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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958/1960

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**FOREIGN  
RELATIONS  
OF THE  
UNITED  
STATES**

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**1958-1960**

**VOLUME X**

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**Part 1**


**EASTERN EUROPE  
REGION;  
SOVIET UNION;  
CYPRUS**



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**DEPARTMENT  
OF  
STATE**

**Washington**









**Foreign Relations of the  
United States, 1958–1960**

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**Volume X**

**Part 1**

**Eastern Europe Region;  
Soviet Union;  
Cyprus**

*Editors*

Ronald D. Landa  
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# Preface

The *Foreign Relations of the United States* series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government. The series documents the facts and events that contributed to the formulation of policies and includes evidence of supporting and alternative views to the policy positions ultimately adopted.

The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the *Foreign Relations* series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. This documentary editing proceeds in full accord with the generally accepted standards of historical scholarship. Official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series were promulgated by Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg on March 26, 1925. A statutory charter for the preparation of the series was established by Title IV of the Department of State's Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 USC 4351 *et seq.*), added by Public Law 102-138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, which was signed by President George Bush on October 28, 1991.

The statute requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant United States diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the United States Government, including facts which contributed to the formulation of policies and records providing supporting and alternative views to the policy positions ultimately adopted.

The statute confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the *Foreign Relations* series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded.



The volume presented here, compiled in 1981 and 1982, meets all the standards of selection and editing prevailing in the Department of State at that time. This volume records policies and events of more than 30 years ago, but the statute allows the Department until 1996 to reach the 30-year line in the publication of the series.

### *Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series*

This volume is part of a triennial subseries of volumes of the *Foreign Relations* series that documents the most important issues in the foreign policy of the final 3 years (1958–1960) of the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower. This subseries comprises 19 print volumes totaling more than 16,000 pages and 7 microfiche supplements presenting more than 14,000 additional pages of original documents.

In planning and preparing this 1958–1960 triennium of volumes, the editors chose to present the official record of U.S. foreign affairs with respect to Europe, the Soviet Union, and Canada in five print volumes. Part 1 of Volume X presents the record of U.S. policy with respect to Eastern Europe as a region, the Soviet Union, and Cyprus; Part 2, the record of U.S. policy with respect to East-West exchanges, Albania, Bulgaria, Finland, Greece, Poland, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. Volume VII (in two parts) documents U.S. policy on European economic and political integration, NATO, Canada, France, Italy, Portugal, Scandinavia, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the Vatican. Volume VIII presents the record of U.S. policy during the first half of the Berlin crisis through the end of the Geneva Foreign Ministers meeting in August 1959. Volume IX presents documents on U.S. policy toward Berlin following the Foreign Ministers meeting with particular attention to the abortive summit conference in May 1960; U.S. relations with the Federal Republic of Germany and Austria; and U.S. policy toward the German Democratic Republic.

### *Sources for the Foreign Relations Series*

The original research, compilation, and editing of this volume were done in 1981 and 1982 under the Department regulation derived from Secretary Kellogg's charter of 1925. This regulation prescribed that the *Foreign Relations* series include "a comprehensive record of the major foreign policy decisions within the range of the Department of State's responsibilities," presuming that the records of the Department of State would constitute the central core of documentation presented in the series. The Department of State historians have always had complete and unconditional access to all records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized (lot) files of the policymaking levels; the files of the Department of State's

Executive Secretariat, which comprehended the official papers created by or submitted to the Secretary of State; the files of all overseas Foreign Service posts and U.S. special missions; and the official correspondence with foreign governments and with other Federal agencies. Any failure to include a complete Department of State record in the *Foreign Relations* series cannot be attributed to constraints or limitations placed upon the Department historians in their access to Department records, information security regulations and practices notwithstanding.

Secretary Kellogg's charter of 1925 and Department regulations derived therefrom required that further records "needed to supplement the documentation in the Department files" be obtained from other government agencies. Department historians preparing the *Foreign Relations* volumes documenting the Eisenhower administration, including the editors of this volume, fully researched the papers of President Eisenhower and other White House foreign policy records. These Presidential papers have become a major part of the official record published in the *Foreign Relations* series.

Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Presidential libraries include some of the most significant foreign affairs-related documentation from other Federal agencies including the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency. All of this documentation has been routinely made available for use in the *Foreign Relations* series thanks to the consent of these agencies and the cooperation and support of the National Archives and Records Administration. Particular thanks are due to the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library for assistance in preparing this volume.

Department of State historians have also enjoyed steadily broadened access to the records of the Department of Defense, particularly the records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Selective access has been obtained to the records of several other agencies in order to supplement the official record of particular *Foreign Relations* volumes.

Completion of the declassification of this volume and the final steps of its preparation for publication coincided with the development since early 1991 by the Central Intelligence Agency, in cooperation with the Department of State, of expanded access by Department historians to high-level intelligence documents from among those records still in the custody of that Agency. The Department of State chose not to postpone the publication of this volume to ascertain how such access might affect the scope of available documentation and the changes that might be made in the contents of this particular volume. The Department is, however, using this expanded access, as arranged by the CIA's History Staff, for compilation of future volumes in the *Foreign Relations* series.

The statute of October 28, 1991, requires that the published record in the *Foreign Relations* series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of all the major foreign policy decisions and actions of the United States Government. It further requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the United States Government cooperate with the Department of State Historian by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. These new standards go beyond the mandate of the prior Department of State regulations for the preparation of the series and define broadened access to the records of other government agencies. The research and selection of documents for this volume were carried out in 1981–1982 in accordance with the existing Department regulations. The editors decided not to delay publication to conduct the additional research needed to meet the new standards, but they are confident that the manuscript prepared in 1981–1982 provides a fully accurate record. The List of Sources, pages XIII–XVIII, identifies the particular files and collections used in the preparation of this volume.

### *Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, 1958–1960, Volume X*

In selecting documents for Part 1 of this volume, the editors placed primary consideration on the formulation of policy by the Eisenhower administration toward Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and Cyprus. The memoranda of discussion and policy papers of the National Security Council with respect to basic U.S. policies toward these areas are presented as fully as possible. The editors had complete access to and made use of memoranda of discussion at National Security Council meetings and other institutional NSC documents included in the Whitman File at the Eisenhower Library, as well as more informal foreign policy materials in that file and in other collections at the Eisenhower Library. These Presidential files were supplemented by NSC and White House documents in Department of State files.

During the years 1958–1960, the Department of State worked closely with the White House in the formulation of U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and Cyprus. Secretaries of State John Foster Dulles and Christian A. Herter advised President Eisenhower in detail and had major roles in the deliberations of the National Security Council. The White House and National Security Council also directed the preparation of reports based on interagency information on these areas. The Department of State prepared and coordinated exchanges of views and discussions of policy toward Cyprus with the British Government, and Department officers participated in the meetings between President Eisenhower and Chairman Nikita S. Khrushchev in September 1959.

The editors have selected from Department of State, White House, and National Security Council records memoranda of conversation and records of meetings between the President and his principal foreign policy advisers. They have also included internal U.S. Government policy recommendations and decision papers relating to these areas.

In addition to Department of State, White House, and National Security Council records, the editors made use of declassified JCS files at the National Archives and Records Administration. Copies of classified JCS materials were obtained from the Joint Staff on a request basis. The editors selected documents that indicated the policy recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding various major foreign affairs policies.

The editors did not seek to document the limited economic relations between the United States and the nations of Eastern Europe, nor did they document U.S. intelligence operations in the area. The substance of important intelligence assessments are included in the political-strategic documents selected for publication here.

This volume was compiled before the development in 1991 of procedures to expand access by Department of State historians to the historical records of the Central Intelligence Agency. As those procedures were being established, the declassification and final preparation for publication of this volume concluded. The Department of State chose not to postpone publication to allow for search for and assessment of relevant material in the Central Intelligence Agency's files.

### *Editorial Methodology*

The documents are presented chronologically according to Washington time or, in the case of conferences, in the order of individual meetings. Incoming telegrams from U.S. Missions are placed according to time of receipt in the Department of State or other receiving agency, rather than the time of transmission; memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the *Foreign Relations* series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the chief technical editor. The source text is reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Obvious typographical errors are corrected, but other mistakes and omissions in the source text are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). The amount of material not declassified has been noted by indicating the

number of lines or pages of source text that were omitted. The amount of material omitted because it was unrelated, however, is not accounted for. All ellipses and brackets that appear in the source text are so identified by footnotes.

The first unnumbered footnote to each document indicates the document's source, original classification, distribution, and drafting information. The source note also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates if the President or his major policy advisers read the document. Every effort has been made to determine if a document has been previously published, and this information has been included in the source footnote.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts have been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.

### *Declassification Review*

The declassification review of this volume in 1991 and thereafter resulted in the decision to withhold less than 4 percent of the documents originally selected. The remaining documentation provides a full account of the major foreign policy issues confronting, and the policies undertaken by, the Eisenhower administration with respect to Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and Cyprus.

The Division of Historical Documents Review of the Office of Freedom of Information, Privacy, and Classification Review, Bureau of Administration, Department of State, conducted the declassification review of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 12356 on National Security Information and applicable laws.

Under Executive Order 12356, information that concerns one or more of the following categories, and the disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security, requires classification:

- 1) military plans, weapons, or operations;
- 2) the vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, projects, or plans relating to the national security;
- 3) foreign government information;
- 4) intelligence activities (including special activities), or intelligence sources or methods;
- 5) foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States;

6) scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security;

7) U.S. Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities;

8) cryptology; or

9) a confidential source.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security and law. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments.

### *Acknowledgments*

The editors wish to acknowledge the assistance of officials at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, in particular David Haight, who assisted in the collection of documents for this volume.

Under the supervision of former Editor in Chief John P. Glennon and Charles S. Sampson, Ronald D. Landa, David Patterson, and James E. Miller collected, selected, and edited the material presented on Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and Cyprus respectively. General Editor Glenn W. LaFantasie supervised the final steps in the editorial and publication process. Althea W. Robinson, Rita M. Baker, and Vicki E. Futscher did the copy and technical editing and Barbara-Ann Bacon of the Publishing Services Division (Natalie H. Lee, Chief) oversaw the production of the volume. Juniee Oneida prepared the index for Part 1.

**William Z. Slany**  
*The Historian*  
*Bureau of Public Affairs*

March 1993



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# List of Sources

## Unpublished Sources

### Department of State

*Indexed Central Files.* The principal source of documentation for this volume was the indexed central files of the Department of State. Most of the documents were selected from the following files:

033.1161: Soviet official visits to the United States  
261.1111: Arrests or detentions of Soviet officials in the United States  
320: United Nations General Assembly  
411.6141: Soviet trade with the United Kingdom  
411.6411: Trade with Hungary  
601.61: Diplomatic representation—Soviet Union  
611.49: U.S. relations with Czechoslovakia  
611.64: U.S. relations with Hungary  
640.0012: Disarmament in Europe  
711.11—EI: President Eisenhower  
747C.00: Political reporting on Cyprus  
761.00: Political reporting on the Soviet Union  
764.00: Political reporting on Hungary  
780A.00: Political reporting on Cyprus

*Lot Files.* Documents from the central files have been supplemented by the lot files of the Department, which are decentralized files created by operating areas. A list of the lot files used in or consulted for this volume follows.

Athens Embassy Files: Lot 64 F 5

See under Washington National Records Center.

Bohlen Files: Lot 74 D 379

Records maintained by Charles E. Bohlen, 1942–1970.

Budapest Mission Files: Lot 75 F 163

Classified and unclassified files relating to Cardinal Mindszenty, 1956–1972, maintained by the Mission in Budapest.

Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181

Collection of documentation on official visits by heads of government and foreign ministers to the United States and on major international conferences attended by the Secretary of State for the years 1956–1958, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123

Collection of documentation on official visits by heads of government and foreign ministers to the United States and on major international conferences attended by the Secretary of State for the years 1955–1958, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560

See under Washington National Records Center.

## XIV List of Sources

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### Daily Summaries: Lot 60 D 530

Master set of the Department of State classified internal publication *Daily Secret Summary* and *Daily Top Secret Summary* for the years 1953–1958, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

### EE Files: Lot 57 D 514

National Security Council documents relating to Soviet and satellite vulnerabilities, maintained by the Office of Eastern European Affairs.

### EE Files: Lot 67 D 238

Economic and political files relating to Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Poland for the years 1946–1965, maintained by the Office of Eastern European Affairs.

### EE Files: Lot 76 D 232

Economic files relating to Eastern Europe and Poland, 1951–1960, including the U.S.-Polish economic talks, 1956–1957.

### EE Files: Lot 79 D 55

Miscellaneous files pertaining to Hungary, 1945–1971, maintained by the Office of Eastern European Affairs.

### Hungary Desk Files: Lot 75 D 45

Miscellaneous Hungarian files, 1949–1972, including material on the trial of Cardinal Mindszenty and his asylum in the Mission at Budapest.

### INR–NIE Files

Files of National Intelligence Estimates, Special Estimates, and Special National Estimates retained by the Directorate for Regional Research, Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

### INR Files, *Soviet Affairs*

Master set of the classified Department of State monthly publication, *Soviet Affairs*, December 1948–May 1959, maintained by the Office of Research and Analysis for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

### IO Files

Master files of the Reference and Documents Section of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, comprising the official U.N. documentation and classified Department records on U.S. policy in the U.N. Security Council, Trusteeship Council, Economic and Social Council, and various special and ad hoc committees from 1946 to the present.

### NEA/GTI Files: Lot 58 D 610

Files relating to Turkey, September 1949–May 1958, maintained by the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs.

### NEA/GTI Files: Lot 60 D 39

Files relating to Greece and Cyprus, 1955–1958, maintained by the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs.

### NEA/GTI Files, Lot 61 D 96

Files relating to Turkey, 1956–1958, maintained by the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs.

## OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385

Master set of the administrative and country files of the Operations Coordinating Board for the years 1953–1960, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

## OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430

Master files of the Operations Coordinating Board for the years 1953–1960, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

## P Files: Lot 61 D 318

See under Washington National Records Center.

## P/PG Files: Lot 60 D 605

See under Washington National Records Center.

## P/PG Files: Lot 60 D 661

Subject files containing OCB and NSC documents retired by the Policy Plans and Guidance Staff in the Bureau of Public Affairs.

## PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548

Subject, country, and chronological files, documents, drafts, and related correspondence of the Policy Planning Staff for the years 1957–1961.

## Presidential Correspondence: Lot 64 D 174

Exchanges of correspondence between President Eisenhower and heads of foreign governments, excluding the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the Soviet Union, for the years 1953–1960, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

## Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204

Exchanges of correspondence between the President and heads of foreign governments for the years 1953–1964, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

## Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149

Chronological record of cleared memoranda of conversation with foreign visitors for the years 1956–1964, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

## Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199

Chronological collection of the Secretary of State's memoranda of conversation and the Under Secretary of State's memoranda of conversation for the years 1953–1960, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

## SOV Files: Lot 69 D 162

Subject files of the Bilateral Political Relations Branch of the Office of Soviet Union Affairs on various aspects of Soviet-U.S. relations, 1943–1966.

## S/P-NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167

Serial file of memoranda relating to National Security Council questions for the years 1950–1961, maintained by the Policy Planning Staff.

## S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1

Serial and subject master file of National Security Council documents and correspondence for the years 1948–1961, maintained by the Policy Planning Staff.

## S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351

Serial master file of National Security Council documents and correspondence and related Department of State memoranda for the years 1947–1961, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

## XVI List of Sources

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### S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95

Administrative and miscellaneous National Security Council documentation, including NSC Records of Action, for the years 1947-1963, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

### State-JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417

Top Secret records of meetings between representatives of the Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the years 1951-1959, and selected problem files on the Middle East for the years 1954-1956, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

### USIA/IAE/E Files: Lot 64 A 536

See under Washington National Records Center.

### USIA/IOP/C Files: Lot 70 D 398

See under Washington National Records Center.

## **Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas**

### CFEP Chairman Records

Records of the Chairman of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy (Joseph M. Dodge and Clarence B. Randall), 1954-1961.

### Dulles Papers

Papers of John Foster Dulles, 1952-1959.

### Hagerty Papers

Papers of James C. Hagerty, Press Secretary to the President, 1953-1961.

### Herter Papers

Papers of Christian A. Herter, 1957-1961.

### President's Appointments

From the White House Office Files, Records of the Special Assistant for Executive Appointments, 1952-1961. Daily appointment books for President Eisenhower.

### Project Clean Up

From the White House Office Files, Records of Gordon Gray, Robert Cutler, Henry R. McPhee, and Andrew J. Goodpaster, 1953-1961.

### Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Records

From the White House Office Files, Records of the Office of the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Robert Cutler, Dillon Anderson, and Gordon Gray), 1952-1961.

### Staff Secretary Records

From the White House Office Files, Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary, 1952-1961. Records of Paul T. Carroll, Andrew J. Goodpaster, L. Arthur Minnich, and Christopher H. Russell.

### White House Office Files

Several White House Office collections, including Project Clean Up.

**Whitman File**

Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President of the United States, 1953–1961, maintained by his Personal Secretary, Ann C. Whitman. The Whitman File includes the following elements: the Name Series, the Dulles–Herter Series, DDE Diaries, Ann Whitman (ACW) Diaries, NSC Records, Miscellaneous Records, Cabinet Papers, Cabinet Series, Legislative Meetings, International Meetings, Administration Series, International File.

**Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland****Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State**

Athens Embassy Files: FRC 64 A 845

Lot 64 F 5: Classified and unclassified subject files of the Embassy in Athens, 1956–1958.

Conference Files: FRC 83–0068

Lot 64 D 560: Collection of documentation of official visits by heads of government and foreign ministers to the United States and of major international international conferences attended by the Secretary of State for the years 1958–1959, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

P Files: FRC 64 A 867

Lot 61 D 318: Files of the Deputy Assistant Secretaries of State for Public Affairs, Robinson McIlvaine, E. Allan Lightner, Jr., and J. Burke Wilkinson, 1954–1959.

P/PG Files: FRC 72 A 248

Lot 60 D 605: Files of the Policy Plans and Guidance Staff, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1952–1959.

USIA/IAE/E Files: FRC 64 A 536

Lot 64 A 536: Miscellaneous files of the Office of Eastern European Affairs, U.S. Information Agency, 1955–1961.

USIA/IOP/C Files: FRC 72 A 5121

Lot 70 D 398: Alphabetical subject files containing Policy Guidance records as maintained by the Policy Guidance Staff, Office of Policy and Plans, U.S. Information Agency, for the years 1952–1967.

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OSS–INR Intelligence Reports

Records of the Research and Analysis Branch, Office of Strategic Services, and the Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State, 1941–1961.

**Princeton University Library, Princeton, New Jersey**

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*Note:* The Department of State takes no responsibility for the accuracy of these memoirs nor does it endorse their interpretations.

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# List of Abbreviations

- AEC**, Atomic Energy Commission  
**AF**, Air Force; Office of African Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State  
**AFEX**, Air Force Europe Exchange  
**AFL**, American Federation of Labor  
**AGARD**, Advisory Group for Air Research and Development  
**AKEL**, Anorthotikon Komma Ergazomenou Laou (Progressive Party of the Working People of Cyprus)  
**AMAS**, American Military Assistance Staff  
**ANTA**, American National Theater Academy  
**ARMA**, Army Attaché  
**ATAF**, Allied Tactical Air Force  
**APFCO**, Athens-Pireus Electric Company  
**APO**, Army Post Office  
**ARA**, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State  
**AVH**, Allam Vedelmi Hatóság (State Security Authority of Hungary)  
**AVO**, Allam Vedelmi Osztály (State Security Department of Hungary)  
**BIS**, Bank for International Settlements  
**BNA**, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State  
**B/P**, balance of payments  
**BP**, Baghdad Pact  
**BPC**, Bondholders' Protective Council  
**CA**, circular airgram; Office of Chinese Affairs, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State  
**CBS**, Columbia Broadcasting System  
**CEMA**, Council for Mutual Economic Assistance  
**CENTO**, Central Treaty Organization  
**CF**, Conference File  
**CFEP**, Council on Foreign Economic Policy  
**ChiComs**, Chinese Communists  
**CIA**, Central Intelligence Agency  
**CINCEUR**, Commander in Chief, Europe  
**CIO**, Congress of Industrial Organizations  
**CM**, Common Market  
**CMC**, Cyprus Mines Corporation  
**CNU**, Committee of National Union, Turkey  
**COMSIXATAF**, Commander, Sixth Allied Tactical Air Force  
**CPR**, Chinese People's Republic  
**CPSU**, Communist Party of the Soviet Union  
**CSSR**, Czechoslovak Soviet Socialist Republic  
**CT**, Country Team  
**CU**, Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs, Department of State  
**CY**, calendar year  
**D**, despatch  
**DCM**, Deputy Chief of Mission  
**DD**, destroyer  
**DDR**, Deutsche Demokratische Republik (German Democratic Republic)  
**DEFREPNAME**, Defense Representative, Naval Attaché, Military Attaché  
**Deptel**, Department of State telegram  
**desp**, despatch  
**DLF**, Development Loan Fund  
**DOD**, Department of Defense  
**DP**, Democratic Party, Turkey  
**DS**, Defense Support  
**E**, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs  
**E/OT**, Office of International Trade, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State  
**EAD**, Epitropi Apokatastaseos tis Dimokratias (Committee for the Restoration of Democracy)



- ECOSOC**, Economic and Social Council, United Nations
- EDA**, Enomeni Dimokratiki Aristera (United Democratic Left of Greece)
- EDFO**, Economic Development Financing Organization
- EDMA**, Eniaion Dimokratikon Metopon Anadimiourgias (United Democratic Reconstruction/Regeneration Front of Cyprus)
- EE**, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
- EEC**, European Economic Community
- EFTA**, European Free Trade Area
- Embdes**, Embassy despatch
- Embtel**, Embassy telegram
- EOKA**, Ethniki Organosis Kypriou Agoniston (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters)
- EPU**, European Payments Union
- ERO**, European Regional Organization of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
- EUCOM**, European Command
- EUR**, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
- EUR/RA**, Office of Regional Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
- EXIM Bank**, Export-Import Bank
- FAO**, Food and Agriculture Organization
- FAST(P)**, Familiarization and Short Term (Program)
- FBI**, Federal Bureau of Investigation
- FDF**, Finnish Defense Force
- FDP**, Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party of the Federal Republic of Germany)
- FE**, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State
- FO**, Foreign Office
- FonOff**, Foreign Office
- FTA**, Free Trade Area
- FY**, fiscal year
- FYI**, for your information
- GA**, General Assembly
- GATT**, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
- GDR**, German Democratic Republic
- GER**, Office of German Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
- GFR**, German Federal Republic
- GNA**, Grand National Assembly, Turkey
- GOC**, Government of Cyprus
- GOG**, Government of Greece
- GOT**, Government of Turkey
- GSEE**, Geniki Synomospondia Ergaton Ellados (Greek General Confederation of Labor)
- GTI**, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State
- HEW**, Department of Health, Education and Welfare
- HG**, Head of Government
- HMG**, Her (His) Majesty's Government
- IAC**, Intelligence Advisory Committee
- IAEA**, International Atomic Energy Agency
- IBRD**, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
- ICA**, International Cooperation Administration
- ICEM**, Intergovernmental Committee on European Migration
- ICFTU**, International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
- ICIS**, Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security
- IDB**, International Development Bank
- IES**, International Educational Exchange Service
- IGY**, International Geophysical Year
- IIC**, International Institute of Communications
- ILO**, International Labor Organization
- ILU**, International Longshoremen's Union
- IMF**, International Monetary Fund
- INR**, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
- INR/IRC**, Office of Intelligence Resources and Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

- IO**, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
- IPS**, International Press Service, United States Information Agency
- IR**, Intelligence Report
- ISA**, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
- ITS**, International Trade Secretariat
- JCAE**, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (of the U.S. Congress)
- JCS**, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- JUSMMAG**, Joint United States Mission for Military Aid to Greece
- JUSMMAT**, Joint United States Mission for Military Aid to Turkey
- KGB**, Komitet Gosudarstvennyi Bezoibastnosti (Committee for State Security of the Soviet Union)
- KKE**, Kommounistikon Komma Ellados (Greek Communist Party)
- L**, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State
- LA**, Latin America
- LCY**, Savez Komunistia Jugoslaviye (League of Yugoslav Communists)
- Legtel**, Legation telegram
- L/EUR**, Office of European Affairs, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State
- LS**, Division of Language Services, Department of State
- M**, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
- MAAG**, Military Assistance Advisory Group
- MAP**, Military Assistance Program
- MDAP**, Mutual Defense Assistance Program
- ME**, Middle East
- MFN**, most favored nation
- MGB**, Ministerstvo Gosudarstvenyi Bezopastnosti (Ministry for State Security of the Soviet Union)
- M/OP**, Operations Coordinator, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Department of State
- MSA**, Mutual Security Act
- MSP**, Mutual Security Program
- MVD**, Ministerstvo Vnutrennykh Del' (Ministry of the Interior of the Soviet Union)
- NAC**, North Atlantic Council
- NATO**, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
- NBC**, National Broadcasting Company
- NEA**, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, until August 1958; thereafter Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
- Niact**, Night action, communications indicator requiring attention by the recipient at any hour of the day or night
- NIE**, National Intelligence Estimate
- NSC**, National Security Council
- OASD/ISA**, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
- OCB**, Operations Coordinating Board
- ODM**, Office of Defense Mobilization
- OEEC**, Organization for European Economic Cooperation
- OPA**, Omada gia mia Proletariaki Aristera (Group for a Proletarian Left)
- OS**, Outer Seven (members of the European Free Trade Association)
- OSP**, Off-Shore Procurement
- OSS**, Office of Strategic Services
- OT**, Office of International Trade, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State
- P.A.**, Purchase Agreements/Procurement Authorizations
- PAO**, Public Affairs Officer
- PEO**, Pan-kyprios Ergatiki Omospondia (Pancyprian Federation of Labor)
- PGOT**, Provisional Government of Turkey
- P.L.**, Public Law
- POL**, Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants
- Polto**, series indicator for telegrams from the Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State
- PPS**, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
- PROAGS**, Project Agreements
- PX**, Post Exchange
- PZPR**, PZR, Polska Zjednoszona Partia (United Workers Party) (Poland)
- RA**, Office of European Regional Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

- ref**, reference
- RFE**, Radio Free Europe
- RG**, Record Group
- RPP**, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi  
(Republican People's Party) (Turkey)
- RSFSR**, Russian Socialist Federated  
Soviet Republic
- RWP**, Romanian Workers Party
- S**, Office of the Secretary of State
- SAC**, Strategic Air Command
- SACEUR**, Supreme Allied Commander,  
Europe
- S/AE**, Secretary of State's Special  
Assistant for Atomic Energy Affairs
- SAK**, Suomen Ammattiyhdistysten  
Keskusliitto (Finnish Confederation  
of Trade Unions)
- SEATO**, Southeast Asia Treaty  
Organization
- SEF**, Special East European File, United  
States Information Agency
- SEK**, Synomospondia Ergation Kypron  
(Confederation of Labor of  
Cyprus/Confederation of Cypriot  
Workers)
- S/EWC**, Office of the Secretary of  
State's Special Assistant for  
East-West Exchanges
- SHAPE**, Supreme Headquarters, Allied  
Powers Europe
- SKDL**, Suomen Kansan  
Demokraattinen Liitto (Finnish  
Peoples Democratic League)
- SKP**, Suomen Kommunistinen Puolue  
(Finnish Communist Party)
- SNIE**, Special National Intelligence  
Estimate
- SOF**, Status of Forces
- SOFA**, Status of Forces Agreement
- SOV**, **Sov**, Soviet; Soviet Union, Office  
of Soviet Union Affairs, Department  
of State
- SPD**, Sozialdemokratische Partei  
Deutschlands (Social Democratic  
Party of Germany of the Federal  
Republic of Germany)
- S/S**, Executive Secretariat, Department  
of State
- S/S-RO**, Reports and Operations Staff,  
Executive Secretariat, Department of  
State
- TEA**, Ta'gmata Ethniki's Amy'nis  
(National Defense Battalions)
- TL**, Turkish lira
- TMT**, Turk Mukavemet Teskilati  
(Turkish Resistance Organization)  
(Cyprus)
- Topol**, series indicator for telegrams  
from the Department of State to the  
Representative to the North Atlantic  
Treaty Organization and European  
Regional Organizations
- TPSL**, Tyovaen ja Pienviljelijain  
Sosialidemokraattinen Liitto  
(Workers and Small Holders) Social  
Democratic League) (Finland)
- TUC**, Trade Union Congress (United  
Kingdom)
- TUSLOG**, The United States Logistics  
Group
- U**, Office of the Under Secretary of  
State
- UAR**, United Arab Republic
- UK**, United Kingdom
- UN**, United Nations
- UNGA**, United Nations General  
Assembly
- UNSC**, United Nations Security  
Council
- US**, United States
- USA**, United States Army
- USAF**, United States Air Force
- USAREUR**, United States Army,  
Europe
- USC**, United States Code
- USDA**, United States Department of  
Agriculture
- USEC**, United States Mission to the  
European Communities
- USEP**, United States Escapee Program
- USIA**, United States Information  
Agency
- USIB**, United States Intelligence Board
- USIS**, United States Information  
Service
- USMC**, United States Marine Corps
- USN**, United States Navy
- USOM**, United States Operations  
Mission
- USRO**, United States Mission to the  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
and European Regional  
Organizations
- USSR**, Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics
- USUN**, United States Mission to the  
United Nations
- VOA**, Voice of America

**W**, Office of the Under Secretary of  
State for Economic Affairs  
**W/CEA**, Special Assistant for  
Communist Economic Activities,  
Office of the Under Secretary of State  
for Economic Affairs  
**WEU**, Western European Union

**WFTU**, World Federation of Trade  
Unions  
**W/MSC**, Office of the Special Assistant  
for Mutual Security Coordination  
**WPA**, Works Progress Administration  
**ZMW**, Związek Młodych Wiejskiej  
(Rural Youth Polish Union)



# List of Persons

- Ackerson, Garret G., Jr.**, Counselor of the Legation in Budapest and Chargé d'Affaires ad interim
- Addis, John M.**, Head, Southern Department, British Foreign Office
- Adenauer, Konrad**, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany
- Akalovsky, Alexander**, interpreter, Department of State
- Allen, George V.**, Director, United States Information Agency
- Allen, Sir Roger**, British Ambassador to Greece
- Amery, Harold Julian**, British Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, December 1958–October 1960
- Atherton, Alfred L., Jr.**, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Department of State, from February 1959
- Averoff-Tossizza, Evangelos**, Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs until March 1958 and from May 1958
- Barbour, Walworth**, Minister and Deputy Chief of Mission of the Embassy in the United Kingdom
- Barnes, N. Spencer**, Member, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
- Bayar, Celal**, President of Turkey until May 1960
- Beale, Wilson T.M., Jr.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs until January 1960; Counselor for Economic Affairs of the Embassy in the United Kingdom from February 1960
- Belcher, Taylor G.**, Consul General at Nicosia, July 1958–August 1960
- Benson, Ezra Taft**, Secretary of Agriculture
- Berger, Samuel D.**, Counselor of the Embassy in Greece from September 1958
- Birgi, M. Nuri**, Turkish Ambassador in the United Kingdom until September 1960; thereafter Permanent Representative to NATO
- Blood, Archer**, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Department of State, until June 1960
- Boggs, Marion W.**, Deputy Executive Secretary, National Security Council
- Bohlen, Charles E.**, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State from December 1959
- Bowker, Sir Reginald J.**, British Ambassador in Turkey until May 1958
- Bulganan, Nikolai Alexandrovich**, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union until March 1958
- Burgess, W. Randolph**, Chief of the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations at Paris
- Burroughs, Sir Bernard A.B.**, British Ambassador to Turkey from May 1958
- Cabell, Lieutenant General Charles P.**, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
- Caccia, Sir Harold A.**, British Ambassador to the United States
- Calhoun, John A.**, Deputy Director, Executive Secretariat, Department of State, until September 1958; Director, September 1958–August 1960; Counselor for Political Affairs of the Embassy in Greece from September 1960
- Caramanlis.** *See* Karamanlis
- Cumming, Hugh, Jr.**, Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
- Cutler, Robert**, Special Assistant to President Eisenhower; member, Operations Coordinating Board; and Chairman, National Security Council Planning Board, through 1958

- Davis, Richard H.**, Minister-Counselor of the Embassy in the Soviet Union until August 1959; Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, August–December 1959; thereafter Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
- De Gaulle, Charles**, French Prime Minister, June 1958–January 1959; thereafter President of France
- Denktash, Rauf**, a leader of the Turkish-Cypriot party
- Dighenis**, alias of George Grivas, EOKA Leader
- Dillon, C. Douglas**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs until June 1958; Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, July 1958–June 1959; thereafter Under Secretary of State
- Dulles, Allen W.**, Director of Central Intelligence
- Dulles, John Foster**, Secretary of State until April 22, 1959
- Eisenhower, Dwight D.**, President of the United States
- Eisenhower, Major John S. D.**, Assistant Staff Secretary to President Eisenhower
- Eisenhower, Milton S.**, President of Johns Hopkins University
- Elbrick, C. Burke**, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until November 1958
- Esenbel, Melih**, Secretary General of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, 1958–1960; Ambassador to the United States, April–December 1960
- Foot, Sir Hugh**, British Governor-General and Commander in Chief of Cyprus until August 1960
- Frederika**, Queen of the Hellenes
- Freers, Edward L.**, Director, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, until May 1959; thereafter Counselor of the Embassy in the Soviet Union
- Gates, Thomas S., Jr.**, Secretary of Defense from December 1959
- Gleason, S. Everett**, Deputy Executive Secretary, National Security Council, until fall 1959
- Gomulka, Wladyslaw**, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party
- Goodpaster, Brigadier General Andrew J.**, Staff Secretary to President Eisenhower
- Goodyear, John**, Counselor for Political Affairs of the Embassy in Turkey until August 1959
- Gray, Gordon**, Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization until June 1958; thereafter Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- Greene, Joseph N., Jr.**, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State until summer 1959
- Grivas, George**, Greek military commander and leader of EOKA in Cyprus until March 1959
- Gromyko, Andrei Y.**, Soviet Foreign Minister
- Gürsel, Cemal**, President of Turkey from May 1960
- Hagerty, James C.**, Press Secretary to President Eisenhower
- Hall, Carlos C.**, Minister of the Embassy in Turkey until February 1959
- Harding, Field Marshal Sir John**, Governor-General of Cyprus until 1957
- Harr, Karl G.**, Special Assistant to President Eisenhower for Security Operations Coordination and Vice Chairman, Operations Coordinating Board
- Hart, Parker T.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, from October 1958
- Herter, Christian A.**, Under Secretary of State until April 21, 1959; thereafter Secretary of State
- Houghton, Amory**, Ambassador to France
- Howe, Fisher**, Director, Executive Secretariat, Department of State, until October 1958
- Hoyer Millar**. *See* Millar

- Inonu, Ismet**, former President and Prime Minister of Turkey
- Irwin, John N., II**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs until September 1958; thereafter Assistant Secretary of Defense
- Isham, Heyward**, Intelligence Research Specialist, Department of State, until November 1959; thereafter Staff Assistant to the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State
- Jandrey, Frederick**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
- Johnston, Eric**, President of the Motion Picture Association of America
- Jones, G. Lewis**, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs from July 1959
- Jones, Owen T.**, Director, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Department of State, until September 1960; thereafter Counselor for Economic Affairs of the Embassy in Yugoslavia and Director of the U.S. Operations Mission at Belgrade
- Kadar, Janos**, Hungarian Prime Minister until January 1958; First Secretary of the Hungarian Revolutionary Socialist Party
- Karamanlis, Constantine**, Greek Prime Minister until March 1958 and from May 1958
- Kekkonen, Urho**, President of Finland
- Khrushchev, Nikita S.**, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; Vice Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers to March 1958; thereafter Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers
- Killian, James R., Jr.**, Special Assistant to the President
- Kistiakowsky, George B.**, Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology
- Kohler, Foy D.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until December 1959; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
- Kozlov, Frol R.**, Soviet First Deputy Premier from March 1958
- Kutchuk, Mustafa Fazil**, leader of the National Turkish Party, Cyprus; Turkish-Cypriot representative to the United Nations, November 1958, and to Cyprus independence conferences, February and September 1959; elected Vice President of Cyprus, December 1959
- Kuznetsov, Vasilii V.**, Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister
- Lacy, William S.B.**, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for East-West Exchanges
- Lay, James S.**, Executive Secretary of the National Security Council
- Laingen, L. Bruce**, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Department of State, until October 1959; Officer in Charge of Greek Affairs, October 1959–August 1960
- Lennox-Boyd, Alan T.**, British Secretary of State for the Colonies until October 1959
- Leverich, Henry P.**, Deputy Director, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State
- Liatis, Alexis S.**, Greek Ambassador to the United States
- Lloyd, Selwyn**, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs until June 1960; Chancellor of the Exchequer thereafter
- Lodge, Henry Cabot**, Representative to the United Nations
- Lyon, Frederick B.**, Minister of the Embassy in Turkey until April 1958
- Macmillan, Harold**, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and First Lord of the Treasury
- Makarios III**, Archbishop of Cyprus, Ethnarch and Primate of Cyprus; President of the Republic of Cyprus from August 1960
- Maleter, Pal**, Hungarian Minister of Defense in the Nagy government, October–November 1956
- Matskevich, Vladimir V.**, Soviet Minister of Agriculture
- McCone, John A.**, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission
- McElroy, Neil H.**, Secretary of Defense until December 1959



## XXVIII List of Persons

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- McKisson, Robert**, Officer in Charge of Balkan Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
- McSweeney, John M.**, First Secretary of the Embassy in Italy and Special Liaison to NATO until September 1958; Office of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State, September 1958–December 1959; Acting Deputy Director, Office of Eastern European Affairs, December 1959–June 1960; thereafter Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs
- Melas, George V.**, Greek Ambassador to the United States
- Melas, Michael Constantine**, Greek Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council
- Menderes, Adnan**, Turkish Prime Minister until May 1960
- Menshikov, Mikhail A.**, Soviet Ambassador to the United States from February 1958
- Merchant, Livingston T.**, Ambassador to Canada until November 1958; Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, November 1958–August 1959; Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, August–December 1959; thereafter Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
- Mikoyan, Anastas Ivanovich**, Soviet First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers
- Millar, Sir Frederick Hoyer**, British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
- Mindszenty, Jozsef Cardinal**, Primate of Hungary, resident in the Legation in Budapest from November 1956
- Minnich, L. Arthur, Jr.**, Assistant Staff Secretary to the President
- Mueller, Frederick H.**, Under Secretary of Commerce
- Murphy, Robert D.**, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs until August 1959; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, August–December 1959
- Nagy, Imre**, Hungarian Prime Minister, October 24–November 4, 1956
- Nixon, Richard M.**, Vice President of the United States
- Nolting, Frederick E., Jr.**, Deputy Head of the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations
- Norstad, General Lauris**, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
- Novotny, Antonin**, President of the Republic of Czechoslovakia and President of the Politburo of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia
- O'Connor, Jeremiah J.**, Deputy Operations Coordinator, Department of State, March–July 1958; thereafter Operations Coordinator
- Paul I**, King of the Hellenes
- Penfield, James K.**, Counselor of the Embassy in Greece until August 1958; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from September 1958
- Persons, General Wilton B. (ret.)**, Deputy Assistant to the President to October 1958; thereafter Assistant to the President
- Pissas, Michael**, Secretary of Synomospondia Ergation Kypron
- Polatkan, Hasan**, Turkish Finance Minister until May 1960
- Popovic, Koca**, Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs and member, Federal Executive Council
- Quarles, Donald A.**, Deputy Secretary of Defense until May 1959
- Rapacki, Adam**, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs
- Riddleberger, James W.**, Ambassador to Yugoslavia until January 1958; Ambassador to Greece, March 1958–May 1959; Director of the International Cooperation Administration from March 1959

- Roberts, Sir Frank**, British Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization until May 1960
- Ross, Archibald D.M.**, British Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
- Rossides, Zenon G.**, Ethnarchy Adviser on Foreign Affairs until 1959; Cypriot member, Greek Delegation to the United Nations, 1958; Cypriot Ambassador to the United States and Permanent Representative to the United Nations from October 1960
- Rountree, William M.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs until August 1958; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
- Sarper, Selim**, Turkish Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council until spring 1960; Minister of Foreign Affairs from May 1960
- Scribner, Fred C., Jr.**, Under Secretary of the Treasury
- Sherer, Albert W.**, Officer in Charge of Polish, Baltic, and Czechoslovak Affairs, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State
- Sinclair, Sir G.E.**, British Deputy Governor of Cyprus until August 1960
- Siscoe, Frank G.**, Counselor of the Embassy in Poland from May 1957
- Smith, Bromley K.**, Senior Member, NSC Special Staff, through 1958; Executive Officer, Operations Coordinating Board, from 1959
- Smith, Gerard C.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning
- Spaak, Paul-Henri**, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
- Stevenson, Adlai E.**, Democratic Party candidate for President in 1952 and 1956
- Strauss, Lewis L.**, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission until June 1958; Secretary of Commerce, November 1958–June 1959
- Striganov, Sergei R.**, Counselor of the Embassy and Chargé d'Affaires of the Soviet Embassy in the United States until August 1958; thereafter Deputy Chief of the American Countries Division, Soviet Foreign Ministry
- Sutterlin, James**, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State, until September 1960
- Thompson, Llewellyn E.**, Ambassador to the Soviet Union
- Thurston, Raymond L.**, Counselor and Political Officer of the Mission to SHAPE at Paris
- Timmons, Benson E.L., III**, Director, Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State, until June 1959
- Tito, Marshal Joseph Broz**, President of the Federated Republic of Yugoslavia
- Twining, General Nathan F.**, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until September 1960
- Urguplu, Ali Suat Havri**, Turkish Ambassador to the United States until December 1960
- Vedeler, Harold C.**, First Secretary of the Embassy in Austria and liaison to the International Atomic Energy Agency until November 1959; Director, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State, from December 1959
- Voroshilov, Kliment Y.**, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet
- Warren, Fletcher**, Ambassador to Turkey until November 1960
- Washburn, Abbot**, Deputy Director of the United States Information Agency
- Weeks, Sinclair**, Secretary of Commerce until August 1959
- Wharton, Clifton R.**, Minister in Romania, March 1958–October 1960
- White, General Thomas D.**, Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
- Whitman, Ann**, Personal Secretary to President Eisenhower
- Whitney, John Hay**, Ambassador to the United Kingdom
- Wilcox, Francis O.**, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs
- Wilkins, Fraser**, Ambassador to Cyprus from September 1960

**Williams, Murat**, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Department of State, until June 1959

**Williams, Walter**, Under Secretary of Commerce until 1958

**Yemelyanov, Vasiliy S.**, Chairman, Soviet Main Administration for Atomic Energy

**Zaroubin, Georgi N.**, Soviet Ambassador to the United States until January 1958; thereafter Deputy Foreign Minister

**Zhukov, Georgi A.**, Chairman of the Soviet State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries

**Zorlu, Fatin Rustu**, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs until May 1960

# EASTERN EUROPE REGION

## U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET-DOMINATED NATIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE; U.S. RESPONSE TO THE RAPACKI PLAN FOR CREATION OF A NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE IN CENTRAL EUROPE; PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S PROCLAMATION OF CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK

### 1. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations

Washington, January 21, 1958, 5:38 p.m.

Topol 2486. This message contains Department views on Rapacki Plan.<sup>1</sup>

Embassies London and Ottawa should convey Foreign Offices as soon as possible and inform Department and USRO when instructions carried out.

USRO should make presentation to NAC based on following points as soon as NAC schedule permits. You may begin your presentation using numbered points 1-4 Polto 2112<sup>2</sup> as preamble. We leave it to your judgment and Spaak's views whether or not convene special NAC meeting.

1) We indicated in our reply to Bulganin note<sup>3</sup> which was discussed in NAC that we believed Rapacki Plan should be studied in

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 640.0012/1-2858. Secret. Drafted by Reinstein (EUR/GER) and McBride (EUR/RA) and cleared with various officers in the Department of State and with the Department of Defense. Also sent to London and Ottawa and repeated to Bonn, Moscow, Warsaw, Ankara, Athens, Brussels, Copenhagen, Lisbon, Luxembourg, Oslo, Reykjavik, Rome, and The Hague.

<sup>1</sup> The Rapacki Plan was first proposed by Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki in a speech to the U.N. General Assembly on October 2, 1957. It called for the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Poland, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, and the German Federal Republic. For text of Rapacki's address (U.N. doc. A/PV.697), see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. II, pp. 889-892.

<sup>2</sup> Points 1-4 of Polto 2112 from Paris, January 18, discussed Western and free world public opinion and the difficulty of leading it in the "right direction." The telegram cautioned that the United States must not appear to be forcing atomic weapons or foreign forces on its European allies, but point 4 concludes that the United States "does not propose to sacrifice real security for agreements that only provide illusion of security." (Department of State, Central Files, 740.00/1-858)

<sup>3</sup> For text of Premier Bulganin's letter of December 10, 1957, and President Eisenhower's reply of January 12, 1958, both of which dealt with ways to reduce international tension, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 27, 1958, pp. 122-130.

NATO and with NATO countries directly concerned. In Heads of Government communiqué<sup>4</sup> NATO nations stated they would study all proposals designed to reduce international tensions. Accordingly we have carefully considered Rapacki Plan. After careful study our reaction is heavily negative. While it might have some surface attraction, it poses totally unacceptable risks. Therefore we cannot consider this scheme as basis for any serious negotiations for reasons given below.

2) Although other proposals in same field (Kennan ideas, Gaitskell plan, etc.)<sup>5</sup> are being publicly discussed, we have restricted following to Rapacki Plan because latter was specifically raised in Bulganin note. Furthermore attempt discuss all these things at once would seem confusing.

3) For obvious reasons we believe NAC debate on this subject should remain most private and we expect every precaution will be taken against leaks.

4) We believe dangers of plan are self-evident to those with any knowledge of subject. Real problem would seem to be public opinion, in combating what appears to public on surface as reasonable proposal. We believe public statements by Western countries on Rapacki Plan should spell out as simply as possible dangers of plan and stress positive aspects Western proposals in disarmament and security fields.

5) In meeting this unquestioned problem of public opinion, we believe NATO Governments should take lead in presenting forcefully to their peoples considerations which make this plan dangerous, as well as positive aspects of Western proposals.

6) Rapacki Plan was put forward by Poles in UN some months ago. While it attracted relatively little attention initially, degree of interest in Western opinion which it has aroused since endorsement by Bulganin makes essential adoption common line by NATO Governments on proposals and concepts it involves.

7) Rapacki Plan has much in common with other Soviet bloc initiatives in that it proposes formula to reduce tensions in Europe based on existing division of Germany, and designed to exclude nuclear weapons from Germany.

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<sup>4</sup> For text of the communiqué issued on December 19, 1957, at the conclusion of the meeting of the Heads of Government of the North Atlantic Council in Paris, see *ibid.*, January 6, 1958, pp. 12–15.

<sup>5</sup> The proposals of former Ambassador to the Soviet Union George F. Kennan and British Labour leader Hugh Gaitskell, among others, are discussed in Intelligence Report No. 7664, "Public Reaction in Western Europe to Recent Disengagement Proposals," February 13, 1958, prepared by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the Department of State. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, OSS–INR Reports)

8) Rapacki Plan goes counter agreed NATO strategy existing since 1954 which calls for integrated nuclear capability in NATO shield forces. Furthermore Heads of Government meeting recently decided implement decision extend tactical nuclear weapons (which US forces now have) to forces of other nations (warheads remaining US custody). Without such weapons Soviet superiority becomes overwhelming in light their much greater conventional forces.

9) Barring NATO forces in Germany from having nuclear weapons is unacceptable militarily and it is highly unlikely US opinion would tolerate maintenance significant US forces in Germany without such weapons, which in their tactical form are increasingly becoming conventional, with U.S. forces. Result would be that shield concept would disappear.

10) Rapacki Plan also involves disarmament considerations. If ban proposed is on nuclear warheads alone, we seriously question its enforceability. If it involves delivery systems as well (Rapacki according to Embassy Warsaw includes ban on "nuclear infrastructure" in his plan), it obviously goes deeply into question armament limitations.

11) From disarmament standpoint, Rapacki Plan and Soviet variant thereof appear new limited form of basic Soviet "ban the bomb" proposal. As arms limitation applied to divided Germany, it involves entire European security question which Western policy links to German reunification.

12) Plan has further disadvantage of establishing particular conditions and limitations on one NATO member which do not apply to others. This is contradictory thus not only to basic NATO strategy as outlined but also to NATO political unity.

13) Rapacki Plan is sharply different from NATO-approved disarmament proposals of last August which envisaged inspection for prevention surprise attack in a broad European zone which included portions of USSR.<sup>6</sup>

14) Rapacki Plan appears designed to appeal to sentiment in West for "disengagement" on basis present line of demarcation between Soviets and West. This sentiment appears to be motivated by two ideas.

a) One is that confrontation of two large groups of potentially hostile forces in Central Europe involves threat to peace and that this threat is increased by adoption of nuclear weapons. This idea, which is fundamentally opposed to NATO shield concept, we do not consider to be sound. Threats to peace since NATO was established and NATO force created have arisen not in Europe but elsewhere. Political directive rec-

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<sup>6</sup> Secretary Dulles made this proposal to the Subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission on August 2, 1957; for text of his address, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. II, pp. 839-845.

ognizes need for forces capable of dealing also with hostile local action, as distinct from major armed aggression. We believe NATO forces, organization and command arrangements are well adapted to prevent inadvertent, unauthorized or unnecessary use of nuclear weapons.

b) Second idea is that presumed reduction of tension which would result from military steps would in some way facilitate settlement of German problem. We believe this is not only erroneous but dangerous concept. In the absence of comprehensive understanding with USSR on future of Germany and on detailed military arrangements in broad area of Europe, partial measures would merely be to solidify status quo, which is Soviet aim. This proposal has no features looking to German reunification and indeed seems perpetuate division.

15) We have received reports indicating that plan was proposed on Polish initiative, although cleared in advance with Soviets. If this is true, it is interesting. It may represent Polish desire to take steps leading to breaking impasse between Soviets and West. It may also reflect Polish concern that continuing build-up of nuclear capability in Western forces in Germany may lead to demand by Soviets for stationing of Soviet nuclear bases in Poland and Czechoslovakia. Such a development could result in restoration of some of Soviet control over Poland weakened during past year.

16) Exploitation of potential differences between Poland and USSR would present West with opportunities. Ability to establish Western military inspection in Poland and Czechoslovakia would also offer possibilities of expanding Western contact and influence in these areas. While these are possibilities to which West must be alert in presenting its own proposals, they do not involve advantages of sufficient importance or certainty to warrant us in incurring risks to our own security.

17) Therefore, we reiterate in conclusion our conviction that in fact Rapacki Plan represents nothing new in the way of progress towards settlement of European problems and is, for the reasons listed above, a highly dangerous proposal.<sup>7</sup>

**Dulles**

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<sup>7</sup>The Rapacki Plan was discussed in the session of the North Atlantic Council on January 22 and also in a special private session later that day attended only by each Permanent Representative and one or two of his advisers. The private session was held at Spaak's suggestion in order to permit a "free and forthright expression of views." Reports on these two sessions are in Polto 2157 and Polto 2158 from Paris, both dated January 22. (Department of State, Central Files, 640.0012/1-2258)

## 2. National Intelligence Estimate

NIE 12-58

Washington, February 4, 1958.

### OUTLOOK FOR STABILITY IN THE EASTERN EUROPEAN SATELLITES

#### The Problem

To assess the prospects for stability in the European Satellites over the next few years.

#### Summary

1. Since the crisis of October 1956, the USSR and the Satellite regimes have had considerable success in reimposing party unity and general submissiveness among the people, at least on the surface. Even in Poland, the Gomulka regime has strengthened its hold despite continuing unrest.

2. For at least the next few years the USSR and the Satellites will probably avoid further political innovation but maintain the general policies—especially in the economic field—followed during 1957. We estimate that by and large such policies will preserve relative stability in the Satellites over the next few years. Popular revolts are unlikely, largely because of the still fresh example of Soviet repression in Hungary; nor do we expect another coup on the Polish model elsewhere in the Satellites.

3. But the USSR and the Satellite regimes have by no means eliminated those forces in Eastern Europe which underlay the unrest of 1956. We foresee a continued atmosphere of change and ferment, more highly charged than under Stalin. Popular dissatisfaction, party factionalism, intellectual dissent, and chronic economic difficulties will continue to stimulate desires for reform and change. A period of political turbulence might again emerge if internal controls are relaxed, or there are economic crises, or uncertainties appear to characterize the policies of

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Source: Department of State, INR-NIE Files. Secret. A note on the cover sheet indicates that this estimate superseded NIE 12-57 and was concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on February 4. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained because the subject was outside their jurisdiction. An extract of NIE 12-57, "Outlook for Stability in the Eastern European Satellites," dated February 19, 1957, is in *Foreign Relations, 1955-1957*, vol. XXV, pp. 578-579.

The cover sheet, dissemination notice, table of contents, and a one-page appendix on Soviet economic aid to the satellites and other intra-bloc credits affecting the satellites are not printed.



the USSR or local regimes. The greatest potentialities for unrest appear to exist in Poland and East Germany.

4. We also continue to believe that Poland's ability to maintain its semi-independence will be a key factor affecting future political developments in Eastern Europe. Barring an acute economic crisis, the Gomulka regime has a better than even chance of surviving the internal threats to its position. We also believe that it will be able to retain its relative freedom from direct Soviet control. In time this development, together with Yugoslavia's continued independence, may tend to encourage nationalist-oriented elements in the other Satellites to seek greater autonomy.

5. For the short term at least the Soviets will almost certainly go slow in liberalizing their policy, but they do not seem to view a return to Stalinist policies as either necessary or feasible. The USSR will probably continue to extend substantial aid to alleviate economic difficulties. Moreover, once reassured that their position is no longer threatened, the Soviet leaders might gradually allow a more independent role to the Satellites, within the limits imposed by Soviet hegemony. On the other hand, should this hegemony again appear to be seriously threatened reversion to a harsher policy would follow.

6. The West's ability to influence the course of European Satellite development through policies and actions directed at the Satellites themselves is limited, particularly by tight Communist controls. Within these limits, however, the post-Stalin trends in Eastern Europe and the likely continuation of stresses and strains within the Satellites have created a situation more open to Western influence than at any time since 1948. Growing trade and East-West contacts offer some opportunities. But probably the only means—short of force—that could have a substantial positive or negative impact on Eastern Europe lie within the field of major East-West agreements which would fundamentally affect the current situation.

[Here follows the "Discussion" section with parts entitled "Situation and Prospects in Individual Satellites," "The Outlook in the Satellites," and "Impact of Western Policies."]

### 3. National Intelligence Estimate

NIE 10-58

Washington, March 4, 1958.

#### ANTI-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC

##### The Problem

To appraise the intensity and scope of dissidence and resistance in the Sino-Soviet Bloc, and to estimate the resistance potential in times of peace and war.

##### Introductory Note

Like its predecessor,<sup>1</sup> this estimate is a brief appraisal of the causes, nature, and extent of anti-regime dissidence and resistance within the Sino-Soviet Bloc. It is based upon eleven country studies prepared by the inter-agency Resistance Intelligence Committee established by the IAC. These studies, which analyze dissidence and resistance in each country of the Bloc, have been noted but not individually approved by the IAC; they are appended as annexes to the estimate itself.<sup>2</sup>

In the estimate and the annexes, the following terminology is used:

Dissidence—a state of mind involving discontent or disaffection with the regime.

Resistance—dissidence translated into action.

Organized resistance—resistance which is carried out by a group of individuals who have accepted a common purpose, agreed upon leadership, and worked out a communications system.

Unorganized resistance—resistance carried out by individuals or loosely associated groups which may have been formed spontaneously for certain limited objectives, without over-all plan or strategy.

Passive resistance—resistance, organized or unorganized, which is conducted within the framework of the resister's normal life and duties, and involves deliberate nonperformance or malperformance of acts which would benefit the regime, or deliberate nonconformity with standards of conduct established by the regime.

Active resistance—resistance, organized or unorganized, which expresses itself in positive acts against the regime. It may or may not

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Source: Department of State, INR-NIE Files. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet, this estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) on March 4. The Atomic Energy Representative to the IAC and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained because the subject was outside their jurisdiction.

<sup>1</sup> NIE 10-55, "Anti-Communist Resistance Potential in the Sino-Soviet Bloc," 12 April 1955. [Footnote in the source text. NIE 10-55 is not printed.]

<sup>2</sup> None printed.

involve violence, and may be conducted openly or clandestinely. It may take such forms as intelligence collection, psychological warfare, sabotage, guerrilla warfare, assistance in escape and evasion, open defiance of authority, or preparatory activity for any of the above.

With the progressive consolidation of Communist control, however, active resistance has in general tended to take less the forms mentioned above, and to be expressed more in such forms as strikes, demonstrations, and open manifestations of intellectual and other dissent. While in many cases these activities are not wholly motivated by anti-regime attitudes, they nevertheless have anti-regime connotations.

#### Estimate

##### *Scope and Intensity of Dissidence and Resistance*

1. Dissidence continues to be widespread in the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Improvements in living standards and such relaxation of regime controls as took place during the last three years have been, except perhaps in the USSR, insufficient to reduce substantially general discontent. Save in semi-independent Poland, nationalist anti-regime feelings in Eastern Europe are as strong as ever. In addition to common grievances, various population elements harbor special resentments, such as those of peasants towards collectivization, workers towards Communist labor discipline, intellectuals and students towards enforced ideological conformity, believers towards anti-religious measures.

2. The scope and intensity of dissidence, however, varies widely from country to country. One of the most important distinctions in both peacetime and wartime resistance potential is whether or not the regime is viewed as representing the national rather than an alien interest. Except among certain of its own national minorities, the Soviet regime has succeeded in identifying itself among its own population as a legitimate national government. But Communist regimes in the Far East have made somewhat less progress in this respect, and those in Eastern Europe, again excepting Poland, have failed almost completely. In the divided countries, the existence of a functioning alternative government exercises some attraction which operates to increase dissidence, but this appears to be a major factor only in East Germany. Other variations in resistance potential arise from differences in national character, in historical traditions, in economic conditions, and in religious attitudes.

3. In the last few years most Bloc regimes have sought to reduce popular discontent and to narrow the rifts between the regimes and their peoples. The leashing of the Soviet secret police, the decollectivization of Polish agriculture, and efforts to improve living standards are cases in point. These policies have had some success. On the other hand, the very trend toward relaxation of controls and resulting confusion as to regime policies have given greater scope to overt manifestations of

discontent. Sharp criticism arose, for example, among Moscow writers and Chinese intellectuals when the regimes experimented with a looser application of controls. In Hungary and Poland, inhibitions upon the use of police terror and serious splits within the Communist parties permitted dissidence to swell into active resistance, in Hungary on a mass scale. In reaction, the Bloc regimes have tightened their controls, and in Hungary after the bloody suppression of the revolt the regime reverted to harsh repression. The Bloc leaders have striven to insure party unity, to circumscribe the range of permissible criticism, and to provide various reminders of their physical power. As a result, organized active resistance is negligible in the Bloc at the present time.

#### *Resistance Potential in Peacetime*

4. During the next few years, conditions of life probably will not improve sufficiently to reduce dissidence significantly in most countries of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. This dissidence will probably continue to be expressed primarily in various forms of passive resistance—noncompliance with regime orders, economic malingering, other low-risk ways of expressing individual opposition. So long as the regimes do not revert to all-out repression, there is also likely to be some continuation of those forms of active resistance—strikes, demonstrations, open expressions of intellectual dissent—which have characterized the past few years. In particular, such manifestations are likely in parts of Eastern Europe. In Communist China, some disturbances by peasants and ethnic minorities are also likely.

5. Moreover, many Bloc regimes recognize that the cultivation of popular support and the eliciting of broader initiative would require not only economic betterment but some degree of liberalization of controls. However, they also recognize that such steps increase the difficulty of maintaining party unity and complete control over the populace. Thus they will probably accede to popular pressures only in those cases in which they regard it as relatively safe to do so. But any relaxation of controls will tend to give dissident elements opportunities to press their grievances in indirect ways.

6. Further, each regime's problems may be increased and complicated by developments elsewhere in the Bloc and influences from the Free World. The repercussions of the USSR's de-Stalinization campaign and the events in Hungary and Poland have agitated dissidents throughout the Bloc, in some cases to the point of stimulating various forms of resistance. Intra-Bloc variations in ideology and policy have contributed to dissatisfaction and ferment among intellectuals and students. As contacts with non-Bloc countries increase, unfavorable comparisons will arise. In consequence, campaigns against dissidence,

while primarily concerned with its domestic sources, must also contend with unsettling influences from abroad.

7. The difficulties of dealing with dissidence, various forms of resistance, and foreign influences may lead to policy vacillations between “hard” and “soft” lines or to intra-party disputes. These developments might evoke greater resistance activity. This activity, however, would tend to be directed towards the elimination of specific grievances rather than to the overthrow of the existing regimes, since the latter course would seem highly unpromising unless there were a serious prior weakening of party and police.

8. For these reasons we regard major outbreaks of active resistance as unlikely, although these cannot be excluded in certain volatile situations in Eastern Europe. Sporadic local outbreaks will probably recur, but they will almost certainly be within the capabilities of security forces to repress. The regime’s counter-weapons—primarily the monopoly of physical force (coupled with an evident willingness to use it) and a near-monopoly of means of communication—will remain formidable. In Poland the regime has shown less reliance on these weapons, but a primary safeguard against violent resistance is the widespread recognition, to which the Catholic Church lends important support, that it would provoke Soviet intervention. Here, as elsewhere in Eastern Europe, Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolt and the absence of Western assistance have underlined the futility of violent resistance.

9. Emigré organizations of former Bloc nationals have, in general, lost effective contact with their homelands and are little known to Bloc populations. Virtually all of them have suffered from internal bickering, and many have been penetrated by Communist agents. Emigré groups do not significantly contribute to resistance potential, and with rare exceptions their leaders would not be welcomed to positions of power after liberation.

#### *Resistance Potential in Event of General War*

10. At the outset of a general war, patriotism would act to diminish sharply the resistance potential in most of the USSR and to some extent in Communist China, though in the latter case this would depend more on the nature of the conflict. In the Far Eastern satellites, any increase in resistance potential probably would be only marginal. But in the satellite states of Eastern Europe, as well as in certain minority areas of the USSR and Communist China (e.g. the Baltic States, Georgia, Western Ukraine, Tibet), the outbreak of war would rekindle hopes of liberation and immediately increase the resistance potential. This potential probably would be highest in Poland, Hungary, and East Germany. We believe, however, that unless the tide of war ran sharply against the Bloc and its military and security forces were significantly weakened,

resistance activities of a para-military nature could be prevented or at least confined to manageable proportions.

11. While we conclude that resistance activities probably would not be a major factor so long as the outcome of the main conflict remained dubious, resistance activity probably could be expected, especially in Eastern Europe, in the form of intelligence collection and transmission, aid to Western personnel in escape and evasion operations, and minor sabotage. The level of such activity would vary considerably, because of differences in resistance potential, and also as a result of the amount of outside assistance available and the location of battle lines.

12. Only conjectures can be made concerning the impact on resistance activity of the use of nuclear weapons. Much would depend on such factors as the extent and locale of the attacks, the types of weapons used, the damage caused, the extent to which regime controls were disrupted, etc. Among population groups suffering direct losses, survivors probably would first be stunned, then concentrate their energies exclusively on problems of personal survival. In areas sufficiently distant from attack to be largely unaffected, resistance might increase as dissident elements found that Communist controls had been weakened; on the other hand, they might conclude that nuclear weapons were so decisive that extensive resistance was irrelevant or unnecessary. Groups outside the attack area but sufficiently close to be caught in the resulting chaos would be subject to all these effects. It is possible that, in certain cases, attacks against selected targets might weaken the regime's anti-resistance capabilities more than they impaired resistance potential.

13. The question of responsibility for the initiation of general war probably would not substantially affect the will to resist the regimes in the Bloc countries. Nor would the nationality of attacking forces be likely, in the majority of cases, to have great bearing upon the cooperation offered by resistance elements. Exceptions would be cases in which long-standing national antipathies might conflict to an important degree with anti-regime feelings, e.g. (a) German forces in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the USSR; (b) Yugoslav, Greek, and Turkish forces in Bulgaria; (c) Greek, Italian, and Yugoslav forces in Albania; and (d) Japanese forces in North Korea and Communist China. On the other hand, in the divided countries anti-regime resistance might increase if military forces of the non-Communist government were used.

**4. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Twining) to Secretary of Defense McElroy**

Washington, May 20, 1958.

[Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5811 Series. Secret. 3 pages of source text not declassified.]

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**5. Memorandum of Discussion at the 366th Meeting of the National Security Council**

Washington, May 22, 1958.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1 and 2.]

3. *U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet-Dominated Nations in Eastern Europe* (NSC 5608/1; Appendix to NSC 5608/1; NSC 5808/1; NSC 5505/1; NSC 5607; NSC 5616/2; NSC 5704/3; NSC 5706/2; NSC 5726/1; NSC 5803; NIE 12–58; NIE 10–58; NSC Action No. 1896; NSC 5811; Memos from NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated May 13 and 21, 1958)<sup>1</sup>

General Cutler briefed the National Security Council at considerable length, stressing in particular the differences of view in subparagraphs 28–c and 28–d of NSC 5811, reading as follows:

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on May 23.

<sup>1</sup> The following are printed in *Foreign Relations, 1955–1957*, vol. XXV: NSC 5608/1, “U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe” (without the appendix), July 18, 1956, pp. 216–221; NSC 5706/2, “U.S. Policy on Defectors, Escapees, and Refugees From Communist Areas,” February 26, 1957, pp. 584–588; and NSC 5616/2, “Interim U.S. Policy on Developments in Poland and Hungary,” November 19, 1956, pp. 463–469. NSC 5607, “East-West Exchanges,” June 29, 1956, is printed *ibid.*, vol. XXIV, pp. 243–246. NSC 5704/3, “U.S. Economic Defense Policy,” September 16, 1957, is printed *ibid.*, vol. X, pp. 495–498. NSC 5803, “U.S. Policy Toward Germany,” February 7, 1958, is printed in vol. IX, Document 243. NIE 12–58 and NIE 10–58 are printed as Documents 2 and 3. NSC 5808/1, “U.S. Policy Toward Poland,” April 16, 1958, is in Part 2, Document 46. Regarding NSC Action No. 1896, see the memorandum of NSC discussion, April 14, *ibid.* NSC 5726/1, “U.S. Civil Aviation Policy Toward the Sino-Soviet Bloc,” December 9, 1957, is in Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5726 Series. Lay’s May 13 memorandum transmitting a memorandum from the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers on portions of NSC 5811 is *ibid.*, NSC 5811 Series. NSC 5811 and Lay’s May 21 memorandum are not printed. (*Ibid.*)

"c. Encourage the dominated peoples to seek their goals gradually [and without resort to premature violent actions].\*<sup>2</sup> [5-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

"d. Discreetly foster dissident and non-cooperative attitudes; and [do not discourage]\*\*<sup>2</sup> non-cooperative activities, including passive resistance.

"" JCS proposal.

"" State-Treasury-Budget proposal."

(A copy of General Cutler's briefing note is filed in the minutes of the meeting, and another is attached to this memorandum.)<sup>3</sup>

When General Cutler had finished explaining that the main issue in this paper focused on these two subparagraphs, he stated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposals for rewriting subparagraphs 28-c and -d really constituted a fundamental difference with the view set forth by the present text of these subparagraphs.

The President said that he was unable to understand the difference, and the matter seemed to him essentially an exercise in semantics. Secretary Dulles noted his agreement with the President's view. General Cutler, however, insisted that if the President and others could not grasp that there was a concrete and substantive difference of viewpoint between the Joint Chiefs' proposals for subparagraphs 28-c and -d and those of the Planning Board, he had failed to explain adequately the essential differences. The Planning Board had unanimously agreed that the dominated peoples should seek their goals of greater independence from Moscow gradually and generally without resort to violence. The Joint Chiefs, on the other hand, believed that there was no chance of achieving independence in these countries without some fighting. They believed that we should discreetly encourage passive resistance and that violent uprisings, rioting, and guerrilla operations should be encouraged, though only "on a calculated basis when we are ready to cope with the Russian reaction." Moreover, the Chiefs believe that in the event that a satellite gained some measure of freedom, the United States should be prepared to make unmistakably clear to the Soviets that we will not tolerate any efforts toward reprisal or resubjugation.

After thus summarizing what he conceived to be the differences between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Planning Board on this issue, General Cutler called first on General Twining.

General Twining said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were aware that they were getting somewhat out of their military sphere in their comments on subparagraphs 28-c and -d, but that they felt that as these

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<sup>2</sup> Brackets in the source text.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. The minutes of all National Security Council meetings held during the Eisenhower administration are in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Official Meeting Minutes File.



subparagraphs were written in NSC 5811 they were much too weak. It was for this reason that they had recommended their changes.

Secretary Dulles said that he could not quite agree with General Twining's view and that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that there was no chance of a satellite securing its independence of Moscow without some fighting. This was a pretty sweeping statement, and while it might be likely, it was not so certain as the Chiefs seemed to think.

Broadly speaking, continued Secretary Dulles, we in the State Department believe that the best hope of bringing about an acceptable evolution toward greater freedom for the satellites is the exertion by the satellites of constant pressure on the Soviet Union and on their own regimes, in the hope of effecting a change in the thinking of the Soviet rulers. Thus the Soviet rulers may ultimately come to realize that it is in their own best interests to be surrounded by free and relatively friendly countries, rather than, as at present, by a series of bitterly hostile satellite states. How to exert this pressure was a very delicate matter, but it seemed reasonably well covered by the limited-distribution Appendix to NSC 5608/1. While it remained true that no enslaved country could ever achieve its freedom if the people of that country were not willing to die for freedom, the example of Hungary showed that the elements that we most depended upon had been liquidated by the resort to violence.

Secretary Dulles stated that he particularly disliked the bracketed phrase in the first sentence of subparagraph 28–c, dealing with premature violence. He felt that the proposed course of action was dangerous, and that the bracketed phrase should be omitted from the final text of the subparagraph.

The President said that he didn't clearly understand the difference between the bracketed phrase and the first part of the sentence, but he was willing to agree with Secretary Dulles that the bracketed phrase should be deleted.

Turning to subparagraph 28–d, Secretary Dulles commented that he couldn't get very excited about whether the bracketed phrase, "do not discourage", was deleted or remained in the final form of the subparagraph. After all, said Secretary Dulles, the difference between "non-cooperative attitudes" and "non-cooperative activities" would have to be drawn by a pretty fine line. He accordingly would not object to the deletion of the bracketed phrase in subparagraph 28–d.

Mr. Allen warned the Council that if subparagraph 28–d remained as written, it would constitute guidance to his Voice of America operations. In this circumstance, and if there were another Hungary, the script-writers could only defend themselves against accusations such as had occurred at the time of the Hungarian revolt, by stating in effect that their discreet encouragement of dissident and non-cooperative

attitudes was national security policy. On the whole, Mr. Allen felt that the bracketed phrase had better stay in subparagraph 28–d.

Both the President and Secretary Anderson expressed anxiety about leaving the phrase “discreetly encourage” in subparagraph 28–d. The President thought that what was really meant by this phrase was “to look on with a benevolent eye”.

*[2 paragraphs (11 lines of source text) not declassified]*

General Cutler then went on to speak of paragraph 40, reading as follows:

“40. Seek to establish between the United States and the dominated nations with which the United States has diplomatic relations, more normal economic relations, thereby facilitating a gradual expansion of trade—consistent with ‘Basic National Security Policy’ (NSC 5810/1)<sup>4</sup> and ‘U.S. Economic Defense Policy’ (NSC 5704/3)\*—as a means of projecting U.S. influence and lessening the dominated nations’ economic ties with and dependence on the Soviet Union.

“\* NSC Action 1865–c directed the review of this policy; cf. NSC 5810/1, paragraph 37. For the Department of Commerce suggestions for expanding par. 40, see Annex C.”

General Cutler also noted that the Secretary of Commerce had suggested, in Annex C to NSC 5811, more detailed guidance with respect to the course of action set forth in paragraph 40. General Cutler suggested that if the details of paragraph 40 were adopted by the Council, they should be removed from the Annex and placed in the policy paper.

The President said that it was his understanding that the proposed expanded trade between the United States and the Soviet-dominated nations was designed to achieve U.S. political objectives and had little or nothing to do with any purely economic advantage which might accrue to the United States. If he were right in this assumption, he believed that the initiative in carrying out the course of action in paragraph 40 should come straight from the State Department.

In turn, Secretary Dulles said he felt that the implementation of paragraph 40 would have to be handled with very great care. As the Vice President had just recently pointed out, the Latin American countries were now under very heavy pressure of an economic sort to increase their trade with the Soviet satellite states. If we, the United States, open the door to greater trade with the satellite states, it may well prove to be the Latin American countries which rush through the door. This could have very serious effects on the political orientation of our Latin American neighbors. The President agreed, and said that that was

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<sup>4</sup>NSC 5810/1, “Basic National Security Policy,” May 5, 1958, is scheduled for publication in volume III.

precisely why he felt that State should take the initiative in determining what should be done to carry out the policy in paragraph 40.

Secretary Dulles said that he would be very reluctant to see the National Security Council agree to any sweeping public statements by U.S. officials regarding increased trade with the Soviet-dominated nations, as appeared to be suggested by the Department of Commerce proposals in Annex C. This could have a very serious effect in Latin America. The Vice President agreed with Secretary Dulles' viewpoint, and said that the leaders of the Latin American countries would on the whole much prefer to trade with the United States, first of all because the machinery we sold them was better than the machinery they got from the Soviet Bloc, and secondly because they did not want a lot of Communist technicians coming into their countries to show them how to operate the machines they had imported from a Soviet Bloc country. The Vice President accordingly agreed that this matter should be handled entirely by the State Department.

Called upon for his views, Secretary Weeks agreed that this was essentially a State Department matter, and that the objective sought, in calling for more normal trade relations with the Soviet-dominated nations, was a political objective and not a commercial one. The paragraphs suggested by the Department of Commerce in Annex C were merely designed to spell out in greater detail what Commerce had supposed to be the State Department's position in favoring more non-strategic trade, as set forth in paragraph 40; and, moreover, Commerce would of course have to implement the actual commercial operations under paragraph 40.

General Cutler then suggested to the Council that Annex C be omitted. The President, however, thought that the whole matter, both paragraph 40 and Annex C, should not be acted upon at this time by the Council, but should be further studied in the State Department prior to final Council action. The subject matter of paragraph 40 was, in the President's opinion, the most important matter which had been discussed this morning at the meeting. As he had so often said, the President reminded the Council again that trade was the chief weapon of the diplomat.

General Cutler then suggested approval of all of NSC 5811 as amended, including paragraph 40, but suggested the omission of Annex C. The details of the implementation of paragraph 40 could safely be left to the Operations Coordinating Board, where the State Department could take the lead. The President said he could not agree with General Cutler's suggestion, and felt that the State Department would have to make up its own mind as to how it wished to make use of increased trade with the Soviet-dominated nations in order to achieve our political objectives. Secretary Dulles agreed, and stated that in its present form

paragraph 40 seemed too sweeping, and he would like an opportunity to look at the problem at greater length. General Cutler asked the President if he was agreeable to Council adoption of all of NSC 5811 as amended, except for paragraph 40 and Annex C. Council action on paragraph 40 and Annex C would be suspended until the Secretary of State had had an opportunity to study further the implications of this paragraph. This proposal was approved.

*The National Security Council:*<sup>5</sup>

a. Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 5811, including a supplementary draft statement of U.S. Policy Toward Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (Annex B to NSC 5811), in the light of:

(1) The views of the Chairman, Council on Foreign Economic Policy, with particular reference to paragraph 40 and Annex C of NSC 5811, transmitted by the reference memorandum of May 13, 1958; and

(2) The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thereon, transmitted by the reference memorandum of May 21, 1958.

b. Adopted the statement of U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet-Dominated Nations in Eastern Europe, and the supplementary statement of U.S. Policy Toward Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, subject to:

(1) *On page 16*, deletion of the bracketed words in the first sentence of subparagraph 28-c, and the footnote thereto.

(2) *On page 17*, deletion of subparagraph 28-d and the footnote thereto.

(3) *On page 20*, deferral of action on paragraph 40 and (on pages 31 and 32) on Annex C, pending further study by the Secretary of State of the foreign policy implications of expanding non-strategic trade with the Soviet-dominated nations for primarily political purposes, and a report on the results of such study for Council consideration at the June 19 meeting.

c. Agreed that the provisions of the special limited-distribution Appendix to NSC 5608/1, as amended at this meeting, should apply to Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Rumania.

*Note:* NSC 5811, as adopted by the action in b above, subsequently approved by the President; circulated as NSC 5811/1 for implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government; and referred to the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency designated by the President.

The action in b-(3) above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of State for appropriate action.

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<sup>5</sup> Paragraphs a-c and the Note that follows constitute NSC Action No. 1914. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

In accordance with the action in c above, as approved by the President, the special limited-distribution Appendix to NSC 5608/1, as amended at this meeting, subsequently issued as a special limited-distribution Appendix to NSC 5811/1.

In accordance with NSC Action No. 1896–c, the special limited-distribution Appendix to NSC 5608/1, without the amendment adopted at this meeting, issued as a special limited-distribution Appendix to NSC 5808/1 (Poland).

[Here follows agenda item 4.]

S. Everett Gleason

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## 6. National Security Council Report

NSC 5811/1

Washington, May 24, 1958.

### STATEMENT OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET-DOMINATED NATIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE

#### General Considerations

##### *Regional Considerations*

1. Soviet control over Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany,<sup>1</sup> Hungary and Rumania (referred to hereafter as the dominated nations)<sup>2</sup> is a basic cause of international friction and, therefore, a

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Source: National Archives and Records Administration, JCS Records, 092 (9–14–49) IN 15 RB. Secret. A title page, a table of contents, and a May 24 covering note by Lay are not printed. In the covering note, Lay noted that paragraph 40 of NSC 5811 and Annex C of that paper were being referred to the Secretary of State for additional study and would be reconsidered by the NSC at its meeting on June 19. See Document 8.

<sup>1</sup> While many of the considerations set forth in this paper with respect to the Soviet-dominated nations of Eastern Europe also apply to East Germany, there are a number of respects in which special considerations are applicable to East Germany, owing to the fact that the United States regards it as under Soviet military occupation and not as a separate “nation”. The specific problems of East Germany and Berlin are treated in the Supplements to NSC 5803. [Footnote in the source text. NSC 5803, “U.S. Policy Toward Germany,” February 7, 1958, is printed in vol. IX, Document 243.]

<sup>2</sup> U.S. Policy Toward Poland is treated separately in NSC 5808/1. [Footnote in the source text. NSC 5808/1, dated April 16, 1958, is in Part 2, Document 46.]

threat to peace and to the security of the United States and Western Europe. Soviet determination to maintain control of these nations is also an obstacle to an over-all European settlement and to a significant relaxation of international tensions, including a comprehensive disarmament agreement.

2. The principal impediment to Soviet efforts to impose an effective Communist political, economic and social system on the peoples of the dominated nations is the anti-Communist and anti-Russian attitude of the great majority of the population in each such nation. This attitude is intensified particularly by severe restriction of personal and religious freedom, a continued low standard of living, and strong nationalist sentiment among the people, especially the youth, and even among certain elements within the Communist parties. An additional impediment is the continued refusal of the West, particularly the United States and its principal NATO allies, to accept the permanence of Soviet-imposed regimes as compatible with the principles of human freedom and self-determination of nations.

3. Although Moscow has not incorporated the dominated nations into the state structure of the USSR as it did the Baltic Republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (see Annex B), Soviet physical control over these nations remains firm. The USSR maintains Soviet troops in much of the area (see Annex A)<sup>3</sup> and the Warsaw Pact formalized Soviet measures for coordination and control over the military forces of these nations. Political control is exerted both on a governmental level and through the Communist Party apparatus. Moscow also exercises control over the area's economy through such means as the Council of Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) and through bilateral trade and aid agreements. There are no known anti-regime groups capable of successfully organizing coordinated and sustained resistance to the Communist regimes in any of the dominated nations. The United States has not been prepared to resort to force or threat of force either to eliminate Soviet domination or to support revolutionary movements.

4. After Stalin's death in 1953, the stability of the Soviet political system in Eastern Europe was shaken by a succession of important developments, including: the elimination of a single source of ideological authority and the attacks on the cult of personality (denigration of Stalin); the re-establishment of Party primacy over the police; the growth of the concept of "different roads to socialism"; and, in the campaign to increase labor productivity, an increased use of economic incentives and a decreased reliance on arbitrary police and administrative

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<sup>3</sup> Annex A, a table on military forces in the Soviet-dominated nations of Eastern Europe and Poland, is not printed.

methods. These developments, which gave rise to policy and doctrinal conflicts within the Soviet leadership, were reflected in the decisions of the 20th Congress of the CPSU in 1956; and their impact spread throughout the Bloc. These developments added to growing uncertainty and confusion in the Communist parties and strengthened the hand of party dissidents seeking democratization and greater national independence. Party and popular unrest reached the greatest heights in Poland and Hungary, where in October 1956 Soviet authority was seriously challenged for the first time since the Yugoslav break in 1948.

5. Although surface stability has been restored and will probably be preserved over the next few years, an atmosphere of change and ferment more highly charged than under Stalin will probably continue for some time. The forces of unrest which underlay the troubles of 1956 are manifest in discontent over current policies within the Communist parties, particularly at middle and lower levels; in intellectual and student ferment; in popular hostility to the regimes, stimulated by party and intellectual dissidents; and in economic discontent, common to all who do not enjoy privileged rank.

6. Additional factors adversely affecting Soviet control in Eastern Europe are:

a. The effects of the Hungarian revolt, which was a serious moral and ideological defeat for the USSR, will persist for some time. The revolt engendered an enduring hatred of the USSR. Future Soviet actions will be tempered by this demonstration of the risk of relying on indigenous armed forces and of failing to gain popular support for Communism.

b. Poland's ability to maintain the limited independence gained in October 1956 will be a key factor affecting future political developments in Eastern Europe. A Polish-type coup in the area is not likely soon, but if the Polish experiment is successful and Moscow's acquiescence in it continues, nationalist elements in the dominated nations may be encouraged to seek greater autonomy.

c. Similarly, the continued existence of Yugoslavia as a Communist nation independent of Moscow will tend to encourage nationalist elements in the area to seek greater autonomy.

7. In these circumstances, present Soviet policy appears to be one of experimentation in an effort to find a middle course between the alternatives of (a) placing primary reliance on policies of force and repression, and (b) granting increasing autonomy and independence to the Eastern European regimes. The first alternative would deny to these regimes the possibility of broadening their base of popular support. The second alternative would stimulate popular pressures for further concessions and might become extremely difficult to limit or control.

8. In this situation, Moscow may experience a diminished ability to exercise unilateral authority in the Communist world. The necessity for maintaining at least outward unity in the Sino-Soviet Bloc and the

international Communist movement will, as in the past, lead the Soviets to compromise on some issues and at least to consider the opinions of other Communist parties on others. However, while the memories of Hungary and Poland remain fresh, the security of the USSR's position will remain uppermost in Soviet minds and measures to insure it will be given first priority. This does not mean that Soviet leaders consider a return to Stalinist policies as either necessary or desirable. Rather, so long as Soviet hegemony and basic Communist tenets are not called into question, the USSR will continue to place major reliance on indirect methods of control, preferring to let the dominated regimes deal with their own internal problems unless these get out of hand.

9. In attempting to cope through flexible and pragmatic means with the complex problem of maintaining its position in the area, the USSR probably will:

a. Attempt to obtain some form of East-West ratification of the status quo in Eastern Europe in the hope of undermining the dominated peoples' hope of future U.S. support and thus reducing the likelihood of deviation and unrest.

b. Continue to maintain sizeable armed forces in the area, particularly in East Germany, not only for military reasons but as an essential element in maintaining control over the dominated nations.

c. Be prepared to use armed force to thwart any serious threat to its control in the area, although Soviet reaction to a Gomulka-type coup would depend on the circumstances of the moment; i.e., whether the threat to the Soviet position was sufficient to outweigh the disadvantages of military intervention.

d. Continue to provide economic aid to the dominated nations in order to reduce unrest by improving living standards, to maintain the area's dependence on the USSR, and to counter the appeal of increased trade between Eastern Europe and the West.

e. Permit the dominated nations to enter into increasing but selectively-controlled contacts with the West, in an attempt, among other things, to influence world opinion, to obtain technological data and ease economic strains, and to appease the desires of the intelligentsia in the area for wider associations throughout the world.

10. The current ferment in Eastern Europe offers new opportunities, though still limited, to influence the dominated regimes through greater U.S. activity, both private and official, in such fields as tourist travel, cultural exchange and economic relations, including exchanges of technical and commercial visitors. Experience has shown that a U.S. policy designed to ostracize the dominated regimes has had the concurrent effect of inhibiting increased direct U.S. contacts with the people of the dominated nations. It is now apparent that, as a practical matter, substantial expansion of direct U.S. contacts with the peoples of these nations, and the development through such contacts of popular pressures upon the regimes for increased internal freedom and independence from Soviet control, cannot be achieved without more active U.S.



relationships with and through these governments. Such relationships would enable the United States to probe, within the party and governmental bureaucracy, for those individuals or groups who show signs of independent thought, nationalist aspirations, or willingness to use their influence to modify their nation's subservient relationship to the Soviet Union.

11. The West could have the greatest impact on Eastern Europe, and would run the greatest risk, through major East-West agreements which would fundamentally affect the European situation. The very fact of negotiations on any such issues as mutual troop withdrawals, German reunification, or the status quo in Europe, would have some impact on Eastern Europe. To the extent that the West seemed to be confirming Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe, morale among the peoples and potential party deviants would tend to be depressed. On the other hand, negotiations which appeared to offer hopes of a Soviet troop withdrawal, particularly if coupled with convincing guarantees against their return, would have an opposite effect. An East-West agreement on German reunification which was interpreted in Eastern Europe as an abandonment by the USSR of East Germany would almost certainly have major repercussions throughout the area. Unless countered by positive and vigorous Soviet action, these repercussions—in the form of increasing dissidence, ferment, Party factionalism, riots and strikes—might lead to upheavals or radical policy shifts toward greater external or internal freedom in Eastern Europe, especially in Poland.

12. With the passage of years during which Soviet domination of the Eastern European nations has continued, émigré national committees have proved less productive. This situation has been aggravated by internal factional strife and lack of unified purpose. There is no evidence that émigré politicians have any significant following in their homelands or that in the foreseeable future they will be able to return there to assume a role of political leadership.

13. Flexible U.S. courses of action, involving inducements as well as probing actions and pressures, are required to exploit the Soviet dilemma and sensitivities in the dominated nations and to complicate the exercise of Soviet control over them. In order to take full advantage of existing opportunities in this area, U.S. courses of action toward the dominated nations must appropriately exploit their individual historical and cultural characteristics and the significant differences of their respective present situations.

#### *Albania*

14. Albania is unique among the dominated nations for its political, economic and cultural backwardness. Despite post-Stalin trends toward liberalization elsewhere in the Soviet Bloc, the Albanian regime

has shown few signs of deviating from the Stalinist pattern. Albania presents special problems to U.S. policy because it has traditionally been subject to rival claims and ambitions by Greece, Italy and Yugoslavia. The Albanian Communists have posed as the indispensable champions of Albanian independence and territorial integrity.

15. Albania has never been a nation of primary importance to the United States. Immediately after World War II, U.S.-Albanian discussions on the establishment of diplomatic relations broke down as a result of Albanian refusal to affirm the validity of pre-war treaties and agreements between Albania and the United States. There have been some indications recently that the Albanian regime may desire to establish diplomatic relations with the United States.

### *Bulgaria*

16. The Bulgarian regime, despite occasional top-level purges and discontent among intellectuals, appears relatively stable and able to maintain control of the nation. Communist efforts to make Bulgaria an industrial nation without the necessary resources base have produced serious economic problems. Large-scale unemployment has caused the Bulgarian regime to seek extensive economic aid from the Soviet Union and to adopt a new economic plan under which Bulgaria would specialize in light industry and truck-farming. The United States suspended diplomatic relations with Bulgaria in February 1950 after a series of harassments which culminated in Bulgarian action against the U.S. Minister as *persona non grata* on charges of subversion and espionage. Bulgarian leaders have several times indicated publicly and through diplomatic channels their desire for a resumption of relations.

### *Czechoslovakia*

17. Except for a brief period of ferment in the spring of 1956 following the disclosures at the 20th Party Congress in Moscow, Czechoslovakia has been a submissive satellite. The Czech people, although traditionally Western-oriented and anti-Communist, have remained largely apathetic under Soviet domination. Specific grievances are probably allayed to some extent by the Czech standard of living, which is appreciably higher now than it was during the Stalin era and is the highest in Eastern Europe. Anti-Soviet sentiment exists within the Party, and there are certainly some in the Party who favor greater independence; but the Party leadership, so far as can be determined, is steadfast in its adherence to the Moscow line. The regime has failed to eliminate the thorny minority problem. The Communist Party continues to have less influence in Slovakia than in Bohemia-Moravia, and the Slovak potential for active resistance is higher.

*Hungary*

18. The present Communist regime in Hungary, in consolidating its physical control of the nation, has followed a policy of terror and intimidation clearly intended to wipe out all resistance. Although the Hungarian people continue to despise this regime, a surface calm prevails and the normal pattern of life under Soviet Communism has resumed.

19. A certain degree of moderation has been evident in the economic policy of the Hungarian regime. Collectivization of agriculture remains the ultimate goal, but Kadar has asserted that this will be achieved by "Leninist" persuasion rather than "Stalinist" coercion. A degree of private enterprise among artisans and small tradesmen has been tolerated though not encouraged, and there has been an effort to keep the market reasonably well supplied with consumer goods. With the aid of extensive grants and loans from the Soviet Union and the other Communist nations, the Hungarian economy has recovered from the effects of the revolution more rapidly than had been anticipated, though grave economic problems remain.

20. The Hungarian regime has not granted any appreciable internal political concessions in order to improve its international standing. It has, however, made continuing efforts to overcome its isolation by other means. It has been energetic in negotiating trade agreements with the West, has shown interest in cultural exchanges, and appears to be prepared to permit a degree of contact between Hungarians and the West. The regime has continued publicly to condemn the excesses of Rakosi even while following a basically repressive policy. For public consumption, at least, it has pictured itself as determined to steer a "middle" course between the extremes of Nagy-ism and Rakosi-ism.

21. Because Hungary has become an important psychological factor in the world-wide struggle of the free nations against expansionist Soviet Communism, U.S. policy must maintain a delicate balance; it must seek to encourage the same evolutionary developments as in the other nations of Eastern Europe, without compromising the symbol which Hungary has become. More restraint will be required in dealing directly with regime officials than in certain other nations of the area, and the timing of U.S. moves will be of great importance.

*Rumania*

22. The physical hold of the Communist regime on Rumania remains firm. Such personnel changes as have occurred in the Rumanian Communist Government and Party since the Polish and Hungarian events appear to have been connected with internal Party differences, and have not been caused by overt public pressures for change.

23. One of the distinguishing marks of Rumanian Communist rule is an unwillingness to deviate too far from a moderate position in

response to sudden changes of attitude in Moscow. The Rumanian Communists have consistently failed to attack Tito with the extreme fervor of some of the other Communist Parties while, on the other hand, they have never gone as far in the direction of liberalization as did the Hungarians prior to the 1956 uprising. Attempts both to pursue standard Communist goals and to allay the economic causes of popular discontent, have caused considerable economic strain.

24. Although unwilling to grant substantial political concessions to the population, the Rumanian leadership during the past year has sought an easing of relations and increased contacts with the United States in order to secure benefits in trade and technology and give substance to its claims of legitimacy and permanence in the eyes of its own people. The Rumanian regime is therefore exceptionally receptive to increased contacts with the West.

#### Objectives

25. *Short-range*: Promotion of the peaceful evolution of the dominated nations toward national independence and internal freedom, even though these nations may continue for some time under the close political and military control of the Soviet Union.

26. Reduction of the contribution of the dominated nations to Soviet strength, and weakening of the monolithic front and internal cohesiveness of the Soviet Bloc.

27. *Long-range*: Fulfillment of the right of the peoples in the dominated nations to enjoy representative governments resting upon the consent of the governed, exercising full national independence, and participating as peaceful members of the Free World community.

#### Regional Policy Guidance<sup>4</sup>

##### *Political and Diplomatic*

28. In order to maintain and develop popular pressures on the present regimes and accelerate evolution toward independence from Soviet control:

a. Expand direct contacts with the dominated peoples to exploit their anti-Communist and anti-Russian attitudes.

b. As a means toward accomplishing a above, establish more active relations with the existing regimes, without creating the impression that the basic U.S. attitude toward those regimes has changed or will change in the absence of some significant modification in their character.

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<sup>4</sup>NSC policies on the Soviet Bloc (including NSC 5726/1, "U.S. Civil Aviation Policy Toward the Sino-Soviet Bloc", December 9, 1957, and NSC 5607, "East-West Exchanges", June 29, 1956) will continue to apply except as modified by this policy or by exceptions in the policies concerned. [Footnote in the source text. See footnote 1, Document 5.]

c. Encourage the dominated peoples to seek their goals gradually.  
[5 lines of source text not declassified]

[1 paragraph (5 lines of source text) not declassified]

30. To impair and weaken Soviet domination, exploit divisive forces by appropriate measures including:

a. Fostering nationalist pride and aspirations among the people and within the regime leadership.

b. [2 lines of source text not declassified]

c. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

d. Publicizing evidences of unequal treatment by the USSR.

e. Encouraging comparisons of the lot of the dominated nations with that of the USSR and with each other.

31. Emphasize on appropriate occasions the U.S. view that the people of each nation should be independent and free to choose their form of government; and avoid any action or statement which could reasonably be represented in the dominated nations as advocacy of a return to the authoritarian systems of government which existed prior to or during World War II.

32. Reiterate on appropriate occasions in public statements that the United States does not look upon the dominated nations as potential military allies and supports their right to independence, not to encircle the Soviet Union with hostile forces, but so that they may take their rightful place as equal members in a peaceful European community of nations.

33. Continue in official public statements:

a. To point out the evils and defects of the Soviet-Communist system.

b. To reiterate U.S. refusal to accept the domination of these nations by the USSR as an acceptable status quo.

c. To stress evolutionary change.

34. a. Encourage the regimes in the dominated nations to take independent initiatives in foreign relations and domestic affairs.

b. Take advantage of every appropriate opportunity to demonstrate to these regimes how their national interest may be served by independent actions looking toward more normal relations with the West.

35. Be prepared to discuss and negotiate issues between the United States and the individual regimes. When complete solutions are not possible, be prepared to accept partial solutions which do not impair U.S. objectives.

36. Endeavor to bring the dominated nations increasingly into the activities of international technical and social organizations in order to contribute to their greater independence from Soviet influence and be to U.S. advantage.

37. Continue as appropriate to support selected émigrés or émigré groups capable of making a positive contribution to U.S. objectives, while gradually phasing out support of less useful émigré organizations.

38. Exploit the benefits received by Yugoslavia and Poland from their relations with the United States as an inducement to the regimes of the dominated nations to seek closer relations with the West.

39. Continue application of "U.S. Policy on Defectors, Escapees and Refugees from Communist Areas" (NSC 5706/2)<sup>5</sup> to nationals of the dominated nations, except that:

a. [5 lines of source text not declassified]

b. Avoid publicity concerning defectors, escapees and refugees unless such publicity would produce a net advantage to the United States.

#### *Economic*

40.<sup>6</sup>

41. Encourage voluntary relief agencies to undertake appropriate operations in the dominated nations if opportunities arise. Be prepared to offer food and other relief assistance, through voluntary agencies or otherwise, to the peoples of the dominated countries when emergency situations occur.

42. Seek the alleviation or settlement of long-standing economic issues (nationalization claims, surplus property and other financial obligations) between the dominated nations and the United States.

#### *Information and Exchange Activities*

43. a. In dominated nations with which the United States maintains diplomatic relations, conduct as many information and cultural activities as are considered desirable and feasible.

b. Continue radio broadcasting activities to all the dominated nations.

c. Encourage private information and cultural activities in the dominated nations, recognizing that private media can engage in activities which would promote U.S. objectives but for which the United States would not wish to accept responsibility.

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<sup>5</sup> See footnote 1, Document 5.

<sup>6</sup> By NSC Action No. 1914-b-(3), action on paragraph 40 and Annex C of NSC 5811 was deferred, pending further study by the Secretary of State of the foreign policy implications of expanding non-strategic trade with the Soviet-dominated nations for primarily political purposes, and a report on the results of such study for Council consideration at the June 19 meeting. [Footnote in the source text. In a June 23 memorandum to the NSC, Lay quoted the text of paragraph 40 as agreed to at the June 19 meeting (see Document 8) and subsequently approved by the President and requested that it be inserted in the text of NSC 5811/1. (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5811 Series)]

d. Be prepared when necessary to permit information and cultural activities in the United States by the diplomatic missions of the dominated nations on an approximately reciprocal basis.

44. To promote expanded contacts and to revive and revitalize traditional bonds between the dominated nations and the United States, encourage, as circumstances in a particular nation may warrant:

a. Contacts between U.S. individuals and individuals in dominated nations in religious, cultural, technical, business, and social fields.

b. Contacts between U.S. business and other organizations and organizations in the dominated nations in comparable fields, including the exchange of delegations of technical experts.

c. Participation, where feasible and appropriate, in international trade fairs, film festivals, etc., organized by the dominated nations, inviting on a basis of general reciprocity their participation in such activities in the United States.

d. An expanding exchange program of students and teachers and increasing numbers of leaders' and specialists' visits.

e. Tourism, on an approximately reciprocal basis, particularly visits between relatives and friends.

#### *Internal Security*

45. Entries, visits, and activities in the United States of individuals or groups from Soviet-dominated nations shall take place under ICIS-approved internal security safeguards.

#### *Policies of Other Free World Nations*

46. Encourage Western European nations to adopt policies toward the dominated nations parallel to those of the United States, and in particular to concert together through established institutions such as NATO, OEEC and the Council of Europe for the purposes of (a) taking all practicable steps to extend Western European influence among the dominated nations of Eastern Europe, and (b) exploiting the concept of an integrated, prosperous and stable European community.

47. Seek to counter Soviet efforts to use the dominated nations for penetration of the less-developed nations.

#### Special Country Policy Guidance

##### *Albania*

48. Promote increased Western contacts with Albania and encourage other Western nations to establish diplomatic missions there. When appropriate, recognize and establish U.S. diplomatic relations with Albania, subject to certain conditions, including a guarantee of correct treatment of U.S. diplomatic personnel and satisfactory settlement of the question of the validity of pre-war treaties between Albania and the United States.

49. After U.S. recognition of Albania, permit travel of U.S. tourists in Albania.

*Bulgaria*

50. Seek through negotiations to re-establish diplomatic relations with Bulgaria in the near future, subject to appropriate conditions and suitable guarantees.

51. After U.S. resumption of relations with Bulgaria, permit travel of U.S. tourists in Bulgaria.

*Czechoslovakia*

52. Expand contacts and reporting opportunities in Slovakia. Be prepared to permit reciprocal re-establishment of Czech consulates in the United States on a one-for-one basis, despite the additional opportunity thus afforded for Communist espionage and subversion in the United States.

53. Seek to stimulate nationalist feeling by such means as references in U.S. propaganda to the Ruthenian territory annexed by the USSR in 1945 and frequent references to the Soviet Union's exploitation of Czechoslovakia's uranium resources.

54. Emphasize in U.S. propaganda past and present contributions of Czechoslovak intellectuals and scientists to demonstrate that the common interests and basic orientation of these groups is toward the Free World rather than toward the USSR.

*Hungary*

55. Continue to keep the Hungarian issue alive through diplomatic action, within the United Nations, through official and non-official U.S. media, and through the encouragement of public reactions and protests in Free World nations against repressive developments in Hungary.

56. Work toward the satisfactory integration of Hungarian refugees in the Free World through support of legislation aimed at regularizing the status of the parolees in this country and through continuing by the Escapee Program to assist in the solution of settlement problems in other nations.

57. In order to permit a substantial number of Americans to visit in Hungary, continue currently to interpret travel restrictions liberally, and for the next tourist season consider removing entirely the passport validation requirement.

58. Encourage cultural and scientific exchanges with Hungary on a case-by-case basis. Do not permit at this time the sending of large prestige attractions to the United States, the exchange of official Government delegations, or visits to the United States by leading members of the Hungarian regime.



*Rumania*

59. Seek to exploit fully the opportunities which exist at present in Rumania because of the receptive attitude of the regime, particularly in economic and cultural relations.

**Annex B<sup>7</sup>**

ESTONIA, LATVIA, AND LITHUANIA

*General Considerations*

1. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were created as independent nations after World War I. In the summer of 1940 they lost their independence by forcible incorporation into the USSR as Soviet Socialist Republics.

2. The United States condemned Soviet aggression in the Baltic States in 1940, and has consistently refused to recognize the incorporation of these States into the USSR. This policy has been publicized on appropriate occasions since 1940.

3. The Baltic States have no governments-in-exile. However, the United States has continued to recognize the diplomatic representatives of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania appointed to the United States by the last free governments of these countries. Their diplomatic establishments in the United States and in a number of foreign capitals are maintained with money released by the United States from the blocked accounts of the free governments of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

4. There are occasional indications that the populations of the Baltic States have not acquiesced passively in the establishment of the Soviet order. It is clear that a strong anti-Soviet sentiment still prevails, although its expression is necessarily circumscribed.

*Special Policy Guidance*

5. Maintain the policy of non-recognition of the incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union and avoid any steps which could reasonably be construed as de jure or de facto recognition. Continue to recognize the diplomatic missions established here by the last free governments of the Baltic States.

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<sup>7</sup> Secret.

6. Preserve limited unofficial contacts between the peoples of the Baltic States and the West by such means as the travel of U.S. citizens to the Baltic States as tourists or for other personal reasons, or the travel of private groups such as American church representatives. Examine proposals for other non-official exchanges on a case-by-case basis, in the light of their possible effect on the policy of non-recognition as well as any possible net advantage to U.S. interests.

7. a. Encourage the circulation of American informational media in the Baltic States, and continue broadcasting services to the Baltic peoples. Design U.S. broadcasts to maintain an interest on the part of the Baltic peoples in the United States and the West generally, and in existing conditions and current developments in the Free World.

b. Avoid making public statements which could reasonably be interpreted as inciting the Baltic peoples to open revolt or indicating that this country is prepared to resort to force to eliminate Soviet domination.

c. Discourage the use of U.S. Government broadcast facilities to convey messages of exiled leaders, but permit the diplomatic representatives of the Baltic States in the United States to send messages on anniversaries and other special occasions, provided that the content accords with U.S. policy.

d. On appropriate occasions, publicly reiterate the U.S. policy of non-recognition of the incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union, to demonstrate that the United States remains conscious of the plight of the Baltic peoples and still does not condone aggression against the smaller nations.

## **Appendix<sup>8</sup>**

*[1 page of source text not declassified]*

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<sup>8</sup>Top Secret.

## 7. Editorial Note

On June 16, Radio Moscow announced that former Hungarian Premier Imre Nagy, General Pal Maleter, and other Hungarian officials had been executed for their actions during the Hungarian rebellion of October–November 1956.

The next day, the Department of State issued a statement condemning the executions and asserting that “the Soviet Union and the Soviet-imposed regime in Hungary have once more violated every principle of decency and must stand in judgment before the conscience of mankind.” At his press conference that day, Secretary of State Dulles also strongly condemned the executions. For texts of the Department of State statement and the transcript of Dulles’ press conference, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 7, 1958, pages 6–10.

At 4:15 p.m. on June 17, Secretary Dulles spoke on the telephone with Senator William F. Knowland about the executions. According to a memorandum of their conversation, the following exchange took place:

“The Sec returned the call and K said there was quite a considerable discussion and it was bipartisan in nature today on the Hungarian situation—he was wondering what steps we could take in the UN or otherwise to show some disapproval of this kind of situation. They agreed it is shocking. K said he does not see how they can do business with the Kadar regime. The Sec said we have not recognized it—K said they are sitting in at the UN. The Sec said he hit it pretty hard at press conf but that is not the same as doing something at the UN. We are not treating it in any casual way and are thinking of other things. K said the Sec might have someone in State look over the *Record* today.” (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations)

The execution of Imre Nagy and Pal Maleter was the subject of discussion at the 104th meeting of the Operation Coordinating Board’s Special Committee on Soviet and Related Problems held at the Department of State at 3 p.m. on June 17. Members of the committee participating in the meeting were Barrett M. Reed and William S. Peterson of the U.S. Information Agency, a representative of the Central Intelligence Agency, Manning H. Williams of the Operations Coordinating Board’s Staff, and Henry P. Leverich, Director of the Department of State’s Office of Eastern European Affairs, who served as Acting Chairman. Williams’ memorandum of the discussion at the meeting reads as follows:

“Mr. Leverich said this announcement, coming at the same time as the publication in Moscow of Khrushchev’s letter to the President of June 11, was a slap in the face to the United States. The question now is, in what degree and how do we react? One way, of course, is through our information media, which would give the affair heavy and continued play. Another way would be through the UN.

“One proposal being considered by the State Department was the reconvening of the Special Committee on Hungary to produce an

addendum to their report demanding details of the trial, etc., and automatically putting the Hungarian item on the General Assembly agenda for September. A special session of the UN is being considered, but it is not likely that the United States will call for one at this time. It was agreed that the Special Committee Report on Hungary was a tremendous reservoir of material available for immediate use.

"Mr. Leverich also outlined the following steps that were being taken:

"a. Reference to the executions was being written into the draft replies to Khrushchev's letter of June 11 and his letter on trade.

"b. Belgrade was being asked to supply new material on Nagy's arrest and execution from Yugoslav sources; it was expected that the Yugoslavs would now open up with new revelations.

"c. A statement for the President to make at the opening of his press conference Wednesday was being drafted.

"d. Ambassador Lodge had prepared a statement which had been cleared in the Department and would be coming out soon.

"e. Suggestions from other agencies would be welcomed; also suggestions as to how EE or EUR could help other agencies.

"Mr. Cox remarked that Khrushchev's remarks on East Europe in the June 11 letter left him wide open on the executions. Mr. Cox said the executions should be referred to as 'Soviet murders,' since there was no indication of even the semblance of a free trial. The label of barbaric Stalinism should be pinned on them.

"Mr. Cox said it was also interesting that the Communists had shifted from blaming 'fascist Horthyites' for the Hungarian uprising and now were admitting that revisionism and national communism were at the center of the trouble. They had made it a matter of Communists versus Communists. Now they were putting the blame on Nagy, the Yugoslavs, and Malenkov.

"Mr. Reed asked about the Secretary's reference to this as another step in a reversion toward the brutal terrorist methods which prevailed under Stalin. He felt this should be kept in context, and that no major reappraisal of Moscow policy should be read into it. Mr. Leverich agreed.

"Mr. Reed also cautioned against seeming to use the executions as an excuse for a negative answer on trade. That was a question which should be handled on its own merits. Mr. Leverich felt that the executions could be referred to in the trade reply, but agreed that cautious handling was required in this instance.

"Mr. Cox suggested that for Asian audiences it would be useful to play up the fact that the Chinese Communists had taken the lead in attacking Nagy and more recently Tito. There was also convincing evidence that what the Yugoslavs have said recently about the Chinese being prepared to lose 300 million persons in a war because there would still be 300 million left was not something the Yugoslavs had dreamed up.

"Mr. McFadden pointed out that the Soviet violation of asylum was a very important issue in many parts of the world, especially Latin America. Mr. Stefan felt that Soviet double-dealing in arresting Maleter after inviting him to negotiate was worth stressing to all areas. Mr.

Peterson suggested that the International Commission of Jurists make a statement on the lack of a fair trial for those executed.” (Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, USSR & Satellites—General—1953–58)

For text of President Eisenhower’s comments on June 18 regarding the executions, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1958*, page 480. For text of Khrushchev’s letter of June 11 to Eisenhower, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 21, 1958, pages 96–101.

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## 8. Memorandum of Discussion at the 369th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, June 19, 1958.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda item 1.]

2. *U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet-Dominated Nations in Eastern Europe* (NSC 5811; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated May 13 and 21, 1958; NSC Action No. 1914; NSC 5811/1)<sup>1</sup>

In briefing the Council General Cutler reminded the members that the paragraph in this policy (NSC 5811/1), relating to a proposal to normalize U.S. trade in non-strategic goods with the Soviet-dominated nations, had not been adopted by the Council but had been referred for further consideration by the President to the Secretary of State together with Annex C of the paper which spelled out in greater detail proposals by the Department of Commerce for stimulating American businessmen to engage in non-strategic trade with the Soviet satellites. The Secretary of State was now ready to inform the Council of the results of his further review of Paragraph 40 and Annex C. In the course of General Cutler’s briefing, the President took his place at the table as did Mr. Walter Williams representing the Secretary of Commerce. (A copy of General Cutler’s briefing note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another is attached to this memorandum).<sup>2</sup>

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on June 20.

<sup>1</sup> Regarding NSC 5811 and the May 13 and 21 memoranda, see footnote 1, Document 5. Regarding NSC Action No. 1914, see footnote 5, Document 5. NSC 5811/1 is printed as Document 6.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

Secretary Dulles informed the Council that he was not at present in a position which would permit him to favor the proposal of the Department of Commerce to launch a considerable campaign designed to interest U.S. businessmen in trade with the satellite nations. In recent weeks the situation of the Soviet satellites had become so ambiguous that it now seemed wise to keep our trade program with them very closely under Washington policy control so that we could turn on or off the flow of trade with the satellites as circumstances dictated. We would not be in a position to regulate such trade if we had told our businessmen in advance to go ahead and engage in extensive trade with the Soviet-dominated states.

In explanation of his change of view, Secretary Dulles pointed out the likelihood that the Soviet Union was in the midst of reverting to the old Stalinist policy of harsh control of the Soviet satellites. This development was illustrated by the recent execution of the leaders of the Hungarian revolt. In connection with the latter event, said Secretary Dulles, the Yugoslav Ambassador had commented to him only yesterday that these executions in Budapest did not constitute the epilogue to the Hungarian revolt, but rather the prologue to something else.<sup>3</sup> Thus, if the satellites are going to be even more completely dominated by the Soviet Union, this would not be an appropriate time for the U.S. to inaugurate and endorse a policy of increasing the volume of trade between the U.S. and the satellites.

Secretary Dulles went on to observe that this matter of U.S. trade with the satellites was related to Khrushchev's proposal for greatly increased trade between the U.S. and the Soviet Union itself. In view of the present mood of the Soviet rulers, Secretary Dulles thought it would be idle to imagine that the U.S. could have one kind of policy with respect to U.S. trade with the U.S.S.R. and another kind of policy for our trade with the Soviet satellites. Accordingly, Secretary Dulles suggested that it would be best for the Council to defer any decision on this matter until the present trend of the Kremlin's policies towards the satellites was more fully developed and clarified. At the moment the Kremlin is taking a much tougher line and if we were to countenance a great surge of U.S. trade with the satellites, it might look as though this was our response to the Kremlin's tougher line.

In the light of the Secretary's views, General Cutler suggested the Council action on Paragraph 40 and Annex C be deferred until perhaps next September when the Council could again look at the problem.

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<sup>3</sup> A memorandum of the conversation between Dulles and the Yugoslav Ambassador is in Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

The President then stated with great emphasis that he had certain views on this subject which he wished to make known at this time. He insisted that we should do all we can to avoid Congressional strait jackets on trade with these satellite states. After all, the Executive Branch had very competent advice on this subject from several different agencies—the CFEP, the State Department, and the Department of Commerce. What we required was flexibility to study and to act on the problem of trade with the satellites on a case by case basis. The Soviets were in a position of being able to change their trade policies towards the satellites or anyone else by simply turning on or off the spigot. We in the U.S. certainly needed sufficient flexibility to permit us to maneuver. The existence of this necessary flexibility was jeopardized by the attitude of Congress in wishing to legislate against any trade with any Communist state.

In response to the views suggested by the Secretary of State and the President, General Cutler suggested that the language in the old Paragraph 40 be amended so that our encouragement of trade with the Soviet satellites should be implemented on a case by case basis and any increase to have the approval of the Secretary of State. The President said he agreed with the wisdom of General Cutler's proposal but insisted that we could not encourage increased trade on even a case by case basis if the Congress insisted on legislation which forbade all trade with a Communist state.

General Cutler reminded the President that the kind of trade referred to in Paragraph 40 was trade in non-strategic goods and that there was no legislation which forbade the U.S. to engage in such trade even with Communist or Communist-dominated nations. Secretary Williams expressed agreement with General Cutler's statement.

The President again complained about the attitude of Congress toward U.S. trade with Communist nations. He cited as an example the difficulties we encountered when the Danes proposed to acquire much-needed coal from Poland in return for building tankers for Poland. However, Secretary Dulles pointed out that in the instance the President cited, we had run afoul of the Battle Act<sup>4</sup> which applied to Denmark. The present paragraph, he again pointed out, dealt only with trade in non-strategic goods. He added that he did not object to General Cutler's proposals for amending the old Paragraph 40 but would also change one other phrase in that paragraph. The President then agreed to this proposed Council action. General Cutler made one further suggestion to

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<sup>4</sup> Reference is to the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (P.L. 213), sponsored by Congressman Laurie C. Battle of Alabama and enacted October 26, 1951. It provided for the suspension of U.S. economic aid to nations supplying strategic materials to Communist countries. For text, see 65 Stat. 644.

put the bee on the CFEP rather than on the Secretary of State for approval of any increase in the volume of U.S. trade with any of the Soviet-dominated states.

General Cutler then suggested that the Council hear the views of the Department of Commerce on this subject. Secretary Williams said he would be happy to describe the views that had been current in his department on this subject. He said that he grasped the delicacy of the problem as it had been described by Secretary Dulles but Commerce had felt that if it were to be our policy to go ahead and normalize U.S. trade with the Soviet-dominated nations, some agency in the government had to engineer and promote such trade by providing guidance and the like to American businessmen. Commerce was the obvious agency to handle trade relations, subject only to a policy veto by the Secretary of State on political grounds. Apparently, however, these views of the Commerce Department were no longer applicable if, as now seems to be the case, the Administration did not wish to generate any considerable increase in U.S. trade with the Soviet-dominated nations generally. Secretary Dulles confirmed Secretary Williams' understanding of his changed position.

At this point the President changed the subject by turning to Mr. Allen Dulles and asking him if he knew when Premier Nagy had actually been executed. Mr. Dulles replied that to the best of their knowledge, it had happened quite recently. The President said that it had been his guess that Nagy had been executed five or six months ago. Mr. Dulles replied that his people in CIA had also thought of this possibility but that the best information at present was that the decision to try Nagy had been made at the recent Moscow Conference.<sup>5</sup> The trial had actually begun at the end of May and lasted a fortnight. The President commented that if this were indeed the case, it made the affair look all the more ominous.

*The National Security Council:*<sup>6</sup>

a. Discussed an oral report by the Secretary of State on the foreign policy implications of expanding non-strategic trade with the Soviet-dominated nations for primarily political purposes (paragraph 40 and Annex C of NSC 5811), prepared pursuant to NSC Action No. 1914-b-(3).

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<sup>5</sup> Presumably a reference to the meetings in Moscow of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), May 20-23, and the Warsaw Pact's Consultative Committee, May 24.

<sup>6</sup> Paragraphs a-b and the Note that follows constitute NSC Action No. 1927. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)



b. Adopted, for insertion in NSC 5811/1, the following revision of paragraph 40 of NSC 5811 (while agreeing that Annex C of NSC 5811 should not be adopted for inclusion in NSC 5811/1);

“40. On a case-by-case basis as approved by the Council on Foreign Economic Policy, seek to establish between the United States and the dominated nations with which the United States has diplomatic relations, more normal economic relations thereby facilitating a gradual expansion of trade—consistent with ‘Basic National Security Policy’ (NSC 5810/1)<sup>7</sup> and ‘U.S Economic Defense Policy’ (NSC 5704/3)\*—when it would be a means of projecting influence and lessening the dominated nations’ economic ties with and dependence on the Soviet Union.

“\*NSC Action No. 1865–c directed the review of this policy; cf. NSC 5810/1, paragraph 37.”

*Note:* The revision of paragraph 40 in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently circulated for insertion in all copies of NSC 5811/1.

### 3. *Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security*

As his first topic, the Director of Central Intelligence proceeded further to describe the trials and executions of the leaders of the Hungarian revolt. It seemed likely that Nagy had been hanged in Budapest on the night of June 16. General Maleter had been tried before a military tribunal. The civilian victims had been tried in a civilian court. Mr. Allen Dulles suggested that the trials were primarily designed as a move against Tito but one of the results had been a considerable weakening of Kadar’s position.

Secretary Dulles carefully inquired as to the reliability of the statement of the Director of Central Intelligence that the trials and the executions of the Hungarian leaders had been prescribed by Moscow. Mr. Allen Dulles repeated his view that while the information on this subject came from a journalist in a position to know and not from any official statement by the Soviet or Hungarian Governments, he nevertheless believed that it was the truth. Moreover, Mr. Allen Dulles believed that we should play up very hard the fact that the executions were ordered by Moscow. Secretary Dulles commented that the reaction in Europe to these executions had been very strong.

Mr. Allen Dulles then went on to sketch in the background of these trials and what the victims had done during the course of the Hungarian Revolution and afterwards. He pointed out that the Yugoslavs had received written assurance of respect for the asylum they had provided Nagy and others in the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest.

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<sup>7</sup> NSC 5810/1, “Basic National Security Policy,” May 5, 1958, is scheduled for publication in volume III.

Mr. Allen Dulles reiterated his conviction that the signal for the executions had almost certainly come from Moscow. The Soviets must certainly have weighed the unfavorable world reaction which these executions would stimulate. Mr. Allen Dulles believed that the executions were intended as warnings first to Tito and thereafter to Gomulka. He thought it likely that in the sequel Kadar would drop out of the political picture quite soon. The reaction of the Hungarian people had been one of stunned and shocked silence.

Secretary Dulles said that he understood that Mr. Allen Dulles was now engaged in a study with State Department officials and CIA people to try to grasp the meaning of all these concurrent developments in the Soviet Bloc.<sup>8</sup> Mr. Allen Dulles replied in the affirmative.

The Director of Central Intelligence next pointed out that there had apparently been called a sudden meeting in Moscow of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. This meeting was believed still to be going on and Mr. Dulles thought it of great significance. None of the most eminent Soviet leaders had appeared in public since June 12 for the reason that they were probably getting ready for this meeting.

Mr. Dulles speculated that the Central Committee meeting might deal with the new Seven Year Plan which was supposed to be unveiled before next July 1. The Central Committee meeting might also debate Khrushchev's programs for the reorganization of Soviet industry and of Soviet agriculture. Khrushchev probably realizes that he is somewhat under fire with respect to both of these programs. There have been accusations that in supporting these programs Khrushchev is not behaving as an orthodox Marxist-Leninist. The Committee might also discuss problems in connection with the summit meeting and the implications of the executions in Hungary. There was even the possibility of a further purge such as that which had occurred last June.<sup>9</sup> Mr. Dulles thought we would know more in a few days and again pointed out that CIA officials were studying with officials from State and other departments the meaning and significance of all these inter-related developments in the Soviet Bloc. He felt that it was of special importance to watch what happened in Poland.

Secretary Dulles commented that a great many important things seemed to be going on concurrently in the Soviet Bloc. Taken together they seemed to point to a change in Soviet policy. On the other hand it was not easy to understand why the Soviets were proposing significant

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<sup>8</sup> Presumably a reference to SNIE 11-8-58, Document 48.

<sup>9</sup> Reference is to the announcement on July 3, 1957, by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union of the dismissal from the Presidium the previous month of the "anti-party" group, which included Malenkov and Molotov among others.

policy changes because normally one does not change policies unless things were actually going badly.

[Here follow the remainder of the briefing and the remaining agenda items.]

S. Everett Gleason

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9. **Draft Paper Prepared by N. Spencer Barnes of the Policy Planning Staff**

Washington, June 27, 1958.

LONG-TERM TRENDS IN THE  
SOVIET EUROPEAN SATELLITES

*Introduction:*

A recent discussion<sup>1</sup> of long-term trends in the Soviet satellites of Eastern Europe produced substantial agreement on the nature and direction of expected trends, but differences as to their strength.

*Area of Agreement:*

It was generally agreed that in the foreseeable future—probably at least over the next ten years—no internal developments were likely to change the basic characteristics of the present political, economic and social structures in the Soviet-dominated states of Eastern Europe. Such changes were not anticipated, therefore, unless there should be profound evolutionary developments in the Soviet Union or comprehensive settlements of major international problems. Neither of the latter were within the scope of this discussion.

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Source: Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548, Europe (East). Confidential. According to a handwritten note on the source text, this subject was discussed at the Policy Planning Staff meetings on May 25 and July 7. Very brief summaries of the discussion at these meetings are *ibid.*, Meetings. This draft paper and another draft paper by Barnes, dated November 7, 1957, entitled "Considerations of US Policy Toward the Communist States of Eastern Europe Exclusive of the USSR," were combined and condensed by Barnes to produce a revised paper printed as Document 11.

<sup>1</sup> Presumably a reference to the discussion at the Policy Planning Staff meeting of May 25.

It was further agreed that there would be a tendency toward consolidation and strengthening of both regimes and system. This would mean in practice, some ten years or more from today and other things being equal, that:

a) Satellite regimes would still be totalitarian, one-party Communist governments; self-perpetuating without benefit of free elections; accepting the hegemony of Moscow to the extent of taking instructions on basic domestic and foreign policy, though exercising a certain leeway in minor decisions and implementation; protected from external aggression or popular revolt first by the presence or threat of Soviet armed force and secondly by internal police controls; with a centralized, planned, government-controlled and largely government-owned economy. In sum, the situation would be very similar in kind to that at present.

b) It would also mean that this type of system would be more firmly entrenched than it is today, in that the masses would accept it more readily, there would be less popular antagonism toward it and less underlying resistance to it.

In support of this forecast, it was believed (assuming the Soviet state and Soviet motivations unchanged) that the following major influences would act in the direction indicated:

a) In the absence of internal disorders—which would in fact be inhibited by Soviet armed force and readiness to use it—the simple passage of time would condition peoples to perpetuation of the regime, and favor their judgment to it.

b) The economic situation would gradually, if slowly, improve and so reduce dissatisfaction.

c) The Soviets would gradually accord more freedom of action to the local regimes, thus making Soviet control less conspicuous even if ultimately determinant, which would reduce popular dissatisfaction stemming from nationalism.

d) Continuous indoctrination would finally have some effect, particularly on youth who would have no first-hand experience with other ways of life.

*Disagreement on Emphasis:*

The existence of such trends was generally agreed on, as well as their tendency to strengthen regimes and reduce popular dissatisfaction. There was, however, a noticeable difference of opinion as to how pronounced the effects would be. One view was that the cumulative impact would be very considerable. No one would go quite so far as to predict that, even after ten or twenty years, in the hypothetical event that Soviet pressures were eliminated, the local Communist regimes would be firmly enough entrenched to maintain themselves and their system through indigenous controls alone. But an impression was given that this condition might be approached; and that the ability of regimes to resist popular pressures directed toward change would be much stronger than at present.

The other view was that not one of the influences listed, or even all combined, would be much more than marginal; and that, even after ten or more years of enforced stability, if the support of Soviet armed force should for one reason or another be withdrawn, popular pressures would force basic changes on the regimes. It was felt that such changes would come just as surely, and not very much more slowly than if the hypothetical situation were to develop in 1958.

Arguments supporting this view rested largely on the following considerations:

a) It is very doubtful whether popular disapproval of a Communist system—whether expressed with violence as in Hungary or sublimated as in Rumania—has appreciably abated in these countries during the last ten years. It is hard to gauge, but it may even have increased in some areas.

b) Continuous indoctrination has not had great effect. Evidence suggests that the youth, a prime target of indoctrination, have nowhere become unquestioning advocates of the system. If anything—as everywhere and at all times—the most skeptical attitudes appear to be found among youth.

c) Superficial apathy should not be confused with willing acceptance. A people are quite capable of retaining a smoldering dislike for a system or a regime not of their own choice, even for generations as history has shown, passive but ready to burst into flame under favorable conditions.

d) While the economic situation may gradually improve, the overall standard of living will rise so slowly as to create no great reservoir of good will for the regimes. Even in the Soviet Union, after 40 years of impressive industrial progress, the standard of living of the masses is not so very much higher; and its present level is a matter for considerable complaint—perhaps as much in the 1950's as in the 1920's.

e) Despite all Soviet efforts to camouflage their hegemony, the majority of the people in the satellites will remain quite aware that they are living under an alien system; and will be under no illusions as to what foreign power forced the system on them, and what foreign power is committed to maintaining it.

f) Despite continuation of present censorship and other techniques tending to isolate the peoples from conditions abroad, considerable awareness of realities in the non-Communist world will probably continue to seep through the curtain. Presumably living conditions in Western Europe and America will actually be better for a long time, barring holocaust; and relative but not complete isolation may even be counterproductive to the satellite regimes—other fields sometimes look more green when seen dimly from afar.

g) Human nature being what it is, and the essence of the Soviet Communist system what it is—political and economic monopoly in the hands of a few—it seems probable that a basic antagonism between the two will persist for decades if not indefinitely. Two of the strongest human urges are: (a) to acquire the comforts and conveniences of life, according to taste of the individual; and (b) to think for himself, and express his conclusions in word and action as he chooses within reasonably liberal limits. In the foreseeable future it seems improbable that a

centralized, planned economy can achieve the flexibility to compete with the consumer's choice of an economic democracy in the first respect; and improbable that a single-party government espousing a frozen ideology can compete with political democracy in the second. In consequence, it seems very doubtful that the masses in any European satellite, though they may become somewhat more tolerant and apathetic with time, will become supporters of communism by preference in the foreseeable future.

If the above argumentation be accepted, it could lead to the following prediction:

Other things being equal, within the next two or three decades an evolution within the Soviet Union which will substantially modify the system in the direction of political and economic freedoms is more likely than an evolution in the European satellites which will result in popular preference for the Communist system as it now exists.

*Implications for U.S. Policy:*

The first and most obvious policy implication to flow from the above consideration is: If change *away* from Communism in the Soviet satellites is desirable; and if it is unlikely—in fact if an opposite trend seems probable—except in consequence of major evolutionary changes in the USSR or comprehensive settlements of international problems; then the best opportunities for promoting the end in view must lie in efforts to further such an evolutionary process and to achieve such settlements. Results are more likely to be attained indirectly than directly.

At the same time, and particularly if the second line of analysis outlined earlier be correct, a constructive, long-term policy pointed directly at the satellites should also be possible. If the underlying spirit of resistance is likely to persist for years with only a gradual drop in potential, other things being equal, then it is reasonable to suppose that a policy of promoting continuing contacts of all kinds, of encouraging a flow of information, a reasonable amount of trade, tourism and normal contacts on the official level, should tend to give some additional support to this potential. Admittedly the effect will probably not be great. But assuming that the inner fabric of resistance potential is strong and durable, the addition of even a marginal degree of Western influence might act to preserve the spirit of dissatisfaction with foreign-imposed Communism for very many years. The ultimate outcome would still be uncertain. In a fast-changing world, however, ultimate is a long time. The unexpected may always be anticipated, and to keep the resistance potential alive should be a sound aim in itself, even when it is not clear in precisely what way this potential may finally be translated into action.

On the other hand, while the most soundly conceived and implemented policy may have positive but quite limited and contingent effect in promoting policy aims, an unsound policy could have more

pronounced adverse effects. It seems to be admitted that at the least a gradual process of consolidation and strengthening of Communist regimes in the satellites is probable. Should Western and U.S. policy emphasize antagonism and aversion, minimize contacts of all kinds, treat the captive nations and their representatives alike as pariahs, as participating causes rather than victims of Soviet imperialism, it might accelerate the process considerably. Complete discouragement, no hope for and little acquaintance with an alternative, could then bring a more fundamental change involving popular acceptance of and adjustment to the system within a good deal shorter period than might otherwise have been the case.

In sum, reasonable conclusions appear to be the following: It is probable that the spirit of resistance to a Soviet-Communist system among the peoples in the satellites of Eastern Europe, due mainly to its innate strength but with some assistance from U.S. and Western policies, will remain alive and a strong potential force for many years—quite probably until global developments have produced significant changes of one kind or another in international relationships. The type of U.S. and Western policies which could give such assistance would appear to be substantially those now accepted in the Department. They require ad hoc skill and judgment in implementation and careful differentiation not only between peoples and regimes but between elements within regimes, almost to the point of schizophrenia. But they are not impossible of implementation.

On the other hand, it is conceivable in any event and quite possible if U.S. and Western policies change in the direction of cutting off and “writing off” the satellites, that the process of regime consolidation and strengthening will accelerate. This could result in a general, passive but more or less permanent popular acceptance of the Communist system in Eastern Europe in the nearer future, and perhaps before other influences have weakened the Soviet drive for expansion.

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10. Report Prepared by the Operations Coordinating Board's  
Special Committee on Soviet and Related Problems

Washington, July 23, 1958.

REPORT ON EXPLOITATION OF HUNGARIAN SITUATION

The OCB, at its meeting of July 9, 1958,<sup>1</sup> requested the Special Committee on Soviet and Related Problems to prepare a special report outlining possible U.S. actions which might be considered in connection with the recent execution of former Prime Minister Imre Nagy and former Defense Minister Pal Maleter, and also containing a summary of actions which have been taken or are in process with respect to this matter.

In response to this request, the Committee reports as follows:

1. The news of the execution of Nagy and Maleter has been widely disseminated through normal world news channels; the spontaneous official as well as public reaction and comment throughout the world (except, of course, in Communist-controlled countries) has been sharp and extensive, and in line with U.S. objectives.

2. The U.S. Information Agency has assisted in disseminating the news further, and in stimulating reaction to it and comment on it, to the extent possible without conveying the impression that the United States is conducting a propaganda campaign to exploit these developments purely for its own ends. A survey of USIA treatment of the Nagy and Maleter executions is attached.<sup>2</sup>

3. The U.S. position on the executions, clearly putting the responsibility on the Soviet Union, was stated on June 17 by Secretary Dulles and on June 18 by President Eisenhower. A strongly-worded State Department press release was also issued on June 17.<sup>3</sup>

4. The State Department, through the U.S. mission at the UN, encouraged and supported the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary in the preparation of its special report on the executions, which was released to the press July 16.<sup>4</sup> (The Department, through the U.S. delega-

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Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, USSR & Satellites—General—1953–58. Confidential. Distributed to the OCB Assistants under cover of a July 23 memorandum from OCB Executive Officer Staats, in which Staats said that he hoped the report could be discussed at the Board Assistants' meeting on July 25. There is no indication that the report was discussed by the Board Assistants or brought to the attention of the OCB in any way.

<sup>1</sup> The approved minutes of this meeting are *ibid.*: Lot 62 D 430, Minutes—VI.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 7.

<sup>4</sup> U.N. doc. A/3849.



tion at the UN, also suggested to the Special Committee that it receive as witnesses various prominent Hungarians now in exile to whom reference was made in the Hungarian regime's communiqué announcing the executions; however, the Special Committee did not act upon this suggestion.) A State Department press release was issued on July 17<sup>5</sup> calling attention to, and summarizing, the special report. The Department's statement welcomed and endorsed the report, and added: "The United States, on its part, will continue to exert every possible effort to keep the plight of the Hungarian people before the conscience of the world and will continue to give full support to all measures within the United Nations that may contribute to the alleviation of the suffering and repression which the Hungarian people now endure."

5. The USIA has given wide distribution to the text of the special report by Wireless Bulletin and VOA broadcasts. The USIA is also investigating the possibility of the UN having the document printed for public sale; if this is done, it will reach a much larger audience, particularly through libraries and other institutions.

6. An effort has been made to ascertain whether the Yugoslavs do have, as rumored, new and significant material relating to Nagy's role in the uprising, his kidnaping, and his execution, including records Nagy may have compiled while taking refuge in the Yugoslav embassy and minutes of the Khrushchev–Tito meeting in Bucharest.<sup>6</sup> So far, the Yugoslavs have not divulged what material they have, and have not indicated any intention of making it public at this time. The Yugoslav Government did, however, furnish to the UN Special Committee the text of its protest to the Hungarian regime on the Nagy execution.<sup>7</sup>

7. The State Department, on the basis of material received from the legation in Budapest, has called attention to the rumors of the trial and execution of Julia Rajk<sup>8</sup> and to the many retrials now going on. Material furnished by the State Department on the retrials was used by Alsing Anderson, of Denmark, chairman of the Special Committee on Hungary, in a press conference, and the *New York Times* carried a long story on this on July 12 and an editorial on July 13.

8. Exploitation of the special report has been under discussion in NATO, and the State Department is keeping its delegation informed of developments in relation to the Hungarian problem.

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<sup>5</sup>For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 18, 1958, p. 295.

<sup>6</sup>Nagy was given refuge in the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest November 4–22, 1956. Reference to the Khrushchev–Tito talks in Bucharest is unclear; presumably it should be the Khrushchev–Tito talks on the island of Brioni November 2–3, 1956.

<sup>7</sup>The Yugoslav note of protest was delivered by the Yugoslav Ambassador in Budapest on June 24 following his return that day from consultations in Belgrade.

<sup>8</sup>Widow of former Interior and Foreign Minister Laszlo Rajk.

9. The State Department is exploring the possibility of raising the Hungarian issue in the UN General Assembly, but no decision has yet been reached on how or when it might best be done.

10. The question of challenging and rejecting the credentials of the Hungarian representatives at the next regular session of the General Assembly or at any special session on the Near East has also been discussed, but no decision has been reached as yet.

11. The Special Committee on Soviet and Related Problems is of the opinion that the executions of Nagy and Maleter, insofar as topical treatment is concerned, have already been given close to maximum exploitation, particularly in view of subsequent events in the Near East,<sup>9</sup> which have overshadowed all other developments in the world press. Maximum use should be made of the UN Committee's special report, and a continuing effort should be made to obtain information and make it available to the UN and the public about current developments in Hungary. The Committee has no additional immediate actions to suggest at this time for further exploitation of the executions.

12. The Committee feels, however, that special attention should be given at this time to the broader problem of keeping alive the story of the Hungarian people's heroic bid for freedom, and the Soviet Union's brutal and continued suppression of Hungarian independence. This is a long-range project requiring coordinated planning by the agencies concerned, and should be the subject of a separate report which will require additional time for preparation. (Long-range treatment of the Nagy story would be part of such a study. One suggestion, for example, has been a book on "revisionism" which would draw heavily on Nagy's role in Hungary.)

13. The Committee is of the unanimous opinion that aid to the Hungarian refugee orchestra is a timely and valuable project in any long-range program to keep the story of the Hungarian revolution alive in the best sense of the word.

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<sup>9</sup> Reference is to the crisis in Lebanon and Jordan.

**11. Paper Prepared by N. Spencer Barnes of the Policy Planning Staff**

Washington, August 26, 1958.

**POLICY TOWARD THE COMMUNIST STATES OF EASTERN EUROPE, EXCLUSIVE OF THE USSR**

*I. Background Factors*

The eight states in Eastern Europe bounded roughly by the USSR and the Black Sea on the east, Baltic Sea on the north, Federal Republic of Germany, Austria, Italy and the Adriatic Sea on the west, and Greece and Turkey on the south, have the following points in common:

They are Communist states, with highly centralized governments which exercise effective control over the peoples and over the political, economic and cultural lives of these nations, and which in turn are rigidly controlled by a single or a dominant political "party" through various mechanisms including a strong security police. It is certain in most, and probable in all of these countries, that the majority of people are opposed to the Communist system and to the regimes in the sense that free elections, at least after a period of free pre-election activity and in the absence of exterior threats, would result in non-Communist governments.

All of these states either are or were under effective control of the Kremlin as a result of war and post-war developments. The Kremlin's power to dictate was eliminated in Yugoslavia through successful defection in 1948, threatened and reasserted by force in Hungary in 1956, circumscribed in Poland over the last two years but has remained substantially intact elsewhere. The most important instrument of Soviet control throughout the area has been armed force, present or immediately available. Other instruments of control have been local party and governmental machinery and security police forces, directed from Moscow though of greater or less reliability; economic pressures exerted

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Source: Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548, Europe (East). Secret. Regarding the origin of this paper, see the source note, Document 9. Several short notes were appended to this paper, one of which indicated that at the Policy Planning Staff meeting on August 25 "it was considered that a series of brief, cleared staff papers should be prepared on major fields of policy for wider distribution than hitherto. Two papers on the Soviet-dominated countries of Eastern Europe were used as examples, and Mr. Barnes will undertake to revise and condense these as the first of such a series." The other notes, initialed by Barnes, indicate that Barnes had sent the revised paper to Elbert G. Mathews, while Policy Planning Staff Director Gerard Smith was absent, and Mathews had said that a further meeting might be held to discuss giving the paper wider distribution when "more active preoccupations quieted down." No indication has been found, however, that such a meeting took place or that this paper was circulated outside the Policy Planning Staff.

through partial integration of neighboring economies with that of the USSR; monopoly of publicity media, etc. In every country the masses strongly oppose Soviet domination and welcome any practical opportunity to assert national independence. In addition, it seems probable that most of the leaders comprising the local governments do or would favor greater national independence if this could be combined with maintaining their own positions of power and influence.

None of the states in question possess the human, natural or technological resources to play a major political, military or economic role in Europe. Geographically and strategically they all lie in a belt between the Soviet Union on the east and the NATO power complex to the west and so will tend, individually or en bloc, to gravitate one way or the other. This gives very considerable politico-strategic importance to the area, participated in to a greater or lesser degree by each of its units.

## *II. Policy Considerations*

US policy in this area will naturally be directed toward the long-term goal of independent, national states plus an East Germany reunited in freedom with the Federal Republic; all with governments freely chosen and supported by the peoples themselves; all satisfied or at least reconciled to living at peace with their neighbors within accepted national boundaries; all free from domination by the Soviet Union or any other foreign power; and all "Western oriented," not in a geographic sense but in the sense of sharing in the traditions of and attitudes toward those principles of human freedom under law and national self-determination within a cooperating comity of nations which may be considered the natural heritage of the free world. In practice, however, and in the near future this goal seems hardly feasible nor, it is believed, is it essential. Communism as an ideology, or way of life to command men's loyalties and fervor, is much less dangerous now. It has proven efficient in producing steel and sputniks but highly inefficient in satisfying man's natural craving for such amenities as consumer goods and free expression. In consequence, red Imperialism rather than ideological Communism is the enemy in being and the first obstacle to progress toward US policy goals; and reduction, neutralization and atomization of the Kremlin's power potential appear as prime goals at present. At the same time, since national policy has ruled out the application of military force to free the captive peoples of Eastern Europe, temporary acceptance of the situation becomes automatic and a shorter term policy designed to foster evolutionary change through non-military means is required.

It would seem wise to concentrate this interim policy on assisting the natural drive toward independence and on reducing the threat of Soviet action directed against such independence. It seems clear that in

practice and in the foreseeable future the first aim can best be promoted under local Communist governments. Non-Communist regimes are not likely to come to power before, or coincident with, independence; and efforts to bring them to power are almost certain to result in retrogression to occupation status as happened in Hungary. On the other hand, national Communism, self-determination under Communism, will not only be in line with the first aspirations of peoples but will be attractive to local leaders at such times as the latter see prospects for successful assertion of national rights. In addition, independence on these terms is much less likely to precipitate Soviet intervention.

The corollary to this proposition is that US policy should, in these countries, for an interim period only, avoid active opposition to Communism per se and should attempt to discourage premature action aimed at overthrowing Communist regimes. There is little danger of overdoing this. The US Government will certainly continue to express, through media, official and diplomatic channels, its conviction that the popular welfare in any country is best served through political democracy, individual liberties and wide scope for private enterprise. But this may be coupled with continuing emphasis on the fact that the US and its Western allies have no intention of exerting pressure on any Communist government in a truly independent state. The chances for disillusionment with the West, such as followed the Hungarian Revolution, would be reduced by this posture. It would encourage elements in present governments who may be inclined toward a gradual swing out of the Soviet orbit. And furthermore, it would continuously undercut Soviet propaganda that US policy promotes the restoration of monopoly capitalism or feudalism.

The above posture is close to that adopted toward Yugoslavia after its declaration of independence, and quite similar to our present attitude toward Poland. But it would seem no less important in its application to other states where the first steps toward independence have not yet been taken. As to how the attitude can best be carried across, the normal use of media, official statements, diplomatic channels, economic negotiations, the UN forum, cultural and informational exchanges and contacts of all types, are well enough known to require no elucidation. It would also seem well to avoid expressing antagonism toward local Communist leaders as individuals—except the most hopelessly compromised Soviet agents—on the theory that any one of them may unexpectedly be tempted to loosen ties with Moscow. At the same time it would appear reasonable to express a clear distinction in action between the more independent nations, as Yugoslavia and Poland, and the out-and-out satellites—in other words a policy of graduating aid and comfort in accordance with degree of independence rather than with degree of similarity in political and social system.

In reducing the threat of Soviet intervention, the general approach should be three-pronged. First, the employment of every effort to stimulate a revulsion of world-wide public opinion against the Soviet use of force against neighboring states. A constant harping on the discrepancy between Soviet word and deed, using the Hungarian example to the limit in showing the insincerity of Soviet advocacy of non-interference, would seem desirable. The examples of Yugoslavia and Poland can be invaluable vis-à-vis the still captive states.

The second prong would be to maintain a US and NATO military potential sufficiently powerful to carry conviction that an alternative exists to Soviet domination. The effectiveness of this posture may be questioned, in view of demonstrated unwillingness to risk all-out war in protecting Hungary's independence. But it is still a real factor, one which may have tipped the balance in Yugoslavia's 1948 breakaway and which could have analogous effect in the future. It goes without saying, of course, that its efficacy will be largely proportional to actual power relationships, and would vanish under demonstrable Soviet superiority; and that not only military potential counts, but availability and readiness to use it if necessary.

The third prong would consist in continued and serious efforts to reach agreements on political issues such as German reunification, troop withdrawals, disarmament and European security, of a kind which would pose both material and psychological blocks to the maintenance or introduction of Soviet troops in neighboring countries. Such agreements would greatly facilitate US policy implementation in Eastern Europe as well as in other areas. The unlikelihood of quick success should be no reason to abandon attempts.

Other important elements in policy toward the area in question would include:

(a) The encouragement of rapprochement and closer ties—diplomatic, cultural, informational, etc.—between the US and Western European nations on one hand and the Communist bloc on the other, on the theory that the natural flow of influence will be from West to East and closer contacts will promote this flow.

(b) Efforts to reorient trade patterns of the smaller Communist countries toward greater dependence on Western trading partners. Limited economic and technical aid would also seem appropriate, but only to countries already enjoying an appreciable measure of independence.

**12. Memorandum From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Cumming) to Secretary of State Dulles**

Washington, November 6, 1958.

SUBJECT

*Intelligence Note: Implications of the "New Rapacki Plan" for the US and Western Europe*

1. A new version of the Rapacki Plan was announced in Warsaw on November 4. (Tab A)<sup>1</sup> The new version envisages two stages. In the first stage Poland, Czechoslovakia, East and West Germany, would ban the production of nuclear weapons and undertake not to build installations for them; simultaneously the US and the USSR would agree not to give nuclear weapons to armies that did not have them.

In the second stage, nuclear installations of the Soviet Union and the West in the area would be banned but only after agreement had been reached on nuclear and on conventional disarmament in the zone.

2. If accepted by the West, the plan would have profound military and political implications. Militarily it would deny to NATO the ability to carry out defensive plans, which depend on utilizing West German forces armed with advanced weapons as a counter balance to Soviet superiority in conventional weapons. While there is no evidence that the USSR intends to arm its satellites with thermonuclear weapons, the denial of these weapons to German forces would constitute an overwhelming military concession to the USSR without reciprocal benefits.

3. Politically, the plan implies that West Germany would eventually be excluded from Western councils and defense planning since it would not be able to fulfill its military obligations. Moreover, as the plan seems to enhance Soviet control over Germany, the Adenauer government is bound to reject it. It is obvious that Adenauer is fully aware of the political, psychological and military dangers involved.

4. The new Rapacki Plan is designed as a major propaganda weapon. It was issued over the heads of existing governments to the "peoples of Europe". However, it can develop into an effective diplomatic tool of the USSR and become a potent weapon for producing additional strains in NATO. It is significant that the plan was released after Rapacki's visit to Norway, where sympathy has existed for some of his ideas.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 640.0012/11-658. Confidential.

<sup>1</sup> Not found attached. A detailed analysis of the new version of the Rapacki Plan is in Intelligence Report No. 7891, "The Rapacki Plan—A Polish Road to the West," December 5, 1958, prepared by the Office of Intelligence Research and Analysis. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, OSS-INR Reports)

5. The propaganda campaign outside Germany will stress that all the legitimate defense needs of the US, UK and France have been provided for, since these powers would keep their thermonuclear weapons in the "atom free zone" until an agreement had been reached on conventional armament in this zone. Only the Germans, the "troublemakers of Europe", the "State that produced Hitler" would be denied these weapons.

6. The Soviet propaganda will also seek to impress the West Germans that the plan is the only one which keeps open the door to reunification and that Germany is not "disarmed" since she would have a conventional force for legitimate defense needs. If the Germans restrict themselves to conventional weapons in their own territory, the Soviets will insist, they should not hesitate to ask the Western allies to remove their thermonuclear weapons from German soil in return for similar Soviet action. Therefore, withdrawal of all alien forces from German soil and the "atomic neutralization" of a "reunited" Germany will be represented as the most rational policy for the Germans to adopt.

7. This propaganda line coincides with the position of an increasingly vocal wing of the SPD. The SPD (and the FDP) will probably hail the new plan as a further sign of the need for negotiations and demand anew assurances from the Adenauer government that it will not rearm Germany with thermonuclear weapons until a new effort has been made to discuss the German question with the Soviets. Should the government not accept these demands, the opposition might launch another major campaign to refer the weapons issue to the people by plebiscite, referendum or some other scheme. The present thermonuclear fallout in the Scandinavian countries and the current deadlock of test suspension talks in Geneva will also provide additional pretexts to the SPD to reopen the "Struggle Against Atomic Death" campaign and to link this campaign with the demand for a high level conference to consider the Rapacki Plan, as well as general disarmament and the reunification of Germany.

8. The East German regime will unconditionally accept the new Rapacki Plan and use it as the basis for a campaign to protect Germany against thermonuclear annihilation and to assure progress towards reunification. If the Adenauer government proves to be intransigent, its policy will be denounced as a return to "fascism" and the East Germans will attempt to develop a "people's movement" throughout Germany to consider means to prevent the return of "Nazism" to Germany. The combination of these factors may confront Adenauer with as serious a coalition of hostile internal and external forces as he has ever had to face.

A similar memorandum has been addressed to The Under Secretary.



**13. Despatch From the Legation in Hungary to the Department of State**

No. 302

Budapest, November 20, 1958.

