Chou the report.)

After allowing General Chou time to read the report, General Marshall stated that he had General Chou's letter on the same subject quoting General Yeh in which General Chou recommended that teams be sent to Tingyuan and Nantung without delay. General Marshall stated that it seemed to him that with a team apparently at Nantung, what is needed is another team at Tingyuan or maybe send it first to

⁷⁴ Not printed.

⁷⁵ *Supra*.

Nantung to confer with the first team and determine where it should go. General Marshall stated it would hardly seem that two teams were needed. If agreeable to General Chou, he would make a recommendation that another team be sent down there and be, he would assume, subordinated to the first team so that they will not be entirely independent and that Executive Headquarters be allowed to determine, after communication with Team 17, as to where the new team should be sent. Whether or not the time has arrived to send a special committee there and to what place, General Marshall did not know. General Marshall asked General Chou's comments.

General Chou stated that the Team 17 has made a very great effort and therefore no team seems needed for Nantung. It seemed to him better to await until the team had returned to Huai-an and then the special committee go down to Huai-an to learn about the situation. After the return of the team is known this can be done. Regarding Tingyuan, General Chou stated fighting is still going on and he hoped that the team would be sent. If there is no airfield there the team can go to Pangpu where there is an airfield and then go down to Tingyuan.

General Marshall told General Chou he had made a mistake, thinking of Nantung and he had confused Tingyuan with Huai-an. He saw what General Chou meant and he agreed to the two teams.

General Chou commented on the report by stating there had been a lot of discussion regarding the line of separation. He thought that when the special committee is sent to hear the briefing, they would know that in certain places there are only Communist militia but no regular troops. The Government troops, upon seeing that there are no regular Communist troops, would go to that place and since the militia is not strong enough to resist they would be pushed back. Then the Communist regular troops would come in and fight back the Government regular troops. The only reason that the Government troops gave is that there are no regular troops in those places, however, General Chou wanted to point out that the cease fire included militia, and irregulars, so actually the lines of separation have not been determined. According to the truce agreement, no troop movements should be made, but these reports show that Government troops did move after the truce and this is one illustration of an example of some cases which lead to conflict. General Chou thought that the explanation from the team would yield more information about that.

General Marshall stated he understood and that he agreed to send an additional team to the Nantung-Huai-an area and a team to the Tingyuan area.

General Marshall stated he had another communication which he

would like to read to General Chou. The communication was a personal report from the American member of the team at Chihfeng, Colonel Pressely on the 16th.⁷⁶ He (Col. Pressely) states that the airfield at Chihfeng was destroyed by the Communists. Many holes were dug in the runway, but are now repaired so that a plane can land, but only on the south end. He requests a plane be sent as quickly as possible for supplies for repair of generator with other supplies that are needed. He states, "I was not permitted to leave the compound on the 11th of May and stopped by an armed sentry at the exit to the compound. Lt. Boyle (that is his assistant) was ordered back to the compound from the street of this city on the 14th of May." They were not permitted to visit the local people on the 14th of May. The local papers claimed the National Government was going to attack the city. He therefore requested a conference with the local commander, the mayor or anyone in authority—but this was denied.

General Marshall said he had a somewhat similar report which he would not burden the record with. He stated that he wished to say to General Chou that this seemed to him to greatly embarrass the entire Communist position in North China. The action of the Communists in the Chihfeng region, the absence of team members in Chengte, not only the complete lack of cooperation, but the definite antagonistic action—the very definite hostility to various American team members due to the propaganda against the United States and against me, leaves a situation there which defies the representations of General Chou regarding other parts of North China and gives the Government contenders an argument against good faith in other matters where certainly, in some instances, I think, the Government is at fault. One of the team captains—not Colonel Pressely—is a good friend of General Marshall's. His report is to be accepted by General Marshall, as he knows the man well—knows his character. General Marshall regards the continued action in that region as unfortunate and might easily prove fatal. Certainly if the reports of the Communist actions in that general region ever reach the American press, it would do the Communist position serious harm. General Marshall thought, therefore, that General Chou should take some positive action to get his people in that region under control.

General Marshall said he wanted to speak about another incident—he had forgotten the place. General Chou would undoubtedly know what it was. However, 10 trucks of UNRRA supplies intended for starving people in a city, including medical supplies, were seized by the Communist authorities. Mr. Robertson told General Marshall orally that his understanding of the incident was that the CNRRA

⁷⁶ Trusum 123, May 17, not printed.

official in charge of the train was found to be carrying, along with the UNRRA supplies, pay for the puppet troops and some other things for them, and that was the basis for the seizure. General Marshall said he did not know now what happened finally to those supplies, but he wanted to say to General Chou the following. However foolish and stupid the action of the Government official was in endeavoring to utilize a neutral person to effect some measure of supply to puppet troops, however indefensible that action was, General Marshall thought the Communists should be very careful regarding what they do with UNRRA supplies. People of the United States are contributing more than 80% of the cost of the UNRRA expenses and China is getting the largest proportion. Now whatever the minor factors are, if the people of the United States, who are now endeavoring to save out of their general diet in wheat and in rice for China and are making a tremendous contribution in money and food and medical supplies and general sustenance to China, find that its delivery is being interfered with for whatever reason, it can have but one effect, which General Marshall thought would be totally to the disadvantage of the Communist Party. General Marshall repeated that he did not know what became of the supplies—they may have been finally sent into the city—he did not know. General Marshall accepted the fact that the Communists had justification in seizing the train, but when it comes to the complete diversion of those supplies, if they were diverted finally, then General Marshall thought that would [be] making a great mistake. General Marshall stated he was told that the Government stopped a supply train going to Kalgan in retaliation for this stoppage. Mr. Robertson saw the Government official involved and told him that action placed the Government in an impossible position by retaliating by blocking supplies contributed by the American people for starving people. If there was to be retaliation it must be in some other manner—so that supply train was released. General Marshall repeated again that he did not know what became of the original ten trucks, but he merely wanted to give point to the possibilities involved in blocking the distribution of UNRRA supplies.

General Chou stated that he was informed regarding these two incidents.

Regarding the matter in Jehol, he has sent wires to cease such actions. That one place alone is involved, actually[,] General Chou stated, he is dealing with several matters during the last few days. That was also the reason why he brought up in the proposal regarding the operation of the field teams, the second point, that the personal freedom and safety of the teams should be respected by the local military and civil authorities because General Chou and [at?] that

time noticed the possibilities that eventually might come out. He stated that with reference to the actions General Marshall just stated in regard to Jehol, they may be able to give very good reasons, but still he thought that such actions should be corrected because they are not compatible with the relationship within the field teams. The argument they gave is that they had a signed agreement at Chengte in which it was agreed that the Communist troops would evacuate the town of Chengte while on the Government side, the 5th Division should return to Hopeh. While the Communist troops did evacuate that town, the Government 5th Division instead of going to Hopeh departed for Manchuria to participate in the fighting. In addition to that the Government 195th Division was also moved to Manchuria, despite protest of the Communist team member. The 85th Division also departed for Manchuria. On account of the fact that the Government has entered into the agreement, the Communist team member was blamed by the local military authorities, for the reason that all the agreements seem to be of no use—that the Government would not abide by these agreements. Then, of course, the present case has been referred to the three commissioners of the Executive Headquarters. This indicates that the military authorities are not satisfied with the work of the field teams, which places the Communist team member in an embarrassed position. A conference had been proposed to be convened in Chengte for the commander of both parties to meet, however, that conference was not able to take place. Another point is that the local commanders do not understand fully the position of the American representatives. In certain things they do not quite agree with the American representative. For example, the fighting [which] started at Peipei along the railway in Jehol, which the papers now report to be occupied by the Communists, was started for the reason that despite all the work of the field team, the movement of the Government troops cannot be stopped, so they moved to block the movement of the troops and destroyed the railroads. Of course this matter has to be taken care of and General Chou has already wired General Yeh in Peiping and requested him to send messages to Jehol and Chihfeng saying that despite the fact that the Government has initially been wrong, the method[s] that the Communist Party has adopted to stop them are also not appropriate. General Chou wanted you ⁷⁷ to know he has taken up this matter.

General Marshall expressed his thanks.

Regarding the other incident, which General Chou stated happened at Liachun—west Shantung, he has also received information. General Chou was informed that the whole matter is said to be settled

⁷⁷ General Marshall.

with the participation of UNRRA and CNRRA representatives. They have agreed that the supplies will be distributed both within the town and partly within the immediate vicinity of the town for the populace—for the civilians. It is reported that an agreement has been signed to that effect. General Chou had received this report, but he will now investigate further in this matter to see if anything goes wrong in that region.

General Marshall stated he was also awaiting to find out exactly what happened, because he wanted to take it up with the Central Government. He thought that both sides had to be very careful in the handling of UNRRA supplies, which the Chinese people need so badly.

General Chou asked if Mr. Ray and Mr. Todd ⁷⁸ had told General Marshall the result of their conference with him. General Marshall stated they had not. General Chou said their conference was very satisfactory. General Chou stated, however that if the contact between UNRRA and himself had been two months ago, that would have been much better. That would save the delay that has occurred when the whole thing was referred to Nanking. Now time is pressing. In their conversation, General Chou and Mr. Ray reached a six-point agreement. There is one point that needs discussion with Dr. T. F. Tsiang. Regarding that point, General Chou has suggested that the three parties (the Communist local government, the Central Government and CNRRA & UNRRA) will make surveys and to work out the relief areas. Railroads are being built across the Yellow River and the decision of the opening of the channel to the old bed will be deferred until 15 June, after the work of the repairing the old dykes has been started so they will see how the project is progressing. If the first step of the dyke can be completed within 40 days then the part of the water can be diverted into the old course. In case it cannot be completed, there is no way but to wait until the flood is over. Now the work will be started and the Communist Party provides all the necessary labor. UNRRA and Yellow River organization will send men down to inspect the progress of work and General Chou has told them that in case they can reach an agreement in the 15 June conference that would be the best thing, but in case they could not reach an agreement they would immediately proceed to Nanking to have a discussion here.

General Marshall stated that Mr. Todd had been interested in getting Mr. Chang Wen-chin to work with him.

General Chou stated there was one thing that he (Todd) may have erred on. In the inspection tour he say [*saw*] only half of the dykes

⁷⁸ J. Franklin Ray, acting director of the China office of UNRRA, and Oliver J. Todd American engineer on the staff.

which were in rather good shape and he did not notice the other part and therefore his plan is optimistic. He predicted that the work could be completed in two months which seems too optimistic.

General Chou stated he would like to discuss on the Manchurian problem, but that he had an appointment with Mr. Shao Li-tze⁷⁹ for luncheon and would have to limit his presentation to an outline. General Chou stated that if General Marshall did not mind, he would like to listen to his comments at the next meeting.

General Chou stated that regarding General Marshall's comments of May 17th he has referred it to Yen-an and Yen-an also has certain hesitations regarding the withdrawal from Changchun. They have to ask the Communist leaders in Manchuria on this question. It seems to them that they have to consider the following two points:

1. In case the Government feels that they can take Changchun within a very short time, they are afraid that the Government would not enter into such an agreement.
2. In case they would capture Changchun, they may raise again other points like Harbin[,] and Yen-an doubts whether the Government would still consider such a proposal.

Regarding the political aspect, the points for consideration are that the political and economical council will be reorganized into a provincial administrative council according to the 3-3-3 ratio; that the Changchun mayor should be neutral, and the magistrate council be participated in by both the Kuomintang and Communist parties.

In regard to the reorganization of the various provincial governments there has to be some arrangement worked out which is acceptable to both parties. Yen-an likes to know whether General Marshall has any comments. General Chou will also discuss with the other parties to get their views. According to this proposal Changchun will be made a city of peace. The police of that city should also be organized by the mayor who is a neutral person, and that the secret police should not be allowed to infiltrate in that police. However the present regulations of the Central Government is different from that. According to present regulations the Central Government has the police directly under them. That is the Japanese system and is not the democratic way.

In the military aspect, General Marshall asked whether after the truce the demobilization will be carried out. General Chou desired to assure General Marshall that the demobilization will be carried out according to the reorganization plan which has to be worked out. We will also work out procedures to distinguish the National Army from the local forces and what way they should be divided.

⁷⁹ Secretary General of the Chinese People's Political Council.

Regarding the Communist troops, it is suggested that the Communists would like to claim 5 divisions under the army reorganization. It is acceptable to Yen-an to push the time of army reorganization in Manchuria so that we do not need to await the reorganization's completion after 18 months. Regarding the disposition of troops, of course, the Communist troops and the National troops will garrison different areas. The Communist troops will be garrisoned along the major cities now under Communist control. They would not go through Government troop areas because it is natural that the Government troops would not agree to that.

Now coming to the political arrangement, once the army reorganization plan can be fixed and implemented and the disposition of troops has been determined then we will separate the military matters from the civil administrative matters and the military reorganization will come under the control of the Executive Headquarters while the civil affairs will all go under the provincial administrative council. With the separation of the political from the military affairs, General Chou thought that everybody may feel reassured.

General Marshall said he would like to make one comment regarding the Government's suspected attitude regarding Changchun, or once it has been taken. General Marshall stated that it was his point of view that in order to avoid such possibilities, for a successful action or agreement, it has to be reached quickly, for that reason and also because of the precarious situation in North China. Regarding Yen-an's second comment regarding Changchun, General Marshall said his attitude toward the Central Government would be the same as it is now toward the Communist Party. General Marshall said he would not permit himself to become involved in the negotiations unless he thought there was a fair prospect of reaching an agreement. Once he had a pretty definite idea of the Communist side of the picture, he could do some investigating to find out what the possibilities of the Government's considerations of his views would be. General Marshall would follow the same procedure he had in the past. He would start with the side that was in the strong position at the moment. General Marshall stated he would be prepared to comment tomorrow in detail regarding the various points General Chou had brought up. General Marshall stated that he would say now that the proposition of 5 divisions is an increase of 5 times the previous agreement and he would assume would inevitably involve a demand on the part of the Central Government for a somewhat corresponding increase on the original proposal. General Marshall thought it would be better to hold down the total strengths than to increase it in such a manner. For example, suppose the ratio of 14 to 1—the present agreement—be changed to 1 to 5. That would be one Communist

army and 5 Government armies. That would seem a better approach than 5 Communist divisions which would inevitably mean the insistence on the part of the Government to a corresponding increase in their final strength. General Marshall thought the critical factor here was the method and the rapidity with which the readjustment of the strengths could be made and the decision as to the disposition of troops. He stated he was assuming that the Communist interest, in view of its present deployment, is to the north of Changchun, particularly as the Government has not entered that area except by little detachments. Therefore, General Marshall was assuming that on the Communist side they would wish the deployment of their troops to be the strongest possible in that region and would request that the Government troops would be confined largely to the region in which they are now disposed. General Marshall was also turning over in his mind some such disposition with the Communists to the north and the Government troops to the south, that Changchun could not be continued indefinitely in the special status proposed and that there would be a Government insistence at some later date for the actual occupation of Changchun if the Government deployment was to be confined to the southward. General Marshall stated that he would undertake tomorrow to comment in more detail, but that he was speaking off-hand here having just heard General Chou's comments. General Marshall stated he was fearful of what some leader on either side might do, which would react right here in Nanking, and would be to the loss of China.

General Marshall stated he was troubled about the political part because he did not know the leaders. He may have met Shao Li-Tze, but he was just a name, also Chen Li Foo. He didn't know General Chou's people. That is the problem he would be most fearful of leaving completely to a future negotiation.

General Marshall stated that General Chou had asked him for his suggestions about the provincial governments and he said he merely starts with a knowledge that there are nine Central Government appointees and 8 Communist appointees. He stated that he believed the province to the NE of Tsitsihar is the only one the Communists have not appointed a governor for.

General Chou stated he was not sure of the direction.

General Marshall said it is very hard for him to propose a compromise. He would try to do so, but that would be largely a guess on his part. However, he was not guessing when he stated that the reorganized political council would probably never be able to reach

an agreement regarding such a vital question of the political reorganization of provincial governments. It would have to be known pretty well in advance what the demands would be. He stated he would try to reply more definitely tomorrow.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Mr. Walter S. Robertson to General Marshall

[Extract]

[PEIPING,] 22 May 1946.

2947. . . . [I have been informed] that Communist troop movements were taking place in Jehol as necessary strategic military measures. . . .

. . . It is evident that orders have gone out from Yen-an to field team members to block all investigation of Communist troop movements and this Headquarters . . . is powerless to do anything about it. It is now also clear why Chou En-lai refused to grant freedom of movement to field teams. The agreement signed on 14 May in deference to his representations and as a test of Communist good faith has already been rendered valueless for emergency situations.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Chou En-lai to General Marshall

NANKING, May 22, 1946.

MY DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: In connection with the redirection of the Yellow River, I have had a conference with Messrs. Ray and Todd of UNRRA on May 18, 1946. At that conference we reached a six-point oral agreement, which I now put in writing and present to you for your reference.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature in Chinese]
(CHOU EN-LAI)

[Enclosure]

THE ORAL AGREEMENT ON THE YELLOW RIVER PROBLEM REACHED BY
MESSRS. FRANKLIN RAY AND TODD, AND GENERAL CHOU EN-LAI

1. The work of dyke repair and bed improvement of the old River course should immediately be commenced despite all sorts of difficulties.

2. All materials and foodstuff needed for the completion of this work will be provided by UNRRA and the flow of supply shall not be affected by political and military factors.

3. An office for managing the supply of materials and foodstuff shall be established in Hotze (Tsaotchow) by CNRRA, in which the Chinese Communist Party shall participate.

4. The relief work for the displaced inhabitants now staying in the old bed of the Yellow River shall be governed by a committee organized by three sides: two members each from the Government and the Chinese Communist Party, and one each from UNRRA and CNRRA.

5. Up to June 15 no channel shall be dug to the bed of the old course below Huayangkow; the Pian-Hsin Railroad (from Kaifeng to Hsin-hsiang) and the highway parallel to it shall not be pulled up. From June 15 onward consideration shall be given to the progress made in the work in the lower stream and agreement shall be made by both sides before any change to them be effected.

6. The work of laying trestles is to be continued. Whether the work of piling rocks will be started or not depends on the progress made thus far in the work along the lower stream up to June 15, 1946, and decision thereon shall be made through agreement by both sides. If decision is made to pile the rocks, the thickness of the rock layer thus piled up shall not surpass two meters.

NOTE: The consideration given to "the progress made in the work in the lower stream", mentioned in the above two items, implies that the principle: "no overflowing will be caused in the lower stream" be obeyed.

VIII. NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO FIFTEEN-DAY TRUCE IN MANCHURIA (MAY 22-JUNE 6, 1946)

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Notes by General Marshall of Meeting With Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek at Nanking, May 22, 1946

Following almost daily discussions with the Generalissimo regarding the detailed terms for the military settlement, the redistribution of troops as a condition precedent to the issuance of the cease firing order and the tentative arrangement whereby the Communists would voluntarily evacuate Changchun and an advance section of Executive Headquarters would take over control of that city pending a further settlement regarding Changchun and the Manchurian area to the north, I was advised on this evening by the Generalissimo that he had not heard from his military leaders in Manchuria for three days. He

feared that following their success at Ssupingkai, they were proceeding on into Changchun. He stated his agreement with me that their occupation of Changchun in advance of the basis of agreement with the Communists practically completed would be inadvisable. He told me, therefore, that he was leaving for Mukden to get control of the situation. I asked him when he was departing and he said the day after tomorrow. I expressed the thought that if the situation was as he feared it to be, that would represent too much of a delay. He stated that he had an engagement the next day with a mission from Tibet which he would have to keep.

I found that, though rather indisposed, the Generalissimo desired Madame Chiang to accompany him. I offered my plane for the trip, it being a safer machine for such a flight than a two-engined C-47. This was accepted.

There was a further discussion of the various factors in the case, but no change in the general understanding of the basis for an agreement which had just about been reached by both sides.

The Generalissimo told me that he might return from Mukden within 24 hours or it might be as much as four days. I expressed the hope that he return at as early a date as possible in order that we might proceed with negotiations to completion.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

General Marshall to President Truman

[NANKING,] 22 May 1946.

740. DEAR MISTER PRESIDENT: As the military situation in North China reaches a critical state trembling on the verge of open general war and the fighting in Manchuria continues, a point has been reached in negotiations that indicates probability of an agreement for termination of hostilities with a reasonable basis for military and political compromises in Manchuria. The time factor is critical as an open rupture in North China would probably fatally defeat the possibility of reaching agreement. The following is the situation and I must ask you and Mister Byrnes to guard this recital against all possibility of a leak, which would wreck any prospects I now have for terminating the present conflict.

On my departure from Chungking for Nanking I, in effect, withdrew as a mediator in the Manchuria problem as having exhausted my resources and found myself in a position where National Government leaders, because of Communist attack on Changchun, felt my advice regarding cooperation with Communists had proved unworkable and Communists were attacking me for assistance they charged

U. S. was giving National Government. I said I could no longer through my actions place the U. S. Government in the position of being charged with responsibility for another stalemate and consequent resumption of hostilities, that a firm basis of compromise would have to be found and that appeared quite improbable in view of the determined, rather implacable attitude of the two parties concerned. I therefore confined my activities to efforts to control the situation in North China and prevent a general outbreak there.

In discussions with the Generalissimo I found he would recede from his determination to have his army occupy Changchun and would accept the suggestion that an advanced section of Executive Headquarters, on withdrawal of Communists, take over the management of Changchun while negotiations were completed for the reorganization of the military and political governments in Manchuria. I also found that he would concede certain points in connection with this political and military reorganization. These discussions were a lengthy process.

Next, General Chou En-lai⁸⁰ wished to resume discussions regarding a possible Manchurian settlement. In effect, I declined but explained again why I had withdrawn, at the same time outlining all the factors I would have to be fully informed on to permit me to reconsider my position. He transmitted my outline to Yen-an and they in turn discussed the terms with Manchurian leaders. All this being by radio over highly controversial matters in the midst of fighting, was also a lengthy process. He has returned with certain definite proposals which are not too seriously out of line with the Generalissimo's present attitude. Chou En-lai comes again today to discuss details, on the assumption that if I consider the Communist position not too extreme I will undertake again formally to mediate.

The most critical factor at the moment is not the distance apart of the two parties, but is the rapid development of a crisis which may overtake and wreck negotiations beyond hope of repair. Added to this is the secret intention of the Generalissimo to fly to Mukden tomorrow because, he stated to me most confidentially, he feared his military leaders there were heading into an attack on Changchun which both he and I think would fatally terminate all hope of an agreement. While he is gone negotiations will be largely at a standstill and time presses seriously. I am trying to arrange a basis for terminating the fighting while he is actually in Mukden, but this will be very difficult of arrangement as I cannot press definitely for Com-

⁸⁰ Representative at Nanking of the Chinese Communist Party.

munist declarations regarding several critical political points without indicating some response from Government side. But I will try to find a method. Both are reluctant to state their terms, awaiting for a commitment by the other side. I am working against time, otherwise I would be quite hopeful. As it is, success depends on the developments in the field more than on the problems of negotiation. Hence my press release of day before yesterday⁸¹ was in an effort to moderate the vitriolic campaign of propaganda now in progress. I did this in the face of a probable hostile reaction to my interference in a purely Chinese problem as would of course be charged by certain people. But something had to be done to moderate the inflammatory press and radio charges and counter charges and I appeared to be the only person who would do it.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Memorandum of Meeting Between the Minister for Foreign Affairs
(Wang Shih-chieh) and General Marshall, May 23, 1946, 5 p. m.*

Dr. Wang stated that he hoped General Marshall would continue to exert his utmost pressure to secure an agreement which would terminate hostilities. He added that he hoped General Marshall would triple his efforts.

Following a general discussion on the situation in Manchuria as then known, in relation to the possibility of the Central Government troops attempting to capture Changchun, Dr. Wang stated that he had talked to the Generalissimo and both the Generalissimo and Dr. Wang thought that it would be the wrong thing for the Central Government troops to make such an assault, and for that reason the Generalissimo had gone to Mukden.

Following a discussion of the point of view of various Kuomintang leaders, Dr. Wang illustrated his own views by quoting a discussion he had had in 1942 with Sir Stafford Cripps,⁸² which was to the effect that the Government should accept the Communist Party in a coalition arrangement.

On his departure, Dr. Wang again stated his hope that General Marshall would continue his pressure to secure an agreement between the Government and the Communist Party to terminate hostilities, and that he would increase his effort many fold.

⁸¹ May 20, p. 865.

⁸² At that time British Ambassador in the Soviet Union.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai at 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, May 23, 1946, 6 p. m.

Also present: Colonel Caughey⁸³
Capt. Soong⁸⁴
Mr. Chang Wen-Chin⁸⁵

General Marshall stated that he was sorry to be late but he had a conference with Dr. Wang Shih Chieh, the Foreign Minister, followed by a meeting with the Belgian Ambassador.

General Marshall said that he had asked Dr. Wang if he minded repeating to General Chou some of Dr. Wang's views, and Dr. Wang stated he did not mind. General Marshall said they talked of many things regarding the situation. Dr. Wang said that he had seen Dr. Peng, the Minister of Information,⁸⁶ and Dr. Wang had exactly the same idea about the control of the press that General Chou and General Marshall had. Dr. Wang felt the same way about it and advised Dr. Peng to that effect. Dr. Wang thought the situation was very serious and that very determined action should be taken on the part of the Government through the Central News Agency to control propaganda. Dr. Wang thought General Chou's proposal for clearing military news through the Executive Headquarters and through a team at Mukden was excellent, particularly when General Marshall stated that when an agreement was not reached—nothing would come out. He thought that was much the better. General Marshall said that Dr. Wang might take a different view from other members of the Government. General Marshall said he told Dr. Wang of General Chou's idea about an agreement on a joint statement following any political conferences. Dr. Wang was in thorough agreement to that.

General Chou said that he was still making every effort to effect the cessation of propaganda. General Chou had written a letter to Dr. Peng saying that the proposal he had made in the previous day's conversation had been approved by Yen-an and he had made an appointment with Dr. Peng for tomorrow morning at 9 o'clock. He hoped that some kind of a solution could be reached by then.

General Chou stated that he had come to see General Marshall for the specific purpose of discussing the situation in Manchuria since he had learned that General Pei Chung Tsi⁸⁷ arrived in Nanking yesterday. Today at 11 o'clock the Generalissimo left for Manchuria. This

⁸³ J. Hart Caughey, Executive Officer on General Marshall's staff.

⁸⁴ John L. Soong, U. S. Army language officer.

⁸⁵ Personal secretary to Gen. Chou En-lai.

⁸⁶ Peng Hsueh-peï.

⁸⁷ Pai Chung-hsi, Chinese Minister for National Defense.

situation led General Chou to guess that maybe the program now in prospect may confront some trouble for completion and General Chou therefore requested General Marshall's estimate of the situation as to whether some change should take place in the meantime or whether we should just continue our efforts along the line we have followed. General Chou stated that it was his impression that General Marshall's idea seemed to be very clear regarding Manchuria with the exception of the provincial governments. General Chou said he was afraid that with the departure of the Generalissimo from Nanking, it might be his intention to still try to resolve the Manchurian problem by force. Possibly the Generalissimo wanted to be absent at this time so that the efforts toward negotiation would be interfered with. General Chou stated that he was willing to resolve the whole matter by negotiations because that is for the best interests of the Chinese people.

General Marshall stated that in the first place, General Chou would understand that he was not entirely free to express himself. He stated that possibly his best answer to General Chou would be that he had provided his plane for the Generalissimo's trip. As to the deputy Chief of Staff, General Pei Chung Chi, he arrived yesterday and the Generalissimo's trip to Mukden was planned 36 hours before that. General Marshall stated that he had arranged for the plane day before yesterday, so Pei Chung Chi's conversation of yesterday had no bearing on the Generalissimo's plan to go to Manchuria. What the outcome of the Generalissimo's trip would be, General Marshall could not say.

General Marshall said he saw the Generalissimo briefly last night after his conversation with General Chou. In view of the discussion General Marshall had with General Chou and despite the fact that General Marshall had yet no clear idea concerning provincial governments, he had concluded that since the situation was so serious that he would discuss the matter with the Generalissimo. The Generalissimo had previously, Saturday or Sunday, discussed the matter with General Marshall and finally brought up the question of his trip to Mukden. Yesterday General Marshall outlined to the Generalissimo the possible basis of an agreement, except for the political reorganization factor. Regarding that, General Marshall stated the Democratic League attitude and General Chou's attitude regarding the reorganization of the political council, but General Marshall had nothing to offer in connection with the provincial governments. The Generalissimo made a statement in regard to the political factors which confirmed what General Marshall had told General Chou the other day that the Generalissimo's intention was to discontinue a special form of government in Manchuria by dissolving the councils.

The Generalissimo, General Marshall stated, did not declare himself regarding Changchun and the military aspects as General Marshall presented them. General Marshall's impression however was that the Generalissimo was not antagonistic.

General Marshall stated that he discussed the communications problem at great length and that the Generalissimo mentioned two other matters which General Marshall said he would relate to General Chou. He stated that he drew the implication from the discussion of these three points that an agreement seemed to be a possibility. The Generalissimo stated three things that to his mind were conditions precedent to any general agreement.

a. The Generalissimo insisted that there must be an effort on the part of the Communist Party to facilitate the restoration of communications. General Marshall said he stated General Chou's contention that it wasn't purely a matter of railway communications; that the Communist Party attached just as much importance to road, river, telegraph and postal communications. The Generalissimo stated that he thought those issues were brought up to present a convenient stumbling block to the actual restoration of communications. General Marshall told the Generalissimo that those issues were raised by General Chou En-lai before the agreement of January 10th was reached. The Generalissimo said he was willing to have this matter adjusted by conference between General Yu Ta-Wei⁸⁸ and General Chou. General Marshall raised the issue of railroad fortifications as having been the major stumbling block and he told the Generalissimo that he had proposed to General Chou what he thought was a reasonable adjustment, i. e., the destruction of all fortifications except those that were to guard the tunnels, bridges, etc. The Generalissimo said he would leave the issue to the discussion between General Yu Ta-Wei and General Chou, which of course would include the restoration of other means of communications as well. The Generalissimo stated that he regarded the railroad as the most important. General Marshall stated that the Communist Party attached great importance to the postal, road and river traffic.

b. The next condition the Generalissimo made was that any agreement in Manchuria must be with the understanding that the demobilization and reorganization plan would be carried out according to the stipulated dates. General Marshall said that while the Generalissimo did not express himself definitely he gathered that the Generalissimo was not excluding reconsideration of final strengths. That was General Marshall's impression, though he said there was no time to raise the issue and discuss it because a dinner party was being kept waiting while General Marshall was talking.

c. The Generalissimo was very insistent and very emphatic about the third condition. General Marshall said he would give it to General Chou in the words of the Generalissimo as nearly as possible. The Generalissimo said he would be unwilling to commit himself to any further agreement without the understanding that, when team mem-

⁸⁸ Chinese Minister of Communications.

bers or corresponding higher staff groups reached an impasse, the final vote should be left with the American. The Generalissimo did not analyze this provision further and General Marshall said he could only assume what his meaning was as to its practical application. General Marshall would assume that the Generalissimo must have meant not the major decisions, but routine decisions such as the movement of the teams, when they should go and where they should go, would be settled in that manner conclusively. General Marshall said he would assume that the Generalissimo was not referring to the commissioners at Executive Headquarters and certainly not referring to the Committee of Three. General Marshall said it was probable that the Generalissimo was referring to the position of the American in the temporary establishment in Changchun but not with respect to compromises and military and political reorganization. He said the Generalissimo would not be delegating to an American a final vote in decisions regarding political reorganizations in China, so General Marshall felt that the Generalissimo was referring to the routine procedures to facilitate action in contrast to the past situation where practically nothing could be done or accomplished.

General Marshall gathered from these statements of the Generalissimo's that he was seriously considering accepting the presentation General Marshall had given him as a possible basis for an agreement without a long delay. General Marshall stated that he told the Generalissimo that he would be willing, if it was desired, to resume his role of attempting to mediate with the provision that General Marshall must have a better understanding of the political provincial governments before he became completely involved. General Marshall told General Chou that this was, of course, very personal and confidential, but General Marshall suggested to the Generalissimo as they were separating, that the Generalissimo consider the great advantage of reaching a general decision while he was in Mukden so that he might possibly declare himself from there as to the termination of active hostilities. General Marshall said he suggested that if in thinking over the presentation he had made, the Generalissimo found it acceptable in principle and would communicate with him, he could in turn inform the Generalissimo that from General Chou's side—if he agreed—it was acceptable in principle. Then immediate action might be taken by the issuance of an order on each side preventing advances, attacks or pursuits. While that did not amount to a cease firing arrangement, it at least stopped the heavy fighting. Then the immediate entry of the advance section of Executive Headquarters into Changchun could be arranged for while we reached the draft of a formal agreement. To all of that, the Generalissimo made no reply except to say that he would send General Marshall a letter by courier from Mukden. General Marshall said that is the state of his knowl-

edge at the present time and now General Chou also had it in his possession.

General Marshall asked General Chou to please bear in mind that what he related to the Generalissimo was his proposal and that the Generalissimo made no reply and gave no reaction. General Marshall said he was deliberately trying to sow the seeds of an idea which might be useful to expedite action. General Marshall said that that was the status of his action as nearly as he could recall it.

General Marshall said he told the Generalissimo of General Chou's having called on the Minister of Information and of General Chou's statement to him regarding the instructions from Yen-an to the military commanders in North China as to the restrictions on their actions.

General Chou stated that he appreciated General Marshall's efforts. General Chou said it occurred to him that since those proposals have not invited a reply from the Generalissimo, it would make matters easier if a branch of the Executive Headquarters were sent to Changchun. By this means a peaceful settlement of the Changchun problem may be reached before reaching a general agreement to terminate aggressive action. General Chou said that with the arrival of the Generalissimo in Mukden and the presence of the field team in Changchun it would create a good impression upon the people both at home and abroad. General Chou said he would regard it as beneficial. As to all other matters, discussion could be held further for a speedy solution. General Chou stated that he was afraid that since the Generalissimo had made no reply to General Marshall's proposal before his departure, once he arrived in the field, the field commanders might influence him to try to reach a solution by force so that future advances would be made which would be bad for the citizens. With that in mind, General Chou had made the foregoing proposal and he said he didn't know whether it was practicable or not. General Chou asked General Marshall how it seemed to him.

General Marshall said he might send a telegram to the Generalissimo at Mukden and just say that General Chou had proposed the immediate dispatch of a team to Changchun as a preliminary step towards the termination of hostilities, and that General Marshall proposed instead sending in an advance section of Executive Headquarters. At the same time each side would issue orders to cease advances, attacks and pursuits. General Marshall said he thought that such an order was necessary since there had to be some basis for the presence of the special organization in Changchun; unless it was merely to organize itself and to do nothing but that. He said he would compose a message to the Generalissimo along the line of General Chou's suggestion, with his (General Marshall's), amendment.

General Marshall then asked General Chou if he was prepared to tell him if the Communist Party would go through with the outline General Marshall had given him of the Changchun arrangement; that is, the evacuation of Communist troops; the entry of the Executive Headquarters, and the cease advance of the Central Government forces. He said he would also have to know what answer General Chou could give to the three conditions the Generalissimo made concerning which the Generalissimo was so specific to General Marshall. General Marshall said his suggestion was that he work on the message to the Generalissimo and General Chou consider what reply he could make to those factors and then see if a joint message could be dispatched.

General Chou said he could assure General Marshall that he would continue to work in consultation and make every effort possible.

Regarding the state of Changchun—the withdrawal of Communist troops; the establishment of a section of Executive Headquarters as a preliminary step; and the ceasing of advance by Government troops toward Changchun; and at the same time issuing orders to stop attacks, advances and pursuits—General Chou stated he could assure General Marshall that that was acceptable to the Communist Party. The Generalissimo's three points were however something new to General Chou.

General Chou said that regarding the first point, he would try to solve it with General Yu Ta-Wei along the lines General Marshall had presented: That is, destruction of fortifications with the exception of those essential to the protection of the railroad from banditry, the restoration of all kinds of communications, the deletion of censorship by both sides on post and telegraph, and participation by the Communist Party in the railway administration.

General Chou said that he would further discuss with General Yu Ta-Wei the second provision. He stated he had no objection to abiding by the reorganization, demobilization plan. General Chou said he was not concerned about the Generalissimo's third provision which envisaged alteration of present procedure. General Chou stated he would try to convince his people to follow such a procedure, but since this provision was raised for the first time, he needed some time before he could give a definite answer.

General Marshall reiterated that that was the provision which the Generalissimo accentuated. General Marshall said that the Generalissimo said he would not again put himself in the position of entering into an agreement where its execution could be blocked by disagreement among team members. General Marshall said he personally felt that such a procedure would be essential in order to make the new

agreement work out smoothly without a flare up. In the event of disagreement within this advance section of the Executive Headquarters the American head of that section should have the deciding vote. General Marshall said he was not talking about major negotiations. He was talking about restoration of peace; the cessation of hostilities; the status of the city itself. Otherwise, General Marshall said, extraordinary difficulties would arise which would practically negate all that was being done in an effort to reach a solution. He added that somebody had to be trusted. General Marshall said he could guarantee the complete impartiality of the American member. General Marshall said he would begin to draft out what he thought might be sent by telegraph to the Generalissimo and if General Chou would go ahead with his investigations, particularly regarding the third provision, they would see what they could do to expedite action. General Marshall asked General Chou to have in mind, just as he had tried to insist with the Generalissimo, that the situation was too grave in its consequences to be blocked by small things. General Marshall felt that the chaotic results of a failure would be so terrible that small things must not be allowed to block the procedure. General Marshall said he had talked more to General Chou than he had to any representative of the Central Government. General Marshall concluded by saying that he thought the possibility of bringing about a termination of the present terrible situation lay within grasp.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

*Mr. Walter S. Robertson*⁸⁹ and *Brigadier General Henry A. Byroade*⁹⁰
to *General Marshall*

[PEIPING,] 24 May 1946.

3053. The Communists continue to make a mockery of team action at the following: Chaoyang Team 26, Chihfeng Team 2, Chengte Team 11, Shih Chia Chuang Team 12, Yungnin Team 31, Hsueh Teams 4 and 24.

For your background information separate radio (designated as "Part 2"⁹¹) follows transmitting in full message just received in clear from American member Team number 11 Chengte. It is illustrative of the complete frustration now being experienced as result of Communist non-cooperation. Communist branch here apparently powerless to correct situation. Recommend showdown with Chou En-lai.

⁸⁹ American Commissioner of Executive Headquarters.

⁹⁰ Director of Operations of Executive Headquarters.

⁹¹ Not found in Department files.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Madame Chiang Kai-shek to General Marshall

[No. 1]

MUKDEN, 24 May 1946.

MY DEAR GENERAL: The Generalissimo wishes me to write you that upon our arrival here yesterday, we learned that the Government troops had already entered Changchun in the morning. This fact, however, does not influence the Generalissimo in his hopes for a speedy cessation of hostilities so that peace and unity may forthwith be restored. He feels that the following should serve as a fair and permanent basis in any understanding with the Communists, and if you concur with him, please proceed as you see fit. I am also writing to Minister Soong,⁹² and so if there is any message you would like to send us through him or any point you wish to discuss with him, please feel free to do so.

I. The cessation of hostilities agreement should be implicitly carried out in spirit as well as to the letter. (Agreement of January 10, 1946.)

II. Demobilization and Reorganization of the Army should proceed according to program. (Agreement of March 23 [*February 25?*], 1946.)

III. Resumption of Communication should become a reality. (Agreement of February 25[9], 1946.)

IV. Method of Procedure.

a. The Communists should not obstruct or impede the Central Government in the taking over the sovereignty of Manchuria as provided in the Sino-Soviet Pact.⁹³

b. The Communists should not interfere with or obstruct the Central Government's efforts to repair railroads in all parts of China for the resumption of traffic. Only in this way can the Communists demonstrate their sincerity to live up to their pledged word.

c. In the carrying out of the three agreements (i. e. cessation of hostilities, reorganization of the army, and resumption of communications) the American officers of the Executive Headquarters or Teams have the determining voice and authority both in the execution and interpretation of views held in divergence by the Government and Communist representatives.

Whether the Communists would agree to the above, and whether the American representative would be willing to guarantee the good faith of the Communists. Should an agreement be reached, the Gen-

⁹² T. V. Soong, President of the Chinese Executive Yuan.

⁹³ Signed at Moscow, August 14, 1945; Department of State, *United States Relations With China* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 535.

eralissimo would appreciate a reply within the next few days so that peace may be restored.

Yours sincerely,

MAYLING SOONG CHIANG

P. S. The Generalissimo wishes me to emphasize that resumption of communication within a stated period (time to be determined by Executive Headquarters) is of paramount importance. M. S. C.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Madame Chiang Kai-shek to General Marshall

[No. 2]

MUKDEN, 24 May 1946.

MY DEAR GENERAL: The Generalissimo asks me to tell you that after the Communists express willingness to accept the conditions as outlined in my first letter (letter No. 1) of the same date, then you might let them know that there is a possibility of the Generalissimo's acceptance of your suggestion that the Communists should have three divisions in Manchuria to the Government's fifteen. Their increased two divisions and the Government's increased one division in Manchuria should come out of the total number of divisions in the reorganization plan as previously agreed upon so that the number of divisions of the whole reorganized army remains the same.

Regarding the disposition of the Communist army in Manchuria, the Generalissimo thinks that it should be stationed in the new boundaries of Hei-lung-Kiang Province.

Regarding the political questions, such as the chairmanship of the Manchurian province in which will be stationed the Communist troops, the Generalissimo feels that they can be settled amicably once the military questions are out of the way.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

MAYLING SOONG CHIANG

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Mr. Walter S. Robertson to General Marshall

[PEIPING,] 25 May 1946.

3111. Reference our 3054⁹⁴ you will be interested in following message, dated May 24, just received from Rustemeyer, Team 11, Chengte:

"Situation here greatly eased by recent statement of General Marshall.⁹⁵ Communist Party now agree to investigate alleged violations

⁹⁴ Not found in Department files.

⁹⁵ See statement to the press, May 20, p. 865.

and to conference between representatives. Plan to start on tour of the front and to effect adjustments commencing Monday when all teams will be effectively constituted."

Reference appears to apply to Teams 11, 2 and 26.

There has also been a marked change in personal attitude of Communists in operational sections in the past few days.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai, at 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, May 25, 1946, 10:45 a. m.

Also present: Colonel Caughey
Mr. Chang Wen-chin
Capt. Soong

General Chou asked General Marshall whether he had received any message from the Generalissimo.

General Marshall stated that he did receive a telegram⁹⁶ to the effect that the Generalissimo had made the trip in four hours and had thanked General Marshall for the plane, but that was all. General Marshall said the Generalissimo had told him he would send back a letter by courier plane. The Generalissimo also told General Marshall that he might return immediately himself or he might be there three or four days depending on the situation but except for the telegram General Marshall just referred to, that is all he knew.

General Marshall said that his only information regarding the military situation was what he had gotten from the Central News Agency or the American correspondents and it all seemed rather confused. General Marshall said he was told that there had been some movement of Government forces, he thought, to the North and North-east of Changchun.

General Chou stated he had learned three days ago that General Hsiung,⁹⁷ who is the Generalissimo's director of the field headquarters in Manchuria, and General Tu Li Ming⁹⁸ jointly sent a message to Executive Headquarters suggesting that after the capture of Changchun the situation be solved by peaceful means. General Chou said he had not received this message from the Communist branch of Executive Headquarters and asked if General Marshall had received one.

General Marshall said he had received nothing.

General Chou said that again yesterday, these commanders pub-

⁹⁶ Not printed.

⁹⁷ Gen. Hsiung Shih-hui.

⁹⁸ Also known as Tu Yu-ming; he commanded Chinese forces in Manchuria.

lished a second message, the tone of which was different from the previous one. The second message advocated that Communist forces should evacuate Harbin and the main railroad lines. General Chou expressed concern over this recent proposal and said it seemed to him that the more territory taken by the Government the higher will be its claims. General Chou said that under such circumstances the fighting would not be stopped and he requested General Marshall's views concerning the situation and concerning further efforts. General Chou said that if the fighting continued, which he himself was against, he was afraid that the Communist forces might also unfold activities to the south of Changchun along the railroads, thus complicating the situation.

General Marshall stated that by all means, the fighting should cease immediately. Everything thereafter should be on the basis of negotiations. He stated that frankly his fear now was exactly of the same nature as his fear three or four weeks ago. At that time, General Marshall said, he was very fearful that successful Communist generals would hold out for conditions that were not going to prove acceptable for negotiations because they (the Communist generals) felt they were in a strong position. Now, General Marshall said his mind was troubled for fear we would get exactly the same result from the Central Government generals. The reactions of Commanders, in each case, are purely local to the situation and they don't visualize the overall situation and the tragedies and harm involved. General Marshall felt—as he previously told General Chou—that whatever provocation, political or military, the assault on Changchun would boomerang to their great disadvantage. This attack was a flat unequivocal defiance of the terms of the agreement of January 10th. General Marshall said he was thinking of the effects of [on] public opinion much more than of military operations. Also, he said, he must be frank in admitting that it (the Changchun attack) had struck him a heavy blow personally, almost destroying his power for negotiations with the Central Government. It had permitted determined conservatives to say "We told you so; your advice has been proven completely wrong". General Marshall said he wanted to repeat again that every effort within his power would be made to produce an immediate cessation of hostilities. General Marshall said what he was concerned about was the respective demands which would arise in negotiations, because unless the new terms demanded on each side were reasonably acceptable the truce would be of short life. General Marshall said his advice and his argument would be for concessions to be made by both sides. He said he was very much disturbed over any prospect of delay, because the suspicions of probable intentions grow every hour; particularly with reference to China proper. On the one hand the

Government is suspicious of Communist intentions in Shanghai; in Nantung; in Tsinan; and in Peiping itself. On the other hand, the Communists are suspicious of Government intentions in other regions and along the Peiping-Shanhaikwan railroad. That condition of deep suspicion on each side could not continue long without eruption, and General Marshall stated it was of tremendous importance that during the next few days General Chou and Minister Peng exert to the limit their efforts jointly to keep down inflammatory press reactions and accusations.

General Marshall said that until he received the Generalissimo's letter he had no basis for negotiations, other than merely to talk to General Chou regarding his views. The only thing definite he had to talk about, and those were already discussed, were the three points the Generalissimo made on his departure regarding: communications; the execution of the plan for the demobilization and reorganization; and the position of the American[s].

General Marshall stated that yesterday General Yu Ta-Wei called. General Marshall found that the Generalissimo had talked to General Yu the last morning before he left for Mukden and recited the same three conditions. According to General Yu the Generalissimo again seemed to have attached the principal importance to the position of the Americans in the various local decisions, i. e. the Generalissimo's third condition. General Yu Ta-Wei believed the Generalissimo was talking about the commissioners. General Marshall said he did not assume that. General Yu talked about the matter of communications, the Generalissimo's first condition, and working out the technical basis for an agreement. He (General Yu) seemed to feel that he could not do much because the real decisions were for the Committee of Three. General Marshall said his reaction was, and so stated to General Yu, that General Yu and General Chou should proceed to work out the technical details for the approval of the Committee of Three. General Yu seemed to feel that no conclusive action could be taken in advance of a Manchurian settlement, whereas the Generalissimo had rather indicated to General Marshall that he considered that a condition precedent. General Marshall said that his own reaction was that all the details regarding communications should be agreed upon so that it could be instantly put into effect the minute a basis of settlement with Manchuria had been reached. General Marshall said he gathered that General Yu Ta-Wei's feeling was largely based on an expectance of Communists' unwillingness to complete the agreement until the Manchurian question was settled, rather than on a Government reluctance to cooperate. However, General Marshall said, General Yu Ta-Wei seemed perfectly willing to go ahead with the detailed discussion with General Chou. General Marshall said

regarding the Generalissimo's second condition, that is, the agreement to carry out the demobilization-integration agreement, that there would seem to be but two issues. One, General Chou's point as to reconsideration of the eventual strength of the forces in Manchuria and two, to General Marshall's mind, readjustment as to speed of demobilization, particularly in Manchuria.

General Marshall said Dr. Peng, Minister of Information, called on him yesterday with the American advisor, Mr. Beal.⁹⁹ General Marshall said Dr. Peng stated that Executive Headquarters, on the basis of unanimous agreement, could probably not issue sufficient press releases on military operations to satisfy the demands of the press. On further thought, General Marshall said, he himself was concerned about the proposal, since decision by the American would place that American in the position of interpreting all the press news in China and General Marshall could not accept that. There was also the point to be considered that Executive Headquarters could never check the accuracy of the reports on short notice. That would always be a tedious process and the delay probably would be unacceptable to the press. General Marshall said he therefore suggested the idea that Executive Headquarters be directed to issue press releases on any military matter after conclusion had been reached. This would serve to discredit previous exaggerations by the partisan press and would tend toward conservatism in the future.

General Marshall said he thought the main purpose of his previous statement to the press regarding "propaganda" was gradually producing results. General Marshall added he was glad to see, up to the present time, that both sides had been sufficiently generous not to attack him for interference in a purely Chinese problem.

General Chou stated that Dr. Peng had called on him yesterday and Mr. Beal called in the evening; they came separately. He said they also paid consideration to the fact that if all the press releases are put out by Executive Headquarters it would not meet the demand of the press. They were afraid, as Dr. Peng stated, that there would be a "black market" for the press. Hence some kind of settlement had to be reached, and General Chou made the following suggestions:

Regarding reports on military hostilities, to which the greatest attention is paid, General Chou thought those reports should be stopped as much as possible and that Executive Headquarters be authorized to publish all news on military operations. The point General Marshall just brought up seemed to be [a] very good one, that is, that the Executive Headquarters give a final report after the conclusion of investigations in order to discredit the unreliable reports. This solu-

⁹⁹ John R. Beal, Washington news editor of *Time Magazine*, adviser to the Chinese Government on foreign press and political relations.

tion seemed to General Chou much better, since the whole job of press releases would overburden Executive Headquarters. The military authorities of the Government and the Communist Party would not directly issue any kind of press release regarding hostilities. Both, instead, would rely fully on the press releases of Executive Headquarters or the field teams, and the conclusions they have made. The Kuomintang and the Communist Party would each instruct its own news agency and papers not to publish any kind of unreliable reports about hostilities. The Kuomintang would see to it that its own press, the Central News Agency, and its own party papers and papers under its influence would not publish any unreliable reports. The Communist Party would do the same. This would be accomplished by persuasion and by mental admonition to the press agencies. It would have nothing to do about freedom of the press by the Government. The foregoing points referred to hostilities reports.

The second item General Chou mentioned was regarding the correspondents of both parties. General Chou stated that he hoped sufficient facilities could be given to the correspondents to permit the Central News Agency and the New China News Agency correspondents to accompany the teams wherever they go. In that way they could file more realistic reports. As to the other papers—the other correspondents—apart from the Central News Agency or the New China News Agency, they could be informed that they may go with field teams if they have the means. General Chou then stated that he would like to cite an example. When the committee went to Hankow and were going out for investigation, 17 Chinese correspondents wanted to go along with them. General Chou accepted them because he took the point of view that the dispatches that they would write would be much closer to fact than if they had written them from Hankow instead. General Chou said this point also met with the approval of Dr. Peng.

General Marshall said it had his approval too.

General Chou said that in the event a branch of Executive Headquarters is established in Changchun, that branch could handle all the reports and press releases on military operations.

Regarding political considerations, General Chou said both Dr. Peng and he agreed, that after each political negotiation, both parties should issue a joint release to the press; that while the discussion was under way no unilateral communiqué should be issued.

General Chou said Dr. Peng also agreed that headlines should be expressed in mild tones without accusation or acrimony.

General Chou said Mr. Beal desired to discuss further with Dr. Peng the matter of reports of hostilities. General Chou said that today General Marshall had made another suggestion which he thought

was very fine and he thought that he would again see Dr. Peng so an early settlement could be reached. Mr. Beal said there was one point, based on his twenty years' experience as a newspaperman, he was rather afraid of. That was that the news should not be too restricted because in that case the press releases of the Executive Headquarters alone would not satisfy the demands of the correspondents and inevitably they would write other stories themselves. General Chou said too that he laid primary emphasis on stopping the hostilities. The matter of stopping press propaganda could be taken up, while at the same time, work could continue toward the cessation of hostilities.

General Marshall said he thought Mr. Beal's point was a good one, but that there was this difference. The issue was one where both sides were endeavoring to put the matter straight and not one side only concerting its efforts to mislead the public.

General Chou replied that he was trying to commence the cessation of the press campaign; and that he had obtained assurance from Yen-an that they were already taking steps to regulate the press. For instance, the broadcast received yesterday contains no news of military operations at all. General Chou construed that this might prove that Yen-an had already taken action toward curtailment and further efforts would be made.

General Chou said regarding the reopening of communications, that he was ready to meet General Yu Ta-Wei at any time. He said that, of course, the Manchurian situation had some bearing on the restoration of communications, but he did not think that it was so important a factor. He thought that he and General Yu might well start to study communications problems in China proper and if some appropriate formula could be worked out, then the same compromise could be more or less applied for Manchuria. General Chou asked General Marshall his views as to whether he should approach General Yu Ta-wei directly or through General Marshall.

General Marshall suggested that General Chou have Mr. Chang telephone General Yu and make the appointment. Incidentally, General Marshall said, General Yu Ta-wei has been very familiar with a great many of the discussions on the other phases of the matter, so he was very decidedly in the picture.

General Chou agreed that a direct approach for exchange of views would be much better than involving General Marshall. This would permit General Yu Ta-wei and General Chou to work out the details.

General Marshall said he thought the direct approach was necessary. He had gathered from General Yu Ta-wei that he (Gen. Yu) feared it was the Communist point of view that would delay the opening, not the Central Government's. Specifically, he feared the Communists would be unwilling to go forward in this until the Manchurian problem had been settled.

General Chou said, regarding the Manchurian problem, for the time being it seemed there was nothing else to do but wait for further word from Manchuria, especially the letter from the Generalissimo. General Chou personally felt that the best solution would be the establishment of a branch of Executive Headquarters in Changchun.

General Marshall believed this should be done immediately.

General Chou said he had no further comments on the Manchurian problem at the moment. Regarding China proper, he said that both sides were now resorting more and more to dangerous retaliatory measures. If continued, large scale hostilities would break out. For example, General Chou said, the Government is afraid that the Communists might attack Peiping and Tientsin. Although the Communists never had such an intention, the Government was trying to strengthen their defenses and were enlarging their positions on both sides of the railroad. As a result the Government had occupied the towns Ansu and Shanshun. In Jehol, the Communists, as a result of the Government sending three divisions to Manchuria in violation of the cease fire agreement, took action of their own accord to cut the railway lines to stop transportation. Subsequently, the airfield at Chihfeng was destroyed to delay plane arrivals. As to the field team at Chaoyang, east of Chengte, the Communist representative was absent. At the same time the Government showed unwillingness to have the field team dispatched to Ansu, midway between Peiping and Tientsin, to investigate the seizure of those two towns. So there was a serious aggravation between the two parties.

General Chou said that the plane facilities and communications made available by General Marshall had been very convenient. However, many obstacles were now delaying the dispatch of airplanes. This resulted from the delay in dispatch of the plane which went to Changchun to pick up the correspondents and also the delay in dispatch of the plane to Chihfeng. Consequently, the Government did not agree, this time, to the dispatch of the plane to carry money from Shantung to the Communist area in Hupeh. Also they delayed departure of the staff officers General Chou wanted to come down to Nanking. General Chou said that if these obstacles continue, it could be expected that more hostilities would occur. General Chou said that he was at the present time engaged in persuading his people not to resort to retaliatory measures. General Chou said he could tell General Marshall frankly that, while on his side they were trying to reach a solution, if the other side continued further aggressive actions, then it might well never end.

General Marshall stated that he agreed completely. He said as a matter of fact, that was what General Byroade had in mind when he was trying to have the American member referee disagreements, and that was what the Generalissimo had in mind also regarding the same

proposal. There was no other way to stop disagreements at the present time. General Marshall said that the arrangement would impose a very heavy strain on the American officer, particularly when the troops have been reached by propaganda that made them hostile to Americans. The Communist hostility in the lower ranks is quite evident. He said the campaign such as he had just referred to gets on the radio and would prejudice the men in the ranks of the National Army. Many were already prejudiced against him personally in Manchuria, all of which made it very difficult for the American officers in the field. However, in these retaliatory procedures, and particularly in the delay of action on movements, plans and things of that sort, about the only way out of the difficulty was to place the responsibility on the Americans.

General Marshall then said that he had Mr. Pauley¹ in the house and he was leaving at 1 o'clock by plane. General Marshall had to give him lunch so he would have to terminate the meeting, but he wanted General Chou to meet Mr. Pauley. Mr. Pauley plans to go to Manchuria. He was now having his difficulties with the Russians in Korea.

General Chou said he had one short comment to make. He said that he would make further efforts to improve the relations between the Communist officers and the American officers. From a study of the trusums² for May and in regard to the materials included in the reports, there is a feeling on the Communist side that the points advanced by the Communists had not been included in the trusums. General Chou said he would make a written report to General Marshall for his reference and also for General Byroade's reference. General Chou said he hoped General Marshall could take some action for speeding the plane from Peiping.

General Marshall instructed Colonel Caughey to dispatch a message to Peiping instructing that the plane be in Nanking tomorrow.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Draft Agreement on Propaganda Truce*³

[NANKING,] May 25, 1946.

1. In regard to press release on hostilities in China proper, agreement is reached by both parties on the following points:

a. Both parties agree that in releasing reports on hostilities in China proper, the press release issued by Peiping Executive Head-

¹ Edwin W. Pauley, Special Representative of President Truman for reparations.

² Truce summaries.

³ Prepared by Gen. Chou En-lai; handed on May 26 by a member of his staff to the Chinese Minister of Information (Peng); copy transmitted by General Chou to General Marshall on June 2.

quarters and the field teams shall be taken as authoritative. Newspapers, news agencies (Central News Agency and New China News Agency) and broadcasting systems of both parties are held responsible to release such news which constitutes a conclusion drawn by Peiping Executive Headquarters from their investigations.

b. The military authorities of both parties should avoid releasing reports on hostilities directly.

c. Both parties should restrain their respective newspapers, news agencies and broadcasting systems from releasing non-factual hostilities reports.

d. The official news agencies of both parties shall despatch correspondents to wherever the Executive Headquarters is situated, and where the field teams are conducting their activities. Other news agencies, newspapers, and broadcast systems shall be provided with every possible convenience if they want to send correspondents to accompany the field teams.

2. Reports on hostilities in Manchuria should be treated in the same way as in item 1 as soon as the detachment of the Executive Headquarters be formally established in Changchun.

3. Political views and criticism for publication should be rational and calm in tone, instead of being abusive.

4. This agreement will be enforced from the day it is signed.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

*General Marshall to Brigadier General Henry A. Byroade, at
Peiping*

[NANKING,] 26 May 1946.

775. Be prepared to move advance section of your Headquarters to Changchun immediately on receiving clearance from me, and notice that field at Changchun can safely receive planes.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*General Marshall to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek*⁴

[NANKING,] May 26, 1946.

Your statement of terms of May 24 by letter of Madame Chiang⁵ arrived at noon today, Sunday. I have today had a three hour conference with General Chou. He is to give me a statement this evening of agreements and commitments on certain details which are involved in your statement of general terms. He is unable to commit himself on details regarding matter of procedure of government in taking over sovereignty and extent of authority proposed for American officers referred to in your paragraph four (c).

⁴ Duplicate copies transmitted, one through Dr. T. V. Soong.

⁵ Letter No. 1, p. 891.

I make these recommendations and observations in the meantime :

a. General Chou and I propose that an advance section of Executive Headquarters be moved into Changchun immediately and get established there.

b. I urge that you immediately issue orders terminating advances, attacks and pursuits by government troops within twenty-four hours of the time of issuing your order, publicly announcing such action and stating that you do this in furtherance of your desire to terminate hostilities and settle matters by the peaceful method of negotiations. I feel that to continue to press your present military advantage will invite a repetition of the unfortunate results of the early National Government experience in Manchuria and the result of the more recent belligerent attitude of the Communist leaders at Changchun. Besides, to do otherwise at this moment would be contrary to your recent proposal⁶ to the Communists.

c. Reference statement in letter regarding my willingness to guarantee good faith of Communists, please explain the meaning you place on the term guarantee.

d. Question. Is it your intention to give American Commissioner at Peiping complete authority to make decision on all matters over which opposing Commissioners are in disagreement. This certainly would facilitate matters, but I feel that it is too all-inclusive in effect to place American, and consequently American Government, in position of deciding a number of major matters that would shortly become involved. How about restricting this final decision by Americans to specific matters such as where, when and how teams should proceed, whom they should see and decisions covering local situation. Also final decision by Americans at Changchun regarding all immediate arrangements and matters in Manchuria pertaining to termination of hostilities. Also decision at Executive Headquarters regarding matters referred to Commissioners by teams or team chairman, and in matters pertaining to restoration of communications. In all of this, decisions regarding political matters would be excluded unless specifically stipulated by later agreement.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

*General Marshall to President Truman*⁷

NANKING, 26 May 1946.

776. DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Since my message of May 22nd, 740, and Generalissimo's departure for Mukden, I have had continuous conferences with Chou En-lai. This noon I received letter from Generalissimo formally stating conditions he demanded for restoration of peace.⁸ In brief he demands execution of agreements for cessation of hostilities of January 10th which specifically relates to freedom of

⁶ See minutes of meeting, May 23, p. 884.

⁷ Copy delivered to the Secretary of State.

⁸ See Madame Chiang's letter No. 1, May 24, p. 891.

action of Government in taking over sovereignty in Manchuria, and agreement of February 25th for military demobilization and reorganization. He placed first importance on Communist demonstration of good faith by permitting Government agencies to restore communications in Northern China, and stipulated that in Executive Headquarters and teams, American member should cast deciding vote or make decisions in case of Communist-Central Government disagreement on action or interpretation of agreements. He also made a peculiar statement of query if I could guarantee Communist good faith in carrying out agreements. Chou En-lai discussed letter with me but was not in position to commit himself on certain points. He will give me a partial statement of agreements late tonight for transmission to Generalissimo at Mukden. Meanwhile, I have dispatched a message to Generalissimo requesting explanatory details regarding his general statements, proposing immediate movement of a section of Executive Headquarters to Changchun, and urging him to issue an order immediately directing cessation of attacks, pursuits or advances while details of truce are being arranged.⁹

I urged him to avoid painful results of previous Government error in forging ahead in Manchuria without granting permission for presence of teams to prevent unnecessary skirmishing and more recent similar unfortunate results of attitude of belligerent Communist generals at Changchun.

I also requested him to explain the meaning he gave to his use of the word "guarantee" in reference to me.

I will keep you advised from now on more closely on progress of events. I think any statement at this time would be premature.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*General Chou En-lai to General Marshall*¹⁰

NANKING, May 26, 1946.

MY DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: I appreciate your kindness of showing me Madame Chiang's letter to you dated May 24, 1946.¹¹

After the entry of Government troops into Changchun, it seems, if the Government is willing to resume negotiation on the basis of its month-old statement that once Changchun is settled, immediate truce can be effected, then this is the right moment to do so. As a matter of course, we fully welcome Generalissimo's expression of his hope for a speedy cessation of hostilities so that peace may forthwith be

⁹ *Supra.*

¹⁰ Copy transmitted to Dr. T. V. Soong and forwarded by him with General Marshall's letter of May 26 to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

¹¹ Letter No. 1, p. 891.

restored. To comply with this hope, I feel sure that my suggestion to instruct Peiping Executive Headquarters to despatch immediately a detachment to Changchun, charged with the task of terminating hostilities would certainly meet your as well as Government's approval.

With reference to the three agreements (which are referred to in the first three paragraphs of Madame Chiang's letter) (the Cease Fire Agreement, the Restoration of Communication Agreement, and the Army Demobilization and Reorganization Plan), in principle we fully agree that they should be implemented without delay. At the same time, it is my view that a fourth agreement should also be drawn in, i. e., the agreement of March 27 by the Committee of Three (Directive to the Field Teams for their Entry into Manchuria) should likewise be entered into.

As to the fourth paragraph of Madame Chiang's letter (Method of Procedure), since it deals with detail questions and is very wide in nature, and again I have no way of obtaining instruction from Yenan right away, I wish only [to] make comments of my own, as far as I am in a position to make a reply:

a. When talking about the taking over of sovereignty of Manchuria, it is not explicit to me what is implied at this moment. If it implies the taking-over of sovereignty of places garrisoned by Soviet troops, then as a matter of fact, Soviet troops have evacuated Manchuria, and the Government has completed the procedure of taking-over for some time. If it implies the disposition of troops, then it should be decided by the Committee of Three, when they come to discuss the demobilization and army reorganization in Manchuria. If it implies the civil administration of Manchuria, then I wish to suggest that it can be resolved by reorganizing the Northeastern Political and Economical Councils into a democratic Northeastern Provisional Administrative Council.

b. Regarding the repair of railroads and resumption of traffic, I agree, that in accordance with the Restoration of Communication Agreement, the railroad repair work be immediately expedited; meanwhile I am willing to commence my talks with General Yu Ta-wei, Minister of Communication, on the detail measures relating to resumption of traffic, railroad administration, and restoration of all communications, which will subsequently be submitted to the Committee of Three for approval.

c. Regarding the determining voice and authority of the American officers I will further exert my efforts on the basis of your previous proposition, that American representatives in the field teams be authorized with the determining power over the procedure of conducting investigations.

In furnishing the foregoing points as a reply, I have practically exhausted my present available resources. Any comment you may have thereon shall be highly appreciated.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature in Chinese]
(CHOU EN-LAI)

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Chou En-lai to General Marshall

MM 006

NANKING, May 27, 1946.

Referring my memorandum dated May 19, 1946, reporting the Nationalist attack in Kiangsu and Anhwei and requesting the despatch of additional field teams, I received the following additional report from the Communist commander of the afore-mentioned area:

"Beginning from May 10 onward to May 20, eight Nationalist regiments, comprising the entire 138th Division, two regiments of the 77th Division, the 511th Regiment of the 171st Division, and the separate 2nd and 3rd Regiments, launched a four-pronged attack on the Communist 4th Military Sub-District around Tingyuan, Anhwei (shown in the overlay). They took over forty towns and townlets (including Tingyuan town, Outang, Chiho, Laojentsang, Teshengchi, Jenhochi, Tsianghsinpu, Jantengshih, Kaoshanchi, Hsiehchiatien, Chanchikang, Changchiaocheh, Yawuochi etc) and occupied the entire 4th Military Sub-District. Since May 18, the Nationalist troops, split into innumerable small units, commenced to comb the far-flung corners. Wherever they go, Communist military and civil personnel are arrested or murdered."

In view of the above, I request you to wire again to Executive Headquarters for rushing a field team down to Tingyuan without delay and to order the withdrawal of Government troops from the Communist 4th Military Sub-District, failing which the Government will be held responsible for any untoward accident.

[Signature in Chinese]

CHOU EN-LAI

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

General Marshall to Brigadier General Henry A. Byroade, at Peiping

[NANKING,] 28 May 1946.

785. Size and composition of the advanced section of Executive Headquarters reference your 3161¹² is the subject. Your first and pressing task is to organize on the ground an effective establishment as to officers, individuals and communications. Your task will be accurately defined later with probably certain special provisos regarding regions to North of Changchun. But in general, it will be to implement original cease firing agreement throughout Manchuria. Your immediate problem after organization will be to supervise cease firing arrangements where contacts had been closest in the north. Your Peiping decisions and interpretations will guide you until special instructions indicate otherwise. Take with you alert, active officers who can do business quickly without ponderous delays.

¹² Not printed.

Timberman¹³ is to go to Peiping as soon as I have had a chance to talk to him. He will take over in your place at Peiping for time being. Direct communication with Nanking is highly desirable.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Madame Chiang Kai-shek to General Marshall

MUKDEN, 28 May 1946.

MY DEAR GENERAL: The Generalissimo has received your message of the 26 May, and is sending you a reply¹⁴ through Dr. Soong.

I have borne in mind what you mentioned to me in Nanking regarding the eventualities which might develop if some agreement is not reached with the Communists in the very near future, and I have steadily sought to emphasize their importance to the Generalissimo. He expressed his appreciation of your concern, and added that he too is concerned over the imminent nature of the existing situation which to his mind is comparable to standing on the ruin of a seething crater which might at any moment and under the slightest provocation explode with another volcanic eruption. In his opinion, therefore, there are only two courses open to prevent a cataclysmic upheaval. The first is to implement the agreements already signed. Frankly he was somewhat irritated in reading Chou En-lai's statement that the latter agreed "in principle" to the carrying out of the agreements. The Generalissimo remarked that it would be better if the Communists indulged less in pious professions, and acted more in accordance with their pledged word.

The Generalissimo is in hopes that if both you and the Government stand firm in insisting on the implementation, the Communists will come to terms. Failing that, he told me that then the only course left open is to occupy strategic centers in Manchuria. In which case the Communists would be forced to carry out in deed and in truth the agreements they had signed at that time, [and?] you would meet with success in your negotiations.

I expressed to the Generalissimo that I hope we would not follow the second alternative, for that is too costly to life and property as witnessed in the Chang Chun fighting. People who just came from that city told me that many of the beautiful buildings which formerly existed are but empty shells, with only the walls remaining in mute protest of violence and depredation,—so different from what I saw a few short months ago! Mukden is bad enough as a result of Russian

¹³ Brig. Gen. Thomas S. Timberman, due at Nanking about June 1, having been transferred to the China Theater from the India-Burma Theater.

¹⁴ *Infra*.

removal of equipment from the factories, and stripping of furniture from public buildings and private residences! The Generalissimo replied that he too hopes that the second course could be avoided, but that in his dealings with the Communists he has learned not to be too sanguine where their promises are concerned unless they are first committed to concrete measures. I am writing this letter to let you know what is going on in the Generalissimo's mind, for in understanding its processes you might be better enabled to bring to a swift and successful culmination of what this country so badly needs—peace, and thereby a chance for our people to recuperate from the wounds of eight years of war.

I close with affectionate greetings to you and Mrs. Marshall.

MAYLING SOONG CHIANG

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to General Marshall

[MUKDEN,] May 28, 1946.

MY DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: I am fundamentally in agreement with the proposals contained in your letter of May 26. I wish to put forward the following points for the implementation of your proposals and in order to render even clearer their meaning and purpose. The painful experience I have encountered during the past five months has compelled me to be more precise and definite in dealing with the Communists. The following points, I earnestly hope, will have your full understanding and support:

1. With regard to the hope you expressed that I issue orders to the National forces to halt their advance and pursuit of the Communists, this is not only your earnest desire but also the very object of my trip here. But I must ask you to secure the assurances of the Communists that the Agreement for Army Reorganization will be immediately and first put into effect in the Northeast. I must also ask you to formulate immediately and let me know the concrete measures for the enforcement of the above-mentioned Agreement. As to the setting up of Executive Field Teams in the Northeast, these may be constituted on the day of issue of the cease-fire order.

2. Regarding the recovery of the sovereignty of the Northeast, it is clear that the Government cannot abandon the taking-over of the administration of *any* area. As to the method of taking-over, the Government may, however, agree to send, after the National forces have halted their advance, only administrative officials and such military and police force as are absolutely necessary for the maintenance of local order and communications to take over the administration of

the various areas not yet taken over, and areas which were once taken over but subsequently seized by Communist forces. The Communists must cause no obstruction in this regard.

3. Regarding the restoration of railroad and other communications, I believe the American Representative must be entrusted with the authority of decision, and he must be given the power to lay down the time limit for the completion of the task. Otherwise, it will be impossible to ensure the materialization of the objective.

4. Regarding the scope of the American Representative's authority of decision, I am able to appreciate the difficult position in which you find yourself and therefore I agree with your suggestion that such authority should be confined to specific matters. However, all executive matters relating to the restoration of railroad and other communications must be included in the scope of such authorities.

5. Regarding the question of "guarantee", what I expect of you is that in regard to all the agreements you have participated in signing—Agreement for the cessation of Hostilities, Agreement for the Restoration of Communications and Agreement for Army Reorganization—you will set time limits for the putting into effect of such agreements and will assume the responsibility of supervision over the strict observance of such agreements on the part of the Communists, so as to avoid any further delays.

CHIANG KAI-SHEK

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54—D270

Brigadier General Henry A. Byroade to General Marshall

PEIPING, 28 May 1946.

DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: During my recent visit to Nanking you stressed the importance of eliminating "debating societies" within the staff of Executive Headquarters. I have given this matter particular attention since Executive Headquarters was first formed and have restudied it thoroughly since my return. I hope to convey herein a background on our methods of operation.

The organization upon which Executive Headquarters should be formed and should operate is, in theory, of course very simple. All matters of policy and decisions of importance should be acted upon by the Three Commissioners. The Operations Division should form the working staff to implement the policies and decisions of the Three Commissioners. This was the concept behind the original organization chart which I drew up in January enroute to Peiping by plane, and this was the method of operation attempted in the first three weeks after our establishment. It soon became apparent, however, this method of operation was unsatisfactory. At the end of this short

period, with scheduled Commissioners' meetings every day, I found that practically no decisions were being made by the Commissioners, and that in most cases the problems were being referred, after long discussion, to the Operations Division for further preparation and study. This procedure could not be allowed to continue, as the effect of referring matters back to the staff after an unsatisfactory Commissioners' meeting is most undesirable. The reason for the failure of the Commissioners to arrive at agreements under the above procedure at that time was that, while initially the problems under discussion were theoretical, they rapidly became very real and complicated as our Field Teams began to operate. The volume grew so heavy that it was impossible for the Commissioners to have full background on the cases at hand. They needed study and "debate" to bring out the real issues which were almost never self-evident.

It was at this time that General Yeh¹⁵ confided in Jack Young¹⁶ that if I continued my high pressure tactics he would find it necessary to protest to Chungking. The gradual change of operating procedure that I permitted to take place at that time was not a direct result of General Yeh's statement, but was due to the fact that from this and other indications I decided a change was necessary in order to establish and maintain the American position of impartiality. We could easily have expedited ourselves into complete liquidation.

It became evident quickly that matters could not be solved by true negotiation, as there was neither the authority nor the desire for concession or compromise; neither did logic enter into the picture to any appreciable degree. It was a pure question of bargaining for every advantage possible. In spite of the American insistence for quick action, both Chinese branches stalled for the time necessary to study each case in detail so as to make certain they could exploit any and every loophole.

Painting with a broad brush, and sweeping statements of generalities which often bring agreement at the higher levels, would not suffice in our operation. We were dealing with realities in which every decision meant an actual loss of ground or face and an imposition upon a field commander. In short, every case was another "Chihfeng." If they were pushed too fast and too far there was little possibility of reaching workable agreements. On the Committee of Three level it may sometimes be politically advisable to reach agreements even if they are not entirely workable; but such agreements made on our level have a very deleterious effect as they

¹⁵ Gen. Yeh Chien-ying, Chinese Communist Commissioner of Executive Headquarters.

¹⁶ Capt. Jack T. Young, of the staff of the American branch of Executive Headquarters.

only place our teams in impossible situations at great loss to their prestige.

It is an easy matter, under our present organization, to force matters quickly through Executive Headquarters. I have often done so in sheer exasperation at the slowness of our three-way organization. In some instances, this has been successful. In many others, however, I realize that I have merely forced the matter into a disagreement. Once the Chinese are forced to make a decision and say "No" it is, as you know, extremely difficult to get a reconsideration of their refusal.

The volume of work handled by this Headquarters is extremely large. For instance, there have been received since January something over 1800 Cease-Fire complaints. In addition to the above, team traffic is also heavy as may be indicated by the fact that our serially numbered outgoing radio messages now total over 3,000. Incoming messages from teams probably total twice that number. Letter traffic of both sides addressed to us has grown increasingly heavy, indicating that they desire a complete file on record for use in any eventuality. These matters must be handled and processed regardless of importance, as we cannot be placed in the position of refusing to discuss matters brought before us.

The delay in processing actions through this Headquarters experienced in the past two months is, in my opinion, to be attributed more to the overall political situation than to any defect in our organization. The Communist Branch here has been extremely difficult to deal with and no agreement of any significance has been possible. They have stated openly on a great number of cases that no decision was possible due to the Manchurian situation. Had I pressed for rapid decision on the great number of problems on which I knew decision was not possible, it would have meant forwarding several problems daily to your Committee. These matters in each case were a direct reflection upon the failure of the Chinese to reach fundamental decisions in Chungking. For your Committee to have been forced to devote its efforts to the minor problems of the effect, instead of devoting full time to the cause, would have been very illogical.

Upon my return and my restudy of our operating procedures, I have discovered several minor aspects of our organization that need correction. The process of drawing out a short term, shoestring organization into a sizeable entity with a relatively extended future has given us growing pains and some maladjustments. I find that some matters are being introduced for discussion at the wrong level. Certain matters which should get to the Commissioners quickly and perhaps initially, are not always so handled. I find also a weakness in that part of the organization which briefs the Commissioners and myself upon the up-to-the-minute status of matters under negotiation.

In order to make our organization completely effective, changes to correct the above will be made without delay and that matter will be kept under constant review.

In the past two days a more cooperative Communist attitude has been displayed. They now seem to be more willing to cooperate in making our organization effective. If this continues to be true, you will see a great change in our operations.

This letter has not been written in an effort to justify any past mistakes, but instead to give you a clear picture of operations within the Headquarters. Having presented this background, I shall be more than glad to institute at any time any changes that you may suggest.

Sincerely,

HENRY A. BYROADE

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

*General Marshall to Colonel Marshall S. Carter*¹⁷

NANKING, 29 May 1946.

788. Please deliver the following message from me to Mr. John Carter Vincent.¹⁸

Regarding your radio statement¹⁹ that military truce of January 10 does not apply to Manchuria, it does and always did in my opinion, despite Central Government implications to the contrary some time back. Misunderstanding partially arose due to the fact that no arrangement was made immediately after the agreement for truce teams to operate in Manchuria, as there was little trouble there in comparison with situation in North China, and there had been no Central Government-Communist disagreement or reluctance over negotiations, and also the presence of Russians presented a delicate problem because of American team captains. This did not mean, however, that cease fire should not be observed there in connection with the provision that Government troops were to be free to move into and within Manchuria for the purpose of establishing Chinese Sovereignty.

On January 24th I addressed in writing²⁰ to the Generalissimo and Chou En-lai, a recommendation that truce teams be immediately dispatched to Manchuria. Chou agreed, and later on frequently urged

¹⁷ Colonel Carter was General Marshall's representative in Washington, acting as a liaison officer in the Department of State.

¹⁸ Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State.

¹⁹ A radio (NBC) broadcast of May 25, originating in Springfield, Mass., in which Rep. Walter H. Judd, of Minnesota, and Rep. Hugh DeLacy, of Washington, discussed the subject "Our Policy in China", with Mr. Vincent giving the point of view of the U. S. Government. This was the 67th radio discussion of an NBC series on "Our Foreign Policy".

²⁰ See memorandum by General Marshall to General Chang Chun, January 24, p. 375.

such action. The Generalissimo declined to approve, stating a fear that the Russians would demand equal representation along with Americans.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54—D270

Memorandum by General Marshall to the President of the Chinese Executive Yuan (Soong)

OSE 91

NANKING, May 29, 1946.

DEAR DR. SOONG: In view of continued advances of Government troops in Manchuria and the absence of any action by the Generalissimo to terminate the fighting, other than the general terms he dictated in his letter (via Madame Chiang) of May 24, I feel that I must clarify my position without further delay. Therefore, I would appreciate your transmitting to him, with urgent priority, the following message from me:

“The continued advances of the Government troops in Manchuria in the absence of any action by you to terminate the fighting other than the terms you dictated via Madame Chiang’s letter of May 24, are making my services as a possible mediator extremely difficult and may soon make them virtually impossible.”

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54—D270

Minutes of Conference Between General Marshall and Dr. Carsun Chang²¹ at General Marshall’s House, May 29, 1946, 5 p. m.

Also present: Dr. Lo²²
 Captain Soong

Dr. Chang said he was very glad to learn from Gen. Chou that the negotiation for reaching an agreement over the Manchurian problem was still being carried on. He hoped that fighting there could be stopped soon.

Gen. Marshall stated that each side was overwhelmingly suspicious toward the other and that this suspicion had increased in the past ten days. The situation in North China was becoming very critical and a solution, despite this suspicion, must be found. In order to meet such crisis, the minority groups—Democratic League, Young China Party and other small political groups—should get together for the interim period to render some useful and important service. What was needed now was some middle men to bring these people to a less suspicious attitude and to convince them that they must moderate

²¹ A leader of the Democratic League.

²² Lo Lung-chi, of the Democratic League.

their feelings. Gen. Marshall elaborated on this point by saying that it was only necessary for the third party to concentrate on [a] few principal members of each side and two or three important editors in order to bring them to the realization that their points of view were greatly influenced by fear and mutual distrust. He cited as an example, the Kuomintang's belief that the Democratic League was allied to the Communist Party; and on the other hand, the Communist Party's feeling that the Young China Party was subservient to the Kuomintang. However, if the Democratic League and Young China Party should get together and concentrate on a few people, much could be accomplished.

Gen. Marshall then stated that the Generalissimo had imposed two conditions on the reaching of any agreement. First; all rail communication must be restored in North China. To this, the Communist insisted that equal restoration must be made to all other forms of communications such as postal, telegraphic, river, road and etc. Secondly; the Generalissimo would not commit himself to any agreement unless guarantee could be given that the procedure would be carried out without interference or delay. To accomplish this, he proposed that the American members in field teams and the Executive Headquarters must be given the decisive vote in cases of disagreement. At this point, Gen. Marshall observed that he was unwilling to commit the American member in the Executive Headquarters to such a heavy burden of responsibility. However, there were two things in which he was willing to allow the American member in the Executive Headquarters to have the final authority, (1) in relation to restoration of communications; and (2) in relation to reports of teams. If an advanced section of the Executive Headquarters were to be established in Changchun, Gen. Marshall would not let the American member go unless he was given such final authority regarding detailed [*details*] of termination of hostilities. He then cited numerous instances where the activities of field teams and the Executive Headquarters were totally blocked due to lack of unanimous agreement. Consequently the Executive Headquarters lost its prestige and Americans were discredited. He further stated that he personally was criticized and attacked by people from all sides. Even in the U. S. a movement was now under way charging him of supporting the Communist Party.

Dr. Chang said that suspicion on the part of the Communists was due to their feeling of insecurity. Otherwise, they would not employ such delaying tactics. In reply to Gen. Marshall's inquiry as to why the Communist Party and the Democratic League had not yet elected their delegates to the National Assembly, Dr. Chang said that they felt the Constitution must first be drawn up before the forming of a coalition government.

Gen. Marshall then asked what would be the best arrangement for Harbin, Tsitsihar and Manchouli. To this, Dr. Chang replied that he thought the Communists would not object to the occupation of Harbin and Tsitsihar by the Government forces. However, he stated, the hostilities must first cease, then the negotiation could begin. General Marshall stressed that he could not afford to once again enter a negotiation without feeling reasonably sure that an agreement could be reached and the negotiation would not end in another deadlock. He observed that if the Americans in the field teams were given the deciding vote on local matters, it would serve as a protection to the Communists. By the free movement of the teams, it would eliminate much of the suspicion now existing. Dr. Chang then said that in order to settle the Manchurian problem, it would be the best for the Government forces not [to] advance further north. Also the Communists must change their way of doing things and cooperate with the Government. He also expressed his hope of having the PCC meet again so that the political status of Manchuria could also be determined.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Draft of Agreement To Insure the More Expeditious Functioning of Executive Headquarters*²³

[NANKING, May 30, 1946.]

We, the Committee of Three, are authorized to announce, with the approval of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and Chairman Mao Tse-tung,²⁴ the following terms to provide a basis for the more expeditious functioning of Executive Headquarters.

a. The American Commissioner at Executive Headquarters is empowered with final decision in case of disagreements on matters referred to it by field teams or field team chairmen concerning the cessation of hostilities, the restoration of communications and the demobilization, integration and reorganization of the Chinese armies.

b. The senior American representative at Changchun is empowered with the final decision in case of disagreements regarding immediate arrangements and matters in Manchuria pertaining to the cessation of hostilities.

c. The American member of a field team of the Executive Headquarters is empowered with the final decision in case of disagreements in matters pertaining to where, when and how the teams should proceed, who they should see and decisions covering the local situation.

²³ Prepared by General Marshall, who handed a copy on May 30 to Gen. Chou En-lai. Copy also sent to Gen. Hsu Yung-chang, Chinese National Government representative on the Committee of Three.

²⁴ Chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

These terms apply only to matters of a military nature. Decisions by an American regarding political matters are excluded unless specifically stipulated by later agreement.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai at 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, May 30, 1946, 6 p.m.

Also present: Colonel Hutchin²⁵
Mr. Chang Wen-chin
Capt. Soong

General Marshall said he had received at noon from the Generalissimo, a letter²⁶ which answered his communication of the other day.²⁷ This letter was not a very definite response, but it gave enough to bring to General Chou's attention some of the Generalissimo's points. General Marshall thought the Generalissimo would arrive at Nanking that afternoon, but apparently he had not and hence, probably had stopped over-night in Peiping. It was known that the Generalissimo asked for his plane to meet him at Mukden between nine and ten the morning of 30 May. General Chou was invited to come late that afternoon, it was thought that the Generalissimo would want to see General Marshall that evening and he wanted to see General Chou before seeing the Generalissimo.

General Marshall said the Generalissimo hadn't put very much in writing, but had apparently discussed matters at considerable length with Dr. Soong, part of what Dr. Soong had given General Marshall was not included in the note from the Generalissimo.

General Marshall said he wanted to read certain portions of that letter. In the first place General Marshall had proposed to the Generalissimo that he issue an order immediately to stop advances, attacks and pursuits preliminary to reaching an agreement for the cessation of hostilities. Also, an answer to his May 24th letter²⁸ discussed several points, particularly that pertaining to American officers.

The Generalissimo's letter stated: "I wish to put forward the following points for the implementation of your proposals and in order to render even clearer their meaning and purpose. The painful experience I have encountered during the past five months has compelled me to be more precise and definite in dealing with the Communists.

²⁵ Lt. Col. Claire E. Hutchin, of General Marshall's staff.

²⁶ See May 28, p. 907.

²⁷ May 26, p. 901.

²⁸ See Madame Chiang's letter No. 1, p. 891.

The following points I earnestly hope will meet your full understanding and support:

[Here follows quotation of the five numbered paragraphs printed on page 907.]

General Marshall said that was the substance of the Generalissimo's communication to him, but there was still more that came to him through Dr. Soong, but not in writing.

General Marshall said he sent the Generalissimo a communication yesterday afternoon urging him to make the first move to stop advances. There had been no reply yet. The letter came before he received that message. Probably the Generalissimo would come before any reply was made. General Marshall reiterated that his purpose in asking General Chou to come, was to learn as much as he could from General Chou, and at the same time give General Chou as much information as he had so to be at least partially prepared in case the Generalissimo wished to see him that evening.

General Marshall said he forgot to mention that Dr. Soong promised to send a message yesterday afternoon urging the Generalissimo to agree immediately to the dispatch of the Advance Section of the Executive Headquarters to Changchun. No answer had yet been received to that. Taking what the Generalissimo had said in his reply in relation to what he had proposed, and taking what Dr. Soong told him, General Marshall had assumed that one of the most urgent factors to be cleared up so far as the Generalissimo was concerned related to the question of American officers. With the expression of opinions by the Generalissimo and Dr. Soong, General Marshall had drafted a possible agreement as a basis for discussion of what the Communist Party would agree to and what they declined to agree to. The Generalissimo had never seen it, but as nearly as General Marshall could tell, it was about what he was talking about. The Generalissimo seemed to have taken the stand that the Communist attitude on the communications question, the question regarding American officers and the general statement regarding the military reorganization, would have to be clarified before he would go into the next move. The matter with relation to communications did not appear to General Marshall to be quite so difficult assuming that the reconstruction would be immediately agreed to and that General Yu Ta Wei and General Chou would endeavor to reach an agreement about the operation of the railroads.

General Marshall handed General Chou a copy²⁹ of the basis for discussion regarding American officers and instructed Colonel Hutchin to send a copy to General Hsu Yung-Chang.

²⁹ *Supra.*

General Marshall said he would like to repeat that he didn't expect to have General Chou reply to the draft this meeting. He said he couldn't finalize it until he had received the Generalissimo's reply that afternoon. The Generalissimo merely made a general statement about American officers which was so broad that General Marshall couldn't accept it and he had indicated to the Generalissimo that this presented a very difficult problem for Americans concerned. General Marshall wanted to see the fighting stopped, but it imposed a very great responsibility and a delicate situation for the U. S. Government. However, it was the only way the field teams would get ahead and it would work both ways. The more freedom of movement they gave the American officers, the less possibility there would be of either side violating the movement orders. Each side thinks the other is moving, and right now a good many troops are moving. General Marshall said his present trouble was that the American officer was not permitted to go and see. Once the American officer could go around himself, particularly after communications are restored, it would be a simple matter to detect a breach of agreements. He said that this appeared to [be?] the protection each side wanted because neither side trusted the other.

General Marshall reiterated that all this would create a very difficult situation for him because, as he told General Chou two days ago, there is a potential heavy open attack on him, General Marshall, about to be launched in the United States charging representation of the interests of the Communist Party as against those of the Central Government. Of course, there were the assertions and propaganda and also the belief of the rank and file of the Communist army that he was backing the Central Government against the Communists. Those two factors did not simplify the problem for him. Probably any attack on him for siding with the Communists is inspired by the ultra conservative political group of the Kuomintang. An attack on him or the U. S. by any one in the Communist party against action that assists the Central Government in fighting against the Communists can be readily understood.

General Chou said that he could briefly communicate to General Marshall the events of the last few days. On the very night he had discussed the situation with General Marshall, he had prepared a reply³⁰ to General Marshall which was dispatched early the next morning. At the same time, he had written a message to Yen-an with respect to the Generalissimo's letter³¹ and General Chou's reply. Also he had discussed the matter with his associates before any reply had come in from Yen-an, General Chou and his associates felt that the

³⁰ May 26, p. 903.

³¹ See Madame Chiang's letter No. 1, May 24, p. 891.

objections covered by the Generalissimo included some which had been discussed prior to the Generalissimo's departure for Mukden, some which General Marshall and General Chou had discussed and were approaching agreement.

General Chou stated that what struck his associates in the Generalissimo's letter was that after Government troops had captured Changchun, no indication was made in the Generalissimo's letter about the issuance of an order to stop the advances, attacks and pursuits. This was in spite of the fact that in Chungking, and also in Nanking, the Generalissimo had repeatedly either declared that once the Changchun problem was settled all the other problems could be settled by means of negotiation without resorting to force. General Chou did not believe in those words because he thought all the time that if the Government was trying to solve the problem by force, then the Government's demands would become greater and greater. If, after the capture of Changchun, the Government would demand Harbin and Kirin and other places, under such circumstances the hostilities could not be stopped by negotiations.

The Democratic League members as well as General Marshall had expressed the hope that hostilities be stopped and had also requested the Communist Party to make certain concessions, General Chou had been discussing this for over ten days on that very problem. After the Generalissimo's arrival in Changchun, he still imposed certain conditions and by that action, he defeated the purpose of General Chou's efforts for and the explanations to his party, thereby causing a complete failure to reach any cease fire agreement at that moment. It would appear that all his efforts had been superfluous. Yenau would have the feeling that General Chou's preliminary discussions of the preceding twenty days seemed to have been superfluous and that General Chou had been deceiving them.

General Chou said that with regard to the fact the Generalissimo had reiterated previous agreements which they had signed, the Generalissimo neglected [the] fourth agreement which was the agreement of March 27th regarding the sending of field teams to and the cessation of hostilities in Manchuria. The Generalissimo's attitude therefore caused feeling by others that he would only bring forward those points which were favorable to him and not these which were unfavorable to him.

General Chou said that in his reply to the letter, he had tried his best to accept anything possible thereby showing his sincere desire to reach a settlement, on the other hand the letter from Madame Chiang had placed General Chou in a most difficult position. Except for the last of the five points raised by the Generalissimo in the second letter,³²

³² President Chiang's letter of May 28, p. 907.

it seemed to General Chou that the Generalissimo had summarized the points he had brought up before his departure and in Madame Chiang's letter. Therefore, it seemed the Generalissimo wanted to put those terms as conditions precedent to the truce, despite the fact that the Generalissimo expressed in the first sentence his hope that the peace could be restored in Manchuria. However, by his putting up those terms, the Generalissimo had indicated that unless agreement was reached on those points, the Government would keep on advancing while at the same time, hostilities in China proper would go on unabated. It seemed to General Chou that the determination of the Generalissimo was such that he would continue fighting further under the pretext of taking over sovereignty in Manchuria and reopening communications in China proper.

General Chou said he had another instance to prove his assertion. He referred to the propaganda campaign itself. After General Marshall made his statement,³³ General Chou immediately proposed to the Kuomintang a propaganda truce. For that purpose he had conceived all kinds of measures. He had discussed them with Mr. Peng and had further worked out a draft of an agreement³⁴ on which General Marshall had made certain suggestions as amendments. It was General Chou's understanding that General Marshall was inclined to agree with his understanding. General Chou had discussed the subject with Dr. Wang Shih Chieh. After he made a few corrections on his draft, General Chou showed it to Dr. Peng. Yesterday, Dr. Peng declared at a press conference that the Kuomintang would do certain things all by themselves which were not necessarily according to the terms that had been discussed and which should have been included in the agreement. Dr. Peng reasoned that if such an agreement were adopted, there would be no more news. Actually, however General Chou's proposal was different. He had proposed that communiqués regarding military hostilities be issued by Executive Headquarters as General Marshall had suggested.

Secondly, yesterday, the Minister of Information (Kuomintang) by order of the Generalissimo, suppressed the Communist paper in Peiping called the "Liberation" published every other day and also suppressed the New China News Agency despite the fact that the China News Agency has acquired a legal status in the Executive Headquarters. This legal status shows in the record which stated that reports will be issued through the agencies of the three parties including the New China News Agency. The whole agency and the paper we[re] closed.

Apart from that, the Communists had requested the publication of

³³ See statement to the press, May 20, p. 865.

³⁴ See draft of May 25, p. 900.

newspapers in Nanking and Shanghai. The reply of the Minister of Publicity was that this could not be permitted at this time despite the fact that other parties, like the China Youth Party, are permitted to publish a paper even if they have not completed the procedure of registration. General Chou said those points proved who was sincere for a propaganda truce and who was not. Ever since he had talked to General Marshall about the propaganda truce, it may have been noticed that the Communists as well as the news published by the New China News Agency had become much calmer while the Kuomintang papers assumed the same tone as before.

General Chou said that in view of all the facts he presented it would seem that when he made a report to Yen-an, either he himself was being deceived or he was deliberately deceiving Yen-an. The Generalissimo's letter as well as the Madame's letter seemed to put up details as conditions precedent to a truce. That means that unless those details are resolved, they would not stop the fighting. If that was the case, then he was afraid that the conflagration in Manchuria would spread to China Proper. This would cause a total split in which case all previous agreements would be upset. One condition precedent to the other agreements was the cease fire agreement and only when this was reached did they come to agreements on other subjects.

The initial purpose for establishing an Executive Headquarters was to effect a truce. Previously, the Government said that the Changchun problem had to be settled. Now, the Changchun problem is settled. To stop the fighting first General Chou discussed on 23 May, the immediate cessation of advances, attacks and pursuits. Following that, an Executive Headquarters branch would be sent to Changchun. Under such circumstances they would discuss the objections brought up by the Generalissimo or they would even discuss a wider field than the Generalissimo had brought up as there were many other subjects to be discussed. However, it now seems that the order had been reversed. As a result of that it seemed to General Chou that all his previous talks had been a deception to Yen-an and also a deception to the Chinese people, as he had said before in Chungking.

General Marshall requested clarification of last phrase.

General Chou said that in Chungking he told General Marshall, as well as the Press, that he did not believe the capture of Changchun would stop the fighting. He was, therefore, very much perturbed by the Generalissimo's purpose [which] was to order a total war and to turn down all the fundamental agreements.

General Chou said that the Generalissimo had stated that during his painful experience in the past five months, he cannot trust the Communists with a feeling of assurance. If the Communist side also

put out certain terms as conditions precedent to stopping the fighting, then how could they get the fighting stopped at all. If the Generalissimo's [terms] were published to the whole country and the whole world, then everyone could see immediately who wanted to stop the fighting.

Right now, there were many hostilities in China proper. Both parties are involved in those hostilities. The most fundamental cause leading to those hostilities are large scale movements of Nationalist troops. According to the data he had collected, the movement of the National troops since January 13th involved 106 divisions. He was preparing a memorandum to General Marshall³⁵ regarding those movements to be sent over that evening.

It appears from that the Nationalists have also occupied large territories from the Communists which, due to the fact that they were not on the railroads, did not draw so much attention from the outside world. They had erected many fortifications and occupied many Communist towns. These actions on the Nationalist side caused the Communists to take retaliatory measures, the aggravation of which could precipitate a total war. He said that this was a very critical situation, especially after the capture of Changchun when the situation had become acute. General Chou said he did not feel reassured that the Generalissimo would be willing to stop the hostilities immediately or to the dispatch [of] an Executive Headquarters detachment to Changchun. General Chou said that was his impression but he did not know what General Marshall thought.

During the last two days, General Chou said he had been studying this matter and he felt he was in a very difficult position when trying to give an answer to the question that Yen-an had brought up. He was telling General Marshall frankly about his thoughts and he would like to hear General Marshall's views, particularly if the hostilities could not be stopped and if the Generalissimo were to pursue the same path he was then taking—what was to be done? If that was not the Generalissimo's purpose, why couldn't an order be issued to stop advances, attacks and pursuits right now.

General Chou mentioned at the last meeting that when they reached the final stage of discussion, he would like to make a trip to Yen-an. At present, even that point has dropped out of his consideration because he could not have a clear picture about the Generalissimo's true intention. If the Generalissimo would state definitely that he would not stop the fighting unless everything had been settled in negotiations, there would be no cessation of hostilities at all. There would be no way to achieve that because no one party could dictate the terms. Should

³⁵ See memorandum of June 3, p. 946.

General Chou adopt an impression that there was still chance for negotiations, when actually no results could be obtained, then certainly the fighting would go on. If we looked at the situation pessimistically, then it would seem that the Generalissimo was seeking all kinds of pretexts for continuing warfare. Therefore, he would like to know General Marshall's evaluation as to the present situation; whether General Marshall thought the Generalissimo would be willing to make concessions on other issues or would he insist that all issues be solved before he stopped the fighting. As a third case, the [apparent omission.]

General Chou said it appeared to him, that there was still a fourth probability. That was that all the terms were brought up merely as an excuse for carrying on the war. According to General Chou's information, which he said General Marshall might consider prejudiced, they plan to continue the war, particularly in Manchuria, and they would only consider negotiating after they had occupied the large cities and the railway lines. They are even organized to carry on the war in the event that they do not have further American assistance. They have made plans to overcome the difficulties they would have to face in the coming four months.

General Marshall said he was using his best effort to secure a cessation of advances. He was also using his best efforts to arrange for the dispatch of an advance section of the Executive Headquarters to Changchun, at least to get established and then get radio communication going so they could be utilized the moment the true basis for cessation of hostilities was reached. He said that General Chou asked him his view on the prospect of any successful negotiations at the present time. Until he could discuss the various issues with the Generalissimo personally and have him amplify them, it was impossible for him to give a definite answer to General Chou. The trouble in this affair is that he had talked a great deal to General Chou and very little to the Generalissimo because he first had to determine whether or not there was any probability of his being able to make any real contribution as a mediator:

The entire basis of his discussion rested on the Generalissimo's last terms that the Generalissimo transmitted through him to General Chou and more particularly on the Generalissimo's refusal to accept the proposal of the Democratic League for the reorganization of the Political Council and for their role in determining the reorganization of local governments. The Generalissimo had stated that he would only agree to have the Committee of Three act as negotiators regarding the military revisions and redeployments, and the political reor-

ganizations. That, of course, involved General Marshall in all those matters. He would not go into the negotiation unless he could be reasonably certain that there was a probable basis of compromise.

General Marshall said he never did clear up in his own mind what the possibilities of adjustments were regarding provincial governments. When the Ssuping kai action took place, and the Generalissimo stated his intention to go to Mukden, General Marshall finally decided he would accept the risk of not knowing enough much [*sic*] about that particular problem—provincial reorganization[—]and would undertake again negotiations regarding the Manchurian situation. What has occurred since then, General Chou was as familiar with the facts as General Marshall. General Marshall had given him the Generalissimo's messages. The Generalissimo had been in a situation where his Generals could talk to him and General Marshall could not. He said he hoped to be able to resume conversations with the Generalissimo that evening.

So, General Marshall said, he would like General Chou to keep in mind the fact that the lengthy discussions he had had with him were very one sided for the reasons stated and also for the reason that the action of the Communists in launching a full fledged attack on Changchun had almost destroyed his powers of negotiations with the Government. The controlling leaders felt that General Marshall had been wrong. He would agree with General Chou that the prospect of terminating hostilities at the present moment would appear to be rather gloomy, but he was not a pessimist and he didn't quit in the middle of a fight. He still [has] hopes of being able to do something to improve the situation, but he must be able to talk to the Generalissimo directly.

General Marshall said he sent the Generalissimo, General Chou's statement³⁶ so the Generalissimo is familiar with that. As General Chou already knew, the Generalissimo goes back very specifically to the question of communications and to the question of American officers facilitating action. The Generalissimo had been rather insistent from the start of his discussion about those two factors. General Chou may disagree with the Generalissimo and with him regarding the rights and wrongs of the communications problem. However, General Marshall was very sympathetic with the Generalissimo in his desire to have a system which would operate and not bog down. The only way to get that would be by imposing a great responsibility on the American officers.

General Marshall said of course he could not know until he talked

³⁶ General Chou's letter of May 26, p. 903.

to the Generalissimo and found out what the Generalissimo's real intentions were. At the moment he thought if the business of American officers could be straightened out and if the reconstruction of the railway line accepted so that it would go ahead without obstruction (General Marshall said he was talking about construction and not operation), then he believed there was a very good chance that he might be able to prevail upon the Generalissimo to immediately issue an order for the cessation of movements and for the transfer of the Advance Section of Executive Headquarters to Changchun and to throw the details before the Committee of Three to draw up the new basis for the cessation of hostilities. That was about as much as he could say at the present time. He felt greatly limited by reason of not being able to talk to the Generalissimo direct. As he told General Chou before, he felt that General Chou's generals in Changchun were causing entirely too much trouble for their good and our good. Now he had a little bit the same state of mind regarding the National Government generals. They are all entirely too human; none of them trust each other.

General Chou agreed with General Marshall's suggestion about a direct talk with the Generalissimo, so that General Marshall could know the Generalissimo's present state of mind. Then General Marshall could either prove or refute General Chou's statement regarding the intention of the Generalissimo. The Communist Party was still in the same position of insisting that the detachment of Executive Headquarters be sent to Changchun and that hostilities be ceased. Only when there was a truce in Manchuria and China proper could they enter negotiations.

The same applied to restoration of communications. The reconstruction of the railroads could only be taken up when there was an assurance that the fighting was definitely stopped. If they feel that fighting will be enlarged, how can they restore all communications? What actually would happen was, that while on one hand, the railroad was being repaired, on the other the fighting would be carried on. Communications are in the hands of the Government. The Communists are inferior as far as the communication facilities are concerned. Also the Communists had to resist the provocative attacks of National troops. They had no other way to counterbalance that than they had done in the past. Therefore, General Chou said, it was evident that unless the cessation of hostilities was effected not only in Manchuria but also in China Proper, the army reorganization could not be taken up.

Regarding the point of determining power of U. S. officers, General Chou said he could state frankly that he was making efforts along this line as far as the investigation of the field teams was concerned.

As to the relation between General Chou and General Marshall, they had had frequent contact so General Chou knew General Marshall. In the past, points brought up by General Marshall are mostly acceptable to General Chou after learning General Marshall's explanations the true intention which was of good intent. However, Communist officers, in the field as well as Executive Headquarters, do not always understand that situation. They could only see what was actually happening.

General Chou cited the Manchurian situation as an example where certain assistance was rendered by the U. S. to Nationalist troops. Despite the fact that equipping of National troops was effected prior to the Japanese surrender which General Chou admitted, they still could not understand why the U. S. gave Nationalists assistance for the transportation of men and war supplies. Without that U. S. assistance, the war in Manchuria would be very difficult for the Nationalist troops to continue.

General Chou said that of course they also knew that when the U. S. equipped the Kuomintang armies, it was done with the understanding that those troops would be used to fight the Japanese, but not for civil strife within China itself. He recalled that as late as April, President Truman had stated that the loan would not be made to increase civil strife in China. Hence it appeared to General Chou that American policy was very definite. Yet, while the fighting in Manchuria is going on, U. S. Marines deployed to guard communications along the railway lines with the result that Nationalist troops are utilizing that railroad for war purposes. That was a point that was very hard for the Communist officers to understand.

However, once the truce had been established, then all such points which they could not understand would vanish. Therefore it appeared to him that after the occupation of Changchun, the fighting should be stopped. That would be not only to the good of the Chinese people, but also beneficial from the international point of view. General Chou hoped General Marshall would make his efforts to put the cessation of hostilities in first place. At that moment they were standing at the turning point in China's history—whether the fighting would be continued or it could be stopped. It was because of the utmost importance of that subject that he took so much of General Marshall's time to explain it.

General Marshall said he would have to terminate the conference because of another engagement so he could only make a few comments. With regard to the point of view of lower Communist officers, he could readily understand that; particularly so with the propaganda that has been helping it along. On the other hand, he said he felt

that the position of the U. S. in this matter was entirely logical and was susceptible to explanation, but General Marshall said he would not do that at that moment. With him it was a fact.

General Marshall said he would endeavor to see the Generalissimo the moment he returned. However, if in the meantime, General Chou had any comments regarding the points he had made other than what General Chou had said, it might help General Marshall to arrive at an immediate decision on the part of the Generalissimo that would be very advantageous to China.

General Marshall said he did not quite see the reopening of communications as General had stated it. Reconstruction of the railroad would take a long time. It wouldn't be a matter of days—more a matter of months. He did not think there was any intention on the part of the Generalissimo to wait over a period of months while we got the communications open before there would be a cessation of hostilities. He thought what the Generalissimo wanted was a clear-cut agreement on the subject. General Marshall said his thought for the immediate discussion was that if there could be an agreement on the part of General Chou that no interference would be made for the reconstruction of the track, then there was a basis for reaching an immediate decision regarding hostilities.

General Marshall closed the meeting by thanking General Chou for coming over.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

General Marshall to Mr. Walter S. Robertson, at Peiping

[CHUNGKING,] 31 May 1946.

804. Your 3319³⁷ just received. Please deliver the following by your hand to the Generalissimo preferably through Madame Chiang.

“Your Excellency[:] I have just been advised by Mr. Robertson at your request that for 2 or 3 days you would remain in Peiping. I have not received a reply to my message to you of May 29.³⁸ Under the circumstances of the continued advance of the Government troops in Manchuria I must therefore repeat that my services in mediation are becoming not only increasingly difficult, but a point is being reached where the integrity of my position is open to serious question. Therefore I request you again to immediately issue an order terminating advances, attacks or pursuits by Government troops, and also that the immediate departure of an advance section of Executive Headquarters to Changchun be authorized by you.”³⁹

³⁷ Not printed.

³⁸ See memorandum from General Marshall to Dr. Soong, May 29, p. 912.

³⁹ A similar message was transmitted through Dr. Soong by General Marshall in his telegram No. OSE 103, May 31, not printed.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

General Marshall to Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer, in the United States

NANKING, 1 June 1946.

807. Reference your message 29th,⁴⁰ action in your case has been delayed in hopes earlier peaceful settlement here would have been accomplished before announcement, for several reasons, effect of suggestion of my withdrawal on CC⁴¹ clique and Communists both, weakening of my influence on Gimo in view of his insistence on my long stay here, your inclusion with me in Communist propaganda against U. S. assistance to Government Armies in present fighting. I had hoped to have fighting terminated several weeks ago but matter still drags with Government military now pressing their temporary advantage to the limit.

Problem of Congressional adjournment had not occurred to me but will have to be taken into account immediately. I have a hope to precipitate initiation of settlement within next 48 hours. If not successful we will have to go ahead with your affair.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Conference Between General Marshall and Dr. Lo Lung-chi at General Marshall's House, June 1, 1946, 10 a. m.

Also present: Gen. Timberman
Captain Soong

General Marshall informed Dr. Lo of the difficulty in reaching a solution due to the absence of Generalissimo, and stated it was very difficult to carry on negotiations via radio communications. He said that frequent conferences were held with Gen. Chou to clear up as many points as possible and that he had recommended to the Generalissimo to issue orders instructing his troops to cease advances, attacks and pursuits. Efforts were also made to get a branch of Executive Headquarters to Changchun to effect cessation of hostilities and to create a condition favorable to further negotiations. The Generalissimo states that he will not enter into another agreement unless he had assurance from the Communist Party that they would not again follow their delaying tactics in carrying out the agreements. To

⁴⁰ No. 89486, May 29, not printed; in this message General Wedemeyer advised General Marshall that he tentatively planned to depart for China between June 10 and June 15 and that he thought his "future status . . . should be clarified . . ."

⁴¹ Chen brothers, Li-fu and Kuo-fu.

accomplish this, the Generalissimo proposed that the American be given the final decision in case of disagreements. However, Gen. Marshall was reluctant to accept such a proposal in view of the grave responsibility and heavy burden placed on the Americans and also the possible involvement of the American Government. He would be willing, however, to allow the American commissioner in Peiping to have the responsibility for the final vote in case of disagreements concerning Restoration of Communications and matters pertaining to the cessation of hostilities. General Marshall admitted however that unless such a system were installed, there was very little hope of reaching any agreement. As a matter of fact he would be reluctant to let Americans become involved in the Executive Headquarters in Changchun unless Gen. Byroade were to be given authority to break disagreements regarding the immediate termination of the fighting. General Marshall said Gen. Chou was reluctant to accept such a proposal because he feared that the lower ranks of the Communist Party could not understand such a system. They felt bitterly toward the U. S. support of the National Government. Due to the effective Communist propaganda, it was feared that these low ranking officers and soldiers in the Communist Party would not accept the Americans as impartial judges. Gen. Marshall then cited the agreement proposed by Gen. Byroade in giving American field team members authority to determine as to where the teams should go and when; who they should visit. This proposal was signed by Gen. Hsu but was declined by Gen. Chou. As a result, an agreement authorizing the commissioners in the Ex. Hq. to solve all team problems within 24 hours before referring to the Committee of Three, was reached. General Marshall reiterated that the situation at present is extremely dangerous due to the conditions in North China and the possibility of the Nationalists' Generals overplaying their military power in Manchuria, just as the Communist Generals have recently done. It was necessary to use all possible influence to stop fighting immediately and send a branch of the Ex. Hq. to Changchun. This would have an important psychological effect on all. Gen. Marshall said that by allowing the American team members to have the deciding vote, the teams could move about freely and stop all troop movements which did not conform with the basic cease for [fire] agreement. By so doing, much of the suspicion and fear on both sides could be eliminated. General Marshall then proposed an idea to organize a few teams consisting of an American and a member each from the Democratic League and Young China Party, which would tour troubled areas in North China and Manchuria. However, he was not in a position to

know how the Generalissimo and Gen. Chou would react to such an idea.

Dr. Lo asked if the Manchurian problem could be settled if the Americans were given the final authority. Gen. Marshall replied that this was the point the Generalissimo emphasized most emphatically. The Committee of Three could then negotiate policies and reduce them to writing. Such policies would have to be agreed by all members of the Committee. General Marshall added however that agreements signed by the Committee of Three in the past, were not carried out due to differences of interpretation by the Commissioners or by their staffs, or by field team members. Suspicion and retaliation measures on both sides further complicated the matter.

General Marshall emphasized that he would not accept a general statement that American[s] would decide on all disagreements but would agree that Americans have deciding vote regarding the restoration of communications and reports from field teams. General Marshall then showed Dr. Lo the draft proposal regarding the activities of field teams.⁴³

Dr. Lo inquired if General Marshall could effect cessation of hostilities if General Chou would accept this proposal. Gen. Marshall replied he could not guarantee that, because he had not had the opportunity to discuss it with the Generalissimo. But Gen. Marshall could not see any objection to Gen. Chou's agreeing to the reconstruction of railroads.

Dr. Lo then explained that the Communists' feeling towards Americans could be contributed [*attributed*] to the American support given to the National Government in the training and transporting of its troops which at present were being used in a civil war. Even now, the National Government armies in Manchuria were depending on the U. S. Navy for supplies. All this made the Communists suspicious as to the American policy, and their impartiality. Gen. Marshall stated that the training and equipping of the Chinese army were a part of an agreement entered into over two and half years ago. It would have been absurd for the U. S. Government to stipulate in such an agreement that should a civil war occur, the portion of the Chinese Army so trained and equipped must be disbanded. At the time the agreement was made, the U. S. was dealing with an ally, and that ally was the National Government and not Yen-an. In the peace treaty [*sic*], it was agreed by the Allied powers that Manchuria was to be taken over by allied China, i. e., Chungking. To assist China in this respect, U. S. had formally committed herself in the transportation of

⁴³ Presumably draft of May 30, p. 914.

Chinese troops into Manchuria, as otherwise the Chinese Government was powerless to effect such a move.

Dr. Lo then stated that his impression was that if the Generalissimo could agree to a cease fire order immediately, the Communist Party would agree to his proposal. He further stated that Americans should not continue to supply the National Government if a civil war should develop. He suggested that Gen. Marshall make it clear that if the Central Government continues to fight, the U. S. would cease all the supplies to it. To this, General Marshall reserved his comment in view of his position as Ambassador. He indicated that Russia might possibly be involved in the situation. However, he said the assistance given by U. S. to China was diminishing and that the Chinese Government was taking over the shipping along coast lines in liberty ships turned over by the U. S., and that the Government was maintaining its own supplies into Manchuria.

In closing, Dr. Lo reiterated that he would tell Gen. Chou about the special proposals regarding teams suggested by General Marshall. At same time, he hoped that if Gen. Chou would agree to accept the proposal, General Marshall would ask the Generalissimo to issue cease for [*fire*] orders immediately. General Marshall stated that he would persuade the Generalissimo to cease advances, attacks, and pursuits. Then teams and the branch of the Executive Headquarters must be sent into Manchuria.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Mr. Walter S. Robertson to General Marshall

[PEIPING,] 1 June 1946.

3371. Delivered message contained in your 804 to Generalissimo in person. Due to illness of Madam [I] used Shen as interpreter. Paraphrased copy was left with Generalissimo which Madam has read. I am requested to convey to you the following message which is signed Chiang Kai-shek but which I understand was written in collaboration with Madam:

"I have just received your telegram sent through Mister Robertson. I surmise that you have received my message of 28 May sent through Doctor Soong. You may rest assured that in all my decisions I have kept in mind the difficulty of your position and am doing everything in my power to facilitate and assure the success of your work. I shall be returning Nanking tomorrow or Monday when I shall tell you in person the Manchurian situation as I saw it. I am ready to agree to your proposal to send an advance party of the Executive Headquarters to Changchun for preliminary work in the event of my not being able immediately to issue orders to Government troops to terminate advances and so forth."

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Mr. Walter S. Robertson to General Marshall

PEIPING, 1 June 1946.

DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: General Yeh returned to his office on Monday, after many weeks of illness. A Commissioners' meeting had been scheduled for that morning to consider many critical problems confronting our Headquarters. Much of the trouble had to do with the action of the Communist team members, who were completely immobilizing our teams in many areas. General Yeh asked that the meeting be postponed until he could familiarize himself with the subjects on the agenda. We of course agreed to do so.

Late Monday afternoon General Yeh came into my office for a long personal discussion. He said that the Communist withdrawal from Ssupingkai and Changchun offered a most favorable opportunity for the two sides to reach agreement on the Manchurian issues, which should permit agreement on all other questions at issue. He reiterated several times that now was the time for everyone interested in peace to redouble his efforts to achieve it. He commented on the friendly relations which existed between the Americans and the Chinese of both sides in Executive Headquarters and expressed regret that such relations did not exist to the same extent between the two Chinese factions. He thought that closer and more friendly personal contact between the Chinese representatives would result in settling many questions which now reach the deadlock stage. He stated he was personally going to make a particular effort to this end.

General Cheng Kai-min ⁴⁴ is still absent, but General Yeh said he would start immediately with his deputy, General Tsai. He had a long conversation with Tsai, followed by a similar conversation between General Lo, the Communist Chief of Staff, and General Tsai. At one time in our operation, these latter two gentlemen were at daggers' points over almost every question. We were therefore particularly gratified to hear from General Yeh of the friendly and satisfactory discussions which had taken place.

We held our meeting Wednesday afternoon in an atmosphere of cordiality and good feeling. The result is indicated by the enclosed copies of the minutes ⁴⁵ and message which it was agreed at the meeting should be dispatched to the Committee of Three for approval and transmission to the Generalissimo and Chairman Mao.

Since General Yeh's return there has been a noticeable change for the better in the Communist attitude throughout our various levels of operation. We are still having many difficulties in the field. Both

⁴⁴ Chinese National Government Commissioner of Executive Headquarters.

⁴⁵ Not printed.

Chinese Commissioners, as you will note from the minutes, feel that this is a situation that can now be corrected only by orders from the highest authority on both sides. It is for this reason that the proposed message was agreed upon.

I was disturbed by the import of the message I received for transmittal in your 804 and greatly disappointed in the reply given in our 3371. We are acutely aware of your difficulties and constantly amazed and inspired by your patience.

With kindest regards [etc.]

WALTER S. ROBERTSON

[Enclosure]

The Three Commissioners to the Committee of Three, at Nanking

[PEIPING, May 29, 1946.]

This message from the Three Commissioners of Executive Headquarters is addressed to the Committee of Three for approval and delivery to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and Chairman Mao Tse-tung.

The proceedings and recommendations of a meeting of the Three Commissioners held on May 29 are believed to be of sufficient importance to warrant your personal attention and action. In this meeting held in the most amicable spirit the following was expressed by the Chinese Commissioners with unanimous agreement on each statement. It was agreed that the directives issued by the Committee of Three and by Executive Headquarters accomplished over a period of time a comparatively satisfactory military truce, but that these directives were not being obeyed by all field commanders. It was agreed that this state of affairs had caused a lowering of morale among the Chinese people and had greatly undermined the prestige of Executive Headquarters and its Field Teams. It was agreed that the spirit of negotiation and the sincere desire of improvement of the overall situation exhibited among the Commissioners and staff of Executive Headquarters must be disseminated to commanders in the field and that they must be reapprised of their responsibilities in carrying out agreed directives of the Committee of Three and the Executive Headquarters. It was further agreed that the success or failure of the Agreements signed by you in January now depended solely upon whether these commanders carry out the directives which have already been issued.

In an effort to establish the necessary conviction for peace and insure that conditions of conflict and activities against peace be stopped immediately, the Three Commissioners respectfully request that the following message be dispatched to all commanders of your respective forces and that you grant authority for its dispatch to all Field Teams for their information. It is further requested that

you grant authority for wide dissemination to the public in a simultaneous release at Nanking, Yen-an and Peiping. Recommended message follows:

“Agreement reached between the National Government of China and the Chinese Communist Party on January 10, 1946, was reached with their hope and the hope of the people of China that this agreement would bring a lasting peace and pave the way for the reconstruction of a new China. In an effort to insure the success of this agreement, the Executive Headquarters, composed of members of the National Government, the Chinese Communist Party and representatives of the United States was formed and delegated authority by the highest level of the National Government and the Communist Party in China. The basic directives toward peace and reconstruction reached by the Committee of Three and by Executive Headquarters and its Field Teams have been sufficient and satisfactory to permit the accomplishment of the desired results. Regardless of this fact, military conflict and other activities against peace still exist in China. These conditions must be corrected quickly or the peace of China may be prejudiced beyond repair. You will, therefore, cause all hostilities of any nature or size including military conflicts, destruction of lines of communications and blockade to be terminated without delay in the area of your responsibility. You will take action to permit and facilitate free passage of civilian travel, food stuffs and merchandise. The building of fortifications and military works and destruction and blockade of lines of communication must cease. The Committee of Three and Executive Headquarters with its organization of field teams has my full confidence and you must carry out without question the unanimous decisions reached by these agencies. There must be no interference with the activities of field teams of Executive Headquarters and their work must be facilitated in every possible way. For the good of China you must establish liaison between opposite forces and promote a spirit of understanding between opposite commanders of all levels. The bitterness that you may feel due to past incidents must now be forgotten. The success or failure of peace of China is of tremendous importance to this country as a whole and all field commanders are hereby ordered to carry out this order. An identical message is being sent by (Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek or Chairman Mao Tse-tung) to all field commanders of the (National Government or Communist Party) forces. Signed (Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek or Chairman Mao Tse-tung).[”]

740.00119PW/6-146

Memorandum by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee to the Secretary of State

SWN 4367

WASHINGTON, 1 June 1946.

Subject: Security Implications in Manchurian Situation.

Enclosed is a copy of SWNCC 291/1, a report by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East, which has been

transmitted for approval by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.

In view of the Recommendations contained in paragraph 5 *a*, it is requested that the Department of State transmit, as a matter of urgency, the Conclusions of this paper as contained in paragraph 4 to General Marshall for comment to include his opinion on the advisability of requesting Presidential approval of these Conclusions and that General Marshall's comments, when obtained, be furnished the Secretariat, SWNCC, for circulation to the Committee for the action contemplated in paragraph 5 *b* of the Recommendations.⁴⁶

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS
Acting Chairman

[Enclosure]

Report by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East

[SWNCC 291/1]

THE PROBLEM

1. To consider implications bearing upon the security of the United States in the present and potential Manchurian situation.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. See Appendix "A".

DISCUSSION

3. See Appendix "B".

CONCLUSIONS

4. It is concluded that:

a. Soviet policy may be expected to concern itself increasingly with Manchuria and China during the decades immediately ahead. Encouragement is being given to Communist movements in East Asian countries, especially in China. The technique in all probability will be to control these movements through small groups of nationals who will seek to turn legitimate indigenous liberal programs to Soviet ends, who will infiltrate into government, and who will wittingly or unwittingly guide their nation into the Soviet orbit. Such "fifth column" technique has proved effective in varying degrees in Soviet-dominated areas in Europe, and although conditions in China are, as

⁴⁶The Department complied in its instruction No. 597, June 10, not printed.

pointed out in paragraph 4 *b* below, not identical, the possibility that Soviet methods will be successful in China is one which must be faced.

b. In Manchuria especially the U. S. S. R. is expected to seek to foster the establishment of an autonomous state dominated by the Soviet Union. Such a state would be receptive to Soviet requests for economic concessions, would eliminate any potential threat to Siberia, and might eventually be absorbed in the Soviet Union. With or without such physical incorporation into the U. S. S. R., a Manchuria integrated into the Russian economy would prove a grave threat to the United States as well as to China. The resulting self-sufficiency of the U. S. S. R. in the Far East would, taken together with her western industries, place under the control of the Soviet Union the greatest agglomeration of power in the history of the world. China without Manchuria would be no effective counter-poise to maintain the balance of power in the Far East.

c. To counter this probable long-range Soviet program the United States must adopt a policy aimed at the orientation of the people of Manchuria in the direction of China and at the integration of Manchuria into the Chinese economy. The initiation and implementation of such a program must remain a Chinese responsibility, but the United States should inform the Chinese Government of its vital interest therein and of its willingness to assist as outlined below.

d. A prerequisite to any constructive program to win the allegiance and support of all Chinese groups, not only in Manchuria but also throughout China, must be a broadening of the Chinese Government from a one-party to a multi-party government, representative of all phases of truly indigenous political opinion. It is felt that communism is in opposition to the basic Chinese way of life and that the present Communist party in China has won a following, not because of real devotion of the people to Communist doctrines emanating from Moscow, but rather because of the ability of Soviet-trained leaders to exploit popular opposition to the reactionary and oppressive one-party rule of the Kuomintang. For that reason, the United States should give every encouragement to middle-of-the-road groups, such as the Democratic League and the Left Wing of the Kuomintang, and should continue its efforts to convince the National Government of the vital necessity for broadening its base of participation so that other political elements may secure adequate representation.

e. The United States should continue to urge the Chinese Government to inaugurate and implement an effective program of reform and reconstruction throughout Manchuria, which would facilitate the adoption of a similar program for the whole of China. Such action would be the best demonstration to the people of Manchuria of

the good faith of the Government and would assist materially in the achievement of political peace and the creation of a truly representative coalition government.

f. Specific points which such a program should embrace are the following: (1) removal of undesirable civil servants and appointment in their stead of able administrators who understand the Northeastern Provinces; (2) release of political prisoners, (3) effective land reform, (4) moderation of taxes, (5) elimination of usury through the creation of agricultural banks and cooperatives, (6) introduction of an effective agricultural program, including experimental stations and work in animal husbandry, (7) improvement of working conditions in a program for industrial rehabilitation, (8) establishment of adequate medical centers, (9) a broadened system of education, and (10) maintenance of strict control over the armies stationed in Manchuria, to eliminate depredations which in the past have alienated the people.

g. The United States should seek to convince China of the absolute necessity for such a program by making further U. S. assistance to China contingent upon the adoption of a reform program. The United States should be prepared (1) to make further loans through the Export-Import Bank for the rehabilitation of existing railroads in Manchuria (except those controlled by foreign interests), and for other projects, (2) to furnish trucks and road construction equipment, (3) to furnish farm equipment and fertilizers, (4) to give vigorous support to the transfer from Japan of factories and machinery on China's reparation account, (5) to undertake immediately a program to make available to China as many trained technical assistants and advisers as possible, and (6) to support a request from China for the carefully safeguarded, temporary retention in Manchuria of Japanese technicians for utilization in the industrial rehabilitation program. In furthering this program, all aspects of an educational program for China, including the training of civil administrative and technical students, should be carefully considered.

h. While encouraging China on a positive program as outlined above, the United States should by all diplomatic means at its disposal and by judicious use of publicity counter every effort of the U. S. S. R. to expand its sphere of influence and economic control in Manchuria. This would mean that the United States should win and hold the confidence of the Chinese Government so that the United States Government would be kept informed of any and all agreements which the U. S. S. R. might desire to enter into with the Chinese Government.

i. ⁴⁷ The United States Government should continue firmly to maintain its position that industrial plants and equipment formerly owned by Japanese in Manchuria represent Japanese external assets which should be allocated to China and the reparations settlement, and cannot be recognized as "war booty" legitimately subject to removal by the Soviet forces. It should insist that any such removals should be reported by the U. S. S. R. and be debited against the Soviet share of reparations from Japan. It should refuse to approve any allocation of Japanese reparations to the U. S. S. R. which fails to take account of such removals within the total reparations apportionment of that country, and it should, if necessary, use any other reasonable means of pressure in an endeavor to make it clear to the Soviet Government that the U. S. Government will not accept the Soviet Government's point of view on this question. Any modification of the above position which might be considered desirable in the future should be made only under specific instructions from the Secretary of State.

j. The United States should support the Chinese Government in holding the U. S. S. R. to the strictest possible interpretation of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of August 14, 1945.⁴⁸ The Chinese should be encouraged to counter any attempt by the U. S. S. R. to broaden the privileges granted under this treaty by the knowledge that their protests will be strongly endorsed by the United States.

k. The position of the United States vis-à-vis China and Manchuria is exceptionally strong, for the United States will be continuing its historic policy of insisting upon the territorial and administrative integrity of China, upon non-interference in China's internal affairs, and upon the equal opportunity of all nations in China's commerce and economic development. This traditional policy coincides with the vital interest of the United States that Manchuria remain an integral part of China and not be utilized by Russia to create a powerful force in Eastern Asia that would constitute a grave threat to the United States.

RECOMMENDATIONS

5. It is recommended that:

a. SWNCC request that the Conclusions of this paper be transmitted urgently by the State Department to General Marshall for comment, including his opinion on the advisability of requesting Presidential approval of the paper, prior to final consideration by SWNCC; and

b. Upon receipt by SWNCC of General Marshall's comments,

⁴⁷ This paragraph printed as revised on June 6.

⁴⁸ Signed at Moscow; *United States Relations With China*, p. 585.

SWNCC consider the Conclusions of this paper as a matter of priority, in the light of these comments, and upon approval by SWNCC, submit the paper to the President for approval as definitive U. S. policy.

[Subenclosure 1]

APPENDIX "A"

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. The historic American policy toward China, enunciated originally by John Hay⁴⁹ in the Open Door notes⁵⁰ at the turn of the century was embodied at the time of the Washington Conference of 1921-22 in the Nine-Power Treaty⁵¹ guaranteeing "the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China." This formed the basis for the protests of the United States against the Japanese aggression in Manchuria in 1931. Throughout the period of Japanese occupation of Manchuria the United States consistently refused to recognize the Japanese puppet state of "Manchukuo" maintaining that territorially and administratively Manchuria was an integral part of China.

2. The United Nations Charter,⁵² to which Russia, China and the United States have adhered, pledges members to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any member state, or in any manner inconsistent with United Nations purposes.

3. At the conclusion of the Cairo Conference in December 1943 President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and Premier Churchill issued a statement declaring that "all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China."⁵³

4. At the Yalta Conference in January 1945 the United States agreed to use its good offices to effect a Sino-Soviet agreement which would restore railroad and naval base rights which Russia possessed in Manchuria prior to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05.⁵⁴

5. The Potsdam Declaration of July 1945, signed by President

⁴⁹ Secretary of State, September 20, 1898-July 1, 1905.

⁵⁰ *Foreign Relations*, 1899, pp. 128-143.

⁵¹ Signed at Washington, February 6, 1922; *Foreign Relations*, 1922, vol. I, p. 276.

⁵² Signed at San Francisco, June 26, 1945; Department of State Treaty Series No. 993, or 59 Stat. 1031.

⁵³ Department of State *Bulletin*, December 4, 1943, p. 393.

⁵⁴ Agreement signed at Yalta, February 11, 1945, *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 984; also Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 498, or 59 Stat. 1823.

Truman, Attlee and Stalin,⁵⁵ affirmed that "the terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out."

6. The Sino-Soviet Treaty of August 14, 1945, with accompanying agreements,⁵⁶ provides that Russia shall have a half interest, for the ensuing thirty years, in ownership and operation of Manchurian trunk railways, joint use of Port Arthur as a naval base with the right of maintaining armed forces in a specified area thereabout and creates a free port at Dairen with a Russian harbor master and Russian lease of one-half of all installations and equipment. Russia expresses its readiness to extend moral and military aid to the Chinese National Government, as the legal government of China, and clearly recognizes Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria.

7. In an exchange of notes relating to the treaty there occurs the following clause: "In the course of negotiations on the ports of Dairen and Port Arthur, also on the joint operation of the Chinese-Changchun Railway, the Soviet Government regarded the Three Eastern Provinces (Manchuria) as part of China and again confirmed its respect for China's full sovereignty over the Three Eastern Provinces and recognition of their territorial and administrative integrity."

8. The United States at the time of the negotiation of the Sino-Soviet treaties received oral assurances from Stalin that the U. S. S. R., would make a public statement expressing support in China, including Manchuria, of the Open Door policy, such a statement to be made in conjunction with a similar pronouncement by China.⁵⁷ No such announcement has since been made.

9. By the terms of capitulation of Japanese forces in Manchuria on September 2, 1945, Russia accepted the surrender in the name of the Allies, including China,⁵⁸ and asked no specific benefits for herself.

10. United States policy toward China was outlined in a document given General Marshall in December 1945,⁵⁹ and substantially reiter-

⁵⁵ Department of State *Bulletin*, July 29, 1945, p. 137. This declaration was issued on July 26, 1945, by the heads of Governments of the United States, United Kingdom, and China, and was signed by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom at Potsdam and concurred in by the President of the National Government of China, who communicated with President Truman by despatch. Later, in its declaration of war against Japan, effective Aug. 9, 1945, the Soviet Government joined in the declaration of July 26, 1945.

⁵⁶ For texts, see Department of State, *United States Relations With China*, pp. 585 ff.

⁵⁷ See memorandum by the Minister Counselor in the Soviet Union, August 8, 1945, *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VII, p. 960.

⁵⁸ For the surrender terms as set forth in "Instruments for the Surrender of Japan, General Order No. 1", see directive by President Truman to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan on August 15, 1945, *ibid.*, p. 530.

⁵⁹ See President Truman's message to General Marshall, December 15, 1945, entitled "U.S. Policy Towards China," *ibid.*, p. 770.

ated in a public announcement by the State Department, December 15, 1945.⁶⁰ This policy states the firm belief of the United States Government that a "strong, united and democratic China is of utmost importance to the success of the United Nations organization and for world peace," affirms the necessity of restoring all China, including Manchuria, to effective Chinese control, states the presence in China of United States armed forces, including Marines, to be for the purpose of assisting the disarmament and evacuation of Japanese troops in liberated areas, and acknowledges the necessity for governmental reforms in China under a unified Chinese National Government along with the effective integration of all Chinese armed forces into the Chinese National Army.

11. The State Department on February 9, 1946 reaffirmed the Open Door Policy in identical notes to the Governments of China and the U. S. S. R.,⁶¹ protesting the reported negotiation of agreements which would lead to exclusive Sino-Soviet control of industrial enterprises in Manchuria, and further protesting the reported removal by the Russians, as war booty, of industrial equipment in Manchuria. In replying to this note, the Chinese Government stated that the U. S. S. R., claimed all industrial equipment which had contributed to the support of Japanese forces, as war booty, but had offered to turn a part of this over to the Chinese, the remaining heavy industry enterprises in Manchuria to be jointly operated by China and the Soviet Union. The Chinese Government note further stated that these proposals had been found unacceptable. The Russian reply was unsatisfactory in arguing that Open Door principles would not be violated, since only a portion of former Japanese industry in Manchuria would be operated by Chinese-Russian stock companies, and unsatisfactory in that it reaffirmed the "war trophy" character of all industrial enterprises which contributed to support the Japanese Kwantung Army. The situation remains unchanged, despite subsequent and stiffer U. S. protests, to which the Soviet Union replied as before.

12. Withdrawal of Soviet troops from Manchuria, originally scheduled for three months after the defeat of Japan and then for December 3, 1945, was twice delayed at Chinese request, the Chinese finding it impossible to send their troops rapidly enough or in sufficient strength to take over. This was in part a result of the Soviet refusal to permit the use of Dairen as a point of debarkation for incoming National Government troops.

⁶⁰ See statement by the President, Department of State *Bulletin*, December 16, 1945, p. 945, or *United States Relations With China*, p. 607.

⁶¹ Department of State *Bulletin*, March 17, 1946, p. 448; for correspondence, see vol. x, pp. 1099 ff.

13. In January and February 1946, all political elements in China had agreed, with General Marshall acting as mediator, (1) to reorganize and broaden the National Government to include Communist party, Democratic League, and non-party groups, (2) to redraft the Constitution for presentation to constituent assembly of May 5, and (3) to reorganize the existing armies in China into a truly National Army.

14. The situation deteriorated rapidly in March and April, however, as irreconcilable elements within the Kuomintang and Communist party made their influence felt and as the Communists exhibited a determination to prevent the National Government from assuming control in Manchuria. The National Government garrison in Changchun fell to the Communists on April 18 shortly after the Soviet withdrawal from the city. Harbin was occupied by the Communists without opposition on April 25, the date of the Soviet evacuation, Chinese National Government officials having previously fled the city by airplane.

15. General Marshall hastily departed for Chungking from the United States on April 12 but was unable to effect a reconciliation of the two parties prior to the movement of the National capital to Nanking the first of May. His efforts to mediate and to stem the fighting are continuing.

[Subenclosure 2]

APPENDIX "B"

DISCUSSION

1. *General.* The security of the United States turns in large part upon the effectiveness of the United States in preventing war, and this in turn depends in large part upon the sincerity and the cooperation of the major powers in seeking selective security through the United Nations. Both the United States and the U.S.S.R. have committed themselves wholeheartedly to the United Nations, yet in actual practice a world of difference separates the two nations in ideology, in national policy, and in their respective interpretations of basic international concepts and of existing international agreements. No area is a zone of greater potential danger to Soviet-American relations than Manchuria.

2. *Manchuria*

a. *History.* Manchuria became internationally important only in the nineteenth century. It was joined to China by the Manchu emperors, last of a series of northern invaders assimilated by the Chinese. This unity was disrupted by nineteenth century imperialist activities

which culminated in a period of Russian predominance interrupted by the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-05. By the Treaty of Portsmouth,⁶² Russia lost to Japan substantially those rights and privileges which the Sino-Soviet treaty of August 1945 has restored to the Soviet state. A steadily increasing Japanese foothold in Manchuria led to the complete exclusion of China after the Manchurian incident of 1931⁶³ and the creation of a puppet state, "Manchukuo", under absolute Japanese domination. Extensive exploitation of Manchurian industrial and agricultural resources made the area an arsenal of Japanese aggression during World War II; it was a keystone of Japanese long-term plans for world domination. The defeat of Japan returned Manchuria to Chinese sovereignty, but raises the question of which nation shall benefit in the future from Manchurian resources.

b. Resources. Manchuria completes China's "industrial crescent", considered by the Japanese essential to an Asiatic empire. It possesses warm water ports in Dairen, Hulutao, Yingkow, and Port Arthur, an extensive railway system connected with China proper, Korea and Siberia, now in bad repair and poorly augmented by a road system, and extensive mineral, timber and agricultural resources. It habitually provides an annual exportable surplus of approximately one million tons of grain. It possesses a substantial part of available Asiatic sources of coal and iron together with adequate supplies of other resources essential to heavy industry, for the most part concentrated in southern Manchuria and fully developed for exploitation during the Japanese occupation. Coal deposits are estimated at 10 to 20 billion tons; iron ore at 2 billion tons.

c. Population. The people are preponderantly Chinese, true Manchus comprising a relatively small minority. Japanese, Koreans, Mongols and Russians aggregate only about 3,500,000 in a total of some 42,500,000 people. Ethnic and cultural considerations incline the populace toward China. Manchuria possesses dissident "bandit" elements at least to the extent that they have traditionally existed in China, and will doubtless offer a haven to dissatisfied Communist Chinese elements.

3. *Present Military Situation.* Armed forces of Russia, China, the United States and Japan are presently in, or in the vicinity of, Manchuria.

a. Russian ground and air forces occupied Manchuria in the closing days of the war against Japan, but withdrawals are believed to be taking place substantially in accordance with Sino-Soviet agreements.

⁶² Signed September 5, 1905; *Foreign Relations*, 1905, p. 824.

⁶³ Japanese seizure of Mukden, September 18, 1931; see *Foreign Relations*, Japan, 1931-1941, vol. I, pp. 1 ff., and *Foreign Relations*, 1931, vol. III, pp. 10 ff.

These forces are elements of the Russian Siberian Army, the strength of which is estimated at 1,000,000 and all of which could readily be brought to bear in Manchuria. Under the provisions of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of August 1945 Russian forces may be employed in the Port Arthur naval base area indefinitely, and may utilize railways for transit purposes until the war with Japan is officially terminated.

b. Chinese forces, both Nationalist and Communist, have entered Manchuria. Vigorous fighting between them is reported and the indications are that the present truce terms between rival Chinese factions in China cannot be applied to Manchuria. Thus far, Chinese Nationalist forces in Manchuria total over 150,000. Reorganization of Chinese forces to reach the post-war composition agreed upon by Chinese Nationalists and Communists will require eighteen months, at the end of which time a total of 50 Nationalist and 10 Communist divisions are contemplated in a single Chinese Army. For the present, numerous Chinese ground units are available, but are having difficulty in moving to Manchuria because of transportation deficiencies. They can be regarded as only partially effective in terms of weapons, equipment and training, according to conventional standards.

c. U.S. forces, principally consisting of a reduced corps of Marines, are deployed in the Tientsin-Peking area as far north as Chinwangtao, and at Tsingtao. The U. S. Seventh Fleet, including three heavy and one light cruiser, but no aircraft carriers, among numerous lighter craft, is assigned to China waters; it could readily be reinforced with elements of other Pacific naval forces, most of which currently possess seriously depleted crew strengths. Depleted American air strength could be brought to bear on southern Manchuria from Korea, Japan and the Ryukyus. Substantial reinforcement of American forces, or the build-up of expeditionary forces in the area of Manchuria, would require many months in view of the rapid pace which demobilization has followed. Occupation forces in Japan and Korea are at a minimum, both in quantity and combat quality.

d. Japanese forces, totalling some 700,000 are for the most part disarmed but their whereabouts is obscure. The Russians have made no reply to U. S. queries as to their intentions to repatriate these Japanese forces from Manchuria. On the contrary, reports indicate that extensive use is being made of Japanese military in the construction of fortifications at Vladivostok as well as in Manchuria.

The Russians' short-term military position vis-à-vis Manchuria is clearly superior to that of either the United States or China, or both together. Russia's long-term military position in Asia requires further examination.

4. *Manchuria in relation to Russia.*—Little accurate information

is available as to the extent of industrialization achieved by Russia in Siberia. There are strong indications that she attempted to gain substantial self-sufficiency with respect to her Siberian Army, both in food and industry, during the 1930's when relations with Japan were strained, on occasion, to the point of local undeclared hostilities. That these efforts proved inadequate is indicated by the J. C. S. 1313 series, exploring potentialities of Siberia as a base for operations against Japan. Russia's efforts to improve east-west rail communications, together with her continuing military and diplomatic efforts to secure defense in depth for these communications, is added proof that self-sufficiency has not been obtainable to the extent considered desirable in Siberia. It is a reasonable assumption, however, that the addition of Manchuria, or control of Manchurian resources, would assure virtual autarchy to a Siberian region thus rendered capable of supporting major forces during extended combat operations. Intelligence estimates during hostilities with Japan indicate that Manchuria had the capability of supporting, with virtual self-sufficiency, about 1,000,000 Japanese troops. Manchurian grain should assist greatly in supporting an increased Siberian population. Russian interests in Manchuria are assured considerable freedom by the Yalta agreement and the confirming Sino-Soviet Treaty of August 14, 1945. The rights and benefits accruing to Russia under these agreements, while substantial, should not in themselves procure for Russia full economic control of Manchuria, but must on the other hand be regarded as setting the limits beyond which Russia should not be permitted to go. Should Russia succeed either in absorbing Manchuria or in orienting Manchurian economy altogether, or very largely, towards herself, it is apparent that the long-term result could be a degree of self-sufficiency for major forces in Asiatic Russia which would permit her conduct of a major war in that area with little regard to the fragility of communications between European and Asiatic Russia. Such a contretemps would greatly strengthen Soviet military potential. Its effect would be even greater, however, in terms of the decreased power potentialities of China.

5. *Manchuria in relation to China.*—It can be definitely stated that, without full control and exploitation of Manchurian resources, China's industrial development will be retarded until such time as technology can provide substitutes for coal and iron and for present methods of surface transportation. Under such circumstances, it would appear that China can remain in the foreseeable future a major power only in theory, and that, with Japan reduced to a third-rate power, no balance of power will exist in Asia. The only bars to Russian expansion at the expense of China in this event, will be Russian good will, thus far not prominently in evidence, United Nations censure, and the checks

exercised by the United States or a combination of powers including the United States.

6. *Manchuria in relation to the United States.*—Although the United States is attempting to maintain its position as respects the Open Door Policy in Manchuria, as in the remainder of China, it can be assumed that trade with Manchuria will not for decades assume real importance to our economic structure except as Manchurian resources can be utilized to strengthen China, improve her standard of living, and make of her a better customer for our products. While such an eventuality would be of considerable importance, it is the benefit to China itself which is of most importance to the United States in terms of our present policy toward China and in terms of our basic interests, which appear to require an Asiatic counter-poise to Russia. At best, during the next two generations, China can exist as an Asiatic counter-poise to Russia only by grace of the support she receives from the United Nations, strongly backed by the United States, or from the United States alone. At worst, without substantial control of Manchurian resources, China may increasingly become an economic and political vacuum into which a powerful and aggressive Russia may inevitably be drawn, regardless of American deterrent action short of war.

893.00/6-346 : Telegram

The Counselor of Embassy in China (Smyth) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, June 3, 1946—9 a. m.

[Received June 3—7:40 a. m.]

902. Summary M[ilitary] A[ttaché's] report for period May 21 to 28:

Elements new first army entered Changchun 23 May after occupation Szupingkai 20 May and Kungchuling on 22 May. Consensus of reports indicates Communist resistance light. According newspaper reports, Central Govt. forces have continued advance north and east Changchun. Extent advance not known.

Consensus informed observers Central Govt. forces capable further advances along rail lines Manchuria without encountering serious Communist resistance. Primary consideration affecting Central Govt. advance will be ability these forces maintain lines, supply and communication north of Great Wall where Communists have capability local harassing attacks.

If Central Govt. forces continue advance Manchuria, Communists expected concentrate efforts attacking lines communication and supply and to conducting raids against Nationalist outposts. Now appears

Communist forces not capable frontal encounters Govt. troops, particularly U. S. trained, equipped units.

In southeast Jehol no important developments since Communist withdrawal from Peipiao on 18 May.

Situation Tsinan area—less tension though Communist encirclement Tehsien, Taian and Laocheng reported tightened. Chinese G-2 states Tsinan has never been in danger capture by Communists although isolation outside was threatened.

Scattered Central Govt.-Communist engagements reported from Hopei and Honan.

SMYTH

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Chou En-lai to General Marshall

MM 008

NANKING, June 3, 1946.

I. With the Manchurian situation taking a turn and the China proper situation undergoing further deterioration, the overall picture of China has entered a most critical stage. These circumstances are basically brought about by the non-observance of the Cease-Fire-Agreement on part of the Government, which is mainly expressed in the following three aspects:

A. Illegal movement of troops amounting to 106 army divisions:

According to incomplete data published by Yen-an Headquarters, which covers the period between January 13 and May 14, movement of Nationalist troops, each time of a scope larger than one division, involves altogether 37 armies (106 divisions), comprising a total of 1,200,000 men. (For details please refer to MM 005.⁶⁴) Such intense movement was chiefly accomplished through full exploitation of the transportation facilities. Had such action been duly investigated and corrected by Executive Headquarters and the field teams, they would never have gone so far. And if investigations were made without taking effective measures for correction, then events like what happened in Jehol would inevitably arise, where the Nationalists have moved three divisions (the 5th Division of the 94th Army, the 89th Division of the 13th Army, the 195th Division of the 52nd Army) to Manchuria, despite explicit order of Executive Headquarters prohibiting and stopping such actions. Based upon such large-scale movement the Nationalists were massing troops to strategical keypoints around the Communist areas and entered into positions most favorable for launching an all-out attack against them (e.g. around the Communist area in North-Kiangsu the Nationalists massed 11 army units

⁶⁴ Not printed.

to the northern bank of the Yangtze River and the southern section of the Tsinpu railway, and another 6 army units at Hsuchow ($117^{\circ}30' - 34^{\circ}20'$). Around the Communist area in Hupeh they massed 11 army units. Along the northern bank of the Yellow River and the railway section between Hsinhsiang ($113^{\circ} 55' - 35^{\circ} 20'$) and Anyang ($114^{\circ} 19' - 36^{\circ}06'$) they also massed 4 army units.) The purpose of this troop massing is that they may under the pretext of opening up communications strike out for the Communist-controlled railway sections, and lay a firm hold upon the supply veins all over the country.

B. Illegal assault and encroachment on Communist territories by means of which they seized 19 cities and 2099 townlets and villages up to the end of April:

Data covering the period between January 13 and April 30 evidenced that the Nationalist troops have altogether laid 3,511 assaults on Communist territories, seized 2,099 townlets and villages, and 19 cities (during the month May they seized another five towns in China proper alone), and inflicted 33,000 casualties upon the Communist military and civil personnel. Inasmuch as those cities and townlets largely lie off the railway line, their seizure did not arouse so much alarm among the public and the neutrals. For this reason disputes over such issues were much dragged out, making the investigation the more difficult. (Example: The armed conflicts in Tingyuan area ($117^{\circ}30' - 32^{\circ}30'$) and in East Honan.) If investigation were made, it happens mostly that either the conflicts by then are over, or the conditions have been much changed. (Example: The armed conflicts in Nantung area ($120^{\circ}51' - 32^{\circ}00'$) and at Hsiaohsien ($117^{\circ}10' - 34^{\circ}10'$) and Hsiayi ($116^{\circ}20' - 34^{\circ}20'$.) Even if any conclusion were drawn after investigation, those conclusions would generally fall under two classifications: If the Nationalist troops had captured a place through attack, they were generally ordered to cease advance, maintain their position, and avoid further conflict (such as in Shansi, Hupeh, and Peiping-Tientsin area); on the other hand, if the Communist troops had recovered or in their counter-offensive taken a place, they however were generally ordered to evacuate that place (such as at Chienping city in Jehol ($119^{\circ}18' - 41^{\circ}50'$), at Nantung ($120^{\circ}51' - 32^{\circ}00'$) and along the northern section of the Tientsin-Pukow railway), and that place is marked as a neutral zone. Such unfair readjustment helps, rather than checks, the incessant attack of the Nationalist troops.

C. Illegal erection of new blockhouses:

Under varied excuses the Nationalist troops are not only blocking the reopening of communications by refusing to tear down the blockhouses and fortifications, but went even a step further by vigorously erecting new blockhouses. Thus there are over 6,000 blockhouses all-

told around the Communist area in Hupeh. The American member of team 23 at Yucheng recently also witnessed the erection of new fortifications at Yenchow, Shantung ($116^{\circ}50'-35^{\circ}35'$). Evidently such actions are aimed to mutilate and lay a heavy blockade upon the Communist areas, so as to provide every facility for the Nationalist troops to launch individual attack against the Communists.

II. In reply to your OSE 86 and the enclosed memorandum of General Hsu Yung-chang,⁶⁵ it is necessary first to reach clarification on the relation between cause and effect of the foregoing subject, as well as on the sequence of events taking place in the various places, before a procedure of settlement can be found out.

1. *Jehol situation.* For the reason that orders of Executive Headquarters failed to stop the movement of three Nationalist divisions from Jehol, the Communist troops thereupon chose to wreck the railways themselves in order to succeed in stopping their movement. Right now the Nationalists are massing heavy forces at Shanhaikwan, Suichung ($120^{\circ}21'-40^{\circ}20'$), and Fuhsin ($121^{\circ}36'-42^{\circ}09'$), with a view to launch vehement attack on Communist troops at Chengteh ($117^{\circ}50'-40^{\circ}56'$).

2. *Teams 11, 26 and 2.* By now team 11 at Chengteh has resumed work, and Communist representatives to team 26 at Chaoyang, and team 2 at Chihfeng have arrived to join the work of the respective teams.

3. *Situation in Peiping-Tientsin sector.* After the Nationalist troops have seized Antze ($116^{\circ}40'-30^{\circ}25'$) and Hsiangho ($117^{\circ}00'-39^{\circ}50'$), hostilities are yet spreading eastward. Though team 25 has been despatched, the Nationalist representative is still blocking team's movement to Antze and Hsiangho for investigation. So far the actual fact has not been established as yet.

4. *Potou ($116^{\circ}32'-38^{\circ}15'$) and Fengchiakou ($116^{\circ}45'-38^{\circ}10'$).* The puppet troops in this area commenced to break the agreement by attacking the Communist Peace Preservation Corps at Chiaoho; they further murdered the captives and insulted the truce team members. On seeing that protests produced no positive result, the Communist forces were forced to take to self-defense. The puppet troops then abandoned Potou and Fengchiakou, and fled to Tsangchow ($116^{\circ}50'-38^{\circ}20'$).

5. *Shihchiachuang ($114^{\circ}25'-38^{\circ}05'$).* On April 15 and 18, Communist members of team 12 were twice detained by the Nationalist troops. When the protest met no response, the Communist representative withdrew to Peiping awaiting a settlement.

6. *East Honan.* The Nationalists at first refused to recognize the existence of Communist troops in the East Honan sector; subsequently

⁶⁵ Neither printed.

they launched vehement attacks against them. Team 10, which went there for investigation, returned to its base without any result. The Communist troops being forced to take up self-defense thereupon cut off the supply line of the attacking Nationalists and heavily besieged Tungming ($115^{\circ}05' - 35^{\circ}20'$) and Yungnien ($114^{\circ}43' - 36^{\circ}40'$) cities, as a result of which the puppet troops within the Tungming city eventually surrendered.

7. *Hsiaohsien and Hsiayi area.* The Nationalist troops stationed at Hsuchow ($117^{\circ}34' - 34^{\circ}20'$) and Tangshan ($116^{\circ}30' - 34^{\circ}30'$) on the Lunghai line occupied Communist-held Hsiaohsien ($117^{\circ}20' - 34^{\circ}15'$) and Hsiayi ($116^{\circ}25' - 34^{\circ}25'$), inflicting heavy losses upon the Communist troops. The Nationalist representative to team 4 however resisted any investigation up to this date.

8. *Tsaochuang affairs.* The puppet troops at Tsaochuang inflicted heavy wounds upon the Communist representative and interpreter. So far no satisfactory reply has been received to the demands raised by the Communists.

9. *Liaocheng ($115^{\circ}58' - 36^{\circ}28'$) affairs.* When team 7 of Tsinan was delivering relief supplies to Liaocheng, a smuggled secret order issued by Nationalist Shantung Governor Ho Ssu-yuan to the puppet troops garrisoning Liaocheng, along with a large sum of money, was detained by the Communist troops. Arrangement for releasing the seized supplies is underway.

10. *The conflicts at Hsiaohaichen and Kwanyinshan near Nantung ($121^{\circ}00' - 32^{\circ}00'$).* The two places were initially wrested away by the Nationalist troops from the Communists, then the Communist troops on being forced to launch counter-attack repelled the former. Now the Communist troops voluntarily withdrew from those two places. If the Nationalist troops would promise not to set foot upon those places again, the Communist side would be glad to contemplate, whether those places should be marked as neutral zone, ungarrisoned by troops of either side or not.

11. *The conflicts at Tingyuan ($119^{\circ}35' - 32^{\circ}28'$).* Nothing was accomplished to meet the request that a team be despatched to conduct investigation on the spot, and that the status as of January 13 be restored. At this moment the conflagration is still spreading, and the situation is becoming very grave. Team is not yet despatched.

12. *The situation in Hupeh area.* The movement of Nationalist troops and their incessant clashes with the Communist troops in early May caused the Committee of Three to reach a new agreement with respect to that area. Right now the Communist area in Hupeh to the west of the Pinghan railway track is again being attacked.

13. *Attack in Kwangtung.* The Communist troops in Kwangtung are spread over scattered areas, and the communication with them

is extremely difficult. The Nationalist troops by taking advantage of the delayed arrival of the sub-teams are launching raids all over the places upon the Communist troops, forcing the latter further to decentralize themselves. Then they went over to charge the latter as being disturbing the populace and breaking the agreement. This action serves no other purpose than to prevent the Communist troops from assembling according to schedule, and obstruct their northward movement.

14. *Suppression of New China News Agency.* Shortly after Executive Headquarters is established, the three sides agreed that press reports pertinent to Executive Headquarters and field team activities shall be issued in the form of joint communiqué through the channels of Central News Agency, New China News Agency and USIS. Now the military and police authorities in Peiping unexpectedly closed down the Peiping branch of the New China News Agency at short notice under the pretext that the agency is illegal. This is only another instance of agreement violation.

Judging from the foregoing facts, one comes easily to the conclusion, that the Communist Party cannot be held responsible for the aforementioned incidents. Under such circumstances it is evident that unless the fighting in Manchuria be stopped without delay, and an early overall settlement be reached, the armed conflicts all over China proper are liable to spread up, rather than be diminished, precipitating eventually a nation-wide conflagration. Therefore I still maintain the position, that only an unconditional truce in Manchuria plus the immediate despatch of an advanced detachment of Executive Headquarters to Changchun and the prompt execution of March 27 Directive may help to bring about the termination of hostilities in China proper. Will you kindly let me know your comments on the foregoing?

Yours faithfully,

[Signature in Chinese]

CHOU EN-LAI

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai at 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, June 3, 1946, 10:15 a. m.

Also present: Colonel Caughey
Mr. Chang
Captain Soong

General Chou opened the meeting by asking General Marshall if he had heard when the Generalissimo was coming back.

General Marshall said the Generalissimo would be back today.

General Chou stated that he would like first to inform General Marshall of a few items. General Chou had learned that the Generalissimo would call a conference of many generals, some of whom have arrived, including General Chang Fa Kwei⁶⁶ and others. The date had not yet been fixed. It was to be held as soon as the Generalissimo returned. This conference would deal with military questions. Apart from that, there would be a food conference to discuss the problem of collecting food for war purposes. At the military conference, the generals would feel that the National troops had crushed the Communist troops in Manchuria and hence would want to carry on the war instead of stopping it. They intended to seize such places as Tsitsihar, Harbin and Antung, etc., so as to control all railway lines and large cities.

With regard to China proper, at first it had been felt that Americans would stop the fighting. Whenever hostilities took place, Americans would intervene. Since April and May, fighting, especially in Manchuria, has become vigorous. When the Kuomintang occupy a place, they leave no trace behind that the Communists had been there. After occupying it, they stop further attack and then try to prove that the place was never occupied by Communists. This tactics had become rather effective for Americans, upon finding such a situation, would leave without further investigation. Under such circumstances, Communist forces feel that they can not stop resisting in Manchuria. The Kuomintang are continuing their attacks after the capture of Changchun. Recently at Anshan, the Communists routed one National division of the 60th Army. The Communists then occupied Anshan down to Yingkow including Haishun and Daishu-chan on the railway line.

Coming to China proper, if the original plan of the Government troops was pursued then the Communists cannot give up resistance.

General Marshall asked **what was meant by the original plan.**

General Chou said their method of procedure. The Generalissimo was deliberately delaying his return by staying in Manchuria and then Peiping. This delay makes the situation only more complicated. The Generalissimo seems to be awaiting the fall of Harbin. If the Generalissimo cannot wait that long, then he should return anyway. The Generalissimo's action showed that he was not working toward the cessation of hostilities.

General Chou asked General Marshall if he could take some of his time to have a rather lengthy discussion.

General Marshall replied that he could take all day.

General Chou said that because he had consulted with General Marshall for five months, he had full confidence in him. Therefore,

⁶⁶ From Kwangtung.

he wanted to tell General Marshall frankly of his thoughts and of the points which he does not fully understand. He wanted to talk to General Marshall not only as a negotiator, but also as a friend. His purpose was to have General Marshall understand what he was thinking and what efforts he was making. He hoped that the records would not be published unless agreed by both sides.

The first point was about American policy. After two months, he had come to the following comprehension. The American Government is carrying on a double-policy toward China. General Marshall was responsible for the good side. This bright side included the policy left behind by President Roosevelt which looked toward cooperation in the whole world, as well as China; President Truman's statement⁶⁷ before General Marshall's departure; and the Moscow communiqué of last December.⁶⁸ These documents served as a basis for General Marshall's mission to China. After arrival in China, General Marshall had actually carried out this documented policy and had reaped large success.

General Chou said he would next speak about the gloomy side. In the Pacific, the U. S. has now made military dispositions. In China, they actively helped the Kuomintang before the Chinese Government was democratized. After victory over Japan, the U. S. still assisted the Kuomintang by providing supplies which were not for the purpose of fighting the Japanese any more. Troops were sent to North China and recently to Manchuria. If only 5 armies had been sent to Manchuria to take over sovereignty, they could still agree to its acceptability. However, even though Soviet troops had evacuated in the middle of April, two additional armies were sent up there—the 60th Army and 93rd Army. He had received further reports saying that the 53rd and 5th Armies are also to be sent to Manchuria but are waiting for shipment.

General Marshall asked if that was the 5th Army.

General Chou repeated that it was the 5th Army, now located near Shanghai. Right now, war supplies in Manchuria were ample enough to last for another three months of war. These supplies were of course sent up by the U. S. Navy. In Manchuria, airplanes had been used extensively. Even the Kuomintang claimed that the bombings had been successful. These planes undoubtedly were handed over to the Kuomintang through lend lease—also fuel. Civil war in China had not yet been stopped. The U. S. Navy has sent two fleets to China, one stationed at Chinwangtao and the other at Tsingtao, and has furnished

⁶⁷ December 15, 1945; *United States Relations With China*, p. 607.

⁶⁸ Department of State *Bulletin*, December 30, 1945, p. 1027.

the Chinese Navy with vessels, though the Ministry of Defense is completely controlled by the Kuomintang.

There were incidents in which the U. S. Marines at Chinwangtao and the Peiping-Tientsin sectors had been provocative. Last November, Marines bombarded a Communist village in East Hopeh. General Wedemeyer⁶⁹ expressed his regret over that matter, but General Rockey⁷⁰ denied that fact. Recently, on May 17th, U. S. Marines again dashed to the outskirts of Tientsin to start provocations by hurting several people in the Communist area there.

General Chennault,⁷¹ on his way back to the United States, declared at Pearl Harbor that the Chinese Communist problem should be resolved by force. The U. S. Navy was still cooperating with General Tai Li's office⁷² and was continuing to supply the Tai Li units. All these circumstances if viewed objectively tend to encourage the Kuomintang to wage civil war. If the Kuomintang received such assistance and felt that it was backed up, it would fear nothing.

General Chou at that juncture expressed his gratification that the loan and relief supplies are under control of General Marshall. Therefore some pressure could be exerted upon the Kuomintang. Even so, relief supplies for the Communist liberated areas are six-tenths of one per cent of the total supplies, despite the fact that the population of the Communist area has suffered most during the years of the Japanese occupation and have suffered damage amounting to over 50% of the total damage in China. Right now in CNRRA, the Chinese office of UNRRA, there is almost no Communist representative at all.

Therefore during the last two months, he gradually became puzzled due to the fact that while General Marshall was working for both sides, other elements believe in arguments of the Kuomintang. Thus the Kuomintang is able to take advantage of American assistance to enlarge the civil war. Under such circumstances, American policy had become a double policy which made it difficult to stop civil war. Some elements in China are even attempting to make this civil war overture for another world war.

General Marshall said the first portion of his comment would be devoted to the period since his arrival in China last mid-December. In the first place, he would like General Chou to know most confidentially that the U. S. Government had issued no instructions to him of any

⁶⁹ Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, then Commanding General, U. S. Forces, China Theater.

⁷⁰ Maj. Gen. Keller E. Rockey, Commanding General, U. S. Marines in China.

⁷¹ Maj. Gen. Claire L. Chennault, wartime Commanding General, 14th Air Force (China).

⁷² Secret police organization of the Chinese Government.

kind whatsoever since his arrival out here. At the same time he had only communicated with the Government on a very few occasions. The situation has been so complicated and so intricate that he had avoided confusing them by frequent reports and they had not asked General Marshall any questions. Actually he had made no recommendation to the Government since he came to China.

His reports outlined the facts as he saw them and what he had done in the light of those facts. The President had not always even acknowledged General Marshall's messages. Since General Marshall's return to Chungking in April he had sent the President only two or three messages; ⁷³ he thought two, and the last was the night before the Generalissimo departed for Mukden. The President had not acknowledged that message and General Marshall had asked no questions. The message merely stated the facts as he saw them in order that the President not be completely ignorant of what was going on. This should make it plain to General Chou that whatever errors there had been in the procedure since his arrival in China, were his errors and not the Government's, though the Government had to be held responsible.

General Marshall discussed American equipping, training and arming of the Central Government troops next. The decision to arm, equip and train 39 divisions was made early in 1944 while General Marshall was Chief of Staff. The decision was made to facilitate military operations against the Japanese. The capture of Canton was to permit the entry of supplies by ship into China.

The United States had been exhausting itself transporting a small amount of material over the Hump into Kunming. To lift a few tons of supplies, the United States was using a tremendous number of planes which were sorely needed to help terminate the war in Europe. It was a difficult decision for the United States. The equipping and training of Chinese divisions took a great amount of shipping and many officers which could ill be spared. However, the United States was willing to ship the materiel to China if they had a reasonable guarantee that the material would be used efficiently. It would probably have not been used that way unless Americans supervised the training.

That decision of the American Government was concurred in by the British Chiefs of Staff, who were deeply interested in equipment, and was transmitted to the Soviet authorities in Moscow. The Soviet Government was also demanding great masses of materiel from the United States and were therefore interested in what we gave China.

⁷³ Telegrams Nos. 651, May 6, p. 815; 740, May 22, p. 881; and 776, May 26, p. 902.

Similarly, the British wanted large amounts of American material and hence were interested parties to the transaction. That explained the basis for the reorganization, the armament, the supply and the training of the 39 Central Government divisions which were called Alpha divisions to distinguish them from the poorer Government divisions.

Now, to meet the present Communist attacks on him and those of Dr. Lo, (head of the Democratic League now making public attacks) would have meant that in 1944, the U. S. should have stipulated to the Chinese Government who were committing themselves to their army being equipped with American equipment, that in the event of a civil war, that Government should disarm its troops and render itself helpless; that it should disband the troops that happened to have been trained by American assistance. Frankly, that to him was nonsense, but it was very good propaganda, he recognized that.

General Marshall said there was one point that he had not covered and that was the lend lease item that General Chou spoke about. It was agreed during the war that the U. S. Government would provide this equipment for 39 divisions under terms of the Lend Lease Act.⁷⁴ Deliveries had not been completed at the time of the cessation of war with Japan. The Lend Lease Act terminates legally on June 30. If delivery of that equipment had not been completed before June 30th, it could not have been delivered except by direct purchase at a very heavy cost to the Chinese. So the effort was made to complete deliveries before the legal expiration of the Lend Lease Act and those deliveries were largely completed more than a month ago.

The procedure had nothing whatever to do with the civil war. As a matter of fact, the last deliveries were very difficult because of lack of shipping and lack of American soldiers to load supplies. Arrangements were made at the time an agreement had been reached for the reorganization and integration of the armies of China. What had occurred since then was another matter. One doesn't start and stop operations of such magnitude like water coming out of the faucet. It was on a schedule that required months to prepare.

General Marshall repeated again that that was accomplished at the time of the Reorganization Agreement.⁷⁵ He just happened to think of the fact that one great difficulty would be to obtain additional equipment needed for the 10 Communist divisions not in the original 39. General Marshall had made a very special effort to get, without delay, equipment needed for the Kalgan school. This school did not come into our plans in 1944, but did enter decidedly into

⁷⁴ Approved March 11, 1941; 55 Stat. 31.

⁷⁵ February 25, p. 295.

his consideration of the financial basis which would result from a delay beyond June 30. In those matters, he had gone ahead on a broad basis of the future establishment of the armies in China, but that the Communists did not consult him when they attacked Changchun. General Tu Li Ming⁷⁶ did not consult him when he conducted his operations north, and certainly the propaganda agencies did not discuss with him the various factors concerned.

General Marshall next discussed the naval question that General Chou had mentioned—primarily the supply of the armies in Manchuria and the transportation of troops to Manchuria. He said that the President in his public statement of American policy towards China referred, as he recalled, directly to the fact that the U.S. Government would undertake to assist the Central Government by transporting troops to Manchuria. That was a public statement. There was no question at that time of a war in Manchuria. It was an agreement to assist the Central Government to establish its troops in Manchuria. The United States was an ally of the Government under existing agreements and the agreements were entered into as an ally.

In his first month in China, December and January last, he became involved in the question of the Chinese Navy and Chinese naval and coastal shipping. Those questions had to be settled very promptly. Otherwise the shipping would have been disposed of elsewhere or decommissioned in the United States. His first effort was directed toward the Central Government's desire to acquire a rather large naval force considering the circumstances, including, he thought, 6 cruisers. General Marshall thought of their inability to maintain them and of their terrific cost to China. He then persuaded them not to have any cruisers. He also dissuaded them from having destroyers and persuaded them to take destroyer escorts, a smaller vessel suitable to coastwise work and protection against pirates. General Marshall said he also persuaded them to concentrate on small vessels that could serve their purpose better in the large rivers of China. If not arranged at an early date, then vessels would have been sold or decommissioned in the United States. It would be difficult and expensive to recommission them and bring them back to China.