REF

Legation Despatch No. 249, October 23, 1958<sup>1</sup>

SUBJECT

The Future of Cardinal Mindszenty

The Legation has, from time to time, sought to comply with the requirement contained in the Department's telegram No. 241 of November 16, 1956,<sup>2</sup> which concluded: "Legation's recommendations invited regarding future of Mindszenty". Recent developments, connected with the Conclave at the Vatican for the election of Pope John XXIII, would seem to make it desirable that the situation of Cardinal Mindszenty again be reviewed and the Legation's recommendations be brought up to date. The present despatch is designed to meet this requirement and this purpose.

*Regime Officially Informed*

The Hungarian Government has now been "officially" advised of the presence of Cardinal Mindszenty in this Legation. No such advice was made to the Government until the presentation of the Legation's note No. 136 on Saturday, October 18, 1958.<sup>3</sup> On two previous occasions, officials of the Foreign Ministry had made oblique reference to our harboring a Hungarian national, but the name of Cardinal Mindszenty was not mentioned and there was no discussion of the subject. High officials of the Government had, however, repeatedly attacked the United States Government and the Legation (in public speeches, in statements to the press, and in reply to direct questions from visiting Americans) for giving "asylum" to a "Hungarian criminal".

Despite the "after-the-event" knowledge of certain "observers" that the Hungarian Government was bound to refuse the request for a

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 864.413/11-2058. Secret; Limited Distribution.

<sup>1</sup> Despatch 249 contained the recommendations of the Legation regarding the possibility of Cardinal Mindszenty leaving the Legation to travel to Rome for the election of a new Pope following the death of Pius XII on October 9. (*Ibid.*, 864.413/10-2358) On November 4 Cardinal Roncalli, who took the name John XXIII, was chosen his successor.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 241 to Budapest contained the Department of State's instructions regarding the Legation's continuing refuge and protection of the Cardinal. (*Ibid.*, 864.413/11-1656)

<sup>3</sup> Text of this note is quoted in telegram 146 from Budapest, October 24. (*Ibid.*, 864.413/10-2458)

safe conduct,<sup>4</sup> there was no way of knowing before the matter was officially broached to the Hungarian Government what its reply would be. The Cardinal (Legation telegram 119, October 9)<sup>5</sup> thought that the choice for the regime would be a difficult one, but was inclined to believe that the authorities would like to have him outside the country. The Legation (Legation telegram 124, October 10)<sup>6</sup> felt that it was "not entirely clear" what decision the regime might reach, but pointed out that recent statements by Government officials had indicated a "general hardening" on the subject of the Cardinal's possible departure from Hungary. The Vatican (Rome telegram 1172, October 13)<sup>7</sup> appears to have had information that the regime would not be opposed to the Cardinal's release, provided he would not return to Hungary. While the Department was not favorable to initiative being taken by the United States in the matter (Department's telegram 1304, October 10, to Rome),<sup>8</sup> the Legation was subsequently instructed (Department's telegram No. 97, October 14, No. 1356 to Rome)<sup>9</sup> to negotiate with the Hungarian Government, on behalf of the College of Cardinals, for a safe conduct, thus seeming to indicate a belief on the part of the Department that there existed some possibility of procuring such safe conduct.

There is, of course, nothing final about a decision taken by a communist government; it is perfectly capable of reversing that decision without any new developments having intervened to give even a semblance of justification for such reversal. However, the refusal of the safe conduct for attendance of the Cardinal at the Conclave was so categorical, and was given at a time and under circumstances which might have been expected to give perhaps the maximum of justification for the Hungarian regime to grant it, that the Legation sees little or no likelihood of any change of attitude in the ascertainable future. Only the agreement of the United States Government to exchange Chiefs of Mission with the regime and, thereby, to accord the regime full interna-

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<sup>4</sup> London *Times*, October 24, 1958, from Vienna: "The Hungarian refusal to grant Cardinal Mindszenty a safe conduct to attend the Conclave of the Sacred College of Cardinals to take part in the election of the Pope, did not surprise observers here, who predicted all along that the Hungarians will describe the American request asking for permission for Cardinal Mindszenty to leave Hungary as 'gross interference in the internal affairs' of their country.

"Hungarian refugees here said today that the timing of the American request coinciding with the eve of the second anniversary of the Hungarian revolt was instrumental for the uncompromising refusal." [Footnote in the source text.]

<sup>5</sup> Telegram 119 described the Legation's informing the Cardinal of the Pope's death. (Department of State, Central Files, 864.413/10-958)

<sup>6</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 864.413/10-1058)

<sup>7</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 864.413/10-1358)

<sup>8</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 864.413/10-958)

<sup>9</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 864.413/10-1358)

tional status would seem to be a likely “bait” to bring about a radical change in its attitude and policy toward this question. The regime’s note of October 22<sup>10</sup> would seem to make clear that the Hungarian authorities (and, presumably, the Kremlin) are satisfied that the presence of the Cardinal in the Legation is a matter of greater embarrassment and concern to the United States Government than to the Government of Hungary.

No such situation can, however, remain permanently static and it is at least within the realm of the possible that, sooner or later, a move will have to be made by one of the interested parties—the Holy See, the United States Government, the Hungarian Government, or the Cardinal—for a solution of this problem. Since, as became abundantly clear during these recent negotiations, the attitude of the Cardinal could be of crucial importance in effecting any solution, the Legation would like to set forth for the consideration of the Department its thoughts on this aspect of the matter, in the hope that means and methods might be found to influence the Cardinal’s thinking, in advance of the event, along the lines desired by the Department and/or by the Holy See.

*The Cardinal and The Vatican*

The Legation appreciates and understands the undesirability (as set forth in the enclosure to Mr. Robert McKisson’s letter of March 11, 1957, to Mr. Spencer Barnes)<sup>11</sup> of setting up a regular channel of communication between the Cardinal and the Vatican. However, those of us in close, daily contact with the Cardinal have long been aware of his confused thinking on the “deep spiritual problems” which his present situation creates and have felt that some means should, if at all possible, be found to give the Holy See a just appreciation of his mental conflicts and to give him the benefit, *on this question only*, of guidance and assistance from his spiritual leaders. (My letters of August 21, 1957, and January 16, 1958 to Mr. James Sutterlin.)<sup>12</sup> The almost complete lack of understanding between the Cardinal and the Holy See became clearly manifest during the recent negotiations and it was only with the greatest of reluctance that the Cardinal finally gave his assent to departure if a “satisfactory” guarantee could be obtained from the Hungarian Government. (The Cardinal, it should be remembered, has no faith in any promises from the present Hungarian regime and fully anticipated the worst, if an attempt had been made to take him to Austria under any such “safe conduct”.) This reluctant assent was accorded only for the

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<sup>10</sup> Text of the Hungarian Foreign Office’s note of October 22 was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 143 from Budapest, October 22. (*Ibid.*, 864.413/10–2258)

<sup>11</sup> Not found.

<sup>12</sup> Copies of both these letters are in Department of State, Hungary Desk Files: Lot 75 D 45, Refuge for Cardinal Mindszenty.

particular circumstances then existing—i.e., attendance at the Conclave—and would, one may safely assume, not carry over to another set of circumstances. It would, therefore, become necessary to “negotiate” once again with the Cardinal and, since the time element might be of extreme brevity, the Legation believes that logic and our own best interests require that the Cardinal be attuned to the thinking and wishes of the Vatican before another crisis arises.

The Legation has sensed for some time, and most particularly during the recent “crisis”, that the Vatican itself has not been of one mind with respect to the policy which it should follow in the matter of the Cardinal’s remaining in or departing from Hungary. Earlier reports on this subject had been conflicting. The direct, official word through the Office of the Apostolic Delegate in Washington was to the effect that he should remain. When, however, a seemingly advantageous opportunity to have the Cardinal leave the Legation and the country presented itself, the Vatican became intent upon his availing himself of such opportunity and considerable pressure was put upon him by the Holy See to follow this course. One is left to speculate whether it was not, perhaps, the late Pope who was inclined to inaction earlier, with the result that those in favor of another policy were in a position to act only after Pius XII had left the scene. The Legation is not in a position to know the correct answer to this question, since it is not aware of the full circumstances (and under whose initiative) the Cardinal chose to seek refuge at the American Legation in the early hours of November 4, 1956. If, however, the late Pope did, during his lifetime, make the final policy determination on matters relating to the Cardinal’s future, the question now becomes once again subject to review because of the presence of a new Pope, whose ideas and conceptions may be different from those of his predecessor. The Legation feels that the Cardinal cannot possibly become *au fait* of Pope John’s thinking on this matter unless some exchange of ideas (again, *on this question only*) is permitted and arranged.

The Legation has no illusions about the difficulties inherent in trying to bring the Cardinal into line with the policy of the Holy See, if the Holy See’s ideas and concepts should prove to be different from his own. The Cardinal is imbued with the very special position and powers exercised for many centuries by the Prince Primate of Hungary. The Holy See, however, seems to appreciate (as the Cardinal does not) that the “social revolution” which has occurred in Hungary since World War II has seriously altered (if, indeed, it has not brought to an end) that “special position”. (The unusual position and powers of the Prince Primate are fully set forth in the chapter on “The Church” in C.A. Macartney’s “Hungary”, published in 1934.)

The Vatican was not, however, always of this view. As late as April of last year (Embassy Rome's telegram No. 4174, April 16, 1957),<sup>13</sup> the Holy See was evincing the desire "to discuss the Cardinal's departure on quid-pro-quo basis with view to extract some concessions from Kadar's regime". While any such concept was unrealistic, even at that date, the Holy See has been in a position, during the intervening eighteen months, to understand the radical changes that have occurred and to alter its concepts and its policy accordingly. Cardinal Mindszenty has not been in such a position; isolated, as he is, from almost all Church developments and from spiritual contact with the Holy See, his views and concepts have fallen behind and out of line with those of his spiritual mentors. It is this lack of rapport—this failure to be "on the same wave length"—which the Legation feels must now be bridged, if we are not to be faced on still another occasion with the necessity of again undertaking difficult and touchy negotiations with the Cardinal under pressure of events which may permit even less time and facility for exchanges between Budapest, Rome, and Washington than existed during the recent "Conclave crisis".

There appears to be a very general (and perhaps not unnatural) assumption by people outside Hungary (one might almost say, outside this Legation) that the Cardinal would welcome any opportunity to exchange his present place of refuge for a place of safety and a position of Church activity outside this country. Articles in the Western press are almost uniformly written with this assumption in mind. Even the Vatican appears to have expected that the Cardinal would be ready and anxious to avail himself of a safe conduct, if such were arranged for him. The Legation's telegram No. 170 of November 19<sup>14</sup> was dispatched because it appeared that the Cardinal's firmly held ideas on this matter might not be fully understood in Washington and New York. The officers of the Legation dealing with the question of the Cardinal's future are so fully imbued with the reality of this situation that it seems important that it again be brought to the attention of those who will be determining United States policy on this question. The Legation feels that the Vatican should likewise be made aware of the problem and, in the light of the recent close contacts between the Embassy in Rome and the Vatican on the subject of the Cardinal, the way would now appear to be paved and the time to be opportune for effecting this objective.

### *Conclusions*

1. Now that the Hungarian Government and the Legation have exchanged communications with respect to the presence of the Cardinal in

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<sup>13</sup> Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 864.413/4-1657)

<sup>14</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 764.00/11-1958)

the Chancery, there seems every likelihood that the regime—choosing the opportunity which seems to suit its own purposes best—will mount a full-scale attack on our harboring of a “Hungarian criminal” and will make demands for his departure from the Legation. The limits to which the regime will be prepared to go in ensuring compliance with this demand will depend upon the extent of deterioration in American-Hungarian relations, both bilaterally and in the United Nations. Whether they will be prepared to go to the extent of breaking relations in order (among other objectives) to obtain custody of the Cardinal, is a question to which a firm answer cannot at present be given; but it would appear inevitable that they should play this situation to its utmost in their efforts to get the United States to accord recognition of “respectability” to the regime, by the sending of a Minister to this Legation and by the cessation of our efforts to have the regime comply with the Resolutions of the General Assembly.

2. The Legation assumes that the United States will continue to do everything possible to prevent the present Hungarian authorities from again obtaining control over the Cardinal, while at the same time seeking a satisfactory permanent settlement of the problem of his refuge. The possibility—if not the probability—of further negotiations on the question would, therefore, appear to be likely to arise in due course (provided, of course, that death or serious illness does not intervene to effect a different solution). The Legation is impressed with the desirability of reaching, in advance of the opening of such further negotiations, a firm and clear understanding among the Government of the United States, the Holy See, and the Cardinal that the Cardinal would leave his refuge in the Legation, if and when a suitable guarantee of his safety might be obtained. The Legation feels, on the basis of its knowledge of the Cardinal’s thinking and of the record during the recent negotiations, that such “clear understanding” cannot be reached with the Cardinal without an exchange of views between him and the Vatican.

**Garret G. Ackerson, Jr.**

*Chargé d’Affaires a.i.*

14. Memorandum of Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Herter) and President Eisenhower

Washington, December 6, 1958.

SUBJECT

Hungarian Resolution on the Matter of Credentials

After the NSC meeting this morning the President called me in to his office to say that he had had a talk with Cabot Lodge with respect to the Hungarian Resolution on the matter of credentials.

The President had apparently gotten the impression from Cabot that the State Department was rather lukewarm on raising the credentials issue, but that it was doing so because it thought the President felt strongly on the subject. Cabot had explained the great difficulties he thought he would have in getting the necessary two-thirds vote for such a resolution and expressed his fears as to the wisdom of raising the credentials issue.

The President just wanted to make it clear that, insofar as he was concerned, and regardless of C.D. Jackson's exhortations, the President would not for a moment consider asking the State Department to go through with such a resolution if we ourselves were lukewarm or had doubts about it.<sup>1</sup>

C.A.H.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.11–EI/12–658. Confidential.

<sup>1</sup> On December 12, the U.N. General Assembly's Credentials Committee adopted a U.S. motion by a vote of 6 to 1 (Soviet Union), with 2 abstentions, that "it take no decision regarding the credentials submitted on behalf of the representatives of Hungary." On December 13, the Assembly, by a vote of 79 to 1, with 1 abstention, approved the Committee's report. (Resolution 1346 (XIII))

On December 12, the General Assembly also adopted a joint draft resolution on Hungary by a vote of 54 to 10, with 15 abstentions. (Resolution 1312 (XIII)) The resolution expressed the Assembly's endorsement of the Special Committee's supplementary report of July 14, 1958, denounced the executions of Imre Nagy and others and the continuing repression in Hungary, and appointed Sir Leslie Munro of New Zealand to represent the United Nations to report to member states or the General Assembly on significant developments regarding the implementation of Assembly resolutions on Hungary.

## 15. Editorial Note

On January 7, 1959, the Operations Coordinating Board considered a report submitted by the Board Assistants on Soviet-Dominated Nations in Eastern Europe. This was essentially a six-month progress report on NSC 5811/1 (Document 6). The report consisted of a "Summary Evaluation" and a section on "Major Operating Problems and Difficulties Facing the United States." The general conclusions in the "Summary Evaluation" were the following:

"Despite Soviet efforts to enforce rigid ideological conformity and to tighten party discipline within the Soviet bloc, Soviet vulnerabilities in the area—including such factors as the degree of liberalization in Poland, the disruptive influence on the bloc of the Yugoslav ideological heresy and of Yugoslavia's position as an independent Communist state, and the failure of the Soviet Union and the bloc regimes to establish a broad base of popular support in the dominated countries—remain evident. The resulting atmosphere of change and ferment in the dominated nations, although recently subject to stronger corrective measures by the Communist authorities, continues to afford moderate opportunities over a long term for the United States to advance its policy objectives, including entering into more active relations with the dominated regimes in order to project U.S. influence in these countries more effectively. The refusal of the United States to recognize the domination of these nations by the USSR as an acceptable status quo and the U.S. view that the people of each nation should be independent and free to choose their form of government have helped to keep alive the hopes and aspirations of these peoples; however, this position has not brought about a modification of Soviet policy favorable to U.S. objectives. It is difficult to demonstrate or evaluate, on a short-run basis, the effects of continuing U.S. efforts to exploit Soviet bloc vulnerabilities; some evidence of success, however, is indicated in continued Soviet sensitivity to such activities." (Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, Soviet Satellites—II)

According to a memorandum of January 7 from Jeremiah J. O'Connor of the OCB Staff to Merchant, in which O'Connor quoted an excerpt from his informal and preliminary notes on the discussion at the OCB meeting that day, most of the discussion of the paper revolved around developments in East-West exchanges since NSC 5811/1 had been approved. Vice Chairman Karl G. Harr noted that reading the paper reflected a "great feeling of quietude" after the Hungarian revolt. Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles said that this was not the case in Czechoslovakia and Poland, and he thought Soviet efforts in those countries had probably "slowed up." Albert W. Sherer, Officer in Charge of Polish, Baltic, and Czechoslovak Affairs, commented that in Poland it was more a matter of some "accommodation" having been reached between Khrushchev and Gomulka. The Board approved the report for transmittal to the National Security Council. (*Ibid.*, USSR & Satellites—General—1959–60)



16. Despatch From the Legation in Hungary to the Department of State

No. 413

Budapest, January 23, 1959.

SUBJECT

Recommendations Regarding United States Policy Toward Present Hungarian Regime

In a recent survey of the course of relations between the United States and Hungary in 1958 (Legation despatch No. 383, January 7, 1959),<sup>1</sup> the Legation came to the conclusion that there had been a worsening of relations in this period. Virtually all the major and minor issues existing between the two countries at the beginning of the year remained unresolved at year's end. With the passage of time, world public interest in the Hungarian question has decreased; other and more pressing problems demand attention. As a result, the present regime in Hungary had been able to improve its international position. If it did not escape unscathed in the recent session of the United Nations General Assembly, it did succeed in avoiding drastic sanctions against it. Internally, also, the regime has further consolidated its position. The Hungarian people have not given up their dislike of the regime and its Soviet masters but, as prospects for outside support have receded, they have tended more and more to an attitude of helpless resignation and decreased resistance to regime pressure.

Under the circumstances, the Legation feels it imperative to re-examine the outstanding issues in United States-Hungarian relations with a view to determining what actions it should itself take or should recommend to the Department in order to improve the United States position in Hungary.

Before setting forth our observations, we should like to make certain general comments. In the first place, the Department will perceive that our present suggestions closely resemble those put forward when we made a similar survey in the early months of 1958 (Legation

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.64/1-2359. Secret. Drafted by Pratt and Ackerson.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 611.64/1-759)

despatches No. 471, March 5, and No. 489, March 12, 1958).<sup>2</sup> This is not surprising, in view of the similarity between the current situation and that prevailing last year. Our proposals last year bore little fruit; in fact, most of them were never translated into action because of political developments in Hungary. There is no guarantee that our initiatives will fare any better this year, but we are convinced that the deteriorating position of the United States in Hungary makes some action on our part more than ever necessary.

In the second place, the overall effect of our recommendations would be to put United States-Hungarian relations on a basis comparable to that existing for United States relations with other Communist bloc countries. We believe that movement toward such a "normalization" of relations with the present Hungarian regime is necessary not because we consider that the regime merits approval and respect, but because we believe some reconciliation with the regime is required before we will be allowed significant opportunities for projecting United States influence on the Hungarian people.

Lastly, it will be noted that our proposed initiatives are neither numerous nor extensive. Any real increase in United States activities in Hungary would require a complete change in the attitude of the regime—something that does not seem likely in the foreseeable future.

#### *Harassment of the Legation*

In the past, the chief harassment of the Legation by the Hungarian authorities has been the arrest of, or punitive action against, local Hungarian employees. At present, two local employees are under "internal deportation" orders and are living a precarious existence in remote villages. Persistent attempts by the Legation to aid them have been rebuffed; however, no new drastic actions have been taken or threatened against other employees in recent months and even cases of minor annoyances, such as revocation of driving licenses, have not recurred. The Legation sees no alternative in the coming months to continuing its efforts on behalf of the two deported employees and standing ready to defend any other employees unfairly treated. It may be that our

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<sup>2</sup>In despatch 471, the Legation submitted the following recommendations: "(1) Continued pressure on the regime for the release of the arrested local employees of the Legation. This pressure should be in the form of diplomatic representations; publicity in the Western press should also be considered. (2) Lifting of the ban on the travel of United States citizens in Hungary as a price for easing some of the present staff restrictions on the Legation. (3) Implementation of a common NATO policy on the accreditation of new Ministers to Budapest. (4) Exploration of means of solving the question of Cardinal Mindszenty's future position." (*Ibid.*, 611.64/3-558) In despatch 489, the Legation submitted certain recommendations for expanding contacts with the Hungarian people through an increase in trade, informational activities, and cultural exchanges. (*Ibid.*, 611.64/3-1258)

vigorous protests over the cases that have occurred have helped to some extent to deter the police from more numerous persecutions.

Minor forms of harassment, such as the “guarding” of the Legation by large numbers of uniformed and secret police, the interrogation of Hungarian visitors to the Legation, etc., may be expected to continue. As in the past, the Legation will from time to time voice its dissatisfaction over such practices, without necessarily making a big issue of the matter. Any lasting solution to the harassment issue must, however, depend on a more extensive easing of relations than seems in prospect now.

### *Contacts with Hungarians*

Since the Revolution, there has been a steady decline in Legation contact with both official and unofficial Hungarians. The regime desired to have Americans and other Westerners attend staged propaganda affairs, but hindered meaningful exchanges with citizens. Means used to accomplish this were not only the minor harassments noted above, but also the anti-American propaganda campaign which became so marked during the fall. The clear warning of this campaign was that it is dangerous for any Hungarian to have any contact with American officials. Men holding posts in various ministries who had never hesitated in the past to discuss official business with Legation officers, now expressed preference for having the Foreign Ministry act as intermediary between them and the Legation. Old friends and new acquaintances shied away from even the most innocuous meetings with Americans. The Legation will continue to try to check this trend by the judicious inviting of official or “approved” personalities to social functions, by seeking face-to-face discussions in preference to written communications whenever business matters arise with Hungarians, etc. However, the best method for expanding the Legation’s circles of acquaintances, under existing conditions, would seem to be the development of informational and cultural programs approved or tolerated by the regime.

### *Information Program*

The Legation continues to be dissatisfied with its lack of anything that could properly be called an information program. Nevertheless, the reasons that have in the past argued against such a program remain strong today: the presence of Cardinal Mindszenty in the Legation, the police surveillance of the building, and the impossibility of asking local employees to do any kind of informational work. We have been able to dispose of a certain number of American magazines and other publications of a non-political nature. In the future, we hope to increase the number of such presentations to ministries, libraries, museums, and other institutions. A more ambitious program remains contingent on future developments.

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*Cultural Exchange*

The visit of a limited number of top-flight American artists, lecturers, and sportsmen in 1958 was one bright spot in the year's rather gloomy picture of Hungarian-American relations. The Legation strongly urges that the number of such visits be increased this year because they are warmly desired by the Hungarian people and because they enable the Legation to expand its circle of acquaintances in the Hungarian cultural field.

In the past, these tours have been arranged through private channels, largely to avoid the necessity of dealing with the regime and to forestall regime demands for reciprocity. While wishing to expand tours under private sponsorship, the Legation would also like to recommend reconsideration of the United States position on official exchanges with Hungary. Dealing with Hungarian authorities on the matter of cultural exchanges certainly signifies little in the way of approval of the regime. The Hungarians have not yet demanded reciprocal visits, but even if they should do so now, we see little objection to having Hungarian cultural figures come to the United States. So far as we know, the few Hungarian performers appearing there in 1958 (the runner Roszavolgyi and the fencing team) did not encounter hostile receptions. We see definite benefits in having as many Hungarians as possible familiarize themselves with the United States. At the same time, our readiness to admit Hungarians should have some influence in persuading the authorities here to accept a greater number of United States artists.

In this connection, the Legation would like to call attention to the cultural operations conducted by other Western countries here (Legation despatch No. 394, January 9, 1959).<sup>3</sup> We have learned that the British Legation has recommended to London a major expansion of their cultural program, with the ultimate objective of restoring the British Council in Budapest and that this recommendation has been accepted in principle in London. Coordination of cultural plans with the British and perhaps with other NATO countries would seem desirable at this stage.

*Commercial Relations*

Somewhat akin to our advocacy of expanded cultural relations, is our belief that the United States should liberalize its trade policy toward Hungary. Obviously this question is part of the general problem of East-West trade. Hungary could probably never become an important outlet for American goods, and it is clear that anything the regime buys from America will be used for the benefit of the regime. However, the Hungarians have voiced a great interest in trying to sell to the United States. Since we do not believe they could garner a large stock of dollars by such

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<sup>3</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 550.64/1-959)

activities, we believe that the United States could profitably acquiesce in the Hungarian desire to try the American market.

As for trade fairs and exhibitions, we think a well-selected American display would be highly effective here and the Hungarians should be tested on their willingness (by no means certain) to accept such a thing. An obvious price for permission to exhibit here is a reciprocal invitation to have a display in the United States. Whether a Hungarian display would get an embarrassingly hostile reception in the United States is hard to say. It seems to the Legation that the matter at least deserves further study. Hungarian officials have expressed considerable interest in this topic, and a flexible United States attitude might improve our bargaining position on other points.

Aside from agreeing to mutual participation in fairs, easing visa procedures for commercial people, and perhaps raising the inspection ban on the import of Hungarian meat products, there is little we can do to boost Hungarian-American commerce. All that we can expect to do is to put ourselves in a position where we can point out to the Hungarians that they are free to compete with others for a share in American trade.

#### *Visa and Passport Problems*

During the past year, a major source of irritation in the Legation's dealing with Hungarian authorities has been the visa policies of the two countries. On several occasions, the Legation has found it necessary to complain about Hungarian delays or failures in issuing visas, particularly to United States officials coming to Budapest on business. In turn, the Hungarians have frequently charged that the United States was too restrictive on visas to journalists, sportsmen, scientists, commercial representatives, etc. In the fall of 1958, they announced a policy of strict reciprocity on visas. The first result of this was the limitation on the exit and entry visas of United States Legation employees (See Legation despatch No. 329, November 28, 1958).<sup>4</sup> The United States has now more than corrected any inequity that existed on this particular score (Legation despatch No. 362, December 19, 1958);<sup>5</sup> we are watching to see what remedial steps the Hungarians will take in return. We believe that, at the very minimum, the United States should review all of its visa procedures with regard to Hungarians, to be sure that we are not more restrictive than the Hungarian regime unless such restrictions are clearly demanded by security considerations.

The United States passport regulations limiting travel to Hungary are another irritant—and, the Legation believes, an unnecessary one—in Hungarian-American relations. The regulations do not seem

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<sup>4</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*, Visa Office Files)

<sup>5</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*)

necessary as protection for United States citizens; in recent years, those Americans who have come here have not experienced serious trouble with the police, nor have any of our local employees been arrested since the early part of 1957. We still have two local employees under deportation and, if there were the slightest indication that keeping the passport restrictions would exert pressure on their behalf, the Legation would favor continuing the regulation. It does not appear, however, that their status is negotiable with any means presently available; therefore, the Legation advocates lifting the passport limitation without directly seeking any Hungarian concession in return. There is, of course, no assurance that this will markedly improve the climate of our relations, but there would appear to be no United States interest which is protected by the maintenance of this travel restriction. The Hungarians have made the point that it is the passport restrictions which prevent a great increase in the number of tourists from the United States. We doubt that this is true, but would favor an experiment which might promote contacts between Americans and the Hungarian people.

#### *Legation Staff Ceiling*

The United States has never accepted the concept that the Hungarian Government can fix the size or composition of the Legation's staff. Nevertheless we have in practice kept even below the limits stated in the Foreign Ministry's note of May 25, 1957.<sup>6</sup> With the severe curtailment of the Legation's activities, the staff ceiling has worked no particular hardship. This situation could change if an easing of the atmosphere produced such things as the regime's granting of passports to intending emigrants, a regular influx of large numbers of American tourists, a major cultural exchange program, or the re-opening of informational activities. Such developments do not seem likely in the near future and, in any event, the requisite easing of the atmosphere would probably also result in the falling away of the staff limitations without the necessity of direct negotiation on the point.

#### *The Hungarian Item in the United Nations*

While the United Nations has not been able to provide a solution to the Hungarian question, its continued consideration of the question has placed the Hungarian and Soviet regimes at great psychological disadvantage and has damaged Hungary's position domestically and internationally. This has naturally provoked bitter reaction on the part of the regime; as was evidenced in the last United Nations General Assembly, the anger of the authorities has been concentrated more and more on the

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<sup>6</sup> Presumably reference is to the Foreign Ministry's note dated May 24, the text of which was transmitted to the Department of State in despatch 589 from Budapest, May 24, 1957. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 611.64/5-2457)

United States as the recognized leader of the fight against the Hungarian regimen in the United Nations.

The Legation believes that the United States stand in the United Nations has been based on principle, and that we could not in conscience have done less than we did; we see no occasion for apology or retraction of our position. As for the future, it is still some months before the next regular session of the General Assembly and events in the meantime will influence our policy then. Nevertheless, if our arguments in favor of moving toward normalization of relations are valid, they will require that the United States adopt at least a tentative position now that we will let the United Nations record stand but will not take the initiative to force the issue from here on out. In this connection, we should mention that, while our opportunities for sampling public opinion are slight, we have found a discouraging lack of interest among Hungarians in the recent United Nations debate and its outcome. Regime propaganda is not particularly effective, but it may eventually get some popular response to its theme that the United States and other Western powers are "ganging up" on Hungary while trying to conciliate the USSR because of its "proven" technical and military superiority.

#### *Designation of Minister*

Up until the middle of 1958, there were frequent indications that the regime strongly desired an exchange of ministers between the two countries as a sign of finally restored relations. In the latter half of the year, hints and statements of regime officials to this effect began to disappear. Nevertheless, it seems certain that the Hungarians would be glad to have a United States minister in Budapest. In view, however, of the United States attitude toward the regime and of the recent history of relations between the two countries, the designation of a minister does not seem likely in the immediate future. When the time is ripe for such a step, it can probably be used as a bargaining point to procure important concessions from the Hungarians.

It should be noted, however, that the bargaining value of a ministerial designation could be reduced if in the meantime other Western countries, particularly the NATO nations, had accredited envoys here. During the past year, the Dutch and Belgian ministers departed, leaving *Chargés d'Affaires* to act for their countries. On the other hand, the British Minister, Sir Leslie Fry, left this month and in line with standard British practice is being replaced by another minister, due to arrive shortly. Similarly, a new Israeli minister is slated to arrive in February, replacing Minister Touval. The present *Chargé d'Affaires* of Greece has indicated he is hoping for an appointment as minister here this year. Hungary may be expected to urge a "regularization" of the relations upon other countries now represented here by *Chargés*; thus, new Hungarian

ministers have already been accredited to Brussels and The Hague. While it would probably have been impossible to dissuade the British from sending a new minister, it is believed that the question of accreditation by other NATO countries should be kept under close review in the NATO Council in order to avoid having the United States placed in an embarrassingly isolated position in this matter.

### *Cardinal Mindszenty*

The question of the future of Cardinal Mindszenty remains one of the most difficult problems of United States-Hungarian relations. This matter has been discussed at length in the Legation's despatch No. 471 of March 5, 1958, and in numerous other messages to the Department. We have at the moment little to add to these communications.

In October of last year, the Hungarian authorities flatly refused the request of the Sacred College of Cardinals, conveyed through the Legation, that Cardinal Mindszenty be permitted to attend the Conclave in Rome. This action put an end to speculation that the regime would be interested in a face-saving device for removing the Cardinal from Hungary. At the same time, the Cardinal's manifest reluctance even to consider departing except on the most specific instructions of the Vatican underlined the fact that in considering solutions to the question his attitude, as well as that of the Vatican, must be taken fully into account. Finally, this episode gave the regime a chance to say for the first time that the Hungarian authorities have been officially "notified" of the whereabouts of the Cardinal. The implications of this position are not clear; at the very least, it would seem that the regime now considers itself free to press at any time its charge that the Legation is harboring a fugitive from justice, contrary to international law and practice.

It should not be overlooked that the question of the Cardinal may involve such deep feelings of personal enmity and vengeance on both sides as to be virtually non-negotiable while the present leaders remain in power. The Legation is inclined to believe, however, that a settlement could be arranged, but that the price would be high. We continue to think the whole question of normalization of relations would be involved, including particularly the exchange of ministers between the two countries, and an express or implied understanding about future United States policy in the United Nations.

### *Conclusions*

It is apparent from the above review that normalization of relations with the present regime in Hungary (even on a purely Curtin basis) is unlikely so long as (1) Cardinal Mindszenty remains a refugee in the Legation, (2) an exchange of ministers is not effected, and (3) the United States continues to spearhead the attacks on the regime in the United Nations. The Legation certainly does not recommend that the



United States attempt to resolve all of these problems at the present time, but it does believe that these matters should be kept actively in mind and that all possible preparations should be made and actions taken to ameliorate and eventually to overcome these impediments to improved relations. There are, however, a few things which might be done immediately, in an effort to put ourselves in a better position to establish more intensive contact with government officials and with other Hungarians whose point of view might be affected by closer relations with the West. The Legation, therefore, recommends that the policy of the United States toward the present regime in Hungary be considered in the following sequence, with Phase I to be instituted immediately.

### *Recommendations*

#### *Phase I*

1. That the passport restriction on travel of American citizens to Hungary be immediately rescinded, without any attempt to negotiate a quid pro quo therefor. The Legation believes that the small degree of thawing in our relations with Hungarian officials which would result from such action would be sufficient quid pro quo.

2. That our visa procedures with Hungary be carefully reviewed in detail, to be sure that our procedures are at least as liberal as those of the Hungarian regime. The Legation, for its part, contemplates raising with the Foreign Office the question of resuming a more liberal policy toward members of this Legation in return for the recent liberalization of United States visa policy toward members of the Hungarian Legation in Washington. (We shall do this about the middle of March, which will be approximately three months after the notification of our new procedures to the Foreign Office.)

3. That the United States officially facilitate, rather than restrict, the visits of Hungarians to the United States—particularly those engaged in cultural, information, sport, and commercial activities. The Hungarians have already been more liberal in this regard than has the United States, but this situation can hardly be expected to continue indefinitely on a one-sided basis.

#### *Phase II*

(The timing of this Phase would depend upon developments not only in Hungary, but in our general relations with the Communist bloc. However, the Legation believes that the matter should now be under active consideration in Washington; that the preliminary steps, which do not require discussion with the Hungarians, should be initiated; and that we should be ready to act if and when the situation appears propitious.)

1. Resolution of the problem of the Cardinal's refuge in the Legation (see, in this connection, the Legation's despatch No. 302, November 20, 1958).<sup>7</sup>

2. The exchange of ministers between the United States and Hungary. (*Note:* It would seem probable that these two matters should be negotiated simultaneously, in the possibility that the one might be used to offset the other.)

3. That we desist from any further efforts to obtain the refusal of the credentials of the Hungarian delegation to the United Nations or the adoption of new resolutions on the Hungarian Question. This would not mean, however, that we would approve the rescinding of the Resolutions which have been adopted by the General Assembly, until such time as the USSR and Hungary might comply with those Resolutions. We should, on the contrary, continue to remind these two countries and the world in general (as, presumably, would other free countries, members of the United Nations) of the failure of the USSR and of Hungary to meet their obligations in this regard.

### *Phase III*

With the completion of Phases I and II, we would be in normal Cur-tain relations with the Hungarian regime and would, thereby, be on a footing similar to that already occupied by other Western missions in Budapest. It is probable that, in the process of reaching this position, certain restrictive actions of the Hungarian regime would already have been altered—such, for instance, as the close surveillance of the Chan-cery (which is probably due, in large part, to the presence of the Cardinal) and the restrictions on the size and composition of the Legation staff. If, in fact, these things had not been done, we should then be in a better position to require that they be immediately carried out.

The United States should then, it is suggested, be prepared to propose to the Hungarian Government the establishment of such understandings or agreements as might be deemed necessary for the implementation of active programs for cultural and informational exchange and for commercial intercourse. The Legation does not feel that grandiose projects, involving large increases in personnel assigned to this Legation, would ever be justified, even under the most favorable circumstances; but it is believed that something quite effective might be done in cultural exchange and in a modest expansion of trade between the two countries. Pending, however, the arrival at this point of Phase III—which it might very well take some considerable time to reach—the Legation suggests that the Department encourage and, where possible, assist the expansion of cultural and commercial exchanges between the

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<sup>7</sup> Document 13.

Hungarians and other Western countries—in particular, Great Britain, France, and Italy.<sup>8</sup>

Garret G. Ackerson, Jr.  
*Chargé d'Affaires a.i.*

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<sup>8</sup> Attached to the source text was a memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State for Security and Consular Affairs John W. Hanes, Jr., to Merchant, dated February 16, in which Hanes wrote that he would oppose any change at this time in U.S. passport policy toward Hungary, and especially those changes recommended in despatch 413 from Budapest. He noted further that he “would certainly oppose it unless there were more compelling reasons for doing it—particularly of a quid pro quo nature—than are apparent to me from reading this despatch.” In another memorandum to Assistant Secretary of State for International Affairs Francis O. Wilcox, also dated February 16, Hanes wrote that he had seen “no actions on the part of the Hungarian regime nor of the USSR to warrant our softening our attitude along any of the lines suggested by Budapest” with regard to U.S. policy on the Hungarian question at the United Nations. (Department of State, UN Files: Lot 61 D 91, Hungary)

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## 17. Report Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research

IR No. 8005

Washington, April 27, 1959.

### POSITION OF INTELLECTUALS IN EASTERN EUROPE

The degree of freedom of expression allowed Eastern European intellectuals<sup>1</sup> as of early 1959 lies somewhere between the rigidly enforced Party line of “socialist realism” that characterized the period before Stalin’s death and the “thaw” that reached peak intensity in the period leading up to and just after the Polish and Hungarian upheavals of late 1956. During the two and a half years since the Hungarian revolution,

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Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, OSS–INR Reports. Official Use Only. The source text bears the following notation: “This is an intelligence report and not a statement of Departmental policy.”

<sup>1</sup> In this survey the term “Eastern Europe” includes the Soviet bloc countries of Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania. It also includes Yugoslavia. The term “intellectual” covers those groups included in the “intelligentsia” class of communist jargon, among which are writers, poets, artists, sculptors, composers, and others in the fine arts, as well as journalists, teachers, and students. The term is basically synonymous with “opinion molders.” Because writers have been the most influential of Eastern European intellectuals, this survey is built mainly on their activities. [Footnote in the source text.]

the Eastern European regimes have tried—with varying degrees of success—to refurbish and strengthen their controls over all spheres of cultural life. Economic and other pressures have been used, but so far there has been little recourse to the police and other strong administrative measures of the Stalin era.

At present, Polish intellectuals have considerably greater latitude of expression than their counterparts in any other Eastern European bloc country. At the other extreme is Albania, which has passed through the Stalin and post-Stalin periods with its intellectual life unchanged. Throughout the period under review the regimes have been faced with the same problem they have had since their coming to power: the necessity of securing and maintaining the cooperation of intellectuals (the “opinion makers”), while trying, at the same time to move toward their ideological goal of forcing intellectual life into the mold of “socialist realism.” At the end of the period, as at the beginning, press and official complaints about intellectual life make clear that the problem is still far from solution. In Yugoslavia, since the 1948 Tito–Cominform break, intellectuals have been allowed an increasing latitude of expression, with the yardstick of “socialist realism” gradually abandoned.

#### *Polish and Hungarian Efforts to Re-Establish Controls*

The eruptions that took place in Poland and Hungary in 1956 saw the virtually complete disintegration of the regime controls over intellectual life. Writers, journalists, and artists led the way in taking over or disrupting government and party apparatuses of control. With the rise of Gomulka to power in Poland and the quelling of the Hungarian revolution, the new governments began to cast about for methods of re-establishing these controls. The Gomulka regime has relied in its efforts largely on persuasion, while the Kadar regime has vacillated between force and inducement. In both cases the resistance of the intellectuals has kept the regimes from achieving more than limited success.

*Poland.* When Gomulka returned to power in October 1956, the Polish Party's control over intellectual life was almost nonexistent. Writers were free from censorship; publishing houses were independent of effective state control. The main Party newspaper, *Trybuna Ludu*, did not necessarily present anything more than the views of its editors. In the early months of 1957, Gomulka's position became strong enough to begin introducing certain measures to control literacy and journalistic activity. Regime spokesmen began to stress the “socialist responsibility” of writers and pointed to the international difficulties (with the USSR) that certain journalists had caused.

The first concrete steps taken were those aimed at increasing the regime's control over the press. Through 1957 the process of weeding out editors and journalists was carried on at a rapid pace. In the wake of an

increasing number of appeals and warnings against irresponsible discussion, the student periodical *Po Prostu* was forced to stop operation in October. The cultural magazine *Europa* was banned before publishing its first issue.

So far at least, there has been no strong attempt to reintroduce “socialist realism,” but the regime has made known its desire to have Polish intellectuals adapt themselves to a minimum degree of “socialist orientation.” While economic and other means of pressure have been used to gain some sort of conformity, the Party is clearly unwilling to resort to repressive measures. In the short run, it cannot suppress intellectual freedom for fear of losing the intellectual support it still has.

Nevertheless, certain steps were taken in the closing months of 1958 that indicated the Polish regime’s preoccupation with the weakness of its system of controlling intellectual life. A plenum of the Central Committee held in October formulated a “new cultural policy” and enunciated various proposals (still only on paper) directed toward improving the situation. One proposal called for the establishment of a high-level cultural agency to keep closer tabs on the direction and scope of foreign contacts. Another stressed the need for a new “ideological commission” within the Central Committee (to supplement the existing Cultural Commission); still another emphasized the need for more direct contact between the Party and writers, while a further one called for the establishment of a “Central Coordinating Commission” for cultural and educational matters with branches throughout the country.

Polish writers continue to resist pressures on their freedom to write as they wish. At a December 1958 writers’ conference in Wroclaw, for example, they firmly and clearly condemned censorship of literary works by the regime. The government sarcastically rejected the writers’ complaints and went on to criticize in sharp terms the silence of certain writers and a “coffee house dictatorship” among intellectuals—the regime’s way of describing the professional ostracism that is shown any writer or artist that gives in to regime blandishment or pressure.

The latest incident in the continuing struggle between the regime and writers broke into the open in early April 1959. The point at issue was a directive set forth by the Minister of Culture the beginning of 1959 that all Polish writers must obtain official approval before signing contracts with foreign publishers. The Writer’s Union fought the new directive and has apparently won its case. Reportedly the Minister of Culture has revised his original statement to read that the directive was meant to be a suggestion and that the submission of foreign contracts for official approval was to be on a voluntary basis.

*Hungary.* Polish reluctance to use strong means for the re-establishment of cultural controls was not initially duplicated in Hungary. The Kadar regime began to take a strong stand against dissident

writers and other intellectuals soon after Soviet troops had put down the revolution. In April 1957 the Writer's Union was abolished (replaced by a regime-oriented Literary Council) and other literary and artistic groups were reorganized. A Central Committee session of June viciously attacked writers, and throughout the rest of the year numerous intellectuals were arrested. In clamping down on cultural life, the regime made use of the phrase "counterrevolutionary activity" as a convenient peg on which to hang its accusations.

The Party resolution of June 1957 was reinforced by a strong "cultural directive" of August 1958. But despite these pressures, writers have continued to resist the regime's efforts to bring about conformity. Their main weapon has been silence. Kadar has recently admitted that many writers have been "silent" for six months or more. Other complaints have been that they have written only about "atemporal" and "apolitical" subjects, if they have written at all.

The apparent failure of strong-arm methods to achieve regime goals in obtaining the cooperation of the intelligentsia has apparently led the Hungarian regime to decide that a policy built on "comradely criticism" and inducement is more likely to be effective than force in bringing intellectuals into line. This "comradely criticism," however, has become increasingly sharp and the regime has made clear that its patience is not unlimited. The regime intends to revive the Writer's Union to take over or supplement the work of the Literary Council—apparently to increase pressure on writers to write as well as to conform. The press continues to attack "deviationists" of various categories (particularly the populists and folk writers who are criticized for overemphasizing nationalism and for attempting to build a third road to socialism). But for the present at least, there is little use of the police to enforce conformity. Whether this new policy will be long continued or will in fact prove effective is not yet clear.

#### *Orthodox Regimes Seek to Strengthen Control Apparatus*

The "thaw" and the 1956 upheavals in Poland and Hungary had only limited effect on the activities of intellectuals in the other and more "orthodox" bloc countries. In Albania no relaxation of the regime attitude was apparent, while Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Rumania, and Bulgaria had short periods of relaxation in the wake of the 1955 Geneva Conference and the 20th CPSU Congress. When writers and other intellectuals have threatened to get out of hand, however, they have been quickly disabused of ideas of intellectual freedom.

The position of intellectuals in these countries falls into one general pattern. Writers, artists, composers, and playwrights have been criticized (and have sometimes been the victims of stronger sanctions) for not staying within the bounds of "socialist realism." But the regimes

have not, like the Polish and Hungarian Governments, been compelled since 1956 to re-establish control apparatuses—they have had only to strengthen existing mechanisms. New measures have been introduced for this purpose, but the use of drastic “administrative” measures characteristic of the Stalin era has been notably missing.

The police have not been commonly used to force complete conformity, and criticism of a book that had been published or a play that was already being shown to the public, has made clear that censorship is not absolute. Contacts with the West continue in varying degrees, although the regimes carp from time to time about the excessive influence of such contacts on the population (particularly the youth).

*Czechoslovakia.* The Czech and Slovak Central Committees used the Polish and Hungarian upheavals to sharpen their attacks on “revisionism” in literature and art and impose tighter supervision over the press and literary journals. Party press organs criticized those writers considered “too liberal” and all through 1957 forced changes in editorial boards to insure greater compliance with the Party line. In December a new commission to censor the press was established.

In spite of this increased pressure for conformity, there were several incidents in 1958 and 1959 that indicated the regime’s control apparatus was not absolute. Josef Skvorecky’s novel *The Cowards*, which was applauded immediately after its 1958 publication, was subsequently denounced as “cheap, slanderous, and sensation seeking.” The head of the publishing house that put out the book was fired. Czech composers were told that they “were not immune to revisionist tendencies” and must make greater efforts to bring their music into closer touch with “real life under socialism.”

In early 1959 regime spokesmen warned writers against such tendencies as “revisionism,” “subjectivism,” and “apoliticism.” Films produced and already shown were condemned for “pessimism” and “bourgeois content” and banned. Theater managers were criticized for putting on plays “that the people want to see” rather than “those that would guide and instruct.” They were also criticized for presenting “too few Soviet plays, only occasional Czech or Slovak contemporary plays, and none written by playwrights in other People’s Democracies.” Comparable regime efforts to insure intellectual conformity are apparent in all other fields of cultural activity. The “cultural conference” scheduled for this July will no doubt see those efforts raised to a still higher pitch.

*East Germany.* The “thaw” in East Germany, which began shortly after the 20th Congress of the CPSU, was concentrated in a limited number of philosophical and theoretical writers. No doubt with the 1953 uprising still vividly in mind, the regime took quick and forceful action (such as the arrest of “revisionist” Professor Wolfgang Harick in November 1956 and his trial in early 1957) to keep the intelligentsia in line;

but it has used persuasion as well as force to attain its goal of conformity with "socialist realism." It has offered intellectuals a number of material and other incentives, including high wages, generous bonuses, and pleasant and paid vacations. The so-called "technical intelligentsia" (e.g., research professors, physicists, engineers) have received special consideration, such as access to Western publications and rather broad freedom of travel. Most significantly they have not been forced to become Party apologists as the price of advancement. The principal limitation placed on their activities has been that they are not publicly to oppose the regime.

Over the last several months the regime has intensified its efforts to strengthen the leadership of its cultural organizations, particularly those in East Berlin where contact with the West is greatest. Several of the Party's most capable and loyal cultural officials have recently replaced less effective officials there. The regime has also stepped up its efforts to emphasize traditional German values, with the aim of increasing the impact of its propaganda in both East and West Germany. "Socialist realism" remains the touchstone for new literature, but the old works now being reprinted and commented on have made room for such subjects as "Germany's cultural heritage," in which Goethe, Schiller, Bach—even Wagner—are presented as progressives and nationalists who looked eastward for inspiration.

*Rumania.* Rumania's "thaw" which began in mid-1955, was cut short in May 1956, when Alexandru Jar and several other writers criticized the Party's cultural line and demanded more intellectual freedom. The regime's response was immediate and the press was soon carrying Jar's abject effort at self-criticism, along with those of his fellow "deviationists."

Through 1957 and early 1958 press articles and official spokesmen called attention to the regime's dissatisfaction with the work of Rumanian intellectuals. The latter were accused of "seeking refuge in the past," "loss of contact with the people," and even "bourgeois nationalism." In 1957, for example, a conference of historians was sharply taken to task for dwelling on such subjects as "medieval sewerage and water problems" and the "organization in the middle ages of provincial towns" in the area that is now Rumania. Although authors were criticized for a number of failings that would have meant loss of position or even imprisonment in the Stalin era, no one was singled out for punishment—although the regime talked of "making examples."

Since mid-1958, the regime has taken a number of steps to increase its control over every sphere of intellectual life. Literature, art, music, the social sciences, have been among those to receive increased attention. Several new decrees have been aimed at tightening the regime's control over theatrical repertoires and artistic organizations. Also



during the last year, the regime has introduced decrees with the goal of improving the social composition of university students (i.e., to increase the percentage of those with worker or peasant parents), and to increase student participation in manual labor.

*Bulgaria.* Bulgaria experienced little literary ferment in the period leading up to and including the Hungarian revolution. It was only after the revolution had been put down that a number of plays, novels, and short stories were published that showed the disgruntlement and disaffection of writers who demanded the relaxation of literary censorship. The main outlet for these complaints was *Plamuk*, a literary journal started by the Writer's Union in early 1957. The most popular of these works—later classified as “black” literature by the Party—were Todor Genov's play *Fear* and Emil Manov's novel *An Unauthentic Case*, both of which underscored corruption and power-hunger in Party ranks. Manov, one of *Plamuk's* editors, came forth as the leading spokesman against “socialist realism” and Party domination of artistic creation.

Through the first half of 1957 the regime seemed undecided as to what steps to take in meeting this challenge. It launched a campaign against Polish, Hungarian, and Yugoslav “revisionist” intellectuals in the spring of 1957, but very little was said about the Bulgarian variety. The first sharp debates between Party spokesmen and the dissident writers began in the summer. By October *Fear* and *An Unauthentic Case* were among those literary works condemned by the regime as “revisionist.” In December six editors of *Plamuk* were fired, and in January they were followed by the chief editor of the Bulgarian daily *Otechestven Front*.

In March 1958 the press began to carry a series of recantations—Genov in April, and Manov, the last to be brought into line, in May. The latter's defeat marked the conclusion of the regime's campaign against Bulgaria's dissident writers. Since then the press has carried articles criticizing various features of Bulgaria's cultural life, but to all intents and purposes the orthodoxy of “socialist realism” is now unchallenged.

*Albania.* The “thaw” and the events of 1956 left Albanian intellectuals untouched. From time to time writers and artists are criticized for not emphasizing “socialist realism” to the extent desired by the regime, but in general Albania's limited number of intellectuals support the regime and its goals—and by so doing they maintain their highly privileged status.

#### *Yugoslavia Allows Wide Latitude of Intellectual Freedom*

“Socialist realism” was abandoned by the Yugoslav regime shortly after the 1948 Tito–Cominform break. There has been nothing since then to indicate that it, or any other yardstick of cultural purity, would be introduced. Yugoslav ideologues like to describe their cultural line as “the

new socialist humanism," but in fact there has been little regime effort to set limits on or guide intellectual activity. Painters and graphic artists are completely free, as underscored by their wide-ranging choice of subject matter and style. An exhibit of Yugoslav paintings is as diverse (and as extreme) as anything seen in Western Europe or the United States. While there are limits on the content of literary works, those limits are wide—mainly that Tito, or his government, is not to be criticized. Writers are well aware of this "off-limits" area and have steered clear of giving the regime cause for retaliation. They have generally left politics to Party theoreticians.

Contacts with the West run the whole gamut of intellectual life. Western European and American plays, particularly those in the socialist or avant-garde genre, are extremely popular. The same is true of books, magazines, and art.

Although not frequently done, the Yugoslavs enjoy taunting about "socialist-realism" in the bloc, with the sharpest barbs reserved for Bulgaria and other neighboring countries. Over the last several months the Yugoslavs have rebutted bloc criticism of Yugoslav cultural life in broadcasts beamed in Polish to Europe—in perhaps the hope that in this way they can show their support for the Poles in rejecting Soviet cultural dictation.

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## 18. Operations Coordinating Board Report

Washington, July 2, 1959.

### OPERATIONS PLAN FOR THE SOVIET-DOMINATED NATIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE

#### I. Introduction

##### A. *Special Operating Guidance*

1. *Scope of Plan.* The countries covered by this Plan are Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Rumania. Poland and Yugoslavia are each the subject of a separate Plan.<sup>1</sup>

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Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, USSR & Satellites—Documents—1959–60. Secret. According to a covering memorandum by OCB Executive Officer Bromley Smith, this plan was a revision and updating of the plan approved by the Board on January 23, 1958, and was concurred in by the Board Assistants, on behalf of their principals, on July 2. No copy of the January 23 version has been found in Department of State files; in his covering memorandum, Smith instructed recipients to destroy copies of previous drafts of the plan as well as the January 23 version.

<sup>1</sup> Regarding the OCB Operations Plans on Poland and Yugoslavia, see Part 1, footnote 1, Document 80 and Document 145, respectively.

2. *Long-Range Objective.* Fulfillment of the right of the peoples in the dominated nations to enjoy representative governments resting upon the consent of the governed, exercising full national independence, and participating as members of the Free World community.

3. *Short-Range Objectives.*

a. Promotion of the peaceful evolution of the dominated nations toward national independence and internal freedom, even though those nations may continue for some time under the close political and military control of the Soviet Union.

b. Reduction of the contribution of the dominated nations to Soviet strength, and weakening of the monolithic front and internal cohesiveness of the Soviet bloc.

4. [13-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

5. *Soviet Policy.* Present Soviet policy appears to be one of experimentation in an effort to find a middle course between the alternatives of (a) placing primary reliance on policies of force and repression, and (b) granting increasing autonomy and independence to the Eastern European regimes. The first alternative would deny to these regimes the possibility of broadening their base of popular support. The second alternative would stimulate popular pressures for further concessions and might become extremely difficult to control. The USSR probably will permit the dominated nations to enter into increasing but selectively-controlled contacts with the West, in an attempt, among other things, to enhance the prestige of these regimes and otherwise favorably influence world opinion; to obtain technical data, commodities, and markets in line with overall bloc plans, and to ease economic strains; and to appease the desires of the intelligentsia in the area for wider associations throughout the world.

6. *Increased U.S. Opportunities.* Although surface stability has been maintained or restored in all the dominated nations, and will probably be preserved over the next few years, an atmosphere of change and ferment more highly charged than under Stalin will probably continue for some time. This atmosphere offers the United States and Western European countries new opportunities, though still limited, to influence the dominated regimes through greater activity, both private and official, in such fields as tourist travel, cultural exchange, and economic relations, including exchanges of technical and commercial visitors. Experience has shown that a U.S. policy designed to ostracize the dominated regimes has had the concurrent effect of inhibiting increased direct U.S. contacts with the people of the dominated nations. It is now apparent that, as a practical matter, substantial expansion of direct U.S. contacts with the peoples of these nations, and the development through such contacts of popular pressures upon the regimes for increased internal

freedom and independence from Soviet control, cannot be achieved without more active U.S. relationships with and through these governments. Such relationships would enable the United States to probe, within the party and governmental bureaucracy, for those individuals or groups who show signs of independent thought, nationalist aspirations, or willingness to use their influence to modify their nation's subservient relationship to the Soviet Union. The actual opportunities for carrying out this policy will, of course, vary from time to time and from country to country. At the present time a necessary first step in Albania is resumption of diplomatic relations. In Czechoslovakia, an important preparatory step is the reaching of an economic agreement, which is currently being negotiated. In Hungary it is difficult to establish useful contacts with government officials while the United States continues to take the lead in focusing world attention on the Soviet suppression of Hungarian freedom and the unrepresentative nature of the present Hungarian government. The Rumanian regime has manifested real though cautious interest in expanding trade relations and in limited cultural, technical, and educational exchanges with the United States.

7. *Need for Flexible Approach.* Flexible U.S. courses of action, involving inducements as well as probing actions and pressures, sometimes applied simultaneously, are required to exploit Soviet vulnerabilities in the dominated nations, and to complicate the exercise of Soviet control over them. Actions to exploit vulnerabilities must be taken with due consideration for other U.S. actions aimed at more active relations with the existing regimes for the purpose of strengthening U.S. influence in these countries and their ties with the West.

8. *Expanding Direct Contacts with the People.* In order to maintain and develop popular pressures on the present regimes and accelerate evolution toward independence from Soviet control, direct contacts with the people of the dominated nations should be expanded. To facilitate this expansion of direct contact with the people, more active relations with the existing regimes should be established, but without creating the impression that the basic U.S. attitude toward these regimes has changed or will change in the absence of some significant modification in their character. The people of the dominated nations should be encouraged to seek their goals gradually. [4 lines of source text not declassified]

9. *Exploiting Divisive Forces.* To impair and weaken Soviet domination, divisive forces should be exploited by appropriate measures, including:

- a. Fostering nationalist pride and aspirations among the people and within the regime leadership.
- b. [2 lines of source text not declassified]
- c. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

- d. Publicizing evidences of unequal treatment by the USSR.
- e. Encouraging comparisons of the lot of the dominated nations with that of the USSR and with each other, utilizing, within the context of existing directives, examples of Yugoslavia and Poland in loosening Soviet control over this area.

10. *Clarifying U.S. Policy.* On appropriate occasions, the United States view should be emphasized that the people of each nation should be independent and free to choose their form of government; but any action or statement should be avoided which could reasonably be represented in the dominated nations as advocacy of a return to authoritarian systems of government such as existed in some of these countries prior to or during World War II. It should also be reiterated on appropriate occasions in public statements that the United States does not look upon the dominated nations as potential military allies and supports their right to independence, not to encircle the Soviet Union with hostile forces, but so that they may take their rightful place as equal members in a peaceful European community of nations. Official public statements should continue to point out the evils and defects of the Soviet-Communist system; reiterate U.S. refusal to accept the domination of these nations by the USSR as an acceptable status quo; and stress evolutionary change.

11. *Encouraging Independent Initiatives.* The regimes in the dominated nations should be encouraged to take independent initiatives in foreign relations and domestic affairs. The United States should also take advantage of every appropriate opportunity to demonstrate to these regimes how their national interest may be served by independent actions looking toward more normal relations with the West. Efforts should be made to bring the dominated nations increasingly into the activities of international technical and social organizations in order to contribute to their greater independence from Soviet influence and to the U.S. advantage. The benefits received by Yugoslavia and Poland from their relations with the United States should be used as an inducement to the regimes of the dominated nations to seek closer relations with the West.

12. *Negotiating Issues.* The United States should be prepared to discuss and negotiate issues between it and the individual regimes. When complete solutions are not possible, partial solutions which do not impair U.S. objectives should be accepted. Efforts should be made to alleviate or settle long-standing economic issues (such as nationalization claims, surplus property and other financial obligations) between the United States and the dominated nations.

13. *Support to Emigrés.* Support of selected émigrés or émigré groups capable of making a positive contribution to U.S. objectives should be continued, while support of less useful émigré organizations

is gradually phased out. Efforts should be made to restrict, on a more selective basis, the issuance of official press releases and public statements commemorating traditional national holidays and other anniversary events in the dominated countries. The regularity with which such statements have been issued in routine response to the solicitations of various émigré groups and organizations year after year has made this practice increasingly counter-productive and has tended to detract from the value and impact of statements issued by high officials on occasions of real interest and significance.

14. *Defectors, Escapees, and Refugees.* [3 lines of source text not declassified] Overt publicity and propaganda exploitation of defectors, escapees, and refugees should be restricted to specific cases where a net advantage to the United States can be expected or where some degree of public treatment is required in the interest of maintaining the credibility of U.S. media. Otherwise, U.S. policies on defectors, escapees, and refugees from Communist areas continue to apply to nationals of the dominated nations.

15. *Expansion of Trade.* Efforts should be made, on a case-by-case basis as approved by the Council on Foreign Economic Policy, to establish more normal trade relations between the United States and the dominated nations with which the United States has diplomatic relations, thereby facilitating a gradual expansion of trade—consistent with U.S. economic and trade control policies—when this would be a means of projecting U.S. influence and lessening the dominated nations' economic ties with, and dependence on, the Soviet Union.

16. *Charitable and Relief Efforts.* Voluntary relief agencies should be encouraged to undertake appropriate operations in the dominated nations when suitable opportunities arise. U.S. agencies should be prepared to offer food and other relief assistance, through voluntary agencies or otherwise, to the people of the dominated countries when emergency situations occur.

17. *Official Information and Cultural Program.* The general goal of the official United States information and cultural program in the Soviet-dominated nations is to provide the peoples in this area with informational or cultural material which will (a) give them a sound understanding of United States and Western policy, (b) strengthen their cultural ties with, and foster favorable attitudes toward, the United States and the Free World, and (c) be useful in helping them meet their own problems in ways which will promote the peaceful evolution of the dominated nations toward national independence and internal freedom.

U.S. information and cultural activities within these countries are severely restricted at present. In Albania, where the United States does not now have a diplomatic mission, it is only through the Voice of

America that the U.S. Government can reach the local populace. Even in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Rumania, the Voice remains, despite strong jamming, especially in urban areas, the primary means for the U.S. Government to reach the broad masses of the population. In the absence of USIS posts in any of these countries, U.S. information and cultural activities are carried on by the personnel of the U.S. diplomatic mission, and primarily by USIA officers (at present one to each mission) assigned there by arrangement with the State Department. In these countries, police-state conditions hamper in varying degrees informal contacts between United States diplomatic personnel and the local populace, so that distribution and placement of informational materials is kept at a low level at best. For the most part, American cultural attractions, including exhibits, can be scheduled and exchange activities carried on only with regime consent and under stipulations of reciprocity.

Although the amount that USIA can actually do at any given time depends mainly on the attitude of the local regime, USIA should be prepared to take advantage of any change in regime attitudes or other opportunity to increase information and cultural activities. The Department of State, on the other hand, should be prepared to resolve problems of reciprocity that undoubtedly will accompany any proposed increase of such activities. At the same time, it is important to exercise discretion in these efforts so that they do not provoke further regime suppression.

18. *Special Role of Private Media.* Private information and cultural activities in, or having access to, the dominated nations should be supported, as private media can engage in activities which would promote U.S. objectives but for which the United States Government would not wish to accept responsibility.

19. *Motion Picture Films.* Continue the practice of giving every proper assistance to American motion picture distributors seeking to market their films in the area.

20. *Granting Reciprocity.* The United States should be prepared to permit information and cultural activities in this country by the diplomatic missions of the dominated nations on an approximately reciprocal basis.

21. *Internal Security.* Entries, visits, and activities in the United States of individuals or groups from Soviet-dominated nations are subject to internal security safeguards approved by ICIS (Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security).

22. *Countering Penetration of Less-Developed Areas.* The United States and other Free World nations should seek to counter Soviet efforts to use the dominated nations for penetration of the less-developed

nations. Czechoslovakia is being given a major role in these efforts; Rumania is also being used in connection with the oil industry.

*B. Selected U.S. Agreements With or Pertaining to the Soviet-Dominated Nations*

*23. U.S. Involvements Which May Imply Military Security Guarantees.*

None.

*24. U.S. Commitments for Funds, Goods, and Services.*

None.

*25. Other Agreements.*

Peace Treaty with Bulgaria.

Peace Treaty with Hungary.

Peace Treaty with Rumania.<sup>2</sup>

Surplus Property Agreement with Czechoslovakia.<sup>3</sup>

Surplus Property Agreement with Hungary.<sup>3</sup>

For additional agreements, see *Treaties in Force*.

## II. Current and Projected Programs and Courses of Action

*Note:* Individual action items when extracted from this Plan may be downgraded to the appropriate security classification. Unless otherwise stated, target dates for the following courses of action are all "Continuing".

### *General*

26. In order to promote expanded contacts and to revive and revitalize traditional bonds between the dominated nations and the United States, give encouragement, as circumstances in a particular nation may warrant, and consistent with U.S. economic and trade control policies, to:

a. Contacts between U.S. individuals and individuals in dominated nations in religious, cultural, technical, business, and social fields.

b. Contacts between U.S. business and other organizations and organizations in the dominated nations in comparable fields, including the exchange of delegations of technical experts.

c. Participation, where feasible and appropriate, in internal trade fairs, film festivals, etc., organized by the dominated nations, inviting on a basis of general reciprocity their participation in such activities in the United States.

d. An expanding exchange program of students and teachers and increasing numbers of leaders' and specialists' visits.

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<sup>2</sup> For texts of the treaties of peace signed by the Allied nations with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania at Paris, February 10, 1947, see 4 Bevans 403.

<sup>3</sup> Not further identified.



e. An expanding program of cultural presentations and athletic events designed to increase U.S. prestige and show U.S. interest in strengthening contacts with the peoples of the dominated countries.

*Assigned to:* State, USIA

*Supporting:* Other interested agencies

27. Encourage Western European nations to adopt policies toward the dominated countries parallel to those of the United States, and in particular to concert together through established institutions such as NATO, OEEC, and the Council of Europe for the purposes of (a) taking all practicable steps to extend Western European influence among the dominated nations of Eastern Europe, and (b) exploiting the concept of an integrated, prosperous, and stable European community.

*Assigned to:* State

28. [3 lines of source text not declassified]

*Assigned to:* Defense

29. To the extent possible, provide appropriate informational and public relations support for the political and economic policies and programs set forth elsewhere in this Operations Plan. Through VOA broadcasts in the language of each country and in other major languages beamed to Eastern Europe, continue to present accurate information on news events and aspects of life in America and the Free World, as well as on significant developments in the Communist World which are either ignored or distorted by Communist media, in order to further the goals listed in paragraph 17. U.S. diplomatic personnel should establish contacts to carry on, to the extent possible at any given time, the following USIS-type program activities:

a. Distribute a daily press bulletin to local government officials, members of the diplomatic corps, and local press services and newspapers, based on stories and texts carried in the Special European File transmitted by radio-teletype to each post.

b. Furnish other press material to local editors where there is any likelihood of its use for publication or for background, particularly in such non-political fields as sports, music, science and technology, and art.

c. Arrange for the non-commercial circulation or invitational playing of American films, records, tapes, etc.

d. As opportunities arise, provide films and kinescopes for local TV placement.

e. Conduct a presentation program among selected individuals and groups, featuring books, magazines, brochures, art reproductions, and other suitable materials.

f. Encourage and facilitate the performance of representative American musical and theatrical works by local artistic groups.

g. Arrange for the showing of American cultural and scientific exhibits (in a number of cities in addition to the capital, if possible), accom-

panied as appropriate by the presentation of books, magazines, and local-language brochures and other material.

h. Utilize Legation or Embassy premises for display purposes, through small exhibits in the windows where these are suitably located and adapted, through picture stories on bulletin boards facing the street, and through suitable displays which can be viewed by visitors to mission offices.

i. Maintain in each mission a small reading room accessible to members of the public who have occasion to visit the mission, making sure that adequate supplies of suitable magazines, pamphlets, etc., are on hand for presentation to visitors or replacement of materials taken by visitors.

j. Provide whatever encouragement and material assistance can be given to the teaching of English locally.

k. Utilize the visits of American tourists, businessmen, cultural and sports groups, etc., on a discretionary basis, to widen the dissemination of American informational and cultural materials among the local populace.

*Assigned to: USIA and State*

#### *Albania*

##### *A. Political*

30. When appropriate, recognize and establish diplomatic relations with Albania, subject to certain conditions, including a guarantee of correct treatment of U.S. diplomatic personnel and satisfactory settlement of the question of the validity of pre-war treaties between Albania and the United States.

*Assigned to: State*

31. On a selective basis, where our opinion is sought, encourage Western and pro-Western governments to establish diplomatic missions in Albania.

*Assigned to: State*

32. Continue to maintain informal contact with representatives of the Free Albania Committee in New York. This relationship should be reexamined at such time as United States recognition may be extended to an Albanian government.

*Assigned to: State*

*Supporting: All interested agencies*

##### *B. Information and Cultural*

33. Through VOA broadcasts, which are virtually our only means of contact with Albania, endeavor to sustain the interest of the Albanian people in the United States and the Free World. By means of these broadcasts seek to inform the Albanian people of U.S. policies, particularly toward Eastern Europe, and of developments in the United States, the Free World, and the Soviet bloc.

*Assigned to:* USIA  
*Supporting:* State

34. In the event of United States recognition, permit United States tourist travel to Albania. In the meantime, continue to maintain the procedures under which passports may be individually endorsed for travel to Albania for legitimate business, professional, or compassionate reasons.

*Assigned to:* State

### *Bulgaria*

#### *A. Political*

35. On March 24, 1959, following negotiations in which the Bulgarian Government withdrew charges of espionage made against former U.S. Minister Heath (which had occasioned the suspension of diplomatic relations in 1950)<sup>4</sup> and provided assurances that a U.S. Mission in Sofia would be permitted to carry on normal diplomatic functions, agreement was reached for the resumption of U.S.-Bulgarian diplomatic relations.<sup>5</sup> Preparations are now underway to establish a U.S. Legation in Sofia. The target date is August 1959.<sup>6</sup> Passport restrictions on the travel of U.S. citizens to Bulgaria have been removed.

*Assigned to:* State

36. Upon the establishment of a U.S. Mission in Sofia, the United States should seek to establish and maintain as active and continuous contact as circumstances may permit with Bulgarian officials and leading personalities in other important fields in order to assess the situation there with a view toward determining the courses of action which will best contribute to the attainment of U.S. objectives in that country.

*Assigned to:* State

#### *B. Information and Cultural*

37. Upon the establishment of a U.S. Mission, explore the possibilities for exchanges in the cultural, technical and educational fields as well as opportunities for United States cultural presentations in Bulgaria. Should such opportunities be found to exist, appropriate proposals should be made to the Bulgarians for such exchanges and presentations.

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<sup>4</sup> Diplomatic relations between the United States and Bulgaria were suspended on February 21, 1950.

<sup>5</sup> The United States and Bulgaria agreed to resume relations on March 24, 1959; see the Supplement.

<sup>6</sup> Edward Page, Jr., presented his credentials as Minister to Bulgaria on March 14, 1960.

*Assigned to:* State

*Supporting:* USIA and other interested agencies

38. Upon its establishment, the United States Mission in Sofia should seek to institute such informational activities as a Legation bulletin board and the dissemination of appropriate United States publications.

*Assigned to:* State

*Supporting:* USIA

39. Continue in VOA Bulgarian broadcasts to present accurate information on news events and aspects of life in the American and the non-Communist world, as well as on significant developments in the Communist world which are either ignored or distorted by Communist news media.

*Assigned to:* USIA

*Supporting:* State

#### C. Economic

40. Advise and, when appropriate, assist U.S. businessmen who show interest in exploring Bulgarian trade opportunities when such trade will not contravene strategic trade controls.

*Assigned to:* State

*Supporting:* Commerce

41. Facilitate visits of Bulgarian commercial missions to the United States, consistent with U.S. economic and trade control policies and provided adequate security safeguards can be maintained.

*Assigned to:* State

*Supporting:* Commerce, Justice

#### Czechoslovakia

##### A. Political

42. Seek the permission of Czechoslovakia for the reopening of a consulate in Bratislava at an appropriate time and be prepared to permit Czechoslovakia to open a consulate in the United States on a reciprocal basis.

*Assigned to:* State

*Target Date:* As stated

43. Be prepared to consider any appropriate opportunity offered by the Czechoslovak Government to expand the staff of Embassy Prague from the limitation of 18 presently imposed by the Czechoslovak Government.

*Assigned to:* State

*Supporting:* Other interested agencies

*Target Date:* As opportunity presents

*B. Information and Cultural*

44. Continue in VOA broadcasts to Czechoslovakia to present accurate information on news events and aspects of life in America and the non-Communist world, as well as significant developments in the Communist world which are either ignored or distorted by Communist news media.

*Assigned to:* USIA

45. Consider at the appropriate time official participation in any international trade fair to be held in Brno.

*Assigned to:* Commerce, State

*Supporting:* USIA

*C. Economic*

46. If an economic settlement is reached, consider means of stimulating an expansion of peaceful trade between the United States and Czechoslovakia.

*Assigned to:* Commerce

*Supporting:* State

47. Continue negotiations with Czechoslovakia in an effort to resolve outstanding economic issues between the two countries.

*Assigned to:* State

*Target Date:* August 1959

*Hungary*

*A. Political*

48. Continue efforts to focus world opinion on the Hungarian issue by all appropriate means, including diplomatic action, debate within the UN, and the use of official and non-official U.S. media.

*Assigned to:* State

*Supporting:* USIA and other interested agencies

49. Continue to consult with Free World nations—and especially with the NATO powers—with a view to coordinating policies toward Hungary.

*Assigned to:* State

50. Continue efforts to establish and broaden contacts with officials at all levels of the Hungarian administration with a view to identifying and encouraging those tendencies and elements which may be disposed toward greater national independence.

*Assigned to:* State

51. When and as conditions permit, seek to develop more active relations with the Budapest regime, being prepared in appropriate circumstances to consider an exchange of Ministers.

*Assigned to:* State

52. At an appropriate time, remove the current restrictions against tourist travel to Hungary by U.S. citizens.

*Assigned to:* State

*B. Information and Cultural*

53. Encourage exchanges of athletes, musicians, educators, scientists, technicians, and professional people on a case-by-case basis but do not permit the sending of the Hungarian Folk Ensemble or similar large prestige attractions to this country until the campaign of repression and reprisals in Hungary has ceased.

*Assigned to:* State

*Supporting:* USIA and other interested agencies

54. In VOA broadcasts to Hungary, continue to present accurate information on news events and aspects of life in America and the non-Communist world, as well as significant developments in the Communist world which are either ignored or distorted by Communist news media.

*Assigned to:* USIA

55. When circumstances permit, initiate some informational activities on the Legation's premises, such as the use of window displays on a modest scale and the dissemination of popular U.S. publications to Legation visitors.

*Assigned to:* USIA

*Supporting:* State

56. As conditions permit, consider participation in the Budapest Industrial Fair and/or the Budapest Agricultural Fair to the extent possible in view of other commitments under the U.S. trade fair program. On a reciprocal basis, permit Hungarian participation at the New York Trade Fair or similar events in the United States.

*Assigned to:* State, Commerce, Agriculture, USIA

*C. Economic*

57. Continue to permit Hungarians to visit the United States for business purposes on a case-by-case basis provided adequate security safeguards can be maintained and provided such visits are consistent with U.S. economic and trade control policies.

*Assigned to:* State

*Supporting:* Justice, Commerce

58. In working towards the satisfactory integration of Hungarian refugees in the Free World and in order to minimize redefections to Hungary:

a. Complete the processing of Hungarian refugees as part of the special immigration program under Public Law 85–316 and, pursuant to Public Law 85–559, continue to admit into this country for permanent residence Hungarian refugees paroled into the United States.

*Assigned to:* State, Justice

*Target Date:* September 1, 1960

b. Continue to employ the U.S. Escapee Program to care for and to assist in the resettlement of refugees in other countries, or, if resettlement is not possible, to arrange for their satisfactory local integration.

*Assigned to:* State

### *Rumania*

#### *A. Political*

59. Make every effort to maintain close and continuous contact with the Rumanian Government on as high a level as possible. Even when the situation is such that there is little or no immediate bilateral business to be discussed, United States representatives should utilize every appropriate occasion to make clear to the Rumanian authorities United States views on important international issues and to encourage them to take these views into careful consideration.

*Assigned to:* State

60. Seek to establish and maintain contacts with Rumanians not directly connected with Government but influential in artistic, professional and technical fields.

*Assigned to:* State

*Supporting:* USIA and other interested agencies

61. Continue on every appropriate occasion to point out to the Rumanians that United States restrictions on Rumanian diplomatic travel are purely retaliatory and will be eliminated whenever the Rumanians are willing to do likewise.

*Assigned to:* State

62. With regard to restrictions placed by the Rumanian authorities on the staff and functions of the American Mission in Bucharest, maintain a policy of strict reciprocity wherever feasible with respect to the staff and functions of the Rumanian Mission in the United States.

*Assigned to:* State

#### *B. Information and Cultural*

63. Encourage cultural, technical and educational exchanges between the United States and Rumania and be prepared to consider fa-

vorably such proposals as the Rumanians may make in this field which are not of a nature disadvantageous to the United States.

*Assigned to:* State

*Supporting:* USIA and other interested agencies

64. In VOA broadcasts to Rumania, continue to present accurate information on news events and aspects of life in America and the non-Communist world, as well as significant developments in the Communist world which are either ignored or distorted by Communist news media.

*Assigned to:* USIA

65. Propose U.S. cultural exhibits and presentations in Rumania whenever the nature of available exhibits warrants and appropriate opportunity exists.

*Assigned to:* State

*Supporting:* USIA and other interested agencies

66. In order to assure favorable treatment of U.S. presentations in Rumania, use the influence of the U.S. Government with exhibitors and impresarios in the United States to promote acceptance of reciprocal or equivalent Rumanian presentations in the United States.

*Assigned to:* State

*Supporting:* USIA and other interested agencies

67. Assist, encourage and maintain close liaison with private groups and organizations such as universities and foundations which seek to develop exchanges of persons, materials and information with Rumania, where such proposed exchanges are clearly consistent with United States objectives.

*Assigned to:* State

*Supporting:* USIA and other interested agencies

68. Although prospects for the establishment of a U.S. information library in Bucharest do not appear favorable at the present time, such a proposal should be renewed whenever circumstances may indicate possible Rumanian receptivity.

*Assigned to:* State

*Supporting:* USIA

69. Continue such informational activities as are now undertaken, such as the Legation bulletin board and the dissemination of technical and popular U.S. publications.

*Assigned to:* State

*Supporting:* USIA



*C. Economic*

70. Advise and, when appropriate, assist U.S. businessmen who show interest in exploring Rumanian trade opportunities when such trade will not contravene strategic trade controls.

*Assigned to:* State  
*Supporting:* Commerce

71. Facilitate visits of Rumanian commercial missions to the United States, consistent with U.S. economic and trade control policies, and provided adequate security safeguards can be maintained.

*Assigned to:* State  
*Supporting:* Commerce, Justice

72. Be receptive to Rumanian proposals looking toward a solution of war damage and nationalization issues, and be prepared to discuss these issues with them, but maintain our position against joint examination of each individual claim as set out in the Rumanian–U.S. discussions of October–November 1956.

*Assigned to:* State  
*Supporting:* Foreign Claims Settlement Commission

*Note:* The following National Intelligence Estimates are applicable:

NIE 12–58—Outlook for Stability in the Eastern European Satellites—4 February 1958.<sup>7</sup>

NIE 10–58—Anti-Communist Resistance Potential in the Sino-Soviet Bloc—4 March 1958.<sup>8</sup>

NIE 11–4–58—Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1958–1963—23 December 1958.<sup>9</sup>

NIE 12–59—Outlook in the Eastern European Satellites (tentatively scheduled for consideration in July, 1959).<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Document 2.

<sup>8</sup> Document 3.

<sup>9</sup> Scheduled for publication in volume III.

<sup>10</sup> Document 22.

## 19. Operations Coordinating Board Report

Washington, July 15, 1959.

### REPORT ON SOVIET-DOMINATED NATIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE (NSC 5811/1)<sup>1</sup>

(Approved by the President May 24, 1958)

(Period Covered: From May 24, 1958 through July 15, 1959)

#### *General Evaluation*

1. In the existing state of relative balance between Free World and Soviet bloc military power, voluntary resort to force (including incitement to internal revolution) for the achievement of U.S. policy objectives in Eastern Europe is not in prospect. Therefore, efforts to achieve U.S. policy objectives are based upon the concept of evolutionary development rather than the concept of liberation.

2. Following upon mass disturbances in Poland and the national uprising in Hungary, the Soviet Union has endeavored to tighten the discipline of the Communist parties within the bloc. It has supported the rigorous repression of all active or potential elements of dissent. Nevertheless, certain factors and conditions of instability reflect continuing Soviet vulnerabilities in the bloc countries and afford moderate long-term opportunities for the United States to advance its policy objectives.

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Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, USSR & Satellites—Documents—1959–60. Secret. A cover sheet and an undated covering memorandum by OCB Executive Officer Bromley Smith are not printed. In his memorandum, Smith noted that the Board discussed the report at its July 15 meeting and that the outcome of the negotiations with the Czechoslovak Government for the settlement of U.S. claims “may determine the future of U.S.-Czech relations for a considerable period and also affect the possibility of applying the general policy of 5811/1.” He also indicated the Board concurred in the report for transmittal to the National Security Council and that it had subsequently been discussed by the NSC Planning Board on August 4.

A memorandum from Jeremiah J. O'Connor to Kohler, dated July 15, in which O'Connor indicated he was quoting from his preliminary and informal notes on the OCB meeting that day, reads as follows: “Mr. Sherer opened the discussion by noting that although some may have expected dramatic results, it will be several years before we can evaluate the success of the U.S. policy of promoting the peaceful evolution of the dominated nations toward national independence and internal freedom. The Acting Chairman, Mr. Harr (White House) asked if the time had arrived when private U.S. organizations could operate in other Eastern European countries as is now the case in Poland. Mr. McKisson replied it might soon be possible in Czechoslovakia and Rumania.”

The Board also discussed U.S. policy toward Hungary, tourism in the satellites, the influence of the Catholic Church in certain countries, and trade opportunities between the United States and Czechoslovakia. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>1</sup> Document 6.

These include the deep popular antipathy to Soviet Communism; the disruptive influence of the Yugoslav ideological heresy and Yugoslav independence; the continued manifestations of liberalization in Poland; the inability of the Soviet bloc regimes to broaden their base of popular support; and the failure of these regimes to satisfy basic consumer requirements while pursuing major economic development objectives.

3. The basic problem of U.S. policy in the area is to sustain and encourage by peaceful means the aspirations of the dominated peoples for national independence and human freedom. The effective application of U.S. policy necessarily has involved two separate, though not irreconcilable, lines of approach: (a) continuing refusal to accept the status quo of Soviet domination over the nations of Eastern Europe as a permanent condition and continuing affirmation of the right of the dominated peoples to national independence and to governments of their own free choosing; and (b) efforts to expand opportunities for direct contact with the dominated peoples, particularly in the cultural, informational, economic, and technical fields, as a means of exerting more effective U.S. influence upon future developments. It is clear, however, that the only avenue through which such interchanges can be expanded and developed is the existing regime in each country. The United States accordingly seeks to enter into more active relations with the Soviet-dominated regimes for this purpose wherever conditions permit. So far, significant progress has not been made toward the expansion of direct contacts, and radio broadcasts remain the primary means of circumventing regime controls aimed at excluding Western influence.

4. These two approaches to the application of U.S. policy remain complementary so long as U.S. actions thereunder are properly coordinated and carefully directed toward the accomplishment of our basic objectives. Thus, we stand firmly in support of the principles of independence and freedom and maintain our rights and responsibilities under existing international treaties and agreements. We define and clarify U.S. policy before the world on appropriate occasions. We expose, and condemn as the facts may warrant, the basic evils and defects of the Soviet-Communist system. It is essential, however, that efforts to exploit Soviet vulnerabilities be sober and judicious and take due account of our gradual but positive efforts to develop increased contacts with the dominated peoples through more active relations with the dominated regimes and to foster evolutionary trends toward the ultimate goals of national independence and freedom for the peoples of the area. Expansion of informational and cultural activities within these countries entails reciprocity, but great difficulties are encountered in providing appropriate facilities and support for reciprocal activities sponsored by the dominated regimes in the United States. Private travel by U.S. citizens to the Eastern European area, including tourist travel, has

increased in the past year. The increase is especially noteworthy in the case of travel to Czechoslovakia. However, tourist travel to Albania and Hungary remains precluded under U.S. passport restrictions which are still in effect with respect to those countries.

5. Our efforts to stimulate evolutionary forces and developments in the dominated nations will be vitally affected by our success in strengthening our own free institutions, economic well-being and military power and those of our allies and friends and by the progress we are able to make in resolving other outstanding international issues. Moreover, as has been noted, these efforts are in part dependent on the willingness of the Soviet bloc countries to permit increased cultural and informational exchanges. In view of the few openings permitted us, implementation of our program has been slow and difficult. It is unlikely that progress in the carrying out of U.S. policy toward the Soviet-dominated nations can be accurately evaluated on a short-term basis. Any meaningful assessment of the effectiveness of U.S. policy may be possible only after the efforts and experience of several years.

#### *Albania*

6. We do not recognize and do not have diplomatic relations with the Albanian regime. The Albanian authorities have shown no clear or direct interest in the establishment of relations with the United States. There has been no progress in the achievement of our objectives with respect to Albania. The relaxation of restrictions on travel by U.S. citizens to Albania has resulted in some travel there for business, professional and compassionate reasons. This has had some constructive effect in that it has enabled Albanian-Americans to see at first hand what conditions are really like in Albania.

#### *Bulgaria*

7. On March 24, following negotiations in which the Bulgarian Government withdrew charges of espionage made against former U.S. Minister Heath (which had occasioned the suspension of diplomatic relations in 1950) and provided assurances that a U.S. Mission in Sofia would be permitted to carry on normal diplomatic functions, agreement was reached for the resumption of U.S.-Bulgarian diplomatic relations. Preparations are now under way to establish a U.S. Legation in Sofia. The target date is August 1959.

#### *Czechoslovakia*

8. There has been little progress toward the achievement of basic U.S. policy objectives in Czechoslovakia. The United States has, however, been able to continue the economic negotiations begun in October

1955<sup>2</sup> and there is some hope these will come to a successful conclusion. If an agreement on outstanding economic problems is reached there may well be some improvement of relations which will afford opportunities for more active contacts. Even without such improvement, Embassy Prague has been able to conduct limited but varied informational and cultural activities among certain Czechoslovak groups. Surveillance of the Embassy staff and intimidation of their Czechoslovak contacts are a continuing handicap to these activities.

#### *Hungary*

9. There has been no progress toward the achievement of U.S. policy objectives in Hungary. In the absence of any favorable change in the Hungarian regime's defiant and uncooperative attitude toward the UN and its efforts to deal with the problems arising from the 1956 revolution, U.S. relations with Hungary remain strained, and the United States has continued successfully its efforts to keep the Hungarian situation before World opinion and under active consideration at the UN.

#### *Rumania*

10. The slight progress we have made in working toward U.S. policy objectives within Rumania is reflected mainly in the cultural field where it has been possible to enter into limited exchange activities in several instances. Relations between the United States and the Rumanian regime appear outwardly more relaxed than in years past but undergo occasional acerbation. All basic issues remain unsettled. The interest of the Rumanian regime in developing better relations with the United States remains extremely cautious.

11. From the standpoint of operations, no review of policy is recommended.

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<sup>2</sup> Documentation regarding these ongoing negotiations is in Department of State, Central File 611.49231.

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## 20. Editorial Note

On July 17, in response to a Congressional Joint Resolution, President Eisenhower issued Proclamation 3303 designating the third week in July as "Captive Nations Week." The proclamation concludes:

"I invite the people of the United States of America to observe such week with appropriate ceremonies and activities, and I urge them to study the plight of the Soviet-dominated nations and to recommit themselves to the support of the just aspirations of the peoples of those captive nations."

The proclamation is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, August 10, 1959, page 200.

In his memoirs, President Eisenhower recalled that he had been sympathetic to the Congressional resolution, but would have delayed its passage for some days. On July 21, Soviet Chairman Nikita S. Khrushchev criticized the proclamation and expressed doubts whether Vice President Richard M. Nixon should continue with his plans to visit the Soviet Union. Eisenhower recalled that this did not discourage the Vice President, who told the President that although he recognized the difficulties inherent in making the trip, he was "optimistic and even eager" to go. (Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, page 408). For documentation on Vice President Nixon's visit, see Documents 92-107.

The Captive Nations Week Proclamation also came up at the President's press conference on July 22. A transcript is in *Public Papers of the President of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1959*, pages 536-546.

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## 21. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Operations Coordinating Board (Washburn) to the Members of the Board

Washington, July 29, 1959.

### SUBJECT

Timing of "Captive Nations Week" Observance

"Captive Nations Week" has haunted the Vice President on every day of his stay in the U.S.S.R. Issued on the eve of his departure for

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Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, USSR & Satellites—General—1959-60. No classification marking. An excerpt from Walter Lippmann's July 27 column was attached but is not printed.

Moscow, and in the very week of the opening of the American Exhibition—the timing could not have been more inept.<sup>1</sup>

The coordination of this exercise appears to have fallen between the stools. Congress had originally wanted the week of July 4; the resolution did not even come to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. No one at a high level in State or USIA apparently considered the matter of timing and coordination. The White House did not get into it beyond the routine signing of the proclamation by the President. The OCB did not consider the matter.

Query: Was this one that the OCB should have gotten into? Could a call from Sect State to Senator Fulbright have deferred the observance until after the VP's trip and after the close of our Exhibition? Should procedures be set up by the OCB to head off this kind of bad timing in the future?<sup>2</sup>

A.W.

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<sup>1</sup> Vice President Nixon arrived in Moscow on July 23, where he opened the American National Exhibit at Sokolniki Park the following day and engaged in the "kitchen" debate with Chairman Khrushchev. See Documents 92–107.

<sup>2</sup> A memorandum from O'Connor to Kohler, dated July 29, in which O'Connor quoted from his preliminary and informal notes at the OCB meeting that day, indicates that Washburn raised the issue of whether the OCB had lived up to its responsibilities regarding the timing of the Captives Nations Proclamation. Robert Murphy and Allen Dulles expressed disappointment with the state of affairs. Murphy called the matter another instance of "Legislative diplomacy," but he felt that Soviet criticism had been directed more to the Congressional action than to the Presidential proclamation. (Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, USSR & Satellites—General—1959–60)

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## 22. National Intelligence Estimate

NIE 12–59

Washington, August 11, 1959.

### POLITICAL STABILITY IN THE EUROPEAN SATELLITES

#### The Problem

To assess prospects for political stability within the European Satellites and in the over-all Satellite structure during the next few years.

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Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. A note on the cover sheet indicates that the following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this report: the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff. The note also indicates that the report was concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on August 11. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained because the subject was outside their jurisdiction.

### Conclusions

1. A considerable degree of stability has been established in the Satellite area since 1956 and the Soviet leaders now appear determined to press for a faster pace of socialization in Eastern Europe. While we do not think a return to Stalinist oppression and exploitation is likely, Moscow almost certainly will seek over the next five years a steady though gradual growth in Satellite-wide conformity and adherence to the Soviet model. Increasing emphasis will be placed on efforts to coordinate Bloc economies, to complete the socialization of agriculture in all the Satellites except Poland, and, in general, to attain at least the outward forms required for this "transition to socialism" by 1965.

2. Though pressures on the Satellite peoples may increase as a result of these developments, and may sharpen general antipathy toward the regimes, widespread popular uprisings are unlikely. Factions within the various parties will almost certainly continue to exist—and perhaps occasionally become active—but such factions will, for the most part, probably remain hidden and kept under control by the dominant, Khrushchev-approved elements. Prospects for economic growth are good and there will probably be small but cumulatively significant improvements in living standards. For these reasons, most of the Satellite regimes will probably maintain a fair degree of political stability and achieve at least limited success in fulfilling their ambitious plans for a rapid speedup of socialization.

3. Such successes, however, will probably fall short of Communist hopes. The anti-Communist and nationalistic sentiments of the Satellite peoples, certain weaknesses within the Satellite parties and shortcomings in the Satellite economies will remain major problems which will, at a minimum, retard Communist progress throughout the area. There are, in addition, a number of possible outside factors, including events within the USSR itself (such as a succession struggle), frictions between the USSR and Communist China, or the divergencies of Gomulka's Poland, which could jeopardize the stability of the Bloc structure.

4. The working relationship between Gomulka and Khrushchev now seems to be operating smoothly. Nevertheless, the moderate "Polish road to socialism" is inconsistent with Khrushchev's determination to accelerate Communist progress in the USSR and socialist progress in the Satellites. The Poles may lag farther and farther behind developments elsewhere in the Bloc and thereby become a more and more disturbing element; the Gomulka-Khrushchev modus vivendi may become increasingly strained as a result. We do not expect any dramatic developments in Soviet-Polish relations over the next year or so, in part because of some Polish willingness to respond to Soviet pressures, in



part because of probable Soviet caution. Yet over the long run tensions could slowly build up, possibly to a point of crisis.

5. Despite a further strengthening of its position last year, the East German regime continues to suffer from popular antipathy, party factionalism, and international disrespect, and still depends on the presence of Soviet forces. These facts, together with the division of Germany as a whole, make East Germany the Satellite most likely to be directly affected by major changes in Soviet or Western policies. Its future is inextricably involved in the Soviet attitude toward all Germany and toward the Berlin situation. A resolution of the Berlin crisis along lines favorable to the USSR would strengthen the GDR regime. On the other hand, should the Soviets fail in their efforts respecting Berlin, the political weaknesses of East Germany would probably be perpetuated for the foreseeable future.

[Here follows the "Discussion" section of the estimate.]

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### 23. Letter From Joseph Cardinal Mindszenty to President Eisenhower

Budapest, November 13, 1959.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: On November 4, 1956, when an open breach of word and promise and an entrapment brought into our capital 15 enemy tank divisions with 6,000 tanks, and our Chief of Staff and Minister of Defense became prisoners during negotiations, I knocked on the door of the United States Legation in Budapest and asked for refuge, so as to cry out for help from here for an unhappy nation left with no intelligentsia, and with 25,000 freedom-fighting heroic dead, 75,000 deportees, 193,000 defectors, 100,000 prisoners and labor camp inmates, and 5,000 executed, and to hold in reserve the remains of my life after eight years of imprisonment and three days of freedom. For this I am gratefully thankful to you, Mr. President, knowing that my "sins" and my presence here have brought many difficulties to the Legation and to the United States.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 864.413/12-959. No classification marking. Transmitted to the Department of State under cover of a brief letter from Ackerson to Kohler, November 13. The letter was translated by Leo Topolsky of the Legation staff in Budapest.

Since that time three years have gone by. In proportion to the passage of time, the American saying about the unmoving guest becomes more serious to me. I must notice that the atmosphere has changed completely with the clever peace, dialectical and panic dumping. As for me, I have become an out-of-fashion guest.

I did not intend that my company here should last a long time. For one thing, I had faith in outside help toward my country in proportion to the justice on its side. For another, there was good opportunity for solution on an individual basis. When, at the end of 1957 and early 1958, the case of my "partners in crime" was being considered,<sup>1</sup> I asked that the following be transmitted to the regime: I would go in their place into the prisoner's dock, but only after their release. This matter got snarled; you, Mr. President, do not know of this.

At the time of the election of the Pope,<sup>2</sup> such a stipulation of principle was lacking; for this reason departure from Hungary was not consonant with my thoughts, although I was ready to obey the call from the Vatican.

Now what can be done?

When the candle of Central Europe and my country, which for three years has been growing fainter, has by this time burned to the stump, life is not a joy. Where a nation becomes an indifferent victim, there the evaluation of the lives of those that hold the candles is also different.

In the course of meditation I have thought of leaving a letter behind me and going out and giving myself to the AVO guards around the Legation. They would then torture me as they did before. This too will pass, but much harder than the outside sensation that can be expected to come in its wake. But I had to cast this idea aside: today I cannot serve a higher interest with it, as I could have in 1957 and 1958. And yet moral law forbids us to give up our lives without a higher interest.

Some sort of negotiation could be begun. But this certainly would have no results for either side, for the current softening and thaw did not come either for the good of my country or my course. There would also be a price: an oath to a regime which was not recognized by myself or my host until the end of 1957. (My only assets and consolation for the end of my life: it was my people and not the favor of power which freed

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<sup>1</sup> Presumably a reference to the arrest in December 1957 of Monignor Egon Turcsanyi, Cardinal Mindszenty's secretary during the 1956 revolt, and the sentencing to death on December 10, 1957, of Major Antal Palinkis-Pallavicini, one of the military leaders who helped free the Cardinal during the revolt.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 1, Document 13.

me, and that for a decade and a half—for eleven years of it not free—I did not collaborate with blood, terror or falsehood.)

I now put my case in the hands of my host. Whether he deigns to decide to grant further refuge, or decides on some sort of change, my personal gratitude for the three years remains unchanged. The good deeds over the long period of time appear in the light and mirror of the loaf of bread and sip of drink in the Gospel.

Repeating my gratitude for the goodness and the refuge, I remain,  
Mr. President,

Most respectfully yours,

**Joseph Cardinal Mindszenty**<sup>3</sup>  
*Prince-Primate of Hungary  
and Archbishop of Esztergom*

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<sup>3</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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**24. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State  
for European Affairs (Kohler) to Secretary of State Herter**

Washington, December 9, 1959.

**SUBJECT**

Cardinal Mindszenty

*Discussion:*

Our Chargé d'Affaires in Budapest, Mr. Ackerson, has recently forwarded a letter addressed to the President by Cardinal Mindszenty (Tab D).<sup>1</sup> This letter, unlike the Cardinal's previous letters, is concerned

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 864.413/12–959. Secret. Drafted by McKisson, cleared with Vedeler, and concurred in by Merchant and Wehmeyer (L/EUR).

<sup>1</sup> Document 23.

with his situation of refuge rather than his views on conditions in Hungary or on international issues. Mr. Ackerson's letter of transmittal (Tab E)<sup>2</sup> provides some explanatory comments on the Cardinal's message.

The Cardinal's letter and Mr. Ackerson's comments touch upon two background matters of importance: the possibility of arrangements whereby the Cardinal might be able to leave Hungary under safe conduct guarantees; and the question of communication between the Cardinal and the Vatican. The immediate matter of a reply to the Cardinal's letter also arises.

1. A US request in October 1958, made at the express desire of the Vatican, that the Cardinal be permitted to leave Hungary under safe conduct guarantees was flatly rejected by the Hungarian Government.<sup>3</sup> In October 1959, however, during a discussion of Austrian-Hungarian relations, the Hungarian Foreign Minister orally informed the Austrian Foreign Minister that if the Austrians would submit a specific proposal to the Hungarian Government for the Cardinal's "release" from Hungary, such a proposal would be seriously considered. We have informed the Austrians that we would welcome an arrangement ending the Cardinal's refuge in the Legation and permitting him to leave Hungary in safety, provided that such an arrangement was also acceptable to the Vatican and to the Cardinal. The Austrian Foreign Minister has communicated with the Vatican through the Papal Nuncio in Vienna and is now awaiting an expression of the Vatican's views in the matter. The Austrians have agreed to consult further with us upon receipt of the Vatican's views.

2. Although Mr. Ackerson in his letter refers to the "policy of keeping the Cardinal in complete isolation, without any contact even with the Vatican", we do not feel that this is an accurate statement of the position which the Department has adopted in this regard. We have made it clear both to Mr. Ackerson and to the Vatican (through the Apostolic Delegate here) that the Department is prepared to accept and transmit occasional brief oral or written communications between the Cardinal and the Vatican which are not of a political or ecclesiastical character but relate rather to the Cardinal's refuge in the Legation or his personal

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<sup>2</sup> Tab E was Ackerson's letter of November 20, in which he furnished additional comments to those he had made in the November 13 letter by which he transmitted the Cardinal's letter to the President. Ackerson provided background for some of the Cardinal's statements and concluded that the Cardinal's letter was "only one more instance of the misfortune which had necessarily to result from the policy of keeping the Cardinal in complete isolation, without any contact even with the Vatican." He stated further that he had always felt that the policy was wrong. He strongly recommended that the reply to the letter "should, at the very least, show some understanding for his difficulties and express our continued hospitality until such time as it might be considered safe for him to leave the Legation."

<sup>3</sup> See Document 13.

spiritual problems and state of mind in relation to his situation of refuge. This position is consistent with the principle, to which we have also adhered, that it would be neither advisable nor proper for this Government to permit Cardinal Mindszenty to use the American Legation in Budapest as a base for ecclesiastical or political activities. We are firmly convinced that continued adherence to this policy is in the best interests not only of the US but also of the Cardinal himself.

3. Previous letters addressed by the Cardinal to you and to the President have consisted mainly of expressions of his personal views on the internal situation in Hungary, the Hungarian problem as an international issue, and various aspects of the East-West conflict. It has been our established practice to avoid involving the President or you in direct correspondence with Cardinal Mindszenty on these matters, since any response in such circumstances would be likely to encourage more frequent messages from him and sooner or later might lead to an embarrassing situation. Consequently, we have instructed Mr. Ackerson on each such occasion in the past merely to inform the Cardinal that his letters have been received in the Department or by the White House, as the case may be. We continue to believe in the soundness of this procedure, where the subject matter of Cardinal Mindszenty's communications to US officials is of a political nature.

In the case of the Cardinal's present letter, we believe that a somewhat different procedure is warranted because of its special nature. In view of the President's absence from the country,<sup>4</sup> and with the approach of the holiday season, we believe that it would be appropriate in this case for you to send the Cardinal a written message (1) extending season's greetings to him and (2) reassuring him that this Government will continue to afford him refuge within the premises of the American Legation so long as consideration for his personal safety and freedom requires such refuge. Such a letter would be in line with Mr. Ackerson's recommendation and would do much to sustain the Cardinal's morale and contribute to his peace of mind. If you approve, the White House will be informed by a memorandum enclosing copies of the Cardinal's letter and your reply.

*Recommendations:*

(1) That you sign the attached draft letter to Cardinal Mindszenty (Tab A);<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Eisenhower left the United States on December 4 for an extended trip which took him to Italy, Turkey, Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, Iran, Greece, Tunisia, France, Spain, and Morocco.

<sup>5</sup> Not printed. The attached draft was dated by hand December 11, apparently indicating that the letter as sent to Mindszenty through the Legation in Budapest bore that date.

(2) That you approve the transmittal of your letter to Cardinal Mindszenty under cover of the attached draft official-informal letter to Mr. Ackerson which I have signed (Tab B);<sup>6</sup>

(3) That you approve the attached draft memorandum to the White House enclosing the original of Cardinal Mindszenty's letter and a copy of your reply (Tab C).<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup>Herter initialed his approval of this recommendation on December 11. Tab B, a copy of Kohler's letter to Ackerson, which bears the stamped date December 11, is not printed.

<sup>7</sup>Herter initialed his approval of this recommendation on December 11. Tab C, a memorandum of December 11 from the Director of the Executive Secretariat, John A. Calhoun, to Goodpaster at the White House, is not printed.

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## 25. Editorial Note

On January 15, 1960, Manning H. Williams, on behalf of Robert M. McKisson, Chairman of the Operations Coordinating Board's Working Group on Soviet-Dominated Nations in Eastern Europe, sent two memoranda to the Executive Officer of the Board. One memorandum noted briefly that the agencies represented on the Working Group "have reappraised the validity and evaluated the implementation of the U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet-Dominated Nations in Eastern Europe (NSC 5811/1) in the light of operating experience and believe there is no need for the National Security Council to review the policy at this time and that there are no developments of such significance as to warrant sending a report to the National Security Council." The other memorandum indicated that the Working Group had reviewed the Operations Plan for the Soviet-Dominated Nations in Eastern Europe, dated January 23, 1959, and revised on July 2, 1959, and considered the plan "adequate for the present time."

In separate memoranda attached to each of these memoranda, Bromley Smith, Executive Officer of the Board, noted that the Board Assistants at their meeting on January 15 had concurred on behalf of their principals in the judgments made by the Working Group. Copies of all these memoranda are in Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, USSR & Satellites—Documents—1959–60. NSC 5811/1, the OCB Report, and the Operations Plan, as revised on July 2, 1959, are printed as Documents 6, 19, and 18, respectively.

## 26. Editorial Note

At the luncheon meeting of the Operations Coordinating Board on March 30, the Board's Chairman, Gordon Gray, raised the subject of the July 1959 Captive Nations Resolution and asked that the executive departments "be alert to use their initiative and offer advice when such matters are before Congress." Under Secretary of State Livingston Merchant said that he had little sympathy with the 1959 resolution, calling it "inaccurate and undignified," although he acknowledged "some of the inherent difficulties faced by the Executive in this type of operation." (Excerpt from the preliminary and informal notes on the meeting, as quoted in a memorandum from O'Connor to Macomber, October 30; Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, USSR & Satellites—General—1959–60)

The discussion apparently was sparked by a number of similar resolutions that had been introduced in the Congress. On August 5, 1959, Congressman Alvin Bentley had introduced H. Res. 337, which urged that no summit conference be held until the Soviet Union and the Communist governments in Central and Eastern Europe had taken some visible steps toward the holding of free elections. While this resolution was still pending before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the spring of 1960, Senator Paul Douglas introduced S. Con. Res. 95 on March 21, which was the same as one introduced that day in the House of Representatives by Congressman Michael Feighan. It listed the "puppet Communist regimes" imposed on the peoples of Poland, Hungary, Lithuania, Ukraine, Czechoslovakia, Latvia, Estonia, White Ruthenia, Romania, East Germany, Bulgaria, mainland China, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, North Korea, Albania, Idel-Ural, Tibet, Cossackia, Turkestan, North Vietnam, and others, and, among other things, urged the President "to pursue energetically and as a matter of first priority at the forthcoming Summit Conference the inalienable right of all people to self-government, individual liberty, and the basic human freedoms, and, in particular, the restoration of these God-given rights to the people of the captive nations." Douglas also introduced S. Res. 102, which was the same as H. Res. 633 introduced by Congressman Clement Zablocki. These two resolutions were limited to the "captive nations of eastern and central Europe."

At the Operations Coordinating Board meeting on April 6, these several resolutions were discussed by Merchant, who said that the timing of the resolutions was not good, although he recognized that "a certain irresistibility attached to them." He said that the Department of State was completely opposed to the resolutions giving a long enumeration of nations, but the type confining itself to the nations in Eastern and Central Europe was "less undesirable." The Board members were in

agreement with Merchant's views, but did not reach any conclusions as to what action to take. (Excerpt from the preliminary and informal notes of the April 6 OCB meeting, as quoted in a memorandum from O'Connor to Macomber and Kohler, April 6; *ibid.*)

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## 27. Despatch From the Legation in Hungary to the Department of State

No. 5

Budapest, July 6, 1960.

REF

Legation's Despatch No. 413, January 23, 1959<sup>1</sup>

SUBJECT

Relations Between Hungary and the West

With the completion of action on the Hungarian Question at the 14th Session of the General Assembly in December and the elapse of the year 1959, the Legation undertook a review and reexamination of United States policy toward the existing Hungarian regime. This review was never forwarded to the Department since the conclusions and recommendations resulting therefrom were found to be not essentially different from those contained in the despatch under reference. In view of the forthcoming 15th Session of the General Assembly, however, some reconsideration of our position and of our policy is perhaps appropriate.

With respect to United States-Hungarian relations, there has been little fundamental change since the exchange of Notes which took place in the late months of 1958. The Legation felt (and continues to feel) that the Department's Note of November 21, 1958,<sup>2</sup> "set the record straight" with respect to the regime's failures to meet its international obligations and placed full responsibility for an improvement in its international situation squarely on the regime. The Hungarian Government, in the following months, sought by various means to foist this responsibility

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.64/7-660. Confidential.

<sup>1</sup> Document 16.

<sup>2</sup> The text of this note was quoted in telegram 129 from Budapest, November 19, 1958. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.64/11-1958)



on the United States, but these efforts were unavailing and, except for some sporadic and desultory conversations on the subject between United States and Hungarian officials in both capitals and an exchange of Notes in Washington in May and June 1959 on the matter of the ILO Conference of that year,<sup>3</sup> the regime has done little more than to reiterate its innocence through whatever propaganda means have been available to it.

The regime's quest for respectability has, however, not been entirely unattended by some measure of success. A number of Western and neutralist governments have begun to weary of the battle on the "Hungarian Question" and the voting with respect to the credentials of Hungarian delegations at successive meetings of United Nations bodies has tended to become less [*more?*] favorable to the Hungarians<sup>4</sup>—not, however, to a degree which has by any means satisfied the regime, which seeks full recognition and respectability without making the slightest concession to the numerous Resolutions of censorship which are still outstanding in the General Assembly. The speeches made by both Kadar and Khrushchev at the Congress of the Hungarian Communist Party toward the end of 1959 were bitter and slighting about the 14th General Assembly and, while some effort was made to play upon the "spirit of Camp David" as an indication of improvement in East-West relations which might be expected to extend to Hungary and the Hungarian Question, the continued stationing of Soviet troops within the country was confirmed and a "hard line" toward any opposition to the regime was clearly manifested (Despatches 312 and 317, December 3 and 4, 1959).<sup>5</sup>

There is no evidence that this hard line has been modified or abandoned since the Party Congress at the end of last year. On the contrary, there is abundant evidence that it was put into effect and that it is being followed ruthlessly and thoroughly at the present time. The following are some of the manifestations of this harsh policy:

A. The Soviet forces continue to be better equipped and better trained than were those which occupied Hungary at the time of the 1956

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<sup>3</sup> These notes have not been further identified.

<sup>4</sup> December 1959: 14th General Assembly—No decision on credentials continued, but Hungary made a member of Outer Space Committee.

April 1960: Second Law of Sea Conference—No decision on credentials. (Credentials accepted at 1958 Conference.)

June 1960: ILO Conference—No decision (Hungarian credentials refused at two previous ILO Conferences). [Footnote in the source text.]

<sup>5</sup> Despatch 312 described Kadar's speech of November 30 in which he commented at length on Hungarian foreign policy. (Department of State, Central Files, 664.00/12-359) Despatch 317 commented on Khrushchev's visit to Budapest on November 28. (*Ibid.*, 033.6164/12-459)

outbreak. While some slight reduction in numbers of occupying forces, as announced, may have occurred over the past year or eighteen months, there has been no reduction in effectiveness and no impairment of the capacity of these forces to repress quickly, effectively, and ruthlessly any disturbance which might manifest itself within the country.

B. The para-military forces (Frontier Guards, Workers' Militia, AVH) of the Ministry of Interior, which is itself under direct Soviet control, have been recreated and are clearly repressive organs of great power and complete ruthlessness. The promises made by Kadar and others of the regime shortly after the Revolution that these organizations would not again come into being have long since been forgotten and discarded.

C. Arrests, secret trials, internal deportations, and executions for participation (or, often, alleged participation) in the "events" of 1956 continue. It is not easy to get hard information on these occurrences, but enough confirmed examples have come to the Legation's attention (and been reported to the Department) to lead one to believe that many of the other reports (which cannot be entirely confirmed) are probably true. The regime is highly sensitive on this score and, probably as a result of the publicity which these developments received abroad and at the U.N., has again tightened up on security in an effort to prevent reports of this nature from leaking out. There is no reason to believe that the arrests, trials, and executions have ceased or even diminished; on the contrary, there is still, despite the measures taken by the regime, sufficient evidence to confirm that they are continuing. (Legtels 237 and 248, March 14 and 31; Despatches 553 and 619, April 6 and May 12, 1960)<sup>6</sup>

D. While still proceeding against individuals (both those who participated in 1956 and others), the regime is now engaged in an intensive and extensive class war, as manifested by the following developments:

1. Forced re-collectivization of the peasants over the past two years (the collectives having very largely disintegrated during the Revolution). This process continues, as is made manifestly clear by the statements of regime officials and by the press, as well as by reports received from peasants calling at the Consular Section of the Legation. (Despatch 322, December 8, 1959)<sup>7</sup>

2. Suppression of artisans and small business enterprises. (Despatch 360, December 31, 1959)<sup>8</sup>

3. Increasing demands on workers through socialist labor competitions (i.e., "speed-ups"), which are written about extensively in the press on the theory that they are manifestations of "voluntary" contributions to socialized production.

4. The enforcement of total submission on all of the churches. Any semblance of an entente between church and state has been

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<sup>6</sup> These telegrams and despatches all report on the continuing executions of participants in the 1956 revolt. All are *ibid.*, 764.00 and 764.005.

<sup>7</sup> Despatch 322 reported on the call for a new collectivization drive and the announcement of the Second Five-Year Plan made at the 8th Congress of the Hungarian Communist Party. (*Ibid.*, 764.005/12-859)

<sup>8</sup> Despatch 360 reported that private Hungarian foreign trade representatives had recently been deprived of their licenses. (*Ibid.*, 864.19/12-3159)

completely abandoned and the communist goal of total abolition of religion is apparently considered possible of attainment. (Despatches 554 and 611, April 6 and May 5, 1960)<sup>9</sup>

5. Attacks still continue—but most of the “dirty work” has now been accomplished—against writers and lawyers; teachers; actors, musicians, artists; doctors; any other groups having similar bourgeois propensities and which the regime may consider dangerous as foci of attack against the socialist society. (Despatches 566 and 621, April 12 and May 12, 1960)<sup>10</sup>

The screw is, of course, not tightened in all directions and on all elements of the population at one and the same time. (The regime has learned from the “salami tactics” of Rakosi, as evidenced by carrying out its policy of collectivization of agriculture over a period of years and in separate sections of the country, rather than in all parts of the state at one and the same time.) The following recent developments, seemingly “on the other side of the ledger”, have led some observers outside Hungary (but certainly few if any inside) to conclude that there has been a “relaxation of controls” and the adoption of a “more liberal domestic policy” (quotations from an article by M.S. Handler of the *New York Times* from Vienna, published in the *Los Angeles Times* of June 5, 1960):

a) *Consumer Goods*. The Soviets found it expedient—indeed, necessary—to accord a measure of economic relief to this country after the destruction which had been wrought in 1956. This was done not only through loans (and perhaps even grants), but by means of a letting up on the rapid socialization of the economy. This new turn made itself particularly manifest in the frantic effort to efface all outward evidence of destruction in the streets of Budapest (albeit that the scars of World War II remain) and in the increase in consumer goods made available on the internal market. Some of these were goods which could not be marketed in the restricted international markets of 1958 and early 1959, but others were produced or imported for the specific purpose of bolstering the new regime and of appeasing the people who had made so manifest their feelings of despair during the events of 1956.

It is, however, a mistake to exaggerate (as some foreign observers seem inclined to do) the extent of this amelioration. Prices are still extremely high in relation to average income and the quantity (not to speak of the quality) of goods available does not begin to meet the potential demand. Even stable agricultural products, natural to the land and of which this country is normally a large exporter, are periodically in short supply.

b) *Increase in Travel*. A number of Western missions in Budapest have observed, in recent months, a considerable increase in the number

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<sup>9</sup> Despatch 554 discussed Church–State relations in Hungary. (*Ibid.*, 864.413/4–660) Despatch 611 described certain conflicts between the government and the Church. (*Ibid.*, 864.413/5–560)

<sup>10</sup> Despatch 566 described informal conversations on March 28 between a Legation staff member and certain Hungarian intellectuals. (*Ibid.*, 764.00/4–1260) Despatch 621 reported on Hungarian intellectual and academic trends. (*Ibid.*, 511.643/5–1260)

of Hungarians being granted passports for travel (but not for emigration) to the West. This is particularly true for certain favored groups (artists, musicians, sports teams), whose return to Hungary is considered a reasonable risk because the economic position of those to whom these passports are given is enough of an attraction to ensure their return. The regime also seems prepared to take a certain amount of loss through defection in return for the favorable international publicity which this more liberal policy brings the regime. It remains true, however, that many thousands of passports are refused and that emigration is still a mere trickle. This Legation, for instance, receives many more applications for U.S. immigration visas than there are applicants with the necessary passports. Emigration to Israel is likewise at the same vanishing point at which it has stood for the past two years. (Despatch 598, April 28, 1960)<sup>11</sup>

c) *Amnesty*. The regime announced an amnesty, effective the first days of April. The provisions of this amnesty were not very broad (Despatch 551, April 1, 1960)<sup>12</sup> and, since the regime has maintained (and continues to maintain) such close secrecy with respect to the numbers of people under arrest, it is difficult to know the extent to which this amnesty has brought relief. The Foreign Ministry itself has given two estimates—"around 500" in one case and 4,000 in another (Legation's Despatch 571, April 14, 1960).<sup>13</sup> In view of the meager news given in the press and the vague claims made by regime spokesmen, it may be assumed that the effect has not been broad or deep. It should likewise be borne in mind that the fate of those who have been pardoned is frequently not a rosy one. In the few cases known to the Legation, the amnestied persons are finding all work and all sources of income closed to them, so that they may again become liable to arrest or to internal deportation for having no visible means of support.

Thus, while an effort has been made by the regime to make it appear that repression against the Hungarian people has ceased or materially abated, it is clear that the complaints made against the regime (and against the Kremlin) in a series of General Assembly resolutions since 1956 remain essentially valid. The imposition of the present puppet regime was effected through the armed intervention of the U.S.S.R. (and continues in power because of the same armed support); the violations of human rights and freedoms have not abated (and there are signs of their having increased in recent months); the regime continues to refuse to permit the entrance into Hungary of representatives of the United Nations in their official capacities (Prince Wan, Sir Leslie Munro, Secretary General Hammarskjöld). The judicial murders of Imre Nagy, General Maleter, and their two companions in June 1958 were a mani-

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<sup>11</sup> Despatch 598, Joint Weeka 17, surveyed political and economic developments in Hungary for the previous week. (*Ibid.*, 764.00(W)/4-2860)

<sup>12</sup> Despatch 551 described the government's March 31 decree granting a partial amnesty to participants in the 1956 revolt. (*Ibid.*, 764.00/4-160)

<sup>13</sup> Despatch 571 was Joint Weeka 15. (*Ibid.*, 764.00(W)/4-1460)

festation of continuing repressive measures and defiance of the United Nations by the regime.

Despite this record, the representatives of the regime have continued (except at the ILO meetings in 1958 and 1959) to speak and to vote at meetings of the General Assembly and other U.N. bodies. It would seem grotesque that “representatives of the very regime which has been convicted by the General Assembly of usurping power over the Hungarian people with the help of Soviet tanks, should be permitted to speak for Hungary in that Assembly” (“Hungary under Soviet Rule III” published by American Friends of the Captive Nations, September 1959). While there may have been some semblance of reason for following such a policy (although the Legation had not felt this to be the case) so long as a *détente* between East and West appeared to exist and the prospect of some accomplishment at a Summit Conference was at least a flickering hope, any such excuse for continuing a procedure which can only do serious harm to the standing of the United Nations in the eyes of the people of the world would seem no longer to hold any semblance of validity. The Legation therefore feels that the policy of “no decision” with respect to Hungarian credentials should be abandoned and that the credentials should be refused, until such time as this regime (or some successor government) complies with the repeated resolutions of the General Assembly.

The Legation is aware of the fact that enough support may not be mustered in the General Assembly and other United Nations bodies for the adoption of such a policy. The Legation is likewise aware that the wrath of the regime will be intensified against the Western governments and, in particular, against the United States for seeking such action, but it is felt that the integrity and good name of the United Nations are of more importance than any additional inconvenience which the Western missions in Budapest may experience as a result of the votes cast by their governments in an effort to withhold from this regime the forum of the United Nations for its propaganda and attacks.

**Garret G. Ackerson, Jr.**  
*Chargé d’Affaires ad interim*

**28. Despatch From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State**

No. 26

Prague, July 14, 1960.

**SUBJECT**

Policy Reflections After an Iron Curtain Tour

A tour of duty in Eastern Europe is bound to sharpen one's impressions of what we can or cannot hope to achieve there. The observations that follow sum up a few such reflections after three years in Prague.

Probably the deepest lesson one gets from such a sojourn is the reminder of how crucial our overall strength is to our policy efforts here or in any part of the world. The small countries make this particularly plain by their sensitivity to where the balance lies.

This truth, though old, comes home with fresh force behind the Curtain, where the intractability of the people to Soviet assimilation efforts fluctuates in direct ratio to the evidence of Western, above all American, vigor and purpose. If we say, with respect to this part of the world, that our basic hope is to see the Bloc people resist Soviet absorption while the West seeks means of drawing them back eventually into some kind of reintegration with Europe, we are bound to add that this will largely depend on the degree of élan and achievement we manage to show in our policy elsewhere around the world, whether in Africa, Latin America, Asia, or at home, no less than in Europe. There is little possibility of our influencing the course of events in the Bloc if we are fumbling or falling behind elsewhere.

If we meet this condition, then we may have a chance to achieve something in the long run by our efforts to keep up maximum contact with the nations of the eastern half of Europe. That their communist rulers know this is shown by their care to limit and control interchange with the West and to keep us out, as a rule, when they think our presence would be too obviously unsettling. A simple example is the Czechoslovak refusal to let us put on a separate exhibit at their Brno Fair. But with their own commercial interest calling for exchanges, and with the facts of technology as well as geography making a good deal of intermeshing of Europe inevitable even through the Curtain, we have considerable means of keeping in touch with those peoples and probably, by showing maximum resourcefulness as well as ability to surmount

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.60/7-1460. Confidential. A notation on the source text indicates that, at Tims' suggestion, copies of the despatch were sent by the Department of State to Moscow, Sofia, Belgrade, Budapest, Bucharest, Bonn, Frankfurt, Munich, and Vienna.

excessive caution and red-tape of our own making, can gradually enlarge the areas of contact. Much of the actual give and take can best be carried on by our European allies, but the ultimate responsibility remains largely on the United States.

This is illustrated with special force by the case of Western Germany, whose great potential leverage on Eastern Europe is barred by absence of normal ties and is in part nullified by the Sudeten extremists and similar revisionist parties, whose actions the Polish and Czechoslovak communists exploit effectively in their anti-German propaganda. Seen from east of the Curtain, Western Germany is a focal point of all the factors negating Western leverage on the Bloc, and a place where the United States has only half exercised its preponderance for the purpose of conducting policy toward the Bloc. Though remaining militarily strong in Germany, we have neglected our political leadership and failed to insist, for example, on a sane West German posture toward Poland and Czechoslovakia which would substantially deflate their fears once for all, or to press for a bolder West German policy of rapprochement with the satellites in general. An opportunity was lost in 1958, for example, to exploit a Czechoslovak bid to Bonn for diplomatic relations, whose establishment might have forestalled the cruder outbreaks of anti-German propaganda that have emanated from Prague ever since and would have opened the way for constructive West German presence inside the Iron Curtain.

We can also do more on our own account, as any Curtain tour teaches one, to improve the range and quality of the American impact here, even through the barriers erected by the communist functionaries. There is no warrant for being discouraged by absence of visible results. A program of engagement, economic, cultural, and political, with the regimes and peoples of this area is by its nature a holding action whose subversive effects, if any, must appear only in future showdowns in the larger international sphere.

Peaceful interchange, for all its modesty as a policy, has a double advantage for our side. The net gain from any exchanges with the communist countries is undoubtedly for the Free World; the unsettling effect is their direction, not ours. And secondly, the challenge we make is more compelling, more universal than Khrushchev's; it goes mere coexistence one better by demanding a breaking down of Chinese walls and a free intermingling. We have a principle here to which the world responds much more naturally than to his.

For the *Chargé d'Affaires* a.i.

**Richard W. Tims**

*First Secretary of Embassy*

**29. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Kohler) to Secretary of State Herter**

Washington, July 14, 1960.

SUBJECT

EUR comments on foreign policy section of Democratic "Basic Platform"

The following comments are submitted in response to the request received from S/S for an assessment from the EUR point of view on "the totality of the foreign policy section of the Democratic Party platform:"

As the program of the opposition political party, the text of the abbreviated so-called "basic platform" of the Democratic party<sup>1</sup> obviously contains a note of criticism, implied and in some cases specific, of current foreign policy. As far as EUR is concerned, we find nothing that should cause any real difficulty, and most of the statements of objectives do not differ essentially from the foreign policy purposes which have guided the Department. The text of the whole platform, however, is not yet available in Washington and this apparently contains more specific and detailed points.

One particular item which may be noted is that the "basic platform" contains two paragraphs which could be interpreted to apply principally to the captive nations of Eastern Europe. These are in accord with the Department's policy to try to reach the Eastern European peoples through exchanges and contacts; on the other hand, the "basic platform" neglects a traditional element in our policy in failing to express support and sympathy for the aspirations of the captive peoples of Eastern Europe.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.60/7-1460. Official Use Only. Drafted by Hillenbrand.

<sup>1</sup> Attached to the memorandum was a copy of page 21 of *The New York Times* of July 13, which contained the text of the abbreviated "Basic Platform" read at the Democratic National Convention.



### 30. Operations Coordinating Board Report

Washington, July 27, 1960.

#### REPORT ON SOVIET-DOMINATED NATIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE (NSC 5811/1)

(Approved by the President May 24, 1958)

(Period Covered: July 15, 1959 through July 27, 1960)

##### I. General Evaluation

1. The Soviet Union has continued to maintain varying degrees of discipline over the Communist Parties within the Bloc and has supported the Bloc regimes in their repression of all dissent. Despite these efforts at consolidation, however, certain factors of instability have reflected continuing Soviet vulnerabilities in the dominated nations and have afforded opportunities for the United States, particularly on a long-term basis, to make some progress toward its policy objectives. These factors include the deep antipathy to Soviet Communism; the disturbing influence upon the Soviet bloc of the Yugoslav ideological heresy and of Yugoslavia's example of successful independence; the manifestations of limited liberalization in Poland; the persisting inability of the Bloc regimes to establish a broad base of popular support; and the general problem still faced by these regimes of satisfying consumer demands while pursuing major economic development objectives. Although it is too early at this time to assess the full import of ideological differences between the Soviet Union and Communist China, the development of such differences to any serious extent may give rise to contention within the Communist parties and regimes and ultimately have an

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Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, USSR & Satellites—Documents—1959–60. Secret. According to an undated covering memorandum by OCB Executive Officer Bromley Smith, the report was concurred in by the Board, after some revisions, at its meeting of July 27, and was transmitted to the NSC Planning Board. Smith also said that the Planning Board noted the report at its August 16 meeting and decided that the Department of State should prepare a revision of NSC 5811/1 (Document 6). See Document 32.

According to O'Connor's July 27 memorandum to Kohler, in which he quoted from the informal notes of the OCB meeting that day, Sherer told the OCB that although there was no prospect of any dramatic progress toward national independence in Eastern Europe, there had been a few encouraging developments in U.S. relations with Bulgaria and Romania. The members discussed the relative military power of the United States and Soviet Union and "agreed that it would be a misinterpretation of the Report if a reader should conclude therefrom that the evolutionary policy of the US for the area was founded on a judgment that in military power the US and USSR were at parity." (Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, USSR & Satellites—General—1959–60)

adverse effect upon the unity of the Bloc. Such a development would add to Soviet vulnerabilities and afford new opportunities for the U.S. to exploit the situation.

2. It has remained the basic problem of U.S. policy in the area to nurture the aspirations of the dominated peoples for national independence and human freedom and to find effective means for promoting peaceful evolution toward these goals. Our approach to this problem has necessarily involved carefully coordinated efforts in two directions: on the one hand, we have continued as a matter of basic principle to make it clear that we do not accept the status quo of Soviet domination over the nations of Eastern Europe as a permanent condition and that we support the right of the dominated peoples to national independence and to governments of their own free choosing; on the other hand, we have sought to expand our direct contacts with the dominated peoples, particularly in the cultural, information, economic and technical fields, as a means of exerting greater U.S. influence upon future developments in these countries.

3. Such interchanges can take place and be developed only with the acquiescence of the existing regime in each dominated country. We have accordingly entered into more active relations with the Bloc regimes for this purpose wherever conditions have permitted. Exchanges with the dominated countries have raised some problems of reciprocity. It is important, therefore, that the United States enlist appropriate facilities, develop procedures, and provide adequate support as may be required by considerations of reciprocity. During the past year encouraging, though still limited, progress has been made in expanding contacts and developing more active relations with certain of the dominated nations. Another means of reaching directly the people of the dominated areas has been international broadcasting. While U.S. foreign-language broadcasts, officially and privately sponsored, are heavily jammed in urban areas, they can be heard in suburban rural areas. English-language and music programs are not jammed.

4. Khrushchev's tactics of contacts and negotiations with the United States and Western Europe during most of the past year have served to encourage varying degrees of interest on the part of the Bloc regimes in more active relations with these same countries. Whether these more favorable conditions for intercourse with the dominated nations will continue to exist indefinitely in the aftermath of the collapse of the recent Summit Conference<sup>1</sup> cannot clearly be foreseen. For the present, however, there has been no adverse change with respect to prospects for the development of exchanges.

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<sup>1</sup> Reference is to the collapse of the Paris summit conference in May 1960.

5. The expansion of U.S. contacts with the dominated countries, by creating a continuity of interest and demonstrating the benefits to be derived from such associations, may serve to place the Bloc regimes under popular pressure, as well as pressure from certain elements within the bureaucracy itself who favor expanded contacts with the West, to progressively enlarge the volume and the areas of such interchange.

6. While endeavoring to establish more active relations with the Bloc regimes as a means of facilitating contacts with the peoples of the dominated countries, it will continue to be necessary, on appropriate occasions, to articulate our policy in support of the right of those peoples to independence and freedom and to expose and condemn, as the facts may warrant, the fundamental evils and defects of the Soviet Communist system. It is essential, however, that our efforts along this line should be carefully timed and judicious in character. We must take due care that we do not, by purely negative actions, impair our positive efforts to develop broader contacts with the dominated peoples and to project our influence through such contacts for the advancement of our long-term policy objectives.

7. It is clear that any progress in stimulating evolutionary forces within the dominated nations will be dependent to an important degree upon our success in strengthening our own democratic institutions, economic well-being and military power and those of our Allies and friends as well as upon the contributions we are able to make toward the just resolution of international issues which vitally affect the entire world. It is evident from our past experience and from the very nature of problems that confront us in Eastern Europe that programs for advancing our objectives with respect to the dominated countries must be conceived on a long-term basis and evaluated with due understanding of this time factor.

## II. Country Evaluations

### *Albania*

8. We do not recognize and do not have diplomatic relations with the Albanian regime. Consequently, there has been no progress toward the achievement of our objectives with respect to Albania, and there is unlikely to be any until such time as the Albanian regime undertakes some clear-cut initiative seeking recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations. The relaxation of restrictions on travel by U.S. citizens to Albania has resulted in some travel there for business, professional and compassionate reasons. This has had some constructive effect in that it has enabled Albanian-Americans to see at first hand what conditions are really like in Albania.

*Bulgaria*

9. The American Legation in Sofia was opened on March 14, 1960 and is now fully operative. The general atmosphere which has thus far prevailed in U.S.-Bulgarian relations has been favorable. The Bulgarian Minister in Washington has indicated his Government's interest in entering upon discussions in due course of various matters including financial claims, trade, and cultural exchanges. The United States has taken advantage of the invitation extended to it by the Bulgarian Government to take part in the 19th Plovdiv International Fair (September 18–October 2, 1960).

*Czechoslovakia*

10. Little progress has been made toward the achievement of U.S. policy objectives in Czechoslovakia. The economic negotiations begun in October 1955 are continuing, however, and there is still some hope that these may be brought to a successful conclusion. Some improvement of relations, which would afford opportunities for more active contacts, might well follow upon an agreement in this field. In the meantime, we have been able to conduct limited but varied information and cultural activities among certain Czechoslovak groups through our Embassy, though harassments of the Embassy staff and of their Czechoslovak contacts are a continuing handicap.

*Hungary*

11. There has been no substantial change in U.S. relations with Hungary, which remain strained. The Hungarian regime has persisted in its refusal to cooperate with UN efforts to deal with problems arising from the 1956 revolution. The declaration of a partial amnesty in Hungary on March 31, 1960, along with fewer reports in recent months of secret trials and executions in Hungary, affords some measure of hope that the regime may abandon the active campaign of reprisals which it has hitherto carried out against those who participated in the national uprising. There is little prospect, however, that U.S. policy can be applied with any effectiveness in Hungary until there is clear evidence that the Hungarian regime has ameliorated its policy of internal repression and modified its defiant attitude toward the United Nations. U.S. passport restrictions on travel by American citizens to Hungary were lifted on April 29, 1960.<sup>2</sup> This action will serve to facilitate and encourage private contacts by Americans with Hungarians in many fields.

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<sup>2</sup> For text of the Department of State press release of April 29 announcing the lifting of the travel restrictions to Hungary, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 16, 1960, p. 797.

*Rumania*

12. Substantial progress has been made in the past year in U.S.-Rumanian relations. Following negotiations begun on Rumanian initiative, an agreement settling U.S. financial claims against Rumania was reached on March 30, 1960.<sup>3</sup> Subsequently, talks have also taken place and are continuing with the Rumanian Government on cultural and technical exchanges. Prospects appear favorable at this time for concluding arrangements in this field which may serve to provide the United States with modest opportunities for advancing its policy objectives with respect to Rumania.

III. Policy Review

13. From the point of view of operations, no review of policy is recommended. To conform with NSC Action 2215-c,<sup>4</sup> editorial updating of the "General Considerations" portion and other pertinent sections of NSC 5811/1 is required. (For example, relations with Bulgaria have been resumed since the policy paper was approved.)

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<sup>3</sup> For text of the agreement, as well as texts of letters exchanged on March 30, 1960, by the two governments and the Department of State's two press releases of that date regarding the agreement, see *ibid.*, April 25, 1960, pp. 670–673.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 32.

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**31. Letter From the Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs (Vedeler) to the Minister in Romania (Wharton)**

Washington, September 7, 1960.

DEAR CLIF: I hope that you will excuse our tardiness in replying to your letter of August 1<sup>1</sup> with regard to the question of an approach to the Rumanian Government on relaxing travel restrictions. We have been spread a little thin in EE these past weeks due to transfers and summer vacations, and I wish to comment as fully as possible on the matters discussed in your letter. The possibility of getting travel restrictions removed is one that we have continued to have very much in mind. I feel,

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.6611/10–1260. Confidential; Official-  
Informal. Drafted by McKisson.

<sup>1</sup> Not found in Department of State files.

as you do, that the time may be drawing near for undertaking such an approach to the Rumanians.

We are in full agreement with your view that, in the light of the modest progress that has been made during the past 9 or 10 months in US-Rumanian relations, a unilateral *démarche* on the problem of travel restrictions would seem to offer better prospect of some favorable result than a multilateral approach involving not only the US but other Western Governments. A multilateral approach would inevitably appear to the Rumanian regime as an effort to exert collective pressure. I think it is certain that the Rumanians would view it with deep suspicion as a propaganda tactic and reject it out of hand. On the other hand, a US proposal linked to recent more favorable developments in our bilateral relations might command Rumanian attention and interest and offer far better chances of success.

We think that you should make the final decision as to the precise timing of any *démarche* on this subject. Presumably this might be at some point following the resumption of the talks here on cultural and other exchanges when there is reasonable prospect that the talks will have some positive outcome but well before you are scheduled to leave Rumania.<sup>2</sup>

We have checked out informally with SCA the question whether your anticipated approach to the Rumanians on travel restrictions is a matter requiring *prior* consultation with other government agencies here or with the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security and have ascertained that it is not necessary to do so. It might be well, however, to note two complications that could arise in connection with the removal of travel restrictions on a reciprocal basis. One of these, which might be raised by the Rumanian side, is the fact that in addition to the State Department travel restriction involving prior notification there is also an entirely independent and additional requirement maintained by the Pentagon according to which all foreign military attachés are expected to give 24-hour prior notification to the appropriate US service branch or branches before leaving Washington on any trip. Even though agreement were reached by us with the Rumanians to remove existing State Department and Rumanian Government travel restrictions on a reciprocal basis, the Defense Department requirement on prior notification as it applies to the Rumanian attachés would remain unaffected. The Rumanians might choose to make an issue of this.

The other possible complication is one that might be raised by interested quarters outside the State Department. It would have reference to

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<sup>2</sup>Wharton left his post on October 21 to assume the position of Ambassador to Norway.

a situation where the Rumanians and ourselves might have agreed to removal of the prior notification procedure on travel but where the Rumanians would continue to designate certain areas within Rumania as closed to diplomatic travel. As you know, we have not set up similar closed zones here, although some years ago we let it be known to the Rumanians that we reserved the right to bar travel within the area bounded by the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers should considerations of reciprocity of treatment so require. We have invoked this only on one or two occasions some years ago. In other words, if the Rumanians insisted on retaining their system of closed zones, this could lead to ultimate insistence here that we set up a comparable system of closed areas. We in EE would prefer, of course, to avoid any such system of designated zones, even if the Rumanians continued to maintain that particular form of restrictions, for it is somewhat complicated to establish and to maintain. However, it could become a problem, if other agencies were to make an issue of it at the time the prior notification restrictions were mutually removed or thereafter.

With regard to the two possible difficulties outlined above, I think that no useful purpose would be served at this point in trying to decide precisely how such complications should be handled. Generally speaking, however, I wonder whether the simplest and most realistic way to handle them, if they arise, is not simply to agree to cancel them out one against the other: i.e., the Rumanians would probably retain their closed zones, and the Pentagon, on the other hand, would continue its requirement of prior notice on all travel by Rumanian Legation military personnel in the US.

It is our understanding that Minister Macovescu recently indicated to Frank Siscoe that he planned to resume the talks on cultural and other exchanges about September 20.<sup>3</sup> We should know pretty well how the talks will turn out after the first meeting or two.

In closing, I might add with regard to your mention of Rumanian eagerness in pressing the matter of raising the respective missions to Embassy status that we now have this subject under active study and are planning to produce a draft staff study within the next several weeks with a view to reaching a decision in the period immediately following the US elections. You may be interested to learn that the Bulgarians are making similar noises. As I suggested in our conversation last May in Paris,<sup>4</sup> we in EUR feel that the elevation of our few remaining Legations to the status of Embassies is sound in principle but that the real problem lies in the timing of such moves in relation to the state and progress of

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<sup>3</sup> See Part 2, Document 30.

<sup>4</sup> No record of this conversation has been found.

our relations with the particular country concerned. There is, of course, a highly delicate public relations situation (involving the Congress, the émigrés, the US public, and the Soviet-dominated peoples) to be faced and properly dealt with at such time as we may be ready to act. We shall be in touch with you, of course, as this matter develops further. Meanwhile, any further thoughts you have on the subject would be most welcome.<sup>5</sup>

With warmest regards,  
Sincerely,

**Harold C. Vedeler<sup>6</sup>**

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<sup>5</sup> In a September 30 letter to Vedeler, Wharton wrote that he was planning to leave Romania about October 21 and planned to call on Foreign Minister Lazareanu about October 14 to discuss the questions of exit permits, documentation for dual nationals, and travel restrictions. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.6611/10-1260)

<sup>6</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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## 32. Editorial Note

At its 440th meeting on April 7, in NSC Action No. 2215-c, the National Security Council noted the statement made by the President during the meeting that he wished to leave NSC policy papers that remained in effect in current condition for the next administration. Accordingly the Council's Planning Board should submit to the Council revisions in NSC policy papers for the purpose of bringing them up to date. However, in those cases where the policy papers required revisions only of a purely editorial nature, the Planning Board was to make a written report to that effect to the Council as a matter of official record. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

Pursuant to this action, and in accordance with the OCB's decision at its July 27 meeting (see the source note, Document 30), the NSC Planning Board on October 14 reviewed NSC 5811/1 (Document 6) and determined that only revisions of an editorial nature were necessary to bring the paper up to date. It accordingly made minor changes on certain pages to reflect changed circumstances and events that had occurred since May 24, 1958. These revised pages were transmitted to the



Council under cover of an explanatory memorandum from NSC Acting Executive Secretary Marion W. Boggs, dated October 17, with the request that they be inserted in copies of NSC 5811/1 and the superseded pages destroyed. The revised paper bore the original date of May 24, 1958, but included in the margin at the bottom of the revised pages the following phrase: "Editorially revised 10/14/60." Boggs also requested that Annex A of NSC 5811/1 regarding military troops in Eastern Europe be deleted from the paper. A copy of Boggs' memorandum, with the revised pages as attachments, and a copy of NSC 5811/1, with the editorial revision of October 14 included, are in Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5811 Series.

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### 33. Instruction From the Department of State to the Legation in Hungary

A-37

Washington, October 21, 1960.

#### SUBJECT

Some Informal Remarks by Kadar

A friendly and reliable source has recently had an opportunity for an informal discussion with Kadar during his visit to New York to attend the UNGA session. The source has written down Kadar's remarks from memory and made them available to the Department. It is believed that Kadar suspected that his remarks would be passed on to the United States Government. The report of Kadar's remarks is given below for the Legation's background information:

#### *U.S.-Hungarian Relations*

"Since the events of 1956, there have been a lot of childish (gyerekes) things going on between our two countries. I want to be frank with you. Both the U.S. Government and we Hungarians have been acting like a couple of kids. Periodically, we expel one another's diplomatic representatives: one American for one Hungarian. I don't think this is an intelligent (okos) thing to do. Let us explore the possibility of an understanding.

"I don't like the Germans (I mean Adenauer's Germany) but to illustrate my feeling on this subject, I would use the German word

'Realpolitik' to describe the way this matter should be treated. We do not hate the Americans. After all, let us be realistic: Who are we? We are only a 'little louse' (kis tota) in this big world. However, the prerequisite for normal relations is a willingness on the part of the U.S. Government to recognize the hard facts. The People's Republic of Hungary is an accomplished fact. It is here today. It will stay here tomorrow. All you have to do is to recognize this fact. The rest is simple. We could then resume normal diplomatic representations instead of this ridiculous (navetaeges) Chargé d'Affaires business."

#### *Hungarian Internal Conditions*

"The U.S. Government talks about Hungary being a Soviet satellite. Now on this subject let me tell you the following. It has cost the U.S.S.R. a lot of money to help normalize our conditions after 1956. Today we are happily engaged in constructive work. Our people enjoy freedom. No more of the Rakosi terror. Believe me, we don't take people to prison in the middle of the night any more. If you don't believe me, then talk to our writers, our intellectuals who were released from prison. Talk to Tibor Dary, the writer. And all this nonsense about Khrushchev dictating everything in Hungary—it is simply not true."

#### *U.S.-Hungarian Trade*

"I was very happy to talk with Mr. (Cyrus) Eaton; he is a capitalist but the right one with common sense. He feels that you should do business with us. You know, we lost more than 500,000 soldiers in World War II. Many of our material assets (bridges, industrial installations) were destroyed. Then we suffered so much during the events of 1956. Why don't we resume normal trade relations?"

#### *The Mindszenty Case*

"I would like to emphasize again that the whole problem is simple. All you have to do is to recognize the facts, recognize that our Republic is here to stay. The other problems would practically solve themselves. In fact, there are no real problems. For example, take this (Cardinal) Mindszenty case. Let me tell you something: The present situation works to our advantage. Why? Because the poor devil (szegeny ordog) is unhappy at your Legation in Budapest. We neutralized him. As long as he is there, we have no trouble. Suppose we let him go to Rome. There he could cause a lot of trouble. Suppose we manage to throw him in jail. There he could cause a lot of trouble by becoming a 'martyr'. No, we do not want to make a martyr out of him. We Communists know the difficulties caused by martyrs. Let me assure you, once the U.S. recognizes that there was such a thing as the People's Republic with Kadar as its leader, we would not have a single problem. I cannot emphasize that strongly enough."

*Rupture of Diplomatic Relations*

"I sincerely hope that whatever happens at the UN (after that debate on the so-called 'Hungarian Question'), it will not result in further worsening of U.S.-Hungarian relations. If it is possible, we would like to avoid the breaking off of diplomatic relations with your country. But we simply must act as grown-up people. Let us talk quietly about our problems. Quietly, you understand."

*Red China*

"My secretary tells me about reports of the American press and I must say here: false reports—concerning the alleged controversies between Khrushchev and Mao Tse-tung. This is a lot of nonsense again. We Communists like to argue a great deal among ourselves. It is in the family (a czaladian van). But don't think for a moment that the two leaders would become enemies! If you want to know, the real problem is this: How can you realistically ignore 650,000,000 people? How can you deny them the right to join the Family of Nations? Why don't you come to an agreement with China? There is a lot of talk about the Cold War becoming more and more menacing. It would be so simple to solve this problem by recognizing this wonderful People. During my visit there I was greatly impressed by their constructive work."

*Kadar's Trip to the U.S.S.R.*

"I had a wonderful vacation there (in the Crimea in August 1960 as Khrushchev's guest). We visited a place at the Caspian Sea where the Volga empties into the Caspian. I enjoyed that very much because the weather was excellent, not like New York with its high humidity."

*Kadar's Trip to the UNGA Session*

"My press officer told me that some of the American newspapers wrote that my trip to New York was a 'last minute surprise' and that I, along with my colleagues from Rumania and Bulgaria, was ordered by Mr. Khrushchev to come to the U.S. This is not true. The American press, as usual, did not tell the truth. *We worked out the plans for our New York trip during our Crimean visit.* And what is so surprising about our coming here to attend the UN meeting? Every leading Government official has the right to attend. I hope that next time I come the conditions between the U.S. and Hungary will be better so that it will not be necessary to have so many policemen around."

*The Trip on the Baltika*

"We had two bad days. I must admit that I was seasick. We just took it easy aboard the *Baltika*. No special meetings. There was no need for conferences. Everything was worked out in advance. Our average speed was twenty knots."

*On Tito*

"I heard that Tito, this great hero (nagy hes) was afraid of the boat ride around Manhattan. I am sorry that the Police Department cancelled the previous plans for me to circumnavigate Manhattan. I also heard that the Police were afraid that some one might drop a bomb from one of the bridges during our boat ride. Tell the Police I am not afraid. I am not from Yugoslavia."

*The Restriction to Manhattan*

"Of course, it is silly (butasag) that your Government restricted me to Manhattan. I would have liked to see the countryside, but as I have previously told you, I would not beg (konyorog) for permission to leave Manhattan. Apart from that, I enjoyed my sightseeing trips and appreciate the courtesies shown me by the Police and the State Department representatives. Frankly, I would not like to live in New York. Not enough trees and (laugh) too many policemen. Grant's Tomb impressed me very much. We know his name in Hungary. I signed the guest book registering our deep respect."

*Khrushchev's Threat to leave the UN*

"I was surprised to learn from my Press Officer that, according to the American press, Mr. Khrushchev threatened to leave the UN if his conditions are not met. This is a misinterpretation of his remarks. Mr. Khrushchev works for world peace. We Hungarians also want peace and he is ready to negotiate with everybody. I don't believe that he wants to quit the UN."

*On a Communist U.S.*

"I must tell you in earnest: *We have no illusions concerning the possibility that the U.S. will become a socialist or a communist state.* We Hungarian Communists are realists. We know that your country is capitalist, and it will not adopt our system."

(Source: Mr. Kadar, this does not seem to be in line with Mr. Khrushchev's remark to the effect that our grandchildren in the U.S. will live under Communism.)

"What makes you think that we have to go along with everything our Comrades say? We Communists like to argue with each other. That is the democratic thing to do. The principal thing is that the East and West must co-exist in peace and that we must negotiate. Take this present UN debate. It is much better to shout (kisbalai) at each other than to shoot (loni) at each other."

*Personal on Kadar*

Kadar said of himself that he was the son of a peasant father, that he liked the trees, the fresh air. His secretary added that Kadar likes to hunt

and that he likes to visit zoos. ("Every time Mr. Kadar visits a city where there is a zoo, he insists on seeing the animals.") His interpreter, Brdelyi, stated that while Kadar speaks "good" Russian, he prefers Brdelyi, a graduate of the University of Leningrad, to translate his words in Hungarian, into Russian when talking with a Russian.

Source added that at a reception, attended by Khrushchev and satellite officials, Khrushchev "ignored Kadar, as usual, while holding court."

*The Kadar Entourage*

Sources gained the impression that Lare Hallai was not an important member of the entourage. On the other hand, Janos Vertes appeared to be an important member of the group. His name appeared on the official UN list of fourteen names, members of the Kadar party on the *Baltika*.

**Herter**

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**34. Memorandum From Secretary of State Herter to President Eisenhower**

Washington, November 10, 1960.

SUBJECT

Raising the Diplomatic Missions at Bucharest, Rumania and Sofia, Bulgaria From Legations to Embassies

The United States has followed the practice in the postwar period of raising virtually all of its diplomatic missions to Embassy status. Our only remaining Legations in Europe are at Budapest, Hungary, Bucharest, Rumania, and Sofia, Bulgaria. Our current relations with Hungary are anomalous and wholly negative. Therefore, I do not recommend any change in the status of our Legation at Budapest.

In view of the positive development of our relations with Rumania and Bulgaria in recent months, I believe that United States interests

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series. Confidential. The source text bears Eisenhower's handwritten initials "DE."

would be served by raising our Legations at Bucharest and Sofia to Embassies at an early date. Such action would strengthen our diplomatic presence in Rumania and Bulgaria and place us in a better position to influence the Rumanian and Bulgarian Governments toward more active and positive relations with the United States and a less dependent relationship with the Soviet Union. I enclose a memorandum outlining recent developments in our relations with Rumania and Bulgaria and further discussing the proposal that our Legations there be raised to Embassy status.

I recommend that you authorize the elevation of our Legations at Bucharest and Sofia to Embassies.<sup>1</sup>

Christian A. Herter

### Enclosure<sup>2</sup>

#### SUBJECT

Relations with Rumania and Bulgaria

Several positive developments have occurred in our relations with Rumania and Bulgaria during recent months. During the past year an agreement settling American financial claims against Rumania was concluded.<sup>3</sup> This agreement may facilitate expanded contacts in the economic field. We are presently engaged in talks with the Rumanians on cultural and other exchanges, and a student exchange program is already in operation. The Bulgarians have recently expressed interest in undertaking negotiations for the settlement of financial claims and the conclusion of arrangements for cultural and other exchanges.

The elevation of our Legations to Embassy status would signify that we attach increasing importance to our relations with Rumania and Bulgaria and intend to pursue an active policy with respect to these coun-

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<sup>1</sup> In a conference on November 15, the President rejected this request. The memorandum of the meeting, prepared by John S.D. Eisenhower, reads: "The President said that the State Department must be thinning out automatically with all the new embassies they are creating. He knows of no increase in personnel of the foreign service. Just that day he had received three requests for new embassies, which requests he had turned down. He had specified that money can be saved if these offices remain legations. To top it all, these locations are behind the Iron Curtain." (*Ibid.*, DDE Diaries)

<sup>2</sup> Confidential. Prepared in the Department of State.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 3, Document 30.

tries. As Ambassadors, our Chiefs of Mission would be in a more favorable diplomatic position in terms of personal prestige and would be placed on the same level as the Soviet bloc diplomatic representatives in Bucharest and Sofia. The raising of our Legations to Embassy rank would also serve to re-emphasize our interest in the peoples of Rumania and Bulgaria and in the future course of development of these nations.

We anticipate that certain quarters within the United States may contend that a change in the status of our Missions from Legations to Embassies would be a step lending new prestige to the Rumanian and Bulgarian Governments. We do not consider such a contention justified. We are confident that it can be answered by making clear that this step does not connote approval of the policies of the Rumanian and Bulgarian regimes but rather affirms more strongly our interest in the welfare of the Rumanian and Bulgarian peoples and our intention to enter upon more active relations with them. We already maintain Embassies at Moscow, Warsaw and Prague, and it is accepted that the status of these three Missions in no way implies approval of the policies and character of the governments concerned.

The problem of bringing about peaceful evolutionary change in Eastern Europe in the direction of freedom from Soviet domination is one of the major challenges we face in our foreign policy. We believe that we now have certain opportunities for projecting our influence more actively and effectively in Rumania and Bulgaria toward this end. The elevation of our Missions to Embassy status will, in our judgment, afford us a more solid basis for the pursuit of our policy objectives in these countries.

We would, of course, plan to consult with the British and other of our allies and to inform other NATO Governments before taking action.

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**35. Paper Prepared in the Embassy in Czechoslovakia**

Prague, November 18, 1960.

**SUBJECT**

Some Aspects of U.S. Policy Toward the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic

**I. Summary**

The period immediately following the U.S. presidential elections<sup>1</sup> may be a favorable one for an internal review of the present status of Czechoslovak-United States relations and for formulating possible innovations and changes. The American elections may also mark a favorable time for a new and different approach to the Czechoslovak authorities. Following Moscow's lead, the Czechoslovak government has not attacked President-elect Kennedy but states that his policy must be given the benefit of the doubt until its definite character becomes clear. In practical terms, this means that the Czechoslovak government is not now formally committed to an attitude of hostility to the new US administration and that it has, in relative terms, more freedom of maneuver with regard to relations with the United States than has been the case for some time. Naturally, Czechoslovak policy will continue to follow the main lines of Soviet policy, but within the narrow limits imposed by this over-riding condition, there is room for some variation: Rumania, for example, seems well ahead of the CSSR in the degree to which it accepts the more constructive consequences of a policy of "peaceful co-existence" in its relations with the United States.

The enclosed paper suggests that our overall objective in Czechoslovakia within the framework of more general policies directed at the Soviet Bloc as a whole could be defined as the encouragement of gradual change through constantly bringing to bear both on the general population and the Communist ruling class the force of Western thought and example—in other words, as an essentially educational process. As suggested in the paper, our long-range aim, which may require a generation or more of effort, could be said to be the alteration of the ideological direction and content of Czechoslovak society away from Leninism and toward a democratic socialism without expansionist aspects (under this situation, there would be a possibility of further class

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.49/11-1860. Confidential. Transmitted to the Department of State as an enclosure to despatch 308 from Prague, November 18, which indicated that the paper had been prepared by Jonathan Dean. Although the paper was not a final submission on the subject, it was submitted "at this time as evidence of the direction our thinking is developing."

<sup>1</sup>The Presidential election, in which Democratic candidate John F. Kennedy defeated Republican Richard M. Nixon, was held on November 8.



change but the goal is already sufficiently ambitious as stated). The underlying assumption of the paper is that the world-wide Communist system and with it the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia will continue indefinitely, that consequently the Czechoslovak regime itself must be the major source of change, and that the major weight of our effort must therefore be in the direction of affecting the views and outlook of the regime itself, both directly and indirectly. Our intermediate aim, which might be achieved within five to ten years, is to bring the CSSR to the level of intellectual receptivity which characterizes present-day Poland. The paper proposes that our immediate objective, and the essential condition of the entire subsequent effort, should be to obtain wider and continuing access to the general population and to the ruling class in the CSSR for the carriers of American and Western ideas—American officials, private citizens and Western films, broadcasts, and books.

In contrast to longer-range American political aims, Czechoslovak aims toward the U.S., as analyzed here, are mainly concerned with trade and information gathering. Although conceived by us as an orderly step by step development in the direction of goals similar to those described above, the pattern of present negotiations and the sequence of subjects now envisaged for future negotiation with the CSSR may result in the Czechoslovaks receiving the economic benefits they desire from us before our principal interests are negotiated on, thus depriving us of leverage in the direction of increased access or opening up of Czechoslovak society to outside intellectual influences.

As a way out of these tactical difficulties and a contribution to the clarity of our own immediate objectives, it is suggested that we consider the merits of formulating as a single package a proposal for an overall adjustment of Czechoslovak-American relations which would balance Czechoslovak economic interests against our interest in obtaining effective access and would be designed to be advanced directly to President Novotny and to gain serious top-level consideration as a question of overall Czechoslovak national interest. In isolation, many of the individual suggestions advanced in the paper would be unpalatable to one side or the other. Taken together, the long-range advantage is considered clearly to favor a United States objective as described above; most of the shorter range benefits would accrue to the Czechoslovaks. It is believed that the rough balance struck in this way may be close enough to cause serious consideration of the proposal by the Czechoslovak authorities and to give the package some chance of ultimate acceptance. The Czechoslovaks would realize perfectly well the nature of our long-term objectives, but they may now have become confident enough about the long-term prospects of the Communist Bloc to take the risk—under prevailing conditions, no firmer prediction can be hazarded. Accep-

tance of the substance of the proposal, even if detailed negotiation lasted for several years, would set the tracks for a serious long-range US effort to change the situation in Czechoslovakia. In terms of this possible gain, the tactical approach suggested is believed worth consideration by the Department.

## *II. Czechoslovak Policy Toward the U.S.*

It is possible to construct a model of Czechoslovak policy toward the United States from private and public statements of Czechoslovak officials and from the actions of the regime. It can be assumed at the outset that, given their size and potentialities, the Czechoslovak communist leaders are under no illusions as to their capacity directly to affect the formulation of US policy on major world issues or to perceptibly affect the intellectual climate of the United States in the direction of acceptance of a communist system. Although they would like to see a fundamental re-orientation of American society according to their conceptions, they cannot attempt this directly, and will work toward it only marginally. Their aims are more modest. They probably are: (a) to gain acceptance on the part of American public and official opinion of the present regime as the legitimate and lasting government of Czechoslovakia. This arises partly from a Communist desire for respectability, partly from realization of the importance of such recognition for the attitude of the Czechoslovak public and the internal consolidation of the regime, and partly because such acceptance would increase the efficiency of Czechoslovak operations in the uncommitted areas. (b) The second major Czechoslovak aim in regard to the United States is the acquisition of information. This covers military information, information on U.S. intentions, and, probably most important of all to the Czechoslovaks, technical, industrial and scientific information. (c) A third major aim of the Czechoslovaks is the increase of trade with the United States. In this field they are interested: (1) in the general sense of increasing their foreign sales of Czechoslovak specialty products; (2) increasing their supply of easily convertible dollars; (3) gaining commodities or equipment in short supply in the bloc area; and (4) obtaining physical possession of goods or equipment which can be copied or otherwise used for the improvement of Czechoslovak technology.

Of these aims (a), the achievement of acceptance and respectability in the United States, is probably considered by the Czechoslovaks as a long-range project though it could be accelerated by specific American actions. However, the remaining aims of collecting information and increasing trade, though of continuing nature, are susceptible of immediate substantial improvement through specific measures now under discussion between the two countries.

*III. United States Aims Toward Czechoslovakia; the Process of Change in the CSSR*

In contrast to Czechoslovak aims toward the US, the chief goal of American policy toward Czechoslovakia is to bring about fundamental social and political change. In view of the small size and controlled nature of the Czechoslovak market, we are not primarily interested in an increase of trade, and then less from an economic than from a political viewpoint having to do with a decrease of Czechoslovak dependence on the USSR and the general opening-up effect of increased trade. (Expanding Czechoslovak trade with the U.S. would make the Czechoslovaks more susceptible to US pressure: the Canadian Minister notes that the Czechoslovaks fear adverse publicity in the Canadian press because of the apparently rapid effect it has in decreasing the sale of Czechoslovak products, particularly consumer goods.) In the field of information, too, though we are interested in information we may obtain from Czechoslovak channels regarding Soviet military and political intentions, we are primarily interested in information which would contribute to our overall aim of bringing about a fundamental change in Czechoslovak society.

Though it does not have positive support from a majority of Czechoslovak citizens, the Czechoslovak government is in firm physical control of the country. Under the conditions of modern nuclear warfare and demonstrated Soviet determination to use military force to maintain control over Eastern Europe, complete overthrow of the regime would be possible only through a cataclysm at the center of power in Moscow, an already distant prospect which recedes still further with the passage of time and the material and foreign policy successes of the Soviet regime. In practical terms, this means that any important change in the existing Czechoslovak system must come through the regime itself. The primary agencies of such change may be said to be five in number:

1. Changes originating in the world outside of Czechoslovakia, mainly the USSR or the uncommitted world, which appear to require or make desirable corresponding changes in the Czechoslovak position in order to improve or maintain the regime's control over the population, to increase the productivity of the Czechoslovak economy or to improve the prospects for a further increase of Communist influence in the world.
2. Changes in the composition of the top Czechoslovak leadership, bringing men of different personalities and intellectual shadings to the fore.
3. Internal technological or organizational developments requiring policy modifications for the sake of higher productivity or more effective methods of controlling or influencing the population.
4. Major, lasting trends in popular opinion requiring shifts or modifications of policy for the sake of maintaining full political control and high productivity; and

5. Changes or modifications in the convictions of the leadership group resulting from confrontation with other ideas and concepts—the ideas of the individual leader can and do change on an intellectual basis even in the limiting conditions of Communist society. A central point of the argument of this paper is that it is possible over a long period by example, argumentation, and discussion to affect the views of individual members of the indispensable core of true believers which are the motive force of any society and to alter these views—in this case in the direction of decreased belief in the universal applicability of Leninist thought or toward a gradual alteration of its actual content.

It is recognized that in practice the five elements described are inter-twined and that any given decision to modify existing policy or institutions may result from a combination of two or more factors; they are set down in separate form for the purpose of analysis. United States policy has the capacity to affect the possibility of change within Czechoslovakia by the nature of its policy towards the USSR and the uncommitted areas and by the success or failure of those policies; resolution of some outstanding difficulties with the USSR would clearly have a beneficial effect in opening up the CSSR and other Soviet-dominated countries and a deterioration, the opposite effect. (There is also some prospect of affecting the development of thought in the USSR in the opposite direction of launching new ideas at the periphery of the Communist system and using connections among Bloc leaders to get them to their ultimate Soviet target.) Similarly, the success or failure of the Communist movement in the uncommitted areas or in countries allied to the U.S., again partly a function of U.S. policy, would have a direct effect on the views of the Czechoslovak leadership group and on the tenacity of their attachment to Marxist doctrine. However, these factors of change, which are the major possibilities, are outside the scope of this report, which is limited to discussing the much narrower subject of what we can do inside Czechoslovakia. Under present circumstances, also, it is beyond the capacity of the United States to significantly affect the composition of the Czechoslovak leadership group or to have direct influence on the economic or administrative structure of the country.

This leaves open the two final possibilities, that of gradually influencing public opinion until there crystallize demands and interest of such dimensions and urgency that the regime must somehow take account of them, and that of directly influencing the views of the ruling class itself (by ruling class is meant the entire range of top technicians and Party members—a group of about 20,000 in round figures). Though modulated according to target group, the means used in both cases are the same—radio, film, exhibits, printed word and most important of all, personal contact, while the fact that the audience is not as sharply divided as is often thought should be kept in mind. Nevertheless, this

analysis emphasizes that it is through the ruling group that changes must be made. It therefore may be concluded that the most effective and economical way of causing change is to concentrate on the effort to directly affect their views and convictions.

These considerations suggest two conclusions for American policy toward Czechoslovakia: the first is that any policy based on the concept of furthering change through the introduction of new ideas into Czechoslovak society (even an increase in interest in consumer goods is an idea in this sense) manifestly requires a great deal of time for real results—possibly as much as a generation or more even under more favorable conditions than now pertain.

The second conclusion is that the main requirement for the execution of such a policy is the widest possible degree of “access”. By “access” is meant access to both the Czechoslovak leader group and to the general population for the intellectual content of American life and of Western civilization through the medium of print, radio, film and personal contacts both in Czechoslovakia and in the United States. Access must involve US officials as well as private citizens, for the former can be of great potential importance in direct influencing of Communist leaders, and even more important, in identifying target persons and groups and working out effective methods and vehicles for the transmission of new ideas. It is believed that our overriding aim in negotiation with the Czechoslovaks should be to obtain access in this sense of the word. Though there are some exceptions, this access can be granted in important and effective measure only by the leadership group itself. This group is of course opposed to the policy aims which cause us to seek access, and aware of their dangers. It may be possible to overcome this opposition by balancing a certain measure of access directly against the Czechoslovak aims of achieving acceptance, information and an increase in trade though it is candidly admitted that given the Bloc orientation of the bulk of Czechoslovak trade the sum of these inducements may not be sufficient.

#### *IV. The Sequence of Negotiation*

Given the primarily economic and information-gathering nature of their interests, the Czechoslovaks are now concentrating on the following topics in their dealings with us: (a) establishment of a Czechoslovak trade mission in New York City; (b) Most Favored Nation treatment for Czechoslovak imports (these points have been introduced in connection with present economic negotiations); (c) removal of mutual limitation on the number of diplomatic personnel; (d) establishment of further Czechoslovak consulates in the United States; (e) U.S. participation in the Brno Fair; and (f) Czechoslovak participation in US trade fairs. (In addition, the Czechoslovaks are interested in a change in US strategic

controls and very possibly in US credit though they realize that these points are too far in the future for serious discussion at this time.)

It is felt that the Czechoslovak advantage in all of these points exceeds the U.S. advantage even though a U.S. advantage is involved in some cases. We are under pressure from the British to make a settlement with the Czechoslovaks to permit transfer of sequestered gold holdings, but aside from this relatively minor facet of good relations with the UK, it is considered that achievement of agreement on the basis of the terms now being negotiated with the Czechoslovaks on the economic agreement would bring approximately equal financial benefits to both sides, leaving the Czechoslovaks the gainers with regard to the establishment of the trade office (whether or not formally conditioned on an acceptable bondholder settlement). It is also believed that Czechoslovak advantage from U.S. participation in the Brno Fair, though desirable for us from the point of view of general cultural influence, would exceed the American advantage: The Czechoslovaks would in this fashion open their way to participation in one or more American trade fairs (where except for desirable exposure of exhibit personnel to the United States, the advantage is one-sided), increase the prestige of the Brno Fair as such, and gain access to machines and products of interest. It is doubtful whether public impact effect and possible increase in U.S. business arising from U.S. participation at Brno would balance out these advantages. Similarly, the net advantage in an agreement on increase in Embassy personnel on both sides or establishment of consulates would be on the Czechoslovak side—if it were carried out under the present vastly unequal conditions of access to persons of influence and places of interest which pertain for American officials in the CSSR and Czechoslovak officials in the United States—there is little benefit in increasing the number of American personnel in the CSSR if their contacts with the population are to be as limited as they now are in actual practice no matter what effort is expended to increase them.

#### V. *Negotiating Problem*

It has been our view that we can move in orderly succession from possible conclusion of an economic agreement to other subjects of greater interest to the U.S.; an economic agreement has been considered necessary to clear the air in the United States and to give the Department the necessary latitude to negotiate other agreements as well as to improve the atmosphere on the Czechoslovak side in the direction of making the Czechoslovaks willing to negotiate on a cultural agreement. This calculation appears to have been correct in the case of Rumania; it may not be so in the different conditions governing the attitude of the Czechoslovak government. The main problem arising from the imbalance of Czechoslovak-U.S. advantages in the economic field is that the sequence in which the subjects are now being negotiated or discussed

with the Czechoslovaks could result in agreement on some or all of the topics listed above, with net economic and informational advantage to the Czechoslovaks and no real corresponding gain in access for the U.S. The U.S. is interested in a cultural and exchange agreement with the Czechoslovaks, certainly an important vehicle of access, but this subject is rather far down on the list of negotiating priorities and the subject of access for US officials to representative Czechoslovak persons and institutions has not as yet been formulated as a subject of negotiation. The Czechoslovaks are naturally pushing the subjects in which they are most strongly interested; the upshot is that we may come to agreement on the subjects in which they are most interested before the topics in which our interest is stronger are raised for discussion. In this way, our main negotiating leverage could be dissipated. This argues for the formulation of a package deal proposal to be made to the Czechoslovaks, linking tightly together a number of benefits for both sides.

#### *VI. Internal Factors Complicating Negotiations*

The nature of the internal situation in the CSSR provides an additional argument in favor of a package proposal. Though all are effectively controlled by communists, the fact that the Ministry of Foreign Trade and the Czechoslovak Chamber of Commerce desire an increase of trade with the United States for their own reasons and that the Foreign Office, haltingly committed to a policy of peaceful co-existence, desires an extension of its information gathering facilities in the U.S. and wants to make progress toward American acceptance of the CSSR, means that these agencies might be inclined to agree to a certain increase in access for the U.S. within the CSSR; this is largely because of the special nature of their functions. But the Interior Ministry and Communist Party apparatus are by the nature of their functions interested in maintaining the control of the Party over the country, excluding outside ideological influences, and keeping information gathering possibilities for foreigners at a minimum. The Party and Interior Ministry apparatus is of course stronger than the agencies concerned with foreign trade and foreign policy. Thus if the general question of access is negotiated in isolation, these groups will always be in a position to prevent or minimize it. A possible way out of the situation for the U.S. may be to raise the question of access to the plane of overall Czechoslovak national interest by linking it in negotiation with questions where the Czechoslovak advantage is plain. A composite proposal is again indicated; some suggestions for the content of such a proposal are made below.

As a further device toward bringing the question of access to the level of national interest, consideration might be given to advancing a package proposal in outline form directly to President Novotny as a major gesture toward improvement of Czechoslovak-American relations. The point is not that Novotny is any more interested than Interior

Minister Barak, for example, in opening up Czechoslovakia to outside intellectual influence, the aim is to avoid an unequal contest of strength between Foreign Ministry and Party forces and to cause the Czechoslovak Politburo to view the entire question of practical relations with the U.S. as a whole.

### VII. *Sample Proposal*

The following ideas are advanced for further consideration as possible component parts of a proposal which could bring important benefits to long-range U.S. policy and which is intended to receive serious top-level consideration from the Czechoslovak government. For this reason, the proposal contains a series of concessions to the Czechoslovak point of view which go beyond—considerably in some cases—what we have as yet been willing officially to consider. The net effect of these proposals has been carefully estimated and it is believed that, if the arguments of this paper concerning the nature of US policy interests toward Czechoslovakia are accepted, the net long-range advantage is on the US side. The first group of suggestions spells out what is meant by the principle of access; a second group contains more evenly balanced benefits and the third contains proposals in which the Czechoslovak advantage is preponderant. Though careful thought has been given to the proposal, it represents only a sample; sharper formulations and additions or deletions could be made in both portions. However, the concept of “access” and of a combined package proposal are essential elements of the underlying thought.

#### 1. *Preponderant US Advantage* (proposals are reciprocal)

a. Agreement on distribution of a Czechoslovak edition of *Amerika* (if considered financially feasible on our side)—possibly in return for wider circulation in the US of the magazine *Czechoslovak Life* (it would be interesting to learn, in any case, to what extent this magazine is now being distributed in the U.S.).

b. Reopening of reading rooms in Prague and Bratislava with a third possibility (Brno?) left open.

c. Agreement on circulation of a daily or weekly press or press-cultural bulletin to Czechoslovak citizens and institutions as well as foreign embassies (the Israeli Legation here sends out 5,000 copies of its bulletin per week).

d. Provisions for an agreed number of USIA touring exhibits per year with an option to visit all CSSR cities of 100,000 population or over.

e. Formal, specific agreement on access to Czechoslovak individuals and institutions, except for military and other objects of security, for US officials on the basis of overall but not case by case reciprocity. The formulation of such an agreement would have to be worked out carefully in order to have some binding effect on the Czechoslovaks as it would represent a new departure both in relations with Bloc countries



and in general diplomatic practice; nevertheless, we would be making few real concessions in view of the almost unlimited access possibilities in the US for English-speaking Czechoslovak representatives. One possible formulation would be that both governments would formally commit themselves to permit and encourage free access to all segments of their respective populations and to provide assistance in making contacts at request on the understanding that the general principle of reciprocity was involved, i.e., that a succession of unsuccessful efforts to establish contact or receive assistance in so doing could provide the basis for limitations or other retaliation. Another more specific possibility which could complement the above would be to state that diplomatic officials of both countries would be given access to all officials and employees of the central government within two weeks on the basis of written application; subsequent visits would not require notification. Though more precise, one drawback with this formulation is its limited scope but the U.S. government presumably could not require compliance with a recommendation to receive a Czechoslovak official from state and local officials and certainly not from private citizens.

One way out of the drafting difficulties caused by the basic dissimilarity of the two societies would be to propose differing, rather than identical commitments. The Czechoslovaks would resist this procedure, but it might be possible to secure its acceptance on the ground of other benefits offered in the overall proposal. In this case, we could suggest a Czechoslovak commitment that access of U.S. diplomatic officials to all Czechoslovak government officials, elected officials, members of the judiciary, and employees of state concerns, officials of the party and persons active in science, education, and culture would be provided within a fixed period after initial application; subsequent contacts with the same persons would not require notification. For our part, we could pledge ourselves to maintain the free access now enjoyed by Czechoslovak officials. Non-compliance by Czechoslovak authorities could presumably lead to limitations on the activities of Czechoslovak diplomatic personnel in the U.S. imposed by the Department.

The rationale presented to the Czechoslovaks could emphasize the full access to all levels of American society enjoyed by Czechoslovak representatives and our desire to meet the authorized representatives of the present system of government (rather than attempting to seek out opposition elements) for the purpose of learning more fully about the country and providing a realistic picture to the U.S. government and the American people.

If a working arrangement on this point could be achieved, its importance for information-gathering and transmission of ideas could be great, not so much with the present small Embassy staff, but when measured against the perspective of work in the CSSR over a long

period in the future with increased Embassy staffs and the addition of a consulate or consulates and of information offices or reading rooms. As a practical matter, it is desirable under present and foreseeable conditions to work through Czechoslovak authorities in making initial contacts. At present, Embassy officers can make a few such contacts deviously or aided by coincidence, but in general they do not have access to the men in authority in whom we are principally interested, nor are most Czechoslovaks willing to discuss matters of substance with Embassy personnel unless the contact has the approval of higher authority. In addition, working through the Foreign Ministry can provide some measure of protection against charges of espionage or illicit activity against U.S. personnel.

f. A normal exchange program of as wide dimensions and as long duration as possible; agreements for exchanges of movie films and television programs. In this connection, it is believed consideration might be given in the course of time to the possibility of unilateral invitations, possibly from private groups or foundations such as the Council on Foreign Relations, to selected Czechoslovak leaders to visit the United States. The political problems involved are clear; but the gain in giving top leaders a realistic picture of U.S. progress and capacities could also be great (undoubtedly the public reaction of leaders concerned would take the form of the account of his sojourn in New York given by President Novotny on his return from the UN General Assembly, but the private reaction is the goal). This subject is mentioned in the context of long-range efforts to affect the views of Czechoslovak leaders and not for negotiating purposes.)

g. A radio and jamming agreement. It is believed theoretically possible that the Czechoslovaks might formally agree to stop jamming if we made a commitment to the effect that no US-originated broadcast in Czech, Slovak, or German would contain any commentary whatever on the internal affairs of the CSSR (or even conceivably also on the internal affairs of neighboring communist countries). It is realized that this would mean a considerable sacrifice of content for U.S. broadcasts, particularly those of privately financed stations, but it is believed the long-range advantage of getting through coverage of American society and social thinking would greatly outweigh the disadvantages. A faint indication that it might be possible to gain agreement on this formulation is given by the fact that the Czechoslovak authorities now rarely jam broadcasts in English, French, and other West European languages.

h. Equitable treatment of American citizens. It would be most desirable from the point of view of the long-range development of Czechoslovak-American relations and in the direct interest of American citizens traveling in this area if some understanding could be reached on equitable and non-discriminatory treatment of private American

citizens in Czechoslovakia. Again, the formulation for presentation to the Czechoslovaks would have to be worked out carefully. One theoretical possibility for further consideration, if U.S. practice permits, would be a mutual agreement for expulsion of persons whose sole offense consists of crossing the border without permission and where there is no evidence of intention to engage in illicit activity against the country concerned. This formulation has obvious loopholes, but would be an improvement over the present situation. A further theoretical possibility would be agreement that a U.S. official be one of the two friends of the accused permitted by Czechoslovak law when trials are held *in camera*, plus specific provision for formal notification to the Embassy of charges against American citizens at the time when they are brought and for consular access prior to trial.

i. If the course of presenting an overall outline to President Novotny were to be followed, the cases of Shaver and Zastera should be mentioned in this context. The problem of treatment of local Embassy employees might well be raised more or less formally in this context or that of the establishment of consulates (below).

2. *Points of More Evenly-balanced Benefit*

The following points would be of more evenly-balanced benefit for both sides only if they were an integral part of a package proposal providing for increased access for U.S. officials; otherwise their net benefit is very much on the Czechoslovak side.

j. Agreement on raising personnel ceilings at the two Embassies.

k. Agreement on establishment of consulates. It is understood the Czechoslovaks have asked for five. It might be equitable to grant them three in return for two U.S. consulates (Bratislava and the right to open a second, possibly in Brno, at a time to be later specified by the U.S.). For bargaining purposes, we might propose three U.S. consulates even though it is not probable, we would desire as many.

3. *Points of Greater Benefit to the CSSR*

l. We could state our willingness to participate in the Brno Fair and to allow the CSSR to participate in either a fixed, but generous number of U.S. fairs or on an unlimited basis in the context of the general settlement proposed.

m. MFN treatment. We might offer MFN treatment to Czechoslovakia as an integral part of the proposed overall agreement. It is believed that this action could be effectively justified to U.S. Congressional and public opinion in the context of the present proposal while it might not be possible to provide adequate justification in other circumstances.

n. Further adjustments in formulation could be made on the Czechoslovak-U.S. economic agreements. There are now several open questions of wording which might rather easily be resolved; it is conceivable that we might consider the entire package proposal worth

dropping the link between the bondholder settlement and the New York trade office of the Czechoslovaks. If it were decided to advance a package proposal and the economic agreement had already progressed to the point of signature, it would not be necessary, though desirable, to hold it up for inclusion in a package proposal; other economic elements described may be of sufficient importance to secure serious consideration of the composite proposal. (For the sake of logical development of the theme, the possibility of limited PL 480 credit for the CSSR is mentioned as a theoretical possibility for the distant future in the event of favorable development of relations; it is not suggested that the idea be advanced at this time.)

o. The final and perhaps most important of the points which could be mentioned to gain serious Czechoslovak consideration of a package proposal or any general consideration of the possibilities of improvement in CSSR-US relations is some treatment of the desire of the Czechoslovak Government for acknowledgement and acceptance from the U.S. It is believed that to achieve the aims of this paper, some sort of statement on the subject would have to be made to the Czechoslovaks to provide the general context in which an American proposal would be advanced. There is a wide range of possibilities in the degree of formality and levels on which a statement could be made, in the lengths to which it could go, and the extent to which it would or would not be publicized. One possibility would be a verbal statement by the Ambassador to President Novotny when presenting an outline proposal to the effect that the US Government, while not agreeing with the basic tenets of the Czechoslovak Government, accepted it as a continuing fact of international life and wished to come to a more constructive pattern of mutual relations on that basis. This is in one sense an implied acceptance of the internal situation in the CSSR though not explicitly of the more important aspect of Soviet domination over the area, but under given and foreseeable conditions it is believed the present situation will have to be accepted to some degree as a condition of effective long-range efforts to change it.

It is considered that the proposal advanced above may have some chance of acceptance, but only if advanced in toto, without economic and other benefits it contains being conceded in separate negotiations in advance—to grant economic concessions first and then to place one's hopes on a subsequent improvement of atmosphere to the benefit of attempts to negotiate singly on various aspects of the access question may be to take an even greater gamble than that here proposed. If the proposal were to be advanced and were accepted, and particularly if it could form a pattern for the activities of other important non-Communist countries in the CSSR (as well as possibly elsewhere in Eastern Europe), our capacity to induce changes in the CSSR over the long run would be greatly increased.

## SOVIET UNION

### **JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1958: SOVIET ANNOUNCEMENT OF A REDUCTION IN ITS ARMED FORCES; AMBASSADOR MIKHAIL A. MENSHIKOV'S PRESENTATION OF CREDENTIALS**

#### **36. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations**

Washington, January 9, 1958, 8:14 p.m.

Topol 2308. Paris for USRO and Embassy. Following is summary of Department's initial and tentative analysis of Soviet announcement Jan. 6 of 300,000 man reduction in armed forces.<sup>1</sup> USRO should see Moscow's 1193, rptd info London 207, Paris 207, Bonn 122 in connection this summary.<sup>2</sup>

#### *Begin Summary*

Announcement part of developing campaign to demonstrate Soviet desires for relaxation of tensions and to encourage Western tendencies toward slowing down military preparations and toward new negotiations with USSR. This third announcement armed forces cuts since Stalin's death. Unlike previous announcements, new statement did not give date by which reductions to be completed. Soviet officials who announced reductions at Moscow press conference took traditional position of declining divulge current strength of Soviet forces.

Announcement foreshadowed in Supreme Soviet Resolution Dec. 21 which "instructed" government consider further unilateral force

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/1-758. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Helmut Sonnenfeldt and James G. Lowenstein; cleared by Charles G. Stefan, Henry P. Leverich, and Vincent Baker; and approved by B.E.L. Timmons, Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs. Pouched to the NATO capitals.

<sup>1</sup> The Soviet announcement said that its armed forces would be cut by 300,000 men over and above the reduction of 1,840,000 men announced in 1955 and 1956 and that the reduction would include 41,000 stationed in East Germany and 17,000 in Hungary.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 1193 from Moscow, January 7, Ambassador Thompson reported that the Soviet announcement of its troop reduction appeared to be further indication that the Soviet Union did not expect serious disarmament discussions in the near future. He added, "in my opinion it is likely that this reduction will in fact be completion of previously announced reduction and not in addition thereto despite Soviet statement to the contrary." (Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/1-758)

reductions.<sup>3</sup> On same day Khrushchev mentioned possibility of such reductions in speech to Supreme Soviet and did so again in Kiev speech Dec. 24.<sup>4</sup> These statements indicated clearly that move aimed coincide with other steps by which USSR evidently hopes allay Western anxieties engendered by recent Soviet technological boasts and achievements and to impede resultant Western efforts toward greater military preparedness and political cohesion.

Khrushchev speeches and Supreme Soviet resolution asserted that certain statements of peaceful intent by NATO leaders at HG meeting were taken into account by USSR and had permitted consideration of force cuts. This unusual acknowledgment of Western peaceful intent perhaps prompted by Soviet estimate that Western opinion favoring slow-down in defense efforts could best be fostered by depicting international situation as improving. However, actual announcement Jan. 6 no longer credited NATO statements with causing Soviet decision but described move as unilateral one which if emulated by Western powers will be "major contribution to the cause of lessening tension". Moreover at Moscow press conference Kuznetsov denied that decision was result of relaxed tension but asserted it would promote relaxation.

Although clearly related to current foreign policy moves, announcement, if it in fact foreshadows reductions in Soviet armed forces, is also significantly based on domestic considerations. In Supreme Soviet and Kiev speeches Khrushchev stated that developments in science and technology had made it possible maintain Soviet armed forces at level demanded by Soviet security requirements with smaller expenditure of resources and emphasized that military effectiveness would not be reduced.

Re effect of projected reduction, factor is whether in fact this is net reduction. Conceivable that during last fall's ME crisis additional troops mobilized and that announcement reflects in part their release after temporary service. Also possible this may merely represent completion of reductions announced in 1955-56 although Soviet spokesmen insist new cuts are in addition to earlier ones.

In sum, announcement timed with international situation in mind; if carried out reduction is made feasible by technological developments; and would be desirable for economic reasons. No present evidence that considerations of popular morale entered into Soviet decision.

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<sup>3</sup> The points developed in this and the following paragraph were made in a memorandum from Hugh S. Cumming, Jr., Director of Intelligence and Research, to Secretary Dulles, January 7, and were probably derived from this memorandum. (*Ibid.*, 761.5/1-758)

<sup>4</sup> For text of Khrushchev's speech to the Supreme Soviet on December 21, 1957, see *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, February 12, 1958, pp. 3-8. For text of his speech in Kiev on December 24, see *ibid.*, February 5, 1958, pp. 12-17 and 40.

Announcement stated that of 300,000 men to be demobilized 41,000 would come from Soviet forces in GDR and 17,000 from Soviet forces in Hungary. This figure for reductions in GDR interesting when compared to only 30,000 said to have been withdrawn in connection with earlier reduction of 1,200,000. One aim of this emphasis on reductions in Germany presumably to put West under pressure undertake similar cut-backs. Elaborate farewell ceremonies will probably again be staged in East Germany at which West will be urged follow suit.

Assignment of advanced weapons to Soviet forces in GDR may be practical reason permitting some reductions. Other possible factor is that Moscow may have moved additional troops into East Germany as result Polish and Hungarian affairs and is now taking credit for withdrawing them.

Announcement of reductions is first such public Soviet announcement since revolt. Soviet statement Oct. 30, 1956<sup>5</sup> indicated that continued presence Soviet troops would be matter for negotiation with Hungary as well as with Warsaw Pact powers. Current announcement not preceded by any public indication that such negotiations in progress or contemplated although Moscow might conceivably go through motions of having Warsaw Pact powers approve move. However, reduction in Hungary presumably intended convey confidence that situation there stabilized.

Soviet announcement may be clue to future Soviet moves in disarmament field. Together with Soviet refusal to participate in disarmament commission and USSR proposal for 82 member commission which would be more suitable for propaganda than negotiation unilateral force reduction casts doubt Soviet interest in serious disarmament negotiations now. Announcement fits in with Bulganin letters' support of Rapacki Plan<sup>6</sup> and leads to inference further Soviet concentration on this or similar proposals as well as Soviet use of propaganda approach to disarmament problem. *End Summary.*

**Dulles**

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<sup>5</sup> Regarding this Soviet statement, see *Foreign Relations, 1955–1957*, vol. XXV, pp. 342–343.

<sup>6</sup> The Rapacki Plan, first proposed by Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki in a speech to the U.N. General Assembly on October 2, 1957, and subsequently renewed through diplomatic channels, called for the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Poland, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, and the German Federal Republic. The countries in this zone, as well as the United States, United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union, would not manufacture, maintain, or import on these territories nuclear weapons of any type, including missile-launching equipment. Moreover, the powers having nuclear weapons would agree not to use these weapons against any territory in the zone. The plan also advanced proposals for the establishment and operation of a control system for the denuclearized zone. See *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, vol. II, pp. 839–892 and 918–926.

### 37. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, February 11, 1958.

#### SUBJECT

Presentation of Credentials to President Eisenhower by the Soviet Ambassador

#### PARTICIPANTS

The President

The Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mikhail A.

Menshikov

The Chief of Protocol, Wiley T. Buchanan, Jr.

President Eisenhower received Ambassador Menshikov at 10:00 a.m., February 11, 1958, at which time the Ambassador presented his credentials.<sup>1</sup> The President opened the conversation by telling the Ambassador he was pleased to welcome him here and hoped he would find his work interesting and assured him of the cooperation of all of the officials with whom he would be dealing.

President Eisenhower then asked the Ambassador what his most recent post had been and something of his general background. The Ambassador answered that he had been in India and then began a detailed account of his background, which started with his graduation from the Moscow Institute of Economics through his entire employment record, describing in some detail his work with UNRRA when he was stationed in Washington and later in Europe. This outline of his background consumed 15 minutes of the 33 minute appointment.

The President and the Ambassador agreed that they hoped during the Ambassador's time in the United States that the tensions between our two countries would be relieved. Both agreed that this was of great importance to both nations. The President commented that the mutual objective of both countries was a rise in the standard of living, better health, education, etc. He stated that it was foolish for such great amounts of money to be spent on missiles, bombs, etc., with each nation becoming more and more powerful, and glaring at each other across the ocean and the north pole.

The Ambassador stated that the heads of his Government were sincere in their desire for an easing of tensions and he hoped there could be

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Source: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149. Confidential. Drafted by Buchanan and approved by Goodpaster on February 15.

<sup>1</sup> Menshikov succeeded Georgiy Nikolayevich Zaroubin as Soviet Ambassador. On February 10, Buchanan sent a letter to Robert Gray, Acting Secretary to the President, enclosing a translation of the remarks Menshikov would hand to the President upon his presentation, a copy of the suggested reply, and a short biographical sketch of Menshikov. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File)



a meeting of the top leaders. President Eisenhower commented that when you use the word “summit” for a meeting that all peoples of the world (and he further commented that he believed all peoples in the world were under tension today) expected something immediately to be forthcoming from such a meeting. The President then stated that it was very important in his opinion that much of the spade work and many of the details must be worked out in advance of the meeting, because as President of the United States it was impossible for him to delegate any authority—that every commission and paper requiring his signature must be done by him personally—consequently, it is impossible for him to ever be gone for more than a few days, possibly 4 or 5. The President stated that he did not expect the other government leaders to come the great distance to the United States, and that at a meeting which lasted for any great length of time it would be necessary for him to send his Vice President.

The President then commented to the Ambassador that he realized that the Russian leaders had certain reservations about dealing with Secretary Dulles. The President then stated, “and I simply state this fact to you. That I have lived with this man for five years, and nowhere in the world is there a more dedicated, a more intelligent and more fair and honest, negotiator than John Foster Dulles. Possibly because of his appearance, and I admit that he does not smile much in his negotiations, you have gotten the impression that he is an unusually hard negotiator. Secretary Dulles attended the Versailles Peace Treaty meeting and from that time on has been working in every way possible for world peace. He is a very experienced and capable man. I am sure, after you have had meetings with Secretary Dulles, that you will agree with what I tell you.” The President then commented, “After all, you do not expect me to fire my Secretary of State.”

At this point the Ambassador interrupted and stated that the top Russian officials had a very high regard for Mr. Dulles and his ability and there was nothing personal in their desire to have a summit meeting. However, the Russian leaders actually had a complex about meeting at lower levels because they had had so many disappointments over a period of years when time and again nothing had been achieved at lower levels.

The Ambassador then commented to the President that in reporting to his Government he would be completely objective in his views. The Ambassador again stated that his earnest desire also was to see if they could not reach some area of agreement and that he favored as many contacts as possible. He also stated that he hoped that he would, from time to time, be able to see the President. President Eisenhower replied that he would be glad to see the Ambassador, that he had never considered himself to be a person who felt he knew it all, and that he

would be very happy to have any position explained to him that the Ambassador might feel he had not understood. At any time that such a situation might arise, the President said he would be very pleased to have to the Secretary of State and the Ambassador call on him.

The President then commented on his relations with Marshal Zhukov<sup>2</sup> in 1945 and stated that he and the Marshal at that time believed Russia and the United States would make good allies and cooperate, but that he had been greatly disappointed in the results.

The President commented that at various times when he was in Europe in 1945, he had spoken through interpreters to various peoples and found that in general the people throughout the world like and are pleased by the same type of things. He commented that in his opinion if a poll could be taken in Russia and the United States that not more than one-half of one percent of the people in either country actually want war. The Ambassador again touched upon his desire and his Government's desire for peace and stated that he felt certain that Khrushchev and Bulganin were sincere in their efforts to ease tensions.

The President said that one difficulty had been that when we present a bill of particulars to the Russian Government, it is turned down without any discussion. By the same token, they present us with a list of items for discussion which are not things that we wish to talk about at the time and that never is there any opportunity to gain any points of agreement during any of these negotiations.

These conversations lasted the other 16 or 17 minutes of the appointment. The President then asked me if arrangements had been made to have pictures made, and I said they had not. He then asked his Appointments Secretary, Mr. Gray, to get the photographers. The President said to the Ambassador, "We will have our pictures made here and maybe we will start some sort of new era of friendliness and cooperation." The photographers completed the pictures and we departed from the President's office at about 10:37 or 10:38.<sup>3</sup>

After leaving the President's office, Ambassador Menshikov made a brief general statement to the press.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Marshal Georgiy Konstantinovich Zhukov.

<sup>3</sup> President Eisenhower summarized his meeting with Menshikov for Secretary Dulles in a telephone conversation at 10:38 a.m. The President indicated that he had stressed to Menshikov his trust in Dulles, and added that Menshikov "is the first one he has seen smile except Zhukov." (Memorandum of telephone conversation; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations)

<sup>4</sup> Menshikov's statement to the press was published in *The New York Times*, February 12, 1958.

### 38. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 3, 1958.

#### PARTICIPANTS

President Eisenhower  
Secretary Dulles  
Soviet Ambassador Menshikov

The Ambassador said that he had sought this meeting as a follow-up of the conversation which he had had with the President when he had presented his letters.<sup>1</sup> The Ambassador said he had reported that conversation objectively to his Government and had asked for this meeting a week ago in order to tell the President the substance of what was contained in the subsequent Memorandum which Mr. Gromyko had delivered to Ambassador Thompson.<sup>2</sup> Now that that Memorandum had been delivered this meeting which he had requested had less significance. The Ambassador, however, went on to say that he hoped that it would be possible within a few days to arrange through diplomatic channels for a meeting of Foreign Ministers of an agreed composition and at an agreed date and place.<sup>3</sup>

The Ambassador went on to say that his Government, aware of the especially heavy responsibilities that devolved on the President of the United States, would not oppose the holding of a meeting of Heads of Government in the United States at a city to be selected by the United States.

The President then referred to the fact that it was not usual for him to transact business directly with foreign ambassadors and he did not want to set a precedent by this meeting. Otherwise he might be confronted with requests from over eighty ambassadors.

The President went on to discuss the proposed meeting of Heads of Government and said that there were difficulties in the way and that he

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Source: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149. Secret. Drafted by Dulles. The meeting was held at the White House. Dulles briefed Eisenhower on this interview with Menshikov in a meeting on March 1 and in a memorandum of March 2. Both the memorandum of conversation and the memorandum are in Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 37.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to the Soviet aide-mémoire of February 28, which agreed to a meeting of the Foreign Ministers "to speed up the preparation of a meeting at the Summit with participation of Heads of Government." For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 24, 1958, pp. 459–461.

<sup>3</sup> Documentation on the meetings of the Foreign Ministers and Heads of Government is in volumes VIII and IX.

felt that there was a necessity for preparation in terms of the substance of matters to be discussed. The President said with emphasis, "We want to find a way to do useful business." But he said we do not want a mere spectacle or a propaganda exercise. The need is for honest preparation of agreed subjects which would lead up to a final act by the Heads of Government. A mere spectacle or propaganda meeting would, the President thought, be without value and indeed of positive disadvantage in confusing the peoples of the world.

The President said that he appreciated the courtesy reflected by the indicated willingness of the Soviet Government to have a meeting if one were to be held in the United States. The President also said that he did not want his opening remarks about the request of the Soviet Ambassador to meet with the President to be taken as indicative of any irritation or impatience on his part. The President realized that the Ambassador was carrying out his instructions.

Secretary Dulles then spoke, emphasizing the impracticability of over eighty ambassadors doing business directly with the President and the importance that any meeting with the President be regarded as exceptional.

The President, in this connection, interjected that he could think of only one prior case where this had been sought and then events had made it unnecessary.

The Secretary went on to emphasize again the necessity of preparation if the "Summit" meeting were to be more than a spectacle. The Ambassador said he thought that there were topics upon which agreement could now be foreseen. The Secretary said he was not clear as to what these topics were. The Soviets proposed to discuss the cessation of testing, but only if this were divorced from "cut-off". The United States proposed to discuss outer space, but the Soviets were only willing to discuss it in connection with the "liquidation of foreign bases".

The President then referred to the unwillingness of the Soviets to discuss the reunification of Germany or the carrying out of earlier agreements with respect to Eastern European states.

The Secretary referred to the note of the Soviet Government to the French Government<sup>4</sup> and pointed out that this had been even more explicit than the note to the United States to the effect that before there was a meeting of Foreign Ministers, there must be a firm agreement as to the fact of a "Summit" meeting and the date and place. This reduced the Foreign Ministers' meeting to what was almost perfunctory. The Secretary said he did not particularly object to reducing the role of a Foreign

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<sup>4</sup>Text of the March 1 Soviet note to France is in Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204.

Ministers' meeting because he thought that much of the preparatory work could be done through diplomatic channels rather than at a Foreign Ministers' meeting. There were some matters that particularly and almost exclusively involved the United States and the Soviet Union. But this did not imply that diplomatic channels would limit contacts to our two Governments because through diplomatic channels there could also be discussions with the British, French and others, as they were involved.

The Ambassador said that he would try to report our views objectively to his Government, but asked whether a formal reply to the Soviet Memorandum could be expected at an early date. The Secretary said that a prospective reply had been discussed between him and the President on Saturday afternoon;<sup>5</sup> that we were now discussing it with some of our allies and that the Secretary hoped that a reply could be finalized for delivery the latter part of the week. The Ambassador thanked the President and the Secretary and discussed briefly what he would say to the press. The President suggested he should say merely that he had had a friendly talk. The Ambassador accepted this and suggested adding that he had hoped to have such talks "from time to time". The Secretary suggested omitting this as it would create problems with other ambassadors if it were to be assumed that the President was to meet periodically with the Soviet Ambassador. The Ambassador indicated he would drop this remark.

The President reiterated that he did not want the Ambassador to feel that the President was in any sense impatient with the Ambassador for having sought this meeting. He had spoken only in general terms and wanted, if possible, to find ways whereby our two great countries could get more closely together.

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<sup>5</sup> See the source note above.

## SOVIET CHARGES OF U.S. VIOLATIONS OF ITS AIR SPACE; CHANGES IN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP, MARCH-JUNE 1958

### 39. Editorial Note

On March 6, Ambassador Menshikov handed an aide-mémoire, dated March 5, to Secretary of State Dulles claiming a violation of Soviet air space by a U.S. military aircraft in the Far East on March 2. A translation of the Soviet aide-mémoire, which was attached to a memorandum from Fisher Howe to General Goodpaster, March 6, reads in part:

“According to precisely established data, on March 2, 1958, at 4:05 hours Moscow time, an American military jet aircraft, having appeared from the direction of the Sea of Japan, violated the state border of the Soviet Union in the area of the settlement of Velikaya Kema and penetrated into the airspace of the Soviet Union, remaining over its territory for a considerable period of time. Thereafter, the aircraft left in the direction of the Sea of Japan in the area south of the Olga Bay.” (Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, Intelligence Matters)

In a memorandum of conversation with the President on March 7, Secretary Dulles wrote:

“The President read the Soviet aide-mémoire which had been delivered to us yesterday protesting an alleged invasion of Soviet air space in the Far East on March 2. The President indicated a strong view that such infractions should be discontinued. He thought we should reply to the Soviets by saying that we were not aware of the matter referred to but that strong measures were being taken to prevent any recurrence.

“The President expressed the view that any such operations carried a danger of starting a nuclear war by miscalculation. He said that his military advisers had pressed upon him the necessity of retaliation if there seemed to be a movement of Soviet planes toward the United States. The President felt that the Soviets might have the same attitude and might misinterpret an overflight as being designed to start a nuclear war against which they would react.

“The President instructed General Goodpaster to communicate with the appropriate US officials in this sense.” (*Ibid.*, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President)

The U.S. reply, an aide-mémoire dated March 31, said that the United States had been unable to determine whether any U.S. military aircraft were in the vicinity of the Soviet Union on March 2. A copy of this U.S. aide-mémoire is attached to a memorandum from C. Burke Elbrick to Secretary Dulles, April 28. (Department of State, Central Files, 761.5411/4-2158) According to a memorandum of Dulles' conversation with Menshikov, March 31, when Dulles handed the aide-mémoire to the Ambassador, he added orally that the United States had issued re-

newed instructions to military personnel enjoining them to adhere strictly to standing regulations prohibiting U.S. military aircraft from approaching Soviet territory. (*Ibid.*, 761.5411/3–3158)

On April 21, a messenger from the Soviet Embassy delivered a note, dated April 21, which indicated that the U.S. reply was unsatisfactory, reiterated the previous Soviet charges, and expected that the United States would investigate the incident further and punish those guilty of the violation. A translation of the Soviet note is attached to a memorandum from Henry P. Leverich to Fisher Howe, April 21. (*Ibid.*, 761.5411/4–2158)

On May 5, the Department of State delivered a brief note to the Soviet Embassy reiterating its earlier denial of the Soviet allegations. This note concluded: "The United States Government has nothing further to add to its aide-mémoire of March 31, 1958 concerning the alleged incident." (*Ibid.*)

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**40. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Intelligence and Research (Arneson) to the Under Secretary of State (Herter)**

Washington, March 27, 1958.

SUBJECT

Intelligence Note: *Khrushchev's Assumption of Soviet Premiership*<sup>1</sup>

The assumption of the Chairmanship of the USSR Council of Ministers by N.S. Khrushchev marks a dramatic step in his concentration of political authority, and a further blow to collective leadership in the Soviet regime.

By adding the Premiership to the office of First Secretary, which he continues to occupy, Khrushchev reversed the trend (established in the

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/3–2758. Official Use Only. Initialed by Arneson.

<sup>1</sup>On March 27, Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Vice Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers, replaced Nikolai Alexandrovich Bulganin as Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers. Khrushchev was appointed to this position by the newly elected Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union at the beginning of its first session in Moscow March 27–31.

Soviet Union immediately after Stalin's death and thereafter applied to the satellites) of introducing a clear demarcation of authority as between top offices in the Party and the government.

In deciding to unite the leadership of both the Party and government, Khrushchev must have had to overcome reservations from leaders apprehensive that this kind of concentration of authority might lead to a renewal of Stalinist excesses.

Although in his new post Khrushchev controls the Committee of State Security (KGB) and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), their subordination to strict Party control has been proclaimed as a central feature of destalinization. At the top of the structure, this presumably meant subordination of the police to the Presidium as a whole. It now remains to be seen whether this collective control will be maintained.

As government chief, Khrushchev will be able to inject his own type of forceful guidance directly into the management of industry. In connection with the recent reorganization of the latter, as well as in the MTS change, Khrushchev may have felt that he was handicapped in overcoming bureaucratic resistance and inertia by his lack of a command post in the bureaucracy.

Khrushchev's assumption of the Premiership probably was also motivated strongly by foreign policy considerations. Thus, a key factor may have been the Soviet assumption that there will be an early summit meeting. Khrushchev, who is not lacking in self-confidence, has shown vexation at taking a formal position secondary to Bulganin's, as he would be forced to do again if the Geneva situation were to be repeated.<sup>2</sup>

Khrushchev may thus be expected to concentrate the direction of Soviet foreign policy in his own hands even more fully than previously. This will probably not lead to any markedly new orientation in foreign policy but rather to continuation of the tempo of Soviet initiatives affecting East-West negotiations, and of Soviet policies vis-à-vis the underdeveloped countries, characteristic of Khrushchev's preeminence since 1955. At the same time, this further increment of power to Khrushchev within the leadership will very likely make him even less dependent than before on his colleagues in the Presidium, and this in turn could have important consequences for Soviet conduct. What these would be depends primarily on Khrushchev's personality, one aspect of which—his impulsiveness—has been exaggerated. In fact, he has been more impulsive in speech than in action. How the latest increase of his power will affect his behavior remains to be seen.

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<sup>2</sup>Reference is to the Geneva summit meeting in July 1955.



Khrushchev's move probably does not mean the return to Stalinist policies or methods. Khrushchev himself has been strongly committed to destalinization; his social and economic policies have, in many cases, broken with those of Stalin; and he has shown no signs of reintroducing Stalinist terror as a method of rule.

A similar memorandum has been addressed to the Secretary.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>Not found.

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#### 41. Memorandum of Discussion at the 361st Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, April 3, 1958.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1 and 2.]

##### 3. *Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security*

General Cabell commented first on Khrushchev's assumption of the Premiership in the USSR. After summarizing the reasons which probably induced Khrushchev to assume this new authority, General Cabell pointed out that only one additional increment of power was needed to put Khrushchev in the same power position that Stalin had previously occupied in the USSR. This last increment was complete control of the secret police. As yet, the CIA detected no signs that Khrushchev proposed to move in this direction. After discussing the make-up of the new leadership under Khrushchev and underlining the importance of Frol Koslov,<sup>1</sup> General Cabell concluded by stating that he anticipated no basic changes in Soviet foreign policy as a result of Khrushchev's moves.

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on April 4.

<sup>1</sup>Bulganin assumed the relatively minor position of Chairman of the State Bank in the new government. Other changes included the appointment of only two Deputy Chairmen of the Soviet Council of Ministers—Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan and Frol Romanovich Kozlov—compared with six in the previous government. Mikoyan was reappointed to this position, but Kozlov was newly appointed. Telegram 1684 from Moscow, April 1, reported on the changes. (Department of State, Central Files, 761.13/4-158)

Secretary Dulles alluded to General Cabell's speculations as to what had induced Khrushchev to take over Bulganin's job. He added that he thought there was one other possible factor in this decision not mentioned by General Cabell. He pointed out that the realities of power in the Soviet Union rest in the Communist Party, which actually runs the Government of the Soviet Union. This fact was a constant embarrassment to the Soviets because it could not be disguised when there was one head of the Government and one head of the Party. Thus everybody knew that the letters that Bulganin signed were actually dictated by Khrushchev. Now that Khrushchev has become both head of the Party and head of the Government, and wears two hats, the embarrassing situation is somewhat more disguised. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union retains all the advantages of being in a position to say that the Soviet and Satellite Governments are not responsible for the actions of the Soviet and Satellite Communist parties. General Cabell said he would not disagree that this reasoning might well have been one of the factors in Khrushchev's decision.

[Here follow discussion of unrelated subjects and the remaining agenda items.]

S. Everett Gleason

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**42. Memorandum From Secretary of State Dulles to President Eisenhower**

Washington, April 7, 1958.

**SUBJECT**

Social Contacts of Soviet Ambassador Menshikov with High United States Officials

Following our conversation of March 28, the Department asked Ambassador Thompson for his views on the advisability of informing Soviet Ambassador Menshikov that we did not look with favor upon the issuance or acceptance of invitations to Cabinet officers and other high

officials unless and until Ambassador Thompson had similar opportunities to see comparable Soviet officials.<sup>1</sup>

Ambassador Thompson states that at receptions he meets members of the Party Presidium, the only officials comparable to our Cabinet officers. He does not deem it advisable to pay calls on them or have them to meals, as he thinks the Soviets could exploit some of his NATO colleagues who would follow suit for the purpose of disrupting Western unity.<sup>2</sup> I support this view.

Ambassador Thompson has, however, recently entertained members of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers. In view of his apparent access to high Soviet governmental officials, I recommend that we not approach Ambassador Menshikov at this time with regard to his invitations to United States officials.

Nonetheless, in view of the public attacks being made on you and the United States by Khrushchev et al. (e.g., at Minsk and Budapest)<sup>3</sup> and the Soviets' evident desire for acceptance in Latin America, I think that our official attitude toward Ambassador Menshikov should be somewhat reserved. Therefore, I suggest that we advise members of the Cabinet individually to avoid accepting invitations to meals, but to accept, if they wish, occasional invitations to receptions. You may wish to take this matter up in a Cabinet meeting.<sup>4</sup>

JFD

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<sup>1</sup> Dulles' memorandum of his conversation with the President, March 28, is *ibid.*, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. The request for Thompson's views is in telegram 1109 to Moscow, March 31. (Department of State, Central Files, 601.6111/3-3158) Dulles' concern about Menshikov's invitations was part of his disapproval of what he believed to be a Soviet public relations campaign to influence high-level public opinion in the United States. Menshikov also asked to see Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, Senate Majority Leader, and Congressman John W. McCormack, House Majority Leader. Dulles spoke on the telephone with both about Menshikov's invitations. (Memoranda of telephone conversations; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations)

<sup>2</sup> Thompson's views are in telegram 1680 from Moscow, April 1. (Department of State, Central Files, 601.61/4-158)

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to speeches at Minsk on January 22 and at Budapest on April 3 and April 4. For text of the speech at Minsk, see *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, March 5, 1958, pp. 15–22 and 51. A condensed text of the two speeches at Budapest is printed *ibid.*, May 14, 1958, pp. 13–15.

<sup>4</sup> A handwritten notation in the President's handwriting at the end of the source text reads: "OK/D.E." According to the minutes of the Cabinet meeting on April 18, the President called attention to this memorandum and urged discretion in accepting social invitations from the Soviet Ambassador. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Cabinet Series)

### 43. Editorial Note

At a news conference on April 18, Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko charged that U.S. nuclear-armed bombers had flown across the Arctic toward the Soviet Union, and he asked for a meeting of the U.N. Security Council to consider "urgent measures" to end these flights. Gromyko claimed that the concerns of his government derived "from United Press reports, confirmed by spokesmen of the United States Air Force command, that such flights are made whenever the screens of American radar installations of the so-called advanced warning system show vague shapes which American observers take for guided missiles or ballistic rockets." Text of Gromyko's statement at this news conference was published in *The New York Times*, April 19, 1958. The text of the letter by Arkady A. Sobolev, Soviet Representative to the United Nations, calling for an urgent Security Council meeting on this matter, was transmitted in telegram 1170 from USUN, April 18. (Department of State, Central Files, 761.5411/4-1858) For text of a Department of State categorical denial of the Soviet charges, April 18, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 5, 1958, pages 728-729. Memoranda of telephone conversations on April 18 between Acting Secretary of State Christian A. Herter and General Thomas D. White, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, at 11 a.m.; Hagerty and Herter at 11:10 a.m. and 11:25 a.m.; Quarles and Herter at 12:20 p.m. and 2:50 p.m.; Herter and Francis O. Wilcox, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, at 2:55 p.m.; and Herter and Quarles at 2:57 p.m., summarizing discussions on the preparation of the Department of State statement, are in Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations.

A summary and analysis of the background of U.S.-Soviet air incidents before the Soviet complaint on April 18 is contained in a memorandum from Hugh S. Cumming, Jr., to Acting Secretary Herter, April 18. (Department of State, Central Files, 761.5411/4-1858)

Initial instructions to the Mission at the United Nations included questioning of Soviet motives in bringing the question before the Security Council, clarifying the nature of the Soviet threat requiring the strong defense in alert status of free world nations, explaining the role of the Strategic Air Command as a deterrent force, emphasizing previous Soviet rejections of U.S. proposals for measures guarding against surprise attack, and consulting friendly Security Council member states, especially Canada, in obtaining supporting statements for the U.S. position. The instructions were transmitted in telegram 732 to USUN, April 18. (*Ibid.*)

A memorandum of Herter's conversation with President Eisenhower on April 20 at 8 p.m. summarized their discussion on the proposed U.S. strategy on this question, debate on which was set in the

Security Council for the following afternoon. Herter recounted that Secretary Dulles had sent back to the Department of State from Duck Island, where he was vacationing April 18–21, some suggestions, all of which had been incorporated in the speech prepared for Henry Cabot Lodge, Representative at the United Nations, to deliver to the Security Council. No further record of Dulles' suggestions has been found. With the exception of two paragraphs, Eisenhower approved the draft speech Lodge had prepared, which was almost identical in substance to a Department of State suggested draft. Herter also discussed three possible resolutions the United States might wish to submit to the Security Council. As summarized in Herter's memorandum of their conversation: "The President then expressed real distress that releases apparently approved by the Department of Defense should have led up to the protest lodged by the Soviets. He called Secretary Quarles expressing his unhappiness with regard to these approved releases, and apparently Secretary Quarles said he would institute a very thorough review as to what had led up to them. I had told the President I did not think there was any security violation involved but that I thought the release of the type of information which had caused the difficulties should be carefully reviewed with the Department of State and the President in the future because of the international implications involved." (Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Memoranda of Conversation)

At the meeting of the Security Council on April 21, Sobolev introduced a draft resolution (U.N. doc. S/3993) calling on the United States to end its flights by nuclear-armed military aircraft toward the borders of other states. For text of Lodge's response that afternoon, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 12, 1958, pages 760–763. Following debate, the Soviet Representative moved to adjourn the meeting first to the following afternoon and then to the following morning, but the Security Council rejected both motions. Sobolev then charged that Lodge, in his capacity as President of the Security Council for the month of April, had discouraged free discussion and he withdrew the Soviet resolution in protest. For text of Lodge's statement rebutting this charge, see *ibid.*, page 763, footnote 5.

Khrushchev revived the Soviet charges in a letter to Eisenhower, April 22. For text of his letter and Eisenhower's April 28 reply, see *ibid.*, May 19, 1958, pages 811–815.

During the meeting of the Security Council on April 29, Lodge referred to the "constructive proposal" of President Eisenhower in his April 28 letter to Khrushchev for an international inspection system for the Arctic zone to guard against surprise attack. For texts of Lodge's statement and two subsequent ones he made on May 2, see *ibid.*, pages 816–820. For text of the U.S. draft resolution on an Arctic inspection zone as amended (U.N. doc. S/3995), see *ibid.*, page 820. The U.S. resolution,

as amended, was favored ten votes to one but was rejected because of the Soviet veto on May 2. The Security Council then rejected, with only the Soviet Union in favor and Sweden abstaining, a Soviet draft resolution (U.N. doc. S/3997) calling for an end to U.S. nuclear-armed military flights toward the borders of other states. The Soviet resolution was published in *The New York Times*, April 30, 1958.

The debate in the Security Council on this matter is summarized in *U.N. Yearbook, 1958*, pages 16–18.

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#### 44. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, April 24, 1958.

On 24 April, at the President's direction, I advised Gen. Twining and Allen Dulles that there are to be no reconnaissance flights, by military or other aircraft, over the territory of the USSR or other Communist countries.<sup>1</sup>

G.

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, Intelligence Matters. No classification marking. Prepared by Goodpaster.

<sup>1</sup>In another memorandum for the record, dated April 24, Goodpaster wrote: "A.D. asked if OK to send a man in by low-flying a/c. After checking I told him OK." (*Ibid.*)

#### 45. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, May 19, 1958.

##### SUBJECT

Courtesy Call of Minister Kuznetsov

##### PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary

EUR—Mr. Foy D. Kohler

EE—Mr. J.A. Armitage

V.V. Kuznetsov—First Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR

Mikhail Menshikov—Soviet Ambassador to the USA

Anatoli Myshkov—Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy

Mr. Kuznetsov opened the conversation by stating that he was on his way home from a visit to Argentina and had wished to pay a courtesy call on the Secretary. He expressed appreciation at the opportunity to meet the Secretary, adding that the Soviet Union believed that contacts were useful in promoting understanding and perhaps even in clearing up some points of difference. However, he had no instructions or specific points to bring up.

The Secretary expressed his appreciation for the call, agreed that it was useful to become acquainted and exchange views and asked Mr. Kuznetsov to give his regards to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko whom the Secretary has known for 13 years. (Mr. Kuznetsov transmitted the regards of Gromyko to the Secretary.) The Secretary said that the Department was working actively on many matters relating to the two countries. He said that he was gratified that it now might be possible to work through experts in studying the question of control of nuclear test cessation. We would have preferred it if the expert study could have covered broader questions of disarmament but this was a start. We are also actively working on the reply to Chairman Khrushchev's letter regarding this matter.<sup>1</sup>

The Secretary stated that he was more than a little distressed to hear that the Soviet Government had declared Embassy Secretary Baker *persona non grata*.<sup>2</sup> Apparently it was charged that he had violated the norms of standard diplomatic conduct and, as far as we could gather,

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 601.6111/5–1958. Confidential. Drafted by Armitage on May 22.

<sup>1</sup> Reference is to Khrushchev's May 9 letter to Eisenhower printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, June 9, 1958, pp. 940–942.

<sup>2</sup> A Department of State press release, dated May 19, summarized the U.S. protest of the Soviet action in declaring John A. Baker, a second secretary in the Embassy in Moscow, *persona non grata* on May 14. For text, see *ibid.*, June 16, 1958, pp. 1005–1006.

this referred only to the fact that he had attended and made friends at the Moscow University. The Secretary added that he would be glad to have some statement as to what the Soviet Union held the proper diplomatic norms to be. On our side, we are trying to give all appropriate facilities to the Soviet Ambassador to have contacts and get to know persons in this country. If the Soviet Union has a different concept of what constitutes the norm of diplomatic behavior, the Secretary assumed that this should apply to diplomats in both countries.

Mr. Kuznetsov said that we had many problems between us and that the Soviet Union believed that we should start with smaller ones and find a way to approach the broader questions. With regard to test cessation, he believed that we may have come to the point where agreement may be reached. The needed action is simple and we may agree on this. With regard to the application of the idea of expert studies to broader questions of disarmament, Kuznetsov had nothing to add to Chairman Khrushchev's letter. The Soviet Government believes that it is most important to agree on what should be controlled and then to proceed to a discussion of how the controls would operate. This is the normal procedure, Kuznetsov insisted, adding that two firms decided on what product one wanted to sell to the other before they set up controls to test the product. The same approach should apply to disarmament but the last letter of Chairman Khrushchev, taking into consideration the United States proposal, had agreed to accept our approach in the instance of test cessation.

Regarding Baker, Kuznetsov himself disclaimed knowledge of the details but assured the Secretary that the Soviet Union was trying not to exaggerate cases like this. He could not believe that there were no reasons behind it and said that perhaps Ambassador Menshikov knew more about it. The Soviet Union desires to assist Embassy personnel to meet people. For example, if the Ambassador wants to meet with people, every attempt will be made to facilitate this. He knows of no instance in which a request of the American Ambassador to make Soviet contacts has been rejected. The USSR felt that the cultural agreement was a good step forward and is trying to observe it scrupulously.<sup>3</sup> (Ambassador Menshikov said he had nothing to add on the Baker case.)

The Secretary said that he was sorry indeed that our proposal on inspection of the Arctic Zone had been rejected by the USSR.<sup>4</sup> He knew

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<sup>3</sup> For text of the joint communiqué containing the agreement on exchanges in the cultural, technical, and educational fields between the United States and the Soviet Union, January 27, see *ibid.*, February 17, 1958, pp. 243-247.

<sup>4</sup> Regarding the U.S. proposal on inspection of the Arctic Zone, see Document 43.



that Gromyko had said that it was a propaganda gesture, but the Secretary assured Mr. Kuznetsov it was not. The Secretary had been on his way to Copenhagen when this proposal was vetoed, and he felt sad when he heard the news. Certainly it has propaganda value that the Soviet Union turned the proposal down, but we hadn't wanted to use it for that purpose. We felt that if we could get some assurance against Soviet attack and they could have some assurance against the possibility of a US attack, this would be a good first step in reducing tensions. The President will write Chairman Khrushchev further on this subject, but the Secretary emphasized that we had missed a chance to allay distrust. The Secretary expressed the hope that Kuznetsov will urge his Government not to have a closed mind in this respect. There are other areas too, to which inspection could be applied. We must get started, though, and we had hoped that if the Soviet Union felt the Arctic Zone particularly important—and Khrushchev had remarked that it was the shortest distance over which missiles could be launched at the United States—we could agree to start here. The Secretary repeated his wish that Kuznetsov take back to Moscow the thought that our proposal was not a propaganda gesture, but that it was an opportunity to do something that would have a great effect on our relations. Admittedly it was only a beginning, but we badly need to begin. We have no objection in principle to extending the idea of inspection to other places, including all bases. The Arctic area proposal, however, is relatively simple and does cover the area of the shortest distance between the two countries. The Secretary noted that he was not asking for Kuznetsov's comments but that he would want Kuznetsov to draw the impression that we were sincere in making the proposal.

Kuznetsov said that he would communicate these remarks to his Government.

The Secretary said that Khrushchev had made a point in his last letter that we had not made clear how the Arctic inspection system would reduce the possibility of aerial attack through the Arctic region. There was also a question in the Soviet note regarding the broader application of the concept of inspection zones, and we hope that we can make our viewpoint clearer in a future letter. The Secretary hoped that clarifications on these points might act to relieve whatever considerations impelled the Soviet Union to reject our proposal on Arctic zone inspection.

Kuznetsov said that in the USSR people don't understand why this proposal is viewed as the only possible step in the betterment of relations. People ask why US planes are dispatched to fly towards the Soviet Union. The USSR is trying to improve relations with the US but, with regard to disarmament, one must keep in mind the security of both sides. A look at the map indicates that the proposed inspection zone includes substantial sections of the USSR and only a strip of Alaska of US

territory. (Mr. Kohler corrected Kuznetsov by remarking "all of Alaska and large parts of Canada.") Kuznetsov said that there were many Soviet proposals, some of which had been advanced to meet US points of view and the idea of the inspection of areas to avoid surprise attack could also apply in Europe or the Far East. The US takes only the Arctic and the Soviet people consider this step leads to further misunderstanding, Kuznetsov concluded.

The Secretary said that, while he could not speak for the Soviet Union, acceptance of the proposal would certainly lead to a great relaxation of tensions in the United States. The Secretary knew that he was credited with wanting war in the Soviet Union and he hoped also that Mr. Kuznetsov realized that this was not true.

Mr. Kuznetsov said that the Soviets understand that the Secretary is a good servant of his Government.

The Secretary said that his grandfather had returned from his experience in the Civil War dedicated to the cause of peace. This dedication had become traditional in the Secretary's family. For the Secretary it became an active force as early as 1907 when his uncle, the Secretary of State at the time,<sup>5</sup> had taken him to the Hague Peace Conference. The Secretary had been imbued with this dedication ever since and he would consider it a major calamity if he took any steps that might lead to war. The Secretary was aware that his ideas of peace did not coincide with those of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union thinks that peace could be achieved if it controlled all the world. The Secretary rejected the idea that military weakness on our part would lead to peace and cited historical precedents when weakness may have invited attack. Though Mr. Kuznetsov would not agree with his theory, the Secretary did not want Kuznetsov to doubt his purpose.

Mr. Kuznetsov said that people all over the world were concerned about peace and want their governments to do something about it. He related some bits about Soviet history and then asserted that history had taught that international problems, when approached through a policy of force, could lead only to catastrophe.

The Secretary remarked that we had nothing in the way of armed force in 1914 and very little in 1939. Our weakness had certainly encouraged the Kaiser and Hitler in their designs.

Kuznetsov said that there were some difficult and some simple international problems. The Soviets considered it more expedient to start with problems that we can solve, thus creating confidence and then

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<sup>5</sup> Reference should be to his grandfather, John W. Foster, who was Secretary of State 1892-1893, and served as the representative of China at the Second Hague Peace Conference in 1907. Dulles served as secretary of the Chinese delegation at that conference. Dulles' uncle, Robert Lansing, served as Secretary of State 1915-1920.

proceeding to solve more difficult problems. He knows that we think the USSR is a threat and therefore we arm. Why does the US then not want a friendship treaty? We have had our periods of cooperation in the past and could have them again.

The Secretary stated that friendship is not achieved by a treaty or any signature to a paper but by acts of friendship between two countries.

As he was leaving, Kuznetsov requested the Secretary to transmit regards from Chairman Khrushchev to President Eisenhower and to inform Mr. Kuznetsov if the Secretary considered there were other courtesy calls he should pay.

The Secretary said that he would inform Mr. Kuznetsov if other courtesy calls were deemed appropriate.

(In reply to questions from the press as he was leaving, Mr. Kuznetsov replied only that he had paid a courtesy call on the Secretary and declined any response to questions concerning substantive matters which might have been discussed.)

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**46. Memorandum From Secretary of State Dulles to the Director of Intelligence and Research (Cumming)**

Washington, June 25, 1958.

The President authorized proceeding to work out a project along the lines of your June 18 memorandum to me.<sup>1</sup> He did so with reluctance and concern, and with the understanding that it would be worked out in a way which would give maximum plausibility to an innocent explanation.

There appeared to be several divergences between the presentation made by Mr. Quarles and the presentation contained in your memoran-

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Source: Department of State, INR Files: Lot 58 D 776, Balloons. Top Secret. Initialed by Calhoun and transmitted through the Executive Secretariat.

<sup>1</sup> Cumming's memorandum to Dulles, June 18, noted that the President had recently rejected Air Force project 461-L, a large-scale high-altitude balloon reconnaissance operation over the Soviet Union, and the Air Force now proposed a similar, but more limited operation involving the release of two or three balloons from Larson Air Force Base in Seattle, Washington, during July. It added that Allen Dulles favored this limited project subject to Secretary Dulles' approval. A handwritten notation on this memorandum reads: "I would not object, but the President should decide. JFD" (*Ibid.*)

dum of June 18. You spoke of "two or three"; he spoke of "four or five". You spoke of launching from Seattle; he spoke of launching from Alaska. You spoke of covering "only marginal areas of the Soviet Union"; he spoke of transiting the main body of the Soviet Union. You spoke of the purpose being to "test the intelligence potential of the project with a minimum risk"; he presented it as an intelligence operation standing on its own merits.

It was agreed that State, Defense, CIA and Killian would work out the details of the specific project, which would then be resubmitted to the President, it being understood that, in case of conflict in the detailed preparation, the views of State would prevail.<sup>2</sup>

JFD

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<sup>2</sup> A memorandum for the record prepared by Goodpaster of a meeting among Secretary Dulles, Quarles, Allen Dulles, Dr. Killian, and the President on June 25, indicated that the President gave a "limited go ahead" to the idea of two or three balloon flights from Seattle "on the understanding that the group that was meeting with the President would itself consider the operational specifics and attendant public statements, cover and diversionary operations, etc.—with political considerations to be given top priority." (Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, Intelligence Matters)

**JUNE–DECEMBER 1958: C-118 AND C-130 AIRPLANE INCIDENTS; U.S. BALLOON RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM; VISITS TO THE SOVIET UNION OF ADLAI E. STEVENSON, ERIC JOHNSTON, AND HUBERT HUMPHREY**

**47. Editorial Note**

On June 27, an unarmed U.S. C-118 transport-type airplane, on a flight from Wiesbaden, West Germany, via Nicosia, Cyprus, to Tehran and Karachi, crossed the Soviet border near Yerevan where Soviet fighter aircraft intercepted and shot down the military transport. Five of the nine crew members parachuted to safety. The remaining four crew members, whose escape was prevented by fire, successfully landed the burning airplane on Soviet territory. All nine were taken captive. For text of the June 28 Soviet note charging that this violation of Soviet air space was "intentional," and the June 30 U.S. memorandum rejecting this charge, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 28, 1958, pages 146–147. [*text not declassified*]

For text of the July 4 Soviet note responding to the U.S. memorandum of June 30, and the July 11 U.S. note, see *ibid.*, August 4, 1958, pages 202–203.

All nine crewmen were detained by Soviet authorities until July 7 when they were returned to U.S. custody in Astara, Soviet Union, and transported to Tehran. Documentation on the negotiations in Moscow leading to their release and on subsequent discussions of the incident is in Department of State, Central File 761.5411.

#### 48. Special National Intelligence Estimate

SNIE 11-8-58

Washington, July 8, 1958.

### IMPLICATIONS OF CURRENT SOVIET CONDUCT

#### The Problem

To assess the implications of current Soviet conduct relative to Eastern Europe and the West.

#### Conclusions

1. We believe the basic motivation behind Moscow's current tough line to be its grave concern over its power position in Eastern Europe, where it considers "revisionism" to have developed to dangerous proportions.<sup>1</sup> This concern has led the USSR to attack Tito and to cause the execution of Nagy—measures intended, at least in part, to put pressure on Gomulka. We believe that the Soviets will exert greater efforts to obtain Gomulka's compliance with Bloc requirements or, failing that, perhaps even to replace him.

2. We believe that recent Soviet actions do not indicate that the USSR has abandoned its "peaceful coexistence" line. However, the USSR probably estimates that its anti-revisionist moves, particularly the Nagy execution, have seriously reduced the chances for early East-West negotiations favorable to its interests. The Soviets will nonetheless continue to press for negotiations and to seek to place the onus on the West for delays.

3. It is possible, however, that the explanation of recent events lies deeper, and these events may reflect differences within the Soviet leadership and a degree of Communist Chinese influence. If this is so, it may portend a new and stiffer policy towards the West as well as the Satellites.

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Source: Department of State, INR-NIE Files. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet, the CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff participated in the preparation of this estimate, which was concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on July 8. The AEC representative to the IAC and the Assistant Director of FBI abstained because the subject was outside their jurisdiction.

<sup>1</sup>We employ the term "revisionism" to embrace deviations from current official Communist doctrine which appear to the Soviet leadership to threaten its power and control. Pressures for greater autonomy in the Eastern European Satellites and Titoism currently rank high among the sins of revisionism. [Footnote in the source text.]

## Discussion

4. *The Campaign against Revisionism.* Since the November 1957 meetings in Moscow,<sup>2</sup> the Bloc campaign against revisionism has been mounting. But its effectiveness was hampered so long as two logical steps remained untaken. First, until Tito was denounced and read out of the socialist world, it was impossible to demonstrate convincingly that his positions were impermissible to a socialist state. Second, until Nagy had been executed, the attitude of complete intolerance toward his crimes was compromised. Both these steps were difficult to take, however, if only because of the negative effect they would have on the Soviet stance in foreign policy. Another restraining factor *possibly* was involved: a reluctance on the part of Khrushchev, both for personal and policy reasons, to admit the failure of his policy of rapprochement with Tito and of his less restrictive policy toward the Satellites.

5. The logic of the anti-revisionist campaign would appear to call for yet a third step—the reduction of Poland to full subordination to the USSR. There is no evidence that Moscow has actually employed its economic and military weapons against Gomulka, although these facts cast a continuing shadow over Soviet-Polish relations. He is obviously placed under great pressure, however, by the actions taken against Tito and Nagy. Against this pressure he retains many of the assets which helped him to power in October 1956: the threat of mass resistance by the Polish people under his leadership, and his ability to argue persuasively that only he can prevent popular violence and to warn that violence in Poland might spread to East Germany and risk embroilment with the Western powers. Over the last 20 months Gomulka has strengthened his position with the Polish military forces and probably counts on their support in any stand he takes with respect to the USSR. Moreover, he has moderated many of those aspects of the Polish internal scene which are offensive to the USSR, has helped the Soviet Union to build and maintain an image of respectability and tolerance before the uncommitted nations, and has, to a limited extent, even assisted the anti-revisionist campaign.

6. Against the above must be set the evidence, implicit in recent Soviet actions, of a greater Soviet determination to meet the dangers of revisionism. In addition, the USSR may believe that, with the West pre-occupied with the Middle East, the risk of widened conflict arising from direct Soviet intervention in Poland would be lessened.

7. We infer from Gomulka's speech of 28 June that, while he realizes he must pull in his horns, he does not regard Soviet-Polish relations

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<sup>2</sup>Reference is to the meeting in Moscow November 14–16, 1957, of representatives from the Soviet Union, Albania, Hungary, North Vietnam, East Germany, Communist China, North Korea, Outer Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia.

as having reached the stage of an ultimate and unavoidable showdown. He neither succumbed altogether to Soviet pressure nor called for popular support against it. Instead, he sharpened his criticism of Yugoslavia, but retained a tone of sorrow in contrast to the anger shown by all other Bloc statements. He condemned Nagy's behavior, but still pictured him as a weak leader giving way to pressure rather than as an active and long-term conspirator. Most important, he did not endorse the execution, calling it Hungary's internal affair.

8. We do not believe that the USSR has taken a decision to subdue Poland at all costs, using whatever means prove necessary. But we cannot reaffirm that "the USSR's reluctant acceptance of the 'new' Poland . . .<sup>3</sup> appears to be a long-range adjustment rather than a temporary accommodation."<sup>4</sup> In view of the intensity of the current Soviet campaign and Gomulka's continued foot-dragging, we believe that the USSR will make more direct efforts to obtain his compliance or, failing that, perhaps even to replace him.

9. *Implications for Soviet Foreign Policy.* We believe that recent events do not indicate that the USSR has ceased to desire a conference at the summit or lower level negotiations on matters in which the Soviet leaders have an interest. At the same time, the Soviet leaders may have concluded prior to undertaking their recent moves that, since the chances of an early summit conference on their terms were waning, they could more easily accept the political losses they would suffer in international affairs by pursuing a harder policy in Eastern Europe. In any event, they must recognize that adverse reactions in the West to their moves against revisionism may seriously reduce the short run chances that negotiations can be conducted on a basis favorable to Soviet interests. We believe that they are prepared to accept such a price, if necessary, in dealing with the situation in Eastern Europe, which they consider must always take precedence over non-Bloc affairs. They probably estimate that other powers will not agree to high level negotiations as long as the USSR continues to take strong measures in Eastern Europe. The Soviet note of 2 July and Soviet conduct at Geneva indicate that the USSR will nonetheless continue to press for negotiations and to seek to place the onus on the West for further delays.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Ellipsis in the source text.

<sup>4</sup> NIE 12-58, "Outlook for Stability in the Eastern European Satellites," 4 February 1958, paragraph 44. [Footnote in the source text. NIE 12-58 is printed as Document 2.]

<sup>5</sup> The July 2 Soviet note may refer to Khrushchev's letter to Eisenhower which proposed a conference of Soviet and U.S. experts to develop recommendations regarding measures for the prevention of the possibility of surprise attack. For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 18, 1958, pp. 279-281. The reference to Geneva presumably refers to meetings there beginning on July 1 among technical experts representing Canada, France, United Kingdom, United States, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union to study methods of detecting violations of a possible agreement on the suspension of nuclear weapons tests.



10. *Other Possible Considerations.* While we think that the above most satisfactorily explains recent Soviet moves, other factors may also be involved. For example, we cannot be certain that Khrushchev's removal of opponents has put an end to the view within the Soviet leadership that his peaceful coexistence line is a dubious tactic which weakens the internal vitality of the Communist movement and that any but the smallest grants of autonomy to the satellites are impermissibly dangerous. Persons of this persuasion may feel that, in view of the recent gains in Bloc strength and weaknesses in the free world, victory is assured if only unity can be maintained. The failure of certain of Khrushchev's policies—courtship of Tito, partial relaxation of controls over Eastern Europe, effort to force the West into a summit conference on Soviet terms—may have encouraged a resurgence of this view within the Soviet leadership. If so, it would probably enjoy the support of the orthodox regimes in Eastern Europe as well as that of the Chinese Communists, who appear to be exerting an increased influence on Bloc policy and to prefer a generally tough line. We think that Khrushchev would take account of such views and, in order to prevent the formation of a serious opposition group, might take the lead in implementing them.

11. But the evidence concerning activities within the Soviet leadership is, as usual, elusive. On the one hand, the published results of the recent CPSU plenum reveal a further step in agricultural reforms associated with Khrushchev and the reinforcement, via the appointment of two new candidate members, of his position within the Presidium.<sup>6</sup> We know of no hardening in domestic Soviet policy paralleling that in policy toward the Satellites. On the other hand, there have been reports of alleged policy differences within the Soviet leadership. Moreover, unresolved leadership differences may underlie several recent oscillations in Soviet foreign policy which have no other wholly satisfactory explanation. The Chinese role is obscure: Peiping has taken an even stronger line against revisionism than has the USSR, and we think that, if the Soviet leadership were divided on this issue, the Chinese position might exert considerable weight.

12. If it is indeed the case that a new line is being pressed upon Khrushchev, then the future course of Soviet policy becomes even more uncertain. On its face, such a new line could involve a more extensive shift in tactics toward the non-Communist world than the mere raising of difficulties about the Geneva meeting, and a greater and more imme-

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<sup>6</sup> Following a number of plenary meetings of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party June 22–29, the party on July 3 announced several changes in the composition and membership of the Presidium of the Central Committee, including increasing the number of candidates (alternate) members of the Presidium from seven to nine.

diate threat to Gomulka's position than could be staved off by his recent speech. But any line of policy involving a partial retreat by Khrushchev would be quite unstable, in view of his almost certain subsequent attempts to reassert himself. Thus policy might undergo a series of zigs and zags flowing from the push and pull of an internal power struggle.

13. Alternatively, Khrushchev himself may have initiated the current line. He has to be especially concerned to distinguish sharply between his own innovations and those of others which he has labelled "revisionism." Thus he may have chosen to attack Tito, execute Nagy, and force concessions from Gomulka in order to establish himself as an anti-revisionist while demonstrating in other fields that only he is permitted to alter Communist doctrine. This view is all the more reasonable if Khrushchev has become personally disenchanted with Tito and impatient with Gomulka. If the initiative is indeed Khrushchev's own, the change in line might become as substantial as in the preceding paragraph but it would still be unstable, if only because of Khrushchev's willingness to change his mind.

14. We conclude that, at present, the most likely explanation of recent Soviet actions is not that the USSR has either abandoned its "peaceful coexistence" line or settled on Gomulka's downfall. Rather Moscow appears to be moving to insure its position in Eastern Europe, involving greater pressure upon Poland, and is prepared to take the consequences of a temporary setback in relations with the non-Communist world.

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**49. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State**

Moscow, July 23, 1958, 11 a.m.

201. At Polish Embassy reception last night my wife and I were seated at small table with Italian, Iranian, Canadian and Netherlands Ambassadors. Khrushchev and other members of Presidium were seated in large circle composed mainly of satellite representatives and such countries as Egypt, India, etc. Shortly before 8 o'clock when party should have broken up, Khrushchev ostentatiously came over to join

our table bringing Indian Ambassador and later we were joined by Mikoyan and Polish Ambassador. Despite several attempts on part of Mikoyan and myself to break up the party Khrushchev insisted on staying until half past nine. In view composition of party and that of other tables within earshot I thought it best to avoid serious conversation and deliberately contrived to put my wife between Khrushchev and myself. Although most of the evening was spent in largely trivial conversation between him and my wife, following subjects came up in general conversation.

Khrushchev looked me straight in the eye and asked bluntly why Secretary Benson had cancelled his visit.<sup>1</sup> I immediately replied that I was sure the reason given in his letter was correct one. When he expressed skepticism I went on to say that we had an approaching election and that agricultural policy was one of the most important issues and as I developed my personal knowledge of Benson's great interest in the visit, Khrushchev appeared convinced. In this connection he said Soviet Union would have a bumper crop this year including the new lands. When my wife remarked that she had seen a large party of youth preparing to depart for participation in the harvest Khrushchev said this was a bad system which they had to employ due to lack of adequate machinery but that they hoped within two or three years to remedy this and abolish the system.

Subject of civil aviation came up and Khrushchev asked me why we had never carried out the agreement to establish civil airlines.<sup>2</sup> I said I thought we had great interest in this but was entirely uninformed as to why negotiations had not been started. (I should be grateful if Department would inform me of current status this question.)<sup>3</sup> Khrushchev proposed that he and I start the negotiations next day to which I said I

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<sup>1</sup> Telegram 75 to Moscow, July 11, requested the Embassy to inform Soviet Minister of Agriculture Vladimir Vladimirovich Matskevich that Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson had to delay his proposed trip to Europe and the Soviet Union indefinitely because of the extreme pressure of legislative and agricultural policy matters. (*Ibid.*, 033.1161/7-1158)

<sup>2</sup> Section XIV of the agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on exchanges in the cultural, technical, and educational fields, signed in Washington on January 27, provided for agreement in principle to the establishment on the basis of reciprocity direct air flights between the two nations and the commencement of negotiations on terms and conditions "at a mutually convenient date to be determined later." For text of the agreement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 17, 1958, pp. 243–247.

<sup>3</sup> In a letter to Ambassador Thompson, August 27, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Thomas C. Mann wrote that bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union on a civil aviation agreement might begin after the airline industry and the Civil Aeronautics Board had formulated a U.S. position for the talks. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.6194/8-2758)

knew nothing about subject and would have to get help. He remarked somewhat contemptuously that this was a typical diplomatic answer.

When I asked him when we were going to get a vacation he said he was leaving for Kiev about August 16 and was going on to the Crimea about August 20. He renewed an invitation he had on a previous occasion extended to my wife that I bring my family to Crimea and that we spend our vacation together there where he promised some good hunting. My wife explained her plans were fairly well advanced to leave for Austria and Italy August 11, mentioning children's need for carrying on dental work already begun in Vienna. Khrushchev indicated he considered this evasion and that he was serious in invitation. He said he realized of course that I would have to obtain authorization from State Department. Matter was left in such manner that it could easily be pursued or dropped. When my wife asked where we would stay he said he thought he had some influence with mayor of nearest town and could find us accommodations. At one point in conversation I said I thought if we could rid world of propaganda, problem of establishing peace would be easy. Khrushchev immediately said "let's make an agreement to do it at once." The various toasts he composed were completely inoffensive.

In the later conversation with my wife she asked what had happened to end our wartime collaboration. Khrushchev replied that our establishment of a large fund for subversion of the Soviet system was largely to blame. He told her that it was Bulganin who had brought him the news of his son's death during the war and he spoke of former in affectionate terms. When he expatiated on role of India as a go-between my wife remarked she did not understand why we could not talk directly to each other and he agreed there was no valid reason.

During this time I was talking to Mikoyan who was close to being drunk, the conversation relating mostly to wartime reminiscences. He paid me some extravagant compliments, saying among other things that although our relations had probably never been worse they found it always possible to talk to me. When he said the role of being American Ambassador in Soviet Union must be an extremely difficult one, adding that he could say anything he pleased while I had to be careful, I replied I was very glad that he realized this. I also remarked that an American Ambassador had to be adept at ducking flying glass, which he took in good part. When he started to make a crack about Arab problem I said that if he wanted to maintain atmosphere which this conversation had hitherto had I would advise him not to open up this subject. He laughed and changed subject.

Throughout conversation I endeavored to maintain as reserved an attitude as circumstances permitted. My general impression is that Khrushchev was worried although I suspect Indian Ambassador may

have taken initiative to suggest he join our table. Whole performance was an eerie one, perhaps best expressed by fact that throughout evening gramophone was playing number of American jazz songs including repeated renderings of "Why Must You Be Mean To Me?".

**Thompson**

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## 50. Editorial Note

In early July 1958, Secretary of State Dulles approved a plan for a limited high-altitude balloon reconnaissance program of the Soviet Union. For background on the planning of this operation, see Document 46.

The operational plan, outlined in a July 2 memorandum from Cumming to Dulles, called for about eight balloons to be released from a carrier in the Pacific to fly over the United States. "At the same time, two or three balloons equipped with cameras will be aimed specifically to pass westward over the USSR, the explanation, if they are detected, to be that they are apparently strays from the launchings previously announced." Dulles' approval of this plan is noted on this memorandum. (Department of State, INR Files: Lot 58 D 776, Balloons)

Attached to Cumming's July 2 memorandum to Dulles is a draft memorandum from Deputy Secretary of Defense Quarles to the President, July 2, outlining the cover plan and operational plan. No record of the President's final approval of this plan has been found, but three balloons were released to fly over the Soviet Union, as planned, respectively on July 12, 14, and 15.

According to undated notes on a meeting among State, CIA, and Defense officials, attached to a July 25 memorandum from Cumming to Under Secretary of State Christian A. Herter, the press release preceding this operation as part of the cover plan indicated that several balloons would be released to fly over the United States, and publicity on these flights was carried in west coast papers on July 17. These notes also indicate that the Air Force officer responsible for setting the mechanism governing the length of the flight of the balloons decided on his own to have the balloons cut themselves down after 400 hours when he estimated they would be over the Atlantic Ocean, but his error in judgment meant that they might possibly descend in the Soviet Union, Poland, or Denmark. (*Ibid.*)

A copy of the press release, prepared by the Department of Defense and issued by the Cambridge Research Center in Bedford, Massachusetts, on July 25, which explained that 5 of the 35 balloons released during the first half of 1958 had been lost, is in telegram 274 to Moscow, August 8. (Department of State, Central Files, 761.5411/8-858)

For the reactions of Eisenhower administration officials to the first balloons coming down in Poland on July 28, see Documents 51 and 52.

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## 51. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, July 29, 1958.

Mr. Ayer<sup>1</sup> called me at about eleven o'clock to advise that a reconnaissance balloon of the 461-L project had apparently gone down in Poland yesterday. He said that he was planning for a statement to the press to be made within a very short time, and read off what it was proposed to say. To my query he indicated that this proposed action and text had been taken up at Assistant Secretary level in State, but not higher, and had not been taken up with the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense. I told him that the President had reserved all major decisions in the matter to himself, and would wish for the matter to be brought to his attention with the recommendations of Mr. Quarles and Secretary Dulles or Mr. Herter. Mr. Ayer argued against doing so, and I finally told him that it was essential that the matter be handled in this way. I also suggested that he get in touch with Mr. Quarles without delay.

I talked to Mr. Herter, who advised that he had seen the text of the proposed action and found it satisfactory. I then talked to Mr. Quarles, who was not familiar with the matter, but said he would go into it at once.

I spoke briefly to Dr. Killian, in my office. He advised that the mishap had occurred because of a decision on the part of an operating official in the Air Force to set the balloons for automatic descent at 400 hours duration, this being a major change in the plan as presented to the President and approved by him.

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, Intelligence Matters. Top Secret. Prepared by Goodpaster.

<sup>1</sup> Frederick Ayer, Jr., Special Assistant for Intelligence, Department of the Air Force.

I then reported the matter to the President and Secretary Dulles, who was with him. The President indicated that, when Mr. Quarles had a proposed statement and plan of action ready, he should take it up with Secretary Dulles in view of the latter's interest as to timing, content, impact on other activities, etc.

The President deplored the way in which this project has been handled. He asked me to advise Mr. Quarles that the project is to be discontinued at once and every cent that has been made available as part of any project involving crossing the Iron Curtain is to be impounded, and no further expenditures are to be made.

I called Mr. Quarles, who said he would clear any proposed statement with Secretary Dulles and with the White House, through me. He confirmed that he understood the President's instructions about discontinuing the project and all outlays of funds connected with the project.

G.

*Brigadier General, USA*

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## 52. Editorial Note

According to a memorandum of a telephone conversation between President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles, July 30 at 6:31 p.m., "the Sec said another balloon is down in the interior of the SU—the one they thought would come down around Denmark. The Pres would take the man who ordered that and fire him. There will be a great thing before the Supreme Court but in the meantime the man will suffer." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations) According to telegram 273 to Moscow, August 8, it was believed this balloon as well as a third one came down in the vicinity of Kiev in the Soviet Union. (Department of State, Central Files, 761.5411/8–858)

The Soviet Union protested these aerial balloon flights over Soviet air space. For the September 3 Soviet note and the U.S. reply of September 5, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 29, 1958, pages 504–505. The Soviet note of October 13 renewing the protest was transmitted in telegram 826 from Moscow, October 13. (Department of State, Central Files, 761.5411/8–1358) For text of the U.S. reply, October 22, see Department of State *Bulletin*, November 10, 1958, pages 739–740. A further Soviet protest on November 20 was transmitted in telegram 1125 from Moscow, November 20. (Department of State, Central Files,

761.5411/11-2058) According to a memorandum from Richard M. Service to Richard H. Davis, May 23, 1960, the United States did not answer this last Soviet note. (*Ibid.*, 761.5411/5-2360)

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### 53. Editorial Note

Adlai E. Stevenson, Democratic Party Presidential candidate in 1952 and 1956, visited the Soviet Union July 12–August 8. The purpose of his visit was twofold: to conduct business for his law clients and to observe conditions in the Soviet Union as a private citizen. During his visit, he met with numerous prominent Soviet officials to discuss outstanding political issues between the United States and the Soviet Union. His conversation with Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko on July 16 was summarized in telegram 133 from Moscow, July 16. (Department of State, Central Files, 032–Stevenson, Adlai/7-1658) Memoranda of his conversations with Nikolai A. Mikhailov, Minister of Culture, on July 16, Soviet First Deputy Premier Anastas I. Mikoyan on July 31, and Nikita S. Khrushchev on August 5 were transmitted in despatch 92 from Moscow, August 8. (*Ibid.*, 032–Stevenson, Adlai/8-858) Memoranda of his conversations with Mikoyan and Khrushchev were prepared from notes taken by Robert C. Tucker, who had previously served in the Embassy in Moscow and accompanied Stevenson on his tour. There is no drafting information on the memorandum of Stevenson's conversation with Mikhailov, but presumably Tucker also prepared it. Attached to despatch 92 is a covering memorandum dated August 8, from Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson indicating that prior to these conversations Stevenson asked him for suggestions on points he might raise during these talks. Thompson made several suggestions, and Stevenson was able to introduce most of them in his talks with Soviet leaders.

Additional documentation on Stevenson's visit, including his diary notes and extracts from memoranda of his conversations with Mikoyan and Khrushchev, is in *The Papers of Adlai E. Stevenson: Continuing Education and the Unfinished Business of American Society, 1957–1961*, Walter Johnson, ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), volume II, pages 232–279. Stevenson also wrote 12 articles summarizing his meetings with Soviet leaders and giving his impressions of the Soviet Union for the North American Newspaper Alliance, which syndicated them. The articles were published in *The New York Times* between August 27 and Novem-



ber 23. Much of the information presented in these articles was subsequently incorporated into Stevenson's book, *Friends and Enemies: What I Learned in Russia* (New York: Harper, 1959)

A summary of Stevenson's conversations with Soviet leaders is printed as Document 54.

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#### 54. Report Prepared in the Department of State

Washington, September 5, 1958.

##### SUMMARY OF MR. STEVENSON'S CONVERSATIONS WITH SOVIET LEADERS

###### *US-USSR Political Relations*

Khrushchev repeatedly posed the question of what could be done to improve US-USSR relations. He and Mr. Stevenson agreed that non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries is a highly desirable step in this direction. However, Khrushchev's manifest resentment of Stevenson's expressed interest in Soviet actions toward Yugoslavia and Hungary and the sharp attack on US "intervention" in Lebanon, Guatemala, Cuba, etc., revealed the broad discrepancy in meaning attached to "non-interference." Khrushchev also repeated the usual Soviet objections to US foreign bases. Mr. Stevenson was impressed with Khrushchev's statement that "If a country wants to go to war, then it can ignore public opinion. But if one does not want war, then one must take account of public opinion. Mr. Stevenson interpreted this statement as an indication that Soviet leaders must now consider public opinion in formulating foreign policy because they now rely more on persuasion and less on coercion than was the case in the Stalin regime.

Mr. Stevenson emphasized to Gromyko that the US public firmly supports its Government in the current Middle Eastern crisis. Khrushchev, Mikoyan and Gromyko all repeated the standard Soviet line that Chamoun's<sup>1</sup> request for US troops was unconstitutional and

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/9-1058. Confidential. Drafted by John A. Armitage. An attached memorandum from Kohler to Dulles, September 10, briefly summarized this report. Also attached was a memorandum from Elbrick to Dulles, September 8, that noted Stevenson's consultation with Ambassador Thompson before his conversations with Soviet leaders.

<sup>1</sup> Camille Chamoun, President of Lebanon.

unsupported by the Lebanese people and that the despatch of US troops to protect US citizens was a classic pretext of imperialists for armed intervention. Khrushchev stated the Soviet Union would never reconcile itself to US troops remaining in the Middle East and expressed the view that Arab dislike of the US would continue to grow as long as troops were present.

Mr. Stevenson interpreted Khrushchev's vigorous expression of distaste for sitting with Chiang Kai-shek<sup>2</sup> as an indication that the Chinese Communists had vigorously objected to this but also felt that the Soviets considered the General Assembly a better forum for mobilizing public opinion than the Security Council, particularly when the Secretary had excluded private talks unless, as Khrushchev said, "they took place by accident in the men's room."

#### *US-USSR Trade Relations*

Khrushchev said that the USSR had not expected US credits but told the Governor that the "secret" motivation of Khrushchev's trade letter<sup>3</sup> was to demonstrate to the Soviet people that US expressions of concern over the welfare of Soviet consumers was politically motivated and not genuine. Khrushchev and Mikoyan characterized the President's reply as a "rather good," "generally favorable" one.<sup>4</sup> In reply to Mr. Stevenson, Khrushchev conceded equivocally that the lend-lease account must be settled before a substantial expansion of trade could take place. Khrushchev also remarked about the failure of American papers to publish his letter in full.

Mikoyan said that the USSR could allocate 500 million to 1 billion dollars of its 8 billion dollar trade volume to trade with the US. He referred to Khrushchev's letter as indicating what US goods Soviet trade monopolies would be interested in and added that USSR could buy excavators over the period of a year or two and so avoid creating domestic productive capacity to meet a short-time need.

While disclaiming economic autarky, Mikoyan said the Soviet Union must be "independent of the capitalist world in the basic questions." However, Soviet purchase of 5 to 10% of a given type of machine from foreign sources would not impair this independence. The USSR desired to expand output and export of items it could produce more cheaply, such as timber, paper, cellulose and oil.

Mikoyan said the abolition of US discriminatory practices was a prerequisite to trade expansion. He mentioned the high US tariff on So-

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<sup>2</sup> President of the Republic of China.

<sup>3</sup> For text of Khrushchev's June 2 letter to Eisenhower on expansion of U.S.-Soviet trade, see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 4, 1958, pp. 200-202.

<sup>4</sup> For text of Eisenhower's July 14 letter to Khrushchev on expansion of U.S.-Soviet trade, see *ibid.*, p. 200.

viet manganese, restrictions on US import of raw furs, US disapproval of the export of an oil drilling cutting edge in return for the Soviet turbo-drill, US refusal to export some medical equipment and supplies and some other equipment for the IGY.

Khrushchev remarked that Secretary Weeks<sup>5</sup> had said the US Government would not hinder deals with private firms and that “apparently we will consider the propositions made by these firms with a view to inviting their representatives to come here for talks.”

#### *US-USSR Cultural Relations*

Soviet Minister of Culture Mikhailov demonstrated the sensitive Soviet amour propre in discussing the film negotiations. Noting the US reluctance to take as many films as the Soviets did, he said “This experience had shown disrespect for the Russian films.” Mikoyan vigorously and emphatically defended Soviet jamming of the Voice of America, attributing it to American cold-war policy and gave no indication of Soviet willingness to make concessions in its travel restrictions.

Governor Stevenson’s efforts to obtain Soviet recognition of American authors’ rights to royalties on works published in the Soviet Union met with a non-committal response from Mikhailov.

#### *Soviet Foreign Trade and Aid*

Mikoyan stated that the Soviet Union would “have to expand” its foreign economic assistance and that joint UN economic development programs could and should be expanded.

Mikoyan claimed that recent large-scale Soviet exports of aluminum, particularly to Great Britain, were designed only to obtain foreign currency and that the Soviet Union would not go in for large aluminum exports in the future as its domestic requirements were growing.

Mikoyan said that in the long-range future, the Soviet Government hoped to make the ruble convertible.

#### *Communist China*

Governor Stevenson’s talks with Soviet leaders confirmed the impression he had from European leaders that “Communist China bulks very large in Soviet thought, concern and policy.”

Khrushchev emphasized that the pace of Communist Chinese development was “astonishing” and had exceeded even what the Chinese Communists themselves foresaw.

Mikoyan remarked that the USSR, as a matter of policy, bought what Communist China could supply, perhaps reducing its own output of a particular item by 1 to 3 percent in order to do so. He gave rice and

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<sup>5</sup> Sinclair Weeks, Secretary of Commerce.

silk as examples of this policy. He denied that there was any friction in Soviet-Chinese Communist trade relations, stating that it might be necessary to "talk things over" if the trade imbalance exceeded the 80 million dollar swing fund.

#### *Soviet Domestic Situation*

Governor Stevenson's over-all impression of the Soviet Union was one of concentrated and harnessed energy and industry. Both Khrushchev and Mikoyan stressed that the industrial decentralization was working out successfully and that the local executives were proving highly capable and equal to their tasks. Both men explained the large number of economic regions (which is generally conceded to be uneconomic) are as determined by the existence of given administrative divisions. This is an interesting commentary on the limitations which entrenched bureaucracy places even on a powerful dictatorship.

Mikoyan reaffirmed the Soviet intention to convert all industry to a 7-hour working day by 1960 although this conversion had cost the coal industry four billion rubles in the past twelve months and would cost the iron and steel industry three billion rubles this year.

#### *Remarks Concerning the Secretary*

Khrushchev made obvious oblique unfavorable references to the Secretary, terming him "A person who if brought together with a saint would make the saint a sinner." He said that Communist leaders said they would regret the Secretary's departure from the State Department because "we'll hardly get a more helpful opponent than he." Later Khrushchev said that "that Sputnik of the President is embittered and is artificially keeping up a state of tension." He implied that the Secretary was motivated by personal feelings and failed to appreciate that politicians' behavior must be determined by the needs of their own countries.

#### *Mr. Stevenson's Conclusions*

Mr. Stevenson considered that there was little to encourage hope of an early settlement of major issues. He was impressed with Khrushchev's "desire to avoid war . . . and his eagerness to talk."<sup>6</sup> He told Khrushchev that "we should proceed from the idea of equality of power on the two sides—Neither rollback by us nor expansion by the Soviet Union." Mr. Stevenson was struck by Khrushchev's acceptance of the idea of equality. He tentatively suggested, in one of his articles, that Khrushchev be invited to visit the United States.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Ellipsis in the source text.

<sup>7</sup> Stevenson made this suggestion in the second of his articles published in *The New York Times*, August 28, 1958.

## 55. Editorial Note

On September 2, an unarmed U.S. Air Force C-130 transport airplane on a roundtrip flight from Adana to Trabzon and Van, Turkey, with a crew of 17 on board, was reported as missing along the Soviet-Turkish border. In Goodpaster's memorandum for the record, prepared on September 9, which summarized his discussions with General Thomas D. White, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, President Eisenhower, and Secretary of State Dulles on the missing aircraft, Goodpaster wrote:

"On the evening of 2 September General White told me he had just received information indicating that a C-130 equipped for electronic reconnaissance had apparently been shot down somewhere along the Turkish-Soviet border earlier that day. He said the report was inexplicable, in that the course of the plane as planned was never closer than 85 miles to the Soviet border. He phoned me the next day, indicating that while there was no further public information, a C-130 was unreported. He sent General Walsh over, with a report indicating that the aircraft had been off course, had crossed the Soviet border (possibly lured by a false radio beacon) and that it had been shot down.

"General White said that he had taken several steps to tighten up further the conduct and supervision of such reconnaissance flights. He sent over copies of instructions aimed at assuring that the aircraft do not, even through navigation error, leave friendly territory. At his request, I reported the matter to the President and the Secretary of State in Newport on 4 September, and discussed it further with the President on 6 September. He thought the instructions were about all that could be done, but stressed the necessity of command emphasis and supervision. I so informed General White." (Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, Intelligence Matters)

Major General James H. Walsh, USAF, was Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Air Force. Neither the report on the decoy theory nor the instructions on future flights, both mentioned in Goodpaster's memorandum, has been found.

For text of the Department of State announcement, dated September 6, of the missing plane and the U.S. note delivered to the Soviet Foreign Ministry on September 6 requesting any information on the plane and its crew, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 29, 1958, page 505. [*text not declassified*]

The United States based much of its subsequent protests to the Soviet Union on information derived from telegram 845 from Ankara, September 9. (Department of State, Central Files, 761.5411/9-958)

A Soviet note of September 12, transmitted in telegram 580 from Moscow, September 12, indicated that the wreckage of an airplane and the remains of six crew members had been found well inside Soviet territory. (*Ibid.*, 761.5411/9-1258) The queries of Chargé Richard H. Davis

to Soviet authorities about the other eleven missing crew members and requests for permission of U.S. personnel to visit the crash site were transmitted in telegram 579 from Moscow, September 12. (*Ibid.*) For text of the Department of State statement of September 12, summarizing the September 12 Soviet note, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 6, 1958, page 531. For text of the U.S. note of September 13, claiming that Soviet fighter aircraft had intercepted and shot down the C-130 and requesting a visit to the crash scene by U.S. technical experts to investigate the circumstances of the crash and to identify and arrange for transportation of the remains of the victims out of the Soviet Union, see *ibid.*, page 533. For text of the September 19 Soviet note, which reiterated that only six bodies had been found, denied any knowledge of the other eleven, repeated its charges of an intentional violation by the plane of Soviet air space, rejected U.S. charges that Soviet aircraft had shot down the C-130, and offered to arrange for the transfer of the remains of the six bodies to U.S. authorities, see *ibid.*, February 23, 1959, page 270. For text of the U.S. note of September 21 and the Department of State announcement of September 23 indicating agreement with the Soviet Union on the transfer of the remains of the six crew members to U.S. officials, see *ibid.*, October 20, 1958, page 618. Six coffins and bodies along with personal effects were transferred to U.S. authorities on September 24. (Telegram 1048 from Ankara, September 26; Department of State, Central Files, 761.5411/9-2658)

The U.S. Government continued to press Soviet authorities concerning the fate of the eleven missing crew members but failed to elicit any information. For text of a U.S. note of October 3, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 27, 1958, pages 659-660. For an account of the conversation between Eric Johnston and Khrushchev on the C-130 incident on October 6, see Document 56. For text of a Soviet note of October 16 on this case, which also charged another violation of Soviet air space by a U.S. military aircraft, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 23, 1959, page 271. For text of a U.S. note of November 8, see *ibid.*, December 1, 1958, page 885. For text of Robert Murphy's representation on the C-130 incident to Soviet Ambassador Menshikov on November 13, a chronology on the matter, a translation of a tape-recorded conversation among Soviet fighter pilots participating in the alleged attack on the C-130, and translation of two articles from *Sovetskaya Aviatsiya* (*Soviet Aviation*), all of which were released to the press on February 5, 1959, see *ibid.*, February 23, 1959, pages 263-269.

Discussion of possible countermeasures to Soviet attacks on U.S. aircraft is in Document 58.

On January 6, 1959, Vice President Richard M. Nixon took up the question of the eleven missing crew members with First Deputy Premier Anastas I. Mikoyan, who visited the United States January 4-20,

1959. Secretary of State Dulles raised it again with Mikoyan on January 16, 1959. For text of their representations, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 23, 1959, pages 262–263. For texts of Department of State press releases of February 5, 6, and 7 reviewing the entire issue, see *ibid.*, pages 262 and 269–270. Summary of a TASS statement of February 17 reacting to the February 5 press release was transmitted in telegram 1628 from Moscow, February 17. (Department of State, Central Files, 761.5411/2–1759) The translation of an *Izvestia* article of February 18 by M. Mikhailov charging that the evidence presented in the Department of State press announcement of February 5 was a “crude forgery” was transmitted in despatch 484 from Moscow, February 20. (*Ibid.*, 761.5411/2–2059)

On May 4, Ambassador Thompson met with Khrushchev concerning the eleven missing crew members and left an aide-mémoire which indicated that President Eisenhower had instructed him to bring this matter to Khrushchev’s personal attention. A draft text of this aide-mémoire, which the President approved on April 3 with minor changes, is attached to a memorandum from Herter to the President, April 2. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series) The aide-mémoire was then transmitted in telegram 1602 to Moscow, April 3. (Department of State, Central Files, 761.5411/4–359) For Thompson’s summary of his interview with Khrushchev, see Document 73. A translation of the Soviet reply to the aide-mémoire, handed to Thompson on May 25, was transmitted in telegram 2371 from Moscow, May 25. (Department of State, Central Files, 761.5411/5–2559) For the brief statement by Press Secretary James C. Hagerty on April 4, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 25, 1959, page 743.

At the end of his visit to the Soviet Union July 23–August 2, 1959, Vice President Nixon wrote a letter to Khrushchev concerning the missing crewmen. A copy of this August 1 letter is attached to a memorandum from Richard H. Davis to John A. Calhoun, August 26. (Department of State, Central Files, 761.5411/8–2659) A translation of Khrushchev’s reply to Nixon, August 22, is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1416.

President Eisenhower did not raise the matter with Khrushchev during his visit to the United States September 15–28, 1959, but he wrote Khrushchev on October 1 expressing “the deep concern” of the families of the eleven missing men and making a personal appeal for information about them. Text of Eisenhower’s letter was transmitted in telegram 904 to Moscow, October 1. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 761.5411/10–159) A translation of Khrushchev’s reply, October 10, is *ibid.*, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204.

On October 21, 1959, Secretary Christian A. Herter wrote a memorandum to the President saying that because Khrushchev’s letter of Oc-

tober 10 provided nothing new, it was “highly unlikely that we shall ever be given further information about the fate of the eleven men.” He suggested that the families of the missing men receive a personal message of sympathy from the President, and he enclosed a suggested message and names and addresses of the next of kin. (Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, International Series) Text of Eisenhower’s letters to the families of the missing airmen has not been found, but a memorandum from James Carson of S/S-RO to Stephen Winship of EUR, December 1, 1959, notes that Eisenhower sent such letters on October 29. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 761.5411/11-3059)

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## 56. Report by Eric Johnston

October 6, 1958.

[Here follows the first part of the report containing Johnston’s summary of the arrangements for his visit to Khrushchev; his airplane flight accompanied by Georgi A. Zhukov, Chairman of the Soviet State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, from Moscow to Adler on the Black Sea; and his impressions of the scenery on the drive to Gagra and the grounds and dacha where Khrushchev was staying.]

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, Eric Johnston. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Eric Johnston, President of the Motion Picture Association of America, visited the Soviet Union in September and October to conduct negotiations on the purchase and sale of motion pictures under the cultural exchange agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union. The portion of the report printed here, which was presumably drafted after Johnston’s return, recounts his meeting with Khrushchev on October 6 near Gagra in the Soviet Union. Before leaving the Soviet Union, Johnston left with the Embassy in Moscow an account of his conversation with Khrushchev, highlights of which were reported in telegrams 778 and 784 from Moscow, October 8. (Department of State, Central Files, 761.5411/10-858 and 032-Johnston, Eric/10-858, respectively) The full text of Johnston’s account, which is identical to the text printed here, was transmitted in despatch 223, October 10. (*Ibid.*, 032-Johnston, Eric/10-1058)

Attached to the source text is a November 11 memorandum from J.S. Earman, Executive Officer of the CIA, to Minnich forwarding Johnston’s memorandum as well as a memorandum of Johnston’s November 4 conversation with Allen Dulles (Document 57).

Also attached to the source text are a briefing note for the President prepared by Minnich on November 13 summarizing the topics covered in Johnston’s memorandum and an undated cover sheet indicating that the President would see Johnston at 8:45 a.m. Eisenhower met with Johnston on November 14, 8:43–9:43 a.m., but no record of their conversation has been found. (Eisenhower Library, President’s Appointment Books)



We walked down the board walk for a couple of hundred feet to a platform covered by a large umbrella under which were several chairs and a table with fresh fruit and dishes. Zhukov pointed out to me that Khrushchev was coming down the walk. Indeed he was. I quickly saw that he was hatless, and was wearing a blue suit somewhat like the seer-sucker type we wear in Washington in the summer. A Georgian white shirt with blue embroidery was tied by a string at the neck. Sandals were on his feet. His bald head was fringed with closely cropped white hair. He is a man of short stature with a bull neck and a large girth. He greeted me with a merry twinkle in his eye and immediately started the conversation by saying: "Mikoyan has just told me about you. He left here yesterday for Moscow. You know, I had a hard time getting rid of him. I thought he was never going to leave."

I replied that I had met Mikoyan in 1944.

A breeze was blowing across the Black Sea and Khrushchev waved his hand and said: "This is a cold wind. It is coming from your ally Turkey. I presume we could expect nothing else but a cold wind from a NATO country." But he emphasized, "This doesn't bother us." He quickly launched into a story which he said a Yugoslavian had told him. "During the war" he went on, "people deserted the cities of Yugoslavia and lived in the hills where they engaged mainly in guerrilla warfare. The animals left the city, too. After the war was over the people returned to the city but the animals remained in the hills. A dog, a cow and a jack-ass got together and decided that perhaps they should go back to the city and see how life really was. They had been gone so long, however, that they thought they would send a scout down to reconnoiter. The dog was sent first. In due time he returned and said the city was terrible. He had barked and everybody had told him to keep quiet. They wouldn't even let him bark in the city any more and he didn't like it. So they sent the cow down to reconnoiter. The cow returned after awhile and reported that the city was terrible. Everybody had milked her dry. Finally, the jackass took his turn at viewing the city lights. When he came back he said the city was wonderful. The people had all gotten together and had elected him president. Tito heard that this story was told to me by the Yugoslavian and was furious because he felt that it was a direct insult to him. Tito is queer that way."

Suddenly, Khrushchev looked at me and said: "Why, you don't look like a capitalist at all. You are not fat. They have sent me a man in disguise—a lean man."

I replied that we had to work so hard in the capitalist countries that we couldn't get fat.

"No, no," he said and laughed heartily, his belly shaking like old St. Nick's. "Sit down," he said "and have some fruit." I am glad to welcome

you to this communist land. A capitalist and a communist can at least talk together.”<sup>1</sup>

I then asked: “What is the cause of present world tensions, and how would you relieve them?”

“What is your next question?” he asked. I again repeated my question to him. He replied:

“There are many causes of world tension today but perhaps the most important is imperialism in its many forms. England and France have grown rich on the exploitation of other peoples.” I interrupted to say that I felt that imperialism or colonialism had cost these countries far more in the recent years than any advantages they might have received; that these countries were trying to educate people for freedom and independence.

“This is not true,” he said, “Look at the Middle East. Colonialism and feudalism still continue there. You are trying to keep the existing governments in power, but the people want their own governments, responsive to their own wishes. This can only come by revolution. Every woman who has a child hopes that it can be born without pain but most women have pain. The overthrow of feudalism and colonialism usually comes with pain.”

“Perhaps you misunderstand our position,” I said, “We do not object to nations changing their leadership even by violent method but we do object to a revolution started by an outside force, a Communist, conspiratorial force directed from the outside.”

“We are not doing that.” he said. “Do you think Nasser<sup>2</sup> is a communist? Communism is outlawed in Egypt and I understand there are 5,000 or more communists under arrest. Do you think this is an outside communist conspiracy? Take Iraq, there the leaders are not communists. In fact, they are anti-communists. The revolt was against a feudal system. Take Finland, there is a Communist party in Finland. We wish them well, but we are not supporting them. We hope all people will overthrow feudalistic governments, wherever they are. But in your case you support these feudalistic regimes with troops. If it had not been for British troops in Jordan, Hussein would have been murdered long ago

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<sup>1</sup> In a letter to Foy Kohler, October 10, Chargé Davis indicated that, beginning at this point in their conversation, Johnston and Khrushchev discussed Johnston’s idea for the exchange of either feature-length films of Soviet-U.S. relations since World War II or shorter newsreels in which Khrushchev and Eisenhower would informally explain the aims and desires of their peoples. Johnston omitted this portion of his conversation with Khrushchev from this report because he had not yet discussed the idea with government officials in Washington. (Department of State, Central Files, 032-Johnston, Eric/10-1058)

<sup>2</sup> Gamal Abdul Nasser, President of the United Arab Republic.

by his people, not by Communists.<sup>3</sup> As soon as British troops are removed from Jordan, the people will decide what they want to do. If they want to overthrow Hussein they will do so. Why do you support these obsolete regimes in many of these Middle Eastern countries? Your imperialism takes the form of interest in oil and its revenues. Oil seems to be more important to you than people."

He had uttered these last remarks with some heat. At the first opportunity I denied vigorously many of his allegations and pointed out in some detail what the oil companies had done to raise the standard of living of peoples in these areas. I explained that several of these countries were receiving large revenues from oil, which had been developed by technical skills not possessed by these less developed areas, and that the sale of oil produced the revenue needed by these countries. "Would you buy this oil?" I asked. His reply was quick: "Of course not! We have more oil and gas than we need. We have no interest in Middle Eastern oil. In fact, we are closing many of our coal mines because we do not need the coal. Oil and gas are being used instead. We are dieselizing our railroad locomotives, making electricity from oil and gas, using it in our factories, and we shall continue to use more oil. We are not interested in Middle Eastern oil."

I took several minutes to try to explain to him some of the problems of the oil companies, their interest in the peoples of these areas, their avoidance of political entanglements, etc., and finally said: "But many of these countries need outside help, financial assistance. The oil revenues, although large, are not of sufficient size to bring the improvements so urgently needed. Would you be willing to cooperate with financial assistance?"

To my surprise he said: "You wrote an article about this a few weeks ago in *The New York Times*.<sup>4</sup> Some of this article was accurate. The revolt in this area is against poverty and disease and feudalism. You suggested in your article that you would contribute three dollars to every dollar that we would contribute to this area."

"That's correct," I replied, "but I suggested that it should be channeled through the United Nations and be used on a regional basis. Would you agree to this?"

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is to the request of King Hussein of Jordan for military aid following an army revolt in Iraq on July 14 and the dispatch of British troops to Jordan July 17–18.

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to Johnston's article published in *The New York Times*, August 10, 1958, which set forth his proposed solution to the Middle East crisis.

"We agree with the principle of helping these people," he said, "but we will not agree to spend the money through the United Nations, because the United Nations is just a puppet show with the strings being pulled by the United States. In fact, we may get out of the United Nations. Why remain in such a puppet show? No longer does the United Nations reflect the will of people."

"But," I continued, "would you be interested in joining in some fund to help raise the living standards that you have been talking about so eloquently?"

"We will contribute," he said, "but we will do so in our own way. The countries which should contribute the most, however, are those which have benefited the most from the imperialism in this area."

"Who is that?" I asked

"England and France," he answered. "They should pay for the past exploitation of this area. Western Europe wants the oil of the Middle East. Let them pay for it at a reasonable price and let them contribute to a large fund to make up in some small measure for their long exploitation of these people. You know," he added, "it is difficult for me to understand your side. You were founded by a revolution and for years you were the great revolutionary force in the world, but today you support reactionary regimes everywhere. You don't seem to understand that the world is undergoing a change. On the contrary we support the desires of all people who set up their own governments and would be free from outside domination."

"Does that include Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland?" I asked.

His voice reared and his fist pounded the table. "They are free," he said. "They have governments of their own choosing." Then he shifted the subject quickly, asking: "Why is Nixon so fond of Chiang Kai-shek? This is another subject of disagreement between our two countries."

I asked him if he had not confused Knowland<sup>5</sup> with Nixon.

"This doesn't make any difference," he said. "Why don't you understand that the Chinese Government is the government of the people of China. We can never settle the China question until you realize this. Kerensky<sup>6</sup> is now living in New York, but Kerensky has just as much chance of coming back and taking over the government of Russia as Chiang Kai-shek has of taking over the government of the mainland of China. Why can't you people understand this?"

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<sup>5</sup> Senator William F. Knowland.

<sup>6</sup> Alexander Kerensky, head of the provisional government in Russia July–November 1917 until the Bolshevik takeover.

Here I carefully explained that this was a problem I felt should be discussed by the President of the United States or the Secretary of State. This dealt with the foreign policy of the United States and I was not in a position to comment, but as a private citizen I thought that perhaps there were several reasons. One was that China was at war with the United Nations, that she had still not come to a peace treaty in Korea with the United Nations.

"You mean," he snapped, "come to a peace treaty with the United States. The United States furnished the forces and the United States did the fighting. The United Nations is just a puppet. Why do you continue to obscure the real facts. But let's not discuss these things, they are details. The broad question is, why don't you understand the situation in China? Eventually the China question must be solved."

I asked him if he would use his good offices with China to try to help solve it.

"Of course," he replied, "provided you will recognize the conditions that exist in China."

"And another cause of irritation," he said, "is you are constantly flying your planes around our border. When a neighbor pulls his blinds down you don't try to peek around the corner. We have shot down several of your planes in the East and West and we are going to continue to shoot them down when you get around our borders. Just recently," he continued, "you had a reconnaissance plane on our border and it crashed in flames. We returned six bodies to you. Now you claim that there are eleven more men, but we don't know anything about those men. We never saw them."<sup>7</sup>

I asked him if I heard him correctly—that he had never seen these eleven men and did not now have them.

He said: "Yes, you heard me correctly. We have never seen the men, we do not now have them. We do not even know that there were eleven men aboard. If they were, we do not know what happened to them."

I said: "Have you told our Embassy?"

He replied "Yes. Now you claim that this was a plane en route from Germany but we know that isn't true. We know the base of the plane in Turkey. Your plane was on reconnaissance trying to find out about a new radar warning system that we have installed. I want to tell you that we are going to continue to shoot down any planes that violate our borders. When we have guests in our country we treat them well, but we are not going to tolerate unwelcome guests and, furthermore, I don't know what you are bothering with Turkey for. I'll let you in on a secret. We have no navy in the Black Sea and no submarines in the Black Sea and

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<sup>7</sup> See Document 55.

we are not going to put any there. Our missiles could wipe out Turkey in 15 minutes. We have sent a note to Turkey and we are going to make claim against Turkey for these plane incidents.”<sup>8</sup>

This was a subject that I was not prepared to discuss and not desiring to pursue it further, I changed the subject, saying:

“I have asked you your opinion of the cause of your irritation with the United States. Now let me give you one of the irritating problems that we have with your country.” I suggested that perhaps he wasn’t going to like it but I thought I should state my views frankly. He interrupted me to say: “How do you know I am not going to like it. You capitalists are always judging what communists are going to say even before they say it.”

“All right,” I said, “here it is. I believe that your relationships with the outside world would be greatly improved if you would allow foreign correspondents to report what they see and hear in the Soviet Union without censorship.”

“There is no censorship of facts,” he said, “in the Soviet Union. It is only lies that we censor. The foreign press reports what it sees. We only delete the lies. Then after we have deleted the lies, the correspondents go to the Embassy and send them through the diplomatic pouch, so they get there anyway.”

“But,” I interjected, “who determines what are facts and what are lies?”

“We do,” he replied.

“That is just the problem,” I said. “People may have different versions of the truth. If you would allow foreign correspondents to report without censorship, you would probably get a few bad articles, but you get many good ones that would far outweigh the bad ones. Much of the suspicion which exists because of your secrecy and your censorship would be removed.”

His eyes narrowed to slits, like a tomcat about to fight another. He pounded the table until the fruit shook. “Look at the lie that CBS just presented on television, the play in which I am supposed to have killed

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<sup>8</sup>In telegram 789 from Moscow, October 8, Chargé Davis reported that the Turkish Chargé in Moscow had called on him that afternoon to say that Georgi Nikolaevich Zaroubin, Deputy Foreign Minister, had read to the Turkish Chargé the previous day the text of a Soviet protest note regarding the C-130 plane and had emphasized Turkish responsibility because the plane was based in Turkey. (Department of State, Central Files, 761.5411/10-858) The text of this Soviet note has not been found.

Stalin," he said.<sup>9</sup> "That's the kind of lie that we don't appreciate. What would you think that kind of lie does to the relationships between our two countries during this period of the cold war? Suppose we had presented on television a play depicting President Eisenhower as murdering someone. What would you say?" I told him that I deplored untruths about anyone, particularly about rulers of states, but that untruths were sometimes stimulated by the secretiveness used in the operation of the Soviet system. For instance, the Voice of America in Russian is jammed when coming into the Soviet Union, whereas we do not attempt to jam Radio Moscow when it is broadcast in English to the states and to the world.

He said: "That is because the Voice of America tells lies."

"Mr. Chairman," I said, "the Voice of Moscow tells lies, too."

"No, it doesn't," he thundered.

"But, Mr. Chairman, I have heard the lies with my own ears on my shortwave radio in my hotel room in Moscow. Distortions of the truth, clearly. Why don't you like the Russian people to get the same kind of information that we give the American people, so the Russian people may judge for themselves. Freer flow of information both ways would do this."

During this part of the conversation he had been gesticulating vigorously and talking to me as though he was haranguing a crowd, but as the sunlight sometimes breaks through the clouds on an April day, his countenance changed, he smiled, laughed, and said: "Now we are getting angry at one another. We are friends. Let us act as friends. What other question do you want to ask me?"

I started to ask him about his new educational program but he looked at his watch and remarked: "It is after 2 o'clock. Come along and have lunch with me and my family. You are going to spend the night here."

We arose and started down the walk. I had my camera with me and asked him if I might take a picture of him. He agreed readily, and I snapped several pictures of him and of Zhukov; then Zhukov took a picture of Khrushchev and me, and the interpreter took a picture of all three of us. Khrushchev was intrigued with the camera. I told him that I was taking three-dimensional pictures in color to be viewed through a finder that restored the three dimensions. He looked at the camera with great interest during my explanation and then said: "You make better cameras than we do, but we make better missiles." And, again with a

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<sup>9</sup>Reference is to the CBS television series "Playhouse 90," which produced the play "The Plot To Kill Stalin" on September 25. Ambassador Menshikov protested this production, which portrayed Khrushchev as the virtual murderer of Stalin. Subsequently, the Soviet Union ordered CBS to close its Moscow news bureau.

loud St. Nick's laugh, he added: "Of course the world will judge which is the most important."

We walked down the boardwalk to the right angle walk that led up to the house. His family awaited us. I was introduced to his wife, a stocky, peasant-type woman with a bulbous nose and gray stringy hair pulled back off her face. Wisps fell carelessly over her ears. She wore a sack-type dress of dark gray. She was very pleasant, but other than the customary salutations, said little. His daughter, whom I would judge to be about 40, was tall and rather slender, with light brown hair, a quick smile and penetrating eyes. It was obvious she had her father's energy and enthusiasm. Her husband, a man perhaps 10 or 15 years older, was tall and large of athletic build, with lots of gray hair. I later learned that he was the head of the theater in Kiev. A doctor, whom I judged to be Khrushchev's personal physician, a tall, lean man, rather handsome and fiftyish, and another man, whose name I did not learn but who appeared to be a personal secretary, completed the luncheon party. I noticed that the living room was large and spacious. The furniture was white, perhaps bleached teakwood. The chairs and draperies were also white. The room was furnished in good taste with objects of art. It was not overdone. He showed me to my bedroom, located off the living room, and it was a large, spacious room, with white furniture. A big bathroom was off this room. It was tiled and contained, in addition to the ordinary plumbing fixtures, what seemed to be a massage table. All types of toiletries were on a table and in the basin tray there was what appeared to be a large cake of perfumed French soap. The soap was purple and finely textured. After washing my hands, I joined the group in the living room and we went upstairs. On a wide balcony extending the entire length of the house, there was a dining table with the proper number of places set and a large quantity of various types of Russian hors d'oeuvres. A lace table covering looked as if it might have come from Belgium. Mrs. Khrushchev sat at the head of the table. Khrushchev was on her right and next to him sat his daughter, her husband, and the male secretary. I sat on Mrs. Khrushchev's left and next to me came Zhukov, Volsky, and the doctor.

After we sat down, Khrushchev said: "Let's have a drink of Armenian brandy first. Mikoyan won't speak to me unless I give you a drink of his brandy first." This, of course, we drank "do dna"—bottoms up.

The hors d'oeuvres were followed by soup, and trout, then by lamb chops, a salad, fruit, and coffee. We had two drinks of brandy and two drinks of vodka during the meal and there were many toasts to friendship and closer cooperation between our peoples. The lamb chops were delicious but I noticed that Khrushchev ate none. I asked him if he didn't like lamb chops. "Oh yes," he replied, "but my doctor won't let me eat them." He waved a hand at the tall man at the end of the table.



I then said: "Mr. Zhukov has told me a big lie."

"What do you mean?" asked Khrushchev.

"He told me," I replied, "that Russians had small lunches and I have never seen a bigger one." Everybody seemed to laugh at this and Khrushchev said: "You should really see a big Russian lunch if you think this is big."

My back was towards the Black Sea but I occasionally glanced around. The sea was like a mill pond, not even waves lapped on the pebbles. Through the branches of these odd surrounding trees, there was the Black Sea, and beyond loomed the tall mountains rising like blue guardians to the Caucasus.

The conversation went at a rapid fire pace. It was a jovial one. There was much kidding of me as a capitalist. I took it in good nature and, in many instances, felt that I was able effectively to turn the tables on the communists. No one spoke during the lunch except Khrushchev, his daughter, the interpreter, and me. No one interrupted him except his daughter and I noticed all were deferential including his wife.

Early in the meal I remarked that his daughter didn't look like him but like her mother. Quick as a flash, he stuck his whole arm across the table with his finger pointing towards me and roared: "Another capitalist mistake. You capitalists can never get anything right. This woman isn't her mother. This is my second wife. Ha! Ha!" he roared again. "Another capitalist lie!" His daughter came to my rescue, however, and said that she had frequently been mistaken for her stepmother's daughter. The contours of their faces were the same. "No, no," he roared, slapping the table, "I never thought my daughter would stand up for a capitalist." He then went on to explain that he had several children; one boy had been killed as a flyer during the war; another son was a graduate engineer and was now working in a technical job in Moscow; another daughter was married to an editor. "How many children are there in families in America?" he asked. "I understand an average of about four children. This is good. To increase the population—good idea."

"You wanted to ask me about our education system," he said. "My son doesn't have the same desire for education as I had." And again his eyes closed to almost catlike slits. He went on: "I worked in a coal mine owned by the French in the Donbas. I got what education I could at night. The French paid miserable wages, so I couldn't go to college at that time. This is the type of capitalist exploitation we are fighting against all over the world." His voice was raised, his fists were clenched, but the storm passed as quickly as it came. He added: "There is no use in talking about the past. The future is ours. The future of communism is inevitable. Nothing can stop it. But our youth must have the same respect for manual labor that I have. After their secondary education they

will go to work. If they want to they can study at night and those who want to get an education can do so, but all must have respect for labor. It is through labor that we make human progress and the Soviet Union is going to make progress."

We had arrived at the salad course and Khrushchev wanted to know if I like mangoes. I told him I was very fond of them. "Well," he said, "I got a shipment from Nasser the other day. I am afraid they are a little too ripe but let's try them." He rang for a servant who brought in a large tray heaped with mangoes. I took one and remarked upon its excellence. Khrushchev said: "Yes, they are good but they are not as good as the ones I get from Nehru.<sup>10</sup> He sends me a shipment about once a month. By the way," he changed the subject, "how is President Eisenhower?" I told him that the President's health, in my opinion, was excellent.

"You know," said Khrushchev, "I like that man. At the Geneva Conference<sup>11</sup> he took me to the bar after every meeting and we had a drink together. I hope his health is good. I'd like to sit down and have another talk with him. Why do you people have such crazy ideas about Russia and the Communist Party? It must be you capitalists who are fearful that the common people will get what they have. But President Eisenhower is a soldier, not a capitalist."

"Tell me about your seven-year plan," I said.<sup>12</sup>

"There isn't much to tell. It is really an extension of old five-year plans, and a little more ambitious. We are going to increase those things that we need the most. It was hard in the early days to make much progress with industrialization but now it is increasing by geometric proportions. At the end of seven years we are going to go a long ways toward catching up with the U.S. At the end of another seven years, or at the end of 14 years, we will catch up with the U.S. in production per capita. We will have electricity for the farms of the Soviet Union, automobiles for her people. It is endless the things you can do. This is a great country, a storehouse of resources. Under communism we can do anything."

"I noticed," I said, "that you are trying to populate Siberia and locating some of your new plants there. To the south of you lies a great country whose population is increasing by 15 million people a year. Ten years from now China may have another 150 million people. China could be a blessing or a problem to you. Do you consider her a problem

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<sup>10</sup> Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India.

<sup>11</sup> Documentation on the Heads of Government meeting in Geneva in July 1955 is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1955-1957*, volume V.

<sup>12</sup> See footnote 3, Document 57.

at all? Might she be interested in the vacant lot to the north of her? Has this thought motivated your planning in Sibera?"

He looked at me rather quizzically and said: "China is a great country. By the year 2,000 it may have a billion people, but communist states never think of going to war with each other. It is only capitalist states that do that. Of course, we will have no trouble with China. All communist states believe in getting along with each other, in growing and developing. We think of peace not of war. In my latest conference with Mao Tse-tung<sup>13</sup> he told me that China was producing more grain this year than she needed. In the Soviet Union, we can increase our agricultural production by ten-fold with adequate mineral fertilizers and adequate manpower. No, there is no fear of China. We both believe in the communist doctrine. We want to develop our countries, have a higher standard of living for our people, and you can only do that through peaceful means."

The sumptuous lunch had been completed. We walked into the upper hall where there was a large wooden box that looked like cedar painted with some design. The box was about 3-1/2 feet by 2 feet by 2 feet. He opened the lid. Inside were neat rows of apples, rapped in white paper. "Take one," he said, "they are the best apples I have ever eaten." I took one. It was bright red. "Who sent you these?" I asked. "An old friend of mine," he said, "Kadar<sup>14</sup> in Hungary." Each of us took an apple and walked down the stairs through the living room to the front porch.

"Let's take a walk," he suggested. We walked along the boardwalk. The family remained near the porch. We were alone except for the interpreter. We walked to the end of the boardwalk, a considerable distance, and then came back. During the walk, he said: "There are two things you must understand. The Soviet Union doesn't want war and under your system the United States can't start a war. Isn't it foolish therefore to continue endlessly this cold war?"

"I quite agree with you," I said, "but it seems to me that the problem is primarily yours."

"No, that's not true," he said. "You hate communism just because it is a different system. You think you can destroy us. You think if you keep up an armaments race that we cannot do likewise and at the same time improve the standard of living of our people. You think that if our people have a lower standard of living there will be a revolt in our country. But we have proved this false. We have kept up with you in the ar-

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<sup>13</sup> Khrushchev visited Peking July 31–August 3 for talks with Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the People's Republic of China.

<sup>14</sup> Janos Kadar, First Secretary of the Hungarian Revolutionary Socialist Party.

maments race. In fact, in some ways I think we are ahead. At the same time we have improved our country and improved the conditions of life of our people. You are afraid of competition from us. You are afraid that we will outproduce you and outsell you in the markets of the world and that other countries will follow the communist example."

I told him that I was not afraid of this at all. As a matter of fact, I welcomed it because I was just as firmly convinced that our democratic society could produce more and bring greater happiness to its people. In such a race, free from force, there was no question in my mind which would eventually survive. There have been many changes in the world and modern capitalism in America today was no more like capitalism of the 19th century than a flower garden resembled a desert. Khrushchev came back to the subject, remarking: "Why don't you reduce armaments then, quit this foolish race and use this saving or a portion of it to help undeveloped countries improve their position?"

I retorted that President Eisenhower had said the same thing. In fact I think he proposed it.

"No," said Khrushchev, "it was a Frenchman who proposed it first and I did it second." I replied that I didn't know who proposed it first but I do know that President Eisenhower is for this kind of development program.

By this time we had rejoined the family who had gathered in a small group conversing. It was about a quarter to five.

"Now," said Khrushchev, "you will spend the night here, have dinner with us, go grouse hunting with us tomorrow. I know a wonderful spot about 30 miles from here across the sea."

"I am very sorry, Mr. Chairman," I said, "but I really think I should go back to Moscow tonite. I would like to go grouse hunting with you but I have already over-stayed my welcome as it is."

"But you haven't seen all the Caucasus," he said, "If you won't stay overnight then at least let me send you to Lake Ritzaluke. It is beautiful. You can spend the night up there."

"But, Mr. Chairman," I said, "I must be back in Moscow on Tuesday (October 7) and that would mean I wouldn't be back in Moscow until Wednesday morning. I must fly back at night."

"Why?" he asked.

"Mr. Zhukov says that I must fly back at night on Monday," I replied. "You can fly back any time you wish. You can fly back in the daytime tomorrow, if you wish."

Zhukov turned to me and said: "We can go and spend the night at Ritzaluke and leave tomorrow afternoon by plane for Moscow.

This I agreed to do.

“But you should leave immediately,” said Khrushchev. “It is a long mountain road and if you leave right now you can make it there before dark. I don’t want you to drive that road after night. I’ll have my chauffeur put the top of the car down and I’ll give you my fur-lined coat. You’ll need it in the mountains.”

[Here follows the remainder of the report containing Johnston’s impressions of the scenery on the way to Lake Ritzaluke, the hotel where he spent the night, and his boat trip on the lake the following morning before returning to Moscow.]

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## 57. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, November 4, 1958.

### SUBJECT

Meeting Between Eric Johnston and N. Khrushchev on 6 October 1958<sup>1</sup>

*[List of participants (6 lines of source text) not declassified]*

Mr. Johnston opened the conversation describing a visit to Mr. Khrushchev’s summer home which lasted between five and six hours. In the course of this visit Mr. Johnston was entertained at dinner during which time he learned the following about Khrushchev’s family. Johnston was advised that Khrushchev’s wife, who was present at the dinner, was Khrushchev’s second wife. Also present were Khrushchev’s oldest daughter, who appeared to be between 40 and 43 years of age, and her husband, Victor Petrovich, Director of the Kiev Opera. In the course of this discussion it also developed that Khrushchev has a younger daughter who is married to an editor in Moscow and that he has a son about 24 years of age who is an engineer and who works in Moscow. Khrushchev mentioned that he had another son who was killed during World War II and stated that he had several grandchildren but did not specify precisely how many. Johnston also noted that it appeared that Khrushchev’s daughter and her husband, Victor, had been

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, Eric Johnston. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information. This memorandum of conversation was given to the President; see the source note, Document 56.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 56.

visiting at the Khrushchev home for about two weeks at the time of this particular dinner.

Johnston was informed that the Sinkiang Railroad, which has been known to have been planned for some time, is actually under construction by the Chinese and the Soviet. He was informed that they hope to have trains in operation on this railroad by the end of 1959. The Russian terminus of the railroad is at Alma-Ata in the Kirghiz Republic and the Chinese terminus will be at Lungchow in Kwangsi Province where it will tie into the railroad presently leading into Vietnam.

Johnston stated that prior to his meeting with Khrushchev, he had been advised [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] that Khrushchev had been a drunkard and that he now had very bad kidney and bladder trouble as well as prostate trouble and that he could no longer drink any alcoholic beverages and had to be very careful of his health. In addition, Johnston remarked that he had been informed [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] that Khrushchev was not a good business executive, that he could not delegate authority, and that all decisions had to be made by Khrushchev personally or nothing was accomplished. Johnston took issue with both of these points, based upon his observations during his visit with Khrushchev. He pointed out that during his entire five or six hour visit with Khrushchev, Khrushchev did not drink excessively but did consume two drinks of vodka, two brandies, and two or three glasses of wine. In addition, Johnston observed that during the entire time of the visit, Khrushchev never excused himself to go to the bathroom. Further, Johnston noted that during this five or six hour period Khrushchev was not at any time interrupted by any phone calls, messenger, or message of any description. Johnston stated that Khrushchev remarked several times in the course of the discussions that he delegated certain functions to certain officials and that they completely managed the responsibilities he had assigned them until such time they ran into difficulties which they could not solve and then, and only then, they came to him for assistance. Johnston also stated that contrary to certain information and impressions he had received prior to this meeting, he did not consider Khrushchev to be a blabber-mouth or a person who spoke without thinking and knowing what he was saying. Johnston considered Khrushchev to be a master showman but nevertheless thought he was extremely careful in everything he said despite the fact that he spoke quickly and in an apparent off-hand manner. It was Johnston's observation that when Khrushchev did not wish to discuss a subject or was not prepared to discuss a subject, even in a private conversation, he merely changed the subject in each case and refused to go further along lines of conversation he did not want to pursue. With respect to the state of Khrushchev's health, Johnston noted that at the end

of this lengthy session Khrushchev seemed just as bouncy as ever and without any signs of fatigue, whereas Johnston himself felt exhausted.

Johnston was impressed with Khrushchev's statistical knowledge of the United States. He stated that Khrushchev was extremely well-informed on all matters pertaining to United States production in all fields but showed a complete lack of comprehension of how the U.S. or, for that matter, the West in general operates and functions. In the latter respect, Johnston felt that Khrushchev had no comprehension whatsoever.

According to Johnston, Khrushchev on two or three occasions expressed an interest in visiting the United States. In this connection he expressed a liking for and a desire to talk to President Eisenhower but commented that the President was sensitive and would not talk to people. Khrushchev went on to say that the President ought to talk to people and stated that he would like to sit down and have several long talks with the President. He expressed the view that some good might come of such talks. In this connection Johnston reported that in a conversation with Mikoyan, Mikoyan had also said that he thought it would be helpful if the President and Khrushchev could sit down and have private conversations similar to those which Mikoyan had with Adenauer.<sup>2</sup> In both instances, Johnston pointed out to Khrushchev and to Mikoyan that because of our system wherein reporters, photographers and the people in general know whatever the President is doing, it would be virtually impossible for the President and Khrushchev to have conversations unbeknownst to the populace of the United States. Johnston stated that Mikoyan remarked that he and Adenauer had made some "deals under the table" which were presently in process of being worked out, but Mikoyan declined to respond to Johnston's questions as to the details of such arrangements.