General Marshall stated that the Chinese could not receive the vessels until they had training in their operation. Ships were complicated affairs; mechanically, electrically, etc. He persuaded the Navy to establish a school at Tsingtao to train sufficient men to take over ships from the American crews. Those decisions came during January and early February. If things were to be done for further rehabilitation of China, they had to be done then or not at all because demobilization of American forces would not permit delays.

⁷⁶ Gen. Tu Yu-ming, Chinese commander in Manchuria.

General Marshall told these details so General Chou could see that this American program for rehabilitation of China was a matter of doing something or not doing it. This choice came at a time when apparently there was to be an accord and general cooperation. General Marshall made a tremendous effort, almost more effort than for anything else, to deliver Chinese coastal and river shipping, because without that, they could not reopen the country. He also tried to get for China material for the reconstruction of the railroads and factories to get shipments of food that would relieve the hardships on the population and restore something like a normal life, etc.

General Marshall said two questions were involved. The first was the terms on which shipping might be acquired, terms which had to be related to the distressing financial situation in China. The second was the availability of river shipping because river shipping was in great demand elsewhere in the world. Therefore, if China was to receive a reasonable quantity of river shipping, they had to act rapidly. He succeeded in "freezing" our surplus coastal shipping all over the world until China had a chance to see if they could reach a basis of agreement. Incidentally, he then became involved in a change of a U. S. law which still has them in difficulty. Because of its tremendous importance to the rehabilitation of China, he had gone ahead for China, and the Kuomintang and the Communist Party each seemingly had gone ahead for civil war—that was about the way the situation rides.

General Marshall said at the present time, as nearly as his information stated which he would check immediately with Admiral Cooke,⁷⁷ he did not think there was any Naval shipping being used for the supply of the armies in Manchuria. Supplies were being hauled largely by Liberty ships which had been turned over to the Chinese Government and which were manned by Chinese crews. Most of those ships were engaged in hauling coal from Chinwangtao to Shanghai, Nanking and Hankow. He did not know how many LST's the Chinese had but it was some small number which he thought was 8 and which was determined entirely by the lack of trained crews. Most of Admiral Cooke's LST's had been sent back to the U. S. or turned over to UNRRA. LST's Admiral Cooke now controlled are employed either in surveys or in hauling supplies up the Yangtze. One Navy LSM is being sent to Chungking. Navy ships are hauling UNRRA supplies to help out UNRRA which had not been able to get trained crews.

General Marshall recognized in General Chou's statement on three months supplies in Manchuria, something he had talked to Dr. Lo about day before yesterday. **What he talked about was a purely**

⁷⁷ Adm. Charles M. Cooke, Jr., Commander, U. S. 7th Fleet.

normal military measure. Any force which was sea-based and didn't accumulate supplies was not deserving the name of military force; it would be suicide not to. Dr. Lo thought that if one stopped what he thought was the American Navy transporting supplies to Manchuria, that would stop the war in Manchuria. General Marshall tried to explain to Dr. Lo that they had a reserve in Manchuria for several months, maybe as much as three months—he didn't know; that it was a normal procedure; and that if a military leader was so ignorant of the requirements of logistics of war that he did not accumulate supplies for a reasonable reserve, he was not a qualified commander.

General Marshall said that apropos of what he had just said, this morning he received a message which repeated a Soviet press statement charging much the same thing Dr. Lo was. He therefore had directed Colonel Hutchin to contact Admiral Cooke and confirm his impression of what the U. S. naval shipping situation was at present. He had just this moment received a reply. "No naval ships are carrying Government troops or supplies to Manchuria. No naval ships are transporting Nationalists along the coasts. Admiral Cooke now has only 10 LST's. Two are being held to pick up Communists at Mirs Bay near Kowloon and eight are on the Yangtze hauling UNRRA supplies."

General Marshall said General Chou made reference to the U. S. position in the Pacific. The implication of that statement was not clear. However, he would state that the United States had demobilized to a degree no other nation had even approached; to the point of a declared weakness that had greatly handicapped the American Secretary of State in his various negotiations. American people were now turning the other way and saying that their insistence on rapid demobilization of the Army had been unwise. In the Philippines, most U. S. troops were moved out and with the Declaration of Independence next July 4, the United States would have few troops left there.

General Marshall said the U. S. had greatly reduced their forces in Japan. One reason the Chinese Government was encouraged to send a division there was to relieve the U. S. of the burden of having to keep so many American troops there. The U. S. had acted similarly regarding Britain and Australia. These countries now had troops in Japan which had relieved some American troops who were then sent home. The U. S. Fleet had been three-fourths demobilized. For the U. S. to spend billions and to suffer some 3 or 400,000 casualties in order to wrest control of the Western Pacific from the Japanese, then to expect the U. S. to completely vacate that region was even more silly than the American people usually were in such international matters. The U. S. had no secrets; foreigners could travel anywhere

and see anything. As General Chou well knew, that was far from the case elsewhere.

General Marshall next discussed the Marines. For awhile, he had been trying to move the Marines out of China, but to his mind it was not logical to remove them and leave almost a vacuum at a time when aggressive action by Communist forces was plainly imminent. It was a reasonable proposition for the Central Government to ask to replace Marine units at critical points. In the present state of affairs, Communist forces could not be depended upon to carry out any mission or order from the Central Government. General Chou had made his own answer to that, General Marshall said. General Marshall had caused the orders to be issued and the schedule for ship sailings prepared for the evacuation of Marines. But at present, if Marines do not guard the railway to the coal mines, the coal supply of Shanghai, Nanking and Hankow would almost certainly cease in a very short time. General Marshall knew something of these conditions for he had guarded that line and those mines himself for three years⁷⁸ against continuous attacks, largely by bandits. The purpose of protection at that time was to see that the Embassies in Peiping had a safe access to the sea in case of trouble.

With reference to the U. S. Navy, it had been in China waters for nearly 50 years or more, ever since the U. S. had an Asiatic Fleet. It had been based as a rule in Manila but usually spent four months off Chefoo and Shanghai in summer seasons. That had gone on for many years. At the present time it had the task of moving some 10 to 15,000 Japanese a day from China to Japan. Control of that was in the hands of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, who is General MacArthur, and it was carried out under the terms of the Allied agreement.

With relation to other American activities in China which reflected the policy of the U. S. Government—he referred to the Military Advisory Group⁷⁹ which is established in Nanking of which General McClure⁸⁰ was the head—that was established at the request of the Chinese Government made almost a year ago. It had not yet been formally approved by the U. S. Government, that is authorization for that group had not yet cleared Congress.

The group was established prior to completion of Congressional action, to assist in avoiding confusion in reorganization of the Chinese forces. One of their first efforts is reflected in the announcement of the reorganization of the Ministry of National Defense which was

⁷⁸ 1924-27.

⁷⁹ For correspondence on this subject, see vol. x, pp. 810 ff.

⁸⁰ Maj. Gen. Robert B. McClure, Deputy Commanding General, Nanking Headquarters Command, and temporarily head of the Army Advisory Group.

in line with U. S. policy regarding the position of the army in a democracy as the servant of the people and not the oppressor. It represented the idea of the control of the civil over the military. The Advisory Group had also been working on preparations for various schools including the details of the school for Communist units that General Chou had discussed. General Marshall said it was not possible for him and two staff officers alone to do all those things. Therefore he passed those burdens to the M. A. G. to work on. He set the organization up before authorization was received, to meet a practical requirement in accordance with the agreed plan for the reorganization of the armies of China.

With reference to General Chou's comment about the five armies in Manchuria, General Gillem⁸¹ had made a lengthy statement about that with which he concurred. The five armies referred to the ultimate arrangement 18 months from the time of reorganization. Actually the present Manchurian armies did not equal the strength authorized for the five armies in the plan to be in place 18 months later.

General Marshall said that as to UNRRA, he was not aware that such a small percentage was being received by the Communists. He would inquire about the amount of six-tenths of one per cent and see if that was correct and then see if anything could be done about it. (Actual figure was .9 per cent.)

General Marshall said he had a message that had reached him that morning from the head of all UNRRA, Mr. LaGuardia,⁸² who was the former mayor of the city of New York, a very aggressive and plain spoken person. He explained to General Chou before he read the communication that he, General Marshall, did not agree with the procedure proposed and he would reply accordingly.

"I am informed that on May 25th there was an attack by between 50 and 100 armed men under officers on a rock quarry 50 miles west of the break in the Yellow River dike. Two air compressors were completely destroyed as well as considerable lengths of their pneumatic hose. Trucks were also damaged and 15 men and 7 officers of the Yellow River Commission were abducted. UNRRA is spending millions of dollars (incidentally, American dollars) in repairing the damage for flood prevention and relief. If it meets with your (General Marshall's) approval, I wish to tell the responsible parties where they come off if this kind of tactics is repeated. I am ready to say that I will withdraw entirely from the project unless I have assurance that sabotage, quibbling and quarreling will stop at once on this project."

⁸¹ Lt. Gen. Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., Commanding General, China Service Command.

⁸² Fiorello H. LaGuardia, Director General of United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation.

General Marshall said that when it came to statements of an individual such as General Chennault, he merely replied that General Chennault is a retired officer trying to organize an air transport fleet by a contract with UNRRA. General Chennault indulged in one of the most important freedoms asserted in a democracy—freedom of speech. Whether it was agreed to was something quite different, but every American could say what he pleased—though it might please only him. In this case, the individual was not an official of the Government. On the contrary, the President in his policy regarding China made a very clear statement of the desire and what amounted to a recommendation that would bring about what General Marshall understood the Communist Party was fighting for. That was said in the face of very violent attacks on the Communists in the U. S. by both Democrats and Republicans.

General Marshall emphasized by repeating again that [for] the American side the Government had given him no instructions beyond those when he left for China last December and he had made no recommendations to the American Government and very few reports. He had endeavored to bring about termination of hostilities, and so far as he could through his influence, the adoption of a procedure in China that was in general accordance with the statement of the President. Further, he would like to say that he recognized that recriminations and accusations were inevitable in the situation such as his and regarding the position the U.S. Government had taken.

His trouble here in China had largely consisted of his inability to get one side to believe in the sincerity of the other. In the present international situation, particularly regarding China, it was virtually impossible for other nations (he said he was using that term in a general manner) to believe in the sincerity of U. S. intentions in China. History of the United States' international efforts would rather prove their sincerity in a very plain and definite manner. The United States never took over concessions in China; returned indemnities, and now the U. S. was giving the Philippine people their freedom. The United States promised the Philippines their freedom thirty years ago and on July 4th they were going to get it, though possibly a considerable party of Filipinos would like very much to have this action somewhat delayed. From his own experience, the United States had often been foolishly idealistic internationally to their own great and ultimate disadvantage. Maybe in the long course of years, that policy would return dividends to the American people—he did not know. However, it cost them dearly at the same time Americans had to suffer every conceivable accusation regarding almost every generous action made internationally.

General Marshall, in bringing the conversation back to the present, said he had been greatly distressed and disturbed by Communist action in their attack on Changchun. He had been equally distressed and disturbed by actions of the Central Government in continuing its action beyond Changchun. His effort had been to compose the two, which was extraordinarily difficult, particularly if the integrity of his action in a middle position was questioned. He had to exercise a great deal of restraint in order to avoid terminating the possibility [of] his assistance in bringing hostilities to a close.

The Generalissimo was returning today. General Marshall's purpose was to do all in his power to bring the present situation to a conclusion. He could not manage it by radio. Frankly and confidentially, the present situation was just the reverse of two months ago when he felt that General Chou was in the position to negotiate less and less. General Marshall assumed the reason for that was largely because of the domination of Communist generals and their associates in Manchuria. He was inclined now to the belief that the same thing had just happened in Mukden—that the Generalissimo had acted to the pressure of his generals in Manchuria. General Marshall wished to assure General Chou that his best efforts would go toward terminating the fighting quickly. He could not discuss the situation until he saw the Generalissimo. He had debated going to Peiping and earlier than that going to Mukden, but other considerations made it seem advisable that he not do that as it might impair his future usefulness.

General Chou said that he appreciated General Marshall's telling him so many facts which would reduce on his part many misapprehensions on many points. Still, he would like to be made clear on certain points.

General Chou said that he did not imply anything was wrong with U. S. assisting China to fight the Japanese; nor during General Marshall's first two or three months, in assisting China to arrange shipping and the turn-over of airplanes and equipment to Chinese armies. What puzzled the Communist Party was that whenever the Kuomintang did not subscribe to American policy, the conflict immediately arose within the American policy itself.

For example, in the past, President Roosevelt decided to assist all anti-Japanese forces in China. Teaching China the ways of a democracy was a prerequisite. When that was brought before the Communist Party by General Hurley, it was fully concurred in. But when the Kuomintang objected to the establishment of a coalition government, then the U. S. immediately seemed powerless. The U. S. continued its assistance towards the Kuomintang and immediately ceased assistance to other parties which were working toward

unity of China. This appeared to the Communists as a self-contradiction of American policy.

General Chou said that from the American point of view, that policy might seem well justified because the Kuomintang is the Government recognized by the U. S. and therefore entitled to receive American assistance. Thus, before the Communist Party entered into the coalition government, the Kuomintang had the right to stop any assistance toward it. The explanation was that as long as the Kuomintang was fighting against the Japanese, assistance may be extended to it. As soon as it was not fighting against the Japanese, but entirely devoted itself to civil war, the American Government could hardly say that supplies were given for the purpose of fighting the Japanese and not for fighting a civil war. When discussing American equipment, he did not imply that it should be taken back. As General Marshall said, that was like water coming out of a faucet and there was no way to stop it. However, the U. S. held a morale power which the Kuomintang could not completely disregard.

General Chou said that coming back to the five months since General Marshall had arrived in China, during the first 3 months General Marshall had not demanded the withdrawal of anything the U. S. Government had given to China. All he demanded was the cessation of hostilities, reorganization of the army and political consultation. By virtue of that spirit, the Kuomintang felt the international demand on China as well as the morale pressure. As a result of that, General Marshall had accomplished a big success and had won the support of the Chinese people as well as the Communist Party.

When General Marshall came to China the second time, the Manchurian situation had gotten out of control and General Marshall was placed in a very difficult position. Right at that time, arrangements planned before this civil war took place were still continuing. That situation made the Communist Party feel that the working method seemed to be different from the past. For example, LST's which were handed over to the Kuomintang were previously in the hands of the U. S. Navy. If the delivery could be effected by imposing certain terms, the Kuomintang would not have so much of a free hand as it had now.

Regarding the Kalgan school, because of objection by the Kuomintang to delivering weapons to the Communists in time of civil war, it could not be opened. The American Government immediately committed itself to meet that demand. Similar things happened with relief supplies. The Government would not allow relief supplies to enter Communist areas. That means that once the hostilities are enlarged, the Communists were 100% restricted but the Kuomintang

may still receive assistance. What had been already delivered to the Kuomintang, the Communist Party did not want to cause trouble about that. What had not yet been delivered, the U. S. had the right to stop it. General Chou wished to point out that it is better not to give any help for civil war in China than to help one side. Of course when peace was restored to China everything could still be done according to the original schedule.

General Marshall said it was his recollection that General Chou said he couldn't get the Kalgan school going before 1 July. At first General McClure intended to go there. Then General Chou met General McClure and said the school would probably start around July 15th. General Chou arranged for him to meet General Chang⁸³ to discuss the matter on the Communist side. Arrangements were to be made for buildings, etc., as well as for the collection of officers and the meeting of other difficulties that would arise in connection with other aspects of the school.

General Chou said that there may have been some misunderstanding. He received a message from Kalgan saying that transportation of students would be one of the biggest problems. Only a few students could come from Yen-an and other places where airplanes were available. A large number would have to travel by foot. They had wondered whether some money could be borrowed from the Government, but in view of the present situation in Manchuria, he thought it might not be advisable to talk to the Government about the loan, particularly since he had so much complication regarding the loan in the Hopeh [*Hupeh?*] area.

General Marshall said he merely wanted to point out that interpreters for the school had been furnished transportation, even using General Gillem's personal plane. General Marshall wished General Chou would be a little more specific about the UNRRA point he raised. He didn't want the information for discussion, but for action on his part.

General Chou thought the main difficulty in connection with UNRRA in the past was the lack of contact between the Communist Party and UNRRA. For example, regarding the Yellow River business, the first he knew about it was when he talked to Mr. Todd.⁸⁴ General Chou forwarded the project to Communist authorities in the neighborhood of that area but the delay was most unfortunate. He received a letter from Mr. Todd on this matter, but since it was a letter rather than a telegram, it was a little late. He wired the people there to take action on the matter.

⁸³ Possibly Gen. Chang Yun-yi, Vice Commander of the Communist New 4th Army.

⁸⁴ Oliver J. Todd, American engineer, UNRRA adviser to the Yellow River Commission.

Mr. Todd's attitude was quite cooperative. He explained that as soon as the matter was straightened out, he would go ahead with the project. That showed the lack of contact. General Chou entertained the hope that some of his men could be stationed with UNRRA and that they would have a representative in CNRRA. They could then include Communist requests in their over-all plans. People would become familiar with the over-all plan.

In the past supplies had been detained by both parties. Dr. Tsiang⁸⁵ had also told General Chou that the Kuomintang had also detained supplies going into the Communist areas. To have a Communist representative in UNRRA would probably necessitate obtaining the permission of the Government. In the Far Eastern Conference on Food to be participated in by representatives of various countries, General Chou hoped that the Communist Party would have one representative in the Chinese delegation under the direction of Dr. Tsiang. He was just thinking about it and had not yet taken any action.

General Marshall expressed his thanks to General Chou for his presentation.

General Chou admitted that the situation had become complicated largely due to the Manchurian issue. He presumed that General Marshall would agree that during the first four months, they had done all they could to make concessions in order to reach a settlement of the Manchurian problem. Changchun was taken under circumstances that left the Communist Party no alternate course—they were forced to follow the course they took. Before April 15th, the Communists consistently promised to the Government that Changchun could be preserved until April 15th if they would only stop the fighting. The Government was unwilling to do so.

The main cause of other issues was the hostilities in Manchuria. The occupation of Changchun by the Communist troops presented a difficult problem for General Marshall. However, from the time General Marshall arrived in China the second time until the time the Communists evacuated Changchun, General Chou had consistently taken into consideration all the issues General Marshall had brought up. He had worked hard to try to secure a situation where not only would the Communist troops evacuate Changchun, but an overall agreement would be reached. For a period of one month, the Government was not willing to stop fighting before further discussion. It was not the Communists who were not willing to do so. The large problem pertaining to Manchuria since General Marshall's re-

⁸⁵ T. F. Tsiang, Director General of Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation (CNRRA).

turn until that time was still the question of cessation of hostilities. At the present time, of course, it seemed that the Government considered itself in an advantageous position. It would be difficult to convince them to stop fighting. But victory and defeat is a common phenomenon. If the fighting should be continued, the whole situation would become confused. On the Communists' part, they still maintained that fighting should be stopped. Therefore, it should not be viewed that the Communists maintain the same attitude as the Government towards continuation of civil war.

General Chou said he did not know whether apart from the point that the Government was not willing to stop the hostilities, whether General Marshall had some consideration regarding the Communist attitude toward the matter. The present attitude of the Kuomintang is that regardless of how the war comes out, they would consider that they could occupy all the large cities and the communication lines under the pretext of taking over sovereignty. General Chou said that was stated in the message sent by General Hsiung⁸⁶ and General Tu Li Ming to Executive Headquarters and also to the Committee of Three. He asked if General Marshall had received that message.

General Marshall said he had not seen it.

General Chou said he just received a copy of that message from General Hsu in Chinese and that maybe the English copy had not yet been received.

General Marshall said he would investigate to see why he had not received the message.

General Chou said the message from General Hsiung and General Tu Li Ming was dispatched when the Generalissimo was there. The Generalissimo arrived there on the 23rd and the message was dispatched on May 26th.

General Marshall said General Chou spoke of two messages.

General Chou said the first was published in the paper and the second one was the message dated the 26th which said that after the capture of Changchun they should occupy Harbin, Tsitsihar, Antung and all the railway lines in Manchuria. In the past, they had stated that once the Changchun problem was straightened out, they would immediately cease fire. It now appeared to him that the Government was intending to drag out the war and to provoke a large split so as to make General Marshall's mission a failure. Once the Kuomintang is involved in war, the U. S. would help the Kuomintang and the Kuomintang was trying to get the U. S. involved in the war.

General Chou stated that the Communist attitude was entirely different from that. Communists had no intention of instigating

⁸⁶ Gen. Hsiung Shih-hui, director of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's Headquarters in Manchuria.

war or of making General Marshall's mission a failure. They hoped that General Marshall would succeed in his mission to stop fighting and to help China toward reconstruction.

The Government had another aim. They are trying to push Communists out of all railway lines. They want a firm hand on all large cities and railroads. The Kuomintang was planning to set up a provincial government which would include all parties except the Communist Party in order to obtain assistance from the United States. General Chou thought that scheme would inevitably fail because if war should be continued and they should try to control all railway lines, then the Communists would be forced to wreck those railway lines so that they would not be able to operate them. Any Government in China without the participation of the Chinese Communist Party could not be called a democratic government. It has never occurred to the Communist Party to set up a government in China without the Kuomintang.

General Chou said he would like to say a few words on the power of final decision. He had told General Marshall before that he was making every effort towards securing the power of final decision for teams conducting investigations. General Marshall had handed him a proposal⁸⁷ without asking for comments right at that moment. As General Chou had heard that the Generalissimo was coming back the next day, he decided to wait before he reported to Yen-an. He was afraid that by sending that proposal to Yen-an at that time, it might cause more misunderstanding. Later on, he learned from Dr. Lo⁸⁸ of the Democratic League that he was handed a similar copy of that proposal. Dr. Lo was told to also exert his efforts toward the adoption of that proposal so General Chou felt that he had to make a report to Yen-an.

In that regard, General Chou's point of view was somewhat different from General Marshall's. The crucial point of General Marshall's thought seemed to be that without an American representative empowered with final decision, the basic agreements in which the U. S. has also entered into, like the cease-fire agreement, the restoration of communications agreement, and the army reorganization plan, will meet with no success. If there was no such final decision, then those agreements might possibly break down in failure. Even the Democratic League, whom some people allege to be pro-Communist, are also trying to convince General Chou the [*this?*] way.

However, General Chou's thought was somewhat different. It appeared to him that it may give an appearance that the United States

⁸⁷ See draft of May 30, p. 914.

⁸⁸ Lo Lung-chi.

is taking advantage of this opportunity to secure leadership or control over China. It could be said that since the final decision has to be approved by the Committee of Three, actually that agency is empowered with the final decision. However, he had to take into consideration that past agreements have a great deal of generalities, the stipulations of which had been under much dispute. Some stipulations could be implemented one way or another. Therefore, the final decision may be of quite considerable effect. That would place Americans in a very difficult position, both in the matter of formality or in the actual implementation.

General Chou said it would make it difficult to go one way or the other, particularly as General Marshall had indicated that reactionary public opinions in America are charging General Marshall to be pro-Communist. In case some decision by the American representative was disadvantageous to the Government, they would use that as propaganda against that particular decision. In case decision was disadvantageous to the Communists, then elements sympathizing with Communists may also interpret it in the opposite way.

General Marshall said that the original proposal for the teams was General Byroade's and Mr. Robertson's. He concurred with the proposal when they submitted it to him. The next proposal was in the form of a stipulation on May 24th by the Generalissimo to the following effect: "In carrying out all three agreements, the American officers of the Executive Headquarters or teams have the determining voice and authority both in the execution and interpretation of the views held in divergence by the Government and Communist representatives."⁸⁹ General Marshall's reply to the Generalissimo on May 26th followed: "Is it your intention to give the American Commissioner at Peiping complete authority to make decisions on all matters over which opposite commissioners are in disagreement. This would facilitate matters but I feel that it is too all inclusive in effect, to place an American and consequently the American Government in the position of deciding a number of the major matters that would shortly become involved. How about restricting this final decision by Americans to specific matters such as where, when and how teams should proceed; what they should see and decisions covering local situations. Also restrict final decision by the American at Changchun regarding only all immediate arrangements and matters in Manchuria which pertain to the termination of hostilities; also at Executive Headquarters regarding matters referred to commissioners by teams and to matters pertaining to restoration of communications. In all of this, decisions regarding political matters should be excluded unless specifically stipulated by later agreement."

⁸⁹ See Madame Chiang's letter No. 1, May 24, p. 891.

Then on May 28th, the Generalissimo said the following: "Regarding the scope of the American representatives' authority of decision, I am able to appreciate the difficult position in which you find yourself and therefore I agree with your suggestion that such authority should be confined to specific matters. However, all executive matters relating to the restoration of railroad and other communications must be included in the scope of such authority."

General Marshall said that the draft he gave General Chou was merely a reduction to writing of the various things which were proposed as a stipulation by the Generalissimo and to which General Marshall took partial exception. The Generalissimo had never seen that paper and he did not give it to General Hsu until some days later. He had merely confined it to a discussion between General Chou and himself. General Marshall stated that he probably made a mistake in giving Dr. Lo a copy, knowing little of Dr. Lo's methods. Now he was pressing General Marshall as to what he thought might be done to facilitate the termination of hostilities. General Marshall said he frankly told him of two stipulations the Generalissimo had made; one as to communications and one as to the American officers.

General Marshall expressed his own embarrassment regarding the latter and also the embarrassment of the American Government. If he were committed to such an arrangement, which he would do only to facilitate the termination of hostilities and the execution of agreements, it would be a very heavy burden rather than a desire. He told Dr. Lo of the feeling that General Chou had described, a feeling which certainly existed in the ranks of Communist forces and which added to the complications. General Marshall suggested some arrangement whereby a few over-all teams might be formed with an American and no military officials, but with two civilians; one a member of the Democratic League and one a representative of the Young China Party. General Marshall had thought of that at the moment and so stated.

He explained then, that if he became involved in the stipulation of the Generalissimo's, he would of course follow the practice that he had adopted throughout the war: namely, to have an over-all inspection service to reassure him personally that everything was uniform as to the operations of the teams and that ineffective officers were removed. Otherwise, he couldn't accept such a responsibility. Hence, the suggestion of the moment in the discussion with Dr. Lo,⁹⁰ was one of merely adding responsibility to the Americans. There would be two representatives who could see for themselves that it was a fair deal throughout. Dr. Lo asked General Marshall if he could have a copy of that proposal and General Marshall had given it to him. That may

⁹⁰ See minutes of conference of June 1, p. 927.

have been an error but throughout all his efforts in China he had utilized every source he could find that might help. Some had helped and others had hurt, but that was the fortune of war.

General Chou replied that there was no trouble about General Marshall's discussing that point with Dr. Lo. In the past, the Democratic League had helped General Marshall to try to conceive some means to solve the Manchurian problem. General Chou thought they were trustworthy fellows.

General Chou said he wanted to clear up two things. The first was that before this draft was shown to Dr. Lo, he had not transmitted it to Yen-an because he planned to discuss various points again with General Marshall. [Day before?] Yesterday, it was shown to Dr. Lo. General Chou had to consider the possibility that it might be known to more people and therefore some public discussion might take place. General Chou told Dr. Lo that he hoped the draft would not be circulated among too large a group of people.

The second point was that General Chou thought such a stipulation might put Americans in a difficult position. It was a very sharp maneuver on the part of the Generalissimo. The Generalissimo had repeatedly stated in the past that he did not believe in all that General Marshall was doing and even predicted that the mission might prove a failure. The Generalissimo would rather use other means, even force.

A question to be brought up again was the cessation of hostilities. In event American actions proved suitable to the Kuomintang, it would inevitably cause opposition from the Communist Party. The Generalissimo could then place you [General Marshall] and the Communist Party in opposition to each other. In event American actions favor the Communists, then it would raise opposition from the Kuomintang. Inevitably, General Marshall would reach a point where work could not be continued. Actually, of course, it seemed rather evident that the second possibility was unlikely to occur for action would be advantageous to the Communists. Communists officers are not well acquainted with dubious methods of procedure while the Kuomintang is. The Kuomintang would be able to conceive all kinds of ways to deceive the Americans and lead them into a trap.

Eventually, the Generalissimo may succeed in placing the Americans in opposition to the Communists. They had already issued a false document saying that the Central Committee of the Communist Party had issued on March 12, a four-point instruction saying that no more negotiations and compromises would be made with the Kuomintang by the Communists. That document had been published by the Central News and was printed in both Chinese and American papers.

General Chou cited two instances to prove the falsehood of the docu-

ment. On March 15, he made a big concession with regard to the draft constitution. Even Dr. Lin Fo⁹¹ called that one of the major concessions of the Communist Party. The same evening, General Chou expressed agreement with General Chang Chih Chung⁹² that National troops could take over the section between Mukden and Changchun. The draft he prepared was still in the hands of General Chang. If instructions had been issued on March 12, as publicized by the Central News, then how could General Chou have made those concessions.

General Chou said it had been stated that Communists were trying to rupture the relationship between the Kuomintang and the United States. All they had said was that no assistance should be given to the Kuomintang whenever it was for civil war purposes. On the other hand, the Kuomintang was trying to push the Communists into such a position that if they objected to that proposal, then it would imply that they were against the Americans. He knew that the proposal was actually from the Generalissimo. Therefore he had no intention to do so at all.

He believed that the U. S. was in an advantageous position in China. The United States had won the overwhelming sympathy of the Chinese people who believe that the U. S. is working for peace and democracy. This political advantage might facilitate reconstruction of China and General Marshall's efforts toward peace. Under such circumstances, the Chinese Communist Party is able to cooperate with the United States.

He hoped General Marshall would use his political advantages wisely. It was not advisable to throw the issue of final decision into open discussion and thereby push the Communists into the position of being the opponent of that proposition. That might prove a hindrance to the cessation of hostilities. Under such conditions, cease fire could be transformed into an issue of final decision. That would divert attention from the main goal which was the point that the Generalissimo was striving after. Since the principle of unanimous agreement was first brought up by General Marshall, he hoped that principle could be adhered to as had been specified in the cease-fire agreement. The question was brought up because past disputes between the Kuomintang and Communists had blocked progress of cease fire, restoration of communications and army reorganization agreements. If hostilities could be stopped, then the main root of the trouble was taken away.

General Chou stated that the Communists have never imposed any conditions precedent to an agreement, whether it was advantageous

⁹¹ Sun Fo, President of the Chinese Legislative Yuan.

⁹² Then representative of the Chinese Government on the Committee of Three.

or disadvantageous to them. The Kuomintang side imposed certain terms or they tried to drag out the settlement unless conditions were imposed.

General Chou said that once he saw proposals raised by General Marshall were compatible with the actual situation, he readily accepted all of them. However, he said, it could not be expected that the lower ranks could grasp the meaning to the same extent because they lacked that kind of experience. Therefore, he said, he felt sure that if the dealing of the Americans were indeed impartial, proposals would meet the approval of the Communist side. After final decision, if American friends show true cooperative spirit, they would succeed in settling problems and making investigations. There were many things vested in the hands of the Americans that would help reach solutions. General Chou thought disagreements in the past were purely caused by the Manchurian situation. This is the effect rather than the cause. If disagreement was caused by lack of final decision, then everything would be referred to the Committee of Three. Thus there would still be endless trouble.

If the Generalissimo would agree to stop fighting and to straighten out all matters, then the number of the field teams could be increased and teams could be sent to all the trouble spots. As to what General Marshall had mentioned about setting up over-all teams including members of other parties, General Chou said he thought that was a very good idea. They should be a separate supervisory organization and not a military setup as the present field teams.

If fighting stopped, there should be close cooperation on press reports. There would be no more closing down of papers and news agencies as was the case in Peiping. Regarding the restoration of communications, General Chou stated he would take that up with General Yu Ta Wei. When fighting had stopped, the problem of demobilization would also be taken up. Though demobilization had already been undertaken, it should be publicized. The work of truce teams in China proper should be intensified. The problem entirely lies in whether they should go ahead in good faith to stop fighting or not. That was the prerequisite to everything else.

General Chou pointed out another condition that showed the Communists' sincerity. From the very beginning, Communists had welcomed the presence of the Americans in Manchuria. They had no secrets to hide. Of course, when fighting was still going on, there might be some places they would not welcome Americans while the Government had the advantage of being able to obtain assistance from the United States.

Coming to the restoration of communications, General Chou said they fully welcomed the restoration of communications. Incidentally, they had dispatched three trucks from Yen-an carrying family depend-

ents since they lacked transportation to bring them down the river. Though they had permits from the National Military Council, they were stopped. He said that showed who was obstructing the restoration of communications.

General Chou told General Marshall he intended to go to Yenan for discussion but because the Generalissimo was not yet back, General Chou decided he would wait until he had a clear idea of the Generalissimo's objections.

General Marshall thanked General Chou for his frank views. He would naturally consider the points General Chou raised. General Marshall assumed that the Generalissimo would ask to see him tonight. However, maybe he would want to talk to his own people first. After seeing the Generalissimo, General Marshall said he would like to see General Chou.

General Chou, in closing, said he wanted to bring up a minor question about money for the Kwangtung Communists. Since the Communist troops were embarking on June 10th, General Chou asked if money could be flown down and asked General Marshall if he could help arrange air transportation.

General Marshall said he would look into it and instructed Colonel Caughey to make the arrangements.

893.00/6-346 : Telegram

The Counselor of Embassy in China (Smyth) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, June 3, 1946—3 p. m.
[Received June 4—11:26 a. m.]

907. Political attacks on Kmt were intensified in Yenan broadcasts for week ending May 31 as situation became more critical in Manchuria with Nationalists capture of Changchun and continued advances northward. One broadcast carried long appeal from Democratic League for cessation of hostilities as sole means of preserving China from disaster. Appeal also demanded cessation of "double-faced U. S. policy" of furnishing arms to Kmt which no longer has any excuse for taking over Manchuria now that Soviet troops have withdrawn. Another item said Communist withdrawal from Changchun was done not from lack of strength but to test Kmt sincerity on stopping hostilities. Also reported that numerous groups in liberated areas appeal for cessation of fighting, stoppage of American arms delivery to Kmt for civil war purposes, and forcing Kmt to live up to commitments. Other items reported growing concern in independent papers over Kmt advances Manchuria; thousands students fleeing to Communist areas to escape inflation, possible starva-

tion and Kmt terror and regimentation in all schools; and a long story by a former student in Sino-American Special Service Training School in Fukien (Tai Li) on methods of training, courses followed, and indoctrination for extermination of Communists.

One broadcast quoted in full captured order to Kmt troops to begin attacking in east Hopei May 30 for purpose destroying Communists that area and cutting their lines to Manchuria. Item May 31 cited few attacks which it charged were preliminary to all-out attack.

Several items recounted closing of Peiping *Emancipation Daily* and New China News Agency May 29 by Kmt order. Paper had largest circulation any paper Peiping-Tientsin. Yen-an *Emancipation Daily* editorial charged action desperate move by Kmt to forestall its deteriorating position in all China, is linked with similar actions against other papers elsewhere, and is in line with Kmt Fascist techniques of oppression people of China. Another item reported three waves of peasant revolts, involving hundreds of thousands in north Chekiang since Jan. against oppression and extortion by Kmt officials, mostly ex-collaborators.

Economic items: Call made for bumper crops in liberated areas; 500,000 acres formerly dry land now being irrigated. 8,000 mile mail network established in liberated areas, now isolated from mail service in Kmt areas. Kmt rule, according to long article, has ruined Formosa economically. Another long article details growing economic prosperity in port of Antung under Communist leadership. Relief for Kiangsi-Anhwei border area came unexpectedly from bean and wheat harvest and Govt. relief contributions. Relief needed [badly?] in Chahar. Flood control, irrigation and reforestation work in north China since Jap surrender have saved 5 million acres from drought and flood dangers.

Dept. please repeat Moscow.

SMYTH

893.00/6-446: Telegram

*The Counselor of Embassy in China (Smyth) to the Secretary of State*⁹³

NANKING, June 4, 1946—9 a. m.

[Received 2:42 p. m.]

911. Missionaries at Ssuningkai during fighting report action desultory during major part of battle but Communists regularly suffered telling losses from Kmt artillery. Stated further indications were of Central Govt.'s complete preparations for general attack which carried

⁹³ Apparently based on telegram No. 57, May 27, from the Consul General at Mukden to the Embassy.

forward into Changchun. Communists lost front line troops at Ssupingkai but main force effected previous withdrawal. Unconfirmed is report of encirclement important Communist force north-east Ssupingkai. Newsmen's report indicates Changchun withdrawal voluntary. Tenor editorial comment and handbill addressed "Harbin Comrades" shows Kmt hope early reaching Harbin. Mukden's 57, May 27 to Embassy.

At reception given May 26 by Generalissimo and Madame Chiang for Executive Hqs and consular personnel I received impression ("I emphasize this is in main by inference from drift of conversation") that (1) Chiang feels present Kmt action Manchuria in line with Jan. 10 agreement and (2) there is no present intention replacing that agreement with new one giving Communists greater benefits or advantage. I would point out that comparatively easy successes Nationalist forces Ssupingkai and Changchun will inevitably have effect convincing Kmt that strategy of force is correct.

Aforementioned missionaries mentioned circumstance low morale on part those Ssupingkai defenders who were recent Manchurian recruits and probable that considerable vacillation and indiscipline will be discovered in ranks recent Communist recruits. Difference opinion among variegated leadership also probable. Withdrawal before Kmt forces advancing north nevertheless hardly means that Kmt victory Manchuria is assured. Communists long have followed strategy of avoiding major battles in favor conservation force with which to attack weaker points in Govt. armor. When kaoliang and other tall crops have reached man's height this summer, growth of banditry aggravated and facilitated by economic dislocations will constitute important distraction for Govt. It will thus directly as well as indirectly favor progress Communist cause in region where disorder is ancient tradition. A counter balance to Kmt success at Changchun is capture Anshan by Communists 25th.

SMYTH

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

General Marshall to Executive Headquarters, at Peiping

[CHUNGKING,] 4 June 1946.

822. The Generalissimo has agreed to the immediate establishment of an advance section of Executive Headquarters in Changchun. General Chou En-lai and I had previously recommended this action. Therefore, please proceed at once to carry out this arrangement with the understanding that the special instructions to govern the function of this advanced section will be issued later.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Marshall to General Chou En-lai

OSE 115

NANKING, June 4, 1946.

DEAR GENERAL CHOU: I have just completed a conference with the Generalissimo on his return to Nanking.

a. The Generalissimo has authorized the immediate dispatch of an advance section of Executive Headquarters to Changchun, there to get established in preparation for carrying out whatever agreements may be reached for the cessation of hostilities. The delay in his action in this particular matter was due to a mistranslation of my request on the subject.

b. The Generalissimo is willing to issue an order immediately to his armies in Manchuria to cease advances, attacks and pursuits for a period of 10 days to afford an opportunity for the Communists to complete negotiations with the Central Government regarding the following:

(1) Detailed arrangements to govern a termination of hostilities in Manchuria.

(2) Definite arrangements, including time limits, for the complete resumption of communications in China.

(3) A basis for carrying out without further delay of the agreement of February 25th for the demobilization, reorganization and integration of the armies of China.

I am issuing instructions to Executive Headquarters in Peiping to carry out *a* above. Should you wish to see me this afternoon to talk over the foregoing I am available at any time you suggest between 3:30 and 5:30—otherwise tomorrow morning.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

*General Hsu Yung-chang to General Hsiung Shih-hui, at Mukden*⁹⁴

[NANKING,] 5 June 1946.

The Executive Headquarters, Peiping, will establish a branch office in Changchun. Pending further instructions, that office shall then start functioning. In the preparatory period you should render every assistance and convenience to the said office.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Press Release Issued at Nanking on June 5

The Committee of Three has directed the movement of an advance Section of Executive Headquarters to Changchun, there to get estab-

⁹⁴ Copy transmitted to General Marshall by Brig. Gen. Peter T. K. Pee, personal aide to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

lished in preparation for carrying out whatever agreements may be reached for the cessation of hostilities. Brigadier General Henry A. Byroade will be the senior American Officer in this Advance Section. Brigadier General Thomas S. Timberman will temporarily take over General Byroade's duties in Peiping.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

*General Marshall to President Truman*⁹⁵

NANKING, 5 June 1946.

828. DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Since my message of May 26, 776, following has transpired. On May 28 Generalissimo sent me from Mukden a letter received the 30th largely repeating terms dictated in previous letter of May 24 but agreeing to my qualifications regarding power of decision of Americans, also stating that as to the method of recovering sovereignty in Manchuria Government could not abandon the taking over administration of any area but might agree to send forward, after military advances had ceased, only administrative officials and such military and police forces as would be absolutely necessary for the maintenance of local order and communications. Also he explained use of word guarantee in reference to me as meaning that in regard to all agreements in which I have participated in signing that I would set time limits for the putting into effect of such agreements and would assume the responsibility of supervision over the strict observance of such agreements on the part of the Communists. Incidentally, to what follows I have made no reference to this matter of guarantee in my negotiations with Generalissimo.

Not having received the foregoing letter on the 29th, I had Dr. T. V. Soong transmit the following message from me to the Generalissimo in Mukden.

[Here follows text as quoted in General Marshall's memorandum of May 29 to Dr. Soong, printed on page 912.]

No reply to the foregoing message having been received on May 31st I had the following message dispatched to Generalissimo in Peking where he had just arrived.

[Here follows text quoted in General Marshall's telegram No. 804, May 31, to Mr. Walter S. Robertson, printed on page 926.]

This message was sent direct by me to our American Commissioner of Executive Headquarters in Peking Walter Robertson and also through Dr. T. V. Soong. Incidentally it developed that my previous message of May 29th had missed the Generalissimo in Mukden and was therefore long delayed in delivery.

⁹⁵ Copy delivered to the Secretary of State.

Robertson on June 1st sent me the following from Generalissimo:
[Here follows text quoted in telegram No. 3371, June 1, printed on page 930.]

During the foregoing period I had continued lengthy conferences with Chou En-lai, Communist representative, including one from 10 a. m. until 4 p. m. Also lengthy meetings with Dr. Soong, representatives of Democratic League, Young China Party, a representative committee from 500 delegates to National Assembly and many others.

Generalissimo returned day before yesterday evening and I had a 3-hour conference with him yesterday morning. The following developed:

A. A misunderstanding on his part caused by a mistranslation had blocked the immediate establishment of the advanced section of Executive Headquarters in Changchun. I immediately directed its establishment.

B. The Generalissimo agrees to issue an order to his armies in Manchuria to cease advances, attacks or pursuits (in other words, aggressive action) for a period of 10 days to afford the Communist[s] an opportunity to prove their sincerity by completing negotiations with the Government during that period on the following points.

1. Detailed arrangements to govern a complete termination of hostilities in Manchuria.
2. Definite detailed arrangements, with time limits, for the complete resumption of communications in North China.
3. A basis for carrying out without further delay the agreement of February 25 for reorganization of armies.

He first stipulated one week in which to complete these negotiations, but I insisted that would be impossible. He finally agreed to a period of 10 days. He stated to me, most confidentially, that this would be his final effort at doing business with the Communists, that the present indeterminate situation with communications blocked, coal barely obtainable in sufficient quantities, cities starving could not be endured economically or otherwise, that all-out war would be preferable.

I saw Chou En-lai yesterday afternoon, first having sent him a memorandum of the Generalissimo's terms. Chou immediately asked for an extension of the 10 days to 1 month but finally reduced his request to 15 days which in my opinion is not unreasonable as there are many complicated plans to be agreed to and he must fly to Yenan at least once and to Manchuria for conferences. Dr. Soong called later and discussed details regarding communications in which he is vitally interested. I already had an American Army engineer, who heads the communications reestablishment activity of Executive Headquarters, in conference yesterday with the Minister of Communications.

I will see Generalissimo early this afternoon regarding extension of time to 15 days.

The following factors have been involved most in the foregoing:

The prolonged absence of Generalissimo created a serious doubt in the minds of Communist leaders regarding impartiality of my attitude, accentuated by a lively propaganda against U. S. support of Government Armies, etc. The Generalissimo's insistence at the same time that American officers should be given the deciding vote in all cases of Communist-Government representative disagreements, added to these suspicions and the delicacy of my position. I can ride through these difficulties, I think.

For your information, but I hope not for press release, our Naval vessels or other American Flag shipping are no longer engaged in transporting either Chinese Government troops or military supplies, this work now being carried out by Liberty ships with Chinese crews under special flag until sale negotiations are completed and by Chinese-manned LST's in process of turnover to Chinese Navy. We may give some help to the transport of a Chinese Division to Japan. I want no press release on this because I do not wish to tie my hands or to appear to be pushed into a defensive attitude of explanation. Furthermore, the Communist leaders know the facts and are surprised and somewhat apologetic.

Question regarding American powers of final decision has been left to direct negotiation between Government and Communists without reference to me.

Finally, as matters now stand solution awaits Generalissimo's agreement or refusal to extend time to 15 days and Chou En-lai's obtaining commitments or instructions from Yen-an. I will advise you tonight or tomorrow of progress.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and Dr. T. V. Soong,
June 5, 1946, 5:30 p. m.*

Dr. Soong opened the meeting by stating that he had talked with the Generalissimo this morning. The Generalissimo insisted on a complete and definite arrangement with Gen. Chou En-lai within the 10-day limit specified in the press release. Dr. Soong added that the program, with definite understandings, must be practical since it [is] inextricably involved with the economic situation.

Gen. Marshall informed Dr. Soong that Col. Hill,⁹⁶ Gen. Byroade's

⁹⁶ Col. Donald C. Hill, U. S. Army, Chairman of Executive Headquarters Communications Group.

engineer, was now in Nanking and would work with Gen. Yu Ta-wei and Gen. Chou En-lai on the restoration of rail communications. Gen. Marshall added that two points complicated the matter on the Communist side; first, their distrust in Tai Li's secret police, and second, the National Government's refusal to remove fortifications. Gen. Marshall stated that there was an additional matter to consider and that was the stiff-necked attitude evidenced by the representative of the Ministry of Communications.

Gen. Marshall stated that he was extremely concerned over the fact that trivial matters in the past had blocked much needed developments in China's economic structure. The small things seemed to mount and mount, thus overcoming any definite results toward necessary reconstruction. Gen. Marshall pointed out that during his recent 3500 mile trip through North China the question of lack of communications was presented to him by the local leaders of every place he visited. Again it was the small things that created the difficulties.

Dr. T. V. Soong stated that the Communists had stolen and destroyed certain equipment on the Yellow River project. Gen. Marshall stated that he had heard about this and also had discussed the matter with Gen. Chou En-lai. He added that it was his feeling that much good could be accomplished and such incidents would [apparent omission] if the National Government accept some Communist representatives on CNRRA in order to obviate minor difficulties such as this. Gen. Marshall also suggested that Dr. T. V. Soong talk to Mr. Todd, UNRRA's field engineer. Dr. Soong also referred to the difficult situation in North Kiangsu, where Communist forces had driven in for the purposes of appropriating the rice crops.

Gen. Marshall referred to his discussions with the Generalissimo concerning the termination of hostilities in Manchuria and the Generalissimo's proposed press release, and showed Dr. Soong a copy of his (Gen. Marshall's) memorandum inclosed to Gen. Chou, dated 4 June, based on these conversations. Gen. Marshall pointed out that it was [at] his insistence that sub-paragraph 1, concerning termination of hostilities in Manchuria, had been inserted. Gen. Marshall said that the Communists were objecting to the 10-day time limit and he felt they were not unreasonable in their contention. Gen. Marshall told Dr. Soong that he proposed to ask the Generalissimo for an extension of five days. Gen. Marshall continued by stating that with reference to point 3 a very definite schedule of timing must be developed for the Manchurian situation and it must be stated in detail to indicate definite schedules for each of the first three months and for each three months thereafter.

Gen. Marshall continued by stating that he was impressed with Dr. Wang Shih Chieh's⁹⁷ fear of establishing a coalition government. Dr. Wang's thought was that a coalition government, such as was the British Government, had been established on a previously sound government. This would not be the case in China, since a stable government does not exist as a basis for the transition to the coalition phase and therefore it might be preferable to adhere to a strictly two-party government.

Gen. Marshall concluded by reiterating that the tremendous suspicion on both sides was making it extremely difficult to resolve this critical situation. Dr. Soong admitted that there was great suspicion and stated that for that reason he thought it might be preferable to seek a peaceful solution by giving the Communists certain areas of China which would then be their domain.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Marshall to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek

OSE 124

NANKING, June 5, 1946.

YOUR EXCELLENCY: Following my conference with General Chou En-lai this afternoon, I set noon, tomorrow, June 6th as the time of commencement of the 15-day period.

Attached is a proposed press release which I am submitting to General Hsu and General Chou. I hope you approve.

With great respect,

Faithfully yours,

[GEORGE C. MARSHALL]

[Enclosure]

Draft Press Release for the Committee of Three

The Committee of Three authorizes the following announcement: "Orders are being issued by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and Chairman Mao Tse-tung directing the cessation of all advances, attacks or pursuits by their respective forces for a period of 15 days commencing at noon, Thursday, June 6th to afford an opportunity for negotiations to reach an agreement regarding the following:

a. Detailed arrangements to govern a complete termination of hostilities in Manchuria.

b. Detailed arrangements, and time schedules, for the complete restoration of communications in China, and

c. A definite basis for carrying out without further delay the agreement of February 25, 1946 for the demobilization, reorganization and integration of the armed forces in China.

⁹⁷ Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Marshall to General Chou En-lai

OSE 126

NANKING, June 6, 1946.

DEAR GENERAL CHOU: The Generalissimo has decided that he will not enter into a joint press release. Attached is the release he proposes to give the press at noon today, Thursday, June 6th.⁹⁸

In furnishing in advance this copy of the Generalissimo's release I would appreciate your giving me the opportunity to discuss with you the proposed draft of your release, whatever it may be.⁹⁹

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Press Release Issued by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Thursday, June 6, 1946, noon

I am issuing orders at noon today to my armies in Manchuria to halt all advances, attacks and pursuits for a period of 15 days commencing noon Friday, June 7th. I am doing this to give the Communist Party an opportunity to demonstrate in good faith their intention to carry out the agreements they had previously signed. In taking this action the Government in no way prejudices its right under the Sino-Soviet Treaty to take over the sovereignty of Manchuria.

The following matters must be satisfactorily settled within the 15 day period:

- a. Detailed arrangements to govern a complete termination of hostilities in Manchuria.
- b. Detailed arrangements, and time schedules, for the complete restoration of communications in China, and
- c. A definite basis for carrying out without further delay the agreement of February 25, 1946 for the demobilization, reorganization and integration of the armed forces in China.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Press Release Issued by General Chou En-lai, Thursday, June 6, 1946, 4 p. m.

The Chinese Communist Party is advocating all the time an unconditional and true termination of civil warfare, which applies to

⁹⁸ *Infra.*

⁹⁹ Notation by General Marshall on June 6:

"Gen Chou telephoned this a. m.

1. Regrets lack of joint statement
2. Inclusion of statement regarding the taking over of sovereignty of Manchuria in Gimo statement
3. He is drafting one—copy will be sent up later today."

For latter, see press release of June 6, 4 p.m. (below).

hostilities in China proper and those in Manchuria as well. It is due to the persistence of the Chinese Communist Party, the aspiration of the Chinese people, and the efforts exerted by General Marshall, that Generalissimo's issuance of orders to halt all advances, attacks and pursuits in Manchuria for a period of 15 days and negotiation on the following matters are secured:

a. Detailed arrangements to govern a complete termination of hostilities in Manchuria.

b. Detailed arrangements, and time schedules, for the complete restoration of communications in China, and

c. A definite basis for carrying out without further delay the agreement of February 25, 1946, for the demobilization, reorganization and integration of the armed forces in China.

Though we feel concerned over the shortness of the 15 day period, and that the inevitable involvement of political subjects pertaining to Manchuria, or even China as a whole, into the forthcoming negotiation would call for a longer period for discussion, we concur with the 15 day cease fire arrangement, having in mind that no opportunity for the realization of peace should be skipped over. In doing so, we will exert our best efforts toward bringing negotiation to a success. We hope that the Kuomintang, in compliance with the desire of the Chinese people as well as nations abroad, would demonstrate in good faith their intention to carry out the agreements they had previously signed, and make the temporary armistice a lasting truce with advances, attacks and pursuits stopped forever.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

*General Marshall to President Truman*¹

[NANKING,] June 6, 1946.

[832.] DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The Generalissimo and Communists are issuing orders at noon today, Thursday, June 6, halting advances, attacks or pursuits by their Manchurian forces for a 15-day period commencing at noon tomorrow, June 7, during which period complete agreements must be reached regarding the three points mentioned in my message of June 5, 828; that is, arrangements for the complete termination of hostilities in Manchuria, complete resumption of communications in China and execution without delay of agreement of February 25 for reorganization of the armed forces.

GEORGE C. MARSHALL

¹ Copy forwarded by the War Department to the Secretary of State, June 6.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to General Marshall

NANKING, June 6, 1946.

MY DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: I am fundamentally in agreement with the proposal contained in your letter of May 26th. In connection with the implementation of your proposal and to render even clearer its meaning and purpose, I should like to place before you the following points. The painful experience I have encountered during the past five months compels me to be more precise and definite in dealing with the Communists. The following points, therefore, I earnestly hope, will have your full understanding and support.

1. As to your proposal that I issue orders that the National Forces should halt their advances, attacks and pursuits of the Communists, that is not only your earnest desire but also what I had in mind when I took the recent trip to the Northeast. I have today, therefore, issued orders to the National Forces in Manchuria that, for a period of fifteen days, as from noon tomorrow until noon of the 21st June, Government troops should halt all advances, attacks and pursuits of the Communists. This I am doing in the hope that a satisfactory detailed arrangement of all signed agreements can be reached within this period. But I must ask you to secure the assurance of the Communists that the Agreement for Army Reorganization will be immediately and first put into effect in the Northeast. Within this period I must also ask you to formulate, and let me know the concrete measures, for the enforcement of the complete Plan of February 25th for the reorganization and integration of the armed forces. As regards the despatch of an advance section of the Executive Headquarters to the Northeast, as proposed by Your Excellency and the Communist representative, it may be sent to Changchun for preparatory work, but of course does not start work until concrete measures are settled.

2. Regarding the repair of railways and the restoration of communications, I feel that the determining authority in these matters should be given to the American representative who will fix the time schedule for its final completion. Otherwise, there will be no guarantee for its realization.

3. I wish to emphasize that the sacred responsibility of restoring the sovereign rights of Manchuria to the Government should not be delayed. Therefore, the Government maintains freedom of action regarding the restoration of sovereignty as contained in the Cease Fire Agreement of January 10th, and this position must be upheld at all times. For example, if the Chinese Communists continue to attack the Government Forces, as they are doing right now at places

near Haichen, south of Changchun, the Government troops reserve to themselves the right to counter-attack.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature in Chinese]
CHIANG KAI-SHEK

IX. NEGOTIATIONS STALEMATED DURING MANCHURIAN TRUCE
(JUNE 6-30, 1946)

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai² at 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, June 6, 1946, 8 p. m.

Also present: Colonel Caughey³
Mr. Chang Wen-chin⁴
Capt. Soong⁵

General Marshall discussed arrangements for General Chou's trip to Yen-an. He suggested that General Chou not take over 12 people, probably 10, because of landing conditions at Yen-an.

Before departure, General Chou wanted to know General Marshall's views on the overall situation. In the past, they had exchanged views, but because of the changed situation, General Chou desired to hear again General Marshall's views. General Chou hoped that after the 15-day period, there would be an actual cease-fire arrangement. That would have a beneficial influence on the situation in China proper. It would reduce hostilities so that an amicable atmosphere would be created for the solution of other matters.

General Marshall said he would try to outline for General Chou, the general measures that would have the most influence towards securing a permanent peace. In those matters, there was definitely two sides and in most of them both sides were wrong to a certain extent. On the Government side, he had to continually fight the conviction on the part of old enemies of the Communist Party—political as well as military—the belief that Communists would not carry out agreements they enter into, but rather would employ delaying tactics invariably to prevent the implementation of the agreement. He also fought the belief that in dealing with the Communist Party, they were confronting Soviet Russia.

On the Communist side, it seemed to General Marshall that he had to fight suspicion of the Government's intention in certain proposals—General Marshall emphasized *proposals*, not actions—suspicion of

² Representative of the Chinese Communist Party on the Committee of Three at Nanking.

³ J. Hart Caughey, Executive Officer on General Marshall's staff.

⁴ General Chou's secretary.

⁵ John L. Soong, U. S. Army language officer on General Marshall's staff.

their purpose purporting it to be some object to crush or damage the Communist Party. The Communists believe the Government troop movements have taken place for a hostile purpose.

The Communists had encouraged the feeling he mentioned which was most unfortunate and made General Marshall's task extraordinarily difficult. This was unfortunate. There was no genuine advantage to the Communists, just a profound irritation in the creation of suspicion.

On the Communist side, there are actions by the Government which might be characterized as threatening or maybe malicious. General Marshall would usually say they were stupid because there is no profit to the Government and only a great irritation to the Communists. General Marshall hoped that General Chou's people during this period in particular, would avoid as far as possible, measures which had little effect and only did damage. On the other hand, wherever they can concede things to facilitate the rehabilitation of China—that would be very helpful towards securing agreements which he judged the Communist Party desired.

General Marshall had said much the same thing to the Government. He had talked about the suppression of newspapers utilizing a news agency in Peiping as an example. These were very harmful acts. They did no good whatsoever. He thought he had assurance that that sort of business would be stopped. There are many other things, of course, of the same general nature. General Marshall was aware of the reluctance of the Communist Party to put their best troops in a position where the actions of the secret police might put them at a great disadvantage. He would do his best to stop that. Those were all generalities but they had an important bearing on the general solution.

To deal in specific matters, General Marshall stated he thought it was of first importance to the Communist Party that General Chou be permitted to reach agreements as quickly as possible through Colonel Hill⁶ regarding the restoration of communications. There was no reason for the Communists to fear use of communications for hostile military concentrations against them. He did not think it would be at all difficult to arrange for troop movements in the restricted areas to be cleared through Executive Headquarters. Unfortunately it was easy to interrupt communications the second, third, fourth and fifth time as had been done frequently. That would go to make a continuous impression decidedly to the disadvantage of the Communist Party. The matter of communications was very important and

⁶ Donald C. Hill, U. S. Army, Chairman of Executive Headquarters Communications Group.

should not be entered into on the basis of trading this for that. Dr. Lo Lung-chi⁷ talked about their trading aspect with General Marshall. General Marshall though did not agree with anything Dr. Lo said. That was the easiest way for him to state the case. In connection with communications, General Marshall thought that the Communist Party immediately should do whatever it could to facilitate increased production and distribution of coal which affects hundreds of thousands of people. The Communist Party should terminate as quickly as possible, repressive measures that affect entire populations of cities. Whatever the purpose, repressive measures were unjustifiable in the eyes of the world in China's present state. Also, these repressions had the great disadvantage of stirring up violent opposition in various parts of the Government. General Marshall was trying to moderate the opposition to a point of proceeding with genuine sincerity towards a real effort, not only to promote a lasting peace, but particularly to establish a basis for a new type of Government on a two-party basis.

In Manchuria, General Marshall assumed fighting would continue at certain places, but he hoped that it would subside without too serious a result. He handed General Chou the letter⁸ he had just received that evening from the Generalissimo⁹ in which he said that if Communists continue to attack Government forces as they are now doing in places near Haicheng and places south of Changchun, the Government troops reserve for themselves the right to counter-attack. General Marshall said he spoke to the Generalissimo about the fighting which was going on around Anshan and Yingkow. He added that he told the Generalissimo that morning what he had said to General Chou. The situation was so indefinite that he could see no way to make any immediate settlement in that particular vicinity.

General Marshall said General Chou thought Communists controlled Anshan and the Generalissimo thought Nationalists controlled it. General Chou said Communists controlled Yingkow and the Generalissimo was not so certain about that. Anyway, it was a confused situation that could not be unravelled at that moment. General Marshall had been working on methods for terminating the fighting in Manchuria. There was not yet a satisfactory formula or series of regulations. However, he wished to have immediate agreement of the Committee of Three for the Advance Section in Changchun to survey the situation without taking action and to establish teams and communication facilities at various points so that they would be ready to act promptly and would be prepared to carry out efficiently

⁷ Of the Democratic League.

⁸ Dated June 6, p. 984.

⁹ Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

the arrangements that would probably have to be made for termination of fighting.

General Marshall stated that the letter which had just come from the Generalissimo that evening made general statements. It also particularized regarding communications and emphasized the Generalissimo's stand regarding the matter of sovereignty. Therefore, it was very important for General Chou at Yen-an to be fully informed as to his authority to negotiate regarding that particular matter—the movements in connection with the question of sovereignty. The Generalissimo had not told General Marshall what he had in mind specifically. General Marshall recalled previous conversations, mainly with General Yu Ta Wei, and briefly with the Generalissimo, which referred to small Government commands characterized as symbolic in Harbin and Tsitsihar. He had nothing definite.

General Chou thanked General Marshall for the good points and the friendly suggestions expressed. The problem seemed to be how to find a way out regarding the specific problems. The most complicated problem with regard to Manchuria was the problem of sovereignty. General Chou had explained to General Marshall about that several times so he did not need to repeat it. At the time when the Soviet troops had not yet completed their withdrawal, General Chou said he had made efforts to try to get Government troops in contact with the Soviet troops. Later on that problem automatically went out of the picture, but still the fighting had been continued for another month. Now in talking about that question, it had to be lined up with the civil administration. Otherwise, if they proceeded along lines the Generalissimo stated, all places garrisoned by Soviet troops even when the Government had completed taking over and were forced to withdraw on account of continued warfare, all those places should be evacuated by Communist troops before a cessation of hostilities could be established. General Chou thought this point might well be very troublesome.

A second question that General Chou had previously discussed with General Marshall and which was also included in the proposal prepared on General Marshall's second arrival in China, was that the *status quo* of the local civil administration should be retained. A solution was proposed through the reorganization of the Northeast council, but the Generalissimo did not subscribe to that idea. Now, the question remained of how to particularize. As General Marshall had said, the Generalissimo had not definitely stated his opinion on that point. It seemed that the Generalissimo did not have that question in mind, yet it was rather the key problem to Manchuria.

General Marshall agreed with General Chou that it was a very difficult side of the problem. He suggested that General Chou become

well informed at Yen-an as to just what lengths he could go in negotiations when he returned. He would, of course, do his very best to compose conflicting views. He would admit the entrance of political consideration into the 15-day period, though he wanted as little to do with it as possible.

General Marshall said General Chou did not mention the question of reconsidering the final strength of forces in Manchuria. He remembered General Chou's statement some time ago regarding 5 divisions. General Chou would recall his reply to that. What worried General Marshall most regarding Manchuria, in relation to the short time available, was determining what sort of a plan they could have for the redistribution of troops during the first, second and third months following the cessation of hostilities—also every three-month period thereafter. The Generalissimo insisted on a definitive time schedule rather than just general terms of the original agreement. The Generalissimo was referring particularly to Manchuria, or the Northeast as he described it.

The trouble General Marshall saw involved not only the difficulty of finding a method for stating procedure to be followed in order that there be as few points as possible for field teams to have to decide, but also the difficulty of knowing dispositions of troops. It should not be so hard to get the deployment of Government forces, but they had no information at all as to dispositions of Communist forces. That added tremendously to the difficulty of stating an agreement. He would like very much for General Chou to think of a solution when he went to Yen-an. As the matter now stood there was so little data available that General Marshall and his staff did not feel they could write the best draft agreement possible. That was one of the most difficult things to do from a planning basis. There would be possibilities of disagreement regarding various phases. General Marshall foresaw complications regarding redistribution of troops because the Communists were not on the principal roads and therefore their movements would be difficult and indefinite as to the time required. In North China, there was a more simple formula, but that would not apply so well in Manchuria. General Marshall said Colonel Caughey and Colonel Hutchin¹⁰ had been working very hard to get it on paper so that it would not result in new disputes on the ground.

General Marshall said they had in mind that paragraph *a*, which applied to the method of terminating hostilities, might be made fairly brief. He was not certain how they would manage the details involved in the first few months of troop redistribution in Manchuria. The redistribution plan should be a special part or amplification of

¹⁰ Claire E. Hutchin, U. S. Army, of General Marshall's staff.

the agreement of February 25th—something like an annex, as they had already made certain agreements on details subsequent to the general agreement of February 25th.

General Chou said that on the point of final comparative strengths, he had already suggested what General Marshall mentioned about preparing an annex.

General Marshall said then it was agreed that there would be a reconsideration.

General Chou said that was the reason he mentioned the point. Regarding the detailed plan for the army reorganization, he would obtain detailed data. As to the communications problem, he had talked to Colonel Hill that morning. Colonel Hill had only contemplated railway control. General Chou hoped within the next few days, Colonel Hill would also work on other aspects of reopening communications and present detailed proposals. General Chou thought that repair work on railways should be started before everything else, and that reopening of all kinds of communications should be started almost at the same time. Communists should participate in the administration and control of railways. Then, of course, they would have to reach some sort of agreement regarding destruction of fortifications and the abolition of inspection and censorship. General Chou thought it would not be difficult to reach a solution.

General Marshall thought the main thing was to get started promptly. He suggested that so far as possible, General Chou avoid the ordinary practice of negotiations of trading one point against the other in the matter of communications. If he would deal with it more on the basis of stating safeguards the Communist Party desired against misuse of the railways, General Marshall thought that was the quickest way to get settlement satisfactory to both sides. General Marshall felt in regard to that particular matter and the matter of coal, that a genuine effort to facilitate in every way (avoiding debates on this and that) reopening communications would do more than anything else to quiet the fears and unfortunate beliefs on both sides.

Everything in China was suffering acutely from the communications situation. China is fighting the most difficult problem conceivable in her effort to restore conditions to anything like normal. The resumption of normal communications is vital to a recovery of the situation, just as General Marshall felt the development of some degree of confidence in the good faith of both sides is vital to interests of both parties, unless the desire was to completely tear down the Government and that would be very easy to do. However, that would involve a world tragedy and a horror for the poorer people of China.

Thus on one side, they were struggling with difficult negotiations regarding sovereignty affairs in Manchuria, and on the other side a

speedy solution regarding communications would help everything. Again General Marshall stated if General Chou would largely confine himself to specific safeguards the Communist Party desired against misuse of railroads by the Government rather than delay this and delay that, or to block action, he felt a satisfactory solution could be reached. He did not expect a miracle meaning he did not expect the policy of retaliation to be completely abandoned by either side. He would do his best to minimize it, but there wasn't much he could do except tell General Chou when it involved his people and tell the Generalissimo when it involved the Government side. And he was getting tired of doing that. General Marshall said that whatever General Chou could agree to, he should agree to right away, for example the reconstruction of tracks which would take a long time at best. They could discuss other matters like the participation of Communists in the railway administration and censorship and other matters pertaining to communications in general.

General Chou said General Marshall made a very good point on the communications and he would take full consideration of that.

General Marshall told General Chou that instructions had been issued to the U. S. radio station at Yen-an to stay on the air continuously from noon tomorrow until Sunday night except between 10 at night and 7 in the morning. Anything that General Chou wanted to use the facilities for that he could send in the clear or in his own code, he was welcome to it. He could use that channel as well as his own to speed up business. Meeting closed as General Marshall discussed airway facilities at Yen-an with Colonel Caughey.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Chou En-lai to General Marshall

MM 014

NANKING, 6 June 1946.

With regard to trusum ¹¹ Nos. 135 and 136 ¹² dealing with the repatriation I wish to make the following comments based on reports from Yen-an Headquarters as a supplement thereof:-

1. The government troops in Shansi do retain in their various units 7,000 Japanese soldiers who are distributed as follows:

a. In Tatumg (113°13'-40°8') and vicinity—1,000, of which one special service battalion, comprising 300 odd men, under the command of General Chiao Ke-min, is stationed in the Tatumg city and the Wangchuang village to the north.

b. At Yangchuan, (113°34'-37°52')—a special service detachment,

¹¹ Truce summary by Executive Headquarters, Peiping.

¹² Neither printed.

numbering 1,200, which is commanded by a Japanese named Fujita Yushin.

c. At Yutse, (112°44'–37°42')—an engineering detachment, about one thousand in number, which is regrouped from the former 229th Battalion of the Japanese Independent 10th Infantry Brigade.

d. At Taiyuan—Officers' Training Camp, 200 Jap officers have been enrolled, while more are coming.

e. At Tsingyuan, (112°17'–37°37')—about 200, being a part of the 227th Battalion of the Japanese 10th Infantry Brigade.

f. At Yuanping, (112°44'–38°45')—150. At Taiku, (112°31'–37°26')—200 odd from Takasaki Detachment.

g. At Sohsien, (112°24'–39°22')—3,000 Japs are enrolled into Tuan Cheng-yu's unit.

h. Apart from the foregoing Japanese units can be found in each of those county towns such as Chiao Cheng, Chihsien, Pingyao, Chiehhsiu, and so forth (all to the south of Taiyuan); these have not been included in the reports of Yen-an Headquarters on account of lacking exact figures.

2. Except a few of the afore-mentioned Japanese have been installed as instructors the overwhelming part is deployed to garrison the various localities. Only for disguise had those Japanese been reported as technicians.

I therefore recommend that instruction be issued to Executive Headquarters to the effect that while teams be ordered to push for the disarmament of the Japanese, swift repatriation of the thus disarmed Japanese be undertaken, so that they would not be exploited by the government troops as an instrument to augment the civil war.

[Signature in Chinese]
(CHOU EN-LAI)

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270 : Telegram

General Marshall to Brigadier General Henry A. Byroade,¹³ at Changchun

[NANKING,] 7 June 1946.

843. It is my thought and desire that you should proceed to get firmly established in Changchun particularly as to communications and reserve of transportation. Probably little can be done by your headquarters towards composing crises or hostilities during 15-day period which commences today. But you might be called upon to arbitrate or act in some particular situation.

Meanwhile I suggest that you endeavor to survey situation in Man-

¹³ Director of Operations of Executive Headquarters and head of its Advance Section at Changchun.

churia and actually to establish a few detached posts with American officer and communications at prospective focal points, Harbin if permitted, Kirin, Anshan, etc., so that you will be ready and capable to carry out rather elaborate or complicated cease firing terms without delay. If my influence is needed in this matter let me know.

Also, I want you immediately to give your best thought to method of readjustment for matters in Manchuria during first 30-day period. Chou En-lai leaves for Yen-an this morning and probably will go to Manchuria after returning here. Also, will probably then meet with me in Peiping and I will want you there at that time with your detailed proposals.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

*General Marshall to Mr. Walter S. Robertson, at Peiping*¹⁴

[NANKING,] 7 June 1946.

846. I have made only two press releases¹⁵ Reurad 3677,¹⁶ one concerned reckless propaganda of hate and suspicion and the other concerned move of the advance section of Executive Headquarters, which I outlined to you in my 831 of 5 June.¹⁷ I have made no official release about the 15-day truce, leaving it to the Nationalist and Communist leaders to make any statement necessary.

This agreement for a 15-day truce is not one drawn up on paper and signed by the Committee of Three, it is something I arranged verbally through meeting individually with first one side and then the other. I did however see and have a chance to comment upon the official press releases of both the Central Government and the Communist Party just prior to release.

In essence the agreement stipulated that the Generalissimo and the Communists would issue orders at noon Thursday 6 June halting advances, attacks or pursuits by their Manchurian forces for a 15-day period commencing at noon 7 June. During this 15-day period complete agreement must be reached regarding 3 major points, that is, arrangements for complete termination of hostilities in Manchuria, complete resumption of communications in China, and execution without delay of agreement of 25 February for reorganization of armed forces.

¹⁴ American Commissioner of Executive Headquarters at Peiping.

¹⁵ May 20, p. 865, and June 5, p. 976.

¹⁶ Not found in Department files.

¹⁷ Not printed.

893.00/6-746 : Telegram

The Counselor of Embassy in China (Smyth) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, June 7, 1946—10 a. m.

[Received 1:20 p. m.]

925. Summary M[ilitary] A[ttaché's] report for period 29 May to 3 June: National Govt. forces reached Kirin 28 May and have fanned out north, northeast and southeast for distances approximately 15 miles each direction. North of Changchun Govt. forces have reached south bank Sungari River.

Chinese G-2 doubts ability Communist forces hold north bank Sungari River due inferiority numbers and equipment. According same source, Sungari River already crossed at Kirin and good road now exists over which Govt. forces can move on Harbin.

Situation southeast Jehol reported generally quiet. Chinese official sources state it will take considerable time repair Communist damage to Pingchuan-Peiping Railway.

Anshan occupied by Communists on 24 May but retaken by Govt. forces on 30 May.

Informed observers present situation Manchuria credit Communist forces with capability making serious harassing attacks against long, and in many areas poorly defended, supply and communication lines of Govt. forces. Speculation has also risen as to Govt. capability replace arms, equipment and ammunition originally supplied by US, and amount of which is limited. So far as known no facilities in China for manufacture these items in appreciable quantity.

Press reports that agreement was reached on 27 May between Pacification Commissioner for Shantung and Commander Communist New Fourth Army for cessation hostilities Shantung have not been confirmed officially. Situation Tsinan, however, seems less tense although Communist forces continue occupation of points on railway east of Tsinan.

SMYTH

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

*Colonel Marshall S. Carter*¹⁸ to *General Marshall*

[WASHINGTON,] 7 June 1946.

90515. Following message transmitted to you at request of Mr. John Carter Vincent¹⁹ in reply to your 788 of May 29:

“Appreciate very much your giving me explanation contained in your 788 of May 29. Actually the statement to which you refer was

¹⁸ General Marshall's representative in Washington.¹⁹ Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs.

deleted by me from the script day before broadcast was given but too late to have NBC release altered. Incidentally, there were other substantial deletions and alterations in the script before the broadcast was given, which have been forwarded to you by Carter. Best regards, Vincent."

893.00/6-846: Telegram

The Counselor of Embassy in China (Smyth) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, June 8, 1946—1 p. m.

[Received June 8—7:25 a. m.]

935. Following is Mukden's 77, June 3 to Embassy:

"It is reported by Soviet newsman who was at Ssuningkai and Changchun after Govt. victory that correspondents were presented with reports regarding many prisoners taken from Communist ranks but saw no prisoners. Previous reliable info that some front line Communists had been taken prisoner is supported by testimony American member truce team who viewed prisoners but evidence thus far available indicates Communist strength Manchuria did not receive Ssuningkai-Changchun sector the crushing blow reported by Kmt sources."

SMYTH

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Minutes of Conference Between General Marshall and Eight Delegates of PCC*²⁰ *at 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, June 8, 1946, 4:15 p. m.*

Also present: Captain Soong

Mr. Mo Te-Hui, a non-party member, paid his tribute to General Marshall and expressed his gratitude toward General Marshall's mission in bringing peace to China. He attributed the arrangement for the present 15-day truce agreement to General Marshall's effort. He felt that 15 days would not be sufficient. However, the people were grateful to have even a small opportunity to conduct negotiations for peace. The scope of the order to cease advances, attacks and pursuits includes three items. It is in this connection that the delegates are here today. They would like to make some suggestions for General Marshall's consideration.

Mr. Li, member of Young China Party, stated his party felt that the present problem was a political one. The Generalissimo had previously said that it must be solved by political means. All parties and people hoped that this was so. Certainly, there would be insur-

²⁰ Political Consultative Conference.

mountable difficulties if we neglected the political angle and tried to solve the problem purely from a military point of view. If the Communists are to be expected to make military concessions, the Government must make similar concessions politically. When military problems are discussed, political problems would be drawn in automatically. It would be necessary for us to concentrate our effort toward this natural development. Mr. Li stated that the group would like to have instructions from General Marshall as to how they could help in this mission.

Mr. Liang, a member of Democratic League, stated that these three political groups stood on the people's front. They could not agree that if the 15-days' truce failed, the whole peace mission would also fail. Now that the 15-days' period was a fixed period of time, we must help it be a successful period. He suggested that political problems should be discussed with a view to solving the present situation. In these political discussions, all political parties should be allowed to participate. Mr. Liang further suggested that, in addition to and separate from conferences of the Committee of Three, the steering committee of the PCC should also conduct their meetings at the same time. The Committee of Three would discuss military problems. The PCC would discuss the various political issues. Liaison should be established between these two committees in order that conclusions reached by one or the other could be exchanged. When a conclusion was reached by the Committee of Three, three representatives elected from the PCC should meet with the Committee of Three to exchange opinions and to consult each other. He cited for an example the possibility that when the Committee of Three discussed the disposition of troops in Manchuria, the Steering Committee of the PCC would discuss political issues regarding the reorganization of local and provincial governments in the Northeast.

General Marshall expressed his appreciation of the compliments they paid to him. He stated that he had no objection to the convening of the parallel committee to discuss political issues and to maintain liaison with the Committee of Three. However, it was outside his jurisdiction. He would not wish to be involved in such an organization. His position vis-à-vis the major interested parties was one in which he must be careful not to invite accusation. General Marshall pointed out differences in the methods of procedure between the two committees. The PCC Committee required a more lengthy process of deliberation. Eighteen years of bitter experience had bred suspicions and fears of each side against the other that were deep-seated. In order to reach a solution, some spirit of good faith must be restored on both sides, then it should be comparatively easy to reach some agree-

ments for the restoration of Communications. Each successive agreement would then tend to restore more and more the mutual confidence.

General Marshall then elaborated on the processes and procedure used by the Committee of Three in their negotiations and the procedure adopted by Colonel Hill for the conduct of his negotiations for the restoration of communications. Because of the absolute necessity for developing confidence on both sides, there was no time for either side to employ the usual drawn out procedure in negotiation for the restoration of communications. There was no time to be wasted. General Marshall explained that undoubtedly there were a few people on each side with an uncompromising and unbending viewpoint. Unfortunately, it takes only a few to upset the whole situation. If they could be persuaded to give ground even a little, we might, in a matter of time, overcome that bitterness, hatred and suspicion which now dominates all negotiations.

General Marshall elaborated on a few of the many difficulties which must be overcome before China could truly realize democracy. He cited the illiteracy of the Chinese people, the lack of a common dialect, and the inadequate means of communications as examples. To overcome some of these difficulties, General Marshall, while in the United States the last time, arranged for the development of special movies to initiate the education of the masses in China. By this method a great deal could be done in a short time to broaden the intelligence or the comprehension of the illiterate masses. Some such expeditious method would be necessary to a successful effort to launch a genuine democracy. Such movies had aided the American Government in quickly creating a modern and efficient army. They had even shortened the war.

Mr. Hwong, an educator for the past thirty years, said that he had two friends recently from the United States who had talked to him regarding the production of movies about China. Mr. Hwong expressed a desire to have another opportunity to talk to General Marshall on this subject.

Mr. Liang then said that outside of the two principal contesting parties, all other parties and all the people of China unanimously wanted peace. Statements to the effect that the Democratic League was allied with the Communist Party and that the Young China Party was subservient to the Kuomintang were greatly exaggerated.

General Marshall then suggested that all the independent groups should combine to exercise their influence on a few important individuals on each side as well as important editors to convince them that there must be more moderation in order that a solution other than a devastating war might be reached.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Hsu Yung-chang*²¹ at 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, June 9, 1946, 4 p. m.

Also present: General Pee²²
Colonel Caughey
Captain Soong

General Marshall said he was about to telephone General Hsu when he received his message that he was calling on him.

General Hsu stated that General Tu Li Ming²³ had sent an urgent message from Manchuria to the Generalissimo. (General Pee passed the message written in longhand to General Marshall to read²⁴). General Hsu said that the incident was very important, especially since the concentration of troops had occurred after the 7th. However, that would not be altogether beyond expectation because the order was issued on the 7th and it may not have reached the field. General Hsu pointed out that General Tu said the attack increased in intensity on the 8th and that if they would not stop the attack, they might retaliate by a counter-attack on the 9th. In the 15-day truce, if such incidents were enlarged, it would create a bad impression on the public. General Hsu thought the incident was of great importance because it might jeopardize other matters.

General Marshall said that General Chou insisted that the 15-day period should include a prohibition against all movements of every kind. He had disagreed with General Chou because he felt that it was impossible for them to reach an agreement regarding all of the complications surrounding a complete cessation of movements. If all movements were prohibited, they would find themselves in all probability in a very intricate situation between Jehol and Chaoyang, regarding which they knew very little. There was a similar confusion between Anshan and Yingkow. Those were matters that would have to be settled by a complete cessation of hostilities agreement. General Chou had said that if the Communists were driven out of a town they should feel free to counter-attack to retake the town. That was exactly the order the Communists claimed to have issued to all of their troops in North China three or four weeks ago—that the Communist armies would undertake no offensive operations. If attacked by National troops, they would defend themselves and they would counter-attack to retake any town they were driven out of. It seemed to General Marshall it was the best that could be expected

²¹ Chinese National Government representative on the Committee of Three.

²² Peter T. K. Pee, personal aide to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

²³ Gen. Tu Yu-ming commanded Government troops in Manchuria.

²⁴ See memorandum by General Marshall to Gen. Chou En-lai, June 9, *infra*.

under the circumstances. The Generalissimo said virtually the same thing to General Marshall, that if the Communist troops attacked, the Nationalist troops would attempt to counter-attack to at least retake the town and defend themselves everywhere. The Generalissimo mentioned another place south of Haicheng, where the National troops did counter-attack.

General Marshall said that if General Chou were in Yen-an, he would send him a message that afternoon reciting all that had happened and urging him to get orders to the proper place to stop that action. General Marshall thought General Chou was due in Nanking, but if he did not arrive within an hour or two, General Marshall would send a message to Yen-an. General Hsu could inform General Tu Li Ming accordingly. General Marshall pointed out one sentence in the message from General Tu that he did not like. General Tu said, "If they show no sign of good faith and keep on attacking the Government troops, then it is my intention to instruct the troops under my command to resume attack and pursuit." General Marshall thought General Tu needed to be calmed down. They had already gotten into a terrible predicament in Manchuria which he thought was partly avoidable. He did not want to see it occur again through the same procedure on General Tu's part. He used the expression, "troops under my command to resume attacks and pursuits" and General Marshall regarded that as a serious matter. Its results could be catastrophic. General Marshall certainly would not accept his (General Tu's) decision. He did not mean by that that General Tu should sit back and accept with equanimity a continued Communist attack. He hoped that General Hsu could see that General Tu Li Ming would not again upset everything in Manchuria. He said he would do his best to stop the Communists. General Marshall said he was of the opinion that they themselves desired very much to go through with negotiations, and he would do all in his power to contain any offensive action by them. He would take some action immediately that afternoon.

General Marshall asked if General Hsu had worked out in his own mind any of the terms he thought should be covered in the negotiations.

General Hsu said that he and his staff officers were preparing the plan. He had in mind that in the past four months little progress had been made regarding reorganization, integration and resumption of communications. General Hsu had one principle in mind. He felt that if garrison areas could be fixed up in a definite period, say within one, two or three months, then other problems would be solved by themselves. Certain areas should be assigned to Communists and others to Government troops. Troops within those areas could be

responsible for repair of communications. If in any area communications were not resumed, it could be easily determined who was responsible. Conflicts could be lessened, because at present, Government and Communist troops were in contact in many places. Furthermore, it would be easier for the teams to be sent to definite areas.

General Marshall agreed with General Hsu's thought as a sound basis of procedure. He had very much the same idea in mind. In Manchuria in particular, if they could find some simple basis for the cessation of hostilities that would not present too much difficulty for the teams, there could be an annex or an extension of the Feb. 25th agreement. They should work out for Manchuria the redistribution of troops on a monthly basis for the first three months, then on a quarterly basis for the remaining nine months. The first three months were very important in getting troops untangled from a dangerous state. Of course, a similar redistribution would have to occur in North China, but that would not have to be in so much immediate detail. Thus, the first problem was to reach an agreement on the moves before they ever got into details. Among the details would be the very difficult matter of determining the line of demobilization. In Manchuria the line of demobilization could not be stated in the general terms that were used in the February 25th agreement.

General Marshall stated that it seemed inevitable to him that in Manchuria the political factor, meaning what happened when Communist troops moved out and Government troops moved in, so far as the local governments were concerned, would require discussion. That was not a military responsibility but could easily wreck all military proposals. General Marshall imagined it would be a matter of deep concern to General Hsu.

General Marshall said that the previous day he had received 10 gentlemen who were members of the PCC. There were three or four of the Democratic League, three of the Young China Party, and one or two of no party. The principal man of the latter two was Mo Teh Hui. The proposal of the Young China men and particularly the Democratic League men was that parallel to the Committee of Three discussion on Manchurian military adjustments, the steering committee of the PCC should have discussions, preferably by a small group, so that the military negotiations would not be wrecked because of undecided political factors. They also proposed that there be some liaison between the military and the political discussion groups. Their purpose was to avoid, or to prohibit, the failure of the military. If they found the Committee of Three was unable to reach a military adjustment because of the fears of political consequences, through their group they might solve that problem.

General Marshall told them he had nothing whatever to do with the political part and that their committee did not operate in the manner of a political committee. He would not object to such a procedure, but he could have nothing to do with organizing it. Of course, he personally did not want to introduce himself into the political reorganization of Manchuria. His interest was in successful negotiations within the 15-day period. General Marshall merely wanted to pass that along to General Hsu.

General Marshall had a definite fear that their greatest difficulty was going to be in relation to the political factors in localities which had been under the control of the Communists, particularly as the Generalissimo had often stated he would negotiate political matters after the occupation. However, the Generalissimo had indicated that on the basis of peaceful evacuation of Changchun, he would undertake to negotiate after the cessation of fighting. General Marshall was afraid that if the Generalissimo returned to his previous stand, he would negotiate nothing until after his troops had occupied everything they wanted. The 15-day period would come to an unfortunate end. General Marshall urged General Hsu to use his influence to find some compromise on the political side.

A still larger question that General Hsu mentioned pertained to an easy basis of settlement once they determined who went where. Speaking about North China, they were inevitably confronted with a political factor. General Marshall had discussed this with quite a few leaders on the Government side. He found them all leaning towards a conception which related to General Hsu's proposal. They seemed to feel unless they reached a decision on certain areas with Communist control here and Nationalist control there, they would never get anywhere. In other words, they would frankly accept a local provincial Communist Government in one section and in another section there would be the Nationalists in control of the provincial government.

That was virtually what they had in the United States. It was not so in England because they did not have any states. All of England was comparable to one American Middle-Western state. In the United States there are Republican and Democratic Governors. The Federal Government only exerts its power over a state on certain determined matters. A state cannot make a treaty and it has to observe the condition of all the treaties of the United States. It cannot make a rule regarding Interstate Commerce. It cannot collect custom duties against another state. It cannot print money. It cannot make war—it can quell local rebellion against state authority, however. What was more important, it had to show good faith to the laws of every other state. The Federal Government has nothing to do with schools or with city or municipal government. It cannot put any police force

in the state. The only way the Federal Government can meet the problem of good roads, for example, is by agreement with the state. The Federal Government has no power to authorize or train the National Guard of the states. The only way they exercise control is not to give a state any money or equipment unless it accepts Federal organization and Federal instruction.

General Marshall mentioned details because he found leading government officials are flirting with an idea as a possible basis of compromise in North China, of having different local provincial governments controlled by Communists and Nationalists. Of course that would have a bearing on their work, but it was a political consideration that would never be given effect until the end of a constitutional convention. However, if that was to be considered, it would certainly influence their approach to the military adjustments. General Marshall was trying to keep away from political considerations, but he found them intruding in almost everything he touched.

Dr. Soong²⁵ brought him this problem. He mentioned the great rice district SE of Hsuechow, Kiangsu province, where Communists were not allowing rice to go out. That rice was absolutely necessary to China. The solution first depended on reopening highway communications. After that, it depended on eliminating suppressive military measures which so restricted people they did not dare send away the rice. The Generalissimo said reopening of railways should come first. General Marshall did not think that was correct, as he thought highways should be reopened at the same time as railways—they couldn't get rice out if they did not have a public highway. He imagined that local Nationalist commanders might not want to open the highways. They would possibly be afraid that Communists would infiltrate their forces, a few men at a time. Therefore General Marshall mentioned it to General Hsu with the hope that he would use his influence to treat highways essentially the same as railroads and at the same time. General Yu Ta Wei²⁶ was working on the communications problem. General Marshall went over the various factors yesterday with him. General Marshall said he was mentioning the point because he thought it would arise in connection with the opposition of national commanders to the opening of highway communications.

General Hsu said he shared General Marshall's view that General Tu should be cooled down. General Hsu did not think Yen-an intended to start any large scale war in Manchuria. Anything happening in Manchuria now was a local activity. General Tu should

²⁵ T. V. Soong, President of the Chinese Executive Yuan.

²⁶ Chinese Minister of Communications.

not take it too seriously. There was no need to resume the offensive or the pursuit. General Tu would only bring damage to Government prestige and would be of no advantage. General Hsu wanted to assure General Marshall that he would do everything he could to curb General Tu's attitude. General Hsu's motive in talking to General Marshall about the incident was that he was afraid that before he could do anything, it might develop into a big incident that would be very harmful. General Hsu's personal comment is that General Tu is over-sensitive. If he is like that, he will not be a great military leader.

General Marshall said they called it pugnacious.

General Hsu commented that a commander who is too sensitive can never gain a decisive victory.

General Hsu stated that after reading General Marshall's memoranda on the drafting of a detailed plan for resumption of communications,²⁷ integration and reorganization of armies²⁸ and the cessation of hostilities,²⁹ he had instructed his staff officers to prepare a draft. General Hsu would like to insure that the work done on the part of his staff could be coordinated with the work done by General Marshall's staff officers.

General Marshall suggested that when General Hsu's people had made some progress, that General Hsu and his staff meet with General Marshall and his staff to go over the various proposals. There were two distinct sides to this. One side was the purely military problem and the other was political factors. General Hsu did not need to wait until there was a completed plan. By discussing various matters, they could work with a better understanding of the difficulties.

General Marshall said he had not talked to General Chou En-lai. Of course, Communists would be very careful not to put forward all their concessions at the start. General Marshall was trying to keep all trades out of the communications problem. On the others, trading was inevitable. General Marshall had told General Yu Ta Wei that the Government should make definite proposals.

General Marshall suggested that when they reached a general understanding about one proposal, the Committee of Three should meet to clear it out of the way. While working on everything, communications arrangements would be largely approved and details of the actual cessation of hostilities prepared. Meanwhile, proposals of the both sides regarding the dispositions of troops would be made. The best way to proceed was to continue discussions on difficult points but always have something else that they could complete. The main

²⁷ Not found in Department files.

²⁸ Draft of June 9, not printed.

²⁹ Draft proposal, not printed.

difficulties were going to be the immediate redistribution of troops in Manchuria and the eventual redistribution of troops in North China. The Generalissimo asked him not to mention possible Government agreement to a reconsideration of the strengths in Manchuria. General Marshall thought that was wrong. If the Generalissimo would allow him to use that at first, it would clear the atmosphere a great deal.

General Marshall would like to ask General Hsu several questions. It seemed to him that there was no advantage in having a meeting of the Committee of Three unless they had a definite idea of what was to be proposed and what was the possibility of an agreement. He asked General Hsu if he agreed to that.

General Hsu concurred.

General Marshall said it would appear desirable to have General Chou and General Hsu personally discuss some of the issues.

General Hsu agreed.

General Marshall thought it was important that they carefully decide what they could agree on and what concessions could be made. One of the first things could be the immediate arrangements for cessation of hostilities. They could see if they could reach any general agreement and at least find out where the major differences were. That would be done without General Marshall's presence. Communications conferences were going forward all the time between General Chou, General Yu Ta Wei and Colonel Hill. General Marshall had talked to General Chou and General Yu Ta Wei and tried to influence them.

General Marshall thought that the very first moment that General Hsu had any ideas about paragraph *a*, the arrangements for the immediate cessation of hostilities, General Hsu and General Chou should talk them over and see where they differ. Then General Marshall could see exactly what had to be done. Meanwhile, General Hsu's staff should be working on redistribution of troops in Manchuria. When General Marshall was told of a difference in paragraph *a*, and had a chance to comment to each one separately, then they ought to have a meeting of the Committee of Three to settle the problem. General Marshall wished General Hsu would be very frank in advising him how he would like to see matters conducted. Present discussions would be a bit different from the February conferences of the Military Advisory Committee of which he was an advisor. Meetings would now be those of the Committee of Three regarding the cessation of hostilities.

General Hsu asked if General Chou had expressed any views regarding the final decision of Americans on truce questions.

General Marshall said General Chou had been opposed to that

throughout. That was the reason for certain recent propaganda. He did not think it profitable for him to bring up the issue. It would be better for General Hsu to bring it up himself. General Marshall thought the real problem was when to insist on the decisive vote for Americans on the teams.

General Hsu said that regarding the deciding vote of the American on the teams and of the commissioner in Peiping, it was most important for that to be approved. Otherwise, like before, nothing could be accomplished.

General Marshall said that he had drafted a proposal³⁰ which he had sent to General Hsu. The Government had introduced a new factor when they proposed that General Marshall have the deciding vote on the Committee of Three. General Marshall said he could not take any further part in discussions of these other matters because of attacks that were being made on Americans and on him. General Marshall was very much in earnest about General Byroade in Changchun having such authority, but regarding the cessation of hostilities only.

General Hsu said he still had a little doubt in his mind. He recalled that in one of his letters, the Generalissimo mentioned that from General Marshall on down to the field teams, all Americans should have power of decision.

General Marshall sent for the file of letters and after rereading a few, he stated that the Generalissimo had made no reference to the Committee of Three. Reference to the Committee of Three had come out in the press here. General Marshall said that in his draft for the agreement regarding American officers, the American Commissioner at Executive Headquarters should be empowered with final decision on matters referred to the Three Commission[er]s by the field teams and for the team captain to have final decision concerning the cessation of hostilities, the restoration of communications and the integration and demobilization of the Chinese armies. General Marshall said Colonel Caughey put that last in. If you got the first two things, that is final decision on restoration of communications and on the activity of field teams, that would be enough. The American commissioner would have the deciding vote. If agreed to, it would help. That makes the American virtually the commander in the field. There would then be two compromises that would make it a bit easier to negotiate. Reorganization would cover practically everything in China.

General Marshall commented that General Chou was due back at 6 o'clock.

³⁰ Draft of May 30, p. 914.

General Hsu expressed his concern that if things continued as at present, and no one would have the right to decide, efforts would come to nothing at all.

General Hsu thanked General Marshall for his explanation regarding state governments. He regards as an important factor that a certain state would respect the law and authority of a neighboring state. General Hsu said that with mutual respect between states, he would have no objection to having Communists in one state and Nationalists in the other. Also, General Hsu expressed the hope that the Communists would be patriotic and not be a foreign country. If that was the case, then nothing could be accomplished by assigning certain provinces to the Communist Party.

General Marshall stated that he felt that political complications were inevitable. He did not want to fight that battle alone. General Hsu would have to help. He was just as much interested as General Hsu in making things work. To use a military expression, when he estimated the situation, he wanted to prepare for whatever trouble that was to be anticipated.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Marshall to General Chou En-lai

OSE 139

NANKING, June 9, 1946.

DEAR GENERAL CHOU: General Hsu Yung Chang has just informed me that the Generalissimo received, on 8 June 1946, a message from General Tu Li-ming to the following effect:

At 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 7 June 1946, Communist forces attacked vigorously the National Garrison at Lafa. For this purpose the Communist Forces had moved southward on the Harbin-Tumen railroad. Also, that the attack increased in ferocity on the 8th.

I request that you urgently contact the appropriate field Commander in order to terminate this aggressive fighting.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Chou En-lai to General Marshall

MM 023

NANKING, June 9, 1946.

DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: Your memo OSE 139, dated June 9, 1946, came to my attention immediately upon my return. I was told while in Yen-an that cease fire order had been issued by the Communist Headquarters in Manchuria as early as on June 5th. Except for skirmishes in far-flung areas, where the order could not be reached in

time, I was assured, that fighting will have stopped around 6th. This can easily be verified by the fact, that no point of any significance will be taken by the Communist forces from 8th onward. In order to meet your request, I have wired the subject matter to Yen-an nevertheless.³¹

[Signature in Chinese]
(CHOU EN-LAI)

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

*Brigadier General Henry A. Byroade to General Marshall*³²

[CHANGCHUN, June 9, 1946.]

Manchu 8. American branch Advanced Section of Executive Headquarters at Changchun is now ready to function and receive the representatives of the National Government and Communist Branch. Office and housing facilities have been difficult to arrange due to lack of useable facilities in this city but are now satisfactory.

I believe it most important that we move quickly in the present truce, to locate teams in strategic positions. Initially they should be located so as to facilitate rapid deployment to any area of possible future disturbance. After study of the situation I recommend the following plan for initial deployment which involves a total of 8 teams for Manchuria: The 4 teams already in Manchuria should remain in Southern Manchuria with Team 28 at its present location of Supingchien; Team 29 east of Mukden near 3-way railroad junction at Haicheng and Team 27 at its present location in Mukden. Two additional teams already planned for Manchuria should be brought into the Changchun area with one proceeding to Lafa and the other North along the Railroad to Harbin to the point of furthest Govt. advance. Two other teams should be formed for initial location at Harbin and Tsitsihar. To permit the most rapid establishment of the 4 additional teams to come into Manchuria, recommend the early dispatch of the American portion of these teams complete with signal communications by air. The American members of the 2 teams to be located east and north of Changchun should land at Changchun where they can be dispatched by road and rail. Similar personnel and equipment should be flown from Peiping direct to Harbin and Tsitsihar. This arrangement will allow the early establishment of radio communications and will permit the American Member making arrangement in advance for the reception of Chinese to the teams which can be dispatched as they become available.

³¹ Notation by Colonel Caughey: "Copy sent to General Hsu/J. H. C."

³² Not received at Nanking until transmitted in telegram No. 3959, June 12, following request in telegram No. 879, June 12, neither printed.

Your approval of the above initial deployment is requested so that I may move such teams as are already in Manchuria without delay to their positions prescribed above. Further request that arrangements and clearance be completed without delay in Peiping for the entry of above personnel and equipment into Harbin and Tsitsihar. Early notification of your acceptance of this plan will be appreciated.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Conference Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai at 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, June 10, 1946, 10:10 a. m.

Also present: Colonel Caughey
Mr. Chang

Gen. Chou opened the meeting by expressing his thanks for the airplane Gen. Marshall had provided for him. He stated the flying in Gen. Marshall's airplane was very smooth. Gen. Chou and Chairman Mao³³ both expressed thanks for the present given them.

Gen. Marshall said Gen. Chou should have his black notebook back, he imagined, about 11:00 or 12:00 o'clock, and that it would be delivered to him direct. Gen. Marshall would see that he got them, probably while he was here.

Gen. Chou thanked Gen. Marshall and stated Madame Mao also thanked him for the candy. Gen. Chou said that while in Yenan, he had a lengthy discussion with his associates, covering nearly all subjects, as far as they could, brought up by Gen. Marshall. He would first bring up a few points to be talked over and then come to the details to be covered in negotiations.

Gen. Marshall asked to interrupt a minute. Probably the greatest difficulty during negotiations would be the hesitation on both sides to commit themselves to definite proposals, one in advance of the other. It is easy to understand why that reluctance, but in view of the time factor, it is unfortunate. That was one reason he had talked at length to Gen. Chou about one phase—Communications. The other reason was, of course, the building up of some little feeling, at least, of good faith and intention.

Gen. Marshall said that he had done exactly the same thing with the Central Government people, especially regarding communications, and he hoped they would follow his advice on the matter of not holding back on proposals until they hear all of the other man's proposals. That was going to be the great difficulty, particularly where political factors relate to military decisions.

³³ Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

Gen. Chou endorsed the point Gen. Marshall had just brought up. He hoped that during the 15 days, they could solve the major questions so that hostilities could be stopped. At least, in his capacity of a negotiator, he would think this way. Therefore, Gen. Chou said, that while in Yen-an, he had discussed many points. In fact there were so many subjects to discuss, and so short a period (only 15 days) that it would be best if the scope of discussion were restricted to three points agreed upon. That which could be solved more easily, they would try to solve first. In doing so, they would increase confidence and facilitate the intermediary action of General Marshall. This would also help toward strengthening the cooperation of the parties concerned. If done this way, even if certain points could not be agreed, they would still have some formulas for others. This would diminish the danger of failure in negotiation and would help to bring success. Any other basis of discussion might involve other political matters which would make it impractical to complete our talks during the 15 days. This, of course, did not imply that political matters would or could not be brought up. Even after the 15 days are over, our discussions on political matters can continue. My suggestion [he said] was subscribed to in Yen-an. While there, I received your telegram and I paid much attention to your views.

Gen. Marshall was much gratified to hear that, and by that he was referring to his entire statement.

Gen. Chou said that now he would come to the crucial point that ought to be discussed. It was admitted that at present, there was no mutual confidence between the two parties and that actually, mutual confidence had been destroyed. In order to restore this mutual confidence, 15 days would certainly not be enough time. The one thing that we could depend upon was the following two factors: first, trying to approach detailed problems one by one and then go on to another; and second, the efforts of Gen. Marshall as a mediator toward increasing the possibility of cooperation between the two parties.

Gen. Chou said that this raises a new problem. It would be recalled that in the lengthy six-hour discussion,³⁴ Gen. Chou had indicated that during the month of May, his analysis brought up certain suspicions of American policy in China. Communists now feel that the United States rather favored the Kuomintang. This helped to a certain extent to encourage the tendency of the Kuomintang to wage civil war, at least in the Northeast.

It seemed to the Communists that there exist several contradictions in the American policy. Communists saw this on the one hand, but on the other hand, they find that Gen. Marshall is working toward

³⁴ June 3, p. 950.

establishing peace. There seems to be a self-contradiction of what American policy really is. Through his explanation of the situation to Yen-an, Yen-an leaders came to believe Gen. Marshall's effort is really working toward peace. There might be drawn this conclusion: America has a two-track policy toward China. This was the conclusion Yen-an arrived at. It was also one which he had frankly told to Gen. Marshall at the last meeting.

Gen. Chou also presented certain facts on American policy in the past few months as related by Gen. Marshall. After long discussion and study, Yen-an came to the conclusion that Gen. Marshall's efforts are really working toward establishing peace in China, and that only his effort can help improve the present situation and the present relationship of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, who now distrust each other completely.

Gen. Chou said despite the fact that China's people aspire for peace, the Chinese people have no power to express themselves because they are suppressed. Gen. Marshall's effort does reflect the aspiration of the Chinese people. Therefore, after lengthy contemplation, he found it necessary to tell Gen. Marshall very frankly what the Communist view is. It may be that Gen. Marshall would not agree to what he was going to present but at least he would know what the subcommittee of the Chinese Communist Party is thinking. This would help to provide a solid basis for his efforts as a reference.

Gen. Chou said Yen-an thought that since the outbreak of the Manchurian conflicts and the hostilities in China proper, Yen-an was led to believe that regardless of the concessions Gen. Marshall would make for the sake of peace, the Kuomintang would never feel satisfied. Yen-an felt that under the pretext of taking over sovereignty in the Northeast, the Kuomintang would want to control all the large cities and the main communication lines. Then they would drive the Communist forces to a corner in Manchuria. As to China proper, they would, under the name of reopening communications, take control of the eight railroad lines in North China, thereby forcing the Communists to the rural areas. Then the Kuomintang can demonstrate that they have accomplished unification and they would advocate peace. In case the Communist Party would object to such terms, the Kuomintang would claim that the Communist Party is actually demanding civil war. By that time, because of talk about reorganizing Government to include other parties, they can even call a National Assembly. This could be done regardless of whether the Communists would attend it or not. This National Assembly would then adopt a constitution to display to the world that China has become a democracy and thereby obtain assistance abroad. The next effort would be to suppress Communists in the rural areas. This is the picture that

the Kuomintang would like to depict when they are working toward civil war.

Gen. Marshall asked, "Do you mean that is the picture the Kuomintang had in mind?" Gen. Chou replied: Yes.

Gen. Chou said that another possibility is that the Kuomintang would dictate such harsh terms for restoring peace, terms which if accepted by the Communist Party would cause it to be eliminated by peaceful means. For example, in Manchuria if the Kuomintang can control all large cities and key communications lines, then they can wipe out Communists in rural areas as bandits. In China proper, they would employ secret police and railroad troops to hold railroad lines and highways, thus dividing Communist areas into pieces. In this way, the Kuomintang want to carry on and rule all Chinese people.

Gen. Marshall asked, "Do you mean perpetually rule?"

Gen. Chou said, "Yes." Right now the Kuomintang Government, as well as the National Assembly, are overwhelmingly dominated by Kuomintang members. They can pass any kind of transactions or regulations they desire. Even if the Communist Party should then be permitted to participate in the Government and in the National Assembly, they would have no chance to reach a compromise with the Kuomintang. The reason for this is that the Kuomintang actually reports to the Central Government. They can utilize all kinds of regulations and demand their unqualified enforcement in the different areas. By peaceful means, they can reduce the strength of the Communist Party and eventually wipe it out. This can be demonstrated by the contentions of the Kuomintang in the P. C. C., the steering committee, and the various party committees in the P. C. C., as well as the party committee or the Kuomintang itself. It is also demonstrated by actions of the Kuomintang.

Under such evaluation of the present situation, Yen-an feels that the Communist Party is placed in a difficult position. What Communists wish for is peace and democracy. However, the prevailing situation is that the danger of civil war is aggravated every day. This compels us to restraint. It seems that under the present rule of the Kuomintang, it is impossible to obtain a true peace and democracy. The Communist Party feels that the only way out is to resist any attack from the Kuomintang. China's Communist Party has sustained itself during the past twenty years through armed fighting in China. It has grown up under such a situation so that if the Kuomintang attack us, Communists would again resist. If they make advances, Communists will make advances at some other point. If the Kuomintang would promise to give up ground, then Communists would do the same. If the Kuomintang gave up fighting, Communists

would also give up fighting. Only in this way can we prevent the Kuomintang from obtaining their goal of implementing a civil war policy. They must comprehend the difficulty in obtaining that goal and then direct their efforts toward peace. This is the situation that has been prevailing during the past two months—that is in April and May.

Gen. Chou said that of course he could very clearly see those incidents in Nanking. He had also duly reported to Yen-an whatever he saw. It appeared that all the actions of the Kuomintang were in preparation for war. For example, during the 15 days of Cease Fire, the Kuomintang were going to call a military conference, a financial conference and a food conference which are being convened. The propaganda conference was just finished. A communication conference will be called soon. Particularly, the military and food conferences show clearly the Kuomintang intention that as soon as the 15 days had expired, they would be ready for large scale fighting.

That could also be seen in the statement of Gen. Tu Li Ming in the Northeast which was published in the field [the] day after this agreement became effective. In that statement, he repeated one which had also been circulated in Chungking saying that the Communists have made a four-point decision. Gen. Chou said Gen. Tu claimed practically all the large cities in the Northeast, demanding that the Communists withdraw from those cities. He had mentioned the names of many cities in that statement. This showed that they were still intending to put the Communist Party in a corner, or else the Communists would have to accept the harsh terms they proposed. That attitude is an intention for carrying out the war. Therefore, they came to the belief that if past circumstances should be continued, then instead of the situation improving, it would only deteriorate.

When they were discussing this in Yen-an, they felt that it was, just as General Marshall had stated, time for commencement of mutual confidence. They would make a start for the settlement of outstanding problems one by one. They would give a new trial to cooperation between the two parties. Such a situation would require a trustworthy individual who could mediate between the Communist Party and the Kuomintang. Yen-an felt that Gen. Marshall's efforts would still be needed in that work. Therefore, Yen-an had conceived two means for coping with the situation: First, in order to eventually secure cooperation in certain things between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, it would be desirable to first secure cooperation between the Chinese Communist Party and the United States as a bridge. For example in the railways and the coal mines they would first secure American cooperation in the Communist area so as to determine if Communists were willing to restore communications and to restore

production and to testify as to their ability to run such enterprises. Then as a next step they would connect the railways of the Communist area with the Government areas.

Second, as the present situation could not be altered within one or two months, or even 15 days, and as the army reorganization plan would require 18 months for completion of which 4 months had expired, there were still four months of required work on that problem. Such a long transitional period would require a long stay of Gen. Marshall in China so that the relation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party could be improved and a basis for cooperation established.

If instead of adopting those two measures, they should try to solve all problems by direct contact between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, Gen. Chou was afraid that there were no means to restore mutual confidence. If one or two problems were solved, new complications would arise. For example, if they did not get provoked by the action of the opposite party, it would be all right. If the provocation on the one side would continue, restraint on the other party could not last long and some day counter-action would be taken. Therefore, they had to find some intermediary measures to stop the war. He said that was what he wanted to say as an introduction to detailed problems.

Gen. Marshall said that naturally he was very much interested in what Gen. Chou had just stated. As to the actions or statements of certain generals, he thought that was to be expected. He recognized, and he thought Gen. Chou should recognize, that there were some military leaders who look to a settlement only by military means. When they give public expression to that, it was most unfortunate. The same thing applied to certain phases of propaganda. Nobody had clean hands on that. Gen. Marshall had endeavored to quiet the outbreaks and he had acted just as vigorously on the Government side as he had on the Communist Party side—possibly more so. The question of suppression of newspapers had been gone into at great length. He would talk to Gen. Chou about that in detail at some later date.

In relation to Gen. Chou's comments on the general intentions of the Kuomintang Party, he might say that he talked to, with frequency recently, several of the leaders. Gen. Marshall found them very seriously considering the most practical approach to a final solution politically. The trouble was that while the bitter fighting was going on, they could not put forward with any hope of success, a policy of moderation and adjustment.

Regarding the United States and Gen. Marshall personally, Gen. Chou should understand that there was just as deep a feeling against

Gen. Marshall on the part of a considerable portion of the Kuomintang as there was against him on the part of the Communists, and maybe more bitter. He accepted it as inevitable and was proceeding to do the best he could under the circumstances. It might interest Gen. Chou to know informally that he had never explained those two phases of the situation to the United States Government. He did not want to bother them with such details. Although, they were plagued by questions from the American press in the United States—searching questions. It was entirely a two-sided affair. The hope in his mind was that there were a sufficient number of individuals on each side to take a long view of the situation and to suppress their own personal feelings of resentment.

Gen. Chou said that Gen. Marshall's comments were very good. Despite the fact that there were misunderstandings by both parties as to the role of Gen. Marshall, he thought that there was an even larger share on the Kuomintang side. It seemed natural to Gen. Chou that some misunderstanding would exist, but he wanted Gen. Marshall to know that the Communist Party had full confidence that Gen. Marshall was really working for restoring peace in China. As to their point that one should have a long range policy, that subject was also under discussion at Yen-an. Yen-an came to the view that it was not an easy task to realize peace and democracy in China and therefore it needed the greatest tolerance and incessant efforts. It could not be secured by the P. C. C. decisions alone, but would have to be carried out step by step in order that they may eventually achieve peace and democracy. It was with that in mind that he had just referred to the necessity of securing cooperation from American individuals who were for a peace in China. They hoped that Gen. Marshall would stay in China for a long time. They came to that conclusion by taking a long view of the situation.

As to other views, there are sufficient number of individuals there, he agreed on that point. Though there were many individuals in the Government, they may not always be thinking in the same way. Powers varied with the different persons. Some of Government representatives were empowered with authority and some were not. Regardless of who the Government representative was, Communists would try to approach the problems one by one and through Gen. Marshall would try to agree to some measures. A great deal would depend on implementation of those measures. Gen. Chou therefore asked that since he concurs with the idea of attacking the problems one by one, was it Gen. Marshall's view that they would first deal with the communications problem, then go to detailed arrangements for the cessation of hostilities and follow that by going to the army reorganization.

Gen. Marshall said that was his view. He had talked at great length with Gen. Yu Ta Wei regarding communications and Col. Hill had given him several papers. He thought the thing to do was to immediately start conferences on that and see how far they could get towards agreement on matters of particular disagreement, and Gen. Marshall could come into that phase of the discussion. In other words, find out how much it is they agree to and then specify what is disagreed to. Do that directly. Then he said he would do his best on the disagreements. Whether or not it was best for Col. Hill to talk to Gen. Chou first before Gen. Chou saw Gen. Yu Ta Wei he did not know. He asked Gen. Chou what he thought.

Gen. Chou said he thought it would be best if he saw Col. Hill in the afternoon and then he would see Gen. Yu Ta Wei in the evening.

Gen. Marshall said he would notify Col. Hill accordingly. He asked Gen. Chou if he had come to any conclusions regarding the problems for the restoration of communications.

Gen. Chou said that regarding the repair work of the railways, he was debating whether or not they should consult the American technical personnel as an initial step in the Communist areas. As to the operation and administration, he tends to be in favor of regarding all the railroads as concerning both Chinese parties. Those railroads would be put under the Transportation Section of Executive Headquarters so that that section would not only be supervisory but would actually run those railroads from the point of starting the repair work until the traffic was established—during the transitional period.

Gen. Marshall thought that so far as Executive Headquarters was concerned, those functions of control should be restricted to controls to whatever extent was necessary in order to reassure the Communists. For example, that the restored railway would not be utilized to the disadvantage of the Communists. That was an example of the type of control he thought Executive Headquarters should have. The actual performance of the work—the direction of its personnel problems and all—he thought would be entirely too heavy a burden on Executive Headquarters but that it could effectively exercise a protective role through supervision.

Gen. Marshall said the problem of highways, it seemed to him, was important for early solution. He examined that quite carefully the past four days. He found several conflicting situations. He thought that in some places, certain Government generals would be opposed to an immediate opening up of highways; meaning all types of roads—trails, cart tracks, broad highways—because they feared the Communist method of infiltration of small groups to bring up a force in one particular area by the process of a few individuals at a time. On the other hand, he thought in some cases you would encounter Com-

munist resistance because by closing the highways they prevented the movement of, say, rice to other districts, or to the relief of cities. It appeared to Gen. Marshall very important to open up highways at as early a date as possible. He could not find just what objection there was to reopening of the postal service and the censorship. He might be wrong, but he thought the difficulties in these matters had been more of misunderstanding than they had been of a deliberate policy. His impression was that there should be no great difficulties in rather quickly reaching an agreement on contentious points. Gen. Marshall said he would endeavor to get in touch with Col. Hill that morning and have him communicate to Mr. Chang regarding an appointment for the afternoon.

Now as to the other phases of the agreement to be reached—*a* and *c*. He did not think that the agreement for the immediate cessation of hostilities should be so very difficult to arrive at, but only if the real difficulties are in effect transferred to a special portion of the detailed agreement under paragraph *c*, which related to the reorganization and redistribution of the military forces. What he had in mind for the most expeditious procedure for conferences during the 15-day period was as follows: That they make detailed terms for immediate cessation of hostilities in Manchuria as simple as possible, leaving the execution largely to the Executive Headquarters established in Changchun. He said he sent word to Gen. Byroade two days ago that he would like him to do the following if he could secure local agreements for the procedure. First, to survey the situation so that he might know himself what the difficulties would probably be, where the critical spots would be, and then to establish immediately but not operate detached posts at various focal points.

Gen. Marshall mentioned in his message to Gen. Byroade, "for example, Harbin, Kirin, Anshan, Yingkow, etc., etc.," there to establish a team at each of those places. If there was objection to a National officer going to Harbin or to a Communist officer going to Kirin, at the present time, then to secure permission to establish an American in each of those places, have his communications all set up, and his local contacts all made in advance. Then the teams could be deployed from those points into action quickly to carry out details of a general agreement. In that way, Gen. Marshall thought there would be a set-up well prepared for action, in complete contrast to the situation on January 11th in Peiping, when they started to establish a headquarters with no communications, radio or road or airplane, no teams and trouble everywhere.

Gen. Marshall said that for the new situation, he wanted to see the complete network established which would permit a very quick adjustment of the troop situation without delays of waiting to go here or

waiting to go there. They would already be on the ground in the immediate vicinity of those places and their transportation already in there. Such a network would permit a rather simple basis of agreement. If the agreement could be written in such a form that both sides would be agreeable to the decisions determined locally.

An instance parallel to that is a general detailed agreement regarding the readjustments of armed forces in Manchuria during the next six months. That should be a special annex to the general agreement of February 25th for the Reorganization of the Armed Forces. That detailed agreement, as General Marshall visualized it, should cover monthly periods for the first three months. Thereafter quarterly periods of three months each. Gen. Marshall regarded it as very important during the first three months to have it for periods of one month to avoid situations that might lead to further fighting. That part of the agreements to be reached, Gen. Marshall thought, was the most difficult of all, far more difficult than that pertaining to communications and very much more difficult than that pertaining to the bare cessation of hostilities. Yet, to Gen. Marshall's mind, it is a most essential part of the whole consideration. In the reconsideration of the total strength in Manchuria, Gen. Marshall saw no great difficulties. They could reach agreements on that, but the periods month by month for the first three months was most delicate.

Gen. Marshall's thought that they should proceed immediately with the communications problem, try to conclude a general agreement on that as quickly as possible, and try to clear certain of its phases without further delay. Gen. Marshall regarded that as important in the way of restoring confidence. The Communists must concede some things and the Government must concede certain things quickly in order to develop confidence toward the more difficult matters to be settled later. He had already talked about that and he would not repeat himself.

As to the cessation of hostilities, Gen. Marshall did not think it should be very difficult if machinery were already established for carrying it out. As they proceed from one thing to another, they should also talk about final reorganization and redistribution matters and try to reach as many agreements as possible. When they reach a dispute, they should turn to something that they could work on such as the cessation of hostilities draft. That would be following the procedure they had in Chungking.

At that point, Gen. Marshall handed Gen. Chou a copy of the message sent to Gen. Byroade.³⁵

Gen. Chou said that the procedure outlined by Gen. Marshall was

³⁵ See telegram No. 843, June 7, p. 992.

agreeable to him. Regarding the restoration of communications, Gen. Chou would contact Col. Hill that afternoon. Gen. Chou wanted to call Gen. Marshall's attention to administration which Gen. Chou was rather afraid he would not be able to reach agreement on with the Ministry of Communications directly. Therefore, he came to the conclusion of putting it under the Executive Headquarters.

With regard to cessation of hostilities, Gen. Chou concurred with the message Gen. Marshall sent Gen. Byroade. He would convey the same idea to the Communist representative in Manchuria. Gen. Chou suggested letting the people now in Manchuria collect reports from both parties as to where forces are or were on June 7th. The Nationalists would report on where their troops were and the Communists would report on places they garrisoned. Of course, there would be some conflicts between reports of the two parties, but reports would at least give some basis for later investigation in case of dispute.

Regarding the army reorganization problem, Gen. Chou agreed that they should talk about the matters one by one. As to the strength of Communist forces in Manchuria, Gen. Chou had gotten some data on his recent trip to Yen-an but it was prepared on April 16. Since that date, more fighting had taken place so that the data again was out of date. It was hard for Communists to conduct investigations about the real strengths because of poor communications. That would necessitate somebody being sent up to study on the spot the Communist forces. Therefore, while Gen. Chou was working on the procedure arrangement of the army reorganization, he would have need to send somebody to the Communist areas in Manchuria to collect data. In case the field team went to Harbin, of course the data can be secured by the Communist member there.

Gen. Marshall queried Gen. Chou as to whether or not he had any objection to putting a field team into Harbin. Gen. Chou said in principle he had always favored the dispatch of field teams to Harbin as soon as fighting had stopped. He would again report the idea to Yen-an and at the same time he would inquire about the condition of the air field. He did not think there was any way to go to Harbin except by air.

Gen. Marshall said he had another question regarding Gen. Byroade's set-up in Changchun. In order to get the Generalissimo's agreement to the immediate dispatch of the Advance Section to Changchun, he stipulated that if [*it*] not begin to function until they had determined the terms for the cessation of hostilities. Gen. Marshall accepted that rather than have any delays. He now found himself in this embarrassment. There are four teams in Manchuria who were supposed to operate under the terms of the agreement of March 27th which stipulated the mission would pertain solely to the readjust-

ment of military matters and that the teams would proceed to points of conflict or close contact between the Government and the Communist troops to bring about cessation of fighting and to make necessary and fair readjustments. Those two provisions are sufficient for the time being for the operation of the teams in Manchuria. The trouble was that under the present agreement of the Generalissimo, Gen. Byroade's headquarters could not function so teams were being directed from clear back in Peiping.

He received a message this morning from Gen. Byroade which was dispatched to Team 27 in Mukden, to the Commissioners in Peiping and also to him.³⁶

"Gen. Liao,³⁷ 6th Army, called tonight (the 9th) to report for a second time that large scale attacks are being launched by the Communist troops in the Lafa area 40 miles east of Kirin. Reports attack was launched at 15 hours on the 7th by one regiment, but is now grown to two infantry regiments and one artillery regiment. This location (Lafa) has already been recommended to the three commissioners as the initial station of a team now being sent to Manchuria. In view of the foregoing report, I am sending Col. Tabscott³⁸ as an American observer immediately to that area (Lafa). It is planned to replace him as quickly as one of the other teams arrives. I request this situation be made the subject of a special meeting by Team 27 in Mukden and that Gen. Liao³⁹ be requested to have this action investigated immediately."

Gen. Marshall said he would like to get from the Generalissimo that afternoon his agreement to Gen. Byroade's handling these teams under the terms of the March 27 agreement rather than have them handled from Peiping. He asked if that was agreeable to Gen. Chou? Gen. Marshall said that previously they were defeated by the political factors, but that at the present time the teams could really operate effectively under the March 27 agreement.

Gen. Chou said that he thought that as soon as the Generalissimo would agree to Gen. Marshall's proposal, the teams could immediately go ahead to implement the March 27th directive. Regarding the Lafa incident, Gen. Chou had wired Yen-an immediately. While in Yen-an he had received the memorandum⁴⁰ Gen. Marshall sent him. On the other hand, Gen. Chou was not sure who had occupied Lafa—whether the Government troops took it from the Communists or whether the Government troops had ever occupied Lafa. It might

³⁶ Not printed.

³⁷ Lt. Gen. Liao Yao-hsiang, Commander of the Chinese Government's New 6th Army.

³⁸ Reference is to Col. Raymond R. Tourtillott, who was senior American officer at Changchun, after Brigadier General Byroade.

³⁹ Gen. Yao Shu-shih was the senior officer of the Chinese Communist branch of the Advance Section of Executive Headquarters at Changchun.

⁴⁰ OSE 139, June 9, p. 1006.

be that the Government occupied Lafa after noon on June 7th which caused the Communists to counter-attack or, possibly, the place had never been abandoned by the Communists. However, the best way to settle such a situation was to get a field team dispatched there.

Gen. Marshall said he would contact Col. Hill to have him see Gen. Chou.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

General Marshall to Colonel Marshall S. Carter

NANKING, 10 June 1946.

865. I think you should know the reasons behind recent heavy Communist propaganda attack against U. S. and me personally. Extended absence of Generalissimo in Mukden and Peiping while his armies hasten their advances in Manchuria, this occurring just as I had brought the two sides to the verge of an agreement, enraged Communists and what was much more serious aroused a deep suspicion in their minds that I was favoring the Government side and was a party to the delay caused by the Generalissimo's prolonged absence while his armies capitalized their success to the south of Changchun. Incidentally, use of my plane added to Communist belief but he used plane on my urging for safety reason and because Madame Chiang was ill, yet he insisted on her accompanying him.

To add fat to the fire Generalissimo then made demand for agreement that the Americans on teams, at Executive Headquarters and finally for me on Committee of Three have authority to make final decision in case of all disagreement. To offset approval this proposition might gain from American public the Communist concentrated propaganda attack resulted, but it was hatched before the 15-day proposition has been broached. The Communist are now inclined to accept me on old terms of confidence but much harm has been done. Incidentally I would have to be very careful of Soviet reactions against U. S. Government if I were given power of decision on highest level which though military would necessarily involve the final word regarding some of the most delicate questions concerning the reorganization of local and provincial government in Manchuria.

I would not risk this information through normal radio or office channels but I pass it to you for limited use as seems best in your judgment. It might be well to tip Shepley⁴¹ off, though this is questionable. However, you are on the ground and you know the reactions: State Department, press and radio, and maybe political part.

⁴¹ James R. Shepley, former member of General Marshall's staff in China.

Chou is back from Yen-an and negotiations are proceeding initially in favorable manner.

Another subject: Convey my congratulation to the Chief Justice.⁴² Tell him I will miss his influence in NAC. Notify Baruch⁴³ that I am writing him a letter regarding Atomic questions he asked. Take occasion to remark to Dean Acheson⁴⁴ and Vincent that I am deeply sensible to the complete backing they are giving me in every way, small embassy or consulate business, funds, etc., etc. This is a hell of a problem but we will lick it yet, pessimists to the contrary notwithstanding.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Hsu Yung-chang to General Marshall

[NANKING,] 10 June 1946.

DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: Your Memorandum OSE 101, dated 30 May 1946,⁴⁵ with two inclosures was received. However, regarding the final authority of American representatives in items 1, 2 and 3 in the second inclosure (Agreement to Insure the More Expeditious Functioning of Executive Headquarters,⁴⁶) you have not empowered yourself with that authority. The Generalissimo still wishes you to refer to the 4th item in the first inclosure (Generalissimo's letter to you dated 28 May⁴⁷) regarding the final authority and that you should be empowered with such authority. It is contemplated that this point be added into your proposal "Agreement to Insure More Expeditious Functioning of Executive Headquarters."

This letter is to notify you of the above and hope you will favor it with consent. Also, a copy of this letter has been sent to General Chou En-lai.

HSU YUNG CHANG (SEAL)

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Hsu Yung-chang to General Marshall

[NANKING,] 10 June 1946.

DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: This is to notify you that in my conversation with you yesterday afternoon (9th June) you contemplated to amend slightly, items (a) and (c) in the proposed "Agreement to

⁴² Fred Vinson, formerly Secretary of the Treasury.

⁴³ Bernard Baruch, "elder statesman" and financier.

⁴⁴ Under Secretary of State.

⁴⁵ Not printed.

⁴⁶ May 30, p. 914.

⁴⁷ *Ante*, p. 907.

Insure the More Expeditious Functioning of Executive Headquarters".⁴⁸

The Generalissimo's opinion is that except the words "and decisions covering the local situation" in item (c) may be altered, item (a) should remain the same as you originally proposed without any change.

Hsu Yung Chang (SEAL)

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Minutes of Conference Between General Marshall and General Hsu Yung-chang at WASC*⁴⁹ Auditorium, June 11, 1946, 10 a. m.

General Hsu referred to General Marshall's memorandum concerning operations of the advance section of Executive Headquarters (see inclosure No. 1⁵⁰). General Hsu said that the Generalissimo preferred to wait until the fifteen days were over before permitting it to operate since he (The Generalissimo) was seriously concerned about the Communist attack of [on?] Lafa and also in other parts of China. In this connection General Hsu stated that he had already sent orders to General Tu Li-ming ordering him to remain strictly on the defensive.

General Marshall pointed out that the terms of the 27 March agreement for operation of field teams in Manchuria fit the present situation perfectly, and he again stated that his sole concern was, in the interest of administrative efficiency, to permit the advance section to operate the field teams rather than Executive Headquarters operate the teams from Peiping. General Marshall pointed out that the advance section could maintain more effective control and would be in a better position to issue instructions to field teams. General Hsu hung onto the Generalissimo's decision and stated that the operation of the advance section might be ineffective judging from past experiences. He made particular reference to the situation near Yinchow which was recently captured by the Communists; the incident occurring on the 9th where Communists destroyed a bridge over the grand canal; Communist activity in Shantung Province along the Pukow railroad; Communist activity in south Hopei Province. General Hsu reiterated that the Generalissimo did not wish the advance section to operate during these fifteen days. General Marshall stated that the reason he brought up

⁴⁸ May 30, p. 914.

⁴⁹ National Military Council.

⁵⁰ OSE 144, June 10, not printed.

this matter was in the interest of the New Sixth Army commander, who had appealed to General Byroade to take action with respect to the Lafa incident. However, now in view of the Generalissimo's attitude, he was placed in the embarrassing position of having to tell General Byroade that he could do nothing.

General Marshall continued by stating that he had been anticipating for some time, possibly ten days, Communist attacks against National troops in retaliation for continued National Government advances in Manchuria north of Changchun.

General Marshall summed up by asking General Hsu to make clear to the Generalissimo the following points:

1) Operation of teams in Manchuria under the terms of the 27 March agreement would be more effective than operating these teams from Peiping as is now authorized.

2) The question came up as a result of the urgent appeal of a National Commander.

3) General Byroade had tried to help.

4) He (General Marshall) felt it necessary to take the matter up with the Generalissimo in view of the Generalissimo's injunction in his 6 June letter.

5) The 27 March agreement fits the present situation.

6) If the Generalissimo cannot approve, he (General Marshall) would have to inform General Byroade not to take any action but instead Peiping Headquarters would be left to take long range action.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270: Telegram

General Marshall to Mr. Walter S. Robertson, at Peiping

[NANKING,] 11 June 1946.

866. Please contact Doctor Leighton Stuart⁵¹ of Yenching University and see if he would be willing to come to Nanking for a week or 10 days, to assist me quietly by influencing certain Chinese officials of his acquaintance to a more moderate or tolerant point of view during current negotiations.

I am requesting such services of several others: Frank Price,⁵² Doctor Wu Yi-fang of Ginling College, General Li⁵³ of Army Medical Corps. W. P. Mills⁵⁴ suggested Dr. Stuart's name. I would provide transportation. Arrival here would have to be during next 5 days.

⁵¹ American President of Yenching University, Peiping.

⁵² Dr. Price had been American adviser to President Chiang Kai-shek.

⁵³ Maj. Gen. Chen-pien Li, M. D., Director of the Serum Institute of the Chinese Ministry of War.

⁵⁴ Dr. Mills was head of the American missionary group at Nanking.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Memorandum by General Chou En-lai to General Marshall*⁵⁵

NANKING, June 11, 1946.

MY DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: I have received a letter from Mr. O. J. Todd, adviser of Yellow River Commission, asking me to investigate the Lu Wang Fen incident. Meanwhile I was told that he had informed you about it as well.

A thorough investigation carried by our side reveals that the incident was brought about by the impertinent actions of some lower level officers who had been ignorant of the agreement reached on the control of Yellow River. For this unfortunate incident I deeply apologize. While instructing them to release without delay and send back under protection the 15 people detained, I have issued severe order to the responsible organs to punish the wrong-doers and to guarantee the non-recurrence of similar incident henceforth, and a full cooperation in pursuit of the previous Agreement.

[Signature in Chinese]
(CHOU EN-LAI)

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Chen Cheng to General Marshall

No. 402

[NANKING,] 11 June 1946.

According to Radio report from Gen. Tu Li Ming: (1) Since 1500 hours, 7 June, our defending force, principal body of 88th Division at Lafa⁵⁶ and Chiutzan were surrounded and fiercely attacked by Communist 2nd Brigade and 1st Division about 20,000 strong coming from Tuen-Tu rail line. Bitter fighting was still in progress at noon on 8th June. (2) at 1600 hours, 7th June, our force at Wu-Ke-Shu⁵⁷ was fiercely attacked by 400 to 500 Communist Party Troops from Yu-Shu-Hsien. Three of our men were captured. (3) At 1500 hours, 7 June, Communist troops, the 21st Brigade, 61st Regiment in the vicinity of Tao-Lai-Sho and Ha-La-Hai:-Chen-Tze⁵⁸ fiercely attacked our defending units. At 2300 hours, Communist troops were reinforced by over 1000 men. (4) Various units of our Army now are remaining at their original positions. Your attention to the above is requested.

CHEN CHENG (SEAL)
General CA
Army Chief of Staff

⁵⁵ General Marshall repeated this message to J. Franklin Ray, American acting Director of the China Office, United Nations Rehabilitation and Relief Agency (UNRRA).

⁵⁶ Notation on file copy: "50 mi[les] east of Kirin".

⁵⁷ Notation on file copy: "50 mi[les] north of Kirin".

⁵⁸ Notation on file copy: "50 mi[les] N[orth] W[est] of Changchun".

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

General Marshall to Mr. Walter S. Robertson, at Peiping

[NANKING,] 12 June 1946.

877. Yeh ⁵⁹ informs Chou that Nationalist in Operations [Division] stated Tu Li-ming will resume advance, attack, pursuit on 10th and then withdrew from meeting. Is this a fact? Rush reply.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chou
En-lai at 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, June 12, 1946, 10:10 a. m.*

Also present: Colonel Caughey
Mr. Chang
Captain Soong

General Marshall opened the meeting by telling General Chou he would give him carbon copies of notes on these meetings with General Chou as soon as they were typed in final form. Several sets of minutes were still in the rough, though most of the notes had been checked. There was still one long one of a six-hour meeting to be checked.

General Marshall said he first wanted to speak to General Chou about certain aggressive actions in North China—Tehsien, Tsian, and Kaomi. An attack at Tehsien was launched on the 7th by the Communists. A United States officer endeavoring to control the fighting was fired upon vigorously at 500 yards and driven back into the compound, which at last report was under heavy mortar fire. The attack at Tsian was reported to a field team by the Communist commander and the team was forbidden radio communication. At Kaomi the American assistant member, the senior member of the team being in Peiping, reported heavy fighting—the Communists blowing up bridges and railroads both east and west of town. Another American officer attempting to leave the area was turned back by the Communist forces 12 miles east of Kaomi. The Communists now surround the village. The Communist commander would not guarantee safe passage.

The National Government reported to Mr. Robertson attacks along the rail line between Tsinan and Tsingtao, at Changtien, Wei Hsien and at Chiao Hsien. Americans have no confirmation of these reports. At the Tsaochuang coal mine the situation is serious. In Jehol and at Lingyuan, an American member of Team 11 while in town was attacked twice. He conferred with the Communist commander, Ta Chen Tze, who refused to recognize the application of General Directive #2.⁶⁰ The Nationalist Government reported at Yung Nien on

⁵⁹ Gen. Yeh Chien-ying, Chinese Communist Commissioner of the Executive Headquarters at Peiping.

⁶⁰ January 20, issued by Executive Headquarters, Peiping, not printed.

10 June that an attack was under way. That has not been confirmed by an American member of Team 31, though he has reported that for the last 10 days a preparation was being made for a Communist attack. A radio just received from Team 7 at Tsinan states that a message received from Chen Yi ⁶¹ at Communist headquarters at Lin Yi, answering an inquiry of the team, states

“National Government since 10 May has concentrated large forces in the Winan District of Central China. Many big towns, including Tingyuan, Koskin[*sic*], and Tachiao Shung have been taken. The Nationalists are now planning mopping up drives. Many protests have proven unsuccessful. The Tsao Chuang incident, wherein a Communist team member and interpreter have been badly beaten by puppet troops is unsettled. The Communists are forced to take necessary action for self defense”.

General Marshall had also received a report from General Yu Ta Wei ⁶² that a bridge over the Grand Canal had been blown out on the evening of the 8th. It will take 22 days to repair it. He received General Chou's note ⁶³ regarding the statement of the Nationalist representative in the Operations Division of Peiping Headquarters regarding General Tu Li-ming's intentions on June 10. General Marshall thought it referred to a telegram from General Tu Li-ming that he saw on the 8th, a telegram which reported fighting at Lafa and stating that if the Communist attacks did not cease, he would take retaliatory action. He took that up with the Generalissimo immediately through General Hsu and Dr. Soong and was assured that two messages had been sent to Tu Li-ming to calm him down. This morning, he sent another message to General Hsu and also a memorandum to Dr. Soong regarding the Peiping incident General Chou just reported.

General Marshall assumed that the attacks at Lafa and at the points in North China just mentioned, were ordered before the arrangement of 6 June had been agreed. What disturbs General Marshall greatly is what has occurred later on the 8th and on the 9th and even the 10th. When he endeavored to go over the outline of the Government's proposals yesterday at Army Headquarters, he found himself in a meeting where the reports of fighting on the 9th and 10th, and particularly the destructions, had all but stopped him from any prospect of success in conducting negotiations. Especially was this true where he felt that the proposed terms by the Government had to be moderated. He had been very positive, or emphatic, regarding General Tu Li-ming

⁶¹ Chinese Communist commanding area in Shantung.

⁶² Chinese Minister of Communications.

⁶³ Not printed.

two days before and then he was confronted with this series of events of Communist aggressive action two days later.

General Chou said that he had read about these incidents in the papers day before yesterday and yesterday. He wired Yen-an on these matters and received reports on some of them. Events had happened in the following way: prior to the 6th and 7th the Government side had made certain preparations. Even on the 7th actions had been taken. For example, last night he sent General Marshall a note regarding the fighting North of Nanking. About 30 miles away, Government troops had taken aggressive action against the captured Laian city and on the 8th and 9th, with continued drives at Tienchang on the 8th and 9th and even the 10th. In the area in Kiangsu and Anhwei, both sides of the railroads are under control of the Communists' New Fourth Army, which governs also the Tingyuan area. Part of the New Fourth Army had been driven back by the Nationalists. Fighting around Tingyuan had been going on for more than one month. The field team did not come to the spot to investigate. Following occupation of Tingyuan area by Kuomintang troops, there was a systematic purge conducted among the 600,000 village inhabitants. To the south of Hsuechow on the Lunghai railway, two towns were captured by Nationalists and no field team was sent to the area. In the Tsaochuang area, where a Communist representative and an interpreter were badly beaten, no settlement had yet been reached. All of these incidents led the New Fourth Army to take retaliatory action as previously explained. At the same time, puppet troops garrisoning various points where fighting is now taking place, are continuing provocative actions. This is a direct cause of retaliatory actions.

As to these retaliatory actions, General Chou sent several telegrams to stop them, even before his departure from Yen-an. The incident which took place to the North of Nanking from the 7th to the 10th led directly to retaliation by Communist forces in Shantung. Conflicts have not yet been stopped in China proper. General Chou told General Yu Ta Wei he would not let conflicts influence their negotiations. Last night, General Hsu told General Chou that hostilities should be stopped but, at the same time, it was important to solve all the outstanding issues. In event these issues were solved, hostilities would be stopped almost automatically. Therefore, he wired Yen-an to transmit orders to the New Fourth Army in Kiangsu, Shantung and Anhwei to stop all conflicts and to wait for a peaceful settlement. The Communist forces should, of course, obey such orders. The Nationalist side should take the same attitude, particularly with reference to the area north of Nanking and the area west of the Tientsin-Pukow rail-

way, the Tingyuan area and also to the south of the Lunghai. Puppet troops in Shantung should take no further provocative action. In the meantime, he was contemplating the proposal of General Yu Ta Wei that the eastern section of the Lunghai railway and the Tientsin-Pukow railway, and the Tsinan-Tsingtao railway be repaired in the initial stage of reopening communications.

General Marshall asked the meaning of the initial stage.

General Chou explained he meant in the first period. Those three railways run through areas where conflicts are now taking place. If arrangements can be worked out with reference to those railways, it would help toward minimizing conflicts. General Yu assured him that during the time of repair no attack will be made. General Chou had assured him he would like the railways to be repaired as quickly as possible. Regarding Colonel Hill's draft, General Yu Ta Wei said they would take this as a reference. General Chou had found certain points which are very applicable—very suitable—and this evening he would present his final views to Colonel Hill. General Chou would like to see Colonel Hill at 8:00 o'clock. At the same time, he would work out a detailed plan with regard to General Yu Ta Wei's suggestion concerning repair of the three railways.

General Chou explained the Northeast situation. On the day before his departure, General Marshall showed him the letter of the Generalissimo.⁶⁴ He particularly noticed, and so told Yen-an, that no action should be taken around Haicheng in South Manchuria which would cause new complications. On coming back to Nanking, General Chou sent a message to Manchuria through Peiping. According to the report he received from Peiping, Haicheng City itself was occupied by Government troops who were continuing to mop up neighboring areas. The attack on two nearby townlets lasted even to 10 June.

As to Lafa, some action might be underway because there is no radio communication with that point. It is probable that the order of 6 June had not reached them in time. There might be the possibility that Lafa had not been evacuated by the Communists and that Nationalists tried to take it. General Chou had read from a newspaper that yesterday General Tu Li Ming approached the Communist representatives of the Advance Section demanding Communist evacuation from Lafa at noon of 12 June or otherwise he would take retaliatory action.

Hostilities in Manchuria should be stopped. As to ways of stopping hostilities, General Chou agreed with General Marshall's suggestion that the Advance Section in Changchun start operations im-

⁶⁴ June 6, p. 984.

mediately and that teams be sent to Lafa, Harbin, Haicheng, Kirin and other places to implement the stipulations of the March 27th agreement. General Hsu agreed in principle with such a procedure and had also expressed a desire that instead of trying to reach an over-all solution on all the outstanding matters at one time, they should solve them one by one. As soon as he had worked out some arrangement with General Yu Ta Wei on the repair work of three railways, he may immediately send some official to Shantung to work out detailed arrangements with General Chen Yi. This task would not need to be delayed until the end of the 15-day cease fire.

The same procedure would apply to Manchuria. In the first place, they were working out an arrangement for the termination of hostilities and they would try to solve the matters one by one. In the second place, regarding the three proposals that would be taken up during the 15 days, they would try to solve first those problems that might be easy to solve. They would lay emphasis on military and communications problems rather than on political matters to be taken up at a later stage after the 15 days.

At this point General Marshall made some off-the-record comments. (?)

General Marshall said he would do his best to influence the Government against retaliations, but he asked General Chou particularly to give an order to all of his people to stop destruction of railways and all other destructions unless they are absolutely forced to do so by circumstances, and by forced he meant that there was no other way out of the situation. He said he could not believe that the Communist Party got anywhere by destructions. The evil results generally fell on the people and brought little return except by way of retaliation.

General Marshall said Admiral Cooke⁶⁵ had just stopped in and he had to see him for a few minutes.

General Chou said that, with regard to the Advance Section of Executive Headquarters operating in Changchun, he fully agreed with General Marshall's suggestion. General Chou had brought from Yen-an a man named Li who came from Mukden and who is prepared to go back to Changchun as soon as arrangements are made on General Marshall's suggestion that that branch will work on the basis of the March 27th agreement. He would like Li to go through Peiping and Mukden and then to Changchun so that he could explain arrangements to their people. General Chou asked whether transportation would be available as soon as arrangements were agreed upon.

Regarding reported destruction, General Chou said it was entirely self defense. Of course the Government side would not try to destroy

⁶⁵ Adm. Charles M. Cooke, Jr., Commander of the U.S. 7th Fleet.

the railways because they needed railways for troop movements. Government measures were different. They undertook to destroy rural areas and villages since communications between large cities would attract attention. Whenever destruction took place on railways, it would be immediately publicized; hence, from the propaganda point of view, it was disadvantageous to the Communists, yet destruction was done by both parties. General Chou said that he would arrange for restoration of communications to begin right away, particularly along the three lines he had referred to. This action benefits all negotiations.

General Marshall said a good bit of fighting was going on along the Tsinan-Tsingtao railroad.

General Chou stated that was reported in the newspaper.

General Marshall stated that Admiral Cooke had showed him some reports of fighting along that line. He asked what the prospects were of stopping the fighting.

General Chou said he had sent a message to Yen-an to transmit to Shantung. It may take a little time to reach them, but he thought hostilities could be stopped very quickly.

General Marshall asked if his message was sent yesterday.

General Chou explained that on day before yesterday he learned about the blowing up of the bridge over the Grand Canal and the Lafa incident. He then contacted Yen-an. Yesterday he learned from the papers about the fighting and had wired Yen-an to stop the fighting.

General Marshall stated that the message Admiral Cooke had from Tsingtao reported fighting several miles north of the city and approaching the wells upon which the city was dependent for most of its water supply.

General Chou said that he learned from the papers that morning about the fighting near Chiah-sien which was the nearest city to Tsingtao. The Central News Agency further reported that the city was retaken by Government troops. General Chou had received from Yen-an the previous day a few replies to his inquiries. One reply said that actions were taken by Communists as a counter-measure to action of puppet troops. As far as General Chou knew, Tsingtao had no puppet troops so the city would not be taken by the Communists.

General Marshall said he was asking the question because it presented the probability of a very embarrassing problem for him, one made more embarrassing to him at this particular moment. He had heard nothing from the National Government on the subject of Tsingtao, but he anticipated that if there was an advance on the city, the Government would certainly insist on sending reinforcements there which would be a very unfortunate procedure right at this time. The 54th Army was in process of moving by ship from Canton to

Shanghai. General Marshall would assume, though he had heard nothing, that if Communists were advancing on Tsingtao, the Government would insist on continuing those ships on into Tsingtao instead of into Shanghai. He repeated that he had heard nothing to that effect, but he regarded it as a very probable line of action. Therefore, he was intensely interested in nothing occurring in Shantung to give rise to such action at this time.

General Chou said he could assure General Marshall definitely that the Communists would take no action against Tsingtao and Tsinan. While General Chou was in Yen-an, he was emphatically assured of that decision because Tsinan is now the center of the Government forces in Shantung and the Government representative had recently worked out arrangements with General Chen Yi regarding transportation of food supplies into Tsingtao. Only in one case would anything occur. That was if Government troops were to take action to annihilate the 5th Division of the Communists in Hupeh. Since they now had an agreement regarding Tsinan, he felt pretty sure that nothing would happen to Tsinan or Tsingtao.

Regarding Tsingtao, that was not only a point where Government troops were staying, but was also a seaport with U. S. Marines. General Chou definitely knew that no incident would take place there. However, he would send another message to Yen-an to send to Shantung. General Chou said he would appreciate General Marshall's telling him or communicating to him any further information or reports regarding the Shantung situation.

General Marshall asked if General Chou had devoted any detailed consideration to the technique to be employed under paragraph *a* for the cessation of hostilities.⁶⁶

General Chou said during the last two days, he had mainly devoted his time to the communications problem. As he understood it, Communists had in general concurred in the functioning of the Executive Headquarters branch in Changchun. He had informed his staff officers on that matter. Regarding the dispatch of field teams to outposts, and the procedure for separating lines of opposing troops, General Chou thought General Marshall was working out some proposal.

General Marshall said he was doing that but he wanted to see if General Chou had any ideas.

General Chou said what he had in mind was that a provisional demarkation of garrison lines for the two armies should be determined, and, secondly, the troops should be separated. General Chou had asked General Hsu whether he had made any preparations, and he replied that he had not.

⁶⁶ General Marshall's draft of June 8, not printed.

General Marshall said he was working on it but the plan was not yet acceptable. He hoped soon to develop one he liked. He would talk with General Byroade tonight. He merely wanted to get a plan that was at least good enough to start with as a basis for discussion. The minute he got it in acceptable form, he said he would send General Chou a copy and also a copy to General Hsu.

General Chou did not quite understand the translation of the part about General Byroade's coming. When it was made clear to him, General Chou asked whether a man he had down here could go back with General Byroade in case an agreement could be reached.

General Marshall said it was possible but that General Byroade might go to Changchun instead of Peiping.

General Chou said that would work also.

General Marshall agreed to see General Byroade about it.

General Marshall continued regarding the redistribution of troops in Manchuria. What he was mainly concerned about now was the readjustments in the first three months. He asked if General Chou had any ideas about that.

General Chou said the primary thing to be done during the first three months, it seemed to him, was to work out a detailed plan for demobilization and to locate the points or areas at which troops that are going to be reorganized should be concentrated, by both parties.

General Marshall asked what his idea was about the redeployment—his general idea.

General Chou asked if he meant the redistribution, and General Marshall answered yes.

General Marshall interrupted to explain that Admiral Cooke was going to Tsingtao at 4:00 o'clock this afternoon and that should General Chou wish to send one of his people up there, Admiral Cooke would be glad to take him.

General Chou said yes he would like to do that.

General Chou inquired whether the man he would send up with Admiral Cooke could bring a letter along addressed to the Communist Commander. If so, as soon as he got there, he could try to get a message to the Communist Commander to go to their own areas. Could Admiral Cooke be requested to ask the Nationalists to let him go and come back?

General Marshall explained he was just talking about that.

General Chou wanted to know if Admiral Cooke would allow him to use his signal system.

General Marshall explained he was just arranging a means to get this man to the Communist Commander and get him back, realizing the danger of approaching Communist lines and returning through Nationalist lines. His suggestion was that they send him in a jeep

with a Marine and with an American flag on it to the Communist Commander and bring him back.

General Chou stated that to make it safe it would be better to send over a letter first by a civilian, a local person, and to get a reply before this man went.

General Marshall said he thought they could work that out.

General Chou continued regarding the redeployment in Manchuria and said he had in mind two thoughts. One was to station Nationalist and Communist troops in key points which they now have in their hands as the present situation exists. This would be a simple procedure since the number of divisions is limited and only nine divisions would have to be deployed at one of the key points. The second was that his redeployment would be considered on the basis that some cities may be left ungarrisoned.

General Marshall said that even if a city was left ungarrisoned, there would be troops somewhere in that region which would in effect dominate that city. He asked General Chou what about that.

What General Chou had in mind regarding large cities was that, of course, they would have local police to garrison the city. Troops could be stationed perhaps not far away. Maybe the Government would not agree to this point of view because there are many big cities on the main lines. The main line is the Changechun railroad and, of course, there might be different arrangements with regard to cities on this railroad if they were left ungarrisoned.

General Marshall said he was not talking about local arrangements of security, but about disposition of troops, even though in the city.

General Marshall said to tell General Chou he caught Admiral Cooke's staff officer before he left and arranged for him to provide the communication facilities.

General Chou said what he had in mind was that regular forces would not be a very large number. Thus, many towns would be left empty. Troops would be rather far away from some cities at least. He told him he was going ahead with that (the paper for the termination of hostilities).

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Mr. Walter S. Robertson to General Marshall

[PEIPING,] 12 June 1946.

3907. At the meeting of the Combined Conflict Control officers on 11 June, the National Government member in connection with the discussion of the truce summary stated that the truce was scheduled to begin the 7th June. That beginning the 11th June if the Com-

unist did not cease their attacks in La Fa area, General Tu Li-ming would take retaliation action by resuming advance. Some time later the meeting was adjourned at the request of National Government member who was called from the meeting by Chief of Staff. The meeting was adjourned with approval of all members. The U. S. member does not feel that the statement and the call were in any way related. The National Government branch could not attend the meeting 12 June, due to shortage of qualified personnel that office. They made no indication of permanent withdrawal. This message is in answer to your 877.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Memorandum by General Chou En-lai to General Marshall*⁶⁷

MM 031

NANKING, June 12, 1946.

Despite the issuance of the 15-day armistice order, Nationalist troops are intensifying their aggressive action along the various fronts in Manchuria. Thus General Yeh, Communist Commissioner of Executive Headquarters reported:

"1. In the morning of June 8th, two Nationalist regiments stationed at Tingchiafangshen townlet, due southwest of Faku ($123^{\circ}23'-42^{\circ}33'$) launched bitter attacks toward Faku. After fierce engagement, they wrested away Tahsiaofangshen (15 km away from Faku), and continued their drive toward Faku. Up till this hour ferocious fighting is still under way.

"2. In the Penhsih ($123^{\circ}46'-41^{\circ}21'$) sector, attack against the Communists was launched in the morning of June 8th. One route of the Nationalists sallied out from Langtzeshan townlet (45 lis due southwest of Penhsih), while a second route made a thrust upon Communist position to the south of Chiaotou townlet (15 lis due south of Penhsih). The bitter fighting is still going on.

"3. At about the same time, Tsemuchiaio townlet, 20 lis due southwest of Haicheng ($121^{\circ}44'-40^{\circ}52'$), was also being attacked by the Nationalists.

"4. In the Lafa ($127^{\circ}19'-43^{\circ}55'$) sector, the Nationalist troops laid bitter attacks on the Communist position both before and after June 7th. No abatement of the Nationalist action has yet been observed."

All the foregoing actions took place after noon, June 7th, the hour, at which the 15-day armistice was being enforced. You are therefore requested to notify the Nationalist troops that such aggressive actions should be stopped without delay.

[Signature in Chinese]
CHOU EN-LAI

⁶⁷ Copy forwarded by General Marshall to Gen. Hsu Yung-chang with memorandum OSE 164, June 13, not printed.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Hsu Yung-chang to General Marshall

No. 629

[NANKING,] 12 June 1946.

According to Radio Message of 11 June from Gen. Tu Li Ming that since 1500 hours, 7 June, time and again, the Communist Party troops attacking Nationalist 88th Division near Lafa was increased. On 8 June, the old rail station south of Lafa was occupied. On 9 June, the Communist Party troops were increased to 21 infantry regiments and 1 artillery regiment and attacked the national forces at Lafa with full strength. On 10 June, Lafa was occupied by Communist Party troops and they further attacked Ku Chia Tze, west of Lafa. The Commander of Nationalist 263rd Regiment, 88th Division was killed in battle. This is to notify you of the above.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Draft Proposal by the Chinese Government*⁶⁸

DRAFT OF SUPPLEMENTAL METHODS TO REAL APPLICATION "REGARDING THE BASIC PLAN OF ARMY REORGANIZATION AND INTEGRATION OF COMMUNIST ARMY INTO THE NATIONAL ARMY"⁶⁹

1. Because of the Communist demand to increase its army allocated to Manchuria, the dispositions of the armies stipulated in Section 4, Item 5 of the Basic Plan are adjusted as follows:

(a) At the end of the 18 months, the disposition of each army should be as follows: (In North East, the integration will be completed 2 months earlier.)

In North East—One army consists of 2 National divisions and one Communist division, with one Nationalist as Army Commander. One army consists of one National division and two Communist divisions, with a Communist as Army Commander. Four armies (3 divisions per army) consist entirely of Nationalists troops and with Nationalists as Army Commanders—total six armies. In North China—Three armies, each consists of two Communist divisions and one National division, with Communists as Army Commanders. One Army consists of two National divisions and one Communist division with a Nationalist as Army Commander. Four armies (each consists of three divisions) consist of all Nationalist troops with Nationalists as Army Commanders—total eight armies.

2. To solve the disputes in the North East, the disposition of each army in the North East is fixed as below, so that the opposing situa-

⁶⁸ This draft was presented to General Marshall on June 12 as a Chinese Government proposal.

⁶⁹ For basic plan of February 25, see p. 295.

tion can be eliminated. (All based on units of regiments to be concentrated and trained.)

(a) Army with Communist as Commander (two Communist divisions and one Nationalist division) is to be stationed in Hei Lung Chiang Province with army headquarters at Nun Kiang. One division to be stationed at Aihun ⁷⁰ and north of the city (based on units of regiments to be concentrated and trained); one division to be stationed at the vicinity of Peian (based on units of regiments to be concentrated and trained). One division to be stationed at vicinity of Suihua (Nationalist Division).

(b) The army organized with two Nationalist divisions and one Communist division is to be stationed at Hsin-An Province with army headquarters at Hailar, one division to be stationed at Lubing ⁷¹ (based on units of regiments to be concentrated and trained); one division to be stationed at vicinity of Poketu; one division to be stationed at the vicinity of Sa-ma-chieh-kan-Ho (Communist division).

(c) Remaining Nationalists armies are to be allocated as—one army to be stationed in Ho-kiang and Sankiang Provinces; one army to be stationed in Nunkiang and Liaopei provinces; one army to be stationed in Kirin Province; one army to be stationed in Antung and Liaoning Provinces.

3. In order to stabilize the North East and to facilitate the reorganization, the Communists forces in the North East should, within the above-mentioned troop disposition areas, begin to reorganize within one month and limit its complete integration in one month's time.

4. The stipulation in Section 1, Item 4 of the basic plan should be expeditiously supplemented. According to the stipulated proportion the number of personnel to be demobilized should be brought up to date in one reduction; and this figure should be based on a monthly reduction of one-twelfth of the total personnel to be demobilized effective from the date of the basic plan was signed. (Ending 25 June, 4/12s should be demobilized.) All the required charts and reports stipulated in the plan must be sent in within two weeks without any delay for any cause.

5. In the same section of the basic plan, the stipulated plan for carrying out demobilization and reorganization, is to be made by 3 men sub-military committee. But if it cannot be made by the three men military sub-committee, it will be made by the Ministry of National Defense with instruction to carry it out, (or it will be made by the sub-committee with American as chairman). It is not necessary for both sides to discuss or approve, so that the time element in reorganization will not be delayed.

⁷⁰ Aigun.

⁷¹ Lupin (Manchouli).

6. To facilitate the restoration of communications, to eliminate the situation of war, the disposition of the reorganized army after the 12 months of the first period in North China will be as follows: (All based on units of regiments and concentrated in one area for training.) All armies with [*will?*] proceed and concentrate at their allocated areas before reorganization (concentration must be completed by the end of July), so that they will not obstruct the restoration of communications.

The first integrated army group is to be stationed in Shantung. The headquarters of the army group is to be Lini, one army to be stationed along Tsingtao-Tsinan rail line (Nationalist Army); one army to be stationed at Fahsien, Yisui, Monyin area.

The second integrated army group is to be stationed in Hopei and Northern Honan. Army Group Headquarters is to be at Peiping. One army to be stationed at Peiping, Shihchiachuang area; one army to be stationed at Changchih, Changtze and Chunliu area (Communist Army).

The third integrated army group is to be stationed in Southern Shansi and Shensi. Army Group Headquarters is to be at Yen-an. One army to be stationed at Suite, Paoan and Lu-shih. One army to be stationed at Lin-Fen, Hsun-Hsien, Yun-Chen and Ho-Tsin (Nationalist Army). The fourth integrated army group is to be stationed in Chahar and Sui Yuan. Army Group Headquarters is to be stationed in Sui Yuan. One army to be stationed west of Chi-ning, one army to be stationed at Chang-Pei and Kuo-yuan area.

There are five Nationalist armies, with one in the vicinity of Tientsin, two in Shansi, and two in Jehol.

7. The disposition of each army after completion of second stage integration (the six months after the initial twelve months.)

The three armies with Communists as commanders are allocated as follows: one in vicinity of Lu-shih, one in vicinity of Changpei, one in vicinity of Lini.

The reorganized army with one Communist division and two Nationalist divisions is to be stationed in the vicinity of Changchih.

The four Nationalist armies: one in Peiping-Tientsin area, one in Jehol, one in Shansi, one in Suiyuan.

8. After the Communist army has totally entered the reorganization area and begin[s] to integrate, the staff training with Americans as advisers can immediately begin and all necessary educational weapons will be issued at the same time.

893.00/6-1246

*The Consul General at Mukden (Clubb) to General Marshall*⁷²

No. 4

MUKDEN, June 12, 1946.

SIR: I have the honor to refer to my telegrams Nos. 80, June 8 and 83, June 10,⁷³ incorporating elements of the press statement made by Commander-in-Chief Tu Yu-ming in interpretation of the "truce order" issued by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on June 6, and to enclose for the information of the Embassy a copy (in English translation) of the full text of the statement⁷⁴ as published in the *Ho P'ing Jih Pao* (*Peace Daily* [Army organ], Mukden) on June 8, 1946.

It will be observed that the spirit of General Tu Yu-ming's statement where it treats of alleged past misdemeanors of the Communist side, as well as the implications of his schedule of proposed accomplishments for the fifteen-day period and of his forecast of movement of Government forces during the same period "for the recovery of territory and sovereignty", is not such as would give sound basis for belief that the Communists would accept the "truce" as thus arbitrarily offered them, unless it can be assumed that they already feel themselves defeated in Manchuria. It is my estimate that they do not feel that their position in Manchuria has become untenable. It is possible that the National Government feels that their military position in Manchuria is now sufficiently strong to force the issue; it may be contrariwise, that the Nationalist military leaders feel that their present military position is over-extended, and they are trying to pin the Communist forces down to inaction while they bring up additional forces for the purpose of strengthening weak points. It is fairly obvious, in any event, that the National Government by the present move anticipate that they will get from it the greater gain, if only by maneuvering into a position where the Communists can be forced to shoulder the blame for breach of the "truce". In the circumstances, it would appear that it would have been sounder political tactics if General Tu had said a little less than he did.

Respectfully yours,

O. EDMUND CLUBB

 Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram
*General Marshall to President Truman*⁷⁵

[NANKING,] June 13, 1946.

[884.] DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Since promulgation of orders to cease aggressive actions and stipulation of three specified matters to be

⁷² Copy transmitted to the Department by the Embassy in China without covering despatch; received about July 9.

⁷³ Neither found in Department files; apparently sent only to the Embassy.

⁷⁴ Not printed.

⁷⁵ Copy forwarded on June 13 by the War Department to the Secretary of State; telegram drafted on June 12 but not sent until 1:15 a. m. of June 13.

settled within 15 days, my negoti- have been constant. Chou En Lai has consulted the Commu- rning group in Yen-an and returned to discussions with me. three things to be settled, agreements have about been completed regarding communication. Little trouble is anticipated in reaching agreements on the detailed arrangements for formally terminating hostilities in Manchuria. The great difficulties to be resolved relate to demobilization, reorganization and particularly to the redistribution of forces, especially in Manchuria and Shantung Province.

My problems of the past few days have also related to the sporadic but violent fighting in various localities, mostly in North China, which could not be halted on short notice and many of the actions were evidently planned and ordered ten or more days ago. However, I think we have secured a reasonable pause. Admiral Cooke left here this afternoon for Tsingtao with a Communist official bearing a letter from Chou En Lai to the Communist leader in Shantung.

The recent rather virulent Communist propaganda or attacks against the United States and my alleged support of the National Government in the recent fighting was due to two reasons, a continuation of an effort to arouse United States opposition to any military representation out here, and to offset in America the effect of the Generalissimo's proposal to give American officers the deciding vote in case of disagreements. The fact that, just as we were on the eve of reaching an agreement, the Generalissimo remained absent in Mukden and Peiping for a considerable period while his armies exploited their successful action south of Changchun aroused great suspicion against his good faith and particularly against the impartiality of my attitude. I think the latter has now been dissipated but a great deal of harm was done.

This message is merely to keep you advised on the situation and of what progress has been made.

GEORGE C. MARSHALL

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Conference Between Brigadier General Henry A. Byroade and General Chou En-lai at General Chou's House, June 13, 1946, 10:45 a. m.

Also present: Mr. Chang
Captain Soong

1. General Byroade said that he sent a radio to the Three Commissioners info Gen. Marshall from Changchun recommending that eight field teams be permitted to move into likely strategic locations during the 15 days truce period. Upon arrival here yesterday, he found that this radio was never received by Gen. Marshall. Consequently, he wired Peiping last night and obtained the radio message but did not

have time to have it translated. Gen. Byroade expressed desire to have authority to move these teams during this truce period so that when the end of the 15 days came, the teams would be in positions to go to where ever necessary. Gen. Byroade said that when he returned to Peiping this time, he spoke to Gen. Yeh about the above, but Gen. Yeh stated that he was not free to give his approval because he did not have enough information regarding Manchuria. He preferred to have this matter handled by Committee of Three. General Byroade emphasized that he just wanted to have the teams moved out and he was not trying to give them any authority that they did not already have. He recommended that teams be moved to Hai-chen, Mukden, Harbin, Tsitsihar, Lafa, area between Changchun and Harbin, Szeping-hai, and Hai-lung.

2. Gen. Chou said Gen. Marshall had spoken to him regarding this matter yesterday. Gen. Marshall expressed that the three stipulations in the March 27 agreement could be applied to teams in Manchuria very well. To this point, Gen. Chou agreed. Although there was a little confusion caused by misunderstanding between Gen. Hsu and the Generalissimo regarding this issue, Gen. Marshall felt that this could be straightened out very easily.

3. Gen. Byroade then said that he was not at all familiar with what was going on here in Nanking and that he had had very little opportunity to see Gen. Marshall. But what he was trying to do was to get some kind of an agreement so that the field team in Manchuria could work under it. He reiterated that it would take some time to get the teams out to the field.

4. Gen. Chou stated that he agreed to the eight teams in Manchuria and that more teams may be required later. He expressed desire to have this problem solved so that the Advanced Headquarters at Changchun could move the teams out and allow them to work under the agreement of March 27 to effect cessation of hostilities. Otherwise, they would merely act in an observatory capacity which could not be very effective. There was no argument about the agreement of March 27. The only thing was that under the circumstance at that time, it was not allowed to function. After hostilities ceased, field teams could be sent to Harbin, Lafa, etc. Gen. Chou then said that he would want to have Mr. Li and Gen. Wang to go to Changchun with Gen. Byroade. He also hoped that after arriving at Changchun, transportation could be arranged for Mr. Li to proceed to Harbin to explain to the people there about the functions of field teams. Then, they would welcome General Byroade to pay Harbin a visit with Gen. Wrow [*sic*].

5. Gen. Byroade then asked Gen. Chou if the Committee of Three was about to come to an agreement regarding field team activities in

Manchuria which would supercede the agreement of March 27. Gen. Chou replied that there were two procedures under consideration. One would be for the interim period which would allow the field teams there to operate under March 27 agreement and it would also give the Advanced Executive Headquarters a basis to work. Second procedure which General Marshall was still working on, must provide solution for all other problems beside the cessation of hostilities—such as boundaries, separation of the two forces, etc. Gen. Chou then stated that if another agreement would be reached by the Committee of Three, it would not affect the three points in the General Directive of March 27. It would only be an amplification. Gen. Chou reiterated that based on March 27 agreement, team could be immediately dispatched to Faku, Lafa and other areas where fierce fighting was in progress.

6. Gen. Byroade then recommended that a sentence be added into the proposed agreement by the Committee of Three⁷⁶ which stated “until further instructed, field teams in Manchuria will operate under Committee of Three General Directive of March 27”. Gen. Chou inquired if arrangement could be made to dispatch teams to Faku and Ti-Lin⁷⁷ where situation was serious. General Byroade replied that if teams could be put in places stipulated in his recommendation, they could conveniently go to places of trouble. In this instance, teams at Szepingkai and Mukden could go to Faku and Tin-Lin easily. The teams there now were operating under Peiping, consequently, if Gen. Yeh could make a request, field teams could be dispatched to those areas. Gen. Chou asked if the authority over these teams would be shifted upon Gen. Byroade’s return to Changchun. Gen. Byroade replied that he would not want to assume such authority until the Chinese sections of the Advanced Executive Headquarters are there and that Peiping understood that the authority would be shifted when time came. Gen. Chou said part of the Communist people for the Advanced Executive Headquarters would have to come from Peiping and part from Manchuria. Gen. Chou further stated that if Gen. Hsu would agree, Gen. Byroade could go ahead in dispatching the teams to areas desired.

7. Gen. Byroade inquired if it would be possible for Gen. Yeh to arrange for teams to go to Harbin and Tsitsihar. Gen. Chou replied that he would send Mr. Li to Harbin first and make necessary arrangement for Gen. Byroade and Gen. Wror [*sic*] to come in a second plane. He was not too positive regarding Tsitsihar. He suggested that the team intended for Tsitsihar be sent to Kirin instead in view of the serious situation there.

⁷⁶ See memorandum approved June 15, p. 1058.

⁷⁷ Tiehling.

8. Gen. Chou then inquired about the airplane situation in Changchun and also asked if a regular shuttle could be arranged between Nanking and Peiping in view of the increased amount of traffic and poor communication system. Gen. Byroade stated that at present he had three planes in Changchun and that there was no maintenance there. Regarding the shuttle, he promised that he would look into the matter.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Marshall to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek

OSE 168

NANKING, June 13, 1946.

YOUR EXCELLENCY: General Yu Ta-wei tells me that you desire that I present to you, in written form, my present suggestions regarding the redistribution of troops in Manchuria, so far as the Communist forces and various provinces are concerned.

At the present time I have no idea of just what the Communist proposals in this matter will be, although I should have this within twenty-four hours. In the meantime I can only proceed on conjecture as to what conditions might meet their demands that at the same time would be reasonably acceptable to the National Government.

The initial proposal of your military staff which relegated the Communist forces to the mountainous, sparsely populated province of Shinhei [*Hsin Hei*] Lung Kiang and along the course of an uncompleted railway immediately to the west, I am certain would not be accepted by the Communists. You had referred to the province Ho Kiang as a possible compromise, with the Communist agreement to withdraw from Jehol as a necessary stipulation. You also mentioned their possible demand for including the province Hsing-An, in which event you had not decided on what compromise they must agree to in North China.

Following my conversation with you and an examination of the map I came to the conclusion that the three provinces mentioned were so mountainous and apparently devoid of resources other possibly than timber, that a Communist commitment to deployment in these areas would be rather unlikely. I therefore suggested to General Yu that Ho Kiang province be ignored and that we consider the possibility of including Nunchiang as the third province, stipulating the evacuation of Jehol and Chahar. General Yu desired to include in the stipulation a Communist commitment to the National occupation of Chefoo and Wei-hai-wei and the reinforcement of Tsingtao.