Both Khrushchev and Mikoyan described Khrushchev's visit to China in glowing terms. Khrushchev stated that in his meeting with Mao Tse-tung, Mao told him of the magnificent harvest China had had; they had ample grain for everyone, and were making great strides in their industrial and agricultural developments. According to Khrushchev, Mao stressed that with the new fertilizers, new chemicals, new seeds, and new methods of agriculture and with the new scientific developments, they anticipated being able to support without any problems a billion people by the year 2000. Khrushchev informed Johnston

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<sup>2</sup> During Mikoyan's visit to Bonn April 25–26, he had discussions with Adenauer and other German leaders. The report to the North Atlantic Council by Herbert A. von Blankenhorn, West German Permanent Representative to NATO, on Mikoyan's visit, including Mikoyan's discussion with Adenauer, was summarized in Polto 3475 from Paris, April 28. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.6162/4–2858)

that Mao was a very forward-looking man and that he anticipated no problems between China and Russia in the future. Khrushchev, in fact, ridiculed Johnston's suggestion that conceivably ten years from now Khrushchev might be looking to the United States for assistance against China and stated that this was purely a capitalist idea and that only capitalists get into wars.

In summation, Johnston expressed the view that the entire motivation of Khrushchev and the Soviet hierarchy is due to a feeling of inferiority and desire to "Beat America." He cited several illustrations in support of this and stressed that Khrushchev studies the United States, particularly statistically, as a challenger studies the champion he is to oppose. Johnston believes that this feeling of "Beat America" permeates all fields of Soviet endeavor including sports, cultural activities, agriculture, industrial production and scientific development, although Khrushchev appeared particularly to place emphasis on surpassing the United States economically and in production per capita prior to the end of his second Seven-Year Plan.<sup>3</sup>

When asked whether or not he thought a visit by Khrushchev to the United States would be helpful to Khrushchev's understanding of the United States, Johnston replied that he was doubtful that it would change any of Khrushchev's very decided misimpressions of America unless he could remain here for a fairly considerable period of time. He expressed the opinion that a short visit in which Khrushchev was wined, dined, and entertained would not affect him in the slightest. He believed that Khrushchev would merely translate his various misimpressions into antagonisms unless he could remain here for a long enough period of time to persuade himself that certain of his impressions were in fact erroneous.

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<sup>3</sup>Reference presumably is to the Soviet Union's second Seven-Year Plan, which would begin in 1966 following completion of the first Seven-Year Plan (1959-1965). In introducing the first Seven-Year Plan at the plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on November 12, Khrushchev asserted that by 1970, and possibly even earlier, the Soviet Union would surpass the United States, as well as all other nations, both in absolute output and in per capita industrial output. (*Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, January 14, 1959, pp. 10-11)



**58. Memorandum on the Substance of Discussion at the  
Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting.**

Washington, November 21, 1958, 11:30 a.m.

[Source: Department of State, State–JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417. Top Secret. Extract—4 pages of source text not declassified.]

## JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1959: VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES OF ANASTAS I. MIKOYAN; THE 21ST CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION

### 59. Editorial Note

First Deputy Premier Anastas I. Mikoyan visited the United States January 4–20, 1959, in an unofficial capacity as guest of Ambassador Mikhail A. Menshikov. Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador to the Soviet Union, first learned of the proposed visit in a note from the Soviet Foreign Ministry, December 16, 1958, which was delivered to him the next day. Thompson, who believed it “would be very useful from many points view for Mikoyan to receive at first hand authoritative exposition our policies from highest officials US government,” recommended favorable action on Mikoyan’s request for a diplomatic visa. (Telegram 1273 from Moscow, December 17, 1958; Department of State, Central Files, 033.6111/12–1758) Thompson speculated that the main purpose of Mikoyan’s trip would be “to explore possibilities of increasing trade with U.S. and corollary purpose to take our temperature on Berlin question.” He also wanted to inform U.S. allies of the proposed visit and to refer them to Eisenhower’s letter to Bulganin, February 15, 1958, which had proposed that influential Soviet citizens visit the United States. (Telegram 1274 from Moscow, December 17, 1958; *ibid.*) For text of Eisenhower’s February 15 letter to Bulganin, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 10, 1958, pages 373–376.

In telegram 965 to Moscow, December 17, 1958, the Department of State agreed with Thompson’s recommendations subject to the approval of Secretary Dulles, who was attending the NATO Ministerial Meeting in Paris. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.6111/12–1758) Dulles also concurred but first wanted President Eisenhower informed of the visit. (Secto 25 from Paris, December 18, 1958; *ibid.*, 033.6111/12–1858) A handwritten note on a copy of Dulles’ message indicates that the President was informed on December 18. (Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, International Series) Eisenhower was presumably informed before or during the 391st meeting of the National Security Council on December 18. As summarized in the memorandum of discussion, Allen Dulles briefed the Council members on Mikoyan’s visit as follows:

“Mr. Dulles reported that the USSR had yesterday requested that Mikoyan be allowed to visit the United States in January as a guest of the Soviet Ambassador in Washington. The ‘cover’ purpose of his visit will be trade discussions; the real purpose has not been divulged. Perhaps the real purpose would be to assess the temper of the American people with respect to Berlin and other international situations before the

meeting of the Supreme Soviet on January 27. Moreover, the Soviets may believe the visit would appear to be a substantiation of propaganda stories 'planted' by Moscow that the U.S. and the USSR are engaged in secret negotiations. Mikoyan, 63 years old, was No. 2 to Khrushchev in seniority but not likely to be Khrushchev's successor. A member of the Presidium since 1934 and a Party member since 1915, Mikoyan is remarkable for his political durability and his ability to end up on the winning side in internal struggles. He is interested less in Communist ideology than in bolstering Soviet economic strength, and is said to love 'horse-trading'. Reports indicate that Khrushchev treats him in a cavalier manner. Mikoyan visited the U.S. once before, in 1936 for 3 months, to study the canning industry." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

On December 27 and 30, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Robert D. Murphy discussed with Ambassador Menshikov Mikoyan's travel plans and security arrangements. (Memoranda of conversation, December 27 and 30; Department of State, Central Files, 033.6111/12-2758 and 033.6111/12-3058) In a memorandum to the President, January 2, 1959, Acting Secretary of State Christian A. Herter summarized Mikoyan's itinerary as well as plans for U.S. officials to hold talks with him. Herter recommended that the President see Mikoyan after Mikoyan had returned to Washington following his visits to other parts of the nation. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File)

Following Mikoyan's arrival in the United States, he met with Secretary Dulles on January 5; see Document 60. An extract from the memorandum of their conversation on the problems of Berlin and Germany is printed in volume VIII, Document 121. Mikoyan also met with Harold E. Stassen, President Eisenhower's former Special Assistant on Disarmament, on January 6. Stassen sent an account of this interview in a letter to the President, January 7. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series) A memorandum of Vice President Richard M. Nixon's conversation with Mikoyan on January 6 is printed as Document 61.

Mikoyan then traveled to other parts of the United States, including Cleveland, Detroit, Chicago, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and New York. Following his return to Washington, he met again twice with Dulles on January 16; see Documents 62 and 63. Portions of these memoranda regarding Berlin and Germany are printed in volume VIII, Documents 135 and 136. Mikoyan saw the President on January 17; see Document 64. The portion of this memorandum pertaining to Berlin and Germany is printed in volume VIII, Document 137. A memorandum of Murphy's conversation with Eric Johnston on January 19 summarized Johnston's conversation with Mikoyan on January 17. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.6111/1-1959) A memorandum of Mikoyan's conversation with Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs C. Douglas Dillon on trade matters on January 19 is printed as Docu-

ment 65. Dillon also gave an account of his talk with Mikoyan in his speech to the Mississippi Valley World Trade Council in New Orleans, Louisiana, on January 27. For text of this address, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 16, 1959, pages 237–243. A memorandum of Mikoyan's conversation with Secretary of Commerce Lewis L. Strauss on January 19 is printed as Document 66.

For text of Dulles' farewell message to Mikoyan, January 20, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 9, 1958, pages 189–190. Mikoyan's reply to Dulles, dated January 21, is attached to a memorandum from Foy D. Kohler, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, to Dulles, January 21. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.6111/1–2159) For Dulles' report to the National Security Council on January 22 on Mikoyan's visit, see Document 67.

For text of Mikoyan's news conference in Moscow on January 24 on his trip, see *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, March 4, 1959, pages 28–31. Mikoyan also gave his impressions of his visit in a speech to the 21st Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on January 31. For text of his speech, see *ibid.*, April 1, 1959, pages 56–60 and 79. His speech was also summarized and analyzed in telegram 1529 from Moscow, February 2. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.6111/2–259)

Intelligence Report No. 7944, "The Mikoyan Visit: An Appraisal," which the Division of Research and Analysis for USSR and Eastern Europe, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, prepared on February 5, is in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, OSS–INR Reports.

Additional documentation on Mikoyan's visit is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1183, and Central Files 033.6111 and 411.6141.

**60. Memorandum of Conversation**

Washington, January 5, 1959.

SUBJECT

U.S.-Soviet Relations

PARTICIPANTS

Anastas I. Mikoyan, Deputy Premier of the USSR  
John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State  
Mikhail A. Menshikov, Soviet Ambassador  
Livingston T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary of State  
Oleg A. Troyanovski, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, USSR  
Llewellyn E. Thompson, American Ambassador to Moscow<sup>1</sup>  
Edward L. Freers, Director, Office of Eastern European Affairs

Mr. Mikoyan opened the conversation by recalling that he had been to the United States before on an unofficial visit and had talked to Secretary of State Cordell Hull in the company of Mr. Troyanovski's father.<sup>2</sup>

The Secretary recalled that he had been at a dinner in Moscow in April 1947 at which Mr. Mikoyan was present but he was not sure whether or not they had met each other on that occasion.

Mr. Mikoyan said that they had met but had not had the opportunity to have a conversation.

The Secretary said that he was happy that Mr. Mikoyan had come to visit the United States. He thought these unofficial visits were extremely useful as a means of eliminating misunderstanding and affording a better appreciation of what were real differences between us and what were not. He said there are real problems, but there is no reason for making them worse and sharpening our differences by creating imaginary and fictitious problems.

Mr. Mikoyan agreed and said it was important to continue these visits. It was always better to avoid differences and reach solutions to problems. This was understood back home and hence Prime Minister Khrushchev had asked him to convey his greetings to the Secretary as had Foreign Minister Gromyko. The Prime Minister had even asked Mikoyan to tell the Secretary that although they two exchanged strong words in the press and otherwise, this was not the main thing. The main thing was to work for peace.

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1183. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Freers. A note on the source text reads: "Sec saw."

<sup>1</sup> Thompson, who thought it would be advisable to be present during Mikoyan's talks with U.S. officials, had returned to the United States.

<sup>2</sup> During Mikoyan's visit to the United States in 1936, Troyanovski's father, Alexander A. Troyanovski, was Soviet Ambassador to the United States.

The Secretary recalled the contacts he had had with Prime Minister Khrushchev in Geneva in 1955<sup>3</sup> and Mikoyan remarked that Khrushchev had indeed told them about this.

Mikoyan said that there was one thing which was not quite clear to them. At one time the United States accused the Soviet Union of following a hard line. It charged the Soviet leaders with saying “nyet, nyet, nyet” all the time. Now when the Soviet Union seemed to be following a more flexible line, it was the American Government which said “no, no, no” all the time. There had been a change in roles.

The Secretary interrupted to say that Mikoyan would be given the opportunity to say “da, da, da” if he so desired.

Mikoyan made the rejoinder that he would like this to correspond to the real position.

The Secretary made the point that he did not understand that Mr. Mikoyan was here to carry on negotiations on any particular topic, but he did hope that there would be an opportunity to exchange views on the matters that divide us.

Mikoyan said that this was the case.

The Secretary said that he had just been saying to his associates in the Department that ever since he had come into contact with Soviet officials—that is since the San Francisco meeting in 1945—he had found it extremely difficult to have a serious discussion with any of them on the matters that gave rise to tension and even involved risks of war. For example, one thing that concerned us very greatly were the goals and ambitions of the International Communist Movement and the extent to which this movement was supported by the Soviet Union. When he had talked to Molotov<sup>4</sup> about this, the latter had said that there was no such thing as the International Communist Movement. The Secretary found it hard to carry on a conversation in such a situation. We have no quarrel, he said, with the Soviet Union as a State. We were delighted to see it grow in power and welfare—this would give us no concern at all. It is the extent to which that power is placed at the disposition of the International Communist Movement, which has goals incompatible with our own safety, that causes concern on our part.

[Here follows discussion of Germany and Berlin, printed in volume VIII, Document 121.]

Mr. Mikoyan then reverted to the Secretary’s remark about his conversation with Molotov. Mikoyan said that since Molotov had not explained the matter of International Communism to the Secretary, he

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is to the Heads of Government meeting at Geneva in July 1955.

<sup>4</sup> Vyachaslav Mikhailovich Molotov, Soviet Foreign Minister, 1939–1949 and 1953–1956.

would explain it. The Secretary interjected the remark that Molotov had not only not explained it, he had said it didn't exist. Mikoyan said it was not a subject for discussion between states, but since this was an informal talk, he would elaborate on the matter. The Communist movement had been in evidence wherever a working class existed, even before the USSR came into being. The Soviets believed, he said, that the ideas of Communism will continue to strengthen. Experience showed that the ways in which it would develop would be different. They believed that this was an affair for each country, its working class and its people. They did not conceal the fact that they sympathized with this development. They do not, however, interfere in the internal affairs of other Communist parties and of other countries. The United States had an intelligence service, with the Secretary's brother at its head. Perhaps he understood this. Several million people voted for the Communist parties in Italy and France. In England, there wasn't a single Communist member of Parliament. In the United States there was no Communist member of Congress. Why was the United States so fearful—even more than France or Italy—although Communist strength in the United States was negligible? In order to understand the Soviets correctly, he continued, it must be recognized that there is a difference between the Communist Party and the Soviet State. There are examples which illustrate this. The Soviet Union has good relations with the UAR. Khrushchev met and talked with the President and Vice President of the UAR, even though they not only do not protect Communists but they attack them and put them in prison. In the USSR there are no political prisoners. The Soviets cannot sympathize with Nasser for arresting political prisoners, especially Communists, but they do consider this an internal matter. Conditions call for this. The Soviet leaders had had many friendly talks with the President and Vice President of the UAR, but there had been no talks about this. This is regarded as an internal matter. The Soviet leaders had very good relations with Afghanistan—with the King and Prime Minister—although there are no Communists in that country. They have good relations with Nepal and its King, although they have never heard of any Communists in that country. They have good relations with Kekkonen, the President of Finland, where there is a large Communist party. Mikoyan said he had good relations with Mr. Hansen, the Prime Minister of Denmark, which is a member of NATO. He had tried to prevail on him to leave NATO but had had no success. Mikoyan said that he wanted the Secretary to believe that this was the truth. Had they acted in any other way, the Soviets would have been the enemies of Communism.

[Here follows discussion of Germany and Berlin (printed in volume VIII, Document 121) and disarmament.]

The Secretary said that he hoped Mikoyan would discuss economic and trade questions with Mr. Dillon while he was here. Ambassador Menshikov said that he would get in touch with us and make the arrangements for this.

The Secretary said that he was glad to have this exchange of views with Mr. Mikoyan. He recognized that the latter's visit to the United States was concrete evidence of the desire of the Soviet Union to establish a more understanding relationship. Mikoyan remarked that this was quite true. The Secretary said that after Mikoyan toured around the country for two weeks he expected him to come back to Washington Americanized. Mikoyan replied that he had come here for a different purpose and that he hoped for acceptable specific proposals from Secretary Dulles.

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## 61. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, January 6, 1959.

### SUBJECT

US-Soviet Relations

### PARTICIPANTS

Richard M. Nixon, Vice President of the United States  
Anastas I. Mikoyan, Deputy Premier of the Soviet Union  
Mikhail A. Menshikov, Soviet Ambassador  
Llewellyn E. Thompson, American Ambassador  
Oleg A. Troyanovsky, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR  
Edward L. Freers, Director, Office of Eastern European Affairs

Mikoyan opened the conversation by saying that he brought greetings to the Vice President from Premier Khrushchev and added that the Soviets had been favorably impressed by the Vice President's speech in London.<sup>1</sup> Observing the latter's office, Mikoyan commented that his

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1183. Secret. Drafted by Freers and approved by the Vice President's office on January 16. Notations on the source text indicate that Dulles and Herter saw the memorandum.

<sup>1</sup> For text of Nixon's speech, which he made to the English-Speaking Union in London on November 26, 1958, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 5, 1959, pp. 14-17.



was twice as large. The Vice President said that we did not think much of Vice Presidents here. Mikoyan replied that we were more democratic here.

Mikoyan said that he thought the political situation here was not easy for the administration in view of the Democratic control of Congress. He noted that our Constitution provided for a party in the minority to exercise rule and thus differed from other constitutions he knew, but he assumed that this would give the United States more stability.

The Vice President said that we operated on a bi-partisan basis on foreign policy but engaged in much controversy over domestic policy. For example, in 1948 President Truman, whose party had a minority in Congress at the time, was supported by an overwhelming bi-partisan vote on the Marshall Plan. In the area of foreign policy, Congress supported the President and the Secretary of State on major issues. He said that sometimes people outside the United States got the wrong impression about our unity because of our freedom of debate. Looking back on the past 25 years, his impression was that one would find increasing support for national policies rather than partisan policies. If this were not so, there would be a chaotic condition whenever the President was from one party and the majority of Congress from the other. All this did not mean that there were no hot arguments between us.

Mikoyan said that, judging from the press, Americans liked argument. The Vice President said we preferred to work things out easily. Mikoyan replied, "Yes, you can do this among your own friends, but how can the two of us work our problems out?" The Vice President said this could be done better by talking than by fighting, and Mikoyan agreed that this would improve our relations.

The Vice President said that there were several areas of agreement between the American and Russian peoples and some of these were even reflected in the policies of our governments as well. He pointed out that Mikoyan had mentioned Khrushchev's comments about the speech he had made in London. He said this speech reflected the views of the great majority of the American people. They desired and preferred to use the resources of this country to win battles against disease, poverty and want, rather than any other battles between nations.

Mikoyan said this was a good platform for improvement of relations. But, he said, many prejudices stand in the way. If there were frequent meetings and contacts at all levels, only the real differences would remain and even these could then be solved through discussion.

The Vice President said that visits such as Mikoyan was making were useful. He was glad that Mikoyan would be able to see the United States and hoped that he would talk to important industrialists. They were not as bad as some people painted them. He was sure that

Mikoyan would see great progress since the time of his last visit. The Vice President said that every visitor to the Soviet Union with whom he had talked—Senator Humphrey, Eric Johnston and others—had told him they had been impressed by three things. One was the progress that had been made in the USSR. Another was the determination to work and succeed, reflected by the Soviet people. The third was the friendly reception given to these visitors, not only by officials from whom it might be expected, but by everyone. The Vice President said he thought Mikoyan would find we were making progress here and that he, too, would meet a generally friendly reception. Certainly there would be nothing but the most friendly reception from the people as a whole. He would find among the American people great admiration for the achievements of the Soviet people in the scientific field. The “Lunik” that had gone on toward the sun had caught the imagination of the American people.<sup>2</sup> He, for one, thought it was good to have this type of competition. Sometimes the Soviet Union might be first; other times the United States. It was the responsibility of those in government to find the means to share the benefits of this process. Economic progress of the world in general would provide ample room for healthy, friendly competition. This brought him to the point as to why there were problems that divide us. Some of these were due to lack of communication. This was a job for our Ambassadors, among others. At times, people did not get the right interpretation of motivations underlying actions. While there existed among the American people a tremendous admiration for the heroism of the Russian soldiers when we were Allies, our people expressed concern when they read statements which indicated a determination by the Soviet Union, through Communist organizations, to increase its influence and to overthrow governments around the world, including our own. This was not said in a critical sense but to show the impression that is made by these statements. The Vice President said he realized that speeches made here might have the same effect upon the Russians. If we were going to talk about peaceful competition it must be just that and not the use of economic power to extend influence.

Mikoyan said that he agreed to the last part of this statement but he said that Soviet intentions were erroneously interpreted. He asked if the Vice President considered their leadership intelligent. Mikoyan said they might make mistakes but they were intelligent. He did not say this with any inflated sense of pride, but said it objectively. In that case, how could the Soviet leaders hope to undermine the United States Government? They would be all Don Quixotes if they did. It was another matter

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<sup>2</sup> Lunik I, a satellite launched by the Soviet Union on January 2, came within about 4,000 miles of the Moon and passed into planetary orbit around the Sun.

that they felt that the internal processes working in capitalist countries should bring about communism. But that was an internal matter. The development of history occurred in a zig-zag fashion, but it was interesting to note that the richest countries were the least susceptible to communist influence. If de Gaulle had apprehensions about communist influence, Mikoyan could understand this since France had a big Communist Party. There was no basis at all for us to be concerned about a communist danger. Of course, the Soviet leaders' sympathies are on the side of communism, just as ours are on the side of capitalism. After all, we statesmen have our responsibility for governing our countries. Americans might say, "Well, what about Hungary?"<sup>3</sup> There comes a time in history when action is necessary. They had an alliance with that government. They thought that American intelligence played a role in this affair. They didn't expect us to agree. They thought we wanted to divide and break up their bloc. They believed that a threat to their friends and allies was a threat to their own country. They had had to act, but they were sorry to have done so. If a communist government or any government hostile to the United States came into power in Mexico or Canada we would not stand aside. There is no use to mention examples. Of course, they would be glad if communism came to power in one country or another but it would never succeed if it relied on help from the outside. We must avoid fighting and even avoid propaganda. For instance, we had appropriated \$100,000,000 for activities against them. This was not bad for them, and the money had been lost. Their system was strong and even billions of dollars were not enough. After Stalin died they introduced many important reforms which have improved the situation. Of course, Stalin wanted their country to be strong, but his methods did not help. The Vice President interrupted to ask if he meant strong internally. Mikoyan said that he was referring to foreign policy and that here Stalin's line had been too inflexible. The present Soviet leaders had tried to change this policy and had not approved some of the ideas of Stalin but he had carried them through. In his old age, Stalin had not read much, nor had he met many people and he had become detached from life. The decisions he took therefore had no proper basis. The present leaders read a great deal, met more foreigners, and had the possibility of adopting decisions based on knowledge of the full facts. The Soviet people had endured so much suffering in the past that they had a right to a better life now. That is why their slogan was to catch up with America. This was not a menace. On the contrary, it admitted that America was ahead of the Soviet Union and it raised America's prestige. If the Soviet people lived better, what kind of threat was that to America? The Soviets did not want to flood the United States with goods.

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is to the October–November 1956 Hungarian revolt.

They wanted them for their own people. They were spending too much money on armaments—though not as much as we were. This was money lost. It would be better in the future to turn these armaments into scrap iron, or still better not to produce them. The United States was increasing its military budget. This meant the Soviet Union must increase its budget. If the former decreased its expenditures for military purposes, the latter would do likewise.

The Vice President mentioned propaganda. He said Soviet propaganda differed from ours. The basic goal of our propaganda was to tell other countries honestly and frankly about the policies of the United States. He said he realized that the Soviet Union considered some of our broadcasts, as well as other types of propaganda activity, as devoted to interpreting internal Soviet policies and Soviet policies toward other countries. He personally doubted the usefulness of this and felt that it would be better for both sides to show restraint. He realized that sometimes speeches could be provocative and create positions and attitudes in other countries which would lead to fear and consequently to miscalculation. He said that we worried about this. If people wanted to change their form of government, this was their right. We accepted this and would not ourselves be here if we did not. The real problem was interference from the outside. Was he to understand from Mikoyan's remarks that the Soviet Union did not support Communist parties in other countries? He understood Mikoyan to say that they welcomed the advent of Communism but would do nothing overt to encourage or bring it about. The Vice President said that even since Stalin's death there had been indications that this was not, in fact, Soviet policy. During the past four years, students of Soviet affairs had believed that there had been considerable interference in internal affairs, in the case of some movements that had developed. He realized that the Soviet leaders pretended they did not do so; but just as people in the Soviet Union believed that there had been American activity in Hungary, so people here believed that the Soviet Union supported Communist parties in other countries. Perhaps this was all a carry-over from the past—from the days of the Third International. The Soviet leaders should be realistic and recognize that this feeling existed. Here again, the Vice President said, the competition of ideas would be helpful—but economic and political interference from outside would be objectionable.

Mikoyan said that what the Vice President described was something they did not do. The Cominform had been a detrimental development and had been abolished. Even under Stalin, it had begun to die away. They now had a firm policy of non-interference. They do not even try to interfere in nearby countries where Communist parties are in power. Of course, when their advice is asked they give it, but it is up to these other countries to act on it or not. For example, in the economic

field, these countries often turned to the Soviet Union for advice since it was more experienced. It was glad to give advice. What was useful, these countries accepted. What not, they rejected. For example, a Korean delegation had come to discuss plans for rebuilding their devastated country. The Soviet leaders told them that it would be best to give priority to housing, rice cultivation, production of fertilizers, etc.; but not to building machines. They had seemed to agree. The Soviets had told them that machinery would be too expensive to produce. Since it was Soviet general practice to turn over the designs of machinery, etc., free of charge, the Koreans had said they wanted blueprints for a factory to make tractors. The Soviets had said they had no objections but there was not much point to this since the Koreans could not sell more than 2,000 tractors per year and it would be too expensive to produce this quantity. The Soviet Ambassador reported that the Koreans had been displeased and had decided to design the plant themselves. In view of this, the Soviet leaders decided to turn over the blueprints to the Koreans anyway.

Mikoyan continued with another example. He said that the Rumanians wanted to build an automobile plant. The Soviets told them that this was not practical. They said that it would be more profitable for the Czechs to produce these automobiles. The Rumanians could not produce more than five or six thousand a year and the automobiles would be too expensive. The Rumanians claimed that their national pride required them to go into this. They built the plant—and the autos are expensive.

Ambassador Thompson said that he would like to revert to the Hungarian question. He said that when he was in Austria during the period of the Hungarian revolution,<sup>4</sup> he was in a position to know what we did or did not do with regard to it. He said that from the very volume of our broadcasts some Hungarians believed that there was a chance we would support them. He assured Mikoyan that the United States had never had any intention of encouraging the fighting because it valued human life too much. It would not have stimulated resistance in the face of the odds in the situation. He did not believe that the Soviet Government had ever given the United States credit for the restraint it exercised during the Hungarian affair. We had been disturbed that something might break out in Poland at the same time. Hence, what activity we did engage in was designed to moderate the situation and reduce the toll of human life. The German Government had conducted an examination of our broadcast scripts in investigating charges made against broadcasts from facilities located on its territory. There were a few which we might have changed had we had it to do over, but very few. We believed that

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<sup>4</sup>Thompson served as Ambassador to Austria 1952–1957.

Khrushchev was right when he said that the Hungarian Government had been out of touch with its people. Our role had been minimal.

Mikoyan said that he also believed that the main cause of the events in Hungary were the mistakes of the Communist leaders of Hungary. If that had not been the case, there would have been no basis for the fighting irrespective of any propaganda. The Soviet leaders believed that interference was bad for the side interfering and for the side being interfered with. But, of course, they wanted their camp to remain firm and they believed that they were now working for this much more intelligently and successfully. They did not want to undermine other countries and they did not want to set the United States at loggerheads with its allies. They realized that the United States was sensitive to its interests and that anything they might do which infringed on them would give rise to suspicion. They were conscious of American interests and their actions were not designed to arouse or evoke our sensibilities.

The Vice President said that this not only applied to actions but to words as well. When provocative statements were made, they had repercussions around the world. He realized that both sides were to blame. In order for the Soviet leaders to understand us and the feelings of our people, of Senators and Congressmen, they had to realize that the latter watched every word in the speeches of Khrushchev and Mikoyan and in *Pravda* statements. Where these were belligerent and aggressive in tone, they obviously had considerable effect here. All sides must be more temperate. We were playing not only with emotions but with instruments of destruction. None of us wanted to set these off.

Mikoyan agreed that this was very dangerous. Perhaps a new approach should be made. The Soviets believed that the Americans were more active in making provocative statements and he said that if the Soviets did so, it was not to remain in debt on the matter.

The Vice President replied that that is the way the process works. One side provokes the other.

The Vice President said that sometimes there are incidents which seem small but they have a great emotional effect. One such incident was that involving eleven missing American airmen.<sup>5</sup> There was more concern felt about this by the average American than about such a thing as the conference on nuclear testing in Geneva even though the latter might be much more important in the long run.<sup>6</sup> Mikoyan said that that was an unpleasant incident and was a misfortune, but the Soviet Union

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<sup>5</sup> See Document 55.

<sup>6</sup> Reference is to the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests, which representatives of the United States, Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom attended in Geneva beginning on October 31, 1958.

was not to blame. In order to avoid such incidents, it would be best for the planes to use safer routes, especially since these flights yielded nothing good. Planes flew over the Far East or over the Baltic area but they learned nothing new. All this territory had been photographed time and time again—there were Scandinavian Air Lines planes coming in and out, Ambassador Thompson's plane came in and out—the Soviets had nothing to hide.

The Vice President said his point was that with regard to reducing tension between us, it would be useful to make progress on matters like this. It would be helpful if the Soviet Government gave us an indication or a statement about what had happened to the men involved. Mikoyan replied that they had given all the information they had. There was no sense in their trying to hide anything. Why were the Americans so suspicious about this? The Vice President said that this was reflection of the times and that suspicions did arise. Mikoyan said that this was true and that no cause should be given to arouse suspicions.

Mikoyan said he had the impression that in the last few months our relations had improved. The Soviet leaders had more confidence in us, though it was far from full confidence. Talks in Moscow with Stevenson, Lippmann, Johnston, Humphrey, and others had made a real impression on the Soviet leaders.<sup>7</sup> He said they could not all be false in their attitudes and that, therefore, something real must underlie their statements. Even the Vice President's statement in London had been something unusual. The Vice President said that we did agree on some objectives. Mikoyan remarked that the main thing was that the Soviet leaders did not want war but wanted peaceful co-existence. This was not because they were weak or were cowards. They wanted peace in order to develop their country and have it become rich like the United States. The Vice President said that the United States believed it was in the American interest for the Soviet Union to concentrate its economic resources on the progress and welfare of the Soviet people. There was no question that where economic health prevailed there was less likelihood for support of aggressive action and less feeling of a need for expansion. It was good for both the Soviet Union and the United States to have Asia, the Near East and South America embark on programs

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<sup>7</sup> Regarding Adlai Stevenson's talks with Soviet leaders, see Documents 53 and 54. Following a visit to Moscow in late October 1958, columnist and author Walter Lippmann published four articles. The first two described his interview with Khrushchev; the last two gave his reflections on Communist objectives derived from his talks with Khrushchev and other Soviet officials and editors. These articles were subsequently published without change (except for additional comments in the last essay) in Walter Lippmann, *The Communist World and Ours* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1958). Regarding Johnston's talk with Khrushchev on October 6, 1958, see Documents 56 and 57. Humphrey met with Khrushchev in Moscow on December 1; see vol. VIII, Document 84.

which would bring better life to the people there. This was what the Soviet Union wanted, Mikoyan said.

The Vice President said that no one in the United States believed in the concept of preventive war. Anyone who did should be in an insane asylum. Mikoyan said that some years ago there were people who advocated this, though they were not in the Government. As for the present, the Vice President was right.

The Vice President said he spoke for the President and the Government in asserting that the United States had no aggressive intentions. He did want to emphasize one point. While there was disagreement with the President and with Secretary Dulles—and people like Lippmann criticized them—and while we welcomed all this as a means of getting the best policies, there was in the Senate and the House of Representatives overwhelming support of the present foreign policy leadership. He wanted to emphasize that this did not indicate inflexibility. Our policy appeared inflexible but this was not the case. In the case of Berlin, which appeared to us as unilateral probing action on the Soviet Union's part, there was unanimous support in the Congress for the position of the President. Mikoyan said that he had felt all this in his talks earlier in the day with trade union leaders such as Reuther and Carey.<sup>8</sup> He felt that at the basis of the problem was American lack of understanding or possibly even distrust of the Soviet position. The Soviets regarded their move as a peaceful action. How could he assure Americans that the Soviets did not want Berlin for themselves? He had tried to impress this on everyone but had apparently not been persuasive enough. The Soviets wanted an end to occupation status. The occupation had been done away with in East Germany and West Germany. It was time to do away with it in Berlin. West Berlin should not remain undefended, it should not go to the GDR, but it should not go to Adenauer either. As an example of one of the problems, in August, Adenauer had held a special meeting in West Berlin.<sup>9</sup> This had been a provocative meeting with speeches against East Germany. When the Arabs had made such speeches with regard to Lebanon, the United States had considered this as indirect aggression. Adenauer's activities in West Berlin had been a clear case of indirect aggression. The Soviets wanted West Berlin to be a free city, demilitarized—with a police force, but no troops. The Americans would say that the Bolsheviks were just being clever; that they

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<sup>8</sup> Circular airgram 6751 to all diplomatic and consular posts, February 9, contained an extensive summary of a meeting among James Carey, President of the International Union of Electricians, Walter Reuther, President of the United Auto Workers, other U.S. trade officials, and Mikoyan on January 6. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.6111/2-959)

<sup>9</sup> Reference presumably is to a political rally Adenauer attended in West Berlin on December 5, not August, 1958, 2 days before municipal elections in that city.



wanted to get Allied troops out of Berlin and then pull it gradually into East Germany. This was not the case. How could the Soviets assure us so? Words did not seem to suffice. The Soviet leaders wanted the status of Berlin to be guaranteed by the Great Powers and the two Germanies with complete non-interference in its affairs and with free access to it by all countries. The Four Powers had guaranteed the status of Austria, and this guarantee had been well kept. The Vice President said that we could not reconcile ourselves to any unilateral action. Mikoyan said that for the time being there had been none, and that we should come to agreement. The Vice President remarked that Mikoyan had put the Soviet position forward very effectively. The United States felt strongly that anything that is done must be by agreement. As far as we were concerned, we could not give up responsibility under the Treaty,<sup>10</sup> particularly in view of the expressed will of the people of West Berlin. Mikoyan said that the Soviet Union did not want to free the United States of the responsibility for Berlin. It wanted the freedom of Berlin to rest not on bayonets but on international guarantees. The Vice President replied that the main thing was to reach a mutually acceptable settlement so that we do not arrive in six months at an intolerable position. Mikoyan said that we should try to settle the problem before then. The Vice President said that the German problem itself must be settled before there can be any long-term settlement for Berlin. Mikoyan replied that if this meant settlement on the basis proposed by Adenauer, this was a distant prospect. If it meant settlement on the basis of two German States and a peace treaty, it would be a more imminent prospect. Actually, he had the impression that Adenauer was not interested in the reunification of Germany. He had talked all day long with Adenauer and the latter did not even mention this subject.<sup>11</sup> Adenauer had said that general disarmament would lead to a relaxation of tension. The only point he had made with Mikoyan was that no pressure should be put on the people of East Germany in the sphere of religion. Mikoyan had said that unless religion interfered with politics, there should be no pressure. Mikoyan said he had asked Adenauer why he did not talk to the Germans in East Germany. He had remarked to Adenauer that the latter talked to the Abyssinians but not to his own people.

The Vice President said that they could not settle this problem in their conversation.

What he wanted to emphasize was that there had been people in the USSR who had believed that the United States would become divided and its system would collapse. There had been a similar feeling in the

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<sup>10</sup> Reference presumably is to the Potsdam Agreements of 1945.

<sup>11</sup> See footnote 2, Document 57.

United States about the Soviet Union, that its internal problems were too great, that it was basically weak. Looking forward, we should begin with the assumption that both countries are strong, neither should fear the other. If we approached each other in that spirit, we could settle some of our problems. Mikoyan replied that he wanted to amend the Vice President's remarks. The Soviet Union had never regarded the United States as weak or divided. The Soviet leaders knew the oratorical prowess of the two American political parties. They had always regarded them both as a common part of the American bourgeois system and they knew that the United States was a strong, organized state. They knew the strength of our economy, our monopolies, etc. They were glad that the United States did not underestimate their situation. This was no menace. Each country should respect the other and not try to subjugate it. However, in the United Nations American representatives often tried to place the Soviets in an inferior position and demonstrate their weakness. This gave offense to them and gave cause for complaint. Such methods did not settle anything. On the question of outer space, the Soviet Union had wanted to take part in the new committee.<sup>12</sup> But it had had to refuse because the membership imposed by the United States delegation had been unacceptable, even though the committee would only have authority in the scientific field. The net result had been the inclusion of various Latin American countries, who could not do much. With the Soviet Union absent, the only point of their presence would be to raise their hands to vote. This affair had led to new conflict in the United Nations which could very well have been avoided. The United States and the Soviet Union are the only countries with space capabilities. The Soviet Union were not members now. Had they been, they might have demonstrated their cooperation. Even in spheres where it is strong, the Soviet Union was being disregarded. The Soviet leaders had directed their representative to let the United States set up its own committee. Mikoyan was sure that the United States would have done the same thing in the circumstances. If we wanted cooperation, we should not attempt to put each other in a subjugated position. There should be full equality. Mikoyan said he could well imagine that we would not come to agreement immediately. It would be better to postpone agreement and come to some *modus vivendi*. In the United Nations, the Soviet Union and the United States were meeting as adversaries. What was

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<sup>12</sup> Reference is to the ad hoc committee provided for in a resolution introduced by the United States and 19 other nations (U.N. doc. A/C.1/L/220/Rev.1), which was approved by the U.N. General Assembly on December 13, 1958, as Resolution 1348 (XIII) by a vote of 53 to 9, with 19 abstentions. The Soviet Delegate then stated that his nation, which had voted in opposition, could not accept the provisions in this resolution for membership on this committee and would not participate in it. For a summary of this question, including text of Resolution 1348 (XIII), see *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1958*, pp. 19-23.

the point of this? The Soviet Union had its pride, too. The Vice President said he wanted to make the point that settlement cannot involve surrender. Each side must be willing to go half way. Ambassador Thompson said that there was another side to the story about the composition of the outer space committee. Zorin had not objected to the participation of the Latin American countries in the committees. He had wanted to pick specific countries suitable to the Soviet Union as against those put forward by the Latin Americans themselves. Thus, there was more to the story than Mikoyan had indicated. Mikoyan said that as far as he could recollect, the main problem was that the Soviet Union wanted equality between two sides—the United States and its allies on one side, the Soviet Union and its allies and with neutral countries, on the other side—in order that there would be no “dictate.”

The Vice President said today’s discussion had shown the advantage of such talks.

Mikoyan said that when we get to know each other better there will be a base for contacts at all levels. Anyone, whoever it is, would get the best reception in the Soviet Union. If the Vice President could find the time to visit the Soviet Union he would see for himself that this was true. The Soviets were prepared to compete with the Americans about who received the other better.

The Vice President said that he did want to come to the Soviet Union some day. He had already visited some 50 countries and would like to add the USSR. He had always admired the heroism of the Russian soldiers. Like many Americans, he had found enjoyment in reading Russian literature. Tolstoy was a real favorite of his, especially his novels “War and Peace” and “Anna Karenina”. He hoped Mikoyan would not experience some of the hospitality that he had experienced in other countries. Mikoyan said he had read about the Vice President’s experiences and had admired his courage. The Vice President referred to the remark that he was known as a staunch anti-communist. He said it was true that he disagreed with communist philosophy just as communists disagreed with bourgeois philosophy. However, he had been among the American leaders who had early recognized the strength and progress of the Soviet Union. He had been the first to advocate a broad exchange policy, even before the government had adopted the policy.<sup>13</sup> This could do no harm. It might not settle problems but it would bring about better understanding. About this he was in the same position as the communists but from a bourgeois point of view.

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<sup>13</sup> Nixon was apparently referring to the substance of his speech delivered at Lafayette College, Easton, Pennsylvania, on June 7, 1956; for text, see *Department of State Bulletin*, June 25, 1956, pp. 1043–1047.

Mikoyan thanked the Vice President for the expeditious manner in which the American Government had settled all matters relating to his visit. He had been made to feel welcome and been received by a very glad attitude on the part of the United States Government. He knew something about the American people since he had traveled in this country for two months on his first visit here. His associates had asked him how he could possibly go to the United States without a bodyguard. He had said that if a bodyguard had been necessary he would not have come. He realized that each state was responsible for whatever happened.

The Vice President said that Mikoyan would find many Armenians in San Francisco. They were among the most progressive people there. They were active in business and engaged in growing grapes; and one of his friends owned one of the best restaurants there. Californians said that Armenians were the toughest people to deal with; that they drove the hardest bargains. Mikoyan said that was probably true of the American Armenians.

Mikoyan said that the Soviet Government was doing the best it could to have everyone meet with the best reception there. This was even true of West Germans. The Soviet leaders were glad that influential Americans were coming to their country and would try to receive them in the best way possible.

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## 62. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, January 16, 1959, 10:30 a.m.–12:45 p.m.

### SUBJECT

US-Soviet Relations

### PARTICIPANTS

Anastas I. Mikoyan, Deputy Premier of the USSR  
Mikhail A. Menshikov, Soviet Ambassador  
Oleg A. Troyanovski, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, USSR  
Aleksandr Alekseevich Soldatov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, USSR

John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State  
Christian A. Herter, Under Secretary of State  
Livingston T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary  
Llewellyn E. Thompson, American Ambassador to Moscow  
Edward L. Freers, Director, Office of Eastern European Affairs

The Secretary began by asking Mikoyan's reaction to the reception he had received in the United States. The Secretary said that we believed in the right of peaceful demonstration but there were some people who did carry on activities which might seem offensive to guests. He hoped that Mikoyan has recognized that the American people are friendly as well as curious.

Mikoyan said that he had had a chance to know something about the American people 22 years ago. He had received a good impression this time in spite of the activities of some immigrants. He felt the Russians and Americans could live together in peace and friendship. Twenty-two years ago he had traveled without a bodyguard, this time there was a great deal of security precaution. It would have been better without this, but apparently this had been impossible.

The Secretary remarked that it showed how important he was now.

Mikoyan rejoined by saying that it showed the change in times.

Mikoyan remarked that he had gotten on better with the press than he had expected—either they had become better or he had been able to talk better with them. Businessmen had also been interested in his proposals. 22 years ago he had seen only a few officials of General Motors and Ford. This time he had seen many influential business leaders who had shown great interest. He had met Henry Ford the last time. This time he had met Henry Ford III,<sup>1</sup> who was also a pleasant man. He had met David Rockefeller,<sup>2</sup> who had expressed his regrets that the Moscow press and some people there seemed to think his family was war-mongering and wanted a deterioration in Soviet-American relations. Rockefeller had told Mikoyan that his family wanted an improvement in these relations no less than any other.

The Secretary said he, himself, was tarnished with the charge of being a leading warmonger. Mikoyan remarked that he would not use the word "tarnished". The Soviets considered the Secretary as the leading strategist of the cold war. The Secretary suggested that when Mikoyan returned to Moscow, he might review the Soviet propaganda line and might well find several respects in which it could be improved. Mikoyan said he would do this on the basis of reciprocity.

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<sup>1</sup> Presumably Mikoyan meant Henry Ford II, President of Ford Motor Company.

<sup>2</sup> Executive Vice President and Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Chase Manhattan Bank.

The Secretary made the point that in the conversation with Mikoyan he might have to dwell on unpleasant topics. It was important to have a full and frank exchange of views. His attitudes were not personal ones but were basically shared by the people of the United States. Under our form of society the individualistic viewpoint was not the governing one and individuals did not hold public office forever. This might give some satisfaction to the Minister but it would be short-lived because our policies would continue to go on.

Mikoyan said he understood the Secretary was referring to our Constitutional provision for a four-year incumbency by the executive.

[Here follows discussion of Berlin and Germany, printed in volume VIII, Document 135.]

The Secretary said he wanted to talk about two other zones in which danger of war could arise. One was the Far East. There the Chinese Communists were supported by the Soviet Union in the objective that the US must be expelled by force from Taiwan and the West Pacific. Such a policy could have very serious consequences. The United States would not be expelled by force or pressure from its collective security associations in the Western Pacific and Southeast Asia. China, like Korea, Vietnam and Germany, was divided. The US was friendly with one part, the Soviet Union with the other. Unification sought by force would almost surely lead to general war. We had exerted great influence for restraint on President Rhee<sup>3</sup> who wanted to unify Korea by force. On our part, we could not be expelled by force where we were present by invitation or in fulfillment of formal agreements.

Mikoyan said there was no analogy in the situations mentioned—historically, juridically or in substance. In Germany and in Korea zones of occupation had been set up by victorious allies. In Korea troops had been withdrawn at different dates, then war had occurred—there was no analogy with Germany. As to Mr. Rhee, the Soviets were not sure our professed restraint would always hold. North Korea was now one big reconstruction site and might be envied by South Korea. The former had no intention to fight but if South Korea started, it would fight well, as it had shown. In general it was a good idea to withdraw troops. There was a need for exchanges between the Koreans in the fields of culture and trade as a gradual means of bringing about reunification.

The division in Vietnam, according to Mikoyan, was the result of agreement reached at Geneva by all concerned.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Syngman Rhee, President of the Republic of Korea.

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to the Geneva Conference on Indochina in 1954.

Turning to China, Mikoyan said that the United States had been party to agreements that Taiwan should be returned to China along with the other islands. At one time it had not interfered in Chinese affairs—a reasonable policy, useful for the United States. China would win in any case and this would be worse for the United States. After the remnants of counter-revolution had settled on Taiwan the United States had entered into a bilateral agreement<sup>5</sup> and regarded Chiang Kai-shek as representing China. Treaties with him had not been accepted by the real China. No state would accept such unilateral actions. The Soviets were surprised by Chinese patience. Neither China nor the Soviet Union had ever sought to have the United States leave all the islands in the West Pacific. The United States had a treaty with the Philippines, and troops there, <sup>6</sup> it had allies in Singapore, it had bases on Okinawa. They did not like this but were not attacking it. In general the Soviet Union wanted all foreign troops withdrawn and peaceful settlements guaranteed by the United Nations. If the United States left Okinawa, it would not be leaving the West Pacific. Since the United States did not want to leave under pressure of force, it should use the respite to leave voluntarily. It would not lose, but gain moral, political and military prestige if it broke with Chiang Kai-shek and recognized the CPR. The latter did not menace the United States, nor did the Soviet Union. The American position gave rise to more anti-Western feeling and tension in the area.

The Secretary said Mikoyan had referred to the violation of the armistice in Korea as breaking up the possibility of reunification. This is what had happened at Taiwan.

Mikoyan replied that he had been misunderstood. The Soviets did want reunification of Korea. He had made his remarks as information only and had had no specific purpose in making them.

The Secretary said the Near Eastern situation was complex and he doubted whether he and Mikoyan could agree on any of the elements in the situation. The area was vital to Western Europe as a source of oil and as a means of communication between Asia and the West. The United States had not believed that the military action by the UK, France and Israel in 1956 had been the right way to protect their interests. This attitude should not, however, be interpreted by the Soviet Union as reflecting any United States indifference to what took place there.

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<sup>5</sup> Reference presumably is to the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China, signed in Washington on December 2, 1954, and entered into force on March 3, 1955. (6 UST 433)

<sup>6</sup> Reference presumably is to the agreement concerning military bases between the United States and the Philippines signed in Manila on March 14, 1947, and entered into force on March 26, 1947. (43 UNTS 271)

We were concerned about apparent efforts of International Communism to gain control of the area, particularly about its activities in Iraq. Although the Soviets had been suspicious of American and British motives in responding to the appeals of Lebanon and Jordan, our withdrawal of troops had proven that we had had no intention of working to sustain Western influence in Iraq from outside. Mikoyan said the Soviets believed, on the contrary, that that had been indeed our objective but that we had not been able to bring it about—public opinion had prevented us. When the Secretary objected, Mikoyan said that both sides would undoubtedly retain their own ideas about this. The Secretary said he was sorry about the Soviet view—it had been disproved by our words and deeds. As soon as a UN formula had been found, we had withdrawn our troops. He said that, on the other hand, he hoped we could feel reasonably confident the Soviet Union did not desire to extend its control in Iraq and other Arab states.

Mikoyan said the Soviets recognized the importance of the Middle East to the West as the source of Arabian oil and as the means of communication to Asia. Bulganin and Khrushchev had made this point directly. The Soviets had, on several occasions, advanced proposals for a Big Power meeting to work out common steps to prevent a further deterioration of the situation and to eliminate outside interference in the area. They had also made proposals about arms shipments.<sup>7</sup>

The Secretary said we had no quarrel with general principles but the area suggested in the Soviet proposals appeared too broad—stretching from Pakistan to Morocco. Mikoyan said the Soviets had been more interested in the Arab world and in Iran and Turkey in this connection. The Secretary said he had asked Gromyko in October 1957 for clarification of Soviet thinking about the scope of the area covered by their proposals but had not gotten it from him. Mikoyan said they had been talking about the Near and Middle East—certainly not Morocco—the Near East was the main hotbed of tension here. They had acted on the assumption that the three Western Powers wanted to act in the area just as they pleased, without asking the Arabs and without accepting the presence or interests of the Soviet Union.

Mikoyan said the Secretary was wrong in suggesting there had been Soviet interference in Iraq. The Baghdad nations<sup>8</sup> all had active in-

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<sup>7</sup> For texts of Khrushchev's letters to Eisenhower, dated July 19 and 23, 1958, proposing a meeting of heads of government to discuss possible solutions to the Middle East crisis, see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 11, 1958, pp. 231–233 and 234–235. A Soviet proposal by Khrushchev for a moratorium on arms shipments to the Middle East, which would be conditional on an agreement of noninterference in the area by the powers, was reported in the *London Times*, February 1, 1958.

<sup>8</sup> Reference is to the members of the Baghdad Pact, a treaty of mutual cooperation signed at Baghdad on February 24, 1955, between Turkey and Iraq and adhered to later that year by the United Kingdom, Pakistan, and Iran.



telligence services. They knew there had been no Soviet citizens involved. The Soviet leaders had not foreseen the revolution nor had they even heard of Kassem.<sup>9</sup> The Secretary said he could be persuaded that the Soviet Union had played no active part in the overthrow of the Nuri Government,<sup>10</sup> but he was talking about activities that had taken place since then. Mikoyan observed that if they had not interfered before the revolution it was strange to suggest that they were interfering now. They were glad that the revolution had occurred because it undermined the Baghdad Pact. But, it was not the Communist Party alone but other forces in Iraq as well who were supporting the legal government of Kassem. On the other hand, in the UAR, Nasser was arresting Communists. The Soviet Union had good relations with both countries. Its policy of non-interference was paying off for it in the Middle East. The Soviets had assured the Shah of Iran<sup>11</sup> that they would not interfere in Iranian affairs, although they didn't like his regime. He had given them assurances that Iran would not engage in any military arrangements directed against the Soviet Union nor allow foreign bases to be set up on Iranian soil. However, since the split in the Baghdad Pact there had been certain developments and his policy seemed to have changed. Iran was providing military bases for the United States. We were thus interfering in the area, not they.

As to Pakistan, Mikoyan said he didn't know whether there were Communists there or not. He had had good relations with Mirza and had represented the USSR at the Constitution ceremonies. The Soviet attitude towards Ayub Khan was the same as toward the previous government.<sup>12</sup> The Soviets saw no constitutional basis for his government, but this was a matter for the Pakistan people. Western policy in the Middle East was mistaken because it did not recognize that the colonial era had come to an end.

The Secretary said there had been much loose talk about the United States putting in new bases under new treaties with Turkey, Iran and

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<sup>9</sup> Brigadier Abdul Kareem Kassem, leader of the army revolt in Iraq in July 1958 and Prime Minister, Minister of the Interior, and Minister of Defense in the new Iraqi Government.

<sup>10</sup> General Nuri el-Said, Prime Minister of the Arab Federation of Iraq and Jordan, who was assassinated during the army revolt in July 1958.

<sup>11</sup> Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlevi.

<sup>12</sup> After Iskander Mirza, President of Pakistan, formed a new cabinet on October 24, 1958, and appointed General Ayub Khan as Prime Minister, he announced that he had decided to resign and hand over all powers to General Ayub Khan.

Pakistan.<sup>13</sup> This was not the case. The United States was engaged in fulfilling commitments already made. It had a Mutual Security Act<sup>14</sup> which laid out the terms and conditions for military assistance. What has been going on has been talks about fulfilling its commitments to Turkey, Pakistan and Iran. These talks were designed to determine the measures needed to bring these commitments up to date.

Mikoyan said it would be better to bury them rather than to bring them up to date. The Secretary said that if Mikoyan saw the texts of the agreements themselves he would be reassured. Our recent commitments might result in some improvement in the military capability of Iran but in general all three countries in our view had excessive military establishments in relation to their resources and we favored greater dedication of the latter to economic development. Mikoyan said that the Soviet view was that the United States was to blame for these large military establishments and that we wanted to keep tension high in the area through this policy.

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<sup>13</sup> Reference is to the multilateral declaration respecting the Baghdad Pact, which the United States, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom signed at London on July 28, 1958, and which entered into force the same day. (9 UST 1077) To implement this declaration, the United States subsequently signed agreements of cooperation at Ankara on March 5, 1959, which entered into force the same day, with Iran (10 UST 314), Pakistan (10 UST 317), and Turkey (10 UST 320).

<sup>14</sup> Reference is to the Mutual Security Act of 1954, P.L. 83-665, legislation designed to promote U.S. security and foreign policy by furnishing assistance to friendly nations. (68 Stat. 832) The legislation was amended in certain details by Congress in subsequent years.

**63. Memorandum of Conversation**

Washington, January 16, 1959, 4–5:30 p.m.

**SUBJECT**

U.S.-Soviet Relations

**PARTICIPANTS**

Anastas I. Mikoyan, Deputy Premier of the USSR  
Mikhail A. Menshikov, Soviet Ambassador  
Oleg A. Troyanovski, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, USSR  
Aleksandr Alekseevich Soldatov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, USSR  
John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State  
Christian A. Herter, Under Secretary of State  
Livingston T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary  
Llewellyn E. Thompson, American Ambassador to Moscow  
Edward L. Freers, Director, Office of Eastern European Affairs

In resuming the conversation from the morning session,<sup>1</sup> Mikoyan indicated that he would like to make some more remarks about the Middle East.

He said the Soviet Union could not remain tranquil when bases were being set up in countries like Iran and Turkey. They could not reconcile such activity with our peaceful statements. The security of the United States had nothing to do with their southern frontier. Our actions only rendered the United States more insecure since some of these countries might involve us in local conflicts. The Ambassador of India, on the platform with him the other day, had stated that the arming of Pakistan by the United States was a danger to it. Pakistan made threatening statements about Afghanistan. The Soviet Union could not understand either the attitude of the Shah or of the United States regarding Iran. The Soviets had been assured by the Shah that he wanted to improve relations with the USSR and that Iranian territory would not be used against the Soviet Union and no foreign bases would be established. Since talks with him two years ago, Iranian-Soviet relations had improved visibly. Precise frontiers had been agreed upon after 100 years of uncertainty, financial claims had been settled to mutual satisfaction, plans for building hydro-electric stations along the frontier had been agreed upon and trade had improved.<sup>2</sup> Then after the Baghdad Pact split

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1183. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Freers and approved by Boster on January 22.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 62.

<sup>2</sup> The Soviet Union and Iran signed protocols in Tehran on April 11, 1958, which defined their common frontier along its entire length. On August 11, 1958, the two powers agreed to cooperate in the joint utilization of frontier stretches as sources of irrigation and electric power and in the construction of several hydroelectric plans and a dam and reservoir. No record of their settlement of financial claims has been found.

occurred, projects for new agreements emerged. If they were signed, this would bring about a considerable deterioration of Soviet relations with Iran and with the United States. The same applied to Turkey, even though it was part of NATO. New American "pactomania" gave rise to serious misgivings. Did the United States intend to interfere here or to find common ground with the Soviet Union?

The Secretary said he could not speak for other States, but we considered collective security arrangements a sound principle for countries that want them. Such countries as India and Egypt did not want them and that was their own business. Iran, Turkey or Pakistan would never be used as bases for aggressive United States action against the Soviet Union. With the increased range of missiles, it made no practical difference whether a base were nearby or far away. The USSR perhaps could annihilate the United States from its own bases. The concept that bases in nearby areas were more dangerous than those in remote areas was becoming increasingly fictitious. We had no intention of establishing United States bases in Iran.

Mikoyan inquired why in that case the United States was widening its network of bases, for example in Turkey—and arming them with atomic weapons. The Secretary said countries lying close to the overwhelming power of the Soviet Union naturally wanted to see effective supporting power nearby. He had often told their leaders that more remote power was equally effective. It was human nature to want to see something. This was more of psychological than of great practical significance.

Mikoyan wondered whether our actions regarding pacts led to a deterioration of United States relations not only with the Soviet Union but with non-members of these pacts as well, and thus increased anti-American feeling. How could Iraq trust the United States when three countries surrounding it were allied to the latter and were receiving military assistance from it? They could threaten Iraq or the UAR. These American actions led to acute situations. The Soviet Union on the other hand had good relations with these countries in spite of differing domestic systems.

The Secretary said we were always happy to get advice, but thought that the governments concerned felt we were following the correct policy. Our helping other nations should not be a threat or menace to the USSR. It does constitute assurance to the peoples concerned who are frightened by the magnitude of Soviet power so near at hand. Mikoyan said he couldn't claim any right to offer advice about United States policy but wanted to be frank in expressing his views. The Secretary remarked that he did not want Mikoyan to feel that he resented this.

Mikoyan inquired whether it was the United States intention to provide West Germany with atomic weapons. The Secretary said that under the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act,<sup>3</sup> which were not likely to be changed in the predictable future, the United States could not in peace time supply nuclear weapons to any other country. Several NATO countries were anxious to have them under their control but we had had to turn them down. There were no such weapons in Europe not under US control. The Brussels Treaty<sup>4</sup> prohibited the Federal Republic from producing atomic weapons on its own. With regard to press reports mentioned by Mikoyan about lifting restrictions, we did not propose any changes of the Act. We did get it changed to furnish nuclear information to the United Kingdom, on the theory that it was already a nuclear power.<sup>5</sup> We were not even doing this for other countries.

The Secretary took up the matter of the Geneva talks on test suspension and surprise attacks.<sup>6</sup> He said he wanted to qualify one earlier remark about the overwhelming support of the people and the Congress for the Administration's policy. He should have indicated that there was a difference of opinion in this country about what our policy should be concerning test suspension. We could see that the latest report about possibilities of detecting underground tests<sup>7</sup> might be interpreted as reflecting a shift in our policy and as having been designed to block negotiations. This was not the case and, as he had said earlier, we did want agreement. Problems as to what was detectable, what system was required, how it would operate were very complicated but we hoped for a successful outcome and were prepared to negotiate in good faith. We realized that the Soviet Union did not want to be in an unfavorable position in the voting in the Control Commission.<sup>8</sup> We hoped the Soviet Union would understand our position that a control system could hardly work if the country in which it operated had a veto power over

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<sup>3</sup>The Atomic Energy Act of 1954. (68 Stat. 919)

<sup>4</sup>A 50-year defensive alliance against armed attack in Europe signed by the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands in February 1948. (19 UNTS 127)

<sup>5</sup>Amendments to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 permitting the transfer of nuclear materials and information to other nations passed Congress and was signed by the President on July 2, 1958. (72 Stat. 276)

<sup>6</sup>Reference is to the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests beginning on October 31, 1958, and on the conference of experts regarding surprise attack beginning on November 10, 1958, both held in Geneva.

<sup>7</sup>Reference is to the statement by the President's Science Advisory Committee that indicated "that it is more difficult to identify underground explosions than had previously been believed." (Department of State *Bulletin*, January 26, 1958, pp. 118–119)

<sup>8</sup>Reference is to the political and administrative arrangements governing the Control Commission, which the negotiators at the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests at Geneva were then discussing.

its functioning. We would have to study the composition of the control body further. He recalled the offer of the Soviet delegation that it might submit a list of matters where the veto power should apply.<sup>9</sup> When this was submitted it might help to resolve the matter.

Mikoyan agreed. He said the Secretary had truly understood Soviet misgivings regarding the American position. The Soviets were generally not too suspicious but did think that doubts could be derived from certain facts. Until a year ago perhaps, people had been saying that it would be impossible to detect explosions. But they could be detected and were being detected. It was impossible to conceal information from intelligence agents in their country and from apparatus outside. The problem was complicated even when scientists dealt with it, but politicians completely complicated it. The Soviets had been apprehensive about the earlier talks, but the scientists had been able to reach agreement. Now, after we had been talking for several months, suddenly American scientists came up with a new discovery that underground tests could not be detected. The Soviets were left with the impression that if this difficulty were overcome, a new one would be put up. We might assert that we could not detect underwater explosions and there would be new talks about oceans.

Mikoyan said he was gratified with the Secretary's statement that we did desire an agreement. They did, too, and would negotiate in good faith. This agreement could be a test as to whether we could agree on any topic. This problem was a clear one and agreement could be reached if the desire were present.

The Secretary said we do detect many Soviet tests but have no way of knowing whether we have detected them all. Mikoyan said that we had not detected more than they had exploded in any event. The Secretary wondered whether we had detected as many. He said if the Soviets have detection devices more advanced than ours, this would be helpful. Mikoyan said that if they did, and agreement were reached, we could all use them. He said the Soviets believed that they could detect all of our tests and that we could detect all of theirs. It wasn't the politicians who decided these questions, anyway. The Soviets were willing to go on with the discussions in the hope of agreement.

In speaking about the surprise attack talks, the Secretary said the approach of the Soviet Delegation had been totally different from ours. They had wanted to discuss the political elements of the problem. We had wanted the experts to do something productive on a technical non-political basis, as had been done in the technical talks on test suspension.

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<sup>9</sup> Not further identified.

As we had indicated in our note yesterday,<sup>10</sup> we wanted the conference to go on. However, we were not in a position to resume the talks as rapidly as the Soviet Union had desired. Our team was not qualified nor did it have instructions to carry on in the form and manner apparently desired by the Soviet Union. We would have to have some time to explore the matter in the light of the Soviet delegation's position to see if a broader basis could be found to resume the talks. We realized that the Soviet Union might misapprehend our attitude. But, it could be sure that we were not employing delaying tactics but were, in fact, engaging in an intensive restudy of our position.

Mikoyan must have become aware by now that there was a great deal of emotional feeling here about the fate of the crew of the C-130 plane which was shot down in the Soviet Union.<sup>11</sup> Anything the Soviet Union might do to satisfy the anxiety of the American public would be helpful from the standpoint of our relations.

Mikoyan said they had done all they could. However, other information had been given out to the public and this had given rise to suspicions on their part. They had returned all the bodies after the crash. They didn't know about any other personnel since no one had informed them beforehand about the plane and its crew. It made no sense for them to hold any bodies or living crewmen and they were unable to understand the point of American insistence. In fact, it irritated them. They had felt at first that we might not have understood them, but their information had been repeated so often this could not be the case. They, in fact, had a complaint of their own on this matter. They did not know why American planes flew over their territory. It would be better not to endanger lives by such a practice. They would welcome advance information on any planes coming into their country.

The Secretary said that Mr. Mikoyan should appreciate that we don't send planes over their territory to be shot down. This would be stupid. Regular commercial air routes did run close to the Soviet border, however, and it was easy to get off the track.

Mikoyan quickly declared that the plane had not been shot down. It had crashed. He said he knew that regular planes fly close to Soviet borders but technical difficulties could lead to political difficulties.

[Here follows discussion of Germany and Berlin, printed in volume VIII, Document 136.]

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<sup>10</sup> For text of the U.S. note delivered to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs on January 15 on the question of renewal of the surprise attack negotiations in Geneva, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 2, 1959, pp. 163–164.

<sup>11</sup> See Document 55.

## 64. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, January 17, 1959, 9 a.m.

### SUBJECT

Mikoyan's Call on the President

### PARTICIPANTS

The President

The Secretary of State

Livingston T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs

Llewellyn E. Thompson, American Ambassador to the Soviet Union

First Deputy Prime Minister Mikoyan

Ambassador Menshikov

Mr. Troyanovski

[Here follow introductory remarks and discussion on Berlin and Germany printed in volume VIII, Document 137.]

After a prompting by Ambassador Menshikov, Mikoyan referred to the President's reply last summer to Khrushchev's letter on trade.<sup>1</sup> This reply had produced a favorable impression but there had been no subsequent progress in this field. The Secretary of State had suggested that he meet with Under Secretary Dillon and he had therefore not discussed this matter with the Secretary of State. The President in his letter had pointed out that even now there was the possibility of developing trade but one difficulty was that the commercial treaty between the Soviet Union and the United States had been denounced. The Congress had also passed legislation directed against the Soviet Union.<sup>2</sup> They had

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Thompson. The meeting was held at the White House. Attached to the source text are three memoranda. One from Dulles to the President, January 15, indicates that he would have an oral report for the President on the morning of January 17 concerning his talks with Mikoyan on January 16 and enclosing a briefing paper with suggested talking points for the President's conversation with Mikoyan. In the second memorandum to the President, January 16, Dulles made additional points the President might wish to raise with Mikoyan. The third memorandum from Dulles to the President, January 16, summarized Dulles' conversation with Mikoyan on the morning of January 16. From 8:27 to 8:59 a.m. on January 17, the President met with Dulles, Merchant, Thompson, and Hagerty at which time Dulles presumably briefed the President orally on his meetings with Mikoyan. (*Ibid.*, President's Appointment Book)

<sup>1</sup> For texts of Khrushchev's letter to Eisenhower, June 2, 1958, and Eisenhower's reply, July 14, 1958, on expansion of U.S.-Soviet trade, see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 4, 1958, pp. 200-202.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is apparently to the commercial agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States of August 4, 1937. (11 Bevans 1271) This agreement was denounced in the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951. (65 Stat. 72) Section 5 of that act required the President to deny the benefits of trade agreement concessions to imports from the Soviet Union and its satellites.



no desire to buy arms or strategic materials and in fact could sell us some.

[Here follows a brief paragraph crossed out on the source text, which reads: "The President said he had no money. Mikoyan retorted that he had so much he didn't know what to do with it and therefore spent it on arms."]

The President said that Mr. Dillon was a very reasonable and well informed man and he was sure that Mr. Mikoyan's conversation with him would be valuable and interesting. He asked Mr. Mikoyan to carry back to Mr. Khrushchev his thanks for the cordial greeting and say that he reciprocated the sentiments he had expressed for his health and happiness. He was prepared to use the final part of his term to promote a better relationship and he was convinced that this could be brought about. Mr. Mikoyan had spoken of making a beginning. The President had hoped that this beginning had been realized when the Austrian peace treaty was signed and at that time he had expressed the hope that it would be possible to have talks with the Soviet leaders. This had been done at the Geneva conference. Two things had come up there that had aroused great interest and hope. The first was the possibility that Germany could be reunited in such a way that Germany would not become a danger. The agreement had been that this would be done peacefully and by popular elections. The President did not agree that we were too much influenced by any individual in our efforts to resolve these problems. We did not know of any other way of doing this except by free elections. He pointed out that free elections were in our tradition. If we tried to establish an imposed peace we would have to keep observers and maintain forces in order to make Germany observe the conditions imposed and we knew of no practical way other than free elections. We do not desire that there be another militarized Germany. We had had four experiences of German militarism and wanted no more. In our view, Germany also wanted no militarism. In the associations in which West Germany had become a member, provisions in regard to German armaments had been made and had been observed. It was fair to say that we would share the Soviets' anxieties if Germany got in a position to start trouble but the Germans were a strong, virile people and if oppressed could react in a way which we would consider undesirable. It was also important to both of us to remember that if the Germans did not have to bear the cost of arms they would have an advantage in economic competition. We wanted a peaceful Germany united in such a way that neither the Soviet Union nor the United States could have any apprehension about it.

Another point which had come up in the Geneva talks had been the increased contacts, visits, exchanges of literature, etc. The President had sent a letter to Mr. Khrushchev, or perhaps it was to Mr. Bulganin,

saying that we would welcome visits here of high Soviet officials<sup>3</sup> and he would like to feel that Mr. Mikoyan's visit here was a result of that invitation. The idea of these exchanges had not been implemented in the way it should. We had made arrangements for the exchange of twenty or thirty students but these exchanges should be in the hundreds if we could find enough who had the requisite knowledge of the language. The Russian language appeared to be harder for us than our language was for the Russian people.

The President said he would not speak about trade as Mr. Mikoyan would talk with Mr. Dillon on this but he thought this was an area in which we could seek better relations. We both put too much of our work and talent into arms. In this field we must so act that we can make progress but with confidence in what we are doing. The President said that he wished to conclude as he had started by saying he was persuaded the peoples of both countries wanted peace, and opportunity to improve their cultural level and to raise their standard of living. This basic truth should guide us even when we disagree on some specific problem. He wished to thank Mr. Mikoyan for having come to visit us and if he had encountered bad manners anywhere on his trip he wished him to know that this did not express the attitude of the United States.

[Here follows discussion of Berlin and Germany printed in volume VIII, Document 137.]

Mikoyan said that the President had spoken of military expenditure and he could express full agreement with his remarks. Some of the American cabinet officers and particularly the Minister of Defense had said that the Soviet Union should reduce its arms and expenditures.<sup>4</sup> Mikoyan said that he had replied that this was what they wanted to do but if they did it unilaterally they were afraid the United States would continue to develop its position of strength.

The President interjected that this was what we both always said.

Mikoyan said that then we should both do it together. He pointed out that in the past three years the Soviets had made no increase in their military expenditures whereas the United States expenditures had been very high and Congress on occasion even increased the proposals made by the President which were already at a very high level.

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<sup>3</sup> For text of Eisenhower's letter to Bulganin, February 15, 1958, proposing, among other things, visits by prominent Soviet citizens to the United States, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 10, 1958, pp. 373-376.

<sup>4</sup> In his January 15 memorandum to the President, attached to the source text, Dulles mentioned that following his meetings with Mikoyan on January 16, he, Vice President Nixon, and other Cabinet members would have dinner with Mikoyan. It may be that the comments of Secretary of Defense McElroy and other Cabinet officials on armaments were made during this dinner.

[Here follows discussion of Germany printed in volume VIII, Document 137.]

Mikoyan said that he had been pleased when the President spoke about developing contacts. Some practical steps in this field had been taken and neither side had reason to be disappointed as reciprocity had been observed and both sides had been correct. With respect to students we should exchange not 100 but several hundred. It was true that the Soviet Union preferred to start with a smaller number and he could say frankly why they were so cautious. The Soviet Union was suspicious of the United States intelligence service although it was headed by a very pleasant man, the brother of the Secretary of State, whom he had met last evening. The Soviet Government suspected, although they might be wrong, that this exchange would be used for other purposes than study. If they were real students this was all right but if they were agents it is another matter.

The President interrupted to say that he would be very surprised if it were possible to take an 18 year old student and make an intelligence agent out of him.

Mikoyan said the outcome would depend upon the behavior of the students.

The President said we must develop a situation of confidence so that there would be no need for this feeling of secrecy.

Mikoyan said that Mr. Johnston had arranged an exchange of films and this was important because pictures influence people.

Secretary Dulles observed that certain films were not always helpful, such as crime pictures. Mikoyan replied that they did not make such films and would not take them from us. He said the Soviet films which they were supplying us contained virtually no propaganda and he hoped the President would see them.

[Here follow discussion of Berlin and Germany and concluding remarks printed in volume VIII, Document 137.]

65. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, January 19, 1959.

SUBJECT

Expansion of US-USSR Trade

PARTICIPANTS

Anastas R. Mikoyan—Deputy Premier of the USSR  
Mikhail A. Menshikov—Soviet Ambassador to the United States  
V. Smolyaichenko—Aide to Mr. Mikoyan  
Vladimir S. Alkhimov—Commercial Counselor, Soviet Embassy  
C. Douglas Dillon—Under Secretary for Economic Affairs  
Llewellyn E. Thompson—United States Ambassador to the USSR  
W. T. M. Beale—Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs  
Alexander Logofet—Language Services, Department of State (Interpreter)

Mr. Dillon: I am delighted to have this opportunity to discuss common problems of trade. We have always favored peaceful trade and an expansion of trade. This attitude is fundamental to our belief that trade is a very useful thing for every country. In particular, insofar as trade with the Soviet Union is concerned, we feel that there would be a special advantage in promoting greater understanding between our peoples which would lead to the relaxation of tensions. We believe that there would be greater value in the latter sense than in the economic sense. Statements made by the President at the meeting in Geneva were in that line and so it was only natural that he replied in the same vein to Mr. Khrushchev's letter<sup>1</sup> and hoped that there would be an expansion of trade. We have noted that in the past few years our trade has not been large and we have bought considerably more from the Soviet Union than you have bought from us. Some people have thought that export controls have made it difficult to buy here in the United States. But actually only about 10 percent of the items moving in international commerce are subject to embargo; the rest can be bought under permits and permits will be granted, so we feel that the way to increase this commerce is to start doing it. We have noticed the arrangement to buy steel which some of our companies recently completed in return for purchases of chrome. That was a fine arrangement. One thing puzzles us a little bit. It is fairly clear that most of the long list of items in Prime

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1183. Confidential. Drafted by Beale. A typed notation at the end of the source text reads: "Note: This memorandum is not a verbatim transcript but is based on detailed notes. In reporting Mr. Mikoyan's remarks the first person pronoun has been substituted for the third person pronoun used by the interpreter."

<sup>1</sup> See footnote 1, Document 64.

Minister Khrushchev's letter are available for purchase in the United States. On the other hand he mentioned items which he said the Soviet Union was ready to sell. Many of those we already produce ourselves or buy from others, so that the market for them can't be easily expanded. But perhaps there are some things, more technically advanced, that the Soviet Union has to offer. Our business firms might be interested in such items. We would be interested in knowing more about what those types of goods might be. One thing I think you realize, and that is our business is done by private companies. That is the only way trade can be carried on from the United States. Whether items are available therefore depends upon your negotiations with those private industries and businesses.

I noticed that one of the main things you indicated an interest in was the products of the chemical industry, such as plastics, synthetics, and so forth. Purchases of those products require negotiations with our chemical industry. From the information available to you, you should be aware that the past business relationships of our chemical industry with the Soviet Union have not been satisfactory. This is because in two or three instances they have arranged to make know-how available and to be paid royalties in return, but in none of these cases have those agreements been carried out. I am aware that the Soviet Union has reasons for being unable to complete those arrangements, but nevertheless the chemical industry feels that they have not been treated fairly. This is something that would have to be looked at very carefully and arrangements made for protecting patent rights, etc., of American producers.

I have noticed that some wonder has been expressed as to why an additional answer to Mr. Khrushchev's proposal has not yet been forthcoming from the State Department. We have prepared such a note<sup>2</sup> and it would have gone out but, unfortunately, there were political occurrences in the Far East and in Berlin<sup>3</sup> which, from the standpoint of public opinion, made it impossible to forward the type of response we would have liked to make. While we don't want to feel that political complications are tied into trade, nevertheless it is a fact that they go hand in hand. In a particular case having to do with the extension of credits, there is nothing to prevent normal business credits, that is credits up to six months. Such credits are available. As for other private credits, it is illegal to extend such credits under a law going back to 1934 which was not particularly directed against the Soviet Union but against the defaults of other countries.<sup>4</sup> It would require legislation to change this

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<sup>2</sup> Not found.

<sup>3</sup> References are presumably to the controversy over the Formosa Straits and the Berlin crisis.

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to the Johnson Act, enacted on April 13, 1934, which prohibited loans to debtor governments in default to the United States. (48 Stat. 574)

situation and certainly it would not be possible to undertake such legislation until we had reached agreement on lend-lease products which have not been discussed for some time.<sup>5</sup> I do not know why there have been no further conversations for several years, but the United States is prepared to entertain such conversations at any time the Soviet Union wishes to do so. I cannot think of any one thing that would have a better general effect on public understanding and would do more to advance the cause of expanded trade than a settlement of lend-lease. Now I have talked much too long, and it is your turn.

Mr. Mikoyan: I think you might have said more.

Mr. Dillon: I will answer any questions.

Mr. Mikoyan: When Mr. Dulles suggested that I talk with you, I had expected positive and constructive suggestions would be made. We have heard many sweet words but would expect more constructive ones. I have heard you and others make statements that the Soviet Union is carrying on trade for political reasons. I cannot agree. I am now convinced that the United States is carrying out such a policy. The United States has pursued that kind of policy because the answer had been protracted for eight months only because political occurrences have taken place. You are experienced enough to know that political matters do not decide trade matters although they affect them. There is one basic truth: that bad political relations do not contribute to expansion of trade. There is a second truth: that trade expansion does contribute to good political relations.

Mr. Dillon: I would agree with that.

Mr. Mikoyan: Then if you agree with that, we are for the Christian principle of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. That is the gist of the matter. You said that you buy more than we buy. Evidently you are convinced of this, but I think you are misinformed. I have heard such things being said and I have therefore asked to have something prepared. When making such a statement you take into account only commodities, but you do not take into account expenditures in dollars. The figures for 1957 completely refute what you have said. The export of goods to the United States from the Soviet Union is valued at \$16 million, whereas imports from the United States to the Soviet Union are valued at about \$10 million. Payments of the USSR to the United Nations are valued at \$6 million. So we pay dollars to the United States. Moreover, capital and interest on credits received after the war amount to \$7.6 million a year. So the total expenditure of the Soviet Union in dollars in the United

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<sup>5</sup> The lend-lease agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union was signed and entered into force on June 11, 1942. (11 Bevans 1281) Negotiations on a settlement of the agreement were suspended indefinitely in late August 1951.

States is \$23.6 million. The difference of \$7.6 million was covered by money we got by selling gold in other countries. These facts refute your thesis on these matters.

So far as the question as to the possibility of exports is concerned, you refer to goods you are producing yourselves or buying from other sources. We are not offering those. We are exporting goods valued at \$1.4 billion and those are the goods the United States is importing. Some hundreds of millions of dollars might be chosen to be imported into the United States considering the great expansion of our exports. The Soviet Union has increased its external trade with capitalist countries 3.3 times since [*between*] 1950 and 1957 inclusive.

The United States is no longer a capitalist country but is a semi-capitalist country. That conclusion speaks for the great possibilities existing in the Soviet Union for an increase in exports. The achievement of self-sufficiency and expansion of the economy in the Soviet Union presupposes an increase in foreign trade.

You refer to private companies and firms as deciding what foreign trade shall be carried on. This is true in a general way, but is not true so far as the Soviet Union is concerned. So far as the Soviet Union is concerned, they are tied hand and foot by the State Department. If the State Department did not interfere or if your legislation were repealed then we would have found a common language with those firms and would have reached agreement with them. After Mr. Roosevelt became the President there was a commercial agreement. This agreement was a simple one but it played a great role. Although you said that your policy does not determine foreign trade matters, still it was the United States Government that denounced the commercial agreement in 1951.<sup>6</sup> As a result we are placed in a state where we are discriminated against. So far as deliveries to the United States of those goods that the United States is not producing are concerned, after the commercial agreement was denounced new import duties were placed on some commodities from the Soviet Union. It may be that you lack concrete information, but judging from what you have said, you are well versed in these matters. As a result of the denunciation of the commercial agreement import duties on some goods are higher than duties on other goods. The duty on manganese ore is four times as high as before although it was a traditional item of trade. The duties on ferro-chrome and ferro-manganese are three times as high. These are strategic materials which add to your war potential, but we are not afraid to sell them. However, let us stick to the views that non-delivery would impede your armaments. I may even console you in the fact that the list which prohibits exports to the Soviet

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<sup>6</sup> See footnote 2, Document 64.

Union only helps us to produce in the Soviet Union and to supply other countries. Timber is a big export item for the Soviet Union, which is large in timber resources. But some import duties are four times as high as some other countries. The duties on birch plywood are three times as high, on tobacco two times as high, and on liquors, including vodka, four times as high. If you don't want to drink vodka, that's all right with me, but it is such a good drink that it seems improper to discriminate. You produce vodka in the United States and you call it by the Russian word "vodka" but you don't pay any royalties on a fixed percentage basis. You only count your claims against us, not ours against you. I therefore reserve the right to raise the question of patents for vodka in the United States.

Mr. Dillon: Unfortunately it is true, since you produce very good vodka. I know of one American firm that imports it in bulk and bottles it and, as I have found out for myself, it is very good.

Mr. Mikoyan: Why "unfortunately"?

Mr. Dillon: "Unfortunately" because we cannot make vodka as well as you can.

Mr. Mikoyan: It is interesting that you should feel that way.

Mr. Dillon: It is the psychology of friendly competition.

Mr. Mikoyan: What you proceed from is not friendly competition. One more point relating to Soviet furs. Soviet furs do not undermine capitalism. Indeed, they only make your beautiful ladies more beautiful, so they do not undermine your system. Your Congress has banned imports of furs since 1951 without reason. Seven kinds of Soviet furs have been banned but no reasons were stated. Presumably no reasons were given because it is expected that every fool will understand the reasons. But we do not consider ourselves in the category of fools and we can't understand it. Perhaps the reason is that your finance ministry had no other useful business to do. I do not mean your present finance minister, who is a pleasant fellow.

With reference to crabmeat, so far as I know Americans are fond of crabmeat. I have done my best to find why crabmeat imports are prohibited. It was stated that according to exact information available to the United States crabmeat was produced by Japanese prisoners of war or Soviet prisoners.<sup>7</sup> Evidently the minister of finance was a capable man to invent this. It is well known that our canned crabmeat is produced on

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<sup>7</sup>In briefing the press on the Mikoyan-Dillon interview, Dillon recalled that the United States uncovered evidence in 1951 that Soviet crabmeat was being processed by "slave labor," and the crabmeat was banned under Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930, which prohibited exports produced by "convict, forced and indentured labor." Dillon said this ban would continue until the Soviet Union supplied evidence that this labor was not indentured. (*The New York Times*, January 20, 1959)



floating factories. There has never been a single Japanese on those floating factories, and you cannot find a reasonable businessman who will be letting prisoners into his factory to work. There are many civil workers who can do that kind of a job. Last, but not least, we don't have a single Japanese prisoner of war. But the United States Government keeps out the goods. The same argument can be generally applied and then there will be no trade. You might declare that all workers in the Soviet Union are prisoners. Such decisions are not an ornament to your government. If I had revealed these facts on a television program, your people would have laughed at you. You speak in favor of expansion, but is it possible to trade under such circumstances? I expected when I came that you would make some suggestions for eliminating the obstacles existing since 1951.

So far as the claims of the chemical companies concerning disputable matters, there is some foundation for what you say, but your information is outdated. I have been informed on one problem connected with the DuPont Company. Although we had all the rights to insist on our position, nevertheless our economic organization is prepared to reach an agreement. So it should not be a long time before the dispute no longer exists. I have been informed that 17 oil and chemical firms had patent claims after the War. All claims disputes have been completely settled with 15 out of those 17. There is a difference of opinion with the two remaining firms so far as the sum of compensation is concerned. They didn't like the figures on the Soviet side but, instead of negotiating with us, they interrupted the negotiations. We are not responsible for that. Negotiations on sums is the usual thing in a business. Therefore, these kinds of disputes can't be considered real obstacles.

I don't want to go into this depth on an analysis of the list of goods which require permits. You are aware of many things that should be corrected in those lists if we are to develop trade. At one of the meetings I had with your businessmen, I quoted some of the items on the list and there was a great deal of laughter, not at us but at the State Department. It was not my purpose to cause laughter but to convince them that some reason should be applied. I don't know what steps businessmen contemplate should be taken, but they will get there. It is said that your State Department enjoys very great powers, in fact dictatorial powers as it is the fashion to say.

You have referred to chemical firms. They behave better with respect to our trade organizations and our importing organizations have been negotiating to place orders. Chemical firms agreed to accept orders for petrochemical plants but said they had to ask the State Department. Quite a period has elapsed but the firms have informed us that the State Department has neither refused nor taken a decision. This is a very flexible approach, very fine, not rough, there is lots of elegance in this.

So far as credits are concerned, you said that it is possible to get six months credits. I do not quite understand this. Is there an instruction or legislation that makes six months possible and seven months impossible? If you pass that rule on the way we repay our debts why does the rule affect six months credit and not seven months? Certainly six or seven months are of no practical importance. You also emphasize the Johnson Act.

Mr. Dillon: It is the same law.

Mr. Mikoyan: That is right. It is not directed especially against the Soviet Union. Incidentally, we were granted bigger credits by the United States in spite of the fact that we never stated our intention to repay the Czarist debts. Certainly Americans are reasonable enough not to expect us to pay the debts of the Czars. If you mean repaying Czarist debts, then that is another object of laughter. But under your present interpretation of law we are put in the category of those who are not exact payers. An idea has just struck me. We are making payments to you on our obligations. That is our 1945 credit. The entire sum with interest amounts to about \$300 million. We have actually paid more than \$60 million. Maybe it is necessary in order to support your statement that we have to stop paying interest and capital on this sum. If you stick to that, and your opinion evidently supports it, you have no right to make claims on us and we could save over a quarter of a billion dollars. Your idea is worth study but we consider ourselves accurate payers.

So far as lend-lease is concerned, in the lend-lease agreement it is not particularly stated that we are to pay. There is not a single word to that effect. The gist of the idea in that agreement is that if the efforts are compensated that would be enough for the United States. If we compare our efforts with yours we know that we bore the brunt of the burden of war. So we compensated by our sacrifices several times the efforts of the Americans. In his message of October 9, 1941 Mr. Roosevelt stated: "I solemnly declare to you that in the event the present war plans of Hitler are successfully carried into effect, we the Americans shall be impelled to carry on the same devastating war as he is now waging on the Russian front".<sup>8</sup> Mr. Acheson, in July 1942, said "Is it possible that you want to put on one side of the scale costs of tanks and ammunition and on the other side the cost of the lives of those who died in these tanks? What comparison is there between such costs and the lives of those people

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<sup>8</sup> Roosevelt made roughly this statement toward the end of his message of October 9, 1941, asking Congress to authorize the arming of merchant ships and to revise the Neutrality Act of 1939.

who perish in snow, etc., etc.?"<sup>9</sup> These quotations make quite clear the position in these matters. You should offer long-term credits to increase the orders that the Soviet Union might place in the United States, and you have promised that firms could make available six months credit. You have also suggested at the same time that we should settle the lend-lease. Evidently we must make payments to you. There is no mutual trade in this, just a one-way street. I draw the conclusion that for reasons of a political nature the cold war continues and you are not prepared to expand trade but to make statements only to console people. In spite of the friendly expressions you have used and the quiet, business-like way you have talked, I am still disappointed. As a matter of fact, as we are not carrying on negotiations I do not see that there is something the United States is willing to do. Let us, therefore, wait until better times. Perhaps they will come.

Mr. Dillon: Thank you, Mr. Minister, for your full explanation which has been very revealing. As regards the use of trade for political purposes, I have not mentioned that subject in talking with you. There have been statements made publicly in which I have referred particularly to the action of your Chinese friends in cutting off trade with Japan, which they admitted was done for political reasons.

Mr. Mikoyan: But you told untruths when you referred to Soviet-Yugoslav trade. It is not true. We have not stopped trade. It is at the same level as before. But you evidently needed to make that statement.

Mr. Dillon: I'm glad to hear that the actions of the Soviet Union toward Yugoslavia and Finland have no political motivation. Many people have thought otherwise.

Mr. Mikoyan: We did not pursue the purpose of developing trade. We have deferred payments but trade has continued.

Mr. Dillon: However, the subject does not have much to do with what we are talking about. You mentioned that popular opinion is important; that political events do affect public opinion; and that political events affect trade. Two events, the abrogation of the trade agreement and legislation concerning furs,<sup>10</sup> were both the result of action of Congress and were not the result of suggestions by the Executive Branch.

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<sup>9</sup> Notes are not exact for this quotation. [Footnote in the source text. Reference may be to a speech given by Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson at the Institute of Public Affairs, University of Virginia, on July 6, 1946. For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 11, 1942, p. 616.]

<sup>10</sup> Section 11 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951 required the President to prevent the importation of ermine, fox, kolinsky, marten, mink, muskrat, and weasel furs, dressed or undressed, produced in the Soviet Union or Communist China. For text of section 11 and President Truman's proclamation implementing it, see *ibid.*, August 20, 1951, p. 291.

Mr. Mikoyan: When then shouldn't you make a suggestion to Congress that these be corrected?

Mr. Dillon: Such a suggestion would be possible, but it is a question whether it would be useful until Congress is ready to act, and Congress is responsive to public opinion. Therefore, it couldn't happen until relations are better than they are now.

Mr. Mikoyan: I don't think I am wrong in my impressions from businessmen that they seem to be in favor of an expansion of trade.

Mr. Dillon: You are in favor, and we feel that trade can be expanded in many items. You gave me a long list of items on which our tariffs are higher against Soviet products. I could make one equally long in which there is no tariff difference and in which there could be an expansion of trade, for example, chrome ore. But surely you would not feel that we should stop buying these products from the underdeveloped countries, that we should stop such trade and immediately switch the business to you.

Mr. Mikoyan: I don't demand that. But your requirements are growing; or are they not?

Mr. Dillon: Yes, and possibly an expansion could take place through growth.

You mention difficulties in getting permits. If you take the figures for the past year, out of \$22 million for which export permits were asked by various companies, only \$3.5 million were not granted. So the great majority are granted.

Mr. Mikoyan: I would like to know what the sum is for those petrochemical requirements that are under consideration. That is another matter.

Mr. Dillon: They don't add up to any particular sum because most of the permits under consideration are for engineering and technical services. These are subcontracted out and they say that they don't know just how big these are.

Mr. Mikoyan: The sum of this category will be bigger.

Mr. Dillon: You should not feel that these will not be granted as no decision has yet been reached on these items.

Mr. Mikoyan: It may happen that there will be no need for permits since we shall either produce these things or buy them somewhere else. This delay is in fact a form of refusal.

Mr. Dillon: Regarding crabmeat, imports are embargoed under law which goes back to 1930. The law does not apply only to the Soviet Union and we are ready to consider its removal and allow the entry of crabmeat if you will allow the Treasury Department to obtain the necessary information to be sure that the conditions existing in 1951 do not exist any more.

Mr. Mikoyan: You haven't got the data to prove your conclusions. You would evidently like to send controllers to be placed at each floating factory. We are fond of crabmeat ourselves and will keep it.

Mr. Dillon: You might talk further with Ambassador Thompson about this and something might be done.

We are glad to hear your figures on trade balance for 1957. Our figures show that exports are valued at \$4.5 million, while our figure for imports is very close to the figure you used. I am surprised to hear that you consider that United Nations expenditures are part of trade with the United States.

Mr. Mikoyan: It is a matter of the balance of payments in dollars. We have to sell in the UN countries in order to get dollars. How would we get them otherwise?

Mr. Dillon: Can't you pay in gold?

Mr. Mikoyan: If Hammarskjöld<sup>11</sup> were sitting in Moscow, you would have to pay him.

Mr. Dillon: We would pay in gold.

Mr. Mikoyan: We do not want your gold.

Mr. Dillon: Regarding the Johnson Act, the law provides that there can be no loans. The Attorney General has ruled that ordinary commercial credits, that is up to 180 days, are *not* loans.

As for lend-lease, as you know we have reached accords with all other countries. We don't ask for anything they acquired during the course of the fighting. All we are asking for is settlement of civilian items delivered after lend-lease trade had ended.

Mr. Mikoyan: You might be mistaken in your facts. After the war ended America stopped deliveries with only one day's notice. The civil supplies affected after that valued at \$210 million were continued under credit arrangements.

Mr. Dillon: Our figures are based on the date on which we considered that lend-lease was over. We do feel that there is an obligation on the Soviet Union for an undetermined amount. This to be paid over a period of time. We do feel that it should be honored as a valid obligation. Regarding your suggestion concerning a possibility of ceasing payments on your post-war debt, we would regret such action, but it would have the effect of making it perfectly clear that the Soviet Union does not always honor its obligations.

Mr. Mikoyan: I don't understand.

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<sup>11</sup> Dag Hammarskjöld, Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Mr. Dillon: What I said was that Mr. Mikoyan had said that the Soviet Union might not honor the obligations under the credit and that we would regret that but it would have the effect of making it perfectly clear that the Soviet Union does not always honor its obligations.

Mr. Mikoyan: There was no such intention on the part of the Soviet Government. The idea just came to me personally in connection with your statement that we are not accurate payers.

Mr. Dillon: I never said that the Soviet Union was not accurate payers but merely that we couldn't proceed with other obligations until settlement under the lend-lease had been made.

You mentioned items under export control which you considered foolish. We are aware of the items you mentioned to American business people as being under control. The facts are that they are not under control. We didn't want to take issue publicly with what you said, but you were misinformed.

Mr. Mikoyan: We are not going to weaken your strategic position.

Mr. Dillon: We do feel very seriously that there is a great deal of room for a substantial increase in trade and, as the President said in his letter to Prime Minister Khrushchev, all that is necessary is to make contact with private people. If there is no such effort on your part we can regretfully draw the same conclusions that you have drawn, but in reverse, that the Soviet Union is not really interested in expanding trade but merely sends us letters for political purposes. We would hope that times would become better and that we would be able to reach a point where trade can expand because it would be a useful thing.

Mr. Mikoyan: In order quickly to place big orders one has to have credits. In reply to that suggestion you say pay for lend-lease. What kind of trade is that?

Mr. Dillon: Lend-lease must be settled before any credits can be extended in large amounts. Nevertheless, we can increase our trade without large, long-term credits and such an increase would be useful.

Mr. Mikoyan: Well, without repealing some of those laws, there would be some expansion but not a big expansion of trade. Concerning lend-lease I ask you to think over the sacrifices that the Soviet people had to make, the destruction of war and the millions that perished. And then put on the scale the expenditures you went into during the war. You should also consider the outcome—that is, the defeat of Hitler.

Mr. Dillon: The Soviet Union has never until now said that it was not prepared to settle lend-lease. In the past it has made concrete offers and only the exact amount has been in dispute. I am surprised at the Minister's position that the Soviet Union is not prepared to make any payment at all. This is certainly a change in the Soviet position.

Mr. Mikoyan: We are not obliged to pay anything on lend-lease. We want to trade. But first you must give us credit so that we can start. If you can't make credit available, then we must do without trade. Our plans don't take into account credits, but if you give us credits we can make changes in our plans.

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## 66. Memorandum of Visit

Washington, January 19, 1959, 3 p.m.

### PRESENT

Secretary Strauss  
Mr. Mikoyan  
U.S. Ambassador Lacy Thompson  
Russian Ambassador Menshikov  
Interpreter  
Commercial Attaché—Russian Embassy  
Under Secretary Mueller  
Acting Assistant Secretary Marshall Smith

Mr. Mikoyan remarked again that he was getting used to the photographers in this country.

The first matter brought up was about our highways. Mr. Mikoyan was greatly impressed by the multiplicity of good roads. Secretary Strauss thanked him for the "advertisement" inasmuch as the road program is under the general direction of the Department of Commerce. They fear that it will be a long time before Russia can catch up with us in the development of such a road system. While they have paved highways connecting Warsaw and Moscow and many of the principal capitals of the satellite countries they have a great lack of highways throughout their nation serving the smaller communities. There are some roads in Siberia but they are very primitive.

Mr. Mikoyan remarked that it is high time we get more closely together and agree to cooperate on all matters of mutual interest to ourselves and to them.

Secretary Strauss remarked that 38 years ago when he was associated with former President Hoover in relief work he had been of some assistance in helping Russia during a period of great famine. Secretary Strauss mentioned that he would like to go to Russia sometime and was assured of a hearty welcome. As a matter of fact, Mr. Mikoyan said he would be pleased to have him as his personal guest.

Mr. Mikoyan was asked if the newspaper people, especially at the press conference this noon, bothered him. He said especially on "Meet the Press"<sup>1</sup> he felt like losing his temper. He said he was not afraid of sharp questions but he could and would bite back. He stated they did not give him sufficient time to answer questions. He brought up the point that in the Middle Ages, when fighting duels, no honorable man would attack when an adversary was not ready. If done, the violator lost honor and was not accepted even by his own associates. Such a man often committed suicide.

Secretary Strauss mentioned that we have become used to the press in this country—that Mr. Mikoyan provided them with a number of headlines during his trip in this country. It was apparent that Mr. Mikoyan was somewhat annoyed at the lack of time given him to answer some of the questions, especially at the National Press Club. He said the president of the club made a speech of considerable length and then he was short of time for his answers.

He is not particularly enamored of former President Truman. He feels that Truman's policies, both at the time of his incumbency and since, have not helped our two countries ability to get together and that his recent comments in the press would not help the situation.<sup>2</sup>

When asked if he felt he accomplished what he came for the answer was in the affirmative. While he said that he had no practical purpose for making the trip but merely to exchange opinions and try to feel out the pulse of this country, the results that he has achieved are beyond his expectations.

Secretary Strauss asked why 7 year periods were taken instead of 5 or 9. The answer was that while 5 year periods have usually been taken, they felt that in these changing times and conditions 7 years was a better length of time to accomplish their program. For instance, he mentioned that they had previously emphasized coal production, but in the last two years they have begun to develop their natural gas potential—gas

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<sup>1</sup> For the transcript of the interview with Mikoyan on "Meet the Press," an NBC television news program, on Sunday, January 18, see *The New York Times*, January 19, 1959.

<sup>2</sup> Truman's "recent comments in the press" may be his two syndicated articles that criticized Soviet policy on Berlin as well as U.S. "diplomatic tourists" to the Soviet Union and U.S. hosts to Soviet visitors like Mikoyan for their eagerness in soliciting the attention of Soviet leaders. (*Ibid.*, December 1, 1958 and January 19, 1959)



being more efficient than coal. They have postponed their hydro-electric stations, mainly to save capital and to utilize their capital for power stations where power would be most efficiently and cheaply developed.

While they have atomic power plants, the efficiency of such plants is very low compared to thermal plants. Secretary Strauss asked if he could tell us the percentage efficiency difference between atomic power development and that from thermal type, but Mr. Mikoyan could not give an exact percentage except to say it was much less efficient and required more investment and therefore costs considerably higher. Further development in this area is mainly experimental.

When asked if their natural gas had a helium content the answer was in the affirmative "in a small degree". This was not followed up and cannot be assured as to its veracity because of the somewhat hesitant manner in which the answer was given.

Secretary Strauss mentioned that over the portals of the Department of Commerce building is a quotation from Benjamin Franklin, approximately "fair and equitable trade between nations is our goal". He stated he hoped that this could be accomplished between our countries and Mr. Mikoyan said he was of the same opinion.

Russian economic development, he stated, has to be at a much slower pace than they had hoped to achieve because they have so many areas to develop that it is a difficult problem.

He stated that in talking with Mr. Dillon this morning<sup>3</sup> he felt that he did not accomplish a great deal—that he was somewhat hurt at Dillon's adamant attitude and that it "smells of cold war". He stated that diplomats, and he does not claim to be one, are very cold in their attitude and spend a lot of time "beating about the bush".

Secretary Strauss stated that the Patent Office is a part of the Department of Commerce and how our patent system has proven to be the bulwark of our whole industrial development. The patent system is an incentive to scientists and assures them of a reward for their initiative and ideas for a reasonable time. He stated that if Russians can take our inventions, without adequate compensation, it is unfair whether it is done directly or indirectly. Mr. Mikoyan stated that something must be worked out and claims not to be informed on this particular situation. He knows that there are contracts in which licenses to use processes are agreed upon and for which payment is made. Secretary Strauss emphasized that he was not talking as much about that but had reference to the copying [of] individual items or procedures without any license. Again, Mr. Mikoyan stated that this must be worked out, but had never been

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 65.

called to his attention. He could not assure us of a change of attitude in this area as he doesn't know.

His attention was called to the international conference regarding patents,<sup>4</sup> which he had heard about and should be further studied. He feels that all obstacles to normal trade should be eliminated and that "fair and equitable" should be put into effect.

Secretary Strauss stated that there was a large list of items on which there were no restrictions as to purchase and that it was only strategic items to which we denied them access. He was rather amused that newspapers quoted Mr. Mikoyan as saying they could not even buy toothpaste in this country, but it was denied that such a statement had been made. He did say, however, they were perfectly willing for them to buy laxatives and other items of this character that were rather ridiculous. He was assured there had been a rather substantial increase in available items and that there was a large list available to them. As a matter of fact we buy much more from Russia than we sell them even though the total foreign trade between the two countries is insignificant. In 1957 they sold us \$16 million dollars worth of goods and bought \$10 million, however, they claim they paid United Nations \$6 million which, they feel, came to this country, and also paid \$7-1/2 million for obligations incurred at the end of World War II.

They are particularly disturbed about restriction on importation of furs to this country<sup>5</sup> and also the high duty on manganese. They stated that since 1950 the trade with other capitalist countries had increased three times, while the trade with the United States had even declined. Mr. Mikoyan said, "let us work together to eliminate this distrust".

He asked Secretary Strauss whether employees in the Department of Commerce heeded his "commands". Secretary Strauss stated he did not issue commands. He also said that in a democracy only in the military were commands used, but he could assure Mr. Mikoyan that everyone in the Department is in accord with policies as enunciated by him.

The Secretary presented Mr. Mikoyan with a copy of "Washington's Farewell Address" in which he had marked a specific part—this was covered in the press release just issued.<sup>6</sup>

An interesting discussion was had on the difference between our religious backgrounds and beliefs, and that of an atheistic country like

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<sup>4</sup> Reference is to the Diplomatic Conference for the Revision of the International Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, which convened at Lisbon, Portugal, on October 6, 1958.

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 10, Document 65.

<sup>6</sup> Not found.

Russia. The answer was “we do not believe in God but in morality, but let us not discuss whose morality is the highest”.

Secretary Strauss said it is the American’s belief religion is much more than morality. Mr. Mikoyan brought out that a number of them lost sons in the war who had given their lives for their country. Secretary Strauss stated that love of country is not religion—that while an admirable motive we did not confuse it with religion. Mr. Mikoyan stated that “equality” and “brotherhood of man” was their religion, and again Secretary Strauss stated that this is not our belief. Mr. Mikoyan mentioned that for thousands of years our religion has taught the brotherhood of man but that it still has not been accomplished.

They stated that they will fulfill contracts—how could they continue on and have confidence of their people without keeping their contracts. Mr. Mikoyan claims they have kept their obligations to a tee—not naming them. He would like to see a warmer climate between our two countries.

He presented the Secretary with a present which the Secretary graciously accepted.

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**67. Memorandum of Discussion at the 394th Meeting of the National Security Council**

Washington, January 22, 1959.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda item 1.]

**2. *Visit of Deputy Prime Minister Mikoyan to the United States***

Secretary Dulles stated his doubt whether it was worthwhile to take up much of the Council’s time with an account of Mikoyan’s visit to this country. If the members of the Council had read the newspapers carefully they would know as much about the Mikoyan visit as anyone else.

There was, however, continued Secretary Dulles, one curious and difficult matter to explain about the visit. That is what happened on

Mikoyan's last day in Washington and what occurred particularly in his conversation with Under Secretary of State Dillon.<sup>1</sup> On this latter occasion Mikoyan had violently denounced Dillon's proposals for a gradual improvement in trade relations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Indeed, he went on to make of Mr. Dillon far-reaching demands which he must have known would have to be refused. These included the granting of U.S. credits to the U.S.S.R., treatment of the U.S.S.R. in the context of the Most Favored Nation, and removal of all obstacles to trade in strategic materials. Thereafter, when he left this country Mikoyan accused us of carrying on the Cold War. These maneuvers all seemed to have been contrived and they were extremely difficult to reconcile with Mikoyan's earlier efforts to *appear* to be conciliatory. On Friday, a day on which Secretary Dulles said he had spent most of his time with Mikoyan, the question of U.S. credits to the U.S.S.R. for trade purposes was not even mentioned, although apparently Mikoyan mentioned this matter briefly to the President.<sup>2</sup> Accordingly, it seemed to Secretary Dulles that these maneuvers were deliberately contrived for a purpose.

With respect to the world situation in general, Mikoyan had contented himself with putting on a very spirited defense of all the existing U.S.S.R. positions. One could detect no change or weakening in any respect except perhaps that Mikoyan had asked for talks on Germany which would be limited to two subjects: namely, Berlin and a German Peace Treaty. To this proposal we had replied that in any talks on Germany it would be impossible to isolate these two issues and that such matters as German unification and European security could not be excluded from these conversations. Also we underlined our refusal to meet with the Soviet Union under the latter's dictation as to the agenda topics. The fact that Mikoyan did not reject out of hand this response of ours may perhaps portend some slight concession. Otherwise, there was no weakening whatsoever in the well-known general Soviet position. In fact, said Secretary Dulles, he did not anticipate any significant change in the Soviet position until we had come closer to the end of the six months period at which point the Soviets had threatened to turn over their responsibilities in Berlin to the East German regime.

Mr. Allen Dulles expressed the thought that Mikoyan's ploy on his last day in the U.S. might have been motivated by a desire to provide himself with a thesis for the report which he would make to the Party Congress in Moscow next week. The events of the last day could provide Mikoyan with material for a blast against the U.S. on grounds of our refusal to increase our trade with the Soviet Union. Khrushchev

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<sup>1</sup> See Document 65.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 64.

may well be worried about the possibility of too great a relaxation of tensions and Mikoyan could help meet his anxiety with such a blast against the U.S.

*The National Security Council:*<sup>3</sup>

Noted and discussed the policy implications of the subject visit in the light of an oral report by the Secretary of State.

[Here follow the remaining agenda items.]

**S. Everett Gleason**

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<sup>3</sup>The paragraph that follows constitutes NSC Action No. 2038, approved by the President on January 23. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

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## 68. Editorial Note

The 21st Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union met in Moscow January 27–February 5, 1959. The Congress was attended by more than 1,200 delegates from the Soviet Union and delegations from some 70 other Communist nations. The focus of the congress was on the long opening speech on January 27 by Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers, on the Seven-Year Plan (1959–1965) of economic development and on other aspects of Soviet domestic and foreign policies. For complete text of this speech, see *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, February 18, 1959, pages 12–19, February 25, 1959, pages 3–10, March 4, 1959, pages 17–25, and March 11, 1959, pages 13–20. Regarding the evaluation of Director of Central Intelligence Allen W. Dulles of this speech, see Document 69. A summary and analysis of Khrushchev's speech is contained in Intelligence Report No. 7942, "Foreign Policy Implications of Khrushchev's Report to the XXI CPSU Congress" which the Division of Research and Analysis for the USSR and Eastern Europe, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, prepared on February 5. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, OSS–INR Reports)

Other speakers at the congress reiterated Khrushchev's emphasis on overtaking and outstripping the West in per capita output in key

kinds of production by the end of the Five-Year Plan and on assuming by about 1970 first place in the world in both absolute and per capita production. They, like Khrushchev, emphasized a foreign policy based on the Leninist principle of "peaceful coexistence" and an end to the cold war but also predicted that increased Communist strength relative to the non-Communist world would result in more assertive policies toward the West. For the condensed texts of many speeches given at the congress, see *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, March 11–June 3, 1959, inclusive.

Khrushchev's concluding remarks to the congress on February 5, which reiterated many of the same themes, are printed *ibid.*, June 10, 1959, pages 23–30. For complete text of the Seven-Year Plan Goals adopted by the congress, see *ibid.*, April 1, 1959, pages 3–30.

A summary and analysis of the entire congress, prepared by the Division of Research and Analysis for USSR and Eastern Europe, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, is printed in "The Twenty-First CPSU Congress," *Soviet Affairs*, February 1959, pages 26–33.

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## 69. Memorandum of Discussion at the 395th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, January 29, 1959.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda item 1.]

### 2. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security

The Director of Central Intelligence dealt first with Khrushchev's six hour speech at the 21st Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union which had opened in Moscow last Tuesday.<sup>1</sup> He pointed out that representatives of some seventy Communist Parties in different countries of the world would be attending the Congress. Even the American Communist Party was represented. Undoubtedly, the Congress would plan various programs for the subversion of the Free World as they usually did at such meetings. The Congress was now about to go into Executive Session.

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on January 29.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 68.

Khrushchev's speech, continued Mr. Allen Dulles, revealed no notable change in the earlier forecast of the economic goals of the new 7-Year Plan. Thus the speech was essentially a propaganda ploy for the new 7-Year Plan. Wide claims were made by Khrushchev for the Plan. He predicted among other things that the U.S.S.R. would surpass the U.S. in per capita production by 1970, a claim which Mr. Dulles believed impossible to realize.

After a brief discussion of the figures presented by Khrushchev, Mr. Dulles went on to point out the claim by Khrushchev that the realization of the objectives of the 7-Year Plan would provide the Communist Bloc with a decisive edge over the Free World by 1970. Also notable was Khrushchev's statement on ICBM's. After considerable study, Mr. Dulles said that the most careful translation indicated that Khrushchev had stated that "serialized production of ICBM's has been organized". If this were an accurate translation, Mr. Dulles indicated that it fitted well with our U.S. intelligence estimates which have assumed that ICBM's would be coming off the production line in small numbers this Calendar Year.<sup>2</sup> Khrushchev's statement did not indicate that Soviet production of ICBM's was ahead of our estimates.

[Here follow discussion of unrelated subjects and the remaining agenda items.]

**S. Everett Gleason**

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<sup>2</sup> An intelligence estimate [*document number and title not declassified*], August 19, 1958, concluded: "The USSR will probably have a first operational capability with ten prototype ICBMs at some time during calendar year 1959." (Department of State, INR-NIE Files) Another intelligence estimate [*document number and title not declassified*], December 23, 1958, concluded: "we continue to estimate that the USSR will probably achieve a first operational capability with 10 prototype ICBMs at some time during the year 1959." (*Ibid.*)

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## 70. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, February 12, 1959.

At a meeting held after NSC today, attended by Secretary McElroy, Secretary Quarles and General Twining, Mr. McElroy brought up the question of aerial reconnaissance over the USSR. He pointed out that in

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, Intelligence Matters. Top Secret. Prepared by John S. D. Eisenhower.

the recent Congressional investigations he had been successful in blunting much of the attack on the U.S. posture relative to ICBMs.<sup>1</sup> However, the Congress was continually concerned over the basic premises employed by the Department of Defense, that is, our intelligence estimates. He pointed out that we know the location of no launching platforms within the USSR. He therefore requested the President to consider the matter of additional overflights of the USSR, citing the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that our planes will not be shot down. General Twining reinforced this request by stating that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would certainly like more information. Mr. McElroy would like to obtain permission to do some planning with State and CIA.

The President mentioned the project to build a more advanced plane to replace the U-2, which he thinks is coming along nicely. He feels that our activity along these lines should be held to a minimum pending the availability of this new equipment. To this Mr. Quarles pointed out that the new equipment will not be available for eighteen months to two years. This argument did not appear to sway the President, however, in that he discounts the capability of the Soviets to build many launching sites within a year. This he bases on the corresponding construction capability within the U.S., observing that we generally overestimate the capability of the USSR to outperform us. He reviewed the controversy of two years ago over the number of Bisons and Bears available to the Soviets. As it turned out, the threat from these aircraft has been far less than had been initially estimated.<sup>2</sup> The President conceded the great advantage held by Mr. Khrushchev over himself, accruing from the dictatorial methods which Mr. Khrushchev is able to follow.

The President is reserved on the request to continue reconnaissance flights on the basis that it is undue provocation. Nothing, he says, would make him request authority to declare war more quickly than violation of our air space by Soviet aircraft. He stated that while one or two flights might possibly be permissible he is against an extensive program. A brief discussion followed with respect to the role of reconnaissance satellites. It was agreed that the satellite, since it does not violate air space, cannot be considered in the same light as reconnaissance aircraft. It was

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<sup>1</sup> McElroy may be referring to his briefing in closed session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 16 on the U.S. defense posture, printed in *Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series)*, 1959, vol. XI, pp. 17-53.

<sup>2</sup> At his news conference on February 26, 1957, Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson revised downward the estimate of Soviet operational bomber strength and said the B-52 heavy bomber was superior to the Russian Bison, with which it had been compared. (*The New York Times*, February 27, 1957)



agreed that the satellite represents the greatest future in this reconnaissance area.

At this time General Goodpaster pointed out that an aerial reconnaissance mission in the North had been considered and approved, but had not been flown as the result of unfavorable sun angle and unfavorable weather. This cannot be implemented until March. It is rated No. 1 priority. However, after this delay, a new consideration will be necessary. General Twining agreed that the area of the USSR to be covered by this planned reconnaissance mission in the north is extremely important. (As a side issue, the President pointed out that we will at least learn from the next reconnaissance flight whether the Soviets have an adequate surface-to-air missile at that time. General Twining pointed out that the Soviets have never fired a missile at one of our reconnaissance aircraft.)

In closing, Mr. Quarles noted that there are [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] flights scheduled for the calendar year 1959. These will be cleared on a case-by-case basis with the President. This was agreeable to the President.

As the group was leaving, the President pointed out the close relationship between these reconnaissance programs and the crisis which is impending over Berlin. As May 27th approaches,<sup>3</sup> the President believes it would be most unwise to have world tensions exacerbated by our pursuit of a program of extensive reconnaissance flights over the territory of the Soviet Union.<sup>4</sup>

**John S.D. Eisenhower**

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<sup>3</sup>The Soviet note of November 27, 1958, set a deadline of 6 months, or May 27, 1959, for acceptance by the Western powers of its proposal for the conversion of West Berlin into a "free city." For text of the Soviet note, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 19, 1958, pp. 81–89.

<sup>4</sup>In a memorandum for the record, March 4, Goodpaster noted that at the President's request he "advised General Twining that the President has decided to disapprove any additional special flights by the U-2 unit in the presently abnormally tense circumstances." (Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, Intelligence Matters)

**71. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State**

Moscow, March 10, 1959, 3 p.m.

1780. In conversation with Kozlov and Kuzmin<sup>1</sup> at Iraqi reception yesterday latter said he could not understand failure of US businessmen take advantage of opportunities trade with Soviet Union. Said Sov Union prepared sign contracts for deliveries over period up to ten years on basis normal commercial credits and if necessary deposit guaranties in Swiss bank. Said Sov Union would be interested not only in means of production but also consumer goods. He mentioned particular interest in textile mills, railroad cars, pipe, and in fact almost anything we wanted to sell. When I inquired what he meant by normal commercial credits he replied "around 3 percent". When I explained I was thinking of length of credits he mentioned 6 or 7 years. I replied that situation had been explained to Mikoyan and said frankly that Mikoyan's statement that Sov Union had no obligation settle lend-lease had made very bad impression.<sup>2</sup> Kozlov denied that Mikoyan had made this exact statement but admitted this was its general tenor. Said "give us credits and we will settle lend-lease account". I thought first step should be to settle some political questions and create proper atmosphere. Kuzmin replied he was not interested in political questions but business deals and said number of Western countries even including West Germany willing extend credits to Sov Union. Said he had recently signed contracts for delivery number of sugar mills but did not specify supplier.

**Thompson**

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 411.6141/3-1059. Confidential.

<sup>1</sup> Iosef Iosifovich Kuzmin, Deputy Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers and Chairman of the Soviet State Planning Commission (Gosplan).

<sup>2</sup> See Document 65.

## 72. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, April 7, 1959.

### OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary McElroy  
Mr. Bissell  
General Goodpaster

The President said he had asked Mr. McElroy and Mr. Bissell to come in to tell them that he had decided not to go ahead with certain reconnaissance flights for which he had given tentative approval the preceding day.<sup>1</sup> He said he wanted to give them his thinking. First, we now have the power to destroy the Soviets without need for detailed targeting. Second, as the world is going now, there seems no hope for the future unless we can make some progress in negotiation (it is already four years since the Geneva meeting).<sup>2</sup> Third, we cannot in the present circumstances afford the revulsion of world opinion against the United States that might occur—the U.S. being the only nation that could conduct this activity. Fourth, we are putting several hundred million dollars into programs for more advanced capabilities.

In summary, the President said he did not agree that this project would be worth the political costs.

He added that he had called Secretary Dulles who had taken the view that if the planned action were in the east he would see no objection but in the north and south of their sector he would not do it. Mr. Dulles had added that if the current negotiations fail, we must at once get the most accurate information possible.<sup>3</sup>

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, Intelligence Matters. Top Secret. Prepared by Goodpaster on April 11.

<sup>1</sup> A memorandum of conversation among the President, Allen Dulles, and others on April 3 noted the President's "considerable reservations" on the advisability of approving Allen Dulles' proposal [*text not declassified*]. The President concluded that "he is not happy with the idea of overflights at this time, but he said that he would discuss the matter in detail with Secretary Herter." (*Ibid.*) No record of Eisenhower's conversation with Herter on this matter has been found. It was probably the proposed flights discussed at the April 3 meeting that Eisenhower had tentatively approved on April 6.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to the Geneva summit meeting in July 1955.

<sup>3</sup> According to a memorandum of a telephone conversation between the President and Herter, April 7 at 10:10 a.m., the President informed Herter of his reversal of his decision on the overflights and that he had talked with Secretary Dulles who approved his reversal. According to a memorandum of a telephone conversation between General Cabell and Herter, at 10:40 a.m., Cabell said that he "had just talked to Allen Dulles who had a call from JFD who was somewhat distressed and quite concerned that he had given the word he had to the President." (Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations)

The President said he agreed on the need for information. This need is highlighted by the distortions several senators are making of our military position relative to that of the Soviets, and they are helped in their "demagoguery" by our uncertainties as to Soviet programs. He was concerned over the terrible propaganda impact that would be occasioned if a reconnaissance plane were to fail. He added that there is some evidence that the Soviets really want a Summit Meeting. The President himself feels that there is need to make some kind of progress at the summit, even though we cannot be sure that this is possible. There are, however, some straws in the wind indicating the prospect is not wholly hopeless. He told the group that if at a later time they think the situation has changed, or if a crisis or emergency occurs, or new equipment becomes available, they could raise the matter with him again.

Mr. McElroy said it is far easier for Cabinet officers to recommend this activity than for the President to authorize it, and that he accepted the President's decision very willingly. Mr. McElroy added that currently the Soviet long-range Air Force, which is of very limited size, is the threat. Later, if we do not have solid information, we will have to put our forces on air alert. In addition, there is a need to base our missile program on the hardest possible information regarding the Soviet program.

Earlier the President had discussed this matter at length with me. In response to his request for my advice, I analyzed the proposal as to the importance of possible costs and possible gains, and indicated I would be disposed to favor the two particular actions proposed. I added that, while I had confidence in my analysis of the costs and gains, I felt less sure of the evaluation of their relative importance and would readily defer to the President's own assessment in this respect.

G.  
*Brigadier General, USA*

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**73. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State**

Moscow, May 4, 1959, 2 p.m.

2180. I saw Khrushchev at 11:30 this morning. In order that he not have opportunity to interrupt or refuse to hear my representations I had prepared Russian translation of aide-mémoire which I handed him and

which he read carefully.<sup>1</sup> He then stated that in their notes on this subject they had already given us an exhaustive explanation of points raised in aide-mémoire. They had not shot down this plane. Whenever they did shoot down one of our planes they said so. Nothing of the sort happened in this case. They had merely found remains of plane which had apparently crashed. Six bodies that had been found were returned to US. He had read in Western press about British plane which was lost in this area and was suspected of having come down in Sov Union.<sup>2</sup> He had been happy to learn it had crashed elsewhere. The two cases were similar. He then cited a number of other cases of airplane accidents including a Sov plane which had preceded him on a flight to Siberia several years ago. Although remains of plane had been found they were never able to locate pilot. He was aware of our alleged report of conversations of Sov pilots. This sort of thing was done in films and we were doubtless very good at it. He asked me to inform President he could not help in any way despite his wish to do so. He then asked in whose interest it was for US to make this move at this time just before FM meeting.<sup>3</sup> Was our objective to split relations between the two countries and stir up public opinion? He did not think this was in our mutual interests. It was best not to fly over their territory. He said a short time ago there had been a case in Far East but their planes did not go up because our plane was over their territory only for short time. However in cases like this accidents could happen. Their fighter planes were stationed to guard their frontiers and it could lead to accidents if our planes crossed their frontiers without permission.

He thought our military people were well disciplined and it therefore seemed that our government must know about these incursions. Apparently they were for reconnaissance to ascertain information re Soviet radar. This could not help good relations. I had spoken of 11 missing men but they knew nothing about them. Perhaps they had parachuted out but he did not know if they had parachutes. Sovs did not fly over our territory and did not think we should fly over theirs. Referring to statements in aide-mémoire about shooting down plane he repeated that had not happened.

I pointed out we had evidence in form of conversations of Sov fighter pilots which proved that plane had been shot down. I could assure him this evidence had not been manufactured and we had offered to make it available to Sov authorities and that offer still stood.

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<sup>1</sup> Reference is to an aide-mémoire on the C-130 airplane that crashed in the Soviet Union on September 2, 1958; see Document 55.

<sup>2</sup> Not further identified.

<sup>3</sup> Documentation on the Foreign Ministers Meeting in Geneva May 11–August 5 is in volume VIII.

I emphasized that plane had not deliberately crossed frontier and he must realize we would not send such slow plane on deliberate mission to fly over Sov territory. I said I wished particularly to emphasize we were not pursuing this matter with any objective of worsening relations. There were 13 families who did not know whether their sons were living or dead and apart from our own desires he should realize pressure these families are naturally bringing upon govt to ascertain fate their sons. As evidence our desire not worsen relations but on contrary improve them I cited impending visit of VP.<sup>4</sup> I said we did not intend at this time to announce anything other than fact that I had taken up this matter with him.

Khrushchev replied he understood distress of relatives but what could he do? They had not found any other bodies. He then cited crash of TU-104 with number of foreigners on board and said many bodies of these passengers had not been found.<sup>5</sup>

I said that although it might now be very late, it could be of some help if our Air Attaché could see scene of crash and remains of plane pointing out that we have previously asked permission for such inspection.

He replied crash had occurred in very sensitive military area. It was near frontier of Turkey with which Sov relations were not good and Sov military did not wish foreigners visit this area.

After conversation on other subjects which is being reported separately Khrushchev said as I was leaving "Let's forget about this affair. You come to us as guests and we will welcome you."

**Thompson**

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<sup>4</sup> Regarding Nixon's forthcoming visit to the Soviet Union, which the White House announced on April 17, see Documents 92 ff.

<sup>5</sup> The crash of the TU-104 has not been further identified.

## MAY–JUNE 1959: VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION OF W. AVERELL HARRIMAN

### 74. Editorial Note

W. Averell Harriman, former Ambassador to the Soviet Union and former Governor of New York, made an extensive tour of the Soviet Union during May and June 1959. A memorandum of Harriman's conversation with Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, May 7, on Harriman's forthcoming trip is in Department of State, Central Files, 032–Harriman, Averell/5–759. A memorandum of his conversation with Secretary of State Christian A. Herter, May 7, on his desire to explore an offer made by Deputy Prime Minister Anastas Mikoyan for Harriman to visit the People's Republic of China is *ibid.* Subsequently, the Department of State acceded to Harriman's request to travel to China as a "journalist" or "news correspondent" and authorized the issuance of a service passport to him suspending the travel restrictions to mainland China. (Telegram 1955 to Moscow, May 22; *ibid.*, 032–Harriman, Averell/5–1459) Harriman did not visit the People's Republic, however, because the government did not issue him a visa. (Telegram 2445 from Moscow, June 3; *ibid.*, 032–Harriman, Averell/6–359)

Charles W. Thayer, retired career Foreign Service officer, accompanied Harriman on his tour. On his arrival in Moscow, Harriman had interviews with Mikoyan on May 13, and Minister of Agriculture Vladimir Vladimirovich Matskevich and Defense Minister Rodion Y. Malinovsky on May 14. Notes prepared by Thayer on Harriman's conversations with Mikoyan and Marshal Malinovsky were transmitted in despatch 654 from Moscow, May 15. (*Ibid.*, 032–Harriman, Averell/5–1559) During the latter part of May, Harriman toured the Soviet Union. He visited some closed areas, including the city of Sverdlovsk and the hydroelectric construction site at Bratsk.

Shortly after his return to Moscow on May 30, Harriman left for a tour of Central Asia. When he returned to Moscow, he had an interview with Nikita Khrushchev on June 23; see Document 75. On June 25, Ambassador Llewelyn E. Thompson gave a luncheon for Harriman, which Khrushchev also attended; see Document 76. Additional details on their conversation concerning Berlin and Germany were transmitted in despatch 741 from Moscow, June 29. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/6–2959)

Harriman returned to the United States on July 8 after short stops in Paris, Bonn, and London. He informed Secretary Herter of his trip to the Soviet Union on July 10; see Document 77. His briefing of the Senate For-

eign Relations Committee on the same day is printed in *Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series)*, 1959, volume XI, pages 733–749. His account of his trip, especially of his conversations with Khrushchev, was published in *Life* magazine, July 13, 1959. He also gave his observations on various aspects of Soviet life in a series of articles for the North American Newspaper Alliance, which were published in *The New York Times* between June 1 and July 3. His trip to the Soviet Union also provided much material for his book, *Peace With Russia?*, published in 1959.

Additional documentation on Harriman's trip is in Department of State, Central Files 032–Harriman, Averell and 611.61. Much of this documentation for the month of July is on the concerns of Harriman and Department of State officials over the leak to the press of Harriman's conversations with Khrushchev. Information on the conversations was contained in articles by Joseph Alsop in the *Washington Post and Times Herald* on July 2, and by Harry Schwartz in *The New York Times* on July 3. Harriman also expressed "grave concern" over a postscript to his *Life* magazine article by John L. Steele, Chief of the *Time-Life* Washington bureau, which revealed Harriman's report that Khrushchev had given the Chinese Communists atomic rockets for their use in support of a possible invasion of Formosa. (Telegram 125 from London, July 8; Department of State, Central Files, 032–Harriman, Averell/7–850)

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## 75. Despatch From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

No. 734

Moscow, June 26, 1959.

### SUBJECT

Conversation Between N.S. Khrushchev and Governor Harriman, June 23, 1959

Mr. Khrushchev received Mr. Harriman at one o'clock in the Kremlin for an interview lasting about 1-1/2 hours prior to going to the coun-

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 032–Harriman, Averell/6–2659. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Ambassador Thompson apparently from detailed notes of this conversation provided by Charles W. Thayer who accompanied Harriman. Thayer's verbatim record of the conversation on Berlin was transmitted in telegram 2653 from Moscow, June 25, printed in vol. VIII, Document 417.



try. After the usual pleasantries, the subject turned to corn. Mr. Khrushchev said that the agriculture situation was still very weak, that there were three to four times too many people on the farms. The Soviets have used only one-half of their potentialities.

“The virgin lands have been a complete success. We have recouped all our capital investment and netted a profit of 18 billion rubles not counting machinery and buildings. Even the skeptics are becoming ashamed. We know that the area we have plowed up is what is called in Canada a risky area. However, in the last five years despite two severe droughts we have made a profit. We suppose that this cycle of two bad years in five will be repeated, but the bread grains we harvest are the cheapest in the Soviet Union, that is, 20 to 30 rubles per centner as against 60 elsewhere, and some well-managed farms with good weather conditions have collected grain as cheap as 12 to 15 rubles per centner due to the susceptibility of the virgin lands to mechanization. On the other hand, on some farms we have two to three times as many people as we should. However, many Americans who are good businessmen and rationalizers do not understand the basis of our farming. The average US farmer operates on a purely commercial basis. The Soviet collective farm on the other hand produces for its own needs and sells only what is left over. Hence, we must make a great effort to reduce surplus labor. Some Americans say we lack manpower for the Seven Year Plan. We have plenty of labor for that; we will take them off the farms.”

Asked how he was going to do this, he said, “We have no secrets. We revealed all our secrets in 1953.<sup>1</sup> Our chief problem is to change the psychology of the farmers not only by reorganization but by improving management and leadership. Up to now we have given too many directives to farms. From now on farm management must show more initiative. For example, our research centers and experimental farms have hitherto had to operate on our state budgets which they eat up regardless of what they turn out in experiments. From now on they must pay their own way and live on the returns for services they render to our farmers.

“Matskevich has told me of the American research centers and their assistance to US farmers. We propose to take a leaf from their book. For example, US commercial farms have profited from our early experiments in artificial insemination and use this method far more than even we who developed it. You should hardly be surprised that Communism

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<sup>1</sup> Reference presumably is to Khrushchev’s lengthy report to the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party at its session September 3–7, 1953, which strongly criticized weaknesses in Soviet agriculture and stressed the need to provide collective farmers with greater incentives to increase productivity.

which was born of capitalism will make the most use of capitalist advances."

Asked whether he really thought that the American economic system was approaching its end, he said that the US was still far from the end but was tending in that direction. Asked what he meant by saying that "the Communist system would bury capitalism," he said he only meant that in an historical sense. Socialism or Communism, he said, was a new and higher form of social organization bound to replace capitalism. The latter must give way. He never meant that Communism would physically bury the capitalist world. The proof of the superiority of the socialist structure is everywhere. During the first Five Year Plan when they constructed the first hydroelectric plant at Dnepropetrovsk, they hired Colonel Hugh Cooper<sup>2</sup> whom they regarded as the highest authority. Yet when you look back, what Cooper did was mere child's play to what is being done today. Another example was a certain American engineer called Morgan<sup>3</sup> who was hired as a consultant to the Metro in its early stages. (Morgan was here four years ago and told Khrushchev he was engaged in housing construction in Turkey. However, being a concrete specialist and an expert in tunnels, it turned out that he was building US military bases and no doubt tunnels in Turkey.)

Mr. Harriman suggested that maybe Soviet achievements were due not so much to the Communist or socialist structure but to very vigorous leadership. The system of free enterprise, he suggested, was in its most creative stage. Mr. Khrushchev compared the level of industry in France, Germany, and England of 30 years ago with that of Russia and claimed that the rate of progress and change in the relative positions of these countries was due without doubt to the social structure. Perhaps, Mr. Khrushchev suggested, it was God's will, in which case God seemed to be on the side of the Communists. But, he added, let us not enter into fruitless theological discussions.

Asked about the possibility of coexistence, Khrushchev stated that he had stated his position frequently: no war, disarmament, and the creation of conditions conducive to peace. "There might be a question about the world's future development, but let us leave that to history. The West says that we want to impose our system by war, but this contradicts objective facts." Western ideologists, he fears, do not understand Soviet doctrines. The original Communist theory was that war was inevitable in imperialistic societies and that the working class

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<sup>2</sup>Hugh L. Cooper, an hydraulic engineer, designed and helped to construct the water power and navigation project at Dnepropetrovsk in the Ukraine area of the Soviet Union in the early 1920s.

<sup>3</sup>Not further identified.

should make use of the arms in their hands during those periods to throw out the capitalists. Marxism had always taught that no war is useful for workers but that it should be used by them to the best advantage. This was proved after World War I which brought the Bolsheviks to power. Due to exceptional circumstances, the United States capitalist system was favored by both World Wars in which it made much money. Governor Harriman vigorously denied this and pointed out that the US had given at least 11 billion dollars to the USSR and had made no profits. Mr. Khrushchev expressed his appreciation and thanks for this aid but insisted that nevertheless both wars were highly profitable. Mr. Harriman suggested that Mr. Khrushchev misunderstood the stimulating of production due to war as profit making. He pointed out that in the last war, the Sverdlovsk area had greatly expanded and greatly increased its capacity, but this did not mean that Sverdlovsk had made profits. Khrushchev replied that compared to the losses in the Donbas, the additional production in the Sverdlovsk area was negligible and asked how many soldiers the US lost in World War II—1-1/4 million casualties in the United States against 20 million in the Soviet Union. Governor Harriman suggested that the Soviet people think that US business wants war or at least an arms race in order to make money. This is not true as Mikoyan no doubt learned. Khrushchev said that Mikoyan had learned no such thing and that he too believed that certain circles in the US wanted the cold war and an arms race for money.

Mr. Harriman pointed out that the cold war and the arms race were started by the Soviet Union. After World War II, the Americans had disarmed faster than any nation in all history and had only started to rearm when the Soviets failed to reduce.

Mr. Khrushchev returned to discussion of the Communist attitude toward war. He said that the old theory of the inevitability of war had been redefined at the 20th Party Congress and later reaffirmed at the 21st.<sup>4</sup> At that time it was decided that imperialist war can be avoided though there is no 100 percent guarantee against this. Today the socialist camp is strong, has a firm economic base, and growing manpower. This new force can deter imperialist war and each year it is becoming a stronger influence.

The class war must be settled not by war but by competition. "We can demonstrate," Mr. Khrushchev said, "the advantages of our system and set an example to other countries which they will follow. However, the question of making a revolution in any country is up to the workers of that country. The US is so rich and its standard of living so high that

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<sup>4</sup> The 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was held February 14–25, 1956. Regarding the 21st Congress, see Document 68.

for the time being it can postpone revolution because it is able to buy off or bribe the workers."

Mr. Harriman stated that it should be obvious that the United States would never under any circumstances start a war. Mr. Khrushchev asked if there was any reason one could see why the Soviet Union should start one, and Mr. Harriman replied that only a misunderstanding or a miscalculation might lead to one. The important thing, he said, was disarmament. Mr. Khrushchev said that he wanted to create the "objective conditions" which would make such accidents impossible. "Further," Mr. Khrushchev said, "if one examines Mr. Dulles' statements, he was motivated not by any misunderstanding but by very real objectives which were endangering peace." He stated that Mr. Harriman's criticisms of Mr. Dulles were different than his. In fact, both Governor Harriman's and Dulles' attitudes pointed in the same direction. Mr. Harriman pointed to the need of greater exchanges between the US and the USSR. Fifteen thousand Americans would come to the USSR this year; when would the USSR send as many to the US? Mr. Zhukov stated that a two week tour in the US costs 8,500 rubles, and Mr. Khrushchev added that while American tourists paid their own way in the Soviet Union, the unions or the Soviet state had to appropriate money for trips abroad that could better be spent for machinery. Nevertheless, appropriations for exchanges were being increased.

He stated that the elimination of discrimination against the Soviet Union in trade matters was of primary importance. The legal obstacles to trade, he said, were discrimination against the Soviet Union, and he accused Mr. Harriman of having a personal role in the setting up of these obstacles. He suggested that Mr. Harriman reverse his position and use his influence to increase trade. Mr. Khrushchev said there was one important point to clarify in connection with arms and trade. There was no doubt that American legal obstacles against trade were raised as reprisals, but this policy had been a complete failure.

"Look at our progress in science. We developed the hydrogen bomb before the US. We have an intercontinental bomb which you have not. Perhaps this is the crucial symbol of our position. The Seven Year Plan is based on an absence of trade with the US and the Plan is being consistently overfulfilled." Furthermore, there was nothing that the United States could furnish which the Soviets could not build for themselves. Nevertheless, the Soviets would like exchanges in certain fields of special equipment which they could build but found cheaper to buy abroad. For example, the Soviet Union had recently bought three textile machines not because they could not build them but because it was cheaper to buy them. Suggesting the Soviet Union also needed pipe, Mr. Harriman said that if some progress could be made on disarmament, the trade problem would settle itself. Mr. Khrushchev reacted strongly

that this sounded like a condition. The Soviet Union would not sacrifice the security of its country for the few advantages that increased trade would bring.

Turning to another subject, Mr. Khrushchev stated that Stalin had had a great respect for Governor Harriman and confirmed the suggestion by Mr. Harriman that had Roosevelt lived, history might have taken a different course. Stalin, he said, had often told him that there were many cases when Stalin and Roosevelt had opposed Churchill, but there were no cases in which Churchill and Stalin had ganged up on Roosevelt. Truman, however, he said, was a different type and had changed Roosevelt's policies.

"We don't consider Stalin without blame. He had grown old by the end of the war but because of his position in the world, he had a very strong voice which he did not always use in the right way." It was not useful to go into details, but in the last years he had a bad influence both internally and in international affairs. Stalin was distrustful, over-confident, and had lost the power to work himself, and he distrusted others, thereby making it impossible for them to work. After his death, however, Stalin's successors had successfully developed initiative and produced successes which he had opposed. "We think we have been successful, both internally and internationally," Mr. Khrushchev said, "and have greatly improved our international position." He added, "We want to disarm and cease the cold war. You say you want to, too, but we don't seem to agree.

"Eisenhower suggested air reconnaissance throughout our country.<sup>5</sup> This was utterly unacceptable. Air reconnaissance in view of US bases was not realistically fair though juridically it seemed so. Nevertheless, we would agree to air reconnaissance but not as a start."

The Soviet Union had suggested a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries.<sup>6</sup> This would lead to a psychological improvement. However, the US objects to such a treaty on the grounds that the UN Charter is sufficient. However, the NATO Pact itself is defended on the basis of the Charter. Thus in one case the US makes a defense pact, justifying it by the UN Charter, and refuses a non-aggression pact on the ground that the UN Charter is enough. Khrushchev said such a pact would bring an increase in confidence. A second step would be a reduction in forces. The Soviets would welcome the

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<sup>5</sup> The reference is to Eisenhower's "open skies" proposal, which he presented at the Geneva summit conference in July 1955; see Secto 63, July 21, 1955, printed in *Foreign Relations, 1955–1957*, vol. V, pp. 447–456.

<sup>6</sup> In his letter to Eisenhower, December 10, 1957, Bulganin proposed, among other things, a nonaggression pact between the NATO and Warsaw treaty nations, based on the principle of "co-existence." (Department of State *Bulletin*, January 27, 1958, pp. 127–130)

most thorough control with inspection by both armies. He also suggested a control of communications. The US had turned this down.<sup>7</sup> "We have even agreed to nuclear controls," he stated. The US had suggested that some nuclear explosions be permitted. The Soviets had agreed although they would prefer to prohibit all since any explosion would assist in the perfection of weapons. In the negotiations at Geneva, the technical experts had reached an agreement but then new difficulties were raised on the political plane.<sup>8</sup> "We do not believe," Mr. Khrushchev said, "that the US is taking a serious attitude toward the control of nuclear weapons."

Governor Harriman suggested it was a pity that Stalin had not agreed to the 1947 agreement on nuclear controls.<sup>9</sup> Mr. Khrushchev stated that the 1947 proposals were preposterous and designed to give the US a monopoly of nuclear weapons. They could not have agreed to them in 1947 and even less so today.

At this point Mr. Khrushchev suggested that we go to the country for luncheon where the discussion could be continued. With Mr. Zhukov of the Cultural Committee and Mr. Troyanovski as interpreter, we got into one car without the usual bodyguard, Mr. Khrushchev commenting that with a former American diplomat such as Mr. Harriman, he felt safe without his bodyguard.

On the way to the country, Mr. Khrushchev stated that the plenary session of the Central Committee due for tomorrow would reach no decisions but simply check up on the progress of the Seven Year Plan. One measure that he hoped would be taken was a setting up of an exhibit in the Industrial and Agricultural Fair<sup>10</sup> at which inadequate machinery would be exhibited to shame the makers of it into producing better equipment. However, he admitted that there had been some difficulty in collecting the poor machinery. Governor Harriman expressed amazement that there had been such difficulties since he assumed Mr. Khrushchev's word was law. Mr. Khrushchev readily admitted that his word was law. "But," he added, "there is no law you can't get around."

Returning to the international scene, Mr. Khrushchev said that it seemed the West wanted to prolong the cold war. Three times he had

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<sup>7</sup> Not further identified.

<sup>8</sup> The conference of Allied and Communist experts on the detection of nuclear test violations met in Geneva July 1–August 21, 1958.

<sup>9</sup> Reference is to the Baruch plan, which the United States advanced in the United Nations for the international control of atomic energy from 1946 to 1948. The Soviet Union consistently opposed this plan.

<sup>10</sup> Reference is to the Soviet Agricultural and Industrial Fair scheduled to open in Moscow in late July.

already reduced the strength of his forces<sup>11</sup> until his military advisers had told him that further reductions were out of the question.

Mr. Khrushchev said he found many of Mr. George Kennan's ideas expressed in the Reith lectures<sup>12</sup> coincided with his own. He liked particularly the idea of a gradual withdrawal in Central Europe. "Many of Mr. Kennan's ideas would be acceptable to us and should be to the advantage of the US as well." Asked specifically if he was prepared to withdraw his troops from Eastern Europe, Khrushchev said he was, under certain conditions, which, however, he did not specify.

The Geneva summit conference, he said, was [a] failure because Dulles and Eisenhower had entertained the unreal objective of liquidating East Germany. "To this we will never agree." Mr. Khrushchev said.

While he did not want to criticize the dead, he found Mr. Dulles had an exaggerated idea of his own personal importance and had underestimated the importance of others.<sup>13</sup> Speaking most confidentially, he stated that it was embarrassing if not unpleasant to note the manner in which Mr. Eisenhower had behaved at Geneva, not as a maker of policy but as an executor of Mr. Dulles' policies. Mr. Dulles, sitting on his right during the conference, had simply passed Eisenhower notes which the latter had then read out without contributing anything of his own.

At the dacha which lay beyond Kuntsevo and Rublevo, Messrs. Mikoyan, Kozlov, and Gromyko were awaiting us. For about half an hour we walked about the garden and down to the Moscow River. On the way, we discovered a hedgehog which Mr. Khrushchev picked up and gave to one of his bodyguards to take home to his grandson.

We then started lunch with the usual toasts. The first toast was to Governor Harriman in which his role during the war was praised. Mr. Khrushchev then launched into a review of Soviet international interests. The Soviets, he said, were not interested in expansion anywhere. The Mid-East had only oil and cotton. The Soviet Union had better cotton and oil enough to sell to the United States if it wanted it. India, he said, could take care of its own problems if it were willing to turn its jungles into arable land. Mr. Mendes-France<sup>14</sup> had suggested to Mr. Khrushchev that China with its bursting population was a menace to the Soviet Union. This, he said, was hardly true. The Soviet Union, if it so

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<sup>11</sup> Reference is to the Soviet Government's announcements of August 13, 1955, May 14, 1956, and January 6, 1958, each of which specified reductions in its armed forces.

<sup>12</sup> Kennan's BBC Reith Lectures in 1957, which generally proposed disengagement in Central Europe, were published in George F. Kennan, *Russia, the Atom, and the West* (London: Oxford University Press, 1958).

<sup>13</sup> Dulles died on May 24.

<sup>14</sup> Pierre Mendès-France, former French Prime Minister and Foreign Minister.

desired, could turn its Siberian forests into arable land sufficient to feed all of China if necessary.

Nevertheless, he said, the Chinese presented a special and delicate situation since they had their own way of looking on problems and the Soviets did not want to tell them how to run their country. (More on China later.)

Turning to Western Europe, Mr. Khrushchev asked what good Finland with its rocks and swamps was to the Soviet Union. Similarly for the other Scandinavian countries. Germany, however, was a different problem.

The West seemed to forget that a few Russian missiles could destroy all of Europe. One bomb was sufficient for Bonn and three to five would knock out France, England, Spain, and Italy. The US had a winged, pilotless plane whose speed was 1,000 kilometers per hour, which was within easy range of Soviet fighters. US missiles, he said, could carry a warhead of only ten kilograms whereas Russian missiles could carry 1300 kilograms. Under these circumstances it was unrealistic to threaten the Soviets.

[Here follows discussion of Berlin, identical to Thayer's report transmitted in telegram 2653 from Moscow, June 25; see volume VIII, Document 417.]

Calming down, Mr. Khrushchev said that as a great capitalist, Mr. Harriman's opinion was valuable. "In the US the workers have no views. I am a miner by origin, now a Prime Minister, and that is a characteristic of this country." Mikoyan said, "I am a plumber." Kozlov said that he was a homeless waif. Gromyko said that he was the son of a beggar. When Mr. Harriman stated that this was not unusual in the United States and that he had many contacts among the working class, Khrushchev retorted that the class struggle was an international question. "Tolstoy," he said, "wanted to till the soil like a peasant, but the peasants called him the stupid count, and said the count had worms in his backside."

A discussion ensued as to whether capitalism could survive. Khrushchev said that if he died and a capitalist came near his grave, he would turn over. "But if you, Mr. Harriman, approach, I won't turn over. We want your friendship but not from weakness. If we doubt from weakness, there would be war. We would like to deal with you because you have authority. You are a master, not a lackey. We don't threaten your capitalism.

"I will tell you a secret. When the war ended, the question of Petsamo arose. We seized it, but Stalin said we must pay something for the nickel because, he said, Harriman is a part owner." Mr. Harriman said he had never heard of nickel in Petsamo until after the end of the war.



Khrushchev stated, “Perhaps Stalin was misinformed, but nevertheless we wanted to avoid war and paid dollars for the nickel.”

The conversation turned to Mr. Kozlov. Mr. Khrushchev stated that he and Mikoyan were of the same age, though Mikoyan is one year younger. Kozlov is 15 years younger. He and Mikoyan have one thing in common. They are agreed that Kozlov will follow them. “Despite his white hair, which ladies love, Kozlov is young, a hopeless Communist. When we pass on, we will rest easily because we know Kozlov will carry on Lenin’s work.” Asked what happens if Kozlov dies earlier or what will happen after Kozlov, Khrushchev said, “We have eight million Communists.” Khrushchev said that after Khrushchev and Kozlov, it won’t be any easier for you. “Nevertheless,” he said, “I recommend him. He is modest and not such a brute (*nakhalni*) as we.” Harriman asked, “Were you ever modest?” Khrushchev replied, “Perhaps.” Harriman asked his opinion of Kirichenko.<sup>15</sup> Khrushchev asked, “Why do you ask of Kirichenko? We have Aristov, Breshnev, Mukhitdinov, Pospelov, and, youngest of all, Polyanski.<sup>16</sup> Don’t try to bet on our followers,” Khrushchev said. “If you bet on Kirichenko, you will lose. We have plenty of horses in our stable. Bet on our country, not on individuals. You bet on Malenkov and he proved to be “*gavno*”.<sup>17</sup> You bet on Beria,<sup>18</sup> he was also *gavno*. Then on Molotov. You were against Molotov but I respect Molotov more than all of them. Beria was an adventurer. Malenkov was a yellow chicken and Stalin knew it.”

Harriman: “Who did Stalin think would follow him?”

Khrushchev: “Stalin didn’t think; he thought he would live forever. I will tell you how Stalin died. We all went out to his dacha on Saturday and had a good dinner. He was in fine spirits. We said goodbye and went home. Usually he called us on Sundays but he did not that day. On Monday night his guards called and said that he was ill. Beria, Bulganin, Malenkov and I (Khrushchev) came out to the dacha and found him unconscious. He lived for several days but did not regain consciousness. He was paralyzed in the arm, the leg, and the tongue from a blood clot in

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<sup>15</sup> Aleksey Illarionovich Kirichenko, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

<sup>16</sup> Averkij Borisovich Aristov, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; Leonid Ilich Brezhnev, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; Nuritdin Akramovich Mukhitdinov, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; Petr Nikolaevich Pospelov, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; and Dmitriy Stepanovich Polyansky, member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

<sup>17</sup> Russian slang, usually transliterated as “govno,” which means human excrement.

<sup>18</sup> Lavrenti Beria, Soviet Minister of Internal Affairs, was executed in December 1953 after having been found guilty of high treason by the Supreme Court of the Soviet Union.

his brain. For one moment before he died, he regained consciousness. He could not speak but he shook hands and he made jokes by gestures, pointing to a picture of a girl feeding a lamb, obviously referring to the fact that he, like the lamb, was being fed with a spoon. Then," said Khrushchev, "he died and I wept. I was his pupil. We are all indebted to him. Like Peter the Great, he combatted barbarism with barbarism, but he was a great man.

"Kozlov will be worthy of us. If you want Kirichenko, he will be worse for you than Kozlov will be." Harriman asked why, then, had Khrushchev turned over Party affairs to Kirichenko. Khrushchev replied, "I am very jealous of my prerogatives and while I live I will run the Party. If you are trying to bury me, you are wish-thinking. Nevertheless, he said, "it is ideas that are important, not people. It is not important who will follow me. Our policy will not change."

The subject turned to Ambassador Bohlen. <sup>19</sup> Khrushchev said that he was respected but was not honest. He had documentary proof that Bohlen spread the rumor that Khrushchev was a drunkard. "When General Twining was here,<sup>20</sup> we all drank heavily. Bohlen can drink too, but later he told the correspondents that I was a drunk. Some British and Scandinavian journalists protested."

Khrushchev then said, "Please understand we want friendship. Within five to seven years we will be stronger than you. I am giving you a secret of the General Staff which your military can use in competition in ballistic missiles. I am talking seriously now. If we spend 30 billion rubles on ballistic missiles in the next 5–6 years, we can destroy every industrial center in the US and Europe. Thirty billion rubles is no great sum for us. In the Seven Year Plan, we are spending on power, gas, etc., no less than 125 billion rubles. Yet to destroy all Europe and the US would cost us only 30 billion. We have this possibility. If we save 11 billion in one year, if we overfulfill our plan by five percent, this will give us a savings of 55 billion in five years. Yet we only need 30 billion. I am frank because I like you as a frank capitalist. You charm us as a snake charms rabbits. I am talking about potentialities. Of course, we will make some missiles but we won't use them. We know if you use yours, it would be silly. Who would lose more? Let us keep our rockets loaded and if attacked we will launch them."

Discussing the Japanese question, Mr. Khrushchev said, "We helped to defeat Japan at the request of Roosevelt. It is true that we agreed to help Chiang Kai-shek but that was during the period in which

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<sup>19</sup> Charles E. Bohlen served as Ambassador to the Soviet Union 1953–1957.

<sup>20</sup> General Twining's report to the President on his trip to the Soviet Union June 23–July 1, 1956, is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1955–1957*, vol. XXIV, pages 246–249.

Japan was the enemy. Once Japan was defeated, the situation was changed and when another force—the Communists—arose, naturally we supported them against Chiang and we will continue to support them. What is China, Peking or Formosa? To whom does Formosa belong? Only to China, and China is Peking. At any time we desire, we can destroy Formosa. I will tell you confidentially, we have given the Chinese rockets which are in the Chinese hinterland but within range of Formosa and can destroy it at will. Your Seventh Fleet will be of no avail. Fleets today are made to be destroyed. If the Chinese decide to take Formosa, we will support them even if it means war.”

*Miscellaneous items*

Governor Harriman expressed surprise at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations' estimate that the maximum future industrial growth of the United States was only 2 percent.<sup>21</sup> He said he had told the professors that if they wanted to keep their jobs, they should revise their estimates to 4 or 4-1/2 percent. Mr. Khrushchev supported by Mr. Mikoyan stated that they were satisfied with the 2 percent figure because this had been the figure for the past five years.

Mr. Zhukov told Mr. Harriman that the Seven Year Plan contemplated no increase in the rate of production of automobiles. The cheap 8,000 ruble car which was planned would probably not be out for another 15 years.

Mr. Khrushchev stated that while he was the senior member of the Presidium, he had only one vote and that decisions were taken by a majority.

Repeatedly during the conversation, Mr. Khrushchev referred to the class struggle throughout the world and to “circles in the United States” which wanted cold war and an armaments race.

Mr. Khrushchev was scornful of the suggestion of free elections in Germany as a method of reunification.

Throughout the evening there was much free bantering between Mikoyan and Khrushchev. Mr. Harriman suggested that if Mikoyan became too obstreperous, Khrushchev should send him to the United States rather than Siberia. Mikoyan stated that it was too late to send him to Siberia as that was no longer permitted. Kozlov and Khrushchev, however, stated that between them they could make an exception of Mikoyan. However, Mr. Khrushchev added, what is the good of sending Mikoyan to Siberia? We would merely have to clothe and feed him. It seemed apparent that Mikoyan is the second in a double leadership.

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<sup>21</sup> Not further identified.

Frequently Khrushchev referred to decisions of "Anastas and myself", e.g., the selection of Kozlov as successor.

Asked whether in the secret speech at the 20th Party Congress a passage relating to foreign affairs had been omitted from the public published version, Mr. Khrushchev replied, "That speech was written not by me but by Allen Dulles."<sup>22</sup>

However, he admitted later that undoubtedly foreign diplomats dealing with Stalin had shared some of the difficulties in international affairs which Stalin's Soviet subordinates had suffered in internal questions.

Asked whether he found it difficult to make 150 speeches every year, Khrushchev said many are speeches of greetings or farewell. Speeches on developments within the Soviet Union, he said, wrote themselves and were a pleasure rather than a burden to make.

During the last hours of the discussion, Mr. Harriman frequently suggested he leave, knowing that the Soviet leaders were very busy. However, Mr. Khrushchev insisted that he stay on and discuss problems in greater detail. "Our working day is over and we are ready to spend all night talking with you." When eventually Mr. Harriman got up to leave at 10:30, Mr. Khrushchev stood in front of the door for at least 15 minutes preventing him from leaving while he continued his talk.

Despite the roughness of Mr. Khrushchev's language and the toughness of the position he took on many issues, he was most genial throughout the evening, smiling incessantly, proposing toasts frequently—chiefly in cognac which he drank liberally—and constantly flattering Mr. Harriman as a great capitalist. "Since workers in the United States have no rights, we like to talk to a great capitalist like yourself, particularly because we know of your good works during the war." Comparing him to Eisenhower, he stated, "You talk with authority and not as a lackey, and that is why we have been so glad to receive you."

Eventually at 10:45 the party broke up. Mr. Khrushchev stated that he would announce to the press only that the conversation had taken place in a warm and friendly atmosphere. He requested that no mention be made of the hedgehog as hedgehogs had a somewhat special and embarrassing connotation in Russia.

For the Ambassador:

**Robert I. Owen**

*First Secretary of Embassy*

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<sup>22</sup> Documentation on the efforts of the Department of State to exploit Khrushchev's secret speech to the 20th Party Congress of the Communist Party on February 25, 1956, is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1955-1957*, vol. XXIV, pp. 56 ff.

**76. Despatch From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State**

No. 739

Moscow, June 29, 1959.

SUBJECT

Conversation with Khrushchev

Supplementing my telegram #2665,<sup>1</sup> the following points developed in my conversation with Khrushchev on the occasion of the luncheon given for Averell Harriman on June 25.

During the course of the luncheon Khrushchev talked about the current Plenum of the Central Committee and said that in addition to the members of the Central Committee there were about 700 Communist and Government officials attending. I raised the question of the decentralization of industry and observed that a lot of their plans still appeared to be on paper. I also said it seemed to me that 104 was an unwieldy number of Councils of National Economy. Khrushchev agreed on both points and said their plans called for a consolidation of the existing Councils of National Economy, but said this would have to be done gradually. He also said they would further decentralize the operation of the economy but could not do this until their production reached higher levels. The present system did not sufficiently develop local initiative but until they had bigger margins to work with they could take no chances by not keeping tight control in Moscow.

In the course of this conversation Khrushchev remarked that both Bulganin and Kaganovich<sup>2</sup> had supported him in his plan to decentralize. He said Molotov was opposed and that in general both Molotov and Kaganovich were opposed to any innovations or changes in the system.

There was a good deal of banter across the table between Khrushchev, Mikoyan and Kozlov. At one point Harriman asked if Khrushchev were not worried that we would try to keep Kozlov in America.<sup>3</sup> Later on Harriman said that if Khrushchev came we would really make an effort to hold him. When Mikoyan said this would be a splendid idea, Khrushchev said that it was perfectly clear why Mikoyan supported this

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/6–2959. Secret; Limit Distribution.

<sup>1</sup> Telegram 2665 from Moscow, June 26, reported Thompson's conversation with Khrushchev on the Berlin question; for text, see vol. VIII, Document 420.

<sup>2</sup> Lazar Moiseevich Kaganovich, who was expelled from the Presidium and the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party in June 1957 as a member of the "anti-Party" opposition group.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 78.

idea as he was after Khrushchev's job. Although said with a smile, one could not help but think the remark made Mikoyan uncomfortable.

At another point in the conversation Harriman made some remark about their completing the Seven Year Plan in five years. Khrushchev said that there was one thing he did not need to worry about as this would not happen. In discussing planning, Khrushchev said their Seven Year Plan was merely an outline of a general direction since science and technology were developing so fast today that it was impossible to plan accurately seven years in advance. He referred to the tendency of the industrial ministries and other economic units to demand resources three or four times in excess of their needs but said that despite this their plans had worked out fairly well. He said this had been possible despite the fact that the Soviet Union was surrounded by American bases.

In connection with the opening of the American Exhibition, he said he had to leave for Poland on July 14 and did not plan to return until July 23 or 24. He said he would arrange his schedule, however, to be sure to be here for the opening of our Exhibition. He spoke as though he dreaded the Polish trip as he said the Poles would insist on his doing a lot of traveling and speaking, which was very tiring. He looked to be in better health than the last time I had seen him, but obviously is beginning to find he does not have the energy he once had.

I shall submit a separate report supplementing that part of our conversation which related to the German and Berlin questions.<sup>4</sup>

**Llewellyn Thompson**

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<sup>4</sup> Transmitted in despatch 741 from Moscow, June 29. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/6-2959)

## 77. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, July 10, 1959.

## SUBJECT

Harriman–Khrushchev Conversations

## PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Averell Harriman  
 The Secretary of State  
 Mr. C. Douglas Dillon, Under Secretary of State  
 Mr. Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of State  
 Mr. Livingston T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs  
 Mr. Foy D. Kohler, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs  
 SOV—D. E. Boster

After expressing regret at the leaking of information concerning his interview with Khrushchev,<sup>1</sup> Mr. Harriman said he very much hoped that there would be no disclosure on one inference he had drawn from the talks—his conclusion from the clear distinction Khrushchev had made in talking of Soviet “rocket” progress—that the Soviets did not have much confidence in the present capability of their long range missiles.<sup>2</sup> He recalled that Khrushchev early in his conversation had referred to Soviet ability to destroy European cities and U.S. overseas bases but had not included American cities in these statements. Later, he had boasted that if the Soviets spent 30 billion rubles on ballistic missiles over the next five or six years, they could destroy every industrial center in Europe *and the United States*. He thought that disclosure of this conclusion would be damaging to us if the Europeans thus gained the impression that we felt secure from devastation while they were not.

Mr. Harriman said he felt that Khrushchev’s performance had been all bluff. But he was a man of many misapprehensions who might overplay his hand. Although we should not take too seriously his flamboyant arrogance, it was true that Khrushchev thought he had us over the barrel tactically (an idea which Mr. Harriman repeatedly emphasized). He thought that he could end our rights in Berlin by signing a piece of paper, and we would be the ones to move our tanks and accept the onus of war.<sup>3</sup> He also undoubtedly reasoned that we had not had the courage to act with force in 1948 and would not have it again today.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.6111/7–1059. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Boster, initialed by Kohler, and approved by Calhoun on July 16.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 74.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 75.

<sup>3</sup> The record of Harriman’s conversation with Khrushchev on Berlin were transmitted in telegrams 2653 and 2665 from Moscow, printed in vol. VIII, Documents 417 and 420.

Mr. Harriman said he felt that Khrushchev had probably made some commitment to help Ulbricht<sup>4</sup> in East Germany and was anxious to have us concede some acceptance of the reality of East Germany as part of a deal with the Soviets. Khrushchev did not take seriously our protestations that we really want German reunification. Mr. Harriman said he would like to see us get out of the negotiations over Berlin and move into disarmament negotiations. He thought this might be fruitful as there have been indications that Khrushchev felt his armaments were costing too much.

Khrushchev had seemed in good health, Mr. Harriman observed. He had drunk a great deal and had eaten everything, although sparingly.

Mr. Harriman indicated his feeling that a summit conference might be a good idea. Khrushchev was a genial personality and would enjoy it. The President, too, might enjoy it if the conference were not taken too seriously. Some progress might be made in disarmament, he thought.

There were two points that he had emphasized to Khrushchev, Mr. Harriman said. First, that the American people, both Republicans and Democrats, were solidly behind the President; and, secondly, that he could not take Khrushchev's statements seriously. He had told Khrushchev that he had seen the great things the Soviets were doing and he could not believe he would jeopardize this. He had assiduously refrained, Mr. Harriman said, from probing Khrushchev on any points but he thought it would be desirable for the Vice President<sup>5</sup> to be primed to do this.

Mr. Harriman said he would summarize his main impressions as these: (1) Khrushchev's present lack of confidence in his missiles; (2) his desire to bolster the East German regime; (3) the possibility of progress in disarmament. His advice, he said, would be to keep the conversations going with the Soviets and not to issue ultimatums to them, as Khrushchev was an impetuous man whose reaction to ultimatums might be unpredictable.

Mr. Harriman criticized Chancellor Adenauer for his overly-rigid views on the current German problem—he wanted everything and would give up nothing. Adenauer believed that Moscow and Peiping were suspicious of one another, that the Soviet virgin lands were a dust bowl, and that Soviet industrial strength was highly over-rated.

Replying to the Secretary's question as to whether he thought Kozlov was the heir apparent, Mr. Harriman said he did. He quoted Khrushchev as saying that this was a point on which he and Mikoyan were

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<sup>4</sup> Walter Ulbricht, First Deputy Prime Minister of the German Democratic Republic.

<sup>5</sup> See Document 92.



agreed. "We have decided on our successor—Kozlov," he had said. Khrushchev had been very definite about this, Mr. Harriman thought.

Mr. Harriman recounted an episode which had impressed him. When he had suggested to Khrushchev that if Mikoyan caused too much trouble he should be sent to the United States instead of to Siberia, Mikoyan emphatically interjected that it was no longer possible to be sent to Siberia. This had impressed Mr. Harriman as sincere, and he felt in general that the one encouraging thing he had seen in the USSR had been this greater sense of relaxation.

The Secretary asked if Mr. Harriman thought that water was a problem for the Soviets in the virgin lands. Mr. Harriman said he thought it was but that the Soviets were attacking the problem in a number of ways and were having some success with their method of holding snow cover during the winter.

Mr. Murphy asked Mr. Harriman's impression about Soviet relations with Communist China. Mr. Harriman replied that Khrushchev had been very upset at Senator Humphrey for suggesting that these relations were not good.<sup>6</sup> Khrushchev had pointed to China's plans for expanding food production and had noted that, if there were still trouble, the Soviets could always cut down some of the vast timber lands that Harriman had seen to help feed China.

Mr. Harriman returned again to his concern at the seriousness of the leak of his conversation, suggesting that he perhaps would not be permitted to return to the Soviet Union. The Secretary said that we shared his concern but were convinced the leak had not been from the Department. Mr. Murphy asked if Mr. Harriman had any evidence to believe the leak had come from the Department and Mr. Harriman said he had not except that he had assumed it was on the basis of the notes he had left with Ambassador Thompson. Mr. Merchant assured him that this could not have been the case as these notes had not left his desk until after the publication of the Alsop article. It was agreed that the leak must have been on the basis of the earlier cables received on this subject from Moscow.

In leaving, Mr. Harriman adverted again to a summit meeting, indicating that Khrushchev had told him to tell the President that he would not come to such a meeting to endorse the status quo but would come to a meeting to have a good time and enjoy it.

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<sup>6</sup> Humphrey met with Khrushchev in Moscow on December 1; see vol. VIII, Document 84.

## JUNE–JULY 1959: VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES OF FROL R. KOZLOV

### 78. Editorial Note

Frol R. Kozlov, First Deputy Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers, visited the United States June 28–July 13. First word of the impending visit came from Richard H. Davis, Chargé in Moscow, who reported in telegram 2375 from Moscow, May 26, that Acting Foreign Minister Vasilii Kuznetsov had just told him that Kozlov would open the Soviet National Exhibition of Science, Technology, and Culture in New York in late June and would spend about 2 weeks in the United States. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.6111/5–2659)

During the next month, U.S. and Soviet officials held numerous conversations in Washington to discuss Kozlov's tentative itinerary and security arrangements. U.S. officials believed that the Soviet leadership regarded Kozlov's visit in part as reciprocal to Vice President Richard M. Nixon's trip to the Soviet Union scheduled to begin in late July. While Secretary of State Christian A. Herter did not want to establish any direct connection between the Kozlov and Nixon visits, he recognized that treatment accorded Kozlov would undoubtedly affect the reception Nixon would receive in the Soviet Union. (Secto 254 from Geneva, June 17; *ibid.*, 033.6111/6–1759) Department of State officials from the outset wanted to accommodate as many Soviet requests concerning Kozlov's visit as possible. William S. B. Lacy, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for East-West Exchange, was designated coordinator for U.S. Government arrangements connected with the visit. (Memorandum from Kohler to Dillon, June 2; *ibid.*, 033.6111/6–259)

Lacy had several talks on Kozlov's upcoming visit with Soviet Ambassador Mikhail A. Menshikov. Memoranda of their conversations on June 5, 9, 10, 15, and 20 are *ibid.*, 033.6111/6–559, 033.6111/6–959, 033.6111/6–1059, 033.6111/6–1559, and 033.6111/6–2059, respectively. Memoranda of Lacy's conversations with Soviet Chargé Mikhail N. Smirnovsky on June 23 and 24 are *ibid.*, 033.6111/6–2359 and 033.6111/6–2459. A memorandum of Smirnovsky's June 25 conversation with John M. McSweeney, who had been designated the senior Department of State official to accompany Kozlov during his stay in the United States is *ibid.*, 033.6111/6–2559. Memoranda of their two conversations on June 26 are *ibid.*, 033.6111/6–2659, and a memorandum of Menshikov's telephone conversation to McSweeney later that same day is *ibid.*

In a memorandum to the President, June 27, Acting Secretary of State Robert Murphy summarized the conclusions of the Department of

State concerning Kozlov's visit and its potential significance for future U.S.-Soviet relations:

"We believe the reason for his visit is: (1) to reciprocate the Vice President's visit to the U.S.S.R.; (2) to estimate U.S. official and unofficial opinion on resolve to preserve our position in Berlin and elsewhere; and (3) to broaden his own experience.

"Kozlov is a trusted deputy of Khrushchev and appears to be regarded by the latter as his "heir apparent". Because we may find ourselves dealing with Kozlov in future years we think we could make the best use of his visit by trying to give him as clear a picture as we possibly can of basic U.S. national objectives." (Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, International Series)

Along with this memorandum, Murphy enclosed a paper providing talking points for Kozlov's proposed call on the President, a biographical sketch of Kozlov, and his tentative itinerary.

A briefing book, containing position papers on major political issues and bilateral questions, is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1408. Copies of correspondence concerning the visit, memoranda of Kozlov's conversations with U.S. officials, and a chronology of his travels is *ibid.*, CF 1409. A detailed chronology of Kozlov's visit, prepared on July 20 by McSweeney and Heyward Isham, who also accompanied the Kozlov party on its tour, contains the names of those Americans who hosted Kozlov's visits and their brief summaries of Kozlov's reactions to the places he visited and the events he attended. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 033.6111/7-1359)

Kozlov and his party arrived in New York at 11:20 a.m. on June 28. On the next morning, he inspected the Soviet Exhibition. President Eisenhower, accompanied by Vice President Nixon, Secretary of Commerce Lewis L. Strauss, Under Secretary of State C. Douglas Dillon, and Ambassador to the United Nations Henry Cabot Lodge, arrived in New York at 4 p.m. for a preview of the Exhibition, and were welcomed to the Soviet Exhibition by Kozlov. A copy of the President's short letter to Kozlov of June 30, thanking him for his courtesy, is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1409. Eisenhower left the exhibition at 5 p.m. and Kozlov formally opened the Soviet Exhibition at 6 p.m. For texts of the brief addresses of Kozlov and Nixon at this opening ceremony, see *The New York Times*, June 30, 1959.

On Tuesday, June 30, Kozlov drove to Philadelphia and in the afternoon flew to Washington. At 10 a.m. on July 1, he met with Secretary Herter. A memorandum of their conversation on the Berlin situation is in volume VIII, Document 422. At 11:15 a.m., he met with President Eisenhower; see Document 79. Following lunch with members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Kozlov met with Vice President Nixon; see Document 80. On July 2, Kozlov visited the Agricultural Research Center in Beltsville, Maryland, and gave a speech at a luncheon

sponsored by the Overseas Press Club and the National Press Club. For text of his speech, see *The New York Times*, July 3, 1959. In the afternoon he went sightseeing in the Washington area.

The next morning, Livingston T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, saw Kozlov off at the airport in Washington for his flight to Sacramento, California. A part of their memorandum of conversation is printed as Document 81. The portion of the memorandum of conversation on Berlin is printed in volume VIII, Document 425. Subsequently, Kozlov visited San Francisco, Detroit, Chicago, Pittsburgh, and Shippingport, Pennsylvania, before returning to New York on the afternoon of July 11.

Kozlov held a press conference on Sunday, July 12, summarized in *The New York Times* on July 13. A memorandum of his conversation with W. Averell Harriman on July 12 at 6:30 p.m. is printed as Document 86. A memorandum of his conversation with Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Murphy at 9 p.m. is printed as Document 87. Kozlov left for Moscow by airplane very early the next morning. For text of his letter to President Eisenhower, July 13, thanking the President for his and the Americans' hospitality and the President's July 14 reply, see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 3, 1959, pages 157–158.

On July 15, McSweeney and Isham prepared a four-page summary of Kozlov's visit and a report giving their observations on Kozlov's personality. (Both in Department of State, Central Files, 033.6111/7-1359) Their evaluation of his visit, prepared on July 16, is printed as Document 90. Intelligence Report No. 8067, "Kozlov's American Tour: June 28–July 13, 1959," which the Bureau of Intelligence and Research prepared on August 7 is in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, OSS–INR Reports.

Additional documentation on Kozlov's visit, including memoranda of his conversations with state and local officials outside the Washington, D.C., area, are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1408–1409, and Central File 033.6111.

## 79. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, July 1, 1959, 11:15 a.m.–12:30 p.m.

### SUBJECT

Mr. Kozlov's Call on The President

### PARTICIPANTS

U.S.—The President, The Secretary of State, Mr. J.M. McSweeney and Mr. A. Akalovsky

USSR—F.R. Kozlov, M.A. Menshikov, A.A. Soldatov, and V.M. Sukhodrev (interpreting)

The President opened the conversation by saying that he had just come from his press conference.<sup>1</sup> He explained that the President's press conference is similar to the questioning of prime ministers in countries with parliamentary systems. He indicated that some of the questions asked by the newspaper men may be embarrassing.

Mr. Kozlov replied that press conferences are also used frequently in the Soviet Union and that Soviet leaders, particularly Mr. Khrushchev, have frequent press conferences. He added that during Marshal Stalin's time this method of acquainting the population with current developments had not been used and that he thought that this was unfortunate, since he believed that the public at large should be informed.

The President said that during the press conference the question of the paintings to be sent to the Moscow Exhibition<sup>2</sup> had been raised. He said that those paintings, or at least most of them, represented an extreme form of modernism and that some of them are even unintelligible to the average eye; some of the paintings were satirical or even lampooning. The newspaper men had asked him why he personally had not participated in the selection of paintings. The President observed that the committee that had selected the paintings was apparently not much interested in public taste. The public at large, at least 95 per cent of the population, would approve the type of paintings he had seen at the Soviet Exhibit. He said that the committee represented a thin stratum of artists, or at least of people who call themselves artists and who believe

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, International Series. Secret. Drafted by Akalovsky. The meeting was held at the White House. Another copy of the memorandum indicates that the White House approved it on July 14. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.6111/7–159)

<sup>1</sup> For the transcript of Eisenhower's July 1 press conference, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1959*, pp. 488–497.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to the American National Exhibition that was scheduled to open in Moscow in late July.

that they are the ones who interpret America. The President asked Mr. Kozlov what his view was on this subject.

Mr. Kozlov replied that he would certainly see the paintings in question in Moscow and that he would inform the President of his reaction to them. As far as modern art was concerned, in the Soviet Union as in the United States, the public cannot understand it, and even artists themselves frequently cannot understand it. He recalled that when he had visited the Brussels Exhibition<sup>3</sup> he had seen an abstract painting. He had asked the woman guide to explain what the painting represented, but she could not. It was someone else's decision, she said, to show the picture. Of course, Mr. Kozlov said, he was not an expert on art and could not judge the value of modern art, but he could say that the general public does not understand it. He also recalled that in Brussels he had seen some "normal" pictures and he liked them; because such pictures can be understood by the average people.

The President said that the opinion of the masses would probably be the same both in the Soviet Union and in the United States, because Mr. Kozlov represented the non-artists in the Soviet Union, just as he represented the non-artists' opinion in the United States. So he thought that he knew what Mr. Kozlov's reaction would be.

The President then recalled that in his early youth he had lived on a farm, in a beef and grain area. When he was in the Soviet Union in 1945<sup>4</sup> and visited some collective farms he talked the same language with the workers because their problems at that time had been the same as he had experienced at his farm in his youth. As a result of the war the farms in the Soviet Union had been deprived of farming implements and the workers were very much concerned with improving the yield, raising the number of cattle, etc.

Mr. Kozlov agreed that immediately after the war the collective farms in the Soviet Union did not have much mechanical equipment but observed that now agriculture in the USSR is mechanized. For instance, 100 per cent of wheat is harvested with mechanized equipment and harvesting of corn is also being mechanized. In this connection he noted that corn in the United States is of excellent quality.

Mr. Kozlov admitted that there had been a defect in Soviet agriculture which now has been corrected, i.e., crops had been prescribed from above. At Mr. Khrushchev's initiative free crop planning has been introduced; in other words, everyone is free to cultivate the type of crop that is most suitable for his land. As a result of this, the peasants now live

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is to the Brussels Exhibition held April 17–October 19, 1958.

<sup>4</sup> Regarding Eisenhower's visit to the Soviet Union in August 1945, see *Crusade in Europe* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1948), pp. 459–467.

better and are much happier. Mr. Kozlov also noted the fact that 3.6 million hectares of virgin land have been cultivated in the Soviet Union and that this had saved the Soviet Union during the drought in 1957, when the Volga and the land in the south of Russia were very dry. He recalled the big famine of 1921, when the Soviet Union had to buy wheat from the United States with gold taken from churches, because it was the only way out.

The President commented that the Soviet Union might find itself one day in the same situation in which the United States is now. That is, where the United States has great surpluses of wheat, corn, tobacco, peanuts, cotton and other agricultural commodities. The storage alone of these commodities costs \$1,000,000,000 a year. The President said that one of our biggest problems was what to do with these surpluses, how to supply other countries that are in need of such commodities without undermining the markets of other exporting countries. For this reason, the United States' exports of agricultural surpluses are limited to such countries as do not have the means to buy such commodities from, for example, Canada, Argentine, etc.

Mr. Kozlov stated that the Soviet Union would not reach such a stage very soon, if ever. He said that the Soviet Union is a very large country and that all of its resources can be utilized by converting one commodity into another so as to raise the standard of living of the people. However, the Soviet Union always has reserves of grain and other foodstuffs for emergency cases. The Soviet Union has now started a big program for increasing the production of milk and butter. The Soviet Union wants to compete with its great and mighty partner, the United States, in the production of milk, butter, and meat. For this reason it intends to treble its livestock. Great emphasis is also placed on corn. In this connection good contacts have been established with one of the outstanding American farmers, Mr. Garst.<sup>5</sup> Mr. Kozlov expressed the hope that Secretary Herter will not exert any pressure on Mr. Garst because of his contacts with the Soviet Union.

The President observed that he loves corn, and that it is his favorite cereal. He said that he loves corn bread, corn cakes, and all other products of corn.

Mr. Kozlov retorted by saying this made the President a great friend of Mr. Khrushchev's who also is a great lover of corn and who always mentioned it, whatever the topic of his speech. Therefore, the President should meet with Mr. Khrushchev and discuss corn directly with him. True, Mr. Kozlov observed, he could not say at what level this

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<sup>5</sup> Roswell Garst, an Iowa farmer, had played a leading role in organizing exchange visits between Soviet and U.S. farmers and had met Khrushchev in Moscow.

meeting should take place but still this common interest would be a good basis for a meeting.

The President said that if only the United States and the Soviet Union, which both are great powers, could work [in] parallel rather than engage in disputes because of their different ideology, this would be a great force for the betterment of the entire world. The genius and inventiveness of the Russian people can be seen at the New York Exhibition, while Mr. Kozlov would see the genius and inventiveness of the American people on his trip. So the problem was to direct the minds of our two peoples toward the same objective. The President noted that he was not putting the blame on anyone or assessing the blame but rather making an observation.

Mr. Kozlov stated that life would be indeed wonderful if our two countries could revive their World War II comradeship-in-arms. He recalled his visit on the previous day to the construction site of the United States atomic ship *Savannah*<sup>6</sup> and said that American engineers there had expressed great interest in the achievements of Soviet technology. He suggested that by exchanging the experience gained from such projects as the *Savannah* and the Soviet atomic icebreaker *Lenin* a great deal of good could be done to both countries. There were many things in common between our two countries, and the struggle for peace was one of them. Of course, there were differences of opinion between our two countries on certain problems but if we adopted a realistic approach they could be resolved. For instance, the Berlin question could be resolved peacefully, through negotiation. However, he did not want to elaborate on this question because he had done this in a conversation with Mr. Herter earlier in the day.<sup>7</sup> Mr. Kozlov continued by saying that it was a horrifying thought that our two countries could use their military potential to destroy each other; this would be a catastrophe for mankind. Therefore, he wanted to associate himself to the President's view that our two countries should work parallel. The Soviet Union realized that certain differences do exist between our two countries: the Soviet Union is a socialist country while the United States is a capitalist country. However, they are far apart geographically so that our peoples can live under their respective systems. One way to broaden the cooperation between our two countries would be to expand trade. However, the United States seems to be unwilling to do that. For instance, American chemical industry is willing to sell to the Soviet Union but the

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<sup>6</sup> On June 30, Kozlov visited the Ideal Toy Corporation in Jamaica, New York, and the construction yards of the New York Shipbuilding Corporation in Camden, New Jersey, where he inspected the nuclear-powered freighter *Savannah*.

<sup>7</sup> A memorandum of Herter's conversation with Kozlov on July 1 is printed in vol. VIII, Document 422.



Department of State has refused to issue the necessary export license. Mr. Kozlov stated that he wanted to emphasize the principle on which the policy of the Soviet Union is based is that of peaceful coexistence and to that principle the Soviet Union will always faithfully adhere.

The President expressed concurrence with Mr. Kozlov's statement and that he was delighted to hear it. He said that many American groups returning from the Soviet Union come to him and report that the Soviet people are very friendly and cordial. Many American groups have been in the Soviet Union—groups of professors, educators—and now there is a group of governors touring the Soviet Union.<sup>8</sup> All of these groups tell us that the people of the Soviet Union are just as devoted to peace as the people of the United States. Everybody knows that the American people do not want war. Therefore, our two countries should break this log jam in their relations and deal with each other in conciliatory terms.

Mr. Kozlov said that he fully agreed with what the President had said and that this was not only his personal view but also that of the entire Soviet people. The problems existing between our two countries can be resolved only through negotiation and not through force. After all, what are our countries fighting about? If we take West Berlin, there are some 2.2 million people in that city and if they want the capitalist social order, that is all right with the Soviet Union. But the occupation regime in that city that has lasted for fourteen years should be terminated.

Mr. Kozlov reiterated that the Soviet Union has all natural resources, all chemical elements as indicated in Mendeleev's chart; it is a country of colossal wealth. It is true, however, that the United States has developed the harnessing of its resources on a larger scale. Today there is a great deal of work to be done in the Soviet Union, particularly in Siberia, work which could take hundreds of years. Mr. Kozlov then recalled Mr. Averell Harriman's visit to Siberia<sup>9</sup> where we went to see the 3.5 million k.w. power station on the Angara River that is now being constructed. Mr. Harriman had received permission to go to that area in spite of the fact that this is a closed zone. Mr. Harriman could see personally how this power station is being built and he was very much impressed with what he had seen. The power from that station would be used for the production of cellulose, synthetic fibres and aluminum.

If we take the Middle East, Mr. Kozlov continued, the cotton that is produced in Egypt is inferior to that produced in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union also has great reserves of oil and needs no oil from that area. Moreover, it could sell oil to the United States, but unfortunately

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<sup>8</sup>Nine U.S. governors toured the Soviet Union in early July. They had an interview with Khrushchev on July 7, reported in *The Washington Post* on July 8 and 9.

<sup>9</sup>See Document 74.

the United States doesn't need it. The main problem of the Soviet Union is that it has no sufficient means to harness its natural wealth fast enough. It is also true that the living conditions in Siberia are more difficult than those in the United States, but people are used to them.

For all these reasons, Mr. Kozlov went on, why should our two countries fight each other? If we take the Berlin problem, it should be resolved by the Germans themselves. After all, it was they who twice imposed war on us, so why should we fight because of them? The Soviet Union is investing thousands of billions of rubles in the development of its industry; 104,000,000,000 rubles are being invested in the chemical industry alone. Therefore, if both of our countries should work in the same direction, wonderful relations between them would exist.

The President said that if this happened, this would open great prospects for advance for the entire world. Mr. Kozlov said what the Soviet Union is trying to do for its country could be done for the entire world. In other words, the Soviet challenge must be translated into concrete measures to improve the welfare of the people throughout the world. Therefore, the President said, he wanted to echo Mr. Kozlov's phrase, that our two countries have no reason, no excuse for war because they have so much to do. What has to be done now is to find a way how to do it better.

Mr. Kozlov expressed full agreement with the President's words.

The President expressed his hope that Mr. Kozlov would convey his good wishes for health and happiness to Mr. Khrushchev and his hope that ways could be found for fruitful negotiations as Mr. Kozlov had mentioned. The President also asked Mr. Kozlov to convey the same message to the Soviet people. Mr. Kozlov replied that he wanted to take this opportunity once again to convey to the President Mr. Khrushchev's best wishes for health and for the prosperity of the American people.

The President said that Mr. Kozlov would have a good time in the United States and that everybody would be ready to talk freely to him. In this connection he expressed satisfaction that Mr. Kozlov would visit Bohemian Grove in California, which is located in beautiful surroundings.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> A memorandum for the files, dated July 1, signed only "a." (presumably Ann Whitman) and initialed in the margin by Goodpaster, gave Eisenhower's reactions to this interview as follows:

"The President, in talking of his conversation with Deputy Premier Kozlov, said that first of all he liked the man—that he was frank and willing to state clearly the Russian positions. The President said what we have to do is to 'thaw out' the Russian defenses. About Berlin we say we will never have our rights there diminished. The Russians say this is an illogical position. We admit it is illogical, but we will not abandon our rights and responsibilities—unless there is a way made for us to do so." (Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, USSR)

## 80. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, July 1, 1959, 3:30–4:50 p.m.

### SUBJECT

Mr. Kozlov's Call on the Vice President

### PARTICIPANTS

*United States:*

The Vice President  
Mr. Kohler  
Mr. McSweeney  
Mr. Akalovsky (interpreting)

*USSR:*

Mr. Kozlov  
Ambassador Menshikov  
Mr. Soldatov  
Mr. Sukhodrev (interpreting)

The Vice President opened the conversation by inquiring whether Mr. Kozlov had had a good time at the luncheon with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to which Mr. Kozlov replied in the affirmative. The Vice President commented on the very good press coverage that Mr. Kozlov had had in the American press. The Vice President expressed the view that, as he had said many times before, it was very important that both sides obtain good visibility of the situation and clarify the issues that are before them.

Mr. Kozlov agreed that it was very useful to define the issues and see where the "boundaries" in such issues lie. He also suggested that it would be useful to expand trade between the U.S. and USSR.

The Vice President said that with regard to trade he believed that it could be developed along with an increase in exchanges between the United States and the USSR.

Mr. Kozlov observed that the Soviet Union was particularly interested in buying from the United States technical equipment, such as chemical equipment, automatic machinery and textile machinery. On the other hand, the United States appeared to be interested in buying chrome ore, manganese ore, and other raw materials from the Soviet Union. He remarked that so far he had seen two American factories<sup>1</sup> and that apparently the United States could learn something from the Soviet Union. Such exchange of experiences could be promoted by mutual purchases of individual equipment on the basis of barter trade.

The Vice President pointed out that, as Mr. Kozlov probably knew, one of the major problems was the difference in our two systems. The

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.6111/7-159. Secret. Drafted by Akalovsky on July 6 and cleared by the Vice President's office on July 10. The meeting was held in Nixon's office.

<sup>1</sup> See footnote 6, Document 79.

United States system was that of private enterprise and American free enterprise manufacturers would be extremely reluctant to engage in any trade without their patent rights being fully guaranteed.

Mr. Kozlov again reverted to the subject of chemical production and said that American exporters appeared to be having difficulties in obtaining export licenses; therefore it was not only up to the Soviet Union to promote trade but also up to the United States. He remarked that the Soviet Union trades with many countries, including Adenauer's Germany, notwithstanding the fact that the Soviet Union has no sympathy with Mr. Adenauer. Therefore differences in social systems should not be an obstacle to foreign trade. In this connection, he recalled the extensive trade between the Soviet Union and the United States before the war, and said that U.S. firms which had supplied equipment for the hydroelectric power station on the Dniepr as well as for the industrial facilities in Magnitogorsk had made good profit and that both sides had been very pleased with the situation. He said that he realized that differences between our two systems do exist and will exist, but nevertheless he believed that trade should be developed. For instance, the Soviet Union conducted trade with England; just recently an agreement had been signed providing for a chemical plant to be built in the Soviet Union by British firms.<sup>2</sup> This agreement had been concluded on a mutually advantageous basis in spite of the fact that the British and Soviet socio-political systems are different. Mr. Kozlov said he believed that the United States is an even more democratic country than England and, therefore, there should be no obstacles to trade between the United States and the USSR.

The Vice President said that in order to have an understanding both sides would have to give. In this connection, he recalled Mr. Kozlov's and Mr. Khrushchev's comments on peaceful co-existence and stated that many of those comments could be understood as meaning that one side is saying that it should be free to do what it wants.

Mr. Kozlov replied that this was an incorrect interpretation of co-existence, and said that Mr. Khrushchev had supported a number of Mr. Nixon's statements which he had considered to be useful and constructive.

The Vice President said that what he meant was that there was a feeling that the Soviet Union insisted on having different rules applied to different sides. Of course, he observed, he realized that propaganda can sometimes create false impressions.

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<sup>2</sup> Reference may be to contracts obtained by the British firms, Courtaulds Ltd. and Prinex Ltd., a subsidiary, in early 1959 to supply complete plants and technical processes to the Soviet Union for the manufacture of various synthetic materials.

Mr. Kozlov noted that the Soviet Union was engaged in large-scale trade with West Germany, England and some 70 other countries, most of which are capitalist countries. He recalled that recently the Japanese Minister of Trade had visited the Soviet Union and displayed great interest in Soviet lumber and oil. All this, he said, indicated that differences in systems are not necessarily obstacles to trade.

The Vice President replied that he wanted to refer not only to trade but to a broader, diplomatic area. He said that it was not clear whether the Soviet Union, in speaking of peaceful co-existence and competition, pursued as its primary purpose the objective of strengthening its own country—to which the United States, of course, had no objection—or whether in addition to that, the Soviet Union wanted to extend its influence and domination to other parts of the world. The Vice President pointed out that he was not making any charges but simply wanted to explain how the problem appeared to many people in this country. Some people in the United States are saying that the Soviet Union is developing its own strength, but that in addition to that it has placed great emphasis on extending its influence and domination to other areas of the world, such as Asia, Africa and Latin America. The Vice President said that he realized that in raising this point he would not meet with complete agreement on Mr. Kozlov's part; just as had been the case when Mr. Mikoyan was in the United States. Nevertheless, it was important that this situation be understood by everyone.

Mr. Kozlov replied that he was aware of the situation mentioned by the Vice President and expressed the opinion it was due to a lack of confidence between the Soviet Union and the United States—confidence which actually should exist. He said that the Soviet Union has no interest in expanding its influence and domination, because it has everything in the way of materials needed for the development of its industry, such as bauxite, nickel, chrome, manganese and oil as well as other natural resources in the bowels of the earth within its boundaries. Moreover, practically all of Siberia is still undeveloped, and there is a great deal of work to be done there. The Soviet Union has to exert great efforts to catch up with the United States in developing natural resources. The Soviet Union, Mr. Kozlov continued, has rich deposits of oil as well as excellent cotton and other materials. For this reason the Soviet Union has no economic interest in Iraqi oil. As far as cotton is concerned, Soviet cotton is superior to Egyptian, and it was only for humanitarian reasons that the Soviet Union had bought cotton from Egypt—it simply wanted to assist Egypt, which is an underdeveloped country—in promoting its

foreign trade.<sup>3</sup> Mr. Kozlov then reiterated that the Soviet Union has all natural resources needed for industrial development, but that the harnessing of those resources had to be expanded in order to bring it up to the level reached by the United States. One of the areas in which this had to be done was in the field of chemical industry. Mr. Kozlov continued by saying that any talk of the Soviet Union's wanting to impose Communism on other people was propaganda—if the people themselves do not want Communism no one could impose it upon them. In this connection, he wanted to point out that the Soviet Union is rendering technical assistance in India,<sup>4</sup> where a social system exists that is different from that of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has no claim on India. It simply wants to assist the development of that country. He recalled that Mr. Harriman, during his visit to Moscow, had made very favorable comments with regard to the industrial combine which had been built by the Soviet Union in India, and which Mr. Harriman had seen while there. However, if India ever became a socialist country, it would require huge economic assistance for raising its standard of living. Mr. Kozlov said that he also wanted to point out that the Soviet Union had friendly relations with countries that had a totally different social system, such as, for instance, Afghanistan, Nepal and Ethiopia, which are monarchies. The relations between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union are most cordial, in spite of the fact that monarchy is almost tsarism, which, as everyone knows, is abhorred by the Soviet people even more than capitalism. The Emperor of Ethiopia is visiting the Soviet Union at this time.<sup>5</sup> Thus, the Soviet Union has good relations not only with socialist countries but also with countries having a different social system, such as India, Indonesia, Afghanistan, etc.

In other words, the Soviet Union is not interested in expanding its borders or conquering new territories. Such relations are the true reflections of the principles of peaceful co-existence. The Soviet Union lives in peace with bourgeois India as well as with capitalist Finland. As far as Finland is concerned, the Soviet Union has no interest in swallowing that small country, and the fact that the Soviet Union has given up its base in Porkkala-Udd is evidence of the Soviet Union's peaceful

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<sup>3</sup> An economic and technical agreement between the Soviet Union and Egypt signed in Moscow on January 29, 1958, provided, among other things, for a Soviet long-term loan, which Egypt would repay in part by supplying Egyptian goods, including cotton, to the Soviet Union.

<sup>4</sup> A 5-year trade agreement between the Soviet Union and India signed in Moscow on November 16, 1958, provided, among other things, for Soviet exports to India of industrial and power equipment, machinery, machine tools, tractors, and other products.

<sup>5</sup> Haile Selassie, Emperor of Ethiopia, made an official visit to the Soviet Union June 29–July 13.

intentions.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, the border between the Soviet Union and Finland is open and many Finns come to Leningrad just to go to the theater. The Finns sell butter and milk to the Soviet Union; although Finland is a small country, it has surpluses of these commodities. Thus, for instance, Mr. Kozlov continued, when he was in Finland two years ago the Finns told him that they wanted to sell their butter surpluses to the Soviet Union, a total of 1,000 tons. This was a rather small amount, Mr. Kozlov continued, sufficient to supply the population of Leningrad with butter for two breakfasts, and so, with Mr. Mikoyan's agreement, the butter was bought.

The Vice President stated that this was a subject which could be discussed at length. However, he merely wanted to point out that he had traveled to 52 countries of the world, and that the Soviet Union would be the 53rd country. In many of those countries he had seen evidence of very intensive propaganda which could not be called peaceful co-existence. He said that he realized that the Voice of America has been charged with engaging in propaganda that the Soviets do not consider peaceful either—and this point had been raised by Mr. Mikoyan with the Vice President<sup>7</sup>—but that during his visit in Latin America<sup>8</sup> he had seen evidence indicating that Radio Moscow had urged the population of those countries to engage in hostile demonstrations against the Vice President of the United States. Of course, this was a personal experience, and he realized that demonstrations occasionally go in the other direction too, but the main point is that on both sides there must be mutual recognition that both the United States and the Soviet Union are strong economically and militarily, and that it is necessary to avoid words and actions outside which tend to inflame the population against certain countries.

Mr. Kozlov expressed full agreement with the Vice President's latter statement but noted that he could not agree that Radio Moscow had incited people in Latin America against the President or the Vice President of the United States; the Vice President must have received fabricated information. On the contrary, the Soviet press had carried very favorable articles about the Vice President. True, the Vice President has a different ideology, but his approach to problems is rational, particularly with regard to cooperation between nations. This fact had also been noted by Khrushchev, at least on two occasions.

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<sup>6</sup> In September 1955, the Soviet Union and Finland signed an agreement providing for the return to Finland of the Porkkala naval base, which Finland had leased to the Soviet Union in 1947 for 50 years.

<sup>7</sup> See Document 61.

<sup>8</sup> Nixon made a good will tour of eight South American countries April 27–May 15, 1958.

The Vice President said he wanted to discuss the situation in a somewhat different context. He remarked that his attitude to the military strength of the USSR and the United States may be somewhat different from the attitude taken by some other people, and that what he wanted to say was that one could read statements (although these are not made by the President, the Vice President or the Secretary of State) to the effect that the United States has a military potential of destroying any aggressor. At the same time, there are statements by Mr. Khrushchev to the effect that the Soviet Union has missiles and bombs capable of destroying any enemy of the Soviet Union. Now his attitude was, the Vice President continued, that there is no sense in arguing who has more missiles or more bombs; what is important is that there be a mutual understanding that neither side should get such advantages as would force the other side to diplomatic surrender or would assure to a great extent the military destruction of the other side without that side having enough military potential left to return the blow. The Soviet Union is a strong nation both militarily and economically and its people are determined to protect their homeland. On the other hand, the people of the United States are also determined to protect their homeland—this should be realized by both sides.

Mr. Kozlov said that he agreed with the Vice President and stated that no objective would be justified in a future war. The Soviet Union knows that the United States is a mighty country; it knows that the United States has H-bombs. Of course, the United States knows that the reverse is also true. Therefore, if the United States should send its aircraft with H-bombs to drop such bombs in the Soviet Union and should the Soviet Union fire its missiles on the United States, this would cause great damage to the Soviet Union—that is true. But the Soviet Union knows that it will destroy the enemy. Soviet missiles are ready for launching; they are in mass production now, which means they are produced one after another.

However, the Soviet people are against war. Mr. Kozlov recalled that within his and his wife's family 10 persons had been killed during the last war and that there was no family in the USSR that had not suffered losses in one form or another during the past two wars. For this reason the Soviet people value their achievements and love their country, just as the American people love theirs. But the Soviet people will fight staunchly if they have to.

Mr. Kozlov then suggested that the Soviet Union and the United States should engage in peaceful competition in various areas of human endeavor. For instance, they could compete in the field of corn. In this connection, he wanted to note the useful contacts that had been established between one of the outstanding American corn producers, Mr.



Garst, and the Soviet organizations concerned.<sup>9</sup> The United States and the Soviet Union could also compete in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy. During his visit to the construction site of the U.S. atomic ship *Savannah*, American engineers had given Mr. Kozlov very useful and broad information, for which he wanted to express his thanks, but at the same time they showed great interest in Soviet experiences gained in connection with the construction of the Soviet atomic ice-breaker *Lenin*. American engineers felt that there was much they could learn from Soviet engineers.

Mr. Kozlov continued by saying that the Soviet Union did not object to criticism by Americans, and recalled in this connection the fact that Mr. Harriman had noted that a great shortage of housing still existed in the Soviet Union. Mr. Harriman was right, but one should take into account the fact that the United States had no war on its territory, while the Soviet Union's territory was devastated during the last war.

Mr. Kozlov said he wanted to emphasize that, not only as a representative of the Soviet Government but as a Russian citizen, he knew the peaceful feelings of the Soviet people, but he also knew that if something should happen they would sweep away the enemy. For this reason, both the Soviet Foreign Ministry—and here Mr. Kozlov said he was not patting the back of his own Foreign Ministry—and the United States State Department should be more flexible in their approaches to various problems, because this is the essence of co-existence.

The Vice President interjected that flexibility means giving on both sides.

The Vice President said that he wanted to suggest two points with regard to Mr. Kozlov's present visit. He said that he believed that even if Mr. Kozlov went back home without any changes in the Soviet position, his visit would have been a useful one. Also, he wanted to suggest one variation to Mr. Kozlov's program in the United States. He believes that the present program places too great an emphasis on meeting the American big businessmen and that greater emphasis should be placed on meetings with wage-earners, workers and farmers, so as to give Mr. Kozlov an opportunity to meet American people at large. This, the Vice President said, was based on his own experience during his many trips to foreign countries.

The Vice President also said that he wanted to suggest that if some concrete result, however small, is obtained from Mr. Kozlov's visit to the United States, this would have a very favorable influence in the United States. Of course, he didn't expect the Berlin situation to be resolved, but there were smaller things as, for instance, the matter of travel restric-

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<sup>9</sup> See footnote 5, Document 79.

tions. Mr. Kozlov's visit to Pittsburgh and other closed areas in the United States and his own trip to the Soviet Union could result in opening Soviet closed cities on the basis of reciprocity. This would influence the situation usefully.

Mr. Kozlov said that he had no disagreement with this suggestion and recalled Mr. Khrushchev's statement with regard to Mr. Harriman's visit that Mr. Harriman was free to go wherever he wanted to go. Of course, Mr. Harriman's visit was a private one, whereas the Vice President's would be an official visit. If the Vice President wanted to go to the Angara, this would be all right. The reason for Siberia being closed for foreign travel was not because the Soviet Union had secrets in that area but rather because it is a quite inaccessible area, difficult for travel. All doors would be open to the Vice President during his stay in the USSR. If he wanted to see the ice-breaker *Lenin*, or the atomic research institute in Dubno, or any of the new construction projects in the Soviet Union, that would be all right. The Vice President would be welcome everywhere. However, Mr. Kozlov said, the only advice he wanted to give to the Vice President was that he should gather his strength because the Soviet Union was larger than the United States and the distances are much greater. The Soviet Union has many places that the Vice President could visit.

The Vice President replied that he realized that there was no problem with regard to travel to closed areas on an individual basis. However, he said, that he believed that if this were to be formalized on a broader basis, this would have a very favorable effect on the Russian and American peoples. The Vice President observed that this question was under discussion between the two governments at the present time and that he was not trying to put Mr. Kozlov on the spot.

Mr. Kozlov agreed that expanded contacts would be useful. Referring to propaganda, Mr. Kozlov said that recently Mr. Gold, an American correspondent, and his wife had visited the Soviet Union and that Mr. Gold upon his return to the United States had published articles which could not be characterized as anything but slanderous. Mr. Gold had published his articles under such headlines as "Woman is the Work-Horse of Russia" and "What Mules Do in Spain, Women do in the Soviet Union".<sup>10</sup> Such articles and headlines do not promote mutual understanding and improvement of mutual relations between the USSR and the United States.

Mr. Kozlov said that during his visit to the atomic ship *Savannah* he had seen several workers suffering from heat prostration, and that if someone used that fact for articles generalizing the working conditions

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<sup>10</sup> Not further identified.

in the United States this would be an unfair description of the situation and would be sheer propaganda. Contacts should serve the purpose of promoting better understanding between our two peoples. The United States has certain deficiencies and shortcomings, including shortcomings with regard to the atomic ship *Savannah*. And the Soviet Union also has certain shortcomings, but all this should not be used as an obstacle to improvement in mutual understanding between our two peoples.

The Vice President said he wanted to raise another point. He said that New York, where the Soviet exhibition is taking place, is a great cultural center of the United States, and that Leningrad, a city which Mr. Kozlov knows very well, is also one of the great cultural centers of the Soviet Union. Therefore, the Vice President continued, he hoped that Mr. Kozlov could use his influence in order to expedite the exchange between our two governments of consulates in these two cities.

Mr. Kozlov replied that this question was new to him and that it has to be studied. He apologized that he didn't know anything about it.

The Vice President pointed out that the point was that little yardage should be made first before long distances are covered. Therefore, concrete results in small limited areas should be an encouragement to people that the problem in greater areas could be resolved.

Mr. Kozlov replied that contacts are indeed very useful and the Soviet people know this very well. The Soviet Union is in favor of expanding contacts in all fields. In particular, he felt that an expansion of contacts in the artistic field would be very useful.

The Vice President said that he wanted to raise a last point. He referred to Mr. Macmillan's visit to the Soviet Union<sup>11</sup> during which the representatives of the British press accompanying Mr. Macmillan were exempted from censorship. Some representatives of the American press will accompany the Vice President on his trip to the Soviet Union and it was our hope that there would be no discrimination of American press as against the British press. The Vice President expressed the belief that it is always better to have a broad coverage of visits such as that.

Mr. Kozlov replied that during Mr. Macmillan's visit to the Soviet Union the British press was very objective. The point raised by the Vice President would, of course, be discussed. Mr. Kozlov expressed the belief that by the time of the Vice President's arrival in the Soviet Union this problem would have been fully studied and resolved.

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<sup>11</sup> Harold Macmillan made an official visit to the Soviet Union February 21–March 3.

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**81. Memorandum of Conversation**

Washington, July 3, 1959.

**PARTICIPANTS**

Mr. Frol Kozlov, Deputy Prime Minister USSR  
Mr. Merchant, Assistant Secretary EUR

While seeing Kozlov off at the airport and waiting for his plane to be refueled I had a conversation with him lasting nearly half an hour. No one was present throughout except his interpreter though newspapermen kept sidling up and attempting to eavesdrop. Toward the end Ambassador Menshikov joined us.

I opened by handing him the President's letter which he immediately opened and asked to have translated.<sup>1</sup> He expressed obvious pleasure and said it was a most thoughtful note of thanks for his presents to the President and Mrs. Eisenhower. He asked that I communicate to the President his appreciation which I promised to do. He then noted that the painting he had given the President was entitled, "Spring," and that he hoped this was the breaking up of the ice of winter and would soon move into the summer of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. I said that this was more dependent on actions and policies of the Soviet Union than it was on us.

Kozlov then launched into an exposition of the importance of good relations between our two countries. He said that they were large and powerful like ourselves and wanted to live in peace. He emphasized the importance of developing trade. I said that we also desired only to live in peace but that there was more to it than trade. In so far as the latter was concerned I said that there was a very broad area in which trade was unrestricted and that I thought the low volume of commerce between our two countries was due to the fact that we were not particularly interested in what they had for export and that they were not particularly interested in consumer goods which formed the bulk of our exports. He said that they were interested in machinery and factories and that the British were supplying them as well as "our friend Adenauer."<sup>2</sup> I said that patent difficulties were an obstacle but he did

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.6111/7-359. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Merchant.

<sup>1</sup> A copy of Eisenhower's July 1 letter to Kozlov is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1409.

<sup>2</sup> A trade agreement between the Soviet Union and West Germany signed in Moscow on April 8, 1958, provided, among other things, that during the period 1958-1960, the Soviet Union would place large orders for various kinds of machinery and equipment in West Germany.

not reply to this point. He then went on to say that they had more materials than we had and as an example we lacked asbestos. I said that this was true but that our good friends in Canada had ample asbestos which represented a convenient and reliable source of supply.

I then changed the conversation by pointing to the view of the Capitol which he compared to a cathedral in Leningrad. We discussed architects of that period and I mentioned that our Capitol was now being rebuilt and in fact it had to be rebuilt after the British burned it in the War of 1812. Kozlov said that the Russians helped us in the War of 1812 (which he characterized as “our rebellion against the British”) by bringing their fleet into San Francisco.<sup>3</sup> I said that my recollection was that at the time San Francisco was a part of Mexico. He denied this and after a little we dropped the argument.

[Here follows discussion of the Berlin question, printed in volume VIII, Document 425.]

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<sup>3</sup>Kozlov was apparently thinking of the visit of the Russian fleet to San Francisco during the U.S. Civil War.

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## 82. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, July 8, 1959.

### OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Herter  
Mr. Allen Dulles  
Mr. Bissell  
General Goodpaster

The President said he had asked for the meeting because he wanted to hear Mr. Herter’s views about a proposal for a reconnaissance flight. He expressed his own concern over the possibility of getting involved in something costly and harmful.

Mr. Herter said that the intelligence objective in his view outweighs the danger of getting trapped. He noted that a single operation was

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, Intelligence Matters. Top Secret. Prepared by Goodpaster.

being proposed. He recognized that there is always the chance of loss of the plane, but our experience has been very good. He had been much interested in the idea of a flight straight through, but understood that this was not practicable. Mr. Dulles confirmed this, commenting that the proposed flight will enter through one country and leave through another.

It was agreed that, in case of protest, we would defend ourselves with an absolute disavowal and denial on the matter.

Mr. Bissell said that the Soviets have a fighter which could probably zoom to the altitude of this plane.

The President then said that Khrushchev seems almost to be looking for excuses to be belligerent. By doing nothing he can put us in a terrible hole in Berlin. Holding the cards he does, he could very readily say that such an event as this marks the end of serious negotiations. There remains in the President's mind the question whether we are getting to the point where we must decide if we are trying to prepare to fight a war, or to prevent one.

After all the discussion, the President indicated that in view of the unanimous recommendation of the officials having the operating responsibility, he would assent to the operation being conducted.

G.  
*Brigadier General, USA*

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**83. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Herter**

Washington, July 8, 1959, 11:15 a.m.

The President telephoned to say he got a rather tough question in his press conference about what Khrushchev was supposed to have told the Governors yesterday to the effect that he wanted to come and see the United States and that nothing would be better for the world than Presi-

dent Eisenhower going to see Khrushchev.<sup>1</sup> The President said he had not known of this statement by Khrushchev<sup>2</sup> but that it raised a lot of press query. The President said he had sort of stumbled around; that he didn't know exactly what to say. However, in this connection, the President said this was what he believed: he felt that if we are ever going to break the log jam, people like the Secretary and himself and Mr. Murphy and Mr. Dillon will have to give serious thought as to whether this might be a good move. The President said if he did this, he would rather go to Russia than have Khrushchev here, but, in any event, he wanted to point out that this question raised a lot of interest. The President said, after giving careful consideration to a question of a meeting between himself and Khrushchev, if we don't reach any answer we have got to have a good excuse for not doing it. The President said he has talked about misunderstandings with our Allies, the Satellites, etc., and that the people will wonder why he won't try to resolve misunderstandings with Russia.

The Secretary said Mr. Murphy has always felt the President should have a meeting with Khrushchev, but the business of how to bring it about is a difficult problem. The President said the only person who couldn't say anything is Macmillan since he saw Khrushchev himself.<sup>3</sup> The Secretary said it may well be that the outcome of the Geneva talks will be not a Summit, but a talk between the President and Khrushchev. The Secretary referred to the President's reference to Quebec as a possible site for a Summit meeting,<sup>4</sup> and said should this work out, it might be difficult with Khrushchev so near, not to invite him to the U.S. The President said if he did this he would want to take him to Camp David where the visit would involve a minimum of protocol and their talks could be relaxed and informal.

The President asked that the Secretary give thought to this idea, and asked that for the moment the matter be kept within a very limited group in the State Department. The Secretary said he would hope to discuss this further with the President after NSC tomorrow.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Regarding the visit of the U.S. governors to the Soviet Union, see footnote 8, Document 79. For the transcript of the President's press conference, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1959*, pp. 506–507.

<sup>2</sup> The newspaper accounts of the governors' meeting with Khrushchev printed in *The Washington Post* on July 8 were based only on the introductory remarks before their long private conversation and did not mention an exchange of visits. A full report of the interview, including the visit proposal, was published in *The Washington Post* on July 9.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 10, Document 80.

<sup>4</sup> Not further identified.

<sup>5</sup> A memorandum of Herter's July 9 conference with President Eisenhower is printed in vol. VIII, Document 429.

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**84. Memorandum From Dorothy S. de Borchgrave to the Under Secretary of State (Dillon)**

Washington, July 9, 1959.

CDD:

Clarence Randall called and told me the following on the phone:

Yesterday in Chicago Inland Steel entertained Kozlov at luncheon. Kozlov turned to Mr. Block,<sup>1</sup> the Chairman, and said "I want to buy steel. That is why I came to you today. I want to buy rolled sheets and I will pay you in gold". Mr. Block was caught unprepared with this question and said "I would have to have the clearance of the State Department". At this Mr. Kozlov blew his top and quite angrily said, "We are just getting a run around. Mr. Herter tells us to talk to the businessmen and you people just say you have to talk to the State Department".

Mr. Randall would be glad to have your reactions and/or suggestions you may have for people in the steel industry who may get similar inquiries.

DB<sup>2</sup>

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Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.  
No classification marking.

<sup>1</sup>Joseph L. Block.

<sup>2</sup>Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials. Attached to the source text is a memorandum from Raymond L. Perkins (S/S-RO) to Edward T. Long (EUR) and Craig M. Stark (E), which identified "DB" as Dillon's secretary. Dorothy S. de Borchgrave was the only person with these initials serving in Dillon's office at this time.

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**85. Editorial Note**

On July 10, President Eisenhower decided to extend an invitation to Chairman Nikita Sergeyeovich Khrushchev for an exchange of visits between the two leaders. Memoranda of conferences between the President and Secretary of State Christian A. Herter on July 9 and 10, at which this decision was made, are printed in volume VIII, Documents 429 and 431.

The idea of inviting Khrushchev to visit the United States had occasionally been discussed by Department of State officials before 1959, usually in connection with a return visit by Eisenhower to the Soviet Union. Moreover, Soviet officials had hinted at their interest in an exchange



of visits, and Eisenhower was frequently queried at his press conferences on the idea. Eisenhower consistently stated that he would go anywhere at any time if he felt it would serve the cause of peace. He did not commit himself any further, however, and the prospect of a Khrushchev visit did not make much progress until the summer of 1959.

In the first months of 1959, Eisenhower was constrained from pushing forward with an invitation in part because John Foster Dulles, in his last days as Secretary of State, continued to oppose a Khrushchev visit. Dulles spoke with the President on March 14 about the latter's idea of inviting Khrushchev to the United States. No record of their conversation has been found, but on the following day Dulles told Under Secretary of State Christian A. Herter and Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Livingston T. Merchant, as recounted in a memorandum for the record by Joseph H. Greene, Jr., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, that "he thought the effects of such an invitation would be to enhance the prestige of Khrushchev and of the Soviet Government and dangerously to undermine the NATO Alliance. Moreover, the Secretary could not imagine any issue on which Khrushchev would make a reliable agreement with us, and he thought that, even if we were to accept the Soviet idea of a bilateral deal to 'divide up the world' and settle all its problems, the Soviets would only use this as a spring board for the further expansion of International Communism, not as an end to their aspirations."

Dulles added that since his conversation with the President it had also occurred to him that an invitation to Khrushchev would undermine Prime Minister Harold Macmillan's efforts to develop a personal relationship for himself, presumably to cater to proponents of détente at home, and he did not think "we should be sticky about letting Macmillan get whatever kudos he can by using the forms of 'leadership', as long as we control the substance, because Macmillan's defeat in the British elections, and the advent of a Labor Government, would confront us with even greater problems than we now have." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers)

Nevertheless, support in the United States for a Khrushchev visit continued to mount. Following his talks with Khrushchev in Moscow in June 1959, Averell Harriman stated that he believed that Khrushchev was profoundly ignorant of the United States and that a visit to this country might help somewhat in correcting his misconceptions of the United States. (*Life*, July 13, 1959) Moreover, Kozlov's visit to the United States June 28–July 13 took place without unpleasant incidents and seemed helpful in opening more meaningful discussion on contentious issues between the two countries. Vice President Richard M. Nixon's impending visit to the Soviet Union in late July further nourished speculation on an invitation to Khrushchev to visit the United States.

The initiative finally came from President Eisenhower, who asked the Department of State to look into the matter; see Document 83. Eisenhower's interest in the matter prompted his conferences with Herter on July 9 and 10 (cited above). At these meetings, Eisenhower proposed that Khrushchev visit him at Camp David prior to a meeting of the four heads of government in Quebec, which would be contingent upon progress in negotiations between the Foreign Ministers in Geneva. The result, the President thought, was supposed to be a qualified invitation to Khrushchev, which Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Robert D. Murphy delivered to Kozlov shortly before the latter's departure from the United States. See Documents 87–89.

The President had intended to impose the same conditions for a personal meeting with Khrushchev as for a four-power summit meeting, but Murphy and Under Secretary of State Dillon believed that the invitation conveyed through Kozlov to Khrushchev had been unqualified. A memorandum of the President's conference with Dillon and Murphy, July 22, on this misunderstanding is printed in volume VIII, Document 466. The President's recollection of this misunderstanding is printed in *Waging Peace*, pages 406–407.

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## 86. Memorandum of Conversation

New York, July 12, 1959.

### SUBJECT

Kozlov Visit: Interview with Averell Harriman

### PARTICIPANTS

First Deputy Premier Kozlov  
Ambassador Menshikov  
Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter  
Mr. Harriman  
Admiral Kirk  
Heyward Isham, Department of State

### 1. Impressions of US

In response to Mr. Harriman's question, Kozlov said that his trip had been "very useful". The Gary works of the U.S. Steel and the

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.6111/7–1259. Confidential. Drafted by Isham on July 22. The meeting was held at Harriman's residence at 16 East 81st Street. A typed notation on the source text reads: "Note: At this informal, private meeting arranged at Kozlov's request, notetaking by a Department officer seemed inappropriate. The following is based on notes made immediately after the conversation and a separate interview with Harriman."

Indiana Harbor works of Inland Steel represented “the last word in technology”; the Homestead District plant of U.S. Steel in Pittsburgh, however, was obsolescent, having frightful dust and deplorable lighting.<sup>1</sup> In the USSR older plants like Homestead were scheduled for reconstruction. Harriman conceded that Homestead was of course one of the oldest steel plants in the US and inquired whether it was due for remodeling. Kozlov said he did not know but had the impression it was not, since he doubted that such an investment would be considered profitable by the company.

Kozlov went on that he had not neglected light industry, having visited a toy plant near New York (the Ideal Toy Corporation, Jamaica).<sup>2</sup> He had been interested to observe the large number of women employed at this factory. This observation led to a rather pointless debate, in which the Admiral<sup>3</sup> joined, about the prevalence of female labor in the US as compared with the USSR. Kozlov first asserted it was about the same as in this country, but upon being challenged by Harriman, he admitted this might not be so, but in any case he had not meant to imply that there was anything wrong with a large female labor force.

Kozlov continued that earlier that day he had visited the Empire State Building, the subway, and the UN building. The subway, Harriman commented, was much inferior to the Moscow metro, and the ventilation was bad. Kozlov nodded that this was indeed so, and the ventilation was worthless. Kozlov added that when at his press conference this noon he had been asked if he believed, with Khrushchev, that our grandchildren would live under Communism, he had replied “Yes, as Communists we do believe that, although this is of course an internal matter for the United States”.<sup>4</sup> Harriman retorted, “You think our system has within it the seeds of its own destruction, and we think the same of your system. Let us then wait and see who is right. Let us agree to disagree”. Kozlov expressed bland readiness to do so.

At a later point in the talk, after the Berlin and disarmament questions had been discussed, Harriman ironically inquired whether on his trip Kozlov had met any of the ruling clique of capitalists; if he had, would he name them, since he (Harriman) would be very interested to know who they were. We could read in the Soviet press the names of the rulers of the Soviet Union, but it was a mystery who the US businessmen were who allegedly ran this country. “Why”, exclaimed Kozlov, leaning

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<sup>1</sup> Kozlov toured the Indiana Harbor Works of Inland Steel Co. in East Chicago, Illinois, and the Gary Steel Works and Tube Mill of U.S. Steel Co. in Gary, Indiana, on July 8, and the Homestead Works of U.S. Steel in Pittsburgh on July 10.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 6, Document 79.

<sup>3</sup> Admiral Alan G. Kirk, Ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1949 to 1951.

<sup>4</sup> Kozlov’s press conference is summarized in *The New York Times*, July 13, 1959.

over to lay a hand on Harriman's forearm, "should we look farther afield? Here we have a Harriman sitting right in front of us"! He and Menshikov roared with laughter at Harriman's discomfiture. The latter stoutly maintained that neither he, nor Mr. Rockefeller for that matter, wanted war. But Kozlov obviously considered he had come out ahead in that exchange, and returning in the car I overheard from the front seat (where I was sitting with Sukhodrev) much boisterous laughter between Kozlov and Menshikov over the sally.

Harriman recalled that when Eisenhower and Zhukov appeared together at a soccer match in the Dynamo stadium in 1945 and put their arms around each other, the entire stadium had erupted into a roar of approval.<sup>5</sup> Kozlov said this incident illustrated the friendship of the Soviet people for the Americans. Similarly, he said, he had been tremendously moved by the spontaneous, standing ovation given the Russian singers and dancers in Madison Square Garden.<sup>6</sup>

As Kozlov was preparing to leave, Harriman expressed the hope that the Soviet leader was leaving this country with the same warm feelings as Harriman had done on departing the USSR. Kozlov replied that he was convinced that the American people wanted peace, and that he was leaving with the very best feelings in his heart.

## 2. *Eisenhower-Khrushchev meeting*

Harriman noted that he and other Americans had recently been suggesting that it would be very useful if Khrushchev were to visit this country. What did Kozlov think of this idea? Kozlov replied that this was a very good idea and that it would without question facilitate a Summit meeting. At this point Admiral Kirk broke in to demand, "What kind of a Summit? If only the US and USSR leaders met, the other powers would be highly disturbed and distrustful". Kozlov pointed out that Macmillan's visit had not been misunderstood by the others and that it had been generally recognized that the visit had resulted in some useful proposals. Harriman made clear that he had meant only talks with the President in the course of a Khrushchev visit here, not a special meeting that could be interpreted as a US-USSR Summit. Kirk affirmed that this was the distinction he had tried to get across. Kozlov said that there has never been any confusion in his mind between the two things, and that of course, the distinction was clear. Harriman added that it was Khrushchev's turn to travel since two American presidents had gone to the

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<sup>5</sup> For the recollections of an eyewitness to this incident, see John R. Deane, *The Strange Alliance: The Story of Our Efforts at Wartime Cooperation With Russia* (New York: Viking Press, 1947), p. 217.

<sup>6</sup> Reference is to the performance of the Soviet Musical Festival which Kozlov attended on the evening of July 11.

Soviet Union (Roosevelt and Eisenhower—though before he became President) but that no Soviet Premier had ever visited this country. Kozlov said he thought Khrushchev would support this opinion (and returning in the car expressed to Menshikov his amusement that Harriman had included General Eisenhower in his Summit arithmetic).

### 3. *Berlin*

Harriman recalled that he had told Khrushchev in Moscow that there was united bipartisan support of our Berlin position and that we were very serious about our obligations to the 2 million West Berliners.<sup>7</sup> Kozlov replied that he remembered these words of Harriman's very well, since he had been present during this part of the conversation, and that he also recalled Khrushchev's emphasis in reply that the USSR would faithfully adhere to the principle of peaceful coexistence. However, it had been surprising to read in the press that Khrushchev had adopted a threatening tone in these talks, because from personal recollection he knew that they had proceeded in a friendly and pleasant atmosphere. Harriman replied that he had not authorized these reports and that he stood behind only those articles he himself wrote (for *Life* and the *New York Times*).<sup>8</sup> But, Harriman pursued, what did Kozlov think about the prospects for agreement at Geneva on the Berlin question? Kozlov answered that he took an optimistic view regarding the possibilities for agreement. He had the feeling that the US side was now looking upon the Soviet proposals "more positively". The mixed East-West German commission could have 18 months to work out a solution. Harriman observed that this might be acceptable if there were no alteration of US rights in Berlin in the meantime. Kozlov in an offhand manner said that this was a "technical question" which the Ministers could decide. Harriman pressed him further: this proposal might be agreeable if the Soviets were not in a hurry, but in Berlin they gave the impression that they were. Kozlov denied this, pointing out that 18 months was a not inconsiderable period. Harriman added, "We are ready to wait, and if you think time is on your side, why don't you wait too, while the seeds ripen"? Kozlov: "We are not in a hurry". Harriman: "I gather you want more recognition for the East German regime". Kozlov: "The question is not so much recognition, since the East German regime is already recognized by a number of other states, as it is the establishment of security within the GDR and eliminating the provocations stemming from West Berlin". (Harriman later told the reporting officer that he discounted Kozlov's statement on GDR recognition.)

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<sup>7</sup> The record of Harriman's June 23 conversation with Khrushchev was transmitted in telegram 2653 from Moscow, June 25, printed in vol. VIII, Document 417.

<sup>8</sup> See Document 74.

#### 4. *Disarmament*

This topic had been referred to in passing at an early stage in the conversation when Harriman reminded Kozlov of his remark to Khrushchev that if the Democrats were elected in 1960 they would not be satisfied with a national growth rate of only 2%, nor would they be so concerned with balancing the budget; they would spend more to keep up with Soviet missile production.<sup>9</sup> After making this statement, Harriman added, he had the impression Khrushchev was considerably less keen on the Democratic Party. Kozlov merely said something about wasting money over missiles and pointed out that Khrushchev had insisted to Harriman that they liked the Democrats, nevertheless.

In response to Harriman's question, Kozlov said that he thought the disarmament question seemed to be "on better rails" than other questions at issue. Harriman agreed. Confirming a point made by Admiral Kirk, Kozlov said that prohibition of nuclear weapons testing was the first step to the reduction of other types of armaments. Harriman said that there would be more progress in this if the President and Khrushchev got together than if the scientists tried to agree, since scientists were basically inventors and they invented new reasons why previous proposals must be considered unsound. Kozlov said he fully shared this opinion.

#### 5. *Harriman's subsequent comments*

After accompanying Kozlov to 680 Park Avenue,<sup>10</sup> I returned to check impressions of the meeting with Harriman. He expressed the opinion that Kozlov, in comparison with Stalin and Khrushchev, was "soft". During the talks with Khrushchev Kozlov had stayed very much in the background, as befitted a man 15 years junior to Khrushchev and Mikoyan. Harriman added that Khrushchev chided him for seeking to interview Kirichenko, demanding "Why do you bet on Kirichenko as my successor? He would be very tough on you. If you bet on Kirichenko, you will lose your money." Later Khrushchev said that on one thing he and Mikoyan agreed: Kozlov would succeed him (presumably in the Premiership, though Harriman evidently did not gain clarification on this point).

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<sup>9</sup> For the record of Harriman's conversation with Khrushchev, see Document 75.

<sup>10</sup> Address of the Soviet Mission to the United Nations.

**87. Memorandum of Conversation**

New York, July 12, 1959.

## PARTICIPANTS

Deputy Prime Minister Frol R. Kozlov, U.S.S.R.  
Ambassador Mikhail A. Menshikov, Embassy of the U.S.S.R.  
Mr. Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter  
Deputy Under Secretary Robert Murphy  
Mr. Foy Kohler

In accordance with the President's instructions,<sup>1</sup> accompanied by Mr. Foy Kohler, I proceeded to New York on the evening of July 12. We met with Deputy Prime Minister Kozlov, Ambassador Menshikov and an interpreter at the Soviet Mission Headquarters, 68th and Park Avenue, New York City. After an exchange of comments regarding Mr. Kozlov's tour in the United States, with which he expressed great satisfaction and appreciation (asking that the President be so informed), I informed him that at the President's request, I was asking whether he would be kind enough to take with him to Moscow a sealed envelope addressed to Prime Minister Khrushchev by the President.<sup>2</sup> He agreed with alacrity. I handed him the sealed envelope and then said in addition I wished to convey to him an oral message from the President following the notes which I had in my hand. Then reading from the talking paper,<sup>3</sup> I conveyed to him the verbatim text of that paper. This was taken down by the interpreter in English and translated to Kozlov and Menshikov. They expressed the greatest interest. Mr. Kozlov said that his decision to leave the United States on the evening of July 12 rather than July 13 is due to his desire to see Prime Minister Khrushchev in Moscow immediately after his arrival there and prior to Mr. Khrushchev's departure for Poland.<sup>4</sup> He promised to immediately deliver the President's written message and to convey to Mr. Khrushchev the oral message.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.6111/7-1359. Top Secret. Drafted by Murphy. Attached to the source text is a July 13 transmittal memorandum from Acting Secretary Dillon to President Eisenhower.

<sup>1</sup> At a meeting with Secretary Herter and other Department of State officials on July 10, the President directed the Department of State to revise a draft letter from the President to Khrushchev and a talking paper which Murphy would use in this meeting with Kozlov. These documents related to the President's invitation to Khrushchev for an exchange of visits between the two leaders. A memorandum of this conference with the President on July 10 is printed in vol. VIII, Document 431.

<sup>2</sup> A draft of the letter is printed as Document 89.

<sup>3</sup> Document 88.

<sup>4</sup> Khrushchev visited Poland July 14–23.

I informed Mr. Kozlov that this matter was being maintained by us in strictest confidence and hoped that they would treat it in the same manner. He agreed readily, emphasizing that there would be no publicity.

We explained to Mr. Kozlov that it had been our intention to see him off at Idlewild but that when he shifted his departure to 4 a.m., we thought that he would understand our inability to be at the airport. He said he fully understood and that our visit to him at the Soviet Mission took care of all the amenities and protocol.

It was agreed with Mr. Kozlov that if questioned by the press we would say that we had come to New York to bid him farewell as a matter of protocol, and if asked he would confirm it that way. Fortunately, as we visited Mr. Kozlov at 8:15 p.m. in the Mission Headquarters after the press had departed, as far as we know, we were not observed by any newspaper people on arrival or departure. We went immediately into the Mission Headquarters and by private elevator to the office on the upper floor. The meeting was limited to the above indicated. It seemed clear that the Russians themselves desired to keep the matter strictly confidential and had arranged our reception accordingly.

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## 88. Paper Prepared in the Department of State

Washington, undated.

### TALKING PAPER

President Eisenhower, in his desire to promote peaceful solutions of international problems, has received reports of statements made by Prime Minister Nikita S. Khrushchev on various international problems which are of interest to the United States Government. At times the point of view attributed to Mr. Khrushchev would seem to imply a certain misunderstanding of the facts as known to President Eisenhower. Having this in mind for some time past, the President would like First Deputy Prime Minister Frol R. Kozlov, since the latter is just now departing from the United States and going directly to Moscow, to convey to Prime Minister Khrushchev a personal and confidential message from President Eisenhower.

It might lead to a better understanding of our problems if there could be a personal meeting between Prime Minister Khrushchev and

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Top Secret. Regarding the drafting and presentation of this paper, see Document 87.



President Eisenhower on an informal basis under arrangements which would facilitate a friendly exchange of views on topics of mutual concern and in a relaxed atmosphere. What is contemplated is not a negotiation but merely a discussion for the purpose of improving the understanding of both parties regarding the problems which concern them.

President Eisenhower is hopeful, as he is sure Prime Minister Khrushchev must be, that the Foreign Ministers who resume their Geneva meeting on July 13 will make such progress as would justify a meeting of the four Heads of State.<sup>1</sup> Should this prove to be the case, President Eisenhower would support the idea of a Four Power meeting at a place such as Quebec, Canada. There are considerations of a practical nature which make Quebec attractive to President Eisenhower as a place for the meeting. First of all, of course, the Canadians have urged its use. As concerns the American side, the President of the United States has constitutional obligations which make extended absence at a greater distance very inconvenient. Congress will undoubtedly be in session throughout most of the summer which requires the President's presence except for very brief periods. If that should be agreeable to Prime Minister Khrushchev, President Eisenhower would like to arrange for the informal meeting above mentioned between Prime Minister Khrushchev and himself at Camp David near Washington at a moment which would be mutually suitable, prior to the Quebec meeting. In the event that Prime Minister Khrushchev would be interested in visiting points of interest in the United States incident to a meeting at Camp David, President Eisenhower would be pleased to make the necessary arrangements. President Eisenhower understands that Prime Minister Khrushchev has a very heavy schedule this summer with visits to Poland and Scandinavia,<sup>2</sup> etc., and this may pose for him a practical problem, even assuming that the above outline might be of interest to him. Therefore the question of the exact timing would be a matter on which the views of Mr. Khrushchev would be necessary.

Should the foregoing appeal to Prime Minister Khrushchev as a possibility, President Eisenhower adds that if this is agreeable he might find it possible to visit the Soviet Union later this year, perhaps in October, should that prove convenient to the Soviet authorities.

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<sup>1</sup> Documentation on the meeting of Foreign Ministers in Geneva May 11–August 5 is in volume VIII.

<sup>2</sup> On July 20, the Soviet Government announced that Khrushchev had postponed his scheduled trip in August to Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark because of alleged increased hostile activities against the Soviet Union by several organizations and organs of the press in these countries. Khrushchev later conceded that these Scandinavian activities provided an excuse for postponing his visit to Scandinavia so that he could visit the United States instead. (*Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament*, p. 370)

**89. Draft Letter From President Eisenhower to Chairman Khrushchev**

Washington, undated.

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: For some time past, it has seemed to me that it would be mutually profitable for us to have an informal exchange of views about problems which interest both of us. This thought has been reinforced by a suggestion attributed to you at the time of the recent visit of the American Governors to the Soviet Union.<sup>1</sup>

Accordingly, I have asked Mr. Robert Murphy to communicate to First Deputy Prime Minister Frol R. Kozlov, who is departing from the United States this Sunday evening, some ideas for your consideration.<sup>2</sup> Perhaps when you have had time to consider my suggestions, you would be kind enough to communicate your reaction via your Ambassador in Washington, Mr. Menshikov. I am sure that you will agree with me regarding the importance of keeping this matter confidential for the present.

Hoping that this method of communication may be satisfactory to you, believe me

Yours sincerely,<sup>3</sup>

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Top Secret. Attached to the source text is a July 11 covering memorandum from Acting Secretary Dillon to the President, indicating that the attached draft letter to Khrushchev was for his signature. Also attached to Dillon's memorandum is a copy of Document 88. Dillon's memorandum bears the President's initials. Regarding the drafting and presentation of this letter to Khrushchev, see Document 87.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 83.

<sup>2</sup> See Documents 87 and 88.

<sup>3</sup> Printed from an unsigned copy.

## 90. Report Prepared in the Office of Soviet Union Affairs

Washington, July 16, 1959.

### SUBJECT

Kozlov Visit: Evaluation

#### 1. *Kozlov's Impact in US*

On the whole Kozlov probably made a favorable personal impression on most Americans he met during his fortnight's visit. His appearance, for one thing, was disarmingly non-revolutionary. Conservatively dressed in Western-style dark serge, white shirt and a banker's tie, flashing a ready smile, and speaking in moderate rather than declaratory tones, he displayed qualities of persuasion that caused San Francisco clothing store magnate Cyril Magnin to exclaim (albeit fatuously) "I'd like to have him working for me as a salesman".

Whether Kozlov's message, or the variations of it he delivered on various occasions, made an impression of comparable plausibility seemed open to question. The principal catechism—peace, friendship, coexistence—was already familiar, if not trite; and Kozlov added no specifics to the formula which would have added verisimilitude. His central point was that if good relations between the two major powers can be secured, world peace would become a certainty. He was at pains to make clear to Americans that, given the existence of opposing social systems, a certain amount of friction and disagreement was inevitable and should not occasion undue anxiety. At the same time, he urged, efforts should be made to hold these irritations to a controllable minimum, without aggravating them by the indiscriminate use of pejorative terms like Communist and Imperialist. Above all, renunciation of force and dedication to the solution of disputes through negotiations is paramount. For its part, Kozlov argued, the USSR was a dependable partner whose word, contrary to some assertions, could be trusted; it had honored the wartime alliance and the armistice agreements in Korea and Viet-Nam. In any event, the US side was not free from the onus of breaking agreements, he charged, referring specifically to Germany.

Kozlov was obviously concerned to reduce suspicion of Soviet intentions; the program to catch up with and surpass the US in per capita output should not be taken as a threat, but as testimony that the US is considered the most worthy rival in an enterprise of raising living standards to which no American should in fairness take exception.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.6111/7-1359. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by McSweeney and Isham on July 16. The source text is incorrectly dated July 13.

Finally, instead of looking backward, the two countries should look forward. In resources, technological achievements, and national character the two countries, he stressed, had much in common. Expanded cultural relations had already proved their value; trade was next on the agenda, although in this respect Kozlov rather defensively added that the USSR was not in the position of a supplicant, since it had demonstrated its ability to survive economic blockade. Further, he maintained, the USSR had, in superabundance, all of the resources required to meet the goals of its economic plans. Trade, therefore, is a desirable thing rather than an economic necessity. And the main obstacle to trade was not US businessmen who had in concrete terms indicated their readiness to do business (e.g., the recent proposed sale of an entire chemical plant to the USSR),<sup>1</sup> but the US Government and in particular the State Department.

We estimate that a characteristic reaction to all these fair words was one of polite attention and approval in principle, strongly tempered by skepticism as to how Soviet verbal reasonableness would be translated into action. Kozlov made no serious effort to defend the Berlin proposals in public, and similarly he avoided discussing the East European situation. Rather he became involved in discussion of thorny problems only when prodded fairly strongly by his American interlocutors. His very silence on immediate and specific issues diluted the effectiveness of his sales campaign.

## 2. *Impact of Trip on Kozlov*

Kozlov's stated estimate of the trip was unequivocally positive: to Harriman he said that the visit had been "very useful" and that he was leaving the country with the warmest feelings in his heart.<sup>2</sup> Before his departure he told both State Department representatives<sup>3</sup> who had accompanied him that he was completely satisfied with all the arrangements that had been made, was grateful for all the help given him, and had no adverse comments of any kind. He also told Harriman that he had been deeply touched by the spontaneous applause given the Soviet singing and dancing ensemble in Madison Square Garden. He regarded this warm reception as further testimony of the basically friendly feelings between the two peoples. There seems to be no ground for doubting that these comments were accurate reflections of Kozlov's response to the cordial attention and sincere welcome given him in this country.

As a Party careerist who had never been outside of the Sino-Soviet bloc (except for Finland), Kozlov could have been expected to come to

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<sup>1</sup> Not further identified.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 86.

<sup>3</sup> McSweeney and Isham.

this country with many deeply rooted prejudices; and he undoubtedly departed with the fundamental tenets of ultimate Communist victory unshaken. He remarked to his concluding press conference that he agreed with Khrushchev that our grandchildren will live in a “socialist” America, although he of course disclaimed any Soviet intention of interfering in US domestic affairs.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, as a Presidium member, Kozlov presumably has access to considerable information about this country; and either for that reason or because he is an experienced and self-composed official, he betrayed no astonishment at finding no visible evidence of unemployment and, on the contrary, high morale among the many workers with whom he talked on factory visits.

Kozlov deliberately avoided acquainting himself with certain aspects of American life, notably labor unions and working class housing. He declined an invitation to meet with James Carey on the grounds that he was a labor bureaucrat (reflecting Kozlov’s often expressed contempt for bureaucrats as well as constituting a useful pretext to avoid a sharp cross questioning such as administered to Mikoyan).<sup>5</sup> Nor did Kozlov seem displeased when visits to housing redevelopment areas had to be cancelled because of schedule changes caused by his earlier return to Moscow. He did not take advantage of a Levittown, L.I., worker’s invitation to visit his home on the Sunday before his departure.

Given Kozlov’s indoctrination, character, and caution lest he be impaled à la Mikoyan, there are limits on the impact any such brief visit could have made on him. It would, therefore, be extremely difficult to draw any conclusions as to the estimate he may have made of political and social conditions in the US.

Nevertheless, Kozlov is intelligent, observant, practical-minded, and experienced in dealing with men and affairs. Given these qualities, and considering his comments and questions during the trip, we believe he was particularly impressed by technological advances, the abundance and variety of goods and services, the excellence of transportation facilities, the lack of disproportions in the nation’s economic development, and, on the intangible side, by the unmistakable sincerity and integrity of his American hosts and acquaintances. At the same time, Kozlov’s pride in Soviet technological and scientific achievements was doubtless reaffirmed by his probable estimate that in certain phases of economic development (e.g., the harnessing of nuclear power, steel rolling mill equipment) we were either not significantly ahead of the Soviet Union or were even in some respects behind her.

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<sup>4</sup> Kozlov’s press conference on July 12 was summarized in *The New York Times*, July 13, 1959.

<sup>5</sup> Regarding Mikoyan’s meeting with James Carey, see footnote 8, Document 61.

The bogey of the American businessman profiteering on armaments, if it ever was a real bogey to Kozlov, must have been largely dissipated, although he would not admit this when Harriman attempted to needle him on this score. Kozlov may also have gained a more balanced insight into the relationship between public opinion and the press, for notwithstanding sharply worded editorials in Detroit, for example, his reception by individual Detroit businessmen was entirely courteous. (Kozlov had his staff make full reports to him on all press comments throughout the trip.)

Representing the new *apparatchik* in the USSR, Kozlov will be heard with particular respect by his Presidium colleagues. His views, while they probably correspond in most respects with those of Mikoyan, may in the end count for more with Khrushchev and the Central Committee.

At least one of Kozlov's misconceptions was known to be demolished—the tale that during the 1921–23 famine the USSR had to take gold from the churches in order to pay the US for food. When faced down by the Vice President and the Secretary of State over this, and presented with the personal recollections of Mr. Hoover, Kozlov had to admit he was mistaken.<sup>6</sup>

### 3. *Conclusions*

On the one hand, therefore, Kozlov in our opinion did not exert any impact of consequence upon the unity of national purpose over current international questions, or stir up appreciable new pressures for trade. On the other hand, we believe that Kozlov was not insensible to the massive evidence of capitalist vigor and individual enterprise to which he was exposed. The net result of the Kozlov trip, therefore, appears to be a clear gain for US interests, particularly in that it carried forward the process of extending a realistic knowledge of this country to the younger policy-making group within the Soviet hierarchy.

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<sup>6</sup> Regarding Kozlov's assertion, see Document 79. No record of Vice President Nixon's or Secretary Herter's statements to Kozlov nor former President Hoover's personal recollections on this issue have been found.

91. Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Eisenhower

July 21, 1959.<sup>1</sup>

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have received your letter and the confidential verbal message transmitted by Mr. Robert Murphy through my First Deputy, F.R. Kozlov.<sup>2</sup>

I have studied your considerations with great attention and deem it necessary to inform you of the following:

As you know, in the past I have more than once spoken of the desirability of your visiting our country and of the possibility of my visiting the USA. This subject was also touched upon in my recent conversation with the Governors from the USA,<sup>3</sup> to which you are referring. For this reason, I have learned with pleasure from your message that you are expressing the desire to visit the Soviet Union at the end of this year, approximately in October. I can assure you, Mr. President, that you will be a welcome guest of ours and that you will be received in the Soviet Union with all the hospitality which is inherent in our people.

You have also communicated that you would like to have us agree with regard to an informal meeting between us in the USA as early as this summer. I agree with you on the usefulness of a friendly exchange of opinion between us on questions of mutual interest and I readily accept your suggestion for such a meeting.

People who know say that the weather in America is very hot in August and that for a man who is not used to your climate this time of the year is not suitable for a visit. They believe that September would be a more favorable time for my visit. Therefore, I could come to your country in September, but I should like to know what your opinion is. If this time is agreeable to you we could agree on a specific date.

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series. Top Secret. A handwritten note by the President at the top of the source text reads: “State is working on draft—it will be cabled first to Herter. DE”

On July 21 at 6:45 p.m., Ambassador Menshikov called on the President and gave him the Russian text of this letter and an oral translation. Eisenhower expressed his thanks for Khrushchev’s prompt and courteous response and added that the United States had never specified what progress in negotiations should be made before a summit meeting. The important thing was to be able to point to progress as men of good will and to the maintenance of U.S. rights in Berlin. He believed that the visits and informal talks would be helpful to U.S.–Soviet relations. (Memorandum of conversation; Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1459) The source text does not indicate who prepared the translation of the letter printed here.

<sup>1</sup> The source text gives no place of origin; perhaps because Khrushchev was in Poland July 14–23.

<sup>2</sup> See Documents 87–89.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 8, Document 79, and Document 83.

I attach no particularly great significance to the form of an exchange of opinion between us, i.e. whether it will be in the form of negotiations or an informal discussion. It appears that at this stage it is better to have a discussion on an informal basis, as you have proposed. But the main thing, of course, is to find a common language and common understanding of the problems we are to resolve.

I also accept with great pleasure your kind suggestion that I make a tour of your country, and I could allocate for that purpose from 10 to 15 days. I shall instruct our Ambassador to deliberate a program for my stay in the USA and I should like to ask you, Mr. President, to instruct, at your discretion, someone to give us recommendations as to how this period of time can be spent more productively and with greater benefit, so as to learn better about life in America and the activities of the American people.

It appears that we should agree as to the basis on which your visit to the Soviet Union and my visit to the USA would take place.

In your message, you, Mr. President, make the convening of a meeting at the highest level contingent upon positive results of the Conference of Foreign Ministers at Geneva. Our views on this subject are apparently known to you. Just as you do, we wish to hope that progress will be made at the negotiations at Geneva, and we are doing everything in our power to achieve this goal, although efforts by our country alone are not sufficient for success.

However, we believe that a meeting at the highest level is necessary irrespective of whether our Ministers of Foreign Affairs will be able to move forward at Geneva or not. Moreover, it is our opinion that a meeting of heads of state and heads of government will be particularly necessary if no progress is made at the Geneva negotiations. We believe that our Governments must not halt when confronted with difficulties—they must do everything possible to normalize the situation, to lessen international tension, and to ensure solid and lasting peace.

As to your considerations with regard to the holding in the near future, of a meeting at the highest level at Quebec, we have no grounds for objecting to having such a meeting take place at Quebec.

I express the hope that the considerations which I have set forth will meet with favorable attitude on your part.

Sincerely yours,

**N. Khrushchev<sup>4</sup>**

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<sup>4</sup>Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.



## JULY–AUGUST 1959: VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION OF RICHARD M. NIXON

### 92. Editorial Note

Vice President Richard M. Nixon made an unofficial visit to the Soviet Union July 23–August 2. The main purpose of his visit was to open the American National Exhibition in Sokolniki Park in Moscow on July 25. Yuri Zhukov, Chairman of the Soviet State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, invited Vice President Nixon on December 5, 1958, to open the exhibition. A memorandum of that conversation is in Part 2, Document 7.

Nixon later recalled that Abbott Washburn, Deputy Director of the U.S. Information Agency, who was then working on the cultural exchange program with the Soviet Union, first suggested to Nixon the idea of his visit to the Soviet Union. (*Six Crises*, page 255) No further record of their discussion on this matter has been found, but when Nixon brought up the possibility of opening the American National Exhibition in Moscow with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Under Secretary of State Christian A. Herter, both of whom supported the idea, Herter also noted that USIA endorsed the proposed trip. (Telegram 1626 to Moscow, April 8; Department of State, Central Files, 033.1100–NI/4–859)

When the views of Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson were solicited, he responded that Deputy Foreign Minister Valerian Aleksandrovich Zorin had just referred on his own initiative to Mikoyan's conversation with Nixon in January in which Mikoyan had received the impression that the Vice President might be interested in visiting the Soviet Union, possibly in connection with the opening of the Exhibition in Sokolniki Park, and he wondered whether the Soviet Government should extend an invitation. Thompson, who had been present at this Mikoyan–Nixon conversation, told Zorin that he was sure that Nixon would like to visit the Soviet Union but advised against a formal invitation. He emphasized instead that whenever the Vice President decided on the visit, he was sure the appropriate arrangements could be made without difficulty. Thompson advised the Department of State that he favored Nixon's visit, opposed a formal Soviet invitation, and suggested that the United States try to obtain a commitment from the Soviet Government for a broadcast of a speech by Nixon nationwide to the Soviet people either at the opening of the Exhibition or on some separate occasion. (Telegram 2025 from Moscow, April 9; *ibid.*, 711.12/4–959) The memorandum of Nixon's January 6 conversation with Mikoyan is printed as Document 61.

In a memorandum to the President, April 9, Acting Secretary Herter forwarded Thompson's response in telegram 2025 along with his

own and Secretary Dulles' recommendation that they favored the idea of Nixon's visit and, if the President approved, recommended that George V. Allen, Director of the U.S. Information Agency, make the announcement as soon as possible in order to dissociate the proposed visit from a possible summit conference. A handwritten notation by Goodpaster on this memorandum reads: "President indicated he strongly approved. State notified."

A memorandum from Foy D. Kohler, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, to Livingston T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, April 13, attached to telegram 2025, noted that Abbott Washburn argued that USIA was refraining from publicity concerning the Exhibition to avoid giving it a propaganda aspect and much preferred that the announcement of Nixon's visit come from James C. Hagerty, the President's Press Secretary. For text of the press release issued by the White House in Augusta, Georgia, on April 17, which announced Nixon's forthcoming trip to the Soviet Union, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 18, 1959, pages 698–699.

When Vice President Nixon asked Secretary Dulles for suggestions in connection with a possible meeting with Khrushchev during his trip, Dulles responded, as summarized in a memorandum from Joseph N. Greene, Jr., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, to the Executive Secretariat, April 20:

"Secretary Dulles told Mr. Herter today that the Vice President had asked him whether he had any suggestion as to the line which he, the Vice President, might take with Khrushchev during his visit to Moscow. Secretary Dulles said he had suggested that the Vice President task Khrushchev with the crisis he has artificially created with respect to West Berlin along the lines that Khrushchev and the Soviet leaders profess their desire for peaceful coexistence and peaceful competition. West Berlin is geographically, ideologically and economically a test case of these professions; if they were sincere, it is hard to see how the Soviet leaders could insist on allied withdrawal from West Berlin and the consequent destruction of all or most that the West has helped the West Berliners to accomplish. West Berlin is in fact no threat to the Soviet empire and, in the situation which has been created, there could be a living example of both peaceful coexistence and peaceful competition. The Soviet demands for West withdrawal strongly suggests that the Soviets do not in fact want either." (Department of State, Central Files, 033.1100–NI/4–2059)

In the ensuing weeks, Ambassador Thompson had numerous conversations with representatives of the Soviet Foreign Ministry concerning Nixon's expected arrival, length of stay, itinerary, the number and names of members of his party as well as accompanying journalists, Nixon's special requests on places he might wish to see, and other arrangements. Telegrams to and from Moscow on these details from late April to late July 1959 are *ibid.*, 033.1100–NI. Nixon requested,

among other things, the Soviet Government's permission to leave the Soviet Union on his plane via Siberia on his way to visit Alaska, which had recently attained statehood. (Telegram 2222 from Moscow, May 7, and telegram 1855 to Moscow, May 7; both *ibid.*, 033.1100–NI/5–759) The Soviet Government, however, claiming that the Siberian aviation route was "not suitable for flights of foreign planes," denied Nixon's request. (Telegram 2482 from Moscow, June 8; *ibid.*, 033.1100–NI/6–859) More positively, the Soviet Government indicated that Nixon's address at the opening of the American National Exhibition as well as a later speech during his visit would be broadcast nationwide on radio and television. (Telegram 2163 to Moscow, June 22; *ibid.*, 033.1100–NI/6–859)

Because Frolov Kozlov, First Deputy Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers, had expressed personal satisfaction for the treatment he received during his visit to the United States and had told Nixon that "all doors in Soviet Union open to you," Nixon renewed his request to visit Siberia in U.S. aircraft and to exit eastward to Alaska. (Telegram 27 to Moscow, July 2; *ibid.*, 033.1100–NI/7–259) The Soviets denied these requests, and Nixon regretfully accepted the use of Soviet aircraft for his visit to Siberian cities. (Telegram 69 to Moscow, July 8; *ibid.*, 033.1100–NI/7–859)

Nixon also asked to visit a Soviet missile launching site, saying he had personally arranged for Kozlov to visit a U.S. missile launching site, although Kozlov declined the invitation, as well as a production line of Soviet intermediate-range ballistic missiles, comparable to the Thor missile line, which Andrei Nikolaevich Tupolev, Soviet aircraft designer and member of the Kozlov party, visited in California. (Telegram 98 to Moscow, July 10; *ibid.*, 033.1100–NI/7–1059) The Soviets did not respond to these requests (telegram 267 from Moscow, July 22; *ibid.*, 033.1100–NI/7–2259), and Nixon did not visit a missile factory or launching site during his trip.

As late as July 2, Nixon had no plans to visit any other nation en route to or from the Soviet Union. (Telegram 37 to Vienna, July 3; *ibid.*, 033.1100–NI/7–259) However, once the Soviet Government denied his request to leave from Siberia, he began to explore short visits to other nations during his return to the United States. He finally accepted a longstanding invitation from Poland to visit that country following his departure from Moscow. (Telegram 59 to Warsaw, July 17; *ibid.*, 033.1100–NI/7–1759) Regarding the background of the Polish invitation, see Part 2, Document 73.

President Eisenhower's letters of greeting and of introduction of Nixon to Chairman Nikita Khrushchev and to Kliment Efremovich Voroshilov, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, both dated July 20, are printed in *Toward Better Understanding*, pages 1–2. The

memorandum of a July 22 conversation between Eisenhower and Nixon on the Vice President's impending trip is printed as Document 93. A detailed itinerary of Nixon's visit to the Soviet Union and Poland, July 22–August 5, is attached to a memorandum prepared by John A. Armitage (EUR/SOV) on October 16 on the administrative aspects of his trip. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.1100–NI/10–1659) Also attached is a list of the people accompanying Nixon. These included his wife Pat, the President's brother Milton S. Eisenhower, Vice Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, Foy D. Kohler, George V. Allen, and Herbert G. Klein, the Vice President's Press Secretary.

Briefing books prepared for the Vice President's trip are *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1413 and 1414. CF 1415 is a miscellaneous file on the trip. CF 1416 contains a detailed chronology, including copies of memoranda of conversation between Nixon and Soviet officials.

Nixon left Friendship Airport in Baltimore on July 22 at about 9 p.m. and arrived at Vnukova Airport in Moscow on July 23 at about 3 p.m. For text of his arrival statement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 17, 1959, pages 227–228, and *Toward Better Understanding*, pages 2–4. He then drove to Spaso House where he resided during most of his stay in Moscow.

On the next morning, July 24 at about 9:30 a.m., he met with Voroshilov; see Document 94. He then met with Khrushchev; see Document 95. Nixon and Khrushchev then went to Sokolniki Park for a preview of the American National Exhibition. A transcript of Khrushchev's remarks at the American exhibit at a model television studio, which featured a new type of color television tape, is in Department of State, Central Files, 033.1100–NI/7–2559. For some unexplained reason, Nixon's remarks during this exchange with Khrushchev were omitted from the transcript. The videotape of this exchange including Nixon's remarks, was broadcast in the United States by the American television networks on the late evening news on July 25. Nixon and Khrushchev had agreed during this exchange that the tape and kinescope of their conversation would be released simultaneously in the United States and the Soviet Union after the translations had been checked, but the networks aired the exchange before Nixon had given his approval. Documentation on the agreement, the networks' actions, and the repercussions of these broadcasts on Soviet-American relations is *ibid.*, 033.1100–NI.

During their tour of the American exhibit, Nixon and Khrushchev came to a model American home where they stopped in the kitchen. Here ensued the "kitchen debate" where they conducted a wide-ranging argument on the relative merits of the capitalist and Communist systems. This debate was not carried on television but was observed by many reporters and reported in the press. A reconstruction of their informal exchanges at the model television studio and model American

home is printed in *The New York Times*, July 25, 1959. Nixon's account of these exchanges is in *Six Crises*, pages 272–279. For Khrushchev's recollections, see *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament*, pages 364–367. Nixon's message to the President and Acting Secretary of State C. Douglas Dillon, July 24, on his activities that day is printed as Document 96.

Early that same evening, Nixon and Khrushchev returned to Sokolniki Park for the formal opening of the American National Exhibition. For texts of Khrushchev's remarks, Eisenhower's letter of greeting, which Nixon read, and Nixon's own address on this occasion, see *Toward Better Understanding*, pages 4–15. Eisenhower's letter and Nixon's address are also printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, August 17, 1959, pp. 228–232.

The next morning, July 25, Nixon met separately with Anastas Mikoyan and Frol Kozlov; see Documents 97 and 98. That evening, Nixon departed Spaso House for the Soviet Government guest house, a dacha about 30 miles from Moscow.

Early the next afternoon, July 26, Khrushchev, Mikoyan, Kozlov, and their wives arrived, and they and the Nixons took a boat trip on the Moscow River. After their return, at a late afternoon picnic, there was a lengthy conversation between Khrushchev and Nixon; see Document 99. Nixon's message to Eisenhower, July 26, on this conversation is Document 100.

On July 27, Nixon and his party left for Leningrad where they toured a factory and shipyard, and had a boat and automobile sightseeing tour. On July 28, Nixon left for Novosibirsk. After a tour of the Ural Hydroelectric Plant and a boat cruise on the nearby lake on July 29, he flew to Sverdlovsk where he inspected a factory. The next morning, July 30, he went by car to Pervouralsk where he toured a steel rolling mill factory and a copper mine. On July 31, he saw a nuclear power plant before returning to Moscow by plane. His message to the President, July 31, reporting on his 5-day tour is printed as Document 103.

On August 1, Nixon spent the day preparing his speech which he delivered over radio and television that evening. For text of his address, see *Toward Better Understanding*, pages 16–24, and Department of State *Bulletin*, August 17, 1959, pages 232–236. He also wrote Khrushchev three letters, all dated August 1. One is printed as Document 104. Regarding his letter inquiring about the fate of the missing crewmen from the crash of the C-130 plane in the Soviet Union on September 2, 1958, see Document 55. For text of Nixon's thank-you letter to Khrushchev, along with Khrushchev's reply of August 6, see *Toward Better Understanding*, pages 32–33. Before leaving Moscow, Nixon received letters from Khrushchev and Voroshilov to Eisenhower, both dated August 1959, which were replies to Eisenhower's July 20 letters to them. Nixon

delivered these letters to the President upon his return to the United States. For texts, see *Toward Better Understanding*, pages 33–35.

At 10 a.m. on August 2, Nixon held a press conference. For the transcript, see *ibid.*, pages 24–31. An hour later he briefed the French and Canadian Ambassadors and the German and British Chargés on his visit. This briefing was summarized in telegram 421 from Moscow, August 3. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.1100–NI/8–359)

Documentation on Nixon's visit to Poland August 2–5 is in Part 2, Documents 73–78.

For texts of the exchange of greetings between Acting Secretary of State Dillon and the Vice President upon the latter's return to Washington on August 5, see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 24, 1959, pages 272–273.

Ambassador Thompson's evaluation of Nixon's visit to the Soviet Union was transmitted in telegram 428 from Moscow, Document 105. A memorandum of the Vice President's conference with the President, August 5, is printed as Document 106. Allen Dulles' evaluation of the visit given to the National Security Council on August 6 is printed as Document 107.

Nixon published his recollections of his trip to the Soviet Union and Poland in *Six Crises*, pages 253–314.

Additional documentation on Nixon's visit to the Soviet Union is in Department of State, Central Files 033.1100–NI and Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1413–1416.

**93. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower**

Washington, July 22, 1959, 11:45 a.m.

## OTHERS PRESENT

Vice President Nixon  
Secretary Dillon  
Major Eisenhower

The President opened by giving the Vice President a piece of correspondence from Prime Minister Macmillan containing advice on how to deal with the Soviet personalities in his forthcoming trip.<sup>1</sup> To place his view in perspective, the President quoted a question he had received in Press Conference this morning asking what the President would like Mr. Nixon to ask Khrushchev.<sup>2</sup> The President had pointed out that the Vice President constitutionally has a position of his own and goes on such missions only at the request and as a representative of the President. He is not a normal part of the negotiating machinery. With regard to his exact schedule, the Vice President confirmed that he plans to visit Poland on the way back from Moscow and has no plans to go to Paris.

[Here follows discussion on the possibility of Nixon stopping in Paris to see President de Gaulle after his visit to Poland and on the Foreign Ministers Meeting in Geneva. This part of the memorandum is printed in volume VIII, Document 466.]

As to tactics in dealing with the Russians, the President recommended a cordial, almost light, atmosphere, on the basis that once the Soviets get us worried they act tough. He said the Vice President can probably expect to be filled up with the same old line. To this, Mr. Nixon expressed his intention of debating with Khrushchev and countering his points. He feels he has an excellent chance to probe and cause some blurring out of Khrushchev's real feelings. He also said he hoped to lay to rest some of Khrushchev's misconceptions about America, particularly with regard to the familiar line that the American people want peace but their leaders do not. He would point out that the reason that our Parties are unified in foreign policy is that our people believe the way our leaders do.

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Prepared by Major Eisenhower and initialed by Goodpaster.

<sup>1</sup> Macmillan's July 22 letter to Eisenhower contained Macmillan's "general reflections" for the Vice President on how to deal with Khrushchev. He stressed Khrushchev's apparent abandonment of direct aggression and his emphasis on "competitive co-existence," his interest in developing the Soviet economy, his desire for respectability, his intense suspicion of the West, and his resentment at plain speaking. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204)

<sup>2</sup> For the transcript of the President's July 22 press conference, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1959*, pp. 536–546.

The President agreed to this and pointed out how we have changed our view of the Soviet people over the last three years. In 1956 we pictured them as sullen and discouraged. Now we have discovered that, despite their governmental system, which is abhorrent to us, they are able to maintain a high morale.

Mr. Nixon expects that the Poles will announce the fact that he is visiting their country. The trip to Poland, he feels, will be very helpful, particularly since he will have the unusual privilege of talking with Gomulka. In Russia, he feels an important matter will be his opportunity to see the icebreaker *Lenin*. For this purpose he is taking Admiral Rickover along.<sup>3</sup> [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] The Vice President pointed out that in the missile field this is not the case. He hopes to see a missile assembly line similar to the Thor assembly line we showed Tupolev. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

Finally, the President advised Mr. Nixon not to be afraid to talk substantive matters and to be positive with the Soviets in his conversations with Khrushchev.

**John S. D. Eisenhower**

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<sup>3</sup> A memorandum prepared by McSweeney on July 15 on Kozlov's tour of the nuclear reactor at Shippingport, Pennsylvania, on July 11, which was under the personal direction of Admiral Rickover, noted that Rickover called McSweeney on July 13 to say, among other things, that Kozlov had assured Rickover that he would be welcome to visit Soviet atomic power installations at any time. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.6111/7-1159)

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## 94. Memorandum of Conversation

Moscow, July 24, 1959.

### SUBJECT

Vice President's conversation with Mr. Voroshilov

### PARTICIPANTS

*United States*—Vice President Nixon, Ambassador Thompson, Dr. Milton Eisenhower, Mr. Alexander Akalovsky (interpreting)

*USSR*—Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Klimenti Voroshilov

Mr. M.P. Georgadze, Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.1100-NI/7-2459. Secret. Drafted by Akalovsky and approved by Kohler on August 31.



Mr. V.V. Kuznetsov, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR  
Mr. S.R. Striganov, Deputy Chief of the American Countries Division, Ministry  
of Foreign Affairs of the USSR  
Mr. Lapanov (interpreting)

The conversation took place in the Kremlin, Moscow, USSR.

Mr. Voroshilov opened the conversation by saying that he wanted to greet the Vice President as a dear guest of the Soviet Union and to wish him health and success on his trip, which would be an extensive and interesting one. He said that the Vice President would not only open the American Exhibit in Moscow but also tour the USSR, and expressed the hope that the Vice President would like the country although, of course, people have different tastes.

Mr. Voroshilov also said that he wanted to greet Dr. Eisenhower.

The Vice President expressed his appreciation for the invitation to visit the Soviet Union and for the honor of being received by Chairman Voroshilov. He said that, although it was not his habit to get up very early, this morning he had got up around 6 a.m., because of the change in time between Washington and Moscow, and had visited a farmers' market.<sup>1</sup> That visit had touched him because of the friendly attitude of the farmers selling their products as well as of the customers. Referring to Chairman Voroshilov's remark regarding the fact that tastes differ, the Vice President said that some farmers had given him an apple and a pear to taste; the fruit tasted very good and it appeared that apples and pears had the same taste all over the world.

Mr. Voroshilov, using a Biblical term, replied that the Soviet people are a "man-loving people", and they particularly respect high foreign officials such as Mr. Nixon, because any visit by such an official should bring about a rapprochement and better understanding between nations. In this instance, rapprochement would be particularly welcome because it would occur between two nations with different social systems. In turn, any rapprochement consolidates peace throughout the world.

The Vice President agreed with Chairman Voroshilov's remarks and said that several workers and farmers he had met this morning had said to him that peace was their primary interest; he had assured the people there that the United States is for peace throughout the world. The Vice President also noted that he had been particularly interested in meeting several World War II veterans and that they also expressed their dedication to peace. This was only natural, because anyone who had gone through a war hates war. This is also characteristic of our President, whom Dr. Eisenhower knows, of course, much better, but

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<sup>1</sup> For Nixon's account of this visit, see *Six Crises*, pp. 267–269.

whom the Vice President has observed at conferences and meetings similar to this one over six and a half years. The President, who knows war better than anybody else in the world is wholeheartedly dedicated to peace.

Chairman Voroshilov observed that there are many war veterans in the USSR who lost their limbs in past wars and that all of them are dedicated to the cause of peace. The trouble with both the United States and the USSR is that they cannot come to agreement that there should be no new war. If only the United States and the USSR, as well as other countries, such as France and the United Kingdom, could get together and decide that there should be no new war, any disagreements could be resolved at a conference table. (At this point, Mr. Kuznetsov interjected that Adenauer would also have to join in such a decision.) Such discussions, Chairman Voroshilov remarked in jest, would not necessarily have to take place with champagne but they would be better with it. The main prerequisite for them is the will on the part of all parties concerned to bring about agreement. He asserted that it was mostly up to the United States and the USSR to bring about a better atmosphere in the world because if these two countries established friendship between them other countries would join them. If the USSR and the United States decided that there should be no war, then there would be no more wars.

The Vice President again referred to President Voroshilov's remark concerning the fact that tastes may differ and stated that he believed that we must realize that it has always been this way in the world: peoples have also had different systems of government and different approaches to problems. In the past, this resulted in war, and although war is always a terrible thing, past wars did not bring about complete disaster as a war would do today. However, we must realize that there are differences and that there will be vigorous presentation of different points of view. What is important is that we must not allow these differences to bring us to the point where one side would have to fight or surrender. In other words, today, as opposed to the situation prevailing even thirty years ago, the policy of ultimatum is completely outdated.

Chairman Voroshilov recalled the fact that the United States and the USSR were friends during the war and stated that there is no reason for them to fight, particularly in view of the fact that, in historical perspective, only seconds have passed since the time of great friendship between the two countries.

The Vice President emphasized that in order to bring about a situation where such things would not occur, it is important that neither side push the other. We must realize that it is possible to be friends and argue at the same time, but arguing must be done with words rather than fists.

At this point Chairman Voroshilov said that he realized that the Vice President was to go to another meeting and therefore he did not want to detain him. Before leaving, the Vice President delivered to Chairman Voroshilov a personal letter from the President.<sup>2</sup> After an exchange of customary pleasantries, the meeting ended at 10:00 a.m.

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<sup>2</sup> Regarding Eisenhower's July 20 letter to Voroshilov, see Document 92.

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## 95. Memorandum of Conversation

Moscow, July 24, 1959.

### SUBJECT

Vice President's Kremlin Conversation with Khrushchev

### PARTICIPANTS

*United States*—Vice President Nixon, Ambassador Thompson, Dr. Milton Eisenhower, Mr. Alexander Akalovsky (interpreting)

*USSR*—Mr. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR  
V.V. Kuznetsov, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR  
S.R. Striganov, Deputy Chief, American Countries Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR  
Mr. Troyanovski (interpreting)

The conversation took place in the Kremlin, Moscow, USSR.

At the outset of the conversation, the Vice President stated that he wanted to deliver a personal letter from the President to Mr. Khrushchev.<sup>1</sup> Mr. Khrushchev expressed his thanks for the letter.

There followed an exchange between Mr. Khrushchev and Dr. Eisenhower in the course of which Mr. Khrushchev, noting that Dr. Eisenhower is a smoker, said that President Eisenhower does not smoke and that apparently only his younger brother still has that bad habit.

Dr. Eisenhower replied that it is all right to have bad habits in small things and to excel in big things.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.1100-NI/7-2459. Confidential. Drafted by Akalovsky and approved by Kohler on August 31. For Nixon's account of this conversation, see *Six Crises*, pp. 269–272.

<sup>1</sup> Regarding Eisenhower's July 20 letter to Khrushchev, see Document 92.

Mr. Khrushchev then said that the weather in Moscow is very good now and that he hoped that the Vice President and his party will have a pleasant stay in the USSR.

The Vice President agreed that the weather in Moscow this time of the year is better than in Washington and then referred to his morning visit to a farmers' market which had reminded him of his younger days when he used to get up so early in order to buy the produce for his father's grocery store. He said that all the people and, in particular, the veterans he had met at the market had expressed great friendship for the people of the United States.

Mr. Khrushchev confirmed that the Soviet people have a great respect for the United States and particularly appreciate the joint efforts of the two countries in the war against Hitler. The United States has always been at the pinnacles of industrial development, economic progress, and standard of living; therefore, competition with such a country is a pleasant undertaking.

The Vice President said that he wanted to state that, in spite of what the Prime Minister might have heard to the contrary, there had been very favorable comment in the United States with regard to Mr. Khrushchev's vitality and keen sense of humor, as well as to his statements concerning competition with our country. The Vice President, recalling his speech,<sup>2</sup> at least a part of which had received favorable comment by Mr. Khrushchev, stated that the United States had nothing against this kind of competition. He also observed, in a jocular comment, that Mr. Khrushchev during his visit in Poland, where he had covered a lot of ground and visited many factories, had outdone many an American politician, as far as vigorousness and vitality were concerned.

Mr. Khrushchev replied that these are individual qualities which do no harm to anybody. Recalling his comments on the Vice President's speech, he said at that time he had wondered whether that speech had indeed been made by Mr. Nixon, because it had sounded so different from what he had been accustomed to hearing from Mr. Nixon. Of course, the end of the speech had been much better than the beginning. He said that he believed that if the United States and the USSR ended their arguments and polemics the way the Vice President had ended his speech, that would mean that the two sides would have at last appraised the situation correctly. However, actions such as the so-called Resolu-

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<sup>2</sup> Reference may be to Nixon's speech before the English Speaking Union in London on November 26, 1958. For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 5, 1959, pp. 14-17. In his conversation with Nixon on January 6, Mikoyan noted that Soviet leaders including Khrushchev, had been favorably impressed by the London speech; see Document 61.

tion on Captive Nations<sup>3</sup> indicate that the chances for such a correct appraisal on the part of the United States are rather slim.

Vice President Nixon said that Mr. Khrushchev's words only confirmed the old proverb that "the devil is not as red as he is painted". Referring to Mr. Khrushchev's remarks regarding the Resolution on Captive Nations, the Vice President said that there is one thing that he personally and the American people respect in Mr. Khrushchev and that is his frankness. Therefore, he appreciated Mr. Khrushchev's comments, but at the same time he wanted to point out that this resolution does not represent a new position of Congress, but rather the fact, which cannot be overlooked, that in our country there are citizens with a national background from Europe and Eastern Europe. These people, of course, make their views known, and Mr. Khrushchev may disagree with those views, but actions of Congress reflect public opinion in our country. The Vice President also pointed out that the President had specifically excluded from his proclamation the language referring to the territories now forming a part of the USSR, which was contained in the resolution of Congress. The resolution points up an aspect of the American system, an aspect which might be difficult to understand, that actions of this type cannot be controlled as far as their timing is concerned, even by the President, because, when Congress moves, that is its prerogative. Neither the President nor he personally, the Vice President continued, would have chosen deliberately to have a resolution of this type when he and the President's brother were planning on visiting the USSR. Nevertheless, the resolution expresses substantial views of the people in our country. The Vice President once again stated that the resolution is not a new tack, but rather a reiteration of a position repeatedly expressed in the past.

Mr. Khrushchev stated that any action by an authoritative body such as Congress must have a purpose and expressed his bewilderment as to the purpose of this particular action. He pointed out that the proclamation in question cannot change anything in the USSR or for that matter in any other country. It would be naive to believe that it could. Emphasizing that he always speaks frankly, Mr. Khrushchev recalled US intervention at the time of the birth of the Soviet regime and pointed out that if US troops could not change anything and were thrown out of the country, it is obvious that a proclamation cannot bring about any

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<sup>3</sup> On July 17, Congress passed a joint resolution which authorized and requested the President to issue a proclamation designating the third week in July "Captive Nations Week" and to issue a similar proclamation each year until the peoples of Soviet-dominated nations attained their freedom and independence. (73 Stat. 212) For text of the President's July 17 proclamation, which responded to this joint resolution, see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 10, 1959, p. 200. Regarding the origin and timing of the resolution, see Document 20.

change whatsoever. He said that the Soviet Government had regarded the Vice President's visit as a contact serving the purpose of rapprochement between the US and the USSR. However, the "ticket" issued to the Vice President by Congress for his visit here will make his situation in the USSR more difficult than if it had not been for that; now there is suspicion toward the Vice President and although the Vice President will not encounter anything offensive, he can be sure that he will encounter questions and straightforward talk on the part of the Soviet people regarding this resolution wherever he goes.

The Vice President observed that that might do some good, since straightforward talk is useful.

Mr. Khrushchev observed that the press might play up catcalls if they should occur, to which the Vice President remarked that he had already had some experience as far as catcalls are concerned. However, Mr. Khrushchev continued, the Soviet Government does not want any repetition of the Vice President's past experiences in that regard and is sure that it will not occur.

The Vice President assured Mr. Khrushchev that he was not concerned about his safety in the USSR.

Mr. Khrushchev emphasized that the Vice President is absolutely safe in the USSR and pointed out that in spite of the fact that his own person is of some interest to the enemies of the USSR he walks about freely, and has no apprehensions as far as his physical security is concerned. The attitude of the Soviet people is such as to make him very proud. He assured the Vice President that the Vice President could go any place without any fear for his safety; of course the Soviet Union also has thieves and hooligans among its population. In addition to that there may be some crackpots, both quiet and violent, so that as far as these categories of people are concerned some precaution should be taken.

The Vice President noted that sometimes the main task of security is to protect high officials from overfriendly crowds who in their enthusiasm might injure them. Mr. Khrushchev agreed and recalled an experience of this type he had had during his visit to India.<sup>4</sup>

The Vice President stated that he wanted to make one additional point. He said that we have to realize that in this era of peaceful competition, and the US trusts that we are entering and are going to stay in that era, we must expect that each side will vigorously express its views regarding the best methods for achieving progress. For example, Mr. Kozlov, during his visit in the United States, expressed the thought, which is not new, that his system is superior. On the other hand we will also

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<sup>4</sup> Khrushchev visited India November 18-30, 1955.

defend vigorously our ideas, but always in peaceful rather than belligerent or provocative terms. This is all to the good because progress in the world has always resulted from competition of words and ideas rather than of peoples against one another.

Mr. Khrushchev fully agreed with this statement and again observed that he could not recognize the Vice President, because these words were so different from what he had heard the Vice President say in the past.

The Vice President said that the resolution of Congress to which Mr. Khrushchev had been referring is an example of this expression of ideas. The proclamation by the President is of the same nature and issued with full authority, although of course Mr. Khrushchev may think differently.

Mr. Khrushchev replied that he did not dispute the prerogatives of the President and the fact that he has full confidence of the elective body. He welcomed the Vice President's remark that any expression of ideas should not be belligerent or provocative and referred in this connection to the fact that the Soviet Union has a law against propaganda for war. Propaganda for war is an abnormal form of human conduct; it should be prosecuted and those guilty of such actions should be either imprisoned or placed in an asylum. The Soviet Union wanted nothing other than peaceful competition.

The Vice President said that the United States does not object to Mr. Khrushchev's remarks in which he expresses his belief that our children will live under socialism or when he says that his system should prevail in that part of the world that is not socialist today. In this competition of ideas each side will indicate its belief that its own system will prevail. If Mr. Khrushchev regards the proclamation referred to as being provocative, although it does not make any reference to the use of force or any such thing, then, by the same token, some of his statements could be regarded as provocative. The point is that we must realize that there are differences between our two countries and that differences lead to debates. We must assume that in such debates each side will try to present its views as vigorously and effectively as it can, but again we believe that they should be presented in peaceful, rather than belligerent, terms.

Mr. Khrushchev inquired which of his statements had been provocative. The Vice President replied that, when he had said provocative, he had primarily had in mind the interpretation of some statements by people who did not hear the tone and the exact context in which the statement had been made. He emphasized that we must not regard criticism as being something provocative, since criticism is always a useful factor in human progress. He also said that he did not regard Mr. Khrushchev's statement that our children would live under socialism as provocative; however, what is provocative is any reference to the use of

force, and for this reason everyone, and particularly our two great nations, must show great restraint in that respect. The Vice President noted that the President, as well as himself, has no doubt regarding Mr. Khrushchev's devotion to peace and had great admiration for the work done by him for his country. Recalling his morning stroll, the Vice President said that he was impressed by the people he had seen hurrying to work and apparently experiencing great satisfaction in what they were doing. Undoubtedly Mr. Khrushchev's inspiration has contributed to a considerable extent to this situation. While he disagrees with much of what is done in this country, the Vice President remarked, he does agree with certain things that are done here. The Vice President expressed confidence that Mr. Khrushchev, as a thinker, will realize that in the United States there is a free press and that individual citizens can and do express their own views at any time they wish. There may be times when views of individual citizens do not represent the views of the President, a person of great restraint and great responsibility with statements regarding foreign affairs. There are even some individuals who make statements which can be characterized as saber rattling. Therefore, in analyzing the situation it is important that a distinction be made between official policy and individual views.

Mr. Khrushchev rejoined by saying that his own point of view on this subject, with which the Vice President may not agree, is that words such as free press, equal opportunities for everyone, etc., are an old story which is learned by children in school. The fact is that, for example, the opportunities of an unemployed person to use the press for expressing his views cannot be compared with the opportunities of such a person as, for instance, Mr. Hearst,<sup>5</sup> since Mr. Hearst controls some 15 newspapers and would never allow the publication of any statement directed against him. This in effect is capitalist censorship. Apparently trying to avoid further conversation on this subject, Mr. Khrushchev said that he would not object to a continued debate, if the Vice President insisted, but suggested that there was no point in arguing since both sides would not change their views anyway. Mr. Khrushchev then stated that the Soviet people believed that capitalism was a progressive system at one stage of human development; it brought about great industrial progress, particularly in the United States, where new production methods such as assembly lines, etc., were introduced under that system. However, they do believe that capitalism is on the downgrade and that it should be replaced with a new, socialist system. Mr. Khrushchev pointed out that he was not trying to convert the Vice President since the time was too short and since he did not believe that he could succeed in doing that anyhow. Reverting again to the Congressional resolution,

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<sup>5</sup> William Randolph Hearst, Jr., editor in chief of the Hearst newspapers.



Mr. Khrushchev stated that the Soviet Government regards this action very seriously since it is a clear case of interference in internal affairs of the countries referred to in the document. Raising somewhat his voice, Mr. Khrushchev emphasized that those nations do not live by the mercy of the United States and reiterated that the United States cannot bring about any change, unless it wants to start a war. However, the Soviet Union had won wars in which attempts had been made to change the course of history, and this should be remembered. The Soviet Government could not escape the conclusion that some people in the United States want the cold war and continued international tension. Actions such as the proclamation on captive nations incite peoples against their governments as well as against the Soviet Government and the Soviet people. The fact that Congress had passed such a resolution, Mr. Khrushchev observed, is a frightening thing; it is frightening not because of the fact itself that this "stupid" decision had been passed but rather because it indicates the attitude prevailing in Congress, although of course it does not reflect the attitude of the American people. This means that Congress can do just about anything, and can take just about any action, including starting a war. In the past the Soviet Government believed Congress could never adopt a decision to start a war, but now it appears that although Mr. McCarthy,<sup>6</sup> with whom the Vice President had sympathized to a certain extent, is only dead physically, but his spirit is still alive. For this reason the Soviet Union has to keep its powder dry. Mr. Khrushchev reiterated that the Soviet Government and the Soviet people regard the resolution as a provocation and again warned the Vice President that he might have difficulties and some serious discussions on this score during his visit. Apologizing for the strong peasant language he was going to use, Mr. Khrushchev quoted a Russian peasant proverb to emphasize his point. The action of the Congress and the Presidential proclamation at the time when the Vice President was coming to the Soviet Union amounted exactly to provocation and can harm only the Vice President. The Soviet Union has no fears—it cannot be frightened because it has strength to defend itself. Actions such as this outright provocation are dangerous, particularly in view of the fact that the United States is the strongest among the Western powers.

The Vice President replied that if the concept of peaceful competition, which Mr. Khrushchev always supports so eloquently, is to prevail, both sides have to resign themselves to this sort of thing. He also noted that the same criticism could be applied to certain statements

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<sup>6</sup>Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican Senator from Wisconsin from 1947 until his death in 1957.

made by Soviet leaders regarding our system and that he could not understand why two different yardsticks should be used.

Mr. Khrushchev stated that the Soviet Union had never taken any action similar to that taken by Congress. There has never been a decision by the Supreme Soviet which could be considered as offensive, and the Supreme Soviet had refrained from taking such actions even after ill-considered actions by the other side. Distinction must be made between individual statements and pronouncements by legislative bodies. Actions by legislative bodies cannot be taken lightly and since it was the US legislature that had adopted this resolution, the question arises what the next step will be—a war?

The Vice President emphasized that his analysis of the President's proclamation is that it represents a peaceful exposition of a point of view rather than any mention of action. This is precisely what peaceful competition is.

Mr. Khrushchev retorted that such arguments were naive and could not convince him. He observed that the Vice President had practiced as a lawyer while he himself had worked as a miner and that even by the standards of a miner's ethics the proclamation is a provocation.

The Vice President stated that the United States believes that any statement by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR carries full authority not only of the legislature but also of the entire nation. In view of that fact the question arises whether Mr. Khrushchev believes that he should desist from statements that governments should be changed. The Vice President pointed out that this was not a criticism but rather an effort to expose the inconsistency in Mr. Khrushchev's attitude.

Mr. Khrushchev remarked that apparently the Vice President does not follow his speeches as closely as he follows the Vice President's. If the Vice President did, he would have noted that Mr. Khrushchev's speeches never call for changes in government and that the Soviet policy is that this is an internal matter. On the other hand the Congressional resolution is a clear case of interference in internal affairs. Mr. Khrushchev said that without wanting to be offensive, he could not resist remarking that even intelligent people can have difficulty in defending stupid actions.

The Vice President replied that he believed that this is simply a case of differences of opinion or perhaps differences of approach. He jokingly remarked that Mr. Khrushchev with his eloquence could also make a good lawyer. But it appeared to him that Mr. Khrushchev was putting more emphasis on this resolution, on its importance, and on its meaning than it has in Washington. The Vice President pointed out that the President and himself, while they may be misguided occasionally,

are not stupid and would not have passed a resolution of this kind at this time. The President believes that the Geneva Conference is in its critical stage and he wants such meetings to take place in the best possible atmosphere for negotiation. For this reason neither the President nor himself would have sat down to pass such a resolution at this time. The United States is not trying to make the Soviet leaders angry; what it is trying for is frank talks in good humor. The Vice President recalled the fact that whenever there is a lengthy discussion of some subject which seems to be getting nowhere, the President always says: "We have beaten this horse to death; let's change to another". The Vice President suggested that this saying should also apply to the topic under discussion.

Mr. Khrushchev pointed out that the Soviet leaders have always held the President in very high esteem, they have always believed that he is a person with extremely high moral standards and a very frank and sincere human being. Referring to the Vice President's remark that neither the President nor he himself is stupid, Mr. Khrushchev said that this brings up the question of what, in such a case, the Vice President's opinion of Congress is. Commenting on the Vice President's observation that Mr. Khrushchev appears to attach too great an importance to the resolution, Mr. Khrushchev again apologized for using strong words, and in obscene language objected to the resolution. It is fresh in everybody's minds, Khrushchev said, and this is why the Soviet people have such strong feelings about it. When the atmosphere clears he will proceed with other problems. He agreed with the President's saying that "We should not beat one horse too much".

The Vice President stated that before leaving he wanted to discuss one point with Mr. Khrushchev, which was necessary for his own and Dr. Milton Eisenhower's guidance in the future. The point is that many members of the press are going to follow the Vice President's group and will want to know what was discussed in these meetings. The Vice President noted that he had visited some 52 foreign countries, had met the heads of state and government in all of those countries, and that he has a standing rule which he always observes, namely, to disclose such conversations only to the President. Therefore, Mr. Khrushchev will have no experience with him as he had with some other visitors.

Mr. Khrushchev agreed to this procedure and stated that the Soviet Government will not abuse the Vice President's confidence either.

The Vice President replied that he had no doubts about Mr. Khrushchev's confidence and that he only wanted to assure him that these talks would be kept in strictest confidence. He also expressed his appreciation for the warm welcome accorded Mrs. Nixon, himself, Dr.

Eisenhower, and the other members of the group in Moscow as well as for the opportunity to talk with Mr. Khrushchev.

Mr. Khrushchev replied that the Soviet people always believed that they should treat their visitors so that they would not feel ashamed when they met again.

The meeting ended at 11:55 a.m., and the United States and the Soviet group left for a preview of the American Exhibition at Sokolniki Park.

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## 96. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, July 24, 1959, 6 p.m.

291. For President and Acting Secretary from Vice President. My conversation with Voroshilov today was friendly but uneventful.<sup>1</sup> With Khrushchev I had sharp and prolonged exchange on question of Captive Nations proclamation but discussion was carried out in friendly manner on both sides.<sup>2</sup> Will report in full in due course. You will have seen from press my exchanges with Khrushchev in public at Exhibition.<sup>3</sup> Khrushchev's lunch which followed was most cordial. I assured Khrushchev I would reveal our private conversation only to President.<sup>4</sup>

**Thompson**

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.1100-NI/7-2459. Secret; Limit Distribution.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 94.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 95.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 92.

<sup>4</sup> In a July 24 message to Nixon, Acting Secretary Dillon responded as follows: "Thank you for your message. It certainly seems as if you are having an interesting time, and we look forward to learning additional details at your convenience. Incidentally, you may wish to pass on your telegrams where appropriate to Chris on an 'eyes only' basis." (Transmitted in telegram 286 to Moscow, July 24; Department of State, Central Files, 033.1100-NI/7-2459)

97. Memorandum of Conversation

Moscow, July 25, 1959.

SUBJECT

Vice President's Kremlin Conversation with Mikoyan

PARTICIPANTS

*United States*—Vice President Nixon, Ambassador Thompson, Mr. Boeschstein, President, Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. Mr. Akalovsky (interpreting)

*USSR*—Mr. Anastas Mikoyan, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR

Mr. V.V. Kuznetsov, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR

Mr. Striganov, Deputy Chief of the American Countries Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR

Mr. Lapanov (interpreting)

The conversation took place in the Kremlin, Moscow, USSR.

The Vice President expressed his gratification at being able to talk again to the Deputy Chairman who had left in the United States many friends who admire him for his stamina and agility in expressing his views. The Vice President noted that during his conversation with Mr. Mikoyan in Washington he had discussed the possibility of his own trip to the Soviet Union only in general terms and at that time had not thought that his visit would materialize so soon. He also said that he had always felt that Mr. Mikoyan's visit to the US had broken the ice not only officially but also privately, regarding the respective points of view of the two countries.

The Vice President also expressed his appreciation for the warm welcome he and his party had received in Moscow.

Mr. Mikoyan recalled that he told the Vice President that the Soviet people would match American hospitality. He returned the Vice President's compliments in kind and added that the Vice President is a great debater who never leaves anyone in his debt.

The Vice President said that he had visited 52 foreign countries and that the hospitality here in the Soviet Union has been as warm as in any of those countries. He again expressed his thanks both to Mr. Mikoyan personally as well as to his colleagues.

Mr. Mikoyan inquired whether the Vice President had been surprised by his words at the dinner party given for him by the late Mr. Dulles,<sup>1</sup> when he had said that in the Soviet Union visitors were not greeted with rocks and eggs.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.1100-NI/7-2559. Confidential. Drafted by Akalovsky and approved by Kohler on August 31.

<sup>1</sup> Reference may be to the January 16 dinner party attended by Mikoyan, Dulles, and Nixon; see footnote 4, Document 64.

The Vice President implied that he remembered how Mr. Mikoyan, in relating his unpleasant experience in Pakistan,<sup>2</sup> an experience which he had taken in good grace, had told him that people in Pakistan were too poor to buy eggs for this kind of use.

Mr. Mikoyan then referred to the Congressional resolution on captive nations<sup>3</sup> and expressed his regret that this declaration, directed against the Soviet state and the Soviet people, had preceded the Vice President's trip because this could spoil his stay in the USSR. He said that he did not believe that this action was the most brilliant product of US Government efforts and expressed his bewilderment as to why it was taken before the Vice President's visit and the opening of the American exhibition, rather than, say, one month later. Recalling a remark made by one of the correspondents at a recent press conference of the President, Mr. Mikoyan said that the declaration was a mine laid in order to worsen the Vice President's reception in the USSR.<sup>4</sup>

The Vice President said that he wanted to point out to Mr. Mikoyan that the timing of such a resolution cannot be controlled even by the President, as powerful as he is. Although Congress, as the Executive Branch sometimes believes, can occasionally move slowly, it can also take quick action at any time it wishes. Congress is a representative body, and Mr. Mikoyan knows from his trip, there are in our population elements, whether Mr. Mikoyan believes they are wrong or not, who feel that governments in their former homelands should be changed. Our Congress often passes resolutions representing the views of those elements, who include such nationalities as Polish, Hungarian, etc. The resolution, and particularly the proclamation of the President, had made a point that it was only an expression of the opinion of American people and the American Government and that they are not attempting to engage in so-called subversive activities. The Vice President pointed out that these documents represent a call for prayer and, making a jocular remark, said that in view of the opinion of the Soviet Government that prayer has no value behind it he could not understand why this action is viewed so seriously.

Mr. Mikoyan replied that he understood the Vice President's difficult position of defending an inconsiderate action. He said that he was

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<sup>2</sup>Not further identified.

<sup>3</sup>See footnote 3, Document 95.

<sup>4</sup>Reference is presumably to the query made by Marvin L. Arrowsmith, Associated Press, at the President's press conference on July 22: "In Warsaw yesterday Premier Khrushchev professed to be puzzled about why Vice President Nixon is going to Russia and he apparently linked this puzzlement with criticism of your proclamation on the captive nations. Do you see this attitude as a sort of strike against the Nixon visit even before it starts?" (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1959*, p. 536)

not going to force the Vice President to adopt his own point of view and suggested that both sides retain their own opinion. He said that he was an Armenian, and that although he is not active in the Government of Armenia proper, he knows some 30 Supreme Soviet Deputies of that Republic and all of them have been wondering who gave the American Government the authority to act in their behalf and why the American Government is not doing something for the liberation of really oppressed peoples, such as the Armenian minority in Turkey.

The Vice President stated that there had been many statements by Mr. Khrushchev who has more unrestrained power than President Eisenhower, calling for liberation of people from so-called imperialists and colonialists. If prayers are not peaceful then Mr. Khrushchev's statements are even more belligerent.

Mr. Mikoyan replied that the Soviet Union is very proud of its being a champion of the liberation of oppressed peoples, whereas the US seems to be against such liberation because the peoples in question are oppressed by its friends and allies. However, Mr. Mikoyan said, he believed that this question of the resolution of the declaration had been discussed sufficiently and that he would prefer to drop the subject.

The Vice President expressed appreciation for the frankness with which Messrs. Khrushchev and Kozlov expressed their views, but emphasized that we do disagree with their estimate of the situation. One cannot say that calling for liberation in one part of the world is a move for peace whereas calling for liberation of peoples in another part of the world is a move against peace.

Mr. Mikoyan pointed out that the Supreme Soviet had never passed declarations of this kind and he again suggested that the subject be dropped. He recalled then his pleasant and useful discussions with the President, the Vice President and the late Mr. Dulles during his visit in the US. It had been Mr. Dulles who had advised him to see Mr. Dillon and, as the Vice President probably knew, after these talks he had stated to the press that his conversations with the President, the Vice President and Mr. Dulles had been useful. On the contrary, as far as his talks with Mr. Dillon were concerned he could not say anything other than that the US Government still wants the "cold war" in foreign trade.<sup>5</sup> He said that at the time he had thought that he might have gone too far in that statement, but that now upon reflection, he can see that the State Department is systematically conducting cold war in trade. For instance, Senator Fulbright had asked the State Department to provide him with answers to 22 questions regarding the Khrushchev–Eisenhower exchange of letters on foreign trade, and it was only four-and-a-half months later that

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<sup>5</sup> See Document 65.

the State Department had given a reply to these questions.<sup>6</sup> It was suggested that the Vice President read those replies and see for himself how unreasonable and politically harmful they were. As an example he referred to the answer concerning the question of credit in which the State Department had stated that the US Government does not favor credits to a potential enemy. He emphasized that the main point was not trade and credits but rather the fact that the Soviet Union is called a potential enemy of the United States. If this is the basis of the United States policy then what is the purpose of exhibits, contacts and other exchanges? If that is the basis of US policy then the Soviet Union must prepare itself for war. He said he wondered whether the Soviet Union should believe the pronouncements by the President or the Vice President or whether it should regard this statement by the State Department as a direct expression of American policy.

He said he did not know whether Mr. Dillon had disclosed his conversation with him to the Vice President, but one of the points Mr. Dillon had made was that, provided the lend-lease problem is settled, the United States Government would offer the Soviet Union extensive credits. He noted that he had never made public his confidential talks although those talks contained a great deal of material that could be used for propaganda purposes. Mr. Mikoyan said that he could not agree to the proposition by Mr. Dillon because the latter had connected it with the settlement of such issues as Berlin, Taiwan, etc., and that he simply suggested that both sides should wait for better times. He also observed that he did not know whether the Soviet Union had been regarded by the State Department as a potential enemy at the time of his talks with Mr. Dillon or whether it had been labeled that only lately. He recalled that he had suggested to Mr. Dillon that the United States and the USSR should restore their 1937–1941 trade relations, to which Mr. Dillon had replied that the USSR wants trade on its own terms.

He also recalled the visits by Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Kuzmin and other Soviet trade representatives to New York and other American cities in connection with the Soviet exhibition and stated that the Soviet officials were very pleased with their talks with American businessmen.<sup>7</sup> However, whenever there was a chance for concluding a

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<sup>6</sup> Neither the letter of Senator J. William Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, containing the 22 questions nor the reply of the Department of State has been found, but Fulbright's letter sent in February and the Department's response released on July 4 were summarized in *The New York Times*, July 5, 1959.

<sup>7</sup> Kuzmin, who headed a Soviet trade mission to the United States, had talks with Secretary of the Treasury Robert B. Anderson and Henry Kearns, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for International Affairs, on July 1 and 2 and attended a meeting with 250 American businessmen. Kuzmin's news conference on July 9 revealing these contacts was summarized *ibid.*, July 10, 1959.



deal the American businessmen seemed to back away, saying that we should wait for better times. This leads the Soviet Union to believe that the United States could not do without the “cold war” because the “cold war” apparently keeps its allies in line, prevents a breakdown of military pacts and makes it possible to have high taxes for the production of armaments. Mr. Mikoyan stressed that this was his frank exposition of the situation as he saw it.

At this point Ambassador Thompson, with the Vice President’s permission, corrected Mr. Mikoyan’s statement regarding Mr. Dillon’s offer of extensive credits. The Ambassador said that he had been present at that meeting and that Mr. Dillon had said that there were many obstacles blocking the road toward the development of trade with the Soviet Union, one of which was the problem of lend-lease settlements.

Mr. Mikoyan disputed this correction and offered to produce a transcript of the conversation. He also said that he had told Mr. Dillon that if the United States wanted all the dollars obtained by the USSR in the United States to go back to the United States, the Soviet Union could not accept such a proposition and in that case it would do without credit.

The Vice President expressed his appreciation for the frankness displayed by Mr. Mikoyan in his statement and, recalling his similar remarks in Washington, stated that the President is convinced that trade is one of the means towards consolidating peace throughout the world. However, just as a child must learn to crawl before he can learn how to walk, progress in this area must be made step by step.

Mr. Mikoyan replied that the President had instructed the Department of State to work out measures for the development of foreign trade.<sup>8</sup> In view of the actions taken by the State Department it appears that the President wants one thing and the Department of State another.

The Vice President rejected this interpretation by Mr. Mikoyan and said that the latter had not touched upon the main problem, namely that of what we should trade. After the Soviet Union in 1948 took actions which changed the manganese situation and after the United States has developed means for getting manganese from other sources, this question has become of particular relevance and points up the fact that credits are needed. However, as far as credits are concerned, Mr. Mikoyan should realize that the President, with all the power vested in his office, could not give even one penny of credit without appropriate actions by Congress. This in turn puts the question in the political arena because Congress will never approve credits unless it is completely convinced

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<sup>8</sup> In his letter to Khrushchev, July 14, 1958, Eisenhower said that he was asking the Department of State to examine the specific proposals on trade contained in Khrushchev’s letter to Eisenhower, June 2, 1958. (Department of State *Bulletin*, August 4, 1958, p. 200)

that they serve the best interests of the United States. So, in general terms, what is particularly needed for trade is a better political climate.

The Vice President referred to Mr. Mikoyan's statement that it was the United States that is waging "cold war" and pointed out that the United States Congress is firmly convinced that the USSR is the one that is waging that war. Nevertheless, if the Soviet Union and the United States continue to discuss foreign trade in an objective and reasonable way, and along with political issues, then foreign trade might become possible. The United States businessmen are very much impressed by Mr. Mikoyan and his ability and they obviously want to sell their products any place they can. At this point Mr. Mikoyan interjected that it is the State Department who interferes constantly, in spite of the words inscribed over the entrance to the Department of Commerce which say that foreign trade brings people together. This inscription had been shown to Mr. Mikoyan by former Secretary of Commerce Lewis Strauss.<sup>9</sup>

The Vice President expressed full agreement with these words but said the question was what should come first, the chicken or the egg. As far as the attitude of American businessmen was concerned, businessmen want to trade where favorable climate prevails. The Soviet Union could help improve that climate. Mr. Mikoyan said that the Soviet Union has been striving to do that, to which the Vice President inquired whether the Soviet Union was willing to improve the situation with regard to the protection of patent rights. Mr. Mikoyan replied in the affirmative, but again complained about United States Government restrictions with regard to the issuance for export licenses, specifically referring to the problem of sheet steel exports to the Soviet Union. The Vice President pointed out that just recently licenses for the export of sheet steel had been issued.<sup>10</sup> He agreed with Mr. Mikoyan that trade is desirable but said that where credits were concerned the political climate must be improved. As far as other aspects of foreign trade are con-

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<sup>9</sup> See Document 66.