The province of Nun-chiang would not, in my opinion, be too serious a concession for the National Government. The railroad net through Tsitsihar could be cut in any event if the Communists were

in the provinces to the northwest and north, and the railroad from Hailar south would fall within the government province of Liao Peh. It therefore appears to me that if the Communists can be prevailed upon to concentrate their troops in the northwest, the old province, consisting of Hsin Hei Lung Kiang, Hsing-An and Nun Kiang, would be the desirable area.

In order to secure the necessary concessions in Shantung it might prove to be necessary to relax on the requirements stipulating the withdrawal of Communist forces from Chahar.

General Yu informs me that it is desired that the Communist divisions be included in two integrated armies, which would mean three National divisions north and west of Sung Kiang province. To my mind this is not only too many troops for that thinly populated region, but also involves an over extension on the part of the National forces. Also, there is the consideration that some time will be required before an integration on the army level of divisions can be effected, while what is immediately wanted is a disposition that will not present an undue hazard to the National Government. I am therefore of the opinion that at least for the first six months and possibly for the first year, a purely Communist army will prove a more practical arrangement and one which can be more easily adjusted to circumstances and the terrain.

General Yu informs me that if the Communist Divisions are not integrated it would be necessary to stipulate that no Communist troops would occupy any of the cities or towns along the railroad. I think this presents two undesirable conditions; on the one hand it would be far more irritating, in my opinion, than it would be important for the interests of the National Government, and on the other hand, judging from the map, it would appear that there are very few localities in which the troops could be quartered, other than along the railroad. I understand that the climate of north Manchuria is very severe in the winter season, therefore a disposal of troops in isolated places would be objectionable from a number of points of view. General Yu stated that National Military Police should be employed along the railroad. I think that some arrangement other than this should be considered because it would inevitably lead to trouble as there would be no immediate support for these isolated men, which could lead, I think, to trouble in some incidents. It seems to me, that since the power to interrupt the railroad would rest with the military forces in the general vicinity it would be much better to charge the guarding of the railroad in such areas to that military force, at least so far as prevention of sabotage by banditry was concerned.

As I before stated, I have no indication at the present time of the Communist proposal as to the future disposal of their troops in Man-

churia. General Byroade feels that in view of their present concentration to the east of Kirin, that it is possible that they will desire to maintain a concentration near the Korean border to the south east of Lafa. That region I believe is rich in resources. Whether or not any such proposal is to be made remains to be seen. If it were made, it might be considered on the basis of an integrated army between Changchun and the Korean border immediately to the east, with a single Communist division near the border. The remaining two Communist divisions could then be disposed within an integrated army in the northwest, one division in southern Hsin Hei Lung Kiang and one in southwest Hsing-An, with the National division in Nun-chiang and the Communist commander of the integrated forces in Tsitsihar. But such an arrangement does seem rather improbable of agreement.

In considering all these matters, I think it is most important that stipulations be avoided which will cause great difficulty of acceptance or prove merely irritating to the negotiations, unless a really important advantage is to be obtained. The main purpose of negotiations would seem to be the attainment of peace under conditions which will not present a hazard to the National Government and also will not involve conditions which might give rise to local incidents that would develop into serious consequences.

Faithfully yours,

[GEORGE C. MARSHALL]

NOTE: I find that the present design of provinces in Manchuria presents exceptional difficulties with relation to the military adjustments.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Draft Proposal Prepared by General Marshall*⁷⁸

TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES IN MANCHURIA

On the basis of the orders of June 6, 1946 halting all advances, attacks and pursuits for a period of 15 days commencing at noon of June 7th, which will be continued in effect, we, the Committee of Three, announce the following instructions to govern a complete termination of hostilities in Manchuria:

a. The terms of 10 January 1946 for the cessation of hostilities will govern except as hereinafter specifically modified.

b. Commanders of forces in close contact or engaged in actual fighting will immediately direct their troops to cease fighting and will seek to secure a local truce by establishing liaison with the opposing com-

⁷⁸ Copies transmitted to Generals Hsu and Chou by Colonel Caughey in his OSE 164, June 13, with the admonition that "this is a *first* draft and subject to amendment". Two drafts had previously been prepared by American staff work.

manders, pending the arrival of a field team. They should both immediately withdraw their respective troops from close contact.

c. The readjustment of troops found to be in close contact or actually engaged in fighting will be directed by the field team on the ground by requiring the withdrawal for specified distances, normally 30 li, of one or both forces according to the circumstances. Special consideration will be given to the local situation believed to have existed at noon of June 7, 1946. In the event of disagreement, the decision of the senior American officer in the advance section of Executive Headquarters at Changchun will be accepted.

d. All movements of National or Communist troops of a tactical nature will cease. Administrative and supply movements as authorized in the original cease fire order of January 10, 1946 may be carried out if previously cleared with a field team.

e. Within seven days after the issuance of this agreement, lists showing all units together with commanders, strength and locations in Manchuria will be submitted to the advance section of Executive Headquarters in Changchun.

f. The National Government will move no additional combat units to Manchuria. However, individual replacements are authorized for the purpose of bringing up to approved strength those units authorized in the basic plan for the reorganization and integration dated February 25, 1946 as hereafter amended.

g. Officers failing to carry out the terms of this agreement will be relieved and disciplined by their respective commanders.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Melby)*⁷⁹

[NANKING,] June 13, 1946.

Subj: Political Situation in China.

Participants: Mr. Chen Li-fu and an officer of the Embassy.

In a conversation yesterday afternoon Mr. Chen Li-fu,⁸⁰ following a long exchange of the usual cocktail party banalities, volunteered some observations on the current political situation in China. He started out by recalling that it is solely the fault of John L. Lewis that he is back in China since he was working in the coal mines in Pennsylvania in 1925 and had planned to stay there but gave up his job when Lewis called a strike which seemed to have no prospect of

⁷⁹ Copy transmitted by the Embassy to the President of the Chinese Executive Yuan (Soong).

⁸⁰ Minister of the Kuomintang Organization Board and brother of Chen Kuo-fu, chairman of the Kuomintang Central Financial Affairs Committee and of the board of directors of the Farmers' Bank of China. The two Chen brothers were leaders of the so-called C-C Clique of the Nationalist Party.

ending. (Chen Li-fu, incidentally, is still a member of the United Mine Workers of America). He said that was his first direct experience with Communist penetration into the internal organism of a country and it had convinced him they must be destroyed. He said he had been fighting the Communists in China for 18 years and would fight them for another 18 if that were necessary.

He then went on to say that any negotiation between two parties must be based on sincerity and good faith and therefore any negotiations in China with Communists have been and would continue to be futile since what they say today they will deny tomorrow. He expressed the belief that there is almost no hope of any agreement during the present period which would prolong the present truce and that if by any chance any agreement is reached it will be meaningless. He added that one additional proof of this is that General Chou En-lai has just come back from Yen-an and has unconditionally turned down all the recent proposals made by General Marshall.

He then went on to say that he does not however believe there will be civil war since the Communists are bluffing and can be destroyed with very little difficulty. Civil war will come only if the potential participants believe it will come and he does not so believe. He said the same is true of international wars. Those who believe there will be war will get war.

J[OHN] F. M[ELBY]

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Ludden)*⁸¹

[NANKING,] June 14, 1946.

In the course of a long conversation with Vinogradov⁸² on June 13th, he expressed the following opinions:

1. That General Marshall's mission has failed and there is no hope of permanent settlement between the Kuomintang Government and the Chinese Communists.
2. That the Soviet Government is distrustful of American policy in the Far East because all of our actions in Japan, China, Korea, and the Pacific Islands are aimed offensively at the Soviet Union.
3. That thus far the Soviet Union has followed a hands-off policy toward China, but it may become necessary actively to intervene in China if the present unsatisfactory situation continues.

Vinogradov is not rated as a senior officer of the Soviet Embassy, but his self-styled personal opinions may be accepted as reflecting

⁸¹ Copy transmitted by the Embassy to the President of the Chinese Executive Yuan (Soong).

⁸² Eugene Vinogradov, Chief of the Press Section of the Soviet Embassy.

current thinking at least within the Soviet Embassy. It is also of some interest that Vinogradov's opinions were offered me gratuitously following a dinner at which my wife and I were the only guests and which was the first time that I have ever been entertained by any member of the Soviet Embassy staff. The Naval Attaché states that Vinogradov is an NKVD representative in the Soviet Embassy.

As far as I am aware, Vinogradov's open expression of the possibility of active Soviet intervention in China is the first time such a view has been put forth to any member of this Embassy's staff.

R. P. LUDDEN

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Mr. Walter S. Robertson to General Marshall ⁸³

[PEIPING,] 14 June 1946.

4053. Would appreciate your advising what is [*if?*] any special instruction[s] were sent to field commanders in Manchuria and North Central China by respective sides in connection with 15-day truce. General Tsai ⁸⁴ states that Generalissimo ordered his commanders in both areas to cease all troop movements and attacks. General Yeh says he noticed in the "newspapers" that the Generalissimo had ordered a 15-day truce in Manchuria but that he has not been notified officially that a truce had been signed by the Committee of Three. Judging by the widespread attacks recently initiated by Communist forces under command of General Chen, ⁸⁵ it would appear that at least in this instance no truce instructions were issued by Communist Headquarters. Since June 7 Chen [and] his field commanders have attacked and occupied 15 cities, towns and garrison points formerly held by National Government forces, with three other cities now under attack. Communist branch refuses to give any orders or take any action with respect to these violations which they state are in retaliation for Nationalist violations. General Yeh states further that commissioners should attempt no corrective action until agreement has been reached by Committee of Three in Nanking.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai, June 14, 1946, 11:10 a. m.

General Marshall opened the meeting by telling General Chou he had talked to General Yu Ta Wei about communications issues and

⁸³ Substance transmitted to General Chou in OSE 179, June 16.

⁸⁴ Lt. Gen. Tsai Wen-chih, Deputy Chinese Government Commissioner of Executive Headquarters, Peiping.

⁸⁵ Presumably Chen Yi, commanding Chinese Communist forces in Shantung.

also about preparing a number of documents. He asked if General Chou received the first draft⁸⁶ of a possible statement of terms for the termination of hostilities in Manchuria.

General Chou answered yes.

General Marshall said he endeavored to make this as simple as possible because all the complications are going to appear in the re-draft of the details regarding the re-organization and redistribution of troops in Manchuria.

General Marshall expressed his concern to General Chou over information that General Byroade brought him. General Byroade told him that both National Government and Communist officials in Peiping tried to persuade General Byroade not to go to Changchun because there was no hope of reaching any agreements. If the representatives of one side had taken such action, he could understand that. However, he was surprised and concerned to find that representatives of both sides not only take a gloomy view of the prospects but definitely were advising General Byroade not to establish an Advance Section of Executive Headquarters at Changchun. Would General Chou comment on this?

General Chou replied that he was not entirely informed about this situation. He had learned something from General Wang, who came down with General Byroade. The prevalent feeling in Peiping may be due to certain factors:

First, there is distrustfulness between the two parties. On the Communist side, the 15-day armistice was not publicized in a joint statement. Individual statements made it look as though the Government side had given an ultimatum to the Communists. Both before and after this announcement, General Hsiung Shih Hui⁸⁷ and particularly General Tu Li Ming repeatedly expressed their intentions to continue the war. The Kuomintang feels that no substantial agreement can be reached within such a short time as 15 days.

Secondly, a 15-day armistice is only temporary interim arrangement. It is far different from a long term truce. Since there are many subjects to be discussed during the period, it is doubtful that their problems can be settled. Instead of trying to solve problems, the opposite party is only trying to gain time in preparation for large hostilities.

Third, from past experience, the March 27 agreement has not been carried out by the Government side in spite of Government signature on the document. For this reason, the field teams had been reduced to impotency in several areas.

⁸⁶ See p. 1044.

⁸⁷ Director of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's field headquarters in Manchuria at Changchun.

General Marshall agreed that this situation is serious. It is not so simple as the one confronting negotiators in January. For that reason, procedure cannot be as simple as we adopted in January. It is much more complicated and hence needs more tolerance and patience in working out arrangements so that confidence and trust can develop step by step.

General Chou stated he fully approves the draft⁸⁸ prepared by General Byroade and also agrees to the suggestion of incorporating the March 27 directive into this document. He also concurred in the Generalissimo's point in this particular reference to have a new agreement before June 22. The present draft document incorporates the views of four different people. It will serve as a basis for the operation of Executive Headquarters in Changchun. This means it may not be easy to reach a compromise in the beginning, but we certainly have to reach a compromise by all means.

Talking about establishing contact with Peiping, and particularly with Manchuria, General Chou told General Byroade a short while ago that he hoped after his arrival in Changchun, he would proceed to Harbin in 2 or 3 days to establish contact with Communist officials there. He could then discuss with them the dispatch of field teams to Communist areas in Manchuria and other matters. General Chou planned to send two people with General Byroade. One is Mr. Lee [*Li*], who recently came down from Mukden to Yen-an and then made the trip with me to Nanking. Mr. Lee knows the background. Upon his return to Changchun and Harbin, he can tell our people what is going on here. The other one is General Wang, who came with General Byroade. Through these two people, General Chou hoped to influence Communist people in Peiping, Mukden and Changchun so that they will understand our best efforts toward establishing peace in Manchuria. These two people now understand the spirit in which the Committee of Three is working. Could he introduce them to General Marshall and would General Marshall say a few words of encouragement to them.

General Marshall said he would be very glad to see them. When did General Chou think would be a convenient time.

General Chou planned to send them with General Byroade and hence the time would depend on when General Byroade was leaving. Before they departed, however, General Chou would bring them along to see General Marshall.

General Marshall asked if there was any other point General Chou wished to speak about before he talked.

General Chou wished to talk on communications—to have that

⁸⁸ See memorandum by the Committee of Three, approved June 15, p. 1058.

settled first. He said Colonel Hill had prepared two drafts. One concerned reopening communications and was generally acceptable to General Chou. Of course, a few minor points may need amendment, but in general it is a good draft. The second draft concerned administration and operation of railways. There are certain points in that draft which need reconsideration, but in principle it also looks quite right. General Chou said that later he had discussed it with General Yu Ta Wei who brought up the point that we should first start the repair work on three railways—Lunghai, Tientsin-Pukou, Tsinan-Tsingtao railways. General Yu hoped we could begin reconstruction immediately so that work can be started before June 22. General Chou fully agreed with this. Once a decision is reached on the reopening of communications, then he could immediately send men to the Communist Headquarters at Lini to make detailed decisions on work to be started. Thus General Chou had accepted General Marshall's suggestions that we should tackle the communications problem at the start, but now trouble arises in that General Yu Ta Wei has suggested some revisions to that draft. The main point[s] of his amendment are:

First, he wants the first paragraph to be deleted. The first paragraph is a general statement on the reopening of communications. Then he made a complete revision of paragraph 6 regarding train guards, etc. General Yu Ta Wei insisted on having an armed railroad police. Paragraph 6 is revised in a way that armed railway police will be organized, a way which was not contained in the original draft.

General Marshall asked that the main points of General Yu Ta Wei's revision be repeated.

General Chou had told Colonel Hill that the revisions were unacceptable because they were not in accord with the previous agreement. Because General Yu Ta Wei had insisted, Colonel Hill put it into the revised draft. Up to this time, General Chou had not brought up any contemplated proposal because he was eager to reach an early solution. As General Yu Ta Wei made so many counter proposals, he was being forced to make a counter proposal too. For this reason, he is concerned.

Second, regarding administrative operation, General Yu Ta Wei declined to accept the draft proposal. General Chou said he would rather not discuss the draft at this time. He did not know clearly what he had in mind. When the Communications Agreement was discussed, General Chou suggested the matter be referred to Executive Headquarters. The result was unhappy because Executive Headquarters never reached any agreement. Then when he first asked General Marshall his views on this matter it was suggested that he

should directly approach General Yu Ta Wei. General Chou tried to meet all General Marshall's suggestions, but General Yu Ta Wei did not approve Colonel Hill's draft. In absence of any new suggestions, he only wanted to reach a compromise in 15 days so no complications will occur. If the Government makes too many demands, the outcome will be in doubt.

General Marshall said he could see that there need be no complication about paragraph *a*. General Yu Ta Wei had another general document reciting the general principles in which General Chou's points were covered but it had not yet been cleared with the Generalissimo. General Marshall had seen it and had revised it. He did not know that General Chou had not yet been involved in that discussion. Unless the Generalissimo introduces some objection that we do not anticipate, the other document should clear away any doubts.

Turning to the second point, there is evidently a definite difference which relates to the character of guards along the railroad. General Marshall had asked General Yu Ta Wei this morning on what he based his contention to which General Chou objected. General Yu stated that there never had been troops used in guarding various specific installations along the railroads. The right-of-way was broad and had been the exclusive responsibility of railroad police. Now he is asked to make a change in the system which had always governed the railroads in China since before the war.

General Marshall raised the point that General Chou's stipulation would have no application to Communist areas because so far as Colonel Hill knew at present, there were no fortifications along the railroad. General Yu Ta Wei had said that was true but the stations always had guards even though there were no fortifications. After a conversation with Colonel Hill, General Marshall had told General Yu Ta Wei that General Chou's opposition was possibly based on the fact that railroad police had been under control of Tai Li and hence had been employed for other purposes than policing the railroad. General Yu Ta Wei did not discuss this point. General Marshall left the matter there and came into this conference with General Chou.

Colonel Hill was asked if there is anything he wanted to add to what was just said—any suggestions?

Colonel Hill said the original agreement provided for the protection of the railroad line by the local commander of the troops in the area through which the line ran. It was his understanding that General Chou's idea is, that the introduction of railroad guards into Communist Party territory would involve another type of protective guard which had not previously been agreed upon.

General Chou asked Colonel Hill what General Yu Ta Wei had in mind about the administrative operation of railroads in the draft.

Colonel Hill said that General Yu Ta Wei's idea in not discussing the draft for administration of railroads at the present time was that this 15-day truce period was too short to permit decisions to be made on subjects for which a decision was not immediately essential. His idea was not that the plan for administrative control should not be started but that discussion on the plan could be postponed until there is more time available for discussions and decisions.

General Marshall asked if that were acceptable to General Chou.

General Chou said that because he did not know the clear idea of General Yu Ta Wei, there were three questions upon which an understanding would have to be reached.

1. The present agencies should be preserved pending the reaching of a new agreement on administration and operation, and that the *status quo* will be preserved.
2. It is understood by both sides that an arrangement will have to be reached before the through traffic is established.
3. When we come to discuss the administration and operation, we will still use Colonel Hill's draft as a basis.

General Chou wanted to know General Yu Ta Wei's comment on these points before he made any decision.

General Chou asked General Marshall to make an evaluation of the possibility that an agreement can be reached in face of the present differences of opinion. If there is to be difficulty in ironing out differences, then he will have to go ahead with preliminary preparations because he does not want to delay the matter when the time comes for agreement.

General Marshall said that so far as he had been able to determine, the one difficult point was the character of the railway and railroad guards in Communist areas. There the difficulty was entirely one of suspicion. He was hopeful that General Yu Ta Wei could remove the suspicion. Whether or not he could, he did not know; he is a very forthright person. Except for that one point, other details seem readily adjustable. General Yu Ta Wei thought the whole thing could be quickly settled, but General Marshall heard more difficulties here at the table than he was aware of before. Some of those were like paragraph *a*, and were the result of avoidable misunderstandings.

General Chou would like to make one concrete proposal which has not been under discussion before. According to General Yu Ta Wei's present proposal, General Chou feels pretty sure that the old way railway troops will be brought back into the picture. General Chou had talked about that with General Chang Chih Chung.⁸⁹ General

⁸⁹ Then Chinese Government representative on the Committee of Three.

Yu Ta Wei's present proposal is that during the period when the railroad is still under construction, each party will still adhere to the system that agencies created by the party will make arrangements within that section. According to that principle, each railway station will organize its own railroad police for guard and administrative purposes. Then railroad teams will make inspections of the police that are organized. The system of railroad policing will be according to regulations of the Government. Suppose that the police as organized do not meet the standards required by the field teams, then the Communist railroad authority will have to change its personnel. Later, railroads would be unified and railroad police would be brought up to standards required. That would also meet requirements of the Government for unification of railroad police. On the other hand, it would remove the suspicion of the Communist side. That is his proposal. If, instead, the Government would send in railroad troops, that would only give rise to suspicions which can in no way be wiped out. General Chou pointed out that Communists had offered strong opposition to employment of Tai Li's units, yet made no claims to alter employment of them.

General Marshall asked General Chou if he was ready to talk at all about the redistribution of troops in Manchuria.

General Chou replied he was. General Chou told General Marshall last time he thought that the redistribution was closely connected with the question of comparative strength. Hence, there must be a decision on how many divisions the Communist Army will have. General Chou had suggested five divisions and General Marshall had expressed his views on this matter. General Chou considered redistribution of troops would concentrate troops in large cities with one division in one city. Hence, places that are occupied will not be many. Of course, Government troops will occupy more such places. What final strength the Government would like to have is still not final. According to previous agreement,⁹⁰ they will have five armies and later 14 divisions. Returning to the suggestion General Chou made and also to General Marshall's views regarding the comparative strengths, General Chou did not know what is the reaction of the Government.

General Chou's second point pertained to the redistribution of troops. Suppose the comparative strength is fixed, then Communist troops would like to be stationed in areas now occupied by them. They hoped the Government troops would stay in places now under their occupation. As the matter now stands, Government troops hold the most important and decidedly the most developed places, places where the population is more dense and there is more food

⁹⁰ For agreement of February 25, see p. 295.

available. Naturally they can provide supplies for larger forces. The North Manchuria population is scattered and sparse; hence cannot supply too many troops. If we are contemplating this point, four factors should be taken into account—the number of troops, distribution of areas, transportation facilities, and supply facilities.

General Marshall said he had informed the Generalissimo some time ago of General Chou's comment about five Communist divisions in the reconsideration of comparative strengths in Manchuria. While he had not received a definite statement from the Generalissimo, the character of the discussion led him to the belief that the Government would be willing to accept a ratio of 5 to 1 instead of the present agreed upon ratio of 14 to 1. This would be managed by increasing the strength of the forces in Manchuria to six armies of which three divisions would be Communist troops and 15 divisions would be Nationalist troops.

As to the eventual distribution of forces within Manchuria, General Marshall now is trying, through the Generalissimo and General Chou, to get some idea of their thoughts in order to prepare a concrete proposal. Up to the present time, he did not have any such basis. He gathered from what General Chou said this morning, that while lacking knowledge of the Government's probable position regarding final strength of troops in Manchuria, he had in mind more or less a continuation of present situation as to distribution of troops. It would appear that that is not a practical proposition for more than a very brief period of time.

General Marshall felt he was also forced to comment that it seemed there is an unavoidable relationship between the political consideration and the military distribution. For example, if an agreement were reached that a certain province would have a Communist chairman under the provisional government, it would seem advisable to relate the disposition of troops to such an arrangement. What the provinces might be or how many, he didn't know. It also appeared, though he was carefully avoiding all political complications, that the Communist decisions regarding distribution of troops would be related to whether or not there was any commitment as to the character of magistrate councils. General Marshall had been turning all these various factors over in his mind, but he had so little to go on that it was exceedingly difficult for him to get down on paper any definite proposal which he could discuss with both sides separately before proposing a joint meeting. What he was endeavoring to get from General Chou was some idea which he might be able to utilize in expediting negotiations to a successful conclusion. Each day of labor on this problem brought some new developments and complications.

General Chou declined to comment on the Government part in the redistribution of troops and their comparative strengths. He only wanted to talk about the Communist side. He now had two figures between General Marshall and himself. He mentioned five and General Marshall said three. He said anyway we will reach a figure between that number 3, 4 or 5. Places that will be garrisoned by those troops will not be many—only a limited number. As previously explained, the Communists would choose a few limited places for the disposition of Communist troops. General Chou thought it would not be difficult to reach some sort of arrangement and mentioned that we will want to adopt the same principle as they did in China proper—that each division will be stationed or concentrated in one place. This will reassure the Government. Communists have one division to the south, one to the east, one in the west and two others in the north, so they have them scattered. The Government has reassured the Communists that they will not form a block at one place. Would the Government rather have the Communist divisions close to each other. General Chou was trying to get mutual confidence and would like to know which was more acceptable to the Government.

As to the distribution of Government troops, General Chou would rather the Government make its proposals. The Government now occupies the choice part of Manchuria, the part where industries are most developed and food is most abundant. The Government may like to have their troops concentrated. General Chou felt there was sufficient new considerations to revise the distribution of troops.

Coming to the political and administrative matters, General Chou had in mind four different kinds of formulas.

First, while discussing reorganization of the army, he would rather leave aside discussion of political matters. He wanted to preserve the *status quo* pending solution on the matter just as with communications. He wanted to talk only about repair work without discussing administration, leaving this matter as a second step.

The second formula he suggested in the past. It has been suggested that a provisional administrative council be formed in the North and East which will be charged with the political, economic and communications problems in the Northeast. General Marshall had concurred in these proposals though they were not accepted by the Generalissimo. However other parties, the Democratic League, the Young China Party, as well as the Communist Party, do endorse these ideas. Even a part of the Kuomintang have given their endorsement to this. General Chou thought the second formula could still be placed under consideration.

Third, one proposal suggested by the Generalissimo was that to empower the Committee of Three to solve administrative problems. General Marshall seemed to be reluctant to accept this proposal, but General Chou thought it could still be considered. Since General Marshall did not want to get involved in political matters, it could be done in a rather round-about way. The Committee of Three need not directly take charge of political matters but would, of course, use a platform to be approved by the coalition government. The Committee of Three would make an inspection tour to Manchuria after the 15-days period is over.

Fourth, after the 15 days, they would immediately discuss reorganization of the Government. They would place the Government in Manchuria as a part of the overall solution to the reorganization of the Government. Pursuant to establishment of the coalition government, an inspection party would be sent out to Manchuria to make a survey. As to local governments of various magistrates, General Chou thought once the provisional government is reorganized, various magistrates would go ahead without reorganization through the medium of an election on behalf of the joint platform reached by the P. C. C. He thought this would not be difficult to carry out. Prior to reelection, they would maintain the *status quo* as suggested before by the first proposal on the Manchurian question. General Chou wanted to constantly exchange with General Marshall any new points of view.

General Marshall said he had only one comment at this time. The reason he injected the reference to the political considerations this morning was the fear that in endeavoring to arrange military distribution, we would be held back in the solution by reluctance to make military movements because of doubts about the political reorganization. Otherwise, he never would have mentioned the subject. He was merely trying to find a quick way to settle the military redistribution. From his past experience in China, he felt that he must penetrate the screen as it were and find out what fear dominated the action or unwillingness. He told General Chou he appreciated his discussions this morning and it would be helpful to him.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Mr. Walter S. Robertson to General Marshall

[PEIPING,] 14 June 1946.

4057. The report quoted your 877⁹¹ sent to both Chou En-lai and Yen-an by General Yeh was also given to press by Communist PRO⁹²

⁹¹ June 12, p. 1025.

⁹² Public relations officer.

without consultation or knowledge of other branches. Barbara Stevens, American representative of *Agence France Presse*, known for her pro-communist reporting, was first called and given "scoop". Her article radioed to Shanghai through USIS facilities began:

"General Tu Yu-Ming, commander Generalissimo's Peace Corps, Manchuria, has announced complete abrogation 15-day truce agreement as of yesterday 10 stating Nationalist Armies will renew advances Manchuria; official Communist Executive Headquarters spokesman stated today quoting official notification which he said received today from Government Branch Executive Headquarters."

Mastersen, Associated Press, after appearance of Stevens article, interviewed Communists and was given same story. Later becoming suspicious he checked with National Government and American branches and radioed correction.

General Tsai has been severely queried by Generalissimo who has been given impression that he, Tsai, was responsible for conveying alleged statement of Tu Yu-Ming to Communist branch. Tsai immediately requested commissioners' meeting. Three-hour session yesterday afternoon with all concerned present revealed following: (1) Colonel Lei, Communist representative conflict control group, insisted that General Chen Yu, National Government representative same group, made the statement as reported by Lei to General Yeh. (2) National Government representative stated he had merely warned that if Communists did not cease attacks at Lafa General Tu Yu-Ming has stated he would be compelled to take retaliatory action. (3) American representative conflict control group corroborated statement of National Government representative. Both American members present at meeting where remark was made stated that it precipitated no unusual discussion at time. Both reiterated that there was nothing to indicate that adjournment of meeting had any connection with this statement. (4) Chiang's PRO admitted he reported incident to press "as background information". (5) General Tsai, who was not present at conflict control group meeting and did not know of incident until queried by Generalissimo, indignantly demanded apology and retraction by Communists. Communists refused.

American comment: Colonel Lei, whether intentionally or unintentionally made false report to General Yeh and Communist PRO. The widespread dissemination of the report by Communist PRO in violation of Executive Headquarters' rules which require joint press releases on official Executive Headquarters business and Communist refusal to make retraction or correction indicate they welcome the political capital afforded possibly as a diversion of attention from their recent widespread [reports?] of truce violations in North Central China.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Colonel Marshall S. Carter to General Marshall

[WASHINGTON,] 14 June 1946.

91356. The following message is transmitted to you at the request of Acting Secretary of State:⁹³

"We find very useful your messages, such as that of June 13, giving authentic summary of current situation, particularly in view of speculative press and radio reports. You will of course let us know when there is anything we can do to be helpful."

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Hsu Yung-chang to General Marshall

[Translation]

[NANKING,] 14 June 1946.

Regarding the establishment and operation of field teams in Manchuria, the Government approves the proposal made by General Byroade.⁹⁴ I send you herewith the copies with my signatures.⁹⁵ I wish to take the opportunity to state to you clearly that if by 22 June no arrangement for stopping hostilities in Manchuria can be reached, the Government will consider the agreement of March 27th null and void and will find itself not bound by the stipulations therein.

HSU YUNG CHANG

893.00/6-2046

*Memorandum by the Committee of Three to the Three Commissioners, at Peiping*⁹⁶

We, General Hsu Yung Chang, authorized representative of the National Government; General Chou En-lai, authorized representative of the Chinese Communist Party and General G. C. Marshall direct that the following message be dispatched to the three commissioners at Executive Headquarters.

The plan for initial disposition of eight field teams in Manchuria as presented by General Byroade in his message, Manchu number 8 dated June 9, and his recommendations therein are approved. This plan should be put into effect without delay. Until further instructed,

⁹³ Dean Acheson.

⁹⁴ General Byroade initially made his proposal in telegram Manchu 8, June 9, p. 1007.

⁹⁵ Memorandum by the Committee of Three approved on June 15, *infra*.

⁹⁶ Approved by the Committee of Three on June 15. Text sent to Executive Headquarters in telegram No. 903, June 15. Copy transmitted to the Secretary of State by General Marshall with covering memorandum of June 20; received July 3.

field teams in Manchuria will operate under Committee of Three general directive of March 27.

It is further agreed and stipulated by the Committee of Three that :

1. In accordance with the 15 day cessation of advances, attacks, and pursuits agreement, the Committee of Three shall work out prior to noon June 22 a detailed arrangement of termination of hostilities in Manchuria, which will supersede the March 27 agreement of this committee.

2. The advance section of Executive Headquarters in Changchun may on its own accord make decisions and readjustments on the location, time of dispatch and direction of movement of the various field teams as the circumstances require.

HSU YUNG CHANG
CHOU EN-LAI
G. C. MARSHALL

NANKING, 14 June 1946.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Colonel Marshall S. Carter to General Marshall

[WASHINGTON,] 15 June 1946.

91474. For your information the following events have occurred in connection with General Wedemeyer's status. On 12 June the following cable signed by Mr. Byrnes was handed to me for dispatch to you :

"Have talked to Wedemeyer who agrees to accept nomination we discussed provided there is legislation preserving his military status. In view of your 679⁹⁷ of May 11, wish you would advise whether announcement of the nomination would adversely affect situation confronting you. If you feel that it would do so, then we will continue to delay action. James F Byrnes."

Upon reading the above message I talked to General Wedemeyer and ascertained that Mr. Byrnes was not aware of your 807.⁹⁸ General Wedemeyer agreed that Mr. Byrnes should be informed of your 807 before dispatch of the cable quoted above. I talked with Mr. Byrnes on this matter and he was most receptive, stating that his one desire was to meet all of your wishes to the best of his ability. He then decided not to send the message quoted above for fear it would be interpreted as a needle from him. Mr. Byrnes then dictated the following memorandum for the President which he signed on 13 June prior to his departure for Paris :

"After talking with you this morning about General Wedemeyer, I learned that General Marshall has wired that he did not wish any action taken with reference to the appointment of Wedemeyer at

⁹⁷ *Ante*, p. 833.

⁹⁸ *Ante*, p. 927.

this time, and that he would advise us when to proceed. I do not think we should do anything about it until we hear from General Marshall, who is fully cognizant of the need for legislation and the proposals for adjournment."

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by Brigadier General Henry A. Byroade to General Marshall

NANKING, 16 June 1946.

Attached is a copy of my paper on Changchun organization corrected to be acceptable to General Chou. His views may be summarized as follows:

- 1) Organization must be headed by a group of three and not an American.
- 2) He cannot agree on any stipulation allowing Americans to break deadlocks on matters of team movement.

After considerable discussion he came out with a substitute subparagraph 3, which on first reading seems all right. In effect however, as he understands and explained it, it would give me the authority only to reiterate such instructions as come down to us from Nanking or Peiping.

I am very reluctant to become tied down by a pair of Chinese opposites whereby I shall be tied down all day and every day on continuous discussions on all sorts of details. I could be much more effective in the type organization I proposed.

In final showdown, if necessary, accept his organization, and his substitute sub para 3 for last sentence original sub para 3, but retain 1st sentence that para on team movements as originally written.

H[ENRY] A. B[YROADE]

[Annex]

We, General Hsu Yung-chang authorized representative of the National Government, General Chou En-lai authorized representative of the Chinese Communist Party, and General George C. Marshall direct that the following message be dispatched to the three Commissioners at Executive Headquarters and to the Advance Section of Executive Headquarters at Changchun.

~~The senior American Officer in the Advance Section of Executive Headquarters shall have the title of Director and shall function as the direct representative of the three Commissioners at Peiping. He will be assisted by a group of three with titles of Chiefs of Staff of the National Government Branch, the Communist Party Branch, and the United States Branch respectively. They shall have the authority to~~

vote and negotiate among themselves. The United States Chief of Staff shall be invited to be the Chairman.

The advance section of Executive Headquarters will be headed by a group of three commissioners with authority to vote, and to negotiate among themselves; one to represent the National Government; one to represent the Communist Party; and one to represent the United States of America. The United States commissioner shall be the chairman of the commissioners and shall be concurrently the Director of Operations.

The details of the remainder of the organization of the advance section shall be as prescribed by Director of Operations.

On all matters coming before the Advance Section for action, every effort shall be made for solution of the problem by unanimous agreement between the combined staff. In the event of disagreement after reasonable attempt to arrive at unanimous agreement it shall be within the authority of the ~~Director~~ U. S. Commissioner at Changchun to take the following action:

1) Refer important and urgent matters of policy direct to the Committee of Three in Nanking for their action, with information copy to the three Commissioners of Executive Headquarters.

2) Refer normal and routine matters of policy to the three Commissioners of Executive Headquarters for their action.

3) ~~Render final decision, which shall be obeyed by all members of field teams and Commanders, regarding Operational matters relating to movements and location of teams, and time of their dispatch. He may also decide disagreements regarding such matters as have previously been interpreted or agreed to by the Commissioners of Executive Headquarters in Peiping.~~

3) *Execute any instructions or orders of the Committee of Three or the Three Commissioners of Executive Headquarters at Peiping despite disagreement among the other commissioners unless those instructions or orders have been altered or revised by proper authority.*

Daily report of operations will be prepared within the staff of the Advance Section and submitted to the Three Commissioners at Peiping for inclusion in the daily Trusums of Executive Headquarters.

The provisions of this agreement shall be put in effect at 1200 hours 22 June 1946 and shall remain in effect until terminated by the Committee of Three.

In the intervening period prior to the above date, this agreement will be utilized as a basis for movement of personnel and organization to permit full operations being assumed by 1200 hours, June 22, 1946.

GENERAL HSU YUNG CHANG

GENERAL CHOU EN-LAI

NANKING, 14 June 1946.

GENERAL G. C. MARSHALL

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Chou En-lai to General Marshall

MM 041

NANKING, June 16, 1946.

MY DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: On June 10, 1946, General Hsu Yung-chang forwarded a copy of his memorandum to you with regard to the power of final decision. As I had explained in person to you and General Hsu in considerable length as to why such a proposal is not acceptable to the Chinese Communist Party, I then thought that a written reply could be dispensed with. On June 14, 1946, I received a second letter from General Hsu in which he again pressed for a solution of this matter. In view of this I am sending the enclosed memorandum to him to clarify my attitude. A copy of this memorandum is hereby forwarded to you for your reference.

[Signature in Chinese]

CHOU EN-LAI

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by General Chou En-lai to General Hsu Yung-chang

MM 040

NANKING, June 16, 1946.

DEAR GENERAL HSU: Reference is made to your note under date of June 14, 1946.

As was fully explained to you at our last conference, the Chinese Communist Party declines to accept the proposal of empowering the American members with final decision in connection with the field teams, the Executive Headquarters or the Committee of Three. Seeing that you have sent a second letter to press for a reply, I beg to forward the following as my personal comment on this matter based on the experience of the past few months.

1. Ever since the Committee of Three, the Military Sub-Committee, and the lower organizations were established, we had in compliance with General Marshall's desire adopted the unanimous agreement principle as the method of procedure in our discussion. On this basis we passed many important decisions, and took actions on innumerable operational matters pertaining to military readjustment. By doing so we have backed out for many a time of a situation which verges on disaster, and achieved recently the agreement governing a 15-day cessation of aggressive actions. Had both parties been lacking in the spirit to abide by the "unanimous agreement" principle, how could so many agreements be brought into being, and the truce preserved for such a long time?

2. In your letter you further mentioned that both sides are lacking in any sort of guarantee. This I don't think is in keeping with the fact. Since the establishment of the Committee of Three, the American officers under the leadership of General Marshall have attended all

meetings, and participated in the formulation of all agreements, and all phases of its activities. By virtue of their position as being placed in the middle, they assumed in outward form as well as in practice the role of guarantee. Apart from that, the American representatives are not only representing the American Government by working along the line of President Truman's statement on 15 December last,⁹⁹ but are also morally bearing the responsibility to implement the Moscow Communiqué of the Big Three.¹ In other words, the American representatives are at the same time serving as an international guarantee. But for this guarantee, how could the two parties have placed such a high confidence and respect in them? Thus to place confidence and respect in the American representatives does not necessarily imply that they be empowered with the final decision. This is best illustrated by the fact that the previous decisions of the Committee of Three were in the largest measure initiated by General Marshall. As the matter then stood, General Marshall enjoyed the highest confidence and respect of the two parties, despite the lack of a final decision power. This evidenced that such a power is not a deciding factor to the settlement of the various issues.

3. It might be argued that empowering the American representatives with final decision would expedite the settlement of disputes between the two parties. To me, at least, this argument seems not to have been backed up by the train of events. Glancing back at the past five months, we find that while during the initial three months very little difficulty was confronted in reaching decision by unanimity, in the following two months, under the influence of the Manchurian issue and a mounting dispute over the PCC decisions, a deadlock was formed which blocked the unanimous agreement. What should be deduced therefrom is: whether an issue can be settled easily or difficultly lies essentially not in the power of final decision, but rather in the earnest intention of both parties to reach a compromise. Were the two parties lacking the good intention to cooperate and compromise, to empower the American representatives with final decision would merely complicate, instead of solving the issues.

4. As far as the American representatives are concerned, the final decision power would instead of being helpful, rather tend to place them into an even more difficult position. We fully respect the American representatives, and trust in their participation in the work of military readjustment, as well as in assuming a leading role in the negotiation. This is one matter. But to grant them the power of final decision, which would place them high above the representatives of the other two parties, to pass verdict, is another matter. Should the two things be confused, it would not only be hardly comprehensible to the Chinese people and the nations abroad, but would set them into surprise.

⁹⁹ Department of State, *United States Relations With China* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 607, or Department of State *Bulletin*, December 16, 1945, p. 945.

¹ Dated December 27, 1945; see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 30, 1945, pp. 1027, 1030 (section IV, China), or *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. II, pp. 815 and 821.

While presenting the foregoing to you in writing, I request earnestly that you will kindly withdraw this proposal of yours, and direct all your efforts toward the solution of matters which were scheduled to be solved within these 15 days.

CHOU EN-LAI

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Mr. Walter S. Robertson to General Marshall

PEIPING, 17 June 1946.

4119. In early conversations after first announcement of 15-day truce agreement General Yeh appeared confused as to its applicability terms and official status (refer 4053²). In response to direct question on Saturday³ as to whether or not instructions had been issued by the Communists to all of their military commanders in North Central China as well as Manchuria to stop all troop movements and conflict during 15-day truce period, he replied "yes". When asked to reconcile such orders with General Chen Yi's coordinated attacks beginning on June 7 he stated that General Chen Yi (1) was retaliating for previous Nationalist attacks, (2) wanted to disband puppet troops, and (3) wished to protect the harvest in his area from raids by puppet troops.

We are checking with American members of all teams in effort to determine what orders were issued to commanders of both sides. Their replies will be summarized for your information.

893.00/6-1746 : Telegram

The Counselor of Embassy in China (Smyth) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, June 17, 1946—9 a. m.

[Received June 17—7:24 a. m.]

991. Coincidentally with announcement of 15-day truce period, barrage of anti-American attacks suddenly stopped. (Yenan English language broadcast for week ending June 14). Practically entire content for first half of week was on economic conditions and during latter part of week on charges of continued Kmt violation of truce agreement.

[Here follows report on broadcast statements.]

SMYTH

² June 14, p. 1047.

³ June 15.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chou
En-lai at 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, June 17, 1946, 10 a. m.*

Also present: Mr. Chang
Colonel Caughey
Capt. Soong

General Chou asked if General Byroade had arrived in Peiping and if he were leaving for Changchun today.

Colonel Caughey said he would probably not go to Changchun today.

General Chou asked if General Marshall would like to discuss the terminations of hostilities in Manchuria first.

General Marshall replied that he would.

General Chou said that this draft,⁴ except for one or two major points which need further discussion, is quite all right. He expected to receive another copy from General Byroade and therefore delayed making an appointment, but now it seemed there is no need to wait.

Two points need clarification. In the first paragraph *a*, the January 10 Agreement is mentioned but the March 27th is not. Since one was mentioned, both had better be mentioned. The January 10th is a general agreement applicable to China as a whole, while the March 27th is specifically for Manchuria. The situation has undergone some change and parts of these two agreements have become obsolete. Except for those parts which have become obsolete, the others should continue to be effective.

General Marshall said he could understand that about the 10 January Agreement but not about the 27th of March. This is, to use an American expression, wiping the slate clean. We should say the January 10th Agreement unless modified or amended specifically. Everything after January 10th is out unless covered in this. That is what we are trying to get.

General Marshall said further that the difficulty General Byroade got into with regard to the relationship between the Advance Section of Executive Headquarters at Changchun and the field teams, so far as concerned the Agreement of March 27th, was that the Generalissimo insisted that that agreement was to be cancelled. What we agreed upon here in the present negotiations was that cancellation would be June 22. He did not want to bring the Agreement of 27 March into the affairs of Changchun but finally reached the compromise General Chou is familiar with. Now, it is anticipated that again this complication would be brought into discussion, thus provoking more delays. Other things being equal, General Marshall was interested in the

⁴ June 13, p. 1044.

time factor. He was completely at a loss to understand either the Generalissimo's point of view or General Chou's point of view. Both of them have something in mind that he doesn't understand. In the meanwhile, the differences put a stop to business. He thought the Manchurian field team agreement wasn't particularly difficult or important. However, General Chou quite evidently felt it was very important; so did the Generalissimo. General Marshall saw it merely as a stumbling block to progress.

General Chou said his principal thought was that some part of the January 10th Agreement had now lost its effect; that was the part about taking over sovereignty. On 10 January, before Soviet troops had evacuated, until 15 April, that provision was still effective. After 15 April when Soviet troops had completed evacuation, the question of sovereignty no longer existed. He was concerned lest the lack of a footnote to the January 10th Agreement would allow the Generalissimo and Kuomintang leaders to go everywhere under the pretext of restoring sovereignty.

The March 27th Agreement is not so important, but General Chou wanted it mentioned because it governed the cessation of hostilities in Manchuria. Yesterday, the Generalissimo's secretary declared that the March 27th Agreement was destroyed by the Communist Party when they captured Ssu-ping-chieh. This is ridiculous because the Communists occupied Ssu-ping-chieh prior to March 27th. When the March 27th Agreement was under discussion, Communists offered to withdraw from the area between Mukden and Changchun. Whatever followed, there are facts which can show the logic of the events. Therefore it was his opinion that if part of the January 10th Agreement had become ineffective, it would be mentioned here. Then, of course, there was no need to refer to the March 27th Agreement. Otherwise, it would be necessary to mention it here and that was what he had in mind.

General Marshall said it seemed to him that mention of it here complicated rather than clarified the situation. If General Chou wanted to make a special point, it should be in the form of a definite amendment to the January 10th Agreement or explanatory statement. Next, as to the question of sovereignty, it did not seem to him quite logical. The mere evacuation of Russians did not conclusively determine the question of sovereignty unless, as he presumed General Chou intended to imply, the Communists had taken over sovereignty by the presence of Communist troops. I don't think that is a fair statement because Communists were definitely not taking over control for the Central Government during the past few months.

General Marshall's next point, and he hesitated to mention it because it was continually in his troubles—was the response to propa-

ganda statements about negotiation. There are statements being made in every part of China from the Yangtze north, on both sides, regarding various factors. If he, General Chou, General Hsu and General Yu Ta Wei responded to each one, they had better quit before starting. It was almost an impossible situation. He had given up hope of persuading authorities to moderate their propaganda. He had accepted the fact that he must try to conduct negotiations in spite of conditions. To sum up, he thought General Chou might better prepare a definite amendment to go into the draft rather than just leave a reference to the March 27th Agreement which does not clearly mean one thing or the other.

The control of the teams will come in the other document which General Byroade left with him. It has been altered to show General Chou's proposals of night before last. He had not acted on it because of other urgent matters and particularly because he had not quite figured out in his own mind how to take the necessary steps.

General Chou said he didn't think what he had mentioned about the March 27 Agreement was important. What was more important to him was to state here, those terms of the January 10 Agreement which have lost their time effect and which should be excluded. His view on taking over sovereignty may be different. Because such differences exist, there must be a sovereignty clause to cover such places as Harbin or Tsitsihar which have been taken over by the Government.

General Chou stated that the outstanding questions are the disposition of troops and the administrative affairs. If the question of taking over sovereignty is brought up again, then the Government might create lots of complications. Many places which Soviet troops evacuated have not been touched upon. The Government may insist on sending troops to these places on the basis that they have not yet completed occupation. If that goes on, there will be invincible difficulties. General Chou wanted to have no dispute over this issue and that the matter be settled as is. Therefore he suggested having such a clause.

General Marshall said the question of Government occupations, he thought, would be covered in the special agreement regarding redispersions in Manchuria, where changes were to take place in prescribed periods. Therefore, he did not think it came into this particular document. It was his idea, as originally stated to General Chou, to have a preliminary understanding that paragraph *c* of the announcement regarding the cessation of aggressive actions, would carry for Manchuria the precise details as to where troops were to go. This particular document now being discussed, had a paragraph *a* which pertained to the immediate details of stopping the fighting and to that only. Now, if General Chou felt that some specific statement

should be made, he should give it to General Marshall today in writing. Were there any other comments on this particular document?

General Chou said he had no comment on *b*. Comment on *c*: First, about the restriction of specified distance, he thought 15 li instead of 30 li would be more practicable. The reason was that when one talks about the restoration agreement, he should realize that inevitably Communists will have to withdraw more than Nationalists. This is only an interim arrangement at this time. First, Government troops are largely stationed in cities, while Communists troops are outside cities. When this paper comes into effect, the Communists will have to withdraw from the besieged state. Second, railways are guarded by Nationalists troops while the Communists troops are away from the railway lines. If separation of forces has to take place, it may be it will depend on previous arrangements. Probably, Nationalist troops will not withdraw from railways, and so again it will be a unilateral withdrawal of Communists troops.

As to the other two cases where both troops are confronting each other in rural areas or on a front crossing the railroad lines, then, of course, both sides should withdraw to the same distance. If the distance of withdrawal were 15 li instead of 30, it might be more easily practiced. The second point, I think, is that the regular position should be that as of 12 noon, June 7. That is his suggestion, General Chou has in mind that position has to be restored.

General Marshall said he used the expression "believe" because he thought they would have a difficult time finding out accurately just what happened. He asked how General Chou wanted it worded.

General Chou said he wanted it stated very definitely here. He said, of course, there might be some argument over what happened. If stated less definitely, then argument would arise as to what arrangement should be made. For example, if it is testified that Communist troops entered Lafa after 12 noon, then of course, Communists troops should withdraw. On the other hand, Nationalist troops also took some places after 7 June. Equal arrangements should be made. If stated definitely here, it would facilitate making a decision in the field.

General Marshall asked how he wanted it stated.

General Chou suggested that the situation as it existed at noon 7 June, 1946 should be restored—the troop positions.

General Marshall said he could not say positions at noon of June 7 without qualification. If there was a heavy fight in which Communists held the town and Nationalist forces had not yet captured the town, but from which maybe at 5:00 in the evening Communists were driven out by Nationalists. Then if you restore the situation as of noon on 7 June, that would mean both Nationalist and Communist troops would probably be back in the town and on the verge of a new fight.

According to General Chou, the Nationalists have to go back 15 li if they don't want to perpetuate the situation where they are in close contact. If you say the situation is restored as of noon 7 June, it will be restored in the middle of battle, and will then be back where they are fighting nose to nose. General Marshall said he was trying to have the situation considered as of 7 June and then adjusted accordingly. If you put the Communist or the Nationalist back in town and the other surrounding the town and say now stay there, your English will defeat you. That is the reason General Marshall said "special consideration." He used the wording "special" rather than merely "consideration." General Marshall explained he phrased it in this manner to provide the basis for determining the readjustment of the troops involved.

General Chou said his third point pertained to the final decision. He said he did not want to repeat his reasons why he is not in a position to accept it. What he wants stated is that in event no unanimous agreement is reached among team members, then the team would immediately report it. In event no agreement could be reached among team members or at Advance Section, then the American representative of the Advance Section would immediately report the situation to Peiping or Nanking, requesting instructions or orders, which, upon receipt, the American representative would be empowered to carry out despite disagreement by the Chinese members. He explained this to General Byroade before.

General Marshall asked if General Chou wanted it reported to both Nanking and Peiping.

General Chou said either.

General Marshall suggested that the choice should depend on the importance or urgency.

General Chou said yes, just as General Byroade had written down in his document. According to paragraph *d* at the end, it said, "may be carried out if previously cleared with the field team." The word "cleared" is not very clear to General Chou.

General Marshall explained it meant they have to notify that team.

General Chou suggested they might simply use "report to the team." He wanted to add in case the report was found to be not corresponding to fact, then the field team would be authorized to take corrective action.

General Marshall said that did not go with the facts. That is the way they originally had it—he didn't know why they changed it.

General Chou said coming back to paragraph *e*, he suggested instead of 7 days to put 15 days because 7 days was too short for the Communists to prepare an overall list. The list will show the strength, locations and commanders on or above the regimental level because it

is rather difficult to get the junior rank within the 15 days. That could be submitted later on.

General Chou referred to paragraph *a* concerning the stipulation which has lost its time effect because the situation has changed. General Chou said, as General Marshall had just stated, he had better make a statement. He suggested the wording "will govern except terms which have lost time effect or as hereinafter specifically modified."

General Marshall suggested that he meant that which passage of time had altered. General Marshall didn't think it would work, but he would try to get it down to this specific thing.

At this time, there was off-the-record discussion.

General Marshall suggested how about adding "or as later directed by the Committee of Three."

Colonel Caughey remarked that he thought they had all the changes suggested by General Chou.

General Chou suggested the use of the wording "Government troops" instead of "Nationalist troops." In paragraph *f*, the word "Government" should be used in lieu of "National."

General Marshall said he wanted to talk to General Chou about paragraphs *a*, *b* and *c*, in other words about reorganization. What has happened so far as the Government is concerned, is they have worked out various proposals. They gave these proposals to him Saturday morning. The Generalissimo desired to have them put into formal shape; that is the exact phrasing and arrangements of amendments of the orders—the exact statement as though it were an accomplished agreement. That is what he was engaged in Saturday afternoon, Saturday night and Sunday morning. He was working on amendments to the original February 25 Agreement—the special annex covering the details of redistribution in Manchuria—and some other similar matters. The Government officials spent Sunday afternoon and night getting them translated into Chinese for the consideration of the Generalissimo, he having previously indicated his thoughts on the subject. General Marshall had hoped that he would be notified this morning of what his conclusions were but was not. Instead, the Generalissimo sent word a few minutes ago that he wanted to see me [*him*] at 6:00 o'clock tonight.

The situation is that while General Marshall didn't know yet just what the proposals of the Government would be, he did know some of the various possibilities. However, he was not authorized to state those at the present time. His greatest difficulty was that he didn't know anything definite from the Communist Party, a fact which made him fearful that he would find himself in a position where matters will have gone too far on the part of one side or the

other for him to do much by way of persuasion in an effort to moderate proposals. For example, he assumed that tonight, the Generalissimo would tell him quite definitely what he had decided would be the conditions to be put forward. That left him merely guessing at what General Chou would think was an equitable readjustment. Hence, he was not in a position to influence matters at the critical moment.

General Chou had given him one very, very general statement Saturday morning. That was all he knew. When it comes to a Government proposal that he, for instance, might feel would not be acceptable to the Communist Party, he would have merely to guess as to whether or not that was the case. That would build up a situation which would make it very hard later on to mediate or moderate. Once people have taken a position, it is difficult to bend them from that position. That was particularly true in the case of the Generalissimo. Whatever he had been able to do in connection with the development of the Government position had been greatly limited because he was only guessing. People don't take him very seriously when he has to admit he was merely guessing.

General Chou said regarding paragraph *c*, that he had in previous conferences tried to give a general impression and a general understanding of the Communist attitude. Of course, his statement was not concrete because during the present negotiations, the Communist Party assumed an attitude of wanting to make concessions. For example, on the three paragraphs concerning restoration of communications, on teams or officials, and on reorganization, the Communist Party is ready to make concessions to reach a settlement. This is very clear. At present, it is clear that the Government's attitude regarding restoration of communications is still unknown.

There is a fourth question which is the political problem. The Communists would have certain claims to make. Because they feared that this might affect negotiations on other parts, they delayed the matter to a later period. Regardless of the three subjects, all are difficult. The Communist attitude is to make concessions to reach agreement. That is why Communists did not make any proposal. They wanted first to see what the Government's proposal would be and then to negotiate. For example, the draft for restoration of communications⁵ was the work of Colonel Hill. General Chou made certain suggestions but did not touch the framework.

Since the question of the attitude toward army reorganization has again been raised, General Chou wanted to present a few more ideas. The Communists put forth only the question of altering comparative strengths and of making some specific redistribution of troops.

⁵ Not found in Department files.

Whether Communist troops would be concentrated in one area or scattered over three or four, the number of places to be garrisoned by them will be limited. The Government side might also make proposals on where they would like to stay. They might even propose more places for the Government troops. General Chou said he had also stated before that he would consider some places which should be left ungarrisoned. He anticipated that the Government might raise the question of Harbin. He had turned over in his mind what kind of solution would be best.

Then there was the question of administration in Manchuria. He did not want to bring up this question at present. A *status quo* should be maintained pending settlement. Some procedure would be worked out for conduct of further negotiations. General Chou guessed the Government might want to send troops to the nine provincial capitals in Manchuria and to send members to the provincial government—a governor and the ministers. The Government might want to send those people they had appointed to various provincial governments so that in the political field, the Government would make no concession at all. This would place the Communists in a very difficult position. If Communists now proposed that the Northeast Political and Economic Council be reorganized and that the provincial government be reorganized too, neither would hardly be acceptable to the Government. That is why he would rather discuss it after the 15-day period. Then they would only discuss the three points stipulated and leave everything else to later—that in itself was a concession on their part. If the Government wanted them to make concessions on every subject, that would be difficult too. They have already conceded certain questions on the traffic operation and administration. The inspection and destruction of fortifications in areas other than railroads would be discussed later. This constituted a concession.

Coming back to the termination of hostilities, when they talked about separation of forces, inevitably Communist troops had to withdraw more than Nationalists because of positions held. That was the second concession. General Chou said the third was the army reorganization. The Government would raise certain claims. They would want Communist troops concentrated. On administrative matters, they would insist that the Government had the right to take over various provincial governments and to force Communists to make concessions too. This would be no political settlement at all. On the contrary just forcing Communists to recognize a Government which had been assigned by the Kuomintang was an arrangement that could not be beneficial to a political settlement.

General Chou recalled that when General Marshall returned from the United States this time, he wanted a four-point proposal for

Manchuria in which it was suggested that the *status quo* for the local government be maintained. This *status quo* will not persist indefinitely and elections will take place. They could get this fixed up after the termination of hostilities is effective. At that time, the Communists would submit a list of their armies, send people to survey Communist areas and get the exact strengths of the Communist forces, etc.

General Marshall thanked General Chou for that statement.

General Chou said to suppose the function of the Advance Section had been determined, then field teams could go to various places to stop the fighting and to make readjustments. They could also direct the concentration of troops. After hostilities had completely stopped, it would also prove helpful to the solution of administrative and political matters. As the Generalissimo had suggested that administrative matters be discussed by the Committee of Three, it seemed a way out. Maybe other parties did not quite agree with this idea because they would rather have the P. C. C. solve the problems. General Chou suggested that the matter be discussed, both by the Committee of Three and the P. C. C. in parallel and try to reach a solution at the same time but after the 15 days.

General Chou hoped the Government's proposals on the army reorganization plan, paragraph *c* of this draft, could be made ready earlier so that he could have time for reconsideration. He needed some time before reaching a solution, particularly since he had to take it up with Communist leaders in Manchuria. After the situation in Manchuria was stabilized, he thought it would be easy to reach a complete settlement on the situation in China proper. He hoped, after the discussion with Colonel Hill this afternoon, they would reach a conclusion on the restoration of the railways problem.

General Chou stated that General Hwang,⁶ who is the Communist head of the Communications Group, arrived here yesterday and talked with General Chou with regard to fortifications. At first, General Marshall had suggested that fortifications at bridges and tunnels be maintained. Then the Government added to that, railroad stations, water towers, depots, stock and repair facilities, etc. In that case, it might turn out that no fortifications need be destroyed. Right now, the stations are very close to each other and there are a lot of small bridges. General Chou said that he lacked knowledge of the actual situation because he was working all alone on the different matters, while the bulk of his staff was in Executive Headquarters. They had poor communications with Peiping. He knew very little about the details.

⁶ Apparently Wang Cheng, founder of the Signal Communications organization of the Chinese Communist armies and considered by the Chinese Communists to be the outstanding signal communications expert in China.

General Marshall asked what he meant by poor communications.

General Chou had mentioned to General Byroade that he would like to have regular air service between here and Peiping in order to have his own people come down to make reports because he cannot convey through the radio the whole idea or get all the details from them. General Byroade said he also thought it necessary to have some regular air service, and that he would consider this matter when he got back.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Draft Proposal for the Termination of Hostilities in Manchuria*⁷

On the basis of the orders of June 6, 1946 halting all advances, attacks and pursuits for a period of 15 days commencing at noon of June 7th, which will be continued in effect, we, the Committee of Three, announce the following instructions to govern a complete termination of hostilities in Manchuria :

a. The terms of 10 January 1946 for the cessation of hostilities will govern except as hereinafter specifically modified, or later directed by the Committee of Three.

b. Commanders of forces in close contact or engaged in actual fighting will immediately direct their troops to cease fighting and will seek to secure a local truce by establishing liaison with the opposing commanders, pending the arrival of a field team. They should both immediately withdraw their respective troops from close contact.

c. The readjustment of troops found to be in close contact or actually engaged in fighting will be directed by the field team on the ground by requiring the withdrawal for specified distances, normally 15 li, of one or both forces according to the circumstances. The local situation believed to have existed at noon of June 7, 1946 will be the basis for determining the readjustment of the troops involved. In the event of disagreement in the teams or at the advance section of Executive Headquarters at Changchun, the senior American Officer at Changchun will report the situation to Executive Headquarters at Peiping or to the Committee of Three at Nanking depending on the urgency of the situation.

d. All movements of Government or Communist troops of a tactical nature will cease. Administrative and supply movements as authorized in the original cease fire order of January 10, 1946, may be carried out if previously approved by a field team.

e. Within fifteen days after the issuance of this agreement, lists

⁷ Transmitted by General Marshall with his memorandum OSE 187, June 17, to Gen. Hsu Yung-chang as "similar to the one you have except that it now includes amendments suggested by General Chou En-lai". See draft of June 13, p. 1044.

showing all units together with commanders of regiments and larger units, strength and locations in Manchuria will be submitted to the advance section of Executive Headquarters in Changchun.

f. The National Government will move no additional combat units to Manchuria. However, individual replacements are authorized for the purpose of bringing up to approved strength those units authorized in the basic plan for the reorganization and integration dated February 25, 1946, as hereafter amended.

g. Officers failing to carry out the terms of this agreement will be relieved and disciplined by their respective commanders.

Marshall Mission Files. Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by Colonel J. Hart Caughey to General Chou En-lai

OSE 189

NANKING, June 17, 1946.

DEAR GENERAL CHOU: Attached there are three papers which constitute the principal proposals of the Government for the agreements to be reached under paragraphs *b* and *c* of the Generalissimo's announcement^s of cessation of aggressive action for the 15-day period. There will be additional proposals covering the precise amendments to the army reorganization agreement of February 25, 1946 regarding the distribution of troops in China proper. It is probable that this can be furnished you some time tomorrow.

General Marshall would like to have a meeting with you as soon as possible tomorrow to get your general reactions regarding the attached papers.

J. HART CAUGHEY

[Annex 1]

GOVERNMENT STIPULATIONS REGARDING NORTH CHINA IN CONNECTION
WITH PROPOSED READJUSTMENT OF TROOPS IN MANCHURIA

1. *Jehol and Chahar*

The Government stipulates that in connection with the readjustment of troops it proposes for Manchuria, the Communists must evacuate their troops from the provinces of Jehol and Chahar before September 1, 1946.

2. *Shantung*

The Government stipulates that coincident with the readjustment of troops it proposes for Manchuria, it must be free to occupy Chefoo and Wei Hei Wei with one army and to reinforce Tsingtao to a

^s See press release by President Chiang on June 6, p. 982.

strength of one army, permitting the withdrawal of the U. S. Marines now located there. It further stipulates that all localities in Shantung Province forcibly occupied by Communist troops afternoon of June 7, 1946 shall be vacated by those troops before July 1, 1946 and immediately occupied by National garrisons, and that those Communist troops shall withdraw a minimum distance of 30 li from the towns and cities herein referred to.

3. *Hopeh*

The Government stipulates that it shall be free to reenforce the region of Tientsin with one army commencing September 1, 1946 to permit the withdrawal of the U. S. Marine garrison now in that area.

[Annex 2]

(Note: This is to be an annex to the amended agreement of February 25, 1946)

MANCHURIA ANNEX

The entire demobilization and integration program for Manchuria shall be completed before January 1, 1947. The ultimate strength of military forces in Manchuria shall comprise a total of 6 armies. There shall be 1 army composed of 1 National division and 2 Communist divisions with a Communist commander, 1 army of 2 National divisions and 1 Communist division with a National commander and 4 National armies with National commanders.

The necessary demobilization or increase in strength to realize the foregoing shall begin on June 22, 1946 and shall be completed before January 1, 1947. Redeployment of divisions to the localities designated hereinafter shall be completed before October 1, 1946. During the month of December 1946 integration of the two armies concerned shall be effected.

The location of armies shall be as follows:

1. One army composed of 1 National and 2 Communist divisions to be located within the three provinces of Hsin Hei Lung Kiang, Hsing-an, and Nun Kiang with one Communist division in Hsin Hei Lung Kiang and North and Central Nun Kiang, one Communist division in Hsing-an and North-Central Nun Kiang, and one National division in southern Nun Kiang. The division headquarters of the above 3 divisions shall be located at Tsitsihar, Hailar and Paicheng respectively. The army headquarters shall be located at Tsitsihar.

2. One army composed of 2 National divisions and 1 Communist division to be located within the provinces of Kirin and Sung Kiang with one National division in Central Kirin province, one National division in Eastern Sung Kiang province and one Communist division in Eastern Kirin province. The division headquarters of the three divisions shall be located at the cities of Kirin, Mutankiang and

Yenki, respectively. The army headquarters shall be located in the city of Kirin.

3. One National army shall be located within the provinces of Sung Kiang and Kirin with one division in eastern and central Sung Kiang and two divisions in Central and Eastern Kirin. The division headquarters of the above divisions shall be at Harbin and Changchun respectively. The army headquarters shall be located at Changchun.

4. One National army shall be located within Liao Peh and Liaoning provinces with one division in Liao Peh province and 2 divisions in northern Liaoning province. The division headquarters of the above divisions shall be located at Ssuping kai and Mukden respectively. The army headquarters shall be located at Mukden.

5. One National army shall be located within Liaoning and Antung provinces with one division in Western Liaoning province and two divisions in Antung province. The division headquarters of the above divisions shall be at Penshi, Antung and Tunghuakai respectively. The Army headquarters shall be located at Penshi.

6. One National army shall be located within Southern Liaoning province. Two of the division headquarters shall be located at Chinchow and one at Yingkou. The army headquarters shall be located at Chinchow.

[Annex 3]

PROPOSED AGREEMENTS FOR RESTORATION OF COMMUNICATIONS

In order to effect without further delay the restoration of communications under the provisions of general directive No. 4:⁹

The Government proposes to the reopening of all means of communications. It proposes the immediate restoration of the destroyed railway lines while the reopening of other communications are under discussion pending agreements.

While restoration of railway lines will be carried out wherever possible, the Government proposes to restore the following lines in the order of priority indicated:

- a. Tientsin-Pukow line, including the entire line from Tientsin to the Yangtze River and including the Tsinan-Tsingtao line and the Hsuchow-Haichow sector of the Lunghai line.
- b. The Peiping-Suiyuan line.
- c. The Peiping-Hankow line.
- d. Other lines.

The Government agrees to the removal and destruction of all mines, fortifications, blockades, blockhouses and military installations lying within 1,000 meters of either side of the railroad line with the exception of those military installations for the defense of and located within 1,000 meters of bridges, tunnels, railroad stations, workshops, storage depots, radio stations, water points, etc.

⁹ Executive Headquarters General Directive No. 4-A of February 12, not printed. See agreement of February 9, pp. 422-425.

The Government agrees that qualified railway personnel of the CCP may be taken into the employ of the Ministry of Communications in the restored sectors of the lines. The qualifications of such persons are to be determined by examinations conducted by Railway Control Teams.

The Government agrees that movements of troops or munitions over restored sections of railroads, highways or waterways shall be restricted as provided in the cease fire agreement of 10 January except as approved by the Executive Headquarters.

[Subannex 1]

PLAN FOR RESTORATION OF COMMUNICATIONS

To implement the agreement of proposals for the restoration of communications without further delay, all local commanders and all team members will expedite construction by all means within their power. No commander or team member will permit interference with the construction work for any reason whatsoever.

Construction will start before 23 June 1946 at each of the following points under supervision of Railroad Control Teams and under control of M. O. C.:

Team No. 18—Tientsin Pukow RR from Tsang Hsien to Te Hsien.

Team No. 23—Tientsin Pukow RR from Yucheng to Te Hsien.

Team No. 16—Tientsin Pukow RR from Taian to Yenchow.

Team No. 24—Tientsin Pukow RR from Hanchuan to Yenchow.

Team No. 21—Tsinan Tsing Tao RR from Kaomi to Fengtze.

Team No. 23 or 7 Tsinan Tsing Tao RR from Chengtien to Fengtze.

Team No. 24 or 4—Lunghai RR from Hsuchow to Haichow.

Construction of other railroad lines will be commenced at the earliest practicable time.

All mines, blockades, blockhouses, fortifications and other military works lying within 1,000 meters on each side of the railroads listed above will be removed or destroyed simultaneously with construction, except those military works constructed for defense of and lying within 1,000 meters of vital railroad installations such as bridges, tunnels, railroad stations, workshops, storage depots, radio stations, water points, etc. This work of removal or destruction will proceed in the direction of construction within each of the seven construction areas above listed at such rate that the demolition of military works will, at all times, be completed for a distance of not less than 1,000 meters in advance of completed construction of the railroad. At the same time other military works along the operative portions of the above mentioned lines, except the Lunghai RR west of Hsuchow, will be de-

stroyed at a constant rate such that the destruction of military works shall have been completed on or before the date of completion of the railroad within the area of control of each of the above listed seven teams.

While restoration work is in progress, local commanders will be responsible for the protection of the lines and the vital installations such as bridges, tunnels, railway stations workshops, storage depots, radio stations, water points, etc. under the supervision of Railway Control Teams. As soon as work of restoration of any sector of the lines mentioned above has been completed, the policing of the railroad property will be entrusted to the railroad police, while the general security beyond the railroad property will be the responsibility of the local commanders. The strength of the railroad police to be sent into the restored sectors will not exceed the normal strength of the police force in the sectors under government control, i. e., an average of not more than five men per kilometer.

[Subannex 2]

APPENDIX A

TIME SCHEDULE

	<i>Days</i>
Tientsin Pukow RR from Tsang Hsien to Te-Hsien . . .	75
Tientsin Pukow RR from Yucheng to Te-Hsien	60
Tientsin Pukow RR from Taian to Yenchow	60
Tientsin Pukow RR from Hanchaun to Yenchow	90
Tientsin[-Tsin]gtao RR	30
Lung-Hai RR Eastern Section, Hsuchow to Haichow . .	15
Peiping-Suiyuan RR, Nankow to Paotou	45
Peiping-Hankow RR, Yuansyih to Anyang	150
Tung-Po RR, Lingfen to Yuncheng	50

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Minutes of Conference Between General Marshall and Dr. Lo Lung-chi and Dr. Carsun Chang*¹⁰ at General Marshall's House, June 17, 1946, 5:30 p. m.

Also present: Captain Soong

Dr. Chang opened the meeting by saying that he and Dr. Lo had learned that the Communist Party had rejected the proposal of giving the Americans power of final decision on grounds that the drafted proposal covered too wide a field. Dr. Lo added that the Communist

¹⁰ Leaders of the Democratic League.

Party should not reject it completely, however. He further stated that General Chou En-lai had said that the American member on a field team might be given the power of final decision if in the case of further disagreement among the representatives, the matter then be referred to the Committee of Three.

General Marshall stated that field teams could not refer matters to Committee of Three directly because it would take too long. Further, he expressed his declination to have anything to do with the issue of final authority of Americans because he was personally involved. General Marshall said the Communist Party's attitude in this matter was dictated by a feeling that he was supporting the Government, particularly after the Government's occupation of Changchun and the insistence of the Generalissimo in giving Americans such authority. But General Marshall felt that authority of decisive vote was too broad and he did not want the Commissioner in Peiping to have such a broad final authority although he might have the final decision on issues relating to the restoration of Communications. General Marshall expressed the fear that the American Government would be too involved if the Americans were given such broad power of final decision. He further stated that the American member on a field team might be given the authority to decide as to where and when the team was to go and who it was to see. In case of disagreement after the team investigation, the facts could be reported to the Commissioners and in this connection, the American Commissioner in case of disagreement should have the power to decide with respect to the local situation. One of the greatest past difficulties was to agree as to where the teams should go. Even the Commissioners couldn't agree in most cases. Therefore, the American Commissioner also should be able to decide where and when the team should go and who they should see. Upon arrival in a troubled area, the American member of the team should have the power to decide within that locality. With respect to restoration of Communications, General Marshall felt that it was to the Communist Party's advantage to allow the Americans final authority because such a procedure could prevent the misuse of railroads by the government.

Dr. Chang then said it was his understanding that General Chou had agreed that the American members on the field team should have the final authority. General Marshall replied that he only wanted American team members to have limited final authority. However, if the American Commissioner were not given the final authority in local situations, then unlimited final authority must be given to American team members.

Dr. Lo then proposed that the term "Final Authority" be changed

to "by a majority vote". It would avoid much of the propaganda on the issue of final authority. General Marshall replied that the American member might not decide to conform with either side. By giving the Americans final authority, it would eliminate prejudices on both sides. Added, however, that he might compromise by choosing a middle course of action. Dr. Lo stated that the Communist Party was willing to give final authority to American team members. He felt that the stumbling block would be in reorganization of the Army. He further stated that whether the 15-day truce would be a success or not depended largely on General Marshall's effort. But if we could not solve all the issues within these 15 days, we could leave some of them until after the period is over. General Marshall said that a definite course of action must be obtained in these 15 days. His role in the mediation was to try to modify on both sides, and get the propositions into acceptable forms. He said that there was great suspicion on trivial matters, thus making it difficult to reach a decision on the major issue.

Dr. Lo then said that the delegates of different political groups were all coming back to Nanking and they were to meet the Government and Communist representatives tomorrow. He offered their assistance to General Marshall. General Marshall replied that it would help a great deal if they could get the issue on the final authority of Americans settled.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Hsu Yung-chang to General Marshall

No. 013

[NANKING,] 18 June 1946.

Colonel Caughey's memorandum of 13 June¹¹ together with draft on "Termination of Hostilities in Manchuria" sent to me on 13 June was received, and my suggested amendments to the draft are as below:

1. Amendments to the original draft:

a) "May be carried out" in item *d* amended to read "May be carried out within the garrisoned areas".

b) Item *f* should be eliminated because it contradicts with the stipulation in the cessation of hostilities agreement of January 10 which states "It will not prejudice the movements of Government troops into and within Manchuria".

c) This paper should be signed at the same time when "the newly drafted agreement on detail procedures in the restoration of communications" and "the amended plan for reorganization and integration of the Communist Army into the National Army".

¹¹ See footnote 78, p. 1044.

2. Regarding General Chou En-lai's suggested amendments,¹² we can agree to all except the following:

- a) In Item c, we still agree to the original 30 li.
- b) In Item c, the original wording "In the event of disagreement the decision of the senior American officer in the Advance Section of Executive Headquarters at Changchun will be accepted." should not be changed.

Please acknowledge the above 1 and 2.

HSU YUNG CHANG

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Conference Between General Marshall and General Yu Ta-wei at 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, June 18, 1946, 9:15 a.m.

General Yu Ta Wei informed General Marshall that the meeting at 0630 between General Hsu and himself and General Chou En-lai was not at all satisfactory. General Yu said that General Chou had become "wild" and acted in a disgraceful manner. General Yu took the view that General Chou's action was not called for since the Generalissimo wanted to give the Communists the best chance possible.

General Marshall asked if they had talked about the Manchuria situation. General Yu stated that they had discussed communication problems and had gotten nowhere, and that when they discussed Manchuria, General Chou saw no reason for arbitration with reference to evacuating Jehol and Chahar or for vacating Chefoo and Wei Hai Wei. General Chou asked that the two extra Communists divisions in Manchuria be an increase to their ten ultimate divisions. General Yu said that then the question of the American deciding the vote had come up and General Chou posed the question "What would happen if I suggested that a Russian have the decisive vote"?

General Marshall asked General Yu if there were any grounds for common solution, to which General Yu replied that he thought not and then told General Marshall that the Generalissimo wanted to have his (General Marshall's) reaction to the meeting. General Marshall replied that he knew the Generalissimo's terms were too harsh. What concerned him at the moment was what concessions could be made by the Generalissimo. In short, *is* there any common ground. General Yu replied that General Chou was aggravated and resentful regarding the Jehol, Chahar and Shantung stipulations and brought up again the question of American decision which was not acceptable to the Communist Party.

General Marshall informed General Yu that General Chou had decided not to go to Yen-an. General Marshall stated that he thought

¹² See draft of June 17, p. 1074.

General Chou would possibly seek an appointment with him tomorrow and that possibly, out of today's meetings, something could be developed.

General Yu insisted that the answer to the North China, as well as the Manchuria question, was to get the Communist forces into specific areas. General Marshall replied that that would evoke the natural fear on the part of the Communists of being concentrated in an area to facilitate ultimate destruction.

General Yu concluded by saying that he had talked to the Generalissimo who is willing to give the Communists more generous areas and he asked General Marshall to have his Staff Officers prepare a solution.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

General Marshall to Mr. Walter S. Robertson, at Peiping

[NANKING,] 18 June 1946.

928. Com[mander] Seventh Fleet¹³ reports information from a Maritime Customs Port Captain to the effect that 14 ships with Chinese troops embarked on a "sub rosa" troop movement during Saturday darkness and Sunday darkness. General Ting and Mayor Li confirmed this movement and further stated 54th C[hinese] N[ational] A[rmy] was moving to protect Tsingtao water supply. Ting also reported Chimo completely surrounded by Communists.

In addition to this information from Admiral Cooke, General Yu Ta Wei informed me this morning that the 54th Army was moving to Tsingtao and the 73rd Army to Tsinanfu. These movements could not have come at a worse time insofar as my negotiations are concerned. It will probably take the best efforts of several good Field Teams to keep this situation from getting out of hand. Please give me a brief outline of your plan to meet this situation.¹⁴

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai at 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, June 18, 1946, 11:15 a.m.

Also present: Mr. Chang
Col. Caughey
Capt. Soong

General Marshall stated that he had two matters to take up. He had the revisions of the February 25 Agreement (handing copy to

¹³ Adm. Charles M. Cooke, Jr.

¹⁴ See telegram No. 4245, June 20, p. 1112.

General Chou).¹⁵ In other words, if the various agreements were accepted, this is the form they would probably have to go into. This, of course, he explained, deals with North China. This was not in shape last night, he said, so that he could get it to General Chou sooner. It had since been confirmed by the Generalissimo and typed up here. The other matter, he said, had just arrived and been translated about 30 minutes ago. General Marshall gave the Chinese copy to General Chou and asked that it be returned within two or three days. This is a copy of the message the Generalissimo's Headquarters sent to Executive Headquarters,¹⁵ as indicated in the note. Instruction was received from the Generalissimo that, aside from dispatching this message to Peiping Headquarters on 18 June, a copy was to be forwarded to General Marshall in the forenoon of the same day. General Yu Ta Wei brought it at about 8:30 this morning. Consequently, General Marshall had no knowledge of the contents last night when he wrote a memorandum to General Chou. He wanted General Chou to have it now; otherwise, it would go clear to Peiping and return through the Communist Commissioner.

General Chou said he received General Marshall's memorandum last night and he quickly went over it because he did not want any further delay. After reading through it he himself was rather surprised, particularly the part pertaining to China proper. He believes this paper is entirely a proposal of the Generalissimo. As far as his authority is concerned he is not in a position to consider such proposal. All he can do is to get it translated and send it to Yen-an, except for the part which stipulates the restoration of conditions in Shantung prior to June 7. The other parts are entirely beyond his expectation and he could not, when he went to Yen-an last time, have thought of such suggestions. Therefore, he felt it a heavy blow on receiving the paper because he has been trying to make a compromise by all means on various issues. However, the attitude of the Government in drawing this draft seems not to pertain to solving the problems. He feels that not only he alone but the public, after reading the draft, would find it unacceptable. Despite all of that he is still trying to get the whole contents cabled to Yen-an today because it is rather long and takes some time.

General Chou continued that because Yen-an needs an explanation of the development of the negotiations in Nanking General Chou feels that he has to make some report on the progress. During the past 10 days he tried to work along the lines General Marshall suggested, by tackling problems one by one and by developing compromise, step by step. Though he was afraid that the entire problem

¹⁵ Not printed.

may not be possible to be solved within 15 days, but he still hopes that the framework can be laid down within this period and the remaining problems can be taken up later. In this way, negotiations will not confront a total wreck, and so in his report to Yen-an he has assumed rather an optimistic and helpful attitude during the past 10 days. Therefore, as far as he is concerned the paper he received last night was rather a surprise and he feels rather embittered to read it. As a matter of fact, two or three days ago the Government had already revealed a little of its intentions. General Chou heard from the Democratic League that a dinner party was given by the Kuomintang to the Middle parties. Mr. Mo Teh Hwei, the man from Manchuria, already indicated that the army reorganization plan was a hard nut to crack because the gap between the two parties was very wide and it touched not only Manchuria but also China proper. Even if Mr. Mo did not know the whole contents of the paper he must have known informally about the outline. General Chou did not believe what Mr. Mo said, but after receipt of this paper he found that Mr. Mo's remarks had some foundation. Of course, early yesterday he already had some omen because of the change in the railroad communications draft. On June 15 when Colonel Hill came to speak to him, Colonel Hill asked if he would be ready to sign the paper providing General Yu Ta Wei would agree on the points included. General Chou said that in general it will be all right to him, having only read the exact English text. He made very few moderate changes. On the next day, June 6 [16], General Yu Ta Wei rejected the proposal.

General Marshall asked if by proposal he meant the paper.

General Chou said he did and continued that on June 17 General Yu Ta Wei made a new draft himself. So, after talking with Colonel Hill yesterday afternoon, General Chou already had some feeling that some trouble was going to arise since it seemed that the Government's intentions in solving the issues were not developing along the lines General Marshall suggested or those General Yu Ta Wei had expressed to General Chou. Immediately after General Chou returned to Nanking this time the Government put some stumbling blocks in the way of a solution. In view of this General Chou feels obliged to make an immediate report to Yen-an on the latest developments. Since he thought that General Marshall would be anxious to have an early reply from him, he worked until early this morning and still came as early as possible.

General Chou wanted briefly to express his own views because he liked to exchange opinions with General Marshall, even though he had asked Yen-an for instructions. Regarding the situation in China proper, except for the point that the status prior to June 7 should be

restored, none of the other points can be considered by him, as far as he sees it. Restoration of the status prior to June 7 is not such a simple matter, because the truce in China proper should be effected on January 13. If you want to return the status to the original position, then you should restore the position to that of 24 hours, January 13, as it has been directed by the General Directive No. 6 in Peiping.¹⁶

General Chou noticed that in General Hsu's document concerning the 54th and 73rd Armies, he intimates that Communist troops have been attacking the Government positions since January 13. General Chou pointed out that the way General Hsu brought forward the question seemed quite all right to him because General Hsu stated that since January 13 the Communists have either occupied or besieged 17 towns or townlets. Actually the towns and townlets occupied alone, not to mention those besieged and still occupied by the Kuomintang, are more than 20, and in addition 2,000 villages have been captured by them. All of these places are off of the railroad lines and they did not draw attention of the public. If the field teams can be dispatched to make a survey then everything can be proved. Therefore, General Chou believes it more logical that the status of January 13 should be restored and not that of June 7. The cessation of aggressive action which commenced on June 7, as he understands, applies to Manchuria and not to China proper. In China proper the truce has been effective since Jan. 13.

As to the movement of troops the number of the Communist troops can in no way be compared with that of the Government troops. The Communist troops could only be moved on foot and in small scale and for the purpose of self-defense. While on the Government side they have moved 118 divisions and even excluding Manchuria it still amounts to nearly 100 divisions. General Chou said he had submitted a memorandum both to General Marshall and General Hsu, concerning these moves, and even General Hsu was not in a position to furnish a reply. Therefore, as far as the cessation of hostilities and the troop movements is concerned he fully subscribes to the survey by the field teams and restoration of forces as were held on January 13. He promised that the Communist troops would evacuate places they occupied after that date; the Government should give the same promise.

As to Manchuria, it is the Communist troops which first abided the 7 June agreement. Take the example of Lafa. The Government staged a very wide propaganda on this affair, while in the meantime they also occupied Faku, which is larger than Lafa, and they took it on June 9. Immediately after the Lafa affair broke out General Lin Piao¹⁷ wired Peiping and Mukden requesting a field team to

¹⁶ Not printed.

¹⁷ Chinese Communist general commanding in Manchuria.

make a survey. It is interesting to note that the Government representative in Peiping objected to the dispatch of a field team to that place. Now, Communist forces have evacuated Lafa, leaving only local police behind. This is even admitted by General Tu Li Ming. On the other hand, the Government troops are still in Faku. Therefore, with regard to Manchuria they fully subscribe to the restoration of the status of June 7.

General Chou stated that with respect to the situation in China proper as of June 7, a series of events had occurred but the situation leading to those events developed prior to June 7th. He said he did not want to mention that, only to say that in May and June the Government had occupied about 5 or 6 towns or townlets held by the Communists. That was the cause which entailed the Shantung incident. If at that time they should only concern themselves with the source of the Shantung situation, that would no doubt be advantageous only to the Government, because of the Shantung hostilities Communists had occupied a few places and disbanded the puppet troops while in other places Government troops had occupied many different places. If that was taken by itself (the Shantung situation) that would hardly be acceptable to the Communists.

Regarding the Government demand for the evacuation from Chahar and Jehol, General Chou said the Government could produce no reason at all for that demand. Therefore, that was beyond the consideration of the Communist Party. If the Communist Party was pressed to consider that matter, that would inevitably result in counter-proposals such as to ask the Government to evacuate Peiping and Tientsin. That would, of course, only complicate the matter.

Regarding the third point referring to the occupation of Chefoo and Wei Hai Wei by the Nationalist troops that was also made without foundation. He said the Government had a naval port at Chinwangtao and Tsingtao which were quite sufficient. Chefoo is only a commercial port while the naval base of Wei Hai Wei had been abandoned for a long time. If the Communist Party were pressed to give up those places, then again they would make counter-proposals and have the Government evacuate Tsingtao.

As to the intention to send an army to Tsingtao to replace the U. S. Marines, that was also without reason for the Marines were stationed in those places for the purpose of repatriation of the Japanese. Once the repatriation was completed then the U. S. Marines should be withdrawn. As for the maintenance of local security, if the fighting should be stopped then the present strength of the Nationalist troops was sufficient and if some detailed arrangement would be worked out in accordance with the army reorganization plan which called for a larger strength of the National troops in those places then that was a

different matter which had no connection with the U. S. Marines. If hostilities would break out the U. S. Marines would be prohibited from entering the civil strife. So they play no role in China's internal civil strife. If there should be no fighting then no reinforcement would be needed for the defense of those two cities so it appeared that there was no reason for that.

Regarding the *status quo* in North China, that was still all right to be considered, but on every other subject they were all beyond consideration, that was, the withdrawal from Jehol and Chahar, and Chefoo and Wei Hai Wei and the dispatch of additional troops to permit the withdrawal of U. S. Marines.

General Chou said General Marshall had requested his concrete thoughts on Manchuria and he would immediately try to discuss it with General Marshall and to tell him what he had in mind. So far as China proper was concerned he thought the proposal was impossible and had General Marshall inferred to him, [*sic*] but since both of them were not informed beforehand about it he had not mentioned that.

General Marshall said he knew of the proposal a few days before, but he was not able to express it to General Chou.

General Chou asked if the Generalissimo would insist on those places or would he be able to make adjustments. General Chou said if the Generalissimo insisted on all those points he thought his trip to Yen-an would not help the matter.

Speaking of Manchuria, as General Marshall had been told by General Chou, the Communists had two fundamental points in mind. The first one was regarding the strength of the Communist forces. The Communists had asked for 5 divisions and General Marshall had proposed three divisions. That was still open for discussion. The second point was in regard to the distribution of troops. General Chou had suggested that the Communist troops be stationed in places now under Communist control. That point had apparently been taken into consideration in drawing up the plan. The other aspect of the plan was that certain places would be left ungarrisoned and that the Government troops would not come into places now under Communist control, but according to the draft the Government troops had entered many places now held by the Communists such as Harbin, Mutankiang, Paicheng, Antung, Tunghwa. That was beyond the expectation of General Chou. As General Chou previously stated, he wanted to have some place left empty without garrison troops and as to what measures should be adopted for those places, that was still left open for discussion.

General Chou said the crux of the issue now seemed to be whether the Generalissimo wants to solve the question of [*or*] that he rather tended to complicate the matter to the utmost. If that was the case,

then it would be difficult for General Chou to consider the various issues. For example, he had already stated on the situation in China proper and would not repeat it. On the communication problem he had made large concessions so that without awaiting the settlement of the other issues they could go ahead with the repair work. On the fortification problem they also made a large concession. As he had explained to General Marshall the previous day, if they accepted the present paragraph there would be no destruction of the fortifications at all. He thought it might be better that no fortification be erected than to have a paragraph as it was phrased. General Chou said he also made no points on the fortifications in the other areas beside what had been mentioned. In principle, he had already concurred on the two original drafts produced by Colonel Hill. But those drafts were revised by General Yu Ta Wei. The main points were taken away by him in drawing up the new draft. For example, if all kinds of communications would be restored then while on the one hand it should be agreed that the unified control of the Ministry of Communications should be reorganized, on the other hand there should be representation of the parties concerned in the various levels of the Ministry of Communications. That stipulation had been left out by General Yu Ta Wei. On the other hand, General Yu Ta Wei advanced the question of the railroad guards and he did not make a concession on that point. The problem of the railroad guards had not been contained in the original draft nor was it ever stipulated in the previous agreement on the restoration of communications. Regarding the troop movement it was stipulated in the cease fire agreement and the restoration of communications agreement that no troop movement should be made in any place. General Yu Ta Wei proposed that only in the section under Communist control would no troop movements be made. If that proposal were accepted it would make the movements of troops legal. On the communications problem, they had reduced to such a point that the Communists make concessions that they would agree to the repair work on the railways and do not take it in connection with the other points. General Chou said he was again afraid what the Government might make the power of final decision another issue. He said he did not know what counter-proposal General Yu was going to propose. Also, he had not read the new paper on the army reorganization. He did not know whether new complications would be involved in that paper or not. So from all the different aspects, it seemed to General Chou that the Government was making the proposal for them to accept because they were forcing them to make concessions far beyond the agreement of February and January, while in the political matters no assurance had yet been made. General Chou said it was not his intention not to make

concessions but the concessions should come from both sides as General Marshall had also said. He said he made the concessions with the view that they would get some assurance on the political matters, but as it turned out, the Government was demanding concessions be made by the Communists and the Government actually made no concessions. The Government troops would not evacuate some places they had occupied while the places the Communists had occupied in retaliation should be evacuated. The Government has made no concession on the strength of the troops. So, General Chou stated, after weighing the proposals altogether, he felt were he simply a representative of the Communist Party and not thinking about his position as a Chinese citizen and not thinking that Sino-Soviet cooperation was involved, he would resign because the negotiations conducted by him seemed to be a complete failure.

General Marshall concluded the meeting by arranging to have his airplane stand by for General Chou's trip to Yen-an and a tentative take-off of 9 o'clock was set.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Marshall to General Yu Ta-wei

OSE 193

NANKING, June 18, 1946.

DEAR GENERAL YU: Colonel Caughey has spoken to me of his telephone conversation with you and his inability to arrange for a preliminary meeting between General Hsu and you and General Chou En-lai. Colonel Caughey tells me you feel that this proposal of mine has placed General Hsu in a very embarrassing position. In reply I would say you are placing me in a very embarrassing position. The time is fleeting. It will very probably be necessary for General Chou to leave for Yen-an tomorrow morning at 9 o'clock, because the bulk of the documents makes it impractical for him to handle a discussion with his people by radio with any possibility of workable instructions within the short time available.

What I wanted at this meeting was not a discussion of the details at all, but rather a general discussion where General Chou's views could be made understandable to you gentlemen and your general views on the subject could be made plain to him, with the additional assistance of your having available before 5 o'clock a typewritten copy of General Chou's comments of this morning.

If you can't agree to a 5 o'clock meeting, I think it urgently important that you at least see General Chou at 6 o'clock. What par-

ticularly disturbs me is that you cannot see me until so late this afternoon that it makes it improbable that some discussion can take place with General Chou today.

I am not anticipating that you gentlemen will reach any agreement, but a beginning has to be made in this business of negotiations which are now confined to practically only three more days, a portion of which short period will be lost by General Chou's trip which appears absolutely necessary.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall, General Hsu Yung-chang and General Yu Ta-wei at 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, June 18, 1946, 4:40 p. m.

Also present: General Pee
Colonel Caughey

General Yu said he wished to discuss the plan on the areas to assign, which was an integral part of the readjustment in the Military Reorganization agreement dated 25 February 1946. There are two plans regarding the Communist troops in Manchuria.¹⁸ We favor the first plan which contemplates one division in Lung Kiang Province, one at Sung Kiang Province, and then the one in the Sung Kiang Province would integrate in one Army with the Government divisions stationed in the southern part of Lung Hai Province, while the northern part over in Tsitsihar would be garrisoned by Communist troops, with the third Communist division on the border near Korea.

General Marshall said he wanted to discuss the Manchuria Annex,¹⁹ the plan the Generalissimo indicated he accepted, which was one of two integrated armies with one Communist division in a small area of eastern Kirin.

General Marshall then read from the Manchuria Annex, which stated the location of armies shall be as follows:

"1. One army composed of 1 National and 2 Communist divisions to be located within the three provinces of Hsin Hei Lung Kiang, Hsing-An, and Nun Kiang with one Communist division in Hsin Hei Lung Kung Kiang and North and Central Nun Kiang, one Communist division in Hsing-An and North-Central Nun Kiang, and one National division in southern Nun Kiang. The division headquarters of the above 3 divisions shall be located at Tsitsihar, Hailar and Pai-cheng respectively. The army headquarters shall be located at Tsitsihar."

¹⁸ Neither printed.

¹⁹ *Ante*, p. 1076.

General Marshall remarked that the Government gains by this compromise outweighed the possibility of disadvantages by the arrangement proposed.

General Yu asked what his suggestion was of where the demarcation line should be in Nun Kiang Province.

General Marshall indicated on the map (46° parallel in the province).

General Yu said in this plan the province of Liao Peh was without any troops and added that this commitment did not prevent the Government from sending troops into this province.

General Marshall asked General Yu how many Communist armies were in Jehol and Chahar.

General Yu said that part of the troops under the Communist commander in Jehol and Chahar had been sent to Manchuria and the main troops under his command were estimated at 50,000 or more.

General Marshall asked if that included both Jehol and Chahar.

General Yu said yes, that was about it. It was their estimation that there were 50,000 in Jehol and 50,000 in Chahar, which could possibly be reorganized into two armies.

General Marshall asked how many of these 100,000 would be considered fairly good troops.

General Yu said about half.

General Marshall asked how many of those normally lived in Jehol and Chahar. How many of the men in the 50,000 did not belong in those two provinces.

General Yu said they did not know the particular details of the question placed by General Marshall, but could give a reasonable idea. The Communist troops at Jehol and Chahar were composed of three categories. It is composed about one-third of militia. The third category is of just armed farmers and armed natives of the region of Jehol and Chahar—at least one-third to one-half of the natives.

7 General Marshall explained that he asked that question because it occurred to him in his discussion with the Generalissimo last night that he was creating an explosive situation by the enforced evacuation of Jehol and Chahar. The proposed movement of the Communist troops north from Central China, (pointing to map) would create a concentration in North China (again pointing to map), particularly of Communists, which, by its density, would present a considerable hazard. In other words, there would be too much steam pressure and an explosion would be likely.

General Yu told General Marshall they would then present the map of the areas to be assigned to the Communist Troops. He then asked if General Chou En-lai would go back to Yen-an.

General Marshall said he didn't know—that he had wanted Chou to go at 2:00 o'clock today. He said General Chou had not proposed going back to Yen-an, but he (General Marshall) had thought he ought to start back at 2:00 o'clock today. He said General Chou had such a mass of papers and that it took a long time to communicate back and forth with Yen-an by radio. He thought more time would be lost unless Chou could talk directly to his people. He could get back to Nanking about 2:30 tomorrow afternoon.

General Yu asked whether General Marshall would be at the meeting between General Hsu and General Chou.

General Marshall said no, he did not want to participate in the first meeting. He did not see any useful purpose in having a formal meeting of the Committee of Three at this moment.

General Yu said he talked to the Generalissimo and he told him he had been discussing all the requirements in the past paper. He said we will go through that document and you tell us what to do.

General Marshall asked what document.

General Yu said the one on integration.

General Marshall said he had seen it in typewritten form, but not on the map. Unless some ground was broken and something gotten out of the way, no progress could be made. It was not now necessary to go into the details at all.

General Yu said this was a map showing the areas which the Generalissimo told you of yesterday. (General Pee then explained the map.)

General Yu said they ²⁰ may enter those concentrated areas in four months' time—July, August, September, October.

General Marshall asked where they were now in these regions.

They then showed General Marshall where they were on the map, explaining they were very much scattered.

General Marshall asked if they crossed the railroad anywhere.

General Yu said yes. (Tientsin—Pukou)

General Marshall then asked where they crossed for this first time.

General Yu said they crossed in many places—that the railway had been disrupted at many points.

General Marshall said, of course, if you get them into those areas they are completely under your control, particularly in Shantung.

He said his comment was that there would be no probability of the Communist accepting the proposition. How many divisions were to be put into those places?

²⁰ The Communists.

1. Southwest Shantung, Lin-i
2. South Hopeh, Taimen
3. East Shansi, Chin Cheng
4. Shensi, Yen-an
5. Chahar, Kalgan

General Yu answered five armies in five areas. He said we may give them one more area. (North Shantung west of the peninsula.) That is a basis for discussion. The Generalissimo discussed this yesterday. He hinted on the possibility of giving them this area.

General Marshall asked that where they were to go into those areas, they must be established there by the end of 12 months.

General Yu said before that. He said they must get the troops in by four months. From four to six months. He said, according to the suggestion made by General Marshall, six months. They go into the regions assigned them. Of course, no provision had been made for the demarcation of these regions.

General Marshall told General Yu he would have to remember that they were dealing with a much larger force and could not cut it down suddenly to that size by terms of a general agreement. So that while they were moving into those areas there would be a great many more people at the end of six months than there would be at the end of 12 months.

General Yu said they were anxious to get them.

General Marshall continued by saying at the end of 12 months they are supposed to have 18 divisions, and at the end of 18 months 10 divisions. Demobilization is not instantaneous—it has to be progressive and must begin moving in two or three months.

General Yu said that is a question of how to physically do the job.

General Marshall said it is not so much physical but rather how to expedite the process. For instance you are going to produce concentrations out of proportion to the area, and therefore demobilization procedures should be speeded up. You must have more area while concentrating at the end of six months and then at the end of 12 months (Pointing out on the map). That is the thought I have in mind.

General Marshall said the Government would be putting people along the railroad. Take Shantung alone—the Communist would be unwilling to evacuate all lines at the end of six months. I am thinking of this as a staff problem and I'm not so sure you can crowd them in at that time.

General Yu said General Hsu had said that in all these areas there were 69 hsien and plenty of room, and that four months was a reasonable time for them to get into the areas if they propose to do so. General Yu said his idea was to get them into certain areas.

General Pee said the Government's proposed amendments to the draft documents were—firstly, from Northwest China and one from South China into North China in the first phase; secondly, they would like to add to Article 5 of the Reorganization Demobilization Plan the assigned areas for the Communist to enter before a certain date—say the six months—so as to avoid being scattered around. This would end hostilities.

General Marshall said he thought the only way to do this was to have a North China Annex to the draft document. He added that the Government insisted that the agreement of February 25 should be the bible, and how [*now?*] were tearing so many pages from it as to leave only the cover. We should avoid that. The best [of] solutions is an annex.

General Pee continued with the 3rd amendment. He said they would like to insure that all plans could be implemented without delay and implemented effectively. He said they hoped the Americans would be vested with the deciding vote so that any argument in the field team or Executive Headquarters could be settled by a majority vote. Regarding this amendment however General Hsu would approach General Chou and talk directly.

General Yu said the Generalissimo had told him that in talking with General Chou to stress the fact that the Generalissimo insisted the American member be given the deciding vote. He said he thought they had presented the most important things. He then stated the Generalissimo had instructed him to ask General Marshall's ideas, but this is an integral plan, not one of bargaining. If presented to General Chou it is not intended to be an instrument of bargaining. The Generalissimo asked me what technique to pursue in dealing with General Chou. Would the proper procedure be to present the plan as written?

General Marshall said he rather thought not because at the present moment, in his opinion, they would find so much disagreement that they would merely add to the complications. General Marshall said one modification was given General Chou last night, that is with respect to area No. 5. That is a modification—

General Yu interrupted to say that he meant the Generalissimo had told him last night if the Communists rejected the idea then what would be considered—

General Marshall asked to let him complete his thought first—that is modification only in the terms up to the present instance. In the first place, General Chou has no authority to accept those stipulations in North China. He must consult Yen-an. In the second place, the areas [*assignment*] depicted on the map adds to the depressing outlook for the Communists. General Marshall suggested

that at this meeting this afternoon, General Yu should tell General Chou he had read his comments of this morning to General Marshall. General Hsu himself has not become familiar with them. General Marshall suggested that the Manchurian question be discussed first. General Chou has already agreed. General Marshall suggested that since the stipulations regarding North China present the great problem so far as General Chou is concerned, and necessitated his going back to his people, therefore, an understanding about the Manchurian question should be easy.

General Marshall continued: I would discuss with him the Manchurian question first, and then specifically his views regarding Shantung, Jehol, and Chahar. I don't think there is any profit in discussion of the reorganization of those towns that have been taken in Shantung since June 7. I am rather inclined to think he will agree to that. He said that was the only thing he had to negotiate on right now. So he must have known something. If there is anything you can give him in a general way—in regard to communications—tonight is the time to talk about it. So that he can go to Yen-an tomorrow at 9:00 o'clock and have a little more than he has so far to tell them beyond the mere reading of papers. I would like you to keep in mind that I think, personally, that General Chou has a proper complaint regarding communications. I want you to be conscientious.

General Yu said he would come to the question of communications later. He asked if General Marshall thought it premature to mention the North China question. General Marshall said if he (General Chou) brought it up, then do it, but if you discuss that, you immediately become involved in the Jehol-Chahar propositions.

General Yu asked if General Marshall thought it time to tell General Chou about the area assignment. He asked if General Marshall thought they could tell General Chou the ideas in general.

General Marshall said that would appear appropriate but not to show him the map. He said if you show him the restricted areas you will have war in China.

General Yu said he would forget the map. He would confine the discussion to the Manchurian question and just talk of area readjustment in a general way.

General Marshall said when it comes to the question of authority of Americans, he was told yesterday by the Democratic League, that they had discussed with General Chou that afternoon that very proposition and they insisted the Communists must make some compromise and found out that General Chou probably would agree to the American team captain having the deciding vote. That still left the question of communications confronted with the possibility of delay. General Marshall had told those two gentlemen in talking to General Chou that

they might make a suggestion that may not give the American team captain quite so complete a vote but to at least leave him power to decide where to go, when, and who to see. Then when the situation is reported to Executive Headquarters the American Commissioner has the deciding vote on the settlement of the disagreement. Another thing, the American Commissioner also should have authority to decide where and when the teams should go. The team captain would decide exactly where the team should go—to this town or that town, or this region.

Also, I told the representatives of the Democratic League to try prevailing on General Chou to extend this same authority to communications matters. I don't think there is any chance of their accepting general authority, but there may be a chance if you define it and permit the teams to go and see. Also permit Americans to prevent delays on communications—that would be an immense gain. The representative suggested it should be a majority vote which wouldn't put Americans in such a conspicuous position. I told them the majority vote was not so good since Americans quite frequently would feel that either the Government or the Communists were entirely wrong.

General Yu said the authority was qualified in the first place in case of dispute among members of the team since it would be referred to the Executive Headquarters.

General Marshall said only regarding the situation, not where to go or when.

General Yu said how about disagreement—there we get the most difficulty. Sometimes there are disputes on account of different interpretations—then, who decides?

General Marshall said the senior American representative at Executive Headquarters has the deciding vote on disagreements on communications, interpretation of facts, etc.

General Yu then said he wanted to get clear these proposal qualifications in case of disagreement:

1. In case of disagreement the commissioner has the deciding vote where and when to send the teams.
2. In the field the team captain decides in case of disagreement as to where and when they go.

General Marshall suggested, "and who they see". Disagreements regarding conclusions as to the situation would go back to the commissioner. An American has the decision in the case of any disagreement regarding communications. That is as far as I think Americans can go.

General Yu said, how about getting an American member to decide in case of general disagreement?

General Marshall said he didn't think the Communists would agree.

General Marshall explained further that these are not "his" proposals—they "must" be the Government's and not "his". You can state it in specific terms.

General Pee said a week ago General Hsu talked to General Chou regarding arbitration and then three days ago General Hsu sent a memorandum to General Chou and General Chou sent back a reply, answering, "No".

General Yu said (coming back to negotiations regarding communications) a general memorandum was drafted and two plans worked out—one called the administration of railways during the interim; the other one a plan of execution for restoration. General Yu told Colonel Hill one consideration of this plan was for some kind of joint administration. He was prepared, however, to take Communists into and to be employed by the Government. He told Colonel Hill he was prepared on all of these to have qualifications and examinations conducted by Americans, so that we would have absolute fairness to adjust the affair. Then he sent these two documents, one drafted by General Marshall and one by Colonel Hill, modified in principle. General Yu told Colonel Hill that he wanted communications restored. It would be good for the Chinese people, though not much military advantage would accrue until all the area is restored. A lot of the area is now under Communist control, where National troops can not move. We have not asked General Chou to evacuate the railroad. He has put through the following demands on communications, but we discussed your formula that we agree to demolish all fortifications, except such tunnels, railroad stations, etc., as are necessary. He also raised the question of joint administration. We will take the Communists into the Government, but we cannot go beyond that; we cannot recognize party bureaus. General Yu said the question of railroad police may be raised by Chou again. These police have existed in China ever since there were railways—General Chou objected to military police during the restoration period—and General Yu agreed to that. But there must be a time when we have to send in police in the interest of the Chinese railway system. I don't see why the Communists should object. He suggested that in the interim period, according to Colonel Hill, no police would be used. Today, Colonel Hill proposed that the troop movement clause be deleted because that does not (matter that I proposed myself) fall within the scope of communications. Colonel Hill proposed that the clause be deleted. We may have an argument at a later date—maybe three months, maybe later.

Another question General Chou raised was that fortifications be destroyed between Hsuechow and Kaifeng on the Lunghai railway. I

don't see why the Government should commit themselves to destroy all fortifications for that small sector.

I want to incorporate into the communications document the same "arbitration" clause. In case of disagreement as to interpretation of this directive the majority vote of three members will be decisive. We don't like the clause "majority vote"—how about saying the American member would have the deciding vote.

General Yu asked if, since General Chou would be going back tomorrow, would he be back again by the 20th?

The first plan was to leave at 2:00 o'clock this afternoon and be back here at 2:30 tomorrow, so he could have a conference here this morning and another one tomorrow. If he goes back tomorrow, I hope he will be leaving there the day after.

General Yu asked if that would be on the 20th. General Yu said they would talk to General Chou as suggested by General Marshall and he said that General Marshall knew the Generalissimo was very sincere in making an effort at peace.

General Marshall told General Yu they must have the fact in mind that the terms were pretty stiff.

General Yu said that was a staff question.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270: Telegram

General Marshall to President Truman ²¹

[NANKING,] June 17 [18], 1946.

[934] DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Negotiations have proceeded very slowly due to reluctance of either side to commit themselves one in advance of the other regarding reorganization and particularly redistribution of troops.

Fighting in Shantung Province proved to be a very disturbing factor, causing increased bitterness and unwillingness to make concessions. Finally Saturday ²² noon last the Generalissimo indicated definitely to me the nature of his demands and had me put them into formal shape for presentation to General Chou En Lai. The latter had made no definite propositions and had only given me a few general statements.

After the formal papers had been drawn up it required the better part of Sunday to translate them into Chinese for detailed consideration by the Generalissimo. It was not until 7:00 o'clock Monday evening that he gave me his formal approval. I immediately sent

²¹ Copy transmitted to the Secretary of State by the War Department on June 19.

²² June 15.

the papers to General Chou En Lai that evening.²³ Again a delay of translating was involved. Chou saw me at 11:00 o'clock this, Tuesday, morning.²⁴ He had had but little time after translation to consider the proposals but sufficient to find them, in his opinion, entirely too demanding to admit of acceptance by the Communists. I prevailed upon him to meet late this afternoon the two principal officials representing the Government in the negotiations. Meanwhile, I saw the Generalissimo at 6:00 o'clock this evening and told him that there was no chance, in my opinion, of the Communists accepting his terms without considerable moderation.

I had suggested to Chou En Lai that he take my plane and fly to Yen-an this afternoon or early tomorrow morning to consult with his principals. He accepted for tomorrow morning but late tonight sent me word that nothing had occurred in the conference this evening with National officials to justify a visit to Yen-an, therefore he would not go tomorrow. One of the two Government officials called on me later and said that the [no?] meeting of views had been obtained and that General Chou had resented bitterly the Government insistence that Americans on field teams and the American Commissioner at Executive Headquarters be given the deciding vote in a number of matters in case of disagreements.

The principal stumbling block presented by the Government proposals does not appear to be in regard to readjustments in Manchuria but more resentment was aroused by certain Government stipulations concerning North China, wherein it is demanding the immediate evacuation by the Communists of the provinces of Chahar northwest of Peiping and Jehol north and northeast of that city; also the Government demand that National troops immediately take over Chefoo and Weiheiwei on the northern coast of Shantung Province. Incidentally the Government had announced this morning that it was in the process of sending an army of three divisions to Tsingtao and another to Tsinanfu, both in Shantung Province, because of the recent Communist offensive operations in that Province.

At the present moment we have reached an impasse. Whether or not I can prevail upon the Generalissimo to make concessions sufficient to find Communist acceptance of the general proposition remains to be seen, and whether or not I can get from the Communists a commitment to definite proposals on their part is also uncertain. The situation is extremely critical and has not been helped throughout by the belief, freely expressed, by some of the Government military officials and some politicians that only a policy of force will satisfy the situa-

²³ See memorandum OSE 189, June 17, by Col. J. Hart Caughey, p. 1075.

²⁴ See minutes of meeting of June 18, p. 1083.

tion, and that the Communists can be quickly crushed. I consider the last view a gross underestimate of the possibilities, as a long and terrible conflict would be unavoidable, I am sure. Also, the Soviet Government would probably intervene openly or under cover. All of my views have been stated to the Generalissimo. I rather think today's evidence of the reception of his demands may induce him to moderate them considerably, though I will probably find my efforts opposed by certain military officials. There remain but three and one-half days of the truce period. If I develop the possibility of significant Government moderations of the original proposals and a Communist favorable reaction I think I can have the truce period extended a few days without the hazard of fatal disruptions in the field. You will be kept advised.

G. C. MARSHALL

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Chou En-lai to General Marshall

MM 042

NANKING, 19 June 1946.

DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: For your reference, on June 9, two Nationalist regiments in North Liaoning laid terrible onslaught on Faku (123°13', 42°16') and completely occupied that city in the afternoon of the same date. Separate memo on this subject is being sent to General Hsu Yung-chang, requesting that the Government military authority in Manchuria be instructed to issue order for the evacuation of that city, so as to follow the Lafa example, and to discharge the responsibility.²⁵

[Signature in Chinese]
(CHOU EN-LAI)

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Chou En-lai to General Marshall

MM 046

NANKING, 19 June 1946.

DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: Enclosed and forwarded for your reference is an appeal issued by the Communist representatives of 30 field teams asking for security and freedom of action.

[Signature in Chinese]
(CHOU EN-LAI)

²⁵ General Marshall reported this message in telegram No. 941, June 20, to Mr. Robertson at Peiping and asked: "Have you a report of the alleged attack against Faku? Do you think the proposed evacuation could be effected?"

[Enclosure]

Appeal of Communist Field Team Representatives

To: Commissioners Walter Robertson, Yeh Chien-ying, Cheng Kai-min; Gens. Byroade and Timberman of the Executive Headquarters; General G. C. Marshall, General Chou En-lai and General Hsu Yung-ch'ang of the Committee of Three in Nanking; Delegates of the Political Consultative Conference; Newspapers and associations:

Months have elapsed since the establishment of the Executive Headquarters. We, Communist representatives of the field teams have been laboriously undertaking the task of settling hostilities in spite of the handicaps and dangers we came across. It is our consistent desire to offer our utmost effort to lay the foundation of peace so that both parties will trust each other and the distance between them can be eliminated. Nevertheless, unexpected things happened. Agitated by the bellicose elements, Government troops garrisoning the various places repeatedly threatened the security and the freedom of the Communist team representatives. Following are the major incidents:

1. On Feb. 20, Major Wang Pao-yu, member of the Tsinan field team, was arrested at Tsaoyuanshi station. Up to now his whereabouts is still unknown.

2. On April 17, Communist interpreter Mr. Lin Chao-nan of Shih-chiachuang field team was imprisoned by the Kuomintang and starved for five whole days.

3. On April 26, Kuomintang troops fired at Col. Wu Ke-wen, Communist representative of Kaomi field team, and he was shocked deaf. Wang Yueh, the interpreter, was also wounded.

4. On May 20, Lt. Col. Sin Kuan-wu, Communist deputy representative in the Kaomi field team was arrested by the Kuomintang authority at Tsaichachuang station. His present status is still unknown.

5. On May 3, Col. Fu Chi-tze, Communist representative of the Potou field team, was beaten and insulted.

6. On May 21, Col. Kan Chung-tou, Communist representative of Tsaochuang field team and interpreter Wu Wu-han were beaten by the Kuomintang with almost fatal wound. Col. Kan suffered three broken ribs. He was disabled for life, while Mr. Wu has not yet recuperated himself from his wounds.

7. On June 11, Col. Mee Yung, Communist representative of the Yen Cheng field team, and his whole staff were kept in custody. Their present status is entirely unknown.

8. On June 10, Lt. Col. Nee Shih-liang, Communist member of Hsueh team, was publicly insulted at Suohsien.

9. On June 9, the U. S. representative of Tsinan field team informed Communist representative Kuang that by order of the Kuomintang authority at Tsinan all Communist team members are restricted to their compound. Communist radio equipment there was forcibly taken away. On the same day, the Government ordered Mr.

Liu Chi-tsing and other members back to Communist area under their escort. No responsible Communist officer was allowed to accompany. Their present whereabouts is entirely unknown.

We can cite many more such cases of illegal arrest, inspection, restriction and guard. There is still no confirmed report about Major Wang Pao-yu, Lt. Col. Sin Kuan-wu, Col Mee Yung and the entire Communist team members of Yencheng field team. It is not known whether they are still alive or not.

All the above-listed incidents directly endanger the safety of the representatives, undermine peace, and make our work nearly impossible. Now that nine-tenths of the field teams are stationed in Government-controlled areas, any recurrence of such actions will block all efforts to win peace. Hence we demand that

1. the Communist team members kept in custody be released immediately;
2. the Government safeguard the security and freedom of the Communist team members;
3. all the Government officers held responsible for these incidents be severely punished;
4. the supreme authority of the National Government apologize publicly to the Communists and indemnify all their losses;
5. the Government be held responsible in case any untoward accident befalls the arrested Communist team members;
6. the Communist radio station at Tsinan be restored;
7. the Executive Headquarters issue a joint communiqué on the above-listed demands.

It is our earnest hope that due consideration will be given to the above-mentioned demands so that truce work can be carried on smoothly, and that people of all circles will strive for the freedom of person, democracy, and peace, and urge the Government to implement the Four Promises and the Three Agreements.

Signed by the Communist Representatives of 30 field teams.

(issued on June 10, 1946)

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Chou En-lai to General Marshall

MM 047

NANKING, 19 June 1946.

DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: I most appreciate your kindness of transmitting to me the five papers²⁶ prepared by the Government in relation to Army Reorganization in Manchuria. Apart from duly

²⁶ Annexes to memorandum OSE 189, June 17, p. 1075.

referring them to Yen-an, I wish first inform you in detail about the conclusion I myself have drawn as the result of a preliminary study:

1. Re Manchurian Annex

I wish to reaffirm our claim for 5 Communist divisions in Manchuria. We further propose that the division headquarters of these 5 divisions be located at Antung, Mutankiang, Tsitsihar, Taoan (Peicheng), and Harbin. These 5 divisions should not be considered as a part of the 9 Communist divisions assigned for China proper. Nor should 5 Government divisions be stationed at places under Communist control, such as Antung, Tunghwakai, Mutankiang, Harbin and Taoan (Peicheng). Their location should be reconsidered.

2. Re Government Stipulations Regarding North China

The Government stipulations are entirely disagreeable to us. If troop disposition for China proper should be stipulated, then that should constitute a separate transaction of the Military Sub-Committee. In such case, instead of specifying troops movement with respect to one party and restricted places only, a complete plan governing the disposition of both Nationalist and Communist armies should be worked out.

With reference to the vacation of towns and villages occupied after noon of June 7, the General Directive No. 6²⁷ of Executive Headquarters should be followed as the guiding principle for action. In accordance with that Directive, troops of both parties should vacate towns and villages they occupied after January 13, instead of restricting the vacation to troops of one party with respect to one particular province. In particular, it should be pointed out that June 7 was agreed as the commencing date for a 15-day cessation of aggressive actions governing Manchuria only, while in China proper the Cease Fire Order went into effect since January 14.

3. Re Readjustment in the Military Reorganization and Integration and Enclosure 2

We disagree with the arrangement of shifting the 2 Communist divisions from Central China to Manchuria. The detail comments are as follows:

a. Article V—Except for the Manchurian portion, no change should be made.

b. Article V, sections I and III—No change should be made.

c. Article V, section II—Except for the Manchurian portion, which shall be as amended, the deployment of the armies, and the strength and the integration procedure of the Communist forces should undergo no change.

²⁷ March 22, not printed.

d. Article V, section IV—Except for the Manchurian portion, which shall be as amended, the deployment of the armies, and the strength and the integration arrangement of the Communist forces should undergo no change.

[Signature in Chinese]
(CHOU EN-LAI)

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Yu Ta-wei at 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, June 20, 1946, 9:30 a. m.

Also present: Coloney Caughey

General Marshall asked General Yu's ideas as to what might be an appropriate extension of the present 15-day truce agreement and General Yu replied, "1 day". General Marshall indicated that this would not be sufficient since there are many unresolved matters to take up, for example, the number of Communist divisions in Manchuria, the American authority for final decision, stipulations regarding Jehol, Chahar and Shantung and modification of the 25 February reorganization agreement.

General Marshall pointed out to General Yu that his approach was not realistic and that it was probably based on his feeling that the U. S. would support a civil war in China. General Marshall stated emphatically that "it would not"; that "U. S. would not back a Chinese civil war." General Yu Ta Wei asked what would happen if civil war broke out after the 23rd of June. Specifically he wanted to know what would happen to the Marines, the 7th Fleet and other U. S. help, economic and military. General Marshall replied that the Marines would probably be withdrawn; that the Seventh Fleet, although possibly still in China waters, would be removed; that U. S. assistance including lend lease, surplus property, loan, military requisitions probably would be cut off; that he did not know what disposition might be made of MAG.²⁸

General Yu then brought up the question of American authority for final decision and stated that some sort of an arrangement was absolutely necessary and suggested the following concession which might be agreeable to the Communists:

"In case of disagreement as to interpretation of the agreements or supervision of their execution, a majority, rather than unanimous, vote would determine."

General Yu pointed out that this concession made no mention of the American. General Marshall stated that he did not think that this

²⁸ Military Advisory Group.

would be acceptable to the Communists unless it were altered to indicate that a majority vote was applicable only in cases where reconsideration of the agreements was necessary by the Committee of Three.

General Marshall indicated that it would probably be necessary, as a basis of further discussion, to consider the following matters: Delete the stipulations regarding Jehol, Chahar and Shantung province and include these matters in the redistribution of forces; move one additional army into North China during the first phase and a second additional army during the second phase rather than moving both additional armies in during the first phase; consider giving Communists control of certain railways; give Communists Chihfeng; and extend the 15-day truce agreement at least 5 days.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and Mr. Stuart, Mr. Price and Mr. Mills*²⁹ at 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, June 20, 1946, 11 a. m.

Mister Price started the meeting by telling General Marshall he and Dr. Stuart wanted to report briefly on two rather significant conversations held yesterday with General Chou En-lai and last evening with the Generalissimo.

Doctor Stuart said they had quite a frank talk with General Chou last evening. In substance, General Chou said that he and his Communist party want and are ready for a continuance of unconditional cessation of hostilities. That is the language he used. In other words, it amounts to an end of the war without conditions. He is ready for this procedure to go ahead in any possible way. Priority of this or that topic does not matter. It is better to clear up an issue if it can be done and then to go on to something else rather than wait until the over-all problem is completely covered and one has a total conclusion.

The chief point General Chou objects to, on the other side, is the Manchurian settlement. Probably, that is a condition which can be settled by further negotiations. He objects definitely to the proposal within the Great Wall and thinks arguments for the proposal have been unreasonable. On the railways, he feels the solution is joint control of all railway lines rather than having a railway police system with secret police throughout the country under the guise of railway police or plainclothesmen. General Chou thought the thing to do is to get the railways protected and operating, rather than to institute a system of special railway police.

²⁹ Dr. J. Leighton Stuart, President of Yenching University, Peiping; Dr. Frank W. Price, former adviser to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek; and Dr. W. P. Mills, head of the American missionary group at Nanking.

These are the main points General Chou and his whole party want in the cessation of hostilities agreement. They are ready to go ahead with negotiations looking toward a stable peace and a socialized democratic system. He sees danger from American withdrawal and from Russian influence as clearly as any other Chinese patriot. He wants American help in every way and feels there is probably no objection to that from the Nationalist standpoint. General Chou did not commit himself much on Russia, but he sees danger from Russian complications in Chinese affairs.

The other and most important issue is the reorganization of the army. Now is the time for Nationalist and Communist troops to go under American guidance and receive American technical assistance—that seems to be the solution. It results in a strong army for China. The very presence of America would tend to unify things. General Chou knows he is speaking for his party in saying that they would be welcome.

On the point of the American, or rather of your ³⁰ final authority, he said that for an American to become the final authority and to make decisions would impinge upon the sovereignty of China. If that were known, it would put all concerned in a very bad light. That also bears upon what Mr. Price and I have in mind for a proposal when these reports are completed. Dr. Stuart thought that was the substance of General Chou's remarks. He was trying to make it as brief as possible.

Dr. Stuart saw the Generalissimo for the second time yesterday afternoon—and saw him for a half hour the day before. Yesterday's conference lasted one hour and ten minutes. It was one of the longest talks Dr. Stuart had had in a year or two with the Generalissimo, and one of the few times in which no one else was present—just the two of them. It was entirely in Chinese, of course, and it was a very frank talk, one in which Dr. Stuart expressed his own opinion as influenced by recent conversations with General Marshall. He quoted no one, and urged as strongly as he could that this was his own opinion for peace and for continued negotiations. Dr. Stuart wanted General Marshall to realize that, in quoting the Generalissimo, what were the points he made in the course of the conversation. These points would not be new to General Marshall but might help him to understand the Generalissimo's attitude. That was what he was trying to do yesterday in his efforts to express the situation in its present stage. The Generalissimo's main points were:

1. The Communists have been the chief offenders and breakers of agreements. The Generalissimo admitted faults on the Nationalist side, but charged that the Communists were the chief offenders.

³⁰ General Marshall's.

2. The Communists do not really want to cooperate. Instead, they want to drag out negotiations, prolong the present situation, and create difficulties for the Nationalist Government. The last thing they want is a real coalition Government with democratic reforms. The Communists must convince the Nationalists by their actions that they really want to cooperate.

3. The Generalissimo admitted many evils and mentioned comments made recently by articles in *Time* and *Ta Kung Pao*, but charged that the Communists were exaggerating these affairs to embarrass the Government. The Government was making reforms and would continue to make reforms, but it could not have certain conditions improved overnight. The same situation is true in other countries—Manila, etc., and in Shanghai.

4. The Generalissimo believes that the Chinese Government can continue, even under present difficulties, for years economically. Parenthetically, Dr. Stuart thought his greatest weakness was in the field of economics. The Generalissimo tentatively admitted that, except in Government, he did not see economic problems clearly. He charged that the Communists are the chief obstacle to economic recovery. They must restore the railways.

5. These next points were more toward the end of the conversation, and came after he, Dr. Stuart, had presented his opinion and the opinions of other friends of China. The Generalissimo said they would meet half way any effort at sincere cooperation from the Communists, but that they had made more concessions than the Communists had. The Generalissimo asked Mao Tze Tung to come to Chungking immediately to seek an end to hostilities, repeatedly. His associates and friends implied criticism of him in that he had lowered his own dignity because it meant that he was recognizing him almost as head of another government. He made a very sincere effort and now did not think it was his place to cater any more to the Communists, but he would meet them half way for the future welfare of the country.

6. Dr. Stuart could see from the conversation that the Generalissimo was much influenced by his party and military advisers in how to seek military decision over the Communists. Toward the end, the Generalissimo said (given in Chinese) "put your heart down, we will not attack but we will defend. We will keep the door open and I will continue to work for a peaceful settlement".

7. The Generalissimo did not fully realize the loss of confidence of the people in the Nationalist Government because he trusted too much, like Churchill³¹ did, to his personal popularity rather than to a future program. Dr. Stuart thought he was making the same mistake Churchill did.

General Marshall asked if he had made that point to him.

Dr. Stuart said: No, he did not like to make that kind of a comparison to him. Dr. Stuart thought the Generalissimo's own prestige was higher than the prestige of the Nationalist Government, which in turn was higher than the prestige of the Kuomintang party. He thought the danger was for him to capitalize on this personal popu-

³¹ Winston S. Churchill, British Prime Minister, 1940-45. The Conservative Party which he headed lost to the Labor Party in the elections of July 1945.

larity. The Generalissimo did not fully realize his lack of confidence. He believed the high men in his cabinet are honest and competent. He magnified Communist mistreatment of people, but minimized mistreatment of people by Nationalist soldiers. He said he was trying and asked Dr. Stuart to look at his record and his commitments to reform his party and to his treatment of the people.

8. The Generalissimo would accept mediation by General Marshall. He would have again and again invited the Communist leaders to mediate but they have rejected this. But we ³² trust General Marshall and would like to have him mediate for us.

9. Dr. Stuart referred to a statement the Generalissimo made again and again in prior conversations and quoted often by his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, who says his father has no permanent enemies. The Generalissimo points to the record that he has been able to win over his political and military enemies and names them, Pai Chung-Hsi, Yen Hsi-shan, Feng Yu-hsiang, Li Chung-jen, who at one time or another opposed him in military ways but now are his supporters. The Generalissimo said that in 1937 [1936] in the kidnapping,³³ his diary proved he had been sincere in his effort to unify the country.

Mr. Price stated that out of the conversation this morning with Dr. Stuart, they agreed that there would be a chance if now the discussions could be lifted to a new level in a new atmosphere with a fresh approach by General Chou. If he would go, preferably with General Marshall, to the Generalissimo and say very sincerely that he wanted to cooperate and to work together in this crisis, toward a united and a democratic China, the Generalissimo would meet him half way. Cooperation will have to be demonstrated by concrete measures in all different fields in which there have been discussions. They also would like to urge General Marshall to make concrete proposals on points or areas of disagreement, perhaps even official mediation of discussions held in the field. Mr. Price and Doctor Stuart still hoped for peace. They thought the Generalissimo, in spite of his advisers, would be rather reluctant to enter into a war because he begins to understand what the effect of it might be. If the 15 days' period ends with no new agreement and there remains the possibility of civil war, there will be sky-rocketing of prices. There will be riots and disturbances upon which Communists will capitalize. The Generalissimo believes that if war starts, Communists will have their agents, spies and saboteurs working everywhere. It will not be clear-cut fighting against each other. The Generalissimo should see what that will lead to if he capitalizes too much on his popularity. He has a sincere belief in the Chinese nation and he does not want to go back to the period of civil war.

Dr. Stuart said he would suggest, if General Chou was willing,

³² The Chinese.

³³ At Sian, December 1936; see *Foreign Relations*, 1936, vol. iv, pp. 414 ff.

for him to go with General Marshall and see the Generalissimo, and would suggest they begin with his proposal that they declare a permanent unconditional cessation of hostilities. With that agreed upon, they can get at once to the matters in order of urgency. For instance, if railways are the most important, then agree on a control system for railways. General Marshall shouldn't hesitate to take advantage of the power the Generalissimo is willing to give, as he said he will abide by your³⁴ decision.

General Marshall asked if he meant the Generalissimo would abide.

Dr. Stuart said yes, on those points, and that General Chou had already agreed.

General Marshall said "You don't mean that. He has not agreed to my having the power of decision—he has resented it."

Dr. Stuart said General Chou has agreed on recommending immediate cessation of hostilities. Whether General Chou agrees in principle to General Marshall's making decisions does not matter if he could say to the Generalissimo that it was his decision that concessions first be made on the method railways would be controlled.

General Marshall asked what was meant by "my decision", and suggested using the word "judgment".

Dr. Stuart said that judgment was a better word, and asked if he might be excused.

Dr. Mills wanted to say one thing before Dr. Stuart leaves, that if it was possible for General Marshall, General Yu, General Chou En-lai, and Dr. Stuart, for the four of them to be present and discuss conditions. He could get in touch with General Chou En-lai and see if he is willing to go with General Marshall to the Generalissimo for that expressed purpose.

Dr. Stuart suggested that if one of them was needed at the meeting, Mr. Price was the better person.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270: Telegram

Mr. Walter S. Robertson to General Marshall

PEIPING, 20 June 1946.

4293. Now coming is Opsum³⁵ number 11. Hsinhsiung:³⁶ United States member subteam 10 report 19 June. Subteam 10 was fired upon by CCP outpost at range of 200 yards 19 June while proceeding by jeep to Hsiuwu³⁷ for conference with Major General

³⁴ General Marshall's.

³⁵ Operations summary.

³⁶ Notation on the original: "40 Mi NW of Kaifeng".

³⁷ Notation on the original: "20 Mi W of Hsinhsiung".

Huang Shin Yin, CO of 4th subdistrict of Ta Huang Hang CCP Military District. The jeep was plainly visible for at least a thousand yards. The American flag was blowing directly across the jeep front and was plainly visible. Several shots were fired. One bullet killed Major Kuo Tze Chi Chang, interpreter, and wounded Major Ming Ching Shu, NG subject member. The commissioner Communist Branch agreed this date to investigate.

Comment: On 11 June Major Lei, Liaison Officer of team 23, was killed by CCP troops near Yencheng,³⁸ while on team business (special team departed this day for Tainan³⁹ to investigate). There have been 3 other incidents in which teams or member of teams have been fired upon by CCP troops since 28 April. In addition 4 other teams have been under fire in cities besieged by CCP troops. Total casualties from these incidents have been 2 NG representatives and one civilian guide killed, 1 NG representative and one United States member wounded.

Both commissioners express great concern over these incidents and are again instructing all troop commanders to forcibly carry out orders to insure safety of teams, reiterating that failure will be dealt with severely.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Mr. Walter S. Robertson to General Marshall

PEIPING, 20 June 1946.

4294. Three-hour meeting of commissioners just completed. No agreement could be reached reference sending a team to Tsingtao. General Cheng Kai-min (National Government Commissioner) will agree to the dispatch of the team only on the following conditions: *a.* That the Communists agree to evacuate all cities illegally attacked and occupied and *b.* That pending such evacuation radio facilities for team members be limited to use of American equipment.

His reason for imposing the above conditions was based on military points of view that he could not take chance of Communist member using independent facilities to give military intelligence to Communist field commanders.

General Yeh (Communist Branch Commissioner) finally agreed to the dispatch of the team but would not accept conditions imposed by National Government Commissioner.

Comment: Yeh reiterated during his discussion that Communists would not attack Tsingtao.

³⁸ Notation on the original: "10 NW of Tsinan".

³⁹ Notation on the original: "30 Mi S of Tsinan".

Discussions complicated by many charges and counter charges of violations and particularly by report received this morning of killing of one National Government team member and wounding of another by Communist troops on June 19, the second such incident in 8 days. General Cheng warned that if Communists did not take immediate steps to prevent murder of team members National Government would not be able to guarantee safety of Communist team members within its areas. Report of incident follows in separate message.⁴⁰

As it was apparent no agreement could be reached, Commissioners decided that each would report the situation to his respective principal on the Committee of Three.⁴¹

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Mr. Walter S. Robertson to General Marshall

PEIPING, 20 June 1946.⁴²

4245. This reply is Reurad 928. Our plan which we are implementing is as follows:

Phase A: Part 1. Seek three-way agreement of Commissioners to send team to Tsingtao immediately (U. S. members of team are being alerted).

Part 2. Confidentially inform U. S. members of teams in affected area of situation.

Phase B: Part 1. Later obtain three-way agreement to place all teams in the Shantung area on an active operational basis (all teams in this area are presently inactive except 4 and 22 because of Branch members being absent, refusal of members to act, or members under restriction).

Part 2. Seek agreement to give temporary cease fire power to Communications teams in Shantung area.

Phase C: Reinforce field team in Tsingtao and Hsuchow with additional field teams and be prepared to reinforce the team at Tsinan. Reinforcement will be provided by rearrangement of teams in the Shantung area and transfer of teams from other less critical areas. Timing of this reinforcement will depend upon the degree of success in obtaining agreements in phases A and B.

⁴⁰ See telegram No. 4293, p. 1110.

⁴¹ In his telegram No. 944, June 22 [20?], General Marshall told Mr. Robertson at Peiping: "I suggest consideration be given to the selection of a super field team for the special job of negotiating an agreement between the senior Communist commander and the senior Nationalist commander in that area [Shantung]. The initial ground work for this agreement should be done with the commanders individually and should include definition of areas and zones of control.

"Employment of this special field team might be avoided [aided?] by having some distinguished American such as General Clement of the Marine Corps to meet with the two Shantung commanders concerned." Brig. Gen. William T. Clement was Commanding General, 4th Marines (Reinf.), in China.

⁴² Apparently drafted on June 19.

Comment: At 5 o'clock this afternoon Cheng Kai-min submitted message from Hsu Yung Chang addressed to the Executive Hqs advising that the government is sending 54th Army to Tsingtao and 73rd Army to Tsinan. It was stated the transfer was necessitated by considerations of defense as a result of recent widespread attacks by Communists in Shantung area. Immediately contacted Cheng Kai-min, pressing him to agree to dispatch of team to Tsingtao. He was most adamant at first in refusing but finally said if I insisted he would concur. His initial refusal was based on the inefficiency of our teams in preventing the Communist attacks and in effecting evacuation of towns illegally occupied. General Yeh (Communist Branch) could not be located but we are meeting formally tomorrow morning June 20 in effort to reach agreement. In this connection the Communists have for six weeks obstructed our efforts to get a team to Tsingtao. Possibly new situation will remove their objections. In event of failure to get agreement at morning meeting the problem will be referred to Committee of Three if you deem it wise.

POSTSCRIPT: General Rockey⁴³ informed Timberman this afternoon of report from Marines at Tsingtao which estimated 15,000 troops of 54th Army have already closed in Tsingtao area.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

*General Marshall to President Truman*⁴⁴

[NANKING,] June 20, 1946.

[947.] DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have arranged that Generalissimo issue an order to his troops continuing suspension of all aggressive action, that is, advances, attacks and pursuits, until noon of June 30th for purpose of permitting further time to negotiate the matters referred to in his original 15-day suspension order, which would otherwise terminate Saturday June 22nd noon.⁴⁵

Also, there appears fair prospect for some government concessions on original stipulation regarding north China. I had Chou En Lai here from 3 to 5 this afternoon and spent 5 to 7 with Generalissimo. Tomorrow, Friday, I have Generalissimo at 9:00 o'clock in morning and Chou En Lai at 11. There is a wide gap to be closed but I now think that I have some chance of success.

G. C. MARSHALL

⁴³ Maj. Gen. Keller E. Rockey, Commanding General, U. S. Marines, China.

⁴⁴ Copy transmitted to the Secretary of State by the War Department.

⁴⁵ Substance reported in telegram No. 948, June 21, to Mr. Robertson at Peiping.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Conference Between General Marshall and Dr. Lo Lung-chi and Dr. Carsun Chang, at General Marshall's House, June 21, 1946, 8:20 a. m.

Also present: Captain Soong

Dr. Lo stated that he and Dr. Chang had suggested to Gen. Chou that he consider giving the American team member final authority to conduct local investigations. Regarding this Gen. Chou had wired Yen-an and the reply came back last evening which approved the American team member to have the power to decide where and when the team was to go. He further stated that members of minority parties met the Government delegates yesterday and asked the Government to extend the 15 day truce. Dr. Chang said that Gen. Chou told them that the Communist Party was willing to give the final authority to American team members in ordering cease fire. General Marshall said that he could not quite understand what Gen. Chou meant by Americans' final decision in ordering cease fire. For instance, when fire was ceased, what should be done to prevent further fighting? Dr. Chang stated General Chou's implied meaning would be that the American team members would have power to decide what distance each side would have to withdraw. Gen. Marshall then said that it was not sufficient to merely imply because the lower ranks among the Communist Party would not adhere to this implication. Gen. Marshall said that Gen. Chou had been reluctant in this matter because the lower ranks among the Communist Party could not analyze the situation as to why Government troops were using American equipment—guns, bombs, etc., and that they all looked upon Americans with disfavor.

Dr. Lo said that Gen. Marshall's arbitration power on the Committee of Three level was another deadlock issue. Gen. Marshall said he saw no particular reason why such an arrangement would not be appropriate in Executive Headquarters and in the Field teams but that on the Committee of Three level unanimous vote proceedings would have to continue with the possible exception of rulings on interpretations of directives and agreements. He could not accept the arbitration power as proposed by the Government because it would impose too much responsibility upon the U. S. Government. The Government insisted on it since they wanted to insure that agreements would be carried out and since the existing procedure was wholly ineffective.

Dr. Lo then said that they would be glad to go to see Gen. Chou this morning regarding what Gen. Marshall had just said. However,

Gen. Marshall replied that Gen. Chou was coming to see him 1100 hours this morning and he suggested that they wait.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai, at 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, June 21, 1946, 12:05 p. m.

Also present: Mr. Chang
Colonel Caughey
Captain Soong

GENERAL MARSHALL: I saw the Generalissimo last night and also saw him again this morning. The situation is roughly this, so far as he is concerned and I am concerned. I was proceeding on the basis that the stipulations regarding Jehol and Chahar, and regarding Chefoo and Wei Hai Wei, were unacceptable as proposed to the Communist Party, and that my problem was to see if I could find any method of approach to the Government regarding their position in this matter. I discussed two things in detail—first, dropping the stipulations as such and making everything referring to North China merely the development of details under the Agreement of February 25 regarding the redistribution of troops. Of course, that involved not only an additional general approach to planning the locations of armies, an approach which had not been touched on before. It also touched on whether or not there was any probability that I could persuade the Government to modify the conditions in the stipulations—in the special document called stipulations. The other point I discussed at length was the extension of the period from June 22nd.

Now to go to the first matter concerning the redistribution of troops. I took the draft ⁴⁶ prepared by the Chinese Staff and discussed with the Generalissimo modifications of it on the assumption that its terms were unacceptable to the Communist Party. While I could not, at the time, get a firm commitment, I did obtain an understanding of the possibility of Government acceptance of the modifications I proposed and which I discussed in general terms.

I had a further talk with the Generalissimo this morning regarding this same matter to see if I could get a firm commitment. While I did not obtain his commitment, I do feel that I have a better basis, at least so far as the Government side is concerned, for negotiating details with General Chou. Again I must comment on the fact that it is extremely difficult for me to do this when I have not a definite outline

⁴⁶ See memorandum OSE 189, June 17, by Col. J. Hart Caughey to Gen. Chou En-lai, p. 1075.

of the Communist proposal—that has been my embarrassment throughout.

There is another factor I have not mentioned but which is intimately connected with the northern part of North China, and that is the basis for an agreement in Manchuria. When I originally received the first Government proposals regarding Manchuria, I felt they would be wholly unacceptable to the Communists. Therefore, it became my task to see what I might do to moderate the Government proposals. While I did obtain large modifications, though they may not seem so to General Chou but in the light of the original Government position they were very large, the Generalissimo attached to each concession from his original proposition, one of these stipulations regarding North China. That is where these stipulations grew up.

For example, when I was proposing that Nun Kiang, in which province Tsitsihar is located, be included, the stipulation regarding Jehol came in. When I secured modification of the Government proposal in northeast Manchuria which had to do with Huiyuan, in order to give Communist troops a position on the railroad leading into western Kirin and into a more prosperous area it seemed to me, the stipulation regarding Chahar developed, and so on. I am merely telling General Chou this so he will know the ropes and so he will understand why I have been in difficulties because he did not give me a very definite stipulation.

There was also considered the concentration of the entire Communist force. I opposed that because I thought it gave a better opportunity for supply and general living if they had these other regions. I then discussed in greater detail with the Generalissimo the proposition of extending the period of this so-called truce, that is the suspension of aggressive action, and he has not given me a firm commitment on that. However, I was led to understand that one of his staff would either see me or telephone me at about 1:30 this afternoon to tell me his final decision. General Marshall said he would pass that information immediately to General Chou.

Now, in my efforts to find a middle ground, I have first taken the points on which I found the Government apparently unbending. Then I have taken the situation of the Communist troops and General Chou's statements—his general statements—and I have done the best I could with these various strong stands to find a basis for a middle course. I am talking now about North China. This diagram⁴⁷ starts as a modification of the work of the Chinese staff and with additions which are entirely mine. The Chinese army staff did not take into account the large numbers of troops involved, it seemed to me, during the first part of the period. So I endeavored to make a start from some of

⁴⁷ Not found attached to file copy.

their proposals and so enlarged the areas to the extent that I thought would be necessary. I added additional areas, and especially an entirely new proposal regarding Jehol and Chahar regarding which the Government had taken a very strong stand. This has all been hurriedly done and I apologize for the rough appearance of the map. It shows the Communist forces in red, the Government forces in blue. And in the red, it shows first a larger outline with little hashmarks, or perpendicular lines. Those marks indicate the general areas in which troops would first be concentrated by 1 October. During that period, there would be a simultaneous demobilization of Government and Communist troops which would greatly reduce the total strength involved in those areas. Following up to the end of the year, there would be a continuous demobilization, so that there would be a large total reduction in strength by the first of January. Therefore, the smaller areas of concentration, the area by Kalgan and Chahar, is not shown with the hashmarks. But it was intended that in the later period, the Communist concentration would be confined to the section of Chahar outlined on this map.

The Government dispositions are complicated as are the Communists by the fact that little demobilization has occurred among the Government troops in North China. The Government has been engaged in demobilization south of the Yangtze and in the west about 30 divisions have been reduced to brigades. This, of course, means that the further demobilization will largely be confined to units in North China and Manchuria. So far as I know the Communists have not yet started any demobilization. The Government demobilization, as I understand it, has been carried out by reducing divisions which lack full strength to brigades, giving them full strength. In other words, if a division had about 6,000 men, as many of them had, it is probable that the new brigade would have a strength of 6,000 men, but the division headquarters, headquarters troops and all of the officer personnel and headquarters personnel of the other brigade would have been done away with. The officers themselves, largely the generals, have been concentrated here. Some have been put in civil positions and some are not yet assigned. The point I am making is if this is done between July 1st and December 31st or January 1st, a very heavy demobilization is involved in North China on both the Government side and the Communist side.

General Marshall passed a copy of the overlay to General Chou.

General Chou inquired if General Marshall was finished. General Marshall replied, "Yes".

CHOU: Regarding North China, no matter how many reasons there are, I think that should not be brought into discussion during this 15 days when we are discussing the army reorganization plan in Man-

churia. In accordance with the Army Reorganization Agreement of 25 February, what we should do is to work out detailed arrangements with regard to the disposition of the armies in all of China. This is the work of the military sub-committee and its staff. Therefore, in the first place, I take exception to such a procedure. By this, I mean that the disposition of troops in North and Central China should be discussed after this 15 day period. Regarding the matter of North China, General Marshall has not discussed with me before, nor has the Generalissimo ever informed me about it. Hence, I made no preparation for it at all. This is the first reason why North China should not be brought into discussion at this moment.

The second reason is that if we have to have a discussion of troop dispositions in China Proper, then it should be discussed in a general scope, not restricting it to North China alone but taking into consideration troop disposition of Central, West, and Northwest China as well. The procedure for working out such an arrangement should be that the staffs of both parties should first have an exchange of views on technical matters as was done with regard to the demobilization plan which was discussed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff under an American chairman.

It seems to me that the present procedure is not proper in which the Generalissimo appointed some of his staff to work out his demands and leave me entirely unprepared to discuss the problem. This is not appropriate procedure for the Committee of Three and, therefore, I decline to agree to such a method of procedure.

The third reason is that the present proposal is entirely a unilateral proposal, taking only the view of the Government. According to this plan, Communist troops will be concentrated in places which are away from railway lines, except in Kalgan area. Perhaps this plan is what General Marshall, through his efforts, is trying to get back because General Hsu told me the Government idea of having such a troop disposition. I also told you yesterday about it.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Such a troop disposition being what?

GENERAL CHOU: Such an arrangement of troop disposition to have five areas off the railway lines and away from the big cities, with the exception of the Kalgan area.

This plan is entirely in accordance with the Generalissimo's intention to get Communist troops away from railway lines and big cities so that Communists will occupy areas which least menace the Generalissimo's position. Then he can wipe out the Communists at any time he wishes. If we accept this proposal, he can achieve his goal by peaceful means; and, if we don't accept it, he would achieve it by force. The aim is just the same, only the methods are different. This is the first part of my observation of this plan.

My second observation is that the strength of the armies in North

China has also been changed from the original army reorganization plan. During the first period there will be 11 armies, four Communist and seven Government armies. On our side, we have no intention of changing the strength of the four armies, thus still leaving the 5th Communist army in Central China. Now the Government wants the 5th Army also to be sent to North China while on their own part they increase their number to 9 armies. This is against the Army Reorganization Plan in China Proper.

My third observation pertains to the disposition of troops. I presume that only in the location of the divisions should cities be stipulated. That applies also to the location of the Army Headquarters because these troops will be used for no other purpose than for training. It would not interfere with civil administration or with local security and, therefore, the military arrangement system should not be re-introduced as you have told me when we discussed the Army Reorganization Plan. I still think there should be no change in the army system.

My fourth observation is that actually in our area we have already done much of the demobilization work. It is not that the demobilization has not already been started.

On the basis of these four points, I find no way to consider this plan. As the matter now stands, whenever we talk about Manchuria, the Generalissimo would have it linked up with North China as a means to press the Communists or to put forward such demands such as that we should withdraw from Jehol, Chahar, Chefoo and Wei Hai Wei in exchange; or that he would only discuss troop disposition in North China and leave only the Kalgan City, itself, to the Communists. Such an attitude leaves me no ground to give consideration to his demands. I appreciate General Marshall's efforts and still hope that he will bend his efforts for an extension of the suspension of aggressive actions.

Therefore, first, I repeat my yesterday's proposal. Yen-an asked me to repeat this proposal that the Committee of Three should immediately decide to stop the fighting in the Northeast and to reassert the cessation of hostilities in China also. A new order to this effect should be issued with the additional stipulation which was raised yesterday to the effect that American members of field teams should have the power to execute this order. Yesterday also brought up the question of the power to make investigations and the Democratic leader also proposed that this power be given. This point was first brought here by General Byroade and Colonel Caughey mentioned it again yesterday. I now would like to take the responsibility to agree on this point so that a guaranty can be given, both in Manchuria and China Proper, to effectively stop the fighting. Wherever hostilities crop up, the American representative of the field team has the power

to decide what investigations are to be made within his area of control and to order the cessation of fighting. This is a powerful guarantee and it surely will be welcome to the Chinese people and, I assume, also to the Allied Nations.

In the second place, after the true cessation of fighting, we will immediately work out a plan for the restoration of communications. We pledge that the repair work of the railways will be started before everything else.

Third, after the cessation of fighting, we shall immediately begin to work out an arrangement with regard to the reorganization and demobilization in the entire country, including Manchuria. The staff of both parties, under the leadership of the American staffs will work out a plan for the Committee of Three and the plan will then be carried out according to schedule.

Fourth, as I mentioned yesterday, a second session of the Committee of Three should be convened to discuss the reorganization of the Government, the protection of the people's rights and the salvation of the people's livelihood. At this moment, the livelihood of the people has reached a most perilous stage. We should also discuss completing the unification of the local administration; by which I imply that both in China Proper and Manchuria the local governments should be reorganized and free elections held. Since the government declines to settle the various issues one by one and intends to force us to accept their proposal within one day's time, this is practically impossible and therefore I propose one overall settlement of all the issues. China is now coming to a most critical moment and either we should follow the line proposed by President Truman to stop the fighting and to have a peaceful negotiation for the reorganization of the Government and the integration and reorganization of the armies, or that we should give the Generalissimo a free hand to act according to his own line. In the latter case, it would be an immense tragedy to the country.

One more addition: The army reorganization, integration, and training is the point which the Generalissimo feels most uneasy about and, therefore, he can leave everything aside. But on this one particular point, he wants his desire to be complied with. If his desire is realized and he can feel at ease, then we can't be at ease because we would have no assurance on everything else which has not yet been discussed. This is the crucial point of issue. Everything else he thinks rather minor so he gets all his means to press us to accept this demand. He may make concessions on individual items such as Kalgan or Tsitsihar but he would make no concession in his over all plan. We cannot feel at ease about it since there is no assurance.

This leads me to a new thought. Suppose the Generalissimo would not change his mind, yet we have no way of accepting his demands.

The war has got to be stopped. We differ from the Generalissimo in this respect that no matter what the differences of views, the fighting should be stopped. The Generalissimo is not thinking this way. He is thinking if his aims cannot be achieved by negotiation, he would gain it by war. The matter now is that he cannot achieve his aim by war.

Therefore, I come to the conclusion it would be more advisable if during the processes of army reorganization, Communist troops will be reorganized in Communist areas and Government troops in Government areas. Reorganization will be carried out in separate armies and training will be undertaken by the American Officer Corps since we all trust the Americans. They are helping China to get unified, reconstructed, and become a democratic country. Then it might be better if after this interim, we bring the two forces together and then effect the integration. We are all aware that the training by the American officers would not lead China to civil war. Actually the distribution of force as it now is would not permit China to wage civil war. We know the Generalissimo has perfect confidence in the actions of American officers and we also place confidence in them. I think this might be a workable scheme. I could not think of anything else.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Referring to General Chou's first comments regarding the detailed expansion of agreement of 25 February concerning the redistribution of troops in North China, the Generalissimo's statement when he made the decision to issue orders for cessation of aggressive action on 6 June was this expression in paragraph c: "A definite basis for carrying out, without further delay, agreement of February 25, 1946, for the demobilization, reorganization and integration of the armed forces in China". Whatever General Chou may have gathered from that statement, I know that the Generalissimo had in mind in the use of the term "a definite basis" exactly the character of the proposals that have just been made. The injection of the so-called stipulations occurred in connection with the proposals [on] Manchuria and, as I explained to General Chou, the stipulations were precipitated by my insistence for the broadening of the areas proposed for the Communists in Manchuria.

So far as the omission of dispositions of the armed forces in south and northwest and other portions of China, I did not undertake to present that because I was working very fast on this particular paper that I have given General Chou this morning (indicating overlay of troop dispositions). I think that would be a comparatively simple matter to remedy, at least the simplest of the complex problems we now have on our hands. I entirely agree with General Chou that we should get action as quickly as possible for the exact terms of the cessation of hostilities and the exact terms for the resumption of lines

of communication, but I am also of the opinion that we will have to have a pretty precise understanding as to what the Communists' demands will be in connection with redistribution of troops in North China. This redistribution should have been decided upon in March and April. The Communists were to have submitted a list of troops, as I recall, three weeks after February 25th and another list three weeks later. The Government prepared a list. We have never yet received the Communist list. Had those lists been submitted, presumably the combined staffs could at least have made a proposal or a report of their differences regarding the redistribution of troops in North China. But, as I have said, that should have been done during March and April, certainly completed in May, and now we are approaching the first of July. I, therefore, do not think the Generalissimo's insistence, particularly in view of his public statement, is illogical.

I have just received this telephone message from the Generalissimo: "With reference to our conversation of yesterday and today regarding the extension of my order for the cessation of advances, attacks and pursuits, I have given orders to my army commanders that the suspension of aggressive action; that is, advances, attacks, and pursuits will be continued in force (that is the suspension will continue) until noon of 30 June 1946.[""]

Now I repeat that I agree with General Chou as to the need for immediate consideration of the order for the cessation of hostilities and the immediate consideration of an agreement for the resumption of communications but I urgently appeal to him not to wreck this last possibility of reaching a preliminary agreement on the military considerations by 30 June. I say to General Chou that I will use my very best efforts to persuade the Generalissimo to make the announcement or definite commitments regarding the PCC and certain other matters in connection with the political reorganization of the government. It was my hope in approaching this present crisis that we might clear the way with these basic military agreements and have an announcement made coincident with the announcement of their successful conclusion regarding the purely political matters immediately to be considered or put into effect.

I have several other proposals for immediate action by the Generalissimo in governmental matters of a political nature which I am not now prepared to discuss with General Chou but which are of a practical nature; that is, they can be put into effect instantly without debate or delay.

One last matter: In the telephone message to me the Generalissimo requested that I take up with General Chou the release of Chou Ching Mai, Mayor of Changchun; and other Central Government personnel;

General Pai [*Pan Hsuo-tuan*], commander of the 184th Division; and the other officers and men, I assume, of that division, that they be handed back to the Central Government authorities by 30 June.

893.00/6-2146 : Telegram

The Counselor of Embassy in China (Smyth) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, June 21, 1946—2 p. m.

[Received June 21—7:10 a. m.]

1019. Despite mutual Kuomintang-Communist accusations of violations, temporary truce agreement Manchuria has been fairly well maintained. Executive Headquarters Truce Teams Manchuria increased from 4 to 8 (summary M[ilitary] A[ttaché's] report for period 11 June to 18 June, 1946). Indications are that problems most difficult of solution will be (1) redistribution rival troops, (2) ratio of Central Govt. to Communist troops, (3) control of Manchurian cities and (4) American mediation powers.

Situation Shantung continued tense. At Tsingtao Central Govt. forces reported not in excess 4,000. Communist troops Tsingtao area variously reported from 30,000 to 100,000. Tsingtao situation eased somewhat 18 June by Communist commitment that no attack would be made on city.

Indications are that Communist military supremacy Shantung has been established at least for time being, possibly as Communist counterbalance to Central Govt. in Manchurian negotiations.

SMYTH

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

The Communist Delegation to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek ⁴⁸

To: President Chiang Kai-shek
 Care of: Messrs. Sun Fo, Wu Tieh-cheng, Wang Shih-chieh, Shao Li-tze, Chen Li-fu, Chang Li-sheng ⁴⁹
 From: Chou En-lai, Tung Pi-wu, Li Wei-han, Yeh Chien-ying, Wu Yu-chang, Lu Ting-yi, and Teng Ying-chao ⁵⁰

Since the announcement of the suspense of aggressive actions in Manchuria, the Chinese people and the public opinion in world are

⁴⁸ Forwarded on June 21; copy transmitted to General Marshall on the same date by Gen. Chou En-lai.

⁴⁹ Members of the Chinese National Government: President of the Legislative Yuan, Vice President of the same, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Secretary-General of the People's Political Council, Minister of the Kuomintang Organization Board, and Minister of Interior, respectively.

⁵⁰ The last-named was the wife of Gen. Chou En-lai.

unequivocal in their ardent desire that through the good offices of General Marshall the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party would reach within this 15-day period an unanimous agreement on such issues as restoration of Communications, termination of hostilities and army reorganization in Manchuria, so that the short-term armistice would resolve itself into a long-term truce and the door toward peace and unity be opened. Unfortunately, despite the arduous efforts of the various parties concerned within these 15 days, the Government by putting forward its own army reorganization scheme surprisingly revealed its intention to force the Communists out of the big cities and railway lines during the process of army reorganization, so as to set stage for their eventual elimination. It further insists that the American representative be empowered with the final decision in the tri-partite conferences, thus to guarantee the implementation of such a scheme. Under such circumstances, we regret to say that we find no way toward giving consideration to such a proposal. Furthermore, the Government is getting deeper and deeper engaged in the movement of troops and preparation for war. A single spark at this time would ignite an immense conflagration. Should at this critical moment the hostilities not be stopped at once, they would send ravage to the people, and devastation to the country. Such a situation is too horrible to be merely thought about.

Just now we received an instruction from the Central Committee of our party, which says, that in the light of the present internal and external circumstances and the will of the Chinese people, it is impossible to avert the grave crisis and to save the Chinese people from their immense suffering except by way of an immediate cessation of hostilities and realization of peace. In view of this we beg to put forward the following measures for immediate implementation :

1. The Committee of Three shall announce without delay a long-term truce for Manchuria, at the same time reaffirming its nation-wide cease fire order, stipulating the detail terms for effecting the cessation of hostilities, and ordering troops of both sides to strictly abide by those terms.

2. Pursuant to the cease fire announcement, the Committee of Three shall immediately discuss the detail measures for the resumption of communications throughout the country, giving first priority to the repair of important railway lines.

3. The Committee of Three shall work out within a set time limit the detail arrangements governing the reorganization and demobilization of the Chinese armies in China proper and Manchuria. The arrangements thus worked out shall be implemented at once.

4. Through consulting with the other parties, the Government shall convene on a fixed date the second session of the PCC, with a view to reaching an early settlement on such matters, as the reorganization of

the government, the protection of civil rights, the relief of people's livelihood, and the completion of the national unity.

If the foregoing points do meet your approval, it is requested that they will separately be referred to the Committee of Three and the Steering Committee of the PCC for taking actions, so that the people's anxiety shall be relieved, and their desire complied with.

In view of the gravity of the situation, we are anxiously awaiting your conclusion on these proposals.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai, at 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, June 21, 1946, 5:10 p. m.

Also present: Mr. Chang
Colonel Caughey
Captain Soong

GENERAL CHOU: It is very important how we shall continue our work during the next 9 days. As far as I can see, to work out some arrangement for termination of hostilities and restoration of communications should not be difficult. The difficulty lies in arrangements for army reorganization. My views on army reorganization were explained this morning. However, I wish to state that prior to the announcement of the armistice in Manchuria, we have in our discussion on army reorganization, entirely talked about army strengths, the disposition of troops in Manchuria, and the completion of reorganization at an earlier date. We did not touch upon the redistribution of troops in North China or Central China, and therefore in this respect, I have had the impression that the matter concerning North China and Central China will be discussed after formal announcement of the termination of hostilities in Manchuria. Of course, this does not imply that I would not discuss North China and Central China affairs, but I thought we would discuss it after these 15 days. Therefore, we have not prepared nor thought about any detailed proposal with regard to China proper. Whether the North China and Central China problem be drawn into our discussion, either in the form of stipulations to the settlement of the Manchurian matter as proposed by Generalissimo, or in the form that it was presented today within the scope of army disposition, I find no way to give it consideration. But suppose that it becomes necessary to discuss it in the next eight days and that we are asked to present detailed proposals regarding the army disposition for mutual discussion, then we can agree to have it in the procedure, in the agenda, and we will duly pre-

pare data for a counter proposal. However, I must admit that in this subject, the distance between the two parties is greater than in any other problem.

Secondly, regarding the power of final decision, it seems that the Government itself is not entirely clear on the matter. In the previous letters exchanged, and that includes the letter from Madame Chiang Kai-shek,⁵¹ the Government always referred to it by the wording "final decision". Then in the press, they issued propaganda saying that what they mean is "arbitration" and saying that the Communists have deliberately confused it with "final decision". Today, they seemed again to have changed their mind in repeating this demand. They no longer use the words "final decision" or "arbitration"; they have changed to the words "majority vote". It seems that the Government itself is not entirely clear on this point, but they still put forward this question to embarrass us because they are perfectly aware that we did not accept this proposal. Therefore, they would interject this question as an intermezzo.

Now, regarding the field teams—we have already obtained settlement on three matters. The first one is the power of the American member to render reports as was stipulated in the agreement at the time when General Byroade came up from Hankow. The second thing is the right to make decisions for investigations, as I agreed this morning. That means to make decisions for the conduct of investigations. And, thirdly, execution power for cessation of hostilities.

Yesterday, as regard to one section, I agreed on two things. The first is the power of American officers to render reports. The second is the execution power of instructions and orders, as I conveyed to General Byroade. As far as I am concerned, I have done everything possible within my power and I do not want to go further into this matter.

In a word, what we are thinking now is what should be done in the next eight days to reach an agreement. Should we go back to what we planned to do, as you suggested about the time the armistice was announced, that is that we go over various subjects one by one so that solution of one matter would facilitate solution of the next one.

We have been thinking that repair of the railroad can be settled prior to others and that repair work can be started immediately. I have the impression that the Government would not accept or agree to it because only two days ago there was a turn of the Government's attitude toward the Yellow River business. As you know, everybody has been anxious regarding the repair of the Yellow River, in particular Mr. Ray and Mr. Todd. In accordance with our agreement,

⁵¹ Letter No. 1, May 24, p. 891.

Communists have already mobilized 210,000 laborers to repair the dikes, and work has been going on for over 10 days. According to that agreement flour, trucks, transportation and money will be furnished by Government agencies and CNRRA. However, up to now, only a very little amount of flour, only a few tons, have arrived in Communist areas. However, UNRRA and CNRRA in Shanghai are devoting their efforts to sending more to Communist areas—to send the required amount, but then there is a turn in that situation. Day before yesterday, the Executive Yuan decided they would supply no more flour and money for work in that area. Instead they want the Communists to advance the money and food. The Government would issue only a promissory note which later on would be refunded by food or paid back in kind. Of course, both UNRRA and CNRRA understand what it means. Therefore, it seems rather difficult to solve matters one by one. I am wondering whether we should conceive some other methods or measures to attack the problem and still maintain the principle of settling the matters one by one, but at the same time have trial talks on the disposition of troops within the scope of army reorganization. However, I wish to point out definitely that the scheme, as the Generalissimo wished could not be achieved regardless of what means would be adopted, because we find it entirely unacceptable. According to this plan, the Communists should evacuate from places they now garrison and they should evacuate to the poorest places; while the Government side, by virtue of the military district system, aggrandizes.

Furthermore, there is no assurance at all for the settlement of political matters. The Generalissimo is forcing the Communists to make commitments in the military aspect without making any promise on political matters. This is entirely contradictory to President Truman's statement,⁵² as well as the Moscow Communiqué of the Big Three.⁵³

I would like to know your views on procedure which I should adopt. I have expressed several times my views on procedure and would like to know yours.

GENERAL MARSHALL: After listening to General Chou's presentation, I am inclined to think that it would be best to have an immediate meeting of the Committee of Three around a table and take up first, the order for the cessation of hostilities and then immediately after that, complete the agreement for restoration of communications. At

⁵² December 15, 1945; *United States Relations With China*, p. 607, or Department of State *Bulletin*, December 16, 1945, p. 945.

⁵³ December 27, 1945; see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 30, 1945, pp. 1027, 1030 (section IV, China), or *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. II, pp. 815 and 821.

the same time, I think General Chou should bring forward his definite proposals regarding redistribution of troops. He has all the Government proposals along with the modifications I have succeeded in having made. Matters will be accelerated if we, as quickly as possible, get his presentation even though we do not bring it to an immediate decision.

My suggestion then would be that we have a meeting tomorrow morning, either here or over at Army Headquarters. I don't care which. Probably it would be best over there. We could make a start on the draft of the order for cease-firing in Manchuria and, if by a miracle we finish that, we can immediately start on the disagreements regarding communications. Now in making that suggestion, I am involved in two ways: One on the Committee of Three and the other as an advisor to the military sub-committee. Paragraphs *a* and *b* are the Committee of Three, paragraph *c* is the military sub-committee of which I am an advisor.

If that seems agreeable to General Chou, I will endeavor to secure governmental agreement to the procedure and to set a time for the first meeting, which I suggest be 11 o'clock.

GENERAL CHOU: Very good.

GENERAL MARSHALL: That will give us several hours to get matters into shape.

GENERAL CHOU: I agree with this procedure and ask whether there is some preliminary draft which will form a basis for discussion on cessation of hostilities and restoration of lines of communication.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I submitted a proposal which General Chou modified and I turned it over to General Hsu. General Hsu has not talked to me about it but he sent me a letter proposing several changes. I did not answer the letter as I did not want to handle it in writing. This will bring it to date at the table with my proposal, General Chou's amendments, and I assume, General Hsu's.

GENERAL CHOU: And how about the restoration of communications?

GENERAL MARSHALL: I do not know. I gave General Chou the only paper I had and that was General Yu Ta Wei's last paper. Has Colonel Hill a paper?

GENERAL CHOU: Altogether there are at least three papers. I have a copy of Colonel Hill's draft and so has General Yu Ta-wei. I assume the meeting will be based on Colonel Hill's last draft. Colonel Hill told General Huang that, in presenting his draft to General Marshall, he would annex to it the suggestions and differences of view, and the remarks of General Chou and General Yu.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I have their various points and comments. There are about five points of disagreement.

GENERAL CHOU: Not that many. There are a few major and some minor differences but they are not important.

GENERAL MARSHALL: All right. My endeavor will be to take that up as it is. Now I will have to find out if the Government will agree to the meeting tomorrow morning. They will, of course, want to know from me, General Chou's reply to this paper I gave him today. I will tell them that General Chou stated he is going to present a proposition of the Communist Party and it is my suggestion that we start tomorrow morning on the cessation of hostilities.

Now I must say to General Chou as we enter into this last effort, and it certainly is the last effort, that my difficulty as I see it is largely this: As I have often stated the matter, the Government, meaning a number of leading officials of the Government, are firmly of the opinion that Communist procedure will be to drag out negotiations interminably and always add something else to the discussion and that, if we get an agreement, some method will be found to obstruct its implementation. The Government also fears, of course, as I have said before, that the Chinese Communist Party policy is either coordinated or dictated with or by Soviet Russia.

On the other hand, as General Chou knows better than I do, Communist leaders are equally convinced that the Government will not go through with an agreement or will force a decision which threatens the Communist Party's continued existence. This will be done they fear in various ways: through failure to carry out with sincerity agreed political measures for reorganization of China's government in a truly democratic manner; through use of secret police to terrorize or obstruct the Communist party; through control of the press and news agencies; and through the actions of some generals who are convinced in their own minds that only a policy of force will settle the matter.

This is very frank speaking but that is the condition of affairs as I see it, and that is my difficulty. The greatest part of that difficulty I think lies in the fact that neither side fully, or even partially, estimates what the fears are of the other side in regard to any particular matter that comes up. They can see only their own fears and, therefore, draw many false conclusions.

Now I am going to talk just as frankly to the Government representatives in this final effort to see if we can't get at least a little bit away from these deep and deadly suspicions which make agreements over the simplest matters almost impossible of fruitful results.

GENERAL CHOU: I feel this should not be the "last effort" as General Marshall stated. I hope this will not be the last effort because it appears hopeful that many matters will have been settled within the

next eight days while possibly many other matters will not and hence will have to be solved after that time. The Chinese people will be sorry if everything has not been solved.

There is the opinion of certain Government officials that Communists are stalling negotiations or that they are raising new demands every time. Well, I do not want to refer back to previous events all the time but certainly, it does not apply to us this time. This time we have made no new demands nor have we been trying to stall negotiations because we followed the line as General Marshall suggested.

Now in talking about the cessation of hostilities, it was the Government side which raised the question of the power of final decision. And, with regard to restoration of lines of communication, I almost fully agree with the draft prepared by Colonel Hill at Peiping. It was General Yu Ta-wei who raised some new questions, such as the railroad police, and it was General Yu Ta-wei who made some revisions on Colonel Hill's original draft. It is true that I did put forward the question of increasing Communist areas in Manchuria but that was raised earlier than the announcement of the armistice. From that time, I made no new claim at all. All the new demands are brought up by the government and, therefore, it is not in accord with fact to say that I have made any new demands or have been trying to stall negotiations.