<sup>10</sup> On July 29, the Soviet commercial counselor in Washington called the Department of Commerce to say that the Nixon party had indicated in Moscow that the United States had approved the application of two U.S. companies to purchase several thousand metric tons of sheet steel. The Department of Commerce informed the Soviet Embassy that no action had been taken on either of the applications because of the present steel strike. The Department of State informed the Embassy in Moscow that it was unlikely the United States would approve either one since both involved barter in items that would hurt exports of friendly suppliers. (Telegram 347 to Moscow, July 29; Department of State, Central Files, 411.6141/7-2959) Thompson reported that Nixon, in his conversation with Mikoyan, had indicated some slight improvement in trade between the two nations and had mentioned sheet steel as an example but had not referred to any specific applications. He had been unaware of the barter nature of the transaction and merely informed Mikoyan he would look into the matter. (Telegram 392 from Moscow, July 31; *ibid.*, 411.6141/7-3159)

cerned, individual cases must be discussed as they come up, and some progress has already been made even since Mr. Mikoyan's visit. The Vice President stated that upon his return to the United States he would work on the problem of trade, but that one must realize that difficulties cannot be resolved by a stroke of pen.

Mr. Mikoyan referred to a speech, made in May by Acting Secretary of Commerce Mr. Mueller and reproduced in a chemical magazine,<sup>11</sup> in which Mr. Mueller had said that any exporter of chemical processes or products whose exports should get into the hands of the USSR would be imprisoned for one year or fined \$10,000.

Mr. Boeschstein stated at this point that credits and trade in the United States are generally carried by private business rather than government and that credit is predicated on trust. As far as licenses are concerned, they are issued quite freely except on a limited number of items. He expressed his belief that the USSR should develop its relations with the United States but that trust must precede and foreign trade will follow.

Mr. Mikoyan said he did not want to argue with Mr. Boeschstein because he understood that the latter wanted to support his Vice President and show full agreement with him. He then said that he wanted to ask one question—he said that while in New York he had met Governor Rockefeller<sup>12</sup> at Mr. Harriman's dinner and that he was favorably impressed by him. He said that Governor Harriman [*Rockefeller*] had asked him to convey to the Soviet Government that the Rockefeller family is not a war-mongering family and it is as peaceful as any other American family. However, Mr. Mikoyan continued, he could not understand why Governor Rockefeller, after having made such a statement, had not visited the Soviet exhibition in New York, whereas the President and the Vice President had done so. The Vice President replied that he was not aware of this situation, but that he knew that on the opening day of the exhibition Governor Rockefeller had had a speaking engagement and had been out of town. He said that he was sure that had Governor Rockefeller been in town on the day of the President's visit, he would have come with the President.

Mr. Mikoyan said he enjoyed the talk but that he realized that it was late and that he, therefore, did not want to detain his guests.

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<sup>11</sup> Mueller's speech has not been further identified.

<sup>12</sup> Nelson A. Rockefeller, Governor of New York.

The Vice President said that he could predict that the trade situation would get better, perhaps slowly at first but it could improve more rapidly if the political situation improves and develops faster. He said that he could not agree that trade agreements must precede political settlements.

The meeting ended at 10:15 a.m.

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## 98. Memorandum of Conversation

Moscow, July 25, 1959.

### SUBJECT

Vice President's Kremlin Conversation with Kozlov

### PARTICIPANTS

*United States*—Vice President Nixon, Ambassador Thompson, Vice Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, USN; Mr. Akalovsky (interpreting)

*USSR*—Mr. Frol Kozlov, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR

Mr. V.V. Kuznetsov, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR

Mr. S.R. Striganov, Deputy Chief of the American Countries Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR

Mr. Lapanov (interpreting)

The conversation took place in the Kremlin, Moscow, USSR.

After an exchange of greetings Mr. Kozlov expressed his regret that the Vice President and his party would stay only one day in Mr. Kozlov's home city of Leningrad. The Vice President began by explaining why he had invited Admiral Rickover to accompany him on this trip. He pointed out that Mr. Kozlov and the Admiral had had a delightful day together in Shippingport and that the Admiral is a top US leader in the field of atomic energy. The Vice President expressed his appreciation for the opportunity that would be given him to visit the Soviet ice-breaker *Lenin* and stated that both the President and he strongly believe that atomic energy should be utilized for peaceful purposes. He said that he wanted to explore with Mr. Kozlov in what specific areas ex-

changes of information on atomic energy or on peaceful uses of atomic energy could be arranged. For this reason Admiral Rickover had been asked to explore as representative of the President and the Vice President, what might be done in this area that had not yet been done.

Mr. Kozlov replied that Admiral Rickover could get in touch with Glavatom, the Soviet atomic energy agency, and discuss the subject. However, he said, he wanted to observe that Admiral Rickover's activities are not in the area of peaceful uses but rather are in that of submarines.

The Vice President replied that he knew that Admiral Rickover had an effective answer to this remark. However, he wanted to say that we know the destructive power of atomic energy and that this is why we want to develop its peaceful uses. This development would reduce international tension.

Mr. Kozlov agreed that peaceful uses of atomic energy should be developed and stated that the Soviet people have been working in that direction. Cooperation in that field is a very desirable thing since work in isolation might lead to such curious situations as the one which he had encountered during his visit to the University of California laboratory in Berkeley. Mr. McMillan,<sup>1</sup> who had received him there, had told him about the laboratory's plans for building an accelerator. As it happens, Veksler,<sup>2</sup> a Soviet nuclear scientist, who had visited the United States, had been working on the same problem. The solutions Veksler had reached turned out to be the same as those of American scientists. This incident points up the need for and the usefulness of exchanges in this area.

The Vice President said that he wanted to emphasize that it was important, in addition to just talking, to lay a basis for action. For this reason he was asking Admiral Rickover to say what, on the basis of his authority, could be done in that area. The Vice President pointed out again that the Admiral had authority from the United States Government. He pointed out that the occasion of Admiral Rickover's presence in the USSR offered a rare opportunity where a technical expert was available for detailed discussions.

Admiral Rickover said that he wanted first to note that the work done by him was not limited to nuclear submarines and surface ships but that it also included peaceful uses of atomic energy. For example, he had been responsible for the design of the Shippingport reactor which was entirely devoted to peaceful uses. He recalled his meeting with Mr.

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<sup>1</sup> Edwin M. McMillan, Director of the Radiation Laboratory, University of California.

<sup>2</sup> Vladimir Iosefovich Veksler, head of the High Energy Laboratory, Dubna Joint Nuclear Research Institute.

Kozlov at the nuclear power station at Shippingport and his statement to Mr. Kozlov that the United States was prepared to release all the information on that installation for a suitable exchange.<sup>3</sup>

Mr. Kozlov replied that information on the Soviet nuclear power station near Moscow had also been made public. He said that if the Admiral was interested, he would be welcome to go there and visit it. However, he said, he agreed with the statement made by the Admiral at Shippingport that electric power from nuclear reactors is too expensive now and that much work should be done to develop this source of energy in order to make it as cheap as hydroelectric and thermal power stations.

Admiral Rickover stated that he was authorized to make arrangements for exchanges on all reactors including those for use in aircraft. The United States would be willing to exchange information on reactors in return for similar or other information from the Soviet Union.

Mr. Kozlov said that this was a very interesting proposition and that it could be considered by the Soviet Government.

Admiral Rickover stated that the United States has plutonium-producing reactors at Hanford and the Savannah River plants. The United States would be willing to exchange information on all types of reactors so that the Soviet Union could see for itself that the United States is willing to turn to peaceful utilization of atomic energy. The United States would like to have quick results in the matters of such exchanges and it is offering them in a spirit of true sincerity. Also, the Admiral continued, the United States is developing at Hanford a dual purpose reactor for the production of plutonium and electric power. The Soviet Union seems to be also designing such a reactor and the United States would be prepared to exchange information on all reactors, including the one just mentioned. The United States would be prepared to open the information and technology on all reactors located on land.

Mr. Kozlov replied that the Soviet Government would consider this proposition and inform the United States of its views.

Admiral Rickover observed that it would be very helpful if at least tentative exchange arrangements could be made before the Vice President's departure. He said that it would be desirable if the Soviet Government designated a person to deal with him without authority to act but only to develop an outline which would then be referred to the principals for decision. Admiral Rickover also expressed willingness to

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<sup>3</sup> An extensive summary of Admiral Rickover's meeting with Kozlov at Shippingport on July 11, including quotations from their conversation, was published in *The New York Times*, July 12, 1959. This account notes only that Rickover told Kozlov that all the information at the atomic power plant would be made available to Kozlov, and he gave him a packet of books on the construction, operation, and operating history of the plant.

change his itinerary if this should become necessary in connection with his suggestion.

Mr. Kozlov said that it would be difficult to act so fast. Firstly because the Soviet Government must consider the US suggestion and secondly because he believed that our two countries must work primarily on creating confidence between them. He reiterated, however, that the Soviet Government would consider the American suggestion.

The Vice President said that the difficulty was to find a way to develop trust and confidence which, as Mr. Kozlov himself had said, is so necessary. The US had thought that the area suggested by Admiral Rickover was one where a very good start could be made. The Vice President emphasized that he was not suggesting that classified projects should be disclosed to the US but rather that discussions on these exchanges be held at a high level so that the confidence desired by both sides could be created.

Mr. Kozlov replied that the atmosphere during his visit to the United States had been better than it is now. He said that the Congressional resolution on captive nations has introduced an element of deterioration in the relations between the US and the USSR. This resolution is resented by the Soviet people and it cannot contribute to the lessening of tension.

The Vice President observed that Mr. Kozlov was probably aware of the fact that this subject had been discussed at length with Mr. Khrushchev yesterday.<sup>4</sup> Therefore he felt that no useful purpose would be served in discussing it at length again.

Mr. Kozlov agreed but said that the resolution included such states as the Ukraine, Turkestan, Kazakhstan, etc., and said that the United States could not treat the peoples of the Soviet Union in this manner. The peoples of the Soviet Union are not captive, they are freely building a new life. Actions such as this resolution put the Soviet Union on guard.

The Vice President pointed out that the President's proclamation did not specifically include any areas forming a part of the USSR and that under the American system the final act is the President's act. The Vice President said that he had no illusion regarding what the Soviet Government terms a revolution in the USSR; furthermore, he wanted to say that he had received a friendly reception by people he had met in the Soviet Union and he was very much impressed by their pride in their work, their love for their country and their friendship for him and his group.

Referring to Mr. Kozlov's remark that this resolution had worsened the situation, the Vice President said that this was all the more reason for

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 95.

concrete action in the field of exchanges as proposed by Admiral Rickover, so that a feeling of confidence could be created. The Vice President recalled his statement during his meeting with Mr. Kozlov in Washington to the effect that both sides should realize that both of them are strong, will have to deal with each other, and will be around for a long time.

Mr. Kozlov commented on the friendly reception he had had in the US on the part of the common people in factories, research centers, and scientific establishments. Therefore no such action as this resolution should have been taken after his trip because it harms US-USSR relations and does not contribute to a lessening of tension. As far as exchanges are concerned, Mr. Kozlov continued, he felt that exchanges of parliamentary and medical delegations, as suggested by the USSR, should be carried out. Such exchanges would be a very proper step after Mr. Mikoyan's and his own visit to the US. Such exchanges are greatly favored by the Soviet Government because it believes that they contribute to a lessening of tension rather than worsening the situation. On the other hand actions like the resolution in question, which are contrary to what the Vice President and the President have often said, lead only to estrangement between our two countries.

Then Vice President inquired why Mr. Kozlov seemed to object to the exchanges proposed by Admiral Rickover.

Mr. Kozlov replied that he did not object but that he had simply said that the question would have to be studied and a reply would be given.

The Vice President observed that both the US and the USSR, as every big country, have a great deal of red tape, which is an element of bigness, but which should be cut where important and far reaching decisions are to be made. The purpose of high level diplomacy is precisely to cut red tape.

Mr. Kozlov agreed that both the US and the USSR have a great deal of red tape but recalled that the USSR had proposed an exchange of parliamentary delegations as far back as in 1955 and a friendship pact in

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<sup>5</sup> At the Foreign Ministers conference in Geneva on October 31, 1955, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov referred to the invitation of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, which resulted in visits to the Soviet Union by parliamentary delegations from several nations, not including the United States. (*The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, October 27–November 16, 1955* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955), p. 237) This invitation has not been further identified.

For texts of Bulganin's letter to Eisenhower, January 23, 1956, proposing a treaty of friendship and cooperation between the two nations; a Soviet draft treaty on the subject enclosed with this letter; and Eisenhower's responses to Bulganin of January 28 and March 1, 1956, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 6, 1956, pp. 191–195, and March 14, 1956, pp. 514–515.



1956.<sup>5</sup> These were very good proposals from the Soviet point of view, but the Soviet Government has yet to receive an answer from the US. The Soviet Union could not understand why these two steps, which would greatly contribute to the establishment of friendly relations between the two great nations and would also improve the climate throughout the world, had been left unanswered by the US for several years. Apparently American bureaucracy stands still.

The Vice President rejoined by saying that Mr. Kozlov, being a frank, reasonable man, would realize that the US could also list several proposals of its own, proposals which the US considers to be reasonable and useful, that had not been answered by the Soviet Union. The Vice President again suggested that the way to make progress in diplomacy is to take positive actions and cited as an example the exchange of exhibits. He also said that he wanted to point out that what the US had suggested today was extremely important from the point of view of world public opinion and that such an action would not only contribute to the knowledge of our two respective peoples but also show to the world that the two great atomic powers are willing to embark upon the road to peaceful cooperation in the field of atomic energy.

Mr. Kozlov said that he agreed that the Soviet exhibition in New York and the American exhibition in Moscow had no doubt a positive effect on the situation. As to the suggestion made by the US today, it would be studied.

Before leaving, the Vice President suggested that Admiral Rickover meet with a top level Soviet official so that a general layout rather than detailed arrangements could be done while the Admiral is in the Soviet Union.

Mr. Kozlov again repeated that this question would be taken under advisement.

The meeting ended at 11:15 a.m.

## 99. Memorandum of Conversation

Ogorevo, July 26, 1959, 3:30 p.m.

## PARTICIPANTS

*United States*

Vice President Nixon  
 Dr. Milton Eisenhower  
 Ambassador Thompson  
 Mr. Foy Kohler  
 Mr. Alexander Akalovsky

*USSR*

Chairman Khrushchev  
 First Deputy Chairman Mikoyan  
 First Deputy Chairman Kozlov  
 Mr. V.V. Kuznetsov  
 Mr. S.R. Striganov  
 Mr. Yuri Zhukov  
 Mr. Troyanovsky  
 Mr. Lapanov

The open air luncheon at the Soviet Government dacha began at 3:30 p.m. and continued until 8:45 p.m. Mrs. Nixon and the wives of the three top Soviet leaders were present throughout.

After about one-half hour of casual table talk Khrushchev launched the serious phase of the conversation with a discourse on Soviet rocket and atomic prowess. He said that he had had a long session yesterday with Soviet scientists who had presented plans to him for launching rockets into the earth's orbit with a payload of 100 tons. This, he said, was sufficient for all kinds of instrumentation; it was also sufficient to carry man and equipment for his return to earth. This project was only in the planning stage at present, but solidly based and clearly realizable without difficulty. He then referred to the accuracy of modern missiles, citing a Soviet ICBM launching about a week ago over a 7000 kilometer course with a final deviation off target of 1.7 kilometers in distance and less than 1.4 kilometers to the right. However, he continued, accidents were always possible. In this connection, he wanted to divulge a secret: a month ago the Soviet Government had been very worried when an ICBM of the same type (Mikoyan contradicted him at this point and said that this was a different missile) had a malfunction in the engine cutoff system and had overshoot its intended course by 2000 kilometers. The Soviet Government had feared it might land in Alaska but fortunately it fell into the Ocean. While this missile had carried no warhead, its acci-

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.1100-NI/7-2659. Confidential; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Kohler and Akalovsky and approved by Kohler on August 31. The meeting was held at the Soviet Government summer house at Ogorevo near Moscow. Attached to the source text is a short summary of passages excised or paraphrased from Khrushchev's conversations with Nixon. These passages contained Khrushchev's apologies for his use of "strong peasant language" and Nixon's use of similar vulgar language in response. For Nixon's account of this conversation, see *Six Crises*, pp. 284-293.

dental landing in Alaska, he realized, could have created a grave incident. Khrushchev said that he supposed that we had monitored these shots. In fact, he said, he knew that we did and confirmed that the Soviets do too. The Vice President pointed out that in this field it was very difficult for great nations to do things that are not known to the other side, to which Khrushchev agreed. The Vice President said that this was the reason why the U.S. had been happy to show Mr. Tupolev our missile production—the U.S. felt that no secrets had been revealed.

Khrushchev stated that Tupolev had told him upon his return from the U.S. that he had not been able to see much there—all he had been shown was the cigar-shaped final product, from which one could not tell anything, and he had not been shown the actual rockets.

The Vice President replied that Mr. Kozlov had been invited to observe missile launchings at the Vandenberg and Cape Canaveral launching sites, but had not availed himself of that opportunity.

Khrushchev said that he knew about that, but the USSR felt that the time was not yet ripe for such things. The proper time for such visits would come after the U.S. bases had been liquidated—then the USSR would show the U.S. its launching sites and missiles. The reason for this was a simple one: U.S. bases are some 300 kilometers from the borders of the USSR, while the USSR is several thousand kilometers away from the U.S.

The Vice President observed that this situation was a two-way street and then referred to Khrushchev's statement to Mr. Harriman to the effect that the USSR had given China missiles to shell Quemoy.<sup>1</sup>

Khrushchev denied this and asserted that all he had said was that the USSR would supply China with missiles if it were attacked by the U.S. He also said that in view of the insignificant distance of 70 kilometers between the Chinese mainland and Formosa, the USSR could, if necessary, supply China with a large number of missiles capable of covering that distance, but again asserted that at the present time the USSR was not furnishing missiles to anyone.

The Vice President then referred to the high cost of missiles, stating that it was unfortunate that so much money had to be spent for building missiles, when the money needed to build one missile could buy 153,000 TV sets, or endow several universities, or buy shoes for several million children.

Khrushchev expressed surprise at these figures and said that the U.S. missile production was too expensive and that it was much cheaper in the USSR. He went on to say that, as he had told Mr. Harriman, the USSR was in possession of "U.S. operational plans," the authenticity of

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<sup>1</sup> Regarding Khrushchev's statement, see Document 75.

which, of course, was not certain in view of possible U.S. counterintelligence operations, and that it was possible that the U.S. had Soviet operational plans too. Soviet specialists, he said, had told him that to paralyze vital centers in the U.S. as well as in Europe, Asia, i.e., the U.S. bases on these two continents, rockets costing a total of 30 billion rubles were needed. This figure was based on the Soviet missile production costs, and it had been reported accurately by Mr. Harriman. He added that this figure included the cost of both ICBMs, which were the most expensive, and IRBMs as well.

The Vice President inquired whether Mr. Khrushchev was referring to what the Soviet Union had or what it needed.

Khrushchev replied that this was what the USSR had. (However there was at this point considerable discussion between Soviet leaders and interpreters. Consensus of Russian-speaking Americans present was that Khrushchev was talking in terms of present Soviet capabilities rather than of actual stocks of missiles already on hand.)

The Vice President then remarked that this meant that the USSR had 3 billion dollars worth of missiles to knock out vital centers of the U.S., Europe, and Asia.

Khrushchev replied that ICBMs would be used only against the U.S., while the U.K., Germany, and even Spain could be hit with IRBMs, i.e., missiles with a range of 2000 kilometers; the next higher range of ballistic missiles, he added, was 4000 kilometers.

The Vice President then commented that, as far as the U.S. was concerned, the main cost was involved in launching sites rather than in missiles proper, and inquired whether this was also true in the USSR.

Khrushchev replied in the negative, saying that launching pads were cheap and that the USSR was building mobile launching pads so that they could change positions.

The Vice President asked Mr. Khrushchev whether mobile launching platforms were built for use in the air or on land. Khrushchev replied that they were not intended for use in the air.

The Vice President then wondered why the Soviet Union continued to build bombers when ICBMs were available.

At this point Mr. Khrushchev interrupted the substantive conversation in order to toast the health of the President of the U.S., Mrs. Nixon and the Vice President, Dr. Milton Eisenhower, and all American guests present, as well as friendship between the Soviet and American people.

The Vice President replied in kind and also raised his glass to the day when the U.S. might receive Mr. Khrushchev.

Reverting to the substance of the conversation, Mr. Khrushchev replied to the Vice President that the Soviet Union had almost stopped the production of bombers. Bombers and fighter aircraft were being built

only in numbers sufficient to maintain the training of Soviet air personnel so that this investment would not be lost. He said that perhaps these bombers could be useful for some limited purpose, but it was not likely. Missiles were much more accurate and not subject to human failure or human emotion. He said that humans were frequently incapable of dropping bombs on assigned targets because of emotional revulsion, a factor not present in missiles. He cited an incident in World War II when Russian bomber crews had claimed to have hit an advanced target, but when the territory in question was recovered the target was found intact because the personnel involved had simply jettisoned their bombs harmlessly without even reaching the target area. Khrushchev went on to say that he felt really sorry for the Navy, it being an obsolete element in arms, which could only provide “fodder for sharks.” In view of their slow speed, cruisers and aircraft carriers were completely useless, “sitting ducks,” and the USSR had stopped building them.

The Vice President observed that Khrushchev apparently did not include submarines in his analysis of modern naval capabilities, since the Soviets had been reported to be building submarines in quantities.

Khrushchev confirmed the Soviets were building as many submarines as they could. However, Mikoyan intervened at this point and said “as many as needed.”

The Vice President commented that submarines were highly useful for launching missiles and that they would be particularly useful when solid fuel had been developed.

Khrushchev agreed but said that the Soviets believed that launching from land was much better than from the sea.

The Vice President observed that this depended on the strategic situation of the nation involved.

Mr. Khrushchev then said that he wanted to reveal another secret—submarines would be used by the USSR for destroying ports, suburban areas [*sic*]<sup>2</sup> and the Navy of the enemy. Destruction of the enemy’s Navy would paralyze his sea communications, a factor which would be of great importance, since the Soviet Union’s potential enemy would be highly dependent on sea communications. He said that Soviet submarines would carry ballistic missiles and anti-vessel rockets, the range of which was now 600 kilometers, but would be increased to 1000 kilometers in the future. The latter range, according to Soviet scientists, would be entirely sufficient.

The Vice President then pointed out that the main problem in missiles was fuel and said that the USSR had been reported as having made good progress in this field, which was evidenced by the thrusts it had

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<sup>2</sup> Brackets in the source text.

attained. It was obvious that the future called for the development of solid fuels, which were easier to store and maintain in readiness. Solid fuel would particularly answer the problem of submarine-carried missiles.

Khrushchev confirmed that the Soviet Union had attained success in the development of rocket fuels, saying that without that its achievement in rocketry would not have been possible. However, he declined to discuss the question of solid fuels, saying that this was a technical subject which he, being a politician rather than a technician, was not qualified to discuss.

At this point Mrs. Nixon intervened to express surprise there was a subject Khrushchev was not prepared to discuss. To her Khrushchev was "one-man government" seemed to know everything and to have everything firmly in own hands. To this Mikoyan observed that even Khrushchev did not have enough hands to handle everything and therefore needed others to help him.

The Vice President then referred to Mr. Khrushchev's statements in Albania, in which he had said that it was better to station intermediate range rockets in Albania than in the USSR.<sup>3</sup> Since press reports may be interpreted in different ways, the Vice President said, it would be interesting to know what Mr. Khrushchev actually had in mind.

Khrushchev said that the U.S. had made arrangements for stationing missiles in Italy, arrangements which were directed against the USSR rather than, say, Africa. The USSR has to paralyze these missiles and he believed that the best place for stationing Soviet missiles would be Albania. The distance between Albania and Italy is only 300 kilometers and thus the Soviet Union would not have to expend its longer-range missiles or endanger neutral territory. When the Vice President interjected, "or without danger to yourselves from fallout," Khrushchev dismissed this as another question. Italy and Greece could be hit best from Albania and Bulgaria, while Turkey could be hit from the territory of the USSR and Bulgaria. It was this that he had had in mind, although he had not mentioned Turkey in the statement referred to by the Vice President. However, he added, at present the Soviet Union had no bases in these two countries. They would be established in Albania when U.S. bases were established in Italy and in Bulgaria when U.S. bases were established in Greece.

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<sup>3</sup> During an official visit to Albania May 25-June 4, Khrushchev made several speeches assailing the establishment of U.S. missile bases in Italy and warning that if Greece allowed such bases, the Soviet Union might erect bases in Albania. For the condensed text of two of his speeches at Tirana, see *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, June 24, 1959, pp. 12-13, and July 1, 1959, pp. 3-5. Regarding Khrushchev's trip to Albania, see Part 2, Documents 35 and 36.

The Vice President then asked whether the Soviets made a distinction between collective security arrangements such as NATO and the individual nations belonging to NATO.

Khrushchev said yes, but the individual members of such arrangements had to make a decision about bases if they wanted to avoid becoming missile targets. If some individual country decided not to accept rockets, the Soviet Union would not hit it with its own missiles.

The Vice President observed that Khrushchev frequently made public statements on the subject of missiles, including the question of their delivery to China. When people in the West read some such statements it was possible that they got an impression which Khrushchev did not intend. He said that today Mr. Khrushchev was apparently simply relating his estimate of the strength the USSR possesses and how this strength would resist any attack or how the USSR would counterattack. However, when such talk is published throughout the world it frequently creates the impression of a deliberate attempt to threaten other countries. Taking into account the attitude toward peace of the people of the U.S. as well as of other nations, these statements could be misunderstood. The Vice President said that he did not know the strength of the U.S. as well as the President, who was highly competent in the military field and could discuss these matters at length. Mr. Khrushchev, of course, also knows the strength of the USSR very well. However, the U.S. has, as Khrushchev knows, considerable power but it does not want to have to use it. No war, regardless of who starts it, can be prevented from causing disaster to the entire world, because even a sudden blow could not eliminate the retaliatory power of the other side. As to the U.S. and the USSR, their respective advantages could not be decisive, i.e., they both must recognize that they are both strong, that they have the necessary will, and that their peoples are strong. Neither of the two countries should look down upon the other; and if there is mutual respect then the two countries can create a basis for the negotiations necessary for reducing existing world problems and for bringing about a reduction in armed forces, which is desired by both sides. The Vice President continued by saying that in his statements to the press as well as in his public statements he would make no reference to the balance of power between the U.S. and the USSR, but would rather emphasize that both nations are powerful and that they have to see to it that the future is that of peace rather than of war. The Vice President emphasized that he was not saying that a settlement of differences would be easy, but still both sides must exert every effort toward this end.

Mr. Khrushchev expressed full agreement as to the Vice President's estimate of the correlation of forces as between the two powers. He denied that Soviet leaders had ever made statements to the effect that the Soviet Union could destroy the United States without suffering losses

itself. Yet some American generals had said that the U.S. could wipe out the Soviet Union in no time. (The Vice President indicated dissent, but Khrushchev held the floor.) He then continued to say that he would reveal another secret. The Vice President was undoubtedly familiar with Marshal Vershinin's famous interview about a year ago on Soviet capabilities of destruction. It was he, Khrushchev, who had dictated that interview. He had been on vacation at that time and had summoned the Marshal and a secretary in order to dictate that interview. The Soviet Government could not let pass in silence certain statements by U.S. generals and the Presidium had carefully considered at what level their reply should be issued. Finally it chose Vershinin, Chief of the Soviet Air Force, to equate with the sources of U.S. threats. A statement by one of the Ministers or by the Chief of Staff would not have been appropriate because it could have been misunderstood by the other side. The Soviet Government as such had never made statements comparable to statements by some U.S. generals. Such statements were irresponsible because the other side might misunderstand them. [The Vershinin statement referred to appears to be a four-column interview with the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Air Forces by a *Pravda* correspondent published in the *Pravda* of Sunday, Sept. 8, 1957, summarized as follows by Embassy Moscow at that time:

"Primary emphasis on (1) annihilative nature of another general war; (2) U.S. 'stupidity' evidenced by Generals and Admirals who say Soviet Union could be destroyed in several hours (specific reference to General Norstad, Admiral Burke and Field Marshal Montgomery); (3) rocket warfare nature of next war, Soviet superior offensive ability with such weapons, and charge that there is no defense against rockets; (4) ulterior motives, particularly adverse to U.S. military partners, of U.S. plan for world supremacy; (5) ulterior motives of U.S. monopolies and military leaders for continuation of arms race; (6) necessity follow Soviet standard disarmament proposals."]<sup>4</sup>

Khrushchev then said that it would be very easy for the USSR to destroy Europe and also mentioned that there would be no need for pinpoint missile accuracy, since accuracy with a 100 kilometer tolerance would be entirely adequate. He then cited a joke he understood to be current in England about pessimists and optimists. The pessimists said only 6 atomic bombs would be needed to wipe out the U.K., while the optimists said 9 or 10 would be required. Referring again to Turkey, Khrushchev said that, while being a poor, hungry country of beggars, it was a U.S. base. The USSR held no naval forces in the Black Sea because

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<sup>4</sup> Brackets in the source text. The quoted paragraph is from telegram 507 from Moscow, September 9, 1957. (Department of State, Central Files, 761.5/9-957)



Turkish territory as well as the entire sea could be covered with missiles and missile carriers. This was why the Soviet Union could not understand why the U.S. held to its bases. Perhaps the purpose was to divert the Soviet Union's nuclear power to the countries where U.S. bases are maintained. Mikoyan interjected that the purpose of U.S. bases was "political domination." Khrushchev said, "If you intend to make war on us, I understand; if not, why do you keep them?"

Khrushchev then said that he would reveal another, internal secret of the Soviet Union. He said that the Austrian State Treaty had been concluded at his own initiative. He had summoned Molotov and asked him why no peace treaty with Austria was being concluded. Molotov had replied that this was impossible. Khrushchev had said to Molotov, "If you want war, then all right, we should keep our positions in the West; however, if we want no war, then why not sign a peace treaty with Austria?" The question had been discussed at length within the Soviet Government and finally the decision to sign a peace treaty with Austria had been approved by every member except Molotov. Khrushchev went on to say that the Soviet Union had gained by this; it has the best possible relations with Austria, even better than with Finland, which are also very good, and all this in spite of the fact that both countries have bourgeois regimes. He recalled in this connection that when he had charged Chancellor Raab<sup>5</sup> with being a capitalist, Raab had replied that he was only a "small capitalist." Khrushchev went on to say that, without wanting to brag, he wanted to point out that it was again he who had proposed that the Soviet Union liquidate its Porkalla base in Finland.<sup>6</sup> His reasoning had been that if the Soviet Union did not want to seize Finland then why direct guns against the Finns. Again there were many discussions and finally the decision had been reached to withdraw. Khrushchev said that if the U.S. were to do the same thing with respect to its bases, world tensions would be relaxed. "I put to you the same question that I put to Molotov," he said, "Do you want to attack us?"

Dr. Milton Eisenhower interjected that under no circumstances would the U.S. do that, and the Vice President also replied in the negative.

Khrushchev then claimed that the U.S. wanted to install new bases in Iran. Ambassador Thompson said this was not true.

Khrushchev rejoined by saying that although the U.S.-Iranian agreement was secret he still had read it and could even give the Vice

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<sup>5</sup> Julius Raab, Chancellor of Austria 1953–1961.

<sup>6</sup> Regarding the Soviet Union's relinquishment of this base, see footnote 6, Document 80.

President a true copy of that agreement.<sup>7</sup> It was true that it had no provision for bases, yet it did provide for U.S. assistance to Iran in the event of "indirect aggression." This meant, he said, that the U.S. wanted to act as gendarmes against the Iranian people when they rose against their government.

The Vice President said he hoped Khrushchev did not think the Soviets could hold a meeting of Communists from 51 countries in Moscow<sup>8</sup> without the U.S. knowing what they were up to and what instructions they were getting with regard to subversive activities. Also Khrushchev had openly declared during his recent visit to Poland that the USSR would support revolution everywhere in the world.<sup>9</sup>

Khrushchev observed that the U.S. should not pay its intelligence agents because they were no good. He claimed that only 12 nations rather than 51 had met and that nothing had come out of that meeting that had not been published in the press. He said that the U.S. did not understand Communist ideas—Communists were against subversion and terror. The U.S. was still talking about conspiratorial parties like the anarchists and Nihilists in the old czarist Russia, but even then Marxists disagreed with such an approach. In response to the Vice President's remark, "unless necessary," Khrushchev specified that Marxists had always been against "individual terror." He said that such terror served no useful purpose and recalled in this connection the assassination of Czar Alexander II, when the Czar was killed but the system still remained. Yet mass uprisings where the bourgeoisie does not surrender its power peacefully are a different thing and are favored by Marxists.

Dr. Milton Eisenhower inquired whether this was not interference in the internal affairs of other countries, while the Vice President wondered whether this meant that the peoples in bourgeois countries were captives whose liberation was justified.

Khrushchev replied that this was too vulgar a term, not a scientific term. He said that if the Soviet Union wanted subversion it would have organized the strongest possible Communist party in the U.S.A. and the whole course of history would be different. He denied that the Soviet Union was supporting violence.

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<sup>7</sup> Reference is presumably to the agreement of cooperation between the United States and Iran signed at Ankara on March 5 and entered into force on the same day. (10 UST 314) This treaty was not secret and contained no secret provisions.

<sup>8</sup> Reference may be to a meeting held in Moscow November 14–16, 1957, of representatives from 12, not 51, Communist nations.

<sup>9</sup> Not further identified.

The Vice President inquired how the uprising in Northern Iraq last week<sup>10</sup> fitted into Khrushchev's theories. (This resulted in considerable exchange among the Soviets with confusion between last week's uprising and last year's revolution.)

Khrushchev finally replied that he knew of nothing going on in Iraq and therefore could not comment.

The Vice President then cited the case of Czechoslovakia.

Khrushchev said this was an interesting example worth examining. He said the Communist party in Czechoslovakia had been the only party in the country which had not surrendered to the Germans. For that reason the prestige of the Communist party had been much greater than its influence in the post-war government of Czechoslovakia, and so the Communist party presented demands on behalf of the people and the government capitulated. There was not one Soviet soldier in the country at that time and the Czech revolution was like the U.S. revolution. There was a complete parallel between the two situations. It was not King George III who had given the Americans their independence—American independence had been won as a result of the American revolution and the sympathies of the Russian people had been on the American side at that time.

The Vice President commented that, of course, everyone can give his interpretation of history. He then referred to the question of individual terror and recalled the Soviet incitement through the press and radio calling for terrorism against Mrs. Nixon and himself when they had been visiting Latin America.<sup>11</sup> Mobs had tried to kill them and the Soviet press and radio had expressed approval of those actions. The Vice President said he wondered how Mr. Khrushchev could reconcile this with his statement.

Khrushchev replied that he never evaded acute problems and quoted the Russian saying, "You are my guest but truth is my mother." He admitted that the sympathy of the people of the USSR had been with the people who had been against the Vice President. The Vice President had been the target of the righteous indignation of the people, indignation which had been directed not against him personally but rather against the policy of the U.S. The Soviet Union had regarded the Vice President's trip as demonstrating failure of the U.S. policy. Khrushchev said he thought that if the Vice President had visited the countries in

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<sup>10</sup> On July 14, fighting erupted between Turcomans and Kurds in Kirkuk, Iraq. Kurdish soldiers, led by Communists, disobeyed orders and began to massacre Turcomans. Army reinforcements, which were sent in from Baghdad, did not restore order until July 18.

<sup>11</sup> Nixon made a good will tour of eight South American countries April 27–May 15, 1958.

question as a tourist no one would have paid attention to him, and repeated that all violence had been directed against American policy rather than the personality of the Vice President.

The Vice President said he accepted Khrushchev's right to his opinion and to his sympathy for such acts. However, he pointed out, what had happened in Venezuela might happen in the world between countries of great power. When military power like that of the Soviet Union was coupled with such revolutionary policies there was a grave danger of matters getting out of control. In comparison, the 2000 kilometers mistake on the ICBM was a relatively small error. Therefore men like President Eisenhower and Mr. Khrushchev who are reasonable, tough, not soft or frightened, must approach these problems on the basis of give and take. Mr. Khrushchev was one of the most effective exponents of his own views, but he adhered to one single theme—the U.S. was always wrong, the Soviets never. It was impossible to find a settlement between two strong nations on that basis. Geneva was an example of that. Secretary Herter, representing the President, had made several concessions to meet the Soviet point of view. But a point can be reached where one side can go no further—therefore, both sides must give.

Khrushchev, referring to the events in Venezuela, said that the Vice President's remarks in that connection smacked of imperialism and tried to justify interference in internal affairs. This was the Eisenhower–Dulles policy, which wanted to control Venezuela's decisions because the U.S. believed that that country was of strategic importance. Such policies would result in hatred for the U.S. everywhere; even in Taiwan last year there had been anti-American riots. The U.S. wanted to determine itself where it could intervene, and this was an imperialist approach. The peoples of the countries concerned would not tolerate that.

The Vice President interrupted Khrushchev and asked him what he could say about the events in Hungary, Poland and East Germany.

Khrushchev dismissed this question, saying that this was an entirely different matter.

Khrushchev then referred to the Vice President's remarks regarding concessions and said that when peace was at stake no surrender, but only advance was possible. Soviet proposals were formulated on a global basis to appeal to the entire world, not just the U.S. Soviet proposals were well thought out and were supported by the entire world, because they were for peace. As for Geneva, this was a tea party and made little or no sense.

[Here follows discussion of the Foreign Ministers Meeting in Geneva and the Berlin question, printed in volume VIII, Document 481.]

At this point the Vice President invited Dr. Eisenhower to speak. Dr. Eisenhower said that he spoke as a private citizen and educator,

with only limited experience in foreign affairs, and for whom it was a privilege to attend this historic meeting, a meeting that offered hope. He said that he wanted to emphasize that never in history had the people of the U.S. started a war. The people of the U.S. wished most passionately that peoples of the world could live in peace, choose their own governments, and select methods for progress. He observed that in another year and a half President Eisenhower would have completed 50 years of service to his country. Dr. Eisenhower expressed the hope that by some miracle within that time, before President Eisenhower's Administration ends, something would be done to ensure that no war should happen.

The Vice President remarked that Dr. Eisenhower had pointed up a possibility which should not be overlooked. The decisions made within the next year or so could determine the course of history for the next 50 years. The architects of those decisions would be the President, the Soviet Prime Minister himself, and other leaders of nations, but the key people would be the President and Mr. Khrushchev.

Mr. Khrushchev agreed and said that this was logical because the USSR and the United States are the two most powerful nations. He then invited his Deputies to speak and show that he was not alone in presenting the views of the Soviet Government. Both were First Deputies. He would give priority to Mikoyan because of age but in contest would not exclude possibility Kozlov first.

Mikoyan said that all the words uttered by Khrushchev were so reasonable, logical and persuasive that he had nothing to add. He observed that when he had visited the U.S. he had found there a desire to understand the Soviet Union and that he had reported this to the Government. He concluded his remarks by saying that Mr. Khrushchev in his statements today had reflected the attitude of the Soviet people, which the Vice President had been able to observe earlier at "our Moscow River rallies." He proposed that policies of dictates and ultimata be replaced by policies of peace and friendship.

Mr. Kozlov joined Mikoyan in supporting Khrushchev's remarks and said that he also had found a desire for peace in the U.S. He would emphasize that the entire Soviet Government and all the Soviet people support the position set forth by Mr. Khrushchev.

Khrushchev concluded the conversation by saying that what he had said was not his own policy but rather the policy of the Government and of the Party. There was no divergence of views within the Government or the Central Committee of the Party. The people of the Soviet Union also understand the problems in this matter and are brought up in that spirit. They desire only peace.

After an exchange of pleasantries the group rose from the luncheon table at 8:50 p.m.

## ADDENDUM

In taking leave of Ambassador Thompson following the luncheon, Khrushchev half-apologized for his attack on the Ambassador during the conversation, saying that he had not meant to give offense.<sup>12</sup> Thompson replied that he had not meant to make a threat.

Following the luncheon, the Vice President walked to the dacha with Khrushchev accompanied only by Soviet interpreter Lapanov and Mr. Kohler. During the private exchange the Vice President mentioned the correspondence which had taken place between the President and Prime Minister with respect to an exchange of visits between the two.<sup>13</sup> In this connection, he again referred to the necessity that if such meetings were to be profitable, they must take place in an atmosphere from which the element of crisis had been removed. In replying Khrushchev referred to a report which he had just received from Soviet Ambassador Menshikov along similar lines, which he said he considered as reflecting the President's instructions to Mr. Murphy.<sup>14</sup> He added rather cryptically, that "instructions had been sent to Gromyko" at Geneva. The Vice President then said that the nature of the luncheon conversation had been such that he had not felt the occasion opportune to mention a few bilateral matters, which caused us concern and were a subject of public interest, relating particularly to the status of individual Americans. He said that if the Prime Minister were agreeable he would like to write him letters on these matters. Khrushchev indicated that this course was agreeable to him and promised to do what he could in connection with these questions. (In pursuance of this private exchange the Vice President sent two letters to the Prime Minister, one dealing with the C-130 case and the other with the issuance of Soviet exit visas to a selected list of American citizens and relatives of American citizens residing in the Soviet Union.)<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> The exchange between Thompson and Khrushchev took place during the discussion of Berlin, printed in vol. VIII, Document 481.

<sup>13</sup> See Documents 89 and 91.

<sup>14</sup> See Document 87.

<sup>15</sup> Regarding Nixon's August 1 letter to Khrushchev on the C-130 case, see Document 55. Nixon's August 1 letter on exit visas is printed as Document 104.

**100. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State**

Moscow, July 26, 1959, midnight.

320. For the President from the Vice President. Geneva eyes only for Secretary of State. I met for eight hours with Khrushchev today in what can only be described as an extraordinary experience. Mikoyan and Kozlov were present with all three wives, plus Acting FonOff Kuznetsov, Chief of Cultural Relations Zhukov, Acting Chief American Section FonOff Striganov, Soviet interpreters Troyanovsky and Lapanov. I had Pat, Milton, Ambassador Thompson, Kohler and Akalovsky.

The first two and one-half hours were spent cruising the Moscow River in motor boats, stopping eight times to gather bathers along shore for series of eight "political rallies". Despite Khrushchev needling me (several times publicly) to effect "here are your captive peoples," crowds were strikingly friendly and consensus my party applause for Pat, Milton and me even more vigorous than for Khrushchev himself.

Excursion was followed by lunch lasting from 3:30 to 9:00 pm with serious discussion throughout after first half hour.<sup>1</sup> On whole, Khrushchev stuck by substantive positions, especially on Berlin and Germany, but tone was not hostile. Presence of ladies throughout, as well as my refusal be drawn into details on negotiating position, induced some restraint and kept conversation general in nature. Point I repeatedly emphasized was that element of crisis, for which he was responsible, must be removed from picture by Geneva if there were to be fruitful further negotiations. He seemed to back away some from previously stated positions. Especially strictly bilateral postscript to long luncheon conversations, in which your recent correspondence brought up, he referred to Murphy conversation with Ambassador Menshikov which he said he considered as reflecting your instructions. In this connection, he said rather cryptically, "instructions sent to Gromyko" at Geneva. In view this, Ambassador Thompson and entire party agree with me in strong recommendation we probe Gromyko at Geneva for a further period before you send reply to Khrushchev on possible bilateral meeting.

At dinner last night Embassy here, Khrushchev was obviously very tired. By this noon he had recovered but his ebullience faded during long afternoon and he was clearly tired again as we parted. He indicated he is leaving soon for vacation and rest.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.1100-NI/7-2659. Secret; Limit Distribution; Presidential Handling. Repeated to Geneva.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 99.

Yesterday, in addition Ambassador Thompson dinner for Khrushchev attended by same party as today plus other Ministers, I had long talks with Mikoyan and Kozlov<sup>2</sup> and visited Soviet Exhibition, hosted by Agriculture Minister Matskevitch. Nothing momentous. Tomorrow morning proceed Leningrad. Pressure of schedule has been such paper work is behind. For this reason, I am leaving Kohler and Akalovsky in Moscow to prepare telegrams for you giving full summaries of meetings, especially discussion with Khrushchev today, pending return and submission full report and evaluation.

As you will have learned, full text my speech at Exhibit opening published *Pravda* yesterday, which old hands here consider phenomenal and of major importance as respects long-term struggle. Exhibit itself is one of which we may be proud. McClellan was elated to receive your letter.<sup>3</sup>

**Thompson**

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<sup>2</sup> See Documents 97 and 98.

<sup>3</sup> Eisenhower's letter to Harold C. McClellan, general manager of the American National Exhibition in Moscow, July 21, which Nixon handcarried to Moscow, congratulated McClellan for his central role "in transforming this Exhibition from an idea to a reality." (Eisenhower Library, White House Central Files)

On July 27, Eisenhower replied to Nixon's message as follows:

"Dear Dick: From all the reports I have received about your journey to the USSR, it is clear that you have so conducted yourself as to gain the respect and admiration of almost all Americans. I recognize many of the difficulties which you have to meet and I am grateful to you for the manner in which you are doing it.

"It is my understanding that the State Department has been providing you with current information and so I have no additional suggestions to make.

"Please give my warm greetings to Pat, Milton and to the rest of the party, and, of course, all the best to yourself.

"As ever, DE." (Transmitted in telegram 321 to Moscow, July 27; Department of State, Central Files, 033.1100-NI/7-2759)



101. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Herter, at Geneva

Washington, July 29, 1959, 8:59 p.m.

Tocah 201. [Here follow introductory paragraphs indicating the letter was handed to Ambassador Menshikov at 5 p.m.]<sup>1</sup>

“July 29, 1959.

Dear Mr. Chairman:

As I informed Ambassador Menshikov, I am grateful for your courteous and thoughtful reply that you so promptly made to my letter carried to you by your First Deputy Premier Mr. Kozlov.<sup>2</sup>

I am glad that the exchange of visits which I suggested appeals to you and I hope that this exchange will in fact lead to a much better understanding between us on our many problems. I can understand that you might prefer to come to the United States in the cooler weather and suggest that we mutually consider some date in September which would permit us informally to exchange views in or near Washington for a period of two or three days and also enable you to spend ten days or so traveling in our country. For my part, if it were convenient for you I would plan to return the visit later in the fall. If you concur, Mr. Robert Murphy will be available to discuss with Ambassador Menshikov the matter of dates and more detailed planning, including that of public announcement.

I believe you will agree that your visit to the United States as well as my later visit to the Soviet Union should take place in an atmosphere conducive to fruitful results and improved relations between our two countries.

I can assure you that as far as the American people are concerned I cannot emphasize too strongly how great an improvement there would be in public opinion if our meeting could take place in an improved environment resulting from progress at Geneva.

As I have repeatedly said, and I earnestly hope you understand, I have no other purpose than to help bring about agreements, in which we can have mutual confidence, designed to promote better understandings, greater tolerance, and peaceful development among the world's peoples including the USSR and the US. There is no greater achievement to which the world's leaders can aspire.

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1459. Top Secret. Repeated to Moscow.

<sup>1</sup> A memorandum of Murphy's conversation with Menshikov on July 29, during which he handed the letter to Menshikov is *ibid.*

<sup>2</sup> See Documents 89 and 91.

You will correctly deduce from what I have just said that progress at Geneva so far has been disappointing to me and not sufficient to justify holding a summit conference of the four powers engaged in that conference. From such a summit conference I believe great good could come and I by no means despair of achieving the progress which would justify it. My suggestion specifically would be that the Foreign Ministers in Geneva make as rapid progress as may be possible in the next few days and if they do not reach agreement they plan to come together again with a view to accomplishing such interim and preparatory work as would justify us in holding a summit meeting of the four Heads of Government this autumn.

With best wishes for your continued good health,  
Sincerely, Dwight D. Eisenhower"

Dillon

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**102. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Herter, at Geneva**

Washington, August 1, 1959, 7:32 p.m.

Tocah 222. No Distribution—Moscow for Ambassador only. Following FYI is text of letter to President from Khrushchev,<sup>1</sup> in reply President's letter to him of July 29:

"July 31, 1959. Dear Mr. President, It is with great pleasure that I note the agreement, which was so quickly reached between us concerning the exchange of visits<sup>2</sup>—about my visit to the USA in September 1959 and about your visit to the USSR later, in the autumn of this year.

The USSR Ambassador in Washington has been given the necessary directions for coming to agreement with persons authorized by you

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1459. Top Secret; Niact; Presidential Handling. Repeated to Moscow.

<sup>1</sup> No information on the delivery of this letter has been found, although Menshikov probably handed it to Department of State officials late on July 31 or August 1. Tocah 215 to Geneva, July 31 at 8:16 p.m., reads in part: "We have just seen Menshikov again this evening. It was obvious that he is expecting momentarily some indication from Moscow as to the exact date preferred by Khrushchev for the personal visit." (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 761.11/7-3159)

<sup>2</sup> See Document 101.

on concrete dates and detailed plans on the organization of the visit and also on the texts of appropriate announcements for publication in the press.

Concerning concrete dates of your visit to the USSR, it goes without saying that we will be happy to receive you at any time convenient to you and would like you to stay a little longer in our country. There can be no doubt, Mr. President, that the people and Government of the USSR will give you a worthy welcome and that you will have full opportunity for acquainting yourself with all sides of life in our country, in which you develop an interest. Conditions will also be created for an exchange of opinions between you and the leading figures of the Soviet Union in an atmosphere of sincerity and good will.

We fully understand, Mr. President, the opinions expressed by you on the desirability of making progress in the work of the Conference of Foreign Ministers in Geneva. We note with pleasure that the positions of the two sides in Geneva on several questions have come somewhat closer. The Soviet Government in the future will do its best to bring about conditions in which the Conference of Foreign Ministers can be more fruitful.

However, it is impossible to overlook the fact that the possibilities of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs are limited, and that in view of the complexity of contemporary international conditions, the questions before them can prove too much for them to resolve. But this should not arouse pessimism among us concerning the expediency of convening a meeting at the summit. On the contrary, under these conditions the necessity of convening a Conference of the Heads of Governments not only does not diminish, but becomes even more urgent.

I and my colleagues deeply believe that if the Heads of Governments, guided by the principles of peaceful coexistence, will make a genuine effort to reach agreement on a number of problems, that the meeting will yield positive results and will be an important step in the matter of improving the international atmosphere and consolidating peace. It is just this, as is well known, that the peoples of all countries expect of the Heads of Governments.

From my heart I wish you good health. Until our approaching meeting.

With sincere regards, N. Khrushchev''

**Dillon**

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**103. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State**

Moscow, July 31, 1959, 7 p.m.

390. For President from Vice President. Geneva eyes only for Secretary Herter. I have just returned to Moscow from a strenuous five-day trip through the Russian provinces, with roughly a day in Leningrad, the old Czarist capital; another in Novosibirsk, the rapidly developing capital of the Siberian frontier; over two in Sverdlovsk, the Ural industrial center, and neighboring cities; plus a lot of travel via TU 104 jets. Kozlov accompanied us to Leningrad, since then we have been in the hands of Yuri Zhukov, head of their "cultural relations" organization. Both American and Soviet press have been present throughout. Practically all activities and discussions have been public and I assume have been fully reported at home, so I shall not go into details. Despite the number of Soviet journalists and photographers along, reports in the local press have been sketchy, highly selected and slanted, with emphasis on what has been said to me and little or no report or mention of my responses.

Everywhere the feature of the trip has been a series of what I have come to call "foothill conferences." At every stop, I have had meetings and discussions with the local officials or plant directors. These have generally been strictly party line affairs, with the same record being played over and over again, from the "captive nations" gambit to "foreign bases." The best feature has been the crowds of ordinary citizens. During the week I have been in contact with tens of thousands of them and have personally greeted many hundreds. At every opportunity I have brought them your best wishes and presented Milton, with enormously enthusiastic response to the name Eisenhower. Some of the crowds of factory workers had obviously been given advance preparation, were clearly under discipline and had a sprinkling of planted "provocateurs" to heckle me. But even in such gatherings there was great curiosity and friendly interest, which in the case of the crowds along the city streets and in country villages were unboundedly enthusiastic. Ambassador Thompson and the other senior officers with me are greatly encouraged by this favorable popular reaction. They consider it demonstrates the really fervent desire of the Soviet people for peace; the counter-productive effect of Moscow's constant pounding of the line that the USA is the target to emulate—"to overtake and surpass"—; and the people's readiness to discount the unending propaganda against the

American government and leaders. These tendencies will be stimulated when the hundreds who actually heard what I said here and there—and the additional thousands who will learn of this via the “grapevine” which flourishes in this system of controlled information—compare what they know with the expurgated accounts they read in their own papers.

It is clear that the Soviets have been trying with their needling and planted hecklers to provoke me into some angry and ill-considered reactions. I have resisted the temptation to hit back violently, popular as that might be at home, for the sake of the weighty considerations involved at Geneva and between you and Khrushchev. Even Zhukov, who is probably primarily responsible for the needling effort, yesterday expressed admiration for my patience and restraint.

I let myself go only once, and that deliberately, by telling off a militiaman who tried to stop crowd’s applause and cheers as I came out of the Sverdlovsk City Hall yesterday. The crowd obviously approved my action and renewed its demonstration. Now Khrushchev, in his speech at Dnepropetrovsk of which I learned last night,<sup>1</sup> is following the same provocative line on a broader scale. This gives me a problem in connection with my radio-television address Saturday. While I shall deal with his major points, I propose to follow the same restrained tactics and avoid any detailed debate. It is clear that the Soviets have been most sensitive to my emphasis on free exchange and competition of information and ideas. Khrushchev seems in his speech to raise a possibility of not publishing my Saturday television speech and conceivably even of finding an excuse for canceling the broadcast altogether. (On the other hand, this would be a drastic departure from strict adherence to reciprocity in all respects so far.)

On substantive matters, the only thing which merits reporting—for what it is worth—is Zhukov’s comment on Geneva. Yesterday he said to me privately that: “I think your meeting with the Prime Minister last Sunday<sup>2</sup> will have a positive effect on breaking the bottleneck at Geneva.” Talking earlier with Ambassador Thompson he made a similar statement but modified its meaning by referring also to the Soviet all-German committee proposal.<sup>3</sup> We have been unable to evaluate these remarks, since we have had only fragmentary and insecure communications on this trip and consequently no current reports from Secretary Herter at Geneva.

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<sup>1</sup> For the condensed text of this July 28 speech, see *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, August 26, 1959, pp. 13–16.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 99.

<sup>3</sup> Gromyko made this proposal at the June 10 plenary session of the Geneva Foreign Ministers Meeting; see vol. VIII, Document 381.

One message which did get through by telephone from the Embassy in Moscow Thursday night, was your note to me,<sup>4</sup> which I greatly appreciate. Pat, Milton, and the rest of our party join in sending you our best.

Thompson

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<sup>4</sup>See footnote 3, Document 100.

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#### 104. Letter From Vice President Nixon to Chairman Khrushchev

Moscow, August 1, 1959.

DEAR MR. KHRUSHCHEV: In the course of our talks last Sunday<sup>1</sup> I had occasion to speak of certain persons, American citizens and relatives of American citizens, who desire to be reunited with their families in the United States, and said I would write you on the subject before my departure. In pursuance of this talk, I enclose the names and latest known addresses in the Soviet Union of a number of those persons whose situation I believe merits the compassionate attention of both our Governments.<sup>2</sup>

The United States stands ready to admit these persons under our immigration laws. I hope the Soviet Government will also find it possible, for its part, to facilitate their departure.

In the interests of a continuing improvement in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, I believe that matters such as this, involving principles of non-separation of families which we both support, should not persist as irritants to larger solutions. In this regard, I can state that the United States Government does not stand in the way of persons including its own citizens who desire to depart from the United States to take up residence in the U.S.S.R.

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1416. No classification marking.

<sup>1</sup>See Document 99.

<sup>2</sup>The list has not been found, but a list of names of Soviet residents and names and addresses of their relatives in the United States who wanted them to come to America is in the briefing book on Nixon's visit. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1416)

The only case which I know to be of concern to the Soviet Government is, as I mentioned to you, that of the Kusmin children now pending in our courts;<sup>3</sup> and I desire to report to you the intention of the United States Government to facilitate a solution of this matter.

I very much appreciated your receptive and sympathetic attitude when we talked about this question and I shall be grateful for your attention.

Sincerely,

**Richard Nixon<sup>4</sup>**

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<sup>3</sup> According to a briefing paper prepared on July 8 in the Office of Soviet Union Affairs, there were four Kusmin (spelled Kozmin in the briefing paper) children, three of whom were Soviet citizens and the fourth, having been born in the United States, an American citizen. These children were wards of the Chicago Family Court of Cook County since July 1953 when their parents were placed in mental institutions. Since their release the following year, the parents, Soviet displaced persons unable to adjust to life in the United States, tried to regain custody of their children. The Soviet Embassy in Washington entered the case in June 1956, and the parents left the United States a year later without their children. The case went to court in the State of Illinois, and in response to a request from the Attorney General of that state, the Department of State sent a letter to Governor Stratton on June 26, 1959, reiterating Department of State policy not to impede the voluntary repatriation of citizens to their own country and to facilitate the reuniting of families. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1413) On August 19, the Family Court of Cook County rendered a decision giving custody to Mr. and Mrs. Kusmin of their four children, and the children left the United States by airplane on August 27 to be reunited with their parents in the Soviet Union. Additional documentation on the Kusmin case is *ibid.*, Central File 211.6122.

<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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### 105. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, August 3, 1959, 6 p.m.

428. I believe that from United States standpoint Vice President's visit was highly successful. He was able in his discussions with top leaders to convince them of United States desire for peace while at same time impressing upon them our determination to resist pressure. While visit

was to some extent hampered by Captive Nations Proclamation and deliberate heckling which was patently ordered by Soviet Government, Vice President was also able to impress Soviet people with our desire for peace and friendship. More importantly by his two speeches<sup>1</sup> and the widespread publicity they received he was able to confirm suspicions which Soviet people already held that there are two sides to great international issues. Soviet concern at impact visit had was shown in many ways including Kozlov's remarks at airport on his departure.<sup>2</sup> On other hand many courtesies shown him by Soviet officialdom particularly after Sunday lunch with Khrushchev indicated visit was, as they would put it, "positive". Vice President's experience and skill as result his many foreign visits stood him in good stead in striking balance between getting our story across and at same time not upsetting bigger game we are playing by provocative statements. While to American ears his TV-radio speech may have seemed soft it was in my opinion extremely effective with Soviet audience and this is confirmed by experienced foreign observers here.

**Thompson**

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<sup>1</sup> Regarding Nixon's speeches at the opening of the American National Exhibition on Jul 24 and on radio and television on August 1, see Document 92.

<sup>2</sup> For the transcript of Kozlov's speech at the airport, see *The New York Times*, August 3, 1959.

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## 106. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, August 5, 1959, 4:45 p.m.

### OTHERS PRESENT

Vice President Nixon  
Secretary Dillon  
Dr. Milton Eisenhower  
General Persons  
Mr. Hagerty  
Mr. Morgan  
Mr. Harlow  
Mr. Kendall  
Mr. Stephens  
Major Eisenhower

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Major Eisenhower and initialed by Goodpaster.



The Vice President opened by offering advice for the President's forthcoming trip.<sup>1</sup> He warned of the Russian policy of trying to physically wear out all visitors. He advised against going to Siberia, since facilities there are not sufficient to handle the press corps. Two or three days is enough in Moscow, and the President should get out of the city where the reception is warmer. The Vice President favors Leningrad and Kiev. He mentioned the great impact of the President's announcement of the exchange of visits, and the salutary effect of this announcement on his own trip. He feels that a delay in the President's plans will be good politically, since it will keep Khrushchev on good behavior for the interim.

The President said he plans to visit the Soviet Union for a short time only, since these trips are now becoming commonplace. He fears that the opportunity to learn much would be remote. He favors going to Kiev, Murmansk, Stalingrad or Kuybyshev. He said he may delay his trip almost to winter.

The Vice President went on to describe Khrushchev as a man with a closed mind, who will not be impressed with what he sees in America. The only approach which will be useful will be to give him a subtle feeling of the power and the will of America. He looks at everything through Communist glasses and believes what he says. Dr. Eisenhower said he thought the speech at Dnepropetrovsk was the softest, in which Khrushchev admitted the Soviet Union could be destroyed in a general war.<sup>2</sup> He has a quick mind, and is good at polemics. He has a primitive approach, and is ignorant of everything outside the Soviet Bloc, although he does not recognize his ignorance. During the 6-1/2 hour luncheon, he repeated a determination that the wartime occupation as such of Berlin should be terminated. He recognizes the need to maintain Western dominance in West Berlin and might even place the corridors under West Germany. He is doggedly determined that East Berlin should stay in the Communist camp.

The Vice President said the only long-range answer to the Russian problem is a gradual opening of the door through contacts. People are hungry for news of the outside world. For example, the Vice President's own listening audience in Moscow was tremendous. Eight out of ten people in Moscow saw his speech by community use of television receivers. This speech he had, incidentally, made mild in order to permit

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<sup>1</sup> At his news conference on August 3, President Eisenhower read a statement indicating that Khrushchev had accepted his invitation to visit the United States in September, and he had accepted Khrushchev's invitation to visit the Soviet Union later that fall. For text of this statement, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1959*, pp. 560–564.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 1, Document 103.

future repetition. The President said that when he had the space, the invitation to accept 10,000 students from the USSR would have been the best idea in a long time.<sup>3</sup> He asked Mr. Hagerty to check with our network heads, such as Sarnoff and Paley,<sup>4</sup> to see if they would back him if he were able to make a deal with Khrushchev. This deal would allow exchanges of one-half hour programs, in which each side, using its own interpreter, would broadcast to the other. These one-half hour programs might be shown in each country once a month (by use of film), on one TV and one radio network at a time. The Vice President advised giving Khrushchev maximum coverage to set the stage for insisting on reciprocity.

The discussion then turned to the forthcoming presentation which the Vice President would make to the nation on TV. It will be conducted early next week and will consist of a commentary on pictures taken by the press on the trip. The Vice President does not wish to get into issues and feels the trip has already been covered well. He plans no press conference.

[Here follows discussion of Poland; for text, see Part 2, Document 75.]

The President asked if the party had seen any missile sites. The Vice President said they had not. [1 line of source text not declassified] Khrushchev refused to show missile sites, saying that reduction of tensions must come first. Mr. Dillon added that Khrushchev has refused in advance to see any U.S. missile sites. He claims he is coming for peaceful purposes.

In response to the President's question, the Vice President said he had asked by letter about the missing personnel on the C-130 crash of last September.<sup>5</sup>

The President asked if any members of the party had returned to the exhibition on their second stop in Moscow. Dr. Eisenhower had, and found that about 65,000 people per day were going through. The dust problem had been solved by the laying of a blacktop surface. Some discussion followed on the Governors' comments on the exhibition.<sup>6</sup> Governor Collins had said the exhibition failed to show a cross section of the U.S. All agreed that such would be impossible. Mr. Dillon said that the

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<sup>3</sup> See Part 2, Document 1.

<sup>4</sup> Robert W. Sarnoff, Chairman of the Board of the National Broadcasting Company, and William S. Paley, Chairman of the Board of the Columbia Broadcasting System.

<sup>5</sup> See Document 55.

<sup>6</sup> On July 31, from 11:28 a.m. to 12:13 p.m., President Eisenhower received Governors Clyde, Collins, Davis, Hodges, McNichols, Meyner, Smylie, Stratton, and Underwood, who had recently returned from a visit to the Soviet Union. (Eisenhower Library, President's Appointment Book) No further record of their conversation has been found.

view of Governor Collins was not shared by all the others. Dr. Eisenhower said he thought the exhibition was good, but was a little neglectful of agriculture, religion and education. The cyclorama and the seven-screen exhibit showing our daily life were his favorites.

The President said the Governors had complained that we stress nail polish and cosmetics too much. The Vice President disagreed, saying the Governors must realize the drabness of life in the Soviet Union. Dr. Eisenhower said the result of their first day's voting, in which we had utilized a voting machine as part of the exhibit, indicated 340 thought the exhibition excellent, 300 thought it good, 300 thought it fair, and very few thought it poor.

The Vice President then went back to the personality of Khrushchev and described his penchant for lighthearted needling, even in making toasts. In contrast, however, he never raised his voice for 6-1/2 hours at his luncheon. He did, however, speak in deadly earnest. The ladies were ignored. The President said he himself would not engage in public debate; rather, he would go on TV before Khrushchev leaves, if Khrushchev, by objectionable statements, makes this necessary.

The conversation then turned to the procedures for handling Khrushchev's visit. The Vice President said normal handling for distinguished visitors will not work when Khrushchev visits the U.S. Khrushchev will have a great entourage. His trip should be managed by someone experienced in running political campaigns. Khrushchev had complained that Mikoyan and Kozlov had spent too much time with industrialists. The President said we should keep him away from the sponsorship of the Henry Fords, even if it may be necessary for the Federal Government to pay the expenses of the entire trip.

The Vice President recommended, in view of the risk inherent in sending Khrushchev to New York, that he come to Washington as a first stop, landing at either Friendship or National Airport. The President said it had been suggested that Abilene be one of the stops of Khrushchev's trip so that he can see where the President actually worked. In this case he could land at Smoky Hill Air Base, and use a helicopter to view the farms of the region on the way. The President noted this trip would be just before the corn harvest. He also mentioned the possibility of Khrushchev's visiting Yankton, South Dakota, which has been called the typical American town, and has the advantage of a mayor anxious to show it off. If such were done, it probably would take the place of Abilene. The Vice President thought it would be worthwhile for Khrushchev to see these farm areas and to see labor leaders, such as Walter Reuther. He also suggested a trip to Los Angeles in order to give Khrushchev a chance to fly over in a helicopter and to see vast numbers of houses such as portrayed in the Moscow exhibit. The Vice President

placed emphasis on factories and power. The President mentioned Levittown, Pennsylvania, which is built strictly for the workers.

The President then asked Mr. Dillon how he planned to organize Khrushchev's trip. He realized that Mr. Murphy would be overseeing this visit from the political side, but is uncertain as to who would run the logistics. He had in mind particularly advance men such as ran his 1952 Presidential campaign. He thought that Dr. Eisenhower might be useful as a guide. Mr. Dillon said he is aware of no one in State who is capable of running a big show. Mr. Stephens<sup>7</sup> said he can call on any one of five men at any time. General Persons<sup>8</sup> mentioned Len Hall.<sup>9</sup>

Dr. Eisenhower then recommended that Camp David be utilized on the Khrushchev visit. He said that someone had already mentioned Camp David to Khrushchev, and he likes the idea. Dr. Eisenhower called attention to Khrushchev's penchant for his own dacha. The Vice President backed up Dr. Eisenhower on the idea of Camp David. He warned that the President must figure on one discussion spanning a full day, at least three hours in the morning and three hours in the evening. He recommended maximum discussion with Khrushchev on the part of the other people prior to his discussion with the President, in order to ferret out his main points in advance. He reiterated his warning that Khrushchev would try to wear anyone down who talks to him. As to social matters, the Vice President recommended stag events in business suits since Khrushchev, by principle, eschews tuxedos. The women are accustomed to being entertained separately.

Dr. Eisenhower noted the museums, the university and the comic opera which he had seen in Moscow. He recommended consideration of an exhibit in the U.S. based on the Moscow permanent exhibit of all the republics of the USSR. He recommended that the President see this site when he visits Moscow.

The President said that in Washington, Khrushchev might be shown a few sites, such as the Lincoln Memorial, and on the first evening, be given a stag dinner. He could be taken to Camp David in a helicopter and shown housing areas on Route 240. Apparently he will have to see our fleets of automobiles in order to believe them. The Vice President said to expect Kozlov and Mikoyan to accompany Khrushchev. He uses them to spell him in long debates. He recommends Akalovski as U.S. interpreter.

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<sup>7</sup> Thomas E. Stephens, Secretary to the President.

<sup>8</sup> General Wilton B. Persons, Assistant to the President.

<sup>9</sup> Leonard Wood Hall, lawyer and former chairman of the Republican National Committee 1953-1957.

The President instructed that Mr. Murphy put together a group to plan this trip. It should be worked out in great detail, recognizing that the U.S. Government may have to pay for the entire thing. He considers this unlikely, however, since many mayors and governors have invited Khrushchev to visit them. The Vice President recommended keeping the schedule light and warned that Khrushchev is rarely bound by the schedule. He felt it would be improper to act himself as host since he had not done so with any other Head of State. He reiterated his recommendation to give Khrushchev the greatest exposure possible and said it would hurt him in the long run. He observed that the Russians often attack in our long suits and make issues of subjects damaging to themselves, such as the captive nations.

Dr. Eisenhower recommended that the President see Khrushchev at the end of his trip. This will serve to keep him on good behavior while he is traveling through the country.

[1 *paragraph (3 lines of source text) not declassified*]

The Vice President finished his presentation by making two points:

1. It will save the President time and energy if he will avoid Khrushchev's effort to philosophize, to discuss military strength, and to compare economic systems. If the President sticks to business, Khrushchev will, in the long run, like it.

2. As to Khrushchev's health, he is not a sick man. He has been driving himself unmercifully, and when in Poland, "ran out of gas." He lacks the stamina he once had, and for this reason, may desire to get down to cases while discussing issues with the President.

The President concluded by requesting the Vice President to report to the Cabinet on his trip.<sup>10</sup>

**John S.D. Eisenhower**

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<sup>10</sup> The Vice President's comments to the Cabinet meeting on August 7 on his recent trip to the Soviet Union were briefly summarized in the minutes of that meeting. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Cabinet Series)

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## **107. Memorandum of Discussion at the 416th Meeting of the National Security Council**

Washington, August 6, 1959.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

Mr. Allen Dulles said that foreign reaction on both sides of the Iron Curtain to the announcement of the exchange of visits between President Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev had been favorable but not uniform.<sup>1</sup> In the U.K. both parties had approved the exchange of visits with the Conservatives saying that the exchange justified their position regarding a Summit Meeting. The President asked whether the Conservatives think we are now going to have a Summit Meeting. Mr. Dulles said the exchange of visits was not exactly what Mr. Macmillan had proposed, but was along the lines of his proposal. The Labor Party in the U.K. was also favorable to the exchange of visits, but was not quite as enthusiastic about it as the Conservative Party. The reaction in Rome and Paris had been more reserved, while West Germany had welcomed the exchange and expressed the hope that Khrushchev's visit to the U.S. would bring home to Khrushchev the power and the desire for peace of the U.S. Yugoslavia had welcomed the announcement of the exchange of visits, but had looked back on the abortive Tito visit and wondered whether Tito might some day visit the U.S. The Chinese Communist reaction had been turgid. The Chinese Communists were saying that the exchange of visits might help to mitigate the cold war, but had added that most of the credit was due to the USSR and to peace-loving peoples throughout the world, and that some dark forces in the U.S. and West Germany were still uneasy, so that the forces of world peace would still have to work hard.

Mr. Dulles reported that a technical analysis of the press and radio coverage of the Vice President's statements in the USSR had been turned over to the Vice President.<sup>2</sup> The analysis showed that the Moscow coverage compared favorably with the visits of other foreign statesmen to the USSR and with the Mikoyan visit to the U.S. Although the Soviets had done better than might have been expected, they did not play fair with the Vice President; for example, they had Khrushchev winning every debate. It was difficult to get an estimate of the coverage outside Moscow but it was clear that the Russians were worried about too wide a dissemination of the Vice President's statements. Obviously, the Vice President's statements would have considerable effect in the USSR.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

**Marion W. Boggs**

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<sup>1</sup> See footnote 1, Document 106.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

## SEPTEMBER–DECEMBER 1959: VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES OF NIKITA S. KHRUSHCHEV

### 108. Editorial Note

Chairman Nikita S. Khrushchev made an official visit to the United States September 15–27, 1959. For documentation on the invitation and Khrushchev's acceptance, see Documents 87–89, 91, and 101–102.

The President announced the agreement on the exchange of visits at a special press conference on August 3. For text of his announcement and ensuing questions from the press, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1959*, pages 560–564. Throughout August and early September, Murphy and Soviet Ambassador Mikhail A. Menshikov held many conversations to discuss arrangements for Khrushchev's forthcoming trip. Memoranda of these conversations are in Department of State, Central File 033.6111.

The most extensive documentation on the Khrushchev visit is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1459–1475. Background documents are in CF 1459–1462; memoranda of conversation are in CF 1463–1464. Copies of cables on substantive and administrative matters are in CF 1465 and 1469. Briefing papers are in CF 1466–1468. Miscellaneous administrative and substantive matters are in CF 1470; White House memoranda on substantive and administrative matters are in CF 1471. A detailed chronology of Khrushchev's visit for September 15 and 16 is in CF 1472. The chronology for September 17 and 18 is in CF 1473. The chronology for September 19 to 24 is in CF 1474 and for September 24 to 27 is in CF 1475.

Khrushchev arrived at Andrews Air Force Base on Tuesday, September 15 at 1 p.m. Members of his large party included his wife Nina Petrovna Khrushchev, his daughters Julia Nikitichna and Rada Nikitichna Adzhubei, his son Sergei Nikitich Khrushchev, and his son-in-law Alexei Ivanovich Adzhubei, editor of the Soviet newspaper *Izvestia*. For texts of Eisenhower's welcoming remarks and Khrushchev's arrival statement at the airport, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1959*, pages 654–656. A memorandum of Khrushchev's conversation with Eisenhower at 3:30 p.m. that afternoon is printed as Document 109. For text of their joint statement following this conversation, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1959*, pages 656–657. Also at 3:30 p.m., William S.B. Lacy, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for East-West Exchange, met with Georgi Zhukov, Chairman of the Soviet State Committee on Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. A memorandum of their conversation on U.S.-Soviet exchange discussions is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1472.

At 4:30 p.m., John A. McCone, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, met with Vasily Semenovich Yemelyanov, Chairman of the Soviet Chief Administration for Atomic Energy; see Document 110. A memorandum of President Eisenhower's private conversation with Khrushchev at the White House at 5 p.m. is printed as Document 111. Following this conversation, Henry Cabot Lodge, Ambassador to the United Nations, whom Eisenhower had asked to serve as Khrushchev's host during his visit, called on Khrushchev at Blair House where Khrushchev stayed while in Washington. A memorandum of their conversation is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1472. Eisenhower gave a dinner in honor of Chairman and Mrs. Khrushchev that evening. For texts of Eisenhower's toast and Khrushchev's response on this occasion, see the press release in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1959*, pages 657-659.

On Wednesday, September 16 at 9:40 a.m., Khrushchev left by car for a visit to the Agricultural Experiment Station in Beltsville, Maryland. A memorandum of his conversation with Lodge in the car on the way to and from Beltsville is printed as Document 112. At 10 a.m., Secretary Herter met with Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko to plan for the meeting between Eisenhower and Khrushchev at Camp David toward the end of Khrushchev's visit. A memorandum of their conversation is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1472. After his return from Beltsville, Khrushchev attended a luncheon at the National Press Club. At 3:30 p.m., he made an automobile tour of points of interest in the Washington area. A memorandum of his conversation with Lodge during this tour is printed as Document 113. Khrushchev ended his tour at the Capitol where he had tea with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Notes of this meeting are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1472.

On the next morning, September 17, Khrushchev and his party left by train for New York City. A memorandum of Lodge's conversation with Khrushchev during the train trip is printed as Document 114.

Khrushchev and his party left by car for Hyde Park, New York, the following morning, September 18, where he was met by Eleanor Roosevelt. Khrushchev laid a wreath on President Roosevelt's grave and then had a tour of the Hyde Park Museum. Memoranda of Khrushchev's conversations with Lodge in the car to and from Hyde Park are printed as Documents 115 and 116. At 3 p.m. the same afternoon, Khrushchev addressed the U.N. General Assembly. Following his speech, Nelson A. Rockefeller, Governor of New York, called on Khrushchev. Khrushchev then took a motor tour of points of interest in New York. Two memoranda of his conversations with Lodge during this tour, in which they discussed trade and the construction of city build-



ings, are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1473. Khrushchev attended a dinner that evening given by Dag Hammarskjöld, U.N. Secretary-General.

At 9:30 a.m. September 19, Khrushchev and his party flew from New York to Los Angeles. A memorandum of his conversation with Lodge on the airplane is printed as Document 117. Following lunch at Twentieth-Century Fox Studios and a visit to a motion picture set there, Khrushchev went to his hotel in Los Angeles. A memorandum of his conversation with Lodge during the car ride to the hotel is printed as Document 118. A message from Lodge to the Department of State, September 19, reporting on his conversation with Gromyko late that evening is printed as Document 119. A memorandum of Acting Secretary of State Dillon's telephone conversation with Lodge, September 20, following up on Lodge's message, is printed as Document 120.

On Sunday morning, September 20, Khrushchev left Los Angeles by train for San Francisco. A memorandum of his conversation with Lodge during the trip is printed as Document 121. A memorandum of their brief conversation on signs protesting Khrushchev's visit in Washington and a summary of a meeting that evening between Khrushchev and International Union presidents are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1474.

The next morning, September 21, Khrushchev toured San Francisco by automobile and boat. A memorandum of his conversation with Lodge during the tour is printed as Document 122. Lodge summarized the events of the previous 2 days in a cable to Herter; see footnote 2, Document 122.

On the morning of September 22, Khrushchev flew from San Francisco to Des Moines, Iowa. A memorandum of his conversation with Lodge and George Christopher, Mayor of San Francisco, en route to the airport is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1474. A memorandum of Khrushchev's conversation with Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson on the airplane in which they discussed the comments of former Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen on Khrushchev's drinking habits is *ibid.* A memorandum of President Eisenhower's conversation with Acting Secretary Dillon and McCone on the exchange of nuclear energy information with the Soviet Union is printed as Document 123.

On Wednesday morning, September 23, Khrushchev visited farms in the vicinity of Coon Rapids, Iowa. A memorandum of his conversation with Roswell Garst during his tour is printed as Document 124. He flew later that day to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, leaving there on September 24 for Washington. A memorandum of his conversation with Lodge on the way to the Pittsburgh airport is printed as Document 125. The President and Herter also met that day in preparation for the Camp

David meetings; see Document 126. That evening, Khrushchev met with several American business leaders at a dinner; see Document 127.

For Lodge's report to the President on his tour with Khrushchev, see Document 128. A memorandum of Pat Nixon's conversation with Khrushchev's daughter Julia at a luncheon on September 25 is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1475. Secretary Herter hosted a luncheon for Khrushchev; his toast, released as Department of State press release 675, is *ibid*. A memorandum of Under Secretary Dillon's conversation with Pavel Alekseevich Satyukov, chief editor of *Pravda*, during the luncheon is *ibid*.

On Saturday, September 26, the President and Khrushchev breakfasted together; see Document 129. Later that morning, they discussed Germany and Berlin; that memorandum of conversation is printed in volume IX, Document 13. For other memoranda of their conversations, see Documents 130 and 131. The two then left by helicopter for a visit to the President's farm in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. Two memoranda of conversation between George Allen and Georgi Zhukov on jamming and the establishment of information centers are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1475. Later that afternoon, Herter and Gromyko discussed bilateral issues; a memorandum of that conversation is in the East-West exchanges compilation in the Supplement. George Allen's memorandum for the files detailing the continuation of these conversations when he and Zhukov joined the meeting between Herter and Gromyko is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1475.

On Sunday, September 27, Dillon met with Khrushchev at 9:35 a.m.; see Document 132. Khrushchev next met with President Eisenhower; see Document 133. The record of the private meeting between the two, at which they discussed the joint communiqué, and the President's report on this meeting in a conversation with Herter are printed in volume IX, Documents 14 and 15. The discussion at lunch is printed as Document 134. After lunch, the conversation turned again to the joint communiqué; the memorandum is printed in volume IX, Document 16. For text of their joint statement following these Camp David discussions, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1959*, pages 692–693. An unsigned and undated summary and analysis of the Camp David talks is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1475.

At about 2 p.m., the President and Khrushchev left by car for Washington where Khrushchev held a press conference and gave a speech carried on the NBC television network. He and his party left late that evening for Moscow. For the President's follow-up comments on the visit, see Document 135.

President Eisenhower's recollections of the visit are in *Waging Peace*, pages 405–413 and 432–449. John Eisenhower's account is in *Strictly Personal*, pages 254–264. Lodge's impressions are in *The Storm Has Many Eyes*, pages 157–181, and *As It Was*, pages 111–113. Khrushchev's reminiscences on his visit are in *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament*, pages 368–416. The Soviet Union published two books in English on the visit: *Face to Face: The Story of N.S. Khrushchev's Visit to the U.S.A., September 15–27, 1959* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1960) and *Khrushchev in America* (New York: Crosscurrents Press, 1960). The latter publication contains the full texts of all Khrushchev's speeches and press conferences during his visit. Transcripts of his speeches and press conferences are also in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1475B. Almost all of his public statements were published in *The New York Times*.

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## 109. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 15, 1959.

### PARTICIPANTS

#### USSR

Premier Khrushchev  
Foreign Minister Gromyko  
Ambassador Menshikov  
Mr. Soldatov  
Mr. Troyanovsky

#### U.S.

The President  
The Vice President  
Secretary of State Herter  
Ambassador Cabot Lodge  
Ambassador Thompson  
Mr. Kohler  
Mr. Akalovsky

Mr. Khrushchev and aides arrived promptly at 3:30 at the President's office. After initial greetings Mr. Khrushchev promptly handed the President a polished wooden box containing a model of the sphere incorporated in the Soviet moon-shot rocket Lunik II and of the pennants contained therein which are presumably now on the moon.<sup>1</sup> Accompanying this was an embossed presentation folder. The President accepted the souvenir with interest and appreciation.

Following the ceremony the President opened the conversation by saying that in view of the limits of the time available today, it would

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1472. Secret. Drafted by Kohler and approved by Herter and Goodpaster.

<sup>1</sup>Lunik II, a Soviet space rocket launched on September 12, reached the Moon on September 14.

probably be possible to do little more than to sketch out the general outlines of the discussions. He did not have any intention of curtailing the talks but thought it would be useful to hit on the subjects of discussion on which it was necessary to get a fuller understanding between the Soviets and ourselves. He said it was inevitable that we would have to talk about points of irritation such as Berlin and Laos. However, he felt that if we could get these into some reasonable perspective, then we could proceed to talk about more constructive subjects, such as wider exchange of ideas and people, trade—if there were any real possibilities—reduction of propaganda of mutually irritating nature and the like. As to Camp David, the site of the talks, this was a simple place. There would not be much room except for about four people on each side plus interpreters and of course personal service. He pointed out that Camp David was cooler than Washington, a fact which he thought would please the Chairman. Mr. Khrushchev quickly interjected that this was quite right. The President continued: among the subjects of bilateral nature, trade and especially the development of tourist exchanges were of interest, pointing out that we were sending nearly 15,000 tourists to the Soviet Union and receiving only about 100 Soviet citizens.

The President said that if there were any subject that the Chairman wanted to start on today, he invited Mr. Khrushchev to present his views in any way he might like. He wanted to mention only one other point. Before the conference broke up the press would want photographs and a short statement. The talks were personal in nature but perhaps the Foreign Ministers could figure out something which could be said to satisfy the curiosity of the press.

Mr. Khrushchev commented that the Ministers should be given some work to do. He confirmed to the President that he agreed with the program of discussions as he had stated. He wanted to ask only if the President contemplated discussing the disarmament question.

The President replied in the affirmative, adding that he did not exclude any subject from the talks.

Mr. Khrushchev repeated that he was in general agreement with the subjects the President had mentioned. These were the ones on which we needed to exchange and to bring our views closer. He had been commissioned by the Soviet Government to discuss the widest matters. The Soviet Government would like to bring about normal relationships between the two countries and the improvement in the international climate which would result from this. Of course he said each country has its own views as to the items to be discussed and the terms of the discussion. He saw no reason why we should not find agreement on many things in the discussions. If so, the discussions could then become negotiations, perhaps at some other spot and some other composition of meetings. The people of the world expected such developments. He

spoke the view of the Soviet Government in saying that: "We believe that you do not want war; and we assume that you also believe this about us."

The President interjected that he saw no profit in mutual suicide.

Mr. Khrushchev resumed, saying that he agreed with this statement, but that when the Foreign Ministers met they talked otherwise and that the presence of interpreters did not seem to help. When one side gave its interpretation of a position, the other side immediately thought that this was what they were saying but suspected that they were thinking otherwise. The main thing, he said, is to establish trust. Probably we cannot take each other's word at this time but we must try to bring about trust. There is no other way. Of course there are differences in our political systems and the whole basis of our social systems is different. These differences must be recognized. If we approach each other in the expectation that the other's system will be overturned, then there will be no basis for understanding. Let us allow history to be the judge of which system is preferable and meanwhile live in peace as good neighbors.

The President said he did not disagree with Mr. Khrushchev's remarks. The question seemed to be—how do we start to clear away the underbrush of confusion and mutual distrust and begin then to solve some of the problems between us. He thought the basis of the mistrust was not suspicion of Mr. Khrushchev toward himself or his suspicion of Mr. Khrushchev. It was a problem of national psychology and popular feeling. He said that frankly, our people are aware of Communist ideology and read its doctrine starting all the way back to Marx, on the destruction of our society, even by force. Our people become uneasy and they say things which are irritating. We have in the US a Communist Party which the people think is militant and is supported by Communists in Moscow. People are thus fearful and tense. Sometimes this feeling even becomes excessive and leads to witch hunts, as in the days of McCarthy (Khrushchev interjected that he read about this). The President resumed, saying that he was sure that we wanted to approach these talks in a friendly way and explore what we could do. He said he was making no charges but explaining the situation. He assumed that Mr. Khrushchev would do the same and we would see if we could find ways to increase confidence and improve the situation, perhaps step by step. So, with the Chairman's permission, he would take up one subject right now, that of Berlin. The United States' position is that we assumed responsibilities at the end of World War II. He agreed with Mr. Khrushchev that the present situation in Berlin is abnormal. However, until the United States can discharge its obligation to the German people, there should be no unilateral action on the part of the Soviets embarrassing to us and making it impossible for us to discharge these responsibili-

ties. We cannot abandon those responsibilities until there is an acceptable settlement.

The President then said that he did not want to monopolize the conversation. So if Mr. Khrushchev wanted to talk, it was certainly his turn to do so.

Mr. Khrushchev replied that the President as the host had the right to regulate the conversation. He had no complaints.

The President said if we wanted to make progress, we must discuss specific questions. The Berlin Question was a symbolic one, irritating to the Soviets and unpleasant for us. The Soviets' threat to take unilateral action had brought about a serious crisis. Maybe, though, we would have to put this particular question at the back end of the talks. Some of the subjects which the President would like to discuss were perhaps nuclear testing, some disarmament questions and, he would again repeat, questions of a much greater exchange of books, publications and ideas. He felt that it was important to have exchanges between government leaders. He was glad that the Vice President and his brother, Dr. Milton Eisenhower, had visited the Soviet Union. Similarly he had been pleased with the visits of Messrs. Mikoyan and Kozlov over here. It would be even better if there could be much broader interchanges between everyday people—workers, farmers, and the like. He was also interested in exhibits. He had admired the Soviet exhibit in New York and had been glad to have ours in Moscow. Mr. Khrushchev interrupted at this point to say that as concerns exhibits, he could say in a friendly way that the United States exhibit could have been much better than it was. He did not want to discuss this in detail and thought he could do that later. However, he would like to say why he considered that our exhibit was not really American. The President replied that he had heard some criticisms from some of our people which were considerably more bitter than that voiced by the Chairman.

The President resumed, saying that he could assure Mr. Khrushchev that every word he uttered outside of private meetings such as this would be candidly and accurately reported. He was delighted that the Chairman could tell our people everything he could or wanted to about how he feels as regards the problems that divide us. When Mr. Khrushchev rides with him to Camp David, he will see all the television antennae and will realize that his likeness and every word that he utters is coming into the living rooms of the houses.

The President concluded that there was not much use in trying to discuss these problems in detail this afternoon. We had outlined a number of subjects and the course we would like to follow in approaching them when there was an opportunity for a longer conversation.

Mr. Khrushchev replied that he was quite agreeable to the exchange of views on the subjects mentioned by the President. If he might, he would like to say a few words in general terms about one subject which had been mentioned. He was afraid that American officials, not being Marxists, did not understand Marxism. Coming to the U.S. he had read the Vice President's last speech.<sup>2</sup> The Vice President "was becoming Marxist" and had indicated that he was studying the subject but he was afraid the Vice President was not studying very well. (The Vice President interjected he was complimented that Mr. Khrushchev read his speech.) Mr. Khrushchev continued saying that Mr. Nixon had mentioned toothaches in his speech. The speech was not a toothache to him but it was certainly not calculated to reduce tensions and calm feelings on the eve of his visit. On the contrary it would arouse feelings. Mr. Khrushchev was a bit of a politician himself and so he understood the approach. The President had mentioned the subject of mutual reduction of propaganda. Like a hunter following a fresh trail he wanted to mention the Vice President's speech as not being designed to bring about a better atmosphere for his visit. We must all realize that it is impossible to gain the confidence of a people over the heads of its government. If the Americans had no respect for him and the Soviet Government, they could not hope to win over the Soviet people. In fact, "I represent our people." If he could be excused for being frank and outspoken he would say that if he had made such a speech as the Vice President's on the eve of the Vice President's arrival in the USSR, the Vice President would find the situation difficult and the atmosphere tense. After the Vice President's speech, he, Khrushchev, had been surprised to find the people here tolerant and friendly. However, this was probably because they respect the President and respect him as a guest of the President. He had raised this subject only because propaganda had been mentioned. If the Soviets followed the same course it would be difficult to bring about a better atmosphere. If he had read the Vice President's speech before his departure he would have felt compelled to hit back.

The President commented that he must read this speech of the Vice President's about which the Chairman was talking. The Vice President suggested that he also read the speech Mr. Khrushchev had made on the day the Vice President arrived in Moscow and the speech he made while the Vice President was there so that the President could get the record straight on both sides.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Nixon's speech to the American Dental Association in New York on September 14 was extensively summarized in *The New York Times*, September 15, 1959.

<sup>3</sup> For a condensed text of Khrushchev's speech in the Sports Palace in Moscow on July 23, which focused on Poland, the captive nations week resolution, and Nixon's visit, see *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, August 26, 1959, pp. 12–13. For the full text of Khrushchev's speech at the opening of the American National Exhibition in Moscow on July 24, see *Toward Better Understanding*, pp. 4–8.

Mr. Khrushchev commented that if they were to talk about the Moscow speeches, he would ask the President to be the referee. If at the opening of the American Exhibit he had not spoken before the Vice President, his speech would have been different in content and in length. Even so his speech had not been published in the American press as had the Vice President's. The President turned to Mr. Kohler who reported that Mr. Khrushchev's speech had been given considerable coverage in the American press but confirmed that it had been published in full textually only on the magazine *U.S. News and World Report*.<sup>4</sup>

Mr. Khrushchev commented that this was not the same thing as the daily press—that they had magazines too in the Soviet Union and he knew what they were.

The President said he wanted to assure Mr. Khrushchev that there was no censorship in the U.S. He also wanted to say that he could not influence the American newspapers. He would not try and could not do so if he did try.

Mr. Khrushchev replied he knew some things about conditions in the U.S. and that he had noted the talk about full freedom of press existing here. He had also noted that what the U.S. Government wants to have published is published and what it does not want to have published is not published. If we were to take that approach the Soviets could, too. It was better to take a reasonable view of the matter and not refer to our respective constitutions. The Soviets were proud of their constitution just as the Americans were. However, he was sorry to pursue this subject. He had taken it up only as an example.

The President said he wanted to make two points. One, he thought we should talk about propaganda objectively but that we should not make propaganda among ourselves. Consequently he would not pursue the question of the debates between the Chairman and the Vice President. The second point was that if Mr. Khrushchev would like to investigate the full freedom of our press, he would invite any editors, reporters or journalists the Chairman might want to see to meet with him. Mr. Khrushchev could be quite alone with them and find out what they say about government control. Again, he would assure Mr. Khrushchev that there was no such control. It would have been very useful to him to have been able to influence the press during the two political campaigns he had waged.

Mr. Khrushchev replied, "I believe you", adding that though this was his first trip to the U.S., he knew something about how things were done here and likewise he read the papers.

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<sup>4</sup> "Our Country Will Catch Up With the U.S.," *U.S. News and World Report*, August 17, 1959.



The President commented that Mr. Khrushchev would be having a big meeting with the press tomorrow. He had no idea of the questions the Chairman would face but he thought he would find that there was no control over them and practically no limitations to the kind of questions that would be asked. The President himself faced this kind of press questioning once a week.

Mr. Khrushchev commented that he reads the record of the President's press conferences including the questions and answers. He thought he knew what the press was like here. He was prepared to take it as he found it though he would point out that there is a different kind of press in the different kinds of social system which we have. The President had mentioned the exchange of ideas. He wanted to say that if there were an exchange of speeches and the American speech was published by the Soviets and the Soviet reply was not published by the American press, then perhaps the next speech would not be published in the Soviet press. This would result in a "dialogue between deaf persons", with what was published on one side not relating to what was said on the other. He too could say that he did not control the publishers and the press in the Soviet Union—so the conditions were similar.

The President replied that we might consider trading television programs, perhaps one-half hour program on each side every month. An American leader could speak there and a Soviet leader here. While he could not control these things he did know that the American companies would be interested in getting such programs.

Mr. Khrushchev replied that the Soviets have had a bad precedent with the Vice President on the question of television programs, too. During the discussion at the American exhibit which was kinescoped, it had been agreed that there would be a full translation on both sides. However, some American television companies had not translated Mr. Khrushchev's remarks in full. He was not complaining, he was just stating the facts.

The President said that he had seen the pictures and he did not think the Chairman had lost any of his effectiveness.

Mr. Khrushchev again said that though he was not making any great complaints his remarks should have been presented in full.

The President replied that he thought that arrangements could be made in connection with the television programs so that the representatives of each country could check the accuracy of translations and monitor use throughout the other country. Mr. Khrushchev said it was too bad Mr. Georgi Zhukov was not here as he was the Soviet official who knew most about these things. As regards television, he had had

Mr. Eric Johnston to his home in the Caucasus.<sup>5</sup> Mr. Johnston had proposed that there be a project for an exchange of filmed speeches of the President and Mr. Khrushchev. The Soviet side had agreed to this but it appeared that the U.S. had dropped the project.

The President said that Mr. Johnston had mentioned this to him only as a proposal but that he had heard no more about it.<sup>6</sup>

Mr. Khrushchev said that he had mentioned the proposal as one instance in which the Soviets had accepted but nothing had come of the project.

The President replied that he would look into this matter and follow through on it. However, he wanted to repeat that if the Soviet monitors find any lack of coverage of Mr. Khrushchev's present visit to the U.S., he would like to hear about it personally.

Mr. Khrushchev thanked the President but said that he did not expect any deficiency in this respect and was sure that he would have no complaints.

The President, changing the subject, said that he would be glad to have any suggestions of the Chairman regarding the arrangements at Camp David or as to any other way in which we might help to make his visit here more pleasant.

Mr. Khrushchev expressed his appreciation, adding that perhaps he had not realized the burden he had undertaken and that he might need some relief or some help.

The President asked whether the Chairman meant that he should perhaps make one of Mr. Khrushchev's speeches in his stead.

Mr. Khrushchev replied that it would probably not be possible for them to change places in that way. Each of them had a certain position where they stood but if they tried to change around, things might get very confused. He went on to say that he recalled that when he was in Great Britain, he had been taken from one city to another at a great pace.<sup>7</sup> He had finally said to Mr. Eden<sup>8</sup> that he had had all he could stand—he now needed some sleep. Mr. Eden had replied that it would be possible to skip an English city but that they could not fail to keep their itinerary in Scotland or Scotland would leave the Empire.

The President resumed, saying that in connection with the arrangements, everything which had been planned had either been suggested

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<sup>5</sup> See Document 56.

<sup>6</sup> See the source note, Document 56.

<sup>7</sup> Reference is to an official visit Khrushchev and Bulganin made to the United Kingdom April 18–27, 1956.

<sup>8</sup> Sir Anthony Eden, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom April 1955–January 1957.

or approved by the Soviet representatives. Consequently if Mr. Khrushchev wanted to get more sleep, he would have to decide for himself what to drop.

Mr. Khrushchev said that if the burden was too great, this was probably a result of his desire to see as much as possible in a very short time. He then reverted to the question of exchanges and said that when we discussed this subject, he would like to have Mr. Zhukov along on the Soviet side.

The President replied that Camp David was only 35 minutes away from Washington by helicopter. Any special aide that Mr. Khrushchev might want could be brought up to Camp David on short notice, in addition to those who would remain there. Consequently he would be delighted to have Mr. Zhukov come up. In fact, he would like to invite the Chairman to take a helicopter ride with him now.

Mr. Khrushchev nodded assent but he said that he would first like to say a few words about the President's reference to Marxism and "your Communist Party". It was not necessary to discuss this in detail now, but during the later talks he would want to rectify the views which the President had expressed. He had read many speeches by members of Congress alleging that Moscow controls the Communist parties throughout the world. Such allegations are certainly in error. However, he would not go into details now.

The President had also mentioned that he wanted to discuss Berlin and he would also like to say a few words on that subject now. He wanted to make clear that the Soviets had not raised the issue of Berlin as such, but rather the question of the conclusion of a peace treaty in order to terminate the state of war with Germany. Thus the status of West Berlin would also be settled. He too wanted to discuss this question. He would give a sincere exposition of Soviet views and would be glad to hear the President's views. It would be desirable if we could work out common language, recognizing the fact of the existence of two German states, and confirming that neither side would try to bring about either a Socialist or a Capitalist solution by force. If we could make that point clear, then we would remove the danger from the situation. If we were to speak of our sympathies, then we both knew where the sympathies of each other lie. American sympathies lie with West Germany and the system existing there. Soviet sympathies are with East Germany and the system prevailing on that side. It would be well to recognize the facts. That doesn't mean that the United States would accord juridical recognition to the GDR, but would accept the state of fact as it exists. "Believe me," he said, "we would like to come to terms on Germany and thereby on Berlin too. We do not contemplate taking unilateral action, though on your side you took unilateral action in Japan in which we were deprived of rights we should have had. We had to accept that." However, he

continued that he realized the problems of Germany have been hanging for 14 years. We must find a way out which would not leave an unpleasant residue in our relationship. Rather, we should seek a solution allowing us to revert to the friendly relationship on the subject of Germany we had enjoyed during World War II. The Soviets were prepared to try to find a way out which would not do injury either to United States prestige or to their own. He felt that if we worked hard enough, we could find such a way out. He would repeat to the President a compliment which he had made publicly about him by citing the very high esteem the Soviets had felt for him as an allied leader during the war. Stalin had had the highest opinion of the President's integrity with regard to the USSR during World War II, and the Soviet leadership all share this high regard.

Continuing, Mr. Khrushchev said, "You must recognize that we are Communists, that we and you have different systems. You must recognize that there are these two different worlds. If we ignore these realities, then we cannot come to terms."

The President, changing the subject, suggested then that in preparing for further talks at Camp David, the respective staffs should take papers and our positions on all these subjects would be discussed. These papers could be put down (on the table) and we could see if we could bring them closer together.

Mr. Khrushchev requested clarification. Did the President mean that the Ministers should try to get agreed documents or summaries of positions?

The President replied negatively, saying that this would not be practicable and cited the long attempts made by the Foreign Ministers to reach agreement at Geneva.

Mr. Khrushchev commented that he felt the Ministers would not be agreed.

The President said no, that he had not had agreed papers in mind but, for example, on Berlin there could be an outline of the respective positions.

Secretary Herter suggested that Mr. Gromyko and he might meet tomorrow and take a little time to agree on the subjects to be discussed. Mr. Khrushchev indicated his agreement with this and the President confirmed that the Foreign Ministers would agree only on the subjects for discussion. The Vice President commented that the Foreign Ministers would agree as to what we disagree on. Mr. Khrushchev terminated the conversation by saying that the Foreign Ministers would try to establish where we disagree. It would then be up to the President and himself to try to agree.

The press representatives were then admitted to the President's office for photographs, after which the President and Mr. Khrushchev had a brief private meeting with the interpreters only and then proceeded to the south lawn with the interpreters and security aides to take a helicopter sight-seeing tour of Washington.

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### 110. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 15, 1959, 4:30–6:30 p.m.

#### PARTICIPANTS

V.S. y'Emelyanov, Chairman, Chief Administration for Atomic Energy, USSR  
John A. McCone, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission  
Dwight A. Ink, Special Assistant to the Chairman, AEC  
John Hall, Assistant General Manager for International Activities, AEC  
Raymond L. Garthoff, Rapporteur  
Natalie Kushmir, Interpreter

In reply to questions, Mr. y'Emelyanov indicated that he will accompany Mr. Khrushchev on the latter's trip around the country, and will be in Washington and available for talks on the 24–26 of September. y'Emelyanov also stated that he will be in this country for meetings of the International Atomic Energy Agency Scientific Advisory Committee in New York on 27 October. He suggested he will have more free time in October than on the present trip.

McCone referred to the talks held with y'Emelyanov by Hall and Rabi in Vienna last June,<sup>1</sup> and to the subsequent talks with Admiral Rickover,<sup>2</sup> and stated that while he had no specific proposals to make he would like to continue exploring the possibilities raised in these talks.

y'Emelyanov stated that he had been surprised with the visit by Admiral Rickover. He had expected McCone to accompany Vice

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1472. Confidential. Drafted on September 16 but no further drafting information appears on the source text. The meeting was held at the Atomic Energy Commission headquarters.

<sup>1</sup> Documentation on the talks among Yemelyanov, Hall, and Isidor I. Rabi, member of the Science Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense Mobilization, is scheduled for publication in volume III.

<sup>2</sup> No record of talks between Rickover and Yemelyanov has been found. Regarding Rickover's meetings with Kozlov, see footnote 3, Document 93, and Document 98.

President Nixon, and had prepared a program of activities for McCone. He regretted that Rickover's schedule had not allowed him to see additional things.

y'Emelyanov offered to show McCone everything appropriate that he would like to see during a visit to the Soviet Union, at any appropriate time. McCone replied that he well understood military matters such as plutonium production were not appropriate, and expressed his understanding that other laboratories and reactors were subject to discussion in connection with possible visits, as are ours. y'Emelyanov stated that this was also his understanding. Facilities for the production of U-235 and Plutonium are connected with the military program and are not open to discussion or collaboration. He indicated that they were ready to show us prototype, experimental, educational, and power reactors. y'Emelyanov further proposed direct collaboration between scientists of the two countries and suggested work on an agreement defining the scope of such collaboration. He stated that, for example, we could collaborate in the field of controlled thermonuclear reactions. He also stated that they are ready to exchange information and visits in the field of uses of nuclear energy for transportation (propulsion), for example, exchange of data on the *Lenin* for data on the *Savannah*. McCone replied that this would, indeed, be useful and suggested that such an agreement might be incorporated in the present exchange agreement by negotiators by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Department of State. y'Emelyanov noted that, according to his understanding, talks on the cultural exchange agreement for 1960-61 were to begin in Moscow in October or November, and would have a section governing activities in the field of the peaceful uses of atomic energy.<sup>3</sup> This understanding was confirmed by Hall.

Hall commented that two matters were under discussion: 1) an exchange of visits by y'Emelyanov and McCone, and, 2) a formal agreement on further exchanges. y'Emelyanov stated his agreement with this understanding of the points under discussion.

y'Emelyanov proposed that, in connection with the visits by himself and McCone, they first decide on the things they want to see and on this basis the duration of the visits, and when these points are clear it would be easy to determine the most convenient timing of each of their visits. McCone noted that as for the things he would like to see, he was interested in any phases of peaceful uses of atomic energy; for example, research laboratories, experimental reactors, prototype reactors, power reactors, and propulsion reactors, such as on the *Lenin*. He repeated that

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<sup>3</sup> Regarding the negotiations leading to a cultural agreement with the Soviet Union, including an additional memorandum on atomic energy cooperation, see Part 2, Documents 1 ff.

exchanges on dual-purpose reactors and U-235 producers, being under a military classification, were not contemplated. y'Emelyanov noted his general agreement and inquired whether McCone would like to visit a uranium mine. McCone indicated his interest. y'Emelyanov continued by suggesting that McCone might be interested in visiting the Alpha and Ogra facilities working on controlled thermonuclear reactions. McCone replied that he would be interested, and suggested that y'Emelyanov might be interested in seeing ours.

y'Emelyanov stated that he had done much for increasing collaboration, although he had run into many difficulties. He gave an example of preferred treatment which he said he had given to the U.S. The only foreign specialist who had been able to visit the *Lenin* was Admiral Rickover. Although his good friend Professor Randers (Norway)<sup>4</sup> had wanted to see the *Lenin*, he had refused to show it to him. (y'Emelyanov noted parenthetically that he himself had never visited the *Lenin*.) y'Emelyanov continued, making reference to the visit of Admiral Rickover with the comment that the Admiral had a difficult character. McCone indicated jocularly that this was the view of some people here, too.

y'Emelyanov returned to the question of suitable subjects for exchange. He noted that several prototype and experimental reactors were being built in the Volga region, but that this was proceeding more slowly than he would like. Consequently, in some cases construction had only begun or not even begun, and in those instances he could only show the plans of projects. McCone replied that the same situation prevails here. McCone noted that plans have the advantage of showing the future, whereas existing installations could only reflect the past. y'Emelyanov suggested that Soviet and American scientists might work together building some new reactor. He stated that he could not claim credit for originating this idea, as it had been advanced by Hall and Rabi in Vienna. But, he continued, he had not wasted time and he had discussed the idea in Moscow, and it had been well received by scientists there. Perhaps, he suggested, we could together build a reactor accelerator or controlled thermonuclear reactor.

Hall noted that the International Atomic Energy Agency could gain a good deal from such a Soviet-American project. He noted that y'Emelyanov had often said that the Agency only talks, and that this seemed a good opportunity to permit it to sponsor a useful activity. y'Emelyanov agreed and suggested that the two countries make an agreement and register it with the Agency. He commented that frankly there was at present a strange situation. The Agency talks over no major

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<sup>4</sup>Gunnar Randers, Director of the Norwegian Atomic Energy Institute.

matters. Life is passing the Agency by. We should work out something on our own. McCone noted that this situation also troubles him, and that he too would like to help the Agency have a more active role. y'Emelyanov adverted to the following example of a difficulty in working with the Agency. He had sought to get accreditation by the Agency for Cern and Dubna, but the Agency did not want to do so for a long time. When it finally agreed, he discovered that the scientists at Dubna were no longer interested because they felt they would only lose time by going there since the work at the Agency was not fruitful. y'Emelyanov stated that he had favored the proposal of Eisenhower of 1953,<sup>5</sup> that he still favored the proposal, and that he would continue to favor it, but that it would be necessary to do something to revive the Agency. McCone expressed his general agreement, but noted that the work of the Agency was by no means wholly sterile. The Agency, he recalled, had done much in the educational field, if not much in scientific work. y'Emelyanov agreed and remarked that the Agency has done more in the past year than before.

McCone inquired whether y'Emelyanov was going to the meeting of the Agency in Vienna. He mentioned that he himself was going there on the 27th of September for one week. y'Emelyanov said that he was not planning to attend unless his presence should be necessary, and that he would go only if his deputy there should in the next fortnight advise him that his presence would be required.

y'Emelyanov referred to the fact that he was now conducting talks with others. For example, he was in touch with Professor Cockcroft<sup>6</sup> concerning exchanges on fast neutron reactors, and in this connection they will soon send a group to England in return for a recent visit of British scientists. Also, they are soon sending a group to France in connection with an exchange on thermonuclear controlled reactions.

y'Emelyanov declared that there was a difficulty peculiar to Soviet contacts with American scientists. The British come, see things, go home—but with the Americans it's a little different. It is true, he said, that we have shortcomings, as do you, but Americans always seem to criticize. They are like guests who after dinner complain that the meat was burned or salted too little or too much. Americans seem to seek out the worst, then exaggerate it, and give it to the press. For example, said y'Emelyanov, Admiral Rickover told him that he had had difficulties in seeing certain things on the icebreaker *Lenin*, but that he would not want

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<sup>5</sup> For text of Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" speech to the United Nations on December 8, 1953, which among other things called for the creation of an international atomic energy agency under the aegis of the United Nations to provide peaceful power from atomic energy, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953*, pp. 813–822.

<sup>6</sup> Sir John Cockcroft, British physicist and master of Churchill College, Cambridge.



to cause any difficulties in the press on such misunderstandings. But y'Emelyanov learned that the *New York Times* had carried accounts quoting Admiral Rickover on the run-around he had been given on the *Lenin*.<sup>7</sup> When I (y'Emelyanov) had visited Shippingport, our press asked me for comments, but I didn't give them anything.

Garthoff noted that he had been present with Rickover at the *Lenin* and could perhaps clarify the situation to which y'Emelyanov referred. Initially Rickover had not been permitted to see the reactors or to discuss them in any detail, despite his prior understanding that it would be possible to do so in the same way that y'Emelyanov had been permitted fully to inspect the *Savannah* and Shippingport.<sup>8</sup> This fact became known to newsmen present at the *Lenin*. Subsequently, when the misunderstanding was cleared up and the Admiral had been permitted to inspect the *Lenin*, the Admiral sought out the press directly upon his return to the hotel and informed them that contrary to the impression that all had received at the time, he had finally been allowed to see it. Unfortunately, some press stories had already been filed. And, Garthoff noted, the *New York Times* did subsequently carry the revised account of the Admiral's visit to the *Lenin* and his words of praise for it.<sup>9</sup>

McCone commented that Nixon's reports on his visit were very complimentary, that Admiral Rickover had been most complimentary in his report to Congress, that Mr. Cisler of Edison Electric and Mr. McCune of General Electric had also both been most complimentary.<sup>10</sup> He suggested that what y'Emelyanov was referring to might be something in the past. y'Emelyanov stated that he had not meant to reproach us but that he wanted to mention certain difficulties that he had with Americans, though never with the French and British. For another example, Professor Weisskopf after his visit to Dubna had written a critical article.<sup>11</sup> But, concluded y'Emelyanov, he was in favor of these

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<sup>7</sup> See *The New York Times*, July 28, 1959.

<sup>8</sup> No evidence has been found that Yemelyanov was part of the tour that visited the *Savannah* on June 30 and Shippingport on July 11. Reference may be to one of Yemelyanov's numerous visits to the United States from 1955 to 1957.

<sup>9</sup> Not found.

<sup>10</sup> Regarding Nixon's public comments on his visit to the Soviet Union, see *The New York Times*, July 28, 1959, and the transcript of his news conference, August 2, in *Toward Better Understanding*, pp. 24–31. For Rickover's report to Congress on August 18, see *Report on Russia by Vice Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, USN: Hearings before the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 86th Congress, 1st Session* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959). The remarks by Walker Cisler, President of Detroit Edison Co., and Francis K. McCune, vice president of atomic business development in marketing services, General Electric, and President of the Atomic Industrial Forum, have not been further identified.

<sup>11</sup> This article, presumably by Victor F. Weisskopf, professor of physics at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has not been further identified.

contacts and merely wanted to note that we must strive to end such problems.

y'Emelyanov declared his surprise that Rickover was at all satisfied with his visit, because he came at a bad time for him so that he (y'Emelyanov) couldn't do anything else for Rickover. McCone took the occasion of this remark to express his own surprise that y'Emelyanov had thought that he, McCone, would be accompanying the Vice President on the latter's recent visit. y'Emelyanov replied that he had merely been thinking in terms of his talks with Hall and Rabi and that when he heard that Rickover was coming he was perplexed, but connected the fact with his talks with Hall. McCone clarified the point that Rickover had accompanied the Vice President at the latter's request, and y'Emelyanov commented that he had merely inferred some connection with the earlier talks.

y'Emelyanov suggested that since both he and McCone were not physicists but engineers, practical men, he would like to conclude the conversation with some concrete practical steps, and he offered two proposals:

1) That we work on a treaty agreement specifying certain areas for collaboration in the nuclear energy field. We can, he suggested, each draft a proposal and then give them to one another, and when we have reached an agreed draft send it to our governments. McCone agreed.

2) Can we decide what you would like to see in the Soviet Union, the duration of your visit, and when you would like it to take place. McCone replied that he would like to think over the specifics of the visit. He noted that y'Emelyanov knows in general from the conversation what he would want to see. He would like to bring several people with him. As for y'Emelyanov's visit here, perhaps it could be made immediately after the meeting in October. y'Emelyanov said probably it could.

y'Emelyanov then sketched a tentative sample program of the sort he envisaged for McCone's visit. The Ural power station (where Rickover had been); the Voronezh power station (where Cisler had been); a good uranium mine; the icebreaker *Lenin*; experimental thermonuclear reactors at Moscow and Leningrad; a big accelerator (7 million kwts) now building at Moscow; a new nuclear center and reactor at Tashkent; etc. McCone stated that he would do the same in outlining a program of y'Emelyanov's visit. He remarked that he thought that y'Emelyanov had seen Brookhaven several times (y'Emelyanov replied six times) and Shippingport, but not the Argonne laboratory, Dresden, the test reactors in Idaho, the materials laboratories at Ames, Iowa, and the Lawrence Laboratory at Berkeley. (y'Emelyanov indicated that he had not been to any of these places except Berkeley.) McCone noted that we now had two experimental gas-cooled reactors that y'Emelyanov might find of interest. y'Emelyanov noted that the Soviet scientists had long been prejudiced against such gas-cooled reactors but were now starting to

show interest; at present their work on such reactors is only in the planning stage. McCone commented that there had been similar prejudices here, and that we used for the most part water reactors. The two new gas-cooled reactors that we are starting to work on are in the 30–40 megawatt scale. y'Emelyanov said that they had used mostly pressurized and field tube reactors, and in planning a joint project with the Czechs had offered either, while favoring field tubes, but the Czechs decided in favor of pressurized tank. In response to a question he stated that this joint project was for a reactor producing 70 thousand kwts (electrical).

McCone inquired whether the Soviets had found that electrical power from nuclear stations was expensive. y'Emelyanov strongly indicated that they had. He further stated they have much cheap coal in the Soviet Union. He stated that there remained many complex engineering problems—for example, that they have not yet decided which thermal-producing elements are best. McCone noted that we both seem to have the same problems and y'Emelyanov agreed.

It was agreed that upon y'Emelyanov's return to Washington on the 24th arrangements will be made to continue talks, and that at that time each will present his suggested proposals in connection with the visits. McCone inquired on a tentative basis whether y'Emelyanov thought that early October, following the meeting in Vienna, might be an appropriate time for his visit to the Soviet Union. y'Emelyanov replied that he couldn't say at the present because he was not certain what plans Khrushchev might have for him at that time, but that he would be in a position to say when he returns on the 24th.

A brief press release drafted by the AEC was approved by y'Emelyanov for release at the conclusion of the talks, and was released.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Not found.

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**111. Memorandum of Conversation**

Washington, September 15, 1959, 5 p.m.

**SUBJECT**

President's Private Conversation with Mr. Khrushchev

**PARTICIPANTS**

*U.S.*

The President  
Mr. Akalovsky

*U.S.S.R.*

Chairman Khrushchev  
Mr. Troyanovsky (interpreting)

The President opened the conversation by saying that he wanted to tell Mr. Khrushchev something that he felt very personally and in which he believed very deeply. He added that he did not expect any immediate answer or comment by Mr. Khrushchev.

The President then said that he had asked Mr. Khrushchev to come to the United States because of one deep conviction. He said he believed that Mr. Khrushchev had an opportunity to become the greatest political figure in history because he has a tremendous power in a complex of states with great might. The President noted that he also has power but only as far as one nation—the U.S.—is concerned; the states forming the Western Alliance have their own ways of doing things and have their own independent approaches to the problems facing them. Thus, Mr. Khrushchev could do a great deal for peace by exercising the power he possesses in that direction. The President observed that he had sixteen more months to remain in office, after which he would become a private citizen. However, even then he would still love people—all people, including the Russian people—just as he loves all of them now. He would want them to live in peace and prosperity then, just as he wants them to live peacefully and happily now. For this reason, the President said, he believed that Mr. Khrushchev could be the man to do a great deal to secure peace in the world. This matter, the President concluded, is one that is very close to his heart, and this was why he mentioned it to Mr. Khrushchev on such a personal basis.

Mr. Khrushchev replied that the Soviet Union shared the President's desire for peace but stated that this goal could not be attained if only one side were to exert efforts to achieve it. Therefore, it is necessary that both sides approach their problems sensibly and resolve the accumulated issues to their mutual satisfaction. Mr. Khrushchev

emphasized that he believed in the President and in his good will and that for that reason there should be will and determination on both sides to do everything possible to resolve their differences. If both sides showed such will and determination, he was confident that all problems existing between them could be settled.

The President concluded the conversation by saying that we should pray that this would come true.

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## 112. Memorandum of Conversation

September 16, 1959.

### PARTICIPANTS

Henry Cabot Lodge  
Mr. Khrushchev  
Mr. Sukhodrev

### SUBJECT

Beltsville Car Trip

Driving out to Beltsville we passed the Jefferson Memorial which I pointed out to Mr. Khrushchev. I said that Jefferson had said that he preferred a press without a government to a government without a press.

Khrushchev nodded and said that was a very good phrase.

Then I said that Jefferson had said that the people had a right to revolution when they felt like it.

Khrushchev said—then why do you complain about our revolution.

I said that I hadn't complained about their revolution but that Jefferson thought you ought to have frequent revolutions—that the people ought to have a right to throw everybody out of office at frequent intervals. We throw ours out at frequent intervals.

Khrushchev said—oh, that wouldn't do.

On the way *back* from Beltsville I said that I had read with great interest the English text of the speech which Mr. Khrushchev had given at Veshenskaya just before leaving to come to the United States<sup>1</sup> and that I had noticed that he had spoken of the desirability of a “freer life” for the Soviet people and wanted to ask if that was a correct translation. After he had said that it was, I said I would be interested to know what he meant by that phrase.

He had obviously been thinking about our conversation two hours earlier. He said: Going back to Jefferson’s phrase about a free press—that may have been all right in Jefferson’s time when the world was coming out of feudalism and going into capitalism, but doesn’t apply today because you haven’t got a free press in this country. He said a poor negro sweeping the roads had nothing to say about the press. The press may be free in the sense that you can buy a printing press, but he couldn’t afford to buy a printing press. The press, of course, is free for the rich people like Hearst who own newspapers—not anybody else.

I said that I didn’t know how much freedom a road sweeper in the Soviet Union had to get his views printed in *Pravda* or *Izvestia* but I said that I can speak with some authority, being a professional newspaper man, that he has been completely misinformed about the United States. We have a commercial press. It is a business. They make their money by selling advertising. The only way they can sell advertising is to have a large amount of readers. If the reader doesn’t like the paper the paper doesn’t sell advertising and all the Hearsts in the world can’t make somebody buy something he doesn’t want to read—so the reader is the boss in every real sense as far as journalism is concerned, just as the consumer is the boss in retailing, just as the voter is boss in politics.

Khrushchev said journalism ought to be educational, not a business.

I said the fact that the press is commercial doesn’t exclude their publishing things of quality and they publish many things of quality, but we think that no one is wise enough to tell the newspapers what they shall print and to tell the people what they shall read. We believe that wisdom resides in the people and that people must have a free choice between a very free and active opposition and those who are in power.

I pointed out that the *New York Times* is our leading paper on foreign affairs and they almost always are in opposition to US policy in the United Nations and almost always say so.

Khrushchev then said Rockefeller could be elected President.

I said he could if the people wanted him.

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<sup>1</sup>Not further identified.

He said: When Rockefeller stopped being President he would have enough to live on. In my country I haven't got money and when I leave I will be taken care of by the country.

I said that Eisenhower was a poor boy.

Khrushchev said he has a farm.

I said that I understand that in Russia a man has a right to own his own home.

Then he shifted and said there wasn't much chance for a man in a poor class.

I said we don't think in terms of classes. Our whole system is geared to the individual and there are so many hundreds of thousands of cases of poor boys starting at the bottom and going to the top that every poor boy feels he has a good chance to get to the top and he is right.

Oh well, Khrushchev said, of course if you want to put it that way all of us started as savages way back.

I said I don't think the boy who gets to the top is a savage. I have even heard that there are poor boys who get to the top in the Soviet Union.

He laughed at that and said he hadn't meant it that way.

The tone of the whole thing had been earnest but not acid. When we were out on the sidewalk at the Blair House I said I had found this conversation very stimulating, that he was a very stimulating man to talk with and thanked him for the opportunity to exchange views. He indicated that he would be glad to do it again.

(He gives you the impression, which Ambassador Thompson has spoken of, of a man who has an open mind on some things. He hasn't got a completely open mind at all, but certainly gives the impression of being a good listener. He not only gives the impression—he is a good listener. He will pick up details in what you have said.)

### 113. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 16, 1959.

#### PARTICIPANTS

Henry Cabot Lodge  
Mr. Khrushchev  
Mr. Sukhodrev  
Mr. Akalovsky

#### SUBJECT

Car Tour of Washington

After the Press Club luncheon I took him to the Lincoln Memorial where he gave every indication of being much impressed. He said Lincoln was a great man. He stood in front of the statue and bowed his head.

Then when I read to him the last paragraph of the Second Inaugural—stressing the part about “firmness” in the right and the part about a “just” peace—which I stressed on purpose—he said, those are “beautiful words”. When we drove away he showed great interest in Lincoln and the Civil War.

On Constitution Avenue we went by the statue of the Third Division and he asked what it was.

I said—it is a monument to the Third Infantry Division.

He asked if they had fought against the Germans and I said yes that in both World War I and World War II that outfit had an outstanding record and I said possibly many people would tell him that the First Division, Second Armored and Third Division had had more engagements, casualties and decorations than any other divisions in the army.

He said—that monument is very warlike. In our country there is nothing like that.

I said the money was raised by the veterans and it was decided by them not the government.

(That struck him as very peculiar coming from a country where everything is done by the government.)



## 114. Memorandum of Conversation

September 17, 1959.

### PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Lodge	Mr. Khrushchev
Ambassador Thompson	Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Pedersen	Ambassador Menshikov
Mr. Akalovsky	Mr. Sukhodrev

### SUBJECT

Train Trip between Washington, D.C. and New York City

During a general conversation with Khrushchev on the train to New York I recalled an incident of my childhood—being taken to see Henry Adams in 1910—and that he had predicted that by the 1950's the two great powers of the world would be the Soviet Union and the United States. That seemed to interest Mr. Khrushchev.

He used it as occasion to bring up the subject of nuclear tests, which he said he hadn't followed. I said I thought the Soviet Union and the United States have the same interest in bringing about an orderly world in view of the fact that the bi-polar world was not a realistic idea even now and that there are five or six countries approaching technological and economic maturity and that the time when we would be the only two great powers was not going to last forever.

He said France could probably make a bomb but it took more than this to be a big power. Sweden could make a bomb, Germany could probably make some, China and India could within the next ten or fifteen years. And I said maybe Brazil much later on, and he said very much later. He agreed wholeheartedly that we have a common interest in getting an orderly world.

On the negotiations on the cessation of nuclear tests he said that we wanted to get intelligence operators into the Soviet Union. I said you could have the same type of people here. He said we don't want them in your country. I said I thought he had no worry about the control posts that would exist in the Soviet Union because with all the resources in the Soviet state they could easily mislead them on any intelligence matters.

Khrushchev said the talks had reached a point where we wanted two-thirds foreigners to be in the control posts and they only want one-third. He thought this was a question that he and the President could work out. Perhaps he has a 50–50 split in mind.

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1472. Confidential. Drafted by Lodge and initialed by Scranton. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: "CAH saw."

Then he got on to missiles and at great length he expressed how helpless bombers were and how much higher and faster missiles are. He said winged missiles were no good. They could be shot right down. He also said the USSR had ICBMs while the US had none. Therefore, the USSR was stronger than the US. I just let him talk and finally said that I could agree that they are ahead of us in rockets. I said when you have two great technological powers like the Soviet Union and the United States one is going to be ahead at various times. We were ahead with the atomic bomb—you are ahead in rockets at the moment. Those things don't last and I am sure, I said, that you can be in no doubt of our retaliatory power, and that it is quite impossible—if you were to use these missiles—not to expect suicidal results for you. I said you can hit our cities but not our retaliatory military installations. I also said that neither of us seemed to have perfected anti-missile defenses. (He nodded affirmatively on what appeared to be both of these points.) I said our bombers and our Navy and our "other things" would "devastate" the Soviet Union. He agreed that a war would be suicidal for both sides.

He then shifted to military bases. He said there we were with those bases and hydrogen bombs in West Germany. I said you have bases in East Germany and he said they weren't bases. I said why not, and after avoiding a reply a few times he said they didn't have the hydrogen bomb there. I said you could move them in a very short time across a few miles of roads. We have to come across the Atlantic Ocean.

Khrushchev said they did not need to put nuclear weapons in East Germany. They could destroy West Germany from the Soviet Union. How many bombs do you imagine it would require to destroy even the United Kingdom, he asked.

Then he mentioned our bases in Spain and Morocco. I said—Mr. Chairman, I was in the Senate when NATO was created. It was created as a reaction to Stalin. If you had been the head of the Soviet state I daresay things might have been different. He nodded his head at this. You know enough to realize there is no offensive intent in NATO at all. It is a purely defensive organization. The countries asked for it because of fear.

I also said I believed that overseas bases were something that weren't going to last forever. It doesn't need to worry you at all. He said in response to this whole little speech of mine: There is much in what you say; in certain respects you are right and in certain ones you are not.

He then shifted to less serious subjects. We were just outside of Philadelphia. There were a lot of old two-story houses through the right window (next to which he was sitting). He said they had some old houses in the USSR but did not build like that any more. I said I would like for him to look at the ones on the left, where there were new houses, as well as the right. He said this was fair—we have a lot more bad hous-

ing than you have. He had not come here to look at bad things, of which they had enough at home. He then said his advisers had told him last night he should watch out for me because I would twist him around my little finger. They told him I would show him only the good things and he should insist on seeing some of the bad ones too. He said he had told them that he did not want to see anything that I did not want to show him. I said I thought if anyone were twisted around a little finger it would not be him around mine and that I wanted him to see anything he wanted, both good and bad.

He then referred to my reputation for arguing with Soviet diplomats in the UN. He said—go in and give the Russian diplomats hell. Beat them up; it is good for them; they will get wiser that way. Gromyko then spoke up for the first time and said he disagreed with this. Khrushchev said—you see, the man speaks up for himself.

Khrushchev then told the old story about two Jewish merchants, each of whom wanted to know where the other was going. One of them asked the other where he was going. The second one, who was going to Cherkasky, figured that if he said he was going to Cherkasky the first one would then think he was not going there. The second Jewish merchant, when he heard the first one say he was going to Cherkasky, reasoned that he said he was going to Cherkasky so he would think he was not and therefore knew he was going to Cherkasky. Khrushchev laughed heartily at this joke and said that although he preferred to talk directly he supposed this was the way diplomats had to talk to each other. He pointed at Gromyko and me and asked which one of us was going to Cherkasky.

After a few more jokes and inconsequential talk I excused myself to allow him to finish his speech (and to find time to write this up).

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**115. Memorandum of Conversation**

September 18, 1959.

## PARTICIPANTS

Henry Cabot Lodge  
Mr. Khrushchev  
Mr. Troyanovski

## SUBJECT

Trip to Hyde Park

Khrushchev was “of two minds” as to his performance in New York on Thursday. He had felt that the questions at the Economic Club had been “provocative” and that the evening there had not been a success.<sup>1</sup> He referred particularly to the question asked by Gardner Cowles about the jamming of radio broadcasts which he thought was especially provocative.

I said that I had known Cowles all my life and that I was sure he had not meant to be provocative but it was just the kind of question important to Americans and that one of the things that gave this trip value was that it gave Americans the chance to ask things on their minds. Obviously the American way of looking at life and the Soviet way of looking at life are very different and that created difficulties. But if there had been no difficulties there would have been no point in his making the great effort to come here to try to solve the difficulties.

He said that the question of what broadcasts would be heard in the Soviet Union was entirely an internal matter and that it was none of our business. If we persisted in an unreasonable attitude there would be no end of jamming. As a matter of fact he had been ready to reduce jamming on selected items—not merely artistic—but speeches and debates. But he certainly would not authorize outsiders making appeals to people within his borders to turn them against the government. He said you would not like people from outside appealing to people here to overthrow the government.

I said that if such appeals were made on our radio most Americans would simply laugh, but I recognized he had a perfect right to regard this as an internal matter.

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1473. Confidential. Drafted by Lodge. Another copy of this memorandum bears the President’s initials, the only memorandum of Lodge’s many conversations with Khrushchev initialed by the President. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File)

<sup>1</sup> For text of Khrushchev’s speech and the following question-and-answer session at the Economic Club dinner on Thursday, September 17, see *The New York Times*, September 18, 1959.

I told him that I thought he had been misinformed when he had been told the State Department was in favor of reducing and contracting cultural exchanges. I said the reverse was the case. They wanted to expand them.

He said he had been advised by Mr. Zhukov that the State Department wanted to curtail exchange of students.

I said there is obviously a misunderstanding which should be cleared up, to which he agreed.

He then started probing me on a wide range of subjects. In fact he was definitely trying to tease me.

He brought up the American Communists who had been sent to jail some years ago and said what an unjust thing that had been.

I said that we were very much against violence in this country. We realized that it had been written by some of the leading Communist writers that violence should be used ruthlessly, but we were against it. On the other hand, I said, every American had the right to try to get control of the government by peaceful means. For example, I had been campaign manager of the effort in 1951–52 to get the Republican nomination for General Eisenhower—which was in effect an attempt to get control of the government. In this case the attempt was completely successful. There was nothing illegal about this.

But American Communists are committed to overthrow the government by force. No government, including the Soviet, fails to have laws to protect it against being overthrown by force.

He wanted to know what these Communists had done.

I said this had happened nine years ago and I hadn't studied it lately, but it is completely spread out on all records of the court.

He said you can look for nine years and you can never find proof that they have done anything wrong.

Then he turned to me with a grin and gave me a nudge in the ribs and said: You say you don't like violence. Did George Washington have an election in order to win the American Revolution?

Later he was talking about a certain politician in Russia who was out speaking to everybody—people and cows. I interrupted him to say that American politicians wouldn't bother talking to the cows because they don't vote. He laughed heartily, made an "X" mark on my sleeve, and said: That scores one for you.

He went back again to the dreadfulness of our press and our politics. I said he ought to realize that with us the printed word wasn't taken as solemnly as in Russia.

Any man who wanted to start a political party could do so by signatures on a paper. This I believed was inconceivable in the Soviet Union. These are some of the differences that exist.

He said, I understand some people buy papers for advertising.

I said my wife reads the ads every morning and notices such things as shoes, hats, rugs, etc., and then telephones the stores her orders. What is wrong with that?

He boasted over and over again how they were going to surpass us, obviously trying to get a reaction out of me. After about the fifth time I said this: I admire so much what the Soviet Union has accomplished in production of heavy industry, medicine, rockets, nuclear physics and languages. I think it is wonderful. I think it is a good thing for us to compete and only humanity stands to gain if we compete to see who can do the most for everyday people. I would like to go further to compete to see who can give them the most freedom—throw the government out if they don't like it. But, I said, it is just inconceivable to me that you can ever get ahead of us. Our potential for long-range growth is simply fantastic, and some time I would just like to show you some figures I think will astound you. With the best will in the world I don't think you can possibly catch up with our way of doing things.

He kept coming back to the subject of my grandchildren and that in their future there will be no more capitalism. They will all the [be?] Socialists.

And finally I said: You are talking about what my grandchildren will be seeing here. Maybe you would like to know what I think your grandchildren will be seeing in Russia. I don't think the Soviet Union is static. There is a lot of evolution there. He said—yes, lots of evolution. And, I said, what I think we are going to see is a lessening of central bureaucracy and a growth of wider individual freedom, and my grandchildren's generation and your grandchildren's generation will be very much alike in essentials although politicians will go on talking a long time in the same old phrases.

He said—may God have pity on you. Then he turned to Mrs. Khrushchev and said: Isn't it a sad thing to see a nice man all stuffed up with foolish notions? Come to the Soviet Union and we will polish you up.

On another occasion he said things like Buddhism, Mohammedanism, etc., were going across national boundaries.

I said—I think you think Communism is a religion.

He said—no, it is science of history.

Approaching Hyde Park I mentioned that I was in the Senate when Franklin D. Roosevelt was President.

He said—he was a Democrat and you are Republican.

I said—yes, but he was kind to me and when I left the Senate to go into the Army he wrote a very nice letter.

He said when Truman came along there was the difference between day and night. If Roosevelt had lived things might have been different.

I said—there are also differences on your side—not just ours.

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## 116. Memorandum of Conversation

September 18, 1959.

### PARTICIPANTS<sup>1</sup>

Henry Cabot Lodge  
Mr. Khrushchev  
Mr. Gromyko  
Mr. Troyanovski  
Mr. Akalovsky

### SUBJECT

Trip from Hyde Park

On the way from the museum to Mrs. Roosevelt's cottage I told Mr. Khrushchev that in accordance with his wishes arrangements had been made for a ride through Harlem upon our return to New York City, to be followed by a ride on the subway. I mentioned that the ride through Harlem would take 20 to 25 minutes.

Ambassador Menshikov then engaged in a conversation with Mr. Khrushchev, whereupon he told me that in view of the short time left before Mr. Khrushchev's appearance at the UNGA, Mr. Khrushchev wanted to go directly back to the hotel after the visit to the cottage.

I replied that this was all right with me but that the Harlem visit had been scheduled to meet his own request.

Menshikov then said that the time scheduled was inconvenient and that therefore the ride had to be canceled. He implied that the time had been selected on purpose so as to make it difficult to have the ride because I did not want Mr. Khrushchev to see Harlem. I objected to his

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1473. Confidential. Drafted by Lodge.

<sup>1</sup> Ambassador Menshikov was not listed among the participants, presumably in error.

remark very strongly, saying that it had been he who had requested the ride yesterday and that now that his request had been fulfilled, I did not want him to say to Mr. Khrushchev that I prevented him from seeing things he wanted to see. I said this rather sharply in order to let him know that I was aware of his attempts to misrepresent various situations to Mr. Khrushchev.

He asked me not to raise my voice and I apologized for raising my voice.

On the way back to New York City Mr. Khrushchev and I had conversations on a variety of subjects. Touching upon the subject of missiles Mr. Khrushchev spoke very highly of his scientists and engineers and, without mentioning his name, referred to one young scientist in particular who had perfected a rocket that had hit the bull's eye on its first flight. The reason for that was that this particular engineer had developed an engine that had performed excellently during its very first test on the platform, while many other types of rocket engines had exploded during their first tests and had to be perfected in the course of subsequent tests. This achievement, Mr. Khrushchev said, had reduced the period required for the development of that particular rocket by two years.

I said that I was aware of the high level of technological skills in the Soviet Union and expressed my hope that both in our country as well as in the Soviet Union, those skills would be devoted to peaceful ends rather than to the production of means of war. I said that I was looking forward to Mr. Khrushchev's forthcoming speech in the UN where he said he would make new disarmament proposals. I asked him whether the proposals would be something entirely new, rather than based on the Soviet proposals made in the past.

Mr. Khrushchev replied that I should be patient and wait until he made his speech. He indicated, however, that he was going to introduce very broad proposals, which would test the sincerity of the United States' approach to the question of disarmament.

I assured him that the United States was as anxious to achieve real disarmament as any state in the world, provided it was under effective control, so that all parties would be confident that neither side was gaining a unilateral advantage.

I said then that out of the 500 foreign control post personnel envisaged for control over a discontinuance of nuclear tests only 200 would be American or British and that I could not see how the Soviet Union's security could be affected by such a small number of foreign personnel. I also pointed out that these people would be stationed at control posts and would not roam around the country.



Mr. Khrushchev said that he had not followed the last stage of negotiations on nuclear tests very closely and that therefore he did not know what the present respective positions were.

I told him that our proposal was for one-third local control post personnel, one-third US-UK and one-third from other countries. He expressed the belief that agreement could be reached on this subject.

I told him that if he and President Eisenhower during their talks would reach agreement on the subject of nuclear tests, this would be a sign of confidence that would be greatly encouraging.

Mr. Khrushchev then said that he was sorry the Soviet Union had accepted the U.S. proposal for nuclear explosions for so-called peaceful purposes. He said that they would be nothing but a continuation of testing because the only thing to be tested was the device's firing mechanism and that purpose could be achieved through so-called peaceful explosions. In referring to Soviet tests he said that each of the tests they had conducted had brought about a decrease in the cost of production of nuclear weapons by 50%. Therefore Soviet experts on atomic weapons were very anxious to continue testing, but he had given them orders not to do so as long as the other powers did not test. He also stated that the Soviet Union was not interested in the production of so-called tactical nuclear weapons because they were too expensive and also because strategic weapons could be used much more effectively. He observed that the United States was a very rich country and that perhaps for that reason it could waste money on the development of tactical weapons. He also mentioned that the Soviet Union had a number of new atomic devices ready for testing, but repeated again that they would be kept in warehouses and not tested so long as other countries did not test their devices.

## 117. Memorandum of Conversation

September 19, 1959.

### PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Khrushchev  
Henry Cabot Lodge  
Mr. Gromyko  
Ambassador Thompson

Mr. Pedersen  
Mr. Sukhodrev  
Mr. Akalovsky

### SUBJECT

Plane Trip from New York to Los Angeles

I told Khrushchev that I planned to suggest in my speech tonight that we exchange a million copies of books on our own countries. He was most pleased that I told him about this in advance. First he said he would like to choose the U.S. book because he did not want to have any propaganda about the USSR.

I said this was not the idea at all; the idea was to give him a book which presented positively information about the United States. What I was interested in now was whether he had any objection to me speaking about this tonight.

He said—no that he liked the idea.

He then told me he would like to get authority to buy some Boeing 707 Jets like we are flying on. He said he would be glad to give us one of their planes for one of ours. He said planes did not have much military value. They were only good for civilian use. They would not use 707's just as we did because their conditions were different. They could adapt what they would learn. He also thought we could learn from some of theirs. He suggested he might give us the plane he flew over in. He said he would take these questions up with the President.

I also told him that he might have some rough going with the Labor Leaders in San Francisco. He told me it was very nice of me to give him this advance notice.

I told him that when I had first gone to the United Nations I was mystified about how the Soviet Union ran its foreign affairs. Russian policies and why and how they were made were a mystery to me. This trip was educational for me. Now I understand at least a few of the reasons for some of their policies. I said facetiously that if you get discouraged about the trials and tribulations of this trip you can at least realize that you have done some education of Lodge.

Khrushchev then referred to his Rabinovich joke. I asked which one of us was which. He said—you can take your choice.

We showed him the President's answer to James Reston in the press conference of September 17 about the fact that their conversations would manifestly have to discuss other countries.<sup>1</sup> He said he agreed with this.

I talked to him about jamming. He said they would be ready to stop jamming on certain things, not only artistic programs but also debates and such things. But they would not allow appeals to overthrow the government to be broadcast to the Soviet Union. He made it clear to me later that he meant broadcasts to the Soviet Union and not to the satellites.

On his disarmament proposals before the UN yesterday,<sup>2</sup> I paraphrased the comments that Herter had made in his brief press release.<sup>3</sup> As Herter had suggested I told Khrushchev as my personal idea I thought it might be desirable for the Secretary General to address a request to member states about how many security forces they would need. Khrushchev first said this would not be acceptable. After further conversation when it became clear that the request would be for information purposes only he said that would be all right.

I told him I had not had time to study his disarmament declaration but I knew the President was personally interested in control measures.

He said the difficulty was we want to have controls without disarmament. He believed that disarmament and controls should go together. He said our proposals were unfair because we had bases abroad.

I said I saw no theoretical reason why controls could not cover outlying bases of both of us—including those of Eastern Europe and ours elsewhere.

He said that is what we want to get at. That is what I am proposing.

I said we did not want any more paper prohibitions in disarmament.

He said—who suggested such a thing.

I said I had not said anybody had but that this was something we had to watch. I pointed out we had had prohibition of alcoholic beverages.

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<sup>1</sup> For the transcript of the President's September 17 press conference, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1959*, pp. 670–671.

<sup>2</sup> For text of Khrushchev's September 18 speech to the U.N. General Assembly, see *The New York Times*, September 19, 1959.

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to USUN press release 3224, September 18, in which Herter indicated that the United States would examine carefully Khrushchev's disarmament proposal, and emphasized U.S. interest in "controlled disarmament," which the Soviet Union had so far rejected. (Department of State, IO Files)

ages in the United States in the 20's and in spite of fine words it had not worked out because it was only on paper.

At one point in the conversation Khrushchev said that rockets were wonderful. You did not have to train people to navigate them. They did not become obsolete or deteriorate. They could be stored simply. We did not have them but he would be willing to destroy his tomorrow in a disarmament agreement.

Khrushchev said that we should leave their internal arrangements alone. We should only deal on international questions. We should not interfere with his system. (He made it clear he meant Eastern Europe as well.)

I said what do you mean. You seem to be shifting your ground. You are also including Poland, Hungary, etc., when you say these are domestic questions in the Soviet Union. There is a difference between Poland, Hungary and the Soviet Union. He became a little annoyed. He said—well you win a prize for geography. You at least know that Poland is different from the Soviet Union. He said that he had been talking to Gomulka recently.<sup>4</sup> Khrushchev said—he is one of those “slaves” you talk about. Why don't you leave him alone.

I said—all we do is pray for them. You don't believe in prayer, so why do you mind?

He said he did not want to see us waste our time.

I said the only thing we prayed for is that these people should have a free choice. Maybe Gomulka would win in an election. I thought you, Mr. Khrushchev, might win in an election in the Soviet Union.

Khrushchev said he had had kidney trouble for a long time. He liked our smooth roads because his bumped him around and bothered him. He said he drank Borzhonie water and that this prevents his kidney stones from forming and dissolves those he has.

Yesterday when I was leaving the Secretary General's dinner at the UN Kuznetsov came up to me and said the greatest thing that had ever happened to Soviet-US relations was that I was taking Khrushchev around the country. I said I was getting a tremendous education because I was getting such an intimate view of the government of the Soviet Union.

He said—this is an education for Khrushchev too and I am glad that he is traveling with someone who vigorously expounds the United States point of view. He said you *must* come to Moscow with the President.

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<sup>4</sup> Khrushchev met with Gomulka during his visit to Poland July 14–23.

I said this was out of my range. I only live from day to day. (Khrushchev has also said to me many times that I ought to come to Moscow.)

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## 118. Memorandum of Conversation

Los Angeles, September 19, 1959.

### PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Khrushchev  
Henry Cabot Lodge  
Ambassador Menshikov  
Mr. Sukhodrev  
Mr. Akalovsky

### SUBJECT

Car Trip from Twentieth-Century Fox to Hotel

During the ride through Los Angeles from Twentieth-Century Fox studio to the hotel Mr. Khrushchev, after some casual talk, was asked by Mr. Carter, Deputy Mayor of Los Angeles, who was accompanying us, what had impressed him most in the United States so far. Mr. Khrushchev replied that he had seen nothing that had impressed him particularly because he had been familiar with the United States and the conditions prevailing here even before coming to this country. Everything he had seen so far only confirmed what he had learned about the United States previously by watching movies, reading books, and studying reports about the United States. The situation in this respect was the same as with the United States Senators he had met during his meeting in the Capitol<sup>1</sup>—he had known all of them before through reading their speeches, and the only difference now was that he had met them personally.

He then went on to say that he was extremely well informed about the United States and about the internal developments in this country

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1474. Confidential. Drafted by Akalovsky.

<sup>1</sup> Regarding Khrushchev's September 16 meeting with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, see Document 108.

through his intelligence service. The Soviet Union had even got money from the United States for its intelligence work, he remarked jokingly, because some of the agents who had been sent by the United States to the Soviet Union had been caught and the Soviet intelligence service had kept sending reports to Mr. Allen Dulles in their name with occasional requests for additional funds. Those funds had been received and thus the United States had paid the Soviet Union for its own intelligence operations. There had also been agents who defected to the Soviet Union who had been sent back to the United States as Soviet double agents. He continued to boast about the extreme efficiency of his intelligence service and said that they knew everything. For instance he said, they knew about a highly confidential message from the President to Mr. Nehru, which the President had written in connection with the Chinese-Indian border disputes.<sup>2</sup> This message had not been published in the United States and, Mr. Khrushchev continued, I probably didn't know about it but if I wished he could supply me with a copy.

I replied that I certainly didn't know anything about it and said that I doubted that he would send me a copy. He remarked that he would show me that he was telling the truth by sending me a copy—which he has not done. He then went on to say that the Soviet Union had known everything about the Turk preparation for military action against Syria about a year ago. The Soviet Union had found out not only the exact disposition of Turkish troops, but also the designations and plans for operation. This information had been published by the Soviet Government and the Turkish General Staff had been completely reshuffled because of that.

Mr. Khrushchev said that he also knew of a confidential letter from the Shah of Iran which had been sent to the President before Mr. Khrushchev's arrival in the United States.<sup>3</sup> In that letter the Shah requested the President to exert some influence on Mr. Khrushchev so as to make him relieve the Soviet pressure on Iran. He then said that the Soviet Union had had complete information as to the preparations for the American exhibition in Moscow and the arguments within the United States Government on this subject about a year ago. He said that those arguments had undermined the success of the American exhibition in Moscow, which in effect was a failure. He claimed that the Soviet people didn't like the American exhibit at all and that after the Czech glassware exhibit had opened in Moscow the Soviet people holding tickets for the American exhibit had been trading two tickets to the American exhibit for one ticket to the Czech exhibit. He concluded this conversation by

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<sup>2</sup> Presumably Eisenhower's September 2 letter to Nehru, printed in vol. XV, pp. 513–514.

<sup>3</sup> Presumably the Shah's August 16 letter to Eisenhower; see vol. XII, Document 274.

saying that he reads a lot of American intelligence reports and circulars sent out by Mr. Allen Dulles, although he would much rather read good novels. Nevertheless, as a Premier he had to be well versed in what was going on.

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**119. Telegram From the Representative to the United Nations  
(Lodge) to the Department of State**

Los Angeles, September 20, 1959, 1:03 a.m.

From Lodge.

1. Following is my conversation with Gromyko at his request after Mayor's dinner in Los Angeles tonight in which he complained (a) that we were organizing provocative questions, (b) that police cordons were keeping Khrushchev from ordinary people, (c) that Pittsburgh might be dropped from schedule, and (d) that perhaps he should curtail rest of trip and return to Washington.

2. I will call you at 9:45 Washington time tomorrow (Sunday) morning to discuss this with you.

After the Mayor's dinner in Los Angeles tonight Gromyko called me and said he wanted to see me with his interpreter. On his arrival I said that I was worried that Khrushchev was getting too tired. Gromyko then immediately took floor and said in Russian: I have come to draw your attention in accordance with wishes of Mr. Khrushchev to say following:

It is now becoming obvious that in almost every place questions are being raised which in our conviction should not be raised if you are guided by good intentions. These questions do not seem to be fortuitous but to make complicated the position of the Chairman of Ministers and negatively to affect outcome of visit. A typical example was today at dinner but this was not only one. You saw yourself that Chairman of Council of Ministers had prepared a speech<sup>1</sup> which had no polemics and would not provide polemics. He had no intention of any aggravation cropping up, but it would have been strange if he had not replied to Mayor's speech.<sup>2</sup> This was characteristic but far from only such occasion.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.6111/9-2059. Confidential; Niact. Transmitted as DTG 200903Z September.

<sup>1</sup> For text of Khrushchev's speech at a dinner given by Mayor of Los Angeles Norris Poulson, see *The New York Times*, September 21, 1959.

<sup>2</sup> A copy of Poulson's speech, in which he referred to Khrushchev's remark that "we will bury you," is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1474.

Impression is being generated that Prime Minister is being secluded by police cordon so that there are no possibilities of meeting with ordinary citizens. We have no objections to security measures but it is our impression that police cordon is being used to prevent him from any contacts.

Regarding Pittsburgh, it was difficult to understand in what situation Prime Minister would find himself. What is the purpose? If major strike is still going on he doubts whether it is worthwhile to go there at all. Otherwise Chairman of Council of Ministers would find himself in a false position.

Next question is whether trip should not be curtailed entirely and Prime Minister returned to Washington to talk to President.

Lodge replied: I certainly hold no brief for questions that have been asked on various occasions but I am sure that on reflection you and Mr. Khrushchev will not think they have been instigated by United States Government to make his visit a failure. I can't believe that you or Khrushchev would believe that. You Gromyko know United States too well to think that. President Eisenhower is not as underhanded or so stupid to do that. We have no control over local politicians. I have been trying all day to persuade Mayor not to make such an unsuitable speech. I can understand why with your different system Mr. Khrushchev might think we can control them, but you have been an ambassador here and you know the United States. United States Government has had no hand at all in this. We have been exerting a moderating influence. If you had seen what he was going to say and took out you would realize that I really accomplished something. I want to deny most vigorously that we are instigating this. I want to do this very very strongly. President would not invite him and then want to make him unhappy. He wants his trip to be useful and interesting and successful.

On police cordon, it is not for purpose of keeping him from the people. I told Mr. Khrushchev today he could see a super-market or stop at a shop or get out and shake hands with people. Monday he will lunch in cafeteria of IBM plant with workers. We are very happy to have him meet any workers he wants. Police are for security. There are people in the United States with strong feelings for various reasons and we must protect him. I thought police in New York did a very good job. There is no disposition to wall him off from workers.

I also understand about how you feel about Pittsburgh. It is perfectly agreeable to me to call off whole trip and go back to Washington. There have been too many banquets and they have lasted much too long and there is no reason why a man of Khrushchev's eminence should be



subject to so much annoyance. Going back to Washington would be perfectly agreeable.

Gromyko: Impression is taking shape that all these gatherings are marked by one general trend. You can see this better than we. I can repeat words of Prime Minister when he has often said that he had not come to beg for anything but to find a common language between us. I can cite Khrushchev's statement that he believes in the good intentions of President. But there is distinction between what President says and what happens.

Lodge: As President said to Khrushchev at Soviet dinner, when he (President) winks the people only laugh.<sup>3</sup> I know you have control but we do not. I tried to talk Mayor out of this speech. He would not drop it entirely. I spoke to him both at luncheon at Fox Studio and tonight.

Gromyko: (At this point Gromyko started speaking in ordinary conversational tones. His manner changed. He ceased being so official and became more human.) We thought provocative elements were being used to sharpen situation.

Lodge: Motive for this is not from United States Government. Motive is personal ambitions of a local politician to have his moment in limelight with world figure like Khrushchev and they see this very eminent man coming into their town and want to get into limelight for some personal ambition of their own. This is not some plot out of Washington. I hope you, Mr. Gromyko, will explain this to Mr. Khrushchev. He might not believe me because I am an American. Our ways may seem strange. We are a loosely organized country compared with the Soviet Union. We are not directed closely from central point.

Gromyko: Speaking frankly, you are representative of President and maybe I could make personal suggestion. You could say something in your speech. You could point out that Khrushchev is an official guest and that certain conclusions should be made from this with respect to behavior.

Lodge: I spoke to Mayor about this today.

Gromyko: You could even do this in speeches. You could use your influence.

Lodge: That is a good opinion. I did tell Mayor today. All I said tonight in my speech was what Khrushchev approved of my doing when I mentioned it in plane this morning. We even have a selfish interest in this of our own because President is going to USSR and because of forth-

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<sup>3</sup> In his toast at the dinner at the Soviet Embassy on September 16, Eisenhower remarked that during his visit to the United States Khrushchev would see that the American people "do not react to our (winking?) and that they do not take orders from us." (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 81, CF 1475B)

coming talks in Washington. We have every interest in trip being successful. I am glad you came to tell me. I would much rather have you tell me what you think than withhold it from me. Things have happened that I regret but there has been no connivance. We will be delighted to make it possible for him to mingle with working people and will call rest of trip off if he so desires.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>This telegram bears no signature.

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**120. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Acting Secretary of State Dillon and the Representative to the United Nations (Lodge)**

September 20, 1959, 10:30 a.m.

I called Lodge back in Los Angeles and told him that I had informed the President of his talk with Gromyko.<sup>1</sup> I further said that we saw no reason why Pittsburgh should not be dropped if Khrushchev so desired. Khrushchev could then devote Thursday<sup>2</sup> to rest and preparation for talks with the President. Lodge said it might be helpful if Khrushchev could see the President on Thursday for an hour or so. I said I was sure this could be arranged if it seemed desirable. I also told Lodge that the President felt that in view of Lodge's comments on certain numbers of Khrushchev's party,<sup>3</sup> it would be advisable to limit the Camp David talks as much as possible, i.e., to two on a side plus interpreters—Khrushchev and Gromyko and the President and Herter. The President also felt that Lodge should hold himself available for Camp David, the final decision on this to be taken when Lodge gets back to Washington and reports to the President. In closing I told Lodge we all admired the

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Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Confidential. Drafted by Dillon who was in Washington.

<sup>1</sup>No record of Lodge's telephone call to Dillon has been found. Regarding Lodge's talk with Gromyko, see Document 119.

<sup>2</sup>September 24.

<sup>3</sup>Not further identified.

job he was doing under most difficult circumstances. He was most appreciative and pointed out that yesterday had been a 23-hour day.

C. Douglas Dillon<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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## 121. Memorandum of Conversation

September 20, 1959.<sup>1</sup>

### PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Khrushchev  
Mr. Gromyko  
Ambassador Menshikov  
Mr. Sukhodrev

Henry Cabot Lodge  
Ambassador Thompson  
Mr. Kohler  
Mr. Pedersen  
Mr. Akalovsky

### SUBJECT

Train Trip from Los Angeles to San Francisco

On board the train from Los Angeles to San Francisco I first discussed the schedule for Mr. Khrushchev's stay in San Francisco, which he approved, and then mentioned the situation in Pittsburgh. I pointed out that, while it was true that the steel strike was still on, other plants such as Mesta were operating. He said that he had been informed of that and that this changed the situation. He would not have seen any reason for going to Pittsburgh if all of the plants were shut down.

Khrushchev then talked at great length about his stay in Los Angeles. He expressed his annoyance about the treatment he had received there and in particular about the fact that no one from the city had been on hand at the railroad station to say goodbye to him or to ask him to say a few words to the population of Los Angeles, even though microphones had been set up on the platform. I apologized for this and said that I understood how he felt. I said to him that I met with the Mayor

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1474. Confidential. Drafted by Akalovsky.

<sup>1</sup>The source text is incorrectly dated September 21.

during the luncheon yesterday and had urged him to delete many portions of his speech and that as late as just before the dinner last night I had tried to make him delete certain other portions which I thought were inappropriate. However, the Mayor refused to do so.<sup>2</sup> I said I hoped Mr. Khrushchev would understand that we had no centralized power in our country, that our country was rather loosely organized and that even as a personal representative of the President I could not control the actions of local officials.

Khrushchev said that he was now beginning to understand the problems the President had in trying to establish normal relations with the Soviet Union. He said that the President was surrounded by certain elements who wanted to prevent a normalization of relations with the Soviet Union. I replied that this was not true. I said that both the Secretary of State and myself were very close to the President and that certainly neither the Secretary nor I were trying to prevent the relations between the two countries from improving.

Mr. Khrushchev replied that he understood that, but said that he also realized why certain difficulties arose. For instance, he said, the Deputy Mayor of Los Angeles, Mr. Carter, told him that he had been born in Russia and that his father had been a merchant. Since Jewish people, except the wealthy ones, had not been allowed under the Czarist regime to live in Rostov, where Mr. Carter had been born, this indicated, Mr. Khrushchev said, that his father had been a very wealthy person and that therefore he had been one of those the Red Army had failed to take care of during the Revolution. Mr. Khrushchev said that he himself had participated in the fighting for the city of Rostov and therefore it was only natural that a person like Mr. Carter would feel rather awkward having to make arrangements for his reception. He said that he didn't blame Mr. Carter for that because he understood that all people were human. It was difficult, he said, for such people as Mr. Carter to change their attitude toward the Soviet regime.

Later during one of our conversations I asked Mr. Khrushchev whether the Soviet Union was switching to a larger production of consumer goods. Mr. Khrushchev said that this was true but said that the Soviet Union was in the same position as a hungry person who had just awakened and wanted to eat. Such a person would not wash his hands before eating. He would grab the food and gulp it down. Therefore, the Soviet Union was not trying now to develop the production of any sophisticated consumer goods; it was simply trying to satisfy the basic needs. Moreover, the demand for sophisticated goods had to be developed in the Soviet Union because people in the Soviet Union don't even

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<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 119.

feel the need for such goods. In this connection Mr. Khrushchev told us a couple of stories demonstrating the low level of civilization in the Soviet Union at the time of the Revolution. He mentioned that at that time very few ordinary people knew how to use a toilet properly or that they should bathe regularly.

I replied that I realized this but that I had read that since Stalin's days there had been a trend in the Soviet Union towards greater production of consumer goods. Mr. Khrushchev confirmed this and said that Stalin regarded this problem from a military point of view. However, when the Seven-Year Plan was being developed he, Khrushchev, had said that five million tons of steel would [not?] make a big difference as far as defense was concerned and suggested that the output be cut by that amount so as to produce more consumer goods. His argument at that time had been that this would not weaken the defense capability of the Soviet Union but would even strengthen the state because the people would support the government. This approach proved to be the correct one just as the freeing of concentration camp inmates had strengthened the Soviet state rather than weakened it. At the time when the question of the freeing of concentration camp inmates had been discussed, some people in the Soviet Government had expressed fears that this might undermine the Soviet state. He, Khrushchev, argued that it would not because the liberated inmates would see that the government was changing its policy and was taking care of them.

In a conversation between Ambassador Thompson and Khrushchev, Khrushchev expressed the view that the performance he had seen yesterday at the Twentieth-Century Fox studio was something he could not understand.<sup>3</sup> He said that he could not understand how such good and hard working people could indulge in such entertainment. The only reason for that he thought might be the extreme abundance of wealth in the United States which made the people look for such unusual entertainment. He also complained about having noticed a reporter at the studio who had been trying to make a dancer lift her skirt while she was being photographed with Mr. Khrushchev. This, he thought, was in very poor taste.

It has been reported to me that after Mr. Khrushchev's stop at San Luis Obispo, where the people had accorded him a very friendly welcome, Mr. Khrushchev had a very brief conversation with Mr. Sholokhov.<sup>4</sup> He told Sholokhov that, as one could see from the warm

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<sup>3</sup> In the early afternoon of September 19, Khrushchev visited the motion picture set of "Can Can" at Twentieth-Century Fox Studios.

<sup>4</sup> Mikhail Aleksandrovich Sholokhov, a Soviet writer who was a member of the official party accompanying Khrushchev.

welcome, the American people had very friendly feelings toward the Soviet Union in spite of efforts by American officials to erect a barrier between him and the American people. Sholokhov replied that this was true and mentioned the fact that he had seen a man at the station waving a hammer and sickle. He said that the American people were really good, friendly people but that he had a feeling that they were oppressed and frightened.

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## 122. Memorandum of Conversation

San Francisco, September 21, 1959.

### SUBJECT

Conversations in San Francisco

### PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Khrushchev  
Mr. Lodge  
Mr. Sukhodrev  
Mr. Akalovsky

On our way from the hotel to the pier for the boat ride in the San Francisco Bay, Khrushchev at one point observed that many of the ideals written down in the Bible were also the ideals of Communism. The difference was, he said, Christians believed the ideal society would be given them by God, whereas Communists thought it would be developed by man. He said that the optimistic goal of Communism was to abolish the State, since the State suppresses the free will of the people.

I asked whether he meant, in other words, both Christians and Communists were seeking Utopia, but that the means of achieving it were different.

Khrushchev said that this was true, and that, from his point of view, disarmament was one way of making a step in that direction, since the Army is one of the means of suppressing the individual freedom of men. He also said that eventually police, as well as courts, would be abolished. This would be more difficult to do in the U.S. because of the capitalistic philosophy which provides for individual profit, and as long as every person thought that he should have more than his neighbor,

there would be excesses by individuals which should be kept under control. The Soviet Union, of course, was different and, as a matter of fact, just before coming to this country, Khrushchev said, he had signed a decree disbanding a regiment of internal security troops. As a matter of fact, since Stalin's death the secret police had been reduced by 75%.

I noted the fact that he was meeting the American people so freely and was talking to them so directly. In Stalin's days, Soviet policy statements had been very cryptic and there had been no information as to the reasons or motives prompting such policy. This veil of secrecy had caused a situation where many people, for lack of information, had started imagining things which might not have been true. This intensified suspicions. This is why I thought that his visit and his encounters with the American people were very revealing and could be very useful.

Khrushchev replied that the secrecy during Stalin's days had been caused by the ill state of Stalin's mind.

During the boat ride Khrushchev admired the beauty of San Francisco and, having noticed an aircraft carrier entering the harbor, stated that he felt sorry for the crew of that vessel. He said that targets as big as that aircraft carrier could be destroyed immediately if war broke out. He felt that the naval weapons of the future were submarines. While in the past submarines had had to approach their targets as close as five kilometers in order to be able effectively to attack them, now they could do it at distances of several hundred kilometers. Such weapons as flying torpedoes enabled them to do so. He also said that the Soviet Union had scrapped several cruisers which had been under construction and 95% completed; the only naval vessels that the Soviet Union was continuing to build were submarines, destroyer boats and guard boats. When one of the newspaper men asked him how many submarines the Soviet Union had at this time, he evaded a direct reply and said that the Soviet Union was catching herring with submarines.

In the course of our subsequent discussion, I asked him whether it was true that the climate in the Soviet Far East had become considerably milder during the past twenty-five years.

He replied that the port of Vladivostok was an all year round port and never froze.

Later on, while driving to the ILU building, Khrushchev again expressed his belief that the Navy, except submarines, had become obsolete. He said that four years ago the Soviet Union had fired Admiral Kuznetsov, the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, because he had opposed the reduction of the Navy and wanted to continue its development.

At the Longshoremens Union Khrushchev made a few rather restrained remarks, expressing the hope that the future would not only be

peaceful, but also would bring more work and better lives for the working people. His visit there lasted about fifteen minutes.

We then drove to the IBM plant in San Jose. On the way there, he admired the San Francisco Bay Bridge and our highway construction in general. He also said that under our capitalistic system the practice of collecting tolls from those who use bridges and highways was a sound and rational one; yet in the Soviet Union where there was no private property, this was not possible.

I explained to him that the bridges and highways were built by the State and that we felt that it was fair that the users pay for their construction and maintenance. I also asked him whether it was not true that people in the Soviet Union were allowed to own homes and leave them to their children as inheritance. I said that this indicated that even in the Soviet Union there was private property.

Mr. Khrushchev said that there was a difference between private property and personal property. Things like automobiles, homes, clothing, etc. were considered to be personal property. Under the Soviet system, he continued, all means of production belonged to the entire people, and it was the means of production that couldn't be owned by individual citizens.

To this I remarked that in the U.S. millions owned stock in our industry and were therefore owners of parts of our means of production. I also clarified to him that in Massachusetts electric power was a state-controlled monopoly and that no individual was allowed to produce and sell power individually. Speaking of shares of stock, I said it was a wise thing for a retired person to receive dividends to supplement their income or to insure income in their retirement days.

Khrushchev said that under their system, everyone was provided with a pension in his old age, and that this was much better than collecting dividends.

I replied that we also had a very good and broad social security system in which the American people spent 26 billion dollars per year.

When we were passing Moffett Field, I told him that we had a wind tunnel there, to which he said that they also had wind tunnels in the Soviet Union, one in Moscow and one in Siberia.

On our way back from San Jose, Khrushchev commented on the excellent IBM plant, but said that computers were very highly developed in the Soviet Union too; such things as A bombs or the H bomb could have never been developed in the Soviet Union if it hadn't had highly complicated and sophisticated computers. He also said that had he been in charge of the construction of the IBM plant, he would have built it as a two-story structure because, in his view, this was more efficient and economical. He also observed that most of the IBM employees were young



people and said that in the Soviet Union they were also bringing more and more young people into industry.

When we were passing Moffett Field, he said that he was not interested in military aircraft because they were an obsolete means of war, having been completely displaced by missiles. He said that, as he had mentioned to the Vice President in Moscow,<sup>1</sup> the Soviet rocketry was so highly developed that just recently one of their ICBM's with a range of 7,000 kilometers and capable of carrying a five megaton war head, had hit a target with a deviation of only 1.4 kilometers to the right. Only 50% of the bombers would possibly reach the target, whereas all rockets would reach the target.

To this I remarked that it was necessary to know where the targets were.

Khrushchev replied that this was not of great importance because of the highly destructive power of nuclear weapons.

Khrushchev commented favorably on certain types of housing near Twin Peaks but didn't like that on the road to San Jose because the houses were too crowded and constructed in such a way as would not permit them to last longer than 20 or 30 years.

I replied that, while it may be true that some houses were built too close to one another, the climate in this area didn't require more solid construction. I also said that our dynamic society involved constant changes and that all products were replaced with newer and better models even before the end of their useful life. I added that the American people preferred to have individual homes with their privacy rather than to live in big apartment houses or "with their mother-in-law."

Khrushchev also seemed to be very impressed with the large number of cars he had seen and said that the Soviet Union, while producing newer and better models of cars, was not trying to emulate the American pattern but was rather going to set up big rent-a-car garages where people could rent a car whenever they needed one. This, he said, was a much more sensible approach than to have people having their cars standing idle when they didn't need them.

I replied that we also had nationwide rent-a-car systems and also said that the automobile was a very important item in our economy because of the jobs it provided in various industries and services.

After our visit to a supermarket in San Francisco, Mr. Khrushchev said that he didn't know whether there were many stores of this type in the Soviet Union and that if there were any, there were very few of them. He said that upon his return to Moscow, he would take up the subject of developing a system of such stores in the Soviet Union.

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<sup>1</sup> See Document 99.

At one point in our conversation, he admired our high standard of living and said that it was in the United States that capitalism was at its best. He said that the Soviet Union had never denied that the United States had the highest standard of life and the most efficient methods of production in the world, and that this was the reason why it had chosen the United States as its partner for competition.

I pointed out to him that there was a great deal of difference between capitalism in its American form and the old European type of capitalism.

Khrushchev said that he didn't think that the Soviet Union could catch up with the United States by 1970; while it might be able to catch up with the United States in the total volume of production, he didn't think it would be able to catch up as far as per capita production was concerned. He added that as far as clothing was concerned, the Soviet Union seemed to be now on the same level as the United States.

I then asked him about livestock and whether the number of livestock had increased considerably in the Soviet Union in recent years. He said the increase had been tremendous and that as a result the production of meat, as compared to the same period last year, was now 60% higher. This was a tremendous increase which he himself had found difficult to believe.

During our stop at a housing development Khrushchev, while declining to visit any of the homes there, talked to several people—mostly women.

On our way to the hotel I told him that the people he had talked to were typical representatives of ordinary Americans and that now he could see what the wishes and aspirations of the American people were.

He said, "This city of San Francisco has charmed me."<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> In a message to Secretary Herter, transmitted as an unnumbered telegram from San Francisco, September 21, Lodge repeated much of the information in the memorandum printed here and added:

"The Mayor and chief of police have cooperated magnificently.

"Khrushchev said that the labor dinner didn't disturb him a bit.

"He has been in excellent humor for two days and has come to make a joke of our mishaps in Los Angeles (having at the time been furious). My personal standing with him is really excellent as of this writing.

"There is no doubt in my mind that as of this moment the gains on this trip definitely outweigh the losses and I can document this in many different ways.

"I can only pray this will continue." (Department of State, Central Files, 033.6111/9-2259)

The reference to the labor dinner is to a meeting Khrushchev attended with international union presidents in San Francisco the previous evening, September 20. A summary of this meeting is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1474.

**123. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower**

Washington, September 22, 1959.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Dillon, Mr. Farley, Mr. Allen Dulles, Secretary Gates, Admiral Burke, Mr. McCone, Dr. Kistiakowsky, Mr. Gordon Gray, General Persons, General Goodpaster

[Here follows discussion of nuclear testing and atomic cooperation, scheduled for publication in volume III.]

Finally, Mr. Dillon said he wanted to mention the matter of the proposal for exchange of atomic reactor information with the Soviets. The President asked whether this type of exchange is not what the IAEA was created for. Mr. McCone said there was need for guidance for himself and others participating in the discussions, both as to the exchange of information and as to exchange of visits. Yemel'yanov has asked Mr. McCone to visit the Soviet Union, and Yemel'yanov would then want to return the visit, inspecting our "peaceful use" reactors and our fusion experiments.<sup>1</sup> Mr. McCone agreed that the exchanges should be under the aegis of the IAEA and said that he thought Mr. Yemel'yanov shared this view. Mr. Yemel'yanov has stressed how expensive the Soviets are finding the use of atomic energy for power, and has also stated that neither country can afford wasteful duplication of the other's efforts in this field. Mr. Yemel'yanov also apparently proposed to Dr. Teller the building of a joint scientific facility—probably a nuclear laboratory—in Vienna.<sup>2</sup> With regard to thermonuclear fusion experiments, Yemel'yanov's suggestion was that the Russians put twenty to thirty scientists in our laboratories and we put twenty to thirty in theirs. The whole area of high energy physics is a promising one for such joint inquiry.

The President asked if we had this kind of cooperation with the British. Mr. McCone said we have a complete exchange of information with them in these fields. The President suggested that our participants in these discussions should chiefly do a lot of listening. Mr. Dillon asked that the discussions be kept within the framework of the IAEA or the

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on September 24.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 110.

<sup>2</sup> No further record of Yemelyanov's conversation with nuclear physicist Edward Teller has been found.

Lacy-Zarubin agreement.<sup>3</sup> The President said he saw no reason why this cannot be done through the IAEA. At the same time he thought we should take a close look at what information we make available. The Russian scientist wants to see our plants, and have us see his. The President wondered whether the Russians could hold out their more advanced activities. Mr. McCone said that they could, in contrast to us, since our program is public knowledge. He had no doubt they would hold out anything that we have not achieved. Mr. McCone stated that we of course would give them only unclassified information, although they would see some advances in materials which they have not yet achieved.

The President asked whether the people in the AEC think this type of exchange is a good thing. Mr. McCone said that they did, more so in fact than he did. Mr. Dillon commented that whatever we see is a gain.

Mr. Allen Dulles said that the Soviets have shown some embarrassment over their program, since it has been cut back so drastically from their earlier, unrealistic goals. Admiral Burke<sup>4</sup> commented that we should not fraternize too closely with them. Our allies will think we are weakening with regard to the Communist threat.

Summing up, the President said he saw no objection to our talking with the Russians and getting a clearer idea of just what they have in mind. He was not sure Khrushchev would want to talk about this question at Camp David. The President said he is afraid that Khrushchev will occupy the time at Camp David in unproductive haranguing. He is more likely to do so in a large group. The President would like to limit the group to Khrushchev and Gromyko in addition to Herter and himself, but supposed this would not be possible. He would like to exclude Menshikov, who seems to be "bad news" and is untrustworthy. He thought we must bring out that the Russian itinerary, and schedule of events, were worked up strictly by the Russians, and they have the responsibility for what was on or not on the schedule during his travels around the country.

G.

*Brigadier General, USA*

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is to the agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on exchanges in the cultural, technical, and educational fields, which Zaroubin, then Soviet Ambassador to the United States, and Lacy negotiated on January 27, 1958. For text of this agreement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 17, 1958, pp. 243-247.

<sup>4</sup> Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, Chief of Naval Operations.

## 124. Memorandum of Conversation

September 23, 1959.

### SUBJECT

Car Trip to Garst Farm

### PARTICIPANTS<sup>1</sup>

Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge  
Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev  
Mr. Sukhodrev  
Mr. Akalovsky

On our way to Mr. Garst's farm, Mr. Garst took up two "political" questions with Mr. Khrushchev. He expressed his hope that the Soviet Union would accept the idea of adequate inspection over disarmament measures and stated that he was sure that the President would insist on such inspection. He said that he thought that disarmament would offer particular advantage to the Soviet Union because, while the armaments burden was depriving the American people of just a few luxuries, it was depriving the Soviet people of many essential commodities.

Mr. Khrushchev said that the Soviet Union was in favor of full and adequate inspection and that such inspection was provided for in the latest Soviet disarmament proposals.

Mr. Garst then said that another problem which he was going to ask Mr. Khrushchev to consider was the so-called cases of compassion, of which there were about two or three hundred. He said that he personally knew of approximately thirty such cases, one of which, for example, was that of a Soviet-born girl who had been deported by the Germans to Germany and had later married an American soldier. At present this girl was living with her husband and children in South Carolina and wanted very much for her elderly parents, who are still in the Soviet Union, to come to this country and join her.

Mr. Khrushchev replied that this woman should write a letter explaining her case and recalling his promise to a Latvian couple he had met this morning at the hotel, said that he was sure that the parents would be granted an exit visa. In general, he said, he had nothing against letting people out of the country because "then the capitalists would feed them", thus relieving the Soviet Union of that burden.

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1474. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Akalovsky.

<sup>1</sup> Roswell Garst is not listed among the participants, presumably in error.

On our way back from Mr. Garst's farm to the airport, at some point Mr. Khrushchev mentioned that the Soviet Union had developed a turbo-jet aircraft with a maximum speed of 640 kilometers and a payload of 14 metric tons, which was capable of landing on dirt fields and did not require any concrete runways. The plane was now being used for transporting cargo, but if converted for passenger service it could carry approximately 100 persons.

(It was interesting to observe that upon our landing at Des Moines Airport on September 22, and while we were taxiing to the ramp, Mr. Khrushchev's son, Sergei, took several movie shots of our military jets standing on the field.)

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## 125. Memorandum of Conversation

Pittsburgh, September 24, 1959.

### SUBJECT

Car Trip to Airport from Pittsburgh

### PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador H.C. Lodge—US  
Chairman N.S. Khrushchev—USSR

As we were driving to the airport in Pittsburgh on Thursday, September 24th, I said to Chairman Khrushchev that a number of people in Pittsburgh had telephoned me and had come to see me requesting that I make appointments for them to see him concerning so-called compassionate cases—families who were separated and who could not be reunited because of the failure of the Soviet Government to approve.

I had told these individuals that of course I could make no appointments for Mr. Khrushchev to see anyone, but I did feel that Mr. Khrushchev ought to know that this had happened to me in Pittsburgh in addition to the many letters I had received before Chairman Khrushchev's arrival.

He said to me: "I want to settle these matters. Please tell all these people to take them up with Ambassador Menshikov." In this

conversation and in the previous one with Mr. Garst he made it clear that he wanted to clean up these cases.<sup>1</sup>

I recommend therefore that the State Department, having in mind what he said to Mr. Garst in Coon Rapids, what I understand he said to Mr. Stevenson in the same place<sup>2</sup> and what he said to me in Pittsburgh, get up their list of cases and take them up with the Soviet Government. The Department should carefully consider doing it through Mr. Thompson instead of through Mr. Menshikov because Mr. Menshikov can apparently always be counted upon to put any American request in its very worst light.

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<sup>1</sup> See Document 124.

<sup>2</sup> Adlai E. Stevenson attended a reception given for Khrushchev in Des Moines in the late afternoon of September 22, but no record of their conversation has been found.

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## 126. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, September 24, 1959.

### OTHERS PRESENT

Secretaries Herter, Dillon, Murphy, Merchant, Mr. Davis, Mr. Hagerty, General Goodpaster

The group came in to discuss with the President matters expected to come up during his meeting with Mr. Khrushchev. The President commented that it will be very difficult to adhere to an agenda. He added that some say that Khrushchev is a master debater. In fact, he seems to be a skillful evader of tough questions.

Mr. Herter thought that the first evening at Camp David might be devoted to having Khrushchev talk about some of our misconceptions regarding communism. Perhaps he could "talk himself out" to a certain extent in this way. The first substantive questions would be Berlin and Germany, to be taken up the following day. Mr. Herter thought that the U.S. should take the offensive on these questions, bringing out that

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on September 26.

Khrushchev started the crisis, for which there was no need, and carried it forward by threats and pressure. He anticipated the Russians will stress the need for a peace treaty with the separate Germanies, and claim that their conclusion of a peace treaty will void our rights. Our first aim is to maintain our rights until reunification has been achieved. We expect to liquidate our rights in time, but not by their fiat.

The President said he wanted to find some standpoint from which to approach the whole discussion that would put Khrushchev "in a box." He could do this by asking Khrushchev how we might compete with respect to the values that people cherish other than the mere increase in industrial production. Suppose, for example, we call on them to accept the principle of peaceful resolution of differences. In Berlin they are operating with veiled threats of "or else." He did not think there was any point in wasting time listening to Khrushchev respond on the subject of freedom. Mr. Murphy suggested probing Khrushchev as to why he had adopted the ultimatum method of dealing with the German problem at this particular time. Mr. Herter thought that a moratorium could be a period of transition to a new status for the city of Berlin, but noted that the Germans would not agree until after their election late in 1960. Mr. Dillon said he had noted in the report of Gaitskell's talk with Khrushchev<sup>1</sup> that the latter might agree to such a moratorium without implication that our rights would lapse at its end. The President thought the key point is that Khrushchev precipitated a crisis when he should have called for negotiations.

Mr. Herter next raised the question of the President's return trip to Russia. The President said that if the American people feel this meeting has been completely futile, and that Khrushchev recognized only his own arbitrary viewpoint, he did not see how he could go. Mr. Herter thought that the current meetings are more likely than not to end somewhat inconclusively. Mr. Dillon added that Khrushchev may save out some "give" for the President's return trip. Mr. Herter did not think the President should condition his return trip on Soviet agreement to a moratorium over Berlin, but did think that a summit meeting should be conditioned on that.

The President asked what State's evaluation was of Khrushchev's disarmament speech.<sup>2</sup> Mr. Herter said it has obviously had substantial impact around the world. The small nations fear that the big powers might start a war, drawing them in. They were also attracted by his suggestion to use the funds freed from armaments for economic

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<sup>1</sup> The report of Hugh Gaitskell, leader of the British Labour Party, of his interview with Khrushchev on September 4 was summarized in *The New York Times*, September 10, 1959.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 117.



development around the world. He recalled that the President had put forward this suggestion six weeks ago.<sup>3</sup> Mr. Khrushchev called for a step by step approach, extending controls as disarmament is extended.

Mr. Dillon suggested that the President consider making a speech on disarmament in the United Nations within the next few weeks.<sup>4</sup> The President thought this might be a pretty good idea, providing him an opportunity to set out our plan.

The President thought that really the most promising line suggested so far is to try to get Khrushchev committed to negotiation as a principle in the conduct of our relations. If he does this, we should be ready to tell him what we are prepared to do. Secretary Herter brought out that Khrushchev had omitted any consideration of any central or UN military force once national forces were reduced. The President said he has been trying to think of concrete examples for a possible step by step approach. We might for example abolish naval units having more than a certain operating range. Mr. Herter said that the Soviets had offered to reduce their conventional forces initially, cutting down to 1.7 million, but offer no way to verify these reductions. One idea his people have been examining is for the United Nations Disarmament Commission to send out a questionnaire for information to every nation asking what forces they require for their own internal security and what armament. Mr. Murphy commented that the existing forces are testimony to our lack of confidence in Soviet behavior, that we increased our forces greatly as the cold war became more severe. The President asked me to find out what was the strength of our armed forces at the end of December 1949. (I did so. The total was approximately 1.5 million.)

Regarding the exchange of atomic reactor information, the President said he viewed the project favorably so long as the whole thing was done through the IAEA.<sup>5</sup>

The President next asked how the Chinese problem could be taken into consideration. If we are talking about disarmament and such subjects, he wondered how we could negotiate on controls in light of our rigid policy against any recognition of Red China. Mr. Herter said we do not wish to change our stand on Red China. They will not renounce the use of force in Taiwan nor will they release our prisoners. The President

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<sup>3</sup> Not further identified.

<sup>4</sup> On September 21, Eisenhower wrote Dillon about the prospect of making an address on the subject of disarmament to the U.N. General Assembly. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.11–EI/9–2159) After discussing the idea with Secretary Herter, Dillon responded on September 23 that the usefulness of such a speech would depend on the results of the Khrushchev talks and that no decision should be made until after the talks. (*Ibid.*, 711.11–EI/9–2359)

<sup>5</sup> See Document 123.

said he realized this but wondered how we can talk about general disarmament with them. Mr. Merchant said we have the same problem regarding the Federal Republic of Germany. It is realized, however, that such countries must come under the purview of a disarmament agreement even though they are not UN members. The President repeated that he wished we had a really fine first step in disarmament to offer—one not involving our allies. Mr. Herter said that each type of weapon is so interwoven with others that it is hard to visualize what the President is seeking. Nuclear weapons now are so intimately mixed in with others that they could no longer be banned as a class.

The President said that there were reasons not to single out the nuclear weapon back in 1948, when we had a monopoly, but times have changed and if we could now really eliminate all atomic weapons we would not be too badly off. However, we can not do this without the most extreme and comprehensive inspection system. There is one possibility, however. Bombers and large missiles are discoverable because they are of substantial size.

The President thought Mr. Herter should talk to our Defense people. Where we once said our great strength advantage is nuclear, this is no longer true. If we could put down the sequence of steps we favor, some pattern might emerge. Mr. Murphy thought we could dust off the main lines of our 1957 proposals.<sup>6</sup>

The President next noted that the Russians seemed to want a non-aggression pact. Mr. Herter referred to this as a political treaty. The President thought it was undesirable since it would cover the same ground as our UN commitment and thus detract from it. Also, it would imply some kind of special relationship between the United States and the USSR, and thus alarm our allies. The President noted the point concerning requests that the Russians cease to detain children and other relatives of people now in this country. He also thought we should press to obtain the additional space needed for our Embassy, and should be as tough on the Russians in this country as they are on us.

Regarding trade questions, the President asked whether it was agreed that we have no objection to selling any strategic goods for gold or other hard currency. The group indicated that we do not. Mr. Dillon said he would prepare an additional paragraph regarding trade for consideration for the communiqué.

Reverting to the question of his visit to Russia, the President said he would be agreeable if Mr. Khrushchev would make a statement that there would be no unilateral interference with our status in Berlin. This

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<sup>6</sup> Reference is to Western working papers submitted to the Subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission on August 2 and 29, 1957.

would then give us an opportunity to pursue other questions without a pistol at our head, in peaceful negotiation. He could then say he would go to Russia. It was thought the statement should take the form that there would be no unilateral action attempting to prejudice our rights.

The President thought it might be desirable for him to go on TV for fifteen minutes or so just following Mr. Khrushchev's departure on Sunday, either to follow up on anything promising that came up in the talks or to correct any fallacious impression given by Mr. Khrushchev. Mr. Hagerty was confident we could get as much time as we might wish.

The President asked the State Department people to give some thought to the general line we want to follow in the discussions—for example, do both nations really commit themselves to peaceful coexistence in the sense he had discussed.

The President mentioned that he was seeing Ambassador Lodge the following day,<sup>7</sup> and indicated he would like to have Mr. Lodge at Camp David, in order not to waste the experience he had gained through his trip with Khrushchev.

Finally, the President discussed arrangements for Camp David, and attendance at the luncheon and dinner that he is planning.

G.  
*Brigadier General, USA*

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<sup>7</sup>See Document 128.

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## 127. Memorandum of Conversation

New York, September 24, 1959.

### SUBJECT

*Journal of Commerce Dinner for Khrushchev*

### PARTICIPANTS

Chairman Nikita S. Khrushchev  
Ambassador Menshikov  
Ambassador Lodge

Acting Assistant Secretary Foy D. Kohler  
Mr. Eric Ridder, Publisher, *Journal of Commerce*  
(See attached for Others)<sup>1</sup>

This was a dinner given at the Sheraton Carlton Hotel by Mr. Eric Ridder, Publisher, New York *Journal of Commerce*, arranged by Soviet Ambassador Menshikov directly with Mr. Ridder.

After the dinner was well underway, Mr. Ridder opened the discussion with a short speech in which he expressed the hope for some friendly discussion with the Chairman with free give and take on both sides. He thought this might clarify many questions and cited an example which bothers American businessmen: namely, that the Soviets are reported to be mining gold at the cost of \$166 an ounce when the world price is \$35 an ounce. Summarizing, he said he would focus on a question to Mr. Khrushchev as to whether the chances of improving trade relations between the USSR and US have been improved by his visit to this country? Mr. Khrushchev said he would like to reverse that question. What did the American businessmen think? Mr. Cortney of Coty<sup>2</sup> stated that they had not been improved, that such a visit was not a factor in the process. Mr. Ridder disagreed. Mr. White, of Republic Steel,<sup>3</sup> then took the floor to explain his concept of the difficulties in the Soviet-American relationship. He said that he had started out as a worker and had worked in the USSR, in Greece and other countries. He was now in management. One thing he had found in his present capacity was that in connection with any labor difficulties, there was always some communist hell-raising involved. In almost any situation Soviet influence was found and it was anti-American. There was some applause after this (in which, apparently by inadvertence, Mr. Khrushchev joined).

After a few remarks from Mr. Fleming and Mr. Strauss, Mr. Moore of Moore-McCormack<sup>4</sup> sketched his company's improving business behind the Iron Curtain, citing that their shipment of hams for Poland had tripled in three years and shipments to Czechoslovakia of Christmas tree ornaments had considerably increased. They would be interested in carrying more Soviet products.

Mr. Cortney then referred to the question of the price of gold. He said that Soviet secrecy on their gold holdings and production created a lack of confidence in business circles. Mr. Khrushchev did not understand why this worried American business, saying that the question of

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Philip Cortney, President of Coty, Inc.

<sup>3</sup> C.M. White, Chairman of the Board of Republic Steel Corporation.

<sup>4</sup> Lamar Fleming, Chairman of the Board of Anderson, Clayton & Co.; Jack Strauss, Chairman of the Board of Macy's; and William T. Moore, President of Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc.

trade was simply a question of: "You buy what you need from us, we sell you what we can." Mr. Cortney took him up on this remark saying this was not the basis of international trade, which resulted rather from mutual advantage. He repeated again that he could not understand why the USSR kept its gold stock figure a secret. Mr. Khrushchev in turn repeated that he did not understand why Mr. Cortney should want to know this kind of thing. Mr. Khrushchev then continued and referred to Mr. Strauss' earlier suggestion that the goods of Iron Curtain origin encountered sales resistance in the US. In this connection he cited Soviet trade with West Germany despite political differences and said he didn't see what difference the origin made, if the goods were right. Mr. Strauss pointed out that goods had to be marked as to origin under American law, and that there was in fact sales resistance to Soviet goods. Mr. Khrushchev then went on to talk about "discriminatory" American tariffs. In developing his thesis, he said the USSR in fact had nothing to sell, that their warehouses are almost empty. He went on to say, however, there was good trade with the Soviet Union and other western countries.

Mr. Reed of American Express<sup>5</sup> then referred at some length to the recent exchanges of managerial, industrial and technical exchanges and asked whether Mr. Khrushchev did not find them useful. Mr. Khrushchev agreed, then went on to say he did not understand why they were able to have trade relations with such a firm as Krupp in West Germany and not with the US. Mr. Cortney again intervened to put the picture in perspective, pointing out that the entire trade of the USSR with the outer world was only two billion dollars out of a total world trade of 220 billion dollars. Mr. Khrushchev then said the questions Mr. Cortney were raising were political, not economic. If the US did not want to trade, then it should not trade. The USSR does not need our goods, though he would point out that in earlier days trade was rather extensive and that Ford, for example, had found it profitable to deal with the USSR. Mr. Cortney said that what was good for Ford was not necessarily good for the US. Khrushchev retorted the United States is made up of Fords.

Mr. McCabe of Scott Paper<sup>6</sup> then changed the subject by asking Khrushchev to give his impressions of the trip.

Mr. Khrushchev took the floor, agreeing to try to give his impressions. He had found that the American people were essentially peace-loving. Business people seemed to him particularly interested in good US-USSR relations, except perhaps for the few who depended directly

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<sup>5</sup> Ralph T. Reed, President of American Express.

<sup>6</sup> Thomas B. McCabe, President of Scott Paper Co.

on government arms contracts. However, among US politicians he found there were some who feared the end of the cold war. Maybe they had made too many speeches to permit it. This was the horse they rode into Congress and they couldn't get off. Overall, however, his principal impression was that the US wants to come to an agreement with USSR and to live in peace. As to trade, he would repeat that the USSR does not need this but still believes it would be a good thing. He could agree with Mr. Cortney that national specialization was a factor in international trade. However, since the US did not agree to exports which the USSR needed, the USSR had been obliged to produce its own industrial equipment. For example, he had visited the Mesta plant and found that their largest press was 50,000 tons in capacity.<sup>7</sup> The largest press produced by Soviet industries now is 70,000 tons. He then cited Soviet development of an advanced oil drill. However, the USSR could buy from the US, for example, chemical equipment in which the US is ahead; maybe also some equipment for the oil industry. The Soviet Union had once traded on a considerable scale with the DuPont Company but not in recent years. It could do some business again if the State Department permitted, but since this was not permitted the USSR was buying more goods of this type from West Germany and the UK. Orders to the UK had in fact mounted so rapidly that he had had recently to counsel restraint on his industrial people, so they would not exceed payment possibilities. The USSR was also buying synthetic fibers and production machinery from Italy and France. It was a question of pay and take. If the US found it profitable to trade with the USSR, good. If we did not find it profitable, then we wouldn't trade. This was the law of trade. The USSR could wait while the US took its time to come around to an understanding of these facts.

Mr. White turned his attention again to economic systems, charging that the USSR had adopted the Western incentive system, the production methods and many other features. He said that was fine. Mr. Khrushchev quickly interjected that the Soviets are not stupid. What they found that was good in the Western system they took. The original and greatest contribution in modern production was Henry Ford's invention of mass production which was a high point in economic history. However, he concluded: "If you don't want our caviar, don't buy it. It is very good. We will eat it ourselves."

Mr. Hewitt of Deere Co.<sup>8</sup> then referred to the fact that they had made sales to the Soviet Union over a period of years but always just one

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<sup>7</sup> Khrushchev visited the Mesta Machinery Company at West Homestead, Pennsylvania, on the morning of September 24.

<sup>8</sup> William A. Hewitt, President of Deere & Co.

or two tractors or combines. He wanted to ask why the Soviets just buy samples of Western production. To this, Mr. Khrushchev said he wanted to give a frank and honest reply. Why should the USSR buy US industrial output in any quantity? They were able to produce everything they needed themselves. Consequently, they buy Western models only to compare and borrow what they consider best. He said the average customer of Deere Co., the US farmer, certainly buys only one or two machines. The Soviet Union buys as much as any farmer or even more. Why should the Deere Co. complain; presumably the company profited equally from both transactions. Maybe Mr. Hewitt should try to get Mr. Garst to buy more of his products. Mr. Hewitt said that he was not talking about individual and private customers but about trade between nations which he understood was the subject of the discussion. Mr. Khrushchev replied that the Soviets were not interested in tractors or combines or planes. At the moment they were only interested in equipment for the chemical industry.

Mr. Pace<sup>9</sup> then asked about the question of payment. Mr. Khrushchev replied that the USSR needed credit, not government credit, but private credit of the kind given them by the UK. They were prepared to pay reasonable rates of interest. In reply to a question from the floor, he said he did not have his technicians available and could not say at exactly what rate. However, he indicated it would probably be the going world rate. He then went on to say that the Soviets were already making vast savings over their calculations in the 7-year plan, being now 5% ahead, which resulted in a significant accumulation of ruble availabilities. (The inference was that increased foreign purchases would increase the savings over the plan and improve Soviet payment possibilities.)

Mr. Percy of Bell and Howell<sup>10</sup> brought up the question of what assurances the USSR was prepared to give as respects patents, licensing rates, etc. In this connection he cited correspondence he had had on this subject with Sergei Mikoyan, son of Anastas, in connection with Sergei's interest in the high quality of a West German camera he had. Mr. Khrushchev replied that if the Soviet Union bought patent or license rights, it would pay in accordance with world practice. However, he went on to turn the question aside by saying that young Mikoyan was speaking of a gift given him by the Germans which was in fact no better than Soviet cameras. He said his own son, Sergei, had received five such gifts, including a Japanese camera. The Soviet product was better.

Mr. White then turned to the question of the general relationship between the two countries, pointing out that Mr. Khrushchev must

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<sup>9</sup> Frank Pace Jr., President of General Dynamics Corporation.

<sup>10</sup> Charles H. Percy, President of Bell & Howell Co.

realize that the US has all elements in its population with very strong feelings, for example, Hungarian, Pole and Czech. Khrushchev questioned him as to his own background to which Mr. White replied that he was German, French, English, Irish and "100% American".

Mr. Khrushchev then went on to say that Mr. White was ignorant of socialism and could not understand the Soviet system. There was then some discussion of communist activities in the US at the end of which Mr. Khrushchev asked Mr. White whether he meant that he wanted him, Khrushchev, to call off the American communists. When Mr. White replied flatly, "Yes", Mr. Khrushchev rolled his head in his hands and said, "there was nothing to do with such people".

Mr. Pace then referred to Mr. Khrushchev's remark that he had found the American people to be peace-loving and asked whether this was a result of his trip. Mr. Khrushchev replied that it was not a result of the trip but that the trip had confirmed this estimation to him. Mr. Pace then asked as to Mr. Khrushchev's feeling on the U.S. Government attitude. Mr. Khrushchev said the reply to this question depended on the concrete situation; for example, if the Soviet disarmament proposals were rejected, then this would cast doubt on U.S. Government intentions. Mr. Pace said we had hoped that Mr. Khrushchev would get the impression that the US was peace-loving but that it was ready to support its "moral principles by power". Some discussion then ensued as to Mr. Pace's meaning, which Mr. Khrushchev concluded by saying that surrounding the USSR by military bases was not "moral". Mr. Pace pointed out that we had the same bases when we had an atomic monopoly which we did not use. Mr. Khrushchev replied that the USSR could not depend upon the caprice of a foreign government. The US atomic monopoly was like knowing that the other fellow had a loaded pistol in his pocket and said that: "He who believes in a word is fooled in the end." More interchange ensued to the effect that the discussion had strayed far away from the subject of trade.

Mr. Khrushchev then said that he would like to make some concluding remarks and be excused. The time was then approaching 10:30 p.m. He said that the Soviet Union wanted to trade with the United States. They considered that trade was the litmus paper indicating whether we had peaceful intentions and wanted to live in peace with the Soviet Union. Evidently we were not yet reconciled to the existence of the Soviet Union, so the Soviets had to be on their guard. He could not return to the Soviet Union and tell the Soviet people of the peaceful words we had spoken if we were not willing to trade. Willingness to trade would be a test of our peaceful intentions. We should not interfere in their Socialist affairs and they would not interfere in our Capitalist affairs. Again he repeated that the removal of trade discriminations would be a test of our intentions. Similarly, if we signed a peace treaty



with Germany, this would mean that we wanted peace. If we refused to sign a peace treaty with Germany, it would mean that we want war. The same could be said with respect to disarmament. However, if the arms race should continue, then the Soviets can compete. Their Seven Year Plan provides amply both for armaments and for their domestic requirements.

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## 128. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, September 25, 1959.

### OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Herter, Ambassador Lodge, Ambassador Thompson, Mr. Merchant, General Goodpaster

The President welcomed Ambassador Lodge back after his trip. He said he had read his reports with the greatest of interest.<sup>1</sup> It seemed that the trip was going better all the while. Mr. Lodge confirmed that this was true, after hitting bottom at Los Angeles. Leading to that were several incidents, first the disrespectful and immature performance at the Press Club in Washington, followed by heckling by a few drunks at the Economic Club session in New York, and what was really a vulgar, even obscene show on the set in Hollywood. The publicity people at the studio wanted pictures for promotional purposes of the dancers with Khrushchev and quite obviously he was offended at this treatment of the Premier of Russia.

Although Lodge had said he would arrange for a trip to Disneyland, while on the plane, the Chief of Police of Los Angeles said he would not accept responsibility after there was a tomato-throwing incident coming in from the airport. Gromyko presented his "démarche" to Lodge at 2 AM and this was the low point of the trip. The turning point came on the platform at Santa Barbara. Although the security people

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on September 28.

<sup>1</sup>Copies of all of Lodge's memoranda of conversations with Khrushchev were sent to the White House and are in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International Series, or Staff Secretary Records.

objected, Ambassador Lodge took responsibility for leaving the train with Khrushchev and the crowds gave him a very cordial reception. San Francisco was wonderful in every respect, capitalizing on the poor performance at Los Angeles. The public were fine and the President's appeal had wide impact. Then there was a splendid day in Iowa. Mr. Garst is a phenomenon in himself. Again there was an excellent performance in Pittsburgh by Governor Lawrence<sup>2</sup> who strongly supported what the President is doing.

Ambassador Lodge said that from his week of travel he had the clear conviction that Khrushchev is a remarkable, although very difficult, man. He then gave a personality sketch of Mr. Khrushchev. Mr. Lodge spoke from notes which he will furnish as the basis for his oral report to the President.<sup>3</sup> He said that Mr. Khrushchev has an open mind on some things, although not on the Communist "religion." He is a very good and attentive listener. While he says that he saw nothing he did not know about on the trip, it is obvious that it has had an impact on him. First, he better understands the independent, separate nature of our local government. Second, he is deeply impressed by much that he has seen—the condition and attitudes of our people, our roads, automobiles, factories, etc. He was struck by the vitality of our people. He probably does not now really think that the Soviets are likely to surpass us, at least anytime soon.

With regard to policy questions, it is clear that he wants peace and thinks that Russia needs peace in order to do what he wants the nation to do. He thinks his disarmament scheme has serious merit. He is ready to ease up on jamming of Voice of America broadcasts, but will not allow appeals to rebel against the government to be made to the Russian people. He is very correct and conventional regarding China, but says no more than he absolutely has to say on this subject. He seems ready to agree on an exchange of books. He also is agreeable to an information questionnaire on national needs for internal security forces. He seems to be ready to settle the lend-lease accounts. He is boastful of having penetrated the CIA. He says he has cut down the number of Soviet Secret Police by 75%. He wants to trade jet planes with us, and leave his TU-114 with us. (Mr. Merchant said it is having mechanical difficulties.) He is keenly interested in having a treaty of peace and friendship with the United States. He is interested in expanding trade and removing restrictions upon trade. He may gradually remove some of the restrictions on travel within the Soviet Union, but should be allowed to do this by himself, in his own time, without being pressed.

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<sup>2</sup> David L. Lawrence, Governor of Pennsylvania.

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

Ambassador Lodge said he hopes that the atmosphere when Khrushchev leaves will be one of "let's keep on talking." It is important to decide whether the President is going to Russia or not. Ambassador Thompson suggested that this should not be put on the basis of making them pay some price to get the President to come. The President said he would of course not do this, but would simply leave the timing uncertain. The minimum in his mind is that Khrushchev must make some proposal by which the world could understand that we are not to have a catastrophe over Berlin.

Ambassador Lodge suggested that some time the President should thank the Air Force, the railroads, the police and others who had a hand in the arrangements for Mr. Khrushchev for the splendid work they did. At the same time he thought we should make a study of our system of handling the visits of Chiefs of State. This was too casual and decentralized. Mayors are much too independent to leave to work matters out on their own. In fact, we should not rely heavily on local politicians.

The President recalled that no one had thought of taking Khrushchev around on this kind of a trip when the proposal was made. This was something he asked for. There is an obvious risk since he is the embodiment of evil in the eyes of many people.

Mr. Lodge said that some of the worst difficulty came from the turmoil created by newsmen. They were all right at fixed installations where they were kept under careful control, but where there was movement in the open the situation was terrible.

The President thought that if in his talks with Khrushchev they could get two or three significant things lined up, he could then take Khrushchev up to his farm, giving no advance notice. He might even drop in with him at the Navy football game, although this seemed unlikely.

Ambassador Thompson observed that Khrushchev did not consult Gromyko in preparing his speeches. Rather he called on his son-in-law and members of his personal staff; his daughters also apparently had a hand in them. Ambassador Thompson said that Menshikov was constantly feeding poison to Khrushchev throughout the trip. Mr. Lodge confirmed this, saying that whenever there was something that could be criticized, Menshikov would do this. He also tried to keep Lodge away from Khrushchev but failed in this. The President agreed with this judgment, indicating that he considers Menshikov evil and stupid.

The President said he is trying to get a central idea on which to base the discussions. He thought he might say that Khrushchev has now had a good introduction to our country, and that the big thing that he wants to know is whether Khrushchev truly wants to promote the conditions that will bring true peace and make it last, and not just spar for

advantage in the discussions. If the former is true, while we may have fluctuations in our relations and occasional difficulties, we can go back to this principle and make progress. Under this concept, Berlin is just something that they want, an advantage they are trying to gain. The President said he would try to set some such pattern as this in the discussions this evening.

The President said he is considering going to church at 8:30 AM in Gettysburg. He could be back at Camp David at 10:00. Mr. Herter said that in the meantime Mr. Dillon could talk about trade questions with the Soviets. Ambassador Lodge felt that Khrushchev would probably not want to go to church. He was offered the opportunity to do so on the trip, but said it would be misunderstood.

In commenting about Germany, the President noted that we have a treaty with West Germany, and cannot of course keep him from having one with East Germany. Mr. Herter said the real point is that he cannot, by concluding a treaty, terminate our rights. Ambassador Thompson suggested asking Khrushchev what he thinks the consequences of such a peace treaty would be. Mr. Merchant thought this would be a good way of bringing out that he cannot sign away our rights. The President commented that if Khrushchev could agree to let the German question rest for three years while we go ahead with actions in other fields, we may find that it becomes easier to solve. Mr. Herter added that they must not push us on reducing troops or curtailing our freedoms there in the meantime. The President asked whether there would be any point in his taking this matter up with Khrushchev alone. Mr. Herter thought this was a promising thing to do. Ambassador Lodge commented, however, that Gromyko had proved to be a good influence on Khrushchev during the trip. He returned again to the subject of Menshikov, indicating that Menshikov had arranged the dinner last night<sup>4</sup> directly with Mr. Ridder of the *Journal of Commerce* and that the dinner had been a gross mistake, both because Mr. Khrushchev was so tired and needed the rest and also because it became the occasion for a couple of very unskilled and rather stupid people to try to "bait" and heckle Mr. Khrushchev.

The President said he might start off by saying that he realized that there had been some unpleasant incidents on Mr. Khrushchev's trip and that he is sorry for them. At the dinner last night, people were picked to attend who had no more sense than to try to needle him. Mr. Lodge said that the trouble arose in several places where the group tried to treat Mr. Khrushchev like a visiting lecturer rather than the head of a powerful nation. He said that it is possible to reason with Khrushchev, providing

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 127.

one approaches him correctly. The President suggested that someone tell Gromyko that he feels we should not make Berlin the one thing that governs and controls our entire relationship. Ambassador Thompson said that he believes Khrushchev really does want us to accept the status quo as the price of having peace. He thought, therefore, that a good approach would be to say that the settlement of the cold war does not remove the issue of Eastern Europe. The split of Germany is dangerous. Regarding Eastern Europe, we have no thought of the use of force, but we do hope that the governments there will become more responsive to the will of their people. The President recalled that in 1952 he had said we would use all peaceable means toward their liberation, and that he had confirmed that Foster Dulles agreed with this (after some initial public confusion). The President asked whether he could call on someone on the subject of disarmament to expound what we think about the matter generally and about Khrushchev's proposal.<sup>5</sup> Mr. Herter initially misunderstood and told the President what is being prepared on the longer range basis. The President asked who would be ready to talk on this tomorrow—who knows the details of Khrushchev's plan. Mr. Herter commented on some elements of the plan—for example, that no control machinery is provided for its early stage. However, Mr. Herter did see an element of genuineness in Khrushchev's proposal. He hoped the "Committee of Ten" of the United Nations could go into it very thoroughly and in detail.<sup>6</sup>

Mr. Herter said there is good prospect of some agreement on exchanges and contacts, and on the peaceful application of atomic energy. The President said he is rather dubious as to whether anything can be done regarding outer space agreements. The President told the group that the networks have indicated they would give him a half hour at 10:30 on Sunday night<sup>7</sup> if he found it necessary, and that he could let them know as late as 7 P.M. on Sunday. Mr. Herter thought it might be as well or perhaps better simply to issue a statement by the President if one were needed. He thought it is better not to have the notion of a "reply" speech hanging over Khrushchev's head. The President said, however, that our people are worried, and he is anxious that they should not have a wrong impression concerning the talks. Mr. Lodge also thought it would not look good to say that we are holding time in reserve. The President emphasized that he has no thought of letting this be known publicly.

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<sup>5</sup> See footnote 2, Document 117.

<sup>6</sup> Reference is to the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee established by the U.N. General Assembly on September 10.

<sup>7</sup> September 27.

Secretary Herter strongly recommended holding a press conference next Tuesday to sum up and comment on the visit.<sup>8</sup> Mr. Lodge said he hoped the President could then express appreciation to the people who helped on the trip. The President asked that the State Department prepare a three-minute statement he could read to open the press conference which he might decide to hold on Monday.

As the meeting broke up, Ambassador Thompson said he hoped the President might find an opportunity to express awareness that Khrushchev is trying to raise the living conditions of his people.

G.  
*Brigadier General, USA*

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<sup>8</sup>For the transcript of Eisenhower's press conference, held on Monday (not Tuesday), September 28, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1959*, pp. 694-702.

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## 129. Memorandum of Conversation

Camp David, September 26, 1959.

### SUBJECT

Khrushchev's Wartime Experiences

### PARTICIPANTS

The President	Chairman Khrushchev
Secretary Herter	Foreign Minister Gromyko
Ambassador Lodge	Ambassador Menshikov
Ambassador Thompson	Mr. Soldatov
General Goodpaster	Mr. Troyanovski
Mr. Akalovsky	

During their breakfast conversation, the President and Mr. Khrushchev were talking about the costly error in military operations of becoming inflexible and refusing to give up a foot of ground. The

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1475. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Akalovsky and Goodpaster and approved in the White House on November 10.

President recalled that Hitler kept reinforcing the North African front with excellent fighting units long after the Germans were contained in Tunisia and when the complete destruction of their forces had become inevitable and simply a matter of a few short weeks. He reinforced them practically to the date of surrender. The President said his own method had been to reinforce success and turn an advance into exploitation.

Mr. Khrushchev agreed with these observations, and expressed the admiration the Russians had had for General Eisenhower as a commander. Mr. Khrushchev then, as I recall, recounted some incidents from the war in Russia. He said he was the “political commander” (in this capacity holding a position parallel to that of the military commander) of a field army on the southern front in the Kiev area. At one point in the German advance, in spite of great efforts the Russians had made to save this revered city, encirclement of their whole force had become imminent and he and his military commander has issued orders to withdraw. The army on his flank, of which he said Timoshenko<sup>1</sup> was the military commander, had issued similar orders. The army group commander had not objected to these orders, but when they reached Stalin he revoked them and gave orders that the army would stand fast and not withdraw. When he was informed of the fact that Stalin had canceled this particular order, Mr. Khrushchev continued, he immediately realized that Marshal Vasilevski,<sup>2</sup> then Chief of Staff, apparently did not have the courage to argue with Stalin and to explain to him the validity of the order from the military standpoint. Marshal Vasilevski was in general a yes-man and never had the courage to defend his own point of view. Khrushchev then telephoned to Stalin, but Stalin would not come to the telephone. Instead he had Malenkov,<sup>3</sup> who shared his office with him, talk to Khrushchev on the phone. Khrushchev said he knew that Stalin was in the room with Malenkov—in fact, their desks were only about fifteen feet apart—because he could hear Stalin in the background talking to Malenkov. Stalin would not come to the phone, and would not agree to permit the withdrawal of the armies. Khrushchev told him that Timoshenko, who was an outstanding soldier, agreed with his (Khrushchev’s) views. Stalin said that this simply showed that Khrushchev had undue influence over Timoshenko. Khrushchev said this was untrue because Timoshenko was a strong-minded man and no one could influence him unduly. In the final event the armies were made to stand fast. They were encircled and practically destroyed by the Germans. Their equipment was completely lost. And this was all the fault of

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<sup>1</sup> Semen Konstantinovich Timoshenko.

<sup>2</sup> Marshal Aleksander Mikhailovich Vasilevsky.

<sup>3</sup> Malenkov was a Soviet member of the State defense committee 1941–1945.

Stalin's stubbornness. Stalin had a tendency to make military decisions thinking primarily in terms of prestige considerations, without taking into account the actual military situation. This, Mr. Khrushchev said, was very wrong and had affected unfavorably the course of military operations during the war.

Khrushchev went on to say that had Zhukov been in Vasilevski's spot, this would not have happened. Zhukov would have stood up to Stalin. He was a very strong-minded man and could not be swayed from what he thought was right. (At this point Mr. Khrushchev turned to the President, and said that Zhukov was a man of unshakable convictions, which is a fine thing in a military man, adding with what amounted to a leer, "so long as this is limited to military things.") He said that Zhukov was by no means faultless, however, because at a later stage Zhukov made an attack in the Kharkov sector in spite of being told that his flanks were insecure and he was risking encirclement by powerful German armed forces. Zhukov went ahead, in a bull-headed way, and his forces were encircled and suffered very great losses. He said that Zhukov would never accept responsibility for this, and he quoted an old Russian proverb that Generals win cities and soldiers lose them.<sup>4</sup>

Khrushchev spoke of Hitler's great mistake at Stalingrad. The Russians were strong only in the city and Field Marshal Von Paulus<sup>5</sup> could have crossed the river and captured the Soviet forces and the area by flanking maneuvers. At that time the Soviet lines in the western part of the big encirclement were quite weak and could have been broken through very easily. However, Hitler gave orders that the city be taken frontally since it had become a matter of German honor and prestige.

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<sup>4</sup>In a memorandum for the record, November 27, John S.D. Eisenhower wrote he had seen this Department of State memorandum of a conversation which he attended and had the following to add after this paragraph:

"Apparently on this Kharkov offensive, Khrushchev was still serving in the capacity of a political commander or commissar. Again, he telephoned Moscow and spoke to Zhukov who ordered, in the name of Stalin, that Khrushchev's army make this attack. Khrushchev, at this time, warned that the entire army of 400,000 men might be destroyed. Zhukov ignored this. Forced to make the attack, Khrushchev's army did in fact suffer decimation. As a sequel, some five years later, at an official gathering, Mikoyan, under the influence of alcohol, brought up the subject with Stalin and pointed out humorously that Khrushchev had been right in protesting this costly attack at Kharkov. In his lighthearted mood, Mikoyan failed to see the intense anger on Stalin's face as he rose from his chair. Khrushchev himself saved the moment by saying to Stalin: 'It is all right. We would have lost the 400,000 men had we attacked or defended.' This seemed to satisfy Stalin." (Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, International Series)

Khrushchev's account of the battle of Kharkov is at some variance with his earlier recollection of this episode, which he presented in his "secret speech" to the 20th Party Congress on February 25, 1956. For text of this speech, see *The New York Times*, June 4, 1956.

<sup>5</sup>Field Marshal Friedrich von Paulus.



This was an impossible task for Von Paulus. In addition, he held Von Paulus in place long after he should have broken out to the west, and instead tried to have other forces break through to Von Paulus with forces that were quite inadequate from a long distance away. By the time he permitted Von Paulus to attempt a western movement, the Soviet forces had been strengthened to the point where no escape was possible.

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### 130. Memorandum of Conversation

Camp David, September 26, 1959, 1 p.m.

SUBJECT

Problems and Procedures Paper

PARTICIPANTS

*United States*

The President  
Mr. Akalovsky

*USSR*

Chairman Khrushchev  
Mr. Troyanovsky

The President had the Problems and Procedures Paper (copy attached) read to Mr. Khrushchev in Russian, whereupon Mr. Khrushchev replied that his first impression was that the paper contained nothing substantive and that it was a mere list of problems and possible procedures. It seemed to freeze the existing positions rather than suggest specific steps for solving the existing problems. He said that the only thing this paper provided for was a commitment on the part of the Soviet Union not to sign a peace treaty with Germany. The paper also put the Berlin question in the first place and failed to provide any specific recommendations with regard to disarmament.

The paper seemed to confirm the reports which had been circulated before his arrival in the United States that the United States expected to impress him with its might and wealth to such an extent that the Soviet Union would retreat from its position on Germany and Berlin. Mr. Khrushchev said that he had known about the wealth and the power of the United States even before coming to this country and, therefore, he could not be impressed or intimidated.

The President replied that the purpose of the paper was to set up procedures under which the outstanding issues and problems could be periodically reviewed at the highest level so as to see what progress was being achieved in certain areas. It had been his hope, the President said, that the paper would not freeze the respective positions as Mr. Khrushchev had said, but rather help toward negotiation of reasonable solutions. As to Mr. Khrushchev's reference to the United States' intention to impress him with its power, the President said that Mr. Khrushchev had not been invited here to see our power and might. He said he was sure that Mr. Khrushchev had at his disposal good services and people who were informed on the situation in the United States. The President also pointed out that he himself had never used the word power in his statements. The main point was that there should be no ultimatum by either side that it would take unilateral action.

Mr. Khrushchev replied that the paper in effect was an ultimatum by the American side and that if the procedure suggested in it were to be followed nothing would happen except that the Foreign Ministers would pull out their old papers and restate their old positions. This in turn would lead to the Soviet Union's signing a peace treaty with Germany with all the consequences which this would entail.

The President observed that there was nothing more inadvisable in this situation than to talk about ultimatums. Both sides knew very well what would happen if an ultimatum were to be implemented. The big question was to find out how to move ahead and find reasonable approaches and solutions to the existing problems. For instance last fall the Soviet Union had presented its position with regard to Berlin and explained some of the reasons why it was taking the position. Now it appeared that the Soviet position was that the United States must run away in order to have that problem solved. This of course is unacceptable to the United States and the President said the only thing that the United States wants is to have Soviet assistance in seeking reasonable solutions to all the problems. The President pointed out that he was not asking for the early unification of Germany because he himself did not know how and when this could be brought about. What he did want however was that a solution be found which would satisfy the people in West Berlin, East Germany, West Germany and also all the other powers that had signed the armistice protocol together with the Soviet Union years ago. The intention of the Soviet Union to go ahead on its own had created a new problem and what the United States was trying to do was to find a reasonable solution to this problem without having to run away or without being deprived of the right to talk.

Mr. Khrushchev thanked the President for his words and said that he understood his thinking; yet, he said, the paper just presented was dealing only with procedures and contained no substance. The set-up

provided for in the paper reminded him very much of Adenauer's ideas. If the Soviet Union were to be dragged into this set-up, solutions of problems would be put off for ten or fifteen years or even indefinitely. He said that he saw no reason for supporting Adenauer on this score. As far as Berlin was concerned he said that he wanted to repeat that attempts should be made to find a solution which would not affect the prestige of either side. A time limit should be set up within which the United States and the USSR would apply pressure on the two Germanys and urge them to settle their differences and come to terms. If the two Germanys achieved no progress in their negotiations after the expiration of the time limit, a peace treaty would then be signed by agreement between the USSR and the US.

The President responded by emphasizing that Berlin is not the big question between the USSR and the United States. What created difficulties was the Soviet attitude toward this question which prevented discussion between the two countries in a bigger way and of more far-reaching importance. What worried the United States was the fact that the Soviet Union insisted that the Berlin question had to be settled its way and that then the other problems could be negotiated. The President said that he did not know precisely how the Berlin question could be resolved but that he had hoped to set up a friendly atmosphere in which negotiations could be conducted. The Soviet position on Berlin had created a difficult situation and, therefore, it was necessary to find a reasonable solution.

Mr. Khrushchev said that the United States should understand in what a difficult position the US paper was putting him. The Soviet Union had introduced at the UN far-reaching disarmament proposals and the US was now referring them to a disarmament group and to a series of meetings without even stating its views on those proposals. At the same time the paper committed the Soviet Union not to take any action with regard to Germany or signing a peace treaty. The Soviet Union believed that Berlin was not the primary question and that it should be put in the second place after disarmament.

The President agreed again that Berlin was not the biggest problem between the Soviet Union and the United States but repeated that if the Soviet Union did not act as a partner and intended to take unilateral action, the situation would remain very difficult.

Mr. Khrushchev denied that the Soviet government intended to take unilateral actions and referred to the Foreign Ministers meetings this summer. In the course of those meetings the Soviet Union had expounded its position but the Western side just would not listen to it. It appeared to him that the reason for that was Adenauer's unwillingness to have the German question settled. Mr. Khrushchev professed not to understand why the Western powers needed the occupation regime in

West Berlin and why they didn't want to liquidate it by signing a peace treaty. He repeated that the Soviet Union did not want to take any unilateral action and that he wanted to solve the German problem together with the United States in the friendliest possible manner.

The President observed that the paper had never been intended as a stand on positions; its purpose was simply to indicate how different problems could be studied, both bilaterally and multilaterally in an intelligent way, and then, if agreement could be reached on the establishment of a better basis for negotiations, the respective positions on individual problems could be presented in detail.

Mr. Khrushchev rejoined by saying that there was nothing new in this paper, that it contained nothing about the views of the United States on the points listed in it. The paper said nothing on disarmament or on the relaxation of tension in the world; it contained no provision for relieving our peoples of the arms burden. Thus it gave no hope to the world. Mr. Khrushchev said that it appeared to him that the United States was not yet ready for disarmament—this was very disappointing and if it were true there was nothing left for the peoples of our countries but to continue to bear the burden of the armaments race.

The President stated that Mr. Khrushchev was apparently making a mistake if he thought that the United States hesitated to present its position. The United States did not hesitate to explain its position as fully as possible on such questions as disarmament, propaganda, the ideological differences between our two systems, but such positions must be negotiated. The purpose of the paper was to provide for a procedure under which negotiations could be conducted and under which the Heads of State could periodically review their status.

Mr. Khrushchev replied that this was an old method and that something new was needed. Under this US plan many questions would arise: such questions as that of the basis for the work of the various conferences provided for in the paper, their membership, the question of parity, etc. In other words this plan was no improvement as against the situation that had existed so far. Mr. Khrushchev said that he was sorry that he did not understand this scheme or the principles underlying it, but that his impression was that it did not provide for anything new. The scheme, he said, was devised to bind the Soviet government and to permit the United States to conduct its own policy from a position of strength. The Soviet Union found such a policy unpleasant and outdated. Mr. Khrushchev then continued by saying that he was pleased with the reception accorded him in the United States and with his meetings with the President. Yet, while he and the President seemed to be in agreement when talking in general terms, the old positions taken at the Foreign Ministers conferences reappeared as soon as they came down to

specifics. This was very disappointing and he was very sorry that the situation was not different.

The President then suggested that the conversation be interrupted and that Chairman Khrushchev and he go to lunch. He said that he wanted to add only one thought—that he was willing to make as many procedural concessions as necessary if the Chairman could suggest a better method for negotiations. Yet there was one point which he had to stress. He said that he would have to resign if ever he accepted a time limit after which the United States would have to withdraw from Berlin. Such a proposition would never be accepted by the American people. What was necessary was to negotiate such a plan as would be acceptable not only to the United States and the USSR but also to Europe as a whole. The President emphasized very strongly that he just could not agree to be forced out of Berlin and then sit down and discuss other problems.

Mr. Khrushchev stated he could not understand why the question was put in this plane. He said that he personally and the Soviet Union wanted peace and it was for this reason that the Soviet Union wanted a peace treaty with Germany. Since a peace treaty with Germany would not be signed for warlike purposes, he could not understand why it would disturb the American people. Neither he personally nor the Soviet people could understand why a peace treaty was regarded by the American people as a threat to peace. As far as the President's reference to his being forced out of Berlin was concerned, Mr. Khrushchev said that this was not the Soviet Union's intention. It seemed to him that agreement could be reached on the problem of disarmament and also on working out a document on Berlin without setting a specific time limit but which could not be interpreted as meaning that the occupation regime would be perpetuated. The United States seemed to object to the Soviet Union's insisting on a specific date while the Soviet Union thought that the United States wanted to perpetuate the occupation regime—therefore perhaps the two sides could try to avoid both extremes and attempt to work out a document which would neither set a definite time limit nor be formulated in such a way as could mean that a perpetuation of the occupation regime was endorsed. Mr. Khrushchev said that he understood the President's concerns and his difficulties but that he also hoped that the President understood his own situation. He said that the Soviet Union wanted a peace treaty with Germany and that the United States was threatening it indirectly both in press reports, which spoke of the possibility of a conflict over Berlin, and in statements by American generals who had spoken about sending their tanks to break through to Berlin. Mr. Khrushchev then again referred to Chancellor Adenauer and said that it was unnatural for the United States to support Adenauer's policy against a peace treaty, because after all the United

States had acted correctly when it refused to listen to Stalin and his associates and signed a peace treaty with Japan.

The President replied that no peace treaty was under discussion here. In recapitulating the situation, the President said that he understood that in view of the fact that the United States did not want to perpetuate the occupation regime and that the Soviet Union did not want to try to force us out of Berlin, both sides would try to negotiate and see how soon the differences on this score could be resolved, differences which the Soviet Union had been calling residues of war. If on this basis progress could be reached, then other, broader areas could be broached and thus a brighter future for humanity could be secured. The President said he understood that Chairman Khrushchev did not like the American paper; therefore he suggested that Mr. Khrushchev's staff prepare a short paper presenting the Soviet approach in a concise manner so that it could be discussed, if not tonight, then perhaps tomorrow morning.

Mr. Khrushchev replied that he didn't see much point in putting out a paper because a reshuffling of subject matters or points would not change the general situation. As he put it, the result of an addition does not change if the components change place. However, he did not clearly reject the President's suggestion, but only expressed doubt as to its usefulness. The conversation ended at 1:45 p.m. whereupon lunch was served.

**[Attachment]<sup>1</sup>**

Camp David, September 26, 1959.

The major problems between the US and the USSR and the principal irritants to the relationship between the two seems to be:

1. Berlin and Germany.
2. Disarmament, including the current Nuclear Test negotiations.
3. Propaganda and the lack of adequate contact and exchange of persons and ideas.
4. Ideological and other conflicts involving third countries.

These problems are interrelated and will not be resolved at once. The most promising avenue for progress seems to be to set up

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<sup>1</sup> No classification marking.

procedures to assure a continuous search for solutions through peaceful negotiation. The US, the USSR, the UK and France have responsibility in most of these matters. It would seem possible to set up permanent consultative machinery between these powers, with other interested powers brought in as required, as follows:

1. A conference of Foreign Ministers to review progress every six months;
2. A meeting of Heads of Government with Foreign Ministers similarly to review progress every year;
3. Provision for over-all review at the Heads of Government level after five years;
4. Special machinery, either multilateral or bilateral as appropriate, can be set up for more extensive study of these problems. This could be done on an ad hoc basis or on a more formalized basis as in the case of the Nuclear Test Conference or of the Ten Power Disarmament Group.

It would be made clear in a manner acceptable to the Heads of Government that all of the above presupposes that no unilateral action will be taken at any time which would vitiate the operation of this process of peaceful negotiation.

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### 131. Memorandum of Conversation

Camp David, September 26, 1959.

SUBJECT

American Exhibit in Moscow

PARTICIPANTS

The President	Chairman Khrushchev
The Vice President	Foreign Minister Gromyko
Secretary Herter	Ambassador Menshikov
Ambassador Lodge	Mr. Sobolev
Secretary Anderson	Mr. Soldatov
Ambassador Thompson	Mr. Troyanovski
Dr. Kistiakowsky	Mr. Zhukov
Mr. McCone	Mr. Yemelyanov
Mr. Akalovsky	

In the course of the general conversation during the luncheon Mr. Khrushchev again referred to the attempt by the United States to

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1475. Secret. Drafted by Akalovsky and approved in the White House on November 10. The source text indicates the conversation was held during lunch.

impress the Soviet people with gadgets displayed at the Moscow exhibit. He repeated his statement previously made to Ambassador Lodge and others during the tour of the United States, that this attempt to lure the Soviet people had completely failed. He then again ridiculed the so-called Miracle Kitchen at the exhibit and recalled his remarks on this matter which he made to Mr. Nixon during his visit to Moscow.<sup>1</sup>

The Vice President pointed out that during his tour of the exhibit with Mr. Khrushchev he had emphasized that the Miracle Kitchen was only a demonstration of something that might be used in the future and that there was no attempt on the part of the United States to represent that kitchen as something that was already part of American life.

Ambassador Thompson stated that, although the kitchen exhibit in itself may have been somewhat on the silly side, the same exhibit had been shown all over the United States as merely a glimpse into the future and that there was no intention whatsoever to mislead the Soviet public into believing that the Miracle Kitchen was already in every household in the United States.

Mr. Khrushchev rejoined by saying, in a rather irritated and excited manner, that the Soviet people could not be impressed with such things as displayed at the American exhibit in Moscow, that they had a high standard of living of their own, and that any attempt to lure them toward capitalism would fail.

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<sup>1</sup> See Document 92.



### 132. Memorandum of Conversation

Camp David, September 27, 1959, 9:35 a.m.

#### PARTICIPANTS

US

Under Secretary Dillon  
Mr. Akalovsky

USSR

Chairman Khrushchev  
Mr. Gromyko  
Mr. Menshikov  
Mr. Soldatov  
Mr. Troyanovsky

Mr. Khrushchev opened the conversation by saying that it was up to the United States to open or close the country for trade with the Soviet Union.

The Under Secretary replied that there were possibilities considerably to expand the trade between the USSR and the United States. However, the question was what the USSR wanted to buy. As the Chairman had said the other night,<sup>1</sup> the USSR seemed to be interested in peaceful trade. Mr. Dillon said that he could state that all such commodities were available, including such commodities as machinery and equipment for the manufacture of shoes and synthetic fabrics. He said that he had looked at the records and that at least five different processes in the synthetic textile field had been made available to the Soviet Union during the past year.

Mr. Khrushchev responded rather violently, stating that this was not a platform for discussion. What he was interested in was abolition of discriminatory practices directed against the Soviet Union. He said that he was not prepared to discuss any specifics; this was something to be discussed by his Minister of Trade, who was not accompanying him on this trip. He then said that he had not come to the United States to learn how to make shoes or sausage, but rather to discuss the general principles of trade between the USSR and the US. The Soviet Union would welcome it if the United States were to rescind its discriminatory practices in trade with the USSR. On the other hand, if the United States should refuse to do so, this would mean that it wants a continuation of the cold war, which, although regrettable, would not disturb the USSR—the Russian spirit, he said, was strong and would hold out even in that situation. Any offer to the USSR of such items as shoe lasts, etc., was insulting to the people of the Soviet Union. They knew how to make

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1475. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Akalovsky and approved by Dillon on September 24.

<sup>1</sup> Presumably during the dinner on September 24; see Document 127.

shoes, perhaps even better than the Americans. Mr. K then invited the Under Secretary to look at his shoes and see that for himself.

The Under Secretary replied that there were two problems involved in this situation, that of buying and that of selling. As far as buying by the Soviet Union was concerned, practically the whole U.S. market was open to the USSR except less than 10% covering commodities of strategic and military importance. The Chairman had said that the USSR was interested in peaceful trade; the United States was also interested in such trade. Mr. Dillon then said that he didn't intend to discuss specifics either. Details could be discussed between the U.S. Department of Commerce and the Soviet specialists who might come here for that purpose.

Mr. K then again emphasized that what he wanted was the abolishment of discrimination against the USSR. He said that he was not talking of trade as such but rather of a principle, of the Soviet Union's right to trade. U.S. companies would sell what they wanted to sell and the Soviet Union would buy what it wanted to buy. The main thing was that there be the right to do so.

The Under Secretary replied that the Soviet Union already had the right to purchase things it wanted. As to the selling situation, it was true that some seven or eight years ago the United States Congress had passed a law which had frozen the level of duties and had thus prevented the extension to the USSR of the benefits granted to the most favored nations.<sup>2</sup> A change in that law, Mr. Dillon said, was not possible without an action on the part of the Congress; this action depended on the state of public opinion in this country and on the general state of the relations between the U.S. and the USSR.

Mr. K interjected that it was necessary to make a beginning somewhere. The Under Secretary agreed with this remark and then said that there was another restriction on the trade with the USSR, which was the prohibition of the import of certain types of furs from the USSR.<sup>3</sup> This question was now under study and, if the conditions in Congress were favorable, a revision of this situation would be sought as a test for future liberalization of trade regulations applied to the USSR.

Mr. K said that this would be a good thing to do.

The Under Secretary said that the Executive Branch would not want to ask Congress to take action on this situation if it was clear that the Congress would reject such a request. Yet, there was a chance of having this action taken perhaps during the next session of Congress. Mr.

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<sup>2</sup> Reference is to the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951; see footnote 2, Document 64.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 10, Document 65.

Dillon agreed with Mr. K that the whole question of trade was more of a political nature than economic. It was also a question of public relations. Studies conducted by the U.S. Government indicated that there was no room for a tremendous increase in trade with the Soviet Union because the commodities which the USSR had in excess were not needed by the United States;<sup>4</sup> those commodities were produced in the United States or were obtained from other countries such as India, Canada, etc. Therefore, the growth of trade with the USSR would be gradual. However, it was important to create a better atmosphere. The Under Secretary then went on to say that there was one thing which the Soviet Union could do and which would contribute greatly to a normalization of the situation. He said that, as Mr. K undoubtedly knew, the trade in the United States was conducted by private companies. Many companies, including, for example, chemical companies were afraid to trade with the USSR because they felt that they had no solid protection of their patents or royalties. For that reason an agreement on the protection of patent rights, including an agreement on such a related subject as copyrights, would help our private business and give it some confidence. The question of protection of these rights, Mr. Dillon said, was one of the problems most frequently mentioned by our private businessmen when they come to the Department of Commerce.

Mr. K said that this question was one that had to be decided between the USSR and the individual companies concerned. He said that if the USSR bought something, it would pay for it, just as had been the case in the USSR's dealings with du Pont. If the U.S. were to rescind its discriminatory restrictions then a new deal with du Pont would be possible.

The Under Secretary pointed out that the Soviet Union, on the basis of the reports received from its Embassy in Washington, was probably fully aware that at its conventions the U.S. chemical industry had passed resolutions indicating its apprehensions with regard to trade with the Soviet Union and its reluctance to engage in such trade until and unless its patent rights are fully protected.<sup>5</sup> Mr. Dillon said that perhaps the Chairman himself had not seen his Embassy's reports on this subject, but he should know that this was the situation.

Mr. K reiterated that this was a specific question to be decided by the two sides at the time when contracts were negotiated. He then again

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<sup>4</sup> One study mentioning the small market for Soviet goods in the United States was Intelligence Report No. 7749, "Khrushchev's Proposals for an Expansion of US-Soviet Trade," prepared by the Division of Research and Analysis for USSR and Eastern Europe, Office of Intelligence Research and Analysis, June 27. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, OSS-INR Reports)

<sup>5</sup> Not further identified.

stated that the whole problem of trade was more political than economic. He noted that some people in the United States wanted the Soviet Union to buy chemical products from them; this was a totally unrealistic approach. The Soviet Union was a powerful nation capable of manufacturing any equipment by itself and of producing all the things it needed. Therefore, if the United States did not want to sell equipment to the USSR, the latter could manufacture the necessary equipment itself or buy it from other countries as it had already done. The Soviet people did not live on a deserted island and were not in a desperate situation. Some people still did not realize that the Soviet Union was a grown up nation and that it could build even such things as the United States had not yet been able to produce. The United States' approach was high-handed and amounted to a policy of Diktat and of cold war. This policy, Mr. K said, had failed in the political field and it would also fail in the economic field. The Soviet Union was a strong nation and it could hold out. He then stated that the Soviet Union did want to trade with the U.S. but that such trade would have to be on the basis of equality and without injury to the national pride of the Soviet people. Any attempt to impose certain conditions on the Soviet Union would fail. Any attempt to offer the Soviet Union such items as shoe lasts was offensive to the Soviet Union and would not constitute a basis for discussion.

The Under Secretary replied that the only reason he had mentioned machinery for the manufacture of shoes was that this item, as he recalled, was on one of the lists of items submitted by the Soviet Union.

Mr. K then very strongly emphasized that the United States should not injure the national pride of the Soviet people and their sensitivity.

The Under Secretary, reverting to the question of patents, stated that this question could be dealt with between the companies and the USSR when the situation arose. Yet there was another step that the USSR could take in order to facilitate a revision of laws regulating such situations as fur import or duties. He said that Ambassador Lodge had told him that the question of Soviet lend-lease obligations had been briefly mentioned in a conversation between him and the Chairman and that the Chairman had expressed agreement to have negotiations started in order to settle this problem.<sup>6</sup> A settlement of this problem could help create a more favorable public opinion and a more favorable climate in Congress, which in turn could help abolish the existing restrictions with regard to trade with the USSR. The Under Secretary emphasized that there was no direct connection between the two problems but that,

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<sup>6</sup> Khrushchev's remarks agreeing to negotiations on the lend-lease problem are contained in two memoranda of conversation with Lodge during their visit to Wall Street and the Empire State Building on September 18. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1473)

nevertheless, a settlement of the lend-lease obligations could help create a better atmosphere in Congress and thus be conducive to the abolishment of restrictions.

Mr. K confirmed the fact that he had had this conversation with Ambassador Lodge and then said that, as Mr. Mikoyan had stated earlier,<sup>7</sup> the Soviet Union was prepared to discuss this problem with a view to settling. However, the Soviet Union's contribution in blood during the last war should be taken into account during such discussions. Mr. K said that he was positive that the United States would obtain little economic advantage as a result of the lend-lease problem being settled, because it spent more money for propaganda than it would receive from the Soviet Union on the basis of the latter's lend-lease obligations. Yet he was aware of the fact that a settlement of this problem would constitute a moral satisfaction for the United States and would help create a better atmosphere in Congress. He said that he was also aware of the fact that this problem was used by elements unfavorably inclined toward the USSR to create friction between the two countries. Mr. K then continued by saying that in this matter, too, there should be no discrimination against the USSR; the U.S. should approach this problem in the same manner as it did with regard to other countries such as England, etc. Any discriminatory approach in this matter with regard to the Soviet Union would hurt the pride of the Soviet people because their contribution in the last war had been the greatest. There was another point, Mr. K said, which he wanted to mention and which indicated that the U.S. would not obtain any economic advantage from a settlement of the lend-lease obligations. He said that in a conversation he had had with the President, the latter had remarked that while in 1948 the U.S. military appropriations amounted to 12 billion dollars, now they were 50 billion dollars.<sup>8</sup> The difference between the two figures showed how insignificant the sum derived from a lend-lease settlement would be. The lend-lease problem was, as a matter of fact, so insignificant from the economic point of view that insistence on its settlement could be compared to catching fleas in a dog's hair. Nevertheless the Soviet Union would be willing to appoint representatives to start negotiations on this subject.

The Under Secretary replied that this would be very helpful and suggested that contacts be established through diplomatic channels with a view to starting negotiations.

At this point, Mr. Gromyko whispered something in Mr. K's ear, whereupon Mr. K stated that the question of lend-lease had bearing on

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<sup>7</sup> See Document 65.

<sup>8</sup> The President's remark has not been further identified.

the question of credits. Yet, he said, this matter should be discussed on the ministerial level.

The Under Secretary agreed that the question of lend-lease had bearing on the problem of credits because the latter were regulated by Congress so that a settlement of lend-lease would be very helpful.

Mr. K. then said that the fact that there was little trade between the United States and the USSR was not a natural situation but rather an artificial one. He said that he did not want to impose his views on Mr. Dillon but that, nevertheless, he wanted to state it. If the United States should abolish discrimination, he continued, trade of course would not jump immediately because it was in a frozen state now; it had to be warmed up just like a plane had to warm up its engines one by one before it could take off. Trade was even more complicated than an aircraft and, therefore, it would be only natural if it did not jump upward immediately. He then said that assuming that the happy day would come when a disarmament agreement would be concluded, the U.S. industry would then have to be reconverted to peaceful production. This would be useful for both the USSR and the United States. The USSR would immediately place big orders, with credits, of course, because it could not pay for everything at once, while the United States would benefit from such orders by having full employment in the country and by having a peaceful production compensating for the production of armaments. Mr. K said that he wanted to make one point very clear: credits were not a gesture of mercy and sometimes he who gave credit was more interested in it than he who obtained it. But, he remarked, this was something for the United States to decide. His own considered view was that credits would be more beneficial to the United States, both politically and economically, than to the USSR, especially so since the United States appeared to be the only country unwilling to extend credit to the USSR. Other countries had already granted credit to the Soviet Union; true, that credit had been private, but the day would come when the respective governments would also grant government credit. He said that he wanted to repeat that the Soviet Union was not begging for credits—its pride would not allow it to do so. It would rather starve than beg, but then, of course, the future prospects for the Soviet Union were not those of starvation but rather of overweight. The only thing that had prompted him to raise the question of credits was common sense. Furthermore, various private companies, such as Ford, General Motors and others had granted credit to the Soviet Union in the past. Now if Mr. Dillon were to help in this respect his reputation as being a conservative and aggressive man would disappear. Some day, when the proletariats took over, Mr. K remarked facetiously, he would put in a good word for Mr. Dillon and say that he had helped the proletariat. The same thing would apply with regard to Mr. Lodge. Mr. K then went on to say that

both Mr. Gromyko and himself thought that Mr. Dillon looked very much like Dimshets, the Soviet engineer who had built an iron and steel plant in India. Dimshets was one of the best Soviet engineers, and he, Mr. K, respected him very much.

The Under Secretary expressed his appreciation of the explanation by Mr. K of his basic view on trade policy. This explanation helped the United States understand the situation. As to the question of credits, they were regulated by a law passed in 1935,<sup>9</sup> a law which had not been directed against the USSR. This law would have to be changed to make the granting of credits to the USSR possible. As to the credits by private companies referred to by Mr. K, they had been granted before 1935. A better atmosphere in the relations between the two countries now would help with regard to the granting of credits by private firms.

Mr. K said that he had nothing to add because American laws were an internal matter of the US. The Soviet Union could have its views on American legislation, it could express its opinion as to whether certain laws were sensible or not, but it was up to the United States to decide what to do. Mr. K then said that tomorrow, Monday, at 4:00 p.m. he was going to speak at the rally in Moscow and asked Mr. Dillon whether he could tell his people that this conversation gave hope that trade between the USSR and the US might be developed and that the existing discrimination practices would be rescinded. He added that he realized that Mr. Dillon could not change laws.

The Under Secretary replied that, as he had pointed out before, the problem here depended upon Congress and, in the last analysis, on public opinion. Thus, as tensions existing between the two countries were alleviated, if they were, this would affect the development of trade and could lead to a lessening of special restrictive laws.

Mr. K stated that he would repeat Mr. Dillon's remarks word for word at the rally tomorrow.

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<sup>9</sup> Reference presumably is to the Johnson Act, enacted in 1934, not 1935. See footnote 4, Document 65.

## 133. Memorandum of Conversation

Camp David, September 26 and 27, 1959.

## SUBJECT

Nuclear Exchange; Communist China

## PARTICIPANTS

US

The President  
 The Secretary of State  
 Mr. Merchant  
 Ambassador Thompson  
 Mr. Kohler  
 Mr. Akalovsky

USSR

Chairman Khrushchev  
 Mr. Gromyko  
 Mr. Soldatov  
 Mr. Troyanovsky

*September 26:*

After his return from taking Mr. Khrushchev to his Gettysburg farm, the President said that Mr. Khrushchev had told him that they were cutting way back on their atomic power plant program on grounds that it was too expensive.

Mr. Khrushchev also told the President that the Soviets were making a number of atomic powered submarines, some of which were equipped with missiles. He also stated that the engines installed in the submarines were superior to ours.

*September 27, approximately 10:15 a.m.*

Mr. Khrushchev, referring to the conversation he had just had with Mr. Dillon,<sup>1</sup> said that he could report to the President that the temperature was neither cold nor hot, i.e., the situation as he saw it was neither fish nor fowl.

The President jokingly remarked that in America they also say, "nor red herring". He then said that he had just been in church and that his preacher had preached both for Mr. Khrushchev and himself.

The President then referred to the Protocol signed between Mr. McCone and Mr. Yemelyanov regarding possible contacts in the field of atomic energy.<sup>2</sup> He said that he had only seen the protocol but had not

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1475. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Akalovsky, Merchant, and Kohler and approved in the White House on October 12.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 132.

<sup>2</sup> The reference is to a memorandum of cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States on the reciprocal exchange of unclassified information on peaceful uses of atomic energy and nuclear physics research, which McCone and Yemelyanov signed in Washington on November 24. For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 28, 1959, pp. 958-959.



read it. His understanding was that the brief protocol was addressed to both the Chairman and him and that it contained recommendations with regard to certain actions to be taken in that field. He believed that there was no point in making that document public until both Mr. K and himself had studied it. Later, through diplomatic channels, agreement could be reached as to the publication of that document.

Mr. K replied that he had not seen the document either. However, he pointed out that he had approved in advance the fields of contacts in that area and that Mr. Yemelyanov had full authority from him in dealing with Mr. McCone. In general, he said, the Soviet Union was prepared to start with small steps first and then expand contacts in the field of atomic energy.

The President said that the U.S. was also prepared to do so.

Mr. K said he knew about this and observed that he was familiar with the President's desires in this field. It was strange, he remarked smilingly, to see the President, a military man, be so peaceful. He then recalled a statement by Mr. Macmillan in which the latter had said that Mr. K was afraid of war more than anyone else.<sup>3</sup> At that time, Mr. K continued, he wanted to reply to this statement rather sharply but he changed his mind. The point was, he said, the Soviet Union was not afraid of war but still wanted to prevent it. Mr. Macmillan had made that statement before his visit to the USSR and he had not been reminded of it during his visit there.<sup>4</sup>

The President said that, as far as he was concerned, he was afraid of nuclear war and that to his mind everyone should be. During the last war, he said, he may have had moments of exhilaration in commanding huge armies, but now war has become nothing more than a struggle for survival. The President then inquired whether Mr. K wanted to discuss any specific points.

Mr. K replied that he did, namely, the question of an agreement on disarmament.

The President observed that he agreed that this point be placed first on any agenda that might be developed for future negotiations, because this was the most important question.

At this point the Secretary suggested to the President that he discuss, perhaps privately, the procedures for a communiqué on their talks.

The President said that he had been told at Gettysburg about the hundreds of correspondents down there, including not only Americans and Russians but British, French and many others. This indicated the

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<sup>3</sup> Not further identified.

<sup>4</sup> Macmillan made an official visit to the Soviet Union February 21–March 3.

great world interest in these talks he and the Chairman were having. Despite the fact that everyone had been told that no negotiations would take place, he thought it might be desirable that he and Mr. Khrushchev have another private talk.

Mr. Khrushchev nodded assent to the President's statement, but said he first wanted to mention another subject. He said he had no brief to speak on behalf of the Chinese Government and that, even if such authority had been offered, he would not have taken the responsibility on himself. However, he would be visiting China in the near future and he would not want to be in the position of saying he had lost the Chinese needle in a haystack. He would like, therefore, to inquire about U.S. policy toward the Chinese Government and what the future course of our policy might be.

The President replied that the Chinese Communists by their own actions have made it practically impossible for us to talk with them except in a very sketchy way through the occasional ambassadorial talks. These had taken place first in Geneva and now were continuing in Warsaw but related mainly to such questions as that of the American personnel imprisoned or detained in Communist China. The Chinese Communists are engaged in aggressive actions and have defied the United Nations. Until they purged themselves, there was not much prospect of any change in our position. In fact, there was not much we could do in the circumstances. We were basically in a position of waiting.

Secretary Herter interjected that the Chinese Communists were still threatening to use force against Taiwan and the islands in the Formosa Straits. They were still holding five American prisoners and were refusing to release them, although they had promised to do so in writing.<sup>5</sup> Communist China was still an outlaw as far as the United Nations was concerned because of its aggression in Korea.

Mr. Khrushchev replied that the Soviets regard it as too bad that the United States takes the position that it does with regard to the Chinese Communist Government and believes that this position does not contribute to a good overall international atmosphere. With respect to the question of the Americans detained in China, Mr. Khrushchev said he knew nothing about this and he could not comment on the subject. However, when he goes to Peiping in the near future he thought he might ask the Chinese leadership about the question. With respect to the question of Taiwan, the Soviets agree with the Chinese Communists. Taiwan is a province of China and what goes on with respect to the

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<sup>5</sup> Reference is to the agreed announcement issued by the Ambassadors of the United States and the People's Republic of China in Geneva on September 10, 1955.

island is part of the process of the Chinese revolution and the Soviet Union fully understands China's aspirations in that respect. The United States is to blame for the fact that the Chinese Communists are not in the United Nations. In opposing the Chinese Communists, the United States has taken advantage of its temporary majority in the United Nations and has pursued a policy which is in fact detrimental to the United Nations. It would be better if the United States would do away with all this and thus contribute to the general peace. He said the President should realize that if some islands were detached from the United States by a mutinous general and the USSR should support that general, the United States would not like it. Taiwan is a part of China and Chiang Kai-shek is comparable to Kerensky, though the latter has no territory at the moment. Essentially, however, the United States concluding a treaty with Chiang is like the United States concluding a treaty with Kerensky. He understood, however, that Kerensky had recently married a rich American lady, so maybe Kerensky would not be interested and would not now need U.S. Government support.

The Secretary said he wanted to stress that the Chairman had made an important statement in saying that the USSR supported the Chinese Communist use of force against Taiwan.

Mr. Khrushchev said he believed that the Chinese Communists have the right to liberate Taiwan from a Chinese general who has mutinied against the Government. In that respect the Soviet Union supports Communist China.

The President said that it was clear that our views were so divergent on this subject that there was really no point in discussing the question in detail. However, if his memory served him right, in the later stages of World War II, the United States, the USSR and Britain had all agreed to support Chiang, who had fought the Japanese so valiantly during the entire war, as the legitimate Government of China. Since then the Soviet position had become different. It was the belief of the United States that there had been a great cataclysm in China and as a result, Chiang Kai-shek had been driven to Formosa. He could not be considered a mutinous general. The President would repeat that our positions were now diametrically opposed and that there would appear to be no use in discussing the question further.

Mr. Khrushchev replied that he agreed that there was not much point in further discussion of this question. It was true that during the war the Soviet Government had had good relations with Chiang. General Chuikov,<sup>6</sup> who later was the famous defender of Stalingrad, had been a military adviser to Chiang. In fact, many other Russian generals

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<sup>6</sup> Vasili Ivanovich Chuikov.

also advised Chiang. However, a revolution is a revolution. It turns everything upside down. If one could suppose that some Soviet general should have mutinied, seized Sakhalin and concluded a treaty of support with the United States, the Soviet Government would have had to hit him and hit him hard. In the reverse case, the United States would take the same action if one of our generals seized an island and secured Soviet support. Therefore, he could not understand why Communist China should act differently. However, he agreed the question did not seem ripe for discussion.

The President replied that he did not agree with the comparison which the Chairman had made. These were not valid analogies. President Chiang Kai-shek headed the legitimate Government of China. It was true that he had been defeated on the mainland but he had decided to hang on where he could, that is, on Taiwan. In no way could he be compared to a mutineer.

Mr. Khrushchev replied that there could not be two legal governments in one country. The question arises as to which will be the legitimate government in China—Formosa or Peiping. The only possible answer to this question is Peiping, as the government established in the Chinese capital. He said the President prefers Chiang. This was a matter of taste. He prefers Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai.<sup>7</sup>

The President replied that it was not a matter of taste. The U.S. has obligations toward the Government of the Republic of China which it respects and intends to fulfill.

Mr. Khrushchev retorted that these were obligations which we took on ourselves voluntarily. They were not given to us by an act of God. Therefore, they could be changed. Furthermore, the Soviet Union also had undertaken certain obligations.

The President said he certainly did not claim perfection with respect to the many decisions he was called upon to make. He simply sought to do the right thing.

Mr. Khrushchev said that he had to respect the President's statement. He merely would point out that he considered that there was a lack of consistency in our policy. The President said that if the two German states remained, they would be an indefinite hot bed of conflict. If this statement was true with respect to Germany, then it was true with respect to China, too. In fact, it was more serious with respect to China because in Germany the two states had respectively 18,000,000 and 50,000,000 inhabitants. In China the Chinese Communists had 650,000,000 to 7-9,000,000 on Taiwan.

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<sup>7</sup> Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Communist Party of the People's Republic of China; Chou En-lai, Prime Minister of the People's Republic of China.

The President agreed that it was possible to make such a comparison. However, he commented that human affairs got very badly tangled at times and that we would simply have to try to straighten them out.

Mr. Khrushchev replied that he realized this but that he had just wanted to point out the inconsistency of our policy. He then quoted a Russian proverb which turned out to be untranslatable as related to the conversation, to the effect that “policy is like a wagon tongue between two horses”.

The President said he wanted to add that while he admitted the comparison between the German and Chinese situations, he wished to point out that the U.S. seeks peaceful settlements in both instances.

The Secretary added also in Korea and Viet Nam.

Mr. Khrushchev said that he did not insist on a military solution in China. There could be a peaceful settlement, he continued, if the U.S. did not give military support to Chiang. In turn, he continued, the USSR also gave military aid to the Chinese Communists. Chiang was our ally, Mao was their ally. However, he agreed that this subject had been exhausted.

The President commented that it would remain a problem for some time.

Mr. Khrushchev agreed with this, saying he meant that the subject had been exhausted only insofar as the present exchange of views was concerned.

The President then referred to the suggestion that he and the Chairman have a private talk as to whether they wanted to say anything at the conclusion of their talks. They could then turn over to their aides the necessary drafting.

Thereupon the President and Chairman Khrushchev entered private discussions at approximately 11:45 a.m.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup>The memorandum of this conversation is printed in vol. IX, Document 14.

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### 134. Memorandum of Conversation

Camp David, September 27, 1959, 1-1:45 p.m.

#### SUBJECT

Quality of American Chocolates; Van Cliburn

#### PARTICIPANTS

The President

Ambassador Lodge

Ambassador Thompson

General Goodpaster

Mr. Akalovsky

Chairman Khrushchev

Ambassador Menshikov

Mr. Soldatov

Mr. Troyanovski

At lunch on the last day of Mr. Khrushchev's visit to Camp David the Secretary, Mr. Gromyko and others were working on the communiqué and as the time was short the rest of the party proceeded to eat lunch without them.

There was little discussion of substantive matters. Mr. Khrushchev produced a box of chocolates which he said had been given to him by Van Cliburn with the request that he and the President eat them together. These were passed around the table and Mr. Khrushchev remarked about the high quality of American chocolates. Ambassador Menshikov said in Russian that Russian chocolates were better. Mr. Khrushchev turned to the interpreter and said "Don't translate that remark." Then, having noted that I had heard it and that the President was waiting for a translation, he explained what Ambassador Menshikov had said and said he had asked the translator not to translate the remark because it was so tactless. Ambassador Menshikov's only reaction was to say rather sourly that at least he personally preferred Soviet chocolates.

With respect to Van Cliburn, Mr. Khrushchev said either on this or an earlier occasion that Van Cliburn had expressed disappointment that he had not been able to play for Mr. Khrushchev on the White House piano which he said was possibly the best instrument in the world. The President said he had not realized that the White House piano was so special. Mr. Khrushchev went on to remark about the great success which Van Cliburn had had in the Soviet Union. It was not quite clear to me whether Mr. Khrushchev was fully aware of Van Cliburn's presumptuousness in attempting to needle the President through him about failure to use him to entertain Mr. Khrushchev.

### 135. Editorial Note

On September 28, President Eisenhower held a press conference on the recent Khrushchev visit; see footnote 8, Document 128. Eisenhower also informed the principal U.S. allies on his talks with Khrushchev. In a letter dated September 28, Eisenhower wrote West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer; see volume IX, Document 18. Copies of similar letters which Eisenhower sent to British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, dated September 29, and to French President Charles de Gaulle, dated September 30, are in Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. A seven-page memorandum summarizing the Eisenhower–Khrushchev talks at Camp David was transmitted separately to Adenauer, Macmillan, and de Gaulle on September 30. A copy is *ibid.* Numerous memoranda of conversation between Department of State officials and foreign diplomats in Washington as well as between U.S. Ambassadors and foreign leaders at various posts abroad from September 28 to 30, in which foreign governments were briefed on the Khrushchev visit, are *ibid.*, Central File 033.6111.

Eisenhower also wanted to follow through on the many issues discussed with Khrushchev. On September 29, he wrote a letter to Secretary of State Herter asking him to “keep on the ball with respect to all the subjects we have considered in our recent conferences,” particularly those pertaining to the Khrushchev conversations. In this regard, the President mentioned exchanges on peaceful uses of atomic energy, trade in general, broadening of other kinds of contacts, and jamming of broadcasts to the Soviet Union, and suggested using Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson, rather than Soviet Ambassador Menshikov, as the diplomatic channel for further discussions. (*Ibid.*, 711.11–EI/9–2959) In his reply, dated October 1, which was initialed by Eisenhower, Herter agreed with the President’s suggestions. He noted “the particular urgency you attach to the question of VOA broadcasts and I will get to work immediately with George Allen on this.” He also wrote that he had asked Livingston T. Merchant, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, to coordinate this activity, “and we will hope to have status reports for you both as specific items come up for your approval, and at regular intervals on the totality of the subjects involved.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series)

Regarding Herter’s subsequent discussions within the government on the issue of Voice of America broadcasts and the exchange agreement signed in Moscow on November 21 by Ambassador Thompson and Soviet Chairman for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries Zhukov, see Part 2, Document 22.

A report on the Khrushchev visit is printed as Document 136. Minutes of the Cabinet meeting on November 6 on the implications of his visit for future U.S.-Soviet relations is printed as Document 137.

### 136. Report on the Khrushchev Visit

KHV/R-1

Washington, undated.

[Here follows a three-page summary of arrangements, itinerary, and the general course of Khrushchev's visit to the United States.]

#### *Khrushchev's Behavior and General Attitude*

From the outset of his trip, Khrushchev made it clear that while he intended to praise the Soviet system, forecast the future "peaceful" victory of communism on a world-wide scale, and on occasion criticize the United States (for trade discrimination, "intervention" in Soviet Russia after the revolution, etc.), he would tolerate no questions or statements made in his presence which he considered "provocative," i.e., directly or indirectly critical of himself, the USSR, or communism in general. Thus, at his first meeting with President Eisenhower he complained of Vice President Nixon's September 14 speech before the American Dental Association<sup>1</sup> in which the Vice President stated that Khrushchev's visit would give Americans the opportunity to answer Khrushchev "courteously but as effectively and as articulately as possible" on major issues. Similarly, when at Khrushchev's appearance at the National Press Club on September 16 (about which, on the basis of previous experience by Mikoyan and Kozlov,<sup>2</sup> he may have had misgivings) the first

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 81, CF 1475A. Confidential. Attached to the source text is a memorandum from Kohler to Secretary Herter, October 29, which noted that this report was "prepared by the U.S. official party and others in the Department concerned with the visit." Kohler also noted: "Annexes to the report are being issued separately in three series—factual, analytical and documentary. Of these, the following contain analyses supporting the principal conclusions reached in the present report: 1) Khrushchev's view of the United States; 2) the Soviet correlation of forces thesis; 3) Khrushchev's treatment of the disarmament issue; and 4) Khrushchev's treatment of the issues of Berlin and Germany."

The factual and analytical annexes are attached to the source text but not printed. The documentary annexes are *ibid.*, CF 1475B.

<sup>1</sup> See footnote 2, Document 109.

<sup>2</sup> Mikoyan's appearance at the National Press Club on January 19 was summarized in *The New York Times*, January 20, 1959. For text of Kozlov's July 2 speech at a luncheon sponsored by the Overseas Press Club and the National Press Club, see *ibid.*, July 3, 1959.



question asked him involved his role during the Stalin period, he harshly attacked the motives of the questioner and left the query unanswered.<sup>3</sup>

Khrushchev's insistence on his own dignity and prestige and those of the USSR, and his constant assertion of the superiority of the communist system, were partly motivated by practical considerations. At the same time, the lengths to which he carried these efforts and the compulsive (and often counterproductive) way in which he reacted to all criticism—explicit, implicit and imagined—illustrated that he possesses to an extraordinary degree the feelings of inferiority characteristic of his countrymen and their resultant drive for self-assertion.

During the first part of his trip an accumulation of irritants (occasional recurrence of critical questions, statements made by American speakers regarding the US which he considered critical of the USSR by implication, refutation by them of critical points regarding the US that he had previously made, the cool reception he was getting from the crowds along his route, security measures which prevented him from mingling with the public and which in any event he probably considered excessive and humiliating), in combination with his own growing fatigue and certain specific incidents during his stay in Los Angeles, led to a threatening display of his anger at the Los Angeles civic dinner given him on the evening of September 19.<sup>4</sup>

The Los Angeles irritants included a one-line speech of greeting at the airport by Mayor Poulson (Khrushchev put aside a prepared text and gave an equally brief reply),<sup>5</sup> the absence of the public from the airport ceremony, a report that the local police authorities would be unable to assure his security if he visited Disneyland, the sparsity of crowds along his routes through the city (which had not been announced), a rather undignified public polemical discussion with Spyros Skouras at the 20th Century Fox luncheon<sup>6</sup> (where Khrushchev publicly complained about the Disneyland matter), and the tasteless display put on for his benefit by the cast of "Can Can."

That evening at the civic dinner Khrushchev took violent issue with a relatively inoffensive speech made by the mayor by insulting him, threatening to go home, threatening a renewal and implied intensification of the cold war, boasting of the USSR's serial production of ICBM's,

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<sup>3</sup> The transcript of Khrushchev's September 16 press conference at the National Press Club was printed *ibid.*, September 17, 1959.

<sup>4</sup> See footnotes 1 and 2, Document 119.

<sup>5</sup> Reported in *The New York Times*, September 21, 1959.

<sup>6</sup> For text of Khrushchev's discussion with Spyros Skouras, President of Twentieth-Century Fox, on September 19, see *ibid.*, September 20, 1959.

etc. Even in this angriest of his performances, Khrushchev, however, continued to praise the President, contrasting his realistic and courageous attitude with those who, he claimed, failed to understand the seriousness of the alternatives facing the world (which he variously described as war and peace and as *détente* and a dangerous continuation of the cold war). Mme Khrushcheva later stated privately that her husband "completely lost his temper in Los Angeles" and attributed his actions to fatigue.<sup>7</sup>

Presumably sobered by the bad press which his performance in Los Angeles received and his own probably urgent desire to keep his trip from ending in public failure, refreshed by a couple of hours' sleep early in the train trip from Los Angeles to San Francisco, and heartened by the generally friendly reception accorded him by the crowds which gathered at station stops along the way, Khrushchev regained his composure. Despite occasional evidence of fatigue at the end of tiring days (shared by other members of the official party), he maintained this composure during the balance of the trip. He did this despite occasional recurrences of what he doubtless considered provocation (for example, Mayor Christopher's closing remarks presenting Khrushchev with a gavel at the San Francisco civic dinner September 21).<sup>8</sup> This composure, together with the generally more friendly public reception along the balance of his route (to which he appeared extremely responsive), doubtless permitted him to absorb more of what he saw than he otherwise would have done. Partly as a result of this improved atmosphere and partly as a reflection of his efforts to give as much substance as possible to the impression that his reception by the US public was warm (which the Soviet press had all along claimed), his acknowledgment of US achievements became more generous. The terms which he prescribed for a US-Soviet *détente* also became noticeably more moderate in form, although their substance was not altered.

#### *Main Themes of Khrushchev's Public Statements*

The line Khrushchev tried to convey in his public appearances in the US was essentially that which he expounded in advance in his article "On Peaceful Coexistence," written for the October issue of *Foreign Affairs* (and appearing in the September 3 issue of the *New York Times*). In this article and in his subsequent speeches, Khrushchev presented "peaceful coexistence" and all-out thermonuclear war as the only two alternatives the world faced, called for the renunciation of war as a

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<sup>7</sup> Not further identified.

<sup>8</sup> Mayor Christopher's closing remarks at this dinner have not been found, but for text of Khrushchev's response after accepting the gavel, see *The New York Times*, September 22, 1959.

means of settling disputes, asserted that peaceful coexistence should develop into peaceful competition for satisfying man's needs in the best possible way, but stated that the ideological struggle between communism and capitalism would continue and reaffirmed his faith in the "inevitable" victory of communism. Also in his *Foreign Affairs* article Khrushchev asserted that the growing strength and deterrent power of the Soviet bloc opened up a real possibility that war could be excluded once and for all from the life of society and called for a number of steps to be taken—all of them by the West—to make peaceful coexistence possible. These included a recognition of the permanence of the socialist system wherever it now exists, an end to political and economic discrimination against the Soviet bloc, the development of trade with the USSR, and the acceptance of the USSR's proposals on Berlin and Germany.

This basic message was essentially the same as that he had expounded during the Vice President's trip to the Soviet Union (i.e., communism was on the way up; capitalism and its strongest exponent, the United States, were unpopular and on their way down and would be superseded by communism; in view of the growing strength of the Soviet Union and the bloc in general, and in view of the devastating nature of modern war, the United States would be committing suicide if it attempted to resist the advance of communism by means of war).

In his public speeches in the United States, however, Khrushchev usually avoided explicit claims regarding Soviet military strength. Having directly referred to the subject at the Los Angeles dinner, he subsequently apologized to soften the effect of his remarks. In general, he stuck to statements regarding the economic and political strength of the bloc and described the horror and folly of war in general terms applicable to the USSR as well as to the United States; nonetheless, on every conceivable occasion he reminded the US of Soviet prowess in rocketry by mentioning the successful Soviet "moon shot" which had taken place on the eve of his visit.

Along with his arguments concerning the impossibility and hopelessness of combating the growing strength of the bloc, Khrushchev made major efforts to show that the USSR was engaged in raising its own standards of living, that communism was founded on humane and even Christian principles (September 27 TV address),<sup>9</sup> and that the USSR thus posed no threat to anybody (i.e., that it was unnecessary as well as hopeless to resist it).

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<sup>9</sup>For text of Khrushchev's September 27 radio and television address, see *ibid.*, September 28, 1959.

Khrushchev frequently remarked that through his visit the US public was getting a chance to see for itself that he did not "have horns." On a number of occasions he used his very substantial talents for humor and ham-acting to show himself in a human light. An important part of his effort was his decision to bring along his generally personable family. To have himself accepted as a human and likeable being, however, was obviously balanced in his mind by the need to project his image as the strong, vital, determined, and confident leader of a great and growing power and of a historically invincible world movement.

In the course of the trip Khrushchev sought to make his message acceptable to Americans by publicly acknowledging the desire of both the President and the US people for peace with flattering references, especially after Los Angeles, to one or another aspect of American achievements, including admission of the present US lead in certain fields, notably the standard of living and the productivity of farm labor. Also probably intended for the same purpose were his statements that he drew no distinction between the people of the US and their government, although the force of these declarations and of his recognition of the desire of the President and the people for peace was lessened by his statements (particularly in his September 27 press conference and his address at the Luzhniki Stadium on his return to Moscow)<sup>10</sup> regarding influential elements in the US who were resisting a relaxation of tensions. Both in the Luzhniki speech and in a subsequent *Pravda* article by Yuri Zhukov,<sup>11</sup> Vice President Nixon was identified as a major villain in the piece, while praise of the President for his desire for peace was continued. It is, moreover, probably true that in publicly drawing no distinction between the people and the government of the United States, Khrushchev hoped to induce Americans to do the same with regard to the Soviet Union.

#### *Khrushchev's Probable Reactions to and Assessment of the Trip*

In attempting to assess Khrushchev's reactions to his trip, there seems every reason to suppose that our productive capacity, high standard of living, popular solidarity, etc., did make an impression on him despite his previous statements that he already knew all about the US from films, extensive reading, etc. (Khrushchev's conversation indicated that he did, in fact, already know a great deal about the country, although what he knew was interlaced with half truths and Soviet stereotypes.) Over and above the fact that his faith in communism,

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<sup>10</sup> The transcript of Khrushchev's press conference on September 27 and text of his speech at Luzhniki Stadium in Moscow on September 28 are printed *ibid.*, September 28 and 29, 1959.

<sup>11</sup> Not found.

which is at once his greatest political asset and his *raison d'être*, would not permit him to admit the long-term viability of our system, certain of his ingrained habits of thought and feeling probably made him react to much of what he saw as self-indulgent, wasteful, chaotic, and decadent. He quite probably believes what Soviet economists tell him about the USSR's faster rate of economic growth, although he may well have carried away with him the conviction that, even granted these faster rates of growth, it would take the Soviet Union a long time to catch up with the US in standard of living. It seems unlikely that his ideas in the military field were changed in any way.

In his assessment of the present political and psychological mood of the US, it seems probable that any impression of vitality and courage he obtained from the people he met was at least partially offset by what he no doubt considered his success in forcing us, through the threat inherent in the Berlin situation, to extend him the invitation and arrange private talks with the President.

In coming here to insist on the USSR's great-power status, the bloc's invincibility, the inevitability and goodness of communism, Khrushchev displayed considerable courage. With the possible exception of his oversensitivity to imagined slights, he never permitted nervousness to show. Indeed, the whole performance, at least until it was apparent that he was staging it satisfactorily, must have been something of an ordeal. Coming here as he did and saying what he did, he could not very well have admitted failure (as was illustrated by the Soviet press's deliberate misrepresentation of his initial reception in the United States as "warm").

In retrospect, he probably feels he has every reason to be satisfied. He certainly impressed the United States with his forcefulness and determination; he showed his own people and others in the world that he was recognized and respected by the United States as the unquestioned leader of a great world power. Moreover, he probably feels that he has given a further impetus to Western negotiation with the bloc and that the West's commitment to negotiate will tend to preclude increased Western defense efforts. At least temporarily, he presumably believes he has achieved a partial *détente* at little or no cost to the bloc. This, he may hope, will permit him to gain a summit meeting on favorable terms. Even should such a meeting fail to achieve any major security agreements the USSR would consider beneficial, he might feel that the Soviet Union could emerge a year or two from now substantially more powerful than it is today. The *détente* line, moreover, may be intended to improve Soviet opportunities for penetration of the underdeveloped areas

(Khrushchev's UN address<sup>12</sup> certainly reflects interest in this subject) where, during the more active threat-and-crisis period of the last year and a half, developments have been far from satisfactory from the Soviet standpoint.

Khrushchev's remarks regarding the impossibility of liquidating all aspects of the cold war overnight, in addition to protecting the Soviet position on certain aspects of its policy that it does not want to give up, indicates that he visualizes a partial *détente* of some duration as possibly desirable granted the proper conditions, i.e., that the *détente* appears to be working to what the USSR considers its advantage. Moreover, Khrushchev's recent statements in Peiping<sup>13</sup> advising against testing the capitalist system by the use of force, while no doubt partly intended for American ears and hedged around so as to leave the Chinese Communist position on Taiwan at least theoretically intact, presumably also reflect a real desire to keep the Chinese Communists from taking any early aggressive action on a scale that might involve them in hostilities with the US, or which would seriously jeopardize the present Soviet efforts to produce a partial *détente*.

*Probable Impact of the Trip on Future Soviet Approach Toward the US*

While the USSR has already laid the groundwork for blaming any setbacks on the road to "friendly relations with the United States" on influential elements in the US opposed to a relaxation of tension, the extent to which Khrushchev through his trip has probably made himself a hero in the USSR as a peacemaker in favor of closer relations with the West means that it would be far from easy for him to admit failure in his self-proclaimed efforts. At the least this would require considerable, apparently substantiative evidence of allegedly US hostile action or intent. His praise of President Eisenhower as a man of peace tends to commit Khrushchev at least in this specific regard for the balance of the President's tenure, while the damning of Vice President Nixon (which could be extended to other presidential potentials if necessary) might provide a cutoff date in case of need. This is not to say that US efforts in the meantime to promote the security and stability of the free world will be allowed to pass unnoticed, or that the USSR may not use at least implied threats in an attempt to improve its position. Should the USSR consider some action of the US a threat to the security of the bloc, there is no reason to doubt that its reaction would be direct and overt. The degree to

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<sup>12</sup>See footnote 2, Document 117.

<sup>13</sup>Khrushchev visited Peking September 30–October 4. For texts of two of Khrushchev's speeches in Peking on September 30, in which he stressed the relaxation of international tension and "peaceful coexistence," see *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, October 28, 1959, pp. 19, 20–22.

which Khrushchev has committed himself to his alleged role as a peacemaker, however, indicates that he will continue, for the time being at least, to pose as such and to be careful to avoid major crises for which the USSR might to its own citizens appear responsible.

Khrushchev's line regarding US-Soviet relations, combining an unyielding exposition of the Soviet position with an expressed desire to assure peace and bring about a US-Soviet rapprochement, represented an equivocal mixture from several points of view. It was assertive enough to fit in with traditional Soviet bargaining methods in a pre-negotiation period, while at the same time sufficiently hopeful to interest the West. It was tough enough to prevent serious opposition on the part of doctrinaire elements within the bloc who would oppose any real *modus vivendi* with the West, but hopeful enough to win Khrushchev great popularity at home among the wide elements of the Soviet population which would like a real *détente* and a faster rise in the standard of living. Even the partial and probably temporary *détente* the line is intended to produce has an equivocal nature: to the more doctrinaire elements, it can be represented as a tactical move to improve the USSR's power position and penetration possibilities; to those who doubt that even fairly rapidly growing Soviet power will permit the spread of communism to be safely combined with national safety, it can be represented as a logical step toward a real relaxation of tension reducing the danger of war.

Khrushchev has shown an ability simultaneously to think a variety of thoughts which to our minds appear contradictory. There is no reason to suppose that he is not equally sincere in wanting to assure both peace and the victory of communism. He is also probably equally sincere about his interest in maximizing the USSR's power relative to prospective enemies, while at the same time raising the standard of living of his own people and the bloc in general, believing that the latter course, too, would promote the spread of communism.

In the light of these considerations, it appears likely that, as stated above, Khrushchev feels confident that he can get what he wants out of a summit conference or other negotiations with the West at an acceptable if not minimal cost. Even failing to achieve agreements acceptable to the USSR (other than a temporary formula on Berlin), he might consider it useful, other factors being equal, to continue the new less threatening stance for a year or two until the increments to the USSR's relative power position, which he believes to be promised by its current military programs, have at least started to come into being. At that time, Khrushchev may believe, he could judge whether things were progressing satisfactorily from his point of view or whether his efforts to educate the West to what he considers the realities of the modern world called for a more concentrated and effective "heat treatment."

### 137. Minutes of the Cabinet Meeting

Washington, November 6, 1959, 9–11 a.m.

[Here follow a list of participants and the President's brief comments on an unrelated subject.]

*US-USSR Relations (CI 59-62)*—Mr. Herter, speaking from the Cabinet Paper,<sup>1</sup> reviewed the background and purpose of the Khrushchev visit, stressing particularly the President's hope that the visit might serve to remove some of the misconceptions that existed about the United States. Mr. Herter pointed out that on the first visit of Mr. Khrushchev with the President the only really significant thing was that Khrushchev had not deigned to discuss at all the disarmament proposal he would be making to the UN a few days later, preferring to keep the matter of the speech a closely guarded secret, though he did refer to it as being "right here in my pocket and no one is going to see it". Mr. Herter noted also the accomplishments at Camp David as set forth in the communiqué, plus the additional statements made subsequently<sup>2</sup> that there would be no time limit placed in ultimatum fashion on the Berlin negotiations. He noted also the brief discussion of China and the impossibility of having any profitable discussion at that time.<sup>3</sup> However, when Mr. Khrushchev went to China,<sup>4</sup> there was evidence but not proof that he did what he could to soft peddle the issue.

Mr. Herter emphasized that the Russian effort now is to attempt to build up a feeling around the world that a new era of peace has set in. Mr. Herter said that some of our friends might over react to this in terms of moving much more warmly toward closer relations with Russia, despite the fact that the Russian representative in the UN recently attacked us vitriolically.<sup>5</sup>

Mr. Herter concluded that the visit could be considered a gain but that only future developments will reveal the worth of the visit. In the meantime, there is a need for other nations to realize that there has been no change in policy on our part.

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Cabinet Series. Confidential. Drafted by L. Arthur Minnich, Jr., the President's Assistant Staff Secretary.

<sup>1</sup> A copy of a paper prepared by Secretary Herter, entitled "Assessment of Chairman Khrushchev's Visit—Summary of Instructions to U.S. Missions Abroad," November 2, is *ibid.*

<sup>2</sup> For Eisenhower's and Khrushchev's statements on Berlin following the Camp David discussions, see vol. IX, Document 16.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 133.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 13, Document 136.

<sup>5</sup> Not further identified.



Mr. Lodge pointed out that people in the UN had thought well of the visit and the way it was handled by the U.S., but that there was growing talk of a “spirit of Camp David”. Mr. Lodge then noted the tendency in the non-white world (which is most of the world in terms of population) to look askance at the United States as being a “white” country and therefore associated with the Colonial Powers. He felt that the aftermath of the Khrushchev visit provides us a great opportunity to correct this attitude, since these countries regard us now as being somewhat more reasonable. We should focus attention on the Declaration of Independence rather than on the Communist Manifesto where it has been, and in doing so we should not endeavor to sell the specific word “Capitalism” which is beyond rehabilitation in the minds of the non-white world. As Mr. Lodge stated, the U.S. can win wars but the question is can we win revolutions.

Mr. Lodge cautioned that the U.S. could not afford any appearance of backtracking from the attitude it has had about the Khrushchev visit, since this would encourage the presently quiescent critics of the visit to sound off.

Mr. Lodge thought that the United States could seize and hold the diplomatic initiative by taking specific actions which might be something of the type of the following:

1. Revive the Baruch plan for atomic control and disarmament.<sup>6</sup>
2. Working for the presence of the UN in Berlin.
3. Focusing more on our assistance to under developed nations through the multilateral UN programs which far exceeds the Soviet contribution.

We could well afford to invite and challenge the Soviets to match our effort.

Domestically, Lodge thought we should give more consideration to the possibility of a greater growth rate of the national economy—perhaps 6% rather than 3% annually. He also stressed the harm done to our world relations by domestic race and color problems, where a single incident like Little Rock<sup>7</sup> can do irretrievable harm. The President immediately asked why the sending of Federal troops had not done good rather than harm by showing our determination to maintain the rule of law. Mr. Lodge agreed that in this respect some benefit had been obtained but the adverse effects of the rioting were tremendous.

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<sup>6</sup> See footnote 9, Document 75.

<sup>7</sup> In late September 1957, President Eisenhower federalized the National Guard and sent regular Federal troops to Little Rock, Arkansas, to enforce a court order requiring integration of a high school.

Mr. McCone discussed the atomic scientists exchange visits and his experiences in Russia,<sup>8</sup> pointing out such things as the Russian capacity for fully organizing efforts to promote special projects, Russian scientific respect for China's potential in science, and the possibility of further exchanges in areas where new information is already being made public anyway. He also noted specifically the Russian agreement to holding technical discussions by the USSR, US, UK and the French as to safeguards against misuse of nuclear power reactors and materials.

Sec. Benson gave his impressions from his visit to Yugoslavia, Poland and Russia, and distributed copies of his summary report.<sup>9</sup> He noted especially the superiority of U.S. agriculture and the probability that Russia will need a decade or more before catching up to our industrialized farm activity. He also talked at length about his visit to a church in Moscow and his firm faith that religion will never die there.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

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<sup>8</sup> McCone and a group of U.S. scientists toured Soviet scientific laboratories and installations October 9–18.

<sup>9</sup> The summary report of Benson's trip to Yugoslavia, Germany, Poland, the Soviet Union, Finland, Sweden, and Norway September 23–October 9 is in Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Cabinet Series.

138. Letter From Foreign Minister Gromyko to Vice President Nixon

Moscow, November 17, 1959.

DEAR MR. NIXON: The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, N.S. Khrushchev, asked me to answer your letter of August 1<sup>1</sup> which raises the question of the possible departure of certain persons from the Soviet Union to the United States of America.

First of all, I would like to mention that correspondence is already underway with the US Embassy in Moscow concerning some of the persons you mention and that the Embassy has received the necessary information and answers. I have been assured that when necessary this will be done also in the future.

Concerning the question raised in your letter about the departure from the USSR to the USA of some other Soviet citizens, the decision in such cases lies within the competence of police organs [militia]<sup>2</sup> in accordance with the procedure established in the Soviet Union. A necessary condition for consideration of a departure case is a formal personal application by the individual concerned.

Of course, if there should be an appeal by the Soviet citizens you mentioned to the indicated organs with an application for departure, their requests will be considered with proper attention as is always the case in the consideration of such affairs.

For my part, I express the hope that the Government of the United States of America will show due cooperation and understanding in satisfying the interests of Soviet citizens who express the desire to leave the United States for the Soviet Union.

With sincere respect,

A. Gromyko<sup>3</sup>

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 261.1111/11–1759. Confidential. Transmitted as an enclosure to despatch 258 from Moscow, November 17. A notation on the despatch indicates that the original and the Embassy's translation of this letter were sent to Nixon's office on December 4. In telegram 1438 from Moscow, November 17, which also transmitted the text of this letter, Thompson reported that when Gromyko handed him the letter that morning, he also referred to Secretary Herter's recent letter to Gromyko with two accompanying lists of American citizens and relatives of American citizens who desired to leave the Soviet Union. Thompson said that virtually all the people named on the two lists had applied for Soviet exit visas, but Gromyko said that in the past U.S. information was often incorrect and that the required applications to the Soviet militia had not been made. (*Ibid.*, 261.1111/11–1759) Herter's letter to Gromyko and the two lists have not been found, but the letter was summarized briefly in telegram 1377 from Moscow, November 11. (*Ibid.*, 261.1111/11–1159)

<sup>1</sup> Document 104.

<sup>2</sup> Brackets in the source text.

<sup>3</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

**139. Letter From Foreign Minister Gromyko to Secretary of State Herter**Moscow, December 22, 1959.<sup>1</sup>

ESTEEMED MR. SECRETARY OF STATE: With reference to your letter of October 22<sup>2</sup> regarding the departure of certain persons from the Soviet Union for the United States of America, I would like to note that the position of the Soviet Government on this question was set forth in general outline in my letter to Vice President Nixon of November 17.<sup>3</sup>

The Soviet Government has held and continues to hold the point of view that questions of reuniting relatives who are separated must be regarded with appropriate attention, and the appropriate Soviet organs invariably are guided by this approach in examining all concrete requests for departure from the Soviet Union. Incidentally, as I have been informed, a number of requests for departure from the USSR to the USA have been approved recently.

As concerns the manner of examining such questions, in accordance with generally accepted practice emigration matters can be taken up only in those instances where there is an official request from the person desiring to depart.

I was glad to learn from your letter that the Government of the United States for its part does not intend to place obstacles in the way of the departure from the USA to the USSR of those persons desiring to do so. I allow myself to express the hope that in the future the American authorities, in accordance with this principle, will show the necessary cooperation in the departure of such persons for the Soviet Union.

Respectfully,

**A. Gromyko<sup>4</sup>**

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 261.1111/12-2159. Confidential. The source text is labeled "Informal Translation." A memorandum from Service to Calhoun, December 21, attached to the source text, indicates that Soviet Counselor Smirnovsky handed this letter to Richard H. Davis on December 21.

<sup>1</sup> If the letter was actually delivered on December 21, the date of the letter is in error.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

<sup>3</sup> Document 138.

<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

**JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1960: RESUMPTION AND  
SUSPENSION OF LEND-LEASE NEGOTIATIONS; VISIT TO  
THE SOVIET UNION OF HENRY CABOT LODGE**

**140. Memorandum of Discussion at the 432d Meeting of the  
National Security Council**

Washington, January 14, 1960.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda item 1.]

2. *Significant World Developments Affecting U. S. Security*

Mr. Dulles said the briefing he had prepared last night on the meeting of the USSR Supreme Soviet had to be modified this morning in the light of the latest news. Khrushchev had made a very tough speech to the Supreme Soviet,<sup>1</sup> especially from the military point of view. If the reduction of military forces proposed by Khrushchev was carried out, the Soviet Army and Navy would total 2,423,000, a figure below the level suggested by the USSR as a minimum level in 1956.<sup>2</sup> Apparently the USSR had now decided to reduce its forces quietly and unilaterally. Khrushchev had stated that the Soviet Air Force was being replaced by rockets, that he was stopping the production of bombers, and that submarines were losing their importance. He had said that the USSR possessed formidable weapons, but that weapons still in process of development were still more formidable. He had asserted that the safety of the USSR would be assured by its nuclear and ballistic missile strength. He had also declared that while the U.S. was catching up with the USSR, the latter would not sit idly by. Mr. Dulles said that intelligence had already reported the slowdown in bomber production referred to by Khrushchev.<sup>3</sup> In connection with the meeting of the Supreme Soviet, Khrushchev had demoted Kirichenko, whom we thought had a grip on third place in the Soviet hierarchy, to an unimportant post in the provinces. Khrushchev had also completed the liquida-

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Marion W. Boggs on March 31.

<sup>1</sup> For text of Khrushchev's January 14 speech, see *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, February 10, 1960, pp. 3-16, 23.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 36.

<sup>3</sup> Reference may be to an intelligence estimate [document number and title not declassified], dated February 9, which mentioned the slowdown in Soviet bomber production and used information derived from Khrushchev's January 14 speech. (Department of State, INR-NIE Files)

tion of the MVD, which was once a dreaded repressive organ, but which now had little importance since the MGB had become the major repressive organ of police power. The President said the Khrushchev speech did not appear at first glance to be a very tough speech. What Khrushchev said in this speech was substantially what he had told the President,<sup>4</sup> except for the statement that submarines were becoming of less importance. Mr. Dulles said Khrushchev's remarks on submarines could not be taken as gospel. Khrushchev would probably reduce the numbers of old Soviet submarines and build nuclear submarines instead.

[Here follow discussion of unrelated subjects and the remaining agenda items.]

**Marion W. Boggs**

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<sup>4</sup>No further record of Khrushchev's remark to Eisenhower on changes in Soviet military policy has been found.

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#### **141. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State**

Moscow, January 18, 1960, 2 p.m.

1903. Eyes only Secretary. During sleighride yesterday Khrushchev asked what I thought of his Supreme Sov speech.<sup>1</sup> I replied I thought it was sensible step to demobilize over million men who were not engaged in productive work and not needed for defense. Khrushchev said he had been obliged to use all of his authority to persuade Sov military but that they now agreed with him. He said many soldiers would be withdrawn from East Germany and Hungary where local forces were adequate and he added that they might even withdraw all Sov forces. In this connection he mentioned great expense of keeping Sov troops outside Sov Union. Khrushchev indicated that reduction would also affect Navy and Air Force. He said Stalin had made mistake in attempting build up Sevastopol as strongpoint and said Sov Union intended remove virtually all naval vessels from Black Sea. He said he doubted if they would even keep a single submarine there since rockets and other land-based weapons could deal with any hostile incursions in this area.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.551/1-1860. Secret. A notation by Goodpaster on another copy of this telegram indicates that the President saw it. (Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, International Series)

<sup>1</sup>See Document 140.

He said they would probably make Sevastopol an open city. He said military were very slow to adjust to modern developments and even now would like to build cruisers which had very short range of fire. He had told his naval officers that no enemy was going to be foolish enough to approach within such range as it was unnecessary to do so.

I raised question of Kirichenko's assignment<sup>2</sup> and Khrushchev said Rostov was important area which they wanted to strengthen. It had suffered from drought in past year and was important industrial center. He said present party rep there was not a bad fellow but Kirichenko was particularly able at dealing with such problems. He said Belayev would be replaced in Kazakhstan by Kunayev who is presently Chairman of Kazakh Council of Ministers.<sup>3</sup> He thought Belayev might be sent to Stavropol where party chief is being retired.

At luncheon Khrushchev asked Mikoyan to preside as toastmaster and it is clear that their relationship continued to be close. He referred to Mikoyan several times as his First Deputy and submitted with good grace when Mikoyan exercised his prerogative as toastmaster several times to prevent Khrushchev from interrupting. Khrushchev also privately expressed to me his admiration for Kozlov's ability. Adzhubei is clearly young man on the make but he seemed to be very much afraid of his father-in-law and I gained impression Khrushchev somewhat lacking in respect for him.

Toasts were mostly of non-political nature and Khrushchev several times called Mikoyan to order when he started introduce political note. At one point however Mikoyan said to one of young men present that if West did not follow Khrushchev's example in disarmament then he would have to do his military duty.

Khrushchev proposed toast to President and expressed his great admiration and friendship for him. He said Sov Union had not been asked to express its opinion on our forthcoming election but if given opportunity they would vote for Eisenhower. I proposed toast to Khrushchev and made reference to his work to improve relations between our countries. I recalled that when in US he had pointed out that consolidation of peace would require much patience and I expressed hope that both sides would patiently continue their efforts despite reverses and obstacles that were certain to arise.

**Thompson**

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 140.

<sup>3</sup> Nikolay Ilich Belayev, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Kazakhstan, was appointed First Secretary of the Communist Party in Stavropol in January 1960. Dinmukhamed Akhmedovich Kunayev, Chairman of the Kazakh Council of Ministers, was appointed First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Kazakhstan sometime in 1960.

**142. Memorandum From Secretary of State Herter to President Eisenhower**

Washington, January 20, 1960.

## SUBJECT

Lend Lease Negotiations

You will recall it was our understanding that Chairman Khrushchev in conversation with Under Secretary Dillon at Camp David agreed to resume negotiations for a lend lease settlement without specific qualification, although in this same conversation he discussed other matters affecting economic and trade relations.<sup>1</sup>

In giving effect to this agreement Ambassador Thompson delivered a note on December 7 to Foreign Minister Gromyko stating "I have the honor to refer to the September meetings between President Eisenhower and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, N.S. Khrushchev, at which time the Chairman agreed to a resumption of negotiations for a settlement of lend-lease."<sup>2</sup> Gromyko's reply of December 22 stated that the Soviet Government "is prepared to begin negotiations in Washington on January 11, 1960 for settling the question of lend lease."<sup>3</sup> Soviet acceptance of our terms of reference was again unqualified.

In the two meetings held thus far, however, Ambassador Menshikov has insisted that a lend lease settlement be accompanied by 1) the conclusion of a trade agreement on a most favored nation basis and 2) the extension of long-term credits on acceptable terms.<sup>4</sup>

The Executive Branch, however, is not in a position to conduct negotiations on either subject at this time. Most favored nation treatment is

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series. No classification marking. Initialed by the President.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 132.

<sup>2</sup> Herter's note to Gromyko, which included this quoted sentence, was transmitted in telegram 1329 to Moscow, December 5, 1959. This telegram also noted that Charles E. Bohlen would be the U.S. negotiator. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.56/12-559) In telegram 1603 from Moscow, December 7, Thompson reported that he delivered this note to Gromyko on December 7. (*Ibid.*, 711.56/12-759)

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 1721 from Moscow, December 22, 1959, merely reported very briefly that a note received that day said that the Soviet Government agreed to begin lend-lease negotiations in Washington on January 11, 1960, and appointed Menshikov as its representative. (*Ibid.*, 711.56/12-2259) The quoted clause does not appear in that telegram, and the text of the Soviet note has not been found.

<sup>4</sup> Summaries of the first two meetings on lend-lease on January 11 and 15 were transmitted in telegram 1499 to Moscow, January 12, and telegram 1550 to Moscow, January 15. (*Ibid.*, 711.56/1-1260 and 711.56/1-1560, respectively)



specifically prohibited by 1951 legislation<sup>5</sup> and the extension of credits would be inconsistent with the Congressional intention expressed in that and other legislation. In the event of a satisfactory lend lease settlement we could, as Mr. Dillon suggested at Camp David, consider recommending to Congress that certain legislative restrictions be removed, but as indicated above the Soviet position has gone far beyond that.

On January 19 Ambassador Thompson took up the matter with Gromyko explaining our understanding of the terms of reference and the position of the U.S. Government as indicated above.<sup>6</sup> Gromyko, however, refused to consider a lend lease settlement not connected with agreement on the other two issues.

Under these circumstances to prolong the talks would only add to misunderstanding and imply a U.S. disposition to negotiate on the two other subjects added to the agenda by the USSR.

The purpose of this memorandum, therefore, is to recommend that in the absence of a change in the Soviet position at the next meeting, scheduled for January 21, at 3:00 p.m., these negotiations be suspended. In this event the Department will issue a statement explaining the reasons for the suspension. Unless you perceive objections, the Department will undertake the necessary steps.

C.A.H.

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<sup>5</sup> See footnote 2, Document 64.

<sup>6</sup> Thompson summarized this meeting with Gromyko in telegram 1918 from Moscow, January 19. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.56/1–1960)

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### 143. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, January 20, 1960, 1 p.m.

1924. Reference: Deptel 1563.<sup>1</sup> On rereading memo Khrushchev–Dillon conversation<sup>2</sup> it is evident ground for misunderstanding did exist. For example at Gromyko's prompting Khrushchev did raise connection between lend lease and credits. He stated lend lease should

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56/1–2060. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.

<sup>1</sup> Telegram 1563 to Moscow, January 19, reviewed the impasse on lend-lease with the Soviets, speculated on Soviet motives in linking these negotiations with trade and credit, and asked for Thompson's comments on Soviet motives and the best way to terminate these negotiations, if necessary. (*Ibid.*, 711.56/1–1960)

<sup>2</sup> Document 132.

be approached in same manner as with other countries such as England (British settlement makes ref to trade and to financial agreement) and although I was not present I assume Gromyko has a point re drafting of communiqué. There is of course also Art 7 of Lend Lease Agreement.<sup>3</sup> Nevertheless I agree Sovs were aware their position would lead to breakdown negotiations. I am inclined attribute this to Sov desire avoid being put in position of having refused negotiate on settlement of an obligation. As you know they have constantly hammered theme that they always scrupulously settle their debts. Possibly an added reason is that as result their visits to US Khrushchev and Mikoyan exaggerate desire of American businessmen for trade with Sov Union. I suspect they may have thought lend lease negotiations could be used to publicize obstacles to trade and thus bring pressure for their removal. Sov propaganda following breakdown of lend lease negotiations will throw light on this. Their line is likely to be that elements in US, particularly State Dept, opposed to relaxation of tension and that negotiations showed we did not desire settlement. In this connection I am troubled by our propaganda position particularly with respect to demand of 100 million for use of ships. I agree we should not in present circumstances put forward our minimum offer, since if negotiations were ever resumed we would have to start bargaining from that point. I suggest however that at final session indication might be made that we would be prepared withdraw this demand if satisfactory over-all figure agreed upon and that you could rpt that we are prepared to negotiate further on what over-all figure should be. Nevertheless we cannot seriously negotiate if Sovs insist upon connecting lend lease with agreements on trade and credits.

With respect to method of breaking off negotiations, while I do not feel strongly there would seem to be advantage to us in simply suspending negotiations after which Dept could issue statement our position. It seems to me this might make it slightly easier to resume negotiations at some time in future than if we get locked in present positions by formal exchange of notes. (I am not however sanguine that negotiations will ever be resumed.) If nevertheless note is desired suggest Dept furnish text in order save time and agree that it should be along lines outlined in reftel.

**Thompson**

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<sup>3</sup> Article VII of the Lend-Lease Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union of June 11, 1942, provided, among other things, that the terms and conditions in negotiating the final determination of benefits from the Soviet Union to the United States should not burden commerce between the two countries but "promote mutually advantageous economic relations between them and the betterment of world-wide economic relations" and to that end should include provision for the expansion of the exchange and consumption of goods, the elimination of trade discrimination, and the reduction of trade barriers. (11 Bevans 1283)

**144. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union**

Washington, January 22, 1960, 7:15 p.m.

1591. For Ambassador from Bohlen. Embtel 1924. Deptel 1580.<sup>1</sup> As indicated in refDeptel it is obvious that Menshikov was not prepared for US willingness to suspend talks, and his request to inform his government would indicate he had no instructions covering such contingency. Next Wednesday's meeting will afford test of real Soviet intention in lend-lease negotiations, since there was no doubt left in Menshikov's mind that maintenance of Soviet position will result in suspension of talks. Since apparently Soviets had not anticipated this possibility, they may now have to review their position in this light. Any information that you could obtain without making a special point of it would of course be very useful in preparing for possible change in Soviet position next Wednesday.

With reference to some of the points made in your 1924, it is difficult for me to see, assuming that our records are reasonably similar, that a genuine misunderstanding could have existed if only for fact that on Sept 30 immediately after Khrushchev's departure Dillon gave following written statement to press on economic conversations at Camp David: "The discussions were general in nature and the only specific agreement reached was an agreement to resume negotiations on a lend-lease settlement. We pointed out that an agreement on this issue would provide a better atmosphere and would facilitate efforts to remove the remaining barriers to a full and free flow of peaceful trade."<sup>2</sup> This statement was allowed to stand without public or private refutation by Soviets. Also, Khrushchev's reference at Camp David to credits in our record is followed by unchallenged statement by Dillon putting matter in complete perspective. Language Article VII in our view does not lend itself to Soviet interpretation, namely that it presupposes bilateral removal of any trade discriminations and can be stretched to include question of credits. No other nation, as I pointed out to Menshikov, has ever

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56/1–2060. Secret; Limit Distribution; Verbatim Text. Drafted by Bohlen and cleared by Kohler.

<sup>1</sup> Telegram 1924 is printed as Document 143. Telegram 1580 to Moscow, January 21, reported that when Menshikov held to the previous Soviet position on lend-lease settlement at the third meeting on January 21, Bohlen, with prior White House approval, proposed the suspension of negotiations. Menshikov expressed regret at this development and asked for time to inform his government. The next meeting was scheduled for Wednesday, January 27. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.56/1–2160)

<sup>2</sup> For the transcript of Dillon's news conference on September 30, 1959, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 19, 1959, pp. 547–554.

attempted this interpretation Article VII the whole history of which showed it related primarily to US program for trade liberalization on multi-national basis. British loan, although signed by Executive Branch on same date as lend-lease settlement, was separate agreement and as President's report to Congress pointed out, settlement was in no way connected or conditional upon loan.<sup>3</sup> Loan, as I pointed out to Menshikov, was based on variety of factors other than lend lease, including fact that British had spent some \$4-1/2 billion of their foreign exchange in purchases prior to entry into force of lend lease.