Regarding procedure: In the past we advocated trying to solve all problems at one time while the Government wanted to solve them one by one. Now that we have begun to solve them one by one and again, it becomes disagreeable to the Government. So today I am making a proposal to the Government for an over all settlement of problems. I have written a letter⁵⁴ to the Government along that line as I told you yesterday and this morning, and a part of this letter will also be forwarded to you. The situation now is indeed extremely critical but, from the angle of the Chinese people, the friendship between China and the United States, and the situation in the Far East, I may say that civil war in China should no longer be continued. It is the Generalissimo who would run a great risk if he believes that he can speed his aim within the time of six months. I can predict that this he will never accomplish. He might be thinking that he is being backed up by the United States. However, I think, as the situation now is, the United States may help him and also continue to help him. But, if China is thrown into a complete chaos by civil war, then it is very doubtful whether assistance would still come from the United States. At this time, he should not only think about one possibility; that is, getting further assistance from the United States but he must think about the other possibility too.

⁵⁴ *Supra*.

As far as Communists are concerned, they should keep in mind the possibility that the United States would keep on assisting the Government. However, the Kuomintang ought to pay a little attention to the fact that the United States might stop giving that assistance. If both parties would view everything in this light, it would be far easier to solve the questions.

With regard to the view that Soviet Russia is exercising influence on the policies or other matters of the Chinese Communist Party, I must say that it is entirely groundless. The truth is that more and more, in North China, we are seeking cooperation with the United States. Even in Manchuria, after the termination of hostilities, we would welcome American representatives and people to visit and to investigate Communist areas. We are not laying a curtain around the Communist area. Instead, we adopt a policy of free traffic. These few instances would illustrate the difference of our policy and that of Soviet Russia, not to mention other aspects.

GENERAL MARSHALL: When I used the expression "last effort", I was referring to the effort to bring hostilities to a conclusion. I was not referring to the necessity for a continued effort toward political reorganization of the Government. I have frequent occasion to remind Government representatives of an attitude which I think has been wrong or has been on a false basis, particularly when it blinds them as to the real merits of the case. Now, in judging the present situation, in estimating the purpose of the Central Government, which General Chou has referred to as not being in accord with the desire for successful negotiations, and particularly when judging the attitude of Nationalist generals in Manchuria whom I think have made it very difficult for us, I would like for General Chou to keep in mind what I said about Communist generals in Manchuria about two months ago when I thought they were causing us exactly the same trouble. The Government only remembers that and does not take into consideration the present attitude of Nationalist generals. General Chou is thinking of the present attitude of Nationalist generals and may have forgotten the previous attitude of Communist generals. Both of them have made negotiations extremely difficult. General Chou will recall that he, on a number of times, used the expression, particularly with regard to modification of the stipulation as to Manchuria of the Cease-Fire Agreement of January 10 and to the agreement in the document of February 25, setting forth the eventual strength in Manchuria, he frequently used the expression in justifying his action that "the conditions have greatly changed". Now the Government man looks at me and says "conditions have changed". I resent both of those points of view. I think they are wrong and that they are both alike. But they are both very human. I am reminding General

Chou of it just as I continually remind the Government people of theirs. My purpose is to clear the air as much as possible, to wipe out as many suspicions as I can preliminary to these final discussions. That is my only purpose in reciting these various circumstances.

I suppose I am prejudiced, and I would be very glad if General Chou would tell me confidentially what he thinks my prejudice is. But I assert that I do not belong to the Kuomintang Party and I do not belong to the Communist Party, and I don't enjoy my job. I am merely doing the best I can.

GENERAL CHOU: I appreciate and feel very grateful toward the efforts you have made. Since you ask me whether you have any prejudice or not, and because I know you so well, I would like to express a viewpoint which might have some connection. The Kuomintang stands for the Central Government, while we only stand for the local authorities. Everything the Kuomintang is doing can be made legal while Communists are charged with being illegal in our actions and in our demands. Their demands are mostly for the interest of big cities and are made from the industrial point of view. From the viewpoint of the Communist, this is more comprehensible to the Westerner, while we, viewing it from the angle of villagers and people find it less easy to be comprehended by Westerners.

In trying for various schemes, we are often left in a passive position because the Government can always maintain that they speak for the unification of China. Since you ask my opinion on this point, I want to relate those to you. However, I wish to repeat that I firmly believe in all your efforts for establishing peace and stability for China. As to the conviction of certain Kuomintang generals that they have the continued assistance of the United States, seeing that now they are going to have Marines and naval vessels and that new airplanes are coming to set up a new Chinese Air Force, and that the Congress is now discussing the prolongation of the Lend-Lease Act,⁵⁵ so that the fighting strength of the Kuomintang will be increased—that is, of course, a different matter.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I thank the General for his comments, and I am very glad to have them. But regarding first the Chinese Navy, the crews were assembled in Miami Beach, Florida, in December 1944 and the vessels were assembled there I think about April 1945. That is a lapse of time of a year and a half. As to the consideration of Congress that has been lying about in the hands of the War Department and State Department for, I think, about eight months or longer than that, almost a year, it is largely a routine act which unfortunately never could be taken up before because of the bitter battles going on in Congress. I had forgotten all about it until I read in the paper

⁵⁵ Approved March 11, 1941; 55 Stat. 31.

of Secretary Byrnes' statement⁵⁶ and I had to have it recalled to me as being almost a year old.

However, the day I left Washington, I wrote a letter⁵⁷ to the chairman of the two Foreign Relations Committees of Congress and asked them to clear the legislation needed to support this Military Advisory Group. They had that for more than six months and had not acted on it. I had gotten into the embarrassing commitment of going ahead and organizing the group; otherwise, the officers released by demobilization would have gone back to the United States, but more particularly, I needed their services. Therefore, without awaiting the action of Congress, I had General Wedemeyer⁵⁸ whip the group together and start them to work. Their first job incidentally was the organization of the Kalgan school and the National Government has not attacked them on that yet. I brought out 100 officers and non-commissioned officers for that school, and if you would stop this damned fighting, I could get them to work up there. I sent ten to Peiping today and have sent others. Congress has not yet passed legislation though the Committees have reported it. That is Democratic action. But it all happens to come up at this moment though it had its inception, or beginning, a long time back. They are things which you cannot stop and start, as I told General Chou before, like turning off water at a faucet. It takes a year to get started, then a year to revive them, if it ever could be done.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall, General Hsu Yung-chang, and General Yu Ta-wei at 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, June 22, 1946, 9:30 a. m.

Also present: General Pee
Colonel Caughey
Colonel Hill

GENERAL YU: I understood fully General Chou's suspicions. I have to understand his suspicions in order to be fair to him in negotiations. In this case, they are not justified because if the Government had decided to attack, they would have done so after 12:00 o'clock today and not extended the truce. With reference to procedure, the Gen-

⁵⁶ The Secretary of State was in Paris for a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers; for statement on June 19 by the Acting Secretary of State before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 30, 1946, p. 1115.

⁵⁷ For General Marshall's letter of April 12 to the Chairman of the House Military Affairs Committee, see vol. x, p. 827.

⁵⁸ Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer was Commanding General, U. S. Forces in the China Theater until April.

eralissimo pays the greatest attention to your recommendations, but we don't want to sign the documents previous to final settlement. When would this meeting take place today between General Chou En-lai, General Hsu, General Marshall and myself?

GENERAL MARSHALL: At 11:00 o'clock.

GENERAL YU: Where?

GENERAL MARSHALL: I should think at the former place.

GENERAL YU: What would be discussed today between General Chou, General Hsu and me?

GENERAL MARSHALL: Colonel Caughey, I thought that had been settled.

COLONEL CAUGHEY: Yes sir, we plan to discuss termination of hostilities and restoration of communications.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I want to do as much as possible. I hope we won't take two hours on this. I want to clear things up as fast as I can. I have never talked with General Hsu in regard to this, so my purpose is instead of trying to settle it in writing, to get your views and discussion orally. On the first paragraph,⁵⁹ there were no comments.

GENERAL HSU: I have no comments on paragraph *a* at all, but we understood that General Chou would like to put in an additional clause, something like the other decision made by the Committee of Three.

GENERAL MARSHALL: That was in paragraph *a*. I was going on down the list. In paragraph *a*, General Chou wished to say "or later directed by the Committee of Three." Any objections.

GENERAL HSU: There are no changes on *a* at all.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Then is it accepted?

GENERAL HSU: Yes. If General Chou insisted on adding an additional clause, we would not raise objection.

GENERAL MARSHALL: As a matter of fact, I thought it was a good one. Now paragraph *b*. Has General Hsu cleared *b* yet.

GENERAL HSU: Yes.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Now paragraph *c*. It had been originally written 30 li,⁶⁰ but General Chou proposed 15 li. If General Chou wanted it that way, it did not do any harm. I am making an effort this morning at the table and would like to know in advance if the Government is implacable on the 30 li.

GENERAL HSU: We prefer 30 li.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I am trying to get what you prefer. If General Chou stood pat, was there any compromise? I want to know in

⁵⁹ See draft of June 17, p. 1074.

⁶⁰ See draft of June 13, p. 1044.

advance. Otherwise, we are stopped right here. I have heard General Chou En-lai's arguments about this and I want to hear the Government's side before we get together.

GENERAL HSU: I thought 15 li was only 1½ hour by foot, so we thought the wider gap would give more security on cessation of hostilities.

GENERAL MARSHALL: We are aware that in a good many places, one could not move 15 li because then we got back into another situation worse. Another thing, I was the one who proposed the 30 li—it is not a Government proposal.

GENERAL HSU: General Chou seems to be very keen on talking about cease-fire in Manchuria.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I am trying to find out if the Government was implacable on the 30 li.

GENERAL HSU: I suggest normally 30 li but if circumstances were impractical, we may lessen the distance.

GENERAL MARSHALL: That was implied anyway.

GENERAL YU: How about leaving it in and then General Chou could give his objections at the conference? I don't think it is worth the argument.

GENERAL MARSHALL: That is the reason I am trying to get the change to 15. I do not think there is any harm and I know there are bigger fights later on. I propose that we should accept it. Further down, you get into bigger points and there is more room for argument. The next sentence was changed to make it clear. The sentence was reconstructed after my discussions with General Chou—reconstructed by me.

GENERAL YU: I did not get the meaning of "special consideration will be given to local situation believed to have existed."

GENERAL MARSHALL: The question is actually the situation at noon of June 7. Who was where? The question is that if some places had been attacked after noon of June 7 by an offensive which drove the troops out and then a counter attack carried the original troops back in, in that case there was no change. However, if the attack was after noon of June 7 and the troops were driven out, then they should be restored to that place because they were there at noon on June 7. If you try to establish the thing with scientific exactness, you won't get it straightened out for months. I changed the sentence merely to make it a better English expression of the idea. There was no argument on either side as to necessity for the thing. It was a question of the phrasing. The change was my own. Was there any objection to that?

GENERAL YU: I think the staff officers want to make it more clear—that is all.

GENERAL MARSHALL: The change was made by me. General Chou could not understand it so I had changed it. This is better English.

GENERAL HSU: We are agreed to this change.

GENERAL MARSHALL: We have now reached the real crux of the whole thing. In the event of disagreement among the teams or at the Advance Section of Executive Headquarters at Changchun, thereafter is a complete disagreement. Now, since that was written by me and since General Chou had offered an amendment and there have been additional possible concessions mentioned by General Chou En-lai, I will agree to a team captain having the decision where and when to go and who to see. I will agree that the American member of a field team shall have the authority to direct execution of the cease-fire order. I have now a more accurate translation here of General Chou's statement regarding the execution of agreements. "After unanimous agreement has been reached and specific instructions or orders have been issued by the Committee of Three, the American member of field teams shall have the authority to execute those instructions or orders." Now, that pertains to the cease-fire instructions only so far as we have gotten. The trouble with it is, that it leaves too much to interpretation as to what you mean by execute. I was endeavoring to have General Chou define that but just at that moment, I had to leave him to see the Generalissimo and I never have had it defined. I have not brought up these particular issues myself.

GENERAL YU: I am afraid that it is rather difficult to settle or to get an agreement. In the first place, I agree that the scope of the power of the American member should be defined. It is too vague. In the second place, we want to revise the procedure of the vote. That is why we have written to General Chou and insisted on getting a formula.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I am not asking you to agree to this. I am telling you what General Chou has been talking about to see to what extent the modifications he made the other day are agreeable insofar as the paragraph we are debating is concerned. At first General Chou proposed that this should read "In the event of disagreement in the teams or at the Advance Section of the Executive Headquarters at Changchun, the senior American officer in Changchun will report the situation to Executive Headquarters at Peiping or to the Committee of Three at Nanking, depending on the urgency of the situation." Since then General Chou has committed himself to the statement that "The American member of field teams shall have the authority to execute those instructions." Therefore I assume that General Chou would be ready to modify his previous language in the document. I am sure that my original wording would not be accepted by General

Chou but General Chou may commit himself to some new wording of his own proposed amendment. Now the embarrassing phase of this particular matter in discussion this morning at the general meeting is this, and I ask that General Hsu keep it carefully in mind: in the first place, the new proposition of General Chou En-lai has been stated to me and not to the Committee of Three. In the next place, I will not be put in the position of mediator on this particular problem regarding the authority of the American officer. Now, in the third place, I think it is important not to draw into this particular discussion, a larger issue, such as the Committee of Three, that does not have to do with the immediate matter under discussion.

GENERAL HSU: The Government would wait until it hears more fully the explanation from General Chou. However, at present, the Government agrees with General Marshall's original stipulation.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I wish to point out that the original stipulation was not being carried out by the Government according to yesterday's press release that stated a majority vote would rule. The original stipulation was that the American officer would have the controlling vote.

GENERAL YU: It never comes about that both the Communists and Nationalists would side against the Americans. The Government was in accord with the original idea.

GENERAL MARSHALL: If General Chou defines "execute" as I assume it would have to be defined, then the American member of the team has the authority to do what we have to do at Changchun and we would not have to raise that issue. The issue would only have to come back to the headquarters as a protest, but the order would have presumably been executed. I would like to ask that, since General Yu and General Hsu are already present, if General Hsu would agree to holding the Committee of Three meeting here at the house immediately after the present meeting.

GENERAL HSU: I agree.

GENERAL YU: I propose that since the time is short, we concentrate on the cease-fire proposal and have another meeting later in the day or the following morning regarding restoration of lines of communication, preferably here at 0930.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I agree to this arrangement. Now, let's continue the discussion of the paragraph regarding the American officers' authority on field teams. My suggestion is that if General Chou proposes a modification here in line with the statements just read regarding the authority of the field team commander to execute agreements, that his amendment be accepted without getting involved at this time in the larger issues.

GENERAL HSU: I have two fears: First, that General Chou is insist-

ing on the unanimous agreement in the Committee of Three to arrive at a directive to be sent to the advance teams for execution. That means if the agreement can be reached, then the field team can execute it, but if General Chou has an evasive attitude and tries to delay a unanimous agreement, it may not be reached and we are faced with the problem that nothing can be done. The second fear is that the Committee of Three cannot be assured that such detailed orders get to the field commanders covering every local situation. Every time an incident of a local nature is raised, they will still refer it to the Committee of Three, and then they will issue orders to be executed after decision is reached.

GENERAL MARSHALL: This is the agreement by the Committee of Three that we are trying to get on a basis of unanimous vote and it gives some rather detailed instructions, which in most cases should be sufficient to cover the position of the American officer. Therefore, arguments about a local situation would rarely, if ever, get back to Nanking. It would be too late. You cannot hope to get perfection. You can give whatever instructions you may wish and still have the man disregard them. We get agreements among the Commissioners at Peiping that are not carried out in the field or at the lower levels at Peiping. In other words, I think at this stage of our negotiations, it would not be wise to carry this issue clear up to the Committee of Three. I do not think this is the moment to do that.

I would like to raise a couple questions. We have left the final language of paragraph *c* to be determined. In paragraph *d*, General Hsu introduced the words "within garrison areas".⁶¹ I see no objection to that. General Chou changed my expression "cleared by field teams" to "approved by field teams". I have no objection to the change, in fact I consider it an improvement on my language. In paragraph *e*, I used the phrase "within 7 days" but General Chou wishes that changed to 15 days. Originally, I had planned on using a time limit of more than 7 days but Colonel Caughey had recommended using a low number in order that the final figure would be a reasonable one. Therefore, I am now in favor of the 15 days. Also, General Chou has introduced the phrase "of regiments and larger units" after the word "commander". In the previous document we only spoke of brigades and higher. This time the document called for all names, from company commanders up. This would not be practicable. Therefore, I recommend that General Chou's recommendation be accepted.

GENERAL HSU: I agree to General Chou's recommendations.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Regarding paragraph *f*, General Hsu wishes

⁶¹ See memorandum of June 18 by General Hsu, p. 1081.

that paragraph deleted in order that the stipulation to the agreement of 10 January will not prejudice movements into or within Manchuria. I believe the omission of this paragraph is unwise because the Nationalists now have in Manchuria enough men unless they are planning on going into an out and out war. And, incidentally, the Generalissimo accepted the proposal for Manchuria which involves an immediate Government reduction, not a reinforcement.

GENERAL YU: I am in favor of the deletion because it was practically a duplication of the Army Reorganization Plan. The addition of this paragraph would impede the progress of this negotiation.

GENERAL MARSHALL: The omission of this paragraph would arouse in the Communists the suspicion that the Nationalists were planning to move troops into Manchuria for war. It would make it literally impossible for me to carry on with the negotiations. I believe that the fact that this paragraph is confined to Government troops may be changed and mention can also be made to include Communists.

GENERAL HSU: I understand General Marshall's attitude and line of thought and will take that into consideration when planning changes in the paragraph, or possible deletion.

GENERAL HSU: I understand General Marshall would like to add an additional clause to that paper. I hope the new formula for the restoration of lines of communication, and the amendments to the reorganization and integration plan will be signed concurrently with this paper.

GENERAL MARSHALL: That need not be put into the paragraph, just don't sign the paper.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Minutes of Meeting of Committee of Three at 5 Ning Hai Road,
Nanking, June 22, 1946, 11 a. m.*

Present: ⁶²

General Hsu Yung	General Chou En-lai	General Marshall
Chang	General Huang	Colonel Caughey
General Yu Ta Wei	General Teng	Captain Soong
General T. K. Pee	General Tung	
General Kuo	Mr. Chang	
General Hsu		

GENERAL MARSHALL: The meeting will come to order. Unless you have objection, we will start with consideration of the draft prepared by me ⁶³ for the detailed arrangements for the termination of hostili-

⁶² Names listed in three columns in these and other similar minutes are respectively those of representatives and their assistants of the Chinese National Government, the Chinese Communist Party, and the United States.

⁶³ See draft of June 13, p. 1044.

ties in Manchuria. Taking the first paragraph, "On the basis of . . ." is that acceptable to you gentlemen?

GENERAL HSU: Yes.

GENERAL CHOU: Yes.

GENERAL MARSHALL: The second paragraph.

GENERAL HSU: Do you care to read the paragraph in English for the record?

GENERAL MARSHALL: All right. "On the basis of orders of June 6, 1946 stopping all advances, attacks and pursuits for a period of 15 days commencing at noon of June 7th which will be continued in effect, we the Committee of Three announce the following instructions to govern a complete termination of hostilities in Manchuria."

General Hsu and General Chou approved.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Turning to paragraph *a*. which reads: "The terms of 10 January 1946 for the cessation of hostilities will govern except as hereinafter specifically modified."

GENERAL CHOU: I propose the addition of the following words. After the word "modified", add the words, "or later directed by the Committee of Three". Is that acceptable to General Hsu?

GENERAL HSU: I would like General Chou to repeat the clause in Chinese.

General Chou read the clause in Chinese.

GENERAL HSU: That is acceptable.

GENERAL MARSHALL: General Hsu states that the amendment is acceptable to the Government. The paragraph is therefore cleared. Paragraph *b*. "Commanders of forces in close contact or who are in actual fighting will immediately direct their troops to cease fighting and will seek to secure a local truce by establishing liaison with the opposing commanders, pending the arrival of a field team. They should both immediately withdraw their respective troops from close contact." Is that agreeable to General Hsu?

GENERAL HSU: That is acceptable to the Government.

GENERAL CHOU: That is acceptable.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Paragraph *b* is cleared. Paragraph *c*. "The adjustment of troops found to be in close contact or actually engaged in fighting will be directed by the field team on the ground by requiring the withdrawal for specified distances, normally 30 li, of one or both forces according to the circumstances. Special consideration will be given to the local situation believed to have existed at noon of June 7, 1946. In the event of disagreement, the decision of the senior American officer in the Advance Section of Executive Headquarters at Changchun will be accepted."

GENERAL CHOU: I propose that the 30 li be changed to 15 li. What are General Hsu's comments?

GENERAL HSU: Paragraph *c* as written is perfectly acceptable to me.

GENERAL MARSHALL: The proposed change is from 30 li to 15 li. I am going to ask General Hsu if he would take it sentence by sentence.

GENERAL HSU: I favor 30 li over 15 li because the further the forces are separated, the less chance there is of conflict.

GENERAL CHOU: Regarding the distance of separation, I think it is necessary to have an appendix stipulating the distance in each case because in the past, disputes have taken place in Executive Headquarters as to how far troops should withdraw. I think that there are 4 cases under which separation should be varied according to circumstances.

1. Suppose troops of one party are stationed within the city and troops of the other party are outside. In that case, the withdrawal could only be carried out by one party—the party on the outside of the city.

2. Suppose the troops of one party are stationed along the railway lines, or that one is on the railroad lines. Under such circumstances, troops on railroad lines shall withdraw away from railroad lines. The other party will draw nearer to the railway line because the party stationed along the railway lines will move away.

3. Suppose the line of separation is perpendicular to the railroad track. In that case, of course, both troops will withdraw an equal distance.

4. Suppose the two forces meet in open country. In that case it can be easily settled by withdrawal of both parties the same distance.

I (Chou) think it is advisable we have a stipulation covering those four cases. This would help a great deal for the settlement of the issue on the ground. Therefore, I propose the four points based on experience of Executive Headquarters. Of course, such stipulations would be more advantageous to that party whose troops are stationed within the city. I think 15 li would be perfectly sufficient for separating forces because the situation in Manchuria differs from that of China proper in that there are fewer villages in Manchuria and troops of both parties in most cases meet in places where there is a cluster of villages holding together. If troops withdraw too far away, it would be difficult for them to be quartered near a second cluster of villages. According to my proposed stipulation, each party would withdraw 15 li so the total separation of the two armies will be 30 li which is entirely sufficient to avoid any further conflict.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Might I ask how General Chou would give official expression to those four examples? He spoke of an appendix. How would it be issued? How do we put it out to the teams? Is this document for instance in its general form satisfactory for general distribution and would his proposals be sent to the Executive Head-

quarters to be given individually to team members as part of their detailed instructions? How would he give expression to his proposal officially?

GENERAL CHOU: My proposal can be presented in the form of an appendix to this document or as a separate decision or instruction. It is immaterial to me whether that decision will be circulated together with this paper or be sent to Executive Headquarters for distribution to the various field teams.

GENERAL MARSHALL: General Hsu?

GENERAL HSU: In the original phrasing of paragraph *c*, it states that "the troops will be directed by the field teams on the ground requiring the withdrawal for specified distances, normally 30 li, of one or both forces according to the circumstances." It says "according to the circumstances". The first example given by General Chou was that if one party is in the town and one party is outside, only one party is to be withdrawn. The other example given by General Chou required both forces to be withdrawn. It stated "according to the circumstances" and so it seems to be clear enough to decide which party should withdraw no matter whether there is one force or both forces to be withdrawn. Of course, if some detailed arrangement is made, it may help to lessen the difficulties.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I assume from that statement that General Hsu is not opposed to considering the issue of detailed instructions to the Executive Headquarters for the teams and if that is correct I suggest that either General Chou or I prepare a draft of such detailed instructions.

GENERAL HSU: In that draft, will we stipulate those different circumstances and the manner to withdraw and how about the distance? General Chou said it would be covered by the main agreement—this distance.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Does General Chou wish me to draft the paragraph or will he draft it?

GENERAL CHOU: I would like you to do it.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I will do it, that is I will have some staff officer do it for me. Let's return to the 30 li and the 15 li issue. We have a difference of view here. Is there anything further to be said by either General Hsu or General Chou?

GENERAL HSU: I favor the 30 li distance for two reasons.

1. The wider the forces are separated, the less chance for possible conflict.

2. Contrary to what General Chou thinks, the distance between the towns is most likely 30 or 70 li, and in between at 30 li there is an intermediate station or village. It is more likely that troops, if they withdraw 30 li, will find some villages, whereas if they withdraw only 15

li, it is very likely that there will be no villages around and they will find difficulty in getting quartered. Hence, I prefer to retain the 30 li as was written before by General Marshall.

GENERAL CHOU: What General Hsu has just stated certainly applies to the actual situation in China Proper. That is, the different stations along the highways in China are about 30 li or 90 li distance from each other, but in Manchuria the situation is far different from in China Proper. In Manchuria, villages are rather concentrated at one place forming a cluster of villages. The nearest distance from one riding station to the next one is approximately 90 to 100 li. Since the Japanese came to Manchuria, many villages have been wiped out and many villages have concentrated into larger groups. This is particularly so along communications lines. I made my proposal entirely having in mind the actual situation existing there. Of course the purpose of my proposal is to stop hostilities. For the purpose of making a compromise, I suggest the distance of 20 li instead of 15 so there would be no more dispute on this small question. Of course there might be certain cases where General Hsu's statement might be correct. In that case then the troops, if necessary, can also withdraw to 60 or 80 li as the circumstances require. Certainly, they could not use that as a pretext to withdraw less than 20 li just because there is no village at 20 li. The statement I have just made is entirely based on the actual situation in Manchuria as described by people who recently came here from Manchuria. I only have in mind how to stop the conflict and to separate forces. That is why I mentioned the cases of troops stationed within the city who should not withdraw because the cities are so close.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Would General Hsu reconsider the 20 li proposition?

GENERAL HSU: After reading carefully the original draft, I think that the way it is written is very flexible because it stated "for specified distances, normally 30 li". It may be 25, may be 35 or it may be 30; take 30 li as standard. I will have no objection to the change to 20 li provided there is some agency to handle the withdrawal and to determine the so-called "specified distance" and the so-called "according to circumstances". If circumstances necessitate that troops withdraw, whether it be 30 or 40 or 20 li is immaterial, but the main thing is that we must have some agency to determine that specified distance.

GENERAL MARSHALL: As we have not reached an agreement on the 15 li, I suggest that we suspend discussion of such an agency for the present and proceed to the next sentence. Is that agreeable?

GENERAL HSU: No objection.

GENERAL CHOU: No objection.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I understood General Hsu to attach certain conditions, so I prefer not to continue with this particular discussion until some later time. Is that agreeable to General Hsu?

GENERAL HSU: Yes.

GENERAL CHOU: Yes.

GENERAL MARSHALL: The next sentence reads, "Special consideration will be given to the local situation believed to have existed at noon of June 7, 1946." That sentence of mine was later redrafted by me to read as follows: "The local situation believed to have existed at noon of June 7, 1946 will be the basis for the readjustment of the troops involved." I made the change because it was a better phrasing and better English. Is that change of mine acceptable? I used the word "believed" because if we waited for an accurate determination it would be some time, but meanwhile a fighting incident has to be settled on the ground. I was trying to make the construction one of practical application actually to stop the fighting today or tomorrow and not six months from now.

GENERAL HSU: I have no objection to that change but ask to have put down here that change which I mentioned to General Marshall regarding the situation believed to have existed prior to 7 June which implies that some sort of agency has to decide the position of the troops at that particular date.

GENERAL MARSHALL: You cannot well write that into the sentence.

GENERAL HSU: It is of the same nature as the 20 li business that hung on the agency to decide the situation on that particular date.

GENERAL MARSHALL: May I put it this way then: That no matter if each sentence is clear, there is the final opportunity for consideration of matters before the clearance or acceptance of the entire paragraph. I fear that if as we take each sentence and then introduce other matters that pertain to other parts of the paragraph, we will make little or no progress whatsoever.

GENERAL HSU: Shall we proceed?

GENERAL MARSHALL: I am still waiting to hear about that sentence.

GENERAL HSU: Do you want to know what the two parties' substitution is for that sentence?

GENERAL MARSHALL: I can leave it or I can suspend discussion on it. I cannot leave it unless both parties tell me it is all right or decline to accept it.

GENERAL HSU: I am afraid that the sentence leaves ground for future argument. One side will say a certain place was held by them at that particular date and the other side will state otherwise. That will cause some argument in the future.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Then I suggest that we leave this sentence for future discussion.

GENERAL CHOU: I entirely agree with this sentence as it now stands, but if General Marshall suggests postponing discussion of this paragraph and General Hsu accepts it, then I will accept also.

GENERAL MARSHALL: The next sentence reads: "In the event of disagreement, the decision of the senior American officer in the Advance Section of the Executive Headquarters will be accepted." General Chou proposed this alteration: Following the word "Changchun": "The senior American officer at Changchun will report the situation to Executive Headquarters at Peiping or to the Committee of Three at Nanking, depending upon the urgency of the situation." In view of General Chou's statements to me of yesterday and the day before, has he any alterations to propose to his amendment that I have just read?

GENERAL CHOU: Regarding the special authority of the American officers, I think it best that we do not put it in here. Instead, I suggest that we prepare a separate decision on all matters regarding field teams and that the section regarding American officers be as a separate paper. This involves not only Manchuria but also China Proper. If we put such a clause in this paragraph, then we will have to write something else in other papers. In every paper we would have to go back to the same clause. The functions and authority of the different levels are also different. Therefore, I propose that we work out a separate draft stipulating the matters for increasing the effective operation of the Advance Section, the field teams, and the Executive Headquarters. First General Hsu has previously proposed to me the empowering American officers with final decision and yesterday I received another letter from General Hsu stating the proposal has been changed to a majority vote on matters of interpretation of agreements and methods of implementation of agreements. Therefore, I came to the idea that we better have a separate agreement on this matter. Otherwise we have to insert something of that kind in every paper. So far I have thought of the following methods to expedite the function of the field teams, the Advance Section in Changchun, and the Headquarters in Peiping. Of course this does not yet cover all the points.

In the first place, regarding the function of the field teams, I have thought of three stipulations: The first one is the authority to make reports on matters of urgency. The American officer will be authorized to render a report directly despite disagreements of the Chinese officers.

Second, the authority to decide [on] making investigations. This was originally proposed by General Byroade. It was his idea that the American officer of the field team may decide as to where and

when to go to investigate military activities within areas under a team's control.

Third, is the authority to take actions on military hostilities. If hostilities have been found to take place, then he can immediately issue orders to stop the hostilities and also can order special troops to withdraw, because the withdrawal has already been stipulated according to this agreement.

Now regarding field teams. Since the crucial question confronting field teams is the armed hostilities, if the American officer in the team will be authorized with those three powers (mentioned above) then we have demonstrated our respect of the American officer. On the other hand, we would not place too much difficulty upon him. Since both Chinese parties are willing to stop the fighting, they will certainly take the decision of the American officer in this respect.

Second, regarding the Advance Section in Changchun and Executive Headquarters in Peiping, so far I have two points:

a. The authority to render reports on urgent matters by the American senior officer, and

b. Apart from the general agreements reached by the Committee of Three or Executive Headquarters, the American officer may take actions to implement the instructions and orders issued by the Committee of Three or Executive Headquarters in case there is disagreement among the parties concerned.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I am confused about what American officer you are talking about.

GENERAL CHOU: This principle applies both to the American officers in Peiping or Changchun.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Will you please repeat that last statement in order that we may have it correctly.

GENERAL CHOU: Apart from the general agreements reached by the Committee of Three or Executive Headquarters, the American senior officer (either at Changchun or Peiping) may take actions to implement the instructions and orders issued by the higher level, the Committee of Three or Executive Headquarters, in case of disagreement among the parties concerned.

Apart from that, yesterday I made a new proposal; that is the right to interpret agreements. Since, I have received General Hsu's report only yesterday and as yet have had no time to consider it, I am willing to have a separate draft on all the matters which I have mentioned. Of course there might be some other points which have not come to my consideration but I believe we should have a separate draft as we are now trying to settle outstanding problems and we will try our best to reach a decision.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Is General Hsu agreeable to treating this matter in a separate paper, applicable to agreements both in China and Manchuria according to January 10 agreement and later agreements?

GENERAL HSU: I agree to General Chou's suggestion to have a separate paper dealing with the authority given American senior members but I fear its being stated in the same paragraph about making 20 or 30 li withdrawals according to circumstances together with the local situation believed to have existed on noon 7 June 46. That is bound to have arguments in the field. There were many arguments in North China in the past so it brings the same conditions in Manchuria without a third party to interfere to break the deadlock. Although we have passed that paper and issued orders, I am afraid that nothing important can be accomplished and arguments will still exist. Therefore I hope that the separate paper can be worked out to settle all those disputes. Then, that paragraph *c* as it stands can be implemented with any other future entanglements.

GENERAL MARSHALL: That is what I understood was the purpose of this special document General Chou proposed. Now, as General Hsu has expressed a willingness to have a special document drafted and submitted here for consideration and approval, it would not appear practicable to continue the discussion regarding the remainder of paragraph *c* at this time, nor to settle the issues raised by General Hsu and by General Chou regarding the preceding portions of the paragraph. Therefore I suggest that we defer action on the paragraph until we obtain agreement regarding the special document. Is that agreeable?

GENERAL CHOU: I have one question: on account of General Hsu's statement to the effect that if the last sentence of this paragraph be omitted, he sees no way to put this paper into effect. This causes me to ask what the Government's intention would be if this clause regarding the arrangement were omitted. As is stated in the last sentence, the Government would be willing to carry out this paper immediately in Manchuria to terminate the hostilities. If my understanding is correct, then I am willing to make a large concession on this sentence so that the termination of hostilities in Manchuria can be materialized immediately.

GENERAL HSU: I intended to make a statement at the start but entered into the discussion of this particular paper. I take this opportunity to make that statement.

The three problems; that is the restoration of communications, implementation of the reorganization plan and cessation of hostilities in Manchuria constitute an overall problem. I would like to have those three problems solved once and for all and if any documents

are to be signed, I hope to sign those agreements all at the same time. By doing that I hope to settle all those problems once and for all and they will no longer trouble both Manchuria and North China. Because the Government has already issued an order to cease offensive actions for eight more days, there are practically no conflicts in Manchuria now. Therefore, we can take our time to work on those three problems as a whole. The Government views those three problems as a single over-all problem so they should be solved together and not solve one and then solve the next one at some other date.

GENERAL CHOU: If General Hsu would like the three papers to be signed all at the same time (perhaps there will be four papers) I believe there should be no objection to the clearing of this paragraph at this moment because, after all, the paper is not being signed right now. But, by taking such a procedure might demonstrate a smooth proceeding of our meeting and would create a much better atmosphere and effect.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Gentlemen, I hardly know what to say. There is so much sparring going on here, to use an American expression, that I am having considerable difficulty in following matters. It is understood I believe now by General Chou that the Government wishes to have all the papers completed before it signs them. It was my proposal that we start with this paper this morning. We had to start somewhere and I thought maybe this would be the least of our difficulties. Now we have arrived at what appears to me to be a very practical place to consider General Chou's proposal to draw up a separate document giving specific terms in relation to decisions regarding teams and Executive Headquarters. If a satisfactory document is so agreed to, there would probably be no necessity for the last sentence of paragraph *c*. My confusion arises from the apparent point General Chou is making that General Hsu had suggested the last sentence be not regarded and that General Chou is taking issue with that now. I understand General Chou to say that we can complete the document down to and excluding the last sentence, depending on the future agreement to the special instructions. Now that last proposal appeals to me as a reasonable one.

GENERAL HSU: Some sort of provision had to be made if we agreed to handle this in a separate annex. This clause at present contains too many words like "normally" and "believed".

GENERAL MARSHALL: My reply to that is this. I thought we had already agreed that I should have drawn up a set of instructions for terms which it seems to me would cover the points that you have just made, instructions on detailed matters which the members of the team could receive and could absorb. These present instructions under con-

sideration go to thousands for the general understanding of the armies and of the people. Every troop commander, company, battalion, regiment and division cannot be expected to see the detailed instructions for teams. So it appeared necessary to indicate in general what the conditions were to be under which this cessation of hostilities order would be carried out. If you do not say normally 20 li or 30 li, the implication is that you must say specifically 18, 17, 14 or 50. That would be entirely impractical because the circumstances vary. We could scratch out the words "normally 15 li" or "30 li" and not refer to distances at all. That is one way of settling this. I think it is a poor one though because you would not give a general idea to the armies.

As the requirement for distances will vary, the expression was used "according to the circumstances". You could omit that, but then you would have everybody in the army asking what you meant by specified distances. As to the choice of the word "believed", that was chosen specifically for the reason that we are trying to stop a fight today and not at some very much later date. If you wait for an accurate determination of that matter, let us say by a recognized legal method, it would bear no present relation whatever to the termination of hostilities. For example, we were at least a month endeavoring to determine the situation at Chihfeng as of January 13th. I say one month, but I don't believe they have determined it yet to anyone's particular satisfaction. Therefore the use of the word "believed". It is conceivable that at some later date after the presentation of more formal evidence there might be a readjustment because the original decision had not been entirely right in the face of later evidence. The main point is that this is for a wider distribution and therefore the matter has to be expressed in general terms if at all.

GENERAL YU: The only reason that I make any comment is that the question will arise tomorrow with reference to communications. Now I like paragraph *c* in the original form as drafted by General Marshall because we can't avoid the use of the words "according to the circumstances". We have to give a certain amount of elasticity to all these stipulations, but General Marshall has provided an instrument for procedure by which we can reach a decision in event of a debate or disagreement. General Hsu proposed to delete that sentence altogether. It seems to me we have to state that in case of disagreement, provisions would be made to reach decision to be covered in a separate annex or these words would not make much sense. I want to stress today that we attach the greatest importance to this separate annex. There will be differences of opinion. This is normal. We are making

a most painstaking effort to get something that will be carried out this time.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Provisions will be made in a separate annex to cover disagreements. That is the last sentence of paragraph *c*. Provisions would be made in a separate document or annex to cover disagreements. General Chou also proposed a separate paper and they are proposing a sentence to that paper rather than any details.

Gentlemen, it is now after 1 o'clock and there is still more of this document, I suggest we adjourn until tomorrow morning.

GENERAL PEE: Revisions will be made in a separate document to cover disagreements.

GENERAL MARSHALL: General Chou proposed a separate document and they refer in this that there is a separate document. However, I am proposing with a passage of time that we suspend discussion and decide on when we have the next meeting to complete consideration of this document. Would 10:30 tomorrow morning be all right?

GENERAL CHOU: General Chou asked whether the Government side has many provisions to make on the following paragraphs. If there is not so much revision maybe we can go through the rest of the paper.

GENERAL MARSHALL: We are still involved in paragraph *c*. We have to have that rewritten.

GENERAL YU: We will leave that to General Marshall to formulate and save time.

GENERAL MARSHALL: There may be some debate. I believe it would be better to adjourn until morning tomorrow. Is it agreeable to hold the meetings here or would you prefer to hold them some place else.

GENERAL HSU: This is the right place.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I just realized that I have violated a Chinese habit of giving tea. You may think I did that to force a decision, but that may be the very reason why we haven't reached a decision.

GENERAL CHOU: Do we have anything to say to the press?

GENERAL MARSHALL: I would very much prefer not to have any press announcement at this time.

GENERAL HSU: I wish to remind General Chou that while we are talking about the cease fire in Manchuria and the restoration of communications, he should alert his staff to do some preparatory work on the problem of demobilization and integration plan, so that after finishing the first two problems we can tackle the third problem.

GENERAL MARSHALL: General Chou had already told me he was doing that.

GENERAL CHOU: General Huang and the two General Tung's⁶⁴ can have a staff meeting with General Kuo and General Hsu.

⁶⁴ Generals Teng and Tung.

GENERAL MARSHALL: If there is no further business, we will adjourn until 10:30 tomorrow morning in this room.

893.00/6-2246 : Telegram

The Counselor of Embassy in China (Smyth) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, June 22, 1946—1 p. m.
[Received June 22—10:33 a. m.]

1026. Charges of Kuomintang violation of 15-day truce agreement and renewed attacks on U. S. were again featured in Yen-an English language broadcast for week ending June 21. More than half of each daily broadcast was devoted to detailing alleged Kuomintang attacks on Communist troops throughout Manchuria and North China. Particular attention paid to General Tu Yu-ming's announced intention of eventual Govt. taking over all Manchuria by force and movement of troops under him following this announcement.

One item alleged Koumintang using truce period to complete preparations for renewal hostilities. As end of truce period approached, broadcast for June 19 was devoted entirely to hostilities.

One long item contained strong attack on George bill⁶⁵ to authorize American training of National Govt. troops as an unfriendly act against Chinese people who want peace. Same item also charged that continued U. S. aid to Kmt encourages civil war and asked what right U. S. has to relegate China to status of U. S. sphere of influence comparable to Latin America.

Another item charged that movement of 54th Army to Tsingtao is violation of every agreement reached since January [*June?*] 6.

Another item recounted Harbin mass meeting denouncing American policy.

One sarcastic Yen-an item said U. S. marines have apparently lost their much-vaunted efficiency since they must remain in North China to continue repatriation of Japanese. It was also alleged that U. S. trained personnel on U. S.-presented vessels are looting Shantung coastwise shipping and committing acts of piracy.

Non-military items included Kalgan feature story on movement of thousands of students from South China to Kalgan because of atmosphere of liberty prevailing there and full economic prosperity which has developed under Communist regime, establishment of a

⁶⁵ H. R. 6795; see "Military Assistance to China, Remarks by Acting Secretary Acheson," made before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on June 19, Department of State *Bulletin*, June 30, 1946, p. 1115.

Mongolian democratic Hsingan provincial government which has been set up in accordance with PCC agreements on local self-government and national minority self-rule (this is played up as illustration of how Chinese and national minorities can work together harmoniously), and charge that Kmt failure to deliver foodstuffs is holding up implementation of Yellow River agreement and dike construction.

Please repeat Moscow.

SMYTH

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Mr. Walter S. Robertson to General Marshall

[PEIPING,] 23 June 1946.

4438. At Commissioners' meeting Saturday afternoon Commissioners agreed to immediate dispatch of team to Tsingtao. The National Government guarantees safety of team personnel. Until evacuation by Communists of Shantung cities attacked and occupied since June 6, radio facilities for team will be restricted to use of American equipment. General Yeh advised that Yen-an had approved sending team under these conditions.

It was further agreed in principle that a wholesale evacuation would be ordered by both sides of all towns and cities attacked and occupied by their forces since January 13th. Each branch is preparing list to be submitted to commissioners at early date. Agreement may be difficult in borderline cases but it is hoped that constructive results can be achieved.

New subject: General Yeh reported to meeting Yen-an had advised that, if investigation disclosed Communist responsibility for killing of National Government team member on June 11 and killing and wounding of 2 National Government members on June 19, stern punishment would be meted to offenders and proper compensation awarded families. He also stated Yen-an had informed him of plot attributed to high Peiping official to (1) take retaliatory measures against high-ranking Communist personnel in Executive Headquarters, and (2) organize uprising of students for which Communists would be blamed and arrests ordered. Yeh stated he had sent this report to General Chou for your information. He requested National Government Commissioner to take effective measures to prevent such occurrences. National Government Commissioner stated he could not believe such a plot existed and assured General Yeh that he, General Cheng, considered himself to be personally responsible for the safety of all Headquarters personnel.

Discussions throughout meeting were friendly and objective.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Minutes of Meeting of Committee of Three at 5 Ning Hai Road,
Nanking, June 23, 1946, 10:35 a. m.*

Present:

General Yu Ta Wei General Chou En Lai General Marshall

Also present:

General Kuo General Huang Colonel Caughey

General Pee General Tung Colonel Hill

General Hsu General Teng Captain Soong

Mr. Ling Mr. Chang

Mr. Sah

Mr. Shih

GENERAL YU: General Pee just told me that General Hsu is unable to come this morning and I can only discuss paragraph *c*.

GENERAL MARSHALL: General Yu tells me General Hsu will not be able to be here this morning and that he, General Yu, is only prepared to discuss paragraph *c* of the paper we had yesterday. He is not sufficiently informed on the remaining paragraphs. Therefore, if it is agreeable to General Chou, he would like to start on paragraph *c*, especially since he has his communications people here. Is that acceptable?

GENERAL CHOU: Yes.

GENERAL MARSHALL: The meeting will come to order. General Yu, will you present your statement.

GENERAL YU: I had the pleasure of contacting General Chou twice and Colonel Hill a number of times, on the restoration of communications. Although our discussions have not entered into details, the general idea is now comprehended by both sides. From my contacts with General Chou, I can see he is very sincere in this problem, as its solution will greatly benefit the people of this country. Today's discussion may amicably accomplish some solution. The Government stand on this problem is that we hope sincerely that the restoration of communications will be accomplished very soon. The sooner the better. I gather from General Chou, directly and indirectly, that they hope certain points can be arranged. I would like to take this opportunity to reiterate four points and I ask General Chou, if he cares to, to make amendments. The first point is the abolishing (the destruction) of blockhouses.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Does he mean blockhouses or fortifications.

GENERAL YU: The exact wording is in special directive No. 4.⁶⁶ The

⁶⁶ Executive Headquarters General Directive No. 4-A of February 12, not printed, but see agreement of February 9, pp. 422-425.

second point is the employment of Communist personnel in railway administration.

Third, General Chou said to me in a very frank way, he hopes that the Government will not send any railroad police to these sectors which have been repaired.

The fourth point, General Chou hoped that all communications, that is other than railroad, would be restored. The Government agreed entirely in principle. We would like to lay special stress on the restoration of railway communications first. If General Chou accepts that principle and there is no other objection, I don't want to enter into the details regarding that point.

Regarding the destruction of fortifications, or blockhouses, it is stated in the general directive of Executive Headquarters, No. 4, that those fortifications and blockhouses which impede railway communications should be destroyed. In spite of the fact that it is stipulated in the original agreement that only such fortifications as interfere with operation of the railroad communications shall be destroyed, we are prepared to destroy all fortifications, blockhouses, etc. lying within 1,000 meters on either side of the railway line. However, we will take the compromise solution suggested by General Marshall that such installations as are needed to defend railway stations, bridges, tunnels, workshops, storage depots, railroad stations, water points, etc., shall be exempted. We agree to the destruction of all fortifications, etc., in the area within 1,000 meters of either side of the railroad.

I understand that General Chou told Colonel Hill that the statement I just read was too general. General Chou wishes to have the stations and bridges specified, such as major stations. The Government is willing to discuss it. Regarding the last statement, General Chou would like to make it more specific. I wish to know if General Chou has any more remarks.

General Yu read a prepared statement on communications.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I would like Colonel Hill to present the modifications and precise stipulations that he proposed in connection with that Government statement.

COLONEL HILL: There is apparently agreement that fortifications, etc., shall be destroyed except those required for defense of vital railroad installations. A definition of vital installations is the question which is not agreed and not settled. In an attempt to reach a definition that would be agreeable, I propose to define vital installations as railroad stations of the first, second and third classes; all tunnels; and bridges with a total span of more than 5 meters.

GENERAL MARSHALL: General Chou, will you comment at this time?

GENERAL CHOU: Inasmuch as General Yu's statement covers many

general terms, more or less like a preliminary statement, I want to know whether we are now entering into discussion paragraph by paragraph or are we still talking in general terms.

GENERAL MARSHALL: What is your desire?

GENERAL YU: Any way you want it.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Is it agreeable to General Chou to proceed paragraph by paragraph but in view of what has just happened, to start with paragraph 5 and then go back to paragraph 1. Unless there is objection we will proceed with a general statement by General Chou.

GENERAL CHOU: As far back as February, we reached agreement on the restoration of communications in general terms. Subsequently in March, the Committee of Three began to work out temporary measures specifying that repair work be started on certain lines while at the same time, fortifications be destroyed. What then happened was that while repair work was started on certain lines, the problem of fortifications could not be solved. Many field teams decided that fortifications should be destroyed, but the Chinese representatives of Executive Headquarters could not agree between themselves about interpretations of that paragraph stated in the restoration of communications agreement. It thus put the American representative in a very difficult position. Therefore in April, the Three Commissioners referred this matter to the Committee of Three but on account of the Northeast situation, the Committee of Three could not enter into discussion on the restoration of communications. The subject was delayed up to now. The destruction of fortifications was also delayed. As a consequence, military hostilities in China proper mounted and the restoration of communications was suspended. This is the cause and effect. Now we are coming back to where we started. We are going to make a new decision to give priority to the repair work of railroad lines. In doing this, it cannot help but get involved with the destruction of fortifications.

When talking about restoration of communications, I agree to start with railway communications so as to be consistent with concessions made previously. Repair work on railway lines could be started before everything else. During my last meeting with General Yu, we agreed that repair work along three lines of railroads should be taken as a start. To that I agreed from the very beginning. Therefore, you may say a general understanding has been reached.

In connection with that, we have the fortification problem. It is not a matter of our claim, because it is stated in previous agreements that all fortifications on and along the communications lines should be destroyed. Since we are only talking about railroads, we will deal

only with fortifications on and along railroads. Since the Government agrees to the restoration of all kinds of communications, fortifications along such other lines would enter later into our discussion. This is not the subject we are discussing now, but certainly at a later time.

The second point is on the administration of railroad lines. The technical aspect of railway lines in Communist areas will be taken up by the Ministry of Communications. As far as administration control is concerned before reorganization of the government, an interim arrangement has to be worked out. We agree with the two points laid down in the first draft prepared by Colonel Hill. These two points are:

a. The control will be unified under the Ministry of Communications.

b. On the other hand the Government recognizes that in the Communist areas, the Communist Party would nominate the personnel who will pass the examination given by Railway Control teams. The Communist Party further has the right to have representation in the administration and control of those railroad lines which concern the Communist Party. The reason we ask for such an interim arrangement is that in regard to the administration, there is no unified control. As railroads are cut, we have to find some method of unifying those railroads before the reorganization of the Government. It is not a matter of placing a claim on the Government, but rather it is a matter of a compromise to be made by both parties.

Third is the railway police, an entirely new proposal which has never been mentioned in the agreement on restoration of communications. The agreement only stipulated that prior to reorganization of the Government, the protection of railroads would be undertaken by local troops of both parties. Apart from that, an unarmed train guard would be organized to ride on the train. The arrangement to be adopted after reorganization of the Government will be worked out later. It has no connection with the interim arrangement. According to the claim that either now or when the traffic is resumed, the Government is to send armed railway police organized on a national basis comprising 18 regiments to enter Communist territories, this proposal is not acceptable to us for two reasons:

a. Because it is contrary to the previous agreement.

b. We have many objections to the organization of a railway police as such. Therefore, I propose that we take the amended draft prepared by Colonel Hill as the basis to discuss the paper item by item because this draft was written with the views of both parties with the intention of getting the two parties together. There are only a few points which need discussion. Such a procedure would facilitate our business.

GENERAL MARSHALL: General Yu, you have heard General Chou's proposal. Is that an agreeable procedure to you?

GENERAL YU: I propose that I read my draft first to see what extent we can use Colonel Hill's draft⁶⁷ which is a revision of my draft as an agreeable compromise. I want to read my draft first.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Does General Chou possess a copy?

GENERAL YU: I will read it.

GENERAL CHOU: I am opposed to that procedure because I never knew of the draft before. I only knew of the draft prepared by Colonel Hill as a compromise.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Does General Chou oppose General Yu's reading his draft?

GENERAL CHOU: Yes. We all have confidence in Colonel Hill. I still insist that we use his draft as a basis. If General Yu has any correction in words or sentences, then General Yu can add his suggestion to it. The procedure of the discussion should be based on Colonel Hill's draft.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I think there is some misunderstanding here. No decision has been reached as a basis for discussion. As I understand it, General Yu had merely asked to read his draft at this stage before discussion item by item of whatever draft was intended. Is that correct, General Yu?

GENERAL YU: I only asked that I read my draft. I have no objection to General Chou reading a draft if he has any.

GENERAL CHOU: I am rather surprised with General Yu's statement. During the past 16 days, all drafts prepared by Colonel Hill were based on the assistance and meetings of both sides. It never entered my mind that there should be any draft prepared by himself or by the Government. If the 15-day truce had not been extended, it is likely that we could not have reached an agreement.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I think there still remains a confusion of the issue. As I understand it, there is a proposal by General Chou En-lai that the discussion proceed with the consideration item by item of this document prepared by Colonel Hill. As I understand the matter at the present moment, General Yu has not directly proposed that there be a different procedure. He has stated that he wishes to read a Government draft. As I understand it, he is not proposing that the Government draft be debated paragraph by paragraph. Is that correct, General Yu?

GENERAL YU: Yes.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Does General Chou object to General Yu

⁶⁷ Not printed.

reading his draft, it being understood that he is not proposing that that will be debated paragraph by paragraph?

GENERAL CHOU: I would like to mention this. In the first place, up till today, I am only aware of the draft prepared by Colonel Hill for our discussion on the basis of views exchanged between the Chinese parties. In the second place, if General Yu merely wishes to express the Government's view, of course he has the right to do so. However, his draft would certainly not be the basis of our discussion.

GENERAL MARSHALL: It is understood that this draft to be read by General Yu is a part of his general statement in regard to the matter. Is that correct? And that the discussion will be based item by item on the draft prepared by Colonel Hill. Is that correct?

GENERAL YU: Yes. As I read it, General Chou will be surprised how little it differs from Colonel Hill's draft. This draft was prepared by me before General Chou came back from Yen-an to Nanking, but it has been revised many times as a result of my discussions with General Chou and Colonel Hill. This is the last revision which was made yesterday.

"While restoration of railway lines will be carried out wherever possible, the Government proposes to restore the following lines in the order of priority indicated.

- a.* Tientsin-Pukou line including the entire line from Tsinan to the Yangtze River and including the Tsinan-Tsingtao and Hsuchow-Haichow sector of the line.
- b.* Peiping-Suiyuan line.
- c.* Peiping-Hsuchow line.
- d.* Other lines.

"The Government agrees to the removal and destruction of all mines, fortifications, blockhouses and military installations lying within 1,000 meters of either side of the railway line with the exception of those military installations located within 1,000 meters of bridges, tunnels, workhouses, railroad stations, water points, etc. The Government agrees that qualified railroad personnel of the CCP may be taken into the employ of the Ministry of Communications in the restored sectors of the lines which are under the CCP control. The qualifications of such personnel are to be determined by examinations conducted by the Communications teams.

"To implement the agreement for the restoration of communications without further delay all team members will aid construction by all means within their power. No team member will permit interference with the removal of those fortifications for any reason whatsoever.

(That is identical with the first paragraph of Col. Hill's draft).

"Construction will start by the 23d of June at the following points under the supervision of the Communications teams and under con-

trol of the Ministry of Communications.” (I will not repeat the team numbers which are embodied in Colonel Hill’s draft)

(General Pee read the time schedule in Chinese)

GENERAL YU: Colonel Hill, would you read from my draft?

COLONEL HILL: “All mines, blockades, blockhouses, fortifications and other military communications lying within 1,000 meters of the railways listed above will be removed and destroyed simultaneously with construction, except those within 1,000 meters of vital railway installations such as bridges, tunnels, railroad stations, work shops, storage depots, radio stations, water points, etc.”

GENERAL MARSHALL: Has that been read in Chinese?

GENERAL YU: Yes.

“In case of disagreement on the implementation of this directive, the majority vote of the three members shall be decisive. This directive will not in any way prejudice the effectiveness of general directive #4.”

I have purposely taken out communications police in anticipation of the objection of General Chou. I am willing to discuss it with General Chou. I have stated herein that all fortifications should be removed with the exception of certain railway station fortifications. General Chou wishes that changed to major stations and I am prepared to discuss that with him.

Concerning the employment of railway personnel, we have embodied a very explicit stipulation herein that the Government agrees that qualified railway personnel of the CCP may be taken into the employ of the Ministry of Communications in the restored sectors of the lines which are under the CCP control at the time of restoration. The qualifications of such persons are to be determined by examinations conducted by Communications teams.

General Chou will see that there are a few differences from Colonel Hill’s draft. One is the limitation of restoration of major stations. I am ready to discuss them with General Chou. With regard to the reference to the railway administration, I have made a very explicit stipulation in my draft.

I leave General Chou to make any suggestions as to the procedure of discussion. The Government proposal has been revised, mainly as a result of my discussion with Colonel Hill. One difference is that in this draft all fortifications protecting towns, and so on, will not be destroyed. Colonel Hill has suggested that we make a compromise. I am willing to discuss matters with General Chou. The other difference is with taking Communist personnel into the railroad. On this I have made a definite stipulation in my draft.

GENERAL CHOU: After hearing General Yu’s statement with regard to the Government’s proposal, I am confused. I suggest that we take

Colonel Hill's draft as a basis of our discussion and go over it item by item. I suggest that for two reasons. First, as the Government representative has said, there is not much difference between the Government's draft and Colonel Hill's draft. In that case Colonel Hill's draft would certainly be easier for a basis. We can then make the necessary amendments.

Secondly, on my part, I wish to point out that I was prepared to discuss Colonel Hill's draft. The Government has shown me no other draft earlier and so I am prepared to discuss only Colonel Hill's draft.

GENERAL YU: Since the final draft has got to be rewritten, I propose that we go into that discussion of fortifications, the employment of personnel and whatever else General Chou will agree to discuss, but I desire to use my final draft as it will have to be rewritten.

GENERAL CHOU: I cannot agree to such an arrangement. I feel very much surprised by General Yu's attitude that his draft should be used as a basis for discussion. I have no objection to taking Colonel Hill's draft as I was prepared for it, and both sides have had this draft. If the Government differed with this draft, they should have expressed their revisions prior to June 22nd, which was to have been the end of the 15-day truce. Both General Huang and the Government exchanged views with Colonel Hill. Since Colonel Hill has conveyed only this paper and the Government has not, prior to this, given me any other, Colonel Hill's draft should be used as a basis. Since the Government agrees that Colonel Hill's draft is similar to the Government's, I am very much confused as to what the point of issue is now.

GENERAL YU: I explained to General Chou that I have prepared a draft which has been revised many times. I cannot see why General Chou objects to discussing it as it is not the final draft. It still has to be discussed and agreed.

GENERAL MARSHALL: The procedure in all of our past conferences of the Committee of Three after a general discussion has been to have a document to debate or discuss sentence by sentence and paragraph by paragraph. Now we find ourselves this morning with a document that is not acceptable to the Government as a basis for debate and also a second document which the Government wrote. I did not previously have the details of the Government's document to which General Yu Ta-wei refers.

Under the circumstances, the only thing that I can see is that we adjourn the conference until the Government submits the document and gives us an opportunity to look it over. Then we can have a discussion. For myself, I find a discussion without a definite paper is endless and usually arrives nowhere. Now the time is very short and I do not think we are gaining any time by prolonging the conference.

I have not seen the document that General Yu refers to, apparently General Chou has not seen the document. Therefore, my proposal at this moment is that we adjourn further discussion.

GENERAL YU: General Chou has not concurred with my draft but wishes Colonel Hill's as a basis. In order to show we are not intending to have disagreement or not getting things done, I accept Colonel Hill's draft as a basis for discussion.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Thank you very much. If agreeable, we will proceed with the discussion of this draft paragraph by paragraph. We will ignore the title for the time being unless there is some objection. General Yu Ta-wei, will you make your comments on paragraph 1, please.

GENERAL YU: (Reading paragraph aloud) "All lines of communications in North and Central China will be open without delay for free and unrestricted interchange of goods, foodstuffs, and ideas, and for free and unrestricted civilian travel."

No comment.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Do I understand that that paragraph as is is acceptable?

GENERAL YU: Yes.

GENERAL CHOU: I do not understand the statement "and ideas".

COLONEL HILL: That refers to telegraph, telephone, radio and postal service.

GENERAL CHOU: I have no objection.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Paragraph 1 is accepted. (Quoting paragraph 2) "Reconstruction of railways will proceed immediately and will progress as rapidly as is consistent with the time limitations necessarily imposed by labor and materiel requirements. Time estimates for construction of the railroad lines is covered in appendix A."

GENERAL YU: No comment.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Is that acceptable?

GENERAL CHOU: Yes.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Paragraph 2 is accepted.

The meeting was adjourned for a few minutes.

GENERAL MARSHALL: The meeting will please come to order. We are about to discuss paragraph 3. "All local commanders and all team members shall expedite construction by all means within their power. No commander nor team member will permit interference with the construction work for any reason whatsoever."

COLONEL HILL: May I interject that that paragraph has been amended as follows: "No commander nor team member will permit interference with the construction work *or with the work of removal or destruction of fortifications* for any reason whatsoever."

GENERAL YU: No comment.

GENERAL CHOU: It is acceptable.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Paragraph 3 is accepted. Paragraph 4 is as follows: "Construction will start before 23 June 1946 at each of the following points, under supervision of Communications teams and under control of the Ministry of Communications." Before reading those points I would like your suggestions as to the date.

GENERAL YU: The date must be changed to "before 30 June".

GENERAL MARSHALL: Agreed. With "before 30 June" is the paragraph acceptable?

GENERAL YU: Yes.

GENERAL MARSHALL: The points mentioned are:

"Team No. 18—Tientsin-Pukow RR from Tsang Hsien to Te Hsien.

Team No. 23—Tientsin-Pukow RR from Yucheng to Te Hsien.

Team No. 23 or 16—Tientsin-Pukow RR from Taian to Yenchow.

Team No. 24—Tientsin-Pukow RR from Hanchuan to Yenchow.

Team No. 21—Tsinan-Tsingtao RR from Kaomi to Fengtze.

Team No. 23 or 7—Tsinan-Tsingtao RR from Chengtien to Fengtze.

Team No. 24 or 4—Lunghai RR from Hsuchow to Haichow.

Construction on other RR lines will be commenced at the earliest practicable date in conformance with the principles herein contained."

GENERAL YU: No comments.

GENERAL CHOU: Acceptable.

GENERAL MARSHALL: All of paragraph 4 is accepted.

GENERAL YU: Except that the date 30 June is to be inserted.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Paragraph 5 reads: "All mines, fortifications, blockades, blockhouses, and other military works lying within 1000 meters on either side of the railroads listed above will be removed or destroyed simultaneously with construction, except those military works constructed for defense of and lying within 1000 meters of vital railroad installations such as 1st, 2nd, or 3rd class railroad stations, tunnels, or bridges of total span of more than 5 meters. This work of removal or destruction will proceed in the direction of construction within each of the 7 construction areas above listed, at such rate that the removal or demolition will, at all times, be completed for a distance of not less than 1000 meters in advance of completed construction of the railroad. At the same time, other military works along the operating portions of the above mentioned lines will be removed or destroyed at a constant rate such that the removal or destruction will have been completed on or before the date of completion of the railroad within the area of control of each of the above listed 7 teams. When work of restoration of the other railroad lines in North and Central China is commenced, this same principle shall apply. How-

ever, the Lunghai RR west of Chenghsien and the Peiping-Hankow RR south of Chenghsien are specifically exempted from the program for removal or destruction of military works."

GENERAL YU: I want that word "Chenghsien" in the last sentence where it reads: "However, the Lunghai RR west of Chenghsien" changed to Hsu Chou.

GENERAL MARSHALL: What is the distance involved?

A map was produced by the Nationalists showing the area involved. General Yu began showing General Marshall the line under discussion between Chenghsien and Hsu Chou. In a general discussion, General Yu stated it was General Chou's desire to have the word "Chenghsien" and it was his, General Yu's desire, to have the word "Hsu Chou". General Marshall stated his agreement to the amendment.

GENERAL CHOU: In connection with General Yu's remark with reference to the destruction of fortifications along the section from Hsuchow to Cheng Hsien, I have the following statement to make. According to the original agreement, fortifications along the railway lines should be destroyed but in order to meet the stand of the Government, I have taken the following three measures to attack this problem.

1. Regarding areas where on both sides of the railway there are only Government areas, I make the concession that no fortifications will be destroyed so as to save work.

2. In Communist areas since the Communists have never erected any fortifications, no destruction is involved. The only problem is the erection of new fortifications. This does not constitute any compromise on the part of the Government.

3. Areas where the railway line is controlled by the Government on one side and the Communists on the other. Under such circumstances, both parties should make concessions that while the Government should take action to destroy the fortifications, the Communists may also give ground to limit the number of fortifications to be destroyed so as to reach a compromise. That is why I suggest that the section between Cheng Hsien and Hsuchow should also have fortifications removed. I understand the difficulty that General Yu now has, which is not the concern of the Ministry of Communications so much as the concern of the Ministry of Defense who right now has heavy military movements along that section. For military purposes, those fortifications are required. However, if hostilities could be effectively stopped and railway traffic started there would be no trouble over restored lines and there would be no necessity to maintain those fortifications.

However, in order to meet General Yu's contention, I am willing to make the following concessions. First, that fortifications in that section between Hsuchow and Cheng Hsien can be destroyed at a later time, it should be so stated in our agreement. We reach the understanding that that would remain for a later time. Later on when

hostilities have been completely stopped, there will be no use to have the fortifications. I make this proposal with a view to helping General Yu out of his difficult position.

Commenting on the same paragraph, I have two suggestions to make for amendments. The first one is regarding the railroad stations. In the paper, it states the 1st, second and third class railroad stations—the word third should be deleted because there are so many such railroad stations.

Second, on bridges where total span is more than 5 meters. 5 meters is too small—there are too many bridges of 5-meter span. Therefore the figure should be amended to 20 meters. If we have fortifications in the neighborhood of so many bridges and railroad stations, the result would be that no fortifications would be destroyed. The purpose of fortifications is to guard against bandits. That would not be of much help in case hostilities do take place. Therefore, two amendments are needed. The fortifications are numerous enough to prevent any banditry.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Colonel Hill, will you comment on the third class station and the extension of 5 to 20 meters? Is there a frequency of their occurrence along the lines.

COLONEL HILL: There are four classes of railroad stations. The 1st and 2nd class are a very small number, the third class stations are average village stations and the most numerous of any, the fourth class are the flag stops. Therefore, the question of whether third class railroad stations should be included in here is quite important.

GENERAL MARSHALL: On a third class station, will you give me an example?

COLONEL HILL: They are classed according to revenue. The third class station is where they take tickets and a small amount of revenue is produced.

With regard to the span of the bridges, the figure 5 meters is not arbitrary. That figure was chosen because that is approximately the maximum span that could be repaired by timber girders. Anything longer than about 5 meters would require steel girders which are very difficult to obtain.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Suppose this particular matter was amended so that the 1,000 meters applied to the first and second class stations, tunnels or bridges of a total span of 5 meters and say 200 meters for third class stations. Would that improve the situation materially from General Chou's point of view.

GENERAL CHOU: I am asking Vice Minister Lin⁶⁸ how many third class stations there are along the Tientsin-Pukou railway and whether there are still any fourth class stations.

⁶⁸ Ling Hung-hsun, Chinese Vice Minister of Communications.

MR. LIN: I can't give the exact number of third class stations, but roughly about three-fourths are third class. There are a few fourth class stations.

GENERAL CHOU: What is the average distance between the stations of all kinds?

MR. LIN: It averages about 10 kilos. The distance is 1100 kilos and the stations total 90, so the average is about 12.

GENERAL CHOU: How many bridges are there on the Tientsin-Pukou line with a span of more than 5 meters? If culverts are included as bridges there would be one bridge every 2 kilos and new fortifications might be built at each such culvert.

GENERAL MARSHALL: The culvert is not the issue. The 5 meters is the issue. We can forbid the construction of fortifications. Is that it?

GENERAL YU: General Marshall, would you read once more the exact wording.

GENERAL MARSHALL: "Commanders will remove or destroy all mines, blockhouses, blockades, fortifications or other military works on and along the lines of communications, which interfere with the operation of such lines."

GENERAL YU: Those do not interfere with the operation of the line.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I do not think he maintains that they do.

GENERAL YU: They don't interfere with the operation of the lines. They are blockades against bandits which is to General Chou's interest and to our interest.

GENERAL CHOU: I wish merely to point out in case we reach an agreement, this practically means no destruction of fortifications at all and it would seem like new construction would be needed which would look very funny to the outsider. General Marshall's proposal for stipulating 200 meters for the third class stations is acceptable to me.

GENERAL MARSHALL: 1,000 meters for everything but third class stations and the third class 200 meters. Bridges of a total span—

GENERAL CHOU: I have not yet come to the bridges.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I know. Bridges of a total span of more than 5 meters. I think that is a solid statement. I am proposing a moderation of one but not of the other because I think Colonel Hill's recommendation which he stated was not arbitrary, but was related to an actual engineering factor which is sound. I think that also removes the probability of such great frequency of bridges that it amounts to preserving fortifications. That would not seem to be the case if the 5-meter span was a factor.

GENERAL CHOU: I said with regard to the bridges we should lengthen the span in our stipulation or state that the culverts will be understood not to be included in bridges. Under the present stipulation, would the Ministry of Communications erect any fortifications?

GENERAL YU: Not unless we are attacked by bandits. We are not interested in building fortifications just for nothing.

GENERAL CHOU: Would the other proposal of General Marshall that no new fortifications be erected, be acceptable to the Government.

GENERAL YU: I have no particular objection to that statement but I hope that General Chou or the Communist Party will understand our general intention of putting up new blockhouses on the railways is necessary if we come across bandits to destroy the bridges. We have to take some self-defense measures and put up blockhouses. If that can be understood, I have no particular objection to General Chou's proposal. Furthermore, I am not interested in building fortifications. It takes money and work. However, in an emergency I don't want to put ourselves in a position of having our hands tied.

GENERAL CHOU: I suggest that it be stated herein that no new fortification will be erected except with the mutual understanding that in case of urgency or necessity, the field team will be asked to deal with the actual situation.

GENERAL YU: As approved by the field team or the railroad control team. If there are bandits, they want to protect their lives.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Would this wording be inserted at the close of the paragraph. "No new fortification will be erected except to meet attacks against the railroad itself and after approval by the Communications team."

GENERAL YU: That is acceptable.

GENERAL MARSHALL: General Chou?

GENERAL CHOU: Yes.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I would like to read a suggested amendment to the first sentence which would be inserted after a comma at the present end of the first sentence, "and within 200 meters of the third class station". That would be a strip of 400 meters of fortifications.

GENERAL YU: I think it is better to leave it at 1,000 meters.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I was trying to reduce the frequency of places for which fortifications would be authorized and it was only for that reason that I cut the distance on the third class stations. I assumed that some defense was necessary but I reduced it to the minimum. I assumed there would be many more third class stations than there would be bridges of 5 meters span. Therefore I endeavored to reduce the allowances in which fortifications are authorized. My proposal was not based on the logic or finesse of defense but rather as a mere compromise to the fear on the part of General Chou that the frequency of these stations or bridges or tunnels would be so great that almost no fortifications would be destroyed. Some of our bridge-

heads abroad were 20 miles deep and 40 miles wide in order to protect the bridge. General Chou?

GENERAL CHOU: Yes. All right.

GENERAL YU: Yes.

GENERAL MARSHALL: That takes us down to the last sentence where the discussion was regarding the Lunghai railroad. Are there comments?

GENERAL CHOU: General Chou concedes that destruction along this section can be undertaken when traffic is resumed. In the other part, destruction will take place simultaneously with repair work. In this particular section, it may follow the repair work at a time when the railroad is in operation along the entire Lunghai line. I suggest that the last sentence be maintained with a footnote as agreed upon by the two sides that the destruction will take place at a later time after the resumption of through traffic on the entire line.

GENERAL YU: I will talk to General Hsu on this last sentence. It is almost 20 minutes to 2. I think we should adjourn for lunch.

GENERAL MARSHALL: There are a few more paragraphs and I would like to hear if there is going to be an argument first.

Paragraph 5 without clearing the last sentence.

I would like to read paragraph 6. "Before through traffic is permitted on the reopened sector of the railroads, qualified railroad personnel of the CCP may be taken into the employ of the M. O. C.⁶⁹ in accordance with a plan to be determined. Qualifications of such personnel will be determined by the examinations to be conducted by the Communications teams or by the Communications Group of Executive Headquarters."

GENERAL YU: What are General Chou's comments?

GENERAL CHOU: Regarding the first sentence, I want to first put a question to the experts of the MOC. What is understood by the word qualified railroad personnel? Does that include all the personnel or does it include only a part of the railway personnel?

GENERAL YU: Colonel Hill, have you any definite idea as to the qualifications of the railroad personnel?

COLONEL HILL: Yes, I think that the Government should agree that qualified personnel in any bracket should be accepted without regard to political affiliations.

GENERAL YU: Administrative personnel as well.

GENERAL MARSHALL: All types of personnel.

I did not expect to settle the paragraph. I just wanted to get an idea of the proposals. Let us drop paragraph 6, that is to be con-

⁶⁹ Ministry of Communications.

sidered later. Paragraph 7, are there any comments that you wish to make at this moment.

COLONEL HILL: There is an agreed amendment to add the thought that this directive shall not supersede General Directive No. 4 or that can easily be added as a new paragraph 9.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Now skipping right on to paragraph 8. Did General Chou have any comment on that at this moment?

GENERAL CHOU: My comment, as previously communicated, is that I want to have a separate document on that matter. If the Government objects to that paper, I would further discuss on what kind of an agency are we to depend for the interpretation of this paper.

GENERAL MARSHALL: General Chou is willing to have that included in the separate document which applies to all teams.

GENERAL YU: I am ready to discuss that point.

GENERAL MARSHALL: When do you wish to meet again on this subject. How about 9:30 tomorrow morning. We will try to finish this and then get back to the cessation of hostilities.

GENERAL YU: Agreed.

GENERAL CHOU: Agreed.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Meeting is adjourned.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270: Telegram

*General Marshall to President Truman*⁷⁰

[NANKING,] June 23, 1946.

[967] DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Negotiations since yesterday morning have been proceeding by formal meetings of the Committee of Three lengthily and painfully but we are making progress. These meetings are preceded and followed by personal meetings of mine with various principals. The Communists have made important concessions in granting the deciding vote to the Americans on teams and at the Executive Headquarters regarding matters pertaining to the cessation of hostilities procedure, interpretation of agreements and their execution. These do not pertain to highest level, that is the Committee of Three, but I think that there is a possibility that the Communists will accept the majority vote decision on interpretation of agreements.

I have declined to commit myself further regarding the Committee of Three as I do not think the United States Government should bear the heavy responsibility through my actions in regard to matters of great importance beyond interpretation of agreements, which means the manner or direction of their implementation.

⁷⁰ Copy transmitted on June 23 by the War Department to the Department of State.

On lower level, that is at Executive Headquarters and with teams, I think it all right for Americans to be committed to a majority vote policy regarding specific matters.

It is very difficult to predict the rate of progress and eventual outcome because of the effect of heavy sporadic fighting, carelessly expressed desire of some important government leaders to settle issue by force, unfortunate propaganda, mutually accentuated suspicion and distrust, et cetera. However, all this seems to be normal to any settlement in China.

G. C. MARSHALL

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting of Committee of Three at 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, June 24, 1946, 10:35 a. m.

Present:

General Yu Ta Wei General Chou En-lai General Marshall

Also present:

General Kuo General Huang Colonel Caughey

General Pee General Tung Colonel Hill

General Hsu General Teng Captain Soong

Mr. Ling

Mr. Chang

Mr. Sah

Mr. Shih

GENERAL MARSHALL: The meeting will please come to order.

Yesterday when we adjourned, we were discussing paragraph 5. The question had not been settled as to the last sentence reading "However, the Lunghai RR west of Chenghsien and the Peiping-Hankow RR south of Chenghsien are specifically exempted from the program for removal or destruction of military works." As I recall, the Government proposal was that the word "Hsu Chou" be substituted for the word "Chenghsien" where it reads "However, the Lunghai RR west of Chenghsien", and that General Chou had stated that he was ready to agree that the destruction of the fortifications, according to the revised terms of paragraph 5, could be delayed along that section until after the resumption of traffic. That, I believe, was the situation at the time we adjourned.

GENERAL YU: I have two suggestions: first, we wait 6 months after resumption of communications on the Lunghai RR before destruction and second, as the matter has some relation to the reorganization and demobilization plan, I propose a tentative wait of four months after the implementation of the reorganization plan before destruction.

GENERAL CHOU: To simplify the matter, I suggest that destruction

take place two months after implementation of the army reorganization plan. I wish we could have such a provision put in. All the questions that you have can then be eliminated for two reasons. First, as General Hsu stated the other day, the present paper and other papers regarding the army reorganization plan will all be signed at once. Second, when the army reorganization plan has been in effect for two months, various troops will be in the process of moving toward the new distribution areas. Therefore, it would in no way interfere with the destruction of the forts the Government is concerned about and the forts can be destroyed at that time.

GENERAL YU: I suggest that I take this matter up with General Chou after this meeting because it embodies the army reorganization plan.

GENERAL MARSHALL: We will suspend discussion of the remaining sentence to be discussed in paragraph 5, which I have already quoted, and proceed to questions on paragraph 6. There was a brief discussion regarding this paragraph yesterday but I think we should start anew and I will ask General Chou for his comments.

GENERAL CHOU: In order to simplify the bitterness in relation to paragraph 6 so that a speedy conclusion can be reached, I suggest that the first sentence be accepted while the second sentence be deleted. Since it is mentioned in the first sentence, "Before through traffic is permitted over the reopened sectors of the railroads, qualified railroad personnel of the CCP may be taken into the employ of the MOC in accordance with a plan to be determined", and since many details are involved in that plan, it can be discussed between General Hsu and myself. This should save a lot of discussion here if we can go into details later.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Would that be with the understanding that the determining method, whatever the detailed arrangements, would be the communication team or its equivalent in Executive Headquarters, by a majority vote? I am mentioning this so that we have in the rough at least some idea of how the differences will be composed, whatever the details of method may happen to be.

I am rather puzzled at possibilities of harmonious settlement of selections and I do not want to see that, at some later time here, wreck the remainder of the agreement. Therefore, I am concerned about this statement as to whether there can be a general understanding on that one phase of the matter, the details to be ironed out later. For example, we referred to a similar arrangement at higher headquarters. I do not know just what that would be but from all our experiences with civil service, that is just what this begins to be an example of. It is very hard when there are disputing factions to determine the qualifications of personnel. Presumably, in many instances, both

the member of the Government and the member of the Communist party might not be at all experts in regard to the matter involved. In some instances they will be, in others they probably will not be. While I cannot endow the American member with God-given knowledge, he at least is not interested in the Kuomintang Party or the Communist Party. That is very frank talking but I do not want to see the rest of this document tied up on that particular point. I may be quite wrong about both the logic of my idea and the advisability of my mentioning the matter at this time, or ever. I spoke on the spur of the moment. I am going to ask Colonel Hill to express himself very frankly as to whether or not he agrees with me and I would like to have him express his views to the contrary very definitely.

COLONEL HILL: There has been prepared and submitted to all three parties concerned, a plan for the administrative control of the railroads. This plan has been in active discussion by members of our Railway Control Section of Executive Headquarters for approximately four months. The plan, I believe, is agreeable to both parties in very general principle but the details certainly have not been agreed to. The basis of that plan is that where there is an applicant from the Chinese Communist Party for an administrative position in the railroads, the qualifications of that applicant shall be determined by a Railway Control team. Certainly, in such cases there would probably be disagreement as to whether or not the applicant was fully qualified and, in such cases, the only possible solution would be to make the American member have the deciding vote.

GENERAL CHOU: As I stated yesterday, I agree in principle with the first draft of Colonel Hill's with regard to Communists employed on railways. There are only certain specific matters which I wish to make some study on the Government's side. These are different points of view on this paper which is now up for discussion. I mention this merely because Colonel Hill referred to the paper. I suggest that as soon as we reach agreement on this particular paper on reopening lines of communication, that we discuss the administrative control. Therefore, I do not think it necessary to have the second sentence of paragraph 6, since that sentence implies only one principle, whereas there are other principles we must take as the basis for administrative control. I think that we should wait for a separate paper on administrative control which will embody several principles. Those principles are, as I stated yesterday, that administrative and operative personnel will be under control of the Minister of Communications. On the other hand, all interested parties will be guaranteed proper prestige on all levels of the railway system, as was explained in Colonel Hill's original draft. Of course there are many other principles to discuss. That is why it is necessary to mention it in

paragraph 6 of the paper on reopening lines of communication. Also, we have to work out the method of selection of Communist personnel on railways and it may depend on what types of personnel they are. As General Marshall just mentioned, in case of disagreement, it could be decided by giving the decisive vote to the American member. All that can be worked out in detail in that separate document. The authority to make examinations up to what levels in the administration is also under my consideration.

GENERAL YU: I believe primary consideration before any decision can be reached must be to find an easy, practicable and exacting way for execution. The points I stress particularly embody practical execution of all these agreements. First, that stipulations in the plan must be clear cut and definite. It is advisable to avoid clauses which will be inter-related to some other paper for execution. Second, that to have a mutual and just understanding of the full extent to which difficulties which are bound to arise in both parties. We have to make stipulations as definite as possible and not dependent on some document not yet discussed which may wreck the whole document.

I will take up Communist difficulties first. If I were to refuse absolutely to take Communist members in the restored sectors into the railway system, I would place General Chou in a very difficult position. Therefore, I proposed yesterday of my own accord that members of the CCP be taken into the employ of the Ministry of Communications in the restored sectors, subject to qualification by examinations. In order to prevent the embarrassing situation of our people trying to prevent the Communists from being employed in these sectors, I was given the power today to state that the railway teams should conduct these examinations.

On the other hand, General Chou will understand my difficulties. I cannot agree to ask the Minister of Communications to take into employment, Communists on all levels in restored sectors. I am not authorized to do that. Participation of Communist personnel on all levels is a general problem. It seems to me it should not be raised in connection with railway administration alone. I therefore propose, with reference to the employment of Communist personnel on railways, to have a definite stipulation in this document that CCP personnel may be taken into the employ of the Ministry of Communications. I agree to make that definite and not make the whole thing dependent on a separate agreement to be reached. The qualification of personnel will be determined by examination. That is just my idea. I am ready to listen to all arguments or statements which General Chou has to make.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Has General Chou any remarks to make?

GENERAL CHOU: General Yu already stated his view yesterday on this paragraph regarding the employment of railroad personnel.

There are two aspects that need consideration. First is the personnel to be employed in the restored section and second is those personnel to be employed in various higher levels which are relevant to the first one. On our part, we maintain that regarding the first class, we will make the nominations and the nominees will then pass the examination and be employed by the Ministry of Communications. Regarding the second, we will make recommendations to have certain personnel join the various sub-agencies of the relevant organization.

There is still some distance between our views. The question has been raised, for example, in case personnel nominated by the Communists fail to pass the examination, then what shall be done. Our suggestion is that we again make new nominations. According to Colonel Hill, personnel will be divided into separate types and some stipulation will define what procedure should be followed in case of failure of nominee to pass the examination. Regarding the second case, General Yu just said he is not in a position to take Communist personnel into the higher levels. In Colonel Hill's preliminary draft, the principle was recognized that a proper representation in personnel will be guaranteed in the various levels, though Colonel Hill did not apply this principle in detail. Since we differ on the foregoing points, I wonder if we can solve the entire problem by having the second sentence in the draft now. Would that be sufficient to iron out all differences? I doubt it very much, for by going over it more and more and by elaborating on this point and that, it is going to be expanded to almost a separate document which will need time for argument and discussion. Certainly we cannot complete it today.

As soon as I noticed in the paper's first sentence that a plan will be determined, it occurred to me that we might well incorporate the idea embodying the sentence in another plan.

I also saw Colonel Hill's work on administrative control. We feel that in connection with it and on behalf of this discussion, we can dispense with the second sentence. As General Yu stated, more explicit wording is desirable, but just as I have said, a separate plan has to be worked out. As General Yu wants everything stated explicitly, we will have to work out a detailed arrangement and get it incorporated in the present paragraph, which will take lots of time.

I see no objection to any of the foregoing suggestions. Regarding General Marshall's wishes on determining the result of examinations and on the procedure to be adopted in event of disagreement, I am just considering this matter. Such a paper will also have some stipulation regarding voting procedure.

GENERAL MARSHALL: We are not making very much progress here. Unless there is objection—that is other remarks at this particular

moment, I suggest that we return to the first sentence as originally written and determine whether or not that is acceptable.

GENERAL YU: If the issue of participation in high levels is to be discussed in this plan, I must discuss the problem at a later stage. I am simply not authorized to discuss it at present. Therefore, if that issue should be raised, then we will simply wreck the whole Government proposal on which we have already spent many hours. I want to emphasize, when the time is ripe for a general discussion of the Communist participation, I am willing to discuss the problem with General Chou, but not now. I hope General Chou will appreciate my position.

GENERAL MARSHALL: May I make a comment now. Do I understand General Chou to mean that at a certain level in the consideration of personnel, it becomes not a railroad administration matter but a question of governmental policies, say a coalition government regime, and it is on that highest level that General Yu is not authorized to conduct discussion at this time? Just what that level is I can only guess. Whether its definition is pertinent to this discussion I do not know.

GENERAL YU: I wanted to say—

GENERAL MARSHALL: I interrupted General Chou and would like to let him speak.

GENERAL YU: I just wanted one sentence to make the meaning clear. I want to tell General Chou that I am prepared, if he insists, to discuss the employment of Communist members in the restored sections. I am prepared if he insists that the word "plan" be adopted in this document. I am prepared to discuss conditions of the Communist members in the restored sections. That is all at present I am authorized to discuss. That is at present.

GENERAL CHOU: To make clear as to what is my understanding of the greatest levels, I have actually in mind those railroad lines which have particular connection with Communist areas. It has nothing to do with the participation in the Ministry of Communications in the nature of a coalition government or to participate in the making of policies. What we want is only to participate in railroad administration along the railroad lines connected with the Communist lines. For example, the Peiping-Suiyuan railroad line, where there is now an independent administration in the Communist area and where a large part of that railroad line is run by Communists and traffic is resumed.

There are two matters that need our attention. The first one is employment of personnel in stations or other places effecting the restored section in the Communist area, and secondly, is the participation in the railroad administration in a section or in the entire line

of that railway, so as to effect unification of administration. As it was before, they are separate administrations and now we want to put them together so that everything can go on from that. This question has been raised before in the Communication Group of Executive Headquarters in Peiping and we attach much importance to that point. General Yu has expressed that he is only authorized to accept Communist personnel in the restored section. I think that principle can be applied to certain lines where the section under Communist control is comparatively short and it does not effect the whole line very much. However, there are other lines where considerable parts are under Communist control. For one like that, we find it necessary to have Communist personnel in the administration organ of the entire line.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I think, gentlemen, before we come to what I hope is the final consideration of this paragraph that we have a 10-minute recess. Is that agreeable to you?

The meeting then recessed.

GENERAL MARSHALL: The meeting will come to order again. That was a constructive 10 minutes.

Returning to paragraph 6 and to the first sentence.

GENERAL YU: I think General Chou put in the wording "the restored sectors."

Qualified personnel may be taken in accordance with the plan to be determined.

GENERAL MARSHALL: "Before through traffic is permitted over the reopened sectors of the railroads, qualified railroad personnel of the CCP may be taken into the employ of the MOC in accordance with a plan to be determined."

GENERAL YU: General Chou says since we have the wording "over the reopened sectors"—

GENERAL MARSHALL: That is agreeable to you?

GENERAL YU: With that understanding.

GENERAL CHOU: I agree with the original.

GENERAL MARSHALL: As written?

GENERAL CHOU: As written.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Then is it clear, only the first sentence?

GENERAL CHOU: I have one statement. In formal discussion between General Yu and General Chou, we reached an understanding with General Yu to employ Communist personnel on restored sectors. I clarified the Communist position that besides employing Communist personnel on restored sectors, there are certain lines where a large section is under Communist control and Communist personnel may also participate in the higher levels up to the railroad bureau. It does

not imply that the Communist personnel will participate in the Ministry of Communications or in the policy-forming agency.

GENERAL YU: I am only authorized to discuss our CCP members in the restored sectors, but I realize the difficulties of General Chou but I am not authorized but am waiting to discuss with General Chou on the problems I stated. I try to do my best to understand the difficulties and do my best to secure authority to get an agreement acceptable to both sides.

GENERAL MARSHALL: In light of the remarks just made by General Chou and General Yu, are you ready to clear the first sentence of paragraph 6?

GENERAL CHOU: General Chou accepts this sentence with the understanding that if General Yu Ta Wei would overcome the difficulties as he said, then the arrangement may not be incorporated in the plan that is to be determined, but in case those difficulties are not solved, General Chou reserves the right to bring up discussions when discussions are made on the plan.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Any objection?

GENERAL YU: I do not have authority yet but I will do my best.

GENERAL MARSHALL: You mean you cannot listen to him?

GENERAL YU: I can listen to him but cannot solve it.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I return now to the question again. In the light of what has been said, are you ready to accept the second sentence of paragraph 6 as written. The first sentence is cleared.

The second sentence reads: "The qualifications of such personnel will be determined by examinations conducted by Communications teams or by the Communications Group of the Executive Headquarters." I believe you stated before that was acceptable to you, General Chou. The second sentence is accepted.

Paragraph 6, as previously written, is therefore accepted.

We will have to increase our speed somehow. However, the most difficult points, I think, are passed. We will take up consideration of paragraph 7: "Detailed plans for the restoration of all other lines of communications in accordance with General Directive 4 will be covered by later agreement." Yesterday the following additional sentence was proposed as an amendment: "This directive shall not prejudice in any way General Directive No. 4."

Is the first sentence as written acceptable to General Yu?

GENERAL YU: "The detailed plans for the restoration of all other lines of communications in accordance with General Directive No. 4 will be covered by later agreement." What is the meaning "by later agreement"?

GENERAL PEE: May General Yu be excused—he has a telephone call.

GENERAL MARSHALL: We will recess until General Yu returns.

GENERAL MARSHALL: The meeting will come to order.

GENERAL PEE: No comments.

GENERAL MARSHALL: The first sentence of paragraph 7 is accepted. Who proposed the amendment by the addition of the sentence I just read? Colonel Hill, do you know—was that your proposal?

COLONEL HILL: It was not mine.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Do you think it necessary?

COLONEL HILL: It is desirable, not essential.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Do you wish to retain that addition?

GENERAL YU: No comment.

GENERAL CHOU: This proposal was originally made by General Huang for General Chou, and he still thinks it better with the stipulation.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Is that acceptable?

GENERAL YU: Yes.

GENERAL MARSHALL: The amendment of paragraph 7, amended by the additional sentence: "This directive shall not prejudice in any way General Directive No. 4." As written and as amended paragraph 7 is therefore cleared.

Paragraph 8. I suggest that paragraph 8 be left for consideration in a document that is yet to be discussed. Is that agreeable?

GENERAL YU: That proposal is covered in a separate agreement. We don't have to discuss it.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Paragraph 8, at least at this time, will not be considered.

I turn to Appendix A, Time Schedule. I will ask for convenience to treat the entire schedule in one discussion proposing any amendment that you desire to make in this particular portion. The Time Schedule as written will be copied into the record. I will not read it now.

"Appendix A

"Time Schedule

"Tientsin-Pukow RR from Tsang Hsien to Te-Hsien . . .	75 days
Yucheng to Te-Hsien	60 days
Taian to Yenchow	60 days
Hanchuan to Yenchow	90 days
Tsinan-Tsingtao RR	30 days
Lung-Hai RR Hsuechow to Haichow	30 days
Peiping-Suiyuan RR, Hankow to Paotou	45 days
Peiping-Hankow RR, Yuanshih to Anyang	150 days
Tung-Po RR, Lingfen to Yunchang	50 days
Peiping-Ku Pei Kou RR	30 days
Tatung-Taiyuan RR	30 days"

GENERAL YU: That is all estimated dates.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Yes, I know.

GENERAL CHOU: This Time Schedule is understood to be only an estimate.

GENERAL MARSHALL: General Yu, have you any amendments to propose to the Time Schedule, as written? Have you any amendments to propose to this Schedule?

GENERAL YU: No.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Gentlemen, as I understand it, this completes the consideration of this document at the present time. If agreeable to you I will have Colonel Caughey prepare clear copies of the document as amended by us in the discussions here yesterday and today. Those copies will be immediately distributed to you both.

Is the title as written acceptable? I forgot to mention that. Is it a plan or a directive?

GENERAL YU: Directive is more satisfactory. This is to be more than a plan.

GENERAL MARSHALL: It now reads "Directive for Reopening of Lines of Communication in North and Central China." Is that acceptable?

Both General Chou and General Yu nodded agreement.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I will ask you gentlemen to turn to the document on the directive for the cessation of hostilities in Manchuria.⁷¹ If agreeable to you both, we will resume the discussion.

GENERAL YU: General Marshall, I tried to contact Mr. Chang⁷² last night twice but failed because he was not in. I meant to tell Mr. Chang that the Government is ready to discuss termination of hostilities in Manchuria after we had finished the discussion on restoration of communications. I also meant to tell Mr. Chang that if anything prevented his being at the meeting that I would be his representative. However, I failed to tell him because I could not reach him.

GENERAL MARSHALL: We will accept that as the authorization for General Yu.

If agreeable to you gentlemen we will resume the discussion on paragraph *c* of that document. As I understood the matter at the time of our adjournment, General Hsu had agreed to General Chou's proposal to substitute "20 li" for "15 li" in the first sentence, General Hsu's having in mind that the matter of reaching decisions would be covered in a separate document. Is that a correct understanding?

GENERAL YU: Yes.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Therefore the distance in this document in the first sentence should read "20 li". The second sentence reads, "The local situation believed to have existed as of noon June 7, 1946, will

⁷¹ Draft of June 13, p. 1044.

⁷² Possibly Gen. Hsu Yung-chang.

be the basis for determining the readjustment of the troops involved." My understanding of the discussion regarding that sentence was, on the part of General Hsu, that we should accept it with the understanding that the matter of details and settlement of disagreements would be covered in two separate documents. Is that correct, General Yu?

GENERAL YU: Were there one or two separate documents?

GENERAL MARSHALL: Two, one regarding conditions around cities, etc., and the other is regarding settlement of disagreements of teams.

GENERAL YU: That is correct.

GENERAL MARSHALL: The second sentence is therefore accepted as written. The third sentence as originally written has been altered by General Chou who, as I understand, would have it omitted because the matter would be covered in a separate document. Is that acceptable?

GENERAL YU: Yes.

GENERAL MARSHALL: The third sentence will, therefore, be struck from the paragraph as written. Unless there is an objection, paragraph *c* is accepted as written with the change "20 li" and with the omission of the third sentence. We will pass to paragraph *d*. That was hastily read yesterday noon but, as I understand it, General Hsu desired some changes. It reads: "All movements of National or Communist troops of a tactical nature will cease. Administrative and supply movements as authorized in the original cease-fire order of January 10, 1946, may be carried out if previously cleared with a field team." General Hsu desired that, in the second sentence after the words "carried out" there be inserted the words "within the garrison areas." Also, in the 5th to the last word, it had been originally written "cleared" but, on General Chou's suggestion, had been changed to "approved". Is the amendment proposed by General Hsu still the desire of the Government, General Yu?

GENERAL YU: I think so. General Hsu has not said anything to the contrary.

GENERAL MARSHALL: That amendment is therefore accepted. Is the alteration of the fifth from the last word "cleared" to "approved", suggested by General Chou, accepted?

GENERAL YU: Yes.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Is there any other amendment to that paragraph that the Government wishes to make?

GENERAL YU: No.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Have you any, General Chou?

GENERAL CHOU: No.

GENERAL MARSHALL: The paragraph is therefore accepted as

originally written with the two amendments already acted upon. We turn now to paragraph *e*.

At this point General Marshall suggested that Mr. Ling, Mr. Sah, and Mr. Shih leave as the discussion no longer pertained to them. He thanked them for coming to the meeting.

GENERAL MARSHALL: The paragraph as originally written reads: "Within seven days after the issuance of this agreement, lists showing all units together with commanders, strength and locations in Manchuria will be submitted to the Advance Section of Executive Headquarters in Changchun." As I stated yesterday, in the second word "seven" was written by me and I was advised by my assistants that that was too short a time. However, I left it as is. General Chou proposed 15 days, instead of 7. Is that acceptable?

GENERAL YU: Yes.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Therefore "15" days is the agreed time. In that same paragraph after the word "commanders", General Chou proposed the additional words "of regiments and larger units." Is that acceptable to General Yu?

GENERAL YU: Yes.

GENERAL MARSHALL: The additional words "of regiments and larger units" is acceptable. Are there any other amendments proposed for that paragraph?

GENERAL YU: No.

GENERAL CHOU: None.

GENERAL MARSHALL: The paragraph is cleared then with the two amendments mentioned. We will turn now to paragraph *f*. This paragraph was written by me with the idea of avoiding unfortunate propaganda against the movement of replacements into Manchuria. The Government, I understand, objected to the paragraph, at least so General Hsu informed me, because it only stated a prohibition against Government troops and because the actual matter of that first sentence would be covered in the detailed amendments of agreement of February 25 regarding the reorganization and redistribution of troops. With that understanding of the matter, I propose the amendment of the first sentence to include the words after the word "government", "and the Communist Party," and in the second sentence after the word "replacements", "of the National Government." General Yu, is the paragraph acceptable to you with the proposed amendments I have just mentioned?

GENERAL YU: That is very important. The content of this paragraph is covered in the proposed amendment to the basic plan of February 25, 1946. We therefore accept it since General Hsu has already announced he will sign it at the same time as the proposed amendment.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Has General Chou any comments he would like to add?

GENERAL CHOU: No.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Paragraph *f* is accepted as amended but I am striking out the two words "National" in both places, leaving just "Government." We will pass to paragraph *g*. It reads, "Officers failing to carry out the terms of this agreement will be relieved and disciplined by their respective commander." Is there any comment on this paragraph?

Both General Chou and General Yu shook their heads.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Paragraph *g* is therefore accepted as written. I will have Colonel Caughey make a clear copy of this document and supply an appropriate title, which will finally be considered at the time of formal acceptance. If agreeable to you gentlemen, we will now turn to General Chou's proposal for the specific examples of the actual guidance of teams. Has General Yu a copy?

GENERAL YU: Yes.

GENERAL MARSHALL: This document as drafted reads: "To the Commissioners from the Committee of Three: An agreement for the complete termination of hostilities in Manchuria has been signed and issued by the Committee of Three this date. The following instructions are issued for the purpose of assisting field teams in effecting a uniform application of the terms of the agreement regarding troops found in close contact or actually engaged in combat: In general there will be four cases confronting the field teams." Now if it meets your agreement, we will discuss the four cases first and then come back to the preamble to this document.

GENERAL YU: General Marshall, I am sorry that I saw this document for the first time today. I need a little time to study the document before I can take part in discussion.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Is it acceptable to General Chou that we suspend discussion of this document at the moment?

GENERAL CHOU: Yes.

GENERAL MARSHALL: The discussion of this document will be delayed until it meets General Yu Ta Wei's convenience.

Now the next paper is General Chou's first suggestion regarding stipulations for the resolution of certain disagreements among the field teams, the advance section of Executive Headquarters in Changchun and in Peiping. General Yu, are you familiar with this document?

GENERAL YU: I heard the discussion the other day but I got a copy for the first time today. Are these General Chou's proposals?

GENERAL MARSHALL: Yes.

GENERAL YU: I am ready.

GENERAL MARSHALL: The following is the proposal by General

Chou En-lai headed "Stipulations for the Resolution of Certain Disagreements Among the Field Teams, the Advance Section of Executive Headquarters in Changchun and in Peiping."

"I. *The Field Teams.*

1. In case of disagreement on matters of urgency, the American representative of the field team may render his own report of the situation as he sees it to Executive Headquarters in Changchun or Peiping requesting instructions.

2. In case of disagreement, the American representative of the field team is authorized to make decision as to where and when the field team will move within his area to conduct investigations regarding military activities. Regarding the place of investigation, transportation difficulties should not be permitted to prejudice or delay the movement of the teams.

3. In case of disagreement on matters relating to cessation of hostilities and separation of forces, the American representative of the field team is authorized to issue orders in the name of the Executive Headquarters to the field commanders on both sides to stop fighting at once and to effect the separation of the forces as prescribed in accordance with directives.

4. The area assigned to each field team will be stipulated by Executive Headquarters.

II. *Executive Headquarters in Changchun and Peiping.*

5. In case of disagreement, the senior American official of Executive Headquarters in Peiping or Changchun may render his own report to Executive Headquarters in Peiping or the Committee of Three based on the situation as he sees it requesting instructions.

6. In case of disagreement regarding the implementation of orders or instructions from the higher level, the senior American official of the Executive Headquarters in Peiping or Changchun is authorized to direct the execution of that order or instruction unless amended or rescinded by the higher level itself."

The first series of paragraphs have a general heading "The Field Teams," which applies to the first four paragraphs. Have you any comments on paragraph 1?

GENERAL YU: I have no comment to make.

GENERAL CHOU: No.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I would like to ask at this time this question. If this document is to cover the procedure in the event of disagreements, would it not be advisable to include in it "communication teams"? You remember in the document on communications, paragraph 8 was omitted because it would be included in this. I propose the following amendments at this time: The general title of the first four paragraphs is "The Field Teams." I suggest that the word "The" be omitted and that the words "and Communication" be inserted after the word "Field." Is that acceptable.

Both General Yu and General Chou nodded approval.

GENERAL MARSHALL: That is acceptable. In paragraph 1, it should be paragraph "a", after the word "disagreement" strike out the word "on" and insert the word "regarding." That's better English. After the word "field" insert the words "or communication". After the words "he sees it" insert the word "direct." Are there any comments on those proposed amendments?

GENERAL YU: None.

GENERAL CHOU: No.

GENERAL MARSHALL: We turn to paragraph 2, which should be paragraph "b". Is that acceptable as written?

Both General Yu and General Chou nodded approval.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Paragraph 2, now termed paragraph b, is acceptable. Paragraph 3, which I suggest be changed to paragraph "c", will be considered next. I propose the striking out of the fifth word "on" and substituting "regarding." Is that modification acceptable?

GENERAL YU: Yes.

General Chou nodded approval.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Are there any other amendments to that paragraph?

GENERAL CHOU: No.

GENERAL YU: No.

GENERAL MARSHALL: The paragraph is accepted with the single amendment which I proposed. We will proceed to paragraph 4, which I suggest be designated as paragraph "d", and I propose that after the word "field" there be inserted the two words "and communication" and that the word "stipulated" be struck out and the word "designated" replace it. Are those amendments acceptable?

GENERAL YU: Yes.

GENERAL CHOU: Yes.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Are there any other amendments to that paragraph?

GENERAL CHOU: None.

GENERAL YU: No.

GENERAL MARSHALL: The paragraph is accepted. We turn to Section II.

GENERAL YU: May I raise the issue—should the four articles refer more to the work of field teams rather than communication teams?

GENERAL MARSHALL: I have another paragraph to suggest on that later. In Section II is the title "Executive Headquarters in Changchun and Peiping" acceptable?

GENERAL CHOU: Yes.

GENERAL YU: Yes.

GENERAL MARSHALL: It is accepted. I suggest we turn to paragraph 5, which should be "a", of Section II. Are there any comments?

GENERAL YU: No.

GENERAL CHOU: No.

GENERAL MARSHALL: That paragraph now labeled "a" is accepted. Go to paragraph 6, which I propose be designated paragraph "b", of Section II. Are there any proposed amendments to that?

GENERAL YU: No.

GENERAL CHOU: No.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Paragraph b, formerly c, is accepted as written.

GENERAL CHOU: I suggest we use paragraph 8 of the original communication directive for reopening of lines of communication in North and Central China with the amendment I am now reading: "In case of disagreement as to interpretation of this directive, the reopening of lines of communication, the American officer of the communication group of Executive Headquarters will be authorized to make the decision in North and Central China."

GENERAL MARSHALL: Don't put that in about North and Central China because we have not yet discussed Manchuria. Then it would have to be rewritten.

After a brief discussion, General Marshall and General Chou came to agreement as to wording.

GENERAL MARSHALL: General Chou proposes an additional paragraph to Section 1 of this document, which would become paragraph d, reading: "In case of disagreement as to interpretation of the directive for reopening of lines of communication, the senior American officer of the communication group of Executive Headquarters is authorized to render the decision."

GENERAL YU: The Government has two proposals to make. First, "In case of disagreement as to where and when to send field teams, the U. S. Commissioner in Executive Headquarters in Peiping has the authority to render the decision."

The second proposal has been communicated to General Chou by General Hsu. It reads: "In case of disagreement as to the interpretation of all agreements and manner of execution of the agreements, a majority vote of the Committee of Three will be decisive."

GENERAL MARSHALL: May I ask a question about the first proposal?

GENERAL YU: As to where and when to send the teams. The U. S. Commissioner of Executive Headquarters in Peiping has authority to arrange conditions.

GENERAL MARSHALL: May I ask a question?

Section 2, paragraph *b*, of the document under discussion provides: "In case of disagreement regarding the implementation of orders or instructions from the higher level, the senior American official of the Executive Headquarters in Peiping or Changchun is authorized to direct the execution of that order or instruction unless amended or rescinded by the higher level itself." Was it not your understanding, General Chou, that was to include sending out of a field team?

GENERAL MARSHALL: May I interrupt General Chou. Is General Chou talking about the second or first.

GENERAL CHOU: First.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I would rather he did not go into the second proposal at all until I make a statement.

GENERAL CHOU: Regarding the dispatch of field teams by Executive Headquarters to different places. When instructions have been issued by the Committee of Three or the dispatch of field teams, such as the directive for sending field teams to Manchuria, that is four additional field teams to Manchuria, and such as the dispatch of a field team to Tingyuan, in case there should be disagreement among the Communists, then the American officer by virtue of paragraph *2b*, is authorized to direct execution of that order and to get the team dispatched. In the second case, if no instructions whatsoever have been issued before then, in case of disagreement, the American Commissioner is, by virtue of *2a*, first to render a report to the Committee of Three requesting instruction.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I understand that.

GENERAL YU: That is my proposal but in different wording.

GENERAL MARSHALL: We have passed that.

GENERAL YU: Yes.

GENERAL CHOU: I am not prepared for discussion of those two, therefore, I would like the meeting to be adjourned so I can consider it.

GENERAL MARSHALL: The second proposal of the Government pertaining to the Committee of Three, I must request you gentlemen to negotiate that among yourselves and not in my presence. That is a Chinese battle that I have no part in. I will ask Colonel Caughey to prepare a fair copy of this as far as we have reached agreement—triple spaced. As I understand the desire of the members, we will adjourn to meet tomorrow. What time and what place is suggested?

GENERAL CHOU: I suggest that the meeting will take place on day after tomorrow instead of tomorrow because I want some time to prepare a proposal regarding the reorganization of the army plan.

GENERAL MARSHALL: We will meet day after tomorrow morning,

and unless information to the contrary is received, at 10:00. Here—provided it is not raining.

The meeting is then adjourned.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Directive for the Termination of Hostilities in Manchuria*⁷³

To the Commissioners from the Committee of Three:

On the basis of the orders of June 6, 1946 halting all advances, attacks and pursuits for a period of 15 days commencing at noon of June 7th, which will be continued in effect, we, the Committee of Three, announce the following instructions to govern a complete termination of hostilities in Manchuria:

a. The terms of 10 January 1946 for the cessation of hostilities will govern except as hereinafter specifically modified, or later directed by the Committee of Three.

b. Commanders of forces in close contact or engaged in actual fighting will immediately direct their troops to cease fighting and will seek to secure a local truce by establishing liaison with the opposing commanders, pending the arrival of a field team. They should both immediately withdraw their respective troops from close contact.

c. The readjustment of troops found to be in close contact or actually engaged in fighting will be directed by the field team on the ground by requiring the withdrawal for specified distances, normally 20 li, of one or both forces according to the circumstances. The local situation believed to have existed at noon of June 7, 1946 will be the basis for determining the readjustment of the troops involved.

d. All movements of Government or Communist troops of a tactical nature will cease. Administrative and supply movements as authorized in the original cease fire order of January 10, 1946 may be carried out within the garrisoned areas if previously approved by a field team.

e. Within fifteen days after the issuance of this agreement, lists showing all units together with commanders of regiments and larger units, strength and locations in Manchuria will be submitted to the advance section of Executive Headquarters in Changchun.

f. The Government will move no additional combat units to Manchuria. However, individual replacements of the Government are authorized for the purpose of bringing up to approved strength those units authorized in the basic plan for the reorganization and integration dated February 25, 1946, as hereafter amended.

⁷³ Marginal notation: "Passed on 24 June, not signed".

g. Officers failing to carry out the terms of this agreement will be relieved and disciplined by their respective commanders.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Directive for the Reopening of Lines of Communications in North and Central China*⁷⁴

1. All lines of communications in North and Central China will be opened without delay for free and unrestricted interchange of goods, foodstuffs and ideas, and for free and unrestricted civilian travel.

2. Reconstruction of railways will proceed immediately and will progress as rapidly as is consistent with the time limitations necessarily imposed by labor and materiel requirements. Time estimate for construction of the railroad lines is covered in Appendix A.

3. All local commanders and all team members shall expedite construction by all means within their power. No commander nor team member will permit interference with the construction work or with the work of removal or destruction of fortifications for any reason whatsoever.

4. Construction will start before 30 June 1946 at each of the following points, under supervision of Communications teams and under control of the MOC:

Team No. 18—Tientsin-Pukow RR from Tsang Hsien to Te Hsien.

Team No. 23—Tientsin-Pukow RR from Yucheng to Te Hsien.

Team No. 23 or 16—Tientsin-Pukow RR from Taian to Yenchow.

Team No. 24—Tientsin-Pukow RR from Hanchuan to Yenchow.

Team No. 21—Tsinan-Tsingtao RR from Kaomi to Fengtze.

Team No. 23 or 7—Tsinan-Tsingtao RR from Chengtien to Fengtze.

Team No. 24 or 4—Lunghai RR from Hsuchow to Haichow.

Construction on other railroad lines will be commenced at the earliest practicable date in conformance with the principles herein contained.

5. All mines, fortifications, blockades, blockhouses, and other military works lying within 1,000 meters on either side of the railroads listed above will be removed or destroyed simultaneously with construction, except those military works constructed for defense of, and lying within 1,000 meters of, vital railroad installations such as 1st or 2nd class railroad stations, tunnels, or bridges of total span of more than 5 meters, and within 200 meters of 3rd class stations. This work of removal or destruction will proceed in the direction of construction

⁷⁴ Marginal notation: "Passed on 24 June, not signed".

within each of the 7 construction areas above listed, at such rate that the removal or demolition will, at all times, be completed for a distance of not less than 1,000 meters in advance of completed construction of the railroad. At the same time, other military works along the operating portions of the above-mentioned lines will be removed or destroyed at a constant rate such that the removal or destruction will have been completed on or before the date of completion of the railroad within the area of control of each of the above 7 listed teams. When work of restoration of the other railroad lines in North and Central China is commenced, this same principle shall apply. However, the Lunghai railroad west of Chenghsien and the Peiping-Hankow railroad south of Chenghsien are specifically exempted from the program for removal or destruction of military works, and the destruction or removal of military works along the Lunghai railroad between Hsuchow and Chenghsien will be deferred until ----- . No new fortifications will be erected except to meet attacks against the railroad itself and only after approval by a communications team.

6. Before through traffic is permitted over the reopened sectors of the railroads, qualified railroad personnel of the CCP may be taken into the employ of the MOC in accordance with a plan to be determined. The qualifications of such personnel will be determined by examinations conducted by communications teams or by the Communications Group of the Executive Headquarters.

7. Detailed plans for the restoration of all other lines of communications in accordance with General Directive 4 will be covered by later agreement. This directive shall not prejudice in any way General Directive 4.

[Annex]

APPENDIX A

TIME SCHEDULE

	<i>Days</i>
Tientsin-Pukow RR from Tsang Hsien to Te-Hsien	75
Yucheng to Te-Hsien	60
Taian to Yenchow	60
Hanchuan to Yenchow	90
Tsinan-Tsingtao RR	30
Lung-Hai RR Hsuchow to Haichow	30
Peiping-Suiyuan RR, Hankow to Paotou	45
Peiping-Hankow RR, Yuanshih to Anyang	150
Tung-Po RR, Lingfen to Yunchang	50
Peiping-Ku Pei Kou RR	30
Tatung-Taiyuan RR	30

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Stipulations for the Resolution of Certain Disagreements Among the Field and Communication Teams, and Executive Headquarters in Changchun and Peiping*⁷⁵

I. FIELD AND COMMUNICATION TEAMS

a. In case of disagreement regarding matters of urgency, the American representative of the field or communication team may render his own report of the situation as he sees it direct to Executive Headquarters in Changchun or Peiping requesting instructions.

b. In case of disagreement, the American representative of the field team is authorized to make decision as to where and when the field team will move within his area to conduct investigations regarding military activities. Regarding the place of investigation, transportation difficulties should not be permitted to prejudice or delay the movement of the teams.

c. In case of disagreement regarding matters relating to cessation of hostilities and separation of forces the American representative of the field team is authorized to issue orders in the name of the Executive Headquarters to the field commanders on both sides to stop fighting at once and to effect the separation of the forces as prescribed in accordance with directives.

d. The area assigned to each field and communication team will be designated by Executive Headquarters.

II. EXECUTIVE HEADQUARTERS IN CHANGCHUN AND PEIPING

a. In case of disagreement the senior American official of Executive Headquarters in Peiping or Changchun may render his own report to Executive Headquarters in Peiping or the Committee of Three based on the situation as he sees it requesting instructions.

b. In case of disagreement regarding the implementation of orders or instructions from the higher level, the senior American official of the Executive Headquarters in Peiping or Changchun is authorized to direct the execution of that order or instruction unless amended or rescinded by the higher level itself.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Draft of Directive To Be Issued by the Committee of Three*⁷⁶

To the Commissioners from the Committee of Three:

An agreement for the complete termination of hostilities in Manchuria has been signed and issued by the Committee of Three this date.

⁷⁵ Marginal notation: "Passed on 24 June, (not signed)".

⁷⁶ Proposed by General Chou En-lai to the Committee of Three on June 24, but tabled for further study.

The following instructions are issued for the purpose of assisting field teams in effecting a uniform application of the terms of the agreement regarding troops found in close contact or actually engaged in combat:

In general there will be four cases confronting the field teams:

1. Where troops of one side are in a city or town and the troops of the other side are outside that city or town. In this case the forces outside the city will be required to withdraw for a prescribed distance.

2. Where troops control a railroad but the points of close contact with an opposing force is within 30 li of that railroad. In this case the opposing troops will be required to withdraw from the point of contact a prescribed distance. In cases of close contact at greater than 30 lis distance from the railroad both sides will be required to withdraw (the troops controlling the railroad the lesser distance) except that troops controlling the railroad will not be required to withdraw closer to the railroad than 30 li.

3. Where the line separating the hostile troops crosses a railroad or river. In this case the opposing forces will be required to withdraw along the railroad or river for a prescribed distance.

4. Where the opposing forces are in close contact or actually engaged in fighting in open country. In such cases the opposing forces will both be required to withdraw a prescribed distance.

Normally a distance of 20 li between the opposing factions should be secured by the withdrawal of one or both forces.

893.00/6-2446 : Airgram

The Counselor of Embassy in China (Smyth) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, June 24, 1946.

[Received July 9—12: 35 p. m.]

A-69. Embassy refers to airgram A-65 dated June 8, 1946 ⁷⁷ and for purposes of record notes below the full text of a statement issued by the Ministry of Information at 2:00 p. m. on June 21, 1946 with regard to the extension of the cease fire order of June 7, 1946:

"In order to show their utmost sincerity and conciliatory attitude, the Government have decided to extend the Presidential Order for the cessation of advances, attacks and pursuits for 8 more days. The President of the National Government has given orders to Army commanders that suspension of offensive action, that is, advances, attacks and pursuits will be continued in force until noon of June 30th, 1946.

"Within this period, agreements regarding the cessation of hostilities, reopening of communications, and the reorganization and redistribution of the military forces should be completed, and in view of the urgency of relieving the prolonged sufferings of our nation, no further delay should be permitted."

For Chargé ⁷⁸

SMYTH

⁷⁷ Not printed.

⁷⁸ Walter S. Robertson, at Peiping.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Chou En-lai to General Marshall, General Hsu Yung-chang, and General Yu Ta-wei

SM 595

NANKING, June 24, 1946.

Last night Mr. Chang Wen-chin, my secretary, notified Colonel Caughey verbally of the outrage which just then occurred at Hsia Kwan Station in Nanking. Colonel Caughey immediately took up the matter with General Yu Ta-wei who promised to transmit it to General Chen Cheng⁷⁹ for taking proper action.

What actually was going on then was that the representatives sent down here by Shanghai civic bodies to sue peace were besieged and severely beaten by some 200 well-organized Nanking secret policemen from 18:00 till midnight. Without showing mercy to any of them, the rowdies beat and insulted all the representatives and others, and robbed away their money and valuables. Throughout the outrage by-standing policemen and gendarmes looked on with complete indifference. Only until 00:30 this morning, when the representatives and other injured persons had collapsed on the ground and the rowdies had scattered, the Garrison Headquarters sent soldiers to the scene and carried the injured on a truck to hospital. Of the 12 people thus injured, 4 are Shanghai civic representatives, the rest being Nanking reporters and civilians who came out to meet the representatives. The names of these persons are listed on the enclosed sheet of paper.⁸⁰

There should be no question that representatives of civic bodies to lodge petition to the Government should be protected by the Government, no matter of what nature those bodies are. In this instance, the representatives sent down by the Shanghai civic bodies came to sue peace and a termination of civil war, and they further planned to make representation to General Marshall and the Government and Communist members of the Committee of Three for no other purpose than wishing to be helpful to the proceeding of this Committee. In that light they should particularly be given protection.

I am deeply aware that the Committee of Three has always highly appreciated the views and opinions expressed by civic bodies and their representatives as well as personages of the society who were making every effort to bring about peace and termination of civil war. In this particular case the representatives from Shanghai not only do represent the civic bodies who elected them, but are also qualified to speak for the 50 to 60,000 Shanghailanders who went to the North Station to bid them farewell. On this account, the Government should attach importance to their cause, and, instead of allowing some 200

⁷⁹ Chinese Chief of General Staff.

⁸⁰ Not printed.

secret policemen to commit this misdeed, the Government should sincerely receive them and listen to their representation.

In view of this, we lodge a strong protest to the Government against this incident and propose that the Government take the following measures in order to allay the anger of the public:

1, the Government shall issue an order that the culprits, held responsible for the beating of the peaceful Shanghai representatives at Hsia Kwan Station, be punished;

2, the Government shall issue order to make investigation into the responsibility of the policemen and gendarmes in connection with the outrage and impose due punishment on those being responsible for the negligence of duty;

3, the Government shall issue an order to disband the secret police organization of the Bureaus of Statistics and Investigation of the army and the Kuomintang Party, and pledge that no like incident would recur;

4, the Government shall issue an order to safeguard the rights of civic bodies and individuals to present petition to the Government;

5, the Government shall pay for all medical expenses of the injured and indemnify for all their losses;

6, the Government shall be responsible for the safeguard of the representatives during their stay in Nanking as well as any other time thereafter.

It is urgently requested that the Government shall give a reply to the above-listed proposals at the next session of the Committee of Three.

[Signature in Chinese]
(CHOU EN-LAI)

893.00/6-2546 : Telegram

The Consul General at Shanghai (Davis) to the Secretary of State

SHANGHAI, June 25, 1946—8 p. m.

[Received June 26—10:17 a. m.]

1132. Approximately 50,000 people from labor unions, women's organizations, universities, and middle, lower and vocational schools participated in so-called anti-civil war meeting and parade Shanghai June 23. Occasion of meeting was departure for Nanking of anti-civil war delegation led by Ma Shao-lin, scholar and former Vice-Minister Education. Professor Ma accompanied by professors, businessmen, student and labor leaders. Delegation, also Dr. Tao Hsing-chih (educator), addressed crowd at north station. Following meeting paraders marched throughout Shanghai. They carried banners and pasted posters on buildings, including this Consulate.

Slogans emphasized desire to end civil war and achieve democracy and to have United States stop aiding "Chinese reactionaries." United States urged to remove American troops from China, terminate military lend-lease, and support "democratic forces". Posters critical of effect of American imports on Chinese industry, opening other ports to foreign shipping, foreign influence (Shanghai serial 1132, repeated Nanking as 632, June 25, 8 p. m.) in customs, handbills stressed friendship with the American people, but condemned American activities which they allege are turned against the democratic forces.

Demonstration was organized by elements associated with Shanghai Federation of People's Organizations, independent, anti-Kuomintang forces. Parade also contained labor and student elements not affiliated with Federation. Great variety of slogans indicated effort of organizers to attract widespread support for this anti-civil war movement. No special Chinese Communist influence evident in meeting activities or banners, posters, or handbills.

DAVIS

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum From the Headquarters of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek

[NANKING,] June 25, 1946.

POINTS FOR GENERAL MARSHALL'S REFERENCE

I. The total ratio between the strength of Government forces and that of Communist forces shall not be altered in the revised plan.

II. The problem of the garrison areas assigned to all forces should be solved once for all. The Government cannot agree to the settlement of the garrison areas in Manchuria alone, while deferring the problem in North China to a later date.

III. The time set for the process of concentration of troops to the assigned areas shall not exceed three months at most. A monthly program for this concentration should be worked out previously.

IV. The following points are requested by the National Government:

1. That within ten (10) days after this agreement is to be signed, the Communist troops must evacuate from all those cities and towns in the provinces of Shangtung and Shansi occupied by them after the date June 7th 1946.

2. That within ten (10) days after this agreement is to be signed,

the Communist troops must evacuate from the entire Tsinan-Tsin[g]tao railway line, the segment of Tientsin-Pukow railway line between Lincheng and Hsuehchow, and the branch railway line from Lincheng to Tsaochwang.

3. Communist troops now in Chengteh, provincial capital of Jehol, Kupeikow and Northern Kiangsu, must finish their evacuation no later than one month after the signing of this agreement.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Chou En-lai to General Marshall

SM 596

NANKING, 25 June 1946.

At our last conference you informed me of the Government's desire to have Mr. Chao Chun-man, mayor of Changchun, Mr. Chao's associates, General Pan Hsuo-tuan, commander of the 184th Division, and a few others released prior to June 30th. After consulting the Communist Commander in Manchuria I now wish to make the following comment:

Mayor Chao Chun-man can be released. However, the Chinese Communist Party also desires that the Government would release Mr. Wang Sheng-tai, secretary of the Mukden Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party, prior to June 30th. Mr. Wang, who is a well-known author under the pen-name King Jen, was arrested in Mukden by the Government troops around the middle of April. It is learned that Mr. Wang Sheng-tai was initially detained in the Army prison in Mukden, later on probably transferred to Chinchow. On May 6, we sent a letter to Mr. Shao Li-tse, Government representative of the PCC, requesting him to secure from Generalissimo's Northeastern Field Headquarters Mr. Wang's release, yet no reply has been made by that Headquarters insofar.

As to General Pan Hsuo-tuan, commander of the 184th Division, and his subordinate regiment commander, since they had come over to the Communists on their own accord, we have the responsibility to render them protection, and cannot therefore turn them back to the Government.

Your comment on the foregoing would be appreciated.⁸¹

[Signature in Chinese]
(CHOU EN-LAI)

⁸¹ General Marshall forwarded to Gen. Yu Ta-wei with memorandum OSE 236, June 27, not printed, a copy of this memorandum requesting that "in your subsequent handling of this matter you discuss it direct with General Chou."

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Chou En-lai to General Marshall

MM 055

NANKING, June 25, 1946.

DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: Regarding the "Basis for Military Reorganization and for the Integration of the Communist Forces Into the National Army",⁸² the kernel issue of our additional proposal lies in the amendment and addition of certain provisions in the light of the changed situation in Manchuria. It is not backed by any intention to alter those basic policies which are embodied in that agreement, such as "subordination of army to politics", "Divorce of Army from Civil Administration", "Separation of Military Operations, Military Administration and Military Training", or to modify the strength and the deployment in a general scale. Should the Government insist on an alteration of those basic policies, it would be bound to meet our opposition.

What the Chinese Communist Party insists upon is merely the modification and addition of such terms, that the Communist forces in Manchuria shall become two armies, comprising five divisions, at the end of the first stage of reorganization, and four divisions at the end of the second stage. Since it thus exceeds the strength provided by the original agreement by 2 divisions at the end of the first stage, and 3 divisions at the end of the second stage, the total strength of the Communist forces shall become 20 divisions and 13 divisions respectively. I beg to forward the following reasons for claiming this increase of strength:

1. The Northeastern Democratic Joint Army had not been recognized by the Government in the earlier days, but at the present time it should be taken into consideration by the Army Reorganization Agreement;

2. Hostilities in Manchuria have never been ceased prior to June 7th. Since the end of February when the Army Reorganization Agreement was signed, the actual conditions have undergone a fundamental change.

In view of the foregoing reasons our proposal of increasing the strength and the force ratio of Communist-led forces in Manchuria should neither imply that some of the Communist forces assigned to China proper be shifted to Manchuria, nor that the Government forces in Manchuria be proportionately increased. It implies only and alone that the strength of the Communist forces in Manchuria as well as

⁸² February 25, p. 295.

its ration vis-à-vis the Government forces be varied to the favour of the Communist forces. That and nothing else is what it implies.

We further suggest that the Manchurian annex⁸³ to the Army Reorganization Agreement be enforced on July 1st, and completed over the same span of time as in China proper (18 months). But the first stage of reorganization can be completed within a period of six months, so that the integration may commence on January 1, 1947.

As regards the disposition of the various Government and Communist armies and divisions in Manchuria and China proper at the end of the 1st stage of reorganization, I have now worked out a tentative draft as shown in the enclosed tables and overlays.⁸⁴

On anything else, my memo MM 047 under date June 19, 1946, is referred to.

[Signature in Chinese]
(CHOU EN-LAI)

(Annex 1)

READJUSTMENT IN THE MILITARY REORGANIZATION AND INTEGRATION
OF THE COMMUNIST FORCES INTO THE NATIONAL ARMY

(Revised by Gen. Chou En-lai)

On the basis of the orders of June 6, 1946 halting all advances, attacks and pursuits for a period of 15 days commencing at noon of June 7th, which will be continued in effect, we, the Committee of Three, announce the following instructions with respect to readjustments in the "Basis for Military Reorganization and for the Integration of the Communist Forces into the National Army" dated February 25, 1946 (referred hereinafter as "the basic agreement"):

a. The terms of the basic agreement (inclosure 1⁸⁵) remain in effect except as herein modified and amended.

b. For the purpose of regulating the various steps in the prescribed procedure in accordance with the stated time periods, the effective date of this basic agreement shall be considered as June 1, 1946.

c. Specific modifications follow:

1. Articles I, II, VI, VII and VIII—No change.

⁸³ June 17, p. 1076.

⁸⁴ Overlays not attached to file copy.

⁸⁵ See footnote 27, p. 295.

2. Article III—The second sentence of Section 1 shall be modified as follows:

“At the conclusion of 12 months the armies shall consist of 110 divisions of not to exceed 14,000 men each. Of these, 20 shall be formed from Communist Forces.[”]

3. Article V—Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of Section 1 shall be modified as follows:

“the Communist Party shall demobilize all units in excess of 20 divisions.”

“The dates for the submission of the two lists to the Military Subcommittee shall both be July 21st, 1946.”

“This report shall include a list of the 20 divisions to be retained.[”]

Article IV—Section 4 shall be modified as follows:

“During the 6 months following the first 12 months the National divisions shall be further reduced to 50 and the Communist divisions shall be further reduced to 13, making a total of 63 divisions to be organized into 21 armies.”

4. Article V—Paragraph 1 of Section 2 shall be modified as follows:

“Northeast China— . . . and 2 armies consisting of 3 and 2 Communist divisions respectively, each army with a Communist commander—total 7 armies.[”]

Article V—Section 3 shall be modified as follows:

“During the following 6 months the 4 army groups referred to in Section 2 above shall be reorganized, creating 4 separate armies each consisting of 1 National and 2 Communist divisions. Thereafter, the organization of army groups shall be terminated. [”]

Article V—paragraph 1 of Section 4 shall be modified as follows:

“Northeast China—2 armies consisting of 2 National and 1 Communist divisions with a National commander; 1 army consisting of 1 National and 2 Communist divisions with a Communist commander, and 3 armies each consisting of 3 National divisions, each with a National commander—total 6 armies. [”]

5. Article VIII—Add words “as amended” to the end of the first sentence of Section 2.

d. Movement by any forces even though authorized by this or other agreements, will be reported to Executive Headquarters prior to the movement and the movement will not be executed without clearance from Executive Headquarters.

e. The Executive Headquarters shall be the agency responsible for placing into effect the terms of this agreement and shall do so in accordance with the terms of the Memorandum to Executive Headquarters agreed to and issued by the Committee of Three on March 16, 1946.

GENERAL HSU YUNG CHANG
*Authorized Representative of the
National Government*

GENERAL CHOU EN LAI
*Authorized Representative of the
Chinese Communist Party*

GENERAL G. C. MARSHALL

[Annex 2]

DISPOSITION OF COMMUNIST ARMY AFTER REORGANIZATION
(at the end of 1st period)

A. FOUR ARMIES (12 DIVISIONS) IN NORTH CHINA

<i>Unit</i>	<i>Location of army headquarters</i>	<i>Location of division headquarters</i>	
Army	Tsining	(1) D Tsining	(1) D Suiteh
Army	Kalgan	(1) D Kalgan (1) D Chihfeng	(1) D Chengteh
Army	Hantan	(1) D Hsingtai (1) D Changchih	(1) D Wensi (1) D Hotze
Army	Lini	(1) D Yitu (1) D Tehhsien	(1) D Tenghsien

(see overlay 1)

B. ONE ARMY (3 DIVISIONS) IN CENTRAL CHINA

<i>Unit</i>	<i>Location of army headquarters</i>	<i>Location of division headquarters</i>	
Army	Hwaian	(1) D Hwaian (1) D Tungtai	(1) D Suchien

(see overlay 1)

DISPOSITION OF COMMUNIST ARMY AFTER REORGANIZATION—CON.

C. TWO ARMIES (5 DIVISIONS) IN NORTHEAST CHINA

<i>Unit</i>	<i>Location of army headquarters</i>	<i>Location of division headquarters</i>	
Army	Harbin	(1) D Harbin (1) D Taoan (Paicheng)	(1) D Tsitsihar
Army	Antung	(1) D Antung	(1) D Mutanchiang

(see overlay II)

DISPOSITION OF GOVERNMENT ARMY AFTER REORGANIZATION
(at the end of 1st period)

A. FIVE ARMIES (15 DIVISIONS) IN NORTHEAST CHINA

<i>Unit</i>	<i>Location of army headquarters</i>	<i>Location of division headquarters</i>	
Army	Changchun	(2) D Changchun	(1) D Kirin
Army	Szepingkai	(1) D Szepingkai (1) D Kaiyuan	(1) D Hsian
Army	Mukden	(1) D Mukden (1) D Fushun	(1) D Penhsi
Army	Yingkou	(1) D Yingkou (1) D Haicheng	(1) D Anshan
Army	Chinchow	(1) D Chinchow (1) D Suichung	(1) D Hulutao

(see overlay III)

B. FIVE ARMIES (15 DIVISIONS) IN NORTHWEST CHINA

<i>Unit</i>	<i>Location of army headquarters</i>	<i>Location of division headquarters</i>	
Army	Ninghsia	(1) D Ninghsia (1) D Chungning	(1) D Tengkou
Army	Sining	(1) D Sining (1) D Chiuchuan	(1) D Tulan
Army	Kaolan	(1) D Kaolan (1) D Tienshui	(1) D Pingliang
Army	Tihua	(1) D Tihua (1) D Usu	(1) D Hami
Army	Yenshih	(1) D Yenshih (1) D Paicheng	(1) D Tulufan

(see overlay III)

DISPOSITION OF GOVERNMENT ARMY AFTER REORGANIZATION—CON.

C. SEVEN ARMIES (21 DIVISIONS) IN NORTH CHINA

<i>Unit</i>	<i>Location of army headquarters</i>	<i>Location of division headquarters</i>	
Army	Tientsin	(1) D Shanhaikwan (1) D Tientsin	(1) D Tangshan
Army	Peiping	(1) D Peiping (1) D Shihchiachwang	(1) D Paoting
Army	Tsinan	(1) D Tsinan (1) D Tsingtao	(1) D Weihsien
Army	Kaifeng	(1) D Kaifeng (1) D Anyang	(1) D Hsinhsiang
Army	Loyang	(1) D Loyang (1) D Shanhsien	(1) D Chenghsien
Army	Taiyuan	(1) D Taiyuan (1) D Linfen	(1) D Fenyang
Army	Kweisui	(1) D Kweisui (1) D Wuyuan	(1) D Paotou

(see overlay III)

D. NINE ARMIES (27 DIVISIONS) IN CENTRAL CHINA

<i>Unit</i>	<i>Location of army headquarters</i>	<i>Location of division headquarters</i>	
Army	Hsuchow	(1) D Hsuchow (1) D Hofei	(1) D Pangfu
Army	Nanking	(1) D Nanking (1) D Wuhu	(1) D Chenkiang
Army	Shanghai	(1) D Shanghai (1) D Hangchow	(1) D Soochow
Army	Hankow	(1) D Hankow (1) D Kiukiang	(1) D Hsinyang
Army	Changsha	(1) D Changsha (1) D Hengyang	(1) D Yuehyang
Army	Chungking	(1) D Chungking (1) D Ichang	(1) D Wanhsien
Army	Sian	(1) D Sian (1) D Nancheng	(1) D Tungkwan
Army	Chengtu	(1) D Chengtu (1) D Ipin	(1) D Chienyang
Army	Kangting	(1) D Kangting (1) D Hsichang	(1) D Yaan

(see overlay III)

DISPOSITION OF GOVERNMENT ARMY AFTER REORGANIZATION—Con.

E. FOUR ARMIES (12 DIVISIONS) IN SOUTH CHINA

<i>Unit</i>	<i>Location of army headquarters</i>	<i>Location of division headquarters</i>	
Army	Foochow	(1) D Foochow (1) D Amoy	(1) D Taipei
Army	Canton	(1) D Canton (1) D Kaoyao	(1) D Swatow
Army	Kweiyang	(1) D Kweiyang (1) D Nanning	(1) D Kweilin
Army	Kunming	(1) D Kunming (1) D Tali	(1) D Chuching

(see overlay III)

893.00/6-2646

*General Marshall to President Truman*⁸⁶

[NANKING,] June 26, 1946.

[995.] DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The negotiations have reached a point where the detailed instructions to govern a cessation of hostilities have been agreed to, also, the instructions for the reopening of communications. Further, an important agreement has been completed granting certain authorities to the American officer on teams and at Executive Headquarters which should greatly facilitate the control of situations by Executive Headquarters in the future. We are now engaged in the far more difficult matter of the redistribution and reduction of troops in Manchuria and North and Central China. The Manchurian phase seems to be the least difficult of the three to compose. The Communists submitted their detailed proposals⁸⁷ this morning and I am at this moment engaged with General Chou in a discussion⁸⁸ of the proposals. I write while he is making his statements in Chinese or listening to the translation of mine.

The Communist proposals are far apart from the government demands and there remain but a few days in which to achieve a compromise solution. The situation is further complicated by the freely expressed desire of some to settle the issue by force, by mass meetings in Shanghai carefully organized to stir up anti-American feeling related to current Congressional consideration of Lend-Lease matters in particular.

⁸⁶ Copy transmitted by the War Department to the Department of State on June 26.

⁸⁷ See *supra*.

⁸⁸ See *infra*.

I realize the circumstances which have caused the initiation of new measures in Congress for aid to China at this time, but these moves, coming at the most critical stage of my negotiations, are causing difficulty and embarrassment. The Communists profess to regard recent measures and official statements in Washington as proving their contention that American economic and military support to the Kuomintang Government will continue to be given irrespective of whether the government offers the Communists a fair and reasonable basis for settlement of military and political differences. The Communists maintain new legislation intended to aid China is reinforcing the government's tendency to deal with the Communists by force and thus is contributing to all out civil war. They relate the proposed Congressional action to active support of the government military power in the immediate future and not many months hence as would be the case.

I think it is a fact that some die-hard Kuomintang elements in other government councils are utilizing recent American measures as a basis for pressing the Generalissimo to push forward with a campaign of determination against the Communists. At the same time, these and other Kuomintang extremists appear to be joining in anti-American agitation on the grounds that American economic pressure is causing American imports to displace Chinese products, bankrupt Chinese industrialists and prevent Chinese recovery. These Kuomintang groups also are antagonistic to the restraint exercised by myself and other Americans on the government with regard to an anti-Communist military campaign, and are even using the Communist line against American intervention in pursuance of their aim to free the government from any American impediment to drastic anti-Communist action.

The agitation and propaganda resulting from the activity of the different factions is being manifested in mass demonstrations, press campaigns and mob actions, such as, the incident at the Nanking Railway Station on the night of June 24 [23]. It would be helpful if government spokesmen in Washington seized a favorable occasion to explain the aims and development of American measures for aid to China.⁸⁹ The recent moves are but steps in the complete implementation of a long agreed program for helping the Chinese nation as a whole to rid itself of the Japanese. These moves include steps to implement the agreement reached in Chungking, February 25 last, for reorganization and unification of the armed forces of China. They are intended to cement rather than destroy unity, and were planned

⁸⁹ With the approval of President Truman, Acting Secretary of State Acheson on June 28 issued a statement to the press along lines suggested by General Marshall; for text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 7, 1946, p. 34.

for a single National Army made up of both Communist and Central Government troops. All of the steps concerned involve a lengthy procedure of negotiation, agreements, legislative action and, lastly, decisions by yourself in accordance with the existing situation; these steps consume many months, more than a year in this case, and if interrupted could not be quickly, if ever, resumed.

It could be pointed out that measures to provide economic aid to China in the form of supplies and credits are an impartial American effort to contribute to a solution of the acute economic crisis in the country and prevent a complete economic breakdown. It could be stressed that it is the American hope that economic assistance be carried out in China through the medium of a government of all factions, including the Communists, and that the American Government feels that a few measures of economic assistance could not be held in abeyance despite the failure, so far, of Chinese groups to come together in a unified government, without danger of an economic collapse which would spell a great tragedy for the common people of China.

G. C. MARSHALL

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chou
En-lai at 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, June 26, 1946, 2 p. m.*

Also present: Mr. Chang
Colonel Caughey
Captain Soong

GENERAL MARSHALL: Thank General Chou for sending me the papers⁹⁰ this morning. I want to ask several questions about them.

The first question related to these long firm lines which are shown here as Communist garrison areas and Nationalist garrison areas. They seem to be the same on this map and also on the next. The lines are the same and yet the disposition of the troops is changed somewhat—I did not understand that.

COLONEL CAUGHEY: The lines are the same because it shows the end of the first period in both cases.

GENERAL MARSHALL: This is all the first period? That is what confused me. So they are the same and this is the disposition of the Government troops?

Now, regarding the first paragraph of General Chou's letter to me in which he states there is no intention to alter those basic policies which are embodied in that agreement, such as "Subordination of Army to Politics," "Divorce of Army from Civil Administrator"

⁹⁰ See memorandum MM 055, June 25, p. 1195.

and "Separation of Military Operation, Military Administration and Military Training"; that so far as I know is not the subject of disagreement on part of the Government, and I agree with General Chou.

In the next paragraph appears the question of the five divisions in Manchuria which would result in an increase from 18 to 20 divisions in the first 12 months. I have not discussed the increase from 18 to 20 divisions with the Central Government. As far as I have gotten with the Central Government in the matter was the question of the reconsideration of comparative strengths in Manchuria, in which the Government had indicated they would agree to a 5 to 1 ratio, which meant an increase of 2 Communist divisions. In the final period there would be three instead of one. General Chou is familiar with that except he has used the expression once or twice that General Marshall proposed the two-division increase. The fact of the matter is that when General Chou told me of the Communist proposal of five Communist divisions in Manchuria, I stated, as he will recall, my own view. My view was that it inevitably meant an increase in Government troops if accepted by the Government at all. I did not think either side gained and that both would lose because of increased burden of armies in Manchuria. However, the point is that I succeeded in persuading the Government to agree to a 5 to 1 ratio as a basis for proceeding with negotiations. My own estimate is that there is no possibility that the Government will agree to a five division ratio in Manchuria, with the total increasing from 18 to 20 divisions. The best I can do this afternoon in the limited time available, is to indicate to General Chou where I think a state of complete disagreement exists. I have not seen anybody from the Government since receipt of this plan, and I am therefore basing my remarks on past conversations regarding various points which I have discussed with the Government before.

I think that regarding this area (pointing to north Kiangsu), the Government will never agree to its continued occupation until we reach the point in the progress of reorganizing and unifying the armies that indicates a peaceful basis of negotiations without prospect of renewed hostilities. I am quite certain the Government will be unwilling to accept the disposition indicated here, in close proximity to the capital at Nanking. The added factor of the movement of this army from here (pointing to Hopei) to increase the garrison and also I assume will greatly increase the Government's unwillingness to rescind from its position regarding this area or retreat from this position regarding that area. So, referring to these troops in the area I am now outlining, I have been turning over in my mind, and I ask General Chou to consider, any other compromise disposition for these people to the north of Hankow in Hopei.

To go on to another area, the continued occupation of Chengtu is I know to be a point of great importance in the position of the Government. The location of these divisions on that particular railroad line is another point I would assume to which they will take decided exception. Those are the most critical factors I see at the moment which might prevent an agreement. I am not discussing the Manchurian dispositions at the present moment. I would rather wait until General Chou talks to me about whatever he has to present, including my comments thus far.

GENERAL CHOU: I would like to exchange views with you freely on various points so that each may get clarified. First, we are talking at a time when political affairs are not touched upon at all because it is understood that political matters will be taken up later. We do this reluctantly because we find it necessary to raise the political problems at the same time. Since we are being forced to postpone talking on political matters, one critical issue arises; that is while the disposition of troops is settled, we are entirely unaware what is the Government stand with regard to political affairs. These present great difficulty to us. But, with a view to settling the outstanding issues, we cannot leave political matters aside and talk merely on military affairs, in particular disposition of troops. This is rather incompatible with the principle of having military problems subordinate to political affairs, as stipulated by the P. C. C., and also, as you have told me, according to the American way of subordinating the army to the Government.

The second principle is the divorce of civil administration from the army, which is also a principle laid down by the P. C. C. We have in mind to solve the problem of disposition of troops by this principle. You just asked me about the significance of the boundary lines. Now, it is our view that the political and military matters should be separated. According to our plan, the army units will only be stationed in those spots as shown on the map, and it will have no connection with the civil administration at all. Then after the reorganization of the Government, local self-government—the Communist army units will be concentrated and assembled within areas under Communist control, as shown here (referring to the map) and Government troops will also be concentrated and assembled in areas under the Government control. Then after reorganization of the army and the initiation of a coalition Government, the local self-government will be effected. When we have adopted a constitution, a provincial election, that is popular election, will be held. By that time, this boundary will automatically go out of the picture. This is the way we are thinking to achieve political democratic unity of China. This is also the idea expressed by the P. C. C. regarding divorce of army from

civil administration, and which I believe is also the line you explained to me as that in the United States.

The third principle is the division of military operations into military training and military operations. The President will be empowered through the Ministry of National Defense and the State Council, to effect any movement of troops. This power is vested in the coalition Government. As to military training, army units will carry out their military training in accordance with the plan worked out by the general Chief of Staff. As to military administration, such as demobilization and recruiting, it will be taken care of by the civil administration and the local civil authorities.

These three matters are entirely separated from each other. This is the line of our proposal, as well as the basic plan of the army reorganization.

Now, the idea of the Government as embodied in its proposal is different. The Government's idea is that wherever troops go, political matters will be adjusted according to the troops which are there. This is entirely against the principle of subordination of army to the politics. For example, the Tingyuan area was recently occupied by Government troops. The local authorities were wiped out and they sent new personnel to take over the civil administration. I predict that as soon as the Communists north of Hankow have evacuated, Government forces will completely wipe out the existing local civil administration and replace it by theirs. So the whole idea is wherever troops go, civil administration will be entirely altered. This is the way in which the Government wants to solve the disposition of troops.

Therefore, from the way in which the Government proposed the disposition of Government and Communist troops, they asked that Government troops be stationed in Jehol, in the Kalgan area, Shantung peninsula, around the Tientsin-Pukou railway, and the Peiping-Hankow railway, and that the Communists evacuate a large part of north Kiangsu, north Shansi and North Anhwei, so that Communist areas will be drastically reduced to such areas as the area around Yen-an, the northern poor area of Chahar which is almost without population, southeast Shansi, the middle of Hopeh around Tungming, and to the area around Lini in Shantung. In this way, instead of concentrating their troops, they are moving nearly to the Communist area, with the result that civil administration will inevitably also be changed. All the railway lines and large cities will be occupied by Nationalist troops and democratic institutions which now exist will be eradicated.

The Government's proposal is incompatible. In the first place, it subordinates politics to the army. Second, it fails to divorce military affairs from civil affairs, so that civil administration will have to

adapt itself to the change of troop positions. Third, as you told me last time, the reason they put such circles on the Government areas is for the purpose of demobilizing. This however, does not seem reasonable to me because while Communist troops are concentrated, Government troops are moving toward Communist areas, or coming into Communist areas, I do not see any reason why they should carry out demobilization in Communist areas since their soldiers come from the southwest or southern part of China. Instead of demobilizing, they will recruit more people from our area. That is against the principle of separation of military and civil affairs.

As to our proposal, there is not one instance in which we have expressed a desire to go to a Government area. We only want our troops to be concentrated within our own areas, and we ask the Government to do the same. In this way we try to divorce the army from civil administration so that civil administration will step by step go toward democratic unification. However, the Government proposal is that prior to a democratic unification of civil administration, they should occupy the large part of the Communist areas. This amounts to an occupation of Communist areas through negotiation as a substitute for a forced occupation. This is incompatible to the general tendencies for agreement and to the resolution of the P. C. C. as it appear to me. This seems to be the point of issue now.

With regard to the disposition of troops in accordance with the Army Reorganization Plan, the Government side believes that Communist troops should be withdrawn to certain specific places. Their intention is quite clear that wherever Government troops go, they would attempt to change the civil administration. Communists are only allowed to maintain civil administration in those few places they are still permitted to garrison. This way subordinates politics to the army.

However, our view is different. We think that as soon as the fighting is stopped, all troops will maintain their present position. Then in the Army Reorganization period, army units will be assembled at specific points within their own areas for training, while the rest of the troops are demobilized. As to local administration, it will be solved by means of the establishment of a coalition government and the initiation of local self government. At that time, the boundary line between the Government and the Communist troops will gradually fade out of significance.

On this basis, we will go over to the third step. That is the integration of the armies. The conception that formed in my talks with General Marshall in January and February was that the boundary line would later fade into insignificance. Therefore, the Government should not demand that Communist troops be withdrawn from certain

places and that Government troops be sent in as replacements. Such a claim is entirely unreasonable. What the Government can do is to discuss where and what particular places Communist troops should be stationed. They may want to negotiate for certain places where Communists should evacuate. We think those places evacuated should be left ungarrisoned. In my present proposal, I properly leave out Chefoo for garrisoning. I plan to leave Chefoo ungarrisoned. You can also see from my overlay, I am properly trying to locate Communist troops away from the positions of Government troops so as to diminish their fear in the initial period.

On the other hand, I permit Government troops to station in practically all major cities near other Communist areas, such as Tsinan, Tsingtao, Paoting, etc. Despite the fact that those places are close to Communist areas, we concede that the Government can station troops there so that the Government may feel assured. But it appears to me that the Government should not think that Communist troops can be driven out of certain places and then replaced by Nationalist troops. If they think that way, they are thinking war instead of peace.

Now I will go over the detail matter. My first point is the movement of those troops north of Hankow. As I previously stated, they may go to Hopeh Province along the Peiping-Hankow railway line.

The second point concerns north Shansi and north Anhwei. The Government may raise the question that during the first period, Nationalist forces should be stationed in this area, but it seems absurd that they should ask the Communists to withdraw entirely, particularly at a time when we are starting the army reorganization plan. The Government representative may now oppose one Communist army during the first period and two divisions in the second period in Central China area. However, why did they not raise that question at former meetings? I repeat that they may negotiate if Communist forces are to be stationed there but it is out of the question if the Communist troops must be withdrawn completely.

I wish further to point out that during the period of reorganization, many Government armies will be stationed around different Communist armies. It is this way in the north areas, like in Peiping and Paoting, where large Government forces are stationed but there are only light Communist forces in the neighborhood. If Communists do not feel worried by the presence of so large a Government force, how can the Government force be menaced by a small Communist force in an adjacent area.

Thirdly, Shantung province itself is almost completely under Communist control. Despite this situation, we only ask that one Communist army be stationed here while the Government will also station

one army there. Furthermore, we are prepared to leave the Shantung Province ungarrisoned. This would be a great concession on our part. Further, regarding Jehol, it is entirely unreasonable for the Government to want the Communists to evacuate that Province. Actually the larger part of Jehol is in Communist hands and we see no reason why we should withdraw. No doubt if we asked the Government to evacuate, they would feel indignant. But, because they occupy a part of the Jehol area, they feel we should evacuate. If we should demand they evacuate the capital of Shantung, leaving it entirely under our control, the Government would certainly feel indignant.

GENERAL MARSHALL: The Government has stated from time to time their reason for asking for Communist evacuation has no relation to Chengte being the capital.

GENERAL CHOU: As soon as hostilities are stopped, the destruction of railways will cease as a matter of course. Particularly during army reorganization, no hostilities will take place and troops will be separated farther and farther away from each other.

We may demand Tsinan since the puppet troops are under direction of the Government. We might be entirely correct to demand the capital of Shantung but we will not do that as we believe the army reorganization will remove that need and no hostilities will occur. Therefore, at the time of army reorganization, we would assume it to be unreasonable to raise any new demand for Tsinan or for the Government to demand Chengte. But the Government's plan is to operate north up to and including Jehol. Therefore, their plan of military operation is based on the following procedure: They would take north Kiangsu and from Suchow to Tsinan and from Tsingtao to Tsinan with only one army. But they are using more. The 54th Army will be shipped in and they will fly two armies instead of one to Tsinan, Suchow will also be reenforced. They will fly troops to the Peiping-Pukow railway and then they will have completed occupation of north Kiangsu area. Their troops will go from Peiping to Jehol to Chaoyang and they will completely control the Peiping-Chaoyang line, Tsingtao-Tsinan line and the Lunghai railway. If we do not concede the Government these points they would force it upon us by arms. This I know quite definitely.

On our part, we have no military plan whatsoever of that nature and should the negotiations end without success, we have no other way but to find new ways to approach a peaceful settlement. If we have to withdraw from Hopeh and Anhwei and to drop back from the Peiping-Hankow railway line, we should have made a scheme to take Tsinan by force or Wei-hsien or Suchow so that the whole area would be under Communist control. Any claim of that nature would be

unreasonable and any military plan of that nature would be wrong. Therefore, I never think about it, just as we have never thought of taking the Peiping-Chaoyang line. We would not consider such a scheme because we believe that as soon as the army reorganization plan takes effect, the boundary line between the Communist and Nationalist armies will fade away and lose its significance. That is the point on which we differ from the Kuomintang.

This is the crux of all issues. We advocate that the disposition of troops should be solved along the way of democracy. What the Kuomintang, or particularly the Generalissimo, is thinking is that he would rather have the army disposition problem solved before everything else so that he will occupy a larger area and would not fear any other party or anything else. Therefore, all other problems so far discussed, we have made the utmost concessions with regard to the contents of the three papers tentatively agreed upon. In the detailed matters pertaining to the army reorganization plan, I am willing to give every consideration and to make whatever concession I am empowered to do. But, on those fundamental questions or principles laid down by the army reorganization plan and PCC arrangements, I cannot see why we should make a greater or any concession. I want to emphasize that any concession would deprive China of its prospect of democracy because under such conditions there would be no democracy in China. Meanwhile, areas which are for the time being left to Communist troops will be wiped out at a later time.

Should the Government still entertain that fear of concentration of the Communist troops, then I wish to point out that as soon as the hostilities stop and the army reorganization plan is put into effect, we would welcome American officers to help us in army reorganization. I do not see that under such conditions, there could still be anything that gives rise to fear to the Government.

As to the Manchurian problem, you just asked me about the figure of three divisions or five. I think that is open for discussion. I am willing to hear General Marshall's view on this point since that is a detailed problem. So long as the basic policies of the reorganization are not violated, I am ready to consider all concrete issues.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I am a little confused as to what General Chou means exactly when he speaks of the fundamental basis which should govern the redistribution of troops under the agreement of February 25th and which he ties in with the agreements of the PCC. He gave a rather detailed and lengthy discussion, but I have lost track of the precise factors he has in mind. I am familiar with those in the agreement of February 25th, having written most of them myself, but I am trying to relate his statement of principle to his objection to the Government procedure. For example, to refer to the comments he

has just made about Manchuria, and to my comments regarding General Chou's discussion of the Manchurian problem some time back. The expression was used that the situation had greatly changed, therefore a reconsideration of the strengths was called for. I may have missed the point, but the situation in effect in North China has somewhat changed, particularly in the last month.

I recognize that there are two sides to most situations regarding offensive action, but so far as I have been able to determine from reports of American officers, there was a very aggressive offensive action after June 8th conducted by Communist troops in Shantung Province and there were other very threatening movements more recently reported in the general region of Tatung. I am, of course, familiar with the Government movement to reinforce troops in Tsinan and at Tsingtao, but those followed a continued aggressive Communist offensive action after June 8th. I had that in mind when General Chou said the situation had changed somewhat in North China during the past month, because those movements constituted a very decided threat against the Government's position and a reaction on the Government's part was inevitable. I am confused in my own mind at the present time as to the approach to this particular phase of the negotiations. I think the more clear cut the issues are made, the more hope there will be to find a mutually acceptable solution.

It appears to me at the moment that the Communist Party has very much in mind that it must not allow itself to be put in a position militarily which would weaken its defensive power to such an extent that it would adversely affect the efforts of the Communist Party, whatever they might be, in the political discussions which we all hope will follow. It also appears to me that on the other side is the fear of the Government against a reaction by military force on the part of the Communists to influence the cause of political discussions. There is also to be considered the freely expressed desire of certain Government officials to settle matters by force, which is exactly what we are trying so hard to avoid and which in my opinion would inevitably lead to utter chaos in China. I am trying to clarify in my own mind what the real motives are, what the real fears are on both sides. Therefore I ask General Chou to clarify the fundamentals that he has been referring to.

GENERAL CHOU: Now stating briefly, the fundamental questions are the following:

Firstly, the present position of the Government is that it would leave political matters for later discussion and merely solve military questions at this moment. This procedure itself presents a difficulty because whenever discussing military matters, it is we who will be pressed by the Government to make concessions. The Government

would not make any concessions as far as military matters are concerned. On our part we are prepared to make military concessions in order to get the Government to concede political matters so that the goal of democratization of politics and nationalization of armies will be achieved. As the situation now stands, only military questions are subject to discussion. This itself creates the fear on our part as to what will be the eventual outcome of the political settlement. Your statement on this part is correct on the Communist fear that by weakening its military strength, it might lose its bargaining power in political matters.

Secondly, when discussing military matters, the Government is demanding Communist withdrawal from certain places which will then be occupied by Government troops. By Government entry into those places, the freedom of the people as well as the local authorities will be wiped out. I have cited enough examples so I will not repeat here. This second fear is due to lack of democracy and to the Government's intention against the agreement of the PCC and the army reorganization plan. Therefore, with regard to the North China problem, our concessions can only go so far as to leave certain places now under Communist control, ungarrisoned. Government troops should not enter into those places or areas during the time of army reorganization and prior to the establishment of democracy in China. That is the crux of the situation.

GENERAL MARSHALL: This proposed dispositions in Manchuria would be effected by whatever the final decision is as to the strength of Communist forces to remain in Manchuria. I assume that the most critical factors, from the viewpoint of the Government, would relate to Antung and Harbin. Is it the intention of General Chou in this diagram to indicate that outside of the area defined by a solid red line, the Government troops are not to go?

GENERAL CHOU: According to the cease fire agreement, this will be the position held by the troops at the time of commencement of the cease fire.

Secondly, as soon as the army reorganization plan is put into effect, I favor dividing reorganization into two stages:

- a.* For reorganization only.
- b.* Integration.

With regard to Manchuria, I am willing to shorten the period of the first stage to 6 months as expressed in my letter.

Thirdly, during the time of army reorganization, Government troops should not go beyond the red lines, but under concrete circumstances we may make special arrangements with each particular instance. For instance, you raised earlier, the question of Harbin.

I transmitted that subject to the Communist leaders in Manchuria. I am not talking here about its garrison by troops but some other arrangement.

GENERAL MARSHALL: There are several special conditions which I am quite certain the Government will bring forward. One relates to the Tsingtao-Tsinan railway line. They desire to have that line cleared of Communist troops at a very early date. Another would relate to the time element for readjustments in Manchuria, particularly because of the early arrival of the winter season. I am quite certain that the Government will insist that the preliminary readjustment should be accomplished by October. As further regards the time element, there will be Government insistence in regard to the situation in Kiangsu and the [*in?*] Anhwei in Central China which they feel constitutes a Communist threat against the capital. The same would apply to certain readjustments in Jehol. I mention these various critical points so that General Chou will have them in mind.

I am somewhat at a loss at this stage of the negotiations as to the best course of procedure. When it became evident yesterday that I would not have an opportunity in the late afternoon to talk to General Chou regarding these matters, and then to talk later either to the Generalissimo or General Yu Ta Wei, I thought it wise to postpone the meeting of the Committee of Three because we would reach the table without either the Government representatives or myself being prepared for a discussion of the Communist proposals. Now, I am in a new dilemma, not knowing how best to proceed to resolve the present great differences between the position of the Government and that of the Communist Party. Both have strong beliefs and intensity of purpose. At the same time I assume, I hope at least, that they both have in mind certain differences regarding which they might make concessions but they do not put them forward at this time. The trouble is there is so little time for maneuvering. It is quite evident that further delays or extensions of negotiations are not practicable because of the growing unrest and the constant threat of disturbances and vicious propaganda. I repeat, at this moment I am rather at a loss. I have a very great responsibility and the urgent necessity of taking some action to facilitate an agreement, yet I find the two sides so far apart and so firm in their purpose, that I do not know what to say or do.

GENERAL CHOU: According to our original plan there are three items coming under discussion during the armistice. We have solved two of the three subjects and also an extra one with regard to procedure of the field teams and Executive Headquarters. Now, the most difficult problem for settlement is the reorganization of the army, and particularly the disposition of troops. This is the key problem as to whether China can be brought under the power of democracy

or not. In battling over this issue, the Chinese Communist Party is not merely protecting itself on areas, but it is trying to fulfill its responsibility toward facilitating China to go on to the path of democracy. In that respect we are not in a position to make concessions. However, the unprepared concessions on fundamental problems does not apply. We would not make concessions on detailed matters. In principle, we cannot concede that the Government may send large forces into a vast part of the Communist areas.

The actual situation is that the Communists are protecting the rights and the social gains of the peasants in particular. As soon as Government troops enter those areas, those benefits will be withdrawn and the peasants put under immense exploitation and suffering. For example, in the Tingyuan area, all social benefits set up for the benefit of peasants have been destroyed by Government troops. The Chinese Communist Party at this stage has no other purpose than to protect the rights and interest of Chinese peasants so as to increase the purchasing power of peasants, and to help develop Chinese productive power. As far as that is concerned, we cannot make any concession. Any concession would constitute a failure of the Communist Party.

As to the question of how large or where a force will be stationed, that can be negotiated. I hope General Marshall will make an analysis as to what are our fundamental questions and what are detailed matters. I state on fundamental questions, we cannot make any concession because it would mean complete failure on our part. The Kuomintang's tactics now is to present fundamental questions in the form of concrete (specific) matters. They ask concretely about this place or that place which added together implies occupation of a very large area by Nationalist troops and that the rise of the people will be abolished.

As to what procedure we should adopt from now on, I am now thinking there are two ways to pursue. The first alternative might be that we should first implement those agreements which have points which can be agreed upon. If say, hostilities in Manchuria can be completely terminated and if railroads in China proper can be under repair and traffic resumed, it would certainly be effective to prevent a further intensification of civil war. We would then have more time to deal with the remaining subject by peaceful means such as the army reorganization plan.

The second alternative would be that if the Kuomintang insists on solving all these issues simultaneously, then we can first lay down a few principles with regard to the army reorganization. For example, we may specify that during the period of army reorganization, the armies of both sides will be concentrated in certain individual spots, that the administrative affairs will be left entirely to the reorganized

government without interference by the army. The second principle is that the troops of both parties will be stationed at those places which would not constitute a menace or arouse fear of the opposing party. The third principle regarding certain places in both Government and Communist areas, negotiations can be made to leave those places un-garrisoned during the time of army reorganizations so as to effect a compromise. The fourth principle concerns arrangements to be worked out initially with respect to Manchuria. If we could reach an agreement on those foregoing points, then I feel rather confident that we may also reach an agreement at this time. I think this second alternative in that way only solves the fundamental questions without touching the others. That is what I can think about at this moment.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I am very glad to have General Chou's suggestions and I will see what I can do with them. As to his first alternative proceeding to implement the agreements we have already reached, and then going ahead with the negotiations we are now involved in, I am quite certain I could not get agreement of the Government to that procedure. I therefore turn to the second alternative which I will examine carefully.

Would it be convenient for General Chou to see me possibly at 11:00 tomorrow morning? That would give me some time to discuss matters with Government officials and see if I can develop any definite propositions to make.

GENERAL CHOU: 11:00 will be all right.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I will telephone or have Colonel Caughey telephone when I see how my time is working out.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Notes of Meeting Between General Marshall and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, June 27, 1946, 9:30 a. m.

The previous afternoon, General Chou En-lai had discussed with General Marshall the Communist proposals for the settlement of the military redistribution of troops in Manchuria and North and Central China which had been delivered to General Marshall and to the National Government early that morning. The stenographic notes of the meeting with General Chou were completed in the late evening and furnished the Generalissimo. However, translation into Chinese was not completed until the early morning and therefore he had had only a limited opportunity to review General Chou's statement prior to the meeting with General Marshall.

Having reference to General Chou's statements the Generalissimo outlined what he considered the Communist procedure of delay and

obstruction which had obtained since the agreement for the reorganization of the armies signed February 25, 1946 and since the conclusion of the PCC conference last February in Chungking. He stated that the Communists had made it impossible for the Government to go ahead with the reorganization agreed upon by the PCC, by their refusal to nominate members to the National Council and also by their refusal to nominate representatives for the Constitutional Assembly which was to have been convened on May 5th, and therefore had to be postponed. The Generalissimo further stated that the military agreement of February 25th provided that certain lists of troops be submitted by the Communists within three weeks of the signing of the agreement and a further list at the end of the 6 weeks. Neither of these lists had ever been submitted, therefore, the Communists had prevented the carrying out of the demobilization and reorganization of the armies.

With reference to General Chou's statement that it was a fundamental consideration of the CCP that the local governments established by them in the regions controlled by them which had for their principal purpose the interests of the peasantry, should not be done away with by the turning over of the occupation of the region to the control of the National military forces citing instances of this process where the Communists had evacuated a region: To this comment the Generalissimo responded with a statement that he wished General Marshall to point out to General Chou that he knew of no instance where the inhabitants of a region occupied by the National Government had fled to a region under the control of the Communists; that on the contrary over 5 million people had fled from Communist controlled areas principally to the large cities under National control which was evidence of the fact that the system of local government instituted by the National Government was preferred by the inhabitants to that of the Communist procedure.

Referring to General Chou's discussion of the belief that the National Government would entertain no political settlements prior to the completion of the military agreements, the Generalissimo stated that his principal desire was that the military readjustments be so established that clashes would be avoided which otherwise would make the political adjustments extremely difficult if not impossible.

The Generalissimo mentioned the possibility of having the Communists agree to an American control of the movements by the CCP out of the areas and the similar control of the movements of the Government into the areas, which could be delayed for a stated period. He stated specifically that North Kiangsu, the Tsingtao-Tsinan railroad, Chengte, Kupeikou, Anwhei province, Harbin should be vacated by the Communists within 10 days and must be occupied by the Gov-

ernment troops within one month. Other places which the Government proposed that the Communists withdraw from should usually be vacated within one month but the entry of the Government troops might be delayed for two or three months longer. The Generalissimo mentioned the possibility that General Marshall might, as apparently his own suggestion, propose as a compromise measure that the Communist officials in the province of Hei Lung Chiang, Shing An, Nun Chiang and Chahar might be accepted by the Government as a temporary arrangement which would receive consideration when the time finally came for the political reorganization.

The Generalissimo stated his agreement to General Chou's contention that the troops should not be located in areas, but rather in definite spots, meaning cities, though the Generalissimo desired that this be stated in terms of *hsiens*.

In the discussion which followed General Marshall stated to the Generalissimo that while the facts appeared on the surface as the Generalissimo had described regarding the PCC conference and the military agreement of February 25th, there were other factors which had exercised a profound influence on the course of events at that time. The discussions and action of the Central Committee of the Kuomintang has conveyed to the public a grave doubt as to the intentions of the Government in carrying out the agreements of the PCC. Also at this time, and actually during the later part of the negotiations culminating in the agreement of February 25th for the reorganization of the army, there were staged violent demonstrations in Chungking against the Communists and at Peiping ostensibly anti-Soviet in their nature but actually resulting in violence to Communist individuals and offices. These so-called anti-Soviet demonstrations were undoubtedly a serious irritation to the Soviet Government and I have been led to believe that as a result the Soviets practically released all of Northern Manchuria to Communist occupation and that Japanese captured arms became available to the Communist troops in that region. Therefore, whatever failures there were on the part of the Communists in this matter, there were very definite Government actions, or permitted actions, which militated against the implementation of the agreements.

General Marshall stated that in the present discussions the Government had laid down very severe terms for the Communists in North China which it was highly improbable that they would, or could, accept without feeling that the continued life of their party would be seriously jeopardized. General Marshall also stated that the demonstrations now starting, and which were threatening, were in pattern an exact repetition of what had occurred in Chungking. There could be no acceptable explanation from his point of view except that of a

deliberate effort to interrupt the negotiations and that the effort was not on the part of the Communists. General Marshall further stated that he could not conduct negotiations under such circumstances. The Generalissimo assured him that there would be no further outbreaks. General Marshall stated that he was not so much interested in the suppression of outbreaks as he was the prevention of the outbreaks.

General Marshall stated that regarding the most critical points under discussion that it would be necessary to find some basis of compromise regarding Kiangsu, Jehol and Harbin in particular, as the present terms would not be accepted by the Communists.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai at 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, June 27, 1946, 1:30 p. m.

Also present: **Mr. Chang**
Colonel Caughey
Captain Soong

GENERAL MARSHALL: I appreciate General Chou's coming this afternoon at this hastily arranged hour. I was absorbed in a discussion with the Generalissimo from 9:30 until noon. So I did not get back here until almost 12:30.

I think the best method of procedure would be for me to outline the principal statements made by the Generalissimo after he read the notes of General Chou's discussion yesterday. In the first place, we were not able to deliver the notes until after 8:00 last night. We had no opportunity to correct them. They were often expressed in rather doubtful language, and then it apparently took them until an early hour this morning to complete the translation into Chinese, and the Generalissimo had not seen them, apparently, until 8:00 this morning. So he had only read very hastily General Chou's comments. Therefore he had not reached any firm conclusions. He told me he would like to consider them more carefully this afternoon and then talk about them later. However, he made these preliminary comments:

Replying, apparently, to General Chou's statements regarding the procedure of the National Government in a manner which was not productive or did not lead to a cessation of hostilities, the Generalissimo said this:

That as he saw it, following the PCC agreement in Chungking, it had been the Communists' unwillingness to appoint or nominate the members for the National Council, I believe, and designate representatives to the proposed assembly to convene May 5, which had made it impossible for the Government to proceed with any reorganization.

Also, that on the military side, the Agreement of February 25 providing that a list should be submitted three weeks after the signing conveying certain necessary information regarding troops, divisions, etc., as a basis for the detailed plans to regulate the demobilization and reorganization; another list was to be submitted three weeks thereafter. The Government had prepared its lists and the Communists had not yet, six months later, submitted theirs. He therefore felt that the obstruction to the civil reorganization and to the military reorganization had been on the part of the Communists.

Referring to General Chou's statement regarding a fundamental issue with the Communist Party, that is, the preservation of the local governments in the areas occupied by them for the advantage of the peasantry, the Generalissimo stated to the best of his knowledge there were no indications of any, certainly not in a material way, refugee movements from the Government areas to Communist areas. On the other hand there had been a movement of something approaching 5 million people from the Communist controlled areas to the areas under Government control, which, to his mind, would indicate that the procedure of governing by the National Government was apparently more satisfactory to the people than that in the Communist controlled areas. The Generalissimo stated that he had never intended to imply that there would be no political readjustments but that it was his desire that troops should be so reestablished that clashes would be avoided and political negotiations could therefore be successfully conducted.

He stated, very much as I had previously indicated, the Government insistence would be that the clearing of the Tsingtao-Tsinan railroad, the evacuation of Chengte, Ku-pei-kou and Antung province, north Kiangsu and Harbin should be agreed upon for an early specified date and that the entry of the Government troops into those places should be agreed to at some time within a month. The remaining places where the Government indicated its insistence that the Communist withdraw should be accomplished within one month, but the Government troops entering into the area could be delayed for two or three months more.

Regarding General Chou's point that the troops could be stationed in definite localities or spots rather than areas he accepted that. However, he wanted to know General Chou's meaning of, "waiting until reorganization of the Government before making provisions that the administrative affairs will be left entirely to the reorganized Government without interference by the army." Was General Chou referring to the general governmental reorganization or to the local civil reorganization?

That is a summary of the views expressed by the Generalissimo after

hastily reading General Chou's comments of yesterday and considering the Communist detailed proposal for the redistribution of troops.

I discussed with the Generalissimo the question of Kiangsu to see if there was any possibility of a compromise arrangement. He gave me no indication that there was. He stated that the Government insisted on that condition.

I discussed with him the dispositions in Manchuria. He had already expressed himself regarding Harbin and Antung, but he had not looked into the matter sufficiently to talk regarding the other details. I discussed with him the disposition of the Communist armies along the Peiping-Hankow railroad, and that portion that runs south to the junction of Lunghai railroad with regard to the location of Communist units in cities along the railroad. He did not make any reply, but I think there is a possibility that, judging from the fact that he did not immediately reject the idea, that might be resolved favorably. I told him I thought all of these discussions about the distribution of troops had become unfortunately involved in the indication of arrangements, and later he accepted the proposition that definite places would be indicated for troops.

GENERAL CHOU: You mean he accepted the idea of spots?

GENERAL MARSHALL: Yes, and I explained that was in conformity with the Agreement of February 25.

I think that covers the field of discussion this morning. He terminated the meeting by stating that he would go more carefully over the notes of General Chou's statement this afternoon.

GENERAL CHOU: I appreciate that you told me the high lights of the Generalissimo's statements. However, on two points of the Generalissimo's statement, though I do not want to go to length in my reply, I want to comment briefly as follows:

The first point: the Generalissimo believes that the delay of political negotiations rests on the Communist Party. I think that is an unfair statement because, as everybody knows the true fact was, as I have already told you, that after the PCC meeting on February 1st I went to see the Generalissimo, telling him that Yen-an was prepared to join the reorganized government. I also indicated to him as to who of the Communist Party would join that government. I even mentioned that General Mao was prepared to join it. But at that time the Government's idea was rather to wait for the decisions for the party meeting in March, and so the reorganization was delayed for one month. The Government further has the intention to let the whole name lists prepared by the other parties be passed by the Kuomintang Party meeting itself, and that was the cause for the delay. Furthermore, the Government has also intended to change the ratio of those members who have to be appointed with the approval

of the Communist Party, as it has been understood at the PCC. Consequently, the Government's intention is to change the ratio of the 14 men who have to be appointed with the consultation of the Communist Party. Under such circumstances we see no way to present the name list because even the seats allotted to the Communist Party were not fixed then. How can we present the list?

Later in February the student demonstrations and other disturbances brought a lot of confusion to the political situation. The Kuomintang Party meeting in March again overturned many decisions after the PCC and the resolution of the Kuomintang Party was again made known to the public, which caused a lot of complaint about the Communists as well as other parties. Later on, because of the complaint of the other parties, the Kuomintang representative explained that its decisions published in the paper are not true decisions of the Kuomintang Party but merely their suggestions. However, this list does not alter the fact that those decisions have been published in the paper. As regards the revision of the draft constitution, we made a further compromise by conceding on three points, but the Government is insisting on further revisions, and thus the second dispute led nowhere.

Apart from that, the Government also asked for an increase of the seats of the National Assembly, so that the ratio of the representatives of the various parties will have to be redetermined. These are the factors which made the implementation of the PCC decisions impossible, and consequently the convention of the National Assembly was delayed.

It can be seen therefore that we are not responsible for the delay because we never asked for any revisions of the PCC decisions or any change of the procedure. It is the Kuomintang which repeatedly asked for a revision and for a change of the procedure. At the Kuomintang Party meeting its intention to overthrow the whole PCC decisions was indicated. Therefore, the responsibility does not lie on us but on the Kuomintang Party.

The second point: regarding the military customs. I admit that we did not present the lists called for by the Army Reorganization Plan. The reason is that after the announcement of the Army Reorganization Plan we had hoped that the fighting in Manchuria could be stopped immediately because even the Army Reorganization Plan includes provisions for Manchuria, and we have made a considerable concession with regard to Manchuria. However, despite these considerable concessions the fighting was not stopped. On the contrary, the fighting is taking bigger and bigger proportions. This makes it impossible for us to get the complete lists of Communist troops, particularly in Manchuria.

A second cause was the outgrowth of hostilities in China proper. These situations make the implementation of the army reorganization impossible. To submit a list has become merely a matter of form. We are of the conviction that if the lists are presented to the American side alone it would be of no bad consequence. For example, in the past we have presented all the materials with regard to our troops to the Yen-an observers group, and I have presented the lists, particularly to Colonel Yeaton.⁹¹ This shows trust in the American side, but to present those lists to the American sub-committee so that the lists would be known to the Government is a matter we consider inadvisable at a time when the hostilities have not yet been stopped. However, this does not imply that we are not interested in the army reorganization and demobilization. In actual fact, since March, and in certain places since February, demobilization was being carried out in the Communist areas. By May the demobilized personnel reached one-third of the total strength of Communist troops in China proper. We also participated with interest in the combined Chief of Staffs conference under the military sub-committee. At that time we have made many proposals and suggestions to the combined Chiefs of Staff. At the time General Marshall was away and it was led by General Gillem.⁹² Owing to the conditions of the fighting in Manchuria the military sub-committee itself could not even talk about the reorganization of troops so, of course, it shows that little could be done. So the delay was primarily caused by the conditions of the fighting in the Northeast, and it was not due to any deliberate delay on our part.

In the third place, regarding the refugees and the Generalissimo's statement that because there are so many refugees coming out of the Communist areas this proves the people support the Kuomintang rule. I think this can be used effectively as a propaganda method but if we want to judge whether a local authority does enjoy the support of the people or not we have to look at his policy and the result of that policy. It is not as simple as it first may appear. As a matter of fact, many people have come out of the Government areas to Communist areas. Those people in Government areas who have no money and no land are being oppressed. We did not adopt the same procedure as the Government is now doing by organizing refugee groups, and letting them cause disturbances here and there. Our procedure is rather to get the people established, to obtain land, to have agricultural implements, to loan money and to reloan on houses, building and lands, so that they can establish a living. Such things happen in the

⁹¹ Col. Ivan D. Yeaton, commanding officer of the U. S. Army Observer Group at Yen-an.

⁹² Lt. Gen. Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., U. S. Army.

Northwest, around Yen-an, Shansi, Hopei, a part of Honan, Shantung, and a part of Kiangsu and Antung. The total number of people affected is certainly not only several hundred thousand but even has reached millions. Incidentally, now that we are undertaking the repair of the dams of the Yellow River, we have to displace many inhabitants now staying on the river bed. Those are mostly refugees coming from the Government areas. We have established them in the river bed. Now that the Yellow River will be diverted to its old course we have to relocate them again. Thus, it can be seen that we did not use those displaced persons for propaganda or to stage demonstrations against the Kuomintang. A second factor is that it is rather difficult for the people to go from the Government area to the Communist area, due to a heavy blockade. Many people were put into custody because they tried to go through the blockade.

Regarding those refugees which the Government referred to, I admit a part of them are coming out of our areas. They are leaving because the peasants in our areas are now conducting a rent reduction and interest reduction movement. The peasants are now going to own land themselves. As I stated yesterday, unless an agricultural formula is introduced the productivity of the peasants will not be increased and there would be no way to increase the purchasing power of the peasants. Therefore there is no way for the industrialization of the country. Many American friends understand this very well. For example, Mr. Wallace⁹³ mentioned this point when he came to China two years ago. Our policy is just as the people's—to increase the living standard, thereby the productivity of the peasants. These peasants would not be terrorized by the landlords who would prefer to continue their exploitation. But, we are trying to divert the rents of the landlords for investments in agriculture and commercial enterprises.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Which rents are you diverting?

GENERAL CHOU: The landlords collect rents from the land and we are trying to persuade, or teach, them to use the money from land rents for commercial and agricultural enterprises. Unless they get the money into the hands of commerce to increase production, the feudalistic system will be perpetuated. Since such a system as ours cannot be enforced by law, we are trying to persuade the landlords, or to encourage them, to adopt this procedure. However, many of the landlords are reluctant to adopt it. Of course, a part of them accept this procedure but others do not. In other areas, where the Communist local authority has consolidated itself, this procedure has been accepted favorably by the landlords, as in Shansi or other parts of North China.

⁹³ Vice President Henry A. Wallace, who visited China in June, 1944; see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. VI, pp. 216 ff.

Those landlords who are hostile to such a procedure are trying to intimidate other people to flee from our areas.

A third factor is that the secret police elements are propagating rumors that we are going to conduct massacre, and create terrorism. It is particularly easy for the secret police elements to do this because they can easily infiltrate from the Government areas to our areas, and a part of the refugees believe what they say. The landlords could leave if they wished particularly since we would not put any restriction to their movement. Had we enforced the same kind of blockade as does the Government, they would have no way to go out. Our policy is rather to welcome them and to welcome their return if they want to return.

Dr. Tsiang⁹⁴ of CNRRA talked to me about this matter and I told him we would welcome their return and that we would take care of their land. Of course they have sold a part of their land to the peasants themselves, but other parts they can still preserve and we will protect their private property. Today the living standard in the large cities, such as Shanghai, is so high that even the big landlords cannot afford to stay away and therefore we welcome them to come back.

The Government's tactics now are not to try to solve those problems, but rather to capitalize on the refugees for propaganda reasons or to use them to stage demonstrations, such as the Shakwan incident.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Which incident?

GENERAL CHOU: The incident at the Nanking railroad station.

To my mind it is not true that this situation would prove that the people are moving to Kuomintang districts in North Kiangsu. As a matter of fact the number of the refugees was not so large as the papers reported. Various people from the Democratic League in Nanking and people who would have a different view than ours also say the movement is not so large. The Democratic Leaguer, Mr. Ling, chairman of the Kiangsu Provincial Council, told me the figure is by far not so large. Even so, we welcome their return and we would render them protective service. We have in no way driven them out of the Communist areas. They did it of their own accord.

My attitude towards the Generalissimo's press release is that as soon as the Central Government is reorganized then, in accordance with the joint platform agreed upon,⁹⁵ the local authorities will be readjusted accordingly and proper elections will be held. Then the people can determine for themselves what personnel and what policies they

⁹⁴ Tingfu F. Tsiang, Director of the Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

⁹⁵ See summary of conversations as issued October 11, 1945, Department of State, *United States Relations With China*, p. 577.

would like to have. For example, in Shanghai there are now several hundred thousand workers who favor the Communist Party but we cannot base our claim on that for the control of Shanghai. As to North Kiangsu, the 20 million population is far larger than the number of refugees there. Therefore, the Government cannot use them as a basis to claim Kiangsu. A proper election can settle the question. That is why I hold the view that the military reorganization should not interfere with the local administration, which can be decided only by proper election.

In regard to the Generalissimo's question as to what I imply the relation of the army and local authorities to be, I wish to give the following reply. My view on the separation of army and civil administration implies that the troops garrisoned in a certain area would not interfere with the local administration. Only after reorganization of the Central Government, could a local re-election settle the problem of the local authorities. Otherwise, as soon as the army comes to a certain place the local authorities have to readjust themselves accordingly. For then the Kuomintang would send personnel to rule over that area. Such a procedure would constitute a party rule, which we adamantly oppose.

Coming to the specific matters: As I have stated yesterday that we should divide discussion between Manchuria and China Proper. That is my suggestion. As to Manchuria, we may consider the detailed problem of locating Government and Communist troops in certain specific areas and try to find a solution for that. For example, we may consider a readjustment at Harbin. I am prepared to consider such problems in connection with Manchuria. As to China Proper, the hostilities have stopped for a long time and since so large an area is involved it is thought fears of the opposing party will be created. I wish to state definitely that we are not in a position to accept the Government's claim of the Tsingtao-Tsinan railway, Chengte, Kupeikou, or such places. However, if the Government fears that they are menaced, I can state that in certain places, such as North Kiangsu or Shantung, we can consider stationing a smaller force or no force at all. But this does not imply in any way that the Government troops may enter our areas so that the people in that part will again be oppressed. This is beyond what we can do.

Now, turning to the variance of views between the two parties. The gap is still very wide and I appreciate General Marshall's devoting so much of his time to conversations with both sides. Both yesterday and today I presented some concrete proposals. Now there are three days left before the deadline and I hope General Marshall will consider what is the prospect of reaching a partial agreement. Our attitude is clear—whether the cessation of fighting will proceed or

whether an agreement should first be raised on outstanding issues—we have only one goal, and that is peace. In this way we differ from the Government which is rather stubborn in its pursuit of a preconceived plan. But our anxiety for peace cannot be capitalized by the Government to force terms upon us and to force us to accept their terms by threatening war. We have made a large concession by conceding to discuss the military reorganization first before the political questions are discussed. Now we cannot make a concession to a point where we, while talking about army reorganization, expose our people to oppression. Should we do so, we would fail and the people would desert us.

GENERAL MARSHALL: As I told General Chou yesterday, I am at a loss as to how to proceed because, as General Chou has just said, the two sides are so far apart and they are so adamant in their positions. I find that in both my discussions with the Generalissimo and with General Chou, about the time a new idea forms in my mind as to possible compromise, some further statement obliterates that as a possibility. If I had two or three weeks I might make more definite progress except for the fact that probably a new series of events would develop which would completely impair the previous situation. Before discussing Manchuria, I would like to ask General Chou some questions. I wish to clarify in my own mind specific possibilities and, if possible, assurances. My impression is the Government is attaching more importance to Kiangsu than to any other particular area and that its concern over the situation there is not, I imagine, other than military. The proximity of the Communist forces located there close to the city of Shanghai and to the national capital presents a constantly disturbing factor and a probable source of continued incidents which would at all times be very unfortunate in their consequences. I understood General Chou to state that, while he was not committing himself, nevertheless there was the possibility, however remote, that it might be arranged for the evacuation of Kiangsu so long as the Government troops did not enter. Was that correct?

GENERAL CHOU: More explicitly I have in mind at this moment that North Kiangsu will be garrisoned with a small force but the Tsinan-Tsingtao railway will be ungarrisoned. I have in mind, without consulting others, that previously, at the time of 25 February, the Government agreed to station one Communist army there in the first phase and 2 Communist divisions there at the end of the 18 months. I therefore believe that since the Government now fears our forces there are a menace that the strength can be reduced. As to the Tsinan-Tsingtao section, since the Government has a fear that the line may be

interrupted by the Communist forces, I may consider to leave it un-garrisoned by Communist troops. Of course this in no way prejudices the local authorities.

GENERAL MARSHALL: (A general discussion took place.) I understand from the discussion which we have just had that while General Chou is not authorized and not even informed as to the possibility of compromises regarding the disposition of Communist troops in Kiangsu, that he has been willing to consider with me the following possible readjustment:

That the present Communist propositions in Kiangsu contemplate three concentrations: one at Tung-t'ai, one at Huai-an and one at Su-ch'ien would be altered by the movement of the troops at Tung-t'ai, to the north of the Lunghai railroad. There would then remain under possible agreement the Communist divisions at Huai-an and another at Su-ch'ien, with no other Communists army troops in the province.

Furthermore, that the Government would maintain or reduce its present military dispositions in Kiangsu and that the area from which the Communist troops have been withdrawn would not be entered by the Government troops. Also that the local governments established in that region would be permitted to continue in their functions.

I understood General Chou also to state that he was considering the practicability of an early establishment of the Communist forces in the two areas mentioned, Huai-an and Su-ch'ien. He did not know whether or not that could be accomplished in the first month. A further point in the discussion related to the operation and freedom of shipments from the coal mines at Tsaochuang. General Chou called attention to the fact that the Communist proposal as submitted to the Government involved the withdrawal of all troops from that region, leaving no garrison troops. Therefore, under the communication agreement left the railroad free for operation of the coal mines, which would be operated under the present committee arrangement.

General Chou further stated, in connection with the discussion of Kiangsu and the general region to the north, that again while he was not authorized at the moment to commit himself he was considering the proposition of altering the Communists' proposal to the Government so that the division of Communist troops located at I-tu on the Tsingtao-Tsinan railroad would be located away from the railroad, leaving the government forces at Tsinan, at Wei-hsien and at Tsingtao, but that withdrawal of the Communist divisions from I-tu would only be made if the Government agreed not to locate military forces at other points along the railroad. General Chou further stated that this clearing of the railroad of Communist troops would be agreed to only

on the consideration that the local established government in that region be permitted to continue to function.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Marshall to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek

OSE 241

NANKING, June 28, 1946.

YOUR EXCELLENCY: In compliance with your request of yesterday, I am submitting my views on the present status of negotiations between the Government and the Communist Party regarding the detailed reorganization and redistribution of troops under the agreement of February 25th last. As you know, during the past several days I have endeavored, with all the means at my disposal, to seek out possible points of compromise to lessen the present serious differences in the proposals or stands of the National Government and the Communist Party. Following my meeting with you yesterday morning, I discussed with General Chou the various issues from 1:30 to 4:00 yesterday afternoon and again at 6:30 in the evening.

At the present time I find the Government demands and the Communist position irreconcilable regarding the following aspects of the situation; the total evacuation of Kiangsu by the Communists, their evacuation of Chengte and the Communist insistence that the local governments in whatever areas might be vacated by the Communists should not be interfered with until the formal reorganization of the Government had been established. I am not yet clear as to the Communist position regarding Antung and that province, nor as to the importance they attach to the occupation of Mutanchiang in preference to Yenki.

Turning to the discussion of the various areas you will have noted the possibilities of a compromise regarding Kiangsu and Anwei suggested by the discussion of this region I had with General Chou yesterday afternoon. Disregarding the matter of the Communist insistence that the local governments remain undisturbed, the solution suggested of withdrawal of all Communist troops south of Huai-an and west of the Grand Canal through Su-ch'ien and Huai-an presents, in my opinion, a possible compromise which relieves the Government of the threat to the capital, Shanghai and the Yangtze in general. It would appear that a Communist agreement might be secured for their evacuation of the areas indicated by the end of a month or 6 weeks. (The basis for the foregoing agreement incidentally had not been cleared by General Chou with Yen-an, according to his statement.)

Turning to the Shantung Province, it would appear that an agree-

ment might be reached which would remove all Communist troops from the Tsinan-Tsingtao railroad line. In the recent Communist proposal a division was to be stationed at I-tu. Involved in this agreement would be a Communist insistence on the strength and dispositions of the National troops along the railroad. General Chou proposed a division at Tsinan, another at Wei-hsien and another at Tsingtao. The time in which these strengths would be reached was not discussed although it was stated that the Government insisted that the railroad line be freed of Communist interference within 10 days. The matter of local governments of the regions to be evacuated by the Communists remains an issue in this area.

Turning to the area through which the Peiping-Hankow railroad passes I believe the principal Communist insistence is directed to locating a division in the city of Hsing-T'ai. Since the original Government proposal admitted the Communist domination of this railroad line by accepting the presence of Communist divisions immediately to the east and west of the railroad the readjustment here should be acceptable to the Government without compromising its position. Two of the other divisions of the proposed Communist army in this general region are located at Ho-tse and Ch-ang-chih during the first phase of reorganization. This is not in accord with the Government desire, but I think it might be accepted as not unduly threatening to the Government's position.

I have not discussed with General Chou the Communist desire to locate a division at Wen-hsi on the Tungpu railroad so I am unable to judge their determination in regard to this particular disposition. I will discuss this with General Chou today.

I find an unyielding determination on the part of the Communists regarding Chengte. Whether or not this same determination applies to Ku-pei-k'ou I do not know, but I feel that this can become a fatal point of disagreement. Examination of the map, and somewhat disregarding the importance of the Peiping-Chengte-Chao-yang railroad, shows the Government in possession of Yeh-Pai-Shou, Ling-yuan and Ping-chuan and at the western end of the line the towns of Huai-jou and Mi-yun, southwest of Ku-pei-kou. On the other hand, the Communists occupy a substantial portion of the remaining region to the north and northwest of the Tientsin-Chinchow railroad. Could you not consider the evacuation of Ku-pei-kou by the Communists and of the region to the south and east of the Peiping-Chengte-Chao-yang line as affording the Government reasonable security of this vital line of communications to Manchuria. The remaining southern boundary of the Communist occupation of Jehol could run through Fen-ning west to Ku-yuan in Chahar and then follow the Outer Wall of Chahar in accordance with your recent proposal.

My discussion regarding Manchuria was of necessity very brief due to lack of time. However, two important points were covered. As previously stated I have not yet reached a conclusion as to whether or not the Communists can be persuaded to agree to the evacuation of Antung, and I did not discuss yesterday their proposal to locate a division south of Tsitsihar at Taoan (Peicheng). I asked General Chou the reason he preferred a division at Mutanchiang to the location proposed by the government at Yenki. He stated that Yenki and the surrounding country was over-run with Korean evacuees and for that reason he did not wish to locate a division there. From General Chou's remarks yesterday it would appear to me that the Communists would accept a so-called symbolic force, as General Yu Ta-wei terms it, at Harbin in place of their present proposed location of one of their divisions and an army headquarters in that city. I am not prepared to report on the strength of the Communist resistance to a reduction from their proposal of 5 divisions in Manchuria to the 3 agreed upon by you.

I have not discussed with General Chou the possibilities of effecting compromises if certain provincial appointments were assured the Communists, but I am inclined to the belief that they are far more deeply interested in an early meeting of the PCC and the initiation of formal discussions regarding the drafting of the constitution. You stated the other day that you would not consider any political discussions for three or four months following the successful conclusion of the military agreements. It is my belief that such a delay would almost inevitably have disrupting consequences. While from your point of view the delay would be for the purpose of testing the good intentions of the Communists, it would actually result, in all probability, through rather normal reactions to the present tense political state of China, in a renewal of hostilities.

It seems apparent to me that a formal detailed amendment with the necessary annexes to the agreement of February 25th for the reorganization of the armies cannot be produced before noon of June 30th. In the meetings I have presided over in the Committee of Three it is frequently the case that the discussion of a single sentence will absorb an hour or more of time. I do not believe the unsettled differences now involved could be resolved in final form as to the exact wording in less than a week, possibly 10 days. At the same time I do not think a prolongation of the truce period beyond June 30th could be carried out without a complete breakdown in the situation. Therefore I propose that a special agreement be prepared which will cover a settlement for the critical areas in enough detail to protect the interests of the Government sufficiently to permit instructions to be issued for the cessation of hostilities on June 30th.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai at 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, June 28, 1946, 3:30 p. m.

Also present: Mr. Chang
Colonel Caughey
Captain Soong

GENERAL MARSHALL: I had two hours with the Generalissimo this morning and I made the point that it would be, in my opinion, impossible to arrive by 30 June at the exact wording for a formal modification of the Agreement of February 25. I therefore proposed that we endeavor to meet the situation, especially the Government's insistence on an understanding regarding the redistribution of troops, by drawing up a special (it might be called a temporary) document which sets forth the agreements regarding critical factors now under discussion. That document would be the accepted basis for the more formal or detailed amendment of the Agreement of February 25 to be prepared in negotiations after June 30th.

I also stated that, in my opinion, a further extension of the truce would not be a workable arrangement because I thought, in the present confused and highly dangerous state of affairs among the troops, and particularly in the civil population, there would be fatal ruptures involving the general spread of hostilities which would certainly not facilitate the progress of negotiations.

Before I go any further with the results of my discussion with the Generalissimo I would like to get General Chou's views on what I have just said.

GENERAL CHOU: General Chou said that in principle he agrees with what you said because the main point is that we want peace and not war. Anything that can prevent the hostilities and forestall any new rise of conflicts would be acceptable. As to the detailed arrangements of army reorganization we will continue talking. The present situation is certainly very serious. I just received a telegram from Yenan this morning saying the Generalissimo had, in the middle of this month, issued an order to General Liu Chieh in Honan and General Cheng Chien in Hankow, that as soon as hostilities arise the Government troops surrounding the Communist forces in the area north of Hankow should launch an all-out attack to completely annihilate the Communist forces. The attack was commenced on June 26 and the Communist forces are compelled to take up self-defense. In view of this situation I think the matter is getting very serious. We have pledged before to the Kuomintang forces that we would not attack the cities of Tsingtao, Tsinan and Tatung, we still adhere to this pledge. On the other hand we also hope that the Government troops would not

attack the 60,000 Communist forces to the north of Hankow. The situation now seems to be very serious. Some emergency measures are imperative. If the Generalissimo intends to straighten out the matter peacefully then he should order the Government troops in Honan and Hopeh to stop the attack and on our part we will inform our own forces to stop fighting back. As far as this arrangement is concerned the Communist forces are placed in an inferior position. In the event of hostilities they are bound to suffer heavy losses, in which case it would have repercussions on other areas, such as Tsinan and Tatung. We have now only two days left until the deadline of the truce (General Chou added that up to now the Communists have adhered to their pledge not to attack those two cities) the situation is getting serious and more serious every day. So any action that would stop the resumption of hostilities, as General Marshall has suggested, I am willing to consent.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I probably feel more strongly than General Chou regarding the perils of the present situation and any attempt to continue it without a formal cessation of hostilities, because I receive reports from both sides. The National Government is fearful of the heavy Communist concentrations near Tatung which, apparently from their reports, are a direct threat to Tatung. I am also thinking about the public demonstrations which are apt to increase rather than diminish and undoubtedly will represent the interest of both sides, as well as the people in the middle who so urgently desire peace.

I would further like to talk to General Chou regarding certain dispositions which we partially discussed yesterday and which relate to my discussion with the Generalissimo this morning. He insisted that T'eng-hsien, north of Hsuehchow, on the railroad, should be evacuated. He took exception to the proposed Communist disposition in Ho-tse and Ta-ming. He accepted Hsing-t'ai and I think accepted Chang Chih. He took decided exception to the Communist occupation of Wen-shi. I am still not clear on his reaction to the proposal that I suggested in the northern part of North Kiangsu, that is, the Communist troops north of Huai-an and the evacuation of Kiangsu and Anwei to the west of the Grand Canal and to the south and east of the trace of the old Yellow River bed between Huai Yin and Tung-hai, it being understood that Communist divisions were to be stationed at Huai Yin and Su-chien. I am proceeding on the basis that this would be accepted. I realize that General Chou merely discussed it with me yesterday and did not commit himself.

Now, we come to the apparently much more difficult issue to settle. I presented the proposal that I would endeavor to persuade the Communists to evacuate the region to the south of the railroad from Ping

Chun to Chengte and along the line through Fenning and Kuyuan, thence south of the outer wall through Kalgan to the border of Suiyuan Province.

When I finished my conversation with the Generalissimo he was still adamant regarding Chengte; and that is the situation at the present time.

Turning to Manchuria, I discussed with him the Yen-ki and Mutan Shing [*Mutankiang*] dispositions. He remained firm on Yen-ki. I told him of General Chou's statement regarding that area in relation to the Koreans. I discussed the two possibilities mentioned by General Chou yesterday, one the evacuation of Harbin by all troops and the organization of a coalition government with a neutral mayor and also the possibility of locating there a symbolic force, say a regiment. He would not consider the total evacuation of Harbin, but insisted on a sizeable force there. We had a further discussion of that without arriving at any conclusion. I am proposing a maximum of 6,000 troops. I did not discuss the question of a Communist division to be located at Pei Cheng. Nor did he express himself further regarding Antung, though he had stated very emphatically that he would insist in [*on*] the Communist withdrawal from that region. I did not have time to discuss with him further the question of comparative strength in Manchuria and the matter was therefore left with his previously emphatic stand that he would not alter his concession to a revision of the ration of five to one, it being understood that did not approve of an increase in the total number of divisions during the first 12 months from 18 to 20. As I have said I did not get to that phase of the discussion this morning, but I don't think there would be any profit in my pushing the matter further because I think it is a determined position on the part of the Government. As to the locality of Peicheng, I do not know. The Generalissimo had been very much opposed to the Communist occupation of Nunchiang Province. It was in connection with his concession to me regarding the Yen-ki disposition that he brought up the stipulations regarding Chengte and Chahar. These are, as nearly as I can recall, the various details of my discussion with the Generalissimo.

GENERAL CHOU: From the Generalissimo's statement that you have just mentioned, it can be seen clearly that so far as the fundamental issues are concerned the Generalissimo objects to the idea that I have expressed which stipulates that the Government troops should not enter the areas vacated by the Communists during the time of army reorganization.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I did not state that. Did I give General Chou that impression? I only made one statement about one place, possibly two, Harbin, and maybe Antung.

GENERAL CHOU: The Generalissimo's reply did not indicate that he accepts the principles I have proposed—that the areas vacated by Communist troops during army reorganization will not be occupied by the Government troops—and, therefore, the Generalissimo's idea is still that military matters will overrule political matters, to which we are adamantly opposed. The only proposal that we can consider would be along the line, or in accordance with the principles, that I have proposed. In my proposal I am trying to concentrate Communist troops to those places which would not constitute a menace to the Government, so as to give reassurance to the Government. But, it being understood that the places if vacated by the Communists will not be entered by the Government troops.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Don't you mean that the Government troops will not be garrisoned in places vacated by the Communist troops?

GENERAL CHOU: Yes. Nor do we see any necessity for the Government troops to enter those areas unless the Government is attempting to control the local civil administration.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Do you mean by military means?

GENERAL CHOU: Yes. I have made these compromises very boldly, accepting a very heavy responsibility, and it is entirely a unilateral concession. I did not raise any claim that any particular place under Government control should be left ungarrisoned. In fact my proposal stipulated that the Government troops are permitted to garrison all the strategical key points in their hands. Not to mention that I did not raise any claim to station our troops in areas under Government control at the present time. This procedure proves it is entirely a unilateral concession.

The Generalissimo still insists in the principles that he has continuously advocated, which implies a complete revision of the PCC resolutions that the military affairs should be subordinated to political affairs, and which is also incompatible with the arrangements of the army reorganization agreement in which it is stipulated the army will have no other concern than the training of troops in time of peace.

From what the Generalissimo has said, we can see that he wants to have various places in Shantung, in Hopei and in Shansi left ungarrisoned by the Communist troops along the railway lines and that the Communists should give up the southern part of Jehol and Chahar to the Government troops. He further demands Chengte, but he did not indicate whether the Government troops would enter the places evacuated by the Communist troops. Nor did he indicate that the local civil administration will be permitted to continue its function until such time as the political matters are straightened out after the reorganization of the Central Government. In the reorganization of the government, actually two aspects are involved. The first one

is the civil administration in the Communist area, the second is the party rule in the Kuomintang controlled areas. All political issues pertaining to those two areas will have to be straightened out. In view of these circumstances, the disposition of the two parties are widely apart and we may even say that they are adamantly opposed to each other, that is, irreconcilably opposed. This makes it very difficult to approach each other in the detailed matters.

In principal matters, in basic issues, the Generalissimo does not alter his fundamental disposition. For example, that the railway lines should be evacuated by the Communist troops, except perhaps a small section at Kalgan. Even there it is not yet known whether or not the Generalissimo will accept it. According to the Generalissimo, the Communist troops will have to vacate the Tungpu railroad, Peiping-Hankow railroad, Cheng-Tai railroad, Tientsin-Pukow railroad, Tsinan-Tsingtao railroad, Lunghai railroad, Peiping-Liaoning railroad, and the Peiping-Chinchow railroad. Also the large cities will have to be evacuated by the Communist troops, such as Ho-tse. It can be gathered from the Generalissimo's attitude that during the past few days he has not made any change to his fundamental policy. That is, he wants the Communist area to be cut into five isolated areas. (Pointing out the areas on the map.) Except for two minor revisions, the Generalissimo has not made many changes from his original proposal. The two revisions were made in North Kiangsu and the concession on Hsing-Tai. Hsing-Tai is the only place he accepts on the railway lines. Regarding his fundamental attitude toward Manchuria, it is almost the same as in China Proper. The Generalissimo has finally agreed to let the Communist troops garrison two large cities, Tsitsihar and Kalgan but, considered as a whole, the disposition of the two parties are still in direct opposition and the gap on specific matters is still very wide. Therefore, I share General Marshall's view that it would be difficult to reach complete settlement during the next two days and, therefore, I think it is a good idea that we should work out in principle certain stipulations regarding the army reorganization provisions and I am willing to work along the procedure as General Marshall has suggested.

GENERAL MARSHALL: The paper that I have hurriedly drafted,⁹⁶ as I said before, does not cover all of the points in dispute but it does include more of the Government's stipulations regarding the Communist than it does of definite statements regarding Government dispositions. I intended to conclude it with a statement regarding the occupation of evacuated regions and the matter of civil government, but I have not been able to find a satisfactory method of ex-

⁹⁶ *Infra*.

pressing the idea because of the many complicated factors. This paper includes propositions that neither side would probably agree to. I am interested more in the form, at this moment, than in the detailed stipulations. I would like General Chou's advice as he hears this, both as to the form and as to the specifications. I will turn over the draft to him to work on this evening himself. Finally, I repeat again the purpose of this is to find a basis for the immediate issue of an order for the cessation of hostilities and I do not expect final commitment on General Chou's part at this time.

(Draft given to General Chou to read for comment.)

GENERAL CHOU: In principle paragraph 1 is okey. Regarding paragraph 2 General Chou still reserves it for his consideration. Paragraph 3 can be considered. General Chou would like to have it expressly stated that paragraph 4 covers China Proper and paragraph 5 covers Manchuria only.

(The following comments by General Chou refer to paragraphs 6-11 of the draft of the special memorandum of "conditions to be agreed to by the Committee of Three", proposed by General Marshall.)

So far as the form is concerned, it seems to be too much in detail in the last six paragraphs. Right now we are discussing disposition of troops within the scope of army reorganization provisions. It should indicate which places will be garrisoned by Government troops and which places will be garrisoned by Communist troops. In the form presented here it merely gives the impression that commitments will be made here and there and I am afraid both the Communist Party as well as the people themselves will have the impression that the Government is insisting on certain localities and the Communists cannot help but evacuate to localities designated by the Government. Also, this way of proceeding is not in accordance with army reorganization plan or PCC resolutions.

GENERAL MARSHALL: General Chou will recall that I stated that this draft is not a complete directive and contains much more concerning Communist troops than Government troops. General Chou will probably wish to insert certain stipulations regarding Government troops. However, it was to avoid the difficulty of attempting to get all these stipulations into the formal arrangement of the agreement of February 25th that I selected this brief way of covering the highly disputed points. There are many details which must be stated in a formal amendment of the agreement of February 25 but most of those do not involve disputes. Though, unless the disputed points are settled, these other factors are of necessity related to the difficulties. I know of no other way to handle this matter than in some such manner as this, unless we attempt a careful re-draft of amendments to the agreement of February 25th. That would be a precise job which

will require considerable time and will inevitably involve lengthy discussions though the points themselves will probably not be of sufficient importance to produce a stalemate.

The issues I have brought forward in this paper, so far as I could see, will determine whether or not the Communist Party and the Government can get together. And, as I have just said, I know of no other means of approaching the matter within the short time available, really less than 24 hours. General Chou, when he takes this draft document, can include the parts he thinks should of necessity be covered regarding the Government troops. However, the principal considerations regarding the Government troops, as I see it from the Communist point of view, relate to two things: their assignment to specific places instead of areas, and the prohibition the Communists propose against the movement of Government troops into areas evacuated by the Communists, along with the insistence on the continuation of the present established civil government.

If this draft document has to be changed on the basis of the impression it would make on the public, it might be that that could be handled in a prepared release which would not mention specifically the details of this document in their present form but refer to the agreements in a general manner, postponing the announcement of details until the formal amendment of the agreement of February 25th had been decided upon. General Chou will remember that last January we did not release to the press the long detailed instructions regarding Executive Headquarters. We only made a general announcement on that question. I do not know but possibly we could handle this the same way except that we would have to include more facts, and then at a later date, say within two weeks, produce in full the formal amended February 25th agreement. These are merely suggestions.

GENERAL CHOU: In addition to the other two principles that the Government troops will not enter the Communist evacuated places and that the established civil government in the areas will be continued, General Chou would like to introduce another principle. That principle would be that the Communists would not station troops which are authorized by the army reorganization plan in certain places within the Communist area nor use those places as a point of concentration of Communist troops. He would use such a provision to substitute for the word "evacuation" used in the draft because using the word "evacuation" can cause lots of disputes; such as, the Government will argue that since evacuation of that place they could send railroad police to that particular section of the railroad and the Government may also claim that the Communist militia should also go away, or other similar issues. Therefore General Chou suggests using wording he proposed rather than the word "evacuation".

General Chou suggests first, a general provision be made regarding those places under issue and then, following that general provision, the details will follow. The general idea is, instead of having 6 paragraphs here he suggests we have one provision in the nature of a general statement, then in the footnote cover the details. The footnote would not be published at this time, and General Chou's statement, which would come in at paragraph 6, would read:

"The Chinese Communist Party agrees that for the purpose of implementing the army reorganization agreement of February 25, 1946, as amended, it will, within the period stipulated above, concentrate its troops now stationed in certain areas into specified localities, it being understood that the Government troops will not move into the areas thus vacated and that the present established civil government and the peace preservation corps, which serves for the maintenance of local security, shall be preserved."

The footnote would read: "The Chinese Communist Party promises that the following places will not be used as troop concentration places for the purpose of army reorganization." Then follows the various provisions regarding initial areas. The footnote would not be published but would be a commitment on the part of the Communist Party when we come to discuss the formal amendment.

I would like to continue about the various places in which I think I can commit myself.

The first part is:

- (a) Anhwei Province
- (b) Kiangsu Province, to the south of Huai-an, Huai-an itself being garrisoned.
- (c) Shantung
 - 1. Tsaochuang.
 - 2. Tsingtao-Tsinan RR

Regarding Teng Hsien, Ho-tse and Te-hsien, I cannot commit myself.

The present situation is that the Nationalists only occupy 5 cities—all the rest are under Communist control. It is not adequate if no large city is left for the Communist troops to be garrisoned.

What the Communists are afraid of is that[,] if Communists evacuate all railway lines and highways, all communication lines are abandoned and Communist areas are cut into pieces which can be easily surrounded.

Regarding paragraph *d*. Shansi: The original Communist proposal specifies there will be two Communist divisions in Shansi and one more to the north. The Government insists that Communists cannot be stationed at Wen-hsi. I do not believe I can accept that although I will consider moving this division somewhere else.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Right now it cuts the railway. As a matter of fact I guess that is why it is stationed there.

GENERAL CHOU: Three-fourths of Shansi is under Communist control. Therefore we should have the right to control that section of the railway.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Is that the only section cutting the railway?

GENERAL CHOU: There are also other places to the North.

Regarding *e*. Hopei: The Communists propose only one division. There will be no opposition, I believe, from the Government side.

Regarding *f*. Jehol: It is agreed that the Communists troops will be withdrawn within one month from the region of Chahar south of the Outer Wall as far as Ku-yuan and also from the region in Chahar and Jehol south of the line, Fenning-Chengte, and south of the railway to the east of Chengte through Chaoyang.

With regard to Manchuria, paragraph 12: Today I am in a position to discuss Harbin city alone and since the Generalissimo expects us to agree to his first suggestion as to completely evacuating that city, I can only accept your original proposal on the Government's having a symbolic force of one regiment. I will try to induce Communists in Manchuria to agree to this, but 6,000 men is too strong a force for me to accept.

My suggestions are then that the first five paragraphs will stand, the sixth will be revised and the rest will go out except the 12th, which will then be the seventh paragraph. With regard to the contents, I will make a further study.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I am anxious to see if we could reach some basis for agreement by noon tomorrow because if there is to be a cessation of hostilities, orders must be issued 24 hours in advance or they will not be observed. A tragic situation may develop in spite of the fact that we have practically reached an agreement. I am concerned over the present situation as to the amendments to this draft for the reason that I think we are becoming involved in a very complicated manner of presentation which not only will not be acceptable to the Government but will be a source of confusion as to interpretation later on. This would mean a probability of a stalemate in endeavoring to reach a formal agreement on the amendment to the February 25 paper. That in turn would mean another resumption of retaliations, gradually developing into open civil war. Now I understand, I think, General Chou's objection to the phraseology "The Communist Party agrees to the evacuation", etc., but I am afraid the method he is taking to obviate that, without intending perhaps to change the conditions, will completely destroy the possibility for both governmental understanding of interpretations and, therefore, agreement. The trouble as I see it is that General Chou has left no apparent uncomplicated

method of presenting various conditions that are included in this paper. I believe an accurate presentation of the conditions is quite necessary to acceptance of the document. And, at the moment, I am at a loss as to how to phrase the conditions so that they can be readily understood. I have also these comments to make: General Chou has made a general statement "that the present established civil government and the peace preservation corps will be continued". I feel rather certain that I cannot secure an acceptance by the Government of the continuation of the local administration unless there are some detailed understandings or conditions mentioned. I am at a loss as to what these conditions might be but I do know that the basis for opposition on the part of certain governmental officers will be directed to the condition that the local governments would be continued in force. I have endeavored to draft a statement to meet the objections. The matter is so complicated that I have not been able to prepare a draft that even appealed to me as practicable. Two others have tried their hands on the same proposition and with the same lack of success.

GENERAL CHOU: I am afraid that if the Communists evacuate areas and no force is left to maintain order, the Government will use that as an excuse to send its peace preservation corps in to restore that order. The militia is still very much feared and is in strength within the peace preservation corps.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I suggest we adjourn the meeting. General Chou can give me his recommendations on my proposal tomorrow morning.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Preliminary Agreement To Govern the Amendment and Execution of the Army Reorganization Plan of February 25, 1946*⁹⁷

The following conditions are agreed to by the Committee of Three to be included in the amendments to the document signed February 25, 1946, "Basis for Military Reorganization and for the Integration of the Communist Forces into the National Army". They are stated in the form of stipulations for the purpose of committing the Government and the Communist Party to these understandings in order to facilitate the preparation and acceptance of the formal documents required and to permit the immediate issuance of instructions for the final termination of hostilities.

1. The settlement of specific garrison areas in Manchuria and North China must be finally agreed to at this time for both National and Communist troops and it is understood that these assignments will refer to definite places rather than to areas.

⁹⁷ Draft prepared by General Marshall and handed to General Chou En-lai on June 28.

2. The ratio previously agreed to between the total strength of the Government and Communist forces shall not be altered.

3. The periods previously assigned for the concentration of the troops into specified localities shall be altered for the first phase (originally 12 months) to three months except where specifically stated to the contrary.

4. The Executive Headquarters shall immediately determine the localities which have been occupied by the Government or Communist forces in China proper since January 13th, 1946 and the troops involved will be required to vacate those localities immediately unless otherwise specifically indicated hereinafter.

5. Localities occupied by the Government or Communist forces after noon of June 7th 1946 shall be evacuated by the forces concerned within 10 days after the signing of this paper.

6. The Communist Party agrees to the evacuation within 10 days of the signing of this paper of all localities at present occupied by their troops along the line of the Tsinan-Tsingtao railroad, (also the segment of the Tientsin-Pukou railroad line between Lincheng and Hsuchow and the branch line from Lincheng to Tsaochuang) with the understanding that the Government will confine its disposition of troops in this region to Tsinan, Wei-hsien and Tsingtao, these forces to be reduced to a strength of a division in each locality within three months. The Communist Party also agrees to evacuate T'eng-hsien on the Hsuchow-Tsinan railroad within one month. It is understood that no troops, Government or Communist, will be located in the region of Tsaochuang.

7. The Communist Party agrees to the evacuation of the areas of Kiangsu and Anwei provinces west of the Grand Canal and east and south of the old river bed of the Yellow River between Huai-an and Tsung-hai, within a period of 6 weeks of the signing of this paper. It is further understood that during the first phase a Communist division will be stationed at Huai-an and another at Su-ch'ien, and that the Government troops may remain in their present positions north of the Yangtze in these two provinces, but will not move into the area vacated by the Communist forces.

8. It is agreed that the Communist Party will locate 1 division at Hsing-t'ai on the Peiping-Hankow railroad and that adjacent divisions will be located at Ta-ming (rather than Ho-tse) and Chang-chih.

9. It is agreed that the Communist division at Wen-hsi on the Tung-kung-Taiyuan railroad will be immediately withdrawn.

10. It is agreed that the Communist troops will be withdrawn within one month from the region of Chahar south of the Outer Wall as far as Ku-yuan and also from the region in Chahar and Jehol south of the line, Fenning-Chengte, and south of the railway to the east of Chengte through Chaoyang.

11. In Manchuria it is agreed that within three months the Communist forces will be established at Yeni-Tsitsihar, and Hailar-Manchouli and that the movements required will be immediately initiated and will be carried out progressively month by month. It is further agreed that the Government will station in Harbin not to exceed 6,000 troops. The ratio of comparative strengths in Manchuria shall be 5 to 1, that is, 5 Government armies and 1 Communist army, and that this strength shall be realized before October 15, 1946.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Marshall to General Yu Ta-wei

OSE 244

NANKING, June 28, 1946.

DEAR GENERAL YU: Late this afternoon General Chou En-lai appealed to me to halt a Government offensive operation which he claimed was directed against the encircled Communist army in Hopei, northeast of Hankow. Before I could bring this to the attention of the Government this evening I received a message from the American Commissioner in Peiping⁹⁸ which appears to confirm the report that a Government offensive actually had been launched by Pacification Headquarters at Chengchow, "to the east of railway".

Please, as a matter of urgency, take the steps necessary to see that such a disruption does not make utterly impossible the successful conclusion of negotiations with which I am now laboring to permit the termination of hostilities.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Hsu Yung-chang to General Marshall

No. 482

[NANKING,] 28 June 1946.

Inasmuch as Communist leader Lin Piao expressed his refusal to the 8 field teams in the Northeast (including those for Harbin and Tsitsihar), it is requested that you contact General Chou En-lai and talk with him for the speedy despatch of Communist representatives of the field teams that they are supposed to send.⁹⁹

HSU YUNG-CHANG (SEAL)
Govt. Representative

⁹⁸ Telegram No. 4694, June 28, not printed.

⁹⁹ Notation at bottom of memorandum reads in part: "Mentioned verbally by Gen. Marshall to Chou En-lai, who said team to Harbin had been sent and that their disapproval of Tsitsihar based on fact Nat[ionalist]s refused to let 2 other teams proceed."

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Mr. Walter S. Robertson to General Marshall

[PEIPING,] 29 June 1946.

4738. Following is account of Shantung negotiations as reported by Colonel Ely¹ who returned last night. General Clement sent staff officers to General Wang Yao Wu [as] National Government Commander at Tsinan and General Chen [Yi] as Communist Commander at Lin-I. Staff officers returned 27 June and reported both Commanders luke warm because of the fact that Shantung was only part of a much bigger picture. Neither would consider a meeting before 1 July.

Wang Yao Wu agreed to meet Clement at Tsinan on 30 June and Chen Yi at Tsinan on 1 July, if agreement appears possible. January, [*respecting?*] return of prisoners and arms captured since 13 January.

Chen Yi stated National issues, such as Coalition Government, would have to be settled before any real solution for Shantung province is possible. He agreed to ask Chou En Lai for authority to visit Clement after 30 June. Clement is visiting Chen Yi 29 June in order to complete arrangements.

Conditions set forth in Clement's letter of invitation are:

- a. Preliminary individual meeting with Clement presenting minimum demands.
- b. Meeting between the two Commanders in Clement's presence to reach broad agreement.
- c. Turn over negotiations to representatives of Executive Headquarters.

As you have been informed it is planned to send team 7 for this purpose.

Colonel Davis² of Team 7 is flying to Tsingtao 29 June to act as General Clement's adviser during initial conversation.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Chou En-lai to General Marshall

SM 616

NANKING, June 29, 1946.

Reference the dike repair work of the lower Yellow River, I am deeply indebted to you for your sympathetic assistance.

Since the beginning of the repair work, 237,000 men were mobilized, who require 300 tons of flour and CNC \$150,000,000 per day. It was

¹ Col. Eugene B. Ely.

² Col. M. F. Davis.

formerly agreed upon that the Government of Liberated Areas will mobilize workers, whereas the Central Government and CNRRA will supply flour, labour and materiel expenses. Unfortunately, only some 500 tons of flour was shipped to the Liberated Areas up to now, not a single cent was remitted there for wage and materiel expenses, nor has any medical relief been sent in. Under such circumstances, the workers' morale is going down, and many of them asked the work be stopped. The Government of Liberated Areas did every effort within its power to borrow or advance the money needed. Nevertheless, owing to the financial limitations, it is impossible for the Government of Liberated Areas to maintain the repair work for a long time. Should there be danger of discontinuance of the work, the Government of Liberated Areas could of course not be held responsible. It was learned that the Central Government appropriated the sum of 3 billion CN dollars for the Liberated Areas; yet it has not reached the destined places.

I wrote a detailed letter³ regarding this matter to Mr. Franklin Ray.⁴ Any assistance you would render to us will be greatly appreciated.

[Signature in Chinese]
(CHOU EN-LAI)

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Chou En-lai to General Marshall

MM 058

NANKING, 29 June 1946.

Enclosed please find my amendment to your draft⁵ supplementary agreement to the basic agreement of army reorganization:

I beg to take this opportunity to reiterate the following three points:

1. In connection with my revised paragraph 6, it is absolutely essential to secure Generalissimo's approval that the Government will give such an assurance as I suggested. In case to the contrary, we see no way to commit ourselves to the proposed concessions.

2. The provincial government of Sungkiang and magistrate of Harbin should be reorganized into democratic local coalition governments, which are formed with the participation of Kuomintang, Chinese Communist Party and local non-partisans, the positions of the provincial chairman and mayor being held by neutral persons.

3. After preliminary agreement has been reached on the various

³ Not printed.

⁴ J. Franklin Ray, Acting Director of UNRRA's China office.

⁵ Draft of June 28, p. 1240.

points of concessions on our part, as I outlined in my amendment, I have to consult my associates in Yen-an and Manchuria before I can put my signature to the document.

[Signature in Chinese]
(CHOU EN-LAI)

[Annex 1]

AMENDMENT TO GENERAL MARSHALL'S DRAFT

1. Paragraph 1: Change the words "garrison areas" into "disposition of troops", "North China" into "China proper", and "places" into "localities".

2. Paragraph 2: The Chinese Communist Party is still having under consideration a revision of Communist army strength so as to maintain 20 divisions at the end of the first phase, and 12 divisions at the end of the second phase of army reorganization.

3. Paragraph 3: Change the words "three months" into "six months".

4. Paragraph 4: Add to the end of the paragraph the following: "Both parties shall move no troops into localities thus evacuated. The local security shall be maintained solely by the local civil authorities and Peace preservation corps or militia."

5. Paragraph 5: Following the words "or Communist forces" insert the words "in Manchuria".

6. Delete paragraphs 6 to 11. A new paragraph 6 will be formed which reads:

"The Chinese Communist Party agrees that in concentrating the Communist troops for the purpose of implementing the Army Reorganization Plan within the period as specified in paragraph 3, no locality within such areas as specified in the appendix⁶ will serve as troop concentration or garrison place. At the same time the Government assures that the Government troops will under no circumstance move into those areas and the present established local governments and peace preservation corps or militia shall be continued for the purpose of maintaining local security and civil administration."

7. Paragraph 12, changed into the new paragraph 7, will be revised to read:

"The Chinese Communist Party agrees that the Government may send one regiment troops to garrison Harbin. Provisions will be made regarding the provincial government of Sung Kiang and the magistrate of Harbin."

⁶ *Infra.*

[Annex 2]

APPENDIX IX

In accordance with paragraph 6, the Chinese Communist Party agrees that in implementing the Army Reorganization Agreement the Communist troops will not be concentrated into or garrison any locality within the following areas:—

- Anhwei*: northeastern part
Kiangsu: latitudinally south of Hwaiian exclusive
Shantung: 1. Tsaochuang Area
 2. Tsingtao-Tsinan railway line
Chahar: South of the latitude of Kalgan exclusive
Jehol: South of the latitude at Chengteh exclusive
Hupeh-Honan Border Area: The Communist troops in that area will be moved to Hopei

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Memorandum by General Chou En-lai to General Marshall*⁷

MM 064

NANKING, June 29, 1946.

It is reliably learned that the Government will launch an attack on Communist Jehol area in case the peace negotiation suffers a deadlock. Your attention is therefore called to the following plan contemplated by the Government:

The main force of the 71st and the 13th armies, which are now stationed in Jehol and western Liaoning, will sally out from Pingchuan (118°36'; 41°1') city to attack the city of Chengteh (117°51'; 40°58'), and another part of the force will advance westward from the area to the west of the cities of Suichung (120°11'; 40°20') and Chinsi (120°28'; 40°56'), while the 92nd army, now stationed at Miyun city (116°50'; 40°25') to the North of Peiping, will assault Kupeikou (117°10'; 40°45') and Hsifengkou (118°17'; 40°28') in a concerted military action.

[Signature in Chinese]
 (CHOU EN-LAI)

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Preliminary Agreement To Govern the Amendment and Execution of the Army Reorganization Plan of February 25, 1946*⁸

The following conditions are agreed to by the Committee of Three and are to be included in the amendments to the document signed

⁷ Reported by General Marshall to Mr. Robertson at Peiping in Telegram No. 1025, June 30, not printed.

⁸ Draft prepared by General Marshall on June 29.

February 25, 1946. "Basis for Military Reorganization and for the Integration of the Communist Forces into the National Army". These conditions are established for the purpose of committing the Government and the Communist Party to certain understandings in order to facilitate the preparation and acceptance of the formal documents required and to permit the immediate issuance of instructions for the final termination of hostilities.

1. The specific disposition of troops in Manchuria and China proper must be finally agreed to at this time for both National and Communist troops. And it is understood that these assignments will refer to definite localities rather than to areas.

2. The ratio previously agreed to between the total strength of the Government and Communist forces will not be altered.

3. The periods previously established for the assignment of the troops into specified localities will be altered for the first phase (originally 12 months) to six months except where specifically stated to the contrary.

4. The Executive Headquarters will immediately determine the localities which have been occupied by the Government or Communist forces in China proper since January 13, 1946 and will require the troops involved to vacate those localities within 20 days after signing this agreement unless specifically directed otherwise.

5. The Executive Headquarters will immediately determine the localities occupied by the Government or Communist forces after noon of June 7, 1946 and will require the troops involved to vacate those localities within 10 days after the signing of this agreement unless specifically directed otherwise.

6. The Chinese Communist Party agrees to a Government garrison in Harbin of one regiment of not to exceed 5,000 men, and to the establishment of a coalition government.

7. The Chinese Communist Party has agreed to concentrate its troops in specified localities, it being understood that the Government troops will not move into the areas thus vacated and that the present established civil government and the Peace Preservation Corps for the maintenance of local security, will be continued. It is further agreed that in these areas no restrictions will be imposed on imports or exports, and free communication with adjacent regions will be assured. It is also agreed that the issue of local currency will be discontinued and the existing local currency will be gradually replaced in circulation by currency of the National Government on a basis to be determined by mutual agreement between the Communist Party and the fiscal authority of the government.

[Annex]

ANNEX TO AGREEMENT OF COMMITTEE OF THREE DATED JUNE — 1946
REGARDING CONDITIONS TO GOVERN AMENDMENTS AND EXECUTION OF
THE ARMY REORGANIZATION PLAN OF FEBRUARY 25, 1946

In accordance with paragraph 6 of this agreement the Chinese Communist Party agrees that in implementing the Army Reorganization agreement of February 25, 1946 the following conditions will govern:

a. Communist troops will not be garrisoned or concentrated within any of the following areas:

Anwei—All of the province after 6 weeks.

Kiangsu—South of the latitude of Hwai-an exclusive, after 6 weeks.

Shantung—1. Tsaochuang area after 6 weeks.

2. Tsingtao-Tsinan R. R. after 2 weeks.

3. Northeast Shantung after 2 months.

4. Lin-cheng after 2 weeks.

5. Te-Hsien.

Chahar—South of the latitude of Kalgan exclusive, within 3 months.

Jehol—South of the latitude of Cheng-tu exclusive, within 3 months.

Hupei-Honan Border Area—The Communist troops in that area will be moved to Hopei within 2 months.

Shansi—Wen-hsi within 1 month.

Manchuria—All provinces except Hei-Lungchiang, Hsing-an, Central and Northern Nun-chiang and Eastern Kirin within 3 months.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Notes on Meeting Between General Marshall and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, June 29, 1946, 11:30 a. m.

The discussion related to the efforts to reach a compromise solution on a special document⁹ which had been prepared to make possible an agreement before the termination of the so-called truce at noon of the following day.

The Generalissimo declined to modify the conditions demanded of the Communists for the redistribution of troops. Specifically, he insisted upon the evacuation of Cheng-te, of all of Kiangsu Province

⁹ *Supra.*

(rather than all of the section south of Huai-an), and the removal of existing local governments in the regions to be evacuated by the Communists. There were many other points at issue which were discussed. The foregoing were the most important, except possibly his requirement for the complete evacuation of Antung Province in Manchuria.

It was pointed out by me that I was left with no basis for further negotiations because throughout the Government had confined itself to demands in North China and had made no compromise other than some small modifications of those demands. The Generalissimo took the line that he could not accept any basis for the conclusion of negotiations that did not guarantee in his opinion the future avoidance of difficulty with the Communists. Temporary measures were not acceptable and his past experience had made it evident that the demands he had insisted upon were necessary.

I pointed out that the same logic could be carried to the extreme of justifying the complete elimination of the Communist Party and army as being the only measures satisfactory for the maintenance of future peace in China. Further, I stated that my negotiations had been made particularly difficult and trying, by reason of the freely expressed opinions of high Government officials, particularly those in commanding positions in Manchuria, that even if an agreement was reached it would have no importance and they were determined to pursue a policy of force. Political leaders of position in the Kuomintang Party had been similarly free in their expression of opposition to negotiations and determination to see the matter through by fighting. I expressed the opinion that whatever might be thought to be the evidence of the past, that the Government of China would be judged by the world, and certainly by American public opinion, as having unnecessarily plunged the country into chaos by implacable demands and the evident desire to pursue a policy of military settlement.

The Generalissimo, after expressing his regrets that the negotiations had resulted in failure and with assurances of appreciation of my efforts, then produced a draft of a statement referring to me which evidently was to be released to the press. It expressed regrets over the failure of the negotiations. It said that, even so, the Government hoped I would continue my efforts at mediation. I expressed thanks for the complimentary references but stated that I much preferred no such reference to me be made and that I would decline to be an umpire on a battlefield.

The conference terminated with my statement that I would see General Chou En-lai immediately, but there seemed to be no probability of reaching any satisfactory agreement.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai at 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, June 29, 1946, 3:30 p. m.

Also present: Mr. Chang
Mr. Durden ¹⁰
Colonel Caughey
Captain Soong

GENERAL MARSHALL: I have just returned from a long conference with the Generalissimo, starting at 11:45 and lasting until 3:00 p. m., regarding this document (Preliminary Agreement to Govern the Amendment and Execution of the Army Reorganization Plan of February 25, 1946 ¹¹) that I prepared after General Chou had proposed the changes in its form yesterday and by his draft this morning. I found the Generalissimo unwilling to agree to the confinement of paragraph 5 to Manchuria only.

Paragraph 6, so far as refers to the coalition government, I am afraid he did not agree to that, but he did agree to appoint the civil mayor and try to find a man, acceptable to the Communist Party, through his own initiative.

Paragraph 7. He first expressed complete disapproval and I am not certain now as to just what his attitude was at the last. He is now, as I understand his point of view, having only seen the translation of this document as I arrived (and, during the early part of my visit), agreed to the contents of the Communist local government until the reorganization of the National Government has been effected. But he later qualified that by stating he could not accept that arrangement in Kiangsu as there are hundreds of thousands of refugees desirous of returning and who, he felt, would probably be mistreated by the present local government.

Regarding the Peace Preservation Corps, he accepts the idea of a Peace Preservation Corps on the same basis as local Security troops strengths in National hsiens.

He did not discuss the last two sentences, the one regarding imports and exports, and the one regarding currency.

Regarding the annex, to which I understood General Chou proposed the amendment that the moves would be completed within one to three months, the Generalissimo insisted that a specific period should be mentioned as was done in this draft document.

Regarding Kiangsu: The Generalissimo would not accept the partial occupation of north Kiangsu. He insisted evacuation should be

¹⁰ Tillman Durdin, staff correspondent of the *New York Times* in China.

¹¹ Draft of June 29, p. 1246.

carried as far north as Huai-an within six weeks and at a later period, whether three or six months I am not certain, to the north of the Lunghai railroad. He stipulated that the second proviso under Shantung should include the evacuation of the coal mines along the railroad, particularly Po-chan.

He made no reference to the statement here in the draft regarding Chahar but he was unrelenting regarding Cheng-te. His last statement I recall was that the Communists should evacuate the area south of the latitude of Cheng-te within one month and Cheng-te itself within three months. He stipulated that the evacuation of Antung Province should be completed within one month. He stated that a paragraph should be added to this document to the effect that the completion of the amendments to the agreement of 25 February must be completed within ten days.

Those, I think are the points that the Generalissimo made proposing amendments or additions to this draft we are discussing.

GENERAL CHOU: The Generalissimo referred only to Antung and Harbin so far as Manchuria was concerned?

GENERAL MARSHALL: Yes.

GENERAL CHOU: Did the Generalissimo mean Antung Province?

GENERAL MARSHALL: Yes. He did not say "the province", but he mentioned it the other day and I am quite sure that is what he was discussing.

GENERAL CHOU: I am somewhat uncertain about the meaning of paragraph 3. At first I thought that the period would be altered from 12 months to 3. Then it was later changed to 6 months. I understand that that concerns only the concentration of troops but does not alter the reorganization and demobilization of troops, which will still be completed within 12 months. Maybe you mean the demobilization and the reorganization, which should be carried out within 12 months, be changed now to six months?

GENERAL MARSHALL: Answering General Chou's question as to whether or not the six months referred to in paragraph 3 refers to demobilization as well as to distribution of forces, it would be my impression that this shortening of the period did not refer to the demobilization procedure at all. I recall that the Generalissimo had stated very specifically in earlier discussions of the Manchurian situation that the reduction of strength as well as the redistribution of troops should be effected before the severe cold weather, and I believe October 15 was the date mentioned.

GENERAL CHOU: The revised draft is not clear. My understanding has been that regarding China Proper or Manchuria the period refers to only the concentration of troops. The period for the demobilization will still be as originally scheduled. With this understanding

then, I agree to the change from 3 to 6 months. The six months refers only to the concentration of troops but not the demobilization of troops.

GENERAL MARSHALL: AS I have said, my understanding was that we were discussing the redistribution of troops but I recall the Generalissimo's statement about Manchuria and he would have to clarify my understanding of that phase of the matter.

The Manchurian annex, which the Generalissimo approved, states that the entire demobilization and integration program of the Manchurian program should be completed before November 1. We had originally written the date January 1, but the Government changed it to November 1.

GENERAL CHOU: My comments on paragraph 2 have already been given to Colonel Caughey. I am still consulting Yen-an.

Regarding paragraphs 4 and 5. I do not see the reason in the Generalissimo's insistence to apply paragraph 5 to China Proper since paragraph 4 applies to China Proper. I believe my original proposal should be maintained whereby paragraph 5 relates only to Manchuria.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I do not know just what was in the Generalissimo's mind regarding this point. I think it possible that he felt that the determination of the facts under the agreement of January 10 would be a very long process, particularly as unanimous agreement is required. For example, in the case of Chinning,¹² they have never, according to your statement yesterday, reached an agreement. The Government feels that Chinning should be theirs, and the Communists feel that Chinning should be theirs. The issue involves the period January 13-14 and it is now nearly the first of July and still no decision has been reached and probably there will never be a unanimous agreement. That means whoever occupies the place will continue to hold it by blocking an agreement. So it is possible that he had in mind that the events since June 7 were more clearly defined therefore they could be readily settled without being set behind the decision regarding incidents of the preceding months. Also, he may have been influenced by the feeling that these offensive actions from the Government point of view after June 7, the date of the so-called truce, were of such a nature and in such localities that he wished an immediate settlement, defining ten days as such a period.

GENERAL CHOU: I wish to point out that the two paragraphs, 4 and 5, are vaguely worded. There are two points: First, regarding paragraph 4 which refers only to China Proper as it is now amended. There is little difference between the two paragraphs as now worded and the question might be raised whether the statement of January 13 should also refer to Manchuria. To raise such a question would

¹² Presumably Tsining, Suiyuan.

merely complicate the matter and therefore I still suggest that paragraph 4 refer only to China Proper and paragraph 5 to Manchuria. Secondly, regarding ten or 20 days' period. It is practicable in Manchuria to complete evacuation in ten days but not in China Proper because it takes some time to reach the troops and investigation must be made there. Most of the Communists are in an unfavorable position with regard to lines of communication. Also, villages or townlets captured by the Nationalists after June 7 may not be determined. If the period in paragraph 5 is prolonged to 20 days then it would be the same as in paragraph 4.

With regard to the June 7 situation, some points have not yet been clarified. The Government would not admit the occupation of places in Shansi or in the Hopeh area, or along the Lunghai railroad, so it is impossible to settle the issue within ten days. Coming to Manchuria, the matter might be simpler because there are fewer hostilities since June 7 and communications are better than in China Proper. Even so, I feel I am running a risk to accept the ten days proposed for Manchuria. So far as the larger places are concerned, determinations within ten days could be made easily. Set examinations regarding the villages and towns would be harder to determine.

GENERAL MARSHALL: It might be possible to eliminate paragraph 5 if we could have an understanding or stipulation in the formal minutes that the occupation of places since June 7 would be determined with a minimum of delay and so far as possible in advance of settlements regarding the occupation of places prior to that date and since January 13, 1946.

GENERAL CHOU: But Manchuria cannot be put into paragraph 4.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Let us state then, "It might be possible to arrange matters if we could have an understanding."

GENERAL CHOU: Paragraph 5 with the word "Manchuria" is acceptable.

As to paragraph 4, I suggest that we add a footnote to paragraph 4. We could state that the occupied places during the months of April, May and June be determined first because hostilities took place only since the beginning of April and because that is all very clearly defined and affects only big places. For example, Tingyuan, in Anhwei Province, to which the Communist Party attaches great importance.

GENERAL MARSHALL: What is the purpose of that? Tingyuan is to be evacuated within 6 weeks. Are the Communist troops in there now?

GENERAL CHOU: They are scattered around there.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Isn't Tingyuan now occupied by Government troops?

GENERAL CHOU: Yes. The point of issue is that if the *status quo*

is maintained the troops of both parties have to evacuate that place. If that is not straightened out the Government troops will otherwise occupy that place.

GENERAL MARSHALL: General Chou will recall his discussion of arrangements in Kiangsu in which he said he thought the Government troops could retake Lai-an, Liu-ho and another place, I think Chengte. Is he altering his stand regarding those places?

GENERAL CHOU: I did not mention Lai-an. Instead it was Puchen (north of Pukou), Liu-ho and Chengte which were garrisoned by the Nationalist troops.

GENERAL MARSHALL: That is right outside of Nanking—across the river.

GENERAL CHOU: I proposed Government troops merely stay in places which are under their garrison.

GENERAL MARSHALL: That had something to do with movements since January 13th?

GENERAL CHOU: Puchen, Liuho and Chengte were occupied before January 13th.

GENERAL MARSHALL: They were?

GENERAL CHOU: Yes.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Then they occupied Laian and Tingyuan on June 7th—those were occupied recently.

GENERAL CHOU: The point of issue is, according to the stipulations in this draft, that the places thus evacuated will be left ungarrisoned. This is a matter which affects the livelihood of the people—also the oppression of the people. The Communists would not raise the question of refugees. If we raised it we could raise the same Hell as the Government, which is now raising the question of refugees.

Regarding paragraph 6, I can try to reach a compromise on that basis; that the mayor will be appointed by the Government who is acceptable to the Communists. The appointment is made on the initiative of the Government. I cannot declare myself definitely on that but will take up the matter.

GENERAL MARSHALL: That will have to be an understanding outside of this paper. In paragraph 7, did he have the insertion after “vacated”, “in China Proper”. Of course in discussing that I ask General Chou to keep in mind that the Generalissimo has disagreed as to the Kiangsu part where General Chou discussed the possible compromise in a statement regarding the local government. The Generalissimo stated that he couldn't accept that arrangement in Kiangsu.

GENERAL CHOU: I wish to raise two points.

First, it is acceptable to me that this arrangement will only refer

to China Proper and as to Manchuria a separate arrangement will be worked out.

The second point is regarding the strength of the Peace Preservation Corps. It is acceptable to me that the strength will be the same as in the Government hsien.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Are the hsien in two or three classes?

GENERAL CHOU: There is a small variance, but not much as far as the strength is concerned.

GENERAL MARSHALL: The reluctance of the Government in that matter comes from their feeling that Communist ordinary troops can easily masquerade as Peace Preservation Corps units and Peace Preservation Corps units are frequently capable of very aggressive action. That reluctance therefore applies to areas such as that immediately north and west of the Tientsin-Hulutao railroad which could be continuously open to sabotage attacks by so-called Peace Preservation units.

GENERAL CHOU: General Chou's reply to that is that such an argument is not aimed to establish peace. On the Government side they also have railroad troops which can be used to arrest and harass people. These railroad troops are recruited from the secret police and they have also other special units. This argument is merely raised due to the Government's intention to still prepare for war. In case it is really sincere in ceasing fighting and to establish peace, then all such considerations can be taken up step by step. An argument would not facilitate the settlement of our questions. Right now, the Government will also maintain railroad troops along the railways, for instance on this railroad from Peiping to Hulutao and they also have Peace Preservation Corps and a large size police force in the large cities. Most of them are recruited from troops of the secret police. They can do a lot of harm to the civilians. They can go to the country to ransack the people and loot the food. Anything of that can happen on the Government side too. Should we argue along that line, then the Communists are also entitled to raise the question of disbanding railroad troops and Peace Preservation Corps, etc. The only practical steps we should adopt is one on the basis of mutual trust to commit ourselves to a certain scope of discussion so as to straighten out the points at issue. Regarding the second sentence in paragraph 7, I accept that.

As regards the third sentence, the currency problem, I believe that it should be settled in principle but not at this time, as I told Colonel Caughey this morning.

Now on the remaining problem concerning North Kiangsu; to have that as an exception is impossible because I cannot see my way clear

to turn over the 20 million people in that area to the Kuomintang Government which is not a coalition government, but rather a most undemocratic one. Now the Government raised the question of refugees. I, myself, am a citizen of Huai-an and the Communists are successful in the settlement of the problem of peasants. I admit that some of the landlords do not feel satisfied with Communists, but the settlement is to the advantage of the peasants. If the Government should intend to take Kiangsu by force that is a different matter, but I cannot agree to turn it over to the Government through negotiations. I am willing to commit myself to station only minimum forces in that area which will be limited to 2 divisions during the first phase and during the second phase it can further be reduced to one division. This division will be integrated with a Government unit, with a Government member as an army commander. So, from the military point of view the Government would not seem to be menaced. As to the political aspect, this will be solved by democratic ways because the local government will also be reorganized on the basis of public election and then it will depend on the ballot cast by the people as to which party will gain control in that area. By comparison I cite the Communist area north of Hankow which has a population of several millions. As the situation now is, the Communists have already been forced out of many places in that area and many refugees are thereby created. As the Communists move to some other place more refugees are formed. I feel sure of that, but the Communists did not use that pretext to claim the civil administration in those areas evacuated. In fact the Communist Party has abandoned its claim of civil administration in many places such as Kwangtung, Anhwei and south Kiangsu. I feel pretty sure that the people are badly oppressed, but the Communist Party did not make it a point to claim the civil administration nor to organize those regions in the way that the Government is now demanding in Kiangsu and elsewhere. This would not help toward the straightening out of the matter. I am only willing to commit myself to a reduction of the Communist forces in North Kiangsu, Anhwei and Hupeh and also in Central China. This not only goes beyond my authority, but it still affects the rights of the people. Merely as a citizen I, myself, would not be willing to turn the whole area over to the Government.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Apropos of that last remark of General Chou regarding Kiangsu. The Generalissimo stated the reason why he would not accept the local Communist Government was that there were a very large number of refugees which fled from that area and whose peace and security would be in jeopardy if they returned while the region was under Communist control. The Generalissimo said he felt a responsibility to those people for their security.

GENERAL CHOU: In the first place, the number of refugees is far from being as large as has been alleged. It is true that some refugees have come out of the Communist area, but the number is not large. On the other hand, oppression of the people in those places where Government troops have moved is much more serious than the refugee problem in the Nanking-Shanghai area. Secondly, the secret police are deliberately organized in those regions to cause trouble. The beating up of the Shanghai delegates is an illustrative example.

Thirdly, perhaps a part of those refugees have come out on account of the fear of the Communist Party which may have been the case at the time of agricultural reform. But if the Kuomintang would send their troops into Communist evacuated areas, or their administrative personnel, then those people who support the Communist local authority now would be badly suppressed in amounts far larger than the refugees scattered in the Nanking-Shanghai area. There are at least many millions of people who now support the Communist rule while the number of refugees is only a matter of tens of thousands. Though I do agree that tens of thousands have left the Communist area we cannot turn over the million people to the suppression of the Kuomintang. This is entirely unacceptable to us. Maybe some of the landlords would hail the arrangement, but the overwhelming majority of the population would be against it. In order to reach some solution on this question I think that some political arrangement might be worked out so that North Kiangsu will have a true democratic government. I am thinking that elections should be held and the Kuomintang, and also other parties, should send representatives to supervise the election to see to whom the population really give their support. The election might be held at an earlier date, say within this year, or as soon as the National Government is reorganized. The election in North Kiangsu would be held so that a peaceful and democratic settlement would be reached. This is a fair settlement as I see it.

Coming to the Annex of the draft. Regarding the time element, I find that I am not in a position to accept the specific time elements desired by the Generalissimo because I am only here alone. I am not informed about the actual conditions as to how much time it will take in particular places to effect the concentration. It is rather difficult for the Communist troops who are accustomed to the rural way of life to do it promptly. I could not accept that offhand, so the only arrangement I can accept is to fix it for one to three months. Maybe in certain places it would take three weeks or six weeks or two months. In such places as the Hupeh area, they can start the concentration now because they are prepared.

Coming to the different provinces in China proper, and taking away the time element, the Anwei arrangement is all right.

In Shantung, Lin-cheng is not in the hands of the Communists.

The next item I think should be Tenghsien instead of Tehsien. Now regarding those places, I do not have so much in mind about the places but rather the principle of having Communist troops garrison the Tientsin-Pukou railroad. Seeing that the Communists have now agreed not to station troops on the Tsinan-Tsingtao railroad, there must be some place on the Tientsin-Pukou railroad so they can use communications in reorganization of troops. Particularly in Shantung where it is almost entirely in the hands of the Communists, it is not right that the Communists should vacate both from the Tsinan-Tsingtao railroad as well as the Tientsin-Pukou railroad. Such an arrangement would be too unfair for acceptance.

The Government may station troops at Tsingtao, Wei-hsien and Tsinan. In turn the Communists should also have some important cities for the garrisoning of troops on the Tientsin-Pukou railroad. As to the particular places for the concentration of Communist troops that must be still subject to discussion later on, when we came to the detailed discussion on the distribution of troops.

Now regarding Wensi in Shansi Province, I take exception that the Communists will not be permitted to garrison that place, but I am willing to make further study on it and give some reconsideration. That is my comment on China Proper.

Regarding coal mines along the railroad lines, I have no intention of stationing any Communist troops there, but I think it is most unfortunate to make such elaborate arrangements by specifying that the Communists should also evacuate the coal mines. Though I had no intention of stationing troops in those places I think such an arrangement is not acceptable in principle. It means that the Generalissimo is merely trying to strangle the Communists—I mean Chiang Kai-shek. No further concessions can be made on Cheng-te. I am doing my best to make concessions toward the Government, but the Government is making additional claims on every concession he makes. The Communists did not make any claim toward the Government. The only claim the Communists have raised is an increase on the strength ratio, and even on that one point I have wired to Yen-an considering withdrawal.

Coming to Manchuria, apart from Harbin, the Antung problem was also raised. As you have just told me the Generalissimo has in mind the Antung Province. I have to have time to take into consideration Antung Province as a whole. I am talking merely about Antung city in the following. I have never been prepared before to consider it. I need serious contemplation particularly with my associates in Man-

churia before I can give any commitment. Right now I feel very uncertain regarding that. I can give no indication as to what the reply will be without consulting my associates in Manchuria. I am not in a position to reply.

I am deeply moved and also feel grateful to all the efforts you have made, but the arrangement that the Generalissimo prescribes leaves me not even a moment for breathing because it keeps me so hard pressed. Also the stipulation that the detailed plan has to be worked out within 10 days. That would be very hard for the Communists to do and the time is too pressing. That is not to the good of China because we cannot solve every matter with care. Now, much depends on General Marshall's efforts to find a way out for the present situation. Maybe the Communist proposition would not be acceptable to the Government, but evidence shows that I have made all the concessions that I can and I have stated that regarding certain matters I still have to get an approval of Yen-an and Manchuria before I can definitely commit myself. I don't know what the Government idea is as to what should be done as a next step; whether a few days' margin can be granted for further negotiations or, if nothing is accepted by noon tomorrow, a complete breakdown with the Government resuming aggressive action and at the same time attempting to negotiate.

Regarding those concessions that I have made, I wish to state that I still have to get confirmation from Yen-an. I made these concessions on my own accord purely because I have full trust in General Marshall to establish peace in China. I place confidence in his efforts despite the fact that we have perhaps thought differently. It is for this reason that I have the courage to make my commitments even without consulting my associates. But I have to state clearly that those things I cannot comment on and which are beyond my power, I must leave as they are.

I have a strong desire for peace and all my efforts are for establishing peace in China. I feel particularly moved by your strong desire to establish peace in China. However, under the circumstances, we cannot accept the terms as the Generalissimo has prescribed them. The Generalissimo has actually made all the preparations for an attack in Hopeh. The attack is being launched and the Government has openly declared that they will take over north Kiangsu by force and they have organized, or are organizing, an army of so-called refugees to launch the fighting. The stage is set for an attack at Tsingtao and Tsinan and Cheng-te. The Generalissimo has actually completed his preparations.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Is that all, General Chou?

GENERAL CHOU: Yes.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I have done my best to endeavor to produce an acceptable compromise regarding the many issues involved in this matter of the redistribution of troops and the related political factors. Incidentally, I took such action as was possible last night regarding the fighting in Hopeh and again this morning, following General Chou's note¹³ on this matter. I am inclined to think the most serious trouble to me has not been so much the prevailing suspicion and distrust and animosity as it has been the effect of the aggressive Communist actions in Shantung and in Shansi Province in the region of Tatung. This morning I was greeted on the commencement of my interview with the Generalissimo with the information just received that four additional bridges were destroyed, two of them quite large—the largest near Chin-chou. These very recent actions have made it very difficult for me to persuade the Government to alter its position. I am aware, I think, rather fully of the various actions General Chou has brought to my attention—which he states threatens Communist positions. Altogether the period of this particular negotiation has been one of extraordinarily difficult influence brought to bear during the periods of our talks.

Having spent some hours this morning discussing the Government's position and determination and now having listened to General Chou's statements, I have come to the conclusion that the negotiations are not going to be successfully completed. Just exactly what the Government procedure will be I do not know. My own impression has been that the situation is so tense that it would probably get entirely out of control if the present loose, so-called truce basis were continued. It has therefore been my hope that in some way I could find a basis for completing agreement on the present paper in time to insure the issuance of the documents for formal termination of hostilities in Manchuria and the additional orders which would stop the fighting in China Proper. But, tragic and regrettable as it would appear, I can find no basis for optimism in the present tragic dilemma.

If General Chou has any suggestions to make, aside from a specific discussion of the various points of this paper, I would be very glad to hear them.

GENERAL CHOU: With regard to North Kiangsu, I already suggested a reduction in the Communist forces. As to Civil administration I suggested that an Inspection Mission be formed comprising members of the general Partisans and non-partisans who will work out the stipulations for holding a popular election after the reorganization of the National Government. I am also ready to consider the proposi-

¹³ Memorandum MM 064, June 29, p. 1246.

tion of forming a coalition government in North Kiangsu after the re-organization of the National Government. The details of the provisions will be subject to further study. My feeling is that I am ready to consider any formula, except the formula for civil administration involving the withdrawal of the Communists from North Kiangsu while the Kuomintang takes it over.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Do you have any further suggestions?

GENERAL CHOU: You have just asked me what suggestions I could make now regarding the parts of this draft. The main text of the draft is almost entirely acceptable to me except for one or two minor points.

In principle I hold no particular concern over the terms of the Annex. I would disagree on certain points, but I am trying my best to reach a compromise. While the main text is not acceptable to the Generalissimo, and he has more exceptions on the Annex, I am trying on that basis to reach a solution and I am thinking of the following procedures that you may adopt:

First, how about our trying to reach an agreement on the main text of this paper before noon tomorrow. As to the Annex, I can commit myself to those points to which I have already given my approval and as to those points for which additional time is required we can continue to discuss those which may not be completed tomorrow.

Secondly, in order that the main text itself will be accepted by the Government, I suggest that you may have Dr. Wang Shih Chieh, General Chen Cheng and Mr. Shao Li-tse on the Government side have a talk with you. If necessary I can also have a separate talk with those three gentlemen so that the main text will be acceptable to the Government before noon tomorrow.

Third—The neutral persons should also be asked to use their efforts so that the main text will be acceptable to the Government. That is, the Chinese neutral parties, such as the China Youth Party, Democratic Party, and Non-partisans.

Fourth, in case the negotiations prove a failure at this moment would it be possible to work out some arrangement for immediate cessation of hostilities, and that a time limit be fixed for the settlement of the outstanding issues with reference to the text and some further discussion be held. In case the Government feels that no settlement could be reached on that point, then of course after the time limit that has been fixed, the Government is still free to take action. My suggestion is that while those outstanding issues are under discussion the P. C. C. will be convened which will also be beneficial. (Initially the Steering Committee)

That is all of the suggestions that I have now, when these papers

were handed to me I read them and noticed several things I thought both sides should consider as to what procedures we may adopt.

Meeting adjourned at 0615 [6:15 p. m.]

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270: Telegram

*General Marshall to President Truman*¹⁴

[NANKING, June 29, 1946.]

[1022] DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: At 9 tonight Saturday with the so-called truce terminating at noon tomorrow, negotiations have reached a stalemate. A representative of Generalissimo is to see me at 10 and I am apparently to see Generalissimo early tomorrow. But when we parted at 3 PM today there was so serious a difference between Government demands and Communist willingness to make further concessions that a final breakdown appeared inevitable. I saw Chou En Lai from 3:30 to 6:30 and got the possibility of a few minor concessions but no more. He is communicating with Yen-an and I will see him tomorrow AM. There appears to be little prospect of important adjustments.

The principal disputed points concern the extent to which Kiangsu Province will be evacuated by the Communists and the Government demand for evacuation of Chengte capital of Jehol Province. Also Communist insistence that local governments and militia established by them in regions they had agreed to evacuate will be continued until political reorganization of the Government is effected. There are numbers of other details as to rapidity of evacuation, clearance of certain railroad lines, etc., which are in disagreement but these are minor matters in my opinion.

Communists are urgently demanding assurance of formal cessation of hostilities order, the terms of which have been agreed upon, but Generalissimo insists that a complete signed agreement on schedules for distribution of troops and their accurate location must first be concluded. I have informed Generalissimo that in my opinion an extension of the present form of partial truce would probably result in violent military ruptures due to tense and explosive situation, the bitterness of commanders in the field, and the strong desire of Government military leaders to settle matters by force for which the plans of the Government are complete and pretty well known to Communists.

I will radio you tomorrow the moment I complete my interview with the Generalissimo.

G. C. MARSHALL

¹⁴ Copy transmitted by the War Department to the Secretary of State on June 30.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Notes on Meeting Between General Marshall and Generalissimo
Chiang Kai-shek, June 30, 1946, 9:30 a. m.*

The Generalissimo opened the meeting by stating that he was willing to compromise in the matter of Chengde but insisted that the evacuation of Kiangsu to the north of the Lunghai railroad must be completed within one month. He wished to know what chance I thought there was of the Communists agreeing to the general terms under these conditions. I told him I thought none at all, that the issue in Kiangsu was serious, that it would be practically impossible logistically to evacuate to the north of the Lunghai railroad in one month, that I had thought that if the evacuation northward to Huai-an was accepted by the Generalissimo upon a one-month basis that there was a possibility that I could secure an agreement of the Communists to evacuate to the north of the Lunghai railroad at the end of three months or more.

I have felt the most serious factor was the Communists' insistence on continuation of local governments and with regard to the Peace Preservation Corps units. I stated that it was for this reason I was very anxious to see a compromise solution attempted on the basis of continuing the local governments while an immediately convening political or especially arranged civil group work out an agreement regarding the modification of those local governments and the matter of the Peace Preservation Corps units. A lengthy discussion followed in which the Generalissimo stated his views again and his concern over the future peace of China unless the requirements he had imposed were fulfilled. He did not indicate arguments of the opposition for a civil group convened for the settlement of the local political problem.

I stated in brief that I thought he should have in mind that all of the demands in North China were on the part of the Government and no compromise whatever had been offered the Communists, except in the way of some modification of terms. Further, that I felt that the situation was being dominated by a military group. I had seen in the paper yesterday that General Ho Ying-chin, whose position was well-known and who had been recently retired from active duty, had been successfully visiting the troubled spots, including Mukden. And that, following his visit to Mukden, I read in the paper this morning, on my way to the Generalissimo's, the public statement of the Chief of Staff of the Manchurian Command; all of which indicated clearly that a military group were attempting to dominate the situation. I told him I had received a first hand report yesterday on some most remarkable statements by the leading political

member of the Kuomintang Party, Mr. Chen Li Fu, which were quite evidently intended for my ears and which were reported to me from written notes. I stated that the procedure now being followed to me indicated plainly that the Government was washing its hands of any democratic procedure and was pursuing a dictatorial policy of military force. I further stated that the comparison would be inevitable of the army leaders' procedure in this case with that of the army dictatorship in the case of Japan, which led to the destruction of that nation.

The Generalissimo made a lengthy and very frank statement, particularly of his personal reactions and disclaiming responsibility for the expressions of officials who were using certain freedom of speech. To this I replied that my comments were addressed to responsible officers in high positions whose statements in frank opposition to the procedure of the Government in Nanking could only be taken as disloyal or almost revolutionary proposals.

The Generalissimo covered most of the difficulties of the situation, the personal insults to which he had been submitted, his singleness of purpose to bring peace to China, and his strong feeling he could not ignore or fail the hundreds of thousands of refugees who were dependent upon him. To this last I replied that it seemed to me that he must measure whether his efforts in favor of the refugees, which were to produce a civil war, actually would benefit the refugees and would that not result in untold agony and suffering to most of the population of North China and Manchuria.

This discussion was very lengthy and very frank. Finally the Generalissimo said that he had already issued orders to his armies that they should not undertake any offensive action except by way of defense, and that he hoped that with this further stay of the fighting the negotiations might be successfully completed and he trusted in me to use my influence to this end.

I told him that I thought it imperative that we introduce a political discussion at this time and referred to the proposition of the previous afternoon of General Chou En-lai, which I had suggested, that three high Government officials, two civil and one military—the Chief of Staff, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and a leading member of the PCC—should meet with the corresponding Communist group and endeavor to thrash out the difficulties regarding local civil governments and any other points in our present negotiations that they might be able to compromise. He said he would consider doing this. I then proposed that he see General Chou En-lai personally. He agreed to this and it was later understood he, after talking to his own people, would suggest to General Chou En-lai the meeting of the special group above referred to.

He then produced the draft of announcements regarding the further stay of aggressive fighting and asked my view and corrections. I made a number of changes in the document, all of which were accepted by him, and I believe it is now being released to the press.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

*General Marshall to President Truman*¹⁵

[NANKING,] June 30, 1946.

[1027.] DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Generalissimo has issued orders continuing the prohibition against aggressive action by his armies. Negotiations will therefore continue.

I will give you details later.

G. C. MARSHALL

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai at 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, June 30, 1946, 2:15 p. m.

Also present: Mr. Chang
Colonel Caughey
Captain Soong

GENERAL MARSHALL: I suppose General Chou got my message that the Generalissimo had some time previous to 12:00 issued orders that his army should not engage in any aggressive action except to defend their positions. I did not see the terms of the order.

I have no specific points to bring to General Chou's attention at this time regarding possible compromises on the part of the Government. But it was a clearly expressed intention on the part of the Generalissimo to go ahead with negotiations. The questions discussed between us were almost entirely regarding the larger issues, that is, those issues I thought were the most serious difficulties in the way of agreements. I should make it clear here that there was no suggestion on my part to the prolongation of the period of restraint from aggressive action. I previously said to the Generalissimo, and to General Chou, that I feared the mere prolongation would result in a violent rupture due to the tense feeling in political as well as military circles and among the people in general.

In searching for some better method to find a solution I suggested to the Generalissimo the desirability of his receiving General Chou

¹⁵ Copy transmitted by the War Department to the Secretary of State on June 30.

and their having intimate discussions. He acquiesced, or agreed, to that suggestion. When I asked him if I should make the appointment and if so, when would he see General Chou, he said tomorrow or the following day. I expressed the view that the day after tomorrow was too long a delay and I thought it was very important that he see General Chou as quickly as possible. I left with the impression that he would probably propose some time tomorrow. I wanted General Chou to know this as soon as possible, and also to know that the notes containing his suggestions as to a possible course of procedure which he made yesterday afternoon had been read by the Generalissimo.

GENERAL CHOU: Asked whether the Generalissimo had explained to General Marshall the order he issued for the continuation of the cessation of aggressive action. Does it contain a time limit or not?

GENERAL MARSHALL: I did not see the order. I will add that he was intending to make a press release regarding that and spoke to me about possible time limits. Just what his decision was I do not know. But my reaction was there should be no time limit. Not because I thought more time should be given to the negotiation of a special agreement but on the contrary because I thought we must complete it as quickly as possible with a very minimum of delays. Otherwise the situation would get out of hand and be completely beyond control. I frankly suggested that he put no period in but terminate his part of the affair if he felt there was no chance of reaching a satisfactory conclusion on a peaceful basis. I think the Generalissimo rather favored putting in a date, but his reasons and mine would be quite different. I was after speed, and yet I could not say just how many days would be required. I don't know whether I make my meaning clear or not. Maybe I can explain my position better this way. The Generalissimo's desire is to conclude the negotiations as quickly as possible. I have exactly the same desire but we disagreed as to the procedure that would best produce that result. He seemed to favor a limiting date. I felt that he would have to put that so far off in the future, in order to make certain of the possibility of completing negotiations, that he might well be prolonging rather than shortening negotiations. I am of the opinion that we have very little time, before we would be overtaken by the situation. I have talked a good bit about this but I wanted to make the position clear. It may be we will find a date mentioned in the release. If no date is mentioned it would mean he took my suggestion which has for its purpose the earlier termination of negotiations.

GENERAL CHOU: The second question you raised is to have an interview between the Generalissimo and General Chou; that procedure seems highly desirable because the position can be explained much

clearer by both parties. I thank you for your assistance in arranging such an appointment. The main thing is to continue the discussion on the special agreement. I am not sure whether to continue to discuss the entire amended basic agreement or still discuss on the basis of this special agreement.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I believe it should be the special agreement. The Generalissimo would prefer the entire agreement but I don't believe you can hope to complete that without long delay. I feel certain the situation, as I previously expressed it, will overtake us.

The Generalissimo did not like the special agreement but it was evident to me that that was the only hope of managing an early issuance of formal instructions for the final termination of hostilities. It was my hope that if we got this special agreement agreed to, not only would the order for the cessation of hostilities be issued, but we could then proceed in a more harmonious manner, like last February, to complete the amendments to the basic agreement of February 25.

GENERAL CHOU: Regarding the hostilities, as far as I know, the situation in Manchuria is rather satisfactory at the present moment. General Yao, whom you have asked to come here before going to Yen-an, just told me that the situation in Manchuria is fairly satisfactory and there are no significant hostilities and that the field teams have also gone up to Harbin and the same thing with Ambassador Pauley's¹⁶ mission. From the foregoing, it seems to me that the chief trouble might be in China Proper. If the Generalissimo's order is restricted to Manchuria then the situation in China Proper might be getting serious.

I learned from General Yao that a field team is scheduled to leave for Harbin today. Two other teams are still delayed by the Government side from going to places indicated in General Byroade's original plan. For this reason the Communists will also delay the dispatch of the team to Tsitsihar until clearance by the Government is given to the other two teams. Another reason there is no conflict in Tsitsihar. They may have to decide to move the Tsitsihar team to some other place.

Regarding the hostilities in China Proper. In the first place I have already mentioned twice the situation in the area north of Hankow. Right now, Government Troops have occupied four or five localities and they compelled the Communists' forces to take up self defense, the result of which would be complete chaos in that area. So far, I have not received a formal reply from the Government and I feel very much concerned.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Has he names of the localities?

¹⁶ Edwin W. Pauley, President Truman's Personal Representative on Reparations.

GENERAL CHOU: I sent over a memorandum this morning.¹⁷ Secondly, regarding the situation in North Kiangsu. The so-called refugees are now going to be armed by the Government and rifles have been issued and the so-called refugees organized in Nanking, Chekiang, Kiangsu and it is possible that they will, within a few days, launch an assault on the Communist area.

Thirdly, regarding the four blown-up bridges on the Tsingtao-Tsinan RR; the reason for the destruction was due to the fact that the Nationalist Eighth Army recently occupied Yitu. After the occupation of Yitu, the Communists, to defend themselves, blew up the bridges.

Fourthly, regarding the situation in Jehol, I sent a memorandum also showing the disposition of Nationalists troops. The main assault was made from the east side and in the western side they also have taken concerted actions.

Fifthly, regarding the situation in Tatung, I learned that General Yen Hsi Shan has considerably over-colored the situation and also that the American member of the field team sent a report on the concentration of troops. I sent two wires about the matter. I received one reply. In the reply assurance was given that the Communists will not attack Tatung but does admit the Communists made some preparations in that area because General Yen Hsi Shan is planning to attack west and along the Tung-pu RR. For this reason the Communists have massed troops forming a menace to Tatung but it has no intention to attack it. The preparation is merely to tie up General Yen's forces so that they could not launch an attack further east. I received a memorandum from General Hsu yesterday regarding this matter, and I have also a reply along these which I have given him. Therefore I am much concerned over the conflict in China proper. It is quite possible that present events will [lead to] conflagration in China proper, particularly in the four places mentioned, Hopeh, North Kiangsu, Tsingtao-Tsinan RR and in Jehol. This situation is serious too, because once fighting starts in one or two places it would affect the whole of China proper. Therefore I share your view that we should continue our discussion on the basis of this special agreement and have it completed as quickly as possible. I have thought over this special agreement, and it seems to me that the issues pertaining to Manchuria should not be so hard for a solution. I do not know whether you would agree with me or not. Maybe I am wrong. To me it seems the main difficulties lie in the issues of North Kiangsu, the Tientsin-Pukou RR line and Jehol. I learned that the Generalissimo is very stubborn on these three points. He is very un-

¹⁷ Not printed.

yielding in his three points. In order to loosen the knot we have to start from these three points. If the Generalissimo would persist in his demands then we may reach an impasse. This seems to me the crucial point of issue now. I do not know whether my impression is right or wrong.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I think those particular points are great difficulties, but I am also inclined to believe that the matter of the local civil governments is one of equal difficulty.

GENERAL CHOU: We will talk about the local civil government. Do you have in mind the local civil government in general or do you refer particularly to North Kiangsu and Jehol?

GENERAL MARSHALL: I am referring particularly to those places the Communists are to evacuate, which will be Kiangsu, Jehol, south of the latitude of Chengte and similar areas which have been under Communist control. I would assume, though I don't know, that in Manchuria the situation is a little different. It is more of a general proposition than in Kiangsu, for example. In most parts of Manchuria neither the Communists or the Nationalist Government have been there but for a short time but it is quite different in North China. It also [is] greatly complicated by the problem of what happens to the refugees on their return.

GENERAL CHOU: Is there any inclination for the Government representative like Dr. Wang Shih Chieh to participate?

GENERAL MARSHALL: I could not say. Dr. Wang read General Chou's proposals but made no commitment. I would hope that they might be discussed when you see the Generalissimo.

GENERAL CHOU: Now, where should we make a point to start?

GENERAL MARSHALL: At the present moment all I can see that can be done is to make a careful review of the papers, see if there are any modification or points of view or any suggestions that might loosen the knots, and await the result of this conversation between the Generalissimo and General Chou. I have no basis for discussion with General Chou regarding the readjustment of these points unless he has something to suggest as a possible rearrangement that might be more acceptable to the Government and still be acceptable to the Communists. However, at this moment I have nothing from the Government side to go on. I am hopeful that their conversation may lead to some adjustments or some procedure that would tend to facilitate matters. Our immediate problem is to prevent a further outbreak of hostilities in North China. The trouble is that the Government feels the Communists' action in Shantung from June 9 until the 13th or 14th were very hostile and aggressive. The Government also feels that Communist concentrations around Tatung are very threatening

and the destruction of bridges, which included a large bridge near Chinchow[,] are hardly evidences of good faith.

On the Communist side, General Chou feels that the Government action north of Hopeh and the action he described along the Tung-pu RR constitute aggressive threats. Now, how to compose these conflicting situations is an immediate problem. In the hope Thursday that we had found a basis for the issuance of the formal agreement for the termination of hostilities in Manchuria I had drafted this further agreement concerning North China :

“Instructions have just been agreed to and issued by the Government and Communist Party for the formal termination of hostilities in Manchuria. All fighting and offensive military movements will immediately cease in North and Central China in strict accordance with the terms of Agreement of January 10, 1946. Detailed orders regarding the redistribution of troops will be issued later.”

GENERAL CHOU: Will the order for cessation of hostilities in North China be issued at the same time as for Manchuria?

GENERAL MARSHALL: That is which [*what*] I had it ready for. It is evident we cannot issue it now. What we should do, and what I will try to work out this afternoon, is to secure the *status quo* in North China. The complication in the matter as I see it is that while aggressive and offensive action has been forbidden, I think, by the Generalissimo to all his armies in North China and Central China, as well as Manchuria, yet at the same time the troops, including the Communists, have been engaged in retaking what they were forced out of, particularly at those points involved in the violent changes of situation since 7 June. Since there has been no formal order for the cessation of hostilities in Manchuria, it has greatly complicated the understanding of the situation in North China and I have not reasoned out exactly how to straighten matters out, particularly in view of the inevitable procedure of retaliations which are evidently in progress in many places.

I am going to see if I can develop some workable proposal, but if General Chou can find some suggestion I would be very glad to have it. That is the critical phase of the matter until we get into the further negotiation tomorrow.

GENERAL CHOU: Since I have not yet been informed about the order of the Government or the press release of the Generalissimo, I would like first to read them before making up my mind to any suggestions. Also, I will meet the third parties because they are scheduled to meet the Government representative yesterday and today. Therefore, I may have some suggestions tonight or tomorrow. I will try to let you know and make an appointment with you either before

or after the meeting with the Generalissimo, depending on what time the Generalissimo's meeting will be. I have nothing further right now.

The meeting was adjourned.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

*General Marshall to President Truman*¹⁸

[NANKING,] June 30, 1946.

[1028.] DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I saw Generalissimo for lengthy conference this morning in which exceedingly frank and lengthy statements were made by both of us, I principally reflecting on the plainly evident and tremendous pressure of military leaders (who also occupy powerful political positions) to pursue without delay a policy of force for which all plans have been made. However drastically they reduce their application to Communist territorial holdings and territory occupied by Communist troops or eliminate local Communist governmental setups of long standing, the Generalissimo laid great emphasis on the necessity of arrangements which would safeguard the Government against the uncertainties of agreements with the Communists or future hostile threats or action by them to influence political negotiations. I had been endeavoring to have a small group of civil representatives of high position or reputation convened immediately to undertake the solution of the exceedingly complicated problem involved with regard to the local civil governments of the regions to be evacuated by the Communist troops and to which thousands of refugees would be immediately returning. With regard to the previous unwillingness to accept such a proposition I stated that the procedure contemplated by the Government officials would in effect be washing their hands of any idea of democratic procedures and deliberately following the dictates of Army officials as did Japan to her ruin.

The Generalissimo finally announced that he had already issued instructions continuing in effect his orders against aggressive offensive action by his troops. He accepted my proposal that he have a personal interview with Chou En Lai tomorrow and that he would discuss with his people the appointment of a special group of six, the three from the Government to include my suggestion of Doctor Wang, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and General Chen Cheng, Chief of Staff. General Chou En Lai would head the Communist representatives. If he decided on this procedure he agreed to propose it himself to General

¹⁸ Copy transmitted by the War Department to the Secretary of State on June 30.

Chou. The latter incidentally had formulated such a proposal the preceding day at my suggestion.

I just completed a meeting with Chou En Lai who is preparing for his meeting with the Generalissimo. The latter issued a statement to the press this afternoon of which I was shown a draft. I have not yet seen the statement actually issued so I do not know to what extent my rather extensive alterations were accepted.

G. C. MARSHALL

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

*General Marshall to President Truman*¹⁹

[NANKING,] June 30, 1946.

[1029.] DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Reference my previous message 1028 a few hours ago please strike out sentence commencing "however drastically" and substitute the following sentence. "The Generalissimo laid great emphasis on the necessity for harsh measures or demands to safeguard the Government against the uncertainties of agreements with the Communists and also against future hostile threats or actions by them to influence political negotiations."

G. C. MARSHALL

**X. SPREAD OF HOSTILITIES IN NORTH CHINA AND SHANTUNG;
FAILURE OF POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS (JULY 1-JULY 21, 1946)**

893.00/7-146 : Telegram

The Counselor of Embassy in China (Smyth) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, July 1, 1946—10 a. m.

[Received July 1—9:15 a. m.]

1074. Consensus of reports indicates cease fire order of 7 June has been well observed by both sides. (M[ilitary] A[ttaché] report period 19 June to 25 June.) Communist press has accused National Govt. concentrating forces southeast Manchuria preparatory to attack on Antung. Appears more likely that New First Army moved this area purpose protecting Anshan, Tashihchiao, Haicheng and Yingkow from attacks rather than preparatory to offensive against Antung.

Plans for air attacks by Chinese Air Force against small craft ferrying Communist forces from Shantung to Manchuria have been held up following representations from Commander US Seventh Fleet

¹⁹ Copy transmitted by the War Department to the Secretary of State on June 30.

that such operations would involve risk of Chinese planes to attacking US Navy vessels.

According to unconfirmed press reports, vessels of Chinese Navy on June 19 shelled harbor installations at Communist-held Chefoo and Weihaiwei.

Shantung continues to be most troubled area. Movement of 54th and 73rd armies to Shantung to reinforce Tsingtao and Tsinan garrisons stated by National Govt. to be for defensive purposes and accordingly not contrary to terms of truce agreement now in effect. Situation Tsingtao eased considerably following arrival reinforcements. Govt-controlled press continues to report Communist attacks on points near Tsinan but, according official sources, situation there not serious.

SMYTH

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

*Mr. Walter S. Robertson*²⁰ to *General Marshall*

PEIPING, 1 July 1946.

4847. Have notified American members of all field teams that truce has been extended. Impossible to issue team message due absence today of National Government branch members. Your 1026²¹ received last evening stated Generalissimo²² had issued orders to his armies prohibiting aggressive action and extending truce. Has Chairman Mao²³ issued similar orders to all of his field commanders? In our opinion it is necessary that field commanders in north and central China as well as Manchuria receive such orders from both sides if widespread conflict is to be avoided. Both sides appear to be jockeying for position and as usual each will claim defensive action if conflict occurs. The press releases of the Minister of Information²⁴ and of Chou En-lai²⁵ confuse rather than clarify the situation. The work of this headquarters both here and in the field would be greatly facilitated if we could be certain that field commanders of both sides had been officially notified of truce extension to include north and central China as well as Manchuria. It has been our experience in critical situations that team members will refuse to obey directives from this headquarters which are contrary to instructions received from their respective field commanders.

²⁰ American Commissioner of Executive Headquarters at Peiping.

²¹ Not printed.

²² Chiang Kai-shek.

²³ Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

²⁴ Peng Hsueh-pei.

²⁵ Head of the Chinese Communist Party delegation at Nanking.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Minutes of Conference Between General Marshall and General Jao,²⁶
at General Marshall's Residence, Peiping, July 1, 1946, 5:30 p. m.*

Also present: Mr. Chang²⁷

Lt. Col. Hutchin²⁸

General Marshall was informed by Gen. Jao of the latter's position as the political adviser to Gen. Yeh²⁹ in the Executive Headquarters at Peiping. General Jao stated that he was going to Yen-an before returning to Changchun to become the Communist Representative in the Advance Section of Executive Headquarters. Gen. Jao stated that he had visited Gen. Lin Piao³⁰ twice at Harbin. Gen. Lin Piao wanted to convey his deep thanks and appreciation through Gen. Jao to Gen. Marshall for his tireless effort in obtaining peace for China. Gen. Marshall's effort was also appreciated by everyone in the Executive Headquarters, particularly his efforts in extending the truce. He also stated that he had gone to Manchuria twice with Gen. Byroade³¹ and that they had planned to go to Harbin together where Gen. Lin Piao had prepared an elaborate reception. However, unfortunately, Gen. Byroade took ill, and the trip was made with Col. Tourtillott,³² with whom Gen. Lin Piao had a successful conversation. Gen. Jao expressed that the Communist troops in Manchuria were hopeful of a peaceful settlement. This hope was diminished somewhat when it was found that the field teams sent there were unable to carry out their mission. However, this hope was again brightened by the 15 days' truce and the subsequent extension.

Gen. Marshall stated that he was very glad to meet Gen. Jao and to talk with someone who had come directly from Changchun and Harbin. He appreciated Gen. Jao's courteous expressions of good will and hope for peace. In fact, his hope for peaceful settlement was even greater than that of Gen. Jao. Gen. Marshall regretted that Gen. Byroade was ill, but expressed his great confidence in Gen. Timberman³³ to carry on the work successfully. He assumed that Gen. Jao

²⁶ General Jao Su-shih, member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Vice Commander of the New Fourth Army.

²⁷ Chang Wen-chin, personal secretary to General Chou En-lai.

²⁸ Claire E. Hutchin, member of General Marshall's staff.

²⁹ General Yeh Chien-ying, Chinese Communist Commissioner of Executive Headquarters at Peiping.

³⁰ Commander in Chief of Chinese Communist armies in Manchuria.

³¹ Brig. Gen. Henry A. Byroade, U. S. Army, head of the Advance Section of Executive Headquarters at Changchun, though absent from duty because of illness.

³² Col. Raymond R. Tourtillott, American member of the Advance Section of Executive Headquarters at Changchun.

³³ Brig. Gen. Thomas S. Timberman, Acting Director of Operations of Executive Headquarters at Peiping.

was completely informed on the general situation by Gen. Chou. He could not estimate what all the aspects of the situation were. However, the basic trouble was the fears of the two parties and their intense suspicion of each other. The problem would be very simple to solve if each side could be more careful in estimating what the fear was on the other side with regard to some particular matter under discussion. As a rule, General Marshall felt, each side only had in mind its own fears which greatly influenced its action and decision. He was probably more aware of the fears on both sides than any one else. In attempting to analyze the situation, it seemed that the greatest difficulties had this background of uncertainty. The Communist Party had a theory of government which was related to individuals and to the economy of the country. Since that theory of government had its chance to be tried out during the past 25 or 30 years, the party has struggled for its place in the sun and has involved itself more in methods of the struggle and technique. In order to survive and get ahead, it had completely concentrated on methods of operation rather than the objective of its ideology. Criticism of the Communist Party, Gen. Marshall believed, was more frequently directed at the technique of operation or methods in the struggle than against the ultimate principle; and mistakes were very common in characterizing technique as Communistic when it was merely a method to gain the end. On the other hand the Kuomintang had never experienced anything but the procedure of concentrated control. There was the initial necessity for one party rule. Consequently, it was difficult to convince Kuomintang people after a long [lease?] of power to relinquish such undivided authority.

Gen. Marshall then expressed the opinion that the Government's fears at this moment were not so much regarding the ideology as of the methods, and the future possibility of autocratic control. He then cited Soviet Russia as example where there was little freedom of press or freedom for the individual as we understand it in America. Whenever the issue of Chinese Communist Party arose, it was inevitably compared with Russia which greatly confused the issue.

To put it briefly, Gen. Marshall said that he found himself considering a certain issue one week in which he was warmly and aggressively in support of one party: then the next week, on another issue, he would be just as warmly and aggressively in support of the other party. He emphasized that the policy of retaliation on both sides did more harm than anything else. As a rule, it did no good and only caused trouble. It almost defeated General Marshall in his negotiations. He then cited the retaliatory acts on both sides which greatly hindered his efforts in trying to obtain compromise. He further stated that

the most serious difficulty he had to deal with regarding the Government and the Communist Party in North China was the continued advance of Government troops after their occupation of Changchun and the continuous attacks by Communist troops in Shantung during the truce period after June 8th. Gen. Marshall then expressed his hope in Gen. Jao to use his influence to stop retaliatory acts while we tried to settle things by negotiation. He explained that in English, the word "retaliation" had almost the opposite implication of the word "negotiation". He wanted Gen. Jao to express Gen. Marshall's feeling in this matter when Gen. Jao returned to Yen-an and Manchuria.

Gen. Jao replied that he would express General Marshall's statement to Chairman Mao Tse-tung at Yen-an and Gen. Lin Piao in Manchuria. He explained historically why there was great suspicion and bitterness between the Kuomintang and Communist Parties. He stated that when Doctor Sun Yat-sen was still alive,³⁴ Communist Party and Kuomintang were in close cooperation and that the armed forces of Kuomintang was built up with the great assistance of the Communist Party. When Dr. Sun died, the Republic was filled with war lords. The Communist members did not wish to be involved in this situation, consequently, they only took up work in the fields of politics and education. In 1927, the split between the two parties took place. The Kuomintang capitalized on the weakness of the Communist Party in that the latter did not have control or command over the army. Consequently, an overwhelming number of Communist Party members were arrested and killed. Very few survived such as Chairman Mao. They had no place to go and were cornered to fight for their lives. So they stood together with the people and took up arms for the first time to fight their life and death struggle. They survived on account of the support from the people. Now, the people in the Communist areas can express themselves freely due to this fact. This great lesson of the past led the Communist Party to be suspicious. They could not help but recall their past bitter experience. In order to wipe out such deep suspicion now, the Government must take practical action to prove that such suspicion was now out of place. Although the military strength of the Government was far superior, the Communist Party was much more influential with the people. Therefore, the two parties were of equal strength when taking both political and military considerations into account. Gen. Jao further stated that it would be easy to persuade the people in Communist areas not to take any aggressive actions if the Government would not take any aggressive actions themselves. Hostile

³⁴ Sun Yat-sen died March 12, 1925.

actions on part of Communists were caused by self defense and by the bitterness of past experience. They had to protect themselves if they were to have a future. Also, the Communist Party was obligated to fulfill the wishes of the people. These were the reasons which had a bearing on the present situation. He emphasized one point, that whenever instructions were issued by Chairman Mao or the Central Committee, they enjoyed high prestige among the lower echelons of the Communist Party. This indicated factual support. Geo. Jao further stressed that the Kuomintang is the largest political party in China and it will play the leading role in the Government. He wanted General Marshall to persuade the Generalissimo to moderate his position actively and on his own initiative.

General Marshall replied that he would give Gen. Jao's statement sincere thought. He clarified that, when he spoke of retaliation, he was referring to the hostile operations during the critical hours of the negotiation.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

The Chief of Staff (Eisenhower) to General Marshall

[WASHINGTON,] 2 July 1946.

93274. Recent press reports from Shanghai, repeated here, relative to General Wedemeyer's³⁵ impending return to China imply your early return to the United States. In the belief that this may be embarrassing to you in your present negotiations I am prepared to relieve Wedemeyer of assignment to China and re-assign him to the Continental US, without in any way prejudicing future plans. Wedemeyer concurs. Please advise.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

*General Marshall to the Acting Secretary of State*³⁶

WASHINGTON, July 2, 1946.

1032. DEAR ACHESON: No negotiations yesterday, Monday. Generalissimo probably discussing with his people basis for his meeting with Chou En Lai at 10 this morning. Whether or not suggestion that a small high level group meet immediately to attempt a political solution to problem of local government I have not yet been informed. Local public opinion among inner Kuomintang bureaucracy is that

³⁵ Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, until April Commanding General, U. S. Forces, China Theater.

³⁶ Copy transmitted on July 2 by the War Department to the Acting Secretary of State, Dean Acheson.

Generalissimo's press release of Sunday was merely a sop to me and for purpose of placing Government in better position public and probably preliminary to launching a military campaign.

I am so closely engaged and so close to the trees that I may lack perspective. Therefore I would appreciate your and Vincent's³⁷ frank and quite informal reactions to present developments and the imperative issues that might soon and suddenly arise.

G. C. MARSHALL

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Memorandum by Lieutenant Colonel Claire E. Hutchin to
General Marshall*

[NANKING,] 2 July [1946.]

GENERAL MARSHALL: Gen. Chou said that the discussion he had with the Generalissimo this morning was confined to the four points which he has been conferring with you. These are the Northern Kiangsu issue, the Tsingtao-Tsinan railroad, the Chengte question, and the Antung problem. Generalissimo has appointed Dr. Wang Shih Chieh,³⁸ Mr. Shao Li-tse³⁹ and General Chen Cheng⁴⁰ to carry on further negotiation on these four points with Gen. Chou; and a conference among them is scheduled for 8:30 this evening at Gen. Chen's residence. General Chou felt that there is no need for him to see you today but he would like to have an appointment with you at 1030 tomorrow morning.⁴¹

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Minutes of Meeting Between General Chou En-lai and Colonel
Tychsen at General Chou's Residence, 30 Mei Yuan Village, Nan-
king, July 2, 1946, 2 p. m.*

Also present: Mr. Chang
Capt. Soong

Colonel Tychsen stated that he was greatly honored in being chosen for this mission and that he was to go to Changchun to understudy with a view to becoming the American Senior Representative (Gen-

³⁷ John Carter Vincent, Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs.

³⁸ Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs.

³⁹ Kuomintang member of the Political Consultative Conference.

⁴⁰ Chief of the Chinese General Staff.

⁴¹ Notation by Colonel Hutchin: "Col. Tychsen had a 2 o'clock appointment with Gen. Chou. I sent Capt. Soong along. At close of the hour, Gen. Chou had this message for you." Col. Andrew C. Tychsen was Assistant Chief of Staff of Executive Headquarters at Peiping, on duty at Nanking a few days before proceeding to an assignment to take charge of the Advance Section at Changchun. Capt. John L. Soong was U. S. Army interpreter.

eral Timberman). He stated that he personally felt much more optimistic since he came to Nanking and that he was more cheerful and hopeful for the eventual success of the overall mission. He stated he would appreciate General Chou orienting him in regard to Manchuria or telling him anything that would help him to better understand Communist viewpoint so that his future mission would be greatly facilitated.

General Chou said that he was deeply moved by Colonel Tychsen's spirit and enthusiasm, and his hope of successful negotiation. If all American friends serving under General Marshall could be like him in his fair attitude and earnest enthusiasm, then the situation could be very successfully dealt with. He stated that the situation in Manchuria was very complicated. The past few months had been the most difficult period. However, under General Marshall's incessant effort, the fundamental issue in Manchuria was solved—the Cessation of Hostilities. The problem now is how to implement such a Cessation of Hostilities agreement once it was put into effect. Another problem was the troop disposition in the Army Reorganization Plan, which would have to be settled before the Cessation of Hostilities could be effected. However, General Chou stated this problem would not be too difficult to solve. General Chou then said that General Jao had visited many Senior Communist officials while in Manchuria, and through him, General Lin Piao expressed his appreciation for General Marshall's effort in effecting the truce in Manchuria and the subsequent extensions. He stated that the present status in Manchuria would be maintained and that the Army Reorganization Plan would be carried out. With this assurance from General Lin, it would facilitate Colonel Tychsen's mission. He further hoped that Colonel Tychsen would be able to meet General Lin and that the problems regarding implementation of Cessation of Hostilities and troop dispositions in Manchuria would be solved in the near future. General Chou elaborated on the situation in Manchuria by saying that if the Cease Fire Order could be continued for any length of time it would facilitate agreement to a permanent Cessation of Hostilities later. The situation is complicated because Manchuria is very large. However, both forces could withdraw 20 li according to the agreement, thus avoiding some likelihood of contact or friction. Also, the troop disposition areas in Manchuria were rather large. There will not be enough troops to garrison all areas once the reorganization of the army was effected. Thus, many large areas would be vacated and remain empty of troops. Consequently, there would be greater distances separating the two forces resulting in a less chance of conflict. The restoration of Communications in Manchuria could also be accomplished sooner than in North China because a large part of the communications in the

former had already been restored. Also, conditions in Manchuria were materially better. General Chou reiterated that as long as an agreement could be reached here, the Executive Headquarters in Peiping and Changchun could carry it out.

Regarding the location of the 8 field teams agreed to for Manchuria, General Chou stated that the Harbin Field Team was already at Shuang-Chen. Since the mission of a field team was to stop conflict, and since Tsitsihar was so far removed from potential fighting, the location of the Tsitsihar field team was not yet settled. It would have to be decided whether it should be sent to Tsitsihar or to the line of contact in the Tsitsihar area. Two field teams to be sent into the Government area were also undecided as to their locations. However, General Chou stated that this could be easily solved by the Executive Headquarters at Peiping and Changchun. Another point General Chou raised was that after 14 years domination in Manchuria by the Japanese and puppets, there were large number of bandits in both the Communist and Nationalist areas. He expressed the hope that these bandits would not be used by either side to further complicate the situation. General Chou concluded that in general, the situation in Manchuria, though complicated, could be solved easily if treated with a fair procedure. As long as the agreement could be reached here, together with Colonel Tychsen's fair and enthusiastic attitude and spirit, the problem could be settled successfully. He hoped that Colonel Tychsen would frequently visit the senior representatives on both sides and talk to them. Based on Colonel Tychsen's spirit, General Chou was confident that he could carry out his task successfully and that he would be long remembered by the Chinese people.

Colonel Tychsen replied that he would try his utmost to carry out his mission, and that he appreciated General Chou's suggestions and comments.

General Chou then said that he had great confidence in General Marshall's choice and that through his contact with General Marshall, he came to know him to be a man with great patience and impartiality. Consequently, the persons he chose would necessarily be the same. However, there was one difficult condition for the American friends to understand; that was the Kuomintang represents the Central Government, while the Communist Party represents the local authority. The Kuomintang occupied all large cities while the Communists are scattered in the country. The Kuomintang possessed the majority of the railways while the Communist Party were left with little means of communication. The Kuomintang controlled all large industries while the Communist Party were confined to rural and agricultural

areas. All these tend to create an impression that the Kuomintang was the legal body in China while the Communist Party was illegal. Therefore, if a person was to mediate the situation, he must understand this condition. He must understand the ideology of both sides and then obtain solution with a fair attitude. In this respect, General Marshall thoroughly understood both sides perfectly.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270: Telegram

Mr. Walter E. Robertson to General Marshall

PEIPING, 2 July 1946.

4905. For your information report from Clement ⁴² of his conversation with Chen Yi ⁴³ follows:

"In conference [at] Lini with Gen. Chen Yi no definite basis on which dated terms could be discussed was reached. I stressed the necessity for immediate agreement to avoid large scale fighting and more important to prevent immediate and future suffering of the people this winter. Appears to be in full accord is Chen but states the issue is too large to be settled in Shantung. I stressed the importance of that province, that it was essential to the unity of China, and with such a cornerstone to build on that it was possible to reach an overall agreement. He declined to commit himself on the return of cities and towns taken in June stating that the Kmt ⁴⁴ was now in a favorable position and moving armies for the offensive whereas Communists are on the defensive. Hence any agreement to return those areas would admit weakness. Above all he wants cease fire agreement extended. He is willing to confer at Tsingtao but due to death his Deputy Gen. Lo, the absence of his Chief of Staff Gen. Loi and the seriousness of the situation at present he can not leave until conditions are more quiet. He seems to be definitely concerned about the large scale Kmt activity at present. To my specific question 'are you willing to confer at Tsingtao relative to establishing areas of control based on June 1 positions and the restoration of railroad to permit unhindered flow of freight' he replied that he commanded all troops in Shantung-Honan-Hopei-Wuhu (Central China) and that he would be eager to confer at Tsingtao and reach an agreement covering this entire area but that he could not until present conditions improved. Further he was agreeable to restoration of railroads providing no troops or military equipment would be hauled. He was

⁴² Brig. Gen. William T. Clement, Commanding General, 4th U. S. Marines (Reinf.).

⁴³ Communist Commander in Shantung.

⁴⁴ Kuomintang.

most enthusiastic when I suggested extending cease fire agreement for a week in order to negotiate at Tsingtao. My reaction is that he appears to be greatly concerned over Nationalist activity at present and is willing to negotiate if the cease fire agreement can be extended. If extension of cease fire order is contemplated request early information so as to insure Chen Yi present Tsingtao. Am informed General Wang Yao-wu⁴⁵ that conference not definitely set but that I would welcome a discussion with him should he desire to come down. Clement?.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270: Telegram

Mr. Walter S. Robertson to General Marshall

[PEIPING,] 2 July 1946.

4907. When presented with proposed message from 3 Commissioners to all Field Teams, Reourad 4847, advising of truce extension and prohibition against aggressive action, National Government Commissioner⁴⁶ stated he had suggested to Generalissimo that such restriction should not apply to cities attacked and occupied by Communists in Shantung Province beginning 7 June. Furthermore General Cheng informed me he was notifying General Wang Yao-wu that if these cities were not evacuated by Communists within reasonable time they should be retaken by force. The duration of reasonable time was to be left to discretion of local commanders. I emphasized that such action seemed entirely contradictory to truce announcement of Generalissimo, would in all likelihood lead to widespread fighting and might well result in complete breakdown of negotiations in Nanking. I urged that if such an ultimatum was to be issued it should be done on the Committee of Three level and not in Executive Headquarters. He replied that he would accept full responsibility. I insistently urged that we at least notify Government representative on Committee of his intentions before taking such drastic action. He replied he had already done so. The towns of which evacuation will be demanded are as follows: Tehsien, Taian, Tsao-Chuang, Choutsun, Kaomi, Kiaohsien, Chimo, Tawenkou, Nan-Chuan, Lan Chun, Cha Shan, and Hsia Mo Tun. I am convinced that active preparations are being made to recover these cities by force and that nothing short of a direct order from the Generalissimo will alter General Cheng's decision.

Report from Clement of his conversations with Chen Yi follows in separate message.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ Chinese Government Commander in Shantung.

⁴⁶ General Cheng Kai-min.

⁴⁷ Telegram No. 4905, July 2, *supra*.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

General Marshall to Mr. Walter S. Robertson, at Peiping

[NANKING,] 3 July 1946.

1044. Following is paraphrase of message sent to General Clement at Tsingtao through Naval channels.

“Concerning the Shantung negotiations, I have been watching the efforts of Field Team No. 7 and of yourself. There is very little guidance from Nanking I realize that could be given you as to the type of settlement which would avoid any outbreak of hostilities.

“The current proposals now being considered by the Committee of Three indicate an agreement may be reached which would remove from the Tsinan-Tsingtao railroad line all Communist troops. At the present time the determining factor is the settlement regarding Kiangsu rather than the railroad line mentioned above. It is the insistence of the Government that the Tsinan-Tsingtao railroad line be freed, within 10 days of the signing of a formal agreement, of Communist interference. There remains a most difficult issue of the matter of local governments in the areas to be evacuated by the Communists.”

This is for your information.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai at No. 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, July 3, 1946, 10:30 a. m.

Also present: Mr. Chang
Colonel Caughey⁴⁸
Captain Soong

GENERAL MARSHALL: I have not discussed negotiations with anyone since I last saw General Chou. I thought it was the proper time for me to step aside and let the Chinese handle their own negotiations.

GENERAL CHOU: I saw the Generalissimo yesterday morning. The Generalissimo talked on four topics. I requested Captain Soong to give you a summary of the conversation.

GENERAL MARSHALL: He gave me the summary.⁴⁹

GENERAL CHOU: At the beginning of the conversation, the Generalissimo asked me to comment. I first expressed the view that military matters should continue to be handled by the Committee of Three so that the three subjects pertaining to the cessation of hostilities could be speedily resolved. So far, a resolution has been

⁴⁸ J. Hart Caughey, Executive Officer on General Marshall's staff.

⁴⁹ See memorandum of July 2 by Lieutenant Colonel Hutchin, p. 1278.

reached for the termination of hostilities in Manchuria and the restoration of communications. Some understanding has also been reached on the authority of American members within the field teams and Executive Headquarters. The remaining problem now pertains to the army reorganization, such as the disposition of troops, the period for complete concentration of troops and the army strength ratio. However, the Committee of Three did reach a partial understanding on the period for concentration of troops and the army strength ratio.

I told the Generalissimo that an understanding has almost been reached on the disposition of troops too. The remaining problem is now civil administration. I believe that insofar as the cessation of hostilities is concerned, the present documents we have at our disposal would be sufficient to secure a complete cessation of hostilities. It is hoped that the field teams will strictly carry out pertinent instructions and that the American member shall have the right to make decisions concerning cessation of hostilities.

Since civil administration involves political matters, it seems difficult for the Committee of Three to reach a decision. Therefore, I suggested to the Generalissimo that previous principles laid down by the PCC⁸⁰ should be applied here. I suggest further that the PCC be reconvened and that the problem of civil administration be solved through the reorganization of the Government. After my comment, the Generalissimo said that it seemed to him advisable first to solve the remaining problems which are not yet solved so that hostilities could be completely stopped. Then through consultation, the National Assembly could be convened and the Central Government reorganized.

Then the Generalissimo came to the 4 main topics :

1. Regarding North Kiangsu. He said North Kiangsu is too near to Nanking and Shanghai, and consequently a threat to those big cities. If Communists placed an armed force in this area, it would arouse suspicion among others as to Communist motives. Therefore, Communists should evacuate North Kiangsu. By that, he implied that Communist forces should withdraw to the north of Lung hai RR line, and that the whole area should be taken over by the Government.

2. Regarding the Tsingtao-Tsinan RR. He did not elucidate on civil administration along the railroad line being taken over by the Government. He only talked about it in general terms.

3. Regarding Chengte. The Generalissimo stipulated that within one month, Communists should evacuate the area south of Chengte. The evacuation of Chengte itself should be effected later after the first month period. He explained that without Chengte in Government hands, Peiping would never feel safe. If the Government would

⁸⁰ Political Consultative Conference.

abandon Peiping, then it could also abandon Chengte; but since the Government must keep Peiping, it has to control Chengte also. The Generalissimo did not disclose whether or not civil administration should be taken over also.

4. Regarding Antung, he did not elucidate his exact terms.

Finally, he expressed the view that those four problems should be settled, and he assigned Dr. Wang Shih Chieh, Mr. Shao Li Tze and General Chen Cheng to converse with me on this matter.

After the Generalissimo spoke on the four points, I commented on the problem of civil administration. In this connection, I explained to him fully my discussion with General Marshall regarding the disposition of the troops. Briefly speaking, we plan to station only two divisions in North Kiangsu, with no forces to the south of Huai-an.

During the second phase of army reorganization, only one division will be stationed in this area. On the other hand, the February 25 Agreement⁵¹ authorized the Communist[s] to station one army there during the first phase and two divisions in the second phase.

As regards the Tsingtao-Tsinan RR, I committed myself not to station troops along the entire railroad line. This permits the Government to station three divisions in each of three places: Tsingtao, Tsinan and Weihsien.

As regards Jehol and Chahar, we committed ourselves to station no troops south of Chengte and to station in those two provinces only two divisions—one at Chengte and the other at Kalgan. In Hopeh province only one division will be stationed at Hantan.

On the other hand, the Government may have at least two armies in the aforementioned areas. This proves that there will be no threat to Government forces.

I explained that I was still in the midst of discussion on Antung with General Marshall. In connection with civil administration in North Kiangsu, I think it affects a population of over 20 million. The Communists have been working for six or seven years in that area. I personally know that agriculture reforms conducted in that area have been satisfactory to an overwhelming part of the population. Of course, there is some dissatisfaction among a handful of people.

As regards the so-called refugees, we would welcome them to go back. We would accede to popular reelection held in accordance with the provisions of the PCC agreements and hope in this way to solve the matter of civil administration.

In his reply, the Generalissimo did not refer to the point of the Tsingtao-Tsinan RR again. Nor to Antung. However, he again spoke on Chengte. He related that to his discussion with General

⁵¹ *Ante*, p. 295.

Marshall, as you had told me some time ago. The problem of Chengte was brought up in connection with Manchuria. The Generalissimo repeated almost everything you had told me. Some time ago, the Generalissimo mentioned the Hei Lung Kiang province as a garrison area for Communist troops. When you asked that a larger area be assigned to Communist troops, the Generalissimo mentioned Hokiang and a part of Nunkiang, plus Tsitsihar, but in return, the Generalissimo demanded Jehol and Chahar provinces. Finally he conceded that Communist troops need only evacuate the part south of Kalgan. However, Communists should also withdraw from Chengte and the part south of it. The evacuation of the region south of Chengte should be completed within one month, but the evacuation of Chengte itself may take place later. However, the Generalissimo comment was rather lengthy on the North Kiangsu province. He repeated again and again that the presence of Communists in North Kiangsu constitutes a threat to the capitol. He stated that the Communists should give ground on this matter because the other concern is rather small and the Communist[s] would not suffer under such evacuation. He explained that after taking over, the Government would certainly take care of the agriculture reforms.

In connection with my comment that the civil administration matter should be solved by the PCC, he said that once the North Kiangsu province is settled, we may continue discussions in the form of consultation. He also mentioned that by that time, the National Assembly would be convened.

The Generalissimo thinks those four points constitute the crucial issues. No agreement could be reached at the moment, so I did not continue to comment, nor did the Generalissimo. So we parted.

In the evening, I met as prearranged with Dr. Wang, General Chen and Mr. Shao. We still dwelled on those four topics. Dr. Wang spoke at length during the discussion. Apart from reiterating the four points mentioned by the Generalissimo, he further commented on Manchuria. He also mentioned the railroad problem as well as what arrangement should be made regarding the taking over of certain places in Manchuria.

Regarding the regions in the southern part of Jehol, he did not express himself very clearly. He merely reiterated what the Generalissimo said in the morning with some additional comments. But he made a comparatively lengthy explanation as to why the Government demands that Communists withdraw from North Kiangsu and other places. The reason he gave was that the Government had been given one concession on the subject of taking over sovereignty in Manchuria and that the Government had recognized the Communist legal status in Heilungkiang, Hsingan and a part of Nunkiang.

Hence, Communists should in turn give up North Kiangsu and other places to the Government.

Dr. Wang admitted that a principle has been laid down in the PCC agreements to the effect that, in the first place, the Government would be reorganized, the joint platform would be implemented before the problem of disputed areas was solved, and popular election would be held. Therefore, the procedure did not call for an initial settlement of the local administration. He further admitted that the proposition of the Government constitutes a change in procedure laid down by the PCC but there is a reason. The Government is asking the Communist Party to make concessions, because the Government has changed its procedure with regard to Manchuria. The Government abandoned its original procedure of taking over first. It now recognizes that Communists may maintain certain places in Manchuria. This is a concession on the Government's part. I argued with them on the point of taking over. I explained that the matter of taking over is a problem of the past. It is out of existence. I emphasized that everything in the Manchurian situation should be equal along the line of the PCC agreements. A settlement in North Kiangsu can only be reached along the line of the PCC agreements. That arrangement should not constitute such an independent procedure as to ask Communists to give up 20 million population, which actually amounts to $\frac{2}{3}$ of the Manchurian population. Mr. Shao admitted that if right after the PCC, the reorganization of the Government had been carried out, then we would have been very successful in carrying out all these methods. Unfortunately, the reorganization of the Government was not effected. This resulted in a deterioration of the situation during the last six months. The mistrust between the two parties is growing in proportion. Therefore, he demands that the Communist Party make a concession for the settlement of the North Kiangsu problem.

Dr. Wang said that each party must perceive the difficulties of the other party. He admits that the North Kiangsu problem is a difficult one to the Communist Party but the Communist Party should also think of the difficulties of the Government.

General Chen Cheng expressed yesterday that he is not for war but for peace. In his capacity as the General Chief of Staff, he has to keep in mind the best interests of the troops throughout the country and has to understand their difficulties. He further explained that at the time when the Army Reorganization Plan was signed last February, the Government side had more difficulty in implementing that agreement than the Communist Party. Now, its implementation will be more difficult for the Communists than the Government. Therefore, he is far from ignoring the difficulties of the Communist

Party. But the best way to straighten out the matter is to make it as simple as possible. He thinks the best procedure is to reach a settlement on the North Kiangsu problem first, before touching other questions. He spoke particularly of the conversation between General Marshall and the Generalissimo and of how the Generalissimo had asked the leading Government members to dinner and requested them to talk with General Chou today. The Generalissimo emphasized the importance that Government representatives take into consideration the difficulties of the Communist Party. General Chen said that other people may not agree with the Generalissimo's idea, but he fully agrees with it because he wants peace. He is inclined to think that if the problem can be settled through political and diplomatic channels so that war can be avoided, that would be better for all.

In that connection, I pointed out in a frank manner that we suspect the Government's tactics. While on one hand, the Government is negotiating with us, on the other they are trying to capture disputed places by force. I pointed out that Government forces have entered the Communist area in North Hupeh from the East and North and captured four or five places in the proximity of Hsuan Hua Tien, the Communist headquarters of that area. I will send to General Marshall a memorandum on this matter this afternoon.⁵² The Government is compelling Communist forces to go away. Their motive is quite evident in that they want to destroy Communist forces and to occupy the area. I further pointed out that in North Kiangsu, General Tang En Po's forces have captured a big townlet called Huang Chiao Chen to the south of Tung-tai city. This report was published by the Kuomintang papers yesterday. The information I have, shows that the Government is making preparations for aggressive action. As regards the Lunghai railroad, I learned that a unit of tanks is being moved east from Hsu-chow to Haichow.

Fourth, major military actions are taking place against the Tsingtao-Tsinan railroad. I already told you day before yesterday that the 8th Army had made a thrust to the west from Wei-hsien and occupied two cities, I-tu and Tsang-lo. The latest information showed that Government troops in Tsinan are also opening attacks against Communists. They have already occupied the Ming-Kwan station and two other cities in the vicinity, one of which is called Chang-chiu. Now, Government forces are converging on Tse-Chin and Lin-tse, thus making an attempt to open up the whole railroad line.

Yesterday, the only place from which I have not received a report of military action is Jehol. Reports so far received testify to the fact that the Government is intending to start a war.

⁵² Memorandum by Chou En-lai, July 4, not printed.

To my assertions, General Chen Cheng first discussed the Hopeh incident. He said according to his information, the Communist force in that area is only 30,000 strong. It would be easy for him to crush that force, still he has not issued any order to that effect. What now happened is that Communist forces have sallied out to the vicinity of the railroad line and occupy one railroad station so far. He made no reply to my assertions in regard to Lunghai railroad line and Pukou railroad line. He merely made a general statement that he has been sick for two weeks and does not know details but can assure me that no attack is contemplated. He did not go into details regarding various issues raised.

Mr. Tang Pu Wu,⁵³ who was my associate and who went with me to the conference, then put this situation before Dr. Wang: "The Government first made Changchun an issue for stopping the fighting, then it again raised the issue of Harbin, and now China Proper itself is involved. The question of civil administration is also brought into discussion. In connection with the talks, the Government has brought up many questions. As soon as one question is settled, a second one is brought up and new questions are being formed. This, therefore, leaves one to think the Government is deliberately complicating the issue." General Chen reported that their intention is to make the matter simple and, therefore, they want only to discuss North Kiangsu. Dr. Wang made no reply at all and then Mr. Shao suggested that negotiations be completed before July 7 so as to create a good impression to the people.

From their expressions, I have the impression the Government is still sticking to the four points with particular emphasis on North Kiangsu. Maybe when the discussion is completed on those four points, they will bring up other issues as Dr. Wang inferred. As to the length of the discussion, Mr. Shao may have hinted rightly that they cannot be completed before July 7. On military matters, General Chen confined himself to a general statement that there is no contemplated attack but he declined to elaborate on this point. From their comments, it seems that they did not speak in concrete terms and, therefore, I have the impression that the Government is actually making military preparations. But, at the same time, they will not completely give up negotiations because if the Communists accept their terms on the peace table, it would suit public reaction. Suppose we do not agree with their propositions or that our concessions do not meet their desires, then I feel that military operations will be augmented.

⁵³ Member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and of the Communist delegation at Nanking.

When leaving the conference, I suggested that we meet again tomorrow. I specifically asked the Government representatives to lay down all the cards so that we will know what is their ultimate goal at this moment. We want to know the over-all demands and not different issues one at a time. Secondly, I asked them to settle incidents now occurring in disputed areas; for, should the incidents be aggravated, that would amount to a settlement by force and negotiations would become superfluous. The fighting along the Tsinan-Tsingtao railroad just raised evidence of the Government's intention to fight. On my part, I would ask that no attack be made on Tatung, despite the fact that the Kuomintang press is now making propaganda to the contrary. As to the duration of our discussion, it is of course my hope that it can be completed as early as possible but I think the Government will raise more and more issues as they are now doing. In view of the foregoing, I wish to make this proposal to you: that you by all means endeavor to stop the enlargement of the present hostilities.

Incidentally, the situation in Manchuria at this moment is not so bad because of the efforts of Generals Byroade and Timberman; and also through the recent moderate expression of General Tu Li-ming.⁵⁴ The situation in Manchuria possibly will not get out of control, but in China Proper the situation is getting more and more serious.

I am inclined to think that the Committee of Three should try as much as possible to get the four documents completed. Three have already been passed by the Committee of Three. The fourth one is the one you suggested regarding cessation of hostilities in China Proper. We should endeavor to get those four documents published first so that the public will have a true comprehension of the present situation and may feel assured. As the matter now stands, Dr. Peng's⁵⁵ statement is most disturbing to the public because it can be interpreted in numerous ways. It may be construed that hostilities are stopped or they are not stopped, or that the truce is lengthened with a time limit or without a time limit. It can also be interpreted to mean that the Government will launch attacks under such pretense as for self defense, for the maintenance of peace and order, for the protection of people's lives and property and for the restoration of communications. Particularly, in that statement he used the phrase "resist and oust the Communists," which actually implies that the Government's aggressive action can go beyond any limit.

General Yao, who came to see you day before yesterday, told me

⁵⁴ Also known as General Tu Yu-ming, Chinese Government Commander in Chief in Manchuria.

⁵⁵ Peng Hsueh-pei, Chinese Minister of Information.

about the comments you made to him and particularly about the points of retaliation. As suggested by you, he will transmit your comments to the generals in Manchuria. I feel sure that he will do that but, because of the weather, he could not go today.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I will start with the latter part of General Chou's discussion. In the first place, I think he has drawn a wrong conclusion as to the Government's procedure at this particular time. It was very difficult for me to bring about this present procedure for meetings on the problem of local governments. That is quite inconsistent with the view that they are utilizing this time for a particular military advantage. I believe it is probable that the military officials actually feel that this delay is a disadvantage to them. I agree with General Chou as to the perils of the present situation in North China and the great importance of restraining commanders from any aggressive action. I ask General Chou to keep carefully in mind what great provocation the Communists in Shantung gave to the Government by their operations 9-14 June. This provocation brought about the inevitable retaliations.

I am familiar with the situation north of Hankow and with the situation along the railroad concerned with Tatung. There is no profit in going over that again at this time. I merely wish to say this, that judging from what General Chou told me of his two conferences and judging from my own discussions with Government officials, for the first time in weeks I am greatly encouraged, more so probably than General Chou is. I say that because of my comparison of the views expressed with the determined stand by some of the Government officials and because of the fact that they have gone into these negotiations in the manner General Chou describes to me. I believe I am even more concerned than General Chou to reach a basis which will permit the issuance of instructions for cessation of hostilities. Therefore, I am very anxious to see an agreement reached on this special paper. But I think it will be almost impossible to reach that agreement unless General Chou in these conferences with the Government officials can find some compromise basis for handling the local civil government refugee problem, some basis more explicit than a mere statement. I think that is our greatest trouble. I do not see at the moment any way to reach an agreement on these purely minor phases until that particular adjustment is handled by civil negotiation.

Therefore, I think it is urgently important for General Chou to press on that particular point with a view to establishing some reasonable balance of interest. If that basis can be developed, I believe we can go ahead quickly.

At this time there was off the record discussion.

GENERAL CHOU: Regarding your evaluation of the present negotiations between me and the Government representatives, my survey is somewhat different from yours. I am rather afraid that the Government representatives are not thinking along the line you have suggested in connection with North Kiangsu. Anyhow, I will try my best to work out some sort of arrangement as you have suggested and try to have a discussion with the Government representatives. I anticipate that no result can be obtained because the Government is thinking only of a complete Communist withdrawal and nothing less. There remains the possibility that in the event of a failure in the negotiations, fighting will be resumed. The Government has completed their preparation for military attacks around disputed areas. You just mentioned the fighting that took place in Shantung between June 9 and June 17, but these actions have a great bearing on the fighting that took place in the earlier two months along the Lunghai line, the Tsingtao-Pukou line and to the north of Nanking. I do not see why the Government should at this moment launch any further aggressive action, particularly along the Tsingtao-Tsinan RR. I have already promised the *status quo* will be restored. General Chou has made this promise in a very ready manner and therefore the Government's present aggressive actions are in fact going beyond retaliation and is pursuing for other purposes. But in spite of all that, I will try to spare no effort in my further negotiations with them, in trying to clear these things, etc.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I want General Chou always to know what I think. Therefore I must say now I don't quite agree with him about the Shantung matter when he relates the events of June 9 to 14 or 17th with matters of two months before. To me they relate directly to the negotiations we are endeavoring to hold here. I accepted the actions of June 7th and 8th as being the result of orders which were issued prior to the so-called truce announcement or even before it was proposed, and I also partly excused in my own mind aggressive actions after June 8th because of probable difficulty of Communist communications. However, I could find no excuse at all for the Communist attacks of the 12th, 13th and 14th. At the time I characterized that as provocation which would inevitably result in Government reinforcement and retaliation. I don't completely excuse the Government, but also I don't excuse the Communists. I state this now, in the hope that General Chou will not pursue the negotiations with too much of a feeling of resentment against the situation that has more recently developed in Shantung. I hope he can reach a better understanding of Government reactions.

GENERAL CHOU: At the present moment we are not so much concerned as to what side started the attack, and I am not so much concerned about the incident in one or two particular places, but I have the overall picture of the hostilities in view. Referring to the hostilities which now are taking place along the Tsingtao-Tsinan RR line, the attack is being made in accordance with pre-conceived plan which is aimed to open up the whole railroad line, and this therefore constitutes a big scale operation because originally many places along the railroad line were not in the hands of the Government but in the hands of the Communists, and therefore these actions far exceed the scope of that at the time around June 9th. Furthermore, this action is still continuing. This situation exploits that the new plan is still in the process of development. Nor is it confined to the Tsingtao-Tsinan RR alone. Other incidents are cropping up in North Hopoh around the Tung-pu line, in North Kiangsu and along the Lunghai line. What I am particularly concerned with is the overall plan and not one or two particular places.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I think I understand.

GENERAL CHOU: Tomorrow I will continue my discussions with the Government representatives and I will try by all means to work out some new arrangements and try to settle the issue.

761.93/7-346

*The Consul General at Mukden (Clubb) to General Marshall*⁵⁶

No. 11

MUKDEN, July 3, 1946.

SIR: I have the honor to report that General Tu Yu-ming's Chief of Staff, Chao Chia-hsiang, in conversation with me yesterday referred to a current charge by the Moscow organ *Pravda* that Kuomintang forces had incorporated Japanese elements into ranks and expressed anticipation that this might presage a new move by the Soviets. Questioned in regard to what form the hypothetical move might take he stated that it would presumably be not in the form of a physical clash but would be in the diplomatic field, and he added that diplomatic relations between the two countries were at present more tense than heretofore. He expanded his thesis by saying that he surmised that the Soviets might make the Chinese-Ch'angch'un Railway the nominal cause for their *démarche*, in the form of an argument that if the Chinese could not run it the Soviets ought to do so. He then made what appeared possibly to be some shift in chronology of anticipation by stating that it was believed that the Soviets

⁵⁶ Copy transmitted to the Department by the Embassy in China without covering despatch; received July 22.

would "do some talking" by winter of this year, by which time American forces would be reduced and the Soviet forces thus comparatively strengthened in the Far East: the situation was such, he said, that "a child could understand."

General Chao stated further that Soviet military officers were now at Harbin, Dairen and Ch'ihfeng. Questioned, he indicated that this was not a new development, but he nevertheless gave the impression that the Kuomintang side had at least just learned of the real situation. He stated further that the deduction from Chinese Communist moves was that, "as if the Soviets played the music and the Communists danced," those moves were synchronized with Soviet pronouncements. Thus, he said, the *Pravda* item probably heralded some move by the Chinese Communists as well. In stating further that the Chinese knew nothing of what was happening in North Korea, General Chao left it to be inferred that what was going on there probably promised no good.

As of incidental interest, there may be reported here General Chao's interpretation of post-truce arrangements as requiring maintenance by both sides of their present general positions, with movements within general boundaries permitted but with advance over those boundaries ruled out. Although such an interpretation would permit either or both sides to build up existing positions, it would appear to contemplate no advance by the Kuomintang forces side in the near future. General Chao said that there were currently small clashes and interruption of communications, but no major engagements in Manchuria.

I invite the Embassy's attention to the circumstances that although the Chief-of-Staff professed that his "feeling" regarding imminent action from the Soviet side came from a process of reasoning—and he emphasized that the event might prove his reasoning false—it is highly probable that his feeling was based upon information more substantial in character than that given in the reported conversation.

Respectfully yours,

O. EDMUND CLUBB

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270: Telegram

Mr. Walter S. Robertson to General Marshall

[PEIPING,] 4 July 1946.

4967. National Government Commissioner informed me this morning (Reference my 4907⁵⁷) that upon instructions from General Hsu⁵⁸ [at] Nanking he was countermanding orders given military

⁵⁷ July 2, p. 1282.

⁵⁸ General Hsu Yung-chang, Chinese Government member of the Committee of Three.

commander Shantung Province to recover by force cities taken by Communists and not evacuated in accordance with his demands. We have now sent out agreed message to all field teams officially notifying them of extension of truce throughout China.

New subject: Two National Government team representatives were killed during June by Communists. In the case of Major Lei a special team appointed to make investigation concluded in an official report to the three Commissioners that the unfortunate death was due to an accident which might have killed any of the members of team present and was not a premeditated murder of Major Lei. Communists have expressed deep regret and made offer of compensation. Official team report on second case has not yet been received. Report of American member indicates willful and inexcusable attack on team by Communists and strongly recommends severe punishment for offender. National Government Commissioner arbitrarily takes position that both cases should be treated as one and states that unless Communist branch will meet identical demands in both cases he will withdraw guarantees for personal safety of all Communist team members. A meeting of the three Commissioners is being held on Saturday morning to consider these cases and it is hoped that Government Commissioners will modify his position in the meantime. The matter is brought to your attention because I may again have to call upon you for assistance in having his arbitrary position rectified by his principal in Nanking. General Cheng is friendly and cooperative in all of his dealings with the American branch but he evidences an increasing bitterness towards the Communists.

893.00/7-446 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to General Marshall*⁵⁹

WASHINGTON, July 4, 1946—noon.

414. The following comment, responsive to your request of July 2,⁶⁰ is offered in the realization that some portions may be obvious to you but in the hope that others may prove helpful in meeting the problems with which you are faced.

The basic difficulty in the situation, as you have frequently indicated, is the absence of mutual trust, not only as between the Kuomintang and the Communists but also as between the two parties and the Chinese people who, alarmed at the prospects of civil war, are distrustful alike of the motives of both parties.

⁵⁹ Drafted by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent).

⁶⁰ No. 1032, p. 1277.

One of the most important steps that can be taken now is a revival of political discussions based on the PCC resolutions. Your effort therefore to obtain agreement to meeting of a high level group to discuss political solution appears to us as thoroughly sound tactic. Knowledge that political discussions were in progress should be helpful in calming those who fear early outbreak of civil war and should also act as a brake on actions of diehards in each of the political parties.

We do not believe that Chiang, as some reports indicate, has lost control over reactionary political elements surrounding him or over trigger-happy anti-Communists in his army. He is in a dilemma. Neither he nor the Communists want war but he fears the consequences of peaceful agreement. He is closely tied to his reactionary political and military cronies but he is most anxious to avoid responsibility for jeopardizing the success of your mission. Under pressure of expediency we believe he will choose to avoid war but we cannot ignore, as you do not, possibility that he may choose the other course. At this juncture it would be a particularly helpful gesture if Chiang could send Ho Ying-chin⁶¹ off on some innocuous tour or mission abroad and give Chen Li-fu⁶² a similar mission or some diplomatic post.

The Communists are anxious to avoid hostilities, we believe, because they are over-extended militarily. They may therefore be prepared to make relatively extensive concessions. We feel that any attempt by the Communists to seek improvement over the arrangement that was agreed upon in the PCC resolutions or to make permanent any gains in their military position since the January truce can be successfully resisted.

Chiang's fire-eating political and military advisors may be right in their assumption that the Kuomintang would be successful in the initial phases of a civil war. They could probably extend their own area of control and contract that of the Communists. This is the thesis and method followed by Chinese warlords for the past three decades. An extension of territorial control has been looked upon as an end in itself. But Chiang cannot by these methods eliminate the Communists as a military force from China and certainly not as a social and political force. Furthermore, maintenance of his position in any newly acquired areas would entail utilization of military force on an extensive and ruinously expensive scale.

In balance we feel that with your guidance the Chinese, fearing the consequences of civil war, will not cease endeavors for a peaceful

⁶¹ Hitherto Chinese Commander in Chief.

⁶² Minister of the Kuomintang Organization Board: he and his brother Chen Kuo-fu were leaders of the "CC clique" of the Nationalist Party.

settlement of some kind. But we must face the possibility (1) of a stalemate without civil war or (2) of a breakdown resulting in civil war. In case of (1), we might continue to maintain contact with both groups but relax for a time our efforts at bringing them together for agreement even though there may be isolated conflicts. It is not improbable that a period of inactivity may bring wiser counsels to the fore on both sides. If the stalemate is clearly due to Kuomintang intransigence, material support from this country could be withheld. In case of (2), while continuing to recognize and maintain relations with the National Government of China, all material support during civil war could be withheld and we could consider withdrawal of American military and naval forces from China except in so far as and for as long as they are needed to protect and evacuate Americans in danger zones.

The attitude of the Soviet Union is manifestly of paramount importance. In either eventuality, but more urgently in case of (2) we could endeavor to obtain from the Soviet Government firm agreement to a hands off policy. If such an agreement were reached the situation in China, deplorable as it would be from the standpoint of reconstruction and the welfare of the Chinese people, would not differ in character, although it might in degree, from situations that have prevailed there off and on during the two decades preceding the war. If an agreement cannot be reached and Soviet support of the Communists becomes a factor, we should make a complete assessment of all phases of the situation to determine whether there is a real threat to our national security and vital interests.

The foregoing are, as you will understand, our informal and personal views. Your own recommendations in the light of actual events would of course be of primary importance in reaching a decision as to this Government's policy and course of action.

ACHESON

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

*General Marshall to the Acting Secretary of State*⁶³

[NANKING,] 5 July 1946.

1053. I am requesting War Department to delay Wedemeyer's departure for China.

The following situation exists. The Generalissimo had a long talk on 2 July with Chou En Lai and arranged for meetings between Chou and with 2 Communist associates and the Minister of Foreign Affairs

⁶³ Copy transmitted on July 5 by the War Department to Acting Secretary of State Acheson.

with 2 Nationalist associates who were the Chief of Staff and Shao Li Tze. This meeting was designed to find a solution for problem of local governments in regions to be evacuated by Communists and regarding the degree of their evacuation from Kiangsu. Two meetings have taken place but I have not yet received a report on yesterday's, Thursday's meeting. The first meeting was largely a statement of views and exploratory as to extent of differences and reasons therefore. Meanwhile some dangerous fighting has been going on in Shantung Province involving exclusion of Communists from places forceably occupied by them since June 7th and involving action to free completely the Tsingtao-Tsinanfu Railroad.

I find that the recent publicity regarding Wedemeyer's return, accentuated by a casual remark by the Chinese Minister of Information that I could not remain here indefinitely, made I am sure without any intention of implying my early departure, has created a situation inimical to my negotiation. The Communists are greatly disturbed and aroused. There[fore,] I feel that Wedemeyer's nomination as Ambassador should be indefinitely postponed.

Further, I feel that in the present circumstances I need assistance in the person of an Ambassador who would immediately create on both sides a feeling of greater confidence in the negotiations. But one name occurs to me that would in any way serve my purpose at this time. I propose that Doctor Leighton Stuart, the President of Yenching University in Peiping, be nominated, assuming that the Generalissimo and other leaders of the Kuomintang [concur?], also to sound out the views of Government and Communists alike. I called on him because by common report of all informed people in China, American as well as Chinese, he occupies a unique position as the most highly respected foreigner, one whose standards of integrity and actions through the 50 years of his life out here have been a model of the best in the western world. Communists and Nationalists alike trust and admire him. The recent celebration of his 70th birthday in Peiping was made a great occasion. He is selfless and has only the interests of China and America at heart. I would not expect him to participate formally in my negotiations or to carry the responsibility for the major portion of the routine business of the Embassy. Butterworth⁶⁴ is exceptionally qualified to do this. But I would want Doctor Stuart in a high position so that I could capitalize on his influence with the various political leaders, most all of whom he knows intimately. During the political negotiations he would be particularly helpful and it is his present urgent recommendations to the Generalissimo and Government officials to raise the

⁶⁴ W. Walton Butterworth, Minister-Counselor.

present negotiations from the level of military disputes to the higher political level for securing a genuine start towards a democratic government.

I would not have in mind his service longer than 9 months. In the tragic event of open civil war, I would assume that for the time being at any rate, you would prefer to leave matters in the hands of a Chargé, Butterworth, recalling him, the Ambassador, presumably for consultation.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai at No. 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, July 5, 1946, 5:45 p. m.

Also present: Mr. Chang
Colonel Caughey
Captain Soong

GENERAL CHOU: I did not call you during the last two days because I have been conferring with Government representatives. Today I made this appointment for one or two particular points which I would like to discuss.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I knew nothing of your appointments. I saw the Generalissimo night before last but did not talk business; we merely had dinner. Hence, I do not know what meetings the Government representatives have had since.

GENERAL CHOU: As you may have read in the newspapers, the Government has announced the convening of the National Assembly on November 12.⁶⁵ This came as a surprise to me just at the time when discussions of political negotiations were raised. It more or less constitutes a bomb shell to the Communist Party.

The National Assembly is a most disturbing matter. I presume you are familiar with its past history. Representatives were first selected some 10 years ago. This year, some compromise was finally reached on the issue of the old delegates as a result of large concessions by our side. Last year the National Assembly was postponed; that was in the midst of civil war. It was postponed again this year when on 27 April, it was decided by the Steering Committee of the PCC, presided over by the Generalissimo himself. At that time, it was agreed that no new date should be fixed pending settlement of all outstanding issues.

However, this time the Generalissimo suddenly presented the proposition to the National Defense Council to have it passed. This constitutes complete ignorance of the PCC position. Therefore, we feel

⁶⁵ Birth date of Sun Yat-sen.

quite surprised. We have protested and made inquiries of Government representatives. Mr. Shao reported that the announcement of the convention was merely incidental. It was brought up in connection with the extension of the PCC and that he knew nothing about it before hand. General Chen Cheng also explained that it was merely accidental and that it was brought up by the Generalissimo himself, and that he, General Chen Cheng, did not even participate at that meeting. Dr. Wong [*Wang*]⁶⁶ said he felt that the decision itself would stand without any evil intent and that there is a desire to consult the other parties after the announcement of how the National Assembly would be convened. He admits, however, that no one can be sure that as events develop, nothing will go off the track. If by November, all outstanding issues have not been resolved, some unforeseen situation may arise which would preclude a National Assembly would result in a big quarrel. My next remarks will supplement their statements.

I said even if I presumed that the announcement was made without evil intent, that later developments may lead to an actual split by the convention of the National Assembly. Therefore, both parties should avoid trying to deteriorate the situation. They should try by all means to overcome difficulties so that the National Assembly can be convened with success. They agreed to my remarks.

Mr. Shao said that the National Assembly Act had merely been passed by the National Defense Council but had not yet been issued as an order of the National Government. I suggested that the Steering Committee of the PCC convene immediately. Most members of the Steering Committee are in Nanking, with a few in Shanghai who could easily be invited to come here. The Steering Committee could discuss matters which have a close relation to the convention of the National Assembly, such as reorganization of the Government, a draft constitution, distribution of seats for the National Assembly, etc. Mr. Shao promised he would reconsider this matter with his Government associates, but Dr. Wong was rather hesitant on this point. Finally they reluctantly agreed to discuss the matter further. Therefore General Chou strongly doubts as to what fruitful result can come out of their discussion.

At this time General Chou made some off the record remarks.

The *Central Daily News* yesterday assumed an attitude similar to ours by saying that the National Assembly is being convened without securing agreement of the other parties. Such an attitude constitutes a measure to effect a national split. I told them frankly, Mr. Shao, Dr. Wong and General Chen Cheng, that prior to the Japanese

⁶⁶ Wang Shih-chieh, Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs.

surrender last year, we were preparing to call an assembly of the people's delegates of the Communist-liberated areas. I myself was then serving as the chairman of the preparatory committee. Secondly, when I came with General Mao to Chungking for negotiations, such preparatory work was entirely suspended. We did this because our policy is to cooperate. We want the National Assembly to be an assembly of unity and cooperation, and we want a democratic constitution to be adopted.

As regards Manchuria, at a time when civil war was at its climax, local Communist authorities initiated a preparatory committee for the convention of a delegation conference from over Manchuria for the purpose of instituting an overall local government for Manchuria. But being eager to stop civil war, we persuaded them to suspend preparation for that assembly. We could have announced a date for such an assembly but we refrained from doing so because we want unity. However, the Government fixes a date each time, thereby threatening the Communists to come to terms before a certain date or the Government would go ahead unilaterally. This is a policy of National split and is very dangerous. If Government representatives could not dissuade the Generalissimo from pursuing such a policy, then it would be extremely difficult to reorganize the Government and to adopt a democratic constitution. I further said to the Government representative that according to PCC procedure, both the army reorganization plan and the reorganization of the Government should be effected. Right now, we are discussing supplementary matters pertaining to the army reorganization plan and some arrangement may be worked out shortly. According to the original undertaking, it had been hoped that the effective date of army reorganization plan can be July 1st. As to the reorganization of the Government, it is almost time to discuss that in line with decision of the PCC. A second PCC convention to discuss these problems would greatly reassure the Chinese people, as well as facilitate reorganization of the Government. On hearing this, the Government representatives felt they were placed in an extremely difficult position. Dr. Wong said that if the Government is reorganized, then the dispute may be carried on within the Government itself. He expressed the feeling that prior to reorganization of the Government, all present existing issues should be settled and that secondly the local administration of the various provinces should be discussed. It should be noted that according to the PCC provisions, local administration will be discussed after reorganization of the Government. The procedure now proposed by Dr. Wong is entirely different from the procedure of the PCC.

At this juncture, I raised the issue that that is a very complicated

problem, that it may require one or two months for discussion. In that case, reorganization of the Government could not be brought into being. There is even the possibility that the National Assembly itself would have to be postponed. If no settlement is reached on the provincial government question, then what should we do? To that the Government representatives made no reply. From their comments, I get a strong impression that at a stage when we almost settled the questions within scope of army reorganization, the Government raised the issue of North Kiangsu, Jehol, Chahar, Shantung, etc. While we did find some measures to cope with that situation, the Government again raised the question of local administration. Should local administration in the disputed areas be settled, the Government may again raise the issue of local administration all over China and in the Communist area before they would discuss the reorganization of the Government. If this line be pursued, then there will be no end which would permit discussion of the nation-wide political affairs.

In view of this I made two proposals. The first one was according to the way they expressed it. North Kiangsu should not be viewed as a matter of local administration because the question of local administration should be discussed immediately prior or after the reorganization of the Government. If that idea is accepted, then there are only two questions on North Kiangsu that have to be discussed at this moment. The first one is the military threat. I have already expressed to General Marshall that we are willing to reduce the Communist forces to two divisions during the first stage and one division during the second stage of army reorganization so as to reduce any threat to the Kuomintang areas. The second question is the political, or the so called refugee, problem. If those are true refugees, we would unqualifiedly welcome their return to North Kiangsu. One method of safeguarding their interests is to organize in each city or hsien a committee comprising representatives of the refugees, as well as representatives of the various parties. This committee would supervise the safety, freedom and property of refugees and would secure land for production. In this way the North Kiangsu problem can be settled. This, I think, is similar to the idea outlined by you day before yesterday.

The Government representatives did not feel in a position to make a reply because my proposition was too far away from their own ideas. They do admit that taking over local administration by the Kuomintang in North Kiangsu constitutes an alteration of the PCC agreement. But they point out that the Government in return has made concessions in Manchuria. I remarked that that depends on from what angle one views the Manchurian question. Viewed from our

side, it is we who made large concessions, particularly with regard to Harbin. Dr. Wang explained that apart from the local civil administration in North Kiangsu, the local administration problem in general will be discussed later. In this connection, I made a second proposal, that we try to solve the purely military problems. If any particular location for troops is not acceptable to the Government, then the Government may bring up the issue for future discussion so that eventually we reach an acceptable basis. The special paper prepared by General Marshall would then be agreed upon and termination of hostilities could be announced. As to local administration in North Kiangsu, that should be solved along with other political problems after the reorganization of the Government. Should the Generalissimo object, then we could call the PCC initially to discuss political matters, or have the Kuomintang-Communist Parties confer and then come to the question of reorganization of the Government. The Government representatives made no reply to this proposition. At the end we merely agreed that we will meet again tomorrow and that we will further discuss overall matters. My view is that to discuss North Kiangsu problem alone without reaching any settlement on other Communist areas is incomprehensible, not to mention unacceptable, to us. General procedure can be worked out in relation to Communist areas, then maybe we can find a way out for North Kiangsu.

From the two discussions I had with Government representatives, I have the impression that the Government is wavering, that its policy is not explicit. That means on one hand, the Government is not explicitly for peace and democracy with the intention of overcoming all difficulties. On the other hand, while the Government does have intentions of continuing the fighting, still it feels that this is not the proper way to do it. But, if they should pursue peace, then they again have fear for this and that. Therefore the Government is suspicious of any proposition brought before them. What they are now doing is groping step by step. This attitude makes it extremely difficult. Should we concede in the beginning all Government desires, then there would be no necessity to negotiate because negotiation implies to find some way out from the stand of both sides.

That is what I have to say on the negotiation and I would like to hear if you have any suggestions or some hints.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Judging from what you have said, I am a little afraid that year [*your*] stand on the local government question is going to make an agreement regarding this paper rather impossible. The Communist Party will not agree to evacuate the region unless the local government remains. The Generalissimo has stated that the Government will not accept that procedure and will not bind

itself to continue local governments. The reasons of both parties have already been stated but the stands taken are very firm. I have considered that they apply equally to vacating portions of Shantung and Jehol and Chahar. Therefore, it has been my hope that some temporary measure could be agreed upon, a temporary measure completing current argument on the reorganization of the Government and paving the way for the formal settlement of the entire issue. Just what this temporary measure might be, I cannot say. But I am emphasizing the fact that some agreement must be reached on a temporary basis if we are to clear the air of conflict and permit political discussions with a reasonable chance of success.

I think it very important to hold discussions down at the present time to clearing that special paper. Everything else is of secondary importance at the moment, because if the fighting is not stopped, there will be a general civil war. If that occurs, the reorganization of the government will be a most remote possibility. Therefore I emphasize again my suggestion for you, General Chou, is to bring this particular paper back into the discussion. What are the troubles that prevent its acceptance? How can they immediately be resolved? I suggest that you discuss the other matters after the formal adjournment of your meeting with Government representatives, at least until we get this thing settled, meaning this special paper. That is the only suggestion I have to make at this time.

GENERAL CHOU: I would like to pose a question once more regarding the point you just referred to in connection with the political matters. I have particularly in mind what is the motive of the Government's recent actions or intentions such as in the unilateral announcement of the National Assembly and what makes the Government so reluctant to convene the PCC or even the Steering Committee. Does it imply that the Government's intention is to first reach a rigid agreement on the military matters? Or that even the military agreement will be carried out a certain degree before the Government will be willing to loosen up its control on all the political matters? If that is the case, then I have one new question to ask. This is not in line with the advocacy of the Communist Party and other parties that while politics are to be democratized, the armies will be nationalized. The Nationalists would continue the same control over armies and would not loosen their control over political matters. This policy of the Government seems incompatible with the spirit of the PCC or the spirit expressed in our talk upon your arrival in China. It is also against the spirit embodied in President Truman's statement⁶⁷ in which the President emphasized the reorganization of the Government as well as the unification of the army.

⁶⁷ December 15, 1945: Department of State, *United States Relations With China* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 607.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I have had no discussion with any official of the Government regarding the sudden announcement of the new date of the constitutional assembly. I therefore at this time cannot give you any view of mine on the subject because I am wholly uninformed. I had been told of it today by one of my own people here at the house, one whom I questioned about the November date. He told me, I think, that the date had some special significance, also that it had once been proposed by the Communist Party—that is all I know. The conversation did not go any further.

Now, as to the other point you raised, I cannot answer that at this time. I can only give my opinion, which is that following the Communist attack on Changchun I noticed a general change of attitude on the part of the Government. Regarding it from their point of view, they doubted whether any agreement could be counted upon. I think it is possible that at the present time while we are still struggling for a settlement of this military problem, and I speak of settlement and not of its implementation, there is probably a hesitation on the part of the Government to commit itself definitely on the timing of the successive steps to be taken in achieving political reorganization. I have urged certain political moves and for that reason I was intent on making a start by securing an agreement to this present series of conferences on a high Government level. My hope was for a success in reaching a basis for this particular paper, particularly as to the local Governments on a temporary basis. I hoped that that in turn would lead to some larger meeting, possibly of the Steering Committee of the PCC.

GENERAL CHOU: That is all I have to say at this moment and I hope tomorrow I can have an appointment to explain the overall picture of the situation. Naturally, I would like to consider your idea of working out some temporary matters with regard to this question.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Any time tomorrow, I will be at your disposal.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Yu Ta-wei*⁶⁸ at No. 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, July 5, 1946, 6:39 p. m.

Also present: Colonel Caughey
Colonel Hutchin

General Yu Ta-wei said that the Generalissimo had sent him to see General Marshall with the following information: The Communists took Ta-Wen-Kou, in Shantung Province, 75 miles north of Hsuechow, and Ning-Wu in Shansi Province, 75 miles south of Ta-tung; these towns were taken either yesterday or early this morning. The Gen-

⁶⁸ Chinese Minister of Communications.

eralissimo has said that he will stop negotiations if the Communists do not stop taking cities by force with no justification. The Generalissimo wants General Marshall's opinion.

General Marshall said similar instances reported to him by the Communists presented an equally strong case on their side, that is, the Communists are contesting National Government actions in Shantung Province against towns along, and in the vicinity of, the Tsinan-Tsingtao Railroad. It would appear that the activity on both sides is inexcusable. Hence, even though negotiations suffer, General Marshall said he was not inclined to warn either side since each side contests activities of the other with equal vehemence concerning almost identical circumstances. In direct answer to the Generalissimo's request for General Marshall's opinion, General Marshall asked General Yu Ta-wei what he (General Yu) thought General Marshall should do, to which General Yu had no specific reply but again stated that the Generalissimo wanted General Marshall's opinion.

General Marshall stated that he considered both sides in the wrong. He added that he hoped the conference which he had arranged between Governmental representatives and Communist representatives for the purpose of resolving civil administration matters with respect to Communist evacuated areas would soon develop a solution to that problem. At this point, it is the one problem which seemed to stand in the way of completing the various considerations now before the Committee of Three which are designed to bring about a complete termination of hostilities in all of China. General Marshall reminded General Yu that he had always feared these outrageous and stupid military actions on the part of both sides, probably in retaliation, and that this was the reason why he had advised the Generalissimo that the extension of the truce period for too long a period would probably permit the military situation to develop to a point beyond control.

General Marshall reiterated his position under the circumstances by saying that he was not free to approach either side and further than this he did not think the Generalissimo could say that negotiations would cease because the Communists can claim a cessation of negotiations also on apparently equal ground. General Yu Ta-wei said that the situation seemed to be becoming extremely critical particularly around Shantung. He added that each additional aggravation on the part of the Communists made more difficult the solution of the problem of civil administrations.

General Marshall stated that he was afraid foolish military Commanders on the Communist side—and this is applicable to the National side also—were motivated by an anxiety to demonstrate military power to cause governmental concessions on the political level. General Marshall added that the situation was so threatening that he saw

little hope of solution unless the special committee established for resolving the civil administration problem was soon able to arrive at a solution.

General Marshall closed by assuring General Yu that he would take up the grievances of each side with the other side and he informed General Yu that this meeting constituted his taking up the Communist grievances with the Government, i. e. General Yu Ta-wei. He informed General Yu that he would take up the Government grievances with General Chou tomorrow. General Marshall asked General Yu Ta-wei to make it clear to the Generalissimo that he (General Marshall) was not in a position to ask either side to cease negotiations or to support either side in its contention that negotiations should cease.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

General Marshall to Mr. Walter S. Robertson, at Peiping

[NANKING,] 6 July 1946.

1062. Have contacted Government officials regarding your 4847⁶⁹ and have found after several lengthy discussions that the Government has not, in spite of the Generalissimo's assurances to me to the contrary, issued orders to National field commanders subsequent to 7 June relative to aggressive military actions. I was assured however that the orders issued applied to field commanders in North and Central China as well as those commanders in Manchuria. Contact with the Communist representatives indicates much the same status except that their initial orders on 7 June were to Manchurian field commanders with information copies to commanders in China proper. I have however gotten commitment out of both sides to press this matter to issue new orders and should have that information available soon. I will keep you advised.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Colonel Marshall S. Carter to General Marshall

[WASHINGTON,] 6 July 1946.

93593. Following message transmitted to you at request of Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson :

"Your 1053⁷⁰ has my complete support. I understand that you are in process of determining whether Doctor Stuart will be acceptable to Chinese Government. I stand ready to take immediate action to

⁶⁹ July 1, p. 1273.

⁷⁰ July 5, p. 1297.

secure his appointment upon receiving your final clearance. Signed Acheson Acting.”

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Mr. Walter S. Robertson to General Marshall

[PEIPING,] 7 July 1946.

5073. General Clement in message dated 5 July mentioned rumored move to Tsingtao of 53rd Chinese National Army. We have received no notification of such move from National Government Branch. United States Branch Executive Headquarters is taking position that movements of 94th and 73rd Armies are illegal and if Communists withdraw from recently attacked and occupied cities that these armies should be moved out of Shantung.

We have conflicting reports on numbers of 73rd Army airlifted from Hsuchow to Tsinan.

Since General Clement has agreement of General Wang, National Government commander, to negotiate and is optimistic that he can get General Chen Yi, Communist commander, to Tsingtao within coming week, would it not be advisable for you to approach National Government side to stop further airborne movements of 73rd Army and possible contemplated moves of other units which would include rumored 53rd Army move.

893.00/7-746 : Telegram

The Counselor of Embassy in China (Smyth) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, July 7, 1946—5 p. m.

[Received July 7—6: 17 a. m.]

1099. No important changes in military situation but charges from both sides of violations of truce agreements continued. (Summary M[ilitary] A[ttaché's] report period 27 June to 5 July.) Press reports carried announcement by Commanding General National Forces Northeast that those forces would not attack Communists Manchuria despite lapse truce agreement.

According press reports, situation Weihsien area of Shantung, Communists have been offensive, eased considerably 30 June. Commanding General Marine forces Tsingtao reports Chimo recaptured by Nationalist forces 2 July.

In Shansi Communist forces reported by press attacking Tatung since 22 June.

Expected that General Ho Ying-chin will depart for US shortly to assume post chief Chinese Military Mission and Chinese representative military staff section United Nations Security Council.

Unconfirmed reports have been current that General Hu Tsung-han, now commanding first war area at Sian, would replace General Tu Yu-ming as Commander Nationalist forces Manchuria.

Summary of reports from reliable sources show that 80 percent of all violations truce order of 7 July were by Communists.

SMYTH

893.00/7-746 : Telegram

The Counselor of Embassy in China (Smyth) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, July 7, 1946—8 p. m.

[Received 10:53 p. m.]

1098. Jamming continued to hamper reception of Yen-an English language broadcast for week ending July 5. Material received consisted principally of attacks on Kuomintang and on United States. One item cited pledge by new Democratic League Army in Manchuria, formed by Kmt officers and Yen-an, to fight for peace and end of one-party rule. Another item alleged capture of Kmt attack plans against Communist Hupeh-Honan pocket; also numerous reports of fighting in that area as well as Shantung and Hopei.

One long story repeated previous accounts of Nanking incident in which Shanghai delegates assaulted by government agents. Another item charged that whereas liberated areas are carrying out their part of Yellow River Agreement, Kmt has so far failed to carry out its part and UNRRA has only performed 50 percent of commitment. Yen-an *Emancipation Daily* editorial of twenty-fifth anniversary of founding of Chinese Communist Party was long eulogy of Party's struggle for good of China and determination to continue until peoples' victory won. It stated difference between Koumintang and Communists is that Kmt takes from people and Communists give to them.

Attacks continued on U. S. military aid bill to China. One item detailed American military aid given so far and showed how it had been used against people. It was reported Shanghai Workers Federation has appealed to American workers to stop this military aid and cease intervention in internal Chinese affairs. One long item strongly criticized recent Acheson statement⁷¹ justifying American aid, charging actual facts far cry from policy of peace, unity and reconstruction. "It is a well-known fact that American Government

⁷¹ Of June 28; see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 7, 1946, p. 34.

is backing only Fascist warlord clique within the Kuomintang." If US wants peace it will stop military aid which can only fan up civil war. US troops instead of devoting themselves solely to repatriating Japs are really being used against Chinese people. Another item reported Manchurian United Democratic Army protests against American aid.

Yenan Chinese number code broadcast on July 4 contained article alleging American policy toward Philippines in 1900 was purely imperialistic and designed to use islands as principal American Pacific base and that this policy has never changed. Also charged that "after the outbreak of the Pacific War, the Americans very soon withdrew from the Philippines, leaving the Filipinos under the iron heel of the Japanese invader", but that the Filipinos themselves never stopped fighting for their freedom. American successes in retaking Philippines were in large part due to efforts of these native troops.

Sent Department 1098; Department please repeat Moscow.

SMYTH

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Draft of New China News Agency

MANIFESTO OF THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE CHINESE
COMMUNIST PARTY IN COMMEMORATION OF THE 9TH ANNIVERSARY
OF THE "7TH OF JULY"⁷²

New China News Agency, Yenan, 5 July—The following is a full text of the Manifesto issued by the Central Executive Committee, Chinese Communist Party in commemoration of the 9th Anniversary of the "7th of July":

To: All Fellow Citizens and all Patriots:

Today is the first commemoration of the "7th of July" after our people have victoriously concluded the war of resistance and patriotism against the Japanese. As you will recall, nine years ago, we, the patriotic people and service men of this entire nation forced the reactionary clique of the Kuomintang Party to abandon its policy of civil war and nonresistance and united our people to begin the war of resistance against the Japanese. During the course of 8 years of war, we persisted resistance against the enemy and unity and progress of the nation, and opposed surrender, disunity and retrogression of this country, thus averting the national crisis created by the policy of negative war of resistance of the reactionary clique of the Kuomin-

⁷² Draft from New China News Agency, July 7, on the 9th anniversary of the outbreak of the undeclared war between China and Japan at Marco Polo Bridge, near Peiping.

tang Party and achieving victory over the Fascist aggression in coordination with the Allied forces in the European and Asiatic battle grounds. During the 8 years of war some hundreds of million of our people and service men had bled, toiled and sacrificed. What were to be received in return for these sacrifices? It was for the realization of national liberation, for the eradication of foreign aggression, for the founding of peace in the Far East, for the assurance that our country may not again become a colonial settlement for imperialism, for the democratization of our country, for the decontamination of feudalistic fascist principles in this country, for the end of the existence of fascist dictators, war lords, secret police and corrupt elements who are riding over the heads of the people and sucking the blood of the people, for peace and unity within the country, for the termination of the civil war of slaughtering our own selves, for the development of national economy, for the speedy industrialization of our country, and above all, for the independence, peace and democracy of our nation.

As soon as the war was won, the people on one hand exert[ed] their unprecedented efforts for the attainment of independence, peace and democracy. But on the other hand, the reactionary group of our country, under the support of the remnants of Japanese fascism and American reactionary group, took advantage of the stolen fruit of victory to sustain dictatorship and civil war. Attempting to replace the former Japanese position in this country and to transform China into a colonial settlement for American imperialism, the American reactionary group worked closely with Chinese reactionaries. Consequently, our patriotic people failed to obtain independence, peace and democracy as the war concluded victoriously. The grave national crisis still exists, we must continue to strive for the accomplishment of the unfinished sacred mission of the war of resistance against the Japanese.

The 11 months following the Japanese surrender saw the serious and intricate struggle between the people's cause of independence, peace and democracy on one hand and the reactionaries' policy of national betrayal, dictatorship and civil war on the other. On 25 August 1945, the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Communist Party proposed in its manifesto that independence, peace and democracy be the fundamentals of the basic post-war national construction policy. For the realization of this policy, Chairman Mao Tse-tung personally went to Chungking for a 40-day talk with National Government President Chiang Kai-shek and signed on 10 October the Summary of National-Communist Talks.⁷³ Under pressure

⁷³ See *United States Relations With China*, p. 577.

of democratic thinking of the world and of the people of this country, the Kmt was compelled to accept the "October 10" Agreement for long-termed cooperation with the Chinese Communists, prevention of civil war, termination of the political tutelage period, convocation of the PCC, assurance of people's liberty, guarantee of co-equal and legal status of all parties, prohibition of activities of the secret police, release of political prisoners, execution of democratic local autonomy, revolutionization and reduction of the armed forces, severe penalties for the traitors, and the disbandment of the puppet forces. At the same time, the Kmt, leaning upon the armed intervention policy of the Hurley-Wedemeyer⁷⁴ clique, launched large scale attacks upon our liberated territories for 3 consecutive months, but these attacks of the reactionaries were repulsed by our people. The people of the United States and democratic circles of the world attacked the Hurley-Wedemeyer policy. Under the pressure of the people of the entire nation, and at the request of the Moscow Conference of the Three Foreign Ministers of last December and the participation of US Special Envoy General Marshall, the Kmt was again forced on 10 January to issue a National-Communist joint cease-fire order and to invite representatives of all parties and non-party citizens to participate in the PCC which was to convene. The PCC unanimously adopted the resolutions of reorganization of the government on a democratic line, reorganization of the National Assembly, implementation of the Outline of National Construction, revolutionization and reduction of the armed forces and the amendment of the draft constitution. These resolutions shine brightly over the path leading to the future of the democratization of our country. To these resolutions and to the cease-fire order, acclaims came from all people of China, the Chinese Communist Party, the Democratic League, the peaceful and democratic elements of the Kmt and the people of the United States and of other Allied nations. The reactionaries of Kmt, on the contrary, declared that they must resort to "remedial" means for this defeat. Since the unfortunate incident at Chiao-Chang-Kou, Chungking on 10 February, 10 days after the adjournment of the PCC, and particularly since the Second Plenary Session of the Kmt Central Committee, step by step, the reactionaries tore up all their promises. Upon discovery that the US is not faithfully carrying out the Moscow decisions⁷⁵ and that the US is continuing military aid to them, they intensified their onslaughts on the people rendering Gen-

⁷⁴ Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley was Ambassador in China; Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer was Commanding General, U. S. Forces in the China Theater and concurrently Chief of Staff, China Theater.

⁷⁵ See *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VII, pp. 829 ff.; for the *communiqué* issued by the conference, see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 30, 1945, p. 1027.

eral Marshall's efforts for peace futile. During the past half year they have attacked and captured 30 odd towns and more than 2,000 villages and hamlets in our liberated regions. More than 1,000,000 Kmt troops have been transported to north China or the Northeast. With a view to aggravate the civil war and to retain the warlord system, they are continuing to conscript soldiers and to use puppet troops, publicly advocating for civil war, forbid anti-civil war movements of the people, openly demand for more territories of our liberated areas and for the overthrowing of the Army Reorganization Plan. True that they often proclaim that political issues should be settled by political means, but in reality they try to solve everything by force, even to the harmless petitions of intellectuals and industrialists. They have spread in Chungking, Peiping, Hsian, Nan-Tung, Hsi-Kang, Yunnan, Kuangtung, Shanghai, Nanking and many other places many bloody instances even more barbarous than terrorism of the former Fascist regimes. Publicly demanding to overthrow the decisions of the PCC and refusing to reconvene the PCC, they are attempting to make a unilateral constitution. Under the dark rule of the reactionaries several millions of the people are dying in starvation, many factories were forced to close down under the crushing pressure of bureaucratic and foreign capitalism, even the high officials of the Government and college professors are compelled to resort to strikes because they could not make a living. The reactionaries are doing everything possible to continue to use their corrupt means, to demand food from the farmers and to raise the prices in order to continue the civil war. These rascals of the reactionary group are extending their sphere of oppression of our country and people.

Let us ask how did the reactionary group of our country sustain its dictatorship and civil war after the war. The answer is the world-known fact of armed intervention on the part of American reactionary clique and its so-called "aid to China." If it were not for this intervention, we would have achieved democracy long time ago and the civil war could not have survived. Under the pretext of the so-called assistance to repatriate the Japanese and to aid our country and people for our national revival, every help given by the American reactionaries is a help to encourage dictatorship and civil war of the reactionaries of this country. Now let us think for a while why the American reactionaries, without regard to the feeling of the people of the United States and of China, are enthusiastic about this dutiful "aid to China." Once again, the answer is another world-known fact. The American reactionaries have an undivulgeable object of imperialistic aggression. Our reactionaries, reactionaries that are accustomed to national betrayal, consented to allow influence

of American aggression in China and the actual control of China's military, economic, financial, internal and foreign affairs by Americans. They are accorded freedom penetrate into, occupy and use our national territorial land, air, sea and inland rivers thus threatening to extinct our national existence. American imperialism is far more dangerous than the Japanese imperialism as the former has a more "civilized" and "legal" outlook and the tools it uses are the capitalism of anti-fascism and the asset of traditional friendship between the people of the United States and China. It breeds traitors and bears potential danger.

It is now very apparent that our very national existence is imperiled by internal as well as external reactionaries. Their aims are to convert our country into a corpse-filled hell, a large concentration camp or a base or colonial settlement for a new war of imperial aggression. All of us who love our country, all heroes who had fought in the war of resistance against the Japs, all disciples of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, we must unite ourselves to repulse the joint attack of foreign imperialism and our reactionaries and must strive to achieve independence, peace and democracy of our country. These three points have become the goal for everyone of us to fight for. We must not yield the peace if we are to win independence and democracy. It is only when there is no peace and when there is a civil war that our fight for independence and democracy is suppressed and that it facilitates military dictatorship and military intervention. Without democracy China cannot be in their actual senses independent and peaceful, the same is true when our country is not completely independent. The Chinese Communist Party is determined to secure peace, independence and democracy for our country and at this most critical moment we urgently appeal to the people at home and abroad on the following points:

1. To immediately issue a nation-wide (including the Northeast) order reaffirming cessation of conflicts without exception, without condition and without time limitation, to cease troop movement, to stop construction of fortifications and to countermand conscription orders.

2. Reconvention of the PCC; implementation of the decisions reached in the previous session; reorganize the one-party government of Kmt and to form a democratic coalition government; reorganize the Ministries of National Defense, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Economic Affairs, the Interior, Communications and Education; deactivate all secret police organizations; purge all fascist, war-like and corrupted elements; eliminate bureaucratic capitalism; enact a protective tariff system; confiscate the properties of notorious traitors and corrupted officials; relieve domestic industries, unemployed workers refugees of famine areas and school teachers and Government workers who are on the starvation level.

3. Under the supervision of the PCC, carry out a drastic and speedy demobilization and reduction of the armed forces, extirpate military oligarchy and despotism of the war-lord system; slash the military expenditure to the lowest minimum and transfer the military budget to relief and educational funds; freeze all surplus weapons; stop buying munition, return all Lend-Lease munition to the US; reject with thanks the US Military Advisory Group in China; notify the US to immediately withdraw all her land, sea and air forces from China and to make a statement to her that the people of China will not assume responsibility of American loans made to China prior to the formation of a democratic coalition government.

4. Request the US, USSR and Great Britain to faithfully carry out the Moscow decisions; request the US to stop military intervention of China's internal affairs, stop prolonging the civil war, nullify the Lend-Lease Act to China,⁷⁶ stop sending the Military Advisory Group to China and voluntarily evacuate all her army, naval and air forces from this country immediately.

Fellow Citizen and all veterans who had fought for independence, peace and democracy of our country, remember our national crisis is still grave and our struggles for our cause will be hard, but our future is bright. We have been struggling for independence and democracy for past hundred years, never in that period had we gathered so much strength as we have today, never was our hopes brighter than they are now. We had faced and surmounted during the 8 years of war difficulties which were more critical and more numerous than those we are confronting today. Squeezed in between Japanese imperialism and the Kmt reactionaries, we have successfully defended this independent and democratic fortress—our liberated areas with a population of 140,000,000 people. In the fight for national patriotism, the strength of our people has grown many times and we have united this strength with that the rural population under the control of the Kmt regime. Not only in this country that we have a national united front, we also have gigantic allied forces on the international scene. People in world have overthrown German, Italian and Japanese facism that forms the nucleus of world facism. These people are free now, they will continue to fight the remnants of fascism and pro-fascist reactionaries. The struggles of our people have received and will continue to receive aid and sympathy from these brothers of ours all over the world. The people of the United States and the American democratic group are joining us to oppose the Chinese and American reactionaries. - The military intervention of the American reactionaries, military dictatorship of Chinese reactionaries and the civil war in this country create serious threats to American security

⁷⁶ For text of Master Lend-Lease Agreement signed at Washington, June 2, 1942, see *United States Relations With China*, p. 466, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1494.

and welfare. Even with foreign aid the Kmt reactionaries cannot solve their own problems. The beastly acts of the Kmt are not signs of their power, but of their weakness. Such are characteristic phenomena of any fascist country, China is no exception. The Chinese reactionaries do their utmost to destroy the potential strength of the people and let foreign aggression turn our country into colonial settlement or Philippine-type "independent" nation. We can never allow it to materialize.

Let us all wake up and unite ourselves in the same spirit that we fought in the war. Let us make known to others that we have no other demands but independence, democracy and peace. In recent talks we have made many concessions for the sake of start [*stop?*] fighting we would get prepared to give them a thorough beating. We must frustrate the attempts of Chinese and foreign reactionaries, we must achieve independence, democracy and peace, we must implement the cease-fire order and the Army Reorganization Plan. We oppose to anybody who opposes the above views.

We oppose to civil war, we want peace!

We oppose to dictatorship, we want democracy!

We oppose to national betrayal, we want independence!

We support the Cease-fire Order, we support the PCC decisions!

We support the Moscow Big Three decision!

Strengthen the ties of friendship between the Chinese and American people!

We oppose to foreign aggression, we oppose to foreign military intervention!

Long live the victory of the war of patriotism and resistance against the Japanese!

Long live national patriotism and solidarity!

Long live independence, peace and democracy of New China!

CENTRAL COMMITTEE

CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

7 JULY 1946.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

General Marshall to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)

NANKING, 8 July 1946.

1071. DEAR ACHESON: Reference my 1053⁷⁷ and your 93593,⁷⁸ Chinese Govt. through Chief of Protocol has officially advised me that appointment is favorably considered. Therefore please proceed without delay.

⁷⁷ July 5, p. 1297.

⁷⁸ July 6, p. 1307.

I stated that I had not yet approached the President in the matter as I wished to avoid the possibility of embarrassing him and Generalissimo in case latter was not favorably impressed. I therefore requested Chinese to delay confidential notification to their Ambassador until Presidential action was assured. I told Protocol Chief that you would confidentially notify Chinese Ambassador before nomination is made public. Also, at same time, please explain matters to General Wedemeyer showing him 1053, and notify me.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

General Marshall to Mr. Walter S. Robertson, at Peiping

[NANKING,] 8 July 1946.

1068. Correspondence has reached this office from both sides in the past few days concerning the Hankow Communist situation. Each side accuses the other of offensive action and therefore each side under the guise of self-defense seems to be engaging in pitted warfare. Would you please give me urgently a current report on this situation together with your recommendation. In his last memo⁷⁹ on the subject General Chou has brought up again the idea of moving the Communist forces northward, thus relieving cause for continued friction. I doubt however that the Government would approve such a measure at this time.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai at No. 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, July 8, 1946, 4 p. m.

Also present: Mr. Chang
Colonel Caughey
Captain Soong

GENERAL MARSHALL: I was told by way of telephone that very little had been accomplished in the conference designed to resolve the local civil government question. Is that correct?

GENERAL CHOU: I feel a bit sorry for the last week since little was accomplished and time is lost, but the only good thing is that both sides have a better understanding of each other's points.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I was hopeful that was the case. Direct negotiations do have that effect, which maybe in the long run is the most important factor. My concern is the situation north of Hankow and around Tatung. Since it has grown so serious I have been fearful it would lead to a complete rupture and thus defeat any results

⁷⁹ MM/078, July 7, not printed.

we might obtain by these negotiations. I wrote a letter ⁸⁰ (attached) to General Hsu today regarding the situation north of Hankow in which I referred to a report from General Yu Ta Wei and a statement from General Chou.

(A portion of the letter was translated to General Chou.)

General Chou produced a map showing the areas now occupied by the Nationalist troops.

GENERAL CHOU: The 9th field team is now completely guarded by the Government side. Earlier the three commissioners in Peiping issued a notification to General Chen Chien, the Government Commanding General in Hankow, and General Liu Chih in Honan and at the same time to General Li Sen-nien that both sides cease attacks and troop movements. A copy of the notification also was issued to field team No. 9. On account of that the Communist member of the team suggested a survey be conducted because both No. 9 field team and No. 32 field team are now in Hankow. The Government rejected the proposal and then the signal communications of the Communist branch were closed down by the Government and the secret code taken away. Only through the American branch could the Communist representative send a letter to Peiping to inform them about the situation. Therefore it seems that the local Government military authorities do not look toward a peaceful settlement of the incident.

With regard to Tatung, I have wired General Yeh in Peiping suggesting that a special team be sent similar to the one sent to Shantung to investigate the situation. The Communist side is prepared to give assurance on two things: First, no attack on Tatung; Second, to send in food supplies to Tatung. If the Government has other terms to put forward with regard to Tatung, I am ready to consider them. It seems to me that possibly the Government may connect the Tatung affair with the incident in Hopeh and make the Tatung affair a pretext for attacking in Hopeh.

Now, there are two alternatives with regard to Hopeh—either an area should be assigned temporarily for Communist troops where they can stay in present locations, or they should be permitted to move northward. Otherwise hostilities will only ensue.

GENERAL MARSHALL: May I interrupt. I think I will send a plane up tomorrow and bring down the senior American member of Team No. 9 and Team No. 32. I will tell the National Government what I am going to see if they wish to bring one of their men down at the same time. Does General Chou wish a Communist member brought down?

GENERAL CHOU: I would appreciate it.

⁸⁰ OSE 274, July 8, not printed.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I will send General Chou's message for his man to come down. I think that is the quickest way.

GENERAL CHOU: Coming to the question of the Tsingtao-Tsinan RR, the situation is very clear. As it was when the agreement could be signed, not only the railroad traffic was to be resumed but also there was to be no threat of Communist forces against the Government forces. The Government still persists however in the idea of fighting through the whole line. I mentioned last time that the Government was attacking westward from Weih sien and eastward from Tsinan, and that they were also driving toward the north for Tsingtao. They captured five cities and over ten railroad stations. The attack is still continuing. On our part we do not see why such a war should be waged because after all it could be settled by peaceful means. Once the status of January 13 or June 7 is restored all those disputed areas will be vacated by Communist forces. Also General Clement is trying to arrange a meeting between General Wong and General Chen. If the fighting is going on the meeting cannot be brought about. In my message to General Chen Yi I said that once hostilities are stopped and the agreements are signed then the meeting can immediately take place. As long as the fighting is going on that plan will not materialize. I asked General Chen Cheng during the last direct conference with the Government representatives what was the motive of this attack. General Chen explained that because of the Government's fear of a Communist threat on Tsinan they are therefore enlarging the area for safety. Right now the Government troops also took possession of some coal mine areas. Such interpretations tend to increase the military hostilities. In view of the flaring up of the hostilities in the various places it has delayed the securing of formal acceptance of the four agreements by the Committee of Three. Therefore local compromises cannot be secured despite efforts of General Timberman and General Clement. It has been our idea when asking General Timberman and General Clement to first attempt to reach local compromises. We could then enlarge the compromises to facilitate the reaching of a nation-wide compromise. But now that endeavor also met obstruction and we have to refer back to the four documents.⁸¹ I would like to discuss those four documents further.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I would like first to comment on General Chou's remarks. In order to make my position clear I wish General Chou to know this. I received a letter from General Chou recently with regard to the fighting along the railroad. Colonel Caughey wanted me to take up that issue with the Generalissimo immediately,

⁸¹ *Ante*, pp. 1186-1190.

or with General Hsu. I declined to do so for this reason. I felt, as I stated before to General Chou, that the Communist operations in Shantung between June 9 and June 14 were wholly inexcusable and made it exceedingly difficult for me to do anything in the way of influencing the Government. I have used my influence to the limit. Now, at this time of which I speak I was unwilling to step in again and protest to the Government because of the embarrassment the Communist operations had previously caused me. I, however, compromised by having Colonel Caughey ostensibly on his own initiative go to see General Hsu, but I personally would not do it. Then a little later General Yu Ta Wei came to me with a message from the Generalissimo protesting vigorously against the operations in the Tatung region, asking me to see General Chou to remonstrate. In this case I declined and for an identical reason—that was the operation of the Government along the Tsingtao-Tsinan RR. So my reaction was the same in both cases. I thought both military actions were wrong. While I am trying every way I can think of to bring a cessation of hostilities, nevertheless I felt that I would fatally weaken my position if I stepped in under the circumstances I have just related. As to the situation north of Hankow, that critical situation had gotten so confused that I was too greatly puzzled to reach a clear conclusion. Regarding the other operations to which I have referred, I had a fixed opinion.

GENERAL CHOU: With regard to the situation in Hopeh, it is better to wait for the arrival of the field team members. I received a rather detailed report but it is in no way complete and I think a clearer picture can be obtained when they arrive tomorrow.

Now, referring to the four documents. During the past week in my negotiations with the Government representatives, I tried to work along the same line as I worked with you during earlier negotiations. I am trying to do my best to reach a compromise.

The Government's position is that the Communists evacuate completely North Kiangsu to the north of the Lunghai railroad, without conditions. Our stand is that the local administration cannot be destroyed; that is our fundamental attitude. Therefore each party is standing firmly against the other and no settlement could be reached. "Negotiations" essentially implies a compromise, otherwise we would only reach a deadlock. We are afraid that after straightening out the North Kiangsu bitterness, we would again have to go over the Tsingtao-Tsinan railroad situation, local administrative affairs and, therefore, political affairs. For these reasons, we think they should be settled along the line of the PCC conditions; that is, after the reorganization of the Government. They should not be settled piece-meal but as a whole.

I therefore suggest that, certainly on the military questions, we try to work out some measures to assist the final settlement by the Committee of Three. The Generalissimo would not feel that the Communist force in North Kiangsu threatens Nanking and Shanghai, since I already made the concession that the Communist forces will be reduced to two divisions in the first stage and one division in the second stage, and I further stated we could possibly make further concessions with regard to reduction of army strengths. But I must state clearly that that does not constitute a complete withdrawal, but merely a reduction.

The Government representatives also feel that any reductions involved lie within the scope of military affairs and therefore not within their authority. They declined to make a reply. For that reason we failed to reach some temporary arrangement.

The Government representatives made it clear that they have no formula. As to the formulas that I have suggested, they find it again unacceptable. My proposition was that first, the Communist army strength be reduced; second, with regard to the refugees, committees will be organized in hsiens to deal with this matter; third, the local administrative question will be straightened out either after the formal truce or after the reorganization of the government into a coalition government. If straightened out after the reorganization the over-all situation first will be discussed, not by piecemeal. Or, a transitional arrangement can be worked out in some way. The Government rejected all these proposals. They offered no counter proposal. Their stand is adamant that we have to accept their only proposition; that is, the complete withdrawal to the north of the Lunghai railroad. Then they will be willing to discuss the technical procedure of the withdrawal. Such a proposition appears to be an order rather than a proposal and, therefore, we find no way to continue the discussion. At the end we agreed that the Government representatives would refer the question back to the Generalissimo and I would refer it to Yen-an. We also discussed the idea of referring the whole question back to the Committee of Three for a settlement.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Do I understand that those negotiations have terminated?

GENERAL CHOU: That is my understanding. After the last conference on Saturday evening, Mr. Shao and Dr. Wang were going to see the Generalissimo in the evening to give a lengthy report on the proceedings. After that interview, Mr. Shao told the Democratic Leaguers that the Generalissimo left them with no definite instructions whatsoever.

GENERAL MARSHALL: It would seem the situation is back in my lap.

GENERAL CHOU: At the last meeting, General Chen Cheng casually mentioned that in case no agreement could be reached on the negotiations, the whole matter will be referred back to the Committee of Three. Then Dr. Wang said he would first consult the Generalissimo.

On the Communist side we feel that there are two ways to settle this situation. First that some compromise plan has to be developed. Second, that we drop the whole matter for the time being; that is in paragraph 7 of the special paper⁸² we might delete everything pertaining to local administration and leave it for future discussion. If some arrangement can be worked out, then the four papers are ready for signature and that would be most beneficial to the situation. I believe the only way to reach such a solution is to refer the whole matter to the Committee of Three.

GENERAL MARSHALL: It seems to me that if we don't touch on the question of the local government, we would immediately be confronted with the situation where the Government would replace the local governments as soon as the Communists withdraw. A serious rupture could result out of that, thus not making for peace but rather creating a new cause of conflict.

GENERAL CHOU: That is right. Should the Government interpret the agreement in this way, it would be quite dangerous. My idea is rather that during the first few months after the army reorganization plan is implemented, the Communist troops would evacuate the Tsingtao-Tsinan railroad and that no troops would be stationed along that line or in the area south of Huai-an. The Communist troops would do this merely in conformity with the army reorganization plan without connection with the political affairs. On the other hand, the Government side would also concentrate their troops at such points, leaving other places vacated; for example, not along the whole railway line in North China or North Anhwei. Those places vacated by the Government would not be occupied by any Communist troops or Communist local civil administration, because the principal objective at the moment is to implement the reorganization plan.

Political matters will be settled within the scope of political discussion in accordance with the provisions of the PCC. Dr. Wang admits that there is such a provision in the PCC, therefore the administrative affairs can be left for over-all settlement prior to or after the reorganization of the government into a coalition government. Dr. Wang also said that he would think about whether it will be advisable or not to solve the local administration of all the different areas throughout China, in all the Communist areas, at one time instead of involving only North Kiangsu or Shantung. He is afraid that

⁸² See draft of June 29, p. 1246.

solving the over-all problem will take too much time, and when the time comes for such a discussion, the Government will prepare some proposals. I must agree that these questions can be discussed after the signing of the four documents, either between the two parties themselves or in the PCC. The two alternatives I suggested bear only this difference: the first alternative, that is, the compromise solution would have to be mentioned in the agreement which we sign; and the second, that is, omitting any reference to local administration, would not have to be mentioned.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270: Telegram

General Marshall to Mr. Walter S. Robertson, at Peiping

[NANKING,] 8 July, 1946.

1075. Hankow Communists is subject. 1068⁸³ and 5063⁸⁴ refer. I have decided to bring in senior American members of Team 32 and Team 9 to report on that situation. C-47 No. 439 leaves here for Hankow at 1000 local time Tuesday, 9 July and returns to Nanking same day as soon as passengers can be loaded. I have discussed this with General Chou who also wants senior Communist members of both teams brought in. Government side has not indicated yet, but I will let you know soonest. Please issue necessary instructions for the two senior Americans to be available at field when plane arrives and make it clear that Americans come regardless of possible reluctance on part of Communists or Nationalists.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270: Telegram

Mr. Walter S. Robertson to General Marshall

[PEIPING,] July 8, 1946.

5127. We are issuing instructions to Team 9 and 32 as per urad 1075. Reurad 1068, current situation north of Hankow is presented by summarizing information beginning in Opsum⁸⁵ 15 dated 27 June. We have no pertinent information beyond that presented in subsequent Opsums 17, 18, 19, 23⁸⁶ and a recent National Govt. Branch complaint here that Communist forces are attacking along Peiping-Hankow Railway north of Hankow.

The 3 Commissioners this Headquarters issued orders 2 July 1946 to senior National Govt. and Communist Party Commanders to cease

⁸³ July 8, p. 1317.

⁸⁴ July 6, not printed.

⁸⁵ Operation summary.

⁸⁶ For résumé, see memorandum by Col. J. Hart Caughey, July 9, p. 1327.

all conflict and troop movements in the central plains military area in an effort to preserve the *status quo*. United States Branch here of the opinion that National Govt. will not agree to any displacement of Communist Party forces from central plain area. United States Branch here holds position that: (a) areas occupied prior to present conflict were those of 13 January; (b) any movement of Communist Party forces from this area to another locality is a strategical move which would unbalance situation at latter place and consequently elsewhere in China.

It is recommended: (a) that effort should be continued towards stopping conflicts, troop movements, and to maintain generally 13 January position; (b) northward movement of Communist Party troops is not recommended; (c) that the Generalissimo and Com[munist] Chou En-lai reinforce action of this headquarters by issuing cease conflict orders thru their channels.

Marshall Mission Files. Lot 54-D270

Notes on Meeting Between General Marshall and General Yu Ta-wei at No. 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, July 8, 1946, 6 p. m.

Also present: Colonel Caughey

1. General Yu Ta-wei handed General Marshall a copy of a Communist bulletin⁸⁷ containing anti-American propaganda directed against American support of the Kuomintang Party. General Yu also gave General Marshall a copy of orders⁸⁸ issued by the Generalissimo on 3 July reiterating the 7 June non-aggressive action order.

2. General Marshall gave General Yu copies of two extracts of the meeting he had had with General Chou En-lai in the afternoon. One extract contained General Chou's statements regarding early reconvention of the PCC. The other contained General Chou's statements relative to a conference between himself and other Communist representatives and Dr. Wang Shih Chieh, General Chen Cheng and Mr. Shao Li-tze for the purpose of resolving the local administration problem.

3. General Marshall told General Yu that he had gotten a rather complete report of the status of negotiations in the conference just referred to but that he had not yet heard from the Government participants. He asked General Yu to make an appointment for him with the Government representatives tomorrow so that he could discuss the situation.

4. General Marshall continued by stating he was afraid that the

⁸⁷ See manifesto of July 7, p. 1310.

⁸⁸ See telegram No. 1077, July 8, *infra*.

conference discussed too many subjects rather than adhering specifically to the question of civil administrations in areas vacated by Communist forces. General Marshall added that it would be necessary for everyone concerned to concentrate seriously in the next few days on the question of resolving the various documents presently before the Committee of Three. He stated that this was absolutely necessary in order to bring about a cessation of hostilities in China. General Yu said that the Communists were obviously at fault and pointed out that the Government forces have nowhere, except in Shantung, attacked Communist positions. General Yu asked what alternative was left if the Communists kept up their offensive actions. General Yu told General Marshall that he (General Marshall) was a friend of the Chinese people and of the National Government and that he should not want the Government to end up in an unfavorable position. General Marshall agreed that it was the Communist activities in Shantung that first caused the difficulty and that the Government's reaction in reinforcing was justified, however he reminded General Yu that the present Government offensive action in Shantung province was very serious and sufficiently intense to evoke retaliatory measures by the Communists in other parts of China. General Marshall added that the situation north of Hankow was entirely different; that the forces being attacked by the National Government are surrounded and the seriousness of this situation, in view of the Loshan agreement,⁸⁹ could possibly have been prevented by more complete cooperation on the part of the National forces. General Marshall also reminded General Yu Ta Wei of the Government's advances in Manchuria toward the end of May. General Marshall emphasized that the biggest difficulty in connection with military operations was the policy of force openly advocated by many of the Government leaders.

5. General Yu summed up by stating, "If the Communists continue, they must take the consequences. I hate to say it, but it is a fact that the Government will resort to aggressive action." General Yu stated that the Generalissimo had been very patient and that he too was inclined to resort to aggressive action if the Communists do not cease their operations.

6. General Marshall concluded by stating that his major concern rests with the 450 million Chinese people who will be the sufferers if agreement is not reached. General Marshall pointed out that the major military agreements have already been passed on and that the remaining outstanding military questions should be resolvable. These outstanding issues are the question of Chengte, the question of

⁸⁹ See memorandum by Colonel Caughey, January 26, p. 382.

North Kiangsu. The problem of civil governments was the great difficulty. General Marshall stated that he was disappointed that the conference consisting of Communists and National Government representatives had not been able to reach agreement regarding local civil governments. He pointed out that the North Kiangsu refugee problem apparently being balanced against total civil war. General Marshall indicated his regret that a solution to the problem lay so close at hand and yet, at the moment, it appeared that China was on a verge of a civil war.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

General Marshall to Mr. Walter S. Robertson, at Peiping

[NANKING,] 8 July 1946.

1077. Orders to National and Communist forces is subject. My 1062⁹⁰ refers. I have now gotten from General Yu Ta-wei a copy of the order issued by the National Government to its field commanders. That order follows:

“We have specially issued the following orders: If the Communist troops do not attack our force, then our troops will not attack the Communists troops. But should the Communist troops attack our troops, then our troops may take self defensive measures for the purpose of protecting lives and properties of the people and to maintain law and order. This order is being distributed and strict compliance by all units is required. It is also required that the date of receipt of this order be reported. Generalissimo Chiang.”

This order was first issued 1 June [*July*] to commanders in Manchuria and it was reiterated on 5 June [*July*] to all commanders in all of China. I have had a copy of this order forwarded to General Chou En-lai requesting that he immediately issue similar orders to all Communist commanders in all of China. Will keep you advised.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Memorandum by General Chou En-lai to General Marshall*⁹¹

FM 101

NANKING, July 8, 1946.

Recently the Yen-an broadcast and the official statements of the Chinese Communist Party not only voiced high dissatisfaction over the U. S. Government policy of extending military and financial assistance

⁹⁰ July 6, p. 1307.

⁹¹ Notation added at bottom: “Action: discussed verbally with General Chou in connection with 7 July Anti-American blast (see minutes of Chou meeting 11 July)”. For minutes, see p. 1340.

to the National Government which they believe amounts to encouraging the civil war waged by the Kuomintang, but further strongly protested against and criticized such a policy. Yet these protests and criticisms should in no way be interpreted as a Communist opposition to the American people and the U. S. Government as a whole. They are rather intended to urge the U. S. Government to reconsider seriously its present erroneous policy and to make the necessary rectification, so as to avoid any injury on the traditional Sino-American friendship.

I am fully aware that the Kuomintang Government is now exploiting these materials for provocative purpose. While they are manufacturing and notifying the U. S. Armed Forces authorities to the effect that the Communists are organizing anti-American movement and instigating the mob beating-up of American residents, they are further attempting to engineer such incidents and to shift the blame onto the Chinese Communist Party.

It is needless to say that all the fabricated informations of the Kuomintang regarding the Chinese Communist Party are just as groundless as their allegations of a Communist plot for armed uprising in the various cities. I believe that you are keen enough to discern the truth. Should any untoward incident still arise in a way depicted by the Kuomintang intelligence, then the responsibility for these incidents should rest solely with the Kuomintang Government.

May I therefore draw your careful attention to the foregoing, with the request that you will kindly inform the U. S. Embassy and the U. S. Armed Forces Headquarters to this effect.

[Signature in Chinese]
(CHOU EN-LAI)

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by Colonel J. Hart Caughey to General Marshall

[NANKING,] 9 July 1946.

Subject: Brief of Hankow Situation.

Mr. Robertson's 5127⁹² states that all available information concerning Hankow is contained in Opsum's 15, 17, 18, 19 and 23.

Opsum 15, 28 June

Hankow team 9 report 26 June. CCP⁹³ reported conflict 13 miles northeast of Ho Kou Chen (60 miles north of Hankow). Team 32 ordered to investigate.

⁹² July 8, p. 1323.

⁹³ Chinese Communist Party.

Opsum 17, 29 June

U. S. member team 32 report 28 June. CCP reported that NG⁹⁴ troops have occupied Pi Pio and Pan Chun Wan, just north east of Hankow and that NG troops are moving from Hankow and from Loshan towards Hsuan Hwa Tien. CCP further reported that NG troops attacked at 4 points on 28 June. U. S. member believes conflict will occur in Hsin Yang-Loshan area (about 75 miles north of Hankow).

Opsum 18, 30 June

U. S. member team 9 report 29 June. CCP troops are moving from eastern section of the central plain military area and are concentrating in the Hsin Yang-Loshan area. CCP have withdrawn headquarters and troops from Hsien Hwa Tien leaving one brigade in that place. NG reported that no attacks had been made but that NG positions have been reinforced.

Opsum 19, 1 July

U. S. members teams 9 and 32 report 30 June. NG troops are attacking Hsuan Hwa Tien from north and east and south 29 June. Conflict has broken out in many places in central plains military area. United States member team 9 (senior team) stated that he believes that CCP will attempt to break out in the central plains military area through the Hsin Yang-Loshan area. General Wang, chief of staff Wuhan headquarters of the Generalissimo, stated in a conference that he had ordered NG troops not to attack except in case of CCP attempt to break through in the Hsin Yang-Loshan area. The CCP has withdrawn many troops from the eastern section of the central plains military area and has moved troops to the Hsin Yang-Loshan area. The United States member believes that the CCP are creating the whole situation and that while both sides have failed to notify the teams of their troop movements the CCP are the aggressors in the current situation. Team 32 evacuated from Hsuan Hua Tien 29 June to Hankow because the position in Hsuan Hua Tien was untenable.

Opsum 23, 6 July

U. S. members teams 9 and 32 report 3 July. Information was received that CCP General Li, Commanding General, Central Military Plains region, plans to break through to the north, and that he has issued instructions to troops that they are needed in the north and that they fear annihilation if they stay in the central military plains region and he advised the troops to make an attempt to break through even if half of them died in the attempt. All attempts to contact General Li have failed.

⁹⁴ Nationalist Government.

Comment: The CCP branch, Executive Headquarters, is attempting to contact General Li through Yen-an. Teams 9 and 32 are investigating the report of conflict in the Hwayon-Hsin Yang areas.

J. H[ART] C[AUGHEY]

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270: Telegram

General Marshall to Mr. Walter S. Robertson, at Peiping

[NANKING,] 9 July 1946.

1079. I am now discussing the Shantung situation Reurad 5073⁹⁵ with General Yu Ta-wei on the Nationalist side and General Chou En-lai on the Communist side. Chou stated yesterday that in a message to General Chen Yi in Shantung he had instructed that as soon as the fighting had stopped and the agreements are signed then a meeting can take place. "Seeing that the fighting is now going on that plan has become a failure." I will continue effort to stop fighting and secure a meeting. It may be possible by supporting Clement and teams to exercise some influence on the situation.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Conference Between General Marshall and Mr. Tseng Chi, Representative of the Young China Party, at No. 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, July 9, 1946, 10 a. m.

Also present: Prof. Chou, Young China Party
Captain Soong

Mr. Tseng said that the setbacks in the present negotiations were to be expected, but it should not constitute discouragement of anyone in General Marshall's effort to mediate. He pointed out that with 5,000 years of history, the political affairs in China were bound to be complicated. He asked for General Marshall's reaction.

General Marshall replied that he did not care to make any comment now. He was sure that they were aware of the present situation as well as he was. However, both sides utilized a great wealth of propaganda which did not help the situation.

Mr. Tseng then said that negotiations were a long drawn out procedure but certain actions were needed and would no doubt prove more effective than mere talks. The Young China Party concurred with the statement made by President Truman and Secretary Byrnes regarding China.⁹⁶ It was hoped that this policy in helping

⁹⁵ July 7, p. 1308.

⁹⁶ For statement of the Secretary of State on December 7, 1945, see memorandum of December 9, 1945, *United States Relations With China*, p. 606; for President Truman's statement of December 15, see *ibid.*, p. 607.

China would be carried out completely by General Marshall irrespective of the outcome of the negotiations. Only through such a procedure, would China have a constitutional Democracy. In this respect, the Young China Party was different from the Communist Party in that the latter wanted U. S. help only after the establishment of Coalition Government.

Mr. Tseng then expressed his belief that in order to return political control to the people and in order to nationalize the Chinese Army, the Communist Party must make more concessions militarily, while the Kuomintang must make its concession chiefly in its political control. Many military agreements had been made but none were being carried out. He cited as an example the Army Reorganization Agreement. The postponement or delay in carrying out these agreements necessarily delayed the reorganization of the Government. Consequently, it weakened the Government position on one hand and strengthened the Communist Party on the other. This was evidenced by the Manifesto issued by Communist Party at Yen-an on 7 July. Mr. Tseng further explained that Kuomintang had been supported by the people for the past eight years and that it represented the people. Therefore, the help of the United States might give to the Government would actually be help to the Chinese people. The Communist Party's claim that it had a people's army and that it was supported by the Chinese people, was purely propaganda. The people of numerous localities once dominated by Communists and later evacuated by them were actually hateful toward Communists. Mr. Tseng reasoned that Chinese farmers were not property owning people and that they were not farm slaves like in Russia. Whatever Chinese farmers obtained from the land was divided between the landlords and the farmers. The land policy enforced by the Communist Party did not at all meet the approval of the people. Communism was not wanted.

Mr. Tseng said that the Young China Party was the third largest political party in China. There were over 100 political parties since the day of the Republic of China. But there were only three political parties qualified in accordance with two basic principles—over 20 years of history, and a nationwide organization. These three were Kuomintang, Communist Party and Young China Party. Mr. Tseng explained that Kuomintang represented the upper class of people, such as wealthy persons and high public officials. The Communist Party represented the lower class people—such as the productive industrial workers. The Young China Party represented the middle class of people—such as educated people and salary earning groups. The number of people in the upper and lower classes represented by the Kuomintang and Communist Party respectively were actually very small while the majority of the Chinese people fall into the

middle class. Consequently, both the Kuomintang and the Communist Party were not successful in China.

Mr. Tseng then reiterated that the Young China Party did not have an international background or motive as the Communist Party and that it did not possess an army. He further stated that it was the intention of the Young China Party to adopt a program of expansion in the near future in order to democratize China. He expressed desire for General Marshall to pay more attention to that party which he thought was very hopeful.

General Marshall then asked Mr. Tseng for his comments regarding the commonly expressed belief that the Democratic League was a tool of Communist Party and the Young China Party was a tool of Kuomintang. To this, Mr. Tseng replied that while Democratic League might be a tool of the Communist Party, the Young China Party was not a tool to Kuomintang. He cited numerous instances during the last PCC session when the Young China Party disagreed openly with the Kuomintang in many of the latter's proposals,—such as the system of the Government, the method of electing National Assembly Delegates, etc. But the Democratic League had agreed to all Communist Party's proposals in the PCC. Mr. Tseng then listed three special characteristics of the Young China Party; (1) It is independent Political Party; (2) It is a mediating group—non-extremist; and (3) It is a constructive political party.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

General Marshall to Mr. Walter S. Robertson, at Peiping

[NANKING,] 9 July 1946.

1084. Orders to field forces is subject, 1062 and 1077⁹⁷ refers. I learned from General Chou this afternoon that Chairman Mao reiterated June 7th orders to all Communist commanders in Manchuria and China on 1 July 1946.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Conference Between General Marshall, Dr. Wang, Mr. Shao, and General Chen at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 9, 1946, 3 p. m.

Also present: Capt. Soong

Mr. Shao clarified the Government's stand concerning its insistence that Communist troops withdraw from four areas—south of Chengte, Antung, along Tsingtao-Tsinan Railroad, and Northern Kiangsu. The reasons given were to eliminate a threat to the government and

⁹⁷ Telegrams of July 6 and 8, pp. 1307 and 1326, respectively.

to obtain better security. He stated that the Government did not demand that the Communist Party give up local administrative control as well as military control in all the areas to be vacated by Communist troops. Local administration problems in all such areas vacated by Communists other than the four specific areas mentioned above, will be discussed and solved by either PCC or by the Steering Committee of the PCC.

Dr. Wang supplemented Mr. Shao's remarks by adding that the overall problem of local administration will be settled by either the Steering Committee of PCC or by PCC itself; but the local administration problem in these four particular areas must be solved for the interim period before the permanent Cessation of Hostilities Order can be issued.

Mr. Shao then stated that the Communist threat to the Government in these four particular areas might be not only in the form of actual troop concentrations but also in the form of disguised troops which would continue to remain under the existing local administration. The reason why the Government was particularly insistent on the total evacuation of Northern Kiangsu by the Communists was that this area is close to Nanking and Shanghai. Through Communist activities in this area, two or three millions of refugees have been made homeless. This has a serious repercussion on the political affairs in this capital.

Mr. Shao further stated that General Chou considered the Government's demand to be excessive. However on the Government side, it is felt that the larger concession was made in favor of the Communist Party. It is true that the Government was authorized to take over sovereignty in Manchuria, both politically and militarily, but now that the Communists interfered, the Government had conceded a large area to them which is far greater than the four areas the Government had demanded from the Communists.

Mr. Shao gave another reason as to why the Government had to be insistent on Communist evacuation of Northern Kiangsu. That was at the beginning of the negotiations last year, the Communist Party promised to withdraw from eight areas in the first stage and two areas in the second stage. The two areas in the second stage were Northern Anhwei and Northern Kiangsu. In exchange for this, the Communist Party demanded certain governorships, vice governorships, mayoralties and vice mayoralties in different areas. Consequently, the Government felt that the Communist Party was ready to withdraw from Northern Kiangsu.

Mr. Shao further stated that General Chou clarified the Communist Party's stand reference the areas south of Chengte, Antung, and

along Tsingtao-Tsinan Railroad by his statement that they would not be too difficult to solve but the Communist Party cannot give up Northern Kiangsu entirely because they had been there for too long. Mr. Shao then said that regarding Northern Kiangsu, the Government made a similar proposal to that of General Chou's when he suggested the organization of a committee to supervise and protect refugees who wished to return home. This proposal was made on the assumption that the existing local administration in this area would be maintained. The Government proposal assumed total withdrawal by the Communists. The Government would assure the safe conduct of Communist personnel to carry out the three People's Principles,⁹⁸ and to continue the present land system. However, after three conferences, no agreement was reached.

On 6 July, the conference was adjourned without setting a date for further negotiation, but it was agreed that the Government Representatives would report the results to the Generalissimo while General Chou would make his report to Yen-an. Mr. Shao and Dr. Wang saw the Generalissimo that night but no further instructions were given to them. The Generalissimo merely stated that he would want a little time to consider the situation.

Mr. Shao said that he had learned from the minutes of yesterday's conference between General Chou and General Marshall that General Chou hinted the lack of sincere intention on the part of the Generalissimo to conduct further negotiations through the medium of this committee. This was not true. Government representatives had just received instructions from the Generalissimo to carry on further negotiations with the Communist Party. However, it was not yet decided as to how these future negotiations would be conducted.

Dr. Wang supplemented that they had seen the Generalissimo this noon and suggested to him that the effort in securing peace by negotiations should be continued. To this, the Generalissimo agreed. Dr. Wang further stated that if the Communist Party could make further concessions, then they would also urge the Generalissimo to concede further. Dr. Wang then asked for General Marshall's comment.

General Marshall stated that he was very glad to hear that the Generalissimo would allow the Five man Conference to continue but that he was in no position to mediate these political problems inasmuch as he knew so little about conditions. However, in this particular situation, it was most important to find a solution, to settle the problem of local administration which was the only serious prob-

⁹⁸ Sun Yat-sen's *San Min Chu I*.

lem now standing in the way of final issuance of the Cessation of Hostilities Order. General Marshall feared that the fighting might spread rapidly. He was intensely interested in obtaining a temporary arrangement which would settle the local administration issue in order that fights and conflicts could be stopped by the issuance of the Cessation of Hostilities Order.

General Marshall then commented that the original proposals to be made by the Government to the Communist Party in Manchuria were not in his opinion a workable basis for negotiation. The Generalissimo had therefore made some alterations in his proposals for that area with the proviso that the Communist Party would vacate in North China Jehol, Chahar, Weihaiwei and Chefoo. All this before the matter was taken up with the Communists.

General Marshall also pointed out that under the Agreement of February 25, at the end of 12 months, one Communist Army would have been in Central China; and at the end of 18 months, 2 divisions would remain there, although no specific locations were designated. But now the situation had totally changed. All the changes tended to indicate that neither side, as a rule, took into consideration the fears of the other side. Contrary to the Government's belief, General Marshall thought that the Communist Party was intensely anxious to obtain a temporary arrangement which would permit the Order of Cessation of Hostilities to be issued immediately.

General Marshall had learned through Dr. Lo ⁹⁹ that General Chou may not have entered into the recent conferences whole-heartedly because he was embarrassed once trying to find a temporary arrangement which would settle the local administration problem because of the party fear that the Government's intention was to abandon the PCC entirely. In view of this situation, General Marshall thought one approach to the problem might be to assure the meeting of PCC or the Steering Committee of the PCC at a specified time in the near future to discuss the problem of local government. This would provide some assurance for General Chou which should enable him to go ahead with the four specific areas on a temporary basis.

General Marshall then reiterated that the fears, suspicions and mutual distrust on both sides caused a continued repetition of acts of retaliation. These wrongful acts had made negotiations here extremely difficult and had carried China to the verge of total civil war. General Marshall summed up by saying that we had reached agreements on Cessation of Hostilities, the Restoration of Communications, and authority of American members to settle disagreements among team members. The only question which remained unsolved was the Local Administration issue. He expressed regret that he

⁹⁹ Lo Lung-chi, leading member of the Democratic League.

could not propose a compromise measure, but the problem must be solved very soon or else China would have a chaotic situation.

Dr. Wang gave three points on the reopening of PCC. First, the Communist Party wanted to solve the present problem its way and its insistence on the PCC was merely intended to please the Democratic League. Secondly, the Democratic League and minority groups hoped for reopening of PCC for their own advantage. Thirdly, if no agreement could be reached on the present situation, then the reopening of PCC would only further complicate the matter. Dr. Wang asked if the Government representatives could be made responsible for additional concessions on the Northern Kiangsu issue, and if the Communist Party would make further concessions in the areas south of Chengte, Antung, and along the Tsingtao-Tsinan railroad. He had not decided as to what proposals they would make to General Chou.

General Marshall then outlined to them a suggestion he had previously made to General Chou concerning the evacuations of Communist troops from Northern Kiangsu and Chengte areas.

General Chen Cheng pointed out to General Marshall that it was absolutely necessary to have the Communist troops moved to the area north of the Lunghai railroad and he asked General Marshall to pay specific attention to this point.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

General Marshall to Mr. Walter S. Robertson, at Peiping

[NANKING,] 9 July 1946.

1087. Following is order supposedly put out by Generalissimo on 1 July. 1062, 1077 and 1084¹ refer. It should not be shown to Communists due to its bitter approach to the problem. It was issued to all commanders of Field Headquarters, Pacification Bureaus, War Areas, Pacification Areas, Garrison Commands, Army Groups, Armies and General Cheng Kai-ming.² Order follows:

“Our Government has been extremely patient, disregarding the great injustice done to itself and conceded time and again, for the purpose of obtaining peace. But up to date, no successful solution is being reached on any problem. Now, for sake of urging the Communist Party to repent itself, so as to reach basis for reaching agreement and establishing peace and unity, the following stipulations are made: If Communist troops do not attack our forces, then our troops will not attack the Communist forces. Should the Communist troops advance against our forces, then our troops, for sake of self

¹ Telegrams of July 6, 8 and 9, pp. 1307, 1326 and 1331, respectively.

² National Government Commissioner of Executive Headquarters at Peiping.

defense, protecting lives and properties of the people, and to keep local law and order will concentrate their strength and counter attack them,—so as to do the duties of we soldiers. This order is being distributed and strict compliance by all units is requested. Also date of receipt of this order will be reported. Signed Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, dated 1 July 1946.”

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Mr. Walter S. Robertson to General Marshall

PEIPING, 10 July 1946.

5219. Reference General Clement—Chinese Commanders Conference tentatively scheduled for 13 July at Tsingtao, National Government Commissioner here informed me that General Wang Yao-wu would not be able to attend due to illness. Major General Yu Hsueh-chung, Chief of Staff, Hsuechow Pacification Bureau, under General Hsueh Yueh, Commander of Hsuechow area, has been designated by National Government Commissioner as representative for both General Hsueh and General Wang. General Wang is under General Hsueh's command.

In order that negotiations could be carried on at same high level on both sides I proposed that General Hsueh attend with General Wang's Chief of Staff as assistant. National Government Commissioner stated that other duties would probably prevent General Hsueh's attending [apparent garble] arranged but suggested that question be taken up with National Government representative on Committee of Three.

Without National Government Commander, most unlikely General Chen Yi will consent to attend personally.

As is evident National Government Commissioner is not going to exert pressure to insure General Hsueh's attendance I suggest that you do so. Account time element and airlift arrangement would appreciate your urgent advice.

Marshall Mission Files : Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by Colonel J. Hart Caughey to General Marshall

[NANKING,] 10 July 1946.

Colonel Hodgskin and Lieutenant Colonel White³ came in at about 2:30 with the following statement and recommendation. The main Communist strength which broke out of the Hankow pocket appears to be in the vicinity of Tsaowang and Sui-hsien.

³ Howell L. Hodgskin and Van R. White, American members of field teams operating north of Hankow.

In order to contact the commanders of these forces, preferably General Li, Colonel Hodgskin recommends that two teams (Team No. 32 and a sub-team of Team No. 9, together with necessary light radio equipment) go by air to Laohokow or Hsiangyang, where there are reported landing fields, with the object of establishing a field headquarters. From this field headquarters the two teams would proceed, one to the vicinity of Tsaowang and the other to the vicinity of Suihsien, for the purpose of contacting the forces and attempting to arrive at some sort of agreement to stop further advances.

In this connection Colonel Hodgskin asked me how they should proceed with reference to any agreement reached. I recommended that an interim arrangement be reached pending final settlement (this is the same sort of instructions previously given to General Clement in Shantung province and approved by you). I believe this is the appropriate course of action in this case also since,

1. General Li could hardly be expected to retrace his steps into the Hankow pocket, and

2. So far the National Government has obstructed Communist recommendations to move Communist forces north.

Colonel Hodgskin stated that if they could contact the forces and if they could get General Li to halt his northern advance that team action in the rear of the Communist would preclude pursuit on the part of the Nationalist forces. He added, however, that he did not believe the Nationalist forces would pursue the Communist forces but rather intended to let the Communists walk into a wall of National resistance further northward.

Colonel Hodgskin believed there would be no difficulty among team members for this relocation. He further stated that Executive Headquarters would have no objection since the localities to be visited are in the areas already assigned to the two teams, and besides there would remain at Hankow the heavy radio station for adequate communication. There are two elements that require further exploration,

1. Approval from General McConnell⁴ to let Colonel Graves, Air Force Liaison Officer at Hankow, fly the teams in (there will be no difficulty in this respect), and

2. Obtain National Government clearance for the teams to land at either Laohokow or Hsiangyang (Colonel Hodgskin believes he can get this clearance from the local commander and if not will refer the matter to you).

Colonel Hodgskin's alternate recommendation is to move the teams up against the Yellow River in the vicinity possibly of Loyang and Lingpao. This recommendation, however, is to be adopted only in

⁴ Maj. Gen. John P. McConnell, Commanding General, Air Division, Nanking Headquarters Command.

the event you disapprove their primary recommendation or they are unsuccessful in halting the northward advance from locations selected in the primary recommendation. In the event this alternate recommendation is resorted to Colonel Hodgskin believes it will be necessary for him and Colonel White to proceed first to Peiping for instructions and then to the vicinity of Anyang or Hsin-Hsiang, where teams 19 and 10, respectively, are located in order to become familiar with the local situation.⁵

J. H[ART] C[AUGHEY]

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270: Telegram

General Marshall to Mr. Walter S. Robertson, at Peiping

[NANKING,] 11 July 1946.

1096. I have sent a letter⁶ this morning to General Yu Ta-wei in which I gave him generally the situation as outlined in first paragraph of your 5219.⁷ My second paragraph stated "in order that negotiations can be carried out at the same high level on both sides, and in order to preclude General Chen Yi, the Communist commander, from dropping out all together, I suggest that you instruct the National Government Commissioner to send General Hsueh with General Wang, Chief of Staff, as assistant."

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Yu Ta-wei at No. 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, July 11, 1946, 9 a. m.

Also present: Colonel Caughey

General Yu Ta Wei displayed a map showing Communist dispositions and recent movements north of the Lunghai railroad, in Kiangsu province north of the Yangtze River near Nanking, in Honan province and in Shantung province. General Yu Ta Wei said, "the Communist[s] are attacking everywhere."

General Marshall stated that the situation appeared critical, but that the answer to the immediate problem lies in obtaining results from the special conference of Government and Communist representatives, which is supposed to be solving the civil administration problem. General Marshall elaborated on this by stating that it might be profitable to approach the problem by establishing, say three, groups to serve in key areas of Kiangsu province; these groups

⁵ General Marshall approved the primary recommendation.

⁶ OSE 281, July 11, not printed.

⁷ July 10, p. 1336.

might consist of three members, a National representative, a Communist representative and an American civilian representative. They would in effect act as a Court of Appeal to rule on equitable distribution of property and to prevent violation of agreements reached for control of the civil administration. General Marshall added that some solution with reference to civil administration is immediately necessary in order to tie together the present military situation. General Yu Ta Wei stated that the Communist Party wants power, and if they get any additional power, such as civil administrative power, they will tend to wage greater civil war. To this General Marshall replied that, on that basis, the Government might as well go to complete civil war today. General Marshall lamented the fact that the conference between Nationalist and Communist representatives failed to come to any sort of a solution with respect to this problem. General Marshall then told General Yu Ta Wei that he had spoken to Dr. Lo Lung-chih of the Democratic League, who had told him (General Marshall) that the Communist Party was also unwilling to make concessions in this conference because it would prefer to have the PCC reconvened so that the PCC could resolve this matter. General Marshall added that failure to reach a solution, even if on a temporary basis, at this time would inevitably lead to civil war. General Marshall added also that on the Government side it appeared that the Generalissimo had consented to participation in a conference of this sort to please him (General Marshall) but at the same time had issued instructions to the Nationalist conferees to assume an unbending attitude in the conference.

General Yu Ta Wei asked General Marshall what the American team members from Hankow had said. General Marshall informed General Yu Ta Wei that the American team members said that both sides were at fault. On the one hand the Nationalist forces had been reinforced considerably around the Communist area and on the other hand the Communist[s], being surrounded and pressed, had filtered out large numbers of men, and had finally carried out their plans for a break through. General Marshall reminded General Yu Ta Wei of the intercepted order, a copy⁸ of which he had previously given to General Yu, which indicated that the National Government had conceived and apparently launched a very definite attack against the surrounded Communist forces. In this connection General Marshall said that the American team members confirmed the fact that such orders were believed to be in existence.

Returning to the conference between National and Communist representatives, General Yu stated that Dr. Wang had told General

⁸ See memorandum from General Marshall to General Yu Ta-wei, June 28, p. 1242.

Chou En-lai that he (Dr. Wang) would hold another conference to resolve the civil administration problem if General Chou so desired. General Yu also said that he had asked Dr. Wang why the matter could not be referred to PCC, to which Dr. Wang had replied that it could not because it would require a unanimous vote. (Implying that the National representatives would not agree.) General Marshall stated that Dr. Wang had also told him the same thing but that he (General Marshall) was of the opinion that some sort of a special ruling could be made to take care of the situation. Dr. Wang told General Marshall that he wanted to deal with the Communist[s] direct on this question.

General Yu told General Marshall that the Generalissimo had cancelled his trip to Shanghai for the purpose of staying in Nanking to hear General Marshall's views on the solution of this problem. General Marshall stated that he had no specific views on the matter, other than already presented, but that he would be glad to discuss the entire question with the Generalissimo at the latter's convenience.

General Yu stated that he would attempt to get for General Marshall an appointment with the Generalissimo the following day.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai at No. 5 Ning Hai Road, July 11, 1946, 10:30 a. m.

Also present: Mr. Chang
Colonel Caughey
Captain Soong

GENERAL MARSHALL: I would like to speak first about the teams that came down from north of Hankow. My desire was to bring in the American team members to get their opinion of the situation. I suggested that the Communist and the National Government members could come down by the same plane if they cared to do so. General Chou desired to have the Communist team members report to Nanking. The National Government did not desire to have their team members come in. However, the instructions to the American team members that were sent from Peiping misled them into feeling that this was a team movement and that therefore both the Communists and Government members should accompany the American members to Nanking. When Colonel Hutchin arrived at Hankow the American members were at the air field ready to leave but the others were not. He went into the city and got in touch with the other people, and they all came, the Government members through

a complete misunderstanding, the purpose of my invitation not having been made clear.

This morning the American team members notified the office here that the National members had stated that they felt they should be present when I talked to the Communist members. The fact of the matter was I had no intention of discussing the matter with the Communist members, reserving my discussion entirely to General Chou. Also I learned from General Yu Ta Wei this morning that he, representing the Government side of the Committee of Three, did not wish to have a meeting of the team members with the Committee. I had not proposed it because the Government members arrived here through the action of my people without reference to the Government. Therefore, I did not feel that I should next propose team meetings with the Committee of Three. I contented myself with a lengthy discussion with the American members and then had them draw up for me their recommendations, which I will presently read to General Chou.

First, I wish to say that the impression I got from the American members is that both sides are at fault in the development of the present situation. The Communist[s] were in a very critical position. The Government forces had been reenforced. The filtering out movement of Communists in small groups had been almost continuous. The strengthening of the Government position had also been continuous and the result was almost a foregone conclusion. I myself felt that the situation was so critical that it was well-nigh impossible to keep it in balance. I also thought, after listening to the Americans, that the situation was so indefinite at the present time that specific instructions could not be given from here unless there was a Government agreement to the evacuation of the Communist forces to the north or concentration in some other nearby area. Lacking that basis, the American team members recommended that Team No. 32 and a part of Team No. 9, with the necessary light radio equipment, be sent by air to Laohokow or Hsiangyang, where there are supposed to be landing fields, and that they there establish a field headquarters for themselves. From that headquarters one team would go to the vicinity of Tsao-yang and the other to the vicinity of Sui-hsien. Their first problem would be to regain touch with the Communist commanders, and endeavor to secure General Li's agreement to halting his northern advance and also to secure Government agreement not to move forward in pursuit. They selected those places based on the best available information which indicated that those were the localities where they might best regain touch with the situation.

I saw no immediate probability of securing a new agreement here, I therefore felt the best thing, so far as the Americans were concerned, was to endeavor to regain contact, see what local arrangements might be made and then report to Peiping, or here, or both. The local arrangements would depend upon whatever would appear to be the best adjustment in the light of the actual situation and the attitude of the respective commanders. I had no other proposal to make and therefore authorized them to return today, leaving at 1:00 o'clock. I am referring solely to the American members, though of course transportation for the National and Communist members was also available.

GENERAL CHOU: I can almost entirely agree with your views. I have but the following to add, which I arrived at after my conversation with the Communist team representatives and which I would like to mention as an explanation. Since the last time we came back from Hankow in May the Government has constantly sent reinforcements to the border of the Communist area to the east of the railroad line, and as you just said the American members also have this impression. As to the two Communist areas to the west of the railroad line at the border of Honan and Hupeh, in May when we were there we already had heard about two conflicts, which were investigated. Second, the Government team representative said that that area was under the jurisdiction of General Liu in Honan and therefore the Government representative was not responsible for that area. This is of course not sensible because, as the Government representative, he should have the full authorization to deal with the whole matter. But anyhow the team negotiated directly with the headquarters in Hsuechow for over a month in order to coordinate the matter, and this caused much delay in the operation of the field teams. Part of the team returned to Hankow only when the latest incident occurred. By that time the Communist area to the west of the railroad line was almost completely crushed. This is one of the direct factors which caused resentment among the Communist troops. The Communist troops in Hankow captured an order issued by the Government on June 22nd which directed an annihilation attack on the Communist troops. This seems to correspond to actual fact because the original 15-days armistice was to have expired on June 22nd and it is very logical that the Government should have made preparations for open attack and that this order only reached the field army units on June 22nd. Later on we agreed to an extension of the armistice here in Nanking, which of course reached the field army units later than June 22nd. The Communist troops captured this order of attack between the time of June 22nd and June 26th, which caused much alarm among them.

At the same time during the 8-day extension of the armistice the Government side continued their preparations and reenforced troops and took up positions at strategical points, and fighting therefore took place at many points. One of those was witnessed by Field Team No. 32 at Hokou.

As the Government was reenforcing and advancing, the Communists also moved troops but these were small units and only in the Communist areas. As I was told by Colonel White, as well as the Communist members, it seems that on about June 29th General Li, then in Hsinyang, finally arrived at his decision to force an exit and that the main force of the Communist forces crossed the railway on June 30th and July 1st.

Due to communication difficulties, it was only on 26 June that the field team sent a wire to Peiping informing it of the hostilities at Hokou and the Government order of attack on 22 June. This message was relayed to me on 28 June. A second report was dispatched by the Hopei Communists on 2 July after the main force had crossed the railroad. By that time they were in a more or less safe position and therefore they installed the radio equipment and sent the message. Based on that message that I furnished a second memorandum to you indicating that I received some information on the situation. Those troops reported as to where the Government troops advanced on the eastern side of the railroad and what Government army units were pursuing them to the west of the railroad. It was further reported that a part of the Communist troops were still left in the eastern section. The Government team members said that that unit was either at Ma-ching or Shang-cheng. I have no way to determine the true facts. Also, a considerable part of the Communist civil officials and local troops, such as Peace Preservation Corps, are still left on the eastern side of the railroad and their present whereabouts and status are completely unknown. The whole area now has been penetrated by the Government troops since 2 July. The main force of the Communist forces seem to be marching on in the night, resting in the daytime, so they have no way to install their radio communication. They could not establish further contact with the Hankow radio station of the Communist field team branch because, as you know, that radio station has been seized by the Government side for over 20 hours. In addition the Communist forces no longer trust that station because they are afraid the code has been taken over by the Government side. Therefore, they would only establish radio contact with Peiping. Our Hankow team can only radio Peiping in "the clear" because Peiping is not sure whether or not the code is still safe. When the Communist members came here I made some arrangements for new

codes for them. Right now, however, there is no way to determine the true status of the Communist forces.

As to what measures we should adopt, I fully agree with the suggestion you have just made. I have no special comments to make but I wish to point out that unless the Government promises to stop pursuing and attacking those Communists and permit them to go to the north, it would be impossible for the Communist forces to feel assured of their safety. It is quite certain that the Communist forces would not march through big towns because it takes too much time to enter those places. While they are being pursued it is too much to their disadvantage and therefore they will only go to those places where there are few Government troops, that is, further westward. I have no intention of asking the Government to demarcate a new area for the Communist forces. The Government does not have many troops to the west and the Communists have operated in the area along the border of Shansi and Szechwan in earlier days. Therefore they know the terrain of that area very well.

I also learned, I do not know whether or not it is true, that the Generalissimo went to Chungking yesterday. I am afraid he is going there to make preparations.

GENERAL MARSHALL: The Generalissimo is in Nanking today. He was going to Shanghai but that was cancelled.

GENERAL CHOU: I have no intention of raising new demarcation areas for Communists, rather I would like to secure a Government promise to let Communist troops go to the North.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Any particular place?

GENERAL CHOU: I would leave to the Government to say what particular point is most suitable. I see no way that they can be assigned a new area south of the Yellow River.

The first question which arises is that we must not only secure a temporary agreement with General Chen Chien in Hankow but also General Liu Chih at Honan because the movement of the troops will affect the Honan area also, and without the agreement of the Honan Governor General much delay and trouble would be caused.

The second question is regarding the Communist forces that remain to the east of the railroad. Their present status is still obscure and we never had contact with their small radio station. In fact I am not sure whether they have small radios. I hope that field team #9 will make investigation. The two American team members have been very enthusiastic and working hard on this matter and I feel very grateful for their efforts. They also promised that they will try to establish contact with the remaining Communists. Since the present situation with regard to the Communists in the eastern part is entirely unknown to me I have no particular suggestion to make

at this moment. The Communist team representative will go back with the two American members today. According to my representative's report at the time when the Communist forces were just crossing the river line the American representative suggested that the field team go immediately to the spot and establish contact. My people fully supported that suggestion but the Government side declined so the team did not go. Anyway, the Communist team members promised to cooperate to the fullest with the American members.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I had a lengthy discussion day before yesterday with Doctor Wang, Mr. Shao and the Chief of Staff,⁹ during which they gave me their point of view as to the discussions they had with General Chou. I was told at this meeting that in all probability they would take up with General Chou some further meeting in an endeavor to find some basis of agreement. I have heard nothing further in the matter. Has another meeting been arranged?

GENERAL CHOU: We met each other again yesterday and had a two hours' talk with no result. Fundamentally the Government representatives cannot alter the essence of the Generalissimo's directive regarding the civil administration of those four areas—North Kiangsu, Tsingtao-Tsinan railroad, part south of Chengte, and Antung. They can only adopt a procedure which tackles those four places one by one. Regarding the taking over of the civil administration, they merely promised that while taking over they would take into consideration the Communist Party agencies. Such a basis was not acceptable to me. I proposed that perhaps we should have a general discussion on the civil administration of all the Communist areas so that when we are discussing the local civil administration in those four places we would also reach an overall solution for all areas. They say that the problem of the other areas can only be taken up after the reorganization of the National Government. This is to say that while the Communists are to turn over the local administration of those four areas, no security or no definite status is given to the other Communist areas. I stated that while I may consider a further reduction of Communist forces stationed in those areas, I cannot accept a complete withdrawal of the Communist forces and Communist administration. Therefore no agreement could be reached. At this juncture, Dr. Wang asked whether the whole question should be referred back to General Marshall. I replied, "If there is no other way out, that seems the only appropriate procedure."

When parting, we promised that we would make further efforts

⁹ General Chen Cheng.

today and tomorrow. If still no conclusion could be arrived at, we would make a decision tomorrow as to whether or not it will be referred back to you. I also told them that I presumed you would first settle the military question. I had reference to the question which has a bearing on the army reorganization, on the distribution of troops, etc., and try to get the signing of the special agreement.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I would like to discuss in a very general way the current events which are endangering the possibility of successful negotiation. The problem, as usual, is one of the serious effects of the Chinese procedure of retaliations. I have frequently presented to the Government the view that it was wrong to continue the campaign along the Tsingtao-Tsinan railroad, particularly as [it] involved places which had not been occupied by the Communists after 7 June. I stated that I thought it probably would have been possible very quickly to get an agreement to evacuate those places that were occupied since 7 June rather than have a campaign of attacks in order to recapture them. I have no accurate information as to whether or not the military operations along the railroad have been slowed up or discontinued. Meanwhile the Government brought to my attention this morning the threatening movements of Communist troops to the west of the Grand Canal and not very far north of Nanking, also against the Tsingtao railroad from the north, and from the south. The Government referred to the Tatung situation but I did not see any report of renewed Communist troop movements in that region. Also, Communist troops are operating against the Tsinan-Pukow railroad between Tehsien and Changhsien.

Then, also, we had the release of the Communist Yen-an statement of 7 July, regarding which General Chou sent me a memo on 8 July which I have here. Now, I have avoided any comments regarding propaganda statements from Yen-an, and regarding the Government statements in Nanking. I use the word "propaganda" because in my opinion this was pure propaganda. I regard propaganda as inevitable but I had not intended to comment to General Chou regarding this incident until the receipt of his memorandum, and I debated even then whether or not I would make any reply to him. However, the coincidence of events has caused me to reconsider the matter this morning, and I have this to say: This statement from Yen-an comes at the same time as propaganda releases from Moscow, along the same line, are made public. That fact alone does not help me in my efforts at negotiation with the National Government. But, what is much more important in regard to my negotiations and my understanding with General Chou, is this factor; the Yen-an release makes an aggressive, really a bitter, attack on Americans and

American policy. It asserts an American imperialistic intention regarding China—which it violently denounces. It is difficult for me to characterize that procedure. It is very much like disputing a man who says “night is day.” What is one going to say? This is a routine example of Communistic propaganda, whether in Europe or in the Far East, and I accept it as such. In other words, it is a technique that is followed regardless of the facts.

But now to the more personal aspect of this matter. In the first place, as I have already explained very carefully and very frankly to General Chou, since the President’s public statement of policy regarding China last December, I have received no other instructions from the American Government. That is a fact. That is not propaganda. Therefore, if this release is correct in its statement, then I am the “reactionary party.” I am the guilty party in all of these matters since early December. I would like General Chou to tell Yen-an that I am the so-called “reactionary party” according to their release. Nobody else can be charged with this but me, personally.

The other more serious aspect is the fact that this bitter, anti-American attack deliberately leads to violent reactions against my officers and Americans generally. I mentioned one day to General Chou that the American field team member at Chengte had given me a report on the situation and recommended the immediate withdrawal of the Americans in the region of Chengte. Later, the same American stated that within 24 hours there had been a change of attitude and he then recommended that the Americans continue in their efforts in that locality. Now he reports that his bedroom was invaded by a group of Communists who told him to get out and cautioned him that he could not go abroad without danger to his life. But the more important fact was that no agency of the Communist governmental administration in that vicinity took any measures to prevent this violation of his quarters. They simply disappeared from the scene. Now, this hostility is being developed on every hand against my officers and men, whose sole effort is to find some way to bring hostilities to an end. What is said, particularly of a bitter nature, is very difficult to unsay, and just how the Communist Party expects me to help them in an effort to secure a cessation of hostilities is beyond my comprehension. I have made no statement to the American people. I read the violent attacks on American policy in the *Daily Worker* in New York, which of course seized on this recent propaganda to exploit for its purpose. I don’t want to be involved in the necessity of a public statement but it is useless to expect that I can serve any useful purpose towards terminating hostilities with this type of propaganda being carried on. In all probability it was the

opinion of those who drafted this paper that it would produce a helpful result in the United States. If a "helpful result" means a precipitation of a chaotic condition in China, then probably they are correct. But the responsibility for the chaotic condition will be very clearly placed by any more of that procedure.

I would like to repeat again this aspect, which I previously explained very clearly to General Chou, that I and I alone have dictated what was being done out here by the U. S. since December, so they have attacked me direct. If the procedure has been wrong, then I am the person who has done that wrong, and not a group of reactionaries in the United States.

I wish to assure you, General Chou, that I have spoken with complete frankness so that there will be no doubt as to my own view of the matter. I wish to assure you that I will go ahead in the effort to secure a successful conclusion of these negotiations and the issue of the cease fire order without any regard to this matter I have just discussed. I feel certain you will proceed in the same manner. To use an American expression, "that is water over the dam."

GENERAL CHOU: I appreciate the frank manner in which you have given me your reaction to that statement. I would like very much to have another chance to talk to you tomorrow in regard to this matter. But I share the conclusion you just reached and the last part of what you said. Yesterday I learned of the nomination of Dr. Leighton Stuart as American Ambassador, and that certainly gives a good impression to the Chinese people. I feel sure you did much in making this recommendation to the U. S. Government.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270: Telegram

*General Marshall to President Truman*¹⁰

[NANKING,] July 11, 1946.

1100. DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Since my last message there have been a series of meetings between the government group headed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Chou En Lai and associates. Meetings were unproductive and ceased last Saturday. I succeeded in having them renewed but the meetings still are unproductive. A final effort of this group to find a solution will be made tomorrow.

The issue to be decided before the government is willing to issue the already agreed upon instructions for formal complete termination of hostilities is the question of local governments in regions from which the Communist have agreed to evacuate their military forces.

¹⁰ Copy transmitted on July 11 by the War Department to the Secretary of State.

The problem primarily involves (a) the handling of land taken from landlords, now refugees, some 1 to 8 years ago, redistributed to peasants, (b) the immediate treatment to be accorded to returning refugees, and (c) the character of the local militia to be maintained. The military phases have been pretty well settled. It is the related civil problems that now has me blocked.

I conferred with government member of Committee of Three this morning, also for 2 hours with Chou En Lai. This evening I spent an hour and a half with Generalissimo. Here is his present attitude:

When efforts to reach agreements are completely blocked it is well to wait awhile and usually a solution will be found. He assured me that his leaders in Manchuria would not resume aggressive fighting, that "he had them well in hand". He felt that fighting in China would be isolated and sporadic and would not lead to general civil war. I had stated that a continuation of the present situation appeared impossible, that general fighting would surely develop and that I will soon have to call in American forces from the field. If such a procedure as he outlined is workable it is purely Chinese. But I suppose I will have to accept the possibilities and do my best to keep things in balance. Incidentally, in this precarious situation Doctor Leighton Stuart's services would be of great assistance to me here in Nanking but I hesitate to bring him here from Peiping until his status is assured. Therefore I would be exceedingly thankful for early Senate action to confirm him. Every hour counts. I do appreciate your acceptance of my proposal for his appointment.

G. C. MARSHALL

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in China (Smyth) to General Marshall

[NANKING,] July 12, 1946.

With regard to Colonel Hutchin's call yesterday morning and his question with regard to Article 7 of a proposed agreement¹¹ between the KMT and the Communists, it seems to the Embassy that problems of local administration created if and when Communist forces withdraw from areas they now occupy offer an excellent opportunity to test concretely the good faith of both sides with regard to the overall question of governmental reform.

In making suggestions herein, the Embassy is limited by lack of specific knowledge of the size of the areas and the number of people

¹¹ See draft of preliminary agreement prepared by General Marshall, June 29, p. 1246.

involved. However, it is suggested that consideration might be given the following procedure:

(1) That the Government declare any disputed zone a "special administrative area" and permit local governments already established to continue to function (pending elections mentioned below) under a "special administrative areas commission" to be appointed by the Government on nomination by the Steering Committee of the Political Consultation Conference.

This "commission" should be as non-partisan as possible. However, under present conditions it would be practically impossible to obtain the services of capable, qualified non-partisan Chinese because of their fear of party reprisals. Therefore, it would probably be necessary to adopt a system such as that already worked out for Executive Headquarters and truce teams.

(2) That the National Government request the United Nations Organization to supervise elections in the disputed areas, or, alternately, request supervision by the United States, or by several powers similar to the Greek precedent.

In any event, the "commission" would be merely a stop-gap pending the holding of elections in disputed areas. On the one hand, we would be able to determine whether or not the Communists have established themselves in certain areas through popular support of the agrarian population or by force and fear. On the other hand, we would be able to determine whether or not the present Central Government is really interested in the over-all question of governmental reform and whether or not it is really interested in its oft-repeated desire to "return the Government to the people".

At first glance, the above suggested solution may seem overly optimistic and unrealistic. However, in an agrarian society such as that with which we are dealing in China, local governments are the most important units in the ruling system. For millions of people the district (hsien) magistrate is the only official of whom there is any knowledge or with whom there is any contact, and his character and integrity in the long run greatly affects the national scene. Furthermore, no high level of education is necessary in order to carry out a free election which, in the situation here contemplated, would merely constitute differentiation between right and wrong.

The use of the services of the United Nations Organization would be in complete accord with repeated policy statements of the United States that we are in favor of international cooperation through the medium of the Organization.

ROBERT L. SMYTH

[Annex]

[NANKING,] July 12, 1946.

There is set forth below a suggested procedure for the "refugee" problem in disputed areas. It is assumed that the "refugees" are

largely land holders dispossessed and driven out for some reason by either the Government or the Communists:

(1) The Government and the Communists agree to permit the free return to their original place of residence of any persons willing to return.

(2) A "special administrative areas commission" shall depute parties to investigate the land policy of local administrations and determine the equity or inequity of any dispossessions carried out thereunder.

(3) The investigatory parties shall be authorized to determine the feasibility of the return of land to dispossessed owners. In the event it is not feasible to return such land, an equitable cash settlement shall be determined by the "commission".

(4) In addition, the investigatory parties shall report to the "commission" wherein any land policy enforced by any local administration is contrary to the laws promulgated by the Chinese National Land Administration.

This procedure would be at best but an inadequate stop-gap. **The** fundamental problems of China stem from her position as an **agrarian** nation with an overwhelming pressure of population on the **land**. Reduced to its essentials, the real basis of conflict between the **Kuo-mintang** Government and the Communists is the question of land tenure, land taxation and landlord-tenant relationships. Until this basic problem is attacked energetically and realistically by a national government, there is little likelihood that any program for the political and economic rehabilitation of the country can succeed.

At the present time the most important consideration is not the further enunciation of laudable principles or the promulgation of model laws, but the actual initiation, on however humble a scale, of land reform in specific areas.

The land problem in China is so vast that it must be attacked by stages and machinery must be created for the purpose. An important forward step would be the granting of authority to some such body as the "commission" referred to in the basic memorandum to determine equitable rents, revise oppressive contracts between landlords and tenants, initiate a policy of compulsory sale of excessive land holdings to the Government for resale on credit terms to small holders, and such other steps appropriate to the special needs of any given area. Such a program might be furthered by the use of both Chinese and foreign talent which is immediately available; in this connection, the suggestion is made that the "Executive Headquarters" concept might well be applied on a civilian level to the land problem—specifically Professor J. Lossing Buck, an American now in Nanking with the American Agricultural Mission, would be well qualified to serve as American land commissioner.

In any approach to the problem, however, one is faced with the hard fact of a central government which is a coalition of landlords and militarists with tremendous vested interests in the *status quo*.

ROBERT L. SMYTH

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270: Telegram

Mr. Walter S. Robertson to General Marshall

[PEIPING,] 12 July 1946.

5316. Efforts to obtain meeting between Shantung commanders at Tsingtao have suffered another setback. At first it appeared Chen Yi's consent could be obtained but that General Wang was dragging his feet. On July 10 we were advised by National Government Commissioner that Wang was ill and would be unable to attend (refer 5219¹²). Today, apparently in response to your action (refer 1096¹³) we were informed by Government Commissioner that General Wang had recovered from his illness and would attend as scheduled. Haskell,¹⁴ acting director of operations, left for Tsingtao this morning to brief Clement for meeting. We are now just in receipt of message from Clement stating he had received communication from Chairman Li Yu, Communist Governor of Shantung, advising that "Chen Yi is still on the Kiao-tsi front directing his troops and cannot visit Tsingtao for conference at this time". I appealed to Communist Commissioner Yeh [who] frankly stated that fighting had started all over Shantung Province and that General Chen Yi as well as other military commanders were too busily occupied with their troops to attend meetings. He further stated that in his opinion nothing short of new vigorous orders from the Generalissimo and Chairman Mao to all commanders involved could stop the fighting and insure conditions under which profitable meeting could be held. Haskell returning tomorrow should bring additional information. Will keep you advised. Fourth Marines pass to GA2 for Clement.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270: Telegram

Mr. Walter S. Robertson to General Marshall

PEIPING, 13 July 1946.

5378. For your information the pertinent parts of Generalissimo's order of 1 July as cited in your 1077¹⁵ and 1087¹⁶ have been trans-

¹² July 10, p. 1336.

¹³ July 11, p. 1338.

¹⁴ Col. Louis W. Haskell.

¹⁵ July 8, p. 1326.

¹⁶ July 9, p. 1335.

mitted to all field team chairmen, as well as the information contained in your 1084.¹⁷ Senior field team chairmen have been instructed to determine when orders of Generalissimo and General Chou En-lai are in the hands of subordinate commanders within reach of our field teams. In no case were the contents nor the gist of the contents of Mao Tse-tung's orders learned by US members of field teams. US Branch Executive Headquarters likewise without information on contents of order.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Yu Ta-wei at 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, July 13, 6 p. m.

Also present: Colonel Caughey

General Yu Ta-wei opened the meeting by stating that the Generalissimo was going to Kuling in the morning and asked that General Yu contact General Marshall to determine whether General Marshall had any information to pass to the Generalissimo.

General Marshall indicated that he had nothing specific to present to the Generalissimo, although he said he wanted General Yu to become completely familiar with his (General Marshall's) views on the present situation.

General Marshall said that the Committee of Three is facing a difficult period during which there would probably be no negotiations due to the Generalissimo's absence. He added that all efforts must be directed toward stabilizing the military situation in order to avoid civil war. General Marshall highlighted his concern with respect to the military situation by relating to General Yu Ta-wei the Generalissimo's apparent unwillingness to the dispatch of field teams to the critical area in the Hankow area. General Marshall told General Yu that the Generalissimo had said he saw no purpose in dispatching teams. General Marshall indicated that this was a great source of worry to him, as the only possible reason he could see for the Generalissimo's attitude was to permit military action on the Nationalist side to proceed during the uncertain period of no negotiations. General Marshall stated that if such was the case and if aggressive military actions developed as he now feared he would be forced to withdraw from the negotiations. General Marshall added that he could not of course make any specific charges unless such a definitive course of hostile action developed by the Government operations.

General Yu Ta-wei next discussed the negotiations on civil admin-

¹⁷ July 9, p. 1331.

istration. He stated that the Generalissimo would probably enter again into negotiations if General Chou asked for it. General Yu added that there was one thing certain and that was that the Communists would have to withdraw their desire to retain a Peace Preservation Corps. General Marshall commenting in an exploratory fashion suggested some modification in the arrangements for Peace Preservation Corps whereby the Communists would retain only ½ the number of Peace Preservation troops as the Nationalist Government authorized in their hsien. He added that it might be that agreement could be reached whereby the Government would establish small forces in the center of Communist areas to insure no improper activity on the part of either the Peace Preservation Corps or the local magistrates. General Marshall stated that some sort of a joint Commission might also be established with an American on each Commission each of which would be responsible for say 10 hsien, and to be further responsible for relating various considerations of land and civil administration policies.

Returning to the military situation, General Marshall stated that he was very concerned with respect to the Honan, North Kiangsu, and Shantung military situation, and that at Tatung. He stated that in almost every case, both sides appeared to be at fault for the serious situation existing in each of these provinces.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Mr. Walter S. Robertson to General Marshall*¹⁸

PEIPING, 13 July 1946.

DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: As you must realize, it is now virtually impossible to obtain agreement on any level in Executive Headquarters involving corrective action.

I have discussed this paralyzing situation individually with the other two Commissioners. Both admit quite frankly that until agreements are reached in Nanking on the basic problems involved they are powerless to take any action which will jeopardize their respective positions either militarily or politically. They both think agreement will be reached ultimately and that it is highly important to keep the Executive Headquarters organization intact so that effective machinery will be available for implementation when needed. For this reason they consider we should at least continue to go through the motions of attempting to enforce our directives, but that we might as well be realistic and recognize the fact that the commanders in the

¹⁸ Notation at bottom of letter: "Action. Letter less P.S. sent Yu Ta-wei [in] OSE 298," July 15, with the observation that "General Marshall said that he thought the Generalissimo should see it."

field are not going to obey our orders when it is against their interests to do so. Curiously enough, both Commissioners earnestly state that there can be no effective agreement in China until an understanding on the Chinese situation is reached between the United States and Russia.

We are doing everything possible to maintain the morale of our organization, both here and particularly in the field, under these frustrating circumstances.

With best wishes for you and Mrs. Marshall.

Sincerely yours,

WALTER S. ROBERTSON

P. S. Enclosed ¹⁰ is type of propaganda now being distributed to Communist personnel, Executive Headquarters.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Marshall to General Yu Ta-wei

OSE 291

NANKING, July 14, 1946.

DEAR GENERAL YU: I have just received information from General Clement and also from Executive Headquarters indicating that the proposed meeting scheduled between Nationalist and Communist military representatives in Shantung province has been postponed because of General Chen-I's presence with his troops on the Chiao-Tsi front. The continued aggressive action of the National forces along the Tsingtao-Tsinan railroad is dominating the situation in Shantung.

In elaboration of my discussion with you yesterday, I wish again to mention my concern over the probability that aggressive military action during the present period will lead to irredeemable chaos. My concern is centered around the Hopeh and North Kiangsu situation, as well as the situation in Shantung province.

893.00/7-1446: Telegram

The Counselor of Embassy in China (Smyth) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, July 14, 1946—10 a. m.

[Received July 15—5:05 a. m.]

1138. Uneasy truce continued, but indications were that constantly reported isolated clashes could develop into open civil war. Mutual KMT-Communist accusations of breaking cease-fire agreement of 7 June continued. Areas principally affected are in Shansi, Shantung, and southern Honan.

¹⁰ Enclosure not found attached to file copy.

Reliable sources report constant Central Government air attacks against Communists during period 30 June through 6 July. Chinese Air Force flew 81 missions using 153 aircraft. (Summary M[ilitary] A[ttaché's] report for period 6 July through 12 July.) On 5 July, 4 aircraft, alleged Communist, strafed Yellow River ferry crossing near Kaifeng.

In late June, one B-24 aircraft of Chinese Air Force flew to Yen-an and remained; Communists claim crew deliberately joined their side. Government has ignored Yen-an claims, but specific Communist identification of unit (35th Squadron, 8th Bombardment Group) and crew lends credence to Communist report. Communist attacks in Tatung area of Shansi continued. In Tsinan area, Shantung, Nationalist counterattacks east along railway had reached Choutsun on 9 July. Concentration of 100,000 Communist troops north Kiangsu increased tension that area.

SMYTH

711.93/7-1446 : Telegram

The Counselor of Embassy in China (Smyth) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, July 14, 1946—11 a. m.

[Received July 15—6:51 a. m.]

1139. Reports of increasing hostilities and more decisive attacks on United States were featured in Yen-an English language broadcast week ending July 12. Particular attention paid to hostilities in Hunan-Hupeh pocket and allegations that fighting was started by Kuomintang forces determined on extermination of Communists. There were references to some fighting in Shantung and south of Tientsin.

One broadcast published full 4,000 word text of Communist Party Central Executive Committee manifesto on July 7, anniversary of Marco Polo bridge incident. Gist of manifesto that war was fought for independence, peace, and democracy, but this war not yet won since American reactionaries are trying to take place of Japan and make China American colony. Manifesto also states only public opinion forced Govt to convene PCC (People's Consultative Council) whose agreement Kuomintang Fascists now busily engaged in sabotaging in order to maintain their rule of violence. This can only be possible with aid of American reactionaries. Later item commenting on Minister [of] Information's reply to Communist manifesto stated it is open confession of Gmo's (Generalissimo) determination to continue hostilities and ignore popular will. Another item cited points from Chou En-lai's press conference following truce termination in which he stated that despite assurances from Gmo, truce

was never extended, that hostilities are being renewed, and that despite fact most concessions during negotiations made by Communists, Kuomintang still shies away from any agreement. Solution to impasse is to be found in convening PCC to reach political understanding without which any military agreement is meaningless.

Excerpts from Yen-an *Emancipation Daily* editorial charged conversations have been a failure so far due solely to inordinate Kuomintang demands, acceptances of which would lead to extermination of democratic forces in China. Another broadcast charged that even during current political conversations US continues to supply arms to Koumintang forces.

Another broadcast quoted from article by Chen Lo-ta,²⁰ labeling Gmo as Chinese dictator and charging that although no one knows contents of secret agreement with US everyone does know that Gmo has paid price of selling out Chinese national rights to American imperialists thereby allowing them to rule China to an extent unprecedented in history.

One report listed accomplishments of Tsitsihar Provincial Government in economic affairs and in protecting rights of Mongol minorities. Also alleged 60,000 refugees have fled from Suiyuan to liberated areas to escape Kuomintang political and economic oppression.

Yenan Chinese number code broadcast during same period contained much of above material. Bulk of broadcasts consisted of miscellaneous domestic news together with large volume of foreign news, most of it with Moscow Tass dateline. Foreign reporting in general followed Moscow line. Most prominent foreign article was strong attack on French for persecution of Annamites and their obvious intent to restore colonial rule over people who are struggling for independence.

Sent Dept. 1139, July 14, 11 a. m., Dept. repeat Moscow.

SMYTH

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Memorandum by General Chou En-lai to General Marshall*²¹

MM 096

NANKING, July 14, 1946.

DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: Chairman Mao Tze-tung and Commander-in-chief Chu Teh cabled to me that they had issued the following order to all Communist field commanders on July 1:

"At any place, if the Nationalist troops do not attack our force, our army shall not take the initiative in attacking them. But in case of

²⁰ Apparently Chen Ta (T. T. Chen), university professor and writer on labor problems.

²¹ Repeated by General Marshall to Mr. Robertson at Peiping in telegram No 1112, July 14; not printed.

being attacked, our army shall resolutely take self-defensive measures in order to protect lives and properties of the people and to maintain law and order of the democratic governments."

The message continued that the Communist field commanders had been in receipt of the order and had put it into execution on July 2.

[Signature in Chinese]
(CHOU EN-LAI)

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

General Marshall to the Chief of Staff (Eisenhower)

[NANKING,] 14 July 1946.

1116. At the present time I cannot say when my negotiations might be completed in China or when I might return to the United States. My tenure of office in this hdqs not indefinite and I wish to return to the States before the middle of September.

Whether or not it would be desirable politically for General Wedemeyer to replace me at that time cannot now be predicted. Another question is the desire of the Generalissimo with regard to Wedemeyer's services as his Chief of Staff. I have not discussed Wedemeyer at all with the Generalissimo. I doubt the advisability of having a United States Chief of Staff in view of Communists' present anti-American campaign. Please discuss situation with Wedemeyer and get his views for me. Incidentally, I do not need his assurances that he will willingly and cheerfully do anything I think might be helpful. I know that to be a fact.

I suggest that you give him such choice as possible for a home assignment but I would prefer that no announcement be made for several weeks so as to avoid if possible insinuations that he has been sacrificed to Communist pressure. I anticipate that he need not return here, but cannot state this conclusively at this time.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Mr. Walter S. Robertson to General Marshall

[PEIPING,] 15 July 1946.

1445 [5445?]. Service on our 5316 re Shanghai [*Shantung?*]. General Clement is continuing efforts to schedule new conference within a week but states that he feels no conference will materialize unless very positive orders are issued direct to the commanders of the area for which Chen Yi is responsible that the truce be strictly observed and the fighting stopped.

Marine reports are that National Govt. forces are still pushing forward in their attacks along the Tsingtao-Tsinan railroad.

Therefore it is recommended that action be taken to have the Generalissimo and Chairman Mao Tse-tung issue orders to all commanders involved to stop fighting in order that conditions under which a profitable meeting can be held may be insured.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

The Deputy Chief of Staff (Handy) to General Marshall

[WASHINGTON,] 15 July 1946.

94527. Eisenhower is away for a week—I have discussed situation with Wedemeyer, 1116 refers. He feels that he should not be employed in any capacity in China under existing conditions. He points to fact that Chinese Communist could be expected to doubt his objectivity due to his close relationship as Chief of Staff to the Generalissimo the past two years. Wedemeyer feels that position of American Chief of Staff to Generalissimo should be discontinued. He points out that conditions that caused President Roosevelt to make such appointment, namely co-ordination of American and Chinese effort against Japanese, no longer maintain. In this regard Wedemeyer feels that President Truman should transmit this information to the Generalissimo. Wedemeyer has written you a personal letter covering this subject fully. This letter was dispatched by courier on July 11.²²

No announcement or references of any nature will be made concerning Wedemeyer's future assignment pending further advice from you.

The Chinese local Embassy has delivered a message to General Wedemeyer conveying the Generalissimo's and Madame's good wishes and asking him when he will depart for China. Wedemeyer has not replied to this message. If agreeable to you and if you are satisfied that the Generalissimo will avoid any publicity, he proposes to answer substantially as follows:

“No doubt you have received information concerning fact that I may not return to China. As a soldier you will understand that I should accept any post that my Government desires to give me. My heartfelt thanks to you, Government officials and the Chinese people who co-operated so effectively and selflessly with me and the American men and women under my command. I have complete faith in the ability of China to emerge from the present period of rehabilita-

²² Not found in Department files.

tion and adjustment to become a strong, prosperous and happy nation. A personal letter follows. (Signed) Wedemeyer."

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Yu Ta-wei
at No. 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, July 16, 1946, 10:30 a. m.*

Also present: Colonel Caughey

General Yu Ta Wei reported that the Communists in Kiangsu Province had attacked in four columns between Tai-hsing and Taihsien on the 15th, although the attack probably had been in progress since the 13th. During this same period and at night, Communist forces also attacked the outskirts of Liu-ho. General Yu said he did not know what their purposes and objectives were unless it was an attempt to wipe out crack Government troops north of the Yangtze.

General Marshall stated that he did not agree with General Yu Ta Wei. There appeared to him to be three possible reasons for this Communist activity. One would be to wipe out Government forces but he did not consider that likely since he doubted the Communists' ability to do so. The second reason might be for retaliatory purposes, but this did not appear to him to be quite the reason. The third and most likely reason is that if the Communists instituted this activity it was to offset attacks which they feared would take place by Nationalist forces in the northern part of Kiangsu Province where Government forces had rapid communications at their disposal. In elaboration of this third reason, General Marshall told General Yu Ta Wei that Communist forces in Kiangsu Province have limited communications at their disposal and had already moved troops down toward the Yangtze River. Since these same forces could not move rapidly northward it would be sound tactics on their part to employ their forces in the south in order either to draw Nationalist forces from the north or cause the Government to concentrate additional forces in that vicinity to preclude their being used elsewhere in Kiangsu Province. In this connection General Marshall pointed out to General Yu Ta Wei that his (General Yu's) fear of Communist intention to annihilate good Government troops would appear ill-founded in the light of the view on the part of the majority of Government officials who seem to feel that Government forces could liquidate within three to six months all Communist forces in China. General Marshall emphasized that he was merely attempting to estimate Communist intentions.

General Yu Ta Wei then stated he would like to analyze the Government's position and pointed out that (1) The Communists violated

the Lo-Shan (Hankow) Agreement,²³ and (2) the recent fighting in Shantung Province along the railroad was precipitated by Communist attacks in that vicinity and now that the battle is in progress General Chen Yi has refused to attend a scheduled conference for the purpose of bringing about peace. At this juncture General Marshall stated that he and General Yu Ta Wei were discussing different things entirely; that what General Marshall had in mind was an estimate of intentions, whereas General Yu Ta Wei was discussing "Justification" of the Government's military procedure. General Yu Ta Wei stated that he would get additional facts and figures concerning the Kiangsu fighting and present them as soon as possible.

General Marshall stated most confidentially that he had seen Dr. Soong the day before, who told him that his original estimate that economically China could stand six months' war was erroneous. Dr. Soong said that he had recently completed a survey of all aspects of the financial and economic structure only to find a pronounced weakness. In elaboration of this condition, General Marshall pointed out to General Yu, that as early as December 1945, China was faced with an economic situation the like of which no other nation ever survived. The one hope rested on her certain gold reserves. At that time Dr. Soong had desired U. S. payment in gold for the China services to the armed forces during the war, and that at the same time he wanted to borrow additional money from the United States. This could not be supported politically in the United States and accordingly the so-called "offset principle" had been established, a procedure which immediately permitted deliveries of surplus property, consequently, a means of financial improvement for China.

General Yu Ta Wei asked General Marshall how he felt with respect to prospects for peace. General Marshall stated that if the Generalissimo continued his present attitude regarding negotiations, then a general civil war appeared inevitable. General Marshall pointed out that the Generalissimo believed that the situation would not deteriorate and might develop favorably for the Government during a lull in negotiations. General Marshall felt that the delay most likely would result in civil war. General Marshall said that agreements for the complete termination of hostilities have been prepared and agreed to since the 19th of June, all waiting for clearance and approval of the civil government question. But the Generalissimo continues to delay on this matter, a procedure which might well permit the situation to blow up. General Marshall stated he felt that the Generalissimo's military commanders are leading him into a situation that will develop beyond control and that when this condition

²³ See memorandum by Colonel Caughey, January 26, p. 382.

materializes these same military commanders will be calling for assistance which will be unobtainable.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Chou En-lai to General Marshall

SHANGHAI, July 16, 1946.

DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: After I arrived at Shanghai, I realize that the oppression of Chen Li-fu's special service agents has been much more serious than I imagined in Nanking. By the personal order from the Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, all the forces of the Kuomintang Party, Administration, and Army are available at the command of Chen Li-fu to suppress opposition forces. (The order has been shown to the authorities concerned).

The black list of names to be arrested, kidnapped, and assassinated, includes people of various quarters, mainly of the Democratic League.

The following has already taken place:

1. The comparatively impartial Wen Hui Pao has been ordered for suspension for a week.
2. The Ch'un Yi Publishing House, owned by the non-partisan delegate to the PCC, Mr. Kuo Mo-jo, has been searched. The reason was because Communist Tung Pi-wu had gone there once.
3. The Hua Hsia Bookstore has been searched because it sold democratic and communist publications.
4. Two newspaper reporters are suspected as Communist reporters.
5. The black lists which includes about one hundred names will be effective within two or three days. Arrests, kidnaps and assassination will be employed.
6. My staff's and my residences in Shanghai at 107 and 117 Rue Massenet; the Communist Hsin Hua Jih Pao Office and Dormitory at Room 201, House 589 Bubblingwell Road, No. 1, Yung Hsiang Terrace, Tung Tai Road and Room 11, House 25, Chu Pao San Road are under the close watch of the special service agents. Visitors to the above places are trailed. Those who read our news releases are under warning.

The seriousness of the situation compels me to contemplate on the problem of how to protect the security of these people's lives; and to raise the issue at the Committee on the protection of human rights of the United Nations Organization.

I should like to bring this matter before your attention and for

your reference in your conference with the Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

Your comment on the subject will be appreciated.²⁴

[Signature in Chinese]
(CHOU EN-LAI)

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai at No. 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, July 16, 1946, 6 p. m.

Also present: Mr. Chang
Colonel Caughey
Captain Soong

GENERAL CHOU: I would first like to thank you for providing the plane to make the trip to Shanghai. This trip was the first I had made to Shanghai in the last ten years. I had conferences all day yesterday, in the forenoon and afternoon. The trouble is that in Shanghai they require too much efficiency, and Dr. T. F. Tsiang²⁵ is too occupied in other things. He could not hold a conference in the evening to bring this to completion. This morning Dr. Tsiang had to come to Nanking to attend a meeting at the Executive Yuan and tomorrow he has to attend the UNRRA²⁶ Far Eastern Committee meeting. So he will not be free until Thursday. I could not wait in Shanghai today and tomorrow because of other things here, so I came back today, but will have to go back to Shanghai tomorrow afternoon. Dr. Tsiang thinks it is not proper to meet here because the CNRRA and UNRRA personnel are all in Shanghai and they can have all the materials at hand.

I hope the Yellow River business can be settled in complete separation from the political and military factors. I hope that through a whole day's meeting day after tomorrow everything can be settled. I also hope I can make a flight with Mr. Todd,²⁷ the engineer, to the Yellow River to see in the field progress of the work and make a decision on the diversion. Possibly we can make the trip to Honan Fri-

²⁴ Notation on original: "Discussed with Dr. Stuart and Mr. Butterworth 19 July". Dr. Stuart was the appointed Ambassador, Mr. W. Walton Butterworth was Minister-Counselor.

²⁵ Director-General of the Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (CNRRA).

²⁶ United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

²⁷ Oliver J. Todd, UNRRA adviser to the Yellow River Commission.

day and come back on the week end. I again have to ask your kindness for transportation facilities, first to Shanghai and then to Honan.

I would like to inquire as to the Government's reaction of my last proposal of sending a field team in connection with the Yellow River supervision.

Regarding general relief affairs, I brought up the same points which I have written to Mr. LaGuardia²⁸ and which I mentioned to you, Mr. Ray²⁹ of UNRRA and Dr. T. F. Tsiang of CNRRA. Dr. Tsiang merely accepted the third point, that is the institution of an Inspection Mission to see in the field about the distribution and to make recommendations. As to permitting Communist representation on the Allocation Committees or on the staff of CNRRA, he said he can merely consider the matter but cannot accept it right now.

While in Shanghai, I also met Mr. Price³⁰ and Dr. Falconer, the deputy director of UNRRA. Mr. Ray is away. They accepted my proposal to have constant contact with my representative in Shanghai regarding such matters as transportation, recommendations for the distribution of supplies to the Communist areas and information about our difficulties. At the same time while we are making representation to CNRRA we will also inform UNRRA on the situation through the liaison man. The UNRRA accepted all the proposals and they are very eager to help along this line. They further made certain suggestions regarding medical supplies and other things and in general were very enthusiastic and cooperative. I feel sure fruitful result will come out of this discussion. UNRRA also supports my proposal to ask CNRRA to provide office room for my representative in CNRRA so that that representative can keep himself informed about the current situation and make recommendations. I am too occupied in so many things that I do not want everything referred to Nanking. I hope CNRRA will also accept this principle. That would diminish misunderstanding and increase efficiency of the work, which would also be beneficial to CNRRA.

During these two days' absence the situation in the field has become more aggravated. The first is regarding North Kiangsu. On July 13 I mentioned that the Government was contemplating open attack on the 15th. Now, this has been verified by the actual fight. The papers reported on the 13th and 14th of fighting, alleging the Communists are attacking, but actually the Kuomintang was making preparation to start the attack on the 15th. General Tang En Po³¹

²⁸ Fiorello H. LaGuardia, Mayor of New York City and Director-General of UNRRA.

²⁹ J. Franklin Ray, Acting Director of the UNRRA China Office.

³⁰ Presumably Frank W. Price, American former adviser to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

³¹ Garrison Commander of Nanking area.

gave an order to his units to attack. He deployed three divisions under his command in the immediate northern bank of the Yangtze River for that purpose. The 49th Division is attacking toward Ju-kao. The 83rd Division attacked to the west of Ju-kao, while the 25th Division is attacking toward Kiang Yen. Apart from that they sent the 5th Army at the same time to attack Tien-chang and Hsu-yu, and a part of the 25th Division was also sent to attack Shao-po. This is merely for the purpose of manoeuvring. Their purpose is to capture as a first step Ju-kao to Kiang Yin. In the western part they occupy the Tien-chang-Hsu-yu line. At the same time they are using the Chinese navy to hold complete control of the Kiang Yin and Chin Kiang. At each place they have two battalions covering the river crossing of the Nationalist troops. At the same time the 5th group of the Chinese Air Force is deployed to coordinate with the ground force actions.

At the same time to the south of the Yangtze River they are disposing the 21st division from Shanghai to Chung-ming. This force can be used in an emergency and they have the 65th Division in the vicinity of Kiang Yin. Those two divisions can be thrown into action whenever it becomes necessary and they can be sent across the river. So, there are two army units in the front line and one army held in reserve all told. This is the situation to the south of the North Kiangsu Communist area at the time of July 15.

I further learned that military operations are also going on in the Hsuchow-Pang Pu sector. They are attacking from Hsuchow southward and from Pang Pu eastward. Because I have not received the detailed information about the plan of operation of the Nationalist troops I am not yet in a position to inform you of the details.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I would like to read from a memorandum ³² I just received this afternoon from General Hsu:

“A Communist force of 40,000 began a siege on Tai-hsing on July 13 and occupied the town on the 15th. They continued to attack Tai-hsien and other important towns and river ports along the north bank of the Yangtze. We strongly and seriously protest. Please notify General Chou En-lai immediately to halt these operations, evacuate the cities and towns so occupied and punish the responsible persons. Otherwise, the Government, for protection of the capitol, must adopt self-defense actions.”

Since we came out here on the porch I received this note from General Yu Ta Wei:

“The Government has captured Tai Hsing, but with heavy losses. There were ten National officers killed in the action.”

³² Not printed.

Further than that General Yu Ta Wei came to me this morning and reported certain attacks. He appealed to me to stop the attacks. He told me the Government dispositions, which would seem entirely contrary to offensive purposes.

GENERAL CHOU: What is the position of the Government troops according to General Yu Ta-wei?

GENERAL MARSHALL: I am not at liberty to tell you that. It is purely defensive and not in the numbers you mentioned at all. Also, where they did have an army, it has now become a division by virtue of their demobilization plan. They have done away with two of the three divisions and built up one division reenforced (three brigades). There is no longer a three division army. They are really all reenforced divisions. Of course, I would think the enlisted strength has not changed much, but the officers' strength has changed. They are doing away with division and brigade officers and I assume the brigades are at full strength, where heretofore they were weak. I would assume that the enlisted strength of the reenforced division is not much below the enlisted strength of the former three divisions. The officers' strength would be very much below their former strength. These are assumptions that are in accord with the pattern of their demobilization scheme.

GENERAL CHOU: This can be easily clarified. I feel sure that the information I received regarding the designation of the Nationalist forces is reliable because they are based on the order issued by General Tang En-po. In that order, according to the Communist information, the designations are all based on the reorganization basis—divisions instead of armies. For example, the 49th Division which is attacking Tukao has left the 105th Brigade to garrison Haimen and Nan-tung. This implies, of course, that the original 49th Army is involved and the original 105th Division, which is now a brigade, is used to garrison those two places. I forgot to mention that attached to the 83rd Division, which is deployed to attack the western part of Tukao, there is the 299th Brigade of the 69th Division and the 148th Brigade of the 25th Division. They are concentrated between Taihsiang and Tsing-kiang. There are concentrated all told five brigades. According to General Tang's order, the troops will be ready at their assigned positions before July 14 so that the attack could be opened on the 15th. As to the 5th Army, it is still organized on the old basis so there are no brigades because they just arrived from the south.

It is not true that the Nationalist troops are merely taking defensive positions, because today's Shanghai newspaper reported Communists' attack on Taihsing but without mentioning that we have occupied that place. Therefore it is most improbable that the Communists

could have occupied that place at July 15. That may account for the reason why General Yu Ta-wei sent a telephone message to correct the previous statement. The outskirts of Taihsing are in the hands of the Communists. Because I had informed the Communist commander of a prospective Nationalist attack, they took the necessary preparations. As soon as the Nationalists opened attack, the Communist forces resisted and dealt them, no doubt, a good blow so that the Nationalists were forced back to the city, but certainly the Communist forces did not take that town. Of course both sides would have suffered casualties. The true light of the situation can be easily disclosed if the fighting is continued in the next few days since then we can find out whose forces are occupying what places. If both parties showed their sincere desire for stopping the hostilities, then the field team at Huai-an should be sent to the field to effect the seizure of orders. Not only lip service should be paid but instead the field team should be allowed to go to the front line to survey the situation.

Now, coming to the Shantung area, the Nationalist forces succeeded in occupying the entire section of the western part of the Tsingtao-Tsinan railroad on June 13-14. They occupied Chang-tien, Tse-chuan and are attacking Po-shan, the important coal mine. In this way they hold in control the whole section from Wei-hsien to Tsinan. The only place that is still in obscurity is I-tu since the Government forces were reported to have taken I-tu but the Communists were still resisting. The situation is not very clear at this moment. Now to the north of Tsinan the Government forces occupy the city Chi-yang and therefore the fighting along the Tsingta-Tsinan railroad is flaring up.

Now, as to southwest Shansi, the New 1st Army under General Hu Tsung Nan's command crossed the Yellow River and occupied Wen-hsi on July 14 and also the southern part of Wen-hsi, including Mou-ching Ferry and the nearby city.

From the above it seems that the fighting will be spread in the three localities, Shensi, Shantung, and North Kiangsu. We received information that the Government was sending reinforced troops to those places so we could anticipate that the fighting is bound to be enlarged. While, on the other hand, in Jehol and Manchuria where the Government has not sent reinforced troops the fighting did not spread out. This was because the Communists did not take this advantage to instigate hostilities.

I further learned, but can get no confirmation, that the Government is now reinforcing one more army to go to Tientsin and Chin-wang-tao, and this possibly may lead to an attack from Tientsin southward.

GENERAL MARSHALL: A telephone message just came in from Gen-

eral Yu Ta Wei. He states Communists are attacking en masse on a 100 mile front between Tai-hsien and Tai-hsing with 18 regiments. The main attack is at a place called Hsien Kai Pao with six regiments, which are a part of the 18. The Communists were repulsed and are retreating eastward. The Nationalist losses: 20 officers and 4500 men. The Communist loss estimated at 10,000, including 1,000 prisoners. Attack has been in progress for three days. He will give me a written report tomorrow.

Can General Chou come over in the morning at 10:30? I will try to see General Yu Ta-wei at 9:30.

Now this is just for General Chou to think about tonight. My own reaction to this present situation—I mean the fact that we are not proceeding with negotiations—is that it cannot continue without developing into general fighting. That is, the situation cannot be controlled and the fighting will not continue local. It will soon become general. It seems to me that unless we find a basis for issuing the cease-fire order, everything will be out of control. All agreements will be wiped out and there will be a general civil war. I told the Generalissimo that before he left for Kuling. I tell General Chou that now. It also seems to me that we have gotten very close to a solution regarding military dispositions. Therefore, I feel that we should make an extraordinary effort to find some solution to the civil government dilemma. I take it that General Chou does not want to make a local decision because he feels that it may be utilized as a precedent to eliminate from further consideration the PCC as a basis for general political settlements. It seems to me that that is a dangerous attitude considering that a general civil war is in the offing. Also General Chou must consider that I might be able to get an agreement that there will be a meeting of the PCC. If the situation degenerates, as I think it will, into a general civil war, with every field commander thinking the other side is taking advantage of him, then the PCC will have no useful purpose whatsoever. Not this year at any rate. Therefore, I repeat that we should make an extraordinary effort to find a basis for the acceptance of the special agreement so that immediately we can issue the cease fire order. I cannot persuade the Generalissimo to issue the cease fire order unless we have some agreement on that special agreement. The issue then is a small one militarily but a very difficult one politically.

I have commented several times that it was very difficult for me to make any suggestions for compromise regarding local administration. However, I am going to make a proposal now for General Chou to think about. Would there be any possibility, for example, of the Communists accepting an arrangement in Kiangsu that wherever they controlled a hsien prior to Japanese surrender they would continue

that local administration according to their own procedure? That where their occupation followed the Japanese surrender, they would not resist the Government control of local administration which might or might not be left in the hands of the present official? That possibly some temporary agreement could be reached regarding the land adjustments in those hsiens which have been taken over by the Communists since the Japanese surrender. In the hsiens which were held by the Communists prior to the Japanese surrender the land adjustments would await the reorganization of the Government. I'll just leave that with General Chou as a thought.

I feel that if we don't find some solution in the next four or five days it will be too late, General Chou tells me of the Government actions and the Government side tells me the Communist actions and each one is outraged with the other. The situation is developing into a straight civil war and unless something is done quickly it will be too late.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Yu Ta-wei at No. 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, July 17, 1946, 9:30 a. m.

Also present: Col. Caughey

General Marshall stated that General Chou En Lai had cleared with Mr. Todd the idea of dispatching a field team of Executive Headquarters to assist in resolving discrepancies which exist concerning the Yellow River project. General Yu said he would have to take up this matter with the Waterways Commission.

General Yu Ta Wei stated that he had given his last information to General Marshall through Colonel Caughey yesterday. He further stated that he was getting a report from the field commanders and would get those facts to General Marshall as soon as possible. In general he said that the National Government had approximately six brigades defending the area recently attacked by the Communists in Kiangsu. Three of these brigades were disposed along the line Liu-ho-Tai-hsien, and three brigades disposed along the line Tai-hsien-Tai-hsing. General Yu added that the attack had been beaten off and the Communist forces were retreating eastward. General Yu had no additional figures with respect to the casualties but stated the fighting apparently had been very heavy since he knew of one division which had lost 600 casualties in one day of fighting. General Yu stated that the situation was rather serious and, since the Government has no assurance that the Communists will not attack again or in other places, it would appear that the Communists must accept all conse-

quences. General Marshall informed General Yu Ta Wei that a continuance of that attitude would inevitably lead to civil war.

General Marshall stated that General Chou had told him yesterday of the National Government advances in the vicinity of Wen-hsi. General Marshall added that a combination of this particular activity would no doubt evidence itself in Communist attacks in the vicinity of Tatung.

General Marshall told General Yu Ta Wei that he had given General Chou En Lai yesterday a proposal with reference to the settlement of the civil administration problem which involved a *status quo* within the local hsien as of VJ day but that General Chou gave no indication of acceptance. General Marshall added that this had been given to him by Dr. Wang Shih Chieh.

General Marshall stated that failure to reach an agreement soon in the present negotiations will mean an outbreak of civil war in all of China, in which both sides will have to accept the consequences. General Marshall stated that besides a lull in the negotiations, Executive Headquarters appeared to be out of business. This idea was contained in the radiogram from Mr. Robertson³³ the previous day, a copy of which had been seen by General Yu Ta Wei. General Marshall continued by referring to an additional message for [from?] Executive Headquarters this date³⁴ in which the thought was expressed, particularly on the Communist side, that sporadic fighting would exist in China until snow falls. General Marshall added that he was trying his utmost to cause both sides to reach an agreement and he was willing to make a last desperate effort.

At this point, General Marshall read to General Yu Ta Wei extracts of a letter which had been given to him by a non-Chinese source.³⁴ This letter purported to be a report from a high Government official to General Chen Cheng, Chief of Staff, and contained a recommendation that the National Government should prepare plans to defeat the enemy in Shantung and along the coast; to wipe out the bandits in Shensi, Shansi and Chahar; to occupy key localities and exterminate enemy resistance; and, at the same time, to continue peace negotiations.

In an off-the-record comment, General Yu Ta Wei stated that he wished to withdraw from participation in the Committee of Three. He stated that he could no longer influence the Generalissimo. For instance, General Yu pointed out that he had assured the Generalissimo about 11 July that the Communists would not attack in Kiangsu Province; that on 13 and 15 July they appeared to launch an all-out

³³ No. 5378, July 13, p. 1352.

³⁴ Not found in Department files.

offensive. General Yu stated that since this happened his advice and opinion were no longer heeded by the Generalissimo or other military authorities in the Government.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai at No. 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, July 17, 1946, 10: 45 a. m.

Also present: Mr. Chang
Colonel Caughey
Captain Soong

GENERAL MARSHALL: I would like to ask you a question first. Are you going to Shanghai this afternoon?

GENERAL CHOU: Yes.

GENERAL MARSHALL: At what time?

GENERAL CHOU: Half past four.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Then are you going to Kaifeng?

GENERAL CHOU: Yes, sir. This morning Mr. Todd, the Yellow River engineer, telephoned me saying he, Mr. Todd, had seen the chief of the Yellow River Conservancy Committee, Mr. Hsueh. Mr. Hsueh said the Government at this moment is not very interested in the diversion of the water since the Government does not want to wash out the railroad over the old bed. Therefore, Mr. Hsueh is afraid that he cannot do much. Mr. Todd asked me to tell you about this. He said Mr. Hsueh is afraid he cannot do much before three or four months. Mr. Todd asked me to tell you that because on the one hand we are afraid a diversion of the water will overflow the Communist area, on the other hand the Government is afraid that the diversion of water will cut the railroad and interfere with troop movements. Mr. Todd is interested in the diversion from a technical standpoint. If we are still willing to help him along that line, I think I should further talk it over with Mr. Todd and Mr. Hsueh and maybe we will decide in Shanghai whether the trip to Honan is necessary or not.

Another question is whether the Government would accept the field team idea for the Yellow River. If such a field team could be set up the work of the Yellow River can be entirely divorced from political and military influences. I hope that this idea meets the approval of the Government. UNRRA seems to want the water diverted. As to the Government's attitude, it is not yet very clear and I have to find out.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I was aware of the Government's attitude—that the military had objected to turning the water into the old bed

because it might cut the railroad. This is now the only means of connection since the Yellow River Bridge is out. However, Mr. Todd proposed that they put only half the water in the old bed and half would remain in the present bed, which he felt would reduce the hazard to the Communist area and would reduce the hazard to the railroad crossing.

The civilian official on the Government side will have little authority in the matter. The military on the Government side has stated their opposition to approval. Now, I did not wish to take up with the Government their decision until I knew whether or not the Communists were going to oppose the same thing. If I found the Communists could go along with Mr. Todd, then I proposed to take up with the Government what I think is an unjustified military objection. In that matter I speak, not merely as a mediator, but as a representative of the people who are giving the money to do this thing—to increase the productivity of the Chinese farmers, to lessen the necessity of the United States sending food to China, to avoid the suffering of the people in the flooded areas. As the matter now stands the Government military authorities object, but nothing has been said to them with regard to their objection. I propose to say it, but only if I find that the Communist[s] are willing to proceed on the basis of half the water being turned back into the old bed.

In view of these circumstances I would like for General Chou to come to a decision, so that I can know whether or not I should see the Generalissimo on this subject.

GENERAL CHOU: This question is rather a complex one because it forms a chain of factors, each depending on the other. You just asked me to make a decision, but my decision depends very much on the attitude and position of the Government. The reason why I have to make trips to Shanghai is just to try to get information on this matter. In order that the old bed will not suffer from any possible damage of overflowing, it is essential that the Government will provide the necessary money and supplies for the repair work. If the Government is not interested in the progress of this work then it can stop the issue of money and if possible all supplies. If the Executive Yuan stops paying the money then there would be no means to displace the hundreds of thousands of inhabitants in the old Yellow River bed. Therefore, as a prerequisite, the Government must also give a decision to carry out this project. We had hoped that all this could have been settled the day before yesterday, but since not all things have been solved another meeting will take place tomorrow. For that purpose Mr. Todd invited Mr. Hsueh of the Water Conservancy Commission to participate, but Mr. Hsueh's reply indicates that he does not see any benefit from his own attendance.

The reason Mr. Todd invited Mr. Hsueh to attend was partially because, on day before yesterday, Dr. Tsiang of CNRRA stated that it is Mr. Hsueh's responsibility to press the Government to pay the money. Now, you asked me to make a decision. My decision depends on many concrete factors and circumstances. I just learned last night that the work along the river in our area has already entered into the second phase. It depends now almost entirely on the rate of money and supplies to be sent in. If we can solve this question satisfactorily tomorrow and if definite assurance is given to the timely delivery of money and supplies, then I will certainly go up to Honan to inspect the field there in order to reach a decision. Mr. Green of UNRRA told me yesterday that a part of the population in the newly overflowed area comes under Communist control, which amounts to about one million people, and they have also reclaimed a part of the flooded area for farming. Therefore, if the new areas should be overflowed again that would certainly be against the interest of the Communist people. What we want to achieve now is that there will be no overflowing in the Shantung area and very little flooding in the new area. It is very complicated for me to make a decision. If the Government has full intent to cooperate and coordinate with the Communists, then everything can be worked out satisfactorily.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I understand your embarrassment in answering my question and I did not expect you to give me an answer now. I understand the number of factors that are related to your possible decision—money and food; but I did not wish to move in and press the Generalissimo to overthrow the army decision if I were then going to find that you would oppose the continuation of the project. I think that the civilian agencies, however much they might be interested in continuing the project, have no power whatsoever in the face of military objections: Therefore, unless they see some possibility of the military withdrawing its objections, there is no good purpose in their proceeding with their plans. At the same time I cannot inform them that I intend to try and overthrow the military decision. I would not try to do this unless I felt reasonably certain that there would be agreement on the Communist side. I think that explains my point of view, except I might emphasize a little more, the fact that the civilian agencies have to stand aside for the military decision at such times as these.

GENERAL CHOU: I would like to ask whether you have heard about the latest report from Kunming concerning the assassination on July 11 of Mr. Li, a figure of the Democratic movement. That is not yet settled. On July 15 Professor Wen of the Chinghua University was assassinated and an attempt was made to assassinate his son. Pro-

fessor Wen was also a leader of the Democratic League in Kunming. He was instantly killed, while his son was very badly wounded.

Regarding the first case, Mr. Li was killed with a noiseless gun, apparently turned over to the Chinese at the time when the SACO³⁵ organization was existing, so even the police did not hear any sound of the firing.

Professor Wen was an American-returned student and a poet, and an intimate friend of Dr. Hu Shih.³⁶

Now, the Kuomintang has all the power within its hands, still they resort to the method of assassination in dealing with the democracy-minded people. That is most treacherous and the method is characteristic of fascist countries. All the Chinese people feel bitterly resentful of such action, and I feel completely speechless after hearing this news. Seeing that the Kuomintang is resorting to such methods, how can we continue the negotiations and talk about democracy? As you know, the Democratic League has nothing else except a few magazines and no papers.

According to the plan of the secret police that we learned, they will take up such methods in Chungking, Chengtu and Shanghai. Many Democratic Leaguers are put on the black list. When the Kuomintang is fighting the Communist[s] with force that is still comprehensible because both parties are armed, but the Democratic Leaguers are entirely unarmed. The rights of democratic movements are not only the desire of the Chinese people but also the desire of the Allied Nations, as expressed by President Truman.

This does not come within the scope of our negotiations, but it is of a serious nature. With such things going on there will be absolutely no assurance of the realization of the PCC decision. Right now the lives of all democracy-minded people are jeopardized, not only the lives of the Communist Party members.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I received a report of the assassination from the American Consul in Kunming, merely the fact of the assassination. Also a report that he had taken into the Consulate certain people who had appealed to him for protection, and he was giving them shelter in the American Consulate in Kunming. I had the Embassy working on the matter with the Government yesterday. The news of the second assassination I heard for the first time from General Chou, and I share with him the same shock and horror that he expresses. The action being taken by the American Embassy cannot bring those men back to life; however, I suspect that it will have a very forceable effect toward restraining repetitions because of the clamor that will be raised, and particularly because of the

³⁵ Sino-American Special Technical Cooperative Organization.

³⁶ Former Chinese Ambassador in the United States.

inevitable reaction of the outside world. The Government does not have to be told what would be the result of the spread of such procedure. I can only hope that the assassinations are the result of local bitterness and of a local decision. As I have understood, there has been trouble of this kind in Kunming for a long time. Just as I came to China there were students killed there.

GENERAL CHOU: I merely want to remind you of this, that since the PCC a series of incidents happened such as the bloodshed in the mass rally in Chungking, the destruction of the Shangwan newspaper, the assassinations in Sian and Nantung, and the railroad incident here. None of these incidents were properly handled by the judiciary organ or by the Government authorities. The Government did not even make sharp denunciation of these incidents. On the contrary sometimes the Government tried to evade the incidents with the result that the secret police are being encouraged with a free hand. On the other hand, the plan of the secret police is not only made for Kunming alone. Mr. Chen Li Fu is himself now in Shanghai organizing the secret police work. Now they have organized a group of assassins called the Po Lang Unit. This is an historical phrase. In the days of the old Ming Dynasty a Chinese scholar by the name of Po Lang, being a weak person, could not commit assassinations himself so he organized a group of husky fellows to assassinate for him. That is how it got its name. I am afraid that if the Kunming incident is not fairly and satisfactorily settled then similar incidents will take place in Shanghai, Chungking and other places.

I have learned that such people as Professor Teng Chu Ming, the woman lawyer Miss Shih Liang in Chungking, Mr. Shen Chun-ju, and Professor Lo Lung Chi in Shanghai are all being put on the blacklist. Now here the question arises as to who will render protection to the leading democratic minded people outside the Kuomintang and the Communist Parties. We are all aware that a strong and large group of democratic minded people in the middle between the Kuomintang and Communist Parties would greatly facilitate the achievement of unity and the settlement of the various issues.

Should such incidents as I refer to above continue to occur then the democratic minded individuals would either flee away to the Communist areas or they would give up their efforts. The only hope for some of them is that the United States would give them protection. It already happened, that in Kunming they have asked protection of the American consulate and somewhere else similar things will take place. It is a most tragic thing to China that the Chinese themselves cannot have protection of their lives. I am afraid that some-

body will propose that another Executive Headquarters be created to take care of the protection of the democratic movement.

GENERAL MARSHALL: In other words, as one agency dies, another must be created.

Confidentially, I am going to have Dr. Stuart and Mr. Butterworth to lunch—first, in order to get the last reports from Kunming and next to see what we might do with the situation.

Has General Chou any comments concerning my proposal for a possible adjustment of the local administrative problem based on localities occupied as of V. J. day? Does he see any possibility in such an approach?

GENERAL CHOU: Once the political question is touched upon, it is very difficult for me to think of any likely possibility. Yesterday I did not have time to comment on that. The reason I think that there is little possibility is due to the fact that the political protection is getting less and less while the armed hostilities are enlarging day by day. Therefore I confront greater and greater difficulty in convincing my people with regard to the North Kiangsu formula. The Kuomintang has also made some proposal along the line of your suggestion. They brought it up as far back as before the PCC. Touching such a formula immediately gets the whole thing involved. You may recall that after VJ day the Kuomintang, with the assistance of American air transport and sea transport, entered many cities besieged by the Communist troops. Of course there are also other cities which they did not succeed in entering. Due to this fact, a civil war broke out in the fall of last year. After your arrival, because you advocated unconditional cease fire and you also supported democracy, we dropped the subject of arguing about the right to participate in accepting surrenders. You will recall that in our first few talks I still mentioned the Communist rights to participate in surrender and you also mentioned that that question should be settled sometime. Later on, since the PCC concluded successfully, I dropped entirely that subject on our own accord because I thought that as soon as the political machinery is democratized, I could voluntarily restore our claims in this matter. As the matter now stands however the hope for political democracy is getting dimmer and dimmer. Adoption of the Kuomintang's point of view on the acceptance of surrender would mean that all areas taken over by the Communists after VJ day should be turned over to the Kuomintang. This would arouse bitter resentment among the Communist people. So, I do not find it wise to bring up this subject to them.

There is also this consideration which makes that proposal impracticable. As a matter of fact, before the Japanese surrender the

Japanese only occupied a part of the Kiangsu cities and a few communication lines, while the outskirts and the villages were occupied by Communists' regular and guerrilla forces. The Communists have now established their own civil administration in places evacuated by the Japs. That not only refers to the places presently under Communist control but also to many places now being occupied by Nationalist troops, including south of the Yangtze River and Chekiang. But we voluntarily evacuated the area south of the Yangtze River. Now, should the places then occupied by the Japanese be turned over to the Nationalist forces we would have a similar situation as in Shantung in relation to the puppet troops—that is the Nationalist and Communist troops would be in very close contact with each other and fighting is bound to occur all the time. Therefore, that seems not to make a practicable solution.

Another point which is even more important is that since the Communist evacuation of Changchun you may have noticed that the military formula worked out by you was almost completely acceptable to the Communists after I made efforts to persuade our own people. This was sufficient to constitute a basis for the issuance of a cease-fire order. Of course, that was not the wish of the Generalissimo. He tried to achieve his aims by force and intimidations and to force the Communists to make further concessions. Being placed in such a cornered position, the Communists would rather resist attack than to capitulate because if they capitulate to the demands of the Generalissimo, then his demands would go higher and higher.

GENERAL MARSHALL: As to the situation in Kiangsu, General Yu had no additional information this morning. Later, he will give me a complete disposition and as much information as they have on the Communists. The important aspect in this is that the Government is firmly convinced that the Communists consolidated their troops in a powerful effort to destroy its troops. In other words, the Communists by an aggressive action have precipitated general hostilities in Kiangsu. On the other side you have presented your view that the Government was about to launch a heavy attack and, as I understood you to say, the Communists acted in order to disorganize that attack. Here is a situation, as I see it, where each side accuses the other of exactly the same thing.

GENERAL CHOU: General Chou said that after going back yesterday he checked on the place, Hsuanchiapao, upon which General Yu had said the main Communist attack was centered. General Chou found that that was under Communist control previously and if fighting took place that means the Government forces have driven out the Communist forces. Of course he has received no information about fighting in that particular place.

GENERAL MARSHALL: You referred yesterday to General Tang En-po's order which provided that the troops should be in position on July 14 for an attack on the 15th. Did you see such an order or do you care to tell me.

GENERAL CHOU: I said that I know for certain that there is such an order. I received a copy of that order, although I didn't see the original. I said that the copy is correct because the designations that were used are all based on the new designations. For example, the 49th division was originally the 49th army; 105th brigade was originally the 105th division; 25th division was originally the 25th army; 21st division was originally the 21st army; 69th division was originally the 69th army; the 74th division was originally the 74th army. The one exception is the 83rd division which was originally the 100th army. The change is due to the fact that after the reorganization there will only be 90 Nationalist divisions so the 100th division will most probably be a Communist division. This is the first time they used the new designations in operations. The 74th division was originally used to garrison Nanking city, but now most of it has been sent across the river while the 18th army which is now called the 18th division will be sent from Wuhan down to Nanking. The 18th division being under the command of General Chen. In the same order they also referred to the deployment of the 5th air force group and the naval vessels. This order is the first operation order of the First Pacification Area which is under the command of General Tung.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I would appreciate your sending me a copy of that order to use as I see fit.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270: Telegram

Mr. Walter S. Robertson to General Marshall

[PEIPING,] 17 July 1946.

5541. Reourad 5445 the following is furnished for background information.

U. S. Branch Executive Headquarters is taking following stand regarding Shantung with guidance instructions furnished hereinafter. General Clement and Colonel Davis³⁷ have seen, commented, and agreed upon the guidance instructions except that General Clement must give cognizance to question raised by General Rockey.³⁸ General Rockey is concerned over proposal to withdraw 54th Army from Shantung since its presence has removed the former jeopardy

³⁷ Col. M. F. Davis, senior American member of Field Team No. 7 at Tsinan.

³⁸ Maj. Gen. Keller E. Rockey, Commanding General, U.S. Marines in China.

to U. S. Marine positions in Tsingtao and General Rockey feels that substitute units may prove less satisfactory.

Proposed guidance instructions to U. S. members of Shantung field teams follow :

"In future negotiations on problems affecting Shantung that may arise or have already risen, the position of the U. S. branch, Executive Hdqs., is as listed below. It must be clearly understood that the position of the U. S. branch is by no means a rigid one. The branch position to these problems is furnished for the confidential guidance of the U. S. members and will be advanced only as compromise proposals in the event of a deadlock on the part of the Chinese members. After having upon request advanced proposals, U. S. members will not take an unalterable stand on the stated positions, thereby preventing Chinese member reaching an agreement on their own basis.

"*a.* Recourse to force as means of settlement of problems will not be recognized by Executive Headquarters.

"*b.* Communist Party troops evacuate all localities seized since 7 June.

"*c.* National Government withdraw 54th and 73rd Armies; however, some new National Government troops should be authorized to comprise necessary garrisons.

"*d.* National Government troops to replace so-called puppet troops, now dispersed, reoccupy all localities lost since 7 June. New garrisons should be equal to or less than original garrisons.

"*e.* Field teams from Executive Headquarters supervise withdrawal 54th and 73rd armies.

"*f.* Monetary reparation be made by attacking side.

"*g.* Unless it is clearly shown that a subordinate is beyond his instructions and provoked incidents or engaged in brutal or unnecessarily cruel warfare, the punishment of subordinate commanders is not considered practicable in view of origin of attack orders traceable to the highest Shantung Communist Authority.

"*h.* U. S. members will avoid taking the initiative or carrying the ball in discussions concerning punishment, reparations, or status of puppets.

"*i.* Unrestricted trade and exchange of commodities between areas be affected.

"*j.* Reconstruction and operations of railroads be consistent with terms of agreement reached but not signed by Committee of Three, copies of which have been furnished all communications and field teams. This provides that reconstruction is responsibility of MOC³⁹ and that all Commanders and field team members give every assistance. Also that question of operation shall be decided by Committee of Three after reconstruction has commenced but before through traffic is permitted over reconstructed lines.["]

Unless otherwise advised will assume there is no objection to our proposed position.

³⁹ Minister of Communications.

893.00/7-1746: Telegram

The Appointed Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, July 17, 1946—5 p. m.

[Received July 17—10:18 a. m.]

1155. Following from Kunming.

[No. 65, July 15.] My 64, July 12. Wen I-to, prominent member of Democratic League, assassinated and son critically injured at 6 o'clock this evening; riddled by heavy gun fire. Reliably ascertained through brother of garrison commander's adjutant that instructions given to Special Service to assassinate ranking members of Democratic League in Kunming and that Tsu Tu-nan, chairman of League's Yunnan branch and Yunto⁴⁰ professor, and Chao Feng, League's provincial secretary, also slated for assassination tonight.

Consulate General, in effort forestall terrorism, has given sanctuary to Tsu, Chao, nine other leading members of League and their families, majority of whom [are] professors at Kunming universities. At 7:30 I called on garrison commander, was told he was "indisposed", and talked with his chief of staff. I informed him of the death of Wen I-to of which he stated he was not informed but that it must have been result of Communist plot. I further stated that out of humanitarian concern for lives of certain other Kunming residents who felt their lives threatened, Consulate General had provided them with sanctuary. I requested chief of staff send guard which is now outside Consulate. Called on garrison commander again at 10 o'clock and requested personal interview but was informed he had retired early suffering from "high blood pressure". Chief of staff then informed me that assassination result of Communist plot to embarrass Government (this explanation also offered in anonymous handbills circulated day after assassination Li Kung-pu); in view of rumors in Kunming that garrison headquarters Secret Service were responsible for death of Li that garrison headquarters has carefully avoided sending its men to university grounds or area previous murder.

There is considerable evidence indicating that assassinations were carefully planned and would probably continue. It is possible that reactionary elements fearing necessity of eventual compromise with liberal elements had decided eliminate these elements entirely regardless of immediate political consequences, and that assassinations in Kunming are less harmful politically than in Nanking, Shanghai or Peking, where League members planned return shortly.

⁴⁰ A short title used by the Consulate General at Kunming for the National Yunnan University there.

Under present conditions of terrorism, League members now staying in Consulate, reluctant to leave unless their safety guaranteed by "responsible" government quarters or general national political settlement reached. These persons also considering possibility seeking sanctuary in Hong Kong as Li Kung-pu had planned before assassination.

Group now at Consulate headed by Pan Kuang-tan and Fei Hsiao-tung feel following conditions presented by them are an essential step toward solution immediate tension created by assassinations:

- (1) Cessation of terrorism in Kunming at once;
- (2) Guarantee of the personal safety of all members of the Democratic League and all others who are working for the cause of democracy and peace.
- (3) Organization and despatch of a committee to investigate the Kunming assassination to be composed of representatives from the Government, the League and from General Marshall.

It is not believed that persons now in Consulate General could leave under present conditions without possibility of further assassinations.

Please wire instructions McGeary.⁴¹

STUART

893.00/7-1746 : Telegram

The Minister-Counselor of Embassy in China (Butterworth) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, July 17, 1946—5 p. m.

[Received July 17—8:17 a. m.]

1156. [To Kunming:] Government of US has strongly disapproved principle of asylum as such and has declined to recognize or subscribe to it as part of international law. It has, however, on occasion sanctioned the granting of temporary refuge by American diplomatic and consular missions when the affording of such refuge seemed necessary in the sound discretion of the responsible officer for the preservation of human life. (Contel 65, July 5 [15], 1 [10?] p. m.)⁴² In no case should shelter be continued after the emergency has passed.

Acting upon your estimate situation I forcefully discussed assassinations with FonMin this morning and expressed concern over a situation which would prompt group of eminent Chinese intel-

⁴¹ Stanley A. McGeary, Vice Consul at Kunming.

⁴² See *supra*.

lectuals to seek refuge in American consular establishment in China. FonMin who professed no knowledge of assassinations other than brief news reports, agreed to institute immediate inquiries with a view to assuring the future safety of the individuals concerned. I will inform you when action has been taken by Foreign Minister. In the meantime you may continue offer protection if you deem situation continues to warrant such action.

With regard to the penultimate paragraph of your message please note that the persons enjoying sanctuary on your premises are in no position to impose conditions precedent to their leaving the consular premises. You should impress upon them that your action was discretionary on your part for the purpose of affording temporary refuge where you deemed it immediately necessary for the preservation of innocent human life.

Sent Kunming 63; repeated Department 1156.

BUTTERWORTH

893.00/7-1846: Telegram

The Minister-Counselor of Embassy in China (Butterworth) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, July 18, 1946—10 a. m.

[Received July 18—4:25 a. m.]

1157. [To Kunming:] Last night ForMin sent me a message via the Vice Minister that Chinese Government was sending forthwith to Kunming a responsible official to undertake an investigation (re Kunming's 65, July 15⁴³ and Embtel 1156, July 17) with a view to bringing to justice persons responsible for these criminal actions. Furthermore General Ho, Military Commander, had been instructed by telegraph to take all necessary measures to preserve law and order with a view to affording special protection to persons now staying in Consulate and to get in touch with U. S. Consul and notify him that such measures had been taken and that departure of these persons from Kunming would be facilitated should they wish to leave city. Liu Chieh asked that Consul accordingly advise persons in question to vacate Consulate.

I expressed appreciation for promptness with which action had been taken and fact that Chinese Government felt sufficiently confident of effectiveness of these measures to make such a suggestion

⁴³ See telegram No. 1155, July 17, p. 1380.

and indicated it would be acted upon. Vice Minister was unable to supply name of investigating official but agreed to do so today.

Please report action taken.

Sent to Kunming 64, repeated to Department 1157.

BUTTERWORTH

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Yu Ta-wei at No. 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, July 18, 1946, 11:30 a. m.

Also present: Colonel Caughey

General Yu Ta Wei presented situation maps concerning the fighting in Kiangsu Province north of the Yellow River and in the Wen-hsi area, Shensi Province. General Marshall showed Yu Ta Wei a map prepared by the Communist delegation regarding the situation in Kiangsu Province.

General Marshall then informed General Yu Ta Wei that the reason he wished to meet him was to show him an order⁴⁴ given to him by General Chou En Lai. This order, according to General Chou, was supposed to have been captured by Communist forces in Kiangsu Province and contains General Tang En Po's operational order for a general attack on the Communist forces in northern Kiangsu Province on July 15. General Marshall stated that this order could have come into being three different ways. It could have been issued by General Tang; the Communists could have fabricated the whole thing; or the Communists could have altered a normal preparatory order, several of which no doubt would have been prepared by General Tang En Po's headquarters as were precautionary arrangements.

General Marshall mentioned that other occurrences charged to the National Government which were very embarrassing. The recent assassination of two Democratic League members in Kunming necessitated the American Consul in Kunming to afford refuge in the Consulate to others who feared assassination. This is a serious matter since an American Consul, by regulations, is forbidden to offer refuge to political persons. However, it appeared to the Consul that, under the circumstances, he could do no less than give protection to the individuals concerned. General Marshall also indicated that he had been provided with a list of the persons to be assassinated, the location where the assassinations were to take place and the alleged individual who would be responsible for the assassinations.

⁴⁴ "Battle Order No. 1 of the 1st Pacification Headquarters", not printed.

General Marshall told General Yu Ta Wei that negotiations could not be conducted in an atmosphere of this nature.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

General Marshall to the Deputy Chief of Staff (Handy)

NANKING, 18 July 1946.

1138. The desire of the Gimo to have Wedemeyer act as his Chief of Staff was merely passed on as something mentioned to me by the Gimo last March when I proposed the discontinuance of that assignment at same time that I notified him that Marine withdrawal would start in April. 94527⁴⁵ refers. I also agree that if Wedemeyer returns he should not act as the Gimo's Chief of Staff. I feel as Wedemeyer does that President Truman should transmit this information to the Generalissimo. However, no information should be passed until it is decided that Wedemeyer is in fact coming back. As indicated in 1116⁴⁶ I do not anticipate that he need return here, but cannot state this conclusively at this time. I have no objections to Wedemeyer's communicating with the Generalissimo in form suggested, but prefer a delay of a few days in dispatch of message.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Mr. Walter S. Robertson to General Marshall

[PEIPING,] 18 July 1946.⁴⁷

5605. American officer has investigated following National Govt. claims of Communist activities at Chefoo :

a. That Chefoo has been used as supply base and port of entry and departure for Communist troops moving between Shantung and Kwantung Peninsula.

b. That fortifications were being constructed in Chefoo and

c. That Russian reconnaissance personnel has been operating on the Chefoo area.

Although the American observer selected the witnesses and conducted the questioning of each witness, local Communist authorities insisted that all such questioning be done in the presence of both military and civilian authorities. The observer was permitted to move with relative freedom within Chefoo proper but was not permitted to investigate Natl. Govt. claims, in other areas of northern

⁴⁵ July 15, p. 1359.

⁴⁶ July 14, p. 1358.

⁴⁷ Telegram as sent July 18 apparently garbled in transmission; repeated July 19.

Shantung. Local Communist officials insisted that the observer be accompanied by military bodyguards whenever he left his billets.

Since the presence of Communist Party officials during the entire investigations may have intimidated the witnesses, it is felt that the results, though negative, are inconclusive as regards claims *a* and *c* above. The testimony did support the claim that fortifications at Chefoo have been strengthened.

The observer cannot state definitely whether troops and munitions have previously entered or left Chefoo. However, the observer believes such movements were not accomplished during his stay in the area particularly in view of the fact that the National Govt. naval blockade on Shantung Peninsula has virtually halted all shipping into or out of Chefoo.

Communist instructions to the observer prior to departure from Lini were:

- a.* He would investigate claims concerning Chefoo only.
- b.* The investigation was to be accomplished in a period of several days.
- c.* Upon completion of the investigation the observer would return to Lini.

Prior to the observers departure from Chefoo, we directed that he remain there pending the results of our request to the Communist Party Branch to remove all restrictions from the conduct of the investigation. Local authorities refused the observer permission to remain in Chefoo and ordered his departure for Lini as originally scheduled.

Upon arrival there, Lini Hqs informed the observer that orders from Commissioner Yeh Chien-ying were required to reopen the investigation. Our request to General Yeh to lift the restrictions on the investigation was without results. The observer has now returned to Peiping.

Due to the restrictive conditions imposed by the Communist Party on the conduct of the investigation we consider that the testimony taken re previous troop and supply movements is invalidated and that portion of the investigation inconclusive. In view of the foregoing it is not contemplated that the investigation will be reopened.

893.00/7-1746 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Appointed Ambassador in China
(Stuart)

WASHINGTON, July 18, 1946—7 p. m.

472. Instructions Kunming (Urtel 1156 July 17) approved. In view our general policy toward asylum and in order diminish possi-

bility Kunming case being taken as precedent Dept desires refugees evacuate consular premises as soon as adequate official assurances forthcoming re their personal safety. Inform Kunming.

BYRNES

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Hsu Yung-chang to General Marshall

No. 439

[NANKING,] 19 July 1946.

The Communists claimed Tsao No. 1 Order from General Tang En Po, Commander of the First Pacification Area of the Government forces which states that Government troops would attack against Northern Kiangsu on 15 July was received.⁴⁸ After investigation, it revealed that the entire document was falsely created. This can be proven with the following facts: (1) General Tang En Po was transferred to become the Commander in Chief of the Capital Garrison. He is no longer responsible for the Northern Kiangsu front. (2) The Government forces do not have the organization of a 2nd Fleet in the Navy. (3) The 5th Army is not under the direct command of the Ministry of National Defense. (4) The Government troops did not initiate attacks on the 15th. On the contrary, Communist forces concentrated 16 regiments on 13 July and attacked our Tai-hsing area and closed in on the shores of the Yangtze River. Government troops suffered heavy casualties and only then they were forced to take defensive actions which you were previously notified as on the record. All these clearly proved that this document was not only falsely created, but the main purpose was to be used to cover up the Communists' planned offensive operations. Also, this tactic is frequently employed by the Communist troops.

The above is for your information.

HSU YUNG CHANG

893.00/7-1946 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Stuart)

WASHINGTON, July 19, 1946—4 p. m.

479. While cognizant shortage Emb political reporting personnel Dept concerned over paucity material reaching Dept re significant political developments in China. For example our info on reported growing anti-US agitation attributed rightist Kmt elements received almost entirely from press and War intelligence reports. Also Dept has recently received little current info on Manchurian developments.

⁴⁸ Notation on the original: "This refers to order claimed [by] Mr. Chou [En-lai] to be Kiangsu attack plan".

While Dept gratified over recent receipt brief monthly political reports from Tientsin, Tsingtao and Canton, it has received no such reports from Shanghai, Hankow, Peiping, Chungking, Mukden, Kunming and Taipeh. Dept accordingly desires Emb instruct latter offices commence forthwith submission such reports to Emb with copies to Dept provided of course General Marshall concurs.

BYRNES

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270: Telegram

Colonel J. Hart Caughey to Mr. Walter S. Robertson, at Peiping

[NANKING,] 21 July 1946.

1153. Have just heard from General Marshall. He has no objection to proposed guidance in 1143⁴⁹ and 5541⁵⁰ except he feels inclusion of National Government agreement to withdrawal of 54th and 73rd Armies offers a most remote possibility since this reinforcement was provoked by Communist operations between 5 June and 13 June. He also says that replacement of these armies by other troops does not present any foreseeable solution.

893.00/7-2146: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, July 21, 1946—10 a. m.

[Received July 21—1:36 a. m.]

1173. Reference Department's telegram 472, July 18, 7 p. m. Following from Kunming:

"66. July 19, 2 p. m. General Ho has not informed Consulate General that necessary measures taken. He has, however, requested that Consulate General turn over persons in question to his custody or he will take no responsibility for any trouble which may occur. Town orderly in that there have been no further assassinations nor likelihood of such extreme moves in view of Consulate General's action. Secret police not as omnipresent. CNAC⁵¹ officer reports large number of secret police who came here last week by plane have left. As soon as General Ho advises Consulate General necessary measures taken persons in question will be advised (your 64 [54],

⁴⁹ July 18, not printed; it reported that General Clement of the Marines had stated "any arrangement that might be reached must stem from present situation rather than January positions" and that General Marshall, now at Kuling, had concurred.

⁵⁰ July 17, p. 1378.

⁵¹ China National Aviation Corporation.

July 18⁵²) to leave, unless contrary instructions received. Background information sent to Department by courier.

Local press reports Executive Yuan designated Tang Tsung, Nanking Police Chief, to investigate situation here. Tang reportedly confederate of Shen Kai-min and Tai Li. Although over [apparent omission] not yet arrived, possibly because of necessity of obtaining instructions from Gmo at Kuling."

STUART

893.00/7-2146: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, July 21, 1946—11 a. m.

[Received July 21—1:46 a. m.]

1174. Reference Department's telegram 472, July 18, 7 p. m. Following from Kunming.

"67. July 19, 6 p. m. At 5 today, representatives of Foreign Office delegate and General Ho's Headquarters called at Consulate General and presented formal written guarantee from Garrison Commander of protection and safety of refugees at Consulate General who are at liberty to return to their homes or to their garrison headquarters, whichever they prefer. The individuals in question have decided to return to their homes and are expected to leave the Consulate General tonight."

STUART

XI. EFFORTS OF AMBASSADOR STUART AND GENERAL MARSHALL TO BREAK DEADLOCK; THE ANPING INCIDENT (JULY 21-AUGUST 10, 1946)

893.00/7-2146

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

No. 1

NANKING, July 21, 1946.

[Received August 6.]

SIR: I have the honor to report to you the conversations with President Chiang Kai-shek during my recent visit to Kuling Mountain when I presented my credentials. Messrs. W. Walton Butterworth⁵³ and Robert L. Smyth⁵⁴ accompanied General Marshall and me on July 18. We arrived on the mountain in the late afternoon and had dinner

⁵² See telegram No. 1157, July 18, 10 a. m., from the Minister-Counselor of Embassy in China, p. 1382.

⁵³ Counselor of Embassy in China, with the personal rank of Minister.

⁵⁴ Consul General at Tientsin.

that evening with President and Madame Chiang. As he and I greeted each other I told him that I wanted him to think of me not so much as an American official but as his old personal friend and one who had long been trying to serve his country. I thought of my present position as continuing this purpose temporarily in another form, and in order to help General Marshall in his special mission I hoped that he himself would feel free to let me know how I could be of use to him also. His response to this approach seemed entirely cordial.

After dinner that evening, the men gathered in one of the rooms, and President Chiang soon began to question General Marshall as to recent developments. General Marshall quite frankly pointed out the signs of approaching unlimited civil war and what seemed to him to be aggressive acts on the part of the Government. One comment led to another, and he soon spoke in very plain language of the two unfortunate assassinations in Kunming and the harmful effects these would have on American public opinion. The President was evidently embarrassed, and General Marshall said afterwards that he hesitated to speak so pointedly in the presence of both Chinese and Americans but that President Chiang had brought this upon himself by putting the questions he had at that time. Personally, I was very much pleased that the conversation had taken this turn and that General Marshall had spoken with such frankness. The Chinese problem, as I see it, has now come in certain decisive aspects to be largely the psychology of this one man.

The next morning we had a simple but dignified ceremony when I presented my credentials, with General Marshall and the other two American representatives present. I was notified that President Chiang wished to see me that afternoon, and I spent about an hour with him. He began by asking me about my impressions of the general situation, and I parried by insisting that I was anxious to learn his views before even attempting to form my own. When, however, he continued to insist, I told him that I was going to speak as his old friend and a friend of the country, and that if in doing so I seemed to overstep diplomatic proprieties I hoped he would call my attention to it. I then told him of my grave concern since returning to China about the first of May over the increasing threat of civil war and the consequences this was having: the mounting inflation; the painfully high cost of living; the suffering of the masses; the advantage for Communist propaganda; the inviting opportunity a divided China affords to a predatory Russia. I spoke of the way in which the Government was losing influence among the intellectuals and the masses and hinted that his personal popularity, which still held, would not be able to offset this loss of confidence in the Government and the party

as a whole. The recent assassinations had caused wide-spread consternation and were interpreted everywhere as the beginning of a policy of suppression of political thought and action. I then spoke of what seemed to me to be the solution.

I greatly desired to see him lead the party in a revival of the original revolutionary reform when its leaders really had a high patriotic motive and were heroic in exposing themselves to danger with no thought of self in their desire to establish Chinese independence with a democratic form of government. I knew that he himself still held this vision and was doing what he conceived to be his utmost to bring it into realization. I felt perfectly certain that the great mass of Chinese of all classes desires national unity, stability and peace under his leadership, and with the establishment of true democracy as rapidly as this could be safely accomplished. The reform movement should be inward in correcting the flagrant abuses which were destroying confidence both in China and abroad, and positive in creating socialized legislation that would bring economic benefits to the common people. The best and perhaps the only way to cope with the Communist movement was to institute agrarian and other reforms that were still more beneficial than those advocated by the Communists and yet were free from the violence, dictatorial methods and possible foreign influence of the Communists.

Concretely, I suggested three immediate measures. The first was a public disavowal of the assassinations on behalf of the Central Government and the assurance that intellectuals who did not use violence need have nothing to fear because of any political affiliations, discussions or other activities as being inherent in democracy. The second was to remove the ban upon the numerous daily papers and periodicals which had been suppressed nominally because they had not complied with the registration procedure but, as popularly believed, because of government policy. The third was the calling, within a few days, if possible, of the steering committee of the Political Consultative Council (PCC) as the beginning of immediate measures for ending the period of "party tutelage" and establishing constitutional government.

President Chiang agreed at once to all of these in principle. He then defended his policy in dealing with the Communists at some length and asked me if my acquaintance with Chinese history did not support his belief that the rulers and the dynasties of the past had succeeded or failed according as they maintained the principle of a blend of force and kindness in dealing with political rebels and other organized forceful opposition. He quoted a classical phrase which is the crystallization of this policy and reminded me of a series of individual opponents of his with whom he had successfully

used this two-fold method. He could not tolerate armed rebellion but had no thought of exterminating or persecuting the Communists once they abandoned military force, and he realized that democracy must have an opposition party, and he had always been entirely willing to have the Communists become a constitutional party with complete freedom for the spread of their political ideology and economic policy.

I then told him that, as it seemed to me, the Communists hesitated to take this step, chiefly from a very genuine fear that whatever his own enlightened policy would be, reactionaries of his own party would not be satisfied with anything less than their destruction as an organized unit. This might be partly used by them for propaganda purposes, but it was also to a large extent genuine and perhaps not without good grounds. I was willing, if he agreed, to undertake to give the Communists my personal assurance that they need have nothing to fear if they took this step and would do everything in my power to see that they were protected. I told him that they had already been making advances to me, that I had known several of their leaders for a long time, and that they had suggested that I make a trip to Yenan. He at once urged that I do so, but I replied that the time did not seem to me to have come and that if I ever should do so I would want to have very concrete proposals from him.

On my departure he told his private secretary to escort me home. It happens that this young man was one of my former students and has the full measure of loyalty which that relationship has always obtained in China. He had been present throughout the interview, and I went over most of the above points with him in further detail, asking him to remind President Chiang of the urgency of his attention to these matters and to say things in my behalf which in Chinese social relations are usually conveyed in some such indirect manner. He had an opportunity to do this that evening with the result that another appointment was made for me the following morning before my departure at noon.

In regard to freedom of the press, President Chiang assured me that he was entirely willing to see that this was done, with the exception of Communist publications in Government-controlled areas until or unless they ceased to use armed force. I told him that this was in my opinion a reasonable stand for him to take and that the effect which I sought at this time would be secured if it became known that there were no other restrictions. He pointed out some technical difficulties in procedure in the calling of the PCC and its steering committee, but he promised that next month, or at the latest in September, there would be a meeting of this nature. We went over vari-

ous other points in the discussion of the previous day, and after urging me again to move to Kuling for the summer both in order to be close to him and for my own health, he allowed me to leave.

I, of course, reported these conversations at once to General Marshall. The experience was reassuring to me in two respects—first, I feel that President Chiang's attitude is such that I need no longer feel embarrassed in talking freely to him despite my present official status. He continues to welcome from me constructive suggestions and even frank criticism that is well meant. I have been somewhat perplexed as to the proprieties in talking with him as a representative of the American Government and the degree of freedom this permitted. That anxiety has been entirely removed. Secondly, it was transparently clear in our conversation that he has the greatest admiration for General Marshall and even something in the nature of personal affection for him. Outspoken as General Marshall has been in his comments, often unfavorable, this has increased rather than weakened the respect of President Chiang and his desire for a continuation of the relationship. As to this I was not at all surprised, but it was reassuring to have such clear evidence of it. The whole situation is, as you are well aware, extremely confused and very near the breaking point, both as regards an extension of military conflict and aggravation of economic and inflationary troubles, and the disorders that the various groups concerned are apt to create deliberately or unconsciously as they become desperate. On the other hand, the stakes are, as you understand better than I, enormous and call for our utmost endeavor. We have as assets the vigorous and patriotic leadership of President Chiang, the desire of most all the Chinese for the very things which we Americans desire for them, and their eagerness for our help, even to the point of wishing us to interfere in their own domestic concerns. It is, of course, perfectly possible that they may reach a point of frustration at any moment when one faction or another will start an anti-American agitation, which could become dangerous if it should get out of control.

In a somewhat more personal note, I venture to express my own deep satisfaction that the policy of my Government toward China is one which I have heartily approved as an individual and can therefore work for without any hesitation in my new function. As this has been put into effect by General Marshall, I can now wholeheartedly attempt to assist him in carrying forward.

President Chiang asked me to send a message of personal good will to President Truman and his hope that the President is enjoying good health. May I take this opportunity to add an expression of my own high regard and respectful good wishes to you as well as to the President. This may seem to you to be a rather tediously lengthy report.

I shall try to make subsequent ones somewhat more succinct, but it occurs to me that since I have been perhaps an entirely unknown personality to you, this detailed statement may in a way be a sort of introduction to my new Chief.⁵⁵

Respectfully yours,

J. LEIGHTON STUART

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of a Meeting Between General Marshall and Dr. Leighton Stuart at No. 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, July 22, 1946, 4 p. m.

Also present: Colonel Hutchin⁵⁶

Dr. Stuart stated he wanted to see General Marshall at 4:00 o'clock this afternoon before he went to his 4:30 meeting with Dr. T. V. Soong. His main object in coming at this time was to pass on to General Marshall the information concerning a probable Government announcement soon to appear in the papers. This Government announcement would probably have five main points:

1. All agreements prior to 30 June are to be carried out;
2. There would be a greater attempt made to settle differences or issues, particularly Communist issues, by political rather than military means;
3. There would be detailed consideration given to the settlement of scattered conflicts;
4. There would be a full explanation given soon as to what is intended by the convention of the National Assembly to begin 12 November. Dr. Stuart elaborated to say that this explanation would show what is being done and why, with particular reference to the establishment of constitutional government.
5. Other parties are to be included for the purpose of giving the present Government a wider basis.

Dr. Stuart thought the papers would infer that this Government pronouncement was influenced largely by General Marshall's and his activities on their recent visit to Kuling. Papers would conjecture about certain meetings held with the Generalissimo in Kuling.

General Marshall replied that he was glad to hear this news and that they probably had had some effect upon the Generalissimo in their discussions the last few days.

Dr. Stuart then stated that General Chou En-lai was coming to

⁵⁵ In his telegram No. 623, August 19, 11 a. m., Acting Secretary of State Acheson cabled Ambassador Stuart: "We have read with much interest your very informative and discerning dispatch No. 1 of July 21 and shall appreciate further similar reports from you from time to time.

"In the midst of all your trials I want you to know always that you and General Marshall have our full support and confidence."

⁵⁶ Lt. Col. Claire E. Hutchin, member of General Marshall's staff.

see him some time this evening, although the exact hour was not known. He had already met with three of General Chou En-lai's assistants, at which time he urged the Communists to take this opportunity to make a dramatic gesture such as complete Communist withdrawal from northern Kiangsu. He emphasized that this was the ideal time to break the current stalemate in the negotiations and that such a gesture would probably do the trick.

General Marshall then described his activities in Kuling after the departure of Dr. Stuart on Saturday. He also spoke of his action regarding Chinese legislation now before Congress. General Marshall told Dr. Stuart that he had advised Washington not to stop the legislation but to let it come up for consideration. He had then been urged to submit statements or to exert pressure on certain leaders in order to facilitate passage of the bill. In reply to this, he had just sent a message this date⁵⁷ in which he stated he did not want personally to urge the passage of this legislation and yet at the same time he did not want it withdrawn, because he felt it might be of some help to him if the State Department allowed it to go up before Congress and the Congress declined or failed to act. If he urged that the bill be passed, it would just accentuate another point of friction. However, if the Congress either disapproves the bill or just left it undecided by adjournment of the Congress on 27 July, it might have a sobering effect upon some aggressive leaders in China.

Dr. Stuart agreed and stated that he was quite optimistic about the most recent trend of events. It looked to him like the time was ripe for really accomplishing something. There was just the bare possibility, although it was distinctly only a possibility at this time, that the Generalissimo could be prevailed upon to issue his order for the cessation of hostilities.

121.893/7-2246: Telegram

General Marshall to President Truman

NANKING, 22 July 1946.

[1165.] DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I took Dr. Stuart to the mountain so-called capitol Kuling Thursday afternoon to present his credentials and to talk to Generalissimo; after dinner that night the Generalissimo precipitated a discussion of situation, to which I felt forced to reply with considerable frankness considering the fact that the Chief of Protocol and two Embassy Secretaries, Butterworth and Smyth, were present. I differed with him as to dangers of present fighting, I feel

⁵⁷ Telegram No. 1164, July 22, vol. x, p. 753.

ing that it was heading directly into uncontrollable civil war. I also differed as to his feeling that entire responsibility rested with the Communist[s], and I was emphatic regarding the effect of world opinion of the assassination of peaceful Democratic League professors at Kunming, particularly as rumor regarding an organization of terroristic intimidation of liberals pointed directly at one of the most conspicuous Kuomintang leaders.

Dr. Stuart had a long talk with Generalissimo the following day and another talk the next morning before his return to Nanking. He was also able to exert some additional influence through the fact that the Generalissimo's secretary was a former student of his, Stuart's.

Since his return to Nanking Saturday he has seen a number of influential people, notably Chen Li Fu, the political leader of the government party, and the man most opposed to my efforts: He sees T. V. Soong⁵⁸ tonight and also Chou En Lai,⁵⁹ who returned this evening from the UNRRA⁶⁰ Yellow River project where I sent him in an American plane.

Heavy fighting has been going on not a great distance from Nanking to north of Yangtze River. Communist report successes. I will get government reports tonight. Will see Chou En Lai tomorrow. The situation is critical but through Dr. Stuart's great help we may be able to bring about an end to this confused and tragic mess and pass into the acknowledged great difficulties of political negotiations but without violence and the danger of complete chaos.

Respectfully,

G. C. MARSHALL

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Yu Ta-wei⁶¹ and General Marshall at No. 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, July 22, 1946, 5:30 p. m.

Also present: Colonel Caughey⁶²

General Yu Ta Wei opened the meeting by asking about General Marshall's trip to Kuling. General Marshall replied that he had only one discussion with the Generalissimo, occurring after dinner Friday night, at which time the Generalissimo asked General Marshall for his reactions with reference to the present situation. General Marshall stated that he replied to the Generalissimo rather frankly and under rather difficult circumstances since Ambassador Stuart,

⁵⁸ President of the Chinese Executive Yuan.

⁵⁹ Head of the Chinese Communist Party delegation at Nanking.

⁶⁰ United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

⁶¹ Chinese Minister of Communications.

⁶² J. Hart Caughey, Executive Officer on General Marshall's staff.

other U. S. Embassy personnel and the Chinese Chief Protocol were present.

General Marshall said that was his only talk with the Generalissimo, although Ambassador Stuart had several satisfactory discussions, which apparently resulted in the Generalissimo's statement in the morning papers.

General Marshall asked General Yu Ta Wei what he knew about the present military situation. General Yu Ta Wei replied that about 5,000 of the Hankow Communists had now moved northwest of Lao Ho Kou at approximately the border of Honan, Shensi and Hupeh Provinces; that another 2,000 were south of the Han River east of Hsingyang; and that another small force had broken out eastward up toward Anhwei Province and were believed to be troops which were recently involved in attacks along rail lines in that province. General Yu continued that at Wen-hsi, in Shensi Province, the Communists had increased the tempo of their attack and the National garrison is having difficulty holding that town; that Communist activity in the vicinity of Tatung also had increased. In Shantung Province the Nationalist forces had almost completed occupation of the Tsingtao-Tsinan Railroad except for a small sector between Wei-hsien and Kaomi; that Communist forces were counter-attacking at I-tu. In north Kiangsu the Communist forces which attacked the line Tai-hsien-Tai-hsing had been repulsed with heavy losses were withdrawing to the east.

General Marshall indicated that the military developments on both sides at the various points mentioned by General Yu Ta Wei were going much as he had expected. General Marshall added that he was surprised, however, that the Communists had not acted aggressively out of Jehol since, as he understood it, the Communists probably had sufficient strength in that area for a successful campaign against vital rail connections into Manchuria.

In this connection General Marshall stated that the only Communist military activity which General Chou had not defended were the Communist operations in Shantung Province from the 9th to 14th of June; that General Chou offered no defense in discussions on this particular situation; but that in all other cases he has offered justification.

General Yu Ta Wei said that he was becoming more depressed every day; that the Communist commanders appeared to be getting out of hand since Chen-I refused to attend a conference in Shantung Province and also since Lin-Yuan refused to attend the conference in Manchuria.

General Yu Ta Wei continued by asking General Marshall what

General Chou had said about the attack on Tai-hsien and Tai-hsing. General Marshall replied that General Chou says they started their attack on the 14th; that this activity on the part of the Communists was probably to offset a Nationalist attack which they feared was coming on the 15th.

General Marshall mentioned recent indications that the 53rd Army was moving to Chinwangtao. He asked General Yu Ta Wei to find out what the destination of this army was.

General Yu asked General Marshall whether he thought China would have a general civil war, to which General Marshall replied that it already had. General Yu asked what the Russian attitude would be and General Marshall replied that probably in Manchuria they would actively vie for control in the open, while in China proper she would probably operate on a *sub rosa* basis. General Yu then asked what the United States attitude would be, to which General Marshall replied that public demand in the United States would probably be to pull out completely.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270: Telegram

*Colonel Marshall S. Carter*⁶³ to General Marshall

[WASHINGTON,] 22 July 1946.

95133. Your 1138⁶⁴ to General Handy⁶⁵ refers. The following message was prepared by Admiral Leahy⁶⁶ and presented to the President for approval. Mr. Truman gave the message to Mr. Byrnes, indicating to the Secretary of State that if Mr. Byrnes thought it should be sent it was all right with him, the President. Mr. Byrnes then handed the message to me and stated that the whole matter was entirely up to you for decision. Accordingly the message follows herewith for delivery to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek if and when you consider appropriate, or for such other disposition as you direct.

"Circumstances which warranted the assignment of Lieutenant General Wedemeyer⁶⁷ as your Chief of Staff and the necessity for coordination of the efforts of the United States Forces with the Central Government Forces which he so effectively accomplished under your direction, have changed so much that the continuation of an American officer as your Chief of Staff appears to be no longer an essential necessity.

⁶³ General Marshall's representative in Washington.

⁶⁴ July 18, p. 1384.

⁶⁵ Gen. Thomas T. Handy, Deputy Chief of Staff, U. S. A.

⁶⁶ Fleet Adm. William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to President Truman.

⁶⁷ Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, until April 5, Commanding General, U. S. Forces, China Theater.

In view of the above and in view of an urgent need for the services of Lieutenant General Wedemeyer with the United States Army at home, I regret the necessity of informing you that it will not be possible for him to return to China. Signed the President."

The following message from General Wedemeyer to the Generalissimo is forwarded at General Wedemeyer's request for delivery if and when you consider appropriate.

"No doubt you have been informed that I may not return to China. As a soldier you will understand that I shall accept any post that my Government desires me to fill. I wish to extend heartfelt thanks to you and the Chinese government officials, as well as the Chinese people, who uniformly cooperated in an unselfish and effective manner with all members of the United States Forces, China Theater, in war effort against the Japanese. I reaffirm my complete faith in the ability of China under your inspiring and selfless leadership to emerge from the current difficulties of rehabilitation and adjustment, to become a strong, prosperous and happy nation. A personal letter follows. Signed Wedemeyer."

Please advise me as to text and timing of any messages delivered so that I may inform Mr. Byrnes and General Wedemeyer.⁶⁸

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270: Telegram

*Mr. Walter S. Robertson*⁶⁹ to General Marshall

PEIPING, 22 July 1946.

5804. Word has been received from Colonel Davis, United States member senior [*senior member*] Field Team 7, that General Clement⁷⁰ believes there is little possibility of commanders meeting at Tsingtao in near future. Also that he has no further use for Team 7. Field Team 15 is presently operative and is in Tsingtao while no team is presently operative at Tsinan. Unless you disapprove, contemplated that Team 7 will be returned to Tsinan to continue original mission. Team 7 will however remain alerted for return to Tsingtao to assist General Clement at such time as it appears likely that a meeting can be arranged.

⁶⁸ On July 25 Colonel Carter informed the Secretary of State that General Marshall had advised him that President Truman's message, "exactly as approved by you and the President", was delivered to President Chiang on July 24 (121.893/7-2546).

⁶⁹ American Commissioner of Executive Headquarters at Peiping.

⁷⁰ Brig. Gen. William T. Clement, Commanding General, U. S. 4th Marines (Reinf.).

893.00/7-2346 : Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, July 23, 1946—5 p. m.

[Received 5:10 p. m.]

1179. Following message repeated from Kunming July 22nd, 3 a. m.

Following receipt communication from General Ho ⁷¹ that adequate protection would be provided persons in Consulate General and oral assurance from General Ho's representative that persons at Consulate General could return their homes with full protection, Consulate General advised persons to leave which they [apparent omission] July 19, 9 p. m. Following day called on General Ho for final confirmation and was informed that he would provide protection only if persons were turned over to him direct. We informed him that persons had come freely and we did not wish to turn them over to him without their consent. After lengthy negotiation he finally agreed afford protection and provide guard if persons concentrated themselves in no more than three places. Otherwise he unwilling afford protection. Accordingly persons agreed to his plan and on July 21, 11:50 a. m., Consulate General in formal note gave names of persons and three places of residence, one of which Lienta University dormitory.

At about 3 o'clock July 21 ricksha puller of Mei Yi-chi, Lienta Chairman, was kidnapped and tortured by four plain-clothes men. He was interrogated re number of armed guards and guns on Lienta grounds. Have confirmed this report in talk with ricksha puller and have seen strangulation marks on his neck. Meanwhile Professor Chiang Tseng-chung, Democratic League member who had not formerly been at Consulate General, received threats yesterday that if he left his home he would be assassinated. By 8 o'clock General Ho had not yet provided guards at designated places which were, however, covered by Gestapo. Accordingly persons requested Consulate General to again afford them refuge. By 10 p. m. General Ho had still not provided guards and Consulate General agreed afford refuge.

Consulate General's decision based not only on atmosphere of terrorism described above and uncooperative attitude of General Ho but also on receipt of reliable information from diverse sources consistently indicating complicity of General Ho in at least one of two previous assassinations.

⁷¹ General Ho Kwei-chang, Chinese garrison commander at Yunnan.

Editor of local newspaper reports that fellow provincial in San Min Chu I Youth Corps stated that Wen I-to assassination carried out by 6 members of 6th division of garrison command who received 6 million dollars; friend of League member whose brother General Ho's Adjutant revealed that garrison command's special service instructed assassinate League members, giving names those topping list (my telegram 65⁷²); Librarian of Kunming Normal School approached by General Ho's intelligence chief for information re movements and addresses of League members; engineer informed Wen I-to 2 days before his assassination in presence wife of Pan Kuang-tan that assassination planned by garrison command (probably 2nd temporary division).

Previous reports re arrival over 400 special service agents Kunming from Nanking confirmed. In addition American reported that he personally saw 6 special planes arrive at airport yesterday carrying about 300 special service [men].

Nonparty professor reports that he saw person in street who commented that handbills accusing Communists of assassinations were obviously Kmt propaganda immediately seized and carried off by Gestapo.

General Ho has stated to banker friends that Communists responsible for terrorism and numerous posters in town follow same line. In conversation with me General Ho also suggested possibility League members killing each other to embarrass him. At same time garrison command has arrested over ten ranking followers of Lung Yun⁷³ including Yang Tsu-an, Lung Yun's former aide de camp and Gestapo chief, on basis alleged report of culprit allegedly captured escaping from Li Kung-pu assassination, that Lung Yun's followers had planned series of assassinations. These arrests create possibility of uprising in Chiaotung area, former Lung Yun stronghold. For past three days have heard occasional heavy gun fire outside city.

Foreign Office delegate, Wang Tchang-ki,⁷⁴ stated in informal personal conversation with me last Tuesday that "Persons who at the present time criticize the Government must expect to pay with their lives".

Prominent League member of undoubted integrity reports he yesterday learned from persons working in office of one of committee offices, responsible for assassinations (including three high provincial officials with "CC" connections and two who formerly Whampoa cadets), led by Tao Yung, provincial leader of San Min Chu I Youth Corps, that he had overheard conversations which led him to believe

⁷² See telegram No. 1155, July 17, 5 p. m., p. 1380.

⁷³ Former Governor of Yunnan.

⁷⁴ Also known as Wang Chang-chi.

that committee in a definitely established emergency meeting had considered raiding Consulate General on night of July 15 to complete slanted assassinations but that when objections raised by "more responsible" members of committee plan was rejected.

In view of above circumstances Consulate General now maintaining heavily armed guard of four persons furnished by [apparent garble] unit. Would not attempt to resist large-scale attack which feel most unlikely. Under present circumstances General Ho has reiterated that he will withhold protection from Consulate General if refugees remain. However do not feel it advisable to expose these persons (who have consistently supported American objectives in China) to ruthless terrorism prevailing in Kunming.

Confirmed with garrison command and local hospital that Captain Hsieh Cheng, garrison command special service officer, fatally stabbed outside city July 15 about 7 o'clock. Have subsequently learned that Captain Hsieh opposed Wen I-to murder and was "taken for a ride" by garrison command. Circumstances of death fully support this explanation.

Intricate relationships between various special service units difficult to unravel with certainty. However, would appear that there is liaison between units of General Ho and committee office and that special service units from Nanking are under committee office. As of 3 p. m. yesterday Tang [Tsung?] reported not arrived.

Responsibility for present terrorism would seem to be in Nanking. There are no signs of its abating. It not believed possible to settle this critical situation short of action from highest responsible Chinese authorities in Nanking.

Above is carefully considered report of situation up to this moment. Please instruct. McGeary.⁷⁵

STUART

893.00/7-2346 : Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, July 23, 1946—6 p. m.

[Received July 23—8:50 a. m.]

1180. [To Kunming:] In view your message 67, July 19⁷⁶ informing Embassy receipt written guarantees protection and safety refugees at Consulate General and Deptstel 472, July 18 (63 to Kunming)⁷⁷ Embassy fails understand action taken your 68, July 22.⁷⁸

⁷⁵ Stanley A. McGeary, Vice Consul at Kunming.

⁷⁶ See telegram No. 1174, July 21, 11 a.m., from the Ambassador in China, p. 1388.

⁷⁷ *Antc.*, p. 1385.

⁷⁸ See telegram No. 1179, July 23, 5 p. m., from the Ambassador in China, *supra*.

Onus for subsequent injury Chinese persons concerned now clearly placed on local authorities. Consul General can not assume role permanent protector any political party or alleged oppressed group in China without laying itself open accusation partisanship.

You may correctly express concern regarding adequacy of measures taken by garrison commander to special commissioner Ministry of Foreign Affairs but you should avoid placing Consul General in position of passing final judgment on such measures in absence further overt acts.

Furthermore protection consular premises is responsibility local authorities. Embassy considers posting armed guards, inferred from your message to be American, most unwise and could very likely aggravate situation. In final analysis Consul [*Consulate?*] General is not in position to defend either itself or refugees therein from concerted action of any organized group; particularly if that group has strong official support as implied by your message. Embassy considers your best course is to inform garrison commander through a special commissioner that you accept in good faith his assurances and assume that he will make adequate dispositions for the protection of refugees now on your premises. You should thereupon expedite their departure. In the meantime Embassy again express to FonOff its concern with regard to the state of terror existing among intellectuals at Kunming.

[To] Kunming as 67.

[STUART]

893.00/7-2546: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, July 25, 1946—1 p. m.

[Received July 26—7: 30 a. m.]

1197. Continuing reports indicate clashes in Shantung, Kiangsu and along Honan-Hupeï border and in Shansi increasing in scope and violence. General situation indicates imminent approach state full scale civil war. (Summary M[ilitary] A[ttaché's] report period July 13-21, 1946.)

In Shantung Nationalist 54 Army, moving west from Tsingtao, and 73 Army, moving east from Tsinan, have recovered entire Kiao-Chi⁷⁹ railway and branch line from Changtien to coal mining area at Poshan.

In Kiangsu first offensive has gained power and momentum, with towns along north bank Yangtze river coming under attack including

⁷⁹ Kiaochoo (-Tsingtao)-Tsinan.

Liuho 20 miles north Nanking. Heavy fighting reported now in progress between Nationalist units and Communist forces in vicinity Huangchiao.

In Honan-Hupei border region estimated forces 60,000 Communist, bulk of garrison troops Communist central China military zone, reported successfully broke through cordon 5 Nationalist armies at Hsiyang, moved west in 2 columns in attempt enter south east Shensi where terrain favorable guerrilla operations.

In Shansi forces 80,000 Communist reported surrounding Tatung on 15 July.

Communist attacks in Hopei along Tientsin-Pukou railroad have ceased and all important centers remain Nationalist hands. Reports indicate 370,000 Japanese have been repatriated from Manchuria. Estimated daily departure from Hulutao now 12,000.

STUART

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Yu Ta-wei and General Marshall at No. 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, July 25, 1946, 6 p. m.

Also present: Colonel Caughey

General Yu asked what the results of Dr. Stuart's talks had been. General Marshall replied that Dr. Stuart has not yet had an opportunity to see General Chou.

General Marshall continued by stating that he was very much disturbed over the present situation and this disturbance is based on the fact that he has "learned too much". General Marshall stated that the situation is such that he is faced with a decision as to whether or not to go ahead. He added that shocking news had reached him in the past two or three days concerning political as well as military matters on both sides. General Marshall stated that he felt he must go ahead but that he had need of a good deal of faith for both sides.

General Marshall asked General Yu Ta Wei what the military situation was. General Yu replied that nothing new had developed since he had last seen General Marshall.

General Marshall then mentioned that General Chou En-lai had returned at 5 o'clock and he had hoped General Chou would see Dr. Stuart this evening but for some reason General Chou wanted to see General Marshall first and therefore a meeting had been set for 10 o'clock tomorrow. General Chou would probably have dinner with Dr. Stuart that evening.

General Yu Ta Wei said that he was very anxious to promote a peaceful settlement and, although he was considerably pessimistic,

he would do anything General Marshall wanted him to do. If General Marshall so desired, he would communicate with the Generalissimo at Kuling or go to Kuling himself. General Marshall stated that he had intended to go to Kuling tomorrow but in view of the present circumstances feels that he may not be able to go. He added that there were so many complicating factors and also it was necessary for him to decide in his own mind as to how to proceed and then to notify the President and Mr. Byrnes.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai at No. 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, July 26, 1946, 10:15 a. m.

Also present: Colonel Caughey
Mr. Chang⁸⁰
Captain Soong⁸¹

GENERAL CHOU: I wish to thank you very much for the transportation facilities you have provided.

Regarding the relief work on the Yellow River project, I was delayed in coming back because I wanted to read the minutes and sign the agreements of the talks. The agreement was delayed on Dr. T. F. Tsiang's⁸² part.

GENERAL MARSHALL: My messages of inquiries were sent because I was anxious to have you come back in order that we might discuss this situation with Dr. Stuart. Then I could go to the Generalissimo without any loss of time. That was my reason for frequent inquiries. I thought the situation was growing very much worse and so rapidly that we did not have very much time to lose. Therefore, I am very glad that you are back.

General CHOU: Because I have been away for a week or so, I am not well informed about the details, only having an overall picture. I learned that the field teams in Hupeh Province had dropped letters to the Communist troops requesting arrangements be made for a meeting place. But because the Communist troops are hotly pursued, though they express the wish to meet the field teams, they are anxious to know how the pursuit and attack by other Government forces can be stopped so as to provide a chance for them to meet the field teams.

As regards North Kiangsu I learned the Government troops in the southern front are continuing their drive and that the attack at Hai-chow (at eastern terminus of the Lunghai Railroad) is also opened

⁸⁰ Chang Wen-chin, personal secretary to General Chou.

⁸¹ Capt. John L. Soong, U. S. Army interpreter.

⁸² Director General of the Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (CNRRA).

and that General Pai Chung Hsi ⁸³ is taking personal command there. Furthermore, the fighting along the Tsingtao-Tsinan Railroad is still continuing. In Shansi the Government troops under General Hu Cheng Nan ⁸⁴ are driving beyond Houms. According to my original evaluation the situation in Jehol Province might be considered more or less stable, however recently I received information saying that General Tu Li-ming's ⁸⁵ headquarters is contemplating an attack in Jehol too. Now all these facts show that the war is spreading.

The political situation also has not been clarified. The Democratic League has requested permission to participate in the investigation of the Kunming assassination but the Government rejected their request. It will only allow the Democratic League to conduct a personal informal investigation. They are not permitted to join the Government investigation party. I further learned that the Government is now trying to fabricate evidence so as to place the blame on the Kunming local military people. Under such circumstances 11 Kunming professors again came back to the American Consulate for shelter. This situation indicates that the Government is not trying to reach a genuine settlement on this matter but is actually plotting further designs.

When I went to Shanghai, Mr. Chen Li Fu ⁸⁶ was at the height of his activities. He authored a blacklist in preparation for violent actions against the liberal minded people. I therefore felt compelled to reveal his designs publicly. Though he denied my charges, saying that he is not plotting any secret service activities, I have evidence which shows that he has held a meeting of all Kunming Party administrative and military agencies in the Ministry at Shanghai. At that conference he said that not only the secret police but everybody within the party in the San Ming Chu, (Kuomintang Youth Group) was to conduct such activities. He issued 200 pistols to those secret police so that they could start trouble, to intimidate the liberal minded people and to make arrests. He also publicly declared that the Chinese Communist Party is an appendix and has to be cut off through an operation. This was published by the *Central Daily News*. This means that he is publicly advocating civil war and it therefore can be concluded that since the Generalissimo went to Lushan the situation in the lower level is getting worse and worse.

Take the case of Professor Tao Hsing Chi, who died yesterday. He was a leading member of the Democratic League and had a Ph.D. from Columbia University. He was a student of Professor Tu and

⁸³ Chinese Minister of National Defense.

⁸⁴ Gen. Hu Tsung-nan was "Pacification Commissioner" for Shensi.

⁸⁵ Also known as Tu Yu-ming, Chinese Government commander in Manchuria.

⁸⁶ Chinese Minister of Organization.

an intimate friend and classmate of Hu Shih.⁸⁷ He was on the top of the blacklist prepared by the secret police. He is a very well known man among the students and liberals in Shanghai and a very well known public social educator. His residence was watched day and night by the secret police who were shadowing his activities. Therefore his friends persuaded him to hide himself for a few days in a friend's house because they were afraid something might happen to him. Even his wife could not attend him. Yesterday morning he suddenly fell down in the lavatory and according to the doctor's diagnosis he was suffering from apoplexy. So far, no indication shows anything else. We do not want to think anything else is the cause, but this shows how he suffered from the activities of the secret police.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I am very grateful to hear that, since I thought something else might have contributed to his death.

Referring first to Kunming, I have naturally been in touch with that situation through the American Consul in Kunming. I have been informed that Government assurances of protection were given by Dr. Wang,⁸⁸ Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Mr. Butterworth personally and in writing. Last night I saw the Governor of Yunnan.⁸⁹ Specific instructions were given him by Dr. Soong making the governor personally responsible for whatever has happened there and whatever might happen. Dr. Soong stated that he (Dr. Soong) was personally responsible behind the governor. This morning I had a further talk with Dr. Soong on the subject and gave him some additional information.

The military situation has gone from bad to worse with possibilities, I think probabilities, of quick development into a general civil war.

Has General Chou any specific suggestions he wishes to make to me?

GENERAL CHOU: Before coming to the last point you mentioned, I would like first to speak on a few other things.

First, regarding the Kunming incident. As far as I know within the original Kunming local military clique there were small factions. The ex-governor⁹⁰ represents one part. He was driven out by the Generalissimo in October of last year, Dr. Soong went there to mediate in this affair. The present governor differs from the ex-governor in certain respects, but still they are closely connected with each other. All these people originally have had contact with the democratic movement in Kunming. Politically they have had certain linkage with each other. It is rather incomprehensible that the Kunming local military clique would create such an incident. Now the Gov-

⁸⁷ Formerly Chinese Ambassador in the United States.

⁸⁸ Wang Shih-chieh.

⁸⁹ General Lu Han.

⁹⁰ General Lung Yun.

ernment has arrested the Adjutant General of the ex-governor. This seems rather a plot because under the present circumstances the Yunnan troops have all been sent to Manchuria and a remaining division was demobilized. The present garrison commander of Kunming is a graduate of the Whampoa Military Academy. His troops are Central troops. The present chief of police is a Tai Li⁹¹ man. Originally he was assigned to keep watch on the Young Marshal⁹² in Kweichow province. He was mayor in the city where the Young Marshal is kept. The Minister of Civil Affairs in Yunnan is a man of the CC⁹³ clique and the Kuomintang party administrative and military organizations are in the hands of the Central Government. It is therefore incomprehensible that anyone except them could take such action of terrorism in broad daylight. It is for this reason that the Democratic League requested that their own man join the investigation party. This request appears to be very reasonable. They further demanded that the investigation party should be composed of three sides—the Kuomintang, Democratic League and Americans—but the government rejected this proposal. Your decision to send your own man to make investigation in Kunming for yourself is a very timely one because this may provide you with the true information as to what is going on before the Government has fabricated a new plot—a false picture on the whole affair.

Now regarding Shanghai, I share your view in that I hope the Kunming incident might prevent any large provocation of the plot in Shanghai. That is why I not only publicly revealed the plot of Chen Li Fu, but also told Dr. K. C. Wu, the mayor, that he could guarantee that the Communists have no intention to start an uprising in Shanghai. I asked Dr. K. C. Wu if he would ever believe that such an uprising can take place in Shanghai. I find it particularly ridiculous about the allegation that the Communists are organizing armed peasants to infiltrate into the city. I told Dr. K. C. Wu he could visualize for himself that if those armed peasants would come to the metropolitan city they would immediately be discovered by the police, even without the help of the secret police, because the peasants are such plain country folks. Once dropped into such a big metropolitan city they would immediately get themselves lost. Even when we go to Shanghai we are apt to get lost. Dr. Wu replied that he did not believe such things and yesterday I again told the foreign correspondents, in response to their question as to whether the Communists would

⁹¹ General Tai Li, late deputy director of the Bureau of Investigation and Statistics, Chinese National Commission of Military Affairs.

⁹² Chang Hsueh-liang, formerly of Manchuria and detained since the end of 1936 for his part in kidnapping Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek at Sian, Shensi.

⁹³ The Chen brothers, Li-fu and Kuo-fu, prominent Kuomintang members.

attack Nanking or Shanghai, that he could assure them that the Communists have no such intention at all. On my part I am trying my best to clarify the situation. On the other hand, however, I am also aware that Mr. Chen Li Fu is engineering some incident and then he would shift the plan onto the shoulders of the Communist Party. Therefore, I told Dr. K. C. Wu that all my staff in Shanghai are made known to the Shanghai magistrate so Dr. K. C. Wu would know where they were staying. Anyway it is evident that Mr. Chen Li Fu's power is getting greater and greater. Previously the Chinese secret police had three different cliques. The first one was under the Kuomintang party; the second one under the National Military Council; and the third one under the San Min Chu Yi Youth Corps. The secret police system in the Youth Corps was disbanded when Mr. Kang Tse left for abroad and General Chang Chih Chung, who then took command of the Youth Corps, dissolved that agency and also the concentration camps. This was done last year and is certainly to be lauded. Because of Tai Li's death the supreme power over all the secret police has automatically fallen into the hands of Chen Li Fu. This is particularly so in Shanghai. This makes the situation very serious and gives rise to many plots. Chen Li Fu is not only against the Communist Party but is also against the peace minded elements within the Kuomintang itself. Therefore he is not only against Dr. Soong, but also against General Chen Cheng,⁹⁴ Dr. Wang and others who participate in the PCC,⁹⁵ though he himself is a member of the PCC.

Now coming to the last question, I have not yet thought of any new ideas during the last week. I do not know whether while in Kuling you had some new information which you have brought back. My idea is mainly the same as I told you about a week ago. It seems to me that there are only two ways out of the present dilemma. The first one is immediately to effect the unconditional cease fire. At the same time the arrangements which we have worked out in the month of June can be put into effect; particularly the formal termination of hostilities in Manchuria and the reiteration of the cease fire in China proper. If agreement can be effected on those two documents then we can also work out and publish the other documents. Such as the restoration of communications, the power of the field teams and Executive Headquarters and the supplementary arrangement on the army reorganization plan, without touching the local administration question in this connection. We can then go on to discuss the reorganization of the Government in accordance with the PCC principles, and subsequently we can discuss the question of local administration. This seems to me the most lucrative procedure and, as I understand,

⁹⁴ Chief of the Chinese General Staff.

⁹⁵ Political Consultative Conference.

is also the fundamental mission for your coming to China. In this way we can also calm the international controversy and the confusion in the public opinion in the United States, and soothe the anxiety of the Chinese people. I will be glad to discuss with you or with Dr. Stuart the detailed procedure along this line. I think that if we proceed with this procedure I can also give help to conceive all kinds of measures.

GENERAL MARSHALL: You just stated, "We can then go on to discuss the reorganization of the Government in accordance with the PCC principles, and subsequently we can discuss the question of local administration." Who is to do the discussing?

GENERAL CHOU: It is rather immaterial as far as the formality is concerned. I think Dr. Stuart has participated in some discussion on the political question. I also think it might be helpful if the Kuomintang, the Communist Party and Dr. Stuart meet on preliminary discussion on the reorganization of the Government and the civil administration question. Of course, it implies that you will also participate in this discussion.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I had turned over in my mind the basis for a possible discussion. The Generalissimo seemed to be opposed to a general meeting of the PCC at this time, it being such a large body that there would be much difficulty in arriving at agreement in time to meet the situation. Of course the steering committee can only deal with an agreed upon policy in working out the methods of its implementation. I was wondering if there was any possibility of handling this matter by creating the State Council at this time for the conduct of such discussion.

GENERAL CHOU: What you have just said with respect to the State Council also constitutes a reorganization of the Government itself. The PCC has already passed certain procedures designed to create the State Council and to reorganize the Government. But the State Council is not yet in being and that is why I say we should still use the procedure of first having preliminary discussion among the Kuomintang, the Communist Party and Dr. Stuart. Then when agreement has been reached by all sides it would be easy for the Steering Committee to pass resolutions since the reorganization of the Government was decided by the PCC. Merely as a matter of formality we would secure the approval of at least the Steering Committee. Certainly many matters can be brought before the State Council for discussion once that is created. Therefore I thought that we could do it in parallel while on the one hand you deal with the cessation of hostilities and on the other we can discuss the reorganization of the government through political consultation. In this way we may stabilize the whole situation. Otherwise the other alternative out of this dilemma would be a general civil war which would bring China

into complete chaos. Once China is thrown into such a chaos, America could not help but reconsider her policy toward China because after a full fledged civil war in China has broken out, how can we expect that the American Government will continue assistance to such a war-torn country? The prospect would certainly be very dark. I don't believe there is any other approach under these conditions. I don't think that stalling is permissible. Any continuation of the present war, even for another fortnight, would cause immense concern in the whole world. Nor can the Chinese people afford the continuation of the war. Under the present circumstances, stalling is not permissible and the road before us is getting narrower and narrower. It is imperative that we take decisive action at this moment. It appears to me that you represent the American Government and also have the responsibility to take decisive action with regard to the present situation.

It appears to me the Generalissimo has in mind, after consulting the various parties with regard to the reorganization of the Government, that he would make an announcement in his own name about it. Of course I have no objection to preliminary consultations about the distribution of seats and the nominees to be elected by their own parties, but, as a matter of formality, it has to get the approval of all the parties concerned. Therefore the convening of the steering committee is necessary for that purpose because any reorganization is done on the basis of the PCC decisions. Therefore we should secure the approval of the various parties in the matter, otherwise it would mean that we are dropping the PCC resolutions piecemeal. Eventually we may reach a point where the resolutions are discarded entirely. While the Generalissimo is thinking of his side, I hope he will also think of the others.

Everything else I will discuss with Dr. Stuart. If I have any military questions with regard to military headquarters, can I talk with Colonel Caughey in your absence?

GENERAL MARSHALL: Colonel Caughey is going up to Kuling with me. Colonel Hutchin will remain.

After a few off-the-record remarks, the meeting was adjourned.

893.00/7-2646: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, July 26, 1946.

[Received July 26—8:35 a. m.]

1200. Following from Kunming.

70, July 24, 7 p. m. General Ho's deputy, Colonel Tu, on July 19 submitted letter from General Ho requesting Consulate General "to

transfer those persons now under your protection to this headquarters for legal and proper protection" and said "adequate protection will be provided". Colonel Tu assured ConGen orally that "transfer" did not mean bodily transfer of persons; that persons could return to their homes; that "transfer" referred to transfer of protection. On basis ambiguous written guarantee and specific oral guarantee ConGen advised refugees return their homes which they immediately did.

Following day in formal call on General Ho to present note and request written confirmation he repudiated Colonel Tu's oral assurances and said that unless persons were directly and bodily transferred to his headquarters to be put under guard he could not provide adequate protection. I informed General Ho that I would not transfer these persons to his headquarters without their prior consent and he then stated that he would provide adequate protection if refugees concentrated themselves in three places outside his headquarters. I stated I would reply to him through FonMin delegate following morning. After informing representatives of refugees specific conditions set down by General Ho, he reluctantly agreed, even though it probably meant indefinite confinement under guard. On July 21 at 11:50 a. m. I delivered list of three places to FonMin delegate with request they be urgently forwarded to General Ho and included request of these persons that they be granted freedom of movement. Although FonMin delegate assured me that note was immediately forwarded General Ho upon receipt, no reply has been received to this date nor have guards been despatched as evidence that our note has been received.

Since by 10 p. m. July 21 guards had not been despatched and conditions of terrorism still prevalent, it was clear that in case of any overt act General Ho had maneuvered himself so that he could and would state that he had not received or did not acknowledge ConGen's communication (Colonel Tu reported last night that note first received late yesterday, contrary to FonMin delegate's report) and could accept no responsibility.

Under these circumstances and fully cognizant of General Ho's ruthlessness and real objectives in this case, ConGen had no reasonable alternative but to extend requested shelter until receipt of formal written acknowledgment from General Ho. If ConGen had not so acted onus for any subsequent overt act would not have fallen on local authorities but morally on ConGen. In addition to question of onus, for which General Ho has shown no particular concern and can be expected to show none pending receipt of instructions to end terrorism or acceptance by him in writing of responsibility for protection in non-ambiguous terms, question of human life involved.

ConGen is waiting for formal written assurances from General Ho. In event General Ho insists that he will provide protection only if refugees are confined to three places under his guard and are not permitted to leave these places, should ConGen advise persons to leave or insist on freedom of movement for these persons? General Ho's position would be wholly justifiable if persons responsible for assassinations not under Govt. control. Colonel Tu has twice telephoned that assurances to above effect will be sent ConGen and requested us to act immediately (before receipt written assurances).

Upon receipt of Embtel 67,⁹⁶ ConGen removed American guards. Guards originally posted inside ConGen because it believed in light unstable local conditions their presence would avert rather than invite further incident. Urgent reply requested.

Yang Tsu-an, Lung Yun's chief [aide] whose arrest previously reported, reportedly beaten and tortured to elicit confession for Li and Wen assassinations.

STUART

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and Dr. Lo Lung-chi*⁹⁷
at No. 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, July 26, 1946, 1:15 p. m.

Also present: Colonel Hutchin
Doctor Stuart

Dr. Lo opened the meeting by stating that he had to see General Marshall before the latter's departure for Kuling because of a particularly important matter which required action during General Marshall's coming visit to Kuling.

Some time ago Dr. Lo had sent to General Marshall a letter⁹⁸ which was a translation of a document concerning the Kunming murders. Yesterday he had followed that up with another letter to Kuling but was afraid that it would never reach the Generalissimo, and unless the Generalissimo saw it personally he doubted that any good would come from it.

It was his idea that there should be a joint investigation committee for looking into the recent incidents involving many Democratic League personnel. He had instituted negotiations toward the establishment of such a joint investigation committee but was having little success. He thought that the only chance for those people not Kuomintang party members to be heard, was to have active participation on a joint committee.

⁹⁶ See telegram No. 1180, July 23, 6 p.m., from the Ambassador in China, p. 1401

⁹⁷ Democratic League leader.

⁹⁸ Not found in Department files.

He was afraid that the responsibility for the incident would be placed upon local people of relatively no importance. There was one individual, the son of the ex-Governor of Yunnan, who was apparently being involved as the chief criminal. In fact he had already been arrested. Dr. Lo did not want to say anything now because of lack of evidence he had at hand. He doubted that he would have much to say on this matter until more information was available as a result of a joint investigation.

He wanted to suggest to the Kunming professors that they invite American representatives to participate in this investigation, thus bringing in the disinterested perspective of an outside nation. His main fear was that the government would try to settle the issues arbitrarily and by themselves without any consultation or coordination with other interested parties.

Dr. Lo had information that the Government representative sent to investigate the incidents actually belonged to the Tai Li organization. Dr. Lo felt that it would be impossible for the Democratic League to send one of their influential members to Kunming to make an investigation when this individual would probably be given no protection and would certainly have no authority except as a member of a joint committee.

Dr. Lo's main purpose in bringing this matter to General Marshall's attention urgently at this time was in order to persuade General Marshall to take this matter up with the Generalissimo while in Kuling. He felt that if anything effective were to be done, it would have to be now.

General Marshall agreed to discuss this matter with the Generalissimo while in Kuling.

893.00/7-2346 : Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, July 23 [26?], 1946—2 p. m.

[Received July 26—4:45 p. m.]

1208. Following from the American Consul General at Shanghai,⁹⁹ [713,] July 20, 3 p. m.

The French Consul General, Mr. Jacques Baeyens, called late yesterday afternoon stating he had been instructed by the French Ambassador to inquire whether plans were being made for the use of American Armed Forces to protect American citizens in the event of civil disturbances in Shanghai and if so, whether French citizens here could count on our protection. After consultation with General

⁹⁹ Monnett B. Davis.

Gillem¹ and Admiral Denebrink,² the French Consul General was informed that the representatives of the US Govt here look to the Chinese authorities to provide adequate police and military protection for the security of Americans and other foreigners, and that they have no reason to anticipate any need for the use of foreign armed forces for this purpose. In the unlikely eventuality, however, of a situation developing beyond the ability of the Chinese authorities to control, American assistance would be extended to American nationals and for humanitarian considerations to such other foreign nationals as might require it.

At the time of his call, Mr. Baeyens indicated that he personally did not share the apprehensiveness of some members of the French community here, and that he agreed in general with our view. He stated that the principal source of the information received by the French authorities was a foreign-educated Chinese, Louis Y. S. Tsu, now in charge of Foreign Affairs Section of Shanghai Municipal Police. The latter had informed the French of special measures being taken by the Shanghai police and military garrison which had been alerted to be prepared for possible disturbances of Communist origin.

Further comment on situation will follow. Davis.

STUART

893.00/7-2646 : Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, July 26, 1946—2 p. m.

[Received July 26—7:55 a. m.]

1209. Following from the American Consul General at Shanghai [720, July 21, 2 p. m.] :

Uneasiness has increased during last 2 days due to flood of rumors arising from military developments lower Yangtze, measures taken by the local police and military garrison, and propaganda from various elements taking advantage of present tenseness to serve their own purposes. It is believed that basic situation does not warrant increased nervousness and that latter is to some extent being artificially created (Remytel 713, July 20, 3 p. m.³).

General Gillem and I called yesterday on Mayor K. C. Wu, who stated that he saw no cause for alarm, but on the contrary felt that local conditions were improving. He pointed out that the raids in

¹ Lt. Gen. Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., Commanding General, U. S. China Service Command at Shanghai.

² Rear Adm. Francis C. Denebrink, U. S. N., Commander, Cruiser Division 5, engaged in occupation of northern Japan.

³ See *supra*.

the Paofeng area on Friday which had given rise to so many wild rumors had been non-political in character, that criminal characters were known to live in that quarter, that in making a roundup resistance had been encountered. He stated categorically that those who resisted the attack were definitely not connected in any way with the Communists.

As to the general situation, he reviewed briefly his activities in connection with student and labor demonstrations, saying that he anticipated no further difficulty in the near future from the former and that he believed the situation with respect to labor was also improving. He pointed out that the anticipated demonstrations this month have not materialized and said the results of examinations at road blocks did not indicate any significant attempt to infiltrate armed persons.

On the other hand there is extreme nervousness among liberal and other circles which have been critical of Kuomintang policies. Some of our Chinese contacts in these groups assert with obvious conviction that revolutionary elements are taking advantage of the present situation to embark on a campaign of intimidation directed against all liberal groups. The Generalissimo's sojourn at Kuling adds to their state of nerves as they feel that without his restraining influence the extremists will go to greater length in carrying out their policy. They refer to the presence in Shanghai of Chen Li-fu, the recent suspension of the liberal newspaper *Wen Hui Pao* for one week, and special police activities including certain arrests as supporting their view. They say they anticipate the abduction and possibly the assassination of some prominent opposition leaders and even go so far as to name at least two prospective victims.

In brief interview Friday Pan Kung-chan, local leader of CC clique, was quoted as likening China to man with appendicitis implying that only forceful measures against Communists will be effective. An editorial in *Shun Pao*, which reportedly reflects CC views, implies Communists responsible recent political murders, saying in sacrifice of few "democratic elements" they had provided themselves with means to revive popular confidence in government. Editorial also accuses Communists of planning other murders.

Liberal circles foresee this as setting stage to blame Communists for any violence which may be committed there during present tense situation.

As confirmed by Mayor and information already reported to Embassy, special precautions are being taken by Chinese authorities to protect water supply and other public utilities. Many special agents have been placed on duty, pill boxes have been erected at strategic

points, and the city is apparently being combed for armed Communists. Davis.

[STUART]

123 Stuart, J. Leighton: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, July 27, 1946—11 a. m.

[Received 4:01 p. m.]

1215. After a long talk last evening with General Chou En-lai, I have decided to leave today to join General Marshall in Kuling.

STUART

893.00/7-2746: Airgram

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, July 27, 1946.

[Received August 7—10:35 a. m.]

A-79. Embassy does not share optimism expressed by Mayor K. C. Wu to Gillem and Davis (Embtel 1209, July 26) with regard situation Shanghai. Although Embassy does not believe there is any immediate military threat to Nanking-Shanghai area (Embtel 1208, July 26), widespread tension is indicative of general deterioration of political situation during recent weeks. Recent events, notably decided spread of hostilities, departure of Generalissimo for Kuling, assassinations at Kunming, and continued worsening economic situation, have increased tension throughout country and general feeling of hopelessness with regard to peaceful outcome.

Although it seems unlikely that either Kuomintang or Communists are willing bear internal and international onus for overt commitment settlement political differences by military means, it is probable that there will be gradual spread and intensification hostilities which may eventually amount to full scale civil war. At the same time it may be expected that urban unrest and disturbances accompanied by assassinations and suppressions will be intensified.

Most probable course development will be spread of hostilities in four critical areas—north Hupei, north Kiangsu, south Shansi, and Shantung—where Government forces will probably endeavor obtain immediate limited military objectives. If successful—and decided success is subject to doubt—Kuomintang undoubtedly expects Communists would agree to more onerous terms than they are now prepared to accept. Such a settlement, however, would give little promise of permanence.

Since mid-April (Embtel 655, April 10⁴) no concrete and abiding steps have been taken to implement agreements reached by Political Consultative Conference and unless some means can be found to bring about an overall political settlement with reorganized and broadened government as first step, Embassy does not anticipate any improvement in general situation.

Rightist elements Kuomintang, aware of deterioration of party's situation and angered by extent of Communist attacks, have recently been more outspoken in advocating that political issues China can be settled only by military extermination Communist opposition. In connection with Kunming assassinations, member local Communist delegation recently expressed to officer of Embassy futility of discussing reduction and integration Communist armies when force was only means by which those in political opposition to Government could protect their adherents, and mentioned possibility of need to withdraw Communist delegation from Nanking in order to protect its members.

STUART

893.00/7-2946 : Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, July 29, 1946—1 p. m.

[Received July 30—3:18 a. m.]

1217. Following message has been received from Kunming, 71, July 27, 5 p. m., from Sprouse.⁵

Accompanied by Foreign Office special delegate, Melby,⁶ McGearry and I, in accordance with arrangements made last evening, called this morning on garrison commander General Ho Kwei-chang. We were received by General Ho Shao-chou, deputy commander, who stated garrison commander absent from city. Ho extended oral assurances of full protection for refugees and stated guards would be placed at three places of residence (chosen by refugees) to which he desired refugees proceed. He explained guards would be used for purpose of protection and in no sense for purpose of surveillance but that refugees would be required to inform guards if they left such places. Permission for departure from these three points would not be required. Ho also stated he would facilitate departure from Kunming of those refugees wishing to leave. He sent [apparent

⁴ *Ante*, p. 167.

⁵ Philip D. Sprouse, Second Secretary of Embassy in China.

⁶ John F. Melby, Second Secretary of Embassy in China.

omission] to accompany McGeary and Huang of Consulate staff in order to locate places chosen by refugees. General Ju of Foreign Affairs section of garrison headquarters subsequently informed McGeary that headquarters referred [*preferred*] refugees postpone their departure from Consulate until tomorrow. He explained it is not felt "safe" for them to proceed to places until maps of area had been prepared and all arrangements made for protection. He said formal note would be sent to Consulate tomorrow informing us of completion of necessary preparations.

Garrison command informed Consulate last Tuesday and Wednesday that formal note confirming above guarantees of protection, which had been given orally by garrison commander to McGeary and Roser⁷ July 20, had been forwarded to Consulate through Foreign Office delegate, but Foreign Office advises that note so far not received.

Refugees state Minister of Education has sent representative to Kunming who has made arrangements for departure by Tuesday plane with him en route to Nanking of three Lienta professors, permission for such travel having been given by garrison commander and local police chief. Remaining refugees are Yunta or non-university personnel. McGeary [*Sprouse*].

[STUART]

893.00/7-3046 : Telegram

The Consul General at Tientsin (Myers) to the Secretary of State

TIENTSIN, July 30, 1946—11 a. m.

[Received 4:20 p. m.]

192. Yesterday Marine patrol of 55 men in 11 vehicles en route to Peiping was ambushed about 50 miles northwest of Tientsin by unidentified force of 300 men equipped with automatic weapons and mortars. Marine officer commanding patrol and 2 enlisted men killed and 11 wounded, 6 critically. Chinese casualties unknown. Commander 11th War Zone has promised full cooperation and vigorous precautionary measures in area where ambush occurred. Marine press release expected shortly. Stories already sent by press correspondents substantially correct.

Sent to Nanking as 106, repeated to Dept. as 192 and to Peiping.

MYERS

⁷ Harold C. Roser, Vice Consul at Kunming.

893.00/7-3046 : Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, July 30, 1946—4 p. m.
[Received July 30—4:10 a. m.]

1223. Following from Kunming for [from] Sprouse:

72, June [July] 28, 3 p. m. Refugees left consular premises today at 1 p. m. following receipt of notice this morning by telephone for garrison headquarters that arrangements completed for their protection. Some returned to homes and others to residence mentioned in the Consulate General's telegram 71, July 27.⁸

Prior to their departure General Lu Han, Provincial Chairman, called at the Consulate and expressed his appreciation of this office's assistance in affording protection to refugees. In most cordial manner he said he would assure protection and would assist refugees who wished to leave Yunnan. Subsequent to his conversation with us General Lu talked with two members of refugee group. According to them, he promised to facilitate departure of entire group for [from] Kunming by plane and refugees expect to leave en route to Shanghai on July 30. General Lu, together with General Ku Chu-tung (Commander of Chinese Armed Forces), and Garrison Commander General Ho Kwei-chang, reported by local press to have arrived Kunming yesterday for Kuling. McGeary [*Sprouse*].

[STUART]

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

*General Marshall to President Truman*⁹

[NANKING,] July 30, 1946.

1210. DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Since my message to you of July 22nd, I remained in Nanking 4 days waiting for delayed return of General Chou En-Lai from Shanghai where he had been negotiating matters with UNRRA¹⁰ and CNRRA¹¹ regarding Yellow River project. During this period the fighting had increased in intensity and in the number of contacts. The Nationalists blamed the Communists for starting fighting in the Kiangsu and Tatung regions while the Communists blamed the Nationalists in Kiangsu, Shantung and Hupeh. The acts were hard to determine and the data confusing. Meanwhile

⁸ See telegram No. 1217, July 29, 1 p. m., from the Ambassador in China, p. 1417.

⁹ Copy transmitted by the War Department to the Secretary of State on July 31.

¹⁰ United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

¹¹ China National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

the assassination of two college professors of the Democratic League in Kunming and the close surveillance of similar individuals in Shanghai by secret police agents created great excitement and caused the feeling among liberals that terroristic methods were being employed to suppress any spoken or printed opposition to the Government. On Chou En-Lai's return to Nanking, I conferred with him to see if I could find any new basis for conciliatory action and found him strongly condemning what he claimed was the deliberate policy of the Government to stand clear of successful negotiations while pursuing an aggressive military policy to secure every possible advantage over the Communists before entering into political negotiations.

Leaving our new ambassador Doctor Stuart in Nanking to confer with Chou En-Lai on a possible basis for initiating a coalition government, I proceeded to the summer capitol at Kuling to see the Generalissimo. Doctor Stuart followed a day later and we arranged for him to analyze personally the entire situation for the Generalissimo, that is, the tragedy impending, the overwhelming desire of the people of China for peace and their rapidly growing disapproval of the methods of the Kuomintang party, the turn of public opinion in the United States, especially following the assassinations and the statement of Madame Sun Yat Sen,¹² and the threatened loss of prestige by the Generalissimo if an immediate and drastic step was [not] to be proposed for actual measures to start a coalition government. Since Stuart speaks Chinese fluently and there would be no necessity for the presence of a third party and since he has long been a friend and admirer of the Generalissimo and is universally conceded to comprehend the peculiarities and conditions of things Chinese, it was thought best for him alone to prepare the way by a very frank statement as indicated before I again participated. Unfortunately immediately after his arrival in Kuling he was stricken by a severe case of dysentery and confined to his bed where he still is. I delayed any action for two days thinking he was about to make a full recovery but when he tried to meet an appointment with the Generalissimo last night he proved to be too weak. I sent to Nanking for American doctors and they arrived this morning at Kuling, pronounced the trouble dysentery—the Chinese doctor had been treating him for malaria—and reported that he should be well on the way to recovery tomorrow.

Under the circumstances I had a long and very frank talk with the Generalissimo today covering most of the ground Stuart was to cover and while no definite result was achieved he was brought to a better

¹² Madame Sun's statement, released July 22, was reported in despatch No. 37, August 8, from the Ambassador in China, not printed.

understanding of at least the American point of view. Stuart will go into details with him tomorrow Wednesday or Thursday and will either report back to me here at Nanking where I just arrived or I will take Chou En-Lai back with me to Kuling. It is extremely critical and what I most fear is the spread of the fighting into the province of Jehol, northeast of Peiping, and then inevitably into Manchuria which we have so far managed to keep quiet. The Generalissimo's attitude is that of counseling us to be patient, quoting a Chinese proverb to the effect that when the fruit is ripe it will drop into your hands and referring to the Chinese traditional method of dealing severely with an opponent at first and then tempering the action with kindness. My view and that of Dr. Stuart is that this method is leading directly into an uncontrollable civil war and that the seeds of distrust and violence now being sown will make later political settlements impossible.

On top of this situation comes today a report of an attack by Communists on a Marine convoy near Peiping with loss of three American lives and a number of wounded. I will see Chou En-Lai tomorrow and hear what he has to say regarding this incident. It is undoubtedly the result of violent Communist propaganda against so-called American military support of the National Government and the present confusion of military action all over North China. I suppose it will precipitate a strong demand for the withdrawal of Marines. As a matter of fact I notified the Navy 3 weeks ago to plan for Marine withdrawal initially to start from Tsingtao and informed Commander of Seventh Fleet Wednesday last to proceed with withdrawal as soon as transport and arrangements could be made. This step was taken by me as Government had reinforced its Tsingtao garrison sufficiently to protect the port. This has not yet been done at Tientsin. No press release on commencement of Marine withdrawal will be made until the dates are settled.¹³

G. C. MARSHALL

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270: Telegram

Mr. Walter S. Robertson to General Marshall

PEIPING, 30 July 1946.

6183. In examining further question of dispatching Executive Headquarters Conflict Control Team to investigate attack on Marine convoy vicinity Anping 29 July, Reourad 6159,¹⁴ following considera-

¹³ For further correspondence on this subject, see vol. x, pp. 848 ff.

¹⁴ July 29, not printed.

tions which not only relate to present incident but involve future position of this Hqs have been weighed.

a. No legal basis exists in directives of Committee of Three or this Hqs for investigation of armed conflict other than between Chinese factions.

b. Marines are required to conduct an official investigation of incident. Findings of this investigation may be at variance with findings of Executive Hqs Tripartite Team.

c. In event Conflict Control Team discovers facts which require conclusion that Communist Party is responsible for attack, counter charges of bias may be brought against American Branch and our position as impartial mediator may be jeopardized in future negotiations.

In view of foregoing, Conflict Control Team will not be sent from this Headquarters unless you deem it advisable from your viewpoint.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Yu Ta-wei at No. 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, July 31, 1946, 6: 45 p. m.

Also present: Colonel Hutchin

General Yu Ta Wei opened the meeting by asking what were the results of General Marshall's conversations with the Generalissimo during this last visit to Kuling. General Marshall replied "Practically none". First the illness of Dr. Stuart interfered with his plans. He had contemplated having Doctor Stuart see the Generalissimo first and talk to him in a very frank way without the presence of an interpreter or a third party. Such a conversation could be held in a manner which would not be particularly suitable in the presence of other people.

After Dr. Stuart's conversation, then General Marshall would have stepped in. However, Dr. Stuart developed dysentery and that delayed proceedings. General Marshall waited two days and finally had to talk to the Generalissimo himself without Dr. Stuart having held any preliminary meeting. It is probable that Dr. Stuart will see the Generalissimo tomorrow (Thursday).

General Marshall thought the Generalissimo was somewhat resentful of Dr. Stuart's appointment as ambassador because he referred to him several times as being merely a college professor. He asked if General Yu understood why he had had Dr. Stuart made ambassador. Whenever General Marshall broached political subjects, the politicians always seemed to go way back into history to start educating him. That would not be necessary with Dr. Stuart as he knows more about China and has more China in his head than almost anyone

in China, unless perhaps there is another Confucius in being. No longer can the Generalissimo's advisors tell him not to follow General Marshall's advice because he does not know enough China.

General Marshall said that when he next went back to Kuling, he would have to go into the seriousness of the present situation very decidedly with the Generalissimo. General Marshall had daily cables from the War Department which contained extracts of pertinent editorials, writings of columnists, radio reports of commentators, etc. He also got through his pouch principal editorial clippings in a much shorter time than anyone else in China. In all of this, the most noteworthy point is the tremendous change in the U. S. attitude towards China; and to his and Dr. Stuart's mind, the principal loss is in the Generalissimo's prestige. That is sheer tragedy. The Generalissimo represents perhaps the greatest capital of China. Now he is being stripped. His advisors give him such prejudiced advice that the situation seems hopeless. There are things that the General knows from the Generalissimo's own people which they can't come out in public statements.

General Marshall said that everyone realizes that two wrongs do not make a right. When he brought up certain matters to the Generalissimo, his reactions were so immediate and along such lines that General Marshall felt frustrated. The situation in China is going from bad to worse. General Marshall fears that fighting will develop in Jehol and that it will inevitably spread into Manchuria, which would mean an all out civil war. The military factors are of least importance now and the political consideration has become of dominating importance. The deteriorating situation towards an all out civil war demands a solution on the highest level.

What worried General Marshall was what was happening back home. The public reaction towards China was getting out of hand. When he was in the United States, he talked to practically all the correspondents, editors and radio commentators, some 600 of them. He knows them and he had them lined up almost solidly behind him in influencing public opinion which would be favorable to China. Now all this is coming apart at the seams. The tide of American public opinion is swinging the other way.

General Yu Ta Wei said that the situation has not changed materially since he last talked with General Marshall. The Nationalists had taken Yang-chow, Tai-hsing and Tien-chang. The fighting had now moved further north. They had also captured Suhsien on the main railroad.

General Yu said nothing of importance had happened at Tunghai (in reply to General Marshall's question). Along the railroad in

Shantung they had put up a decided fight, particularly in the vicinity of Changto. In Hupeh, there was still considerable activity around Lao-Lo-Kou and the Communist forces were moving in the direction of Hsian. In the vicinity of Tatung the attack was coming from both the south and the east and the main forces were getting closer and closer to the city. General Yu had no information on the ambush of the Marine motor convoy near Peiping.

General Marshall said that about the attack of the Marine Corps supply convoy, he had a message through Navy channels¹⁵ that indicated the troops involved may not have been Communists. There was no definite identity of the attackers yet. His report stated that the Nationalists believed they were not Communists but that they were guerrillas. The Marine headquarters had even indicated that trouble was usual in this area. (Later information indicated a Communist attack).

General Yu asked General Marshall if he remembered the situation concerning the peace team that was sent to Canton. He stated that the National member had been withdrawn and assigned someplace else.

General Marshall said yes, he remembered the situation concerning the team in Canton. Its withdrawal had probably been delayed as a result of Colonel Caughey's trip with the Communist representative when they set up the plan of evacuation of Communists from the Mirs Bay area. One of the things that is no doubt in the back of the Communist mind is their proposed evacuation of Communists from Hainan Island. Once the Canton situation was settled, the Communist representative immediately came after Caughey to get the Hainan issue settled. The question as General Marshall now saw it was: could Executive Headquarters withdraw Team 8 from Canton?

General Yu said that the withdrawal of Team 8 would be highly desirable. The Generalissimo had been explicit in stating that he would not consider the withdrawal of the Communists from Hainan Island at all and, in fact, that was the condition to which he gave his agreement to the Canton deal. General Yu asked if General Marshall thought that the political situation was more important than the military.

General Marshall said "Yes, of course it was much more important." One of the critical factors in the present situation was the secret police which were operating to keep under surveillance almost every individual who had a liberal thought in China. The most recent death was the one of a man named Tao who had a Ph.D from Columbia University and who had been driven into hiding in two different

¹⁵ Not found in Department files.

places by the pressure of the secret police. Finally he died of apoplexy. That was similar to the incident which occurred in the railroad station here in Nanking, in the capital of China, when from 7 p. m. to 12:30 in the morning, the Government did absolutely nothing to terminate a perfectly outrageous situation. What the Generalissimo says to all these things is, that he is in a difficult position because he, the Generalissimo, has to have each liberal watched lest something happened to him and the Government be falsely accused.

General Marshall mentioned that Dr. Lo Lung Chi had again made statements to the press of a private conversation he had had with General Marshall even after General Marshall had given him repeated warnings that he could not talk to him if that were to be the case every time. Of course, he is one of those individuals who is scared to death and Carson Chang is another one. General Marshall said he was told by an American a week to ten days before that the campaign of assassinations would start, and sure enough, it started. The situation is terrible. Think what an impression that makes on Americans when radical elements in China persecute the most highly educated people in China, the most liberal minded, and when they suppress newspapers and publications. That was exactly what the Government had done. No one can swallow that sort of business. It serves only to detract from the Generalissimo's prestige, and yet he does not realize that.

General Yu said that not much had happened during General Marshall's absence. There was a member of Executive Headquarters travelling on a peace team airplane with suspicious luggage. The baggage was taken into custody and 400 ounces of gold were discovered. While it was true that it was not illegal gold, the peace team airplane should still not be used to transport it. General Yu Ta Wei had had a report from Cheng Kai Ming¹⁶ that he did not want to keep these people but that they are trying to make a case of illegal detention.

General Yu said also that he thought General Marshall was wise to leave the Marine Corps to make its own investigation of the incident near Peiping.

General Marshall asked General Yu Ta Wei who he thought we might get to replace General Hsu Yung Chang on the Committee of Three. General Hsu had already had an unfortunate effect upon negotiations through his retiring personality. The individual selected as his replacement should be one with considerable prestige. General Yu did not know who to suggest. General Marshall thought it might

¹⁶ Chinese Government Commissioner of Executive Headquarters at Peiping.

be a good idea to pick the severest critic or possibly the Generalissimo's worst advisor and put him in the Committee of Three and then start indoctrinating him.

893.00/8-146 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Stuart)

WASHINGTON, August 1, 1946—3 p. m.

539. For General Marshall. Your very informative 1210¹⁷ to the President and me is greatly appreciated, and I hasten to reassure you of our unqualified confidence in the complete wisdom of your decisions. We fully recognize the size and complexity of your vexatious task, and as you are of course fully aware, stand ready to take whatever assisting action you may desire.

We are distressed to hear of Dr. Stuart's illness and I hope you will give him my best wishes for a speedy recovery.

The increasingly violent wave of terrorism directed at intellectuals and others critical of the Kuomintang appears to us to be a disturbing current development and we are therefore pleased to note that this subject is included among those you are bringing to the Generalissimo's attention.

ACHESON

121.893/8-146 : Telegram

President Truman to General Marshall

[WASHINGTON,] August 1, 1946.

WH 489. Receipt of your message of July 30 is acknowledged.

I appreciate your difficulties, approve of the method you are following, and hope with you for success in accomplishing a peaceful solution of the Chinese problem.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Mr. Walter S. Robertson to General Marshall

PEIPING, 1 August 1946.

6268. Re our message on this subject July 30.¹⁸ Both Communist and National Government Commissioners have suggested independently of each other that we immediately despatch a fact-finding team to An Ping to investigate Marine incident there on July 29. Na-

¹⁷ July 30, p. 1419.

¹⁸ Telegram No. 6183, p. 1421.

tional Government Commissioner stated that he had received instructions from Generalissimo ordering dispatch of team. Communist Commissioner said his first information came from newspapers shortly followed by a report from Communist Command that area which stated "on July 29, 60 Marines and 80 National Government soldiers opened attack upon 53rd Regiment Communist Army resulting in many casualties." General Yeh¹⁹ advised that he had requested additional information as he considered report lacking in essential details. In view of our advice to you that team should not be sent unless you deemed it advisable please reply urgently if you concur in the suggestions made.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai at No. 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, August 1, 1946, 4 p. m.

Also present: Col. Hutchin
Capt. Soong
Mr. Chang

GENERAL CHOU: During your short absence, fighting continued and is now taking larger and larger dimensions. I did not call on you yesterday because I thought after your arrival, you would have too many calls. Actually the situation is very serious and I want to speak briefly about the situation.

Regarding Communist troops in Hupeh, I learned that an agreement has been reached among the team members on July 27. Previously, the Communist commander had intended to meet the field team at Lung Chu Tsai but because they were hotly pursued by Government troops, they could not stop. This time the field team agreed that a meeting would be convened in Hsian before August 5th. General Li Hsien-nien agreed to designate the representative of the 18th Group Army in Hsian, Mr. Chou, as General Li's representative to contact the field team members. I have studied carefully the text of that agreement and found it very suitable. I am willing to accept the whole agreement. Now it depends on attitude of the Government. If the Government would before August 2 express its acceptance, then the prospect is rather hopeful. Then the pursuing and the frontal attack of the Government troops can be stopped. Communist troops are willing to stay in an assigned place, and the negotiations can be resumed. It now depends on the attitude of General Cheng Chien, General Liu Chih and General Hu Chung Nan in Hsian.

¹⁹ General Yeh Chien-ying, Chinese Communist Commissioner of Executive Headquarters at Peiping.

Should they insist on annihilating the Communist troops, then fighting cannot be stopped and might even spread.

In North Kiangsu, fighting is also being extended. The Government has no intention of stopping attacks. So far, Government troops which occupy five cities; namely Jukao north of Nantung, Tien Chang west of the Grand Canal, Hsu-wi further north of Tien Chang, Hsiao Hsien southwest of Hsuehchow, and Lin Tai east of southern section of Lunghai Railroad, and many other townlets. These facts indicate that after the arrival of General Pai Chung Hsi at Hsuehchow, the Government's operational plan was to make a two prong attack both from the north and from the south. It appears to me that the Government's plan is to clear the Grand Canal communication line south from Hsuehchow to Chen Kiang. Execution of such a plan would take a long time. So far they have sustained 30,000 casualties. On the average, they occupy each city at the cost of one division. It is obvious that they cannot by force obtain their end.

In Shantung Province, along the Tsingtao-Tsinan Railroad, fighting is especially severe and the front line is moving back and forth. Two places have been recaptured by the Communists but were then again retaken by the Government troops. These two cities are Tsiyang to the northeast of Tsinan and Yitu railroad junction on the Tsingtao-Tsinan railroad.

In Shansi, General Hu Chung Nan's troops sustained three regiments losses in fighting. Fighting is still continuing to the north of Houma. I am further afraid that fighting will arise in Jehol Province. Until yesterday I received no report at all about that area. I learned however last night that the 53d Army is being sent into Chinchow. As you may recall, both the 53d and 54th Armies were shipped from south China to Shanghai. Subsequently the 54th Army went to Tsingtao while the destination of the 53d remained unknown. Recently I received a report that that army made its appearance in Chinchow. The Government plan apparently is to send the 93d, the 13th and the 53d Armies to attack Chengte in three columns. That attack will first be opened to the south of Chengte and at Kupeikou. According to the report of American members in Chengte, Communists are making preparations for evacuating heavy equipment. I believe the American report is true and I believe the Government is contemplating an attack to try to seize Chengte.

In Antung Province, some military operation is also afoot. Comparatively speaking, the situation in Manchuria was rather stable. But recently the Government is making troop dispositions in Antung Province. The Government 60th Army is the Yunnanese Army. It is making preparations for an attack. At the Sungari River crossing,

Nationalist and Communist troops are each holding one bank of that river. The American Branch suggested establishing a no-man's-land between the two lines. Each army would withdraw 30 li. Now the Government has sent troops across to the northern bank to reconnoiter Communist positions. This indicates that they will eventually open an attack against Antung and Harbin.

From the foregoing military operations, it seems that the Government's military plan is based on demands expressed by the Government at the end of June when no agreement could be reached on points of difference. Those Government demands were to annihilate Communist troops in Hupeh, to occupy north Kiangsu, to clear the Tsing-tao-Tsinan railroad and the southern section of the Tungpu railroad, to occupy Chengte and to seize Antung and Harbin; the whole military plan is worked out accordingly.

If the initiative for making attack lies only in the hands of one side, it is difficult, hardly comprehensible, that Communist troops will only take up self defense without making counterattacks. The Government plans conflicts to take place only in places where they have the initiative. Even so, they may not achieve their objective because they have no assurance of being successful in all those places. Apart from that, one must consider the possibility that Communists will make counterattacks and attack in other places. This will eventually become a full scale civil war. Of course, war minded elements within the Government may be inclined to think that it is favorable to them to instigate a full scale civil war so that there will be no room for mediation.

Recently along the Peiping-Mukden railroad, some incidents took place in connection with the U. S. Marines. The Communists have submitted one note regarding seven incidents to Executive Headquarters and, with the addition of the last note, there are altogether eight incidents. Some incidents are caused by the U. S. Marines entering Communist liberated areas. The last incident also involved Nationalist troops. If the U. S. Marines are merely for the purpose of patrolling, then it is hardly conceivable they should come into the Communist area, particularly that they come along with the Nationalist troops. This may show that some element of the Chinese Government is trying to get U. S. Marines entangled in Chinese affairs, to stage some incident along the Peiping-Mukden Railroad that will enable the Government to control more areas on both sides of the Peiping-Mukden Railroad. This seems to be their intention and this is also a part of the plot designed by those who are instigating a full civil war.²⁰

²⁰ See vol. x, pp. 848 ff.

On our part we are willing to exercise our influence to prevent a civil war. Any means that can be resorted to for that immediate purpose, we will welcome. I have in mind three different alternatives. First, as I expressed the last time, since the civil war has now assumed a general character, then we should immediately announce a nationwide truce, and all documents drawn up prior to June 30 should be signed and published, with the exception of course of the discussion of local civil administration which will be left for future discussion.

As a second alternative, we may settle the hostilities piecemeal, tackling first the most serious areas of conflict such as the Communist areas in Hupeh Province, the conflicts in north Kiangsu and in Shantung Province; that field teams should be sent to all those places to settle conflicts one by one so that eventually we may effect a general truce.

As a third alternative, we may solve the military questions along with the political questions. As I explained to Dr. Stuart last time, if we cannot reach a general truce immediately, it would be wise to discuss the political matters, trying to work out a procedure for the reorganization of the Government, so that both the political and the military questions will be straightened out simultaneously.

Should the Government reject all three proposals, then it is rather obvious that the Government is inclined to extend the civil war. Since we have no other means to stop it, then again only two ways are open. The first one is: since Government troops are continuing to occupy Communist controlled places, they cannot help but launch counter-measures in some other places. Of course, I am fully aware this would only lead to a promotion of the civil war. Under such circumstances if the Government should launch an attack on Chengte, Communist troops may launch an attack on Tatung. It would be extremely difficult to dissuade the Communist troops from taking offensive actions against Tatung or Tsinan, and if the Government troops attack Wei-an in north Kiangsu then it would be difficult to keep the Communist troops from attacking Hsuehow. We are aware that this tends to aggravate the situation and is therefore extremely dangerous.

The second way, which we may be forced to accept, is to express public statements both toward the whole country as well as abroad to Americans that a general civil war is existing, that China is in a state of civil war and there is indication that the situation will be further deteriorated.

At the same time, if the Government's intention is really not civil war but peace, as I was assured by Dr. Stuart, than I can hardly perceive how they can keep on fighting without showing any willingness

to settle the issues by peaceful means. If the issues are eventually to be resolved through negotiations on the status of January 10 in China Proper and the status of June 7 in Manchuria, it will have to be resolved that armies of both parties will be withdrawn to that line. Under such circumstances what is the purpose of making further attacks? I am still at a loss to understand the Government's intention unless it is the Government's intention to keep those places which they have occupied. If both parties persist in occupying after the peace deadline, then a deadlock will take place and the whole purpose of effecting a truce will be defeated. If the war is going on, the situation will become more and more complicated and the more difficult for a settlement. I am trying all my power to control the situation.

First with regard to the Peiping-Mukden Railroad, I wonder if it is advisable that the plan to evacuate the U. S. Marines include a provision that we send field teams to protect the railroad. I believe that the communications will be better protected. Of course, the field teams should also get assurances that Government troops will not use the line as a basis for attacks toward adjacent Communist areas. Then the Communists will also take up the promise not to destroy the railroad. Should the Marines need to go to nearby Communist villages, they should first notify Communist members and go with a Communist. Seeing that the situation is so serious, I am anxious to see that it is kept in hand.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Has General Chou any comment to make about this recent action involving the Marines, some 35 miles from Peiping?

GENERAL CHOU: As soon as I read it from the newspapers, I sent a wire to inquire on the matter. So far I have only received this report from the newspaper on the matter. (Hands General Marshall the report²¹). It is not an official report. I have not yet received any formal report from General Yeh.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I have waited to form any conclusion regarding this matter until I received a formal report from the investigating officers sent out by the Marine commander at the direction of Admiral Cooke,²² also until I had had an opportunity to talk to General Chou and hear anything he cared to say on the matter. Admiral Cooke had lunch with me today and personally gave me the report of the investigating officers of what took place. In my opinion, in order to understand this matter, it is necessary to go back to various occurrences in Jehol, particularly in relation to the statement of General Lee Hsueh-Jui, the Communist commander in that region,

²¹ Apparently report of July 31 by the New China News Agency of Yen-an, not printed.

²² Vice Adm. Charles M. Cooke, Jr., Commander, U. S. 7th Fleet.

and also to the propaganda from Yen-an which relates to the same situation and to the recent abduction of 7 Marines engaged in buying ice. This statement General Chou has just handed me of the news broadcast from Yen-an is wholly different from the facts reported to me by investigating officers. One lieutenant and 41 enlisted Marines were escorting a convoy consisting of 21 small trucks (carrying the 41 men), 6 supply trucks carrying food and supplies for the Marine garrison in Peiping, but mostly for the Executive Headquarters, 1 UNRRA truck with a Chinese driver and 1 staff car with 3 U. S. Army officers reporting to Executive Headquarters.

Now, this Yen-an broadcast has, so far as I can see, but two correct statements. That is that there was a fight in which casualties were sustained by both sides and later in the afternoon U. S. reinforcements arrived from Tientsin. Other than that it is a complete, and I think a deliberate, misrepresentation. In the first place this column conveying supplies for the Executive Headquarters, except the one UNRRA truck, encountered a road block and when a young officer went forward to inquire what this meant, he was shot and killed. Instantly firing was opened with rifle, machine guns, and trench mortars. We have no accurate data on the number of Communists involved. It was estimated at 300. That continued for four hours and it ceased when a Communist officer displayed a white flag. The column then proceeded on to Peiping without all the trucks. Later a relief party from Tientsin arrived and took all the trucks and drove them to Peiping. The town of Ampeng [*Anping*] was not raided, the 8th Route Army was not forced to defend itself, there were no Kuomintang troops involved or present, according to the reports we have which I think are correct.

Now, I would like to analyze this occurrence in relation to what I have been trying to do. Dr. Stuart and I have been endeavoring to persuade the Generalissimo to issue an order for the cessation of hostilities and to approach the present situation on a high level of political reorganization of the Government immediately. I am met always with statements that the fighting which is going on is initiated by the Communists in Kiangsu and in other places. I don't agree with the Government because I feel that at least part of this fighting has been initiated by the Government. Nevertheless, their contention is to me, that the responsibility rests with the Communists just as General Chou places the responsibility with the Government. Since June 14th, I think the major aggressive action has been on the part of the Government. The Government does not admit that. We have been endeavoring to bring to a quick conclusion this fighting before it spread into general uncontrollable civil war. I think that General Chou's purpose at the present time and my purpose are almost identi-

cal. I have been pursuing this course and ignoring entirely the vicious Communist propaganda which is virtually directed against me because I am responsible, in their misrepresentations of the American presence in China and which is paralleled to my further embarrassment by a similar Soviet propaganda. I use the expression, "embarrassment" meaning in my relations and my influence with the Central Government.

Tragic as were the assassinations in Kunming in effect they have exerted an influence on the Government favorably in my proposals because they had a very definite effect on official, political and public opinion in the United States. Just at the critical moment in the efforts of Dr. Stuart and myself to secure exactly what General Chou has been endeavoring to get, we have this second deliberate offensive action on the part of this Communist commander in Hopei, or Jehol, I don't know which. In connection with his protests to Executive Headquarters, I read into his previous action of permitting the efforts to intimidate my American representative in Chengte, and this recent representation he must have made to Yen-an, which is almost a complete fabrication. I can't imagine any single thing at the present time which could have been so unfortunate from the viewpoint of the desires of the Communist Party as put forward by General Chou. It puts me in a still more difficult position with the Central Government, because it is going to have exactly the opposite effect on the American people, because Americans don't accept this sort of thing calmly.

I would rather await in this matter until General Chou has heard from his own people, that is officially. I wanted him to know immediately what I think is the disastrous effect of this procedure which I assume is due to the attitude of the local commander in that region, judging from past occurrences.

I accepted the fact that American officers would be under fire from time to time in the ordinary performance of their duty on the field teams. That has been unavoidable. As a matter of fact, I think we have been very fortunate that some of them have not been badly hurt. These other occurrences are quite different matters, especially as it appears that in this case the supplies were directly concerned with Executive Headquarters, except the truck of UNRRA supplies. I agree with General Chou that the start of hostilities is generally that of civil war and I have assumed that it is on the verge of spreading into a general state of civil war. My fear, rather my belief is that it will soon get beyond control of either side. Serious as that is, carrying the country to the verge of a chaotic condition, nevertheless I have come to the conclusion that the military settlement, while an immediate necessity so far as is necessary to stop the fighting, is a

secondary consideration, that if we are to save this situation, it must be done by the immediate initiation of some form of coalition government. It would seem to me and to Dr. Stuart that the initiation of the State Council is the only practical approach. General Chou has mentioned the possible complication of the resumption of the situation as of January 13 which I imagine will immediately present a difficult point of compromise. I have not discussed this with the Government at all. As we approach the conclusion of our negotiations regarding military adjustments, the Government position was to resume that of January 13th. As General Chou has said the situation has since changed very radically and I anticipate that will bring new difficulties for adjustment which will increase every day. Incidentally, I have not discussed with any member of the Government this affair of the Marines, but I can anticipate exactly what the effect is going to be. It will not be to my advantage in pressing for a solution to the general situation.

GENERAL CHOU: I am inquiring about the statement of General Lee. I am not familiar with the statement.

GENERAL MARSHALL: It is following the release of the 7 Marines and then he submits this protest to the Communist member of the team. The message is from the Communist member of the peace team at Peitaho, sent to Commissioner Yeh Chien Ying signed Colonel Lee Kwang Tze (member of team). He first speaks of the Marines, that they were well treated, then he says "according to our Lee Hsueh Jui, commander of those areas, the American troops stationed along the Peiping-Liaoning railroad invaded our liberated areas. On June [July] 9th, American soldiers with automatic rifles and one automobile from Tongshan entered our Chen-ku-chuang and Ding-fu-chuang area, 20 li west of Tongshan and on afternoon of same day more than 10 American Marines in one truck entered again said district for activities. The afternoon of June [July] 10th, American soldiers with a jeep came from Hsing Ling to our Chien-pow-chen area, 20 li N. E. of Kyui railroad station and they took foodstuff. When our commander objected they paid no attention to such objection. July 11th more than 10 American soldiers stationed at the bridge 53 at Shih-fakow with 3 amphibious tractors entered the vicinity of our Ta Hsi-fachiang area 30 li S. W. of Hsien and destroyed much agricultural area. On afternoon of July 13th 8 Americans from Len Hso Ying went with 1 auto to Hsiao-nan-ching and fired one shot and we fired two shots in the air and they were captured and disarmed by our troops. The three points just mentioned on which the Americans did not send any notifications or proceed beforehand, but just according to their wishes invaded our liberated areas is unreasonable." The next refers to the

7 Marines. It says all of these occurrences indicate that the Americans are supporting the Chinese civil war.

GENERAL CHOU: I also received a similar report on the incident you just read from your reports with a slightly different version, but all of the information came from Peiping. I feel that the severity of the whole question is not only connected with these unfortunate incidents, but in the very existence of such a problem. According to your analysis, the statement made by Yen-an had produced certain effect among the lower officers and therefore the attack of the local commanders toward the American forces stationed in that area has given rise to such an incident. This is one side of the story. We are confronted with three points. First, the mission of the U. S. Marines in north China is to protect the railroad, but on the other hand we are also aware that the Nationalist troops are using that railroad to transport arms and to launch attacks against the Communist areas. Of course these two are two separate matters but obviously the Communist personnel naturally would think about the result of such a coincidence.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I will have a careful check made by the Marine commanders of the Government troop movements from Tientsin to Chinwangtao. I think there have been almost none. Where the Government has been using the railroad is from Chinwangtao to Manchuria, with which the Marines have nothing to do. The Marines have been guarding the railroad from Chinwangtao to Tongshan the coal mine area.

GENERAL CHOU: Secondly, we must take into consideration that Nationalist troops are right now waging a war against the Communists and so naturally they have a tendency to hail a conflict between U. S. Marines and the Communist troops, and the more the civil war is extended, the more they hope that the conflict of the Marines and the Communists will be enlarged. We may say with certainty that such an intention is existing and this is a factor that must be taken into consideration.

Thirdly, the U. S. Marines of course feel that they are invited, having secured the approval of the Government, to go to north China and that they may move around freely in that area, but in view of the complications of the North China situation where two Chinese armies are standing hostile to each other, it is quite possible that they may not fully evaluate the complication of that situation. I think that factor should be taken into consideration.

Though the cases cited by Commander Li in his note refers only to minor incidents, viewed from the angle of the local commanders they are, to him, not so small and they are liable to lead to conflict.

Now, regarding the latest incidents, so far I have not received any official report but I am very much concerned over this matter. Regardless of what the Yen-an press release states, I feel that an investigation should be made as to the actual situation as to when the American convoy first arrived at that spot, how the reported 300 Communists made a sudden raid on the convoy. If the report by the American side be true then it appears to me there must be some cause behind it and we must find it out. What is the reason that led them to open fire on the American convoy, whether merely because they came in 21 trucks or were there some other considerations behind it. It might be possible that the Nationalists side sent a small band to instigate some hostilities which then led to armed resistance on the Communist side. The Communists may have tried to ambush another Nationalist attack while [*sic*] Nationalists were already aware that some American convoy was going to pass that point and therefore they tried first to project some incident. Of course this is merely presumption on my part but it is not entirely impossible.

I have no intention of making an entirely unilateral investigation because the report I receive may vary quite considerably from the American side and instead of clarifying the situation would only complicate it. Since the matter concerns Executive Headquarters, I hold the view that Executive Headquarters should send its most able staff in the form of a peace team to investigate the incident and the related matters. They should determine the responsibility, whether 1, 2 or 3 sides are at fault, and then make recommendation to Executive Headquarters to announce punishment of the sides responsible. If we wish normal relations to be maintained on all sides, then we must tackle this incident with a responsible attitude. Of course any investigation reports submitted by the U. S. Marines or by our side may also be used as reference and once the whole situation has been clarified and the guilty party has been determined it would not influence our other issues. This is my suggestion to this matter.

You just mentioned that this incident will give some argument for the public opinion and may affect negotiations. Of course such kind of reaction is unavoidable but the attitude I would like to assume is toward the settlement of this incident. We are anxious to determine the true responsibility for this incident. It is our attitude that all three parties should participate in the investigation, unlike the Government attitude in investigating the Kunming incident by appointing only the Government people to that party. We want to clarify the whole matter because this incident is not in line with our policy because it would defeat any purpose we may have for the present time. Such an incident must be caused by certain factors. We must, therefore, get to the root of the incident and find the true responsibility. I fully realize that this incident will be used by the Government

as a pretext to block your efforts, but this can only be effective for a short time and in the long run if my suggestion with regard to the west section of the Peiping-Mukden line can be accepted it would insure communication and would also guarantee the freedom and safety of the American Marines in that part.

GENERAL MARSHALL: In connection with what General Chou has recommended and the message I have just received from Commissioner Robertson, I am agreeable to sending this message, "Since the Nationalists and Communists both wish to make a fact-finding investigation, it appears advisable to send a special team carefully selected, especially as to the American Member." (General Marshall later added the sentence, "General Chou concurs with this message."²³) Is that agreeable General Chou?

GENERAL CHOU: Very good. I fully understand and approve the sending of this team. I agree entirely to the message General Marshall is sending. I also am sending a message to General Yeh, asking him to send a capable staff member from his fact-finding team to investigate the matter. If the responsibility should be on the part of the Communists, it will be shown. I desire to find a settlement on the incident and not to make it more complicated and worse.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Would it be convenient for General Chou to see me tomorrow at 4:30 p. m.? Of course if nothing comes up in the meantime it may not be necessary but I thought it best to have a tentative date for 4:30. I will reaffirm it tomorrow.

GENERAL CHOU: Very well. Have you sent any reply telegram to the 9th Field Team with regard to the agreement they reached?

GENERAL MARSHALL: I received your message about that and I sent you a note which you have not yet received. I repeated your note to Peiping and asked if they could get the Commissioners to agree to that. If they agree, it will save us from running into a block at this end. I thought it was best to try to get it settled there because they deal directly with the team, and also because they might reach a settlement, while down here we might not.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270: Telegram

General Marshall to Mr. Walter S. Robertson, at Peiping

NANKING, 1 August 1946.

1224. Reference your 6268,²⁴ since Nationalist and Communists both wish to make a factfinding investigation, it appears advisable to send a special team carefully selected especially as to American member.

General Chou En Lai concurs in this message.

²³ See telegram No. 1224, August 1, *infra*.

²⁴ August 1, p. 1426.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Colonel Marshall S. Carter to General Marshall ²⁵

[WASHINGTON,] 2 August 1946.

96471. At a full Cabinet meeting yesterday the China situation was discussed at length. The President believed it desirable that shortly after his return to Washington on Wednesday 7 August 1946, he issue a statement bringing up to date his policy of 15 December 1945 ²⁶ but not deviating therefrom in any basic principles. I hope to be able to furnish you the full text of the statement in time for your review prior to its issuance by the President. The State Department has been directed to draft the statement and has asked me to obtain your preliminary views in the matter. Therefore, I would appreciate knowing the following:

a. Do you have any objections to a policy statement by the President at this time?

b. If not, do you have any views which you particularly desire the President to include in his statement?

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

*President Chiang Kai-shek to Major General Keller E. Rockey,
U. S. M. C., at Tientsin* ²⁷

[KULING,] August 2, 1946.

47. I am deeply concerned over the attack on the American Marines in Tientsin and have instructed Generals Li Tsung Jen and Cheng Kai Ming to assist you in every way possible in the investigation of this regrettable affair. Please convey to your officers and men my deep sympathy and regret over this loss and suffering of their comrades who were killed and wounded.

CHIANG KAI-SHEK

711.93/8-246

The Chinese Ambassador (Koo) to President Truman ²⁸

WASHINGTON, 2 August 1946.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I beg to transmit to you the following message from President Chiang Kai-shek, which I have just received:

²⁵ Forwarded by Colonel Caughey to General Marshall at Kuling in telegram No. 1247, August 4, not printed.

²⁶ For text, see *United States Relations With China*, p. 607.

²⁷ Sent apparently by Capt. Ernest K. H[orace] Eng of General Marshall's staff, at Kuling, who was handed the message "by the Generalissimo's secretary".

²⁸ Copy transmitted to the Department by the White House on August 7.

"President Truman: Your kind telegram²⁹ communicated to me through General George C. Marshall has been received. I am sorry to learn that General A. C. Wedemeyer is unable to return to China. During the time of our war of resistance, General Wedemeyer, pursuant to Your Excellency's policy of assistance to China, had rendered to us valuable service which contributed in great measure to the success in the China theater. The Government and people of China as well as I personally are deeply appreciative of his efforts. I take this opportunity, therefore, to convey to you my sincere thanks and my best wishes for your good health. Chiang Kai-shek"

I remain [etc.]

V. K. WELLINGTON KOO

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

*General Marshall to President Truman*³⁰

[NANKING,] 2 August 1946.

[1229.] DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Reference the Communist attack of 29 July on a Marine Detachment or convoy near Peiping, the Navy Department has received the Marine report of the incident. Meanwhile at the personal request of Chou En Lai, as well as the Generalissimo, a fact finding team of selected individuals from Executive Hqs has been sent out to make a report and to determine responsibility. I delayed such action until the Marine investigation had been completed and the Communists made a personal request for such action because of the almost inevitable charge that the Government Representative in the investigating team would automatically side with the American member. I stated this reason to Chou En Lai.

Doctor Stuart in Kuling has so far recovered his health as to have had a long conference with the Generalissimo in which he secured a tentative agreement to the appointment of a group of Government and Communist representatives to sit with Doctor Stuart as chairman, to determine an immediate method for initiating a reorganization of the Government. This committee will point toward establishing an effective State Council concurrently with a cessation of hostilities. The Generalissimo utilized the Communist-Marine Corps incident as a reason for delaying decision but has agreed to discuss the entire matter with me and Doctor Stuart in Kuling where I go tomorrow afternoon. I had a long talk along this same line with T. V. Soong this morning and he is also leaving for Kuling tomorrow. He is strongly opposed to the actions, terroristic in my opinion, of Chen Li Fu, the

²⁹ See telegram No. 95133, July 22, from Colonel Carter to General Marshall, p. 1397.

³⁰ Copy transmitted on August 2 by the War Department to the Secretary of State.

political leader of the Kuomintang and the virtual successor of Tai Li, former head of all secret police or plain-clothesmen operations in China. Soong is urging immediate steps to establish a more Democratic form of Government, but where he may or may not differ from Stuart and I, is regarding the urgent necessity in our opinion for creating the State Council of 40 members, which in effect would give a form of genuine legislative action for control or guidance of the existing Government. I think I have convinced Soong of the necessity for such action.

I had a lengthy session with Chou En Lai yesterday, Thursday, and another scheduled for tomorrow Saturday morning. I leave for Kuling at 1 o'clock.

Admiral Cooke, Seventh Fleet, and I have been in personal conference over Marine Corps-Communist incident. He is at Kuling so will see him again tomorrow. Meanwhile, I should receive information from Executive Hqs which should guide us as to appropriate action in the case.

Respectfully yours,

G. C. MARSHALL

893.00/8-246

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

No. 22

NANKING, August 2, 1946.

[Received August 14.]

SIR: Referring to the Department's telegram no. 517 of July 26, 1946,³¹ in which it was requested that an air mail report be submitted of the results of the trip to Kunming of Second Secretary of Embassy Philip D. Sprouse, I have the honor to enclose: (a) copy of a memorandum dated August 1, 1946, entitled "Departure from the Consular Premises at Kunming of Chinese under the Protection of the Consulate General; Assurances of Protection by the Chinese Authorities at Kunming"; and (b) copy of a memorandum, dated August 1, 1946, entitled "The Question of Responsibility for the Assassinations of Li Kung-pu and Wen I-to at Kunming", both of which were prepared at my request by Mr. Sprouse.

Each of these memoranda contains a summary of its contents. It is pertinent, however, to emphasize that the American involvement in the incident as a result of the Consulate General's affording protection to the Chinese refugees seems to have ended satisfactorily and in an amicable spirit—at least on the surface. The friendly attitude of the Chinese authorities at Kunming during the visit of Mr. Sprouse is felt to be due to the approach made to the Generalissimo by General Marshall and Ambassador Stuart in this regard.

³¹ Not printed.

This belief is strengthened by the circumstance that on the day prior to the departure of the refugees, General Lu Han, Chairman of the Yunnan Provincial Government, General Ku Chu-tung, Commander of the Chinese Armed Forces, and General Ho Kuei-chang, Commander of the Yunnan Garrison Headquarters, are said to have arrived at Kunming from Kuling, where they had been summoned by the Generalissimo. The action of the Consulate General in affording protection to the refugees is believed to have been warmly approved in all non-official circles at Kunming.

It is not possible to fix the responsibility for the assassinations but the vast majority of reports and rumors current at Kunming point to elements within the Kuomintang. It is believed, however, that the official version of the case will implicate anti-Government Yunnan provincial supporters of General Lung Yun, former provincial chairman, with possible Communist financial connection. Democratic League sources at Nanking state that their request to the Central Government to send representatives to Kunming to participate in a joint investigation of the assassinations was refused by the Nanking authorities, but that they have been given permission to conduct their own separate investigation.

In order that knowledge of this incident will not be interpreted by other consular officers in China as indicating a change in the Department's policy regarding the according of temporary refuge or asylum, the Embassy is circularizing them in the sense of its telegram no. 63 of July 17, 6:00 p. m. to Kunming repeated to the Department as no. 1156 of July 17, 6:00 [5:00] p. m.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:
W. WALTON BUTTERWORTH
Minister-Counselor of Embassy

[Enclosure 1]

*Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in China
(Sprouse)*

[NANKING,] August 1, 1946.

Summary. On July 27 assurance of full protection for the Chinese refugees residing in the Consulate General were given to Mr. Melby and Mr. Sprouse by the Yunnan Garrison Headquarters, and by 1:00 p. m. on July 28 all members of the refugee group had returned either to their homes, to one of the universities or to the three places of residence chosen by them and agreed to by the Garrison Headquarters. Both the Garrison Headquarters authorities and General Lu Han, Provincial Chairman, were cordial in their discussions of the matter with officers of the Embassy and Consulate General and expressed

appreciation of their assistance. On July 28 General Lu Han also gave assurances of protection for the refugees, and both he and Garrison Headquarters authorities stated they would facilitate the departure of the refugees from Kunming. The refugees expect to leave Kunming during the present week. Chinese at Kunming are believed to approve warmly the action of the Consulate General in affording protection to the refugees. The friendly manner in which the incident was settled is felt to be due primarily to the approach made to the Generalissimo by General Marshall and Ambassador Stuart in this regard. *End of Summary.*

[Here follows detailed report.]

PHILIP D. SPROUSE

[Enclosure 2]

*Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in China
(Sprouse)*

[NANKING,] August 1, 1946.

Summary. Direct and conclusive evidence of Central Government responsibility for the recent assassinations of Li Kung-pu and Wen I-to at Kunming has not been obtained nor has any evidence yet been made known which would establish the guilt of anti-Government Yunnan provincial interests of the Communist Party. The vast majority of reports and rumors at Kunming indicate Central Government complicity in the assassinations and this estimate is strengthened by a consideration of possible motives behind the murders. On the other hand, there are rumors at Kunming which implicate anti-Central Government provincial supporters of General Lung Yun, former provincial chairman. Similar rumors indicate Communist instigation through the use of large sums of money as reward to the authors of the plot. Central Government sources state arrests have been made and a report on the cases will shortly be made public. *End of Summary.*

[Here follows detailed report.]

PHILIP D. SPROUSE

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270: Telegram

Mr. Walter S. Robertson to General Marshall

PEIPING, 3 August 1946.

6407. Reurad 1224.³² A 3-way agreement has been signed for the immediate dispatch of a fact-finding team to investigate and report

³² August 1, p. 1437.

upon the ambush of Marine convoy on the Peiping-Tientsin road, 29 July. Field Team 25 has been selected for this mission. Colonel M. F. Davis former general officer who has had broad experience as chairman Team 7 is designated as U. S. member and team chairman.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai at No. 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, August 3, 1946, 11 a. m.

Also present: Colonel Hutchin
Mr. Chang

GENERAL MARSHALL: (Opened the meeting by handing General Chou a copy of the last report³³ on the ambush of the Marine convoy).

Dr. Stuart had a long conference with the Generalissimo. His proposal was that a special committee be organized with Dr. Stuart as the chairman for the purpose of reaching an agreement for the immediate organization of the State Council. Such a committee would be informal, in a sense that is, it should meet in Nanking and not Kuling. He (Dr. Stuart) stated in a message to me that the Generalissimo seemed to have agreed in principle with the proposal, but wished to delay any decision until he had discussed the matter again with Dr. Stuart and with me. I notified Dr. Stuart to remain in Kuling until I arrived there. That is the basis for the discussion with the Generalissimo at the present time.

Now I hope to have an immediate meeting with the Generalissimo so that Dr. Stuart can return here tomorrow and see General Chou. I will probably remain there with the Generalissimo in order to have some quick means of taking up with him the points reported to me by Dr. Stuart that represent a difference and regarding which the Government representatives do not seem to have the authority to negotiate. However, I will have to let the progress of events decide my movements. In these matters it has seemed best to me to utilize Dr. Stuart so far as possible in the political negotiations instead of myself because it not only obviates the necessity for an interpreter which slows down all talks a great deal, but he knows most of the individuals personally as well as having a special understanding of Chinese reactions, procedure and political history.

GENERAL CHOU: Of course it is a good thing that along with the negotiations for truce we will try to settle the question of the Government reorganization. We will have to wait to see what kind of a procedure will be adopted. Of course I will wait for Dr. Stuart to

³³ Apparently a report prepared by General Rockey, not printed.

come here to learn the results of his discussion with the Generalissimo. I wonder if the Government is now trying to stall by initiating the political discussions while on the military side a full-fledged civil war is being waged and in view of this situation the efforts toward political settlement may again be defeated. That is what I am worried about. Now I have received two reports which are of a serious nature. The first one is at noon yesterday Yen-an was bombed as may also be testified by the American liaison officers there. 7 Nationalist planes of which 6 are P-47's and 1 B-24 came from the southern direction. The first strafed the outskirts of the city for over twenty minutes, shooting over 10,000 machine gun bullets. Subsequently they released 11 bombs. They had two places as targets. The first one is the airfield and one Nationalist B-24 plane which came over to the Communist area from Kunming the end of June was destroyed. The second target place is near Wang-chia-ping. That is the place where you met Chairman Mao Tse Tung and General Chu Teh and where Chairman Mao is living. I am still awaiting detailed report about the casualties.

The American liaison officers also helped to examine the pieces of the bombs and bullet shells and testify that they are American made and are of the time bomb type.

The second report is that definite instructions have been issued to the Nationalist Hsuechow headquarters (General Hsueh Yueh and General Cheng Hsueh Chung) that a general offensive will be launched today northward along the Tientsin-Pukow railroad toward the southern part of Shantung. The offensive will be taken up in three routes. The first is on the eastern route from Haichow, the eastern terminus of the Lunghai railroad, toward Lin-i, the Communist headquarters of the New Fourth Army. The central route is from Hsuechow toward Taier-chuang, which lies south of Tsao-chuang. The western route is from Hsuechow along the Tientsin-Pukow railroad toward Teng-hsien. It is planned to reach these objectives within two or three weeks to reach the line Lin-i-Teng-hsien. For that purpose the army units, which comprise six army units, now stationed at Haichow and Hsuechow are deployed. This information is absolutely reliable that the attack will be opened today.

When I relayed day before yesterday that the Government is planning to attack in seven areas, I did not take the Tientsin-Hsuechow section into consideration. I did not expect that the attack in this section will be opened right now, but now instead of seven we have eight places. The purpose of the Government is obvious. They hope during the process of negotiation to occupy all those previously mentioned places; namely, to annihilate the Communists in Hupeh, to occupy north Kiangsu, to clear the Tsingtao-Tsinan railroad and the

southern section of the Tungpu railroad, and to seize Chengte, An-tung, Harbin, and now plus the Tientsin-Pukou railroad. They try by these means to obtain their purpose and that explains why they refused our representative in Hsian, Mr. Chou, to meet the chairman of the 9th and 32d field teams which by now arrived at Hsian. The field teams cannot enjoy free movement. This shows that they are unwilling to cease their attack upon the Communist troops in Hupeh.

On the other hand, we now have the bombing of Yen-an. The purpose can be nothing less than to get the Communist Party provoked to plunge into the total civil war. That purpose can also be detected from two pieces of propaganda. The first one is the statement recently made by Doctor Peng, Minister of Information, in Kuling in which he stated that ultimately we will reach a political settlement but it will take some time. By that he implies that the negotiation will be drawn out so as to enable the Government to reach its military purpose in the meantime.

Secondly, is the public speech given by a war minded general in which he stated that if the Communist Party would accept a total civil war then it would greatly facilitate a settlement. This shows their intention to get us drawn into a total war.

The situation now put before us is very complicated. While the negotiations are being drawn out the fighting will be spread out. Suppose the Communists, instead of playing a peaceful part, go over into some places to the active side. Then the areas of conflict will be enlarged and this may provide an opportunity for the Generalissimo to manoeuver in such a way that if we would yet concede to his demands in the negotiation so that he can lay hold on the disputed places then he can call off the fighting. If his desire with regard to those eight places are not complied with and the fighting is being intensified then he can make an announcement about a general civil war. Such a situation is extremely dangerous. Therefore I am thinking that if we do not approach the problem from effecting a truce first, we may face such a situation that while we are talking about the political matters the fighting will be more and more intensified and it may get completely lost. Therefore I am still of the opinion that while the political discussion is going on we must find means of effecting a truce. It can be accomplished either by the announcement of a general truce, or by effecting the truce piecemeal as I explained last time, instead of intensifying the war.

As to the bombing of Yen-an, I have not yet received any instruction from Yen-an, but merely information. Therefore, I reserve the right to make further comment.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I would like to point out to you at this moment that the proposition to have the political discussion at this time was

suggested by Dr. Stuart. It was not the proposal of the Government.

GENERAL CHOU: It is true that the proposition of opening the political discussion is brought up by Dr. Stuart, but what I meant to say is that the Government would not flatly refuse such a discussion, but they may have in mind to stall it.

Coming to the Marine incident in the neighborhood of Peiping, all sides have agreed to send a special mission to investigate the situation. I would rather wait for the result of the investigation, but right now the Government is intensifying propaganda on this subject. According to the American report you have just shown me, and which was published in the papers yesterday, the American side claims that it is a raid upon the American personnel. The report I received from our side, which was submitted by the local commanders to Commissioner Yeh and relayed to me is essentially similar to the broadcast released by Yen-an which claimed that not only American, but also Nationalist troops were present. Secondly, that the U. S. personnel was a patrol unit which was also admitted by the U. S. Marines. It is further said that they have patrolled that point for three times. It is essentially of a military nature. Thirdly, that place where the incident took place belongs to the Communist liberated area because the highway between Peiping and Tientsin goes through the Communist area. In that respect it is different. I don't know what was the procedure in the past for the passers-by but, as a normal procedure, notification should be given before they pass. The American report also admitted some firing took place and both sides sustained casualties. The papers reported the American headquarters in Peiping gave the figure of Communist casualties as 8 dead and over 10 wounded. Judging from the report I have received from my side, it seems that the whole matter is still worthy of investigation. I am particularly interested to find out how the incident was provoked, whether the Nationalists are involved in the matter. Of course I am perfectly willing to wait for the result of the investigation made by the special mission, that the responsibility will be determined. It is most probable that the Generalissimo will utilize this incident to intensify the military warfare and which is worthy of serious attention.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I have not previously heard of the bombing of Yen-an. I can understand the probable purpose of the Government in destroying the bombing plane that had previously landed there. I don't understand the purpose of bombing elsewhere in Yen-an. No report has come from our detachment there. I assume that one will be received within the course of the day. I am aware of the rapidly disintegrating military situation. I am intensely desirous for having an order issued for the cessation of hostilities, as is Dr. Stuart. The problem on our part is how to get an agreement to permit the issuance

of that order immediately. That is what we are struggling towards at the present time. That was one reason I regretted so much the incident of the Marine Corps just at this particular moment because I felt that the Chinese Government would probably react to the incident in a manner that was not conducive to a cessation of hostilities.

With regard to the situation in Hupeh and Team 9, I received on August 1st a summary of the recommendations of Team 9 submitted to me by General Hsu.³⁴ In that letter it said that Director Chen (Commander in Hankow) radioed a report on 23 July that up to that moment no reply had been received from Li Hsien Nien³⁵ and that his headquarters (Chen's) and the field teams had really done their best in a last attempt to effect a truce but that Li Hsien-nien had refused to accept mediation. Previously Chen had radioed a report that according to the statement of Colonel Ho Chu Chin that he would return to Hankow if Li Hsien Nien's representative had not arrived before the 18th of July. Furthermore, that if General Li's troops did not advance further west then the matter could be completely settled within three or four days. Another radio from Director Chen on the 22d stated that Li Hsien-nien did not come to Hsin-chuang in acceptance of their invitation. Team 9 again dropped leaflets on the 21st of July asking Li to meet with Field Team 32, that if Li failed to appear the teams would fly to Peiping for instructions. I gave you the sense of his last radio of the 23d of July. This communication further states that an agreement was reached by teams 9 and 32 on 15 July near Lao-ho-kou that the Government representative had agreed to a cease fire on both sides for a period of 24 hours pending the arrival of a representative of General Li's headquarters. Those are just some of the items of information that the Government sent me which I transmitted to the Commissioners in Peiping, but which would not have reached them on the critical date of August 2 that General Chou referred to in his statement. I am going to take up to Dr. Stuart a copy of General Chou's remarks to me today and those of the other day. Is there anything further that General Chou would like me to tell Doctor Stuart.

GENERAL CHOU: With regard to Doctor Stuart, I share the view of having an informal meeting regarding the Government reorganization. I think that as soon as some suitable basis has been reached the whole plan should be passed as a formality by the steering committee of the PCC because this is the normal procedure, and I would also like to remind Doctor Stuart to get in touch with the other parties in the course of discussion so that they will not feel that they are com-

³⁴ Memorandum of July 30 by General Hsu Yung-chang, not printed.

³⁵ Commander of the Chinese Communist troops in the Hankow area.

pletely detached from the discussion. I have mentioned the last point to Doctor Stuart but I would like to remind him.

I have a few remarks regarding General Li Hsien Nien's affairs. I received a similar memo from General Hsu enumerating the points you just outlined but to me it appears the crucial issue now is that General Li is constantly being pursued by the Government troops. He therefore cannot bring his troops to a stop because when he stops fighting will occur and his chief concern is to avoid fighting. If he stops, he must prepare for fighting. By now the field teams have arrived at Hsian. The 8th Route Army has one office in Hsian and its director, Mr. Chou, can make negotiations with the Government side and the field teams in behalf of General Li and then he will inform General Li to send his own men out to Hsian to conclude the negotiation. Therefore, what we should now do is instruct Executive Headquarters to communicate to General Hu Chung Nan to permit Mr. Chou, Director of the Communist Office, to contact the field teams and to talk with them on behalf of General Li.

Meeting was adjourned.

893.00/8-346 : Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, August 3, 1946—4 p. m.

[Received August 5—1: 20 a. m.]

1257. Growing animosity toward America increasingly apparent in Yen-an broadcasts for week ending August 3. Criticism of American policy re war criminals, and America's confirmation of "Kuo-mintang" mentioned in every newscast. In nearly all reports of fighting "Kmt troops" referred to as "American trained and equipped". Anping incident of July 29 between US Marines and 8th Route Army in which four Marines were killed and several wounded reported in broadcast as Communist defensive action against US Marines and Kmt troops, and was referred to as "hostile act against Chinese people". *Emancipation Daily* editorial stated: "From standpoint of Chinese people, we should demand apology from United States Marines in Tientsin and punishment of officers directly responsible for incident." Item on July 31 charged Marines in Tsingtao are constructing gun emplacements and part of 15 US Naval vessels turned over to Central Government have been used against 8th Route Army off Chefoo and Weihaiwei. Broadcast of July 31 reported two divisions of Central Government's 53rd Army and part of 54th transported by American vessel to Tsingtao and charged that prior to this

General Marshall had promised US vessels would carry these armies only as far north as Shanghai. Long press telegram of [to?] New York by Yen-an reporter on civil war situation, quoted in full, ended “. . . ³⁶ it is generally believed that US aid will play decisive role in prolonging or calling halt to Chiang Kai-shek's game of stalling peace and democratization of Kmt Government in China.”

Reports of fighting in Shantung, Kiangsu-Anhwei border region and Hupeh-Honan pocket continued. Chiang Kai-shek charged with unscrupulous use of undisarmed Japanese and puppet troops and Korean nationals in fighting 8th Route and new 4th Armies.

“Helplessness and timorousness” of Vice Minister National Defense Ministry at war crimes trials described in bitter *Emancipation Daily* editorial as national disgrace seldom seen in history. Editorial charged that “American authorities today are not adopting stern attitude towards Fascist criminals but attitude of appeasement in Japan”.

Other items reported virtual demise of industry in Szechuan province due to lack of aid from Kmt Government, negotiations on Yellow River question, new business enterprises in Kalgan and Communist land policy in Chahar.

Sent Department as 1257. Department please repeat Moscow.

STUART

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

General Marshall to Colonel Marshall S. Carter ³⁷

NANKING, 5 August 1946.

1258. Doctor Stuart and I agree that Presidential statement at this moment undesirable from local China point of view because in effect it would strengthen the Generalissimo's resistance to our demands for his agreement to cessation of hostilities and simultaneous discussions for immediate creation of State Council. A week or 10 days later such a statement might prove, in our opinion, advisable. Draft could be processed now. But, meanwhile we are considering draft of a suggested confidential message from President to Gimo reflecting seriously on evident suppression of expression of liberal views of most highly educated group in China and public spirited citizens generally, while narrowminded and bigoted militarists and a small nucleus of political irreconcilables pursue open civil war.

³⁶ Omission indicated in the original.

³⁷ Forwarded to Colonel Carter in Washington by Colonel Caughey as received from General Marshall at Kuling.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*The Minister-Counselor of Embassy in China (Butterworth) to
Colonel J. Hart Caughey*

NANKING, August 5, 1946.

DEAR COLONEL CAUGHEY: There is transcribed below a statement for General Marshall:

Assuming that President Truman is not now compelled for domestic political reasons to make a public statement on China but is mainly desirous of doing so as a means of furthering your efforts, I would not counsel the issuance of such a statement at this time.

It may be that the Gimo being aware of the extent of your plenary powers is not equally aware that your statements to him exactly reflect the general attitude and policy of the government—and for that matter informed American opinion as well. If the purpose of such a public statement by the President is to disabuse the Gimo of these misconceptions and to bring pressure on him to effect the political compromises we desire, then it seems to us that there are other more effective and suitable means of achieving this end at this particular stage, such as a personal communication from the President to the Gimo which, incidentally, could and should be phrased in stronger terms than in a public statement, and of course it could at a future date be made public. Such a letter should certainly emphasize the failure of the government to take concrete steps in implementing the PPC³⁸ Agreements and particularly the broadening of the base of the government.

On the other hand, a public statement sufficiently strong to cause a decisive change in the Gimo's attitude and that of some of his more powerful advisers would almost inevitably so encourage the Communist Party as to change their present attitude to one of unmalleability or intransigency—not to mention the effect it would have on American opinion.

With kindest regards,

W. WALTON BUTTERWORTH

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

General Chou En-lai to General Marshall, at Kuling

NANKING, August 5, 1946.

Lodged strongest protest with General Hsu Yung-chang for transmittal to President Chiang Kai-shek regarding bombing Yen-an by Nationalist Air Force and put forth following demands:

First. Order be immediately issued for investigation into outrageous bombing; also officers held responsible be severely punished:

³⁸ People's Political Council.

Second. Entire Chinese Air Force be put under control and supervision Executive Headquarters so as prevent Chinese Air Force from participating civil war.

While forwarding you copy my memo for General Hsu, was instructed by Yen-an to ask you, Chairman Committee Three, to take up matter with National Government. Should these demands be rejected by it, would like ask you convey to United States Government our request that all lend-lease combat planes together with spare parts and ammunition previously handed over Chinese Government be withdrawn immediately, so as avoid aggravation Chinese civil war and massacre Chinese people and maintain United States peacemaking and neutral position in China. Awaiting your reply.

CHOU EN-LAI

893.00/8-646 : Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, August 6, 1946—10 a. m.

[Received August 6—4:25 a. m.]

1270. Recent conversations with Democratic League members, including certain of those who sought refuge in Consulate Kunming, indicate state of widespread fear within League as result Kunming assassinations. Regardless of where responsibility for assassinations may lie, end result has been to reveal the weakness of Democratic League as a political party per se and therefore as a factor making for cohesion in China's internal politics. Now aware of their organization's limitations or frightened by the assassinations, prominent League leaders feel that they are faced with choice between following alternatives: (1) recant; (2) proceed abroad; (3) join the Communists.

At present time Ministry of Education making arrangements for several prominent professors, members of the League, to proceed Australia and United States in various academic capacities. Others have recanted by public expression of intention to engage only in academic pursuits in future.

It seems probable that majority of League leaders will accept first alternative. Current press comment with regard possible reorganization Government without Communist participation may be preliminary to offer official posts to Democratic League members. Such a step would probably effectively eliminate liberal opposition to Kuomintang policies in addition to having important publicity value abroad. Most prominent professors may be expected to accept alternative (2) if offered and for practical purposes exile is as effective as assassination.

Only minority of League leaders may be expected to proceed Communist areas; one prominent League professor has already expressed to Embassy veiled desire proceed Yen-an. Anticipated, however, that movement of students, especially from universities affected by assassinations, to Yen-an, Kalgan, or other Communist controlled points will increase. Many professors and intellectuals reluctant proceed Communist areas through fear of being used by Communists publicity purposes only.

STUART

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Colonel J. Hart Caughey to Mr. Walter S. Robertson, at Peiping

NANKING, 6 August 1946.

1264. Ambassador Stuart returned to Nanking to confer with Chou this noon. General Marshall stayed in Kuling to be close to Gimo. In letter to me General Marshall says "Keep Doctor Stuart constantly advised of the status of investigation regarding the Marine incident, in time, if possible for him to intervene with Chou in the event that the Hopei-Jehol Communists endeavor to color or deliberately confuse the issue. Get Robertson to tip you off promptly if such a course is threatened". Please keep me advised regarding above. Bits of information from time to time would be helpful in advance of complete report on findings.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Record of Conference at the Embassy in China, August 6, 1946

[Participants: Ambassador Stuart
General Chou En-lai
Philip Fugh, Assistant to Ambassador Stuart]

DOCTOR STUART: I feel very much disturbed that during the peace negotiations anything like the An-ping incident should have happened. If the Chinese Communists wish to force the withdrawal of U. S. forces from China, public opinion in the United States indicates that the opposite might be the result.

Regarding the question of the Informal Committee, as discussed in our previous conversation, the concurrence of President Chiang has been secured. But he made certain preliminary conditions which Mr. Fugh took down in writing. I shall now ask him to read these.

MISTER FUGH: The An-ping incident has placed considerable difficulty in the way of peace negotiations. The reaction of United States public opinion regarding the incident depends much upon its future

developments. After discussion, President Chiang approved the establishment of the Informal Committee. But before the meeting of the Committee the Government should first discuss what the objectives of the Committee are to be. They should be as follows:

- (a) To put into effect the cease fire order of June 30th.
- (b) To put into effect the plan of February 27 [*February 9*] for restoring communications.
- (c) To carry out the basic plan of army reorganization of February 25th.

Decision should be made in one month to six weeks time on the following:

- (a) Withdrawal of the Communists in Northern Kiangsu to north of the Lunghai Railway.
- (b) Withdrawal from the Chiao-chi³⁹ Railway line.
- (c) Withdrawal from Chengteh and the area south.
- (d) In the northeast the Communists must withdraw into the 2½ provinces (Heilungkiang Province, Neng Kiang Province and ½ of Hsin-an Province).
- (e) Territories in Shansi and Shantung Provinces taken after July [*June*] 7th should be restored. Fighting is to be stopped at once and the Committee will meet again and resume the negotiations, if in the first meeting of the Committee the above stipulations have been adopted.

GENERAL CHOU: Regarding the An-ping incident, it is my opinion an investigation should be made before our drawing any conclusions for, according to reports of the Chinese Communists, the incident was precipitated by the intrusion of Kuomintang troops together with United States troops into the "liberated area". The United States Marines had several times before created disturbances, only fortunately no incidents were precipitated then. The fact that conflicts are liable to occur along the Pei-Ning⁴⁰ railway line can be explained as follows:

(1) The United States troops in wanting to protect the railway line, have a tendency to push away from the line. The Chinese Communist troops, while trying to avoid conflict, cannot very well help resisting when coming into direct contact with the United States troops. In the recent past, several United States undertakings have given rise to misunderstandings on the part of the local people, such as photograph-taking and setting up of radio stations by the United States troops in liberated areas.

(2) The United States troops want to protect the lines between Chinwangtao and Tientsin, between Tientsin and Peiping and the highway between Tientsin and Peiping, but these lines are utilized by Kuomintang troops for shipping arms and ammunition.

³⁹ Kiaochoo (-Tsingtao) - Tsinan.

⁴⁰ Peiping - Liaoning (Mukden).

(3) The railways from Chinwangtao to Shanhaikwan, from Shanhaikwan to Manchuria have since the end of the war been used by the Kuomintang for shipping troops. The practice is still being continued.

(4) The Kuomintang makes use of the railway line between Shanhaikwan and Peiping for shipping arms and munitions and try to expand their territories along the line. When attacked by the Communists they retreat to the railway line. If the Communists further attacked, conflict with United States troops would result. The Chinese Communists and the people regret the above state of affairs.

An-ping is in the liberated area. The Communists were usually notified when United States troops passed through the place on previous occasions. But this time no notification had been received. As the fight lasted four hours, it could not be called surprise attack.

General Marshall stated that, according to United States reports, no Kuomintang troops were involved in the incident, that the Communists really made a surprise attack. As statements from both sides do not agree, General Marshall considered the feasibility of dispatching a field team to investigate. Finally it was decided upon that a field team be sent. The Communists urged that the investigation be made as early as possible. I wired Chief of Staff Yeh to make further investigations. According to telephone message received today, the Kuomintang are inclined to delay the matter. The reason seems to be that there have been preparations for war at Shiang-ho and Pao-ti, hence their reluctance to have the field team dispatched. Occupation of Shiang-ho and Pao-ti would considerably increase the difficulty of the investigation.

In the first place, the occurrence of this incident is most unfortunate regardless which side is responsible.

In the second place, I was in favor of an investigation immediately after the incident happened.

In the third place, delay in dispatching a field team for investigation may give rise to unforeseen developments.

In the fourth place, I make the following statement on behalf of the Chinese Communists Party: The Chinese Communists never purposely created the incident with a view to forcing the United States forces to withdraw from China as is so often supposed. For by doing so the Chinese Communists would lose United States friendship; they are not so unwise. General Marshall requested the view of the Chinese Communists on a suggestion made by him that the garrisons of the United States troops in north China be taken over by the 2nd Army of the Kuomintang. It should follow that the withdrawal of the U. S. troops can be effected by other methods rather than creating incidents. General Marshall once mentioned that each U. S. patrol group consisted of 42 men and 13 vehicles. From the military point

of view, a patrol group has duties to fight. The essential point is from which side provoked first originated, or how the incident started. For this reason the sooner the field team is dispatched the better.

In addition, I like to stress on a point which deserves consideration. Is the Kuomintang using it as a pretext to provoke conflict between the Communists and the Americans? While Mr. Kan Nai-kuang⁴¹ was in the Philippines, some Americans informed him that there was no more civil war in the Philippines and they expressed hope that China might expedite to reach settlement. General Marshall and Doctor Stuart are, of course, advocates of peace for China. But the speeches and opinions of some American quarters often encourage the activities of the war-mongers of Kuomintang. I can assure you that the Communists have no intention whatsoever to clash with the United States. The Chinese Communists wish to achieve Chinese-American-British-Soviet cooperation through Sino-American cooperation. On the contrary, the war-mongers of Kuomintang are provoking World War III, driving the Communists into the arms of the Soviet Union and exclusively receiving United States aid. I am speaking frankly that the Communists are not satisfied with part of the United States policy, for example, the garrisoning of United States troops in China has actually benefitted the Kuomintang tremendously. It not only denies benefits for the Communists, but has even sustained harm for the latter. As for the Executive Headquarters, both Government and Communists have received blessing from it. Resentment of the presence of United States troops in China is hotter among the lower classes than the higher classes of the Communists. For example, the 10 years' extension of United States military aid to China and the extension of Lend-Lease make the Communists feel such aid prior to the formation of a coalition government would become capital of the Kuomintang to attack the Communists. It is this part of the U. S. policy that has met the fiercest resentment. Since the arrival of General Marshall, his great achievements for the unity of China have given light for the future of the Communists. The Communists even put into oblivion the movement of Kuomintang troops by the U. S. forces. However, inasmuch as the PCC decisions are overthrown and the U. S. Congress approved the extension of the Lend-Lease, fear on the part of the Communists become[s] inevitable.

MISTER FUGH: In view of the feeling of unrest among the lower level members of the Communist Party toward the United States troops in China, was the Anping incident caused by such a feeling?

GENERAL CHOU: Such feeling is present on both Chinese and American sides. On the American side, there is a feeling expounded by a

⁴¹ Chinese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs.

group of Americans that they have helped China to win the war against Japan. Now they are responsible to protect the railroad and should have the freedom to move in all directions. They feel resentful whenever they are interfered [with]. But they lack the understanding toward both the Government and the Communist troops. Take the incident in which the 7 Marines were captured for instance. Both reports from the American and the Communist Party stated that American troops opened fire. American soldiers frequently fire their guns just for fun. But on the Chinese side, it is felt that whenever a gun is fired, there is intention to attack, particularly in the areas where a tense military situation between the Government and the Communists is in existence. Therefore, before a thorough investigation is made on this incident, I do not intend to draw any positive conclusion. I also hope that you will tell General Marshall that the earlier the investigation team is sent the better it is.

MISTER FUGH: According to my observation, the Generalissimo personally does not seem to have the intention to emphasize this incident.

GENERAL CHOU: All problems can be easily solved if we can settle the larger differences first. If we try to solve our problems by starting on the small and odd issues, then a dragging situation will necessarily be created. In the proposal suggested by the Generalissimo this time the focal attention should be given to the fact that it does not mention that the problem of local government, after evacuation in Northern Kiangsu and other areas is to be solved by the PCC. The breakdown of negotiations at the end of June by the refusal of the Communist Party to accept the proposal, was caused by the fact that it was contrary to PCC decisions. During July, the negotiation was continued by Mr. Shao Li Tse, General Chen Cheng and Dr. Wang Shih-chieh and it was still centered on these four areas (mentioned fewer areas than this time—withdraw into 2½ provinces and Yenki area in Manchuria; and must evacuate all areas in Shansi and Shantung occupied since 7 June). Finally the Government conceded that if one area could first be solved, then it will be all right. The conditions stipulated this time are more than previously. For instance, should the areas occupied by Government troops in Shansi and Shantung also be evacuated. It should also be noted that in the fourth document of the supplementary paper⁴² to the Army Reorganization Plan, it has already been stipulated regarding troop disposition areas in both Manchuria and China Proper. The demands made this time are greater than all demands made previously. It seems that they have no sincerity in seeking a solution.

MISTER FUGH: Among these demands, which ones can be immediately discussed, which ones can not at all be considered, and which ones can be reserved for future negotiation?

⁴² Not printed; substantially the same as the draft of June 29, p. 1246.

GENERAL CHOU: The Generalissimo feels that General Marshall's proposal in solving the present situation is too complicated. He wants to solve it on the basis of solving the problem of troop disposition areas. The Communist Party however insists that the solution must be based on General Marshall's line of thought and it should allow the organization of people-governments in various areas, and then, we can proceed on the reorganization and integration of the Army. The viewpoints on both sides are totally different. On 20 July, the Generalissimo had said: "I have given you several provinces, you should therefore evacuate from certain provinces." This kind of attitude is not what the Communist Party would desire.

MISTER FUGH: In the forthcoming reorganized Government, Communist Party and Kuomintang will be merged into one body. There seems to be no need in insisting on certain areas in the present negotiation.

GENERAL CHOU: This point is very true and we cannot understand it either.

DOCTOR STUART: To how many stipulations in this proposal can you agree?

GENERAL CHOU: I can agree to none.

DOCTOR STUART: Is it meant then there is no hope for peace?

GENERAL CHOU: There are four ways the Generalissimo views the present situation: (1) Accomplish his aim by force, then negotiate. (2) Since General Marshall and Ambassador Stuart are here to negotiate peace and therefore cannot be rejected, he brought forth the above demands. (3) Fight on one hand and negotiate on the other. (4) If the Communist Party refuses to negotiate, then he can place the responsibility of civil war on the Communist Party.

It may be that the Generalissimo brought up these unreasonable demands because he feels that he is militarily victorious according to reports from his field commanders. It is noted that he is in a much more favorable position militarily than the time when General Marshall first arrived in China. The Government now possesses an air force and a Navy through the Americans. It has completed the project in transporting troops to Manchuria and North China. It has also taken over many large cities in the Northeast. He believes that within three months or so, he can accomplish his aims.

MISTER FUGH: Ambassador Stuart feels that if the Government and the Communist Party cannot reach a compromise, the only way is to suspend negotiations temporarily pending further developments?

GENERAL CHOU: Then how about the Chinese people. This way, the civil war will necessarily be prolonged.

MISTER FUGH: Ambassador Stuart is always sympathetic towards the Chinese people. But the difficulty in the present negotiations cannot be solved by one man.

GENERAL CHOU: Prior to 29 June, I already conceded that we could make concessions militarily, but no more concessions could be made on political issues. We had agreed that no troops will be stationed along the Tsingtao-Tsinan Railroad. On the problem of Chengte, the Generalissimo also had promised not to discuss it for the time being. In Manchuria we had agreed to evacuate Harbin provided the Government troops there would not exceed 5,000 and that the Mayor will be appointed by the Government with the approval of the Communist Party. The Antung problem could also be considered. Regarding item (d) and item (e) in this proposal, they were not mentioned before. Furthermore, the issues in these two items were agreed upon in the fourth document of the supplementary paper of the Army Reorganization Plan on 29 June—in Manchuria the situation must be returned to the conditions existing on 7 June, and in North China the situation must be returned to conditions existing on 13 January.

DOCTOR STUART: If this is the case, then is there no hope for peace?

GENERAL CHOU: It seems that there is no way to conduct the negotiations, in the light of President Chiang's way of talking. What we are demanding are still unconditional cease-fire and convocation of the Committees of the PCC. In regard to military matters, Ambassador Stuart had said that they fell within the sphere of General Marshall and the best thing is still to request General Marshall to consider them, this is because he is more familiar with the proceeding of such issues. According to Ambassador Stuart's way of looking at it, it seems that the Chinese Communists cannot accept any of the five points presented by President Chiang. In reality this is an unsolved problem as contained in General Marshall's four documents. The Chinese Communists have time and again made many concessions.

Can we wait till General Marshall returns and then we hold a joint discussion to see whether there is a way to settlement?

DOCTOR STUART: Will there be ways and means after General Marshall returns?

GENERAL CHOU: Yes, the U. S. attitude is that the U. S. certainly hopes that some democratic elements lead both the Government and Communist authorities, but in actual practice China has no such elements. Since the Northeastern incident, the U. S. has been feeling that the Communist strength is growing too strong that it might not be beneficial to the United States. In connection with such fears, ways and means should be sought to make observation on other aspects

and to banish such fears. Otherwise, there will be two results, namely:

(1) The Chinese Civil war will be prolonged and aggravated, which will not be beneficial to the United States. Nor will the United States be able to render open help to Kuomintang. The consequence will be a permanent civil war in China.

(2) International intervention or the United Nations may send an investigation party to conduct an investigation, neither of which will render any good to China.

Therefore the U. S. should continue to arbitrate the China issue, but must also consider whether or not the Chinese Communists are to be feared and whether or not cooperation with them is impractical. Recognizing Soviet and British special privileges at Port Arthur and Hong Kong respectively one must not forget that U. S. special privileges also exist in China. They are "open door" and freedom of trade. Owing to the superior quality of American goods, the U. S. has already, imperceptibly, acquired the market in China. Although the U. S. has no other designs subjectively, she has, objectively, gained the first special privilege in China. Only until such time that the U. S. has helped China to industrialize herself can such special privileges be abolished. Ambassador Stuart is a lover of China, I am sure he feels that such powers are irresistible and that they can only be diverted to aid China. The Soviet Union and Great Britain recognized what [*that?*] they possess special privileges. It is easy to predict that the U. S. must occupy a No. 1 position in China when Roosevelt gave recognition to Soviet special privileges in the Northeast at the Yalta Conference.⁴³ He had extraordinary foresight. His death is surely a great loss to the world. We agree with the policy formulated after General Marshall's arrival, we hope the U. S. will still be able to continue to implement it.

On the question of veto power, its use will be limited to the overthrowing of proposals on the PCC Outline. It must obtain a majority of over two-thirds votes. Other matters are not bound by this restriction.

On the question of cease-fire, should General Marshall feel there is danger of conflict in a certain locality, I can assure him that there is no such danger. I agree to send Americans to any area for investigation. This is an evidence that the Chinese Communists have no desire for civil war.

Will the U. S. participate in the war should fighting continue and peace become hopeless?

DOCTOR STUART: Consideration should be given as [to] what attitude

⁴³ See agreement signed February 11, 1945, *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 984.

the U. S. should adopt under such circumstances. If the Chinese Communists cannot accept President Chiang's terms, I am afraid we will not get anywhere even after General Marshall returns here.

GENERAL CHOU: General Marshall had said that he would take up military matters while Ambassador Stuart tackles the political issues. What President Chiang had talked are military problems. If the U. S. China policy will still be handled by General Marshall for implementation he may accomplish his peace mission. Of course I hope General Marshall will continue to strive hard. But if the U. S. should change its policy to assist Kuomintang to annihilate the Communist Party, there is no necessity for him to strive in that line. I do not believe, however that the U. S. would act likewise.

DR. STUART: Should this be the situation, I think we will have to resume our talks after General Marshall has finished with the Military issues.

GENERAL CHOU: Why can't President Chiang discuss political matters with Ambassador Stuart? When talks on military subject are held with General Marshall, he can also bring forth political issues simultaneously. At least the Communists can yield so as to allow military and political discussions be held simultaneously. I cannot accept the provision of the so-called previous decision on the five points. If I am to accept it, it can be considered only as an unsolved problem of military matters. If it is to be a subject of political talks, it cannot be regarded as a provision that must be decided upon previously. Only under these conditions can I accept it and discuss it. The reason is that local administrative authority is always a part of political talks.

711.93/8-746: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Durbrow) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 7, 1946—10 a. m.

[Received August 10—4: 56 a. m.]

3113. An outspoken and sharply critical survey of American policy in China written by A. Perevertailo appeared in *New Times* No. 14, July 15.

Article starts off with statement that principal factor favoring fomentation civil war in China is USA support of reactionary Kmt circles in their fight against democratic movement. American policy in China is motivated by (1) economic, (2) political and strategic interests.

USA Govt and businessmen regard China market as prime importance. During war USA consolidated economic position in China

through loans, Lend-Lease, many advisers and experts. Chief competitors Japan, Germany, Britain were eliminated or pushed aside. USA regards its economic predominance in China as legitimate war prize and views China as new economic frontier. China's ruling circles count upon American aid to enable them to escape making radical agrarian reforms necessary to expand domestic markets. These considerations are economic basis of political collaboration between Chinese reaction and certain American circles.

American political and strategic aspirations shaping policy in China are part of obvious American plan of world domination. China is regarded as one of most important steps along road to world domination. American imperialists view Chinese democratic elements as chief obstacle obstructing realization of expansionist plans and fear that democratic victory may alter Chinese development so as to preclude possibility of using China in American global strategy plan.

Hence, "Communist danger" publicized by American reactionary press and insistence on support of Kmt reactionaries in fight against Chinese democracy. "Fables" about aggressive Soviet designs and interference in China are used as pretexts for keeping USA troops in China and extending aid to Chinese reactionaries.

"America's present policy in China differs radically from that prosecuted by Roosevelt administration." Under Roosevelt US diplomats concentrated on achieving Chinese unification and democratization. One-sided support of reactionary Kmt first introduced with advent of Hurley⁴⁴ who encouraged Chiang's intransigence and intention of reactionaries to liquidate Communists after Japan's defeat.

With Japanese defeat USA military authorities gave Chinese Govt troops large scale military aid claiming it would facilitate Japanese surrender. Kmt used this aid to start first post-war offensive against Peoples Revolutionary Armies and democratic regions. Wedemeyer⁴⁵ was quoted as stating "our assistance in redistribution of Chinese Govt forces *ipso facto* strengthens Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's position as opposed to Chinese Communist forces."

"Pressure of public opinion in China and USA compelled American Govt to recall Hurley⁴⁶ and send Marshall." Although a truce was established American aid continued enabling Chinese reactionaries to violate truce and launch new and wider offensive which con-

⁴⁴ For special mission of Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. VI, pp. 247 ff.

⁴⁵ Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, Commanding General, U. S. Forces in China, October 1944-April 1945.

⁴⁶ For resignation of Ambassador Hurley, November 1945, see *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VII, pp. 722 ff.

tinued until June when new truce was arranged which was observed no better than first.

Perevertailo itemized Lend-Lease and other advances to Chinese Govt. He then said: "It is palpably evident that none of these expenditures were called for by practical needs to bring Japanese capitulation to conclusion". Capitulation could have been effected by Peoples Revolutionary Armies at cheaper cost to China and American taxpayers. Course taken by American command was only to prevent Japanese capitulation to Peoples Revolutionary Army troops, to prevent latter from keeping strategic centers and communications in liberated territories and to ensure technical superiority of Govt troops.

Administration bill introduced in Congress for rearming, et cetera, of Chinese Army "evoked a wave of indignation particularly in China."

After describing at some length Chinese demonstrations against civil war and American intervention, Perevertailo asked what was reaction of American authorities to legitimate demands of Chinese people. "Notwithstanding all the activities displayed by General Marshall in China his efforts have so far borne no fruit. They are obviously at variance with the policy actually pursued by America in China which policy in its turn is at variance with decisions at Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers."⁴⁷ American troops are to remain in China, military assistance bill is being pushed through Congress⁴⁸ and Senate has voted to give China 270 naval vessels. Judging by their actions American military authorities in China are preparing for major operations.

These facts compel conclusion that USA has no intention of changing its policy of interfering in Chinese internal affairs. [It is?] Furtherance of ambition to create in China economic, political and strategic bases for establishment of American domination in Far East.

"Such policy is bound to excite most serious apprehensions in circles that strive to maintain and consolidate peace. The Soviet policy cannot be indifferent to America's policy in China."

Comment.

Although this article is perhaps the bluntest which has appeared in Soviet publications regarding American policy in China it is subdued in comparison with treatment of many other international subjects, characterized by ranting hyperbole and dialectical subjectivity.

⁴⁷ For text of the Moscow communiqué of December 27, 1945, see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 30, 1945, p. 1027, or *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. II, pp. 815 and 821.

⁴⁸ For correspondence on this subject, see vol. x, pp. 724 ff.

We suspect that Perevertailo's comments represent pretty accurately all sentiments of Soviet leaders regarding American policy in China. ||

DURBROW

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Mr. Walter S. Robertson to General Marshall

[PEIPING,] 7 August 1946.

6588. Yen-an and Communist Branch [of] Executive Headquarters apparently are making every effort to color and confuse the Anping issue (re your 1264⁴⁹). Press releases in Yen-an and Communist Branch Press interviews here are stating that Communists are pressing for prompt team investigation while National Government and American representatives Executive Headquarters are delaying such investigation. The truth is exactly the reverse. Communists have been employing every conceivable tactic to delay and obstruct the investigation.

For your information the facts are as follows: On August 1 both Chinese Commissioners requested investigation of incident. In view of position previously taken I immediately wired for your consent (re our 6268⁵⁰). At 8:55 p. m. August 1 your 1224⁵¹ was received. The next morning August 2 Commissioners signed order authorizing Team 25 to make investigation. At same time General Yeh was requested in memorandum to obtain assurance of safe conduct for team from appropriate field commanders and to "determine the place, date and hour, but not later than noon Monday August 5, most suitable to local Communist Party field commanders for Team 25 to establish contact with them." It was not until morning of August 6 that message guaranteeing safe conduct of team was delivered by Communist Commissioner, and no reply has yet been made to our request to name place, date and hour team can contact Communist field commanders.

In the meantime Colonel Davis attempted to proceed with examination of those eye witnesses to event who were still in Peiping. This procedure was blocked by Communist member, General Huang.⁵² On Sunday August 4 General Huang did not show up for meeting but sent a subordinate with no credentials. Consequently no action could

⁴⁹ August 6, p. 1452.

⁵⁰ August 1, p. 1426.

⁵¹ August 1, p. 1437.

⁵² Maj. Gen. Hunag Yi-feng, senior Chinese Communist member of Team 25, investigating the Anping incident.

be taken. The next morning General Huang appeared but took up the entire day from approximately 9:15 in the morning to 3:30 in the afternoon arguing as to procedure. He demanded that team first proceed to Tientsin to interview General Rockey, then return to Peiping to interview General Sun, Commander 11th War Zone Headquarters here, then proceed to field to interview unnamed commander of an unidentified Communist unit. He flatly stated he would not agree to the examination of any witnesses until these interviews had been accomplished. He further stated that he would not officially accept as credible evidence the testimony of any American eye witness who was present in the convoy. He also questioned propriety of American acting as team chairman and suggested instead that chairmanship be rotated. In his long haranguing speech he was often near insulting to American member and appeared to be trying to arouse his anger. The rest of the afternoon was taken up in debate between the Communist and National Government members on the latter's challenge of General Huang's eligibility to be a member of the investigation team. Next morning August 6 Colonel Davis called as witnesses Major Freese⁵³ and Mister Duke⁵⁴ both of this Headquarters who were present in the convoy at the time of the attack. Whereupon the Communist member took the floor and for 2 hours again insisted that the procedure he formerly recommended be adopted. When Colonel Davis reminded him that the witnesses had long been kept waiting asked permission to examine them, the Communist member flatly refused and the meeting was adjourned.

This morning August 7th the team reconvened at 0900 o'clock. Colonel Davis reports entire morning up till 1130 was taken up by Communist member General Huang again reiterating his demands that before team could visit scene of conflict, interviews must be held in order previously outlined and further that following these interviews the team must decide unanimously on witnesses before they could be called to testify or be interviewed. Witnesses standing by who had been brought up from Tientsin were not allowed to be examined. Deadlock being considered at Commissioners meeting today results of which you will be advised later.

It appears that the Communist representatives are under orders from higher level to delay and obstruct investigation as long as possible, utilizing the time gained thereby to get firmly fixed in public mind their version of incident and at same time throwing responsibility for delay upon the National Government and American Branches.

⁵³ Maj. Fred J. Freese, U.S. Army Air Force.

⁵⁴ Emanuel M. Duke, U.S. Army Peiping Headquarters Group.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270: Telegram

Colonel Marshall S. Carter to General Marshall

[WASHINGTON,] 7 August 1946.

96789. Your 1258⁵⁵ refers. The President will make no China policy statement without your prior clearance. In the meantime the State Department is taking no action to draft Presidential policy statement pending receipt of your suggested confidential message from President to Generalissimo.

893.00/8-746

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

No. 33

NANKING, August 7, 1946.

[Received August 25.]

SIR: On my return from Kuling on presenting my credentials, which I reported in my first despatch;⁵⁵ I became so concerned about the news brought to me of developments within China—economic, fiscal, military and psychological, et cetera—and the reports reaching me of public opinion in the United States that instead of following my original plan to go to Peiping to wind up my affairs there, after consulting with General Marshall, I made another trip to Kuling on July 27 to bring these impressions as earnestly as I could to the attention of President Chiang Kai-shek and to urge him more strongly than I had before to adopt a modification of policy as soon as possible.

Unfortunately I was taken ill the morning after my arrival in Kuling and had to spend the next few days in bed. It was possible, however, to keep in touch with him through two trusted young Chinese, one of whom is his personal secretary and a former student of mine. In fact, it proved possible thus to go into greater detail in these matters and into a proposal that I had formulated than would have been the case in an initial personal visit. It also gave him time to think over what he knew I would myself state.

The opportunity to talk frankly with him came on the afternoon of August 1. After telling him why I had felt constrained to make this trip, I went on to say that it seemed to me that the continuation of the conferences between the Government and the Communist Party, which had been going on for months, did not apparently hold out much hope of reaching an adequate solution, and in any case would tend in the future as in the past to futile delays. I drew upon such

⁵⁵ August 5, p. 1449.

⁵⁶ Despatch No. 1, July 21, p. 1388.

arguments as I thought would prove most effective and presented them so as to accord with President Chiang's psychology. I stressed that he was losing more than he could hope to gain by permitting a continuation of fighting in what had come to be tantamount to an undeclared civil war. I called attention to the great assets that were now his, but indicated that by senseless dissipation they were dwindling away. I expatiated on these two advantages, namely his own personal popularity and truly national position which gave him the ability to rally the vast majority of his fellow countrymen, including the Communists, under a banner of enlightenment and reform held by him and inspired by him with something of the patriotic fervor and sacrificial devotion which the Kuomintang originally had; and secondly, the fact that the United States Government and American people wanted precisely those things for China which nearly all Chinese desired and were still willing to do their utmost to help in their realization.

Then as to concrete suggestions I proposed that there be set up an informal committee of two or more members of the two parties, the Government representatives to be appointed, of course, by himself. I indicated that I would be willing, if he wished, to sit with such a group in an effort to reach agreements to break the present deadlock. If such an understanding could be achieved between the two principal political units, the Steering Committee of ten, representing five political units, could almost certainly give a formal character to such arrangements, and steps could be taken promptly for the calling of the State Council of forty members, which would be one important element in forming the proposed coalition government. Meanwhile, the cease-fire order might be given by himself and would in that case certainly be followed by one from Yen-an. I told him that I had gone over this whole proposal with General Marshall, who had given his full approval. President Chiang agreed to all that I had said but expressed the opinion that in view of the attack on the United States Marines near Peiping, we had better do nothing until General Marshall could return to Kuling and bring more information about the developments growing out of that occurrence. I told him that the doctor would not allow me to leave the mountain before that time, and he humorously added that he would not either.

General Marshall arrived on August 3, and he and I went over the whole situation carefully the following morning. It was then possible following the clarification of the attack on the Marines and the recession of this incident to obtain a definitive authorization from President Chiang to proceed with my proposal.

At the risk of seeming repetitious, I should like to summarize President Chiang's attitude towards the Communists, since so much cen-

ters in the personality and psychology of this one man. He has no faith in the aims of the Communist Party, and he points out in great detail and with many illustrations how he has been dealing with them for over twenty years and has tried unsuccessfully by what he regards as every practicable method to come to some sort of workable basis with them. He is convinced that this problem of bringing unity to China is very much aggravated by the help which in subtle ways the Chinese Communists derive from Soviet Russia. His own instinct and his realistic appraisal of actual conditions in the country prevent him from acceding to his closest advisers, who would undoubtedly like to exterminate or at least attempt to suppress the Communists by armed force, although he must at times feel keenly in sympathy with them. He seems to have an impression that by not becoming too impatient they will soon be in a predicament where they themselves will seek American aid and that we can then be in a much stronger position to effect a settlement. That he has been taking advantage of the failure in negotiations to press his military advantage in various strategic areas must be assumed. He would argue that this has always been because of violations of agreements on the other side and could make a fair case; and General Chou En-lai argues and acts similarly.

President Chiang is perhaps slightly bothered to know just how to deal with me. He has been genuinely solicitous about my health and urged me to lengthen my stay at Kuling until I had had more rest as well as a complete recovery, but he would also like to have me inactive a while longer.

On the evening of my return to Nanking, General Chou En-lai and one of his associates came here for dinner and stayed until after midnight. He discussed the Anping ambushed attack on the Marines at some length but gave no convincing explanation of what had happened. He strenuously denied that this was ordered from Communist headquarters or had behind it the intention of creating public opinion in America designed to lead to the withdrawal of our Marines from that area. Yet, he made it very clear that Chinese Communists strongly objected to the aid thus given to the Nationalist forces.

I gave him the conditions which President Chiang regarded as prerequisite to the creation of the informal committee which he and I had discussed before my departure for Kuling. In substance these conditions are:

1. The withdrawal of Communist forces from North Kiangsu to north of the Lung-Hai Railway.
2. Their withdrawal from the Tsingtao-Tsinan Railway line.
3. Their withdrawal from the city of Chengte and from the province of Jehol, south of that city.

4. Their withdrawal from Manchuria into an area comprising two and one-half provinces lying roughly to the northwest.

5. The evacuation of towns entered by them subsequent to June 7.

6. The relinquishment of civil administration, especially in North Kiangsu, although Communist Party headquarters would be allowed in each city previously occupied by them.

General Chou En-lai said that it would be impossible to consider this proposal which he characterized as a high-handed and dictatorial unilateral action. I reminded him that President Chiang was, after all, the head of the recognized government of the country and that in any case, these terms could be regarded as final as far as he was concerned. If rejected, I did not see how a widespread civil war could be averted and reminded him of the disastrous consequences to the population and to the nation. He argued strenuously that the responsibility would not be with the Communists in that case but with the Government. He insisted also that there was nothing in these conditions which had not been discussed in General Marshall's conferences and that they really belonged there as unfinished items. He attempted to maintain that the demands have been increased since the previous summary on June 29,⁵⁷ the day before the termination of the truce, but, of course, he really meant that the difficulty lay in the unwillingness of the Communists to meet in full condition number 6, the consequence of which they genuinely seem to fear.

I tried to avoid the impression of being too much of an advocate of the Government point of view, while making very clear my distress at the apparent inevitability of continued and long drawn-out hostilities. We are waiting until the return of General Marshall from Kuling in a day or two to discuss further procedure.

The net result of my conversations with President Chiang and with the Communist spokesman is that we at least know how irreconcilable are the attitudes of the two parties. Otherwise, I have not yet succeeded in improving the situation.

I shall report again promptly after discussing the matter with General Marshall in the light of these latest efforts.

Respectfully yours,

J. LEIGHTON STUART

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Interview Between Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and General Marshall at Kuling, China, August 8, 1946, Afternoon

General Marshall stated that he had delayed his return to Nanking until today waiting to receive the detailed report of Doctor Stuart's

⁵⁷ See draft of June 29, p. 1246.

interview with General Chou En Lai on his return to Nanking Tuesday evening at which he communicated the Generalissimo's stipulations of the cessation of hostilities. The Generalissimo was informed that no progress had been made by Doctor Stuart, that General Chou considered the stipulations to be not only a repetition of the impasse on June 30 but that additional harsh terms had been added thereto. General Marshall stated that he had nothing new to add to what he had already communicated to the Generalissimo except that he would outline the situation as he saw it today. He was convinced that fighting in North China would soon be completely out of control; that once it spread into Jehol, Manchuria would immediately be aflame, and then the fighting would be general in all areas.

He stated that his objective beyond the question of a unified and rejuvenated China was not as some of the Generalissimo's advisors seemed to think (to put the Communist Party into control) but quite the opposite. Where he differed apparently from the Generalissimo and his immediate advisors was that he (General Marshall) thought their present procedure would lead to Communistic control in China. He felt that a chaotic situation was developing which not only would seriously weaken the Kuomintang but would afford the Communists an excellent opportunity to undermine the Government, and it would also afford an exceptional opportunity for Soviet Russia to intervene, either directly or under cover in a manner favorable to the Communists. He stated that his information from a wide variety of sources was that the prestige of the Kuomintang had been seriously lowered and that criticism of its governmental procedure was increasing daily.

However, General Marshall felt that an even more serious consequence was now impending. Recent events in China had created a body of American opinion that freedom of press, freedom of speech was being denied and that the intellectual element, especially those educated in foreign universities, were under deliberate persecution, certainly under repressive measures, calculated to intimidate them from expressing any view that was not favorable to the Government.

General Marshall stated that the most serious consequence of this was its profound injury to the prestige of the Generalissimo, which was the greatest asset possessed by China.

He mentioned the protest of a group of Harvard professors submitted to President Truman, which happened to be headed by the former professor of General Wu Ta Wei. He commented that professors were often more idealistic than realistic as to measures necessary but that in this case they were reflecting the opinion as to the character of the Government. And that opinion, in effect, was that

the procedure was identical with that followed by Germany regarding liberal opinion, which had shocked and outraged the world.

General Marshall reminded the Generalissimo that the Communists throughout the negotiations of the past two months had asked continuously for a cessation of hostilities to be followed by negotiations for the settlement of the disputed points. He commented on the intense desire of the Communists to have the actions and the procedure of the PCC followed and their belief that the Government was deliberately by-passing the PCC. He commented on what he thought was the extremely narrow point of view of certain military leaders. These leaders saw only the immediate objective of the fighting in their particular locality and seemed quite oblivious of measures which would control a situation actually developing under them. This was, General Marshall said, especially true in Manchuria where National military activities were calculated to promote, rather than curtail, Communism among unemployed workers for whom no measures whatever were being taken, either to train them in the specialties left vacant by the Japanese or to be given other indications that their future was a matter of interest to the local military commanders.

The Generalissimo stated in regard to the Kunming assassinations that the only way such a matter could be handled was to locate the guilty party, which he was determined to do, and then to punish him. He stated that much of the accusations of the Communists and members of the Democratic League (the latter individuals were being harrassed and intimidated by the secret police) was deliberate misrepresentation of the purpose of the Government, which was to protect the individual against harm that would inevitably be charged against the Government.

General Marshall replied that while accepting the Generalissimo's procedure and intention regarding the locating of the responsible individual of the Kunming assassinations, yet there were other factors involved which threw quite a different light on the actions and intentions of the Government. He cited the fact that an hour before his departure from Nanking to Kuling, he had received a message from the American Consular [*Consulate*] General in Kunming⁵⁸ that six liberal newspapers or magazines had just been suppressed. On his inquiry of the Minister of Information on the hour before departure he had been told that these suppressions were due to the fact that the publications were not properly registered. He stated to the Generalissimo that even if these papers had not been registered, he could not imagine a more ill-advised procedure of the Government

⁵⁸This was reported to the Department by the Vice Consul at Kunming (McGeary) in his airgram No. A-5, August 12, not printed.

than to suppress the papers in Kunming at this particular time. Practically no one in the United States would accept the reasons given as *bona fide*. General Marshall stated that it would further convince people that a campaign of intimidation was being carried out by the Government, and that when that campaign was directed at the most highly educated group in China the seriousness of the matter, so far as public opinion in the United States was concerned, could hardly be exaggerated. The people in the United States were bound to contrast it with the educational limitations beyond high school standards of some of the most aggressive military leaders who were precipitating, in his opinion, a general civil war.

The Generalissimo asked him to let him know the result of his (General Marshall) conversations with General Chou En Lai in Nanking if there seemed any possibility for an agreement.

This closed the meeting.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and Doctor Stuart
at No. 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, August 9, 1946, 9:30 a. m.*

Also present: Colonel Caughey

Ambassador Stuart opened the meeting by giving General Marshall a summary of his meeting with General Chou En Lai on 7 [6] August 1946. Doctor Stuart stated that General Chou had done most of the talking and that when he submitted to General Chou the Generalissimo's terms, General Chou appeared shocked. General Chou had stated that he believed that this whole matter possibly should be put back into the discussions for the complete termination of hostilities which were in progress toward the end of June as items of unfinished business. The Ambassador stated that General Chou had objected to each and every one of the terms, making a comment on only one aspect of the terms. This comment had to do with the possible resolution of one of the terms (which indicated that Communists must withdraw from towns occupied in Shantung and Shansi Province since 7 June 1946) if the National Government, also within these same two provinces, would evacuate towns occupied by them since 7 June. Doctor Stuart said he pointed out to General Chou that if the Communists could possibly accept the terms of the National Government, that he (Doctor Stuart) would see that the Communists received fair treatment with reference to the implementation of terms and that by accepting his terms, the Communists would indicate to the world their sincerity in the desire for peace in China. Dr. Stuart

said he felt that General Chou En Lai was now waiting for further instructions from Yen-an.

General Marshall informed Doctor Stuart that he was concerned over Mr. Robertson's report⁵⁹ concerning the delay and confusion being employed by the Communists of Executive Headquarters with respect to the investigating committee that was supposed to have studied the An-ping Marine incident. He read parts of 6588 (Mr. Robertson's report on this subject). General Marshall continued by stating that he did not think that he could tolerate this attitude on the part of the Communists and was developing in his own mind a procedure for handling the matter with General Chou En Lai. He told the Ambassador that he proposed to approach General Chou somewhat as follows: To tell General Chou that the Communist attitude in this respect was playing directly into the hands of the National Government, and also to inform him that this attitude was intolerable from the U. S. point of view; to tell General Chou that he proposed to send a message to Executive Headquarters instructing the withdrawal of American participation in the investigation and at the same time making a public statement which the world could balance against whatever statement the Communists wish to put out; to tell General Chou that in the event of such action he (General Marshall) was quite sure that the irreconcilables and the die-hards of the National Government would be amused over the fact that the Communist attitude with respect to the investigation definitely proves the general attitude of the Communist Party in all matters; to tell General Chou that Communists' actions in this respect would go far beyond the An-ping incident itself; to tell General Chou that he (General Marshall) would give him 24 hours to make a decision. General Marshall then asked Dr. Stuart if that approach appeared too extreme. The Ambassador agreed that it was not and stated that he believed the time had come for a showdown.

General Marshall then asked Dr. Stuart what he should tell General Chou if General Chou brings up the question of the Generalissimo's new terms. Dr. Stuart believed there was probably not much that could be said at this particular time although he felt that if General Chou brought up the matter, he (General Chou) would suggest some concessions. Doctor Stuart said it was up to General Chou to make the advances.

General Marshall and Doctor Stuart then discussed the brief joint statement which had been prepared by Doctor Stuart. Doctor Stuart said the reason he wished to make such a statement was to try to keep the public better informed and to prevent speculation on the part

⁵⁹ Telegram No. 6588, August 7, p. 1463.

of the Press. General Marshall stated that he believed the statement should either be amplified or not used at all.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

*Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Yu Ta-wei
at No. 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, August 9, 1946, 10:30 a. m.*

Also present: Colonel Caughey

General Yu Ta Wei opened the meeting by indicating that the over-all military situation had not improved. In North Kiangsu fighting is prevalent against Communist offensives from the east toward the National Government controlled area, which in general forms a crescent extending south of Hsuehchow along the railroad, thence bending eastward just north of the Yangtze River over to and including Taihsien and Tai-hsing; there have been no significant recent developments in the Shantung Province; General Li's troops in Hupeh Province still remain in two concentration areas—one south of the Han River in the vicinity of Lao-ho-kou—and one north of the Han River in the vicinity of Shang-nan; the outstanding feature of military developments is the apparent rapid deterioration in Shansi Province in the vicinity of Tatung, where Communist forces have now moved in on that city, taken the city power plant and airfield. General Yu continued by stating that the rail line between Tai-yuan and Ching-hsing-kuang (on the border of Shansi and Hopei Provinces) had been destroyed as well as the rail line south from Tai-yuan to Hsin-chiang.

General Yu Ta Wei then asked General Marshall what had been the results of the discussions between Dr. Stuart and General Chou En Lai. General Marshall indicated that thus far there had been no results since the Generalissimo's terms, presented by Dr. Stuart, were even harsher than the terms dictated toward the end of June.

General Yu then asked General Marshall what his ideas were with reference to further negotiations. General Marshall informed General Yu Ta Wei that it would be necessary for him first to see General Chou En Lai this afternoon, and also he must have an opportunity to appraise carefully the present situation and complicated factors. He continued by informing General Yu Ta Wei that the situation was most desperate and that the feeling on both sides was at such a pitch as almost to preclude the development of a procedure which would permit a peaceful settlement. General Marshall told General Yu Ta Wei that the situation within the National Government itself was such that he was having difficulty in seeing his way clear to even suggest a reasonable approach. For instance (after reminding General Yu

that he (General Yu) had seen a good bit of the world) General Marshall indicated the political leader in the Government was also the head of the secret police, which was much the state in Germany during the war, the only difference being that the name of the individual involved was not Himmler.

There followed a general dissertation on the aspect of American public opinion and how that opinion may affect the situation in China.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai at No. 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, August 9, 1946, 4:30 p. m.

Also present: Colonel Caughey
Captain Soong
Mister Chang

GENERAL MARSHALL: I talked to Doctor Stuart this morning and I also read the minutes of your conference with Doctor Stuart. Doctor Stuart also told me something of his conversations day before yesterday with representatives from your headquarters. So I have that much information.

Now, before discussing general matters, I would like to discuss the investigation of the contact between the Marines and the Communists at An-ping. The last hour yesterday before leaving Kuling, I talked to the Generalissimo. It was one of the most difficult or embarrassing discussions I have had, not because of what the Generalissimo had to say but entirely because of the extreme frankness that I thought was necessary on my part. On my arrival here a few hours later, I found this message from Mister Robertson,⁶⁰ of which I wish to read several extracts. "Yenan and Communist branch Executive Headquarters are apparently making every effort to color and confuse the An-ping issue. The press release in Yen-an and the Communist branch press interviews here (that is, Peiping) are stating that Communists are pressing for prompt team investigation while National Government and American representative Executive Headquarters are delaying such investigation. The truth is exactly the reverse. The Communists have been employing every conceivable tactic to delay and obstruct the investigation." There follows two pages of description of what has been said and one in an effort to get started. Almost all of it dealing with the delaying action and the demands of the Communist member of the team. The message concludes with this statement: "The deadlock being considered at a Commissioners' meeting

⁶⁰ Telegram No. 6588, August 7, p. 1463.

today (that is, yesterday), the result of which you will be advised later." I have not yet been advised. It appears that the Communist representatives are under orders from higher level to delay and obstruct the investigation as long as possible, at the same time throwing the responsibility for delay upon the National Government and the American representative. You will recall that I declined at the start to authorize the Americans to go ahead with a team for such an investigation and it was only when the Communist Commissioner, as well as the Government Commissioner and you personally, pressed for such action that I agreed. Now what has happened is even much worse than I anticipated and it would seem to indicate that what might possibly occur once the investigation starts would be still worse than I anticipated. I do not feel that, representing the United States Government, I can accept that situation in silence, and therefore I am considering now withdrawing the American member and making my statement public as to what I consider are the facts in the matter. I would not hesitate an hour to do that were it not for the fact that such action on my part will have a tremendous and almost determining effect on the possibility of reaching a successful conclusion of the negotiations we have been struggling with so long. The worst aspect of the matter as I see it, but solely with regard to peace in China, is the fact that my action would tend to confirm the contention, or claim, of those members of the Government that I have been struggling with for the past six months. They have always insisted that a negotiation with the Communists was not a practical proposition, that inevitably obstructive tactics would be employed to defeat the purpose of the negotiation. Well, here, in this instance, they would convict me of agreement with them by virtue of my own statement. I regard this matter now as extremely serious and I am unwilling to commit the United States any further in such a futile procedure, realizing how serious the consequences and after discussing the matter with Doctor Stuart. I am willing to wait 24 hours to receive an assurance, not a discussion, that this matter will be handled in an ordinary every-day straight-forward manner. I regret very much having to make this statement here even in the privacy of this meeting but I will not go along further with any procedure such as that now being employed in Peiping by the Communist representative with respect to this investigation. And I will add this, that it is hard for me to comprehend just what profit they thought was to be gained in the first place. And it is even harder for me to comprehend why they hazard the great disadvantage they are inviting at the present time.

GENERAL CHOU: There is one sentence which is not very clear to me. You stated, "I am willing to wait 24 hours to receive an assurance and not a discussion."

GENERAL MARSHALL: I do not want to resume a debate on the question again after 24 hours. I want to receive a flat assurance that the investigation is to go ahead without debates. It must be positive action. I will not wait any longer. I see only one argument that they list here that I thought was sound. The Communist representative objected to the American acting as chairman. He wanted to rotate. I think he is perfectly right, but that is the only thing I saw in the whole procedure that is justified. The Committee should be able to call in any and all the witnesses. However according to the Communist stand the Committee won't use any of them until this or that technicality is discussed. I will not wait.

GENERAL CHOU: Regarding the An-ping incident, the first minute that I heard about it I formed an opinion of making investigation and I am still of this opinion today. From the information I have received, the circumstances are not exactly as you have just said. My report is almost the complete reverse of the one received by you. This is also rather surprising to me because this indicates that the incident is going to be complicated. Still I think if we would treat those matters reasonably, then we may still reach certain conclusions within certain limits.

I read from several newspapers this morning that the team has been dispatched yesterday, or at the latest, today. I think this is true because it is reported by the Central News. As to the reason for the delay of dispatch of the team, from the reports I received from Peiping, I do not gather that the Communist branch is unwilling to see the team dispatched. Instead, all the messages shown me state that they are eager to get the team dispatched, and in my message to them I also pressed for this dispatch. Now, viewing the matter objectively, we may also either reach the conclusion that the later the team is dispatched the more disadvantageous it would be to the Communist branch because An-ping lies on the highway and is a part of the Hsiang-ho county, which Government troops are right now attacking. We may expect a change of the situation at any minute. Once that change is effected, the situation confronting the investigating team would become even more complicated and make the investigation the more difficult. That is also why I am eager to press for the early dispatch of the team. The messages I received from Peiping told me that it is the Nationalist branch which is delaying the dispatch so as to facilitate their military attack. They also informed me of the procedures the Nationalists adopted to delay action. For example, they did not approve the Communist representative and argued on this point a whole day. The Nationalists have done this before. Later they concluded to send the team out on August 8. The Communist branch, in a memorandum to Mr. Robertson, however requested the

team be dispatched on the 7th. From this information it is difficult for me to see any trace of a Communist unwillingness for an early dispatch of the team, unless I, myself, am also deceived by my representatives. I do not see any necessity for them to deceive me because after all the incident was not directly connected with the Executive Headquarters. It was caused in connection with the local forces.

Yesterday I read the newspapers from Shanghai carrying an AP dispatch in which it is said that the American spokesman in Peiping charged the Communists for delaying the dispatch of the team. I was quite surprised reading that article and immediately wired Peiping, asking them to furnish an early explanation because they never mentioned any clash with the American side over this question. Though it is somewhat surprising to me I do not feel it is difficult to comprehend for I see that the Nationalist side would certainly try to sow dissension and to complicate the matters. Evidently, before the team has been dispatched, they would try every means to complicate the matter and to sow dissension between the Communist and American branch. Even now that the team has been dispatched, as I presume it has, new complications will almost certainly arise as a result of this action. As far as I know the only proposition the Communist side has put out to the team was a change of the Communist representative. The change of the Communist representative was due to this fact: You recall that when we were discussing the dispatch of such a team, you were of the opinion that the members should be very carefully selected and, if such a team should ever be dispatched, this would be particularly so with the American member. The Communist branch of the Executive Headquarters originally chose a rather junior staff member as representative. Later on, due to my instruction, they changed and appointed General Huang Yi-feng, the Communist representative of the Communications Group, because he used to get along well with American friends and he has an objective view, and is also broad-minded. Therefore I thought he would be more cooperative toward the American members. As to the American representative, Colonel Davis, it has been reported to me that people have some complaints because, in the past when Colonel Davis was in Tsinan, he did not get along very well with the Communists. However, because his appointment had already been made by the American branch, they refrained from making any comment on that.

I fully realize that the situation is very complicated and that the reports after fact finding may augment the complications in connection with the relations of the Communist and the American branches. But, in order to straighten out the whole matter, we have to clarify the situation and determine the true responsibility. From the reports so far we have received there are many points which do confirm each

other but still the outstanding question is the cause of this incident and as to who is the attacker. On this point, both sides have different versions. On my part I am waiting for the result of the fact finding so that the truth can be determined, despite the fact that up to now the reports of both sides are complicated, as are also the statements so far published. But, as a member of the Committee of Three, I would like to wait for the result of that investigation. I quite share your view that if we let ourselves be over-ruled by our sentiments the matter will only become more complicated and will have a tremendous and determining effect on the successful conclusion of the negotiation.

GENERAL MARSHALL: For your information I will read the outline of events as given me by Mr. Robertson.

On the morning of August 2 the Commissioners signed an order directing team 25 to make an investigation. At the same time General Yeh was requested to obtain assurance of the safe conduct for the team and to "determine the place, date and hour, but not later than noon Monday, August 5th, most suitable to local Communist Party field commanders for the team to establish contact with them." It was not until the morning of August 6th (or 4 days later) that a message guaranteeing safe conduct of the team was delivered by the Communist commissioner and no reply has yet been made to our request to name the place, date and hour for the team to make contact with the Communist field commanders. In the meantime (that is August 2nd to August 6th or 8th) Colonel Davis attempted to proceed with an examination of those eye witnesses to the event who were still in Peiping. This procedure was blocked by the Communist member, General Huang. On Sunday, August 4, General Huang did not appear, but sent a subordinate with no credentials, consequently no action could be taken. The next morning, Monday, General Huang did appear but he took up the entire day from 9:15 in the morning to 3:30 in the afternoon arguing as to procedure. He demanded that the team first proceed to Tientsin to interview General Rockey, then returning to Peiping to interview General Sun, Commander 11th War Zone Headquarters, then proceed to the field to interview an unnamed commander of an unidentified Communist unit. He stated he would not agree to the examination of any witnesses until these interviews had been accomplished. He further stated that he would not officially accept as credible (that is acceptable) evidence the testimony of any American eye witness who was present in the convoy. He also questioned the propriety of an American acting as team chairman and suggested instead the chairmanship be rotated. In his long speech he was often near insulting to the American member and appeared to be trying to arouse his anger. Now the remainder of the afternoon (Monday, August 5th) was

occupied in a debate between the Communists and the National Government member on the Government's challenge for General Huang's eligibility (which you referred to). On the morning of August 6th, Colonel Davis called as witnesses Major Freese and Mister Duke of the Executive Headquarters who were present as passengers in the convoy at the time of the attack, whereupon the Communist member took the floor and for two hours insisted that the procedure he formerly recommended be adopted. When Colonel Davis reminded him that the witnesses had long been kept waiting and asked for permission to examine them, General Huang flatly refused and the meeting was adjourned. On the morning of August 7th, the team met at 9 o'clock and Colonel Davis reported the entire morning until 11:30 was occupied by General Huang in reiterating his demands that before the team could visit the scene of conflict, interviews must be held in the order previously outlined by him, and further that following these interviews the teams must decide unanimously on witnesses before they could be called to witness or be interviewed. Witnesses standing by or waiting in Peiping, having been brought there from Tientsin, were not allowed to be examined. I previously read the remainder of the message.

GENERAL CHOU: I appreciate your conveying to me the foregoing information. I had read a part of it from the newspapers, but some of it did not appear in the newspapers.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I accept the fact that the investigating committee must have an agreed procedure and I cannot imagine that there has been any American objection to deciding on a procedure. I will, of course, wait until I can confirm your information that the committee left either yesterday or today. I had gotten no information here to that effect. I suggest that we drop the matter of this incident for the time being and I would like to hear your comments regarding the present situation.

GENERAL CHOU: After learning from Doctor Stuart about the last terms the Generalissimo had prepared at Kuling, I cannot help but to make a review of the negotiations during the last three months—ever since we moved to Nanking. In making this review I come to the feeling that the Government and the Generalissimo have adopted their own line and no matter how the situation may change he would not alter his own course. His line has been developing ever since April 24th when the Steering Committee of the PCC had its last meeting. In that meeting it was decided to postpone the National Assembly. I think it can be said that from the time of General Marshall's arrival in China until the last meeting of the PCC Steering Committee on April 24th, we have proceeded along the road toward causing a cessation of hostilities and reorganizing the Army. Such a

procedure it can be said, was brought to China by you and it is in line with the desire of the Chinese people for peace. During this period, though the Kuomintang did not feel satisfied with the PCC resolutions and part of its members were attempting to overthrow those decisions, the Generalissimo was more or less inclined to make some amendments at that time. We, of course, were against such amendments and so the controversy has continued ever since.

As regards the Manchurian problem, our contention was first to effect the cease fire and then to talk about the "taking over" procedure, but the Generalissimo was not in favor of cessation of hostilities in Manchuria. He rather preferred to regard Manchuria as an exception to the general cease fire order and he therefore was only willing to talk about the "taking over". Despite the existence of such disputes there still existed at that time a possibility of reconciliation. However, as I see it, after April 24th when we moved to Nanking, the Generalissimo changed his view on the whole matter. He did not talk any more about the line stipulated by the PCC. Militarily speaking, he is extending the civil war step by step. He is unwaveringly pursuing his purpose either by way of negotiation or by way of force. If we would yield to his demands in negotiations then he would stop the military operations. Thus, when we conceded on the question of Harbin, he then suspended the attack, while in the case of Changchun when we refused to accept his terms he launched an attack as was the case with North Kiangsu. Whenever he could not occupy a place he would carry on the negotiations simultaneously with the fighting. Regardless of whether he would get hold of that place by fighting or by negotiations, he would strive for the realization of his purpose.

Now another aspect is that his objective is growing more extensive day by day. At the time when you were discussing with me the settlement of the Changchun question, you had the impression that it was not so difficult to straighten out. I had this conviction as well as you, but when eventually the Communist troops did evacuate Changchun, the Generalissimo was not satisfied with that alone. He is demanding Harbin again. Of course he has one protest; that is, that Changchun was taken by them by force and not entirely through political negotiation. So I made further effort with regard to Harbin. Now the Harbin affair can be regarded as settled during the negotiation but then he brought up the issue of North Kiangsu and this time he again expanded his terms from North Kiangsu alone to 5 points. Also, with regard to the restoration of the status as of June 7th, he is also making an amendment that instead of both parties restoring that position, he now demands only the Communists withdraw to such a status. Should we pursue this procedure we would get

nowhere and at the same time the civil war will spread to the whole country.

Now, speaking on the political affairs, the Government's attitude as it appears to me is directed toward a reorganization of the Government without consulting the other parties. The Government would make its own decision as to who should be invited into the Government. The Generalissimo may reserve some seats for the Communists but he would pay no attention whether we would join them or not. The Government is also prepared to effect this reorganization even if the Communist Party would not accept its terms. So far as I could learn they have already secured the agreement of the Young China Party to participate in such a government and they are striving to get agreement from the National Socialist Party to secure one member from that Party and to get one non-partisan. Thus the reorganization could be effected around August or September and the National Assembly could be started in November along similar lines as the Government reorganization; namely they would request the Communists to submit the list of National Assembly delegates but they would pay no heed whether the Communists would participate or not. All this means that the Government would pay no attention at all to the PCC resolutions and just go ahead with what it wants to do. The Government will dictate the terms and no matter whether Communists would accept those terms or not the Generalissimo would just go along his own way. This procedure leads to nothing but to a National split.

General Chen Cheng, the General Chief of Staff, at the last press conference in Kuling, made a very outspoken statement. He said that with regard to North Kiangsu there were three alternatives: 1) That the Communist Party would voluntarily withdraw. 2) The Government would move the capital somewhere else. (Since both those alternatives are impracticable the only alternative left is to fight). Now it seems to me that in Shantung, Shansi, Jehol, along the highway between Peiping and Tientsin, and in some parts of Hopei they can, by the same reasoning, wage war against the Communists in case the Communist troops did not evacuate from those places. Based on the same reasoning they may wage war in any other place.

In the political aspect the Government is now inclined to pay no attention to the negotiations and the procedure adopted by the Government since coming to Nanking is entirely contrary to the procedure outlined in President Truman's statement⁶¹ and the procedure you have proposed. It appears to me now that those question[s] are no longer individual matters which have no connection with each other, but rather this is the new line of the Generalissimo and the Govern-

⁶¹ December 15, 1945; *United States Relations With China*, p. 607.

ment, by which they are trying to place the Communists in the position of causing the civil war and a National split. This procedure is not only aimed to deceive the Communist Party but also to deceive the representatives of the American Government. That means in the past this deceit was aimed at General Marshall and at present also to Dr. Stuart. I have had such a feeling through the last three months. However on the other hand I also cherish a hope and I am always ready to try other possibilities, particularly being impressed by your efforts and by the participation of Dr. Stuart. I have maintained the hope (although everything now seems to be without result) that the feelings I have had before seem to be verified. That is the seriousness of the situation.

Regarding the outstanding matters at this moment, it appears to me that almost nothing can be settled. Every step is designed for propaganda and not for settlement. For example, regarding the incident of the bombing of Yen-an, the planes evidently passed over Yen-an city and it is known to all that the B-24 plane came on its own initiative over to the Communist side. But the Government firmly contended that that plane landed at Yen-an because it had lost its direction and that the bombing and strafing planes did not fly over Yen-an. Their argument on destroying that plane is to say that they did not want to see that plane bomb Chinese people, but as a matter of fact that plane had been disarmed of all its bombing equipment before it made that flight. On the other hand the Kuomintang planes have made 268 raids on Communist territory since January. They have created untold damage to the population. This shows that all their arguments are nothing but propaganda.

In the case of the Kwangtung Communists, in accordance with the original arrangement, we have submitted the list of 700 demobilized persons, but the Nationalist authority in Canton, without any reference to previous agreement, collected those personnel for mass training.

With regard to General Li Hsien-nien in Hupeh, the Nationalist Branch of Executive Headquarters blocked the approval of the agreement [on?] the field team and also even contemplating the recall of the 9th and 32nd teams. At the same time General Hu Chung Han also blocked the representatives of General Li from coming from the Communist territory.

With regard to the fighting, it is almost universal knowledge that only the National troops attack the Communist troops, but the Government still argues that they are being attacked by the Communists. The Government has no intention at all of reconvening the Steering Committee of the PCC under any circumstances. Also the propa-

ganda is not designed for the settlement of the disputes. Their propaganda seems also very self-contradictory, since on one occasion they say that I am insisting that as a first step we should reorganize the government while on other occasions they would assert that I am insisting first on a cease fire. Of course they are trying to capitalize on the An-ping incident for sowing dissension and to provoke dissension between the Communists and American members. From all these instances I cannot see any slight indication that the Government has the intention of settling the issues.

All the foregoing refers to the policy of the Government. Now another aspect is the policy of the United States. Ever since your coming, I placed full confidence in your suggested proposals and I also have a firm belief that you are working toward a peaceful goal. Therefore, I want to forget what occurred before January 10; such as the dispute over the acceptance of surrender and other matters. After all, we have the conviction that the Government has got to be straightened out, that the assistance rendered by the United States will be extended to China as a whole, and that a peaceful solution is obtainable. Therefore, I am also directing our efforts along that line. Since coming to Nanking, it is true that we had exercised certain criticism toward the American policy. I recall that I had one occasion to comment lengthily on this policy; and, on another occasion, you also made a lengthy explanation drawing the conclusion that all the criticism was actually directed against you. It appears to me that your assertion has some factual basis because the contradictions are reflected on you. Had China been moving along the line of your desire—toward peace, democracy, reorganization of the Government, reorganization of the armies, stability in Manchuria—then whatever assistance the U. S. would have given to the Kuomintang would be of little significance because eventually all that material assistance would be turned over for the purpose of national reconstruction.

Though hostilities still occurred during the first three months, once that was brought to a stop, the harmful effect of the American assistance would be rather insignificant. Your way of thinking has convinced me on many matters. Therefore, I still have confidence and hope but, on the other hand, the Kuomintang did not pursue the same course. Instead it is determined to wage civil war, it is against democracy, it wants to force a split with the Communist Party. On that basis the assistance rendered by the U. S. merely helps strengthen their regime.

If we compare the military power of the Kuomintang at the time of your first arrival with its present power, we can come to the same

conclusion. There has been a definite change during the past eight months. While the Kuomintang has received considerable assistance, we are not even permitted to receive such small assistance as in the case of establishing a military training school in Kalgan. Such a state of course evoked certain complaint and bitter feeling on the Communist Party side, and they have the impression that the Americans are actually helping the Kuomintang to wage war against Communists. Because of that, there is some friction reflected on the relations between CCP and the United States. While the U. S. is helping us to effect a truce and restoration of communications, we welcome and are anxious to cooperate with them. But, on the other hand, when the Kuomintang troops are attacking us and are utilizing the American equipment and arms and are being moved to the vicinities of the Communist positions, it causes complaint and suspicion among the Communists. It is for these reasons that before and after a true truce is established, we are very reluctant to submit the list of our army units to Executive Headquarters. This fact also furnishes a reply to what I have so far been unwilling to make firm.

The course of the events of the past six months has thus placed us in a very difficult position because at the beginning of this period we had been devotedly pursuing the road you have proposed and, even though we confronted certain difficulties, we never wavered from that course. This fact is reflected in the following aspects: In the first place, we never wavered from unconditional truce, no matter whether the conditions in any particular instance are favorable to us or not, we are always ready for a truce. Secondly, we are always for a reorganization of the Government in line with the PCC resolutions. Third, we are for the restoration of communications and are still ready to carry out the plan we have worked out. Fourth, with regard to the army reorganization, it is true that we did raise the question of varying the army strengths in our favor but later on, due to your objection, I withdrew that demand. Though we asked for some readjustment of troop disposition, similar demands were also put forward by the Kuomintang side. This means nothing but a minor readjustment. It does not mean an alteration of the original basic agreement. On all those four points, we still stick to our original proposition. But, on the Government side, they have an entirely different scheme. They are planning to place us into such a position that while we take up the commitments, they would pursue a different road. Now by taking up those commitments and pursuing with you the road which has been outlined to us before, it now appears that we almost fell into a trap.

In order to clarify this situation, I wish to review the standpoint on a few basic questions. The first point is regarding our attitude to-

ward the American assistance. Because we are firmly convinced of the road of peace and we are firmly against civil war, despite the fact that we did not receive any assistance from the United States, we did not make a complaint, yet the fact remains that the Kuomintang is receiving that assistance. The Kuomintang is capitalizing on this assistance for civil war purposes. This places us into a most difficult position.

The second point is regarding the reorganization of the Government and regarding our relation with the Kuomintang. While we have always been anxious to establish a democratic, unified government in keeping with the PCC resolutions, we have always anticipated that we would participate in such a reorganized government and that we would stay in the position of a minority party. After that there would be the National Assembly which would adopt a democratic constitution. It is because of the fact that we are so firmly convinced of such a road that we refrain from taking any steps to cause a National split. In the last year, the Communists were contemplating convening a delegation congress of the Communist liberated areas. We made certain preparations for that Congress and I, myself, was appointed as chairman of the preparatory committee. But, since we have adopted the road of unity, I never paid a thought to that matter again. But on the Kuomintang side there is an entirely different picture. The Kuomintang is preparing for the reorganization of the Government which would exclude any Communist participation. Many Kuomintang editorials voiced this tendency, as you may readily receive confirmation from Mr. Beal.⁶² All the Kuomintang papers are making propaganda along this line. They also express their intention of having no Communist participation in the National Assembly and that they are not adopting a constitution in keeping with the PCC resolutions.

Third, with reference to the American assistance, we have had the conviction that so long as we are looking for peace and democracy and so long as peace and democracy is obtainable, the assistance rendered by the United States to the Kuomintang is of little consequence because, after all, it will all be turned over to the unified government and though the Communist Party did not receive any assistance at this moment it still has hope it will receive assistance in the future. But the Kuomintang is thinking differently. They will exploit U. S. assistance to strengthen their own position for civil war. As you once told me, they are strong enough now to wage civil war without U. S. assistance for another three months in Manchuria. As a matter of fact the assistance is still coming and a present of naval vessels has

⁶² John R. Beal, formerly Washington news editor of *Time Magazine*, adviser to the Chinese Government on foreign press and political relations.

been made to the Kuomintang. The National armies are also being strengthened, it is the same with the air force. The Chinese army units which were equipped and trained by the Americans in war time were little used in the anti-Japanese war, except in west Honan. Ever since the conclusion of the war the lend-lease supplies have been coming in and the total figure taken over after the war is no less than those turned over during the war. Now all this equipment and material has been utilized to wage civil war and such assistance is still coming.

From the three foregoing points, it is easy to draw the conclusion that we are actually being "roped in" and are in the first stage of being "beaten up". We no longer have freedom but the Kuomintang still has freedom. That is why day before yesterday I talked to Dr. Stuart, saying that we believe firmly in President Truman's statement. I recall that his statement talked about cease-fire, about reorganization of the government, about the termination of political tutelage, about the conference of the various parties, and about the reorganization of the armies. It did not mention that Communists should evacuate any particular place before a cease fire can be effected.

Dr. Stuart also suggested that he withdraw himself for a moment and let the Communists and the Kuomintang talk directly with each other. I explained to him that this is impossible, as can be testified by you. We have had such opportunity while we were in Chungking but the result was highly unsatisfactory. The 5-man conference in Nanking was completely fruitless.

During the past half year I placed perfect confidence in the mediation of the United States. While it is true that in individual matters, in subordinate matters, we sometimes had some change of our attitude, basically we never deviated from President Truman's statement. But, on the other hand, the Kuomintang and the Generalissimo have deviated from that line. It is my feeling that the United States has a moral responsibility toward the Chinese people. That after it has led China into such a dilemma, some way of settlement should be found. Of course the Chinese people also have the power to strive further for democracy and peace. But that is a remote possibility because the Kuomintang is waging a civil war. It is working for a National split and for the preservation of dictatorship. It evoked the opposition of the Chinese people but the struggle of the Chinese people will be a long term one and under the suppression of the Generalissimo they may have to shed their blood. Should any effect be brought about, another force which would greatly influence the people of China is the mediation of the United States. During the past six months, the United States has so deeply involved itself in the China issue that it requires U. S. efforts to complete that mission.

I believe the U. S. has the power to solve the China issue by mediation. Of course you complained to me several times that both parties are now full of dissension and complaints toward your attitude but I wish to call to your attention this difference, that while on our part I admit that we may have made certain criticism I still cherish the strong desire to cooperate with the Kuomintang. We want only democracy and do not want to go ahead along the road alone without cooperation with the Kuomintang. On the contrary we are still anxious to cooperate with the Kuomintang and the United States.

The other thing that we complained about was in connection with the U. S. assistance rendered to the Kuomintang, which is being used against the Communists. The attitude of the Kuomintang is different. During the past six months all our efforts were directed towards one thing, that is to try to prove that it would be good to cooperate with the Communist Party and that the only purpose of the Communist Party is to settle by unity. We never intended to stall. The Kuomintang does not want to cooperate with the Communist Party and therefore it tries by every conceivable means to prove the impossibility of cooperating with us. They want to pull the United States into the whirlpool of Chinese civil war. That is their purpose. I am not afraid of that but it is most undesirable because it is harmful to the Chinese people. It would be a tragedy because we are merely against an erroneous part of the American policy and against whatever assistance the U. S. may give to the Kuomintang which will be used to fight the Communists; but, basically, we are for cooperation with the Kuomintang and the United States. Of course we are for cooperation with all United Nations, including Soviet Russia. But the United States will take the first place among the United Nations because that place is indisputable and we have no intention to change that status. But our relation with the U. S. is now reaching a dilemma and we are placed in a very difficult position. President Truman's statement is the most complete and the best statement made by the U. S. Government since the Japanese surrender. I am of the belief that the policy contained in that statement is a most correct one, but the procedure of the Kuomintang now is different from that and I therefore have the feeling that you and Dr. Stuart should have a fair view and opinion on the current situation and find some way to fulfill your responsibility toward both the Chinese and the American people.

The reason why I made this lengthy statement is because I felt the necessity of revising the over-all situation. If instead of making such an over-all review I would make point to point counter-proposals to the Kuomintang proposals then I think that there are two points which are undesirable. When talking to Dr. Stuart, he asked me

whether I had any counter-proposals to make. I felt pretty certain that whatever kind of proposal I would make to Dr. Stuart to bring up to Kuling would not meet the approval of the Generalissimo. Therefore, instead of troubling Dr. Stuart to make this unnecessary effort, I should rather talk to him plainly because as a personal friend I felt it most unnecessary to cause so much trouble to Dr. Stuart if I knew for certain that no results could be accomplished. Regarding the efforts made by you during the last six months, I regret to see that those efforts should now reach a state of paralysis. I expect that you may not entirely agree to what I have said but I would like very much to hear your comments. The reason I did not go into the details on the various matters is because if I had, it would increase the tendency to stall. In the meantime the Generalissimo would carry on the war and then in September or October he would start the Government reorganization and in November call the National Assembly and then the Communist Party would be faced with the question as to what its reaction should be to that. Under such circumstances, I would be placed in the passive position. I am already thinking about that. I feel that I must discharge a responsibility to the Chinese people but also that it is not proper for me to refrain from saying what I think about your mission, because future events may eventually tell us about what we are visualizing. Even as a friend I feel that I have the responsibility to tell you frankly what I think about the situation. I would like to hear your comments.

GENERAL MARSHALL: It would not be possible for me tonight to make a detailed comment to you on such a lengthy statement. Your statement brings up so many different points, some of which are highly debatable. There is no question in my mind that I must use every effort I can find to compose the situation and I will continue to do that. But with great frequency, usually once a week—sometimes every day, I find myself in a new dilemma. I have mentioned many of the major dilemmas and embarrassments to you from time to time. Now, in all of this, I have to operate without a definite knowledge of the facts concerning dilemmas—just why did it occur; just what was the purpose behind the incident; how much was accidental; how much was the act of an ill-advised subordinate; how much was a carefully inspired plan—just what are the intentions. That applies to both parties. I am never in the clear as to an understanding. I suppose that is common to all such negotiations, but I think it is more pronounced in this particular case than others within my knowledge. General Chou has implied certain motives that are guiding the action or the attitude of the Generalissimo. That is his opinion. The Generalissimo, of course, would deny that. Certainly I have no intimate

knowledge beyond that of General Chou. I draw my own conclusions from implications just as I draw them regarding certain things of the Communist Party. It is not easy for me to take decisive action either for the reason that I can never be entirely certain of the intentions or the purpose for the future of either party, but also because for one in my position it is not easy to find a method for positive action.

Dr. Stuart and I have gone over every phase of this matter that we can think of in the effort to find some crack or crevice into which we may exert pressure to force a decision to terminate hostilities. He has a wide knowledge of things Chinese and I have a certain military knowledge and an intimate knowledge of what has happened since December. Putting together our respective knowledge it gives us as fair a basis for reaching a conclusion as is possible in this immensely complicated and tragic situation. Personalities play such a large part. Suspicions and bitterness play such an important part. The normal attitude of a party out of power opposed by the inevitable attitude of those in power who will fight to avoid losing individual or party power—these all present aspects of the situation and the exceeding difficulties involved. Following this discussion by you and further discussion by me with Dr. Stuart, I will want to talk to you again to see if we can develop a definite proposal.

To change the subject because I have to keep an engagement, I have a letter from General Hsu⁶³ protesting the aggressive action of 40,000 Communist troops at Tatung. He states he has warned General Chou that a continuation of this affair will lead to total civil war. General Yu Ta Wei asked me to bring this to General Chou's attention.

Meeting adjourned with setting of time for next meeting at 10:30, August 10.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Mr. Walter S. Robertson to General Marshall

PEIPING, 9 August 1946.

6688. Commissioners meeting, called August 7 to consider deadlock of Team 25 appointed to investigate An Ping incident, experienced same obstructing tactics on part of Communist Commissioner that Communist representative had shown in team meetings (refer to 6588⁶⁴). General Yeh, usually reasonable, objective and cooperative in his approach to problems, brought up and debated so many trivialities that it was obvious his sole purpose was to delay action.

⁶³ Not printed.

⁶⁴ August 7, p. 1463.

The only difference between his methods and those of Communist team member was that Yeh filibustered inoffensively whereas General Huang according to Colonel Davis was at times exceedingly offensive. After a 6½ hour session of hairsplitting trivialities, the following agreements were finally reached :

1. Team 25 should depart for scene of conflict near An Ping at 9:00 a. m. August 8.
2. A sub-team of Team 25 should be appointed and proceed immediately to investigate alleged conflict in the general vicinity of An Ping which the Communist Party Commissioner claimed was then in progress and being participated in by both National Government troops and United States Marines, but that the organization and operation of sub-team should in no way impede the activities of Senior Team 25.
3. Two press representatives from each Sino Branch and two American correspondents would be permitted to observe the proceedings of Senior Team 25. This proposal was made by American Commissioner to circumvent unilateral press releases by Communists deliberately distorting causes for delay instead action.

In accordance with agreement listed as number 1, both American and Natl Govt representatives appeared at appointed place at 9:00 a. m. August 8 ready for departure. Colonel Davis had stated that transportation would be furnished for three Representatives from each Branch. The Communists appeared with nine. They stated, however, that they would not depart until certain methods of procedure had been adopted. At the same time the United States Commissioner was presented with statement prepared by Communist Representative charging Colonel Davis, American member, with unfairness and autocratic methods. United States Commissioner immediately called in Communist Commissioner and Communist and American Team representatives in effort to break new deadlock. Morning spent in filibustering on part of Communists. United States Commissioner suggested to Communist Commissioner that as it appeared Team as presently constituted could make no progress new representatives be appointed by Communist and American Branches. (General Huang was hand-picked by Communists for this assignment and is a finished professional in the art of filibustering.) Communist Commissioner would not agree to appointment of new representatives but suggested that our representatives be "ordered to cooperate". He finally agreed to dispatch Team which left for An Ping at 2:30 p. m. returning to Peiping at 7:30 p. m. Testimony was taken on ground from villagers. This morning Communists argued that such testimony could not be accepted as these villagers were in reality Natl Govt plain-clothesmen. When challenged they could present no evidence to support charge. Team met this morning August 9 at 9:00 a. m. Again deadlocked by Communist representative presenting same

demands and using same tactics previously outlined. He reiterated position that no witnesses could be heard in evidence except those unanimously agreed upon by Team. Despite vote of Natl Govt and American representatives he again refused to allow Marine witnesses who were standing by to testify. Net result of today's Team meeting from 9:00 a. m. to 4:30 p. m. was zero.⁶⁵

Timberman and I agree there is strong evidence to indicate that Communist representatives both on the Commissioner and Team levels are acting under higher instructions to delay, impede and obstruct in every way possible the progress of the investigation, in the meantime throwing the blame on others and utilizing the time gained for propaganda purposes. Certainly there is nothing to indicate a sincere desire to get at the truth. Unless there is an early change in the present attitude, in our opinion it is open to question whether or not we should continue to be a party to the absurd farce now taking place.

Will keep you advised.

893.00 Mongolia/8-946

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

No. 40

NANKING, August 9, 1946.

[Received August 27.]

SIR: [Here follows discussion of Mongol autonomy question reported in Chinese press.]

Although little is known with regard to any relationship between the autonomy movement in Manchuria and the Communist-sponsored movement in Chahar, an alleged informal agreement delineating spheres of operations for the two authorities has been reported. This agreement is also stated to provide for unmolested passage of Communist Eighth Route Army troops from the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region across Mongol areas of western Manchuria. The facility with which Eighth Route Army troops crossed through western Manchuria in the early months of 1946 would tend to lend credence to the existence of such an agreement which may well have been reached only after the delegation of Manchurian Mongols had received a partial rebuff by the Generalissimo's Headquarters at Peiping in February.

It may be anticipated that the Communist-sponsored movement in Chahar will be more dynamic and radical than that in western Manchuria and it is probable that the former will tend to absorb the latter unless the Central Government is prepared to take active and energetic steps to undercut the Communist appeal. Unfortunately the

⁶⁵ Paraphrased copy to this point sent by General Marshall to General Chou En-lai.

record of Chinese Government relations with the Mongols and other national minorities is not a savoury one. In the past the partitioning of Inner Mongolia into a number of Chinese provinces prevented the Mongols from uniting effectively. The intervention of the provinces, the authorities of which did not act from motives of national responsibility but solely for the personal profit of their controlling military, and financial cliques, created among the Mongols a deep and abiding distrust and hatred of Chinese administration in general.

There thus exists in Mongol areas a state of mind receptive to the blandishments of organizers who are prepared to propound the identification of the Mongols as a separate people entitled to choose for themselves wherein their interests lie. Communist organizers may also hold out to the Mongols the hope of separate provincial status of their own and under their own "banner" system of administration. Such a movement was promoted by the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Political Council under the leadership of Teh Wang in the early 1930's. At that time the Central Government, partly because of its distrust of any racial autonomy movement and partly because of its inability to control the border province governors, notably Yen Hsi-shan, successfully sabotaged Teh Wang's movement and he, probably sincerely in the interests of his people, became a puppet of the Japanese. In 1936 Mr. Owen Lattimore⁶⁶ made the observation that "as for Teh Wang, he has not 'gone over' to Japan; he has been bound hand and foot and thrown to the Japanese." From the time of the defection of Teh Wang to the present, Inner Mongolian autonomy has been a dead issue.

Teh Wang's movement was the only spontaneous Mongol attempt to form a united front with the Chinese against Japan; the Mongols were spurned by the Central Government and the attempt failed. "Teh Wang has been discredited in the eyes of the Mongols themselves, because his failure meant that the only honest, young, talented, patriotic Mongol prince willing to modify the hereditary privileges of the aristocracy for the sake of the nation was unable to accomplish anything real for his people. Since his failure was due partly to the defection of the most dishonest Mongol princes, as well as to the intrigues of Chinese politicians, the ruling class as a whole has been even more thoroughly discredited."*

Against this background the Communist-sponsored autonomy or separatist movement in Chahar may be expected to meet with sincere autochthonous support wholly aside from the question of any artificial outside stimulus. The preoccupation of the Central Government with pressing political and economic questions in China proper also plays

⁶⁶ Then director of the Walter Hines Page School of International Relations at Johns Hopkins University and Editor of *Pacific Affairs*.

*"Eclipse of Inner Mongolian Nationalism"—Owen Lattimore—Lecture before the Royal Central Asian Society, April 29, 1936. [Footnote in the original.]

into Mongol hands and into the hands of those who may wish to make immediate use of legitimate Mongol aspirations for the advancement of their own ends.

During the Japanese occupation of Manchuria the Mongols grew to like the Japanese less and less even though the Japanese had granted the Mongols nominal autonomy in Hsingan Province. It does not necessarily follow, however, that they grew to love the Chinese more. Likewise the Mongols of Chahar and Suiyuan have been disappointed in the past by their own leaders and by the exploitation of Chinese provincial officials. In the meantime the prestige of Outer Mongolia has been rising. An area and a people with a basically sound case for some form of autonomy, but without the resources enabling it to act independently may be expected to look toward the nearest source of possible support. In the case of the Mongols this support is immediately available from the Communist Border Region Governments. To the north, however, there is always Outer Mongolia where there is a Mongol Government and the only Mongols in centuries who have become allies of a strong nation without becoming a wholly subject people.

Therefore with regard to any Mongol autonomy movement, by whomever sponsored, the position of the Central Government is fundamentally weak. There is no intent herein to ignore the probability of Soviet political expansionism in Asia or that Soviet influence may possibly be affecting already the situation in Inner Mongolia. It is suggested, however, in view of past performance that until such time as a Chinese Government is in position and willing to offer and to implement a program of reform sufficient to undercut any outside appeal, it seems unlikely that the Mongols can be expected to orient themselves toward China.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:
W. WALTON BUTTERWORTH
Minister-Counselor of Embassy

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall, General Chou En-lai, and Dr. Stuart at No. 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, August 10, 1946, 10:40 a. m.

Also present: Colonel Caughey
Mr. Chang
Captain Soong

GENERAL CHOU: With reference to the negotiations, yesterday Doctor Stuart informed me about the present situation. I feel that we are placed in a most difficult position. Prior to your departure

for Kuling, I felt that the only way to think was in terms of broad principles and leave aside the detailed points for the time being. Therefore, at that time I suggested three procedures by which we may compose the present dispute.

The first one is an immediate nation-wide truce. Once the truce is established, all the documents which we prepared prior to June 29 could be signed and put into effect, with the exception, of course, of the points concerning the local administration.

Secondly, would be a simultaneous solution of the government reorganization problem and the military problem. This would appear to be a reasonable approach because, if we leave the point of administrative affairs aside, the Government may not feel safe to declare the truce. It was my thought that with the participation of Doctor Stuart we might easily negotiate that matter. Our present problem is merely an elaboration of the principles for the government reorganization as already laid down by the PCC. I fully agree with the proposals suggested by Doctor Stuart regarding that question—that the American, the Government and the Communist representatives should first have a preliminary discussion and that then the other parties would be informed about their proceedings. Finally the basis agreed upon can be put before the steering committee of the PCC for approval. Then the government can go ahead with its reorganization.

As a third alternative, in case we fail to achieve the first two alternatives—that is a total truce and government reorganization—then we may, in the process of our negotiation, first settle the cessation of hostilities piecemeal so that at least the fighting will not be spread out, but on the contrary, be narrowed down. This was my suggestion prior to your departure for Kuling. I conveyed the same idea to Doctor Stuart later on. This proposal seemed to me the most reasonable action.

As indicated by my statements yesterday we (Communists) may easily conclude that the Government has no intention to settle the disputes. The Government merely issued terms which they knew beforehand would be unacceptable to us, and that those terms go beyond the terms which were brought forward in our previous discussions prior to June 30, and also at the 5-man conference between the Government and the Communist representatives. Therefore I do not see a way to complete those terms. It appears the Government attitude indicates that they are pursuing a different course, as I explained yesterday, instead of intending to settle the issue.

Because there was little time left yesterday, I did not have a chance to enumerate the facts in support of my statement and I would like

to give a few main facts for that purpose. Regarding the military affairs, at the time when the armistice in June was still in effect, the Generalissimo in a speech delivered to the military officers at a Memorial Service said that he has perfect assurance that the military issue would be settled within one year. General Chen Cheng at the press conference in Kuling also said outspokenly that the Government will resort to force. As the matter now stands, the Government forces have deployed over 80 per cent of their strength to the north of the Yangtze River; in north, central, northwest and northeast China to fight against the Communist troops. Should the demands put forward by the Generalissimo be not accepted by the Communists—which demand Communist evacuation in areas to the south of the Lunghai railroad in North Kiangsu, in Shantung, Shansi, Jehol Provinces and in Manchuria, plus the sector of the adjacent areas of the Peiping-Tientsin-Shanhaikwan railroad area—then fighting will take place in the entire region to the north of the Yangtze River. Should we reject the terms, they would attempt to take those places by force as was clearly indicated by General Chen Cheng. Therefore, in case the fighting cannot be narrowed down and we do not accept the terms, the Government would insist on occupying those places by force and the fighting will spread. This procedure of the Government is obviously in contradiction with President Truman's statement and the terms which we worked out during the 22 days' armistice. The Communist desire, as always, is for an unconditional truce and as soon as that truce is announced the armies of both sides should withdraw for a certain distance in order to effect a separation of forces.

Regarding the PCC resolutions, there are even more instances which show that the Government is trying by all efforts to pursue a course it alone chooses without consulting the other parties. Doctor Peng Hsueh Pei ⁶⁷ declared outspokenly to the correspondents to this effect. Mr. Chen Li Fu also stated to Mr. Wang Yen Pi and other leaders of the Democratic League in Shanghai that the minor parties should not wait for the Communists but should participate directly in the Government and break with the Communists. He openly condemned General Mao Tze Tung ⁶⁸ as a traitor. He is openly sowing dissension among the democratic elements and is paving the ground for a government reorganization without Communist participation. I anticipate that the procedure of the Kuomintang elements would be that they may invite the Communists to participate with the Government but they would not first consult us. The Kuomintang merely would say, "Here are the seats and whether you take them or not, we will go ahead

⁶⁷ Chinese Minister of Information.

⁶⁸ Chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party at Yanan.

with reorganizing the Government anyway." In case they would be less polite they would just simply ignore the Communist Party. They would adopt the same procedure at the National Assembly and the Constitution. With regard to the PCC resolutions, they would only carry out those parts which seemed favorable to them and neglect those parts which are unfavorable. Our desire is, of course, for the government reorganization but we hope this reorganization is accomplished through consultation with the other parties and along the procedure proposed by Dr. Stuart.

In the meantime, of course, we could discuss the civil administration problem. Then we would consult the opinion of the other parties, and finally the steering committee of the PCC. The steering committee would approve the civil administration agreement as a matter of formality. However the latest events would seem to indicate that this course is not acceptable to the Government. Therefore I rather feel lost as to how to make any suggestions with regard to the PCC resolutions.

Now as to the attitude of the United States toward China and the attitude of the Kuomintang. Since the An-ping incident the Kuomintang is bending all their efforts to sow dissension between the Chinese Communist Party and the U. S. On the other hand, they hope that during the coming two and three months the U. S. will stand aside and not bother any more about the hostilities between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. This would leave a free hand to the Kuomintang in that they may capture additional places from the Communist area, and in that they may go ahead freely with the government reorganization and the National Assembly as they desire.

With reference to the An-ping incident I made a careful study of the statement you made yesterday. I immediately wired to Peiping about your statement and after studying this matter again by reading the reports of the Central News and other Kuomintang sources it seems to me that the Communist Party did not have the intention to stall the matter. I do not want to refer to the information that comes from my own source, I merely want to judge my opinion from the reports of the Central News and the Kuomintang papers. From the papers I read that the team was dispatched on the 8th but they came back without result on that day. The reason for the failure on that day was because they had no agreed procedure. The Communist representative insisted on having such a procedure. According to the report of the Central News the procedure put forward by the Communist representative was; first, to hear the report of the American commander; second, to hear the report of the local commanders of the Communist forces; third, to hear the report of the local government; fourth, to hear the testimony of the eye witnesses; fifth, the eye witness may

include both American and Communist personnel; and sixth, to hear the testimony of the local civilians. After going through this procedure the team may collect the material and submit their report and recommendations to the Three Commissioners. Now, according to the same Central News report the American commissioner mainly agreed to that procedure, but the National Government commissioner refused to sign because he did not feel assured by such a procedure. Without a signature the Communist member did not feel assured and he insisted that such a procedure should be formally agreed upon by the Commissioners. His insistence seems to me quite reasonable because the Nationalists seem to want to hear only the American member, then conduct an investigation on the spot. Then they would term the investigation as concluded. In effect such a procedure would permit reaching a conclusion before any investigation is made and the conclusion would be that the whole incident was created by the Communist side. That is why the Communist representative raised objection. It can be accepted without dispute that the Central News certainly would not in particular favor the Communists. Therefore, I cannot see from that report that we have any intention to avoid a settlement of that issue. The only thing is that the Communist representative does not feel assured without a definite procedure and he is afraid of the Kuomintang intentions to reach a conclusion prior to the investigation. Now the judgment made by me is entirely based on the report from the Central News.

With regard to the second point I just raised about the present sentiment of the Kuomintang, they are now circulating in many papers that you are preparing to go back to the U. S.—reports to that effect. The other day when I spoke to Dr. Stuart, his personal comment was that in case there is no way of settlement right now the only thing for the Americans to do is to stand aside and to look upon the matter. Should those two points be realized then I think it would be most unfortunate and disadvantageous for China. It seems to me that the most desirable thing for China would be that the mediation of the U. S. in line with President Truman's statement be successfully accomplished.

Should that mediation fail then there would be only two alternatives as I related to Dr. Stuart the other day. The first alternative would be to leave China to a chaos of civil war which would mean a complete tragedy. The second alternative would be international intervention which is highly undesirable. The Kuomintang has recently published an editorial in the Li Hsing daily in Kuling which was written by Mr. Tao Hsi Sheng and prompted by the Generalissimo. In that article he said that the National Government is not afraid of intervention and implied thereby that they would like to see General

Marshall leave for the time being and let them have a free hand to carry on war for a certain period. By such a procedure they would force the Communist Party into a dead corner and leave us no way out of the situation. There is a Chinese proverb that used to say, "Even a dog, if he is pressed to a dead corner, would jump over the wall." Therefore the Government can hardly expect the Communist Party to find itself pressed into the corner without finding for itself a way out. As I told you before, all our efforts had been aimed to achieve unity and we avoided doing anything that would lead to National dissension. That is why we abandoned recently the calling of the federation conference of the liberated areas. We also assumed a tacit attitude toward the suppression of the Kuomintang authorities of our papers in Nanking and Shanghai and to the suppression of freedom of rights. Though we could in accordance with the normal procedure first get our paper published and then have it registered in order to avoid any trouble, we have no intention to do so. Recently the Kuomintang circulated many rumors and I refrained from making any reply, placing hope on the success of our negotiations as I have full confidence in the efforts of you and Doctor Stuart.

One of the recent rumors says that we have broken the dykes in North Kiangsu and I made a study of the reports carried in the reports this morning. I found that the flooded area is all within the Communist control. (General Chou produced a map which he showed to General Marshall and Dr. Stuart.) According to the report we would have broken the dykes merely to flood our own area. This action, from the military as well as the common sense standpoint, would be impractical as it would result in the flooding of our own area. They permitted the correspondents to view the area from the air and did not permit the correspondents to go overland. As you know in summer time there is some flooding because of high water in many places all over China and it cannot be detected from the air whether they were caused by the dyke breaking or due to natural causes. The correspondents said that they could not detect from the air any break of the dykes, but rather the whole dyke itself was overflowed by high water.

Now all the procedures adopted by the Kuomintang is directed to cause a split with the Communist Party. What the Kuomintang most desires is that we would pursue the way to civil war to try to overthrow the government. Of course we would never pursue that course. Meanwhile we have to contemplate seriously what measures we should adopt. We have to record carefully what we should do in case the fighting cannot be stopped and the Kuomintang goes ahead with the government reorganization and the National Assembly without consulting us. Should the Kuomintang use a free hand to

go ahead for the next three or four months according to its own desire then we have to conceive our own measures. In that case China may be virtually divided into two parts. That would not only be against the interests of the Chinese people but would also be detrimental to the world and to the United States. That is why I am so seriously concerned that General Marshall and Dr. Stuart would continue their efforts. During the past six months, I have exerted efforts to achieve peace in China and I would like to see that in this present dilemma they double their efforts to compose the situation.

Now speaking of concrete terms, I would like to cite an instance. For example, with reference to the U. S. Marine Corps in China, it has been enunciated that the Marine Corps was stationed in China for two purposes. One, for the repatriation of Japanese. As a matter of fact all the Japanese in China Proper have been evacuated. Therefore that reason no longer continues to be a consideration. Second, to help to maintain peace. It appears to me that if the position of the U. S. Marines is to maintain a true peace, the area garrisoned by the U. S. Marines should be free from any attacks, and also free from any military movement on the Kuomintang side. That area would be a true neutral zone. Communications would be used then for no other purpose than for peace. If the Communist troops are not permitted to move in that area, but the Kuomintang may use that area to transport troops, that area cannot be considered neutral. That pertains to Tsingtao also. Therefore, in order to assure peace, the Marine Corps should be made just as completely neutral as the Executive Headquarters. Otherwise it would be hard to comprehend by all sides. It seems that these points require consideration of the U. S.

Doctor Stuart made a few comments in Chinese.

(Summary of Dr. Stuart's comments to General Chou).

"After talking to General Marshall I made an informal proposal for General Chou's consideration that General Marshall and I jointly recommend that the Communists withdraw from all of North Kiangsu to a point north of the Lunghai railroad, that they withdraw from the Tsingtao-Tsinan railroad, that they withdraw from the city of Chengte and the part of the province south of the city, and that they withdraw into the 2½ provinces of Manchuria previously specified. That if they agreed to this we shall urge the Government to arrange at the earliest possible time for the proposed informal committee to meet and that this be followed by the establishment of the steering committee and the State Council. This would in effect establish a reorganized government in which the Communists are represented and could take up all such matters as local administration, not only for the areas specially under consideration but in a more inclusive sense. We would further recommend to our own government that

plans for a reformed and reorganized government be assisted in every possible way."

GENERAL CHOU: Now with reference to the proposal just made by Doctor Stuart to both parties, I would like to make the following comments on points raised by Dr. Stuart with reference to the Communist Party calling for complete evacuation from North Kiangsu to the north of the Lunghai railroad, from Tsingtao-Tsinan railroad, south of Jehol including Chengteh and, in a large part, from Manchuria. Now those are all old issues which have been under discussion prior to June 29 and also by the 5-man committee. The Communist feeling has been that some definite measures have already been worked out or rather proposed by me concerning the military aspect. For example, I proposed that the Communists would only station a small force in North Kiangsu and that they will have no force stationed along the Tsingtao-Tsinan Railroad or in South Jehol. The two issues in connection with Manchuria are Harbin and Antung. The Harbin issue may be considered as solved, while I am willing to consider the Antung issue. So it seems to me that Antung is the only point that remains under consideration. As far as the military aspect is concerned, the issue can be settled in this way.

Speaking about the political aspect, the Government now demands taking over certain places from the Communists prior to the Government reorganization. Such a procedure is in contradiction to the PCC resolutions because the PCC resolutions specified that discussion will be held regarding the disputed areas after the Government reorganization. It seems to me that the taking over of those places by the Government are by nature administrative and therefore political problems. Such a procedure is against the PCC resolutions. The Generalissimo, himself, has stated that he would abide by the PCC resolutions. If such a procedure is adopted, as I said, then it constitutes an overthrow of PCC resolutions. Following that as a precedent, the Government may overthrow any part which is disadvantageous to them. In that case, the PCC resolutions will be completely thrown out. In previous discussions, I made a concession to this effect, that an informal committee may be called together to hold preliminary discussion on such matters prior to the government reorganization, with a view to facilitating the government reorganization. Of course the discussion will not be confined to only a part of those territories, but they must consider the whole issue of the Communist areas. Now if the Government's present desire is merely to take over the places referred to in the terms and to leave the other Communist areas in a state of uncertainty, such a procedure is not acceptable to us; nor do I feel that I can make a report to our own

people about such a procedure because the interest of millions and tens of millions of population are at stake should we turn over to the Kuomintang those areas while the fate of the population in other parts are still in suspense. That is why such a procedure seems unreasonable to me and is beyond my consideration. On the other hand, the proposals raised by the Government are all matters which have been faced in the period between January and March. All those terms have been signed and agreed upon by the Government. The Government is committed to carry out such as the reorganization of the Government, the army reorganization, and the five resolutions of the PCC governing such matters as the government reaction for democracy, peace freedom, the National Assembly with participation of all parties, and democratic constitution. The Government should have carried out those parts on its own accord and it is not a new issue. Of course we desire and fully welcome the American representative to press the Government to this effect, but it is also our view that the Government should on its own accord carry out those parts unless the situation has changed so much that some points are no longer applicable.

I would like to point out that those proposals which concern the Government are all points which have been agreed upon by the Government previously and to which the Government is already committed; while those proposals which concern the Communist Party are new issues which have no direct bearing to the points we have had under discussion. By putting those two claims side by side, it seems to us not very fair. It is therefore not acceptable to us, nor can it be comprehended by our own people. Instead I would rather suggest this division of issues: Any proposal concerning the military affairs that was not settled prior to June 29, I would suggest be settled now but, as to local administrative affairs, that should be referred to the political sub-committee which will then discuss this issue in an over-all manner and not piecemeal. Otherwise the handing over of such territories is tantamount of [to] ceding of territory by the Communist Party. If we reject the Government claim, the Generalissimo will try to achieve his purpose by force. I recall that Dr. Stuart told me the Generalissimo had mentioned to him recently that he sees no purpose for the Communist Party to insist of [on] holding North Kiangsu because they cannot defend it. That seems to say that he would take those places by force. This seems most unfortunate to me. I must also point out that we never asked the Government to cede any territory to the Communists because we think it is not proper to lay such claim.

That is my comment with regard to Dr. Stuart's proposal.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Apparently that concludes what we can do this morning. I do not know now just when I personally would wish to meet with General Chou again nor do I know now what phase of the situation I would wish to discuss. I will have to think about it. I will discuss the situation with Dr. Stuart. Should, on the other hand, General Chou have any matters or thoughts that he wishes to bring to my attention my time is at his disposal. However, it might be that Dr. Stuart would prefer to discuss matters further and he can so proceed on his own initiative.

GENERAL CHOU: I think the present situation is extremely tense, as I have said before. Therefore we cannot wait too long because the fighting is still continuing. That means that the Kuomintang is going along the road to a complete national split and that the Kuomintang is persistently working along its own line to the complete disregard of any other factor. Therefore we cannot wait too long to let the situation stall by itself. It is my conviction that the more the situation becomes deteriorated, the more it will be difficult for mediation. I have told you very frankly and completely about what I am thinking with regard to the present situation and I hope that you would let me know about your observations and any point of view you may have on this so that I can then render a report to Yen-an and send them at the same time my own opinion on the situation with my recommendations. Therefore I hope that you would let me, at an early date, know about the opinions you may have formed. Of course I will also find time to contact Dr. Stuart.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270: Telegram

Mr. Walter S. Robertson to General Marshall

PEIPING, 10 August 1946.

6752. The following is reply to questions listed in your 1288.⁶⁹

a. Colonel Davis did not object to agreement on a settled procedure for team action. Both he and the Natl Govt representative did vote to examine Major Freese and Mr. Duke, Executive Headquarters personnel who were passengers in the convoy at time it was attacked, and the Marine witnesses from Tientsin, during the time team was waiting for safe conduct pledge from Communists requested on August 2 and not reported until August 6. General Huang on the other

⁶⁹ August 10, not printed.

hand insisted upon the following procedure in the order enumerated as a *sine qua non* for team action :

1. Interview with General Rockey in Tientsin ;
2. Interview with General Sun Lien-Chung, Commander Generalissimo's 11th War Zone Hqs ;
3. Interview with unnamed Communist Commander of unidentified Communist unit ;
4. Agreement that all witnesses called upon to give testimony would have to be unanimously approved by team.

Colonel Davis offered the following counter proposals for procedure :

1. Interrogation of Major Freese and Mr. Duke ;
2. Interrogation of the Marine Commander and witnesses ;
3. Visit by them to point of conflict to interview such Communist commanders and other Communist witnesses as may be available and any civilians who may be found as witnesses ;
4. Visit such other commanders and Hqs as team considers appropriate ;
5. Team meeting to consider evidence and formation of team report.

National Govt representative voted to accept the American program. Communist representative objected and to the time of this writing has not allowed team to examine any witnesses although Marine witnesses have been standing by ready to testify since Wednesday August 7. (In my 6688 ⁷⁰ it was erroneously stated that testimony was taken on ground from villagers at time of team visit to scene of conflict on afternoon of August 8. Both Natl Govt and American team representatives voted to hear testimonies of magistrate of district and other villagers who were available, but Communist representative refused to allow testimony to be taken.

b. Question already answered under *a.*

c. Colonel Davis did not object to rotation of chairmanship. When question was raised in Chiefs of Staff meeting, American Chief of Staff's reply was that it had been agreed by the Committee of Three that American Branch members would act as chairman of teams. Subject was not pursued further. I have personally stated to General Yeh that I did not object to rotation of chairmanship, but decision of course also involved consent of Natl Govt Branch. General Yeh replied that he did not consider the question important.

d. Colonel Davis is not the officer you met at Tsinanfu. He did not go to the field until 12 April and has never met you in China. You

⁷⁰ August 9, p. 1489.

are referring to Colonel Lake. Davis was selected by Timberman and me after consideration of new available officers. Colonel Martin would have been our first choice, but unfortunately he was and still is ill and incapable of taking assignment. However, Davis, formerly a Brigadier General in the Air Force, is an intelligent, sincere and earnest officer, approximately 52 years old, and entirely too dignified a gentleman to be subjected to the rough handling he has had to undergo at the hands of General Huang. General Huang having again blocked all team action this morning, I again propose[d] to General Yeh in private meeting this afternoon that we either appoint new Communist and American team representatives or report to the Committee of Three that the team was in hopeless deadlock. After some discussion, during which he mentioned having a msg from Chou En-lai, Yeh and I came to tentative agreement on program of procedure almost identical to the one submitted by Colonel Davis and is now being translated for submission to Natl Govt Commissioner. I am hoping to obtain signed agreement this evening. I fully appreciate the threat of this situation to your position as mediator and to the future effectiveness of Executive Hqs. For this reason it may be advisable to wait and see what comes out of the agreed program of procedure. However the Communists appear to be endeavoring to maneuver this incident into an issue of Americans fighting with Natl Govt troops against Communists, the purpose being, I believe, to force the withdrawal of American military force from China. I feel certain the Communist leaders in this Hqs are fully cognizant of the falsity of their official claim, but have a propaganda job to do; there is no prospect in my opinion of reaching agreement with them on this incident, whatever procedure is adopted.⁷¹

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270 : Telegram

Mr. Walter S. Robertson to General Marshall

PEIPING, 10 August 1946.

6753. (Team 13) Communist Party Commissioner Yeh in an informal discussion today when being pressed to direct General Ho Lung to cease attacks in Tatung area stated to Timberman he could send a message to Ho Lung but that it would do no good, that his power of control over field commanders had practically ceased and he could not stop fighting anywhere in view of widespread nature of conflicts. Previously he had stated to me he would do nothing to

⁷¹ Agreement on a "program of procedure" was reached by the three Commissioners on August 14; see communication from the Three Commissioners of Executive Headquarters to Field Team No. 25, August 10, vol. x, p. 329.

stop conflict at Tatung when discussing critical situation existing at Tatung.⁷²

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Yu Ta-wei at No. 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, August 10, 1946, 5: 15 p. m.

Also present: Colonel Caughey

General Yu Ta-wei opened the meeting by producing a map showing situation with respect to the railroads in Northern China. General Yu pointed out that the Communists had interfered with, and very seriously interrupted rail traffic in Shansi province.

General Yu then asked General Marshall if he had as yet taken up with General Chou En-lai the Communist attack on Tatung. General Marshall informed General Yu Ta-wei that he had, by reading to General Chou a part of the statement contained in General Hsu Yung-chang's memorandum⁷³ on this subject; however, General Chou made no reply at that time.

General Yu asked General Marshall what the results were of his conference with General Chou En-lai. General Marshall stated that nothing definite had been accomplished, and he told General Yu that the Communists felt, as a result of the Generalissimo's recent terms, that they were being pressed into a corner because of the additional severity of the terms. General Marshall then stated that the Communists felt that the Government did not want an agreement but instead negotiated only to gain time for progressive military operations; that the Government intends to abandon the PCC agreements and that each Government move is in an effort to discount further considerations of PCC agreements and procedure.

General Marshall told General Yu Ta-wei that in discussing these terms with Dr. Stuart, General Chou said that the Communists had already made great concessions such as agreement for garrisoning Government troops in Harbin; evacuation of the Tsingtao-Tsinan railroad; receded from their demand for two additional divisions in Manchuria; etc. Every time General Chou discusses these matters, however, he brings up the question of civil administration and points out that giving up of administrative control in areas evacuated by their troops is in effect abandonment of the PCC agreements. Also, in General Chou's talks he freely discusses the proposition of United States assistance. General Chou points out that ships, arms, munitions and planes have all been turned over by the United States to

⁷² Notation on the original: "Chou [En-lai] is in same boat".

⁷³ No. 1049, August 9, not printed.

National Government, with which the National Government is now fighting the Communists. At the same time the Communists get no equipment or support from the United States and are therefore quite resentful over the fact that the means whereby the Nationalist Forces wage war with the Communists are products of the United States. General Chou states that this is one of the big factors in the An Ping incident.

General Marshall then stressed to General Yu that it appeared to him that the principal concern of the Communists stems from their anxiety to fully implement PCC agreements, or conversely that their feeling that the National Government is not only not interested in implementing the PCC agreement but seeks to bury such implications.

General Yu Ta-wei admitted that there was a general deterioration in the situation and blamed this deterioration on the fact that the Communist theory with regard to the implementation of the PCC agreements was fine but that their actions did not correspond to this theory. General Marshall differed with General Yu Ta-wei in that he attributed the deterioration of the situation more to the fact that both sides entered into retaliatory military operations with reference to the acts or omissions of the other side. General Marshall added that the trouble with the Government was that they had completely failed to evaluate the effect of Government actions on the Communists and that instead the Government only evaluated its own fear of the Communists' activities. In this connection General Marshall stated he felt that the Generalissimo did not hear of the gross misconduct on the part of Military Commanders, but instead only hears of the same sort of conduct on the part of Communist Commanders; thus his approach to most of the Military aspects is unrealistic.

General Yu stated that General Chou was an extremely able and liberal-minded man with high integrity but he expressed the opinion that General Chou did not represent the true mentality of the Communist people as a group. General Marshall agreed that he was a liberal and said he believed that if General Chou occupied the key position in the new Coalition government he, because of his liberal ideas, would not necessarily adhere strictly to the Communist platform.

General Marshall stated that the Generalissimo did not want Communism in his Government and then he asked General Yu what the alternative might be. General Marshall continued by stating that the present tactics of the Kuomintang were such that its obstruction of Communism in the government, in the long run, would create conditions favorable for a communistic regime. For instance, a continuation of the present scale of military operations undoubtedly will cause

a financial crash, most likely a party dissolution, dissension among party members, and strife and civil war on a large scale. He added that all these factors were fruitful breeding grounds for Communism.

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270

Memorandum by General Chou En-lai to General Marshall

MM 117

NANKING, August 10, 1946.

General Yeh Chien-ying reported to me in the night of August 9 from Peiping that the special fact-finding mission in connection with the Anping Incident could not yet secure perfect cooperation among its members owing to the fact that the American and Nationalist representatives would not accept the proposition of the Communist representative, which to me seems to be a very reasonable one. The Communist proposal governing the procedure of the fact-finding set forth the following steps for investigation:

- (1) to hear the report of the representative of the U. S. Marine Commander;
- (2) to proceed to the Communist area to hear the report of the local Communist commander;
- (3) to hear the report of the Nationalist local authority;
- (4) to determine the eye-witness of the three sides, and to hear the testimony of the eye-witnesses;
- (5) any other essential actions;
- (6) to draw a conclusion from the fact-finding, and submit a report to the Commissioners for publication.

Both the American and Nationalist representatives in the two meetings held on August 9 refused to consider such a proposition, despite the fact that both Commissioners Yeh and Robertson saw the necessity of having it discussed.

It appears to me that the procedure proposition of the Communist representative is quite fair. And in the light of your yesterday's statement that the procedure should be decided upon prior to the investigation, I request that should this proposed procedure meet your approval, you will kindly instruct the Executive Headquarters to issue order to the special fact-finding mission that it adopt this procedure and thus expedite the investigation.

[Signature in Chinese]
(CHOU EN-LAI)

INDEX

INDEX

- Acheson, Dean, 59, 723, 1021, 1295-1297, 1393ⁿ
- Ampeng (Amping). *See* Anping.
- An-lu, 505, 506, 671
- Anhui Province:
- Communist withdrawal, Nationalist proposal for and Communist comments, 1208, 1213, 1216, 1228, 1232, 1238, 1241, 1246, 1248, 1253, 1256, 1258, 1332
 - Hostilities in, 367, 863, 905, 1396, 1449
- Annamites, Communist anti-French propaganda, 1357
- Anping incident, views on, Chiang Kai-shek, 1438; Chou En-lai, 1436, 1446, 1453-1456, 1476-1478, 1479-1483, 1496-1497, 1506, 1507; Marshall, 1421, 1424, 1432-1437, 1452, 1472, 1474-1476, 1478-1479; Myers, 1418; Robertson, 1421-1422, 1442-1443, 1446-1447, 1463-1464, 1478-1479, 1489-1491, 1502-1504; Stuart, 1448-1449, 1467; Yen, 1427
- Anshan, 736, 951, 975, 987, 994, 998, 1016
- Anti-American feeling (*see also* Demonstrations and Propaganda), 131
- Antung Province, 1272, 1345, 1428-1429, 1445, 1500
- Communist evacuation, Nationalist proposals for, 1219, 1233, 1249, 1251, 1258-1259, 1331-1333, 1335
 - Nationalist troop distribution, proposed, 1036, 1077
- Antze, 863, 948
- Anyang, 385, 460, 480, 482-483, 484, 503, 656, 675, 1338
- Army. *See* Chinese National Army and Communist Army.
- Asylum in Consulates, U.S. policy on, 1381, 1383, 1385-1386, 1402, 1411, 1414, 1441
- Baeyens, Jacques, 1413-1414
- Bandits. *See* Puppet forces.
- Beal, John R., 859, 896, 1485
- Bell, Col. F., 389
- Berger, Maj. L. W., 759, 767
- Bias Bay, 736
- Boca Tigris. 617, 632, 635, 640
- Bochlovsky, Gen. 62, 98
- Boku. *See under* Chin Pang-hsien.
- Briggs, Col., 654-656, 657
- Buck, Prof. J. Lossing, 1351
- Butterworth, W. Walton, 1298, 1299, 1363ⁿ, 1376, 1388, 1394, 1406; Consular protection, U.S. position on, 1381-1383; public statement by Pres. Truman on U.S. policy in China, views on question of, 1450
- Byrnes, James F., 17-18, 19-20, 1385-1387
- Byroade, Brig. Gen. Henry A.:
- Correspondence and remarks. *See under main subject headings.*
 - Illness of, 1274
 - Promotion, 343ⁿ
 - References to, 12, 348ⁿ, 361, 420, 421, 977, 1023, 1032
 - U.S. member of Executive Headquarters and other duties re cease-fire agreements, 2, 9, 24, 127, 129, 130
- Cairo Conference, 1943, 938
- Canton:
- Cease-fire violations at, 581, 597
 - Communist forces, evacuation of. *See* Communist Army: Canton and Hankow.
 - Executive Headquarters authority, applicability, 430, 431, 433-434, 441
 - Field team:
 - Establishment and reports, 368-369, 377-378, 379, 386, 396-397, 441, 456, 424
 - U.S. member, 389
 - Nationalist forces in, 41
 - Caraway, Brig. Gen. Paul W., 40, 81, 178ⁿ, 214, 291, 318, 319, 321, 325; presence at meetings, 302, 317
 - Carter, Col. Marshall S.: 994, 1058, 1307; U.S. policy statement on China, views on question of, 1438, 1465; Wedemeyer, views on future employment of, 1059-1060, 1397-1398, 1398ⁿ
 - Catholic nuns, repatriation, 711
 - Caughy, Col. J. Hart:
 - Correspondence and remarks on: Canton and Hankow, 597, 636-638, 641, 668ⁿ, 707, 1327-1329, 1336-1338; cease-fire agreements, 361-364 *passim*, 382-392 *passim*, 425-430 *passim*; Chihfeng, 386-387; deadlock on negotiations, 1452; Manchuria, *see under* Manchuria; National Army, reorganization and integration with Communist forces, 232, 328-329, 1203; Shantung field teams, 1387

Caughey—Continued

- Delegate to Gen. Chang Fa-kwei 633
- Presence at meetings. *See* Marshall: Meetings *under subject headings*.
- References to, 121, 266, 277, 349, 1191, 1320, 1410
- Yenan, trip to, 592

CC clique in Kuomintang, 154, 160, 440, 532, 533-534, 539, 540, 1407

Cease-fire agreements of *January 10, 1946* (*see also under place names*):

- Negotiations leading to, 1-130
- Byroade on, 13, 22, 25-26, 29, 30, 34, 36, 37, 38, 51, 60, 63, 64, 83-96 *passim*, 108, 109, 112, 120
- Chou En-lai on, 11-17, 20-25, 28-38 *passim*, 43-75, 76-116, 119-125, 148-149, 151-152, 162-163, 171

Committee of Three (Marshall, Chang, Chou):

- Agreement to confer, 12, 13, 14, 20, 25-26
- Conferences, records of, 26, 43-75, 76-116, 119-125
- Memoranda of agreements, texts of, 125-129

Communications, restoration and protection of, 1-7 *passim*, 13-14, 15, 22-26 *passim*, 44, 45-46, 52-54, 71, 125, 134; postal communications, inclusion in, 13, 44, 53-54, 60, 126, 409, 422

Draft order to armies, text of, 125-126

Executive Headquarters (military) for implementation of cease-fire arrangements, 2-16 *passim*, 24-25, 34-39, 54, 55, 56-58, 71-110 *passim*, 120-127 *passim*, 148

- Activation of headquarters, 130
- Communications facilities at, 16
- Field headquarters of, 14-15, 24
- Organization of, 127-129, 130
- Site, 14-15, 24-25, 37-38, 58, 88, 110
- Title, 123

U.S. staff and role, 2, 7, 8, 9, 16, 25, 38-39, 58, 72, 88, 95, 97, 109, 126, 127, 128; Robertson, role as chairman, 59, 127, 130

Mao Tse-tung, message to Marshall, 151-152

Marshall:

- Conferences with (*see also* Committee of Three, *supra*): Chang Chun, 26-39, 144-146; Chou En-lai, 11-17, 20-25; Shang Chen, 138

Cease-fire agreements of *January 10, 1946*—Continued

Negotiations leading to—Continued

Marshall—Continued

Messages to President Truman, 1-2, 129-130, 151-152

Memoranda of *Jan. 10*: 122, 125-129

Military inspection mission: 3, 10, 19, 146; representation, 134

National forces movements as exception to general standstill order, 12-14, 20-32 *passim*, 41-82 *passim*, 99-107 *passim*, 125-130 *passim*

Press, announcements to, 16-17, 22-23, 26, 58-59, 130

Proposals and draft plans: National Government, 1, 3, 18-19; Communist, 10; U.S., 3-10

Problems of implementation, *January-March 13*, 341-572

Byroade, 353-373 *passim*, 383-384, 398-422, 430-441 *passim*, 454, 468, 474-476, 482

Chang Chih-chung, 398-422, 467-501 *passim*

Chang Chun, 344-347, 374-375, 386-387

Chou En-lai:

Conferences, records of (*see also* Committee of Three, *infra*), 347-349, 398-422, 441-442

Messages, memoranda, 342-343, 352-353, 367-368, 370-371, 376-377, 384-386, 396-397, 471-501 *passim*, 529-538

Committee of Three (Marshall, Chang, Chou): meetings, records of, 463-468; memoranda re administration of railroads 512; information requests on Chahar and Jehol, 345, 380

Communications, restoration and protection of, 344, 351, 357-366 *passim*, 371, 378, 383, 397, 398, 401, 455-466 *passim*, 471-502 *passim*, 587, 590, 612

Agreements on Restoration of Communications: Documents A, B, C, 422-425, 432

Discussions on, 400-421

Executive Headquarters:

Field teams, establishment and reports, 343-397 *passim*, 428-444 *passim*, 454-510, 518, 531-532, 536, 542; list of, as of *January 23*, 389

Functions, 351, 399-400, 463-464, 467, 486

Manchuria, authority in, 371-376 *passim*, 442, 500

Meeting (Byroade, Cheng, Yeh), report of, 353-359

- Cease-fire agreements of *January 10, 1946*—Continued
 Problems of implementation—Con.
 Executive Headquarters—Con.
 Principles and procedures: 378-379; Robertson, U.S. representative, 341-342; Trusum, 361-362, 382-383, 386, 388-389, 392, 432-433
 Manchuria, applicability to. *See under* Manchuria.
 Marshall:
 Correspondence on: 342-345, 349-351, 359-361, 362-372, 375-377, 380-381, 383-390, 393-397, 425-426, 429-439, 446-447, 511-516, 529-535; with Chiang Kai-shek, 513; with Truman, 351-352, 373-374, 380, 426-429, 434-435, 444-446, 510-511, 541-542
 Meetings with: Chang Chih-chung and Chou En-lai, 398-422, 516-528; and field teams, 467-510; Chang Chun, 345-347, 374-375; Chiang Kai-shek, 528-529, 540; Mao Tse-tung, 501-502; Three Commissioners, 453-501
 Robertson:
 Executive Headquarters, meetings, 353-359
 Messages, memoranda, 362-363, 365-366, 372, 377-381, 382, 389-390, 393-395, 432-434, 438-439, 448-450, 453-462, 476, 482, 484, 499-500
 Smyth, 341-342, 394, 397-398, 430-431, 437-438, 439-441, 443-444, 503, 538-540
 Three Commissioners (Robertson, Cheng Kai-min, Yeh Chien-ying), 381-382, 453-462
 Truman, messages to Marshall, 380, 434-435, 446, 511
 Central China, definition, 268, 401, 402
Central Daily News, 1300, 1408, 1496
 Central Government. *See* Chinese National Government.
 Chahar (*see also names of towns*):
 Communist forces, number in, 1092
 Field teams, dispatch and reports, 345, 346, 364, 392
 Mongol autonomy movement in, 1491-1493
 Nationalist demands for Communist evacuation of, 1043, 1075, 1082, 1087, 1100, 1106, 1115-1119 *passim*, 1217, 1234, 1239, 1241, 1246, 1248, 1285, 1286, 1304, 1334, 1370
 Nationalist forces takeover from Soviet forces, question of, 45, 47, 50, 60, 61, 80-82, 99-105, 129-130
 Service areas, 199-200
 Soviet forces in, 503
 Chang, Carsun (Chang Chun-mai), 1425; meetings with Marshall, 912-914, 1079-1081, 1114-1115
 Chang-chih, 1229, 1232, 1241
 Chang Chih-chung, Gen.:
 Correspondence and remarks: on cease-fire agreement, implementation, 398-422, 467-501 *passim*; on Communist forces in Canton and Hankow, evacuation of, 621-632 *passim*; Manchuria, *see under* Manchuria; on reorganization of armies, *see under* Chinese National Army
 Dissolution of Youth Corps and concentration camps, 1408
 Military Sub-Committee, appointment to, 191
 Opposition to, 534
 Sinkiang, trip to, 174, 583, 589, 590, 594, 606, 610
 Chang Ching-ho, 783
 Chang Ching-wu, 729
 Chang Chun, Gen.:
 Cease-fire arrangements: implementation, 344-347, 374-375, 386-387; negotiations, 4, 23, 26-39, 49-75, 76-116, 119-129
 Chinese armies, reorganization and implementation, 188-189, 196-198
 Manchuria. *See under* Manchuria.
 Military Sub-Committee, appointment to, 191
 Political consultative conference, 144-146
 Opposition to, 534
 Chang Fa-kuei, Gen. (*see also* Kwang-tung), 516-517
 Cease-fire agreements:
 Applicability, questions of, 523-525
 Violations of, 264, 396-397
 Communist forces, nonrecognition of status of, 430, 431, 433, 456, 523, 613-647 *passim*, 703, 705, 706-707, 743
 Executive Headquarters, nonrecognition of authority of, 433, 614, 622-627 *passim*, 641, 646
 Chang Hsueh-liang, Marshal, 171*n*, 448, 1407*n*
 Chang Hsueh-shih, 448, 451, 755, 756
 Chang Kia-ngau (Chia-ao), Dr., 443, 801
 Chang Kung-chuan, 852
 Chang Li-sheng, 171, 1123
 Chang Ming-hsin, Maj. Gen., 767
 Chang Nat-teh, 861-862
 Chang Tsun (Tung)-sun, Gen., 333
 Chang Wen-chin, 695, 753, 875, 1191
 Presence at meetings. *See* Marshall:
 Meetings *under subject headings*.

- Changchun, situation in, 42, 443, 445, 589, 595, 600-601, 713, 714, 734, 754, 758, 860, 931, 941, 995, 1276, 1305, 1377, 1480; Executive Headquarters branch office (*see also* Manchuria: Crisis), 976
- Changchun railroad, 601, 1293
- Changtien, 433, 468, 681, 1025, 1367, 1402
- Chao Chen-shou, Gen., 488, 489
- Chao Chia-hsiang, Gen., 1293-1294
- Chao Chia-shan, Lt. Gen., 759, 762, 767
- Chao Feng, 1380
- Chao I, Lt. Gen., 767
- Chaochwang. *See* Tsaochuang.
- Chaoyang (Tsaoyang), 866, 890, 899, 998, 1336, 1337, 1341
- Chefoo, 1273, 1384-1385
- Communist evacuation, National demands, 1075, 1082, 1087, 1088, 1100, 1115, 1119, 1208, 1334
- Port of debarkation for Communist forces evacuated from Canton and Hankow. *See* Communist Army: Canton and Hankow.
- Chen Cheng, Gen.:
- Army reorganization and integration, 329-330, 332, 334, 339-341
- Committee of Three, appointment as Acting Government Representative, 641, 717
- Communist attacks: 1024, 1495; Hopeh, 1289; Lunghai railroad, 1335; North Kiangsu, 1481
- Illness, 735, 737, 754, 755
- Meetings with Marshall, 339-341, 1331-1335
- References to, 190, 207, 292, 742, 745, 1261, 1278, 1285, 1286, 1287-1288, 1300, 1319, 1324, 1345, 1408, 1495
- Chen Chien, Col., 708
- Chen Chien, Gen., 1318, 1344
- Chen Kuo-fu, 154*n*
- Chen Li-fu (*see also* CC clique), 154*n*, 1123, 1296
- Activities and influence, 533, 1264, 1395, 1405, 1407, 1408, 1415, 1439-1440
- Communists, position on, 1045-1046, 1495
- Special service agents of, 1362, 1375, 1405, 1407
- Chen Lin, Maj. Gen., 506
- Chen Ping-hsieh, Prof., 861-862
- Chen Shih-chu, Gen., 753, 759, 767
- Chen Shih-yi, Gen., 331
- Chen Shu, 767
- Chen Yi (Yie), Gen., 367, 388, 469, 472, 478, 1029, 1064, 1313, 1319
- Chinese Commanders' conference, proposed. reluctance to attend, 1281, 1308, 1329, 1336, 1338, 1352, 1355, 1358, 1361, 1396
- Shantung, 426, 1243, 1281-1282; Taian, distribution of food, 425; Winan district, fighting, 1026
- Cheng Chien, Gen., 1231, 1427
- Cheng Hsueh-chung, Gen., 1444
- Cheng Kai-ming (Chieh-min), Gen., 341, 353-359, 421, 800, 836, 931, 1438
- Communists, position on, 1282, 1295
- Executive Headquarters members, treatment of, 1152, 1425
- Meetings: dispatch of field teams to Chihfeng, Kalgan, and Tsinan, 353-359; Manchurian crisis, 759, 765, 767
- Position on dispatch of field teams to Canton, 369, 377; Tsingtao, 1111, 1113; Potou railroad station, attack on, 843
- Chengtai railroad, 460, 492, 1235
- Chengte(h):
- Civil administration, 1345
- Field teams, dispatch and reports of, 348-349, 379, 389, 456, 890, 892-893; American team member, threats to, 1347
- National forces attacks on, 41, 347, 948
- National insistence on Communist evacuation of, 1194, 1216, 1219, 1228, 1229, 1233, 1234, 1241, 1248, 1251, 1254, 1258, 1259, 1263, 1278, 1284-1286, 1325, 1331-1333, 1335, 1429, 1453, 1458, 1467, 1499, 1500; attack plans, 1428, 1430, 1445
- Chennault, Maj. Gen. Claire Lee, 953, 961
- Chiahsien, 457, 1030
- Chiang Ching-kuo, 30, 75-76
- Chiang Kai-shek, Generalissimo, 2-130 *passim*, 173*n*
- American Chief of Staff, U.S. discontinuation of office of, 1358, 1359, 1384, 1397
- Civil liberties, announcement concerning, 147
- Correspondence and remarks: Army reorganization and integration, 189, 202-203, 335-336; Chinese forces, question of use in occupation of Japan, 429, 445; Communist-Government relations, 528; Communist forces, evacuation of, 637, 647; Communists, 166, 168, 529, 1466-1467; Communist responsibility for stalemate of truce negotiations, 1107-1109; PCC, 138, 142-143, 158, 445; deadlock of negotiations, reports of meetings with Gen. Marshall, 1468-1471, and Amb. Stuart, 1388-1395, 1465-1467; Executive Headquarters teams in Manchuria, 428, 445; Manchurian situation (*see also* Manchuria), 529-533, cease-fire agreements, applicability to Manchuria, 589; Soviet Union, 529; U.S. relations with Russia, 166, 168

- Chiang Kai-shek—Continued
 Criticism of by Chinese press, 167-168, 170
 Full powers of, 155, 565-566
 Interview with Miles Vaughn, 166-167, 168, 170
 Marshall, relations with, 1392
 Meetings with Gen. Chou, reports of, 1278, 1283-1286; with Gen. Marshall, 1349
 Mukden, trip to, 881-888 *passim*, 893
 New Year's Eve speech, reaction to, 133-134
 Political prisoners, release of, 147
 Prestige, influence, and questions of loss of, U.S. evaluations, 131, 154, 155, 157, 161-162, 1020, 1108-1109, 1296, 1333, 1389-1390, 1415, 1416, 1420, 1423, 1425, 1469
 Secret orders to eradicate pocket of Communist forces, 641-642
 Soviet Union:
 Question of personal visit to, 840, 841-842
 Question of sending representative to, 17
 Stalin, talks with, 75-76
 Title, English translation, 255-256
 Tributes to: Marshall, 540, 583; Wedemeyer, 1439
 U.S. loan, effect on of PCC speech and U.S. interview, 789
- Chiang Kai-shek (Mayling Soong), Madame, 177, 190, 370, 588; messages, negotiations for Manchurian truce, 891-892, 906-907
- Chiao Ke-min, Gen., 991
- Chiaotso, 379, 481
- Chiaotso-Hsinhsiang railroad, 456
- Chichiachuang, 352, 357
- Chichihar. *See* Tsitsihar
- Chihfeng, 235, 1106
 Airfield damaged, 872
 Communist and Soviet forces, presence of, and proposed takeover by National forces, 30, 45-50 *passim*, 61-65 *passim*, 72-74, 82, 99-105, 342, 346, 374, 380-384, 1294
 Field teams, dispatch and reports on, 348-366 *passim*, 379, 383-392 *passim*, 502, 866-867
 National army cease-fire violations at, 342-347 *passim*, 352, 376-390 *passim*
 Soviet troop withdrawals, 376, 379, 381, 390
- Chimo, 1282, 1308
- Chin Pang-hsien (Boku, Poku), 754, 778*n*
- Chin Teh-chun, Lt. Gen., 753*n*, 759, 764, 767
- Chinchow, 354, 355, 358, 1270, 1428
- Chinese Air Force, bombing of Communist cities, 1356, 1444, 1445, 1450-1451
- Chinese Democratic Parties, Federation of. *See* Democratic League.
- Chinese National Army:
 Communist army compared, 184-185
 Development of, 195
 Japanese elements in, questions of, 370, 563, 568, 991-992, 1293, 1449
 Movement to establish Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria. *See* Manchuria.
 Reorganization and integration of Communist forces into, negotiations respecting, *January-May*, 41-42, 172, 177-341
 Allocation of armies by region, 233, 266-273, 284-285, 298-299, 309, 608-609
 Basic Agreement:
 Chiang Kai-shek, acceptance in principle, 290
 Manchuria, applicability to (*see also* Manchuria, *passim*), 264, 267-269, 309-310, 325-326
 Mao Tse-tung, acceptance in principle, 263
 Signature and press release, 285, 288-289, 291-295; Smyth on, 539-540
 Text, 295-300
 Title, wording of, 275-281
 Basis for, 441-442, 444-445; Marshall, 428, 429, 463-464, 472
 Chang Chih-chung, Gen. (*see also* Military Sub-Committee, *infra*), 194-196, 199-202, 209-211, 222-223, 262-263; Draft basic agreement, signature, 291-295 *passim*
 Chiang Kai-shek, 201-202, 528-529
 Chinese methods and traditions, consideration of, 321-325
 Chou En-lai:
 Conferences and meetings (*see also* Military Sub-Committee, *infra*), 202-206, 211, 223-224, 258-259, 263-264, 327-329
 Draft basic agreement, signature, 291-295 *passim*
 Messages, remarks, 33, 73, 188-189, 193-194, 330-331, 333, 531-532, 545, 1284, 1301
 Demobilization of units and disposition of demobilized personnel (*see also* Militia, Military police, Puppet forces, Railroad guards, and Secret police), 189-242 *passim*, 256-258, 263, 304-321 *passim*, 339-340
 Basic Agreement, 297-298
 Communist delay in supplying lists of forces, 331, 337

- Chinese National Army—Continued
 Reorganization and integration of Communist forces into—Con.
 Executive Headquarters, authority and duties, 206, 230, 260-261, 263, 276, 290, 291, 299, 336-337, 338-339; U.S. directive, draft plan, 300-302; discussions, 302-325
 Manchuria, movement of National forces. *See* Manchuria.
 Marshall:
 Basic Agreement, signature and press release, 285, 288-289, 291-295
 Conferences and meetings with:
 Chang Chih-chung, 194-196, 199-202, 209-211, 222-223, 262-263; Chang Chun, 196-198, 346; Chen Cheng, 339-340; Chou En-lai, 114-115, 202-206, 220, 223-224, 258-259, 263-264; Military Sub-Committee, 211-215, 220-222, 224-258, 265-289, 302-326
 Correspondence with: Chang Chun, 192; Chiang Kai-shek, 188, 191, 335-336; Chou En-lai, 193-194; Truman, 177, 193, 206-207, 260-262, 290, 351-352; Wedemeyer, 177, 189-192, 207-209
 Military Sub-Committee to effect nationalization and reorganization (Marshall, Chang Chih-chung, Chou En-lai), 33, 150, 188-189
 Meetings, 211-215, 220-222, 224-258, 265-289, 302-326, 520-522
 Membership, announcement and discussions, 130, 148, 150, 177, 191, 192, 193-194, 285-286, 289, 337
 Militia. *See* Militia.
 National forces movements as exception to stand-still. *See under* Cease-fire.
 National Military Council, role, 187, 198, 225, 229, 264, 273, 284, 297, 321
 Peace Preservation Corps. *See* Peace Preservation Corps.
 Service areas, establishment, functions, etc., 198-206 *passim*, 210-223 *passim*, 281-282, 296, 301, 319-320, 330-331, 334
 Training schools for Communist forces:
 Kalgan school, 335-336, 341, 955-956, 963, 1133, 1484; termination by Chiang Kai-shek, 785-787
 Proposals for establishment and equipment of, 258-259, 262,
- Chinese National Army—Continued
 Reorganization and integration of Communist forces into—Con.
 Training schools for Communist forces—Continued
 Proposals for, etc.—Continued
 263-264, 310, 313, 316, 318, 327-341 *passim*
 U.S. military equipment:
 Communist units, questions of use by, 179, 185, 209, 216, 217, 332, 337-338, 341
 National Army use of and Communist objections: Marshall, 230, 246, 446; discussions with Gen. Chou, 925-930 *passim*, 952-963 *passim*, 1132-1133; Smyth, 1151
 U.S. proposals, 178-188, 215-219
 Wedemeyer, 39, 178-188, 207-209; views on demobilization, 189-192, 208
 Strength of, U.S. evaluation, 181, 312-313, 1366
 Chinese National Government (*see also* Kuomintang *and* Political entries):
 Black list of persons to be arrested, kidnapped or assassinated, 1362
 Communist allegations regarding policy of, 1010-1012
 Interim (coalition) government of Republic of China, charter, 139-141
 Reorganization. *See* Political Consultative Conference.
 Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (CNRRA), 1127, 1244; question of Communist representation on, 953, 965, 980, 1364
 Chinfu, 670, 677, 680
 Chinhsien, 458, 489, 494
 Chining, 398; field teams, establishment and reports, 363, 365, 379, 383, 389, 393-394, 455, 464-467
 Chinwangtao, 106, 953, 1367, 1397; railroad communication, 443, 1435, 1453, 1454
 Chiulikwan, 505, 506, 507, 508
 Chou Ching-mai, Mayor, 1122
 Chou En-lai, Gen. (*see also under subject headings*):
 Character of, 501, 1506
 Chinese Communist Party representative, 148, 152
 Kuomintang, position on, 162-163
 Kuomintang affiliation of prior to 1927, 194, 292
 Political Consultative Conference, remarks, 149-150, 162-163, 171
 Staff and residences, surveillance by special service agents, 1362
 Chou Fu-shing, Gen., 382
 Chou (Chow) Pao-chung, Maj. Gen., 450, 783
 Chou Tien-chien, 507

- Chou (Chow) Tsien-chung (Hsien-chung), 829-830, 1329
- Choutsun, 1282
- Chow Ai, Gen., 672, 677
- Chow Tang-fan, 680, 682
- Chü-ao, 385, 386
- Chu Teh, Gen., 452, 747-748, 868, 1357
- Chung Hsin Coal Mining Co., 820
- Chungking, 433, 1217-1218
- Chungyang, 385, 386, 455, 491
- Civil administration. *See* Local self-government.
- Civil liberties (*see also* Press), 147, 155, 162, 171, 173, 185, 287-288, 961
- Draft constitutions, 137, 143, 145, 147
- Suppression of, 919-920, 974, 1469
- Clement, Brig. Gen. William T., references to and reports of messages, 1112*n*, 1243, 1281-1282, 1308, 1319, 1352, 1358, 1378, 1387*n*, 1398
- Clubb, O. Edmund, 612-613, 733, 752, 755-758, 779-784, 795, 1293-1294
- CNRR. *See* Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.
- Coalition government, negotiations, proposals, etc., 130, 131, 135, 142, 178, 352, 445, 883
- Interim coalition government, 142-146, 150, 163-166, 206-207
- Soviet position, 117
- Cole, Lt. Col., 482-484
- Committee of Three, 3*n*, 6*n*, 12-14, 20, 25-26, 43-129 *passim*, 345, 380, 463-468, 512, 535, 543-553, 561, 585-586, 594, 603, 608, 611-612, 641-717, 759-776, 793, 848-849, 976, 1005, 1058-1059, 1139-1186, 1189-1190, 1240-1242, 1246-1248, 1370-1371, 1425-1426
- Communications. *See under* Cease-fire agreements, Executive Headquarters, and Manchuria.
- Communist Army:
- Canton and Hankow, agreements to remove Communist troops surrounded by Government troops at, 613-711
 - Acting Committee of Three (Byroade, Chou En-lai, Hsu Yung-chang), meetings, 653-667, 669-695, 696-702
 - Byroade (*see also* Acting Committee of Three *supra*), 642-643, 653
 - Caughy, 597, 636-638, 641, 668*n*, 707
 - Chiang Kai-shek, 637, 647
 - Chou En-lai:
 - Directives to Executive Headquarters and the 8th Field Team, drafts, 619-621
 - Meetings with: Acting Committee of Three, 654-667, 669-695, 696-700; Marshall, 650, 653; Military Sub-Committee, 621-632
 - Communist Army—Continued
 - Canton and Hankow, etc.—Con.
 - Remarks, messages, 396, 517, 580, 632-633, 638-640, 645, 646, 648-650, 702, 704, 707-711
 - Expenses of transfer, 643*n*, 703, 704, 705-707, 710, 711, 842, 844
 - Gillem, 522, 576-583 *passim*, 612-644 *passim*
 - Hsu Yung-chang, 649, 651, 656-657, 662-667 *passim*, 683, 697-702 *passim*, 708; presence at meetings, 621, 654, 657, 696
 - Marshall, 396, 612, 614, 642-653 *passim*, 668, 702-705, 707-711, 842, 1424
 - Military Sub-Committee meetings, 621-632
 - Ports of embarkation, 616, 617, 619-620, 632-633, 634, 635-636, 637, 640, 644-646, 707, 708*n*, 711, 736
 - Provisions, 582, 628-632 *passim*, 648-649, 650
 - Smyth, 641-642
 - Wedemeyer, 616-617, 635, 640
 - Development of, 1937-1946, 194-195
 - Integration into National Army, negotiations for (*Jan.-May*). *See* Chinese National Army: Reorganization and integration of Communist forces.
 - Manchuria, movement of forces. *See under* Cease-fire agreements, problems of implementation, and Manchuria *entries*.
 - National Army compared with, 184-185
 - U.S. evaluation of, 180-181, 182-185
 - Communist Party:
 - Estimates by: Chiang Kai-shek, 166, 168; Kennan, 116-119; Marshall, 1275
 - Kuomintang relations with, 528, 806-807, 1276-1277, 1280-1281
 - Manifesto of Central Executive Committee in commemoration of 9th anniversary of "7th of July", 1310-1316, 1346, 1356
 - Military position and activities, presence in Manchuria and cooperation with Russia. *See* Manchuria.
 - Soviet relations: Chao, 1294; Chou, 537
 - Trials and executions by, 481
 - U.S. evaluations, 116-119, 777-779, 815-816, 817
 - Constitutional Convention, *May 5*, proposed. *See* National Assembly.
 - Constitutional government. *See* Political Consultative Conference.
 - Cooke, Vice Adm. Charles M., Jr., 374, 616, 1029-1039 *passim*, 1431, 1440

- Craig, Col. David W., 389, 464-467
 Culley, Col. F. C., 767, 768-771
 Cummings, Col. A. H., 389, 480, 481, 485
- Dairen, Russian interests in, 563, 939, 940, 1294
 Davenport, Col. H. A., 767
 Davis, Col. James C., 162-163
 Davis, Col. M. F., 1243, 1378, 1398; Anping investigation, 1443, 1463-1464, 1477, 1478-1479, 1490, 1502-1504
 Davis, Monnett B., 1192-1193, 1413-1416
 Deadlock of negotiations, efforts of Amb. Stuart and Gen. Marshall to break, 1388-1507
 Chiang Kai-shek, meetings with Marshall, 1468-1471; Stuart, 1388-1395, 1465-1467
 Chou En-lai:
 Correspondence, 1450-1451
 Meetings and conferences with: Marshall, 1404-1410, 1427-1437, 1443-1448, 1474-1489, 1493-1502; Stuart, 1395, 1452-1460, 1467-1468, 1471-1472, 1493-1502
 Marshall:
 Correspondence, 1397-1398, 1426-1427, 1438, 1449-1452, 1463-1465, 1489-1491, 1502-1505; with Truman, 1394-1395, 1419-1421, 1426, 1439-1440
 Meetings, conferences with: Chiang Kai-shek, 1420-1421, 1468-1471; Chou En-lai, 1404-1410, 1427-1437, 1443-1448, 1474-1489, 1493-1502; Lo Lung-chi, 1312-1413; Stuart, 1393-1394, 1471-1473, 1493-1502; Yu Ta-wei, 1395-1397, 1403-1404, 1422-1426, 1473-1474, 1505-1507
 National government position, 1393
 Stuart:
 Illness of, 1420, 1422, 1426, 1465
 Meetings, conferences with: Chiang Kai-shek, 1388-1395, 1465-1467; Chou En-lai, 1395, 1452-1460, 1467-1468, 1471-1472, 1493-1502; Marshall, 1393-1394, 1471-1473, 1493-1502
 Message from Acheson, 1426
 Presence at meeting on Kunming assassinations, 1412
 Terrorist attacks (*see also* Kunming), 1425, 1426
 Yu Ta-wei, meetings with Marshall, 1395-1397, 1403-1404, 1422-1426, 1473-1474, 1505-1507
- D'ettore, Lt. Col. W., 669
 Demobilized Manpower Commission, proposed, 313-321 *passim*, 340
 Democratic League (Federation of Chinese Democratic Parties):
 Army reorganization, proposal for, 197
 Democratic League—Continued
 Assassination of certain members at Kunming. *See* Kunming.
 Communist Party, relations with, 1331
 Democratic Reconstruction Association, relations with, 137
 PCC and reorganization of government, position on, 132-133, 134, 154, 160-171 *passim*, 1335; Society for Promotion of PCC, 147-148
 Political and Economic Council reorganization, proposals for, 798, 799, 802, 803, 810, 811, 851-852, 855, 857
 Demonstrations, 137, 532, 533, 1202, 1221; Chungking, 439-440, 443-445, 1217-1218; Harbin, 1151; Loshan, 508; Manchuria, 553-554, 752, 757, 785, 815; Nanking, 1191-1192, 1202, 1224, 1309, 1425; Peiping, Executive Headquarters premises, 438-439, 442, 445; Shanghai, 1192-1193, 1201, 1415; Soviet remarks, 1462
 Denebrink, Rear Adm. Francis C., 1414
 Drake, Lt. Col. R. R., 432, 767, 771-773, 774-775
 Duke, Emanuel M., 1464, 1502, 1503
 Durbrow, Elbridge, 1460-1463
 Durdin, F. Tillman, 1250
- East River, 396, 433, 441
 East River Communist forces. *See* Communist Army: Canton and Hankow.
 Economic situation: Chiang Kai-shek, 1108; Chou En-lai, 152; Szechuan Province, 1449; U.S. evaluations, 131, 132, 974, 980, 1361, 1389
 Eisenhower, Gen. Dwight D., 787, 833, 1277, 1358
 Ely, Col. E. B., 353, 357, 1243; field team reports, 454-459, 476, 477, 479
Emancipation Daily, 553-554, 1309, 1357, 1448, 1449; closing of, 974
 Eng, Capt. Ernest K. H. (Horace), 81, 1438*n*; presence at meetings, 235, 248, 258, 262, 263, 302, 317, 327, 516, 543, 554, 566, 576, 588, 606, 611, 621
 Executive Headquarters (military) for implementation of cease-fire arrangements:
 Changchun, branch office, 976
 Communications for, 14-16, 22, 24, 25, 357, 361-362, 390
 Detention of field team member, 1425
 Effectiveness, breakdown in, 1354-1355, 1370, 1376
 Establishment and initial functions. *See* Cease-fire arrangements of *January 10, 1946*, negotiations and problems of implementation.
 Expeditious functioning. draft of agreement on, 914-915

Executive Headquarters—Continued

- Field teams. *See* Cease-fire agreements: Problems of implementation *and under* Manchuria entries.
- Informational reporting to State Department discontinued, 391
- National Commissioner, replacement for Tai Li, 800
- Operation of, 908-911
- Press releases, issuance by, 896-898, 900-901, 919
- Railway Control Section. *See* Communications *and* Railways.
- Reorganization and integration of armies, functions re, 218, 227, 229, 302-308, 311, 315, 318; Chou, 213, 276; Gillem, 336-337; Marshall, 211, 214, 230, 254, 260, 290, 300-302, 315, 318; Shinkle, 338-339
- Title, 288
- Tribute to, 463-464
- U.S. staff at, 207, 211, 260-261, 291-292, 301, 303, 375
- Authority of American member, question of. *See under* Manchuria.
- Fairbank, John K., 131-132, 131*n*
- Faku, 1034, 1041, 1086, 1087, 1101
- Fang Fang, Gen., 637, 696, 703-711 *passim*
- Far Eastern Commission, consideration of Manchurian situation, proposed, 427, 429, 434-435
- Feng Pai-chu, Gen., 615, 619
- Ferguson, Col. J. M., 389, 392-393, 480-483
- Ford, Col. D. H., 389, 503, 504
- Freedom of press. *See* Press.
- Freedom of speech, 40, 185, 961
- Freese, Maj. Fred J., 1464, 1502, 1503
- Fu Tso-yi, Gen., 358, 383, 502
- Fugh, Philip C., 1452-1458 *passim*
- Fushun, 612, 724, 779, 780
- Gillem, Lt. Gen. Alvan C., Jr., 157, 159*n*, 163, 516, 1414
- Correspondence and remarks on Communist forces, evacuation from Canton and Hankow, 522, 576-583 *passim*, 612-644 *passim*; Manchuria, *see* Manchuria entries; reorganization and integration of armies, 302, 303, 317, 327-338 *passim*
- Nanking, trip to, *March*, 583, 585
- U.S. representative on Committee of Three and advisor to Military Sub-committee, 535; to Mukden, 546, 576, 585-586, 591, 592, 594
- Grand Canal, 1026, 1030, 1346, 1428
- Graves, Col. E. M., 389, 503-509, 654, 676, 677, 1337
- Great Britain, special privileges in China, 1459
- Gripper, Col. P. C., 389
- Haicheng, 999, 1007, 1028, 1029, 1040
- Haichow, 385, 479, 1404-1405, 1444
- Hainan Island Communist forces. *See* Communist Army: Canton and Hankow.
- Han River, 1396, 1473
- Han Tuan-pei, Gen., 458
- Handy, Gen. Thomas T., 1359-1360
- Hankow, 1267, 1317-1329 *passim*, 1336, 1342
- Communist forces, evacuation. *See* Communist Army: Canton and Hankow.
- Famine, 456, 522-523
- Field teams, establishment and reports on, 503-510, 1337, 1339, 1340-1342, 1353
- Harbin:
- Communist occupation of, 589, 724, 758, 823, 840, 941
- Communist position on, 914, 1230, 1233, 1239, 1244, 1245, 1458, 1500, 1505
- Field team, dispatch to, 1007, 1008, 1016, 1018, 1029, 1040, 1041, 1267, 1280
- Nationalist claims on, 975, 1216, 1242, 1247, 1429, 1445, 1480
- Soviet presence at, 443, 595, 600, 1294, 1303; withdrawal 42, 734, 736, 795
- Harbin-Tumen railroad, 1006
- Harriman, W. Averell, 148, 149*n*
- Harris, Col. D. Q., 383, 389, 473-480
- Harris, Col. L. V., 389
- Haskell, Col. Louis W., 353, 359, 362, 397, 1352
- Heilungkiang, 1036, 1217, 1248, 1286, 1453
- Heishui (Heishuichen), 347, 353
- Hickey, Lt. R. C., 38; presence at meetings, 224, 235, 248
- Hill, Col. Donald C., 426, 461, 980, 986, 1015, 1028, 1050, 1051, 1052, 1128, 1154-1168 *passim*, 1171-1173, 1177; presence at meetings, 1133, 1153, 1169
- Hilldring, Maj. Gen. John H., 512
- Ho Chang-chung, Maj. Gen., 506, 507
- Ho Chu-chin, Col., 1447
- Ho Kow Shien. *See* Hokou.
- Ho Kwei-chang, Gen., 1382, 1387, 1388, 1399-1402, 1407-1412 *passim*, 1419, 1441
- Ho Lung, Gen., 358, 487, 488, 491, 493, 1504
- Ho Shao-chu, Gen., 1417
- Ho-tse, 1229, 1232, 1235
- Ho Ying-chin, Gen., 433, 434, 650, 676, 697, 846, 1263, 1296, 1309
- Hodgskin, Col. Hewell L., 1336, 1337-1338

- Hokiang. 1036, 1042, 1286
Hokou (chen). 617, 654, 655-656, 660, 1327, 1343
Holly. Col. U. W., 389, 458-459, 487-493, 494
Honan. situation in, 42, 503, 1354, 1396; East Honan, 947, 948-949; Hupeh border area, 516, 518, 676, 1246, 1248, 1309, 1342, 1356, 1402, 1403, 1449; Northern Honan, 344, 444, 503; Southern Honan, 353, 1355
Hong Kong, 1459
Hopei (Hopeh) :
 Japanese troops, disarmament of, 430-431
 National forces offensives in, 342-343, 352, 366, 1242, 1259, 1260, 1270
 Redistribution of forces in, proposals for, 1076, 1242, 1259, 1260, 1270, 1285
 Situation reports: Chen Cheng, 1289, 1481; Chou En-lai, 1293, 1318, 1320; Marshall, 1355; Smyth, 1302; Stevens, 391
Houma. 379, 389, 457, 503, 1405
Hsian, 1424, 1427, 1445, 1448
Hsiaohaichen, 819, 864, 949
Hsiaohsien. 863, 947, 949, 1428
Hsiayi, 863, 947, 949
Hsieh Cheng, Capt., 1401
Hsin-An, 1036, 1042, 1043, 1044, 1076, 1091, 1248, 1453
Hsin Hei Lung Kiang, 1042, 1043, 1044, 1076, 1091
Hsin-Hsiang, 389, 456, 480-486, 1110, 1338
Hsin Hua Jih Pao, 533
Hsin Yang. *See* Sinyang.
Hsing-T'ai, 385, 1229, 1232, 1235, 1241
Hsingyang (Siangyang), 1396, 1403
Hsiung (Tsung) Shih-hui, Gen., 62, 63, 63*n*, 81, 82, 98, 714, 730, 779, 780, 893, 966, 1048
Hsiuwu, 385, 386, 1110-1111
Hsu Kan, 580
Hsu Kwang-ta, Maj. Gen., 729, 767, 774
Hsu Yung-chang, Gen., 1294-1295, 1318, 1320, 1365, 1447, 1448, 1450, 1489
 Committee of Three, membership, 793, 976; replacement, 1425-1426
 Memoranda on: Changchun branch office of Executive Headquarters, 337; National forces, order to attack in North Kiangsu, answer to Communist allegations, 1386
 Presence at meetings, 543, 554, 566, 576, 606, 1139, 1153, 1169
 Remarks, messages on evacuation of Communist forces from Canton and Hankow. *See under* Communist Army: Canton and Hankow; on Manchurian problems, *see under* Manchuria.
Hsuan Hua (Hwa) Tien, 680, 683, 708, 709-710, 1288, 1328
Hsuchow (Suchow), *see also* Lunghai railway :
 Field teams, dispatch and reports, 356, 367, 371, 373, 379, 383, 388, 389, 455, 459, 460, 473-480, 1342; Communist lack of cooperation, 890
 Nationalist forces in, 947, 1365, 1430, 1444, 1473
 Repatriation of Japanese from, 436-437
 Rice exports, Communist retention, 1002
Hsuchow-Tsinan railway, 1241
Hsueh, Tu-pi, 1371, 1372-1373
Hsueh Yueh, Gen., 1336, 1338, 1444
Hu Ching-jou, Gen., 347
Hu Shih, 1374, 1406
Hu Tsung-nan (Chung-nan), Gen., 1309, 1367, 1405, 1427, 1428, 1448, 1482
Huai-an :
 Field teams, 847, 850, 854, 871
 Redistribution of forces, proposals, discussions, 1227, 1228, 1232, 1238, 1241, 1251, 1263, 1322, 1367
Huaiyin, 457, 1232
Huang An, 671, 676
Huang Chuan, 670, 677, 687
Huang Pi, 671, 676
Huang Shin-yin, Maj. Gen., 1110-1111
Huang (Hwong) Yen-pei, 137, 997
Huang Yi-feng, Maj. Gen., 1463-1464, 1477, 1478-1479, 1490, 1502-1503, 1504
Hulutao, 41, 1403
Hunyuan, 365, 398
Hupeh :
 Famine in, 628
 Field teams, dispatch and reports, 708, 1404, 1427-1428, 1447
 Honan border area. *See under* Honan.
 Situation in, 516-523 *passim*, 676, 947, 948, 949, 1031, 1257, 1288, 1342, 1396, 1416, 1424, 1429, 1430, 1444, 1473
Hurley, Maj. Gen. Patrick J., 1312, 1312*n*, 1461
Hutchin, Lt. Col. Claire E., 1278, 1278*n*, 1349, 1410; presence at meetings, 843, 868, 915, 1274, 1305, 1393, 1412, 1422, 1427, 1443
Hwa Yuan, 670, 687
Hwang-an, 617, 618
Hwang Hwa, 353-357 *passim*, 759, 767
I-tu, 1229, 1288, 1367, 1396
Inner Mongolia, 41, 503; autonomy movement, 1491-1493
Jao Su-shih, Gen., 1274-1277, 1279
Japan :
 Assets in Manchuria, status of, 937
 Chinese troops, proposals for use in occupation of, 202, 204, 269, 272, 285, 429, 445

- Japan—Continued
 Manchurian occupation, influence of, 448-449
 Mongols, relations with, 1493
 POW's in China, status report, 492-493
 Surrender, 1945, terms, 939
 Troops in China :
 Cooperation and employment by National forces, Communist claims, 370, 563, 586, 991-992, 1449
 Cooperation with Communists, and use of captured Japanese equipment, National claims, 345, 778, 780, 813, 815, 818, 823, 1217-1218
 Military equipment, proposals for use of, 39, 208-209, 213, 301-308 *passim*
 Soviet employment of, 943
 Surrender and repatriation of, 39, 357-358, 378, 411, 430-431, 435, 438, 444, 461-462, 464, 492-493, 503, 724, 758, 790, 823, 959, 1403; General Directive No. 5, 435-437
 Surrender to Communist forces, problems, 1-10 *passim*, 24, 39, 41-42, 84, 86-87, 357-358, 384-385, 398, 435, 468, 1376-1377; to Soviet forces, 29, 30
- Jehol :
 Cease-fire violations and movements of forces, situation, 449; Chou En-lai, 342-353 *passim*, 530, 873-874, 946-947, 1246, 1268, 1405, 1428; Marshall, 1396, 1431-1432; Robertson, 866-868, 879; Smyth, 563, 994
 Communist interruption of air and rail communications, 899, 948
 Executive field headquarters, 15
 Field teams, establishment and problems, 123, 124, 345, 346, 364, 365, 866-868, 1025
 Local civil government in, 1269
 Manchuria, inclusion of Jehol province in, 27-31
 National demands for Communist evacuation of, 1075, 1082, 1087, 1100, 1106, 1115-1119 *passim*, 1209, 1213, 1234, 1239, 1248, 1285, 1286, 1288, 1304, 1334, 1367, 1467, 1481, 1495; number of Communist forces, 1029
 Service areas, 199-200
 Troop movements and question of presence of Soviet or Communist forces in, 11, 27-32 *passim*, 39, 42-50 *passim*, 60, 80-82, 99-105, 129, 130
 U.S. nationals, proposed restrictions of movements in, 800
- Josselyn, Paul R., 600-601
 Judd, Walter H., 911n
 Jukao, 1365, 1428
- Kalgan, 39, 41
 Communist forces, presence in, 1235, 1285, 1286
 Communist propaganda, 1151-1152
 Field team, dispatch, reports, and problems, 15, 24, 350-351, 354, 355, 356, 357, 360-361, 362-366, 379, 455, 460; U.S. member, 389
 Training schools for Communist forces, proposed. *See under* Chinese National Army: Reorganization.
- Kan Chung-tou, Col., 1102
 Kan Nai-kuang, 1455
 Kao Hsu-hsun, Gen., 554
 Kaomi, 459, 602, 1025, 1282
 Karrick, Capt. S., 759, 767
 Keng Piao, Gen., 729, 767, 770
 Kennan, George F., 75-76, 116-119, 447-448
- Kiangsu, North :
 Communist appropriation of rice crops, 980
 Communist evacuation, National demands, 1194, 1213-1262 *passim*, 1284-1293 *passim*, 1320, 1321, 1331-1335, 1394, 1429, 1453, 1467, 1481, 1495-1501 *passim*
- Local civil Communist administration, problems of and proposals for transfer, 1285, 1303-1304, 1320-1326 *passim*, 1332-1345 *passim*, 1368-1369, 1376-1377, 1456, 1468
 Redistribution of forces, discussions, 1227, 1232, 1248-1256 *passim*, 1262-1269 *passim*, 1285, 1302
 Refugees, 1223, 1224-1225, 1255-1257, 1268, 1326, 1333
 Situation reports, 42, 352-353, 366, 370, 849, 863, 905, 946-947, 1027-1028, 1213, 1259, 1354-1371 *passim*, 1383, 1396, 1402-1405 *passim*, 1419, 1428, 1430, 1444, 1449, 1473, 1480, 1498; Tsao No. 1 Order, 1378, 1383, 1386
- Kiaochow-Tsinan railroad, 398, 1402, 1453
 Kirin, 994
 Field teams, dispatch, 1016, 1029, 1041
 Redistribution of forces, proposals, 1036, 1076-1077, 1116, 1248
- Kizer, Benjamin H., 374, 597
 Ko, Gen., 663-664
 Ko Ju Ho, 381
 Ko Pai-nien, 759, 767
 Koh Tsai (Kuo Tsien), Gen., 386, 504, 505, 506, 648, 663-664
 Koo, V. K. Wellington, 1438-1439
 Korea, North, 1294
 Korea, Soviet forces in, 166

- Korean forces, alleged use by National government, 1449
- Ku Chu-tung, Gen., 367, 819-820, 849, 860, 1419, 1441
- Kuang Jen-nung, Gen., 469-470
- Kueisui, 455, 464, 465-466
- Kunming:**
 American Consulate, granting of temporary refuge in, 1387-1388, 1405, 1406, 1410-1412, 1417-1418, 1419, 1440-1442; U.S. official position on, 1381, 1383, 1385-1386, 1402, 1411, 1414, 1441
 Assassinations of University professors and Democratic League members in, 1362, 1373-1376, 1389, 1390, 1395, 1399-1402, 1406-1407; effect on negotiations, 1416, 1417, 1420, 1433, 1451-1452, 1470; investigations of, 1382-1383, 1388, 1405, 1407, 1412-1413, 1441-1442
- Kuo Chi-chiao, Gen., 265, 265*n*, 274, 278, 302, 306, 312, 316-317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 489-490, 516, 767, 773; presence at meetings, 543, 554, 566, 606, 621, 1139, 1153, 1169
- Kuo Mo-jo, 1362
- Kuomintang:**
 CC clique, 154, 160, 440, 532-540 *passim*, 1407
 Central Committee: endorsement of PCC resolutions on draft constitution, 445, 539-540; plenary session, 565-566
 Communist Party, relations with, 528, 806-807, 1276-1277, 1280-1281
 Good faith, question of, 157, 158-159, 161-163, 169, 173-175, 815, 818
 Internal problems of, 132, 154, 157, 165, 541
 Organization of, 209
 Prestige of (*see also* Chiang Kai-shek), 1469
 Whampoa clique, 154, 160
- Kupeikow, 365
 Communist evacuation, National proposals for, 1194, 1216, 1219, 1229
 National forces' attacks on Communist forces in, 342, 347, 352, 1428
- Kwangshan (Kwangshian), fighting in, and dispatch of field teams to, 347, 353, 365, 367, 373, 379, 386, 389, 456, 675, 677, 683
- Kwangshui, 506, 507
- Kwangtung, 1256, 1482
 Denial of status of Communist forces by Gen. Chang Fa-kwei, 396-397, 431, 516-517, 523-525, 579-580, 582
 National forces' attacks in, 587, 949-950
- Kwanyiinshan, 864, 949
- La Guardia, Fiorello, 960, 1364
- Lafa, fighting in, and dispatch and reports of field teams, 1006, 1007, 1019-1030 *passim*, 1034, 1035, 1040, 1041, 1086-1087
- Lake, Col. J. P., 389, 425-426, 432, 468-470, 1504
- Land reform programs: Chiang Kai-shek, 1285, 1286; Chou En-lai, 1223-1224, 1330; Smyth, 1351-1352, 1390
- Lao Ho Kou, 670, 1337, 1396, 1424, 1447, 1473
- Lao Yao, repatriation of Japanese, 436-437, 462
- Lattimore, Owen, 741, 1492
- Lau, Col. K. K., 759, 767
- Leahy, Adm. William D., 1397
- Lee, Gen. C. P., 228, 254, 272, 280-286 *passim*, 313, 558; presence at meetings, 224, 235, 248, 265, 278, 302, 317, 543, 554, 566, 576, 606, 621
- Lee Hsueh-jui, Gen., 1431-1432, 1434
- Lee Kwang Tze, Col., 1434
- Lend-lease (*see also* U.S. aid), material for Communist Army training schools, inclusion under: Chen Cheng, 341; Gillem, 337-339; Marshall, 336
- Li, Maj. Gen., 865, 866
- Li Hsien-nien, Gen., 504-508 *passim*, 648, 649, 651, 686, 708-709, 1318, 1328, 1329, 1337, 1341, 1343, 1427-1428, 1447, 1448, 1473, 1482; presence at meetings, 669
- Li Ke-nung, 353, 358
- Li Kung-pu, murder of (*see also* Kunming assassinations), 1373, 1374, 1380, 1381, 1400, 1412, 1440, 1442
- Li So-yu, Gen., 358
- Li Tsung-jen, Marshal, 349, 365, 1438
- Li Wei-han, 1123
- Li Yu, Gov., 1352
- Li Yun-chang, Gen., 451
- Liachun, 874-875
- Liang, Gen., 768, 769, 770
- Liao Chen (g)-chi, 633, 644-645, 705-707
- Liao Yao-hsiang, Lt. Gen., 1019
- Liaoning, 449, 451, 503, 758, 1036, 1077
- Liaopei, 1036, 1043, 1077, 1092
- Lia Yuan, 488, 491
- Lin Fo. *See* Sun Fo.
- Lin Piao, Gen., 451, 712, 714, 728, 755, 806, 1086-1087, 1242, 1274, 1279
- Lin Ping, Gen., 615, 619, 703
- Lin Wei, Gen., 162, 336, 800
- Lincheng (Lencheng), 344, 346, 371
 Communist evacuation of, 1258; National demands for, 1194, 1241
 Food shortages in, 479-480
 Railways, conditions, 479-480
- Linfen, 457, 487

- Lingyuan, 342, 456, 1025, 1396
 Lini, 469, 1050, 1385, 1444
 Liu Chieh, 595-596, 613, 1382
 Liu Chih, Gen., 648, 672, 1231, 1342, 1344, 1427
 Liu Po-cheng, Gen., 458, 487, 488, 489
 Liuho, 1254, 1360, 1369, 1403
 Lo Jui-ching, Lt. Gen., 728, 759, 764-765, 677
 Lo Jung-huan (Yung-wheng), 451
 Lo Lung-chi, 1334, 1339, 1375, 1425; meetings with Gen. Marshall, 927-930, 969-970, 987, 1079-1081, 1114-1115, 1412-1413
 Local self-government in Communist-evacuated areas:
 Manchuria. *See under* Manchuria.
 North China and Shantung, 1269, 1322-1323, 1353-1354; Chou En-lai, 1284, 1285, 1302, 1345, 1408, 1409, 1456, 1458, 1460, 1496, 1500, 1505; Marshall, 1306-1307, 1317, 1333-1335, 1348-1349, 1368; Stuart, 1499-1502
 PCC provisions, applicability, 1284, 1286, 1287, 1322, 1332, 1334, 1456, 1505
 Special conference on, 1338-1340
 U.S. proposals for, 1350, 1370, 1376
 Political reorganization, proposals, drafts, etc., 134, 140, 145, 164-165
 Loshan, 456, 506, 508, 687, 1328
 Loshan Agreement (*Jan. 23, 1946*), 503-504, 507, 508, 665-666, 1360-1361
 Loyang, 796, 1337
 Lu Han, Gen., 1406*n*, 1419, 1441-1442
 Lu Ta-wei, Gen., 669, 679, 685-695 *passim*, 771-772, 773, 1326
 Lu Ting-yi, 1123
 Ludden, Raymond P., 166-167, 169-171, 175-176, 448, 513-516, 1046-1047
 Lung Kang, 644, 645, 647
 Lung Yun, Gen., 1400, 1406*n*, 1441
 Lunghai railway, 1388
 National demands for Communist evacuation of, 1321, 1335, 1453, 1495, 1499, 1500; Chiang Kai-shek, 1263; Chou En-lai, 1253; Marshall, 1235, 1351; Stuart, 1467
 National forces attacks on Communists, 1288, 1289; Chou En-lai, 370, 1027, 1292, 1293, 1404, 1444; field team reports, 383, 455
 Reconstruction and removal of fortifications, priorities of: Chou En-lai, 1028, 1050, 1098-1099, 1167; draft proposals, 1077, 1078, 1079; Hill, 460, 473-476; Marshall, 1162, 1163, 1169, 1220; time schedules, 1177, 1187, 1188
 Luwangcheng Agreement (*Jan. 29, 1946*), 504
- MacArthur, Gen. Douglas A., 100, 230, 262
 Macheng, 669, 677
 Maddocks, Maj. Gen. Ray T., 332, 332*n*, 333
 Malinovsky, Marshal Rodion Yakovlevich, 73, 447
 Manchuria:
 Cease-fire agreements of *Jan. 10*, applicability to: 264, 326, 502, 548, 550, 589, 594, 744, 891, 902-903, 911; movement of Chinese troops for purpose of restoring Chinese sovereignty as exception to, 2, 6, 12-13, 14, 20-22, 26-32 *passim*, 41, 42, 44, 50, 60-82 *passim*, 126, 431, 434, 444, 449, 452, 530, 531, 542, 984-985, 1066, 1067
 Chinese forces in, U.S. estimate, 943
 Chinese interests, U.S. evaluation of, 944
 Committee of Three (Chou, Hsu, Marshall), deciding vote of Gen. Marshall, proposed, 1005
 Communist policy, interests, and influence in: 528-535; Yenan statement, *Feb. 14*, 450-453, and U.S. evaluations, 442, 448-450, 502, 513-516, 777-779
 Crisis, *March 23-May 22*, 712-880
 Acheson, 723
 Additional instructions for field teams, drafts, 745-746, 751-752
 Anti-American and Anti-Communist propaganda, 806, 859-870 *passim*
 Basis for discussion, U.S. draft, 744-745
 Byroade, 712-715, 718, 726-728, 741, 842-843, 865
 Conference with Chou En-lai, 834-839
 Directive re movement of field teams, draft, 833-834
 Caughey, 753-754, 779-780, 800; trip to Canton, 717
 Chang Chun, administration, proposals for, 851-852, 854-855, 856-857; Communist capture, occupation, and proposed evacuation, 781-784, 790, 799, 804-805, 810, 811, 814, 818, 821, 823, 826, 831-833, 845, 876, 877
 Chen Cheng, illness, 735, 737, 754, 755
 Chiang Kai-shek:
 Cessation of hostilities, proposal, 795-796, 797
 Conference with Marshall, 840-841
 Position and views, U.S. evaluation, 733, 802-804, 806, 816-818

Manchuria—Continued

Crisis, *March 28-May 22*—Continued
Chiang Kai-shek—Continued

U.S. reports to, 722-723, 732, 738-739, 785-787, 824-828

Chou En-lai :

Conferences with : Byroade, 834-839 ; Gillem, 749-751 ; Marshall, 790-792, 797-800, 802-805, 843-846, 847-848, 849-861, 868-878

Directive re movement of field teams, draft, 839-840, 842, 844

Messages, memoranda, remarks, 717, 719-720, 725, 729-730, 745, 752-753, 754-755, 796-797, 810-812, 862-864, 879

Position and views, U.S. evaluation, 717, 721-722, 738, 740

Clubb, O. Edmund, 733, 752, 755-758, 779, 780-784, 795

Commission for investigation and recommendations, proposed, 800, 801

Committee of Three :

Acting Committee of Three, Three Commissioners, and members of Team 27, meetings, 759-776

Agreement on dispatch of field teams, 848-849

Chen Cheng as temporary replacement for Chang Chih-chung, 641, 717

Hsu Yung-chang, appointment as Government representative, 793

Communists political representatives and plane, disappearance of, 754, 765

Demonstrations, 752, 757, 785, 815

Field teams, directives re movement of, drafts, 833-834, 839-840

Gillem, Lt. Gen. Alvan C. :

Conferences with : Acting Committee of Three and Three Commissioners, 759-776 ; Chou En-lai, 749-751

Messages, memoranda, 715-717, 720-723, 725, 729, 732-733, 734-735, 737, 738-739, 742-745, 748-749, 754-755

Hsu Yung-chang, Gen., 733-734, 781, 793-795, 813-814, 819-820, 822, 843 ; appointment to Committee of Three, 793, 976 ; replacement, 1425-1426

Local government issue (*see also* Local civil administration, *infra*), 827-828, 855-858, 878

Manchuria—Continued

Crisis, *March 28-May 22*—Continued
Marshall :

Correspondence, 715-717, 721-722, 724-725, 734-737, 742-744, 753-755, 785-787, 800, 805-812, 819-820, 822, 824-828, 843, 865-868, 879 ; with Acheson, 841-842 ; Eisenhower, 833 ; Truman, 815-818, 828-829, 841-842, 846-847

Immediate cessation of hostilities in Manchuria, U.S. draft on, 792-793, 801-802

Meetings, conferences with : Chang Nat-teh and Chen Ping-hsieh, 861-862 ; Chiang Kai-shek, 840-841 ; Chou En-lai, 790-792, 797-800, 802-805, 843-846, 847-848, 849-861, 866-878 ; Prof. Chow, 829-830 ; Hsu, 793-795, 813-814

Possible basis for agreement re Manchurian issues, 824-828

Press, statement to re propaganda, 865

Proposals for compromise solution, summary, 833

National government position, U.S. summary of, 794

Robertson, 718-719, 728-729, 735-736, 739-742, 746, 749, 759, 763, 767, 776, 805-806, 807-810, 866-868, 879

Smyth, 724, 736, 746-748, 758, 785, 790, 822-823

Soviet intercession, question of, 842

Truman, correspondence with Marshall on, 815-818, 828-829, 841-842, 846-847

U.S. planes, use by National forces, 805, 806

U.S. team members, interference with, 807-811

Yeh :

Illness, 755, 760, 765

Remarks, reports of, 712, 713, 714, 741, 754, 806, 865-866, 867

Young China Party, position, 829-830

Yu Ta-wei, 717, 737, 742-743, 753, 759, 767, 788-790, 793, 820-822, 823-824, 825, 830-832

Demonstrations in, 553, 554, 752, 757, 785, 815

Executive Headquarters, authority in, 371-376 *passim*, 442, 500

Far Eastern Commission consideration, question of, 427, 429, 434-435

Manchuria—Continued

- Field teams from Executive Headquarters, agreement to send, *Mar. 27*, 542-613
- Basis for entry, 584, 839-840, 842, 844; U.S. drafts, 542, 592, 745-746, 751-752, 833-834
- Caughey, 596-598, 599
- Chang Chih-chung, 543-562, 566-583, 603, 606-617
- Chiang Kai-shek, 445, 528, 565-566, 603-604
- Chou En-lai, 536, 586-587; draft proposals, 564-565, 584; meetings, 543-562, 603, 606-617; trip to Yen-an, 582-597 *passim*
- Committee of Three, 543-553, 603
- Executive Headquarters:
 Authority to send, 371-376 *passim*, 442, 500, 1284
 Instructions for, 600, 603; drafts, 542, 543, 564-565, 584
- Gillem, 543, 565-566, 583-605 *passim*, 612; meetings, 543-563, 566-583, 588-590, 603, 606-611
- Locations of teams, 1280
- Marshall, 123, 124, 363-364, 576, 578, 590-591, 599, 867-868, 1025; basis for entry of teams, 502, 542; meetings with Committee of Three, 345, 346, 543-553; messages to, 362-363, 562-566 *passim*, 583-594 *passim*, 603-605, 866-867
- Military Sub-Committee meetings, 554-562, 566-583, 606-617
- Robertson, 591-592, 601-602
- Smyth, 553-554, 563, 586, 595-596, 613
- History, 941-942
- Japanese external assets in, status of, 937
- Japanese forces in, 943
- Jehol province, question of inclusion in, 27-31
- Local civil administration in, 451, 452, 531, 545, 585, 1300
- Military Sub-Committee, proposed visit, 259, 261, 262, 264, 325-326
- National government program, U.S. interests, 935-936
- National Military Council, question of authority of, 546
- Political and Economic Council, Democratic League proposals for reorganization of, 798, 799, 802, 803, 851-852, 855, 857
- Political Consultative Conference, effect on of situation in Manchuria, 167-168, 170-171, 172
- Political development of, 935
- Population and resources of, 942
- Redistribution and reorganization of forces, problems of (*see also* Truce entries, *infra*), 1279-1280, 1286, 1290, 1294, 1324, 1499, 1500

Manchuria—Continued

- Situation in, *January-March 13* (*see also* Cease-fire agreements, problems of implementation), 341-572
- Sovereignty, National government, resumption by, problems (*see also* Local civil administration, *supra*), 904-912 *passim*, 984-985, 988, 1066, 1067, 1332; Soviet recognition of National sovereignty, 939
- Soviet Union:
 Acceptance of surrender of Japanese forces by, 29, 30
 Communists, relations with, 18, 42, 157, 168, 345-346, 440-441, 449, 513-515, 528-529, 538-540, 716, 718, 727, 731, 741, 756, 782-783, 813-814, 1217-1218, 1294, 1384, 1467
- Economic concessions, demands for, 427-428, 440, 515, 538, 612, 757, 937, 940
- Field teams: equal representation on, questions of, 528, 599, 911-912; internment of inspections plane, Chihfeng, 354-366 *passim*, 379; official notification of presence, questions of, 718-725 *passim*, 732, 781
- Policy and effects of, 11, 18, 75-76, 118, 138, 143, 934-945
- Troops in, 47, 61-64, 73, 81-82, 98, 143, 372, 374, 376, 426-428, 438-448 *passim*, 503, 563; withdrawal of, 166, 515, 534-536, 555-556, 586, 595-596, 600-604 *passim*, 613, 734, 757, 778-779, 940, 942-943; agreement for, 62, 98
- Truce, *June 6-21*:
 Extension of, 1105, 1106, 1113, 1190, 1230, 1273, 1295, 1321; cease-fire orders of Chiang Kai-shek, *July 3*, 1122, 1324, 1326, 1335-1336, 1352-1353; Mao Tse-tung, *July 1*, 1331, 1353, 1357-1358
- Negotiations leading to, *May 22-June 6*, 880-985
- Byroade, 890, 908-911
- Changchun, Communist evacuation and Executive Headquarters control, proposed: Chiang Kai-shek, 930, 984; Mme. Chiang Kai-shek, 891; Chou En-lai, 888-899 *passim*, 920, 921, 965, 966; Marshall, 880-905 *passim*, 916, 917, 918, 926, 927-928, 975-978, *passim*; Smyth, 945-946, 973, 975; Wang Shih-chieh, 883-884

Manchuria—Continued

Truce—Continued

Negotiations leading to—Con.

Chiang Kai-shek, 907-908, 915-916, 930, 984-985; meetings with Marshall, reports of, 880-881, 885-886, 976, 978; press release, 982; Chou En-lai comments on Chiang Kai-shek letter, 917-919

Chiang Kai-shek, Mme., 891-892, 906-907

Chou En-lai, 884-890, 893-900, 905, 915-926, 946-973; press release, 982-983

Commencement, *June 6*, announcement, 981

Communications, restoration of as condition for truce, 886-892 *passim*, 893-903 *passim*, 924, 926, 948, 972-983 *passim*, 993

Communist position, U.S. summary of, 882-883

Draft agreements: Three Commissioners, 932-933; U.S. drafts, 792-793, 801-802

Executive Headquarters, Changchun, field teams, authority, *See Changchun, supra*.

Executive Headquarters and field teams, American members' authority for final decisions, 886-902 *passim*, 908, 914, 923-924, 928, 967-970, 977, 979, 984; draft agreement, 914-915

Local civil administration, proposals on, 904, 922-923

Marshall:

Correspondence, 890, 891-893, 901-902, 905-912, 926-927, 930-932, 946-950, 975-976, 981, 982, 984-985, 993; with Chiang Kai-shek, 901-902, 912, 926, 981; Truman, 881-883, 902-903, 977-979, 983

Meetings, conferences with: Carsun Chang, 912-914; Chiang Kai-shek, 880-881, 885-886, 976, 978; Chou En-lai, 884-890, 893-900, 915-926, 950-973; Lo Lung chi, 927-930; Soong, 979-981; Wang Shih-chieh, 883, 884

National government position, summary: Chiang Kai-shek, 886, 891, 907-908; Marshall, 881-882, 886-887, 902-903, 978; Smyth, 975

Press releases: Chiang Kai-shek, 982; Chou En-lai, 982-983; Committee of Three, 976-977, 981

Manchuria—Continued

Truce—Continued

Negotiations leading to—Con.

Redistribution of forces. *See Reorganization of forces, infra, and names of Manchurian provinces.*

Reorganization and demobilization of army as a condition for: Chiang Kai-shek and Mme. Chiang Kai-shek, 886, 891, 907, 978, 984; Chou En-lai, 889; Marshall, 896, 983

Robertson, 890, 892-893, 930-932

Security implications, State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee memorandum, 933-945

Smyth, 945-946, 973-975

Political situation, Chinese summary, 1045-1046

Stalemate of negotiations during truce period, 985-1272

Byroade, 1007-1008, 1019, 1039-1042, 1048, 1060-1061

Carter, correspondence with Marshall, 994-995, 1020-1021, 1058-1060

Caughy, transmission to Marshall of National proposals regarding redistribution of troops and restoration of communications in North China and Manchuria, 1075-1079

Changchun, Executive Headquarters advance section, 987-988, 992, 1007-1008, 1015-1022 *passim*, 1028-1029, 1031, 1045, 1048-1049, 1059, 1065-1066, 1067

Chiang Kai-shek, meetings and correspondence with Marshall on, 1042-1044, 1215-1218, 1228-1230, 1248-1249, 1263-1265; position of, 1107-1109, 1122, 1193-1194; message to, from Communist delegation, 1123-1125

Chou En-lai (*see also* Committee of Three, *infra*):

Changchun organization of Executive Headquarters, U.S. paper, summary and corrections, 1060-1061

Meeting, conferences, 985-991, 1008-1020, 1025-1033, 1039-1042, 1047-1056, 1065-1074, 1083-1090, 1115-1123, 1125-1133, 1139-1151, 1153-1168, 1169-1186, 1203-1215, 1218-1228, 1231-1240, 1250-1262, 1265-1271

Messages, 1062-1064; to Chiang Kai-shek, 1123-1125; Marshall, 991-992, 1006-1007, 1034, 1101-1105, 1191-1192, 1194-1196, 1243-1245

Manchuria—Continued

Truce—Continued

Stalemate of negotiations during truce period—Continued

Committee of Three (Hsu, Chou, Marshall): draft directives, 1058-1059, 1189-1190; meetings, 1139-1151, 1153-1168, 1169-1186

Communications, restoration and protection of, 986-1018 *passim*, 1028-1039 *passim*, 1049-1050, 1073-1074, 1080, 1098-1099, 1120, 1126, 1153-1178

Administrative control of railways, 1171-1176

National proposals, 1077-1079

North and Central China, directive for reopening lines of communications, 1187-1189; railroads time schedule, 1158, 1177-1178, 1187-1188

Communist field team representatives, mistreatment, 1102-1103, 1122-1123, 1152, 1191-1192, 1194

Executive Headquarters and field teams, American mediation powers, 1004-1005, 1020, 1021, 1060-1069 *passim*, 1079-1081, 1095-1107 *passim*, 1114-1126 *passim*, 1136-1147 *passim*, 1168-1169, 1181-1185, 1189, 1201, 1241, 1247

Field teams, dispatch to Communist areas, 1039-1041, 1049, 1073, 1111, 1112-1113; Committee of Three memorandum, 1058-1059; special field team, proposal, 1112ⁿ

Final comparative strengths of National and Communist forces, 989-990, 1192, 1195-1196, 1245; National draft, 1076-1077; U.S. draft, 1247

Hsu Yung-chang, 1021-1022, 1026, 1027, 1035, 1058-1059, 1062, 1081-1082, 1242; meetings with Marshall, 998-1006, 1022-1023, 1091-1099, 1139-1151, 1153-1163, 1169-1186

Local civil administration:

Communist insistence on *status quo*, 996, 1234

Marshall:

Conferences with Chou En-lai, 988-989, 1054-1056, 1072, 1120, 1205-1207, 1214-1215, 1219, 1225, 1234-1238 *passim*, 1250, 1256, 1261, 1269, 1271; Hsu, 1000-1002; messages and conferences with Chiang Kai-shek, 1228, 1229, 1249, 1263, 1264; messages to Truman, 1262

Manchuria—Continued

Truce—Continued

Stalemate of negotiations during truce period—Continued

Local civil administration—Con. Mongolian democratic Hsingan government, 1151-1152

Ludden, memorandum of conversation with Soviet embassy officer Vinogradov, 1046-1047

Marshall:

Conferences with: Chang, 1114-1115; Chiang Kai-shek, 1215-1218, 1248-1249, 1263-1265; Chou En-lai, 985-991, 1008-1020, 1025-1033, 1047-1056, 1065-1074, 1083-1090, 1111-1123, 1125-1133, 1203-1215, 1218-1228, 1231-1240, 1250-1262, 1265-1271; Committee of Three, 1139-1151, 1153-1168, 1169-1186; Eight Delegates of PCC, 995-997; Hsu Yung-chang, 998-1006, 1022-1023, 1091-1099, 1133-1139; Lo Lung-chi and Carson Chang, 1079-1081, 1114-1115; Stuart, Price, Mills, 1106-1110; Yu Ta-wei, 1082-1083, 1091-1099, 1105-1106

Correspondence, 991-993, 994-995, 1006-1008, 1020-1025, 1033-1034, 1035, 1038, 1047, 1056-1058, 1059-1062, 1064, 1081-1083, 1090-1091, 1101-1105, 1110-1113, 1152, 1191-1192, 1194-1196, 1242, 1243-1246; to Chiang Kai-shek, 1042-1044, 1228-1230; Truman, 1038-1039, 1099-1101, 1113, 1168-1169, 1201-1203, 1262, 1265, 1271-1272; Yu Ta-wei, 1242

Mediator, role as, 1109, 1110; (1st) draft cease-fire proposal, 1044-1045

Reorganization and redistribution of forces, discussions and correspondence:

Marshall, 993; with Chiang Kai-shek, 1042-1044, 1215-1218, 1248-1249; Chou En-lai, 1016-1017, 1018ⁿ, 1032, 1033, 1053-1055, 1068-1072, 1088-1090, 1104-1107, 1115-1126 *passim*, 1195-1201, 1203-1225 *passim*, 1233-1240, 1244, 1250-1255; Truman, 1099, 1100, 1201; Yu, 1082-1083; Yu and Hsu, 1091-1096

- Manchuria—Continued
 Truce—Continued
 Stalemate of negotiations during truce period—Continued
 Reorganization and redistribution of forces—Continued
 Proposals and drafts:
 Committee of Three preliminary agreement and annexes, 1240-1242, 1246-1248
 Communist amendments, 1196-1201, 1245-1246; National government, 1035-1037, 1075-1077, 1193-1194
 Robertson, 1033-1034, 1047, 1056-1057, 1064, 1110-1113, 1152, 1243
 Smyth, 994, 995, 1064, 1123, 1151-1152, 1190
 Termination of hostilities, U.S. draft proposals, 1044-1045, 1074-1075; discussions and proposed amendments, 1065, 1081-1082, 1134-1151 *passim*, 1178-1181; delays, 1361-1362; Directive for termination of hostilities, 1186-1187, 1189-1190
 Yu Ta-wei, 1002, 1015, 1026-1029 *passim*, 1042-1053 *passim*, 1082-1091 *passim*, 1191; meetings with Marshall, 1091-1099, 1105-1106, 1133-1139; Committee of Three, 1139-1151, 1153-1168, 1169-1186
 U.S. forces in, 943
 U.S. interests, 945
 U.S. program and policy, SWNCC memorandum, 934-945
 Manchuria Joint Democratic Army, 448, 449, 451
 Mao Tse-tung, Gen.:
 Meeting with Marshall, 501-502, 510
 References to, 2-130 *passim*, 151-152
 Russia, question of visit to, 149, 152
 Title, English translation, 255-256
 U.S., question of visit to, 149, 152
 Marshall, Gen. George C. (*see also* Marshall mission and under *subject entries*):
 Advisor of Committee for cessation of hostilities, 351-352
 Authority of, as U.S. representative in China, 20, 1005
 Chiang Kai-shek, relations with, 1392
 Railway Control Section, U.S. assistants, 461
 Recall for consultation, 168-169, 259, 264, 446, 511, 513, 535, 576, 577, 723
 Return to U.S., question of, 1358
 Marshall—Continued
 Tributes by: Chang Chih-chung, 293-294; Chang Chun, 124-125; Chiang Kai-shek, 540, 583 (quoted); Gillem, 577; PCC, 163
 Visits to: North China, proposed, 442, 445; Shanghai, 373-374
 Marshall mission:
 Importance, 446-447
 Responsibility of Gen. Marshall, 953-954, 961
 Matthews, H. Freeman, 933-934
 McClure, Col. Clinton I., 328, 329, 332
 McClure, Maj. Gen. Robert B., 331, 331*n*, 332-333
 McConnell, Maj. Gen. John P., 566, 1337
 McGeary, Stanley A., 1381*n*, 1401, 1417, 1418, 1470*n*
 McKinley, Lt. Col. James F., 649-650
 Mee Yung, Col., 1102, 1103
 Mei I, 1399
 Melby, John F., 1045-1046, 1417
 Meng Hsien, 480, 481, 482
 Middleton, Col. J. W., 331-332, 843
 Military Advisory Group:
 Establishment and need for authorization: Marshall, 429, 959-960, 1133; Truman, 434
 Training program for Communist officers and men, proposed, 263, 329
 Militia, local:
 Manpower levels, 210
 Peace Preservation Corps distinguished from, 242
 Provincial control, questions of, 146, 150-151, 200, 213, 218-225 *passim*, 248-254 *passim*, 263, 274-275
 Miller, Col. Paul, 386, 389, 433, 636
 Mills, W. P., 1023, 1106-1110
 Ming Ching-shu, Maj., 1111
 Ministry of Communications, 400-425 *passim*, 466, 512, 526-528, 1379
 Mirs Bay, 632, 640, 643, 646, 708*n*, 711
 Mo Teh-hui, 801, 852, 995, 1000, 1085
 Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich, 19
 Mongolia, autonomy, move for, 440, 441, 1491-1493
 Mongolia, Inner, 41, 503
 Mongolia, Outer, 61, 1493
 Moscow Conference (1945), 19-20
 Mukden (*see also* Manchuria):
 Committee of Three, proposed visit to, 561, 585-586, 594, 608, 611, 612
 Detention of Communist personnel at airport, 726, 728-730, 732, 737, 742
 Field teams, 552, 585, 1007, 1040, 1041
 Marshall visit, proposed, 445

- Mukden—Continued
 Military Sub-Committee visit, proposed, 546, 555-556, 558, 576, 591, 592, 594
 Railroads control of, 27, 443, 595
 Soviet forces in, 443, 612; withdrawal, 42, 431, 438
 Mullen, Col. V., 389
- Nanking, 1027, 1292, 1338, 1395
 Hsia Kwan railway station incident, 1191-1192, 1202, 1224, 1309, 1425
 Visit of Gen. Gillem, 583, 585
 Nankou, 460, 602
 Nantung, 847-848, 849, 854, 864, 870-871, 947, 1366
 National Army. *See* Chinese National Army.
 National Assembly for adoption of constitution. *See under* Political Consultative Conference.
 National Democratic Reconstruction Association, 136-137
 National Military Council:
 Manchuria, question of authority in, 546
 Reorganization, proposed, 339, 340
 Reorganization and integration of armies, duties, 187, 198, 225, 229, 264, 273, 284, 297, 321
 Replacement, 717
 National Socialist Party, 1481
 New China News Agency, 747, 748, 749, 805
 Manifesto, text, 1310-1316
 Suppression of, 919, 950, 974
New Times, 1460-1463
 News agencies and newspapers. *See* Press.
 Nieh Jung-chen, Gen., 357-358
 Nine Power Treaty, 1922, 758, 938
 North China:
 Definition of, 266-269
 Redistribution of National and Communist forces in. *See under* Manchuria: Stalemate of negotiations during truce.
 Spread of hostilities and failure of political negotiations (*July 1-July 21*), 1272-1388
 Acheson, 1295-1297
 Chiang Kai-shek, meetings with:
 Chou En-lai, 1278, 1283-1286;
 Marshall, 1349
 Chou En-lai:
 Correspondence, 1326-1327, 1329, 1357-1358, 1362-1363
 Meetings with: Chiang Kai-shek, 1278, 1283-1286; Marshall, 1283-1293, 1299-1305, 1317-1323, 1340-1348, 1363-1369, 1371-1378; Col. Tychsen, 1278-1281; Wang Shih-chieh, Shao Li-tse (report of), 1345-1346
- North China—Continued
 Spread of hostilities and failure of political negotiations—Continued
 Clubb, 1293-1294
 Eisenhower, messages to Marshall, 1277
 Executive Headquarters, breakdown in functioning of, 1354-1355, 1370, 1376
 Marshall:
 Correspondence, 1273, 1277-1278, 1281-1283, 1293-1297, 1307-1308, 1323-1324, 1326-1329, 1331, 1335-1338, 1349-1353, 1357-1360, 1362-1363, 1378-1379, 1384-1385; with Acheson, 1297-1299, 1316-1317; Eisenhower, 1277, 1358; Truman, 1348-1349
 Meetings, conferences with:
 Chiang Kai-shek, 1349; Chou En-lai, 1283-1293, 1299-1305, 1317-1323, 1340-1348, 1363-1369, 1371-1378; Jao Su-shih, 1274-1277; Tseng Chi, 1329-1331; Wang, Shao, and Gen. Chen, 1331-1335, 1345; Yu Ta-wei, 1305-1307, 1324-1326, 1338-1340, 1353-1354, 1360-1362, 1369-1371, 1383-1384
 Political discussions, need for, 1296
 Shantung, 1272-1274, 1276, 1281, 1282, 1291, 1292, 1294-1295, 1298, 1304, 1305, 1306, 1309, 1320, 1325, 1329, 1338, 1352, 1354, 1355, 1356, 1367, 1370, 1378-1379, 1385
 Chinese Commanders Conference, proposed, 1336, 1338, 1352, 1355, 1358-1359, 1361
 U.S. proposed guidance instructions for U.S. members of field teams, 1379
 Smyth, 1272-1273, 1308-1310, 1349-1352, 1355-1357
 Special paper, 1304, 1322
 Stuart, 1380-1381, 1387-1388; instructions to, 1385-1387
 Truce extension, problems of notifying field commanders, 1273, 1295, 1307, 1324, 1326, 1331, 1335-1336, 1342-1343, 1352-1353
 Yu Ta-wei, meetings, conferences, 1305-1307, 1324-1326, 1338-1340, 1353-1354, 1360-1362, 1369-1371, 1383-1384
- Northeast Administrative Council, 549
 Northwest China, meaning of, 266
 Nunchiang (Nun Kiang):
 Communist civil administration, question of, 1217
 Redistribution of forces, proposals, 1036, 1042-1043, 1044, 1092, 1116, 1233, 1286; Manchuria Annex, 1076, 1091, 1248

- "Open door", 1459
Outer Mongolia, 61, 1493
- Pacification Headquarters, Communist, reduction and elimination of, 206, 210, 211, 240, 301, 304-305
- Pai Chung-hsi, Gen., 649, 651, 676, 849, 860, 884, 885, 1405, 1428
- Pan (Pai) Hsuo-tuan, Gen., 1123, 1194
- Pan Kuang-tan, 1381, 1415
- Pauley, Edwin W., 900
- Peace Preservation Corps, 379, 398, 451, 490, 780, 784, 863, 1343; continuation and role of after reorganization of armies, questions and proposals, 242-245, 273, 296, 299, 320, 377, 1238, 1245-1255 *passim*, 1263, 1354
- Peasant revolts, 974
- Pee, Col. Peter Tsong-kan (Chung-kan):
Committee of Three, assistant to, 753
Executive Headquarters representative to Gen. Chang Fa-kuei, 627, 633, 636
Presence at meetings. *See* Marshall, conferences, *under main headings*.
References to, 113, 122, 254, 779
Remarks, 81, 281, 282, 284, 698, 1176; American deciding vote on field teams, 1095, 1098; evacuation of Communist forces, 634
Visit to Canton, 717
- Pei-an, 734, 1036
- Peiching (Jehol), 381
- Peiping (Peking):
Executive Headquarters site, 14-15, 24-25, 37-38, 57-58, 88, 110
Peiping-Tientsin area, 947, 948, 953, 1453, 1495
- Peiping-Chinchow railway, 1235
- Peiping-Hankow (Pin-Han) railroad:
Communist forces, movements on and proposed evacuation, 506, 507, 1220, 1229, 1235, 1241
Field team headquarters on, 15
National forces, occupation and movement on, 27, 42, 670, 676, 677, 1208
Reconstruction and protection, schedules, 460, 483, 1163, 1169, 1177, 1188
- Peiping-Hsuechow railroad, 1158
- Peiping-Ku Pei Kou railroad, 1177, 1188
- Peiping-Liaoning railroad, 47, 1235
- Peiping-Lunghai railroad, 41
- Peiping-Mukden railway:
Repair shops, Soviet claims to, 612
U.S. Marines attacked (*see also* Anping incident), 1429, 1431, 1437, 1453*n*
- Peiping-Suiyuan railway, 27
Administration, 414, 1174
Reconstruction, schedule, 460, 1158, 1179, 1188
- Peng Chen, 451, 756
- Peng Hsueh-pei, 884, 896, 919, 1290, 1445, 1495
- Peng Shou-sheng, Gen., 726, 730
- People's Consultative Council (PCC):
CC clique, 534
Cease-fire agreement of *Jan. 10*, announcement by Chiang Kai-shek, 130; presentation of proposals, 1, 3
Communist unwillingness to appoint or nominate members for the National Council, 1215-1216, 1218, 1220, 1221, 1495-1496
Establishment, 1945, 132-133
Military Inspection Mission, proposals, 3, 10, 12
Number and apportionment of delegates, 132, 144, 146
Public sessions, U.S. résumé, 146-147
Reorganization of government and settlement of political matters in accordance with PCC principles, discussions:
Chou En-lai and Marshall, 1000-1001, 1284, 1301-1302, 1322, 1368, 1408-1410, 1443-1448 *passim*, 1481, 1484, 1485, 1495-1501 *passim*; Fugh, 1457
Informal Committee for, proposed, 1439, 1443, 1452-1453, 1466, 1499
Steering Committee, proposals for reconvening, 1000-1001, 1300-1304 *passim*, 1334, 1390, 1391, 1409-1410, 1447, 1499
- Perevertailo, A., 1460-1463
- Perrine, Col., 461-462
- Petrov, Apollon Alexandrovich, 426-427, 443, 444
- Philippines, U.S. policy, Communist position on, 1310
- Pian-Hsin (Pei-an) railroad, 880
- Pin-Han railway. *See* Peiping-Hankow.
- Pingch'ên railroad, 460
- Pingchuan, 347, 365, 456, 994
- Po Ku, 514
- Poku (Chin Pang-hsien), 754, 778
- Political Consultative Conference:
Discussions (*Jan.-Apr.*) pertaining to, 131-177
Central Executive Committee, 134, 145, 150, 156, 158, 159, 162, 174, 539
Chou En-lai, views, remarks, 149-150, 162-163, 171
Draft constitutions, proposals, 137-138, 145
Interim government, draft charter, 206-207
Kuomintang, question of good faith of, 157, 158-159, 161-163, 169, 173-175
Mao Tse-tung, opinions, 149
Marshall, 159

- Political Consultative Conference—Con.
Discussions—Continued
Meeting with: Chang Chun, 144–146; Shang Chen, 138
Messages to: Byrnes, 151–152; Truman, 142–143, 148–152, 445
National Assembly:
Number and apportionment of delegates, 39–40, 133, 134, 144, 145, 147, 164, 172, 174–175, 202, 206, 534, 1481
Postponement, 134–135, 177, 1299
Political impasse, 159–162, 165, 167–171, 172–175
Smyth, 539
National Assembly, reconvening, 1286, 1302, 1305; announcement, 1299–1300, 1393
Reopening of, proposals, 1124–1125, 1284, 1301, 1334, 1335, 1339
Political situation, U.S. monthly reports, 1387
Port Arthur, 939, 1459
Portsmouth, Treaty of, 1905, 942
Poshan coal mines, 1251, 1367, 1402
Potou, 459, 948
Potsdam Declaration, 1945, 938–939
Pravda, 1293, 1294
Press (see also names of papers and news agencies):
American correspondents, 326
Communist, 553–554; unauthorized press releases, 1056–1057
Freedom of press, 40, 155, 162, 173, 1390, 1391
Permission to accompany field teams, 897
Press releases, clearance, 884, 896, 900–901, 919, 972
Propaganda. See Propaganda.
Suppression of, 919–920, 950, 974, 986, 1470–1471
Price, Dr. Frank W., 1023, 1106–1110, 1364
Prisoners, 84, 481, 701
Japanese. See under Japan.
Political, release of, 147, 155, 162, 171, 174
Propaganda, 1324, 1386; Chou En-lai, 859–860, 864, 868–870, 1445; Communist Manifesto, text, 1310–1316; Marshall, 865, 868–870, 993, 1020, 1039, 1066–1067, 1202, 1329, 1346–1348, 1421, 1433; Robertson, 806, 1056–1057; Smyth, 1064, 1151, 1309–1310; Soviet, 1460–1463; Stuart, 1400, 1415, 1448, 1449
Provincial government. See Local self-government.
Puppet troops and irregular forces, 346, 352–353, 371, 471, 499
Demobilization, plans for, 210, 213, 254–255, 300, 301, 305, 452, 468, 470
Puppet troops and irregular forces—Continued
Executive Headquarters policy, 394–395, 411, 430–431, 433–434
Hankow, 660–661; Manchuria, 1280; Tai-an, 425–426
Railroads (see also name of railway):
Administration, 402–407, 408, 414–419, 1379
Manchuria, National control of localities evacuated by Soviet forces, 542, 543, 552–568 *passim*, 584
Reconstruction and operation, problems of, 1, 2, 42–46 *passim*, 52–55, 371, 377, 398, 401, 411, 455–466 *passim*, 471–494 *passim*, 512, 519, 526–528, 601–602, 1281, 1402, 1453
Train guards and railway police, 220, 223–224, 248–253, 257, 274–275, 407–410, 425, 1050, 1051–1053, 1079, 1089, 1098, 1106, 1156, 1255
Ray, J. Franklin, 879, 1024*n*, 1364
Refugees:
Communist areas, from, 1222–1224, 1264, 1269, 1349
North Kiangsu, 1225, 1256–1257, 1268, 1302, 1321, 1326, 1332, 1333
U.S. proposals, 1350–1352
Suiyuan, 1357
Rigg, Maj. Robert R., 600
Ringwalt, Arthur R., 159*n*
Robertson, Walter S.:
Executive Headquarters, U.S. representative, 2, 9, 59, 127, 130, 341–342
Reports on: Anping incident, 1426–1427, 1463–1464, 1489–1491; Cease-fire agreements of Jan. 10, see Cease-fire agreements; Chiang Kai-shek New Year's Eve speech, reaction to, 133–134; Chinese Commanders' Conference, 1336; Communist forces in Canton, 614, 646; Executive Headquarters, lack of agreement, 1354–1355, field teams, 1295, 1352–1353; Jehol province, Communist activities, 866–868, 879; Manchuria (see also under Manchuria), Communist position in, 448–449, truce in, extension of, 1273, 1295; National Democratic Reconstruction Association, 136; Shantung province, 1281–1282, 1294–1295, 1308, 1323–1324, 1352–1353, 1358–1359, 1378–1379; Soviet intentions in Manchuria, 11; Soviet request for Chinese special representative to Moscow, 17; summary of military activity of week ending Dec. 29, 1945, 41–43; Tsingtao, 1398

- Rockey, Maj. Gen. Keller E., 1113, 1378-1379, 1503
- Roosevelt, Franklin D., 1459
- Roser, Harold C., 1418
- Rustmeyer, 892-893
- San Min Chu I Youth Corps, 133, 1400, 1405, 1408
- Secret military forces under reorganization of armed forces, U.S. draft plan, and discussions of, 219, 244-245, 247, 299-300
- Secret police (*see also* Kunming assassinations):
- Anti-Communist activities, 1191-1192, 1224, 1257
 - Black lists, 1362, 1374, 1375, 1405, 1406, 1424
 - Chen Li fu authority over, 1408
- Sekwantien, 505-508 *passim*
- Shan (g) Cheng, Gen., 63, 63*n*, 138, 338, 349, 670, 677, 680, 687
- Shanghai, 41, 462, 1407-1408, 1413-1416; French citizens, question of protection by American Consulate General, 1413-1414
- Shanghai Workers Federation, 1309
- Shanhaikwan, 47, 948; railroads, 1454
- Shansi province:
- Communist evacuation, National demands for, 1234, 1238, 1253, 1260, 1348, 1453, 1456, 1471, 1481, 1495
 - Famine in, 490
 - Japanese forces, presence of, 431, 438, 536, 991-992
 - Situation reports on, 352, 391, 398, 444, 487, 503, 563, 595, 608, 947, 1208, 1239, 1305, 1344, 1355, 1367, 1370, 1402, 1403, 1405, 1416, 1428, 1473, 1505
- Shantung province:
- Japanese forces in, 397, 398, 431
 - National demands for Communist evacuation of, 1453, 1456, 1481, 1495
 - Redistribution of forces, proposals for, 1075-1076, 1087, 1106, 1208-1209, 1228-1229, 1238, 1246, 1248, 1260
 - Situation reports on: Chang, 608; Chou En-lai, 352, 370, 411, 1027, 1028, 1087, 1234, 1428; field teams, 432-433, 457-478, 470, 1112, 1243; Hill, 426; Marshall, 366-367, 1022, 1094, 1099, 1269, 1396, 1419; Robertson, 1113; Smyth, 444, 503, 586, 595, 994, 1123; Stuart, 1402, 1416, 1449
- Shao Li-tse:
- National position on Communist evacuation from certain areas, 1331-1333
 - References to, 78, 79, 80, 533, 1194, 1261, 1278, 1285, 1286, 1289, 1298, 1300, 1321, 1324, 1345
- Shengte, 1262, 1367, 1370, 1396, 1403
- Shepley, James R., 12, 32, 33
- Presence at meetings, 144, 196, 201, 202, 204, 209, 211, 374
 - References to, 34, 290, 290*n*, 1020
 - U.S. Ambassador to China, question of appointment of Gen. Wedemeyer as, 446-447, 511-512
- Shiao (Shao) Ke, Gen., 382, 390
- Shihchiachuang, 379, 389, 456, 890, 948
- Shinkle, Col. J. G., 338-339, 516
- Siao Ping-yin, Maj. Gen., 507
- Siberian resources, 944
- Sin Kuan-wu, Lt. Col., 1102, 1103
- Sinkiang, 117-118, 202; Gen. Chang Chih-chung, visit to, 583, 589, 590, 594, 606, 610
- Sino-Soviet treaty, 1945:
- Manchuria and North China, discussions of implementation of National forces occupation on Soviet withdrawal, 14, 28, 31, 45, 46, 49, 60, 73, 74, 99-102 *passim*, 542, 543, 552, 559, 564, 594, 604, 938, 939, 943
 - Soviet adherence to conditions, 18, 19
 - Strict interpretation, U.S. position on, 937
- Sinyang (Hsin Yang) (South Honan), field team to, 379, 506, 507, 508, 670, 671, 680, 1328, 1343
- Smith, Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell, 512
- Smyth, Robert L., 59; messages on: cease-fire agreements, problems of implementation, 341-342, 394, 397-398, 430-431, 437-444 *passim*, 503, 538-540; civil administration of Communist-occupied areas, proposals, 1349-1352; Communist forces in Hankow, government secret orders for elimination, 641-642; Communist propaganda statement, *Feb. 14*, 533-554; Kunming, safety of refugees, 1388; Manchuria, *see* Manchuria; North China, situation reports, 1272-1273, 1308-1310, 1355-1357; PCC, 146-148, 152-162, 163-166, 167-169, 539
- Snow, Edgar, 40, 40*n*
- Sohsien, Japanese units with National forces in, 992
- Soong (Sung), Capt. John L., presence at meetings, 650, 1278-1371, *passim*, 1404, 1427, 1474, 1493, (*see also* Marshall, meetings *under* Chinese National Army, reorganization *and* Manchuria *headings*)
- Soong, T. V., meeting with Marshall, 979-981; references to, 512, 534, 977, 978, 1002, 1026, 1406, 1408
- South China, definition of, 268
- Soviet Union (*see also* Sino-Soviet treaty):
- Anti-American propaganda, 1433
 - Chinese National Government, relations, 11, 17-18, 19, 117, 1046-1047
 - Chinese special representative to Moscow, question of, 17

- Soviet Union—Continued**
 Communists, relations (*see also* Manchuria), 528-529, 537, 1294; U.S. evaluations, 116-119, 513-515, 777-779, 815-816, 817
 Economic cooperation, discussions on, 604
 Inner Mongolia, influence in, 1493
 Interests and influence of, 202, 1293-1294, 1297, 1397, 1469; U.S. evaluation, 116-119
 Manchuria. *See* Manchuria.
 Special privileges in China of, 1459
 Student demonstrations against, 439-440
 U.S. policy, Russian critical survey of and U.S. comments, 1460-1463
 U.S. position on, Chiang Kai-shek views regarding, 603-604
- Sprouse, Philip D.**, 342, 1440
 Chihfeng, Kalgan, and Tsinan, dispatch of field teams to, 353-359
 Kunming refugees, 1417-1418, 1419, 1441-1442
 Political reorganization, negotiations, 132-133, 134-138
- Ssuning-kai** (Ssu-ping-chieh), 931, 974-975, 995, 1040, 1041, 1066
- Stalin, Iosif Vissarionovich**, 17-18
- Stassen, Harold E.**, 447
- State Council**, proposed establishment, 1409, 1434, 1439, 1443, 1466, 1499
- Stevens, Barbara**, 391-392
Stevens, Harry E., 391-392
- Stuart, Dr. J. Leighton**, 1023, 1363*n*, 1376
 Anping incident, 1448-1449, 1452, 1467
 Deadlock of negotiations, *July-Aug.* *See under* Deadlock.
 French citizens in Shanghai, question of U.S. protection, 1413-1414
 Kunming assassinations, correspondence on, 1385-1389, 1399-1402, 1410-1412, 1417-1418, 1419, 1426, 1440-1442, 1451
 Meetings with Chou En-lai and Chiang Kai-shek, reports of, 1106-1110
 Mongol autonomy movement, 1491-1493
 U.S. Ambassador to China, appointment, 1298-1299, 1307-1308, 1316-1317, 1348, 1349, 1422-1423; presentation of credentials, 1388-1389, 1394
- Su-ch'ien**, 1227, 1232, 1241
Suchow (Shuchow). *See* Hsuechow.
Sui-hsien, 505, 1336, 1337, 1341, 1423
Suiyuan, 352, 392, 398, 1357
Sun Fo, 158, 533, 534, 971, 1123
Sun Lien-chung, Gen., 1503
Sun Yat-sen, 147, 162, 164, 293, 1276
Sun Yat-sen (Chingling Soong), Madame, 1420
- Sung Jui-ko, Lt. Gen.**, 504
Sung Kiang, 1076-1077, 1244, 1245
Sungari River, 994, 1428-1429
Supreme National Defense Council, 144, 150, 155
Szechwan, 1344, 1449
- Ta-ming**, 1232, 1241
Ta Pang (Pong) Bay, 634, 637, 638
Tai-hsien, 1360, 1368, 1369, 1396, 1397, 1473
Tai-hsing, 1360, 1365-1369 *passim*, 1386, 1396, 1397, 1423, 1473
Tai Li, Gen., 40, 224, 539, 953, 1388, 1407, 1413
- Taian**:
 Communist evacuation demanded, 1282
 Field teams, dispatch and reports, 379, 425-426, 457, 459, 468-469
- Taiyuan**:
 Field teams, dispatch and reports, 379, 389, 455, 458, 487-501
 Japanese officers enrolled in Chinese officers' training camp, 992
 Railroads, destruction, 1473
- Tamshui**, 644, 645, 647
Tang En-po, Gen., 1288, 1364-1365, 1366, 1383; Battle Order No. 1 of the First Pacification Headquarters, 1378, 1383, 1386
- Tang Pu-wu**, 1289
Tang Tsung, 1388
Tang Yen-sheng, Col., 353, 359
Tangku, 436, 462
Tangshan (Tongshan), 343, 1434, 1435
Tanhsien, Hainan Island, 616, 619, 640
Tao Hsi-sheng, 1497
Tao Hsing-chih, Dr., 1192, 1405-1406, 1424-1425
Taolin, 393, 394, 465
Tapeng Peninsula, 396, 397, 430, 441;
 Port of embarkation for evacuating Communist forces, 616, 617, 619, 644, 645, 647, 707, 711
- Tatung**:
 Communist forces, concentration of and subsequent attacks: Chou En-lai, 352, 1268, 1290, 1430; Marshall, 1232, 1269-1270, 1317-1318, 1320, 1354, 1370, 1396, 1419, 1489; Robertson, 1504-1505; Smyth, 1308, 1356; Stuart, 1403; Yu Ta-wei, 1424, 1473
 Famine in, 494
 Field teams, dispatch and reports, 379, 389, 391, 455, 456, 460, 465, 489-490, 493
 Japanese units in National forces in, 991
- Tatung-Taiyuan railway**, 455, 1177, 1188
Tatung-Tunkow railway, 15
Tawenkou, 1282, 1305
Teh Wang (Prince Teh), 1492

- Tehsien:
 Communist forces, attacks by and National demands for evacuation, 1025, 1248, 1282
 Field teams, reports, 379, 383, 389, 432, 457
 Teng Chu-ming, Prof., 1375
 Teng-hsien, 1232, 1241, 1258, 1444
 Teng Tai-yuan, Gen., 617, 618, 1139, 1153, 1169
 Teng Ying-chao (Madame Chou En-lai), 1123
 Tienchang, 1027, 1365, 1423, 1428
 Tientsin, 37, 47, 1356, 1367, 1453;
 Peiping-Tientsin area, 947, 948, 953
 Tientsin-Peiping railway, 1453, 1495
 Tientsin-Pukou railway:
 Communist and National forces, fighting, 11, 15, 27, 42, 346, 371, 383, 398, 947, 1027-1028, 1093, 1403, 1444, 1445
 National demands for Communist evacuation of, 1194, 1235, 1241, 1268
 Reconstruction and protection of railway, 459, 474, 475, 1028, 1050, 1164-1165, 1258; draft agreements and tables of priorities, 1077, 1078, 1079, 1158, 1162, 1177, 1187
 Tihwa, visit of Gen. Chang Chih-chung to, 610
 Timberman, Brig. Gen. Thomas S., references to, 906, 977, 1274, 1319, 1491, 1504
 Evacuation of Communist troops from Kwangtung, report, 710
 Presence at meeting between Gen. Marshall and Dr. Lo Lung-chi, 927
 Tingyuan:
 Field teams, 905, 947, 949
 National occupation and Communist attacks, 1026, 1027, 1028, 1214, 1253-1254
 Todd, Oliver J., 879, 964-965, 1024, 1371, 1372-1373
 Tolun:
 Communist and Soviet forces, occupation and National claims to sovereignty, 30, 45-50 *passim*, 61-65 *passim*, 72-74, 82, 99-105, 343-344, 376, 392
 U.S. observers, internment and release, 392-393, 432
 Tourtillott, Col. Raymond R., 382, 383, 388, 389-390, 1019n, 1274
 Treaties, conventions, etc.
 Cease-fire agreements, *Jan. 10, 1946*.
See Cease-fire agreements of *Jan. 10, 1946*.
 Loshan Agreement, *Jan. 23, 1946*, 456, 506, 508, 687, 1328
 Luwangcheng Agreement, *Jan. 29, 1946*, 504
 Nine Power Treaty, 1922, 758, 938
 Portsmouth treaty, 1905, 942
 Treaties, conventions, etc.—Continued
 Potsdam Declaration, 1945, 938-939
 Sino-Soviet treaty, 1945, 14, 28, 31, 45-46, 49, 60, 73-74, 99-102, 542-543, 552, 559, 564, 594, 604, 938-939, 943
 Yalta Agreement, *Feb. 11, 1945*, 938n, 1459n
 Truman, Harry S.:
 Correspondence and instructions to Marshall: confidence in judgment and ability of Gen. Marshall, 380, 828-829, 846-847, 1426; Far Eastern Commission, question of consideration of Manchurian issue by, 434-435; Gen. Wedemeyer, assignment in U.S., 1397-1398; Marshall, recall for consultation, 446, 511; Military Advisory Group in China, 434-435; U.S. Marines, question of withdrawal, 434
 Policy statements on China, *Dec., 1945*, influence of, 133; question of advisability of additional statement, 1438, 1449, 1450, 1465
 Tsai Wen-chih, Gen., 353, 357, 358, 377, 931, 1047, 1057
 Tsaochuang (Chaochwang):
 Coal mines, 344, 346, 477-479, 1025, 1227
 Communist occupation and subsequent agreements and demands for evacuation of, 371, 1238, 1241, 1246, 1248, 1282
 Field teams, food disposition by, 455, 479; interference with, 480, 949, 1026, 1027
 Tsaowang (Chaoyang), 866, 890, 899, 998, 1336, 1337, 1341
 Tseng Chi, 1329-1331
 Tseng Sheng (Sen), Gen., references to, 396, 397, 430, 432, 456, 615, 619, 637, 703, 706
 Tsiang, T. F., 965, 1224, 1363, 1364, 1373, 1404
 Tsinan (Chi-Nan), 15, 24, 1241, 1258
 Field teams, dispatch and reports, 350-356 *passim*, 362, 363, 365, 379, 383, 492, 433, 455-456, 457, 468-473, 1398; U.S. member, 389
 Railroad reconstruction, 42, 602
 Situation reports: Chou En-lai, 1031, 1209-1210, 1259, 1288, 1319, 1367, 1430; Robertson, 1113; Smyth, 398, 503, 563, 946, 994, 1273, 1356; Stuart, 1402
 Tsinan-Pukow railroad, Communist concentrations, 1346
 Tsinan-Tsingtao railway. *See* Tsingtao-Tsinan railway.
 Tsinanfu, 1083, 1100
 Tsingtao:
 Evacuation of Japanese forces, 436, 462
 Field teams, 1030-1031, 1032, 1111-1112, 1152, 1398

- Tsingtao—Continued
 National forces in, 1075-1076, 1087-1088, 1100, 1113, 1123, 1151, 1258-1259, 1273, 1308, 1379, 1402
 U.S. vessels, use by National forces, 1448-1449
- Tsingtao-Tsinan railway, 27
 Civil administration, questions of, 1306, 1345
 Communist evacuation, National proposals for, 1194, 1213, 1216, 1219, 1226-1248 *passim*, 1322, 1331-1333, 1335, 1458, 1467, 1499, 1500, 1505
 Field teams reports, 456, 459, 462
 National forces attacks on Communist forces: Chou En-lai, 1028, 1319, 1367, 1396, 1405, 1428, 1444, 1467; Chou En-lai-Chiang Kai-shek discussions, 1278, 1284-1293 *passim*; Marshall, 1025, 1030, 1298, 1306, 1320, 1346, 1355; Robertson, 1359
 Repair and protection, problems of, 42, 1050, 1077, 1078, 1079, 1162, 1177, 1187, 1188, 1268
- Tsining, 352, 1252
 Tsinpu railway. *See* Tientsin-Pukow railway.
- Tsitsihar, 734, 914, 1007, 1008, 1040, 1041, 1235, 1267, 1286
- Tsoyun, 365, 398
- Tsu, Louis Y. S., 1414
 Tsu Tu-nan, Prof., 1380
 Tsui Wu, 480, 481-482
- Tu, Col., 1410-1411, 1412
- Tu Li-ming (Yu-ming), Gen., 893, 966; Chihfeng, occupation of, 347, 349, 360, 374, 380-387 *passim*; Manchurian truce, violations of, 999, 1003, 1006, 1012, 1022-1028 *passim*, 1034, 1035, 1038, 1048, 1057, 1087, 1151, 1290, 1405; personality of, 1002-1003; replacement, reports of, 1309
- Tu Shu-wu, Col., 469-470
- Tuan Mao-lin, 370
- Tung (Tang, Tong), Gen., 325, 330-331; presence at meetings, 224, 235, 248, 265, 278, 302, 317, 327, 554, 566, 576, 606, 621, 1139, 1153, 1169
- Tung-Ming, 480, 482, 949
- Tung Pi-wu, 144-145, 1123, 1362
- Tungkung-Taiyuan railroad, 1241
- Tungpu railroad, 460, 503, 586, 1177, 1235, 1270, 1293, 1429, 1445
- Tychsen, Col. Andrew C., 1278*n*, 1278-1281
- United Nations Charter (1945), 938
- United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, 522, 1127, 1309, 1364, 1371
 Percentage of aid received by Communists, 960-964 *passim*
- Transportation of supplies in U.S. vessels, 957, 958
- United States Aid:
 Conditions for proposed loans, questions of, 168, 206-207, 529, 537, 577, 604-605, 936, 1297; "Offset" principle, 1361
 National government reception of and Communist demands for uniform use, 1313, 1315, 1330; Chou En-lai, 925, 1326-1327, 1451, 1505-1506; Chou En-lai-Marshall discussions, 952-963, 1132-1133, 1455, 1483-1487; Lo, 929-930; Marshall, 230, 246, 979, 1201-1203, 1326-1327, 1394; Smyth, 1151, 1309-1315 *passim*, 1357; Soviet comments, 1461, 1462
- United States Ambassador, appointment. *See under* Stuart and Wedemeyer.
- United States Embassy in China, personnel assignments, 59
- United States Marines:
 Anping ambush. *See* Anping incident.
 Attacks on Communist forces, alleged, 953
 Communist anti-American propaganda, 1151, 1448-1449
 Effect of presence in China, 15, 37, 1499
 Withdrawal, prospects and conditions, 143, 429, 434, 959, 1087-1088, 1421
- United States policy, 939-940, 961
 Communist evaluations, Chou En-lai, 952-953, 962-963, 1009-1010, 1483-1484, 1496
 Soviet criticism, 1460-1462
- United States public opinion, 1397, 1423, 1433, 1452-1453, 1469-1471, 1474
- United States special privileges, 1459
- UNRRA. *See* United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.
- USSR. *See* Soviet Union.
- Vaughn, Miles, 166, 168, 170
- Vincent, John Carter, 131-132, 290*n*, 730-731, 806-807, 994-995
- Vinogradov, Eugene, 1046-1047
- Vinson, Fred M., 1021
- Wang Chen, Gen., 504-508 *passim*, 637, 642, 669, 679-695 *passim*, 1040, 1049
- Wang Cheng, Gen., 1073*n*
- Wang Gong, Gen., 477
- Wang Lin, Cmdr., 708
- Wang Pao-yu, Maj., 1102, 1103
- Wang Sheng-tai (King Jen), 1194
- Wang Shih-chiao, Maj. Gen., 507
- Wang Shih-chieh, meetings, 1339-1340; with Chou En-lai, 1285-1289, 1300-1303, 1321-1322; Marshall, 426-428, 443-444, 883-884, 1331-1335, 1345-1346; references to, 1, 16, 18*n*, 22, 23, 26, 158, 159,

- Wang Shih-chieh, meetings—Continued
174, 232, 533, 981, 1123, 1261, 1269,
1278, 1285, 1324, 1345, 1406, 1408
- Wang Shih-ying, Gen., 367
- Wang Shu-ma, Gen., 477
- Wang Tchang-ki (Chang-chi), 1400
- Wang Ting-hsuan, 376
- Wang Tsue-jae, Gen., 619
- Wang Tsun-sheng, Capt., 633
- Wang Yao-wu, Gen., 1282; Chinese
Commanders Conference, 1282,
1336, 1338, 1352
- Wang Yen-pi, 1495
- War booty, Soviet claims in Man-
churia, 427, 428
- War crimes trials (Japan), 1449
- Wedemeyer, Lt. Gen. Albert C.:
American Chief of Staff to Gener-
alissimo Chiang Kai-shek, ques-
tions of appointment as, 1358,
1359, 1384, 1397
Correspondence, remarks: Army re-
organization, U.S. draft plan,
178-188, 207-209; Communist
forces in Canton, evacuation,
616-617, 635, 640; situation re-
port to Gen. Marshall, 39-41;
U.S. policy in China, effect of,
1461
Hurley-Wedemeyer policy, 1312
Reassignment outside China, ques-
tion of, 1277, 1359-1360, 1397-
1398, 1439
References to, 2, 15, 27
U.S. Ambassador to China, questions
of appointment, 259, 447, 512, 927,
1059-1060, 1297-1298, 1317
- Wei-an, 1430
- Wei Hai Wei, 1273; National demands
for Communist evacuation, 1075,
1082, 1087, 1088, 1100, 1115, 1119,
1334
- Wei Hsien, 1025, 1241, 1258, 1288, 1308,
1367
- Wei Tao-ming, Amb., 19-20, 75-76, 806-
807
- Wen I-to, Prof., murder of (*see also*
Kunming), 1373-1374, 1380-1381,
1400, 1401, 1412, 1440, 1442
- Wenshi, 379, 1232, 1238, 1241, 1248, 1258,
1367, 1370, 1383, 1396
- White, Col. F. G., 389
- White, Lt. Col. Van R., 1336, 1338, 1343
- Wilson, Col. W. C., 128
- Wong, Gen. *See* Wang Chen.
- Wong Wen-hao, 534
- Wu, K. C. (Mayor and Minister of
Information), 26, 144, 166, 1407-
1408, 1414-1415, 1416
- Wu Ke-wen, Col., 1102
- Wu Tieh (Teh)-chen (g), Gen., 158, 159,
1123
- Wu Yi-fang, 1023
- Wu Yu-chang, 1123
- Wuho, 504-505, 506
- Yalta Conference, 1945, 938, 1459
- Yang Ching-yu, 450-451
- Yang Tsu-an, 1400, 1412
- Yangchuan, 991-992
- Yao, Gen., 1267, 1290-1291
- Yao Chi, Gen., 466
- Yao Shan-shih, 432
- Yeaton, Col. Ivan D., 40-41, 40*n*, 1222
- Yeh Chien-ying, Gen.:
Communist representative to Execu-
tive Headquarters, 341
Illness of, 755, 760, 765
Remarks and position on, reports of:
Anping incident, 1454, 1489-1490,
1507; Executive Headquarters,
deadlock, 1503, 1504; field teams,
dispatch, 350-364 *passim*, 369,
432, 438-439, 1318; Manchurian
crisis, *Mar. 28-May 22*, 712, 713,
714, 754, 806, 865-866, 867; Man-
churian truce, stalemate of ne-
gotiations during, 1025, 1034,
1040, 1047, 1064, 1111, 1113, 1123,
1152; Shantung, 1352, 1385; Ta-
tung, 1504-1505
- Yellow River, 947
Dike repair, 960, 1024, 1126-1127,
1223, 1243-1244, 1363-1373 *passim*
UNRRA supplies, 964-965, 980, 1152,
1309, 1404
- Yen Hsi-shan, Gen., 458, 487, 493, 494,
502, 554, 586, 595, 1268, 1492
- Yenan, bombing of, 1444, 1445, 1446,
1450-1451, 1482
- Yenan Observers Group, 40*n*, 41
- Yenchow, 457, 468, 469, 948
- Yenki, 1230, 1233, 1456
- Yingkow, 375, 376, 387, 428, 431, 531,
569, 617, 654-655, 671, 1016
- Yitu, 1268, 1428
- Young, Capt. Jack T., 353, 458, 654, 657,
669, 685, 696
- Young China Party, 829-830, 1329-1331,
1481
- Youth Party, 132-133, 147, 148, 165, 197
- Yu Hsueh-chung, Gen., National Gov-
ernment Commissioner, Chinese
Commanders Conference, 1336
- Yu Ta-wei, Gen.:
Committee of Three, appointment,
653; resignation, 1370-1371
Manchuria. *See under* Manchuria.
Meetings with: Chiang Kai-shek, re-
port of, 895-896; Marshall, 1305-
1307, 1324-1326, 1338-1340, 1353-
1354, 1360-1362, 1369-1371, 1383-
1384, 1395-1397, 1403-1407, 1422-
1426, 1473-1474, 1505-1507
References to, 650, 651, 889, 898, 980,
1318, 1320, 1329, 1338, 1341, 1354*n*,
1365-1368 *passim*, 1377
- Yungniên, 362, 480, 482, 890, 949, 1025-
1026
- Yunnan University, 1380



Lehman Library

JX
233
.A3

c.5
,
1946
vol 9