As I endeavored to stress to Menshikov, if we wish to make any progress toward eventual aim of trade normalization, only possible first step at this juncture is lend-lease settlement which as Dillon repeatedly pointed out at Camp David to Khrushchev would improve atmosphere so that Executive Branch could discuss with Congress the question of removal of some of the restrictions which Soviets have in mind. My impression is that Menshikov is extremely conscious of weakness of their position in regard to subject of negotiations, as well as emptiness of attempt to interpret Article VII as some form of obligation to conclude trade agreement and extend credits. As already indicated, Menshikov's attitude confirms my belief that at present stage at least Soviets are not interested in actual terms of lend-lease settlement, since at no time has he made any serious reference to our offer made at first meeting.

Foregoing is for use in event lend-lease discussions raised with you on own initiative by any Soviet official.

Herter

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<sup>3</sup> The lend-lease settlement and financial agreement with the United Kingdom were both signed in Washington on December 6, 1945. (12 Bevans 700) President Truman did not link the lend-lease settlement with the proposed loan to the United Kingdom in his message to Congress on the State of the Union, January 21, 1946, or in his special message to Congress transmitting the financial agreement with the United Kingdom, January 30, 1946. (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1946*, pp. 45-46 and 97-100)

**145. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union**

Washington, January 27, 1960, 7:46 p.m.

1618. Fourth meeting on lend lease negotiations today turned out to be last. Dispensing with preliminaries Menshikov read oral statement “clarifying” Soviet position in terms virtually identical to initial presentation January 11. Lend lease question would long since have been settled had not US suspended negotiations in 1951 (*sic*);<sup>1</sup> USSR war effort constituted benefit far exceeding cost lend lease to US; Article VII explicitly envisioned trade normalization. Khrushchev’s Camp David remarks also cited re necessity for eliminating trade discrimination and giving USSR no less favorable lend lease settlement than that given UK including extension of credits negotiated concurrently. Soviet Govt expressed regret “negative” US response contained in its January 21 statement<sup>2</sup> and urged Soviet position (linking lend lease settlement with simultaneous conclusion most favored nation trade agreement and long-term credit) be given favorable consideration.

Bohlen summarized impasse as arising from unwillingness Soviet Govt to discuss lend lease as separate subject and inability US Govt to discuss concurrently two other subjects added to agenda by Soviets. US position identical to that which had been taken since it proposed resumption of negotiations and could not be called negative since it did not differ from our stand at outset as expressed in December 7 note apparently confirmed by Soviet reply of December 22.<sup>3</sup> Menshikov reiterated that lend lease inseparably connected with other two subjects and constituted single indivisible whole.

We have issued press release<sup>4</sup> adapted from statement given Soviets January 21 (Deptel 1581) and Soviet Embassy will undoubtedly follow suit. Bohlen has given press background briefing.

**Herter**

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56/1–2760. Confidential. Drafted by Isham; cleared in the Bureau of Economic Affairs, the Office of the Legal Adviser, and the Bureau of European Affairs; and approved by Bohlen.

<sup>1</sup> Regarding the suspension of U.S.–Soviet negotiations, see footnote 5, Document 65.

<sup>2</sup> The text of the statement read to Menshikov on January 21 was transmitted in telegram 1581 to Moscow, January 21. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.56/1–2160)

<sup>3</sup> See footnotes 2 and 3, Document 142.

<sup>4</sup> For text of this January 27 press release, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 15, 1960, pp. 239–240.

**146. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State**

Moscow, February 9, 1960, 4 p.m.

2098. Eyes only Secretary from Lodge.<sup>1</sup>

1. At Bolshoi evening 7 Feb Khrushchev appeared entirely to neglect President Gronchi and kept me at his side seated at table during first entre-act. At second everyone was standing, but K. Did not move around but remained talking to me. Although he appeared tired he treated [me] with great cordiality.

2. I told him I was impressed by amount of housing construction, sanitation, etc., observed throughout visit. He replied "we have much to do before getting ahead of you." I responded USSR had already surpassed us in several fields. When he asked what I meant, I spoke of superlative Sov ballet. When he said this was not very important, I mentioned rocketry. Referring to my inference USSR is ahead of US in rockets Khrushchev replied "no we're not; not really."

3. With ref President's June visit here<sup>2</sup> Khrushchev asked me tell President he free travel anywhere in USSR he desires including military bases such as naval base at Sevastapol. Khrushchev said he unsure whether or not President would travel in Siberia but free to do so if desired. During interview at Kremlin 8 Feb he several times expressed hope President would be accompanied by grandchildren.

4. Both at Bolshoi and Kremlin Khrushchev urged that [I] accompany President during forthcoming visit. He seemed take for granted this would be arranged.

5. I spoke of many crowds which had given me actual ovations and he said President's reception would be friendly in extreme and that there would be no need for security precautions.

6. I had appointment with Khrushchev at Kremlin 4 pm Monday Feb 8. Present besides Khrushchev and me were Kuznetsov and Troyanovsky and on US side, Toumanoff and Thacher.<sup>3</sup> After reiterating my thanks expressed at length on previous evening for courtesies extended on trip and congratulations on achievements in fields of public

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/2-960. Secret.

<sup>1</sup> Lodge was visiting the Soviet Union in an unofficial capacity.

<sup>2</sup> In a letter to Khrushchev, November 28, 1959, Eisenhower said he would like to leave the United States on the night of June 9 for a visit of a week to 10 days in the Soviet Union. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204) In a reply to Eisenhower, December 3, 1959, Khrushchev agreed to these dates. (*Ibid.*) A White House press release, January 17, announced that the President planned to visit the Soviet Union June 10-19. (Department of State *Bulletin*, February 1, 1960, p. 147)

<sup>3</sup> Vladimir I. Toumanoff of the Embassy in Moscow and Peter S. Thacher, member of the U.S. Delegation to the U.N. General Assembly.

works, sanitation, etc., I spoke of the good accomplished by Khrushchev visit to US as seen in retrospect. It could have great place in human history as beginning of new things. It was therefore important to try advance from progress reached and at least not to destroy good that had been done.

7. Khrushchev spoke about negative results as regards Dillon and the lend-lease negotiations.<sup>4</sup> If US didn't want to trade, matter could wait. He appeared resent Dillon's "silence" which implied that Khrushchev had never linked lend-lease and trade. He recalled that I was present at Camp David on day he talked with Dillon—day on which President Eisenhower had invited him to go to church with him. He also spoke about matters of helicopters which, he said, "smelled a little bad." He felt US firms were stalling, that Sov Union did not really need the helicopters as they had good ones of their own, but that matter had symbolic significance.

8. I said I would look into this and see what had happened.

9. He then brought up Berlin, which he said was the "most burning question." It should be solved as soon as possible on basis of a peace treaty and a free city of Berlin. He pinned great hopes on a summit meeting<sup>5</sup> in this connection. If US came in good faith and not "in the wake of Adenauer" it would make possible solutions without loss of face on either side. On the other hand, if no agreement was reached on this, relations between the two countries would deteriorate.

10. In rejoinder I made these points:

(A) That US policy would not be "in the wake" of anybody, but would be based on our idea of what was right.

(B) That there ought to be many things "in the pot" and that no participant ought to adopt a "this—or else" attitude.

(C) That constructive results should come out of the conference even if it did not achieve everything that all the participants wanted.

(D) It should be realized that this was not only summit meeting that was ever going to be held.

(E) [I] feel that one of things which Mr. K. had been influential in bringing about as result his trip was general expectation that there would be series of summit meetings and that there should not be a break which would destroy or weaken this possibility.

(F) He had remarked facetiously that even though I was in USSR as tourist, politician was always politician and always available to talk politics. Therefore, as man who had spent greater part his life in American politics in varying capacities and as one who deeply hoped for good relations between USSR and US, I felt I should point out that there is always minimum of flexibility in foreign relations in US in an election

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 145.

<sup>5</sup> In a letter to Eisenhower, December 30, 1959, Khrushchev accepted the Western powers' proposal for a summit meeting of the four powers in Paris beginning on May 16. (Department of State *Bulletin*, January 18, 1960, p. 78)

year. What is hard or impossible to do in 1952 or 1956 or 1960 is often quite susceptible of accomplishment in 1953 or 1957 or 1961. I urged Troyanovsky to be sure to translate all of this with greatest of care.

(G) Khrushchev listened with care and said he fully understood what I was trying to put across.

11. Kuznetsov then intervened to say what good results we had had at last General Assembly, and I responded by saying that agreements reached on resolutions concerning disarmament and creation of an outer space committee were most substantial reached since existence of UN.<sup>6</sup>

12. Khrushchev said he realized this. He knew that people and Govt of US wanted peace. He thanked me again in fulsome manner for what he said I had done to make his trip in US such a success. When I said I had regretted that certain things had not gone just right in Los Angeles, he brushed that aside and said there are always details that are not perfect but he attached not slightest importance to them, and with passage of time was more and more delighted with his visit.

13. He said he understood that Mayor of San Francisco, Mr. Christopher, was coming to USSR in April. I took advantage of this observation to recall how skillfully Khrushchev had spoken kindly of Mayor Christopher (who was at that time up for re-election) and yet had done so in way which could not possibly have been embarrassing or construed as getting involved in elections.<sup>7</sup>

14. As result of his initiatives, meeting lasted for an hour and a half and was marked by utmost cordiality throughout. He appeared tired but relaxed and mellow. His warmth and cordiality towards me quite surprised me. Khrushchev showed pride in improvements for minority peoples of USSR under Communism, notably Moslems. At no time during his discussions with me did Khrushchev raise subjects of disarmament, China, India or other "non-aligned" countries.

15. Utmost courtesy shown me during trip. Firyubin<sup>8</sup> sent word that even though I was traveling as tourist, I should be treated as distinguished guest—local officials in Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan had affairs in my honor. Gromyko having lunch my honor today.

**Thompson**

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<sup>6</sup> Reference presumably is to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1378 (XIV) on general and complete disarmament, Resolution 1402 (XIV) on the suspension of nuclear tests, Resolution 1403 (XIV) on the report of the Disarmament Commission, and Resolution 1472 (XIV), which, among other things, established a U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. For texts of these resolutions, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, vol. II, pp. 1545, 1548–1549, 1549, and 1556–1557.

<sup>7</sup> Khrushchev's remarks to Mayor Christopher about his re-election campaign were quoted in *The New York Times*, September 21 and 22, 1959.

<sup>8</sup> Nikolay Pavlovich Firyubin, Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.



## MAY–JULY 1960: THE U–2 AIRPLANE INCIDENT

### 147. Editorial Note

On May 1, a U.S. U–2 unarmed reconnaissance plane, piloted by Francis Gary Powers who was employed by the Central Intelligence Agency, was shot down by Soviet military authorities 1,200 miles inside the Soviet Union near Sverdlovsk. In the following days, Nikita Khrushchev exploited the incident to sabotage the summit meeting between the Heads of Government of the United States, Soviet Union, France, and the United Kingdom, which began in Paris on May 16. Documentation on the relationship between the U–2 incident and the collapse of the summit is in volume IX.

The President's recollections of his role in authorizing the U–2 reconnaissance flights and the responses of his administration to the crash of the U–2 plane and subsequent Soviet recriminations are in *Waging Peace*, pages 543–559. Regarding background on the President's decisions on overflight operations, see Documents 70, 72, and 82.

In a memorandum for the record, April 25, Goodpaster, presumably referring to a proposed U–2 flight, wrote: "After checking with the President, I informed Mr. Bissell that one additional operation may be undertaken, provided it is carried out prior to May 1. No operation is to be carried out after May 1." (Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, Intelligence Matters)

Eisenhower recalled that Goodpaster telephoned him on the afternoon of May 1 to tell him the U–2 flight was overdue and possibly lost. Early the next morning, Goodpaster told the President that the plane was still missing and certainly down somewhere. (*Waging Peace*, page 543) No further record of the reports by Goodpaster to the President has been found, but on May 3 the National Aeronautics and Space Administration issued a statement that the airplane was on a joint NASA–U.S. Air Force air weather service mission in Turkey and had apparently gone down in the Lake Van, Turkey area on May 1. For text of this statement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 23, 1960, page 817.

In a long speech to the Supreme Soviet in Moscow on May 5, Khrushchev referred to an overflight by a U.S. plane on April 9 as an "aggressive act," and then announced that a U.S. spy plane had been shot down deep in Soviet territory on May 1. Soviet authorities, he continued, determined that the plane crossed into the Soviet Union from Turkey, Iran, or Pakistan. For the complete text of Khrushchev's May 5 speech and his account of the U–2 incident, see *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, June 1, 1960, pages 4–19, 44.

At the meeting of the National Security Council on Thursday morning, May 5, summarized in a memorandum of discussion prepared by

Marion W. Boggs, Allen Dulles reported that Khrushchev had just made a long speech to the Supreme Soviet and "the latter part of his speech dealing with foreign relations and with the Summit was still coming in but was reported to contain a very tough line so far as the U.S. and the Summit are concerned." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records) In his memoirs, Eisenhower remarked that the complete text of Khrushchev's speech, including his claim of the Soviet military shooting down the U-2, arrived just as the NSC meeting was ending. Eisenhower asked those senior officials concerned with U-2 operations to remain behind to discuss the situation. The principals then devised a statement that would harmonize with the May 3 "cover story." Eisenhower also instructed his press secretary, James C. Hagerty, to inform the press that the President had ordered a full inquiry, the results of which the Department of State and NASA would release. (*Waging Peace*, pages 548-549) No further record of Eisenhower's conversation with these senior officials has been found, although the President's Appointment Book indicates that he met briefly, from 10:37 to 10:47 a.m., following the NSC meeting with Acting Secretary of State Dillon, Secretary of Defense Gates, Director of Central Intelligence Dulles, the President's National Security Adviser Gordon Gray, and Goodpaster. (Eisenhower Library, President's Appointment Books)

In telegram 2715 from Moscow, May 5 (transmitted at 7 p.m. Moscow time and received in the Department of State at 1:34 p.m. the same day), which Ambassador Thompson labeled "most urgent," Thompson reported that at an Ethiopian reception that evening Deputy Foreign Minister Jacob Malik had said that the Soviets did not yet know under what article of the U.N. Charter they would bring the plane incident before the Security Council because they were still questioning the pilot who had parachuted to safety. (Department of State, Central Files, 761.5411/5-560) Despite this warning that the pilot might be alive and subject to Soviet interrogation, the Eisenhower administration had already decided to continue with the earlier statement. For texts of the May 5 NASA statement, a Department of State statement devised at the May 5 NSC meeting, and the May 6 U.S. note to the Soviet Government asking it to provide full facts on the fate of Francis Gary Powers, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 23, 1960, pages 817-818.

On May 6, *Pravda* published an account of how the Soviet military shot down the reconnaissance aircraft. For text of the article, see *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, June 1, 1960, pages 27-28.

In another long speech to the Supreme Soviet on the next day, May 7, Khrushchev said, among other things, that the pilot was alive and that Soviet authorities had recovered parts of the airplane. He also displayed samples of the developed film allegedly taken by camera equipment installed on the plane and charged that Powers had flown out of Peshawar

airfield in Pakistan, which was correct, and not out of Turkey, and his landing destination was Bodo airfield in Norway. For full text of his speech, see *ibid.*, June 8, 1960, pages 3–7.

In response to this speech, the Department of State issued a statement on May 7 admitting that while the inquiry ordered by the President established that “insofar as the authorities in Washington are concerned there was no authorization for any such flight as described by Mr. Khrushchev,” such a flight over the Soviet Union to gather information was probably undertaken, and it justified such activities as necessary “given the state of the world today” and the Soviet Government’s rejection of the President’s “open skies” proposal in 1955. For text of this statement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 23, 1960, pages 818–819. For Ambassador Thompson’s analysis of Khrushchev’s motives in playing up the plane incident, see Document 148. A memorandum of the National Security Council discussion on May 9 of the incident is printed as Document 149. In a statement released to the press on the afternoon of May 9, Secretary Herter conceded that the President had issued directives authorizing the gathering of intelligence information, although specific missions of unarmed civilian aircraft had not been subject to authorization. For text of Herter’s statement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 23, 1960, pages 816–817. For Thompson’s report on his meeting with Khrushchev at a reception at the Czechoslovak Embassy in Moscow on May 9, see Documents 150 and 151.

On May 10, the Embassy in Moscow delivered a note to the Soviet Union requesting permission to interview Francis Gary Powers. On the same day, the Soviet Foreign Ministry delivered a note to the Embassy replying to the U.S. note of May 6. The Soviet note protested the “aggressive acts of American aviation” and warned that “if similar provocations are repeated, it will be obliged to take retaliatory measures.” For texts of the U.S. and Soviet May 10 notes, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 30, 1960, pages 852–854.

At his news conference on May 11, President Eisenhower read a statement on the U–2 incident, which supplemented what Herter had revealed in his statement on May 9. For text of the President’s statement as well as subsequent questions from the press, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960–61*, pages 403–414.

Eisenhower’s decision on May 12 to call off all activities that the Soviets might regard as provocative is summarized in Document 152.

Eisenhower left by plane for the summit conference on May 14. Soon after his arrival in Paris on May 15, he learned that Khrushchev had read to Prime Minister Harold Macmillan a message (a copy was given to President Charles de Gaulle) demanding that Eisenhower denounce the U–2 flights over the Soviet Union as provocative, renounce

further flights, and “pass severe judgment” on those responsible for them as conditions for his participation at the summit conference. He reiterated these demands at the conference opening session the following morning. Eisenhower asserted that overflights of the Soviet Union had been suspended for the duration of his administration, but when he refused to apologize, Khrushchev withdrew his invitation to Eisenhower to visit the Soviet Union and also withdrew from the summit. For the record of this session, see volume IX, Document 168.

On May 18, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko asked the U.N. Security Council to consider the question of “aggressive acts by the United States Air Force against the Soviet Union, creating a threat to universal peace.” The Security Council took up the Soviet complaint May 23–27. For texts of the statements made in the Security Council by Representative Henry Cabot Lodge on May 23, 26, and 27, as well as texts of the Soviet draft resolution and a revised version of a resolution introduced by Argentina, Ceylon, Ecuador, and Tunisia, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 13, 1960, pages 955–962. The four-power resolution is also printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1960*, pages 96–98. The Security Council rejected the Soviet draft resolution on May 26 by seven votes to two (Poland and the Soviet Union) with two abstentions (Ceylon and Tunisia) and approved the four-power resolution the following day by a vote of nine to zero, with Poland and the Soviet Union abstaining. The Soviet complaint and debate in the Security Council are summarized in *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1960*, pages 40–41.

On May 24, 4 days after his return to Washington, Eisenhower convened a meeting of the National Security Council; see Document 153. The President held a breakfast meeting with bipartisan congressional leaders on May 26; see Document 154. Documentation on hearings conducted in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on events relating to the summit, including the U-2 incident, is summarized in Document 155.

When the Soviet Union shot down a U.S. Air Force RB-47 airplane over the Barents Sea on July 1, subsequent discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union on this incident occasionally raised the U-2 incident as well. See in particular Documents 162–165.

Powers was tried and convicted of espionage by the Military Division of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. For the Soviet announcement of criminal proceedings, indictment, composition of the court, a transcript of the trial August 17–19, and the verdict that sentenced Powers to 10 years of confinement, see *The Trial of the U2*, introduction by Harold J. Berman (Chicago: World Publishers, 1960).

In a memorandum to Goodpaster, August 18, Allen W. Dulles listed all U-2 overflights of Soviet bloc nations, [text not declassified] since the initiation of the U-2 operations on June 20, 1956. [text not declassified]

The last flight mentioned was Francis Gary Powers' mission of May 1. (Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, Intelligence Matters)

The role of the Central Intelligence Agency in the U-2 overflights is recounted in Allen Dulles, *The Craft of Intelligence* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963) and Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., *The Real CIA* (New York: Macmillan, 1968). The pilot gave his own account in Francis Gary Powers with Curt Gentry, *Operation Overflight: The U-2 Spy Pilot Tells His Story for the First Time* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970). Powers' congressional testimony shortly after his return from imprisonment in the Soviet Union in 1962 is in *Francis Gary Powers: Hearing Before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 87th Congress, 2d Session, March 6, 1962* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962).

A summary and analysis of Soviet public statements on the U-2 incident are contained in Intelligence Report No. 8285, "Soviet Account of U-2 Incident," which the Bureau of Intelligence and Research prepared on June 13. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, OSS-INR Reports)

Additional documentation on the U-2 controversy is in Department of State, Central File 761.5411 and EUR/SOV Files: Lot 71 D 438, Powers, Francis Gary. Documentation on Embassy efforts in Moscow to interview Powers in prison, his trial, and efforts of the Department of State, his family, and legal counsel to secure his release is *ibid.*, Central File 261.1111-Powers, Francis Gary.

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#### 148. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, May 7, 1960, 6 p.m.

2750. Eyes only Secretary. I am at a loss to submit any recommendations on how we should handle plane incident but following thoughts may be useful to you. Difficult to assess Khrushchev's motives in playing this so hard. I believe he was really offended and angry, that he attaches great importance to stopping this kind of activity, and that he believes this will put him in advantageous position at summit. There is no doubt that we have suffered major loss in Soviet public opinion and

probably throughout world. Judging by reaction Norwegian Amb<sup>1</sup> Norway and possibly other countries may take unilateral action to pledge prohibition cooperation such actions in future.

A more menacing interpretation is that Khrushchev realizes, particularly after his visit to De Gaulle, Dillon speech, and NATO pronouncements,<sup>2</sup> that he cannot make progress at summit and feels obliged proceed with separate peace treaty and risk consequences that will follow. He therefore could be exploiting this incident to prepare public opinion for eventual crisis. Of course this may be what Khrushchev wants us to think. Also cannot help but think, although evidence is very slight, that Khrushchev is having some internal difficulties and this incident affords him a convenient diversion.

Judging by display which Khrushchev made of evidence in Supreme Soviet today<sup>3</sup> I would doubt that we can continue to deny charges of deliberate overflight. Khrushchev has himself stated dilemma with which we are faced should we deny that President himself had actual knowledge this action although I should recommend this be done if possible and that it should be accompanied by some drastic action to prevent recurrence action of this sort without his knowledge. This would preserve for us great asset we have in regard which Soviet and other people have for President. I would suggest this might also be accompanied by statement that espionage practiced on both sides and most successfully by Soviet Union which can exploit openness our society.

In these circumstances and in view fact Soviet Union has repeatedly boasted of its ability to destroy US and other nations, those responsible for defense our country have felt it necessary to take every step to insure our ability to carry out that defense. I would suggest however that impropriety of this action be admitted. At same time I suggest we should strongly assert our desire to achieve progress in settling political questions, and particularly in field of disarmament to make rapid progress in order remove any doubt by either side of intentions of other. If we have available any provable evidence of comparable Soviet actions these might be mentioned but I believe only if they are adequate.

In any event I do not believe we should consider calling off summit conference and decision on President's visit should obviously await re-

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<sup>1</sup> [Text of footnote not declassified]

<sup>2</sup> Reference is presumably to Khrushchev's visit to France March 23–April 3, Dillon's April 20 speech in New York (see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 9, 1960, pp. 723–729), and the May 4 communiqué of the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting in Istanbul (see *ibid.*, May 23, 1960, p. 840).

<sup>3</sup> For text of Khrushchev's May 7 speech, see *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, June 8, 1960, pp. 3–7.

sults that meeting if it is to be held. Although Vershinin<sup>4</sup> may now cancel his visit I would still think we should not take any initiative to do so.

**Thompson**

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<sup>4</sup> Air Marshal Vershinin was scheduled to visit the United States May 14–22 to reciprocate the visit of General Twining to the Soviet Union in 1956, but Vershinin postponed his visit on May 13. (Telegram 2827 from Moscow, May 13; Department of State, Central Files, 711.5861/5–1360) The visit was later canceled altogether.

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#### **149. Memorandum of Discussion at the 444th Meeting of the National Security Council**

Washington, May 9, 1960.

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

##### **1. *Soviet Destruction of a U.S. U-2 Reconnaissance Plane***

The President opened the meeting by remarking that the U-2 plane incident had produced a great storm. Allen Dulles was meeting with Congressional leaders in a session called by Secretary Herter to explain our reconnaissance activities fully but without apology.<sup>1</sup> The Department of State would issue this afternoon a comparable public statement which he (the President) had made less defensive in tone.<sup>2</sup> Reconnaissance activity had been going on for years; consequently it was inevitable that it would be revealed sooner or later. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Central Intelligence and the scientific community had not only agreed to reconnaissance activity of this type but had insisted upon it. The President thought that the question was now posed as to the action we would take in the future in this field; in any event, the problem would have to be reviewed.

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Boggs on May 13.

<sup>1</sup> Herter and Dulles briefed a group of 18 congressional leaders from both houses on the U-2 in the early afternoon of May 9. No transcript of this session has been found; according to one report, none was made. (David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, *The U-2 Affair* (New York: Random House, 1962), p. 116)

<sup>2</sup> Regarding Secretary Herter's May 9 statement, see Document 147.

The President cautioned that the members of the Council would probably be accosted by newspapermen when they left the meeting. He believed that the participants in the meeting should have nothing whatsoever to say to the press and only the Department of State should issue public statements. If members of the Council made statements to the press, these statements would be compared and if there were any differences between them, the differences would be expanded into a big news story. Our reconnaissance was discovered and we would just have to endure the storm and say as little as possible. The President then remarked that if we discovered a Soviet spy, we would have to expose all our intelligence sources and methods in order to obtain a conviction. Even if convicted, a spy would probably be sentenced to only six years and would be replaced by six more spies. In this situation, about all the FBI can do is keep spies under surveillance.

The Attorney General said it was very difficult to prosecute spies in this country because most of them have diplomatic immunity, being attached either to Soviet Bloc embassies or to the UN. Mr. J. Edgar Hoover<sup>3</sup> has been compiling a list of Soviet Bloc spy cases during the last few years. At least sixteen Soviet Bloc diplomats have been dismissed from the U.S. on grounds of *persona non grata*. Mr. Rogers<sup>4</sup> recalled that in the Abel case,<sup>5</sup> a spy with no diplomatic immunity had received a twenty year sentence.

The President said he hoped he would not be allowed to forget about the Abel case and the twenty year sentence. However, he did not mean to say that the law enforcement agencies were not alert. The difficulty in prosecuting spies in the U.S. lay in their diplomatic protection, as the Attorney General had said, and also in the rules of evidence in our courts. Moreover, some judges were inclined to think that spying is not too heinous a crime.

The Attorney General said an attaché of the Czech Embassy had recently been discovered taking pictures of military installations from commercial planes.

*[1 paragraph (15-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]*

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<sup>3</sup> Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

<sup>4</sup> William P. Rogers, Attorney General.

<sup>5</sup> Rudolf Ivanovich Abel was convicted of conducting espionage for the Soviet Union in the United States in October 1957. He and U-2 pilot Powers were ultimately exchanged as prisoners by the United States and Soviet Union in 1962.



*The National Security Council:*<sup>6</sup>

Noted and discussed a statement by the President on the subject, and the admonition by the President that all Executive Branch officials should refrain from any public or private comment upon this subject, except for authorized statements by the Department of State.

[Here follow agenda items 2 and 3. For text of the discussion of item 2, "Preparation for the Summit Meeting," see volume IX, Document 149.]

4. *Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security*

Mr. Amory<sup>7</sup> said he would mention two relatively brief items. The first item concerned the factors motivating Khrushchev in exploiting the U-2 reconnaissance plane incident. Khrushchev might have been motivated by the following: (1) deep conviction, which appears common among Soviet leaders, that secrecy is a major asset of the USSR; (2) anxiety with respect to any violation of Soviet territory; (3) the possibility that the Soviet military hierarchy was unhappy over the demobilization measures recently announced by Khrushchev<sup>8</sup> and has consequently insisted that Khrushchev take a strong stand in the plane case; (4) a possible desire to embarrass the President at the outset of the Summit Conference, a tactic which would be consistent with the past performance of the Soviets in trying to put the West on the defensive and exploit any chinks in the alliance just before international conferences. Mr. Amory said the opinion had been expressed in some quarters also that Khrushchev's exploitation of the plane incident had resulted from his discouragement at the prospects of the Summit Conference. Under this interpretation Khrushchev's tactics were primarily moves in preparation for the failure of the Summit Conference designed to put the onus for failure on the U.S. Mr. Amory did not believe there was serious opposition to Khrushchev's policies within the USSR, certainly not within his immediate entourage. However, certain economic difficulties existed in the USSR and opposition to Khrushchev's basic policy of détente had been manifested by the Chinese Communists and the East Germans.

[Here follow discussion of other subjects, including Vershinin's forthcoming visit (see footnote 4, Document 148), and the remaining agenda items.]

**Marion W. Boggs**

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<sup>6</sup>The paragraph that follows constitutes NSC Action No. 2231, approved by the President on May 13. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

<sup>7</sup>Robert Amory, Jr., Deputy Director for Intelligence, CIA.

<sup>8</sup>Regarding Khrushchev's announcement of Soviet troop reductions to the Supreme Soviet on January 14, see Document 140.

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**150. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State**

Moscow, May 9, 1960, 7 p.m.

2771. At beginning of Czech reception today Khrushchev greeted me warmly, took me aside, and before I could make any remark said he was sure not only that I knew nothing about this overflight but that I was opposed to such operations. He said they could not help but suspect that someone had launched this operation with deliberate intent of spoiling summit meeting. He explained they had not protested overflights because on an occasion when they did do so we had blandly denied any knowledge of them. He expressed resentment at Department statement about incident, particularly suggestion that because they had closed areas and secrets this was justification for overflights. He said they had known of these activities for very long time and said to me and later repeated publicly that day after General Twining left Moscow where he had been courteously received as guest, one of these planes had been sent far into Soviet Union. He referred to Senator Mansfield's remarks<sup>1</sup> and said that in due course they would probably let us see pilot. He indicated they would produce their evidence at press conference including [garble] Ambassadors tomorrow or next day. In this connection I referred to Litvinov agreement.<sup>2</sup> He said this incident showed bombers were useless and they had no plans to send bombers to US and should occasion arise would only use rockets. He also said, if I understood him correctly, that they were no longer producing medium-range rockets, apparently because they had already sufficient stock. I said I had no instructions in matter but hoped they did not in fact intend to take this case to Security Council since this would certainly worsen atmosphere as we would be obliged defend ourselves. He said nevertheless they had decided to do so and added that if situation were reversed he was sure we would do same thing.

Khrushchev remarked that the one thing that bothered him, and he was telling me this only personally, was that Soviet public opinion was

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.5411/5-960. Confidential; Niact; Limit Distribution.

<sup>1</sup> Reference may be to Senator Mansfield's remarks on May 5 and 8 in which he said he believed Eisenhower had not been told of the U-2 flight. For text, see *The New York Times*, May 6 and 9, 1960.

<sup>2</sup> In the exchange of letters between President Roosevelt and Soviet Commissar Maxim Litvinov, which established diplomatic relations between the two nations in November 1933, the Soviet Union agreed, among other things, that requests by U.S. consular representatives in the Soviet Union to visit U.S. nationals detained in Soviet jails would be granted without delay.

concerned and it could be that during President's visit some people might show their resentment. He said of course they did not want any such thing to happen and when President came here as guest they wanted him received as such. Throughout conversation Khrushchev was very affable, said he sympathized with my position but "what could he do about it?"

I am reporting his public remarks separately.<sup>3</sup>

Although it could be simply a desire to get in best negotiating position against US I cannot help but interpret his public remarks and appeal to Security Council as a determination to go through with separate treaty unless he gets some satisfaction on Berlin at summit meeting. He obviously intends to exploit this incident to hilt with our allies, particularly Norway, Pakistan and Turkey. Although he denied wanting to add fuel to flames during his public speech, he seemed to be doing exactly that. Nevertheless press and other treatment has been restrained.

In reply my question Khrushchev said as far as they were concerned Vershinin would proceed with his visit.

Thompson

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<sup>3</sup>See Document 151.

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### 151. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, May 9, 1960, 7 p.m.

2772. In reply to Czech Ambassador's toast at reception this afternoon Khrushchev with obvious realism dwelt at length on overflight incident.<sup>1</sup> He raised question as to who could have sent this plane and said what could they think of a govt in which such operation could be undertaken without permission. At this point he repeated in public his remarks exonerating me personally.<sup>2</sup> He did, however, make derogatory remarks about Allen Dulles. He later remarked he suspected government did know about it secretly. He referred to countries who had let their territories be used for such operations and said not only would any further intruder be shot down but in this event Soviet Union would also

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.5411/5-960. Confidential; Niact.

<sup>1</sup>For the condensed text of Khrushchev's statement, see *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, June 8, 1960, pp. 22–24.

<sup>2</sup>See Document 150.

consider taking other appropriate measures which he made clear could involve action against bases that were used for this purpose.

He led into German question and said with great force that if they were obliged to conclude separate treaty and Western powers attempted on basis of situation which had resulted from German surrender to use force this would be met with force.

He said he did not wish to add fuel to flames and what was important was to reach agreements including disarmament. He said bombers could not fly over 12,000 to 17,000 meters altitude whereas fighters could go to 28,000 but had difficulty finding target and that rockets were the thing. He said American plane had not been armed for simple reason that there was nothing to shoot at at that altitude and it needed weight for other purposes.

After toast he sought out Norwegian Ambassador and Pakistan Chargé and needled them at length, surrounded by considerable crowd, about use of their territory. Norwegian Ambassador said he knew nothing about incident except what Khrushchev had said but could not understand how such small plane could have attempted fly all way to Norway. He said he was sure his govt knew nothing about it. I did not overhear entire conversation but Khrushchev did not accept this statement.

Whole performance shocked those of my colleagues who have not seen him put on this act before.

**Thompson**

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## 152. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, June 1, 1960.

My checking back indicates the following:

On Thursday, May 12th, just as the Cabinet Meeting came to an end,<sup>1</sup> the President and Mr. Gates stood for a moment behind their chairs in the Cabinet Room and the President told Mr. Gates that he was issuing instructions to call off all activities that might be taken by the

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up. Secret. Prepared by Goodpaster.

<sup>1</sup> According to minutes of the Cabinet meeting on May 12, there was no discussion of the U-2 incident. (*Ibid.*, Whitman File, Cabinet Series)

Soviets as provocative. This included instructions regarding cessation of the U-2 project. With respect to Defense, he wished Mr. Gates to take action to assure that such things were called off.

The President then went into his office with Secretary Herter, with me also present.<sup>2</sup> He told Mr. Herter the same thing concerning calling off all activities of a provocative nature, and asked me so to inform Mr. Allen Dulles, both generally and with specific regard to the U-2. (I did so by telephone following this meeting.)<sup>3</sup>

The following day, after a presentation given to the President by General Twining and a group from the Joint Staff in the Cabinet Room,<sup>4</sup> General Twining told the President he had just received word that Air Marshal Vershinin's visit to the United States was being postponed. After some discussion, the President told General Twining of the instructions he had issued and asked that General Twining assure, with respect to Defense activities, that any of a provocative nature be called off. General Twining said he would do so.

G.

*Brigadier General, USA*

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<sup>2</sup> According to a memorandum of a conference between the President and Herter following the Cabinet meeting on May 12, which Goodpaster prepared on May 16: "The President told Mr. Herter he would like to have a recess or a restriction imposed on all intelligence operations of a 'provocative' nature. Mr. Herter said he would pass the word along these lines, and stated that he had already told the Air Force to cut down on 'ferret' operations." (*Ibid.*, DDE Diaries)

<sup>3</sup> No further record of this telephone conversation has been found.

<sup>4</sup> In a memorandum for the record, prepared on May 17, Gordon Gray noted that on May 13 at 9:45 a.m., General Twining, with the assistance of four military staff officers, presented to the President a study he had requested evaluating the wartime situation following a nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the President said he was satisfied with the study. (Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, Meetings with the President)

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### 153. Memorandum of Discussion at the 445th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, May 24, 1960.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1 and 2.]

3. *Statements Regarding the U-2 Incident and the Recent Military Test Alert* (NSC Action No. 2231)<sup>1</sup>

The President said there was a matter he would like to take up with the Council. It was clear that Congress would insist on some kind of investigation of the U-2 incident and the breakup of the Summit Conference. It must be well understood in advance in the Administration how far officials could go in testifying on these matters without endangering our whole intelligence fabric. The U-2 incident was partly out in the open and some questions about over-flights could be answered. However, the President continued, no information should be divulged as to how many over-flights have been made. Congress could be told that over-flights have been going on with the approval of the Secretary of State and our scientific advisers, who have indicated that this method of gathering intelligence is necessary. It should be made clear that basic decisions respecting reconnaissance over-flights of denied territory have been made by the President. However, the impression should not be given that the President has approved specific flights, precise missions, or the timing of specific flights.

Mr. Dulles said he would prefer in his own testimony not to mention the President in connection with the reconnaissance over-flights.

The President said he had in his press conference already referred to his own role in reconnaissance over-flights.<sup>2</sup> Turning to the timing of the last U-2 flight, the President said there was no good time for failure. The question was: Had the risk been measurably greater at the time of the flight than it would have been at any other time? As Ambassador Lodge had said at the UN Security Council meeting, at the time Khrushchev was making his disarmament speech before the UN last year,<sup>3</sup> the U.S. had taken two Soviet spies into custody. The President believed that as long as a powerful government suspected the intentions of another powerful government, intelligence activities would be carried on. He felt that the possibility of a new Pearl Harbor should not be unduly emphasized, nor should we attempt to be dramatic, but we could state publicly that intelligence operations are going on and that we are studying methods of obtaining information. The President remarked that over-flights, before the last one, had been so successful that we may have become careless. He added that the April 9 over-flight could be

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<sup>1</sup> See footnote 6, Document 149.

<sup>2</sup> For text of the President's remarks, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960-61*, pp. 403-404.

<sup>3</sup> Lodge's statement has not been further identified.

mentioned publicly since the Soviets had already mentioned it.<sup>4</sup> He repeated that as to timing there was no good time for failure.

The President believed that certain elements in the U.S. would try to make it appear that we had instituted a general military alert on Sunday night, May 15. All that happened was that Secretary Gates had asked him whether it would not be appropriate at that time to make sure that our long-range communications were working efficiently. He had agreed that such a communications alert might be ordered. This test alert was the kind of alert that is conducted regularly. The President felt that in our public statement we should play down the May 15 alert by indicating that it was a test of our long-range communications facilities. Secretary Gates said that the alert also involved a quiet increase in military command personnel on duty for a test of command procedures.

The President asked whether the pilot of the U-2 which was brought down in Russia had made any flights before this one during his four years with CIA. Mr. Dulles said the pilot, Francis Powers, had made twenty to twenty-five operational flights over denied territory. One of the flights over denied territory was partly aborted because of weather conditions; the plane went through Mongolia and returned. Mr. Dulles added that Powers had been with CIA four years and before that had been with the Air Force for six years. He had been selected for this mission because of his knowledge of Arctic navigation. The President said that when reconnaissance over-flights had been explained to him, he had been told that the pilots on such flights were taught to destroy the plane rather than to let it fall into Soviet hands. The President believed that the blunder of our first statement on the U-2 incident was based on the presumption that the plane was destroyed.<sup>5</sup> Accordingly, we thought the story that a NASA weather reconnaissance plane was missing was a good cover story. The President then remarked that apparently Powers started talking as soon as he touched the ground. Mr. Dulles said that we had traced the U-2 piloted by Powers down to 30,000 feet. Pictures of wreckage of the U-2 published by the Russians showed that parts of the plane have bullet holes. Mr. Dulles believed that bullets fired at the plane while it was in the air may have jammed the destruct mechanism. In any case, the pilot had time to eject himself from the U-2 while it was descending from 70,000 to 30,000 feet and, contrary to Soviet stories, the arming of the destruct mechanism would

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<sup>4</sup> Khrushchev mentioned this in his May 5 speech to the Supreme Soviet; see Document 147.

<sup>5</sup> Regarding the first NASA statement on the missing U-2 plane, May 3, see Document 147.

not have blown up the pilot.<sup>6</sup> The President said apparently the pilot had a flight plan with him when he landed. Mr. Dulles said a flight plan was, of course, necessary to the operation. The President believed that the pilot did not have to carry the flight plan with him while descending from 70,000 feet altitude. Mr. Dulles said he understood the flight plan was found in the cockpit of the downed plane.

Secretary Herter said he understood the timing of the U-2 flight was dictated by technical factors. For example, he had been told that at this season of the year the sun's rays were at the proper angle for good aerial photography and that the weather was apt to be clear over the USSR. He wondered whether this line of thought would be useful in testimony before Congress. The President said the U-2 flights were made because it was necessary for us to find out whether the Soviets were hardening their airbases or not, but of course it was impossible for us to say this publicly. Mr. Dulles said this was the best season of the year for reconnaissance over-flights of the USSR because the weather in that part of the world was apt to be foggy at other times.

Secretary Gates asked whether the pilot of the U-2 had been briefed to tell the truth if he were captured. Mr. Dulles said the pilot had been told to reveal whatever he himself knew, including the fact that he worked for CIA.

Mr. Herter wondered whether the fact that we had tracked the U-2 down to 30,000 feet should be revealed. Mr. Dulles preferred to say that we had tracked the plane to the point where it could be shot down. The President wondered why it was necessary for us to reveal that we had tracked the plane down to 30,000 feet. Mr. Dulles explained that the Soviets were announcing that their rockets could shoot a plane down from an altitude of 60,000-70,000 feet. It would be re-assuring to our allies if we could inform them that the plane had not been shot down at this high altitude. The President said that nevertheless it bothered him to reveal information of this kind which throws some light on our intelligence activities. Mr. Dillon thought we might say that the Russian pictures revealed bullet holes in the wreckage of the plane, thus implying that the plane had descended to a relatively low altitude before being shot down. Mr. McCone said that *Time* magazine had stated in its last issue that we tracked the plane down to 30,000 feet.<sup>7</sup> The President said that secret information which revealed our intelligence activities must not be

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<sup>6</sup> In his speech to the Supreme Soviet on May 7, Khrushchev reported that Powers did not use the automatic ejection device because there was an explosive charge in the plane that was to blow up as soon as the pilot was catapulted. (*Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, June 8, 1960, p. 5) The Soviet press subsequently reiterated Khrushchev's version. (*Ibid.*, June 29, 1960, p. 30)

<sup>7</sup> *Time*, May 23, 1960.



given out. This was a matter which involved the security of the U.S. and the protection of our intelligence operations. The President then added that no one should admit that any person in any nation other than the U.S. has been a party to reconnaissance over-flights. These over-flights should be regarded as solely a U.S. operation. The President added that he had proposed a bilateral meeting with Khrushchev in Paris to discuss the over-flights because he wanted to make it clear to Khrushchev that our allies were not involved.

[Here follows discussion of the upcoming summit conference.]

General Twining believed that an investigation, once started, would seek to explore our whole intelligence operation. He wondered whether there was anything we could do to stop the investigation. The President said he would be able to stop an investigation of the advice which his personal advisers had given him but the forthcoming investigation would deal with Administration officials as well as his personal advisers. Accordingly, he felt the investigation could not be stopped. However, he believed Administration officials should testify themselves and not allow their subordinates to speak. General Twining feared that if the investigators probed CIA, they would then want to investigate the JCS operations. The President said Mr. Dulles would reply to the questions asked by the investigators and might have to say that CIA was a secret organization of the U.S. Government.

Secretary Anderson believed that the President's forthcoming TV address<sup>8</sup> should leave the public with the image of a clear and decisive leader but that it should also say that no apology is due for U.S. efforts to protect the Free World against devastating attack. Moreover, the speech should express the hope that no one in this country will engage in activities which will imperil the capability of the country to protect itself in the future. The speech should contain the implication that there is a limit beyond which investigation cannot go without imperiling our security. Secretary Anderson felt that the image of Pearl Harbor was still in the minds of the people and that they would accept this admonition about security.

The President said that upon his return to this country from Paris, he had deliberately talked about the U-2 incident and the Summit at some length at Andrews Field<sup>9</sup> because at that time he did not intend to make a TV speech. Now he was about to make a TV speech and he un-

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<sup>8</sup> For text of the President's May 25 nationwide television address on the collapse of the summit in Paris, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960–61*, pp. 437–445.

<sup>9</sup> For text of the President's remarks, see *ibid.*, pp. 435–437.

derstood that the State Department was preparing a White Paper.<sup>10</sup> He wondered whether our opponents would not say we were on the defensive if we continue to make speeches and prepare White Papers. Secretary Herter said the proposed State Department White Paper would cover Soviet espionage activities in the U.S. and other Free World countries.

Secretary Anderson asked whether Mr. Dulles had any estimate regarding the fact that the USSR is sending eighteen of its UN officials home. Mr. Dulles said this move might be due to regular rotation. The eighteen officials would be drawn both from the Soviet Embassy and from the UN. The one thing that was clear was that the Soviets did not like the conduct of Ambassador Menshikov. Secretary Herter said the State Department had been studying the projected return of the Soviet Ambassador and the eighteen other Soviet officials and had been able to see no special significance in the move. There was, however, apparently a kind of mass movement going on. The Polish Ambassador appeared to be going home also.

The President wondered whether it would be a good idea for him to mention in his speech the fact that the State Department is preparing a White Paper on the details of Soviet espionage. Secretary Herter said he preferred to wait until the first draft of the White Paper was prepared. There was a question whether the White Paper could contain enough cases to make it worthwhile without compromising the FBI sources of information. Mr. Dulles asked whether the White Paper would cover Soviet espionage in allied countries. Mr. Dillon said the White Paper would cover such espionage. The President wondered whether this coverage would require us to clear the White Paper with our allies. Mr. Dillon said information in the White Paper about Soviet espionage in allied countries was drawn from public sources.

The President said we had been the leader for peace in the world. In order to remain the leader, we must remain strong and in order to be strong we must obtain intelligence information.

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<sup>10</sup>Reference may be to a report drafted in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, attached to a May 26 memorandum to Under Secretary Dillon, and entitled "The Soviet Espionage Effort Against the United States and the Free World." Lampton Berry, Deputy Director of Intelligence and Research, wrote in part that the attached INR paper "has been prepared primarily with a Congressional audience in mind, but also with a view of possible eventual publication." (Department of State, INR Files: Lot 58 D 776, 1960 Intelligence Notes) No further record of the preparation and publication of this paper has been found.

*The National Security Council:*<sup>11</sup>

Noted, after discussion of the subject, the following instructions by the President regarding statements by Executive Branch officials in public or in Congressional testimony:

a. Discussion of the U–2 incident could include information which the USSR is presumed to know, but should not include any information which would jeopardize any other intelligence sources and methods. Statements should be calm and clear, but not expansive as to details or other intelligence activities. It should be emphasized that the policy of the United States is to seek a just and lasting peace, but to pursue that objective from a position of strength which requires intelligence activities to guard against surprise attack. Therefore, there should be no apologies for our effort to protect the Free World from surprise attack, and we should not imply that any other nations were involved in this U–2 activity. While making clear that the basic decision regarding the U–2 program was made by the President, the impression should not be given that the President approved specific flights, their precise missions or their timing.

b. As to the test alert, it should be made clear that this was of limited scope designed primarily to test long-range communications and command procedures, and that such alerts are necessary to maintain the operational readiness of U.S. armed forces. Authorization was given for more frequent test alerts.

[Here follow the remaining agenda items.]

**Marion W. Boggs**

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<sup>11</sup>The paragraphs that follow constitute NSC Action No. 2237, approved by the President on May 31. (*Ibid.*, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

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## **154. Memorandum of Conversation**

Washington, May 26, 1960, 8:45 a.m.

BIPARTISAN LEADERS BREAKFAST WITH THE PRESIDENT,  
HELD IN THE STATE DINING ROOM, THE WHITE HOUSE,  
THURSDAY, MAY 26, 1960, AT 8:45 A.M.<sup>1</sup>

The President started the discussion by telling his guests that he had invited them in for a round table discussion of the events in Paris of the preceding week. He said that he thought they might want to ask

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. No classification marking. Prepared by Hagerty.

<sup>1</sup>No list of participants has been found.

questions of him or Secretary Herter or Secretary Gates who were also present. The President also added that he heartily approved of the inquiry which was being started in the Senate<sup>2</sup> and that the Administration people, of course, would fully cooperate.

The President said that he specifically wanted to bring up two questions at the start.

The first was what happened to the U-2 plane. He said that the Soviets had claimed they had shot it down by rocket, but that he did not believe this. The Soviets had known about these flights for some time and were not able to interfere with any of the other flights because of the high altitudes at which the planes were flying. He pointed out that a picture of the plane released by the Soviets showed bullet holes in the wings. No Soviet fighter could get up to 70,000 feet so it is obvious that those holes must have been put in the wing at a lower attitude. He said it is the present theory that the plane's engine had flamed out, and that the pilot had to come down to below 70,000 to get the plane working again. It is possible that at that level Soviet planes could have attacked the U-2 and that their bullets could have damaged the plane's control and made it possible [*impossible*] for the pilot to destroy the plane.

The second point the President said he wanted to raise was that of intelligence and espionage. He said that intelligence and espionage were distasteful for many Americans, but that he as President from the very beginning of his Administration had to make decisions based on what was right for the United States concerning the fundamental intelligence knowledge that we had to have. In this field, of course, one had to weigh the risks and the serious consequences that would result if one were caught. The decision of such espionage is something that the President, and the President alone, has to decide. The President fully knows that if anything goes wrong, there will be criticism not only abroad but here at home. Nevertheless the President has to accept responsibility for these decisions and also keep the knowledge of such activities in the fewest possible hands. Only a few people in State, Defense and CIA knew of this, and there had been no spreading or leaks of the information. The President said that he was responsible for the directive for the U-2, that the wisdom of the decision lay with the President. "There is no glory in this business," he said. "If it is successful, it can't be told."

The President said that he did his best to put everything he could on the record in his speech last night,<sup>3</sup> but that he was worried that the members of Congress in conducting the inquiry would try to dig into the interior of the CIA and its covert operation. Such attempt would be

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 155.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 8, Document 153.

harmful to the United States and he was sure that the leaders of the Congress would realize this. He repeated that the Administration people would cooperate with the inquiry—he called it “investigation” several times.

Senator Dirksen<sup>4</sup> said that he was in G-2 during World War I and had some idea about intelligence and that he agreed with the President that intelligence operations by the Government should be held very tightly.

The President continued that it was also his decision to suspend flights.<sup>5</sup> He said that he was sure that the leaders of Congress would be able to see some photographs of the Soviet installations taken by the U-2 and that they would see how tremendous they were.<sup>6</sup> He pointed out that these flights had to be done from friendly bases and that when the U-2 incident occurred, there was a question of embarrassing our allies, and that was one of the reasons he made the decision to suspend the flights.

Senator Bridges<sup>7</sup> interrupted to ask why some of our allies protested about use of bases on their soil. The President responded that the leaders should remember that some of these nations are fairly weak militarily and are close to the borders of the Soviet Union. He said that the Scandinavian countries particularly were afraid of the Bear, that they were perfectly willing to participate if the projects and missions could be concealed but that when they were uncovered, the Scandinavian countries felt that they must disown them.

Secretary Herter said that the Pakistan reaction was very good—that they had registered a protest with us for their own protection but that they were not going to publish such a protest and were merely going through the motions.<sup>8</sup> Norway also made a protest,<sup>9</sup> but again Secretary Herter said those nations had to go through the motions for home consumption.

The President said that Ayub of Pakistan was a fine and staunch ally and dwelt for a few minutes on Ayub’s plan of basic democracies

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<sup>4</sup> Senator Everett McKinley Dirksen of Illinois.

<sup>5</sup> See Document 152.

<sup>6</sup> Allen Dulles displayed photographs taken by the U-2 during his testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 31; see Document 155.

<sup>7</sup> Senator Styles Bridges of New Hampshire.

<sup>8</sup> The text of the Pakistani protest note, which the Ambassador of Pakistan delivered to the Department of State on May 19, was quoted in telegram 2934 to Karachi, May 19. (Department of State, Central Files, 761.5411/5-1960)

<sup>9</sup> The Norwegian protest note, which Norwegian Foreign Minister Halvard Lange handed to Ambassador Frances E. Willis in Oslo on May 13, was transmitted in telegram 963 from Oslo, May 13. (*Ibid.*, 761.5411/5-1360)

where first the localities, then the provinces and finally the nation will be given the right to vote.

Senator Mansfield<sup>10</sup> said he was glad to hear that the President would support the “investigation” but that he and his colleagues preferred the word “inquiry”, that it would not be an investigation in the ugly sense of the word.

He then said that he wanted to ask one question. What would the President think if there were to be established in the Congress a joint Congressional Committee which would oversee the activities of the CIA.

The President responded that his own feeling was that the operation of the CIA was so delicate and so secret in many cases that it must be kept under cover, and that the Executive must be held responsible for it. He said that he would agree to some bipartisan group going down occasionally and receiving reports from the CIA on their activities, but that he would hate to see it formalized—indeed would be against the proposal made by Senator Mansfield.

Senator Russell<sup>11</sup> supported the President in this viewpoint and said that they do have a Congressional group that periodically went over reports. He said that they knew the U-2 planes were under construction a long time ago. The Senator added that he was not afraid of the Senators on security matters but that he was afraid of staff leaks. He put it quite bluntly when he said that any leaks of this nature from staffs would endanger the lives of men going into Russia and that he did not want it on his conscience.

Congressman Vinson<sup>12</sup> said that he was in complete disagreement with Senator Mansfield, that he supported Senator Russell, and that indeed in the House they had the same system as in the Senate.

Senator Hayden<sup>13</sup> also agreed with Senator Russell and Congressman Vinson—and Senator Mansfield’s suggestion therefore was rapidly knocked down.

Senator Fulbright<sup>14</sup> then said that he looked upon the work his Committee would do as a study or inquiry and that he hoped the word “investigation” would not be used in connection with it. He said he was glad to hear that the President approved of the inquiry and that he would do his best to keep it on the track and not let it stray. He also said

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<sup>10</sup>Senator Mike Mansfield of Montana.

<sup>11</sup>Senator Richard B. Russell of Georgia, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

<sup>12</sup>Representative Carl Vinson of Georgia, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee.

<sup>13</sup>Senator Carl Hayden of Arizona.

<sup>14</sup>Senator J. William Fulbright of Arkansas, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

that he would like to raise this question—that there was a tendency to revive political dialogue between the parties on who was soft on Communism. He said that if this continues, it would be disastrous, that it would get into the political campaign and that in the end, both parties might find themselves in the position where it would be impossible to renew contacts or continue them with the Soviets.

The President agreed with Senator Fulbright on this point and said that such a situation was easy to develop unless both political parties were careful of their language and their charges. He said that this was one of the things that Khrushchev was trying to do, to inject this matter into the American campaign, that he as President had refused to even recognize it and that he was sure the United States had leaders who had the sense to remain bipartisan in the international field. As for himself, the President said he would have no part of any such political activities.

Senator Fulbright said that his Committee would follow the same pattern as the Russell Committee had in the past, and that a transcript would be issued after the private meeting. The transcript, however, would be subject to censorship as far as security matters were concerned.

Senator Fulbright said that he would like to raise another point, and that was whether it was wise for the President to take responsibility for the U-2 flights. He said that he himself thought that disavowal would probably have been better.

In response the President said that when the plane was first missing, no one knew what had happened. It had been thought that if the plane got into trouble it would be destroyed, all material on board would be destroyed, and that the pilot would be free of any such material. On this assumption the story of a weather plane would have been able to stick. But, he added, the assumptions were incorrect. Within a few days the balloon was up. Senator Fulbright said that he still didn't think it was wise to take full responsibility. President Eisenhower responded that he thought it was, that if he didn't take responsibility someone else would have had to. He said he agreed that Khrushchev had tried to give him an out on this, but that he looked upon it as his responsibility, and he assumed it.

"Incidentally," he said with a smile, "if anyone were punished they should punish me first." He said that anyone sitting in his chair wouldn't want to put the CIA on the spot, and would not want to disown the CIA or its Director. He said that in addition to being President, he was also Commander-in-Chief, and he didn't see how he could duck this responsibility. He said he would be interested to see what the majority opinion of Fulbright's Committee would be on this point.

(At this point Congressman Vinson leaned over and whispered to me that the President was dead right, that Fulbright was all wrong on his thesis, and that he, Vinson, thought the President had acted quite right in assuming responsibility. He said—“That’s the kind of a man he is anyway.”)

Senator Johnson<sup>15</sup> then asked whether our intelligence would suffer by the discontinuance of the U-2 flights.

The President responded that when our friends were on the spot he had no alternative but to cancel out the flights. But he added that it was quite clear that with the advance of techniques these flights are not going to be as useful as they were in the past.

Senator Johnson then asked why they weren’t stopped before the Summit Meeting.

The President said again that this was a decision that had to be made. The previous flights had been successful. The ill-fated flight had to take advantage of the weather to get the needed information that would not be available later on, and the decision was to go ahead. It was just bad luck that the flight had failed.

Speaker Rayburn<sup>16</sup> interjected that as far as he was concerned, he had kept quiet about the whole thing.

The President responded that the people closely associated with the flight were sure that their cover story would hold and that that was the only reason he told them to put it out. He said that on reflection it would have been a good idea to count to ten, but that that was crying over spilt milk and that nothing could be done about it. It was then that the President said that he would study any recommendations that Senator Fulbright’s Committee might make.

Secretary Herter said that the whole matter was a question of alternatives—that the flights in the past had been successful, that the information they had collected was remarkable but that when the flight failed it was decided to make a frank and full story of the incident.

The President jocularly said that as far as punishment was concerned, the only way he could be punished would be by impeachment. Speaker Rayburn also replied jocularly that “you haven’t got long enough to go for that.” But then on a serious vein the Speaker told the President that whether mistakes had been made or not, “we are all in this together.”

The meeting then broke up with the President thanking all the participants for coming to the White House.

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<sup>15</sup>Senator Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas.

<sup>16</sup>Representative Sam Rayburn of Texas, Speaker of the House of Representatives.



The President then came to his office at the White House, and Bryce Harlow<sup>17</sup> and myself worked up the following statement which the President approved:

At the breakfast meeting with Congressional leaders of both parties, President Eisenhower discussed various aspects of the Paris meeting and the U-2 incident. The President told the leaders that he personally welcomed the bipartisan inquiry which will start tomorrow.

In turn, the entire group agreed that the inquiry should be conducted on a completely non-partisan and truly bipartisan basis. The President said that Administration officials concerned would cooperate fully and added that, of course, he would consider any recommendations such an inquiry might make. There was a frank and general discussion lasting over an hour.

**Jim Hagerty**

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<sup>17</sup>President's Deputy Assistant for Congressional Affairs.

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## 155. Editorial Note

On May 27 and 31 and June 1 and 2, Secretary of State Christian A. Herter, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles, Hugh L. Dryden, Deputy Director of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Under Secretary of State Dillon, Charles E. Bohlen, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates, Jr., testified in executive session before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on events relating to the summit conference in Paris in May. For the hearings of May 27 and June 1 and 2, without testimony the executive branch believed might jeopardize the national security of the United States, see *Events Incident to the Summit Conference: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 86th Congress, 2d Session* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960). For text of the full hearings, including Allen Dulles' statement on the U-2 and his responses to questions from committee members on May 31, see *Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series), 1960, volume XII* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), pages 279–359. For the report of the committee on the hearings, see *Events Relating to the Summit Conference: Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Together With Individual Views, Senate Report No. 1761, 86th Congress, 2d Session* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960).

156. Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Bohlen) to Secretary of State Herter

Washington, July 8, 1960.

SUBJECT

Memorandum of Conversation with Ambassador Menshikov

At lunch today alone with Ambassador Menshikov and Smirnovsky the following points emerged:

1. *U.S. Elections*

Before luncheon Menshikov asked me a whole series of questions concerning the American elections, possible candidates who had the best chance and who might be the probable Secretary of State. I told him that my information was almost entirely obtained from the press and, therefore, was about equal to his; that while it was obvious that Mr. Nixon would be the Republican candidate, the Democratic one still had elements of doubt despite the obvious lead of Senator Kennedy. In regard to the Secretary of State I had no information whatsoever and that I doubted if any of the prospective candidates had as yet made up his mind and I only knew the names that had been mentioned in the press and in the columns.

2. *U-2*

Menshikov both before and after lunch endeavored to develop discussion concerning the U-2 incident, and in particular why the President had accepted responsibility and had not apologized, which he maintained would have had a radical effect on Khrushchev's attitude.

I told him this was past history and I saw little point in going into it further, but I merely wished to make one point which related to Mr. Khrushchev's statement at the Czech Embassy on May 9<sup>1</sup> before there had been any assumption of responsibility by the President. I said personally I thought this indicated the embarrassing position in which Mr. Khrushchev had put the President had he refrained from accepting responsibility as Head of the American Government.

During the course of this conversation Mr. Menshikov made a remark which left me with the impression that insofar as the Soviet

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Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Bohlen and initialed by Bohlen; Max V. Krebs, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State; and Secretary Herter.

<sup>1</sup> See Documents 150 and 151.

Government and Khrushchev were concerned that unless there was at some time either by this or a future administration an “apology” for the U-2 incident, this would continue to be a big factor in Soviet/American relations. When, however, I challenged him on this saying that if they expect an apology from any administration, either from this one or its successor, they would wait a very long time and that I could only conclude if this was the Soviet position there was little prospect of any improvement in the future, he backed away from this by saying that what he had had in mind was that if a future administration would continue the policy of these “aggressive and provocative” flights there would be little prospect of improvement. I told him that President Eisenhower at Paris had already stated the flights would be suspended so long as he was in office<sup>2</sup> and while he could not bind his successor, it would seem to me that U-2 flights were no longer feasible and therefore should not be a future factor in our relations.

At one point in the conversation he asked me directly whether I as adviser on Soviet affairs had known or approved of these flights, to which I told him in the business we were both engaged in there were certain questions to which he could not expect an answer and this was one of them. He quickly abandoned that point.

At another point he mentioned that repetition of U-2 flights would lead to retaliation of the bases, to which I replied I thought this was an extremely irresponsible attitude to have the peace of the world hang upon the possibility of an accidental and unidentified plane flying over Soviet territory. His only answer was that they were able to tell what kind of a plane it was.

### 3. *Current Soviet Policy*

I took occasion throughout luncheon to emphasize to Menshikov that while in Soviet procedure it might be possible to run two contradictory policies, this was not possible insofar as the U.S. estimate of Soviet intentions was concerned. I pointed out that on the one hand they are reaffirming their policy of “peaceful co-existence”, settlement of disputes by negotiation, relaxation of tension, etc. while on the other the Head of their Government was losing no occasion to attack the U.S. I said I thought since he was returning to Moscow he should endeavor insofar as he could to make plain to the Soviet Government and Mr. Khrushchev that a continuance of the attacks on the President of the United States would have a long term deleterious effect on our relations; that no matter what the political persuasion in America was, an attack on the President was deeply resented and that if continued it would cer-

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<sup>2</sup> Eisenhower made this statement at the Heads of Government meeting at Paris, May 16 at 11 a.m.; see vol. IX, Document 168.

tainly affect the attitude of the new administration of whatever party it was.

Menshikov attempted to state that Khrushchev was merely replying to attacks on the Soviet Union by American officials but was unable in answer to my question to give any specific cases, except some statements he attributed to Senator Johnson and a speech by the Vice President in South Dakota, I believe.<sup>3</sup> I told him that during the presidential campaign obviously things were going to be said by the candidates which might be unpleasant but they did not have anywhere near the same significance as when said by the actual head of a foreign government, pointing out in this connection that the President had refrained from any reply in kind to Mr. Khrushchev's personal attacks on him and U.S. policy.

Menshikov attempted to depict the President's statement in regard to interference in domestic affairs as "insulting" to Mr. Khrushchev,<sup>4</sup> to which I obviously replied that Khrushchev had indeed commented rather freely on the forthcoming American election. I endeavored at this point of the conversation to impress on him the fact that continued assaults on the United States and the President would cause the American people and Government to have the gravest doubts as to the seriousness of Soviet professions or eventual improvement in relations, which incidentally Menshikov repeatedly asserted was their main goal.

#### 4. *Disarmament*

Discussion on disarmament revealed nothing new with Menshikov stressing the standard Soviet line that they wanted disarmament and we wanted controls. However, when he said they had broken up the Geneva conference<sup>5</sup> in order to get action and progress in the disarmament

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<sup>3</sup>Regarding Senator Johnson's statement, Menshikov was probably referring to Johnson's remarks at a news conference on July 5 announcing that he was a Democratic candidate for President. In his statement, he said that the next President would be greeted by new Communist threats, including a Russian submarine base in Cuba, which Menshikov specifically referred to later in this conversation. For text of Johnson's statement, see *The New York Times*, July 6, 1960. No record of a speech by Nixon in South Dakota at this time has been found. Reference may be to his speech at Minot, North Dakota, on June 20 in which he favored a U.N. pool of surplus food. Nixon indicated that Eisenhower was considering presentation of this proposal at the recent summit meeting, but Khrushchev's actions there had ruled out Soviet participation in the program at this time. For text of Nixon's speech, see *ibid.*, June 21, 1960.

<sup>4</sup>Reference may be to the President's remarks at his news conference, July 6, in which he referred to Khrushchev's "very crude attempts to involve himself and his influence, if any, in this country into our affairs," and he did not think either political party should be concerned about his attempted interference. (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960-61*, p. 555)

<sup>5</sup>The Soviet bloc walked out of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament meeting in Geneva on June 27.

field by bringing it into the General Assembly, he shifted the subject when I told him this was an extremely unconvincing reason since no one in their right mind could believe that a body as large as the General Assembly could make any concrete progress in disarmament. He incidentally denied what I had been told by Eaton what Zorin said in regard to Soviet ideas of inspection on any reduction-in-force levels,<sup>6</sup> i.e. that they would merely inspect the actual reduction without relevance to the previous and resulting levels. Menshikov said this could not be true but qualified it by saying it would depend upon the nature of the "agreement."

##### 5. *Cuba*

In connection with my statement that Soviet attitudes in regard to this administration would have a long-term effect on the attitude of the next administration, I mentioned that the Soviet attitude towards the Cuban situation would fit into this category. Menshikov immediately said what he had said to Senator Fulbright,<sup>7</sup> that Senator Johnson's statement about a submarine base was completely out of this world and provocative; the Soviet Union had no intention of establishing bases or any military arrangements in Cuba. He did say, however, that he saw no reason why the Soviet Union could not develop "friendly" relations with Cuba, since we had such relations and even worse from their point of view with many countries bordering on the Soviet Union. I told him I would not argue the question with him, but merely state the fact that too great Soviet involvement in Cuba would have a very important and lasting effect on our relations with the Soviet Union; that he could believe this or not but I was telling him a simple fact. I mentioned in this connection the effect Khrushchev's visit to Cuba would have in the event he came there and made the type of speech attacking the U.S. and its so-called imperialist policies. Menshikov sought to counter this statement by saying that he could not understand why the President visited countries bordering on the Soviet Union and Khrushchev could not visit Cuba. I said it was not so much the fact of the visit but what he would say when he got there, pointing out that the President on his recent trip to the Middle East<sup>8</sup> said no word whatsoever attacking the Soviet Union, but judging from Mr. Khrushchev's recent utterances there was no guarantee that he would not indulge in insulting statements concerning the U.S. if he visited Cuba, and attempt to arouse the people of Latin

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<sup>6</sup>The remarks of Valerian A. Zorin, Soviet Representative at the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament, to Fredrick M. Eaton, U.S. Representative at the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament, have not been further identified.

<sup>7</sup>No further record of this conversation has been found.

<sup>8</sup>Eisenhower visited Turkey, Greece, Afghanistan, India, and Iran in December 1959.

America against the United States. Menshikov said no one could foretell what Khrushchev would say, but with regard to the latter point he made the remark that "the people of Latin America" were already aroused against the United States, with which I disagreed.

#### 6. *Berlin*

Towards the close of the conversation Menshikov emphasized that any holding of the Bundestag as proposed in September in West Berlin would be a "provocation" and the Soviet Union would be faced with a situation when they would be forced to go ahead with the separate treaty. He appeared to be quite emphatic on this point and obviously had had specific instructions on it.

When I told him that in my experience when the Soviets used the word "provocation", it was grounds for doing something they intended to do anyway, he took very strong exception and stated that the current Soviet position was to leave Berlin alone for six to eight months as stated by Khrushchev, unless there was an attempt by Western powers, in particular West Germany, to introduce some new element into the situation such as the convocation of the Bundestag in Berlin. I told him this was a matter that was under consideration and on which we had not established our definite view.

In general, despite the nature of some of the exchanges, Menshikov was entirely friendly and spoke continuously of the importance of improvement of relations with the United States. Considering the wide range of subjects in the conversation, I believe he is interested in obtaining an estimate of the U.S. attitude to take back to Moscow where he admitted he would "possibly" speak at the Central Committee meeting on July 13.

He seemed to be particularly interested in developing the thesis that Khrushchev had had a very deep regard for the President but that his actions in assuming responsibility and not "apologizing" for the U-2 was largely responsible for the present state of affairs. My impression was that he was disappointed that I would not go into this aspect of the matter with him beyond the statements reported above.

He expects to be gone in Moscow two to three weeks.

## JULY–SEPTEMBER 1960: THE RB–47 AIRPLANE INCIDENT

### 157. Editorial Note

On July 1, the Soviet Union shot down a U.S. Air Force RB–47 airplane, which was on a proposed mission from the United Kingdom near the northern borders of Norway and the Soviet Union and over the Barents Sea, and rescued two of the six crew members. The two survivors were Captain John B. McKone and Captain Freeman Bruce Olmstead. President Eisenhower discussed his initial reaction to a report that the Soviets had shot down the plane in a telephone conversation with Secretary of State Herter on July 11; see Document 158. For text of the July 11 Soviet note presenting the Soviet account of the incident, see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 1, 1960, pages 164–165. For a memorandum of the President's telephone conversation with Secretary Herter on July 12 on the proposed U.S. reply to the Soviet Union, see Document 159. For texts of a statement by James Hagerty, the President's Press Secretary, July 12, and the U.S. note, July 12, claiming the RB–47 was never closer to the Soviet Union than about 30 miles and never penetrated Soviet territorial waters or air space, protesting the Soviet interpretation, demanding the release to U.S. custody of the two officers, and proposing a joint investigation with the Soviet Union and any other acceptable "authority," see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 1, 1960, pages 163–164. The United States also postponed negotiations with the Soviet Union on an air transport agreement scheduled to begin in Washington on July 18. For text of the aide-mémoire to the Soviet Foreign Ministry on July 14 declaring the postponement, see *ibid.*, page 165.

For texts of the President's July 13 statement agreeing to a full discussion of the RB–47 incident and his July 13 letter to Senator Mansfield responding to Mansfield's July 13 telegram in which he suggested the incident be brought before the U.N. Security Council, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960–61*, pages 578–579. Mansfield's telegram is in Eisenhower Library, White House Central Files. For texts of the July 15 Soviet note rejecting the U.S. version of the incident and the July 18 U.S. note reiterating its position, see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 8, 1960, pages 210–211. The National Security Council discussed the incident on July 15 and President Eisenhower and Secretary Herter met on July 19; see Documents 160 and 161.

The U.N. Security Council took up the Soviet complaint July 22–26. For texts of statements by Representative Henry Cabot Lodge on July 22, 25, and 26, see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 15, 1960, pages 235–244. For text of the Soviet draft resolution, which the Security

Council rejected on July 26 by a vote of two (Poland and the Soviet Union) to nine and a U.S. draft resolution, as modified, July 26, which the Soviet Union vetoed, and an Italian draft resolution, July 26, which the Soviet Union also vetoed, see *ibid.*, page 244. The discussion in the Security Council is summarized in *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1960*, pages 41-42.

For text of the August 2 Soviet note replying to the U.S. note of July 18, and the August 4 U.S. note reiterating its demand for the release of the two officers, see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 22, 1960, pages 274-276. Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson spoke with Nikita Khrushchev on the RB-47 case on September 8; see Document 162.

Meanwhile, because the RB-47 flight originated in the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union sent a protest note to the British Government. For the reaction of British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, including the text of the undated letter he sent to Khrushchev rebutting the Soviet accusations on the matter, see Macmillan, *Pointing the Way*, pages 237-241. The text of Macmillan's letter to President Eisenhower, July 18, which explained his decision to write a personal rebuttal to Khrushchev, as well as the texts of the British note to the Soviet Government and Macmillan's letter to Khrushchev, were transmitted in telegram 426 to London, July 18. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.11-EI/7-1860) Eisenhower's reply to Macmillan, July 21, congratulating him on his personal letter to Khrushchev, was transmitted in telegram 554 to London, July 21. (*Ibid.*, 711.11-EI/7-2160) The United States and the United Kingdom also reviewed their working arrangements concerning reconnaissance flights involving British territory. Memoranda of conversation between Ivan B. White, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, and British Ambassador Sir Harold Caccia on July 26, 27, and 28, and September 1 on this question are *ibid.*, 700.5411. Memoranda of conversation between White and T. Brimelow, Counselor of the British Embassy in Washington, continuing these discussions on September 9, 22, and 26 are *ibid.*

The United States and Norway also reviewed U.S. reconnaissance flights touching Norwegian territory. A memorandum of conversation between Secretary Herter and Norwegian Foreign Minister Halvard Lange on October 10 indicated that the United States agreed to give Norway advance notice of U.S. peripheral reconnaissance flights through military-to-military channels. (*Ibid.*, 700.5411/10-1060) A memorandum of conversation between Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, and Paul Koht, Norwegian Ambassador to the United States, October 13, confirmed this agreement. (*Ibid.*, 700-5411/10-1360)

The Soviet Union also raised the RB-47 incident, along with the U-2, in the U.N. General Assembly. For text of a statement by James



J. Wadsworth, Representative to the United Nations, in the General Committee on September 23, replying to the Soviet complaint on the two incidents, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 17, 1960, pages 622–623. On September 23, the General Committee rejected by a vote of 12 to 3 the Soviet proposal that its complaint be allocated to plenary consideration. For text of Wadsworth's statement, October 13, opposing the Soviet proposal to take up the two plane incidents in plenary session, see *ibid.*, November 7, 1960, pages 726–727. On October 13, the General Assembly rejected the Soviet proposal by a vote of 10 to 54 with 33 abstentions and referred the issue to its First (Political and Security) Committee, but discussion there was deferred until 1961.

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#### 158. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Herter

July 11, 1960, 3 p.m.

The President telephoned from Newport about ticker reports that the Soviets have shot down our B-47,<sup>1</sup> missing since July 1, over the Bering Sea and have picked up two survivors. The President said he had been told this plane was 30 miles off the coast when it was last heard from.<sup>2</sup> The President said this may be true, but said he has gotten to the point where he doesn't trust them to the slightest degree. The President said they have two of our people and if these two people say maybe they were lost then we are in for it again. The President said if we can prove it was not over territorial waters when it was shot down, will we break relations or what do we do.

The Secretary said it was a very serious situation; that Mr. Gates was with him now and they had been going over this; that they were

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations. No classification marking. Drafted by "ms," presumably Marian S. Stilson, Secretary Herter's personal assistant. The President was in Newport, Rhode Island.

<sup>1</sup> The number "24" was crossed through and "47" inserted by hand.

<sup>2</sup> Memoranda of telephone conversations between Goodpaster and Herter, July 11 at 12:55 p.m., 1:30 p.m., 2:15 p.m., and 2:30 p.m., indicated that Goodpaster was keeping the President fully informed on the plane incident as reports came in over the ticker. (Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations)

now in a briefing for the trip to Ottawa<sup>3</sup> but would resume discussion of the plane incident following that. The Secretary said we still do not have the actual note; all we have so far are ticker reports but we have our Code Room alerted to get us the text of the note the moment it is decoded.<sup>4</sup>

The President said he guessed we have the plot of the plane's course, but the President said he supposed our plot can be inaccurate. The President said he would be available to the Secretary except about 4:30–5:00 p.m. when he is going out on a ship. The Secretary said just as soon as we get the Soviet note, which will probably be after that time, we will get in touch with the President.

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<sup>3</sup> Reference presumably is to the meeting of the U.S.-Canadian Committee on Joint Defense held at Montebello, Quebec, near Ottawa, July 12–13.

<sup>4</sup> According to a memorandum of a telephone conversation with John Eisenhower on July 11 at 7 p.m., Herter still had not received the official text of the Soviet note. (Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations) Presumably he had the official text by the next morning when the United States drafted the reply to the Soviet note. Regarding the texts of the July 11 Soviet note and the July 12 U.S. note, see Document 157.

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### 159. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Herter

July 12, 1960, 11:50 a.m.

#### MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH THE PRESIDENT IN NEWPORT

The President telephoned with regard to giving the mileage figure in our reply to the Soviet note. The President said he didn't know how we can avoid this. The President said what it must be is that Defense and CIA must think they have tracking radar station the Soviets know nothing about.

The Secretary said most of it is carried on by another Government. The Secretary said it seemed to him if we make the flat assertion that the

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations. No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the source text.

plane was not over their territorial land we will be asked the same question as if we say it never got within 30 miles, and the Secretary said it weakened our note considerably not to specify.

The President said that is the way he feels, but said the only thing is if the station is there—but the President said we wouldn't have to say anything else.

The Secretary said it seemed to him we can always say it came from direct communication with the plane and the Soviets can't prove or disprove it one way or the other.

The President asked if we didn't have direct communication.

The Secretary said no; the plane was under orders to communicate if they were in danger but did not do so.

The President said it must have been hit by a sidewinder type of thing. The President said he personally did not see the percentage in saying the plane did not go over Soviet territorial waters and not being able to say it never went within roughly 30 miles.

The Secretary said it weakens our case if we don't do this.

The President asked what their argument against this was.

The Secretary said they just say it might compromise us, but if we make a flat assertion it didn't go over territory, he couldn't see the difference.

The President said if we say that and they say they had a tracking station and sent fighters to check up, will we have to say how we know they didn't go closer than 30 miles if you have somebody like the World Court involved would you have to say how you knew this.

The Secretary said only up to a certain point.

The President said here is what he thinks—there is a weakness in the argument of the Air Force and Intelligence. The President said they say we never got out of international waters and never went over Soviet territory and how can you say that if you don't know where the plane was. The President said it seemed to him their argument is silly.

The Secretary said that is just what we have been arguing with them.

The President asked the Secretary to pass along his view to Defense and CIA.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

**160. Memorandum of Discussion at the 451st Meeting of the National Security Council**

Washington, July 15, 1960.

[Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Extract—3 pages of source text not declassified.]

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**161. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower**

Newport, Rhode Island, July 19, 1960, 3:15 p.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Herter, Mr. Bohlen, Mr. Kohler, Mr. Wilcox, Mr. Hagerty, General Goodpaster

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

Mr. Herter next took up the subject of the RB-47 case in the UN. He said we are trying to marshal our facts into the strongest possible case. Mr. Kohler commented that there are a number of problems of classification, or declassification, that still remain. He said that he wanted to put merely a general pitch before the President during the meeting, with detailed language yet to be developed. He said we are being guided by the determination not to make use of any [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] even though this is some of the best that we have as to the location of the plane. He said a map is being prepared which will show a generalized track, and that there will be a general statement as to sources, not pinpointed to one specific method. The President stressed that we should not let ourselves be caught out in any story, as in the U-2 case, where we have to change our story subsequently or acknowledge an untruth. During further discussion I raised the question as to whether there had been consideration of the necessity for such flights maintaining radio silence, indicating that I saw no reason for this. The President agreed, and asked that I take the matter up with General Twining (which I did on the morning of Wednesday, July 20).<sup>1</sup>

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on July 21.

<sup>1</sup>No record of this meeting has been found.

Mr. Herter said he had some information that an American aircraft, which he thought was of C-47 type, had earlier on July 19th, through navigation error, flown directly over the Kuriles. The Soviets had apparently tried to bring it down but were unable to locate it in the fog and clouds.

Mr. Herter next took up the letter sent to the President from Mr. Macmillan enclosing the British reply to the Soviets on the RB-47 case, together with a personal letter from Macmillan to Khrushchev.<sup>2</sup> He commented that Macmillan has taken a very stout stand. The President read the letter (which I carried up to him) and said that he was glad to see it, commenting that many people have been saying that the British are being soft these days.

Mr. Herter then said that the question should be considered why the Soviets are taking the line that they have been taking. Their action gives real grounds for concern, since they are deliberately engaging in saber-rattling. He said that he and his associates, particularly Mr. Bohlen, have been giving some thought as to how best to handle this situation. One action that they have thought of is to work for something of major psychological effect through bringing our defense forces to a greater state of readiness. He asked Mr. Bohlen to outline this line of thought. Mr. Bohlen said the Soviet actions were now going beyond their usual ugly, angry reaction to every event they dislike. There has been a considerable shift in the Soviet behavior, evidenced by widespread campaign of inciting violence and disorder all around the world. He said that the threat to use force is something new in the Soviet tactics. This has now become something more than just words and needs to be met with more than words, since polemics and arguments are something they love for creating tension and disturbing world affairs. He said he had been casting about for some action that might quiet them down and show the world that the Soviets are not in position to rule the roost.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

In further discussion Mr. Bohlen said there are two hypotheses with regard to this change of Soviet line. The first, which he does not believe, is that they might have decided this is the best year for a showdown—that the correlation of forces is in their favor, and that the U.S. is paralyzed because of the forthcoming election. The second, which he is inclined to favor, is that they are having a good deal of trouble with Peiping and are adopting a militant line in order to cut out the Chinese.

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<sup>2</sup>See Document 157.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

Mr. Kohler then raised one point with regard to flights such as the RB-47. The British have apparently stopped theirs for the present and have suggested that we suspend our flights. We have held up certain of them but if we were to stop them for very long, it would be difficult and dangerous to start them up again. The President recalled his question (which Colonel Eisenhower had conveyed to General Twining) as to why the British could not take on the sector of northwest Europe for such operations. He agreed that if we suspend the flights for very long it would be very hard to start them up. The President thought that on the next such flight we ought to give consideration to announcing the route in advance.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

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## 162. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, September 8, 1960, 2 p.m.

692. I saw Khrushchev at 10 this morning. Conversation lasted 1 and 1/2 hours most of it without translation which is equivalent to over 3 hour conversation. I began by asking if he were familiar with my conversation with Gromyko and his reply on RB-47.<sup>1</sup> When he replied he was fully familiar with it I said since he was pressed for time I would not repeat my remarks and my purpose was simply to impress upon him personally the seriousness with which my government regarded their continued detention of the two American fliers. I said my government would regret if this should lead to undoing much of good work that had been done to improve our relations but did not see how this could be avoided. He interrupted to ask if this were threat. I said by no means, but they should realize that feeling was very strong on this subject. I knew there was a difference of opinion about facts but our people went on basis this plane had not violated Soviet frontiers.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.5411/9-860. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Another copy of this telegram bears the President's initials. (Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, International File)

<sup>1</sup> Thompson reported his conversation with Gromyko in telegram 532 from Moscow, August 25. (Department of State, Central Files, 761.5411/8-2560)

Khrushchev said they would have been glad if occasion had not arisen for them to hold these fliers. This was consequence of policy of US. He said assertions had been made by Secretary Herter and confirmed by President that we had right send planes over Soviet territory.<sup>2</sup> I interrupted him to deny this and said Secretary Herter's first statement may have been equivocal but this had been explained later. I also said President had said there would be no more U-2 flights.<sup>3</sup> He said type plane was of no importance. I said RB-47 was in entirely different category from U-2 flight. Latter had been sent to overfly their territory whereas RB-47 had strict instructions not to do so and we were convinced this had not happened.

Khrushchev said this was our opinion. If it had not done so it would not have been shot down. They had no aircraft carriers and it had been shot down by shore-based plane which was again proof.

I pointed out land-based planes can fly far from shore. Khrushchev remarked they had a limited radius of action though bombers could fly long distances. How far was US from border? Had plane lost its way? These flights were not good. US had taken upon itself right to fly planes over other countries. We had flown over Afghanistan, had wanted fly over Finland and had overflown India. We did not recognize sovereign rights of other countries. During Lebanon crisis we had flown over Austria without permission although both countries had undersigned Austria's neutrality. This policy increased tensions and they considered it a provocation. He pointed out that Soviet Union was different from what it had been in past and it was not Afghanistan. They had right and power to protect their homeland. He said we gave excuse that our planes had been sent on these missions to protect our security but surely we must realize that such flights threatened their security. He said suppose they had sent missiles without warheads over our territory. He repeated his conviction that President had not known of this flight although he had probably known in general about such flights and had given Allen Dulles a pat on the back when shown photos taken by these planes. He pointed out they had protested earlier flights of this kind both to US and to Security Council.<sup>4</sup> He said they had followed our plane on April 9 and on May 1 Malinovski had phoned him about second flight and he had given orders to shoot plane down. He said if this

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<sup>2</sup> Reference may be to Herter's May 9 statement attempting to justify the U-2 flights and the May 12 U.S. note to the Soviet Union on the incident. For texts, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 23, 1960, pp. 816–817, and May 30, 1960, p. 852. For text of the President's May 11 statement, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960–61*, pp. 403–404.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2, Document 156.

<sup>4</sup> Regarding earlier Soviet charges of incursions of its air space by U.S. military aircraft and balloons, see Documents 39, 43, 47, 50, and 55.

incident had not happened President would have had wonderful and hospitable reception in Soviet Union. What could he have done at Paris? They would have been ashamed to sit down with us in circumstances of this humiliation with no expression of regret on our part. We were not their neighbors but someone had wanted to spoil our relations though he was convinced that if President had been asked to clear this specific flight he would not have done so.

Khrushchev then said he wished to speak to me frankly and personally and said that his remarks were not for transmission to my govt. Although I am reporting on these separately<sup>5</sup> I here give only portion related to U-2 question. Toward end of our conversation I said our election campaigns were at best very sharp affairs and I thought it important that neither candidate be provoked into taking positions which would make impossible or long delay serious attempt to resolve our problems and to stabilize peace. Khrushchev said "Do you mean we should not put these fliers on trial before your elections?" I said, "No, I think they should be returned." He said "This is your first position but your second position is not to try them before the elections. We will think about this and discuss it in the govt and I am inclined to think you are right." He said that release of fliers before election would undermine their policy (I cannot recall his exact words here but believe his meaning was that this would be admission on their part that we were not to blame). He said they were aware of problem of our elections and did not wish to prejudice future possibilities for understanding.

I said he should not misunderstand me. In referring to our elections I was talking on whole broad question of our relations. My position was that they should return the fliers.

**Thompson**

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<sup>5</sup> See Document 163.

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### **163. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State**

Moscow, September 8, 1960, 5 p.m.

698. Eyes only Secretary. Following is that part of my conversation with Khrushchev which he did not want me to report.<sup>1</sup> He said he was

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/9-860. Secret; Priority.

<sup>1</sup> For reports on the rest of Thompson's conversation, see Documents 162, 164, and 165.



convinced that there was no possibility of resolving our problems during rest of current administration. He had been much attracted to President who perhaps suffered from fact he was too kind a person and was basically military man who did not fully understand politics. He was quite sure if President had been asked to authorize U-2 flight on May 1 he would not have done so even though he doubtless knew in general of these flights. He said he had tried to leave way out for President to disavow U-2 flight but he did not do so. He said of course he realized President had gotten into almost impossible position since it would have been difficult for him to go before American people and admit he had not known what was going on. They would wait until after our elections to make new effort to reach understanding. He frankly had not been charmed by Nixon who he thought was a careerist but they had no desire interfere with our elections and would stay out of them. He mentioned Nixon's speech in New York before Dentists' Convention<sup>2</sup> and said that had been stupid thing to do just before he, Khrushchev, was to visit US. However they were prepared to deal with Nixon if he were elected by American people. He knew little of Kennedy whom he had only met when he visited Foreign Relations Committee<sup>3</sup> and exchanged few words with him but he indicated both our parties represented our system including our monopolies. This however need not prevent agreement on subjects relating to peace.

I replied to effect he misjudged President. I said I would admit, although I did not have facts and it was probably indiscreet to say so, that in my opinion President had probably not specifically authorized U-2 flight. (Khrushchev interrupted to say "I will never exploit that remark against you.") I pointed out however that he himself had just made clear that he had not really left way out for President. I said moreover that at Paris he had immediately upon arrival given French written memo<sup>4</sup> which he knew would eventually become public knowledge and that this action had been interpreted by us to mean he did not really wish to settle U-2 affair. I said this was of course painful affair for me to have to discuss and there was no question but that plane had violated Soviet frontier. However, it seemed to us they had gone very far in over-exploiting it and this cast doubt on their intentions.

With respect to VP I wanted to make two remarks. In first place he had referred to VP's speech before dentists. While neither VP nor anyone else had ever mentioned this to me, it was common knowledge that

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<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 109.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 108.

<sup>4</sup> Regarding Khrushchev's memorandum, which he gave to de Gaulle on May 15, see Document 147.

shortly before this the VP had appeared before American veterans' organization and persuaded them not to pass resolution calling for demonstrations against Khrushchev during his visit to US.<sup>5</sup> This had caused many people to attack VP on ground he was pro-Communist. VP was politician and I personally thought his Dentists' speech should be regarded in light this background.

My second remark was that VP was as staunch an opponent of Communist system as Khrushchev was of capitalist, but I thought they would make mistake if they concluded from this that VP did not wish to reach agreements with Soviet Union in matters where it was to our mutual interest. I said I made these remarks not in any partisan manner as I knew both candidates and regarded them highly. I was equally sure that Kennedy would be prepared endeavor reach mutually satisfactory agreements. It was at this point that I referred to importance of Soviets not pushing either candidate into position which would jeopardize future negotiations. I said we already had number of acute problems and mentioned specifically Congo and Cuba. Khrushchev said they had no intention of increasing tensions but it was obvious from whole conversation they will maintain their present line at least until after our elections.

In discussing economic matters Khrushchev referred to conversations and arguments he had had with Harriman and Humphrey,<sup>6</sup> both of whom he characterized as intelligent men though he indicated he had not been pleased with the way Humphrey had handled matter of their conversation upon his return.

He referred to dissensions within US and in West and boasted theirs was monolithic system. (He did not mention China.) He said he had heard of discussions in West about dissensions within Soviet regime but said they were united not only in party but also in government, and pointed out he was head of both party and government. He said reports of his disputes with Suslov<sup>7</sup> and others were completely untrue and there was full agreement not only with him but with Mikoyan and Kozlov and others. He said even with Molotov there had not been basic

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<sup>5</sup> Apparently heeding Nixon's plea not to jeopardize the Khrushchev visit to the United States in 1959, the delegates to the American Legion convention in Minneapolis in late August 1959 killed resolutions condemning Khrushchev's presence and passed resolutions urging acceptance of his visit.

<sup>6</sup> Regarding Harriman's conversations with Khrushchev, see Documents 75, 76, and 86. Humphrey met with Khrushchev in Moscow on December 1, 1958; see vol. VIII, Document 84.

<sup>7</sup> Mikhail Andreevich Suslov, Secretary and Presidium member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

disagreement over his policies,<sup>8</sup> particularly coexistence, but said Molotov carried burden of his age and background in his thinking. He said coexistence was Leninist policy and even Stalin had agreed with it.

Throughout this conversation and to some extent last night<sup>9</sup> Khrushchev emphasized great importance he attached to fact that U–2 flights were made after his visit to US and especially his friendly conversations with President. He has thus indicated that not only was Soviet military prestige an important factor but also his own personal prestige in view of favorable remarks he made about President after his return to Soviet Union.

**Thompson**

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<sup>8</sup> During a shakeup in the Soviet Communist Party leadership in mid-1957, Molotov was removed as a member and Presidium member of the Central Committee of the party and from all other duties and was then appointed Soviet Ambassador to the Mongolian People's Republic.

<sup>9</sup> Thompson reported his conversation with Khrushchev on the U–2 incident, which Khrushchev initiated in the presence of the entire diplomatic corps during a Kremlin reception for the Vice President of the United Arab Republic on September 7, in telegrams 686 and 688 from Moscow, September 7. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/9–760)

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**164. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State**

Moscow, September 8, 1960, 5 p.m.

699. This morning when Khrushchev said he wished to speak personally, frankly and confidentially I could of course not continue to take notes and he spoke rapidly in Russian without translation. Following is therefore to best of my recollection but should not be taken literally.<sup>1</sup> In explaining why Soviet Union did not intend war and believed world would eventually go Communist and our grandchildren live under Communism, he said this was because Soviet system was better and

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/9–860. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.

<sup>1</sup> For reports of the rest of Thompson's conversation, see Documents 162, 163, and 165.

when this was demonstrated even we would adopt it. He then launched into long harangue, much of which along usual Communist lines. He referred to fact that our steel mills were producing at only half capacity and said this could never happen in Soviet Union and was fatal handicap to US. He had read statements by President Truman about our rate of production<sup>2</sup> but said the high rate in US at end war was due to necessity of supplying war-torn countries. Now even Japan and Germany were able sell in US market. He was utterly convinced Soviets would exceed our production per capita by 1970. He mentioned unemployment in US and referred to his conversation with American labor leaders in San Francisco.<sup>3</sup> He contemptuously referred to them as having sold out to capitalism. He realized I would not agree with such appraisal but that was his view. He referred to opportunities in Soviet Union, citing his own case. He mentioned some figures regarding surplus agricultural products in US and said "Imagine what we could accomplish with our system if we had such surpluses to dispose of" and then indicated they expected to achieve them. He said he had read statements of American Congressmen and others arguing against American tourists visiting Soviet Union and said it was natural they would be favorably impressed by Soviet Union after picture that had been painted for them. He said our two defectors<sup>4</sup> had been astounded at what they had seen of Soviet Union and mentioned incidentally that they were intelligent people and that Soviet Union had not known about them nor had any responsibility for their defection. He said Francis Powers was also a not unintelligent fellow and had been much impressed with what he had been shown on trips around Moscow. He said in these circumstances how could anyone in his right mind in Soviet Union want to settle matters by war with awful destruction this would bring. He said I had lived in Soviet Union now for three years and had seen with my own eyes progress they had made. He observed that we often spoke of freedom under our system but I surely had been able to see the extent to which people enjoyed freedom in Soviet Union. He started to say I was free to go anywhere I liked but then corrected this to Moscow and its environs. He exuded confidence and it was impossible not to be convinced that he genuinely believed what he was saying.

When he had finished this long discourse I pointed out he had covered a large field and that his time was limited as this was his last day in Moscow. I would therefore not deal with all points he had made. I said I

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<sup>2</sup>Not further identified.

<sup>3</sup>See footnote 2, Document 122.

<sup>4</sup>William H. Martin and Bernon F. Mitchell, both former employees of the National Security Agency, announced their defection to the Soviet Union in a news conference in Moscow on September 6.

was glad he believed they could win through economic competition since this meant they did not intend use force. I had no reason therefore to disabuse him of his conviction but rather than argue some of the economic points he had made I would send him two articles by American economists which would summarize for him some thinking in US on question of economic competition. (I later sent him articles by Willard Thorp and W. Rostow contained in part III of Joint Economic Committee of Congress on comparisons of US and Soviet economies.)<sup>5</sup> I said both our systems had strengths and weaknesses. They frequently spoke of overtaking us in butter production but we had all the butter we could use and why should we try to out-produce them. Their rate of industrial production was higher than ours but our system was geared to produce what we needed. He indicated his agreement with this. I said however I wished particularly to draw his attention to what I considered an error in their thinking; this was their tendency to over-simplify question of US motives in foreign relations. I said they tended to interpret them entirely in terms of class warfare and this was quite wrong. He had mentioned repeatedly monopoly capitalism and I said that while profit motives could on occasion enter into these things, this factor very minor. I said we were fully as confident as he was in our system and would welcome peaceful competition to show which was better.

Referring back to that part of his conversation which related to U-2, I said one thing had very much struck me in what he said now and in many previous statements by himself and others in Soviet Govt; that was references to being treated as equals, humiliation, Soviet power, etc. I said I knew there was never any intention to humiliate Soviet Union or discount their power. I had lived long time in both countries and thought to some extent I was in position to understand both points of view. No question that both our peoples wanted peace and that neither govt wanted war. Since each knew this true, each tended to regard his own actions as purely defensive but this was not view taken by other side. There was distrust, suspicion, and even fear on both sides and this accounted for some actions of those responsible for security.

Khrushchev repeated they desired understanding and did not themselves intend do anything provocative, at which point I again pressed for release of RB-47 fliers.

**Thompson**

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<sup>5</sup> For the papers by Willard L. Thorp, Merrill Center for Economics, Amherst College, and Walt W. Rostow, economist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, see Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, *Comparisons of the United States and Soviet Economies: Papers Submitted to Panelists Appearing Before the Subcommittee on Economic Statistics*, 86th Congress, 1st Session (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959), Pt. III, pp. 571–608.

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**165. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State**

Moscow, September 9, 1960, 9 p.m.

713. In reviewing my cables on Khrushchev conversation<sup>1</sup> I find following points not covered.

In disclaiming any intent to use force for spread of Communism Khrushchev observed that of course once a revolution took place Soviets would give assistance to govts representing working class.

With respect to Powers trial he mentioned statement made by American lawyer (presumably Hallinan)<sup>2</sup> on justice of trial.

In discussing conviction that Soviet would overtake US by 1970 Khrushchev made clear this included consumers goods such as textiles.

Khrushchev disavowed any intention of interfering in our elections. He knew he had been criticized for attacks he had made on President (not clear whether he was referring to world press or to remarks I had made to Kosygin).<sup>3</sup> He asked however how he could have received President. He said "If someone comes to visit you and you catch him redhanded throwing a dead cat over your fence, you could not respect yourself if you received him as an honored guest."

**Thompson**

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/9-860. Secret; Limit Distribution.

<sup>1</sup> Documents 162, 163, and 164.

<sup>2</sup> The Soviet Government invited Vincent Hallinan, Progressive Party candidate for President in 1956, to observe Powers' trial in Moscow. TASS, the Soviet press agency, quoted Hallinan as having said the Powers' trial was absolutely fair. (*The New York Times*, August 19, 1960)

<sup>3</sup> Reference presumably is to a conversation Ambassador Thompson had with Khrushchev and Aleksei Nikolaevich Kosygin, First Deputy Prime Minister, on the U-2 incident on June 30, in which Khrushchev criticized the President's handling of the incident. When Khrushchev left the meeting, Thompson told Kosygin that further criticisms "of this nature would have effect in US far beyond anything which I believed they intended. Kosygin made no significant reply but appeared embarrassed." (Telegram 3282 from Moscow, June 30; Department of State, Central Files, 761.5411/6-3060)

## SEPTEMBER–OCTOBER 1960: VISIT TO THE UNITED NATIONS OF NIKITA S. KHRUSHCHEV

### 166. Editorial Note

On September 1, the Soviet Government officially announced that Chairman Nikita Sergeyeovich Khrushchev would head the Soviet Delegation to the 15th Session of the U.N. General Assembly opening in New York on September 20. For text of the brief Soviet announcement, see *The New York Times*, September 2, 1960. Documentation on U.S. participation in the 15th Session is printed in volume XI, pages 305 ff.

The prospect of Khrushchev's appearance at the General Assembly prompted discussion in the Eisenhower administration on the President's participation there as well. In a memorandum to Eisenhower, September 2, Secretary of State Herter wrote that Khrushchev had also "written Nehru a letter urging him to come and the Soviets are undoubtedly trying to line up other heads of state and government." Herter advised that the President authorize the Department of State to instruct U.S. Missions to inform local governments that Eisenhower would not participate in the work of the General Assembly or be there while Khrushchev was, would not address the General Assembly during the opening general debate, and had not yet made a firm decision to appear there. Eisenhower initialed Herter's memorandum. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series) This memorandum is printed in volume XI, page 305. Instructions conveying these Presidential decisions were transmitted in circular telegram 341 to all diplomatic posts, September 2. (Department of State, Central Files, 320/9–260)

In the following weeks, the United States and Soviet Union exchanged statements and aides-mémoire on security arrangements and administrative matters relating to Khrushchev's visit. The text of a Soviet note, September 6, requesting protection arrangements for Khrushchev was transmitted in telegram 599 from USUN, September 7. (*Ibid.*, 320/9–760) A similar Soviet request to Dag Hammarskjöld, U.N. Secretary-General, September 6, was transmitted in telegram 600 from USUN, September 7. (*Ibid.*) For text of the September 9 U.S. aide-mémoire, which among other things restricted Khrushchev's travel to Manhattan Island in New York, and a September 10 Department of State statement on these restrictions, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 3, 1960, pages 521–522. For text of the September 13 Soviet communication charging that the U.S. travel restrictions were unprecedented in the history of the United Nations and could not be considered "other than as an unfriendly act toward the U.S.S.R.," and the U.S. reply of September 13, see *ibid.*, pages 522–523.

A similar Soviet communication to Hammarskjöld, September 13, and Hammarskjöld's September 15 letter to James J. Wadsworth, U.S. Representative at the United Nations, urging some relaxation on the restrictions imposed on Khrushchev and mentioning in particular a lifting of the ban on Khrushchev's visiting or staying at the Soviet residence in Glen Cove, Long Island, were transmitted in telegram 698 from USUN September 15. (Department of State, Central Files, 320/9-1560) A September 16 Soviet note replying to the September 13 U.S. note is attached to a memorandum of a conversation between Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, and Georgi M. Kornienko, Counselor of the Soviet Embassy. (*Ibid.*, 320/9-1660) Guidance to U.S. Missions on the travel restriction of Khrushchev to Manhattan was transmitted in circular telegram 418 to all diplomatic posts, September 16. (*Ibid.*, 320/9-1660). The memorandum of conversation and circular telegram 418 are printed in volume XI, pages 324-327.

For text of Eisenhower's statement, September 17, urging "the traditional dignity and cooperation of our people" in the face of "an extremely difficult security problem" arising from "the forthcoming attendance at the United Nations General Assembly of nearly a score of Chiefs of State or Heads of Government, several of whom have been bitterly antagonistic to the United States," see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960-61*, page 702.

Another Soviet note delivered to the Department of State on the evening of September 17 protested the "campaign of hostile anti-Soviet public acts" being planned for Khrushchev's arrival in the United States. For text, see volume XI, pages 328-329. It was transmitted in telegram 427 to USUN, September 17. (Department of State, Central Files, 320/9-1760) The text of the U.S. reply to Hammarskjöld's September 15 letter was transmitted in telegram 431 to USUN, September 18. While not included in the text of the reply, instructions in the same telegram said that the Department of State was willing to convey orally to Hammarskjöld when he was given the letter that the United States would consider a request for a specific visit by Khrushchev to Glen Gove, such as a weekend, if the Soviet Delegation made the request at least 48 hours in advance. (*Ibid.*, 320/9-1560)

Meanwhile, in a telephone conversation with Secretary Herter on September 8, Goodpaster said that President Eisenhower had reconsidered his earlier decision to stay away from the General Assembly and now thought he should make the first speech there. He wanted to make the speech even if Khrushchev was present and then leave without meeting with him. Goodpaster indicated that Eisenhower's administrative assistant Malcolm C. Moos and C.D. Jackson, Vice President of *Time* Inc. and a frequent consultant to the President, as well as James Shepley from Vice President Nixon's office were already working on a draft of



Eisenhower's speech, which would not be "a polemic against Khrushchev but it would be constructive and positive in tone." The main thrust of the speech "would be to come up with proposals in a constructive way on how to put the world on a better footing." Herter remarked that while there was a lot to be said in favor of a speech by the President, opinion in the Department of State was divided on it, and he believed the President should not make the speech. (Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations)

Khrushchev arrived in New York on the Soviet ship *Baltika* on September 20. For text of his arrival statement in which he emphasized disarmament and challenged Eisenhower to join him in U.N. summit talks, see *The New York Times*, September 20, 1960.

Eisenhower decided to go ahead with his speech and addressed the General Assembly on September 22. For text of his speech, which stressed non-interference in Africa, especially during the Congo crisis, the Food for Peace program, outer space, arms control, and peaceful change in the developing world, and touched on "several immediate problems," such as the RB-47 incident, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960–61*, pages 707–720.

On the next day, September 23, Khrushchev delivered a long speech, which demanded among other things the ouster of Secretary-General Hammarskjöld and suggested his replacement by a three-man body representing the West, Soviet bloc, and neutral nations. He also suggested the United Nations leave New York, promoted disarmament and "peaceful coexistence," and reiterated Soviet charges of overflights of Soviet territory by U.S. aircraft. For text of Khrushchev's speech, see U.N. doc. A/PV.869 or *The New York Times*, September 24, 1960. Khrushchev spent the weekend of September 24–25 at Glen Cove.

On September 30, President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India, President Sukarno of Indonesia, President Abdul Gamal Nassar of the United Arab Republic, and President Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia sent a letter and a joint draft resolution, both dated September 29, to the President of the General Assembly requesting "as a first urgent step" toward easing the current world tension a renewal of the recently disrupted contacts between Eisenhower and Khrushchev "so that their declared willingness to find solutions to outstanding problems by negotiation may be progressively implemented." For texts of the letter and draft resolution, see volume XI, pages 370–371.

In another speech to the General Assembly on October 1, Khrushchev attacked the United States and its allies and charged that only the admission of Communist China to the United Nations could avert the danger of nuclear war. For text of Khrushchev's speech as well as statements by Representative Wadsworth on the same day, see U.N. doc. A/

PV.881 or *The New York Times*, October 2, 1960. Following his speech, Khrushchev went to Glen Cove for the weekend of October 1–2.

For text of Eisenhower's October 2 letter rejecting the plea of Nkrumah, Nehru, Sukarno, Nasser, and Tito for a meeting with Khrushchev, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960–61*, pages 742–744. For text of Khrushchev's reply of October 3 requiring U.S. condemnation of its "unprecedented treacherous acts" before agreeing to resume talks with Eisenhower, see *The New York Times*, October 4, 1960.

For texts of Khrushchev's speech to the General Assembly on October 3 renewing his attack on Hammarskjöld and the Secretary-General's response that same afternoon, see U.N. doc. A/PV.882 or *The New York Times*, October 4, 1960. Khrushchev visited Glen Cove again October 8–9 before addressing the General Assembly on disarmament on October 11 and on colonialism on October 12. For texts of his and Wadsworth's October 11 and 12 speeches, see U.N. docs. A/PV.900 and A/PV.901. Extracts were printed in *The New York Times*, October 11 and 12, 1960. Khrushchev left New York on the evening of October 13 to return to the Soviet Union.

Eisenhower's recollections of his and Khrushchev's visits to the U.N. General Assembly are in *Waging Peace*, pages 576–589. Khrushchev's recollections are in *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament*, pages 462–486.

Documentation on the visits of Khrushchev and Eisenhower to the 15th Session of the U.N. General Assembly is in Department of State, Central Files 033.6111, 320.611.61, and 761.13. Some documentation is also in the Eisenhower Library in the following files: Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series; Whitman File, International Series; Whitman File, DDE Diaries; and Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations.

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#### 167. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, October 14, 1960, 5 p.m.

971. Lacking many of the clues as to meaning Khrushchev's behavior in New York must be available to Dept, for example in form of reports his private conversations from other delegates, I hesitate comment. Following points however may be worth noting.

Khrushchev's behavior in virtually following Chinese line in fact while paying only lip service to his own previous policies would appear

constitute further evidence of depth Chinese-Soviet split and Khrushchev's apparent need undercut Chinese influence with other satellites on ground he too soft toward West. Having taken this line however believe it more than ever incumbent upon Khrushchev to obtain at reported forthcoming meeting of Commie parties<sup>1</sup> complete Chinese acceptance of Soviet leadership and probably specific Chinese commitments to support certain Soviet policies and to refrain from some specific actions objected to by Soviet leadership. In Commie tradition handling such matters, maximum Soviet desire at such meeting would probably be purge of Chinese party leadership. Minimum would be Chinese self criticism and some commitment for future along lines indicated above. While likely some formula will be sought endeavor conceal split from West, I continue believe unlikely gap between two parties can be completely closed.

While I continue believe Khrushchev will seek meaningful negotiations with West next year, long-range implications of his UN behavior are that present line is not merely trial balloon or temporary expedient. (Soviets are of course capable of abrupt changes when any particular policy proves ineffective and probably do not realize difficulties of democracies in making similar changes.)

Most important actions with long-range implications would seem to me to be following:

- 1) Revelation determination force world to accept concept of three blocs.
- 2) Clear revelation of determination prevent UN from becoming effective peace-keeping body.
- 3) Refusal accept opportunity keep cold war out of Africa.
- 4) Change in attitude toward Algerian question and relations with France.
- 5) Linking of disarmament with form of UN and Chinese participation.
- 6) Blatant reassertion of Communist ideological goals and methods.

In preliminary comment on foregoing, indications appear to be that Khrushchev has given up any real expectation of achieving agreement on disarmament except possibly in atomic-testing field. Believe important factor in Khrushchev's actions was incorrect appraisal of world political situation. Feel certain that present Khrushchev line will be viewed with disfavor by most of Soviet people including many important officials. Impossible to predict however extent to which such disapproval may have any effect upon future developments. Khrushchev's present

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<sup>1</sup> Reference is to a conference of world Communist leaders held in Moscow during most of November 1960.

situation both with respect to Chinese dispute and Soviet opinion is likely make it more difficult for him to accept any setback in near future such as on Berlin situation. Consciousness this fact borne out by extent to which Berlin question played down in Soviet press.

Thompson

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**168. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Soviet Union Affairs (McSweeney) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Kohler)**

Washington, October 26, 1960.

SUBJECT

Effects of Khrushchev's Behavior at UNGA

SOV is in general agreement with Mr. Nunley's penetrating evaluation of Soviet tactics and objectives at the UNGA.<sup>1</sup> We concur particularly with his conclusions that Khrushchev sought by his outrageously belligerent behavior to weaken Western influence in the UN by expanding in the course of time the role of the Soviet bloc and of the neutral nations in both the UN constituent organs and in the UN administrative apparatus and to diminish the possibilities of opposition by the uncommitted countries to Soviet objectives, particularly through gaining broadened acceptance of the two-world concept.

SOV offers the following observations which may throw some additional light on Khrushchev's motivations and on an assessment of his performance.

1. The central current fact of the Soviet Union's international relations is the existence of a real and formidable challenge to Soviet leadership of the Sino-Soviet bloc. It is the primary current task of Soviet foreign policy to repulse this challenge and reassert the unquestioned Soviet leadership of the bloc. Furthermore, the Soviets have shown themselves clearly determined to reassert this leadership on the basis of the essential general tenets of Soviet foreign policy: Soviet foreign policy should pursue a relatively low risk course of action; bloc objectives should include disarmament on terms acceptable to the Soviets and

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.13/10-2660. Confidential. Drafted by Armitage on October 26 and sent through Davis. Initialed by Armitage, McSweeney, Davis, and Kohler.

<sup>1</sup> The memorandum from William T. Nunley (EUR) to Kohler, October 17, attached to the source text, is not printed.

should be pursued, when appropriate, through negotiation with the major Western powers; in the current period the bloc should cultivate better relations with all non-NATO countries and for this purpose be prepared to extend economic assistance to non-communist governments of some of these countries whatever their attitude toward domestic communist parties. The Chinese Communist position on many of these points requires a substantially more uncompromising opposition to non-communist political forces. Therefore, as part of its campaign to re-establish its hegemony in the bloc the Soviet Union must show itself as an outspoken and effective champion of anti-imperialism in order to avoid the possibility of its position being undermined by the Chinese Communists. This imperative colors its actions in the international arena.

This is not to say that the Soviet line itself does not accommodate a substantial measure of militancy and belligerence whenever it is deemed to suit Soviet purposes. Given the advent of numerous new African members to the UN, the Cuban situation, the unsettled state of the Congo and the Soviet set-back there and the growing Algerian disillusionment with the prospect of accommodation with France, the Soviets would under almost any circumstances have appeared in the UN as the outspoken and anti-imperialist champion of the formerly colonial areas. However, it would be our conclusion that extremes to which the Soviet performance went on some of these issues, the Soviet *de facto* recognition of the PAG, and the lengths to which Khrushchev carried his attack on Hammarskjöld and the UN structure were importantly influenced by the requirements of Soviet problems within the bloc. Likewise, the future Soviet development of these positions will be to some extent conditioned by the measure of Soviet success with the Chicoms.

Whatever their motivation, Khrushchev's very excesses in the UN will make any moderation of his conduct more dramatic to less sophisticated observers.

2. Soviet objectives toward the underdeveloped and newly independent countries have distinct short- and long-term aspects. In the short run, the Soviets are striving in these countries to overcome their fears of Communism, to gain a substantial measure of acceptability and to associate them with the bloc in frequent opposition to the Western powers. In the longer run, the Soviets hope by the force of Soviet example and by the strengthening of local Communist forces to gain political control within these countries. These two objectives are frequently complementary and reinforce each other. However, this is not always the case and it is well to bear in mind that the long-range objective—Communist political control of these countries—is more fundamentally important to the Soviet Union than the shorter range aims and also more fundamentally adverse to our own national interests.

We make this point because it seems relevant to an assessment of the measure of Khrushchev's success with these countries at the UNGA. As Mr. Nunley has cogently pointed out, there is small comfort in any revulsion in these countries towards Khrushchev's behavior if their probable political reaction over the next few years is to incline in the direction of the extreme Soviet position as a means of "seeking accommodation." However, it is possible that the fright technique may induce these countries to behave on the international scene more according to Mr. Khrushchev's likes and at the same time make them more wary regarding Soviet intentions within their countries. From some of the reports of Nasser's conversations,<sup>2</sup> it would seem that he gained a deeper appreciation of the fact that Khrushchev's behavior in sum had said that "those who oppose me I will break." Quite possibly, other neutralist leaders reacted similarly. Without the felt presence of Communist power *within another country*, the scare tactic may have limited effectiveness. The reaction may be to take steps to see that the menacing power does not acquire the potential to execute what Khrushchev's behavior so clearly implied.

Although there can be no immediate conclusions in this regard, there may be indications of the reactions of neutralist leaders in the domestic political field before Khrushchev's maneuvers on the UN front have run their course.

3. SOV would doubt that Khrushchev believes that he can best weaken the free world collective security systems "through a process of intimidation"—the British Labor Party notwithstanding. He recognizes the limits of the tactic and seems well aware that a major Stalin mistake was an over-reliance on threats and bluster. We believe it more likely that, having abandoned the prospect of negotiations in 1960, he has discounted the losses involved in greater Western opposition in order to make gains in and with the uncommitted countries and to regain bloc leadership.

4. We would emphasize what appears already to be an apparent Soviet gain from Khrushchev's menacing behavior. He frightened most neutrals into not opposing him directly and in the process strengthened the acceptance of the "two-world" concept with a moral equation of the sides. In this context Nehru's departing statements<sup>3</sup> were particularly useful to him. The trend toward neutralism was strengthened with its implied denial of the expansionist nature of Soviet foreign policy.

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<sup>2</sup> [Text of footnote not declassified]

<sup>3</sup> On his last day in New York, Nehru stated that both the United States and the Soviet Union were more alike than any two other countries. His remarks were reported in *The New York Times*, October 10, 1960.

# CYPRUS

## JANUARY–APRIL 1958: U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE FOOT PROPOSALS

### 169. Memorandum From L. Bruce Laingen of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs to the Director of the Office (Jones)

Washington, January 2, 1958.

#### SUBJECT

Outlook for Cyprus

#### *Introduction*

For the present, two avenues of approach appear to offer some hope for progress toward eventual solution of the Cyprus question. The first is in new British proposals based on recommendations by Governor Sir Hugh Foot.<sup>1</sup> The second is through Mr. Spaak.<sup>2</sup> From present reports, the first appears likely to concern itself chiefly with self-government; the second must be primarily concerned with the international aspect. There should be no reason why these cannot proceed concurrently. The United States should provide all appropriate support and encouragement to these two approaches.

#### *Discussion*

For the immediate future, progress depends almost entirely on Governor Foot and the recommendations he is now making to HMG. Should his efforts lead to no progress the situation on the Island will deteriorate into a shaky truce at best and full scale violence at worst, with increased intransigence in their respective positions by both Greece and Turkey. It is, therefore, of utmost importance that Foot's efforts have some success.

Foot is reported to have concluded that a long term settlement is not possible now. He may propose that HMG therefore buy time now by strenuous efforts to get agreement in the field of self-government,

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Source: Department of State, NEA/GTI Files: Lot 61 D 249, Background and Briefing. Secret.

<sup>1</sup> Sir Hugh Foot assumed the post of Governor of Cyprus on December 3, 1957. After 4 weeks of meetings with Greek and Turkish Cypriot representatives, he returned to London on January 1 for discussions with officials in the Foreign and Colonial Offices on future British policy toward Cyprus.

<sup>2</sup> In May 1957, NATO Secretary General Paul-Henri Spaak informally approached the Turkish Government with a proposal for the creation of an independent Cyprus. The Turkish Government rejected this proposal and Spaak suspended his diplomatic efforts. For documentation, see *Foreign Relations, 1955–1957*, vol. XXIV, pp. 269 ff.

thereby helping to dissipate prejudices and build confidence—both between Cypriots and British and between Turks and Greeks on the Island. Once this is done he reportedly believes that the atmosphere can be created in which talks on the future international status of the Island can lead to some measure of agreement. (Greek Ambassador to London Seferiades is reported to feel much the same way.)

Foot therefore disagrees with HMG's present thinking that there is no chance for progress toward self-government on the Island until agreement has been reached among the parties concerned on the international level.

We have no indication as yet of the details of Foot's recommendations. They are not likely to have much chance of success with the Greeks unless they include an offer to resume negotiations with the Cypriots and unless they indicate a willingness for open discussion on broad principles of self-government, stated by HMG without insistence on the lines of previous offers such as the Radcliffe Proposals.<sup>3</sup> They will need to be liberal. They should be dramatic in nature—such as the setting of a definite date for a conference in London and a future date to follow for Island-wide elections. Such a conference would have to include both Turk and Greek-Cypriot participants. Greek and Turk Cypriots can both present good arguments why it would be hard for each to accept such an invitation. But it would be hard for them to refuse, especially if the proposals are liberal, dramatic and include timetables.

The British offer would have to refer to self-determination. HMG's present position on this was stated in December 1956. At that time HMG reaffirmed its previous recognition of the principle, "when the international and strategic situation permits and provided that self-government is working satisfactorily." This statement also referred to partition as one of the options which must be available when self-determination is applied.

A restatement of this kind is not likely to be acceptable to the Greeks now. On the other hand, a watering-down of this statement would be unacceptable to the Turks. In these circumstances it should suffice for the British to simply re-affirm acceptance of the principle and to pledge continued efforts in the international field for its application in a manner recognizing the legitimate interests of all concerned.

This, in other words, would be embarking upon discussions on self-government and self-determination simultaneously and concur-

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<sup>3</sup> The Radcliffe Plan of December 1956 offered Cyprus a constitution under British sovereignty. The United Kingdom would retain its bases and control over the foreign affairs, defense, and internal security of Cyprus while a locally-elected legislature would be responsible for all other areas of policy. The Greeks were to have a guaranteed majority in the legislature.



rently. There is no reason why this cannot be done. Spaak has not exhausted his possibilities, especially by using the Trieste type negotiations.<sup>4</sup> Spaak is reluctant to approach the Turks directly. We are not prepared to do so. Moreover, Spaak does not personally have the time which the continuing exchange of views is likely to require. It is time that we approached Spaak again to suggest again that the methods used to settle Trieste might usefully be tried in the Cyprus problem.

Would British proposals along these lines stand a chance of acceptance? The problem will be least with the Greeks, although Turk-Cypriot participation in all aspects of self-government talks will be hard for Makarios to accept. The Turk-Cypriots in their present mood will be extremely suspicious of any self-government proposals, since they see even self-government as only another road to enosis on the part of a Greek-Cypriot dominated government.

However, the Turks could hardly refuse to permit consideration of self-government proposals. And they would still be assured of talks on the international level as a forum for their insistence on something that could be seen as a variant on partition. Moreover, while a Greek-Cypriot dominated legislature may quickly begin demanding enosis, it may be restrained in doing so by the realization that to do so would only encourage the Turk-Cypriots in demands for partition. Finally, the Turks would have a good guarantee against enosis in continued control over foreign affairs by the British.

### *Recommendations*

A new beginning must be made on Cyprus and there is hope for it in both of the types of talks envisaged above. It is of overriding importance that the improved atmosphere which has resulted from Foot's efforts to date not be dissipated by new British proposals which succeed in taking us no further than have others since the Harding-Makarios talks broke down.<sup>5</sup>

We should, therefore

(1) be prepared to give our support to new proposals which HMG may make based on the Foot recommendations, especially if they are along the above lines,

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<sup>4</sup> Negotiations over the final disposition of the Free Territory of Trieste began in February 1954 among the three powers that provided the military government for the area, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia. In June 1954, the three powers agreed to a draft agreement that was then presented to Italy. The Italian Government directly participated in the final stages of the negotiations, which were concluded in October 1954.

<sup>5</sup> These talks, held intermittently from October 4, 1955, to March 9, 1956, were broken off by the arrest and deportation of Makarios. The talks centered on the terms of Cypriot self-determination.

(2) encourage the British to make new and liberal proposals along these lines in self-government if HMG asks our views,

(3) depending upon British intentions, give consideration to instructing USRO to encourage Spaak (as set forth in CA-3732, October 21, 1957)<sup>6</sup> to consider further moves on the Trieste pattern as offering the best chances at this time for a NATO contribution toward settlement of the international aspects of the question.

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<sup>6</sup>CA-3732 transmitted a memorandum on Cyprus for the use of USRO in discussions with Spaak. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/10-2157)

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## 170. Letter From Foreign Secretary Lloyd to Secretary of State Dulles

London, January 9, 1958.

DEAR FOSTER: I should like you to regard this message as personal for you yourself for the present (except of course we would have no objection at all to your telling the President anything you wish of its contents).

We have decided to have another attempt to make progress over Cyprus.

Sir Hugh Foot, the new Governor, has done a remarkable job in the four weeks in December that he was in Cyprus. He has achieved a marked change in the atmosphere by his personal courage in his public appearances notwithstanding the risk of terrorist attack, by acts of clemency and by successfully getting into contact with many Cypriots publicly and privately. He has been back with us for a few days and he is in complete agreement with all of us on the plan set out in the enclosures to this letter.<sup>1</sup>

We cannot abandon the assurances which we have given to the Turks, i.e. that the Turkish Cypriot community should have the right to

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Source: Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548, Cyprus. Top Secret. Attached to a letter from Caccia to Dulles, January 9.

<sup>1</sup>Not printed. The proposals were: 1) a 7-year period of self-government for Cyprus under the aegis of the British Government, 2) self-determination on equal terms for both Greek and Turkish Cypriots at the end of this period, and 3) the retention of British bases on Cyprus. The British Government also expressed its willingness to accept at any time a solution that had the agreement of the Greek and Turkish Governments and the two Cypriot communities. Further, the British Government offered to end the state of emergency in force on Cyprus and release persons detained by British authorities on condition that the cease-fire proclaimed by EOKA on August 5, 1957, continue. The British Government had imposed a state of emergency throughout Cyprus on November 26, 1955.

determine its future as a community in just the same way as the Greek Cypriot community. We cannot abandon that position because:

- (a) We publicly pledged ourselves to it;
- (b) It would have a fatal effect on the Turkish Government if we did;
- (c) Opinion here would be very difficult over a change;
- (d) Unless we maintain that ultimate position there is no chance of the Turkish Cypriots co-operating in anything else.

Therefore we propose to maintain our pledge that partition will be one of the options open in the event of self-determination.

On the other hand, partition is very difficult and dangerous, and any attempt to do it could lead to all sorts of consequences. Therefore we have to leave the way open for some settlement which would be neither Enosis nor partition. Foot believes that if he is given five years without terrorism he can build up a feeling in the island against both these extreme courses and produce a situation in which both communities in Cyprus will decide to remain united.

The plan enclosed is put for convenience in the form of statements which would be made in Parliament and in Cyprus. This cannot happen for at least a fortnight.

You will see that the plan provides for the retention of bases to meet the strategic requirements of Her Majesty's Government and her allies. Such British bases would be under British sovereignty, but the possibility of there being a base to be operated by the Turks is left open. The Turks have hinted once or twice that if they had a base on the island they might regard that as a substitute for partition.

One advantage of the scheme as set out is that it offers to the people of Cyprus the immediate prospect of the ending of the state of emergency and the release of most of the detainees, after which Makarios would be allowed to return to Cyprus.<sup>2</sup> Foot feels that Makarios will not dare come out against a plan which has this as one of its features. He feels passionately that he can persuade Makarios and the Cypriots to co-operate in the plan. He feels that if Makarios does not condemn it the Greek Government will hesitate to do so. He also wants personally to expound the plan to Makarios before the Greek Government are told.

There are now so many pitfalls surrounding this subject that I am not at all confident that we shall get acquiescence in the scheme. Nevertheless we propose to let Foot have a shot at it. We propose to tell the Turks about the plan rather in advance of the Greeks. We hope that they

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<sup>2</sup> Makarios was deported to the Seychelles Island on March 9, 1956. On March 28, 1957, he was released from detention with permission to live wherever he chose except Cyprus. The Archbishop moved to Athens.

will agree to see Foot to hear his explanations and also to satisfy themselves that he is the sort of man who will keep his word about treatment of the Turks and will not give in to terrorism should it be renewed. According to the development of those conversations, we should start to tell the Greeks and Foot will be available to go to Athens where he would see Makarios. The meeting of the Baghdad Pact<sup>3</sup> is particularly awkward, but I believe it better to try and get this over with the Turks before the Pact meeting. Anyhow, we cannot easily wait because Foot must return to Cyprus and every day after he returns, and nothing is said, increases the likelihood of terrorism again.

We shall of course tell Spaak something of this fairly soon and we have it in mind that Foot should see Barbour in London before he leaves. In the meantime however I am asking you to keep the contents of this to yourself, because I want to delay to the last possible moment knowledge that a plan has been made.

I would think that the best help that you could give, if you were willing to do so at the appropriate time, would be appeals to Menderes and Karamanlis to be statesmen enough to see that this dispute is poisoning the atmosphere in the Eastern Mediterranean and if the chance is not taken to get some peaceful development in Cyprus without prejudice to the final solution, the chances of disaster are greatly increased. I am sure that to get even the degree of acquiescence from the Turks and Greeks which is necessary if the plan is to work at all, your help will be vital.

Our Ambassador in Ankara will put the plan to the Turks as soon as possible.<sup>4</sup> How we proceed after that will depend upon their reactions. I will keep closely in touch with you.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Scheduled for January 27–30 in Ankara.

<sup>4</sup> The British proposal was presented to the Turkish Government on January 10. In telegram 1856 from Ankara, January 10, Ambassador Warren reported the Turkish Government's version of the meeting with the British Ambassador and initial Turkish reaction. The Turkish Foreign Ministry continued to favor partition of Cyprus. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/1–1058)

<sup>5</sup> Printed from an unsigned copy.

**171. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State**

Athens, January 14, 1958, 4 p.m.

1936. Ankara telegram to Department 1856.<sup>1</sup> Present self-determination formula will obviously mean partition to Greeks and hence in normal course of events would be promptly, emphatically and emotionally rejected. There is, however, a faint possibility that Foot might prove sufficiently persuasive in direct conversation to convince Makarios he had nothing to lose by agreeing to plan. In this case GOG could almost certainly be counted on to go along. However, in order to give such approach even its slight chance of success, plan must be presented secretly and GOG and Makarios be given time consider it. That is, Foot's meeting with Makarios must be exact opposite of Lennox-Boyd's sensational arrival to present Radcliffe proposals.<sup>2</sup> A real covert operation is indicated.

There is also one other modification of Foot plan which it appears to us might have some minute possibility of success. Self-determination formula might be officially interpreted as meaning "on basis acceptable to both Greek and Turk Cypriot communities." This would be regarded by Greeks as giving minority equal voice with majority and hence unpalatable, as it would certainly also be to Turks, but there might be bare chance of both accepting it if GOT and GOG could at same time be persuaded agree that continuation Cyprus problem seriously prejudices national interests of both, endangers unity of western alliance and plays into Soviet hands; that no solution is viable unless it is willingly accepted by both sides; and that both governments are therefore determined to negotiate secretly and present to HMG for approval an agreement on international status of island.

This procedure would give GOT direct hand in determining Cyprus future as well as the prompt settlement it considers essential. To GOG it would give opportunity to negotiate under conditions enabling concessions to be made backed by approval of Makarios on Cyprus (this depends, of course, on always questionable assumption that Makarios

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/1-1458. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Ankara, London, Nicosia, and Paris.

<sup>1</sup> See footnote 4, Document 170.

<sup>2</sup> Alan Lennox-Boyd, the British Colonial Secretary, visited Athens and Ankara with little advance public warning December 13-16, 1956, to acquaint the Greek and Turkish Governments with the contents of the Radcliffe Plan. On December 19, Lennox-Boyd unveiled the plan, which included British willingness to consider partition, in a speech to Parliament. For text, see House of Commons, *Parliamentary Debates*, 5th Series, vol. 562, col. 1268. The Greek Government rejected the Radcliffe Plan the same day.

would “play ball” and that he would prove flexible enough to meet Turk requirements).

I have discussed above with British Ambassador<sup>3</sup> and found completely pessimistic, both re possibility Greek acceptance Foot plan and re possibility developing any other formula capable of winning sufficient acceptance from parties concerned to prevent serious deterioration Cyprus situation. Turkish Ambassador Vergin has talked to him along same relatively flexible lines he has to Averoff (Embtel 1850)<sup>4</sup> and me (Embtel 1819),<sup>5</sup> but British Ambassador is convinced that Vergin does not mean what he seems to imply and that there does not exist any potential basis for direct Greek-Turk negotiation. [3 lines of source text not declassified]

While situation looks extremely discouraging, it is obviously of utmost importance that every possible effort be made to make Foot plan succeed and if this impossible to try immediately to find some alternative or at least stop-gap to prevent Cyprus situation from again getting out of hand. Above suggestions made with this thought in mind. In present circumstances we consider them worth a try.

**Penfield**

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<sup>3</sup> Sir Roger Allen.

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 1850 from Athens, January 2, reported that Averoff had recounted his talks with the British and Turkish Ambassadors in which he stated that any settlement regarding Cyprus must include self-determination for the population of the island and the return of Makarios. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/1-258)

<sup>5</sup> Telegram 1819 from Athens, December 27, reported that the Turkish Ambassador expressed his government's willingness to hold discussions on Cyprus and its openness to new suggestions for a settlement. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/12-2757)

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## 172. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State

London, January 14, 1958, 7 p.m.

4121. Eyes only for Secretary. On British initiative I saw Governor Foot of Cyprus this afternoon in office of FonOff Assistant Under Secretary Rose at whose request report of conversation is being sent on this eyes only basis.

Conversation which lasted an hour consisted of exposition by Foot of his thinking underlying plan for new step re Cyprus which is essentially set forth in Ankara's 1856 rptd London 172, January 10.<sup>1</sup> Foot does not expect enthusiastic reception this plan on part either of Turks or Greeks but he is hopeful that extent protest both sides can be minimized to degree which will in fact constitute reluctant acquiescence. Re the Turks he emphasizes that plan does not constitute change from UK assurances already given on December 19, 1956<sup>2</sup> that no final solution will be reached without the concurrence of the Turkish community and that plan envisages partition as minimum possibility to be considered at end seven year period in the event no better solution is then presented or is reached in meantime. In his public statements in regard to this plan Foot will make clear that he does not like partition and is determined to work for better solution although partition cannot be ruled out now. Re the Greeks Foot proposes to present plan in person to Makarios and to take line that he convinced this is Archbishop's last opportunity to participate in forward progress of island, that if he does not acquiesce in termination of the emergency and participate in negotiations for constitution he may expect to remain in exile indefinitely and that in fact present plan gives Archbishop all he has been demanding in that it is directly aimed toward self-determination after a specified period and self-determination on the only basis which is realistic in the light of the interests of the communities on the island. While Foot anticipates Makarios will protest and may raise conditions to acceptance, Foot is hopeful that he can convince Makarios of the soundness of this plan sufficiently so that the Archbishop will in effect acquiesce. In that case Foot feels that the Greek Government although also protesting would have no choice but to similarly acquiesce.

Insofar as the reaction among the Greek and Turkish Cypriots is concerned the Governor estimates that the plan will be welcomed by the large majority who are increasingly fed up with current uncertain conditions on the island. He appreciates the risk that will be taken in terminating the emergency but thinks that the risk is acceptable and will be minimized by relief among those whose relatives will be released from detention who now constitute a wide percentage of the families on the island.

In regard to procedure Foot is awaiting the agreement of the Turkish Government to his proceeding immediately to Ankara if possible tomorrow or the next day, following which and if but only if he achieves satisfactory Turkish response to his proposals, he will proceed to

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<sup>1</sup> See footnote 4, Document 170.

<sup>2</sup> In Colonial Secretary Alan Lennox-Boyd's speech to Parliament. See footnote 2, Document 171.

Athens to see first Makarios and immediately after the Greek Government. If all goes well he would hope to be back in Cyprus early next week.

Foot reiterated with emphasis throughout conversation his conviction that this is last opportunity in foreseeable future to take useful forward step toward solution Cyprus problem and that he sees no alternative to plan as proposed. If plan falls through he anticipates renewal of violence and assesses EOKA's capabilities as greater now than heretofore. He would consequently expect violence on intensified scale and is not optimistic that UK would be able to pacify the island by force in any reasonable period. In this connection he noted that EOKA currently appears to enjoy wider sympathetic support among island inhabitants than at any time in the past which would enable relatively small number terrorists to create major trouble and enhance difficulties of security forces and inter-communal strife could be expected to be greater than heretofore.

In the circumstances Foot concluded that next few days are crucial and expressed firm hope that US whose intervention might be decisive would see its way to supporting this proposed plan with the Greeks and the Turks vigorously at the appropriate moment. His hope would be that we could instruct our Embassies in Ankara and Athens to coordinate with their British colleagues and make appropriate strong representations to the Turkish and Greek Governments immediately following the contemplated British presentations if and when Foot discusses proposal with those governments.

**Barbour**



**173. Letter From Foreign Secretary Lloyd to Secretary of State Dulles**

London, January 16, 1958.

DEAR FOSTER: Harold Caccia will have told you of the Turkish Government's reaction to our ideas on Cyprus policy<sup>1</sup> and of the further communication which I am today instructing our Ambassador in Ankara to make.<sup>2</sup> The Turkish Memorandum is about as bad as it could be, but I am not disposed to take their reply as a final refusal. I think that the best chance of persuading them to go along with the course of action on which we have decided will be in personal discussions with Menderes at the end of next week.<sup>3</sup> I much hope that when you arrive in Ankara you will give me your valuable support in inducing them to be more reasonable. Between now and then, it may be possible to clear up certain points in further diplomatic exchanges between the Turks and ourselves, but we shall not run after them. In any case we shall have enough trouble with the Greeks and Makarios.

I should be very glad to have any comments you might care to make on the whole correspondence.<sup>4</sup>

Yours ever,

Selwyn<sup>5</sup>

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Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Top Secret. Attached to a letter from Caccia to Dulles, January 17.

<sup>1</sup> On January 14, the Turkish Government rejected the Foot Plan and suggested that the British Government instead announce that Cyprus would be partitioned at the end of one year and simultaneously invite the Greek and Turkish Governments to a meeting to discuss final disposition of the island. In the event of a Greek refusal to attend such a meeting, the British and Turkish Governments would then settle the Cyprus issue between themselves. The Turkish proposals were summarized in telegram 1910 from Ankara, January 16. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 747C.00/1-1658)

<sup>2</sup> A copy of the instructions sent from London to the British Embassy in Ankara was attached. In it the British Government repeated that it would continue to rule Cyprus until a political solution satisfactory to both Greek and Turkish Cypriots was found. The British Government accused the Turkish Government and press of stirring up unrest among Turkish Cypriots. The British Government also stated that it would refrain from further public statements on Cyprus and consultations with the Greek Government until Lloyd had met with Turkish leaders in Ankara.

<sup>3</sup> In his covering letter to Dulles, Caccia reported that Lloyd proposed to fly to Ankara on January 24 and hold bilateral talks with the Turks January 25-26.

<sup>4</sup> In a January 18 letter which he handed to Caccia for delivery to Lloyd, Dulles praised the British Government for its efforts to promote a settlement in Cyprus and encouraged the continuance of these efforts. He added: "I suppose that it is highly unlikely that the Turkish position will be amended to the extent that the proposals in their present form will ever be found fully acceptable. Indeed, the Greeks too can be expected to raise serious questions, particularly with respect to the possibility of partition on which we share your own reservations. We had hoped, however, that the plan would be near enough to the mark so that it might offer a basis for starting negotiations toward a settlement." Dulles then offered U.S. assistance in persuading the Greeks and Turks to accept the plan "as a point of departure for discussions." (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204)

<sup>5</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

174. Letter From Prime Minister Karamanlis to President Eisenhower

Athens, January 17, 1958.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: It was a great pleasure for me to receive your letter of December 31st,<sup>1</sup> which gives me the opportunity to express to you once more my deep appreciation of the personal contact that we had in Paris.<sup>2</sup>

Although the last meeting of NATO could have been more constructive, it undoubtedly contributed, thanks to your presence and to your sincere and generous suggestions, to the reaching of a closer cooperation between the members of the North Atlantic Alliance and to the strengthening of the morale of the Free World.

I have studied with great attention the part of your letter concerning the British colony of Cyprus, which has been struggling for years in order to obtain its freedom. I regret that, as it appears from the contents of your letter, I was not able during my visit to you to explain fully the Greek views on the question.

The diplomatic talks, which you advocate between the immediately concerned Governments, could and should solve some particular subsequent questions.

However, it is almost impossible from the practical point of view to solve the main question if the fundamentally concerned part, i.e. the Cypriot People, were not to participate to [*in*] the elaboration of any solution and were not to be given the clear perspective that they will at some time be able to decide upon their own fate.

Let us suppose that a decision not acceptable to the Cypriots were taken without them being consulted. Would we then be called upon to cooperate with the ruling Power in order to impose by force such a decision?

Greece, without betraying her duty towards her oppressed children, but at the same time conscious of her obligations towards the Free World, has always pursued solutions apt to combine the satisfaction of the fair claim of the Cypriot people not only with the particular interests of Gt. Britain and Turkey, but also, in a general way, with those of the Atlantic Alliance. In this endeavour, Greece has suggested ways of solv-

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Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 64 D 174, Karamanlis. No classification marking.

<sup>1</sup> In his letter, Eisenhower stressed the need for cooperation among the NATO allies, encouraged Greece to seek a peaceful solution to the Cyprus problem through consultations with Turkey, and indicated that the United States was ready to offer "appropriate assistance" to further a settlement. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 747C.00/1-458)

<sup>2</sup> At the NATO Heads of Government meeting in Paris, December 16-19, 1957. For a memorandum of Eisenhower's December 18, 1957, conversation with Karamanlis, see *Foreign Relations, 1955-1957*, vol. XXIV, pp. 523-525.

ing the problem, which have been warmly praised by personalities of international weight. Consequently, Greece is not to blame for the non-solution of the Cypriot question. Greece has always shown understanding. It is time for the other parts concerned to show a similar spirit. And indeed it is high time, because the invincible might of the ideals which guide today the fortunes of Mankind, is bound to bring sometime freedom to Cyprus. But it is possible in the meantime that the Cypriot question should provoke new complications which could have perilous repercussions in the Balkans, the Middle East, and even on the general policy of my country.

As you know, Mr. President, Communism in Greece presents no danger from the viewpoint of numerical force. However, on account of the Cypriot question, the attitude of our Allies on that matter and the tragic events of Istanbul and Smyrna,<sup>3</sup> the Greek people were subjected to a bitterness that has encouraged, at the time of the last general election, the formation of a "Popular Front"<sup>4</sup> of which the averted access to power might have created a crisis in the relations of Greece and the Free World.

In spite of this, the Greek people, linked traditionally to the Western World, followed my leadership,<sup>5</sup> having faith as well in my assurance that the Allies of Greece would show the proper understanding and that the misunderstandings brought about by the Cypriot question would be cleared.

I am sure that you will not fail to appreciate, Mr. President, the difficulties which are created for my Government by the frustration of the expectations of the Greek people.

Nevertheless, despite these hindrances, I wish to assure you, Mr. President, that, as long as my Government are in power, they will continue to handle the Cypriot question in a manner which, without driving them away from their national duty, will serve as well the interests of the Free World. In this arduous endeavour, your support, to which my Government attaches a particular importance and for which I wish to thank you, will be of the greatest help.

Please accept, Mr. President, with the expression of my sincere feelings of friendship, the assurance of my highest regard.

Sincerely

**Karamanlis**

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is to serious anti-Greek riots which took place in these two cities in September 1955. The riots were sparked by the bombing of the Turkish Consulate in Salonika.

<sup>4</sup> Prior to the February 16, 1956, general elections in Greece, the parties of the center and left formed the "Democratic Union" coalition. The Communist-dominated United Democratic Left Party (EDA) was a part of this coalition.

<sup>5</sup> Karamanlis' National Radical Union Party won a majority of 165 seats in the February 1956 elections.

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**175. Letter From Prime Minister Menderes to President Eisenhower**

Ankara, January 18, 1958.

MR. PRESIDENT: I wish to thank you for your kind letter of December 31, 1957,<sup>1</sup> handed to me by Ambassador Warren.

I was indeed very happy to meet with you again in Paris<sup>2</sup> and to have the honor to exchange views on various very important problems interesting our two countries, the NATO Alliance, as well as the whole community of free nations.

I fully concur with your views that the Paris meeting further strengthened the unity and cooperation among NATO members and that it served the peaceful purposes of our Alliance.

Turkey, imbued with the same spirit of solidarity, has made and continues to undertake sincere and serious efforts in order to bring about an early and just solution to the Cyprus dispute which has been created through no fault of hers.

As I have endeavoured to explain in detail when I had the honor of meeting with you, the importance of Cyprus for the security of Turkey is indeed very great. Moreover the future and fate of our brothers in Cyprus constitutes a national cause upon which the Turkish nation dwells with utmost sensitivity. Consequently, it would have been logical for Turkey to insist on the retrocession of the Island to its former possessor, in the event of a change in the international status of Cyprus. Turkey, however, fully aware of the necessity of finding an early solution to this dispute which is upsetting the unity of the free world, at the expense of sacrificing her rights in this cause, followed a conciliatory and moderate course of action and accepted the principle of partition which was advanced as a compromise solution. In this connection, I would like to emphasize this important point: The idea of partition is not a proposal advanced by Turkey. This idea was first put forth by Greece and then supported by the United Kingdom as a compromise solution, and was accepted as such by Turkey.<sup>3</sup>

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Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Menderes. No classification marking.

<sup>1</sup> This letter was similar to the one sent to Prime Minister Karamanlis; see footnote 1, Document 174. A copy of Eisenhower's letter to Menderes is in Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Menderes.

<sup>2</sup> Memoranda of President Eisenhower's conversation with Menderes, December 18, 1957, are printed in *Foreign Relations, 1955-1957*, vol. XXIV, pp. 747-749. The two Presidents were in Paris to attend the NATO Heads of Government meeting.

<sup>3</sup> The reference is unclear. The first British Parliamentary discussions on a possible partition took place in July 1956. The British regarded partition as the least favorable solution to the Cyprus problem. No references to a Greek proposal for partition were found.

This should suffice to indicate that the solution of the dispute through partition should in no way represent a strange and adverse solution and should not, therefore be considered as an unwelcome solution by the interested parties. It should be realized that since 80% of the Greek population of the Island is known to be communistic any solution which would make it possible for the communist elements to assume a dominating position on the Island would constitute a danger for all peace loving nations and particularly for the NATO community. Viewed in this context and considering the security of Turkey, the true extent of Turkey's sacrifice in accepting partition will be duly appreciated and accepted.

As it can be seen, there is no doubt that the position of the Island represents as such a very serious problem. Yet the struggles which have been going on for years and the regrettable developments of the last few years have made it crystal clear to every single Turk that the solution of this problem is of primordial importance not only for the existence of the Turks in Cyprus but also for Turkey's own security. Consequently, permit me to assure you, Mr. President, in the most sincere manner that the freedom of action of my Government or any other future Turkish Government has been extremely restricted by the national will and desire.

The Government of the United Kingdom has recently brought to the attention of the Turkish Government certain proposals which that Government is considering to adopt in order to solve the Cyprus question, and has requested the Turkish Government's opinion in this respect. We have studied these proposals with the utmost care and goodwill and have already communicated to the Government of the United Kingdom our own views on these proposals.

I consider it my duty to note with great satisfaction your efforts for finding a just and equitable solution to this problem between the interested parties.

I have no doubt that your continued efforts will constitute an important element in facilitating the early solution of this problem.

It is our earnest hope that the sacrifices made by Turkey in order to arrive at an agreement will not be in vain and that, sooner or later, the other interested parties will deem it necessary to follow the same path. Turkey considers herself, by all means justified to expect such a response from the other interested Governments.

While ending my letter, I wish to thank you once again for your message which is an expression of your close concern for the solution of this problem which is of such vital importance for Turkey and the maintenance of NATO solidarity.

Sincerely yours,

**A. Menderes**

**176. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State**

Athens, January 22, 1958, noon.

2015. I have had long talk with Averoff on Cyprus. He has what he considers reliable information that British statement will provide period self-government to be followed by self-determination on following basis. Greek Cypriots will be asked their wishes; if they choose Enosis, Turk Cypriots will also be given opportunity join Turkey. At same time this statement made by HMG Foot will make statement opposing partition. Although this formula much more favorable to Greeks than one put to Turks<sup>1</sup> (about which Averoff appears to have no knowledge), Averoff says he is convinced it would cause violent adverse reaction both on Cyprus and in Greece which neither Makarios nor any Greek Government could control. Only suggestion he had was to leave formula for realization self-determination completely vague which might give GOG some possibility controlling reaction. We agree that the vaguer the formula the better and suggest this point might be made with British. Averoff said he had no information on what British intend to do about Makarios but urged importance prompt return Cyprus.

Although he refused to be pinned down, Averoff seemed to be thinking along lines second and third paragraphs Embtel 1936.<sup>2</sup> I questioned him again about his conversation with Turkish Ambassador (Embtel 1850)<sup>3</sup> and he stated emphatically and categorically his conviction that Vergin was in fact making a Turkish offer to settle on a basis of Greek acceptance two basic points, (1) Turkish troops on Cyprus and (2) special minority arrangements which would remove Turks from Greek domination. Vergin closed conversation by saying "whenever you have anything to tell me, I am authorized immediately to take plane to Ankara to report".

As usual, I emphasized to Averoff virtues of quiet diplomacy and particularly urged that whatever British statement might say, GOG [*1 line of source text not declassified*] if unable approve statement, at least play for time by reserving position on basis certain "clarifications" must first be sought.

It is very difficult to believe that Vergin would have talked to Averoff the way he apparently did (and certainly did to me) unless he

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/1-2258. Secret; Limited Distribution. Repeated to London and Ankara.

<sup>1</sup> For a summary of the British proposals, see footnote 1, Document 170.

<sup>2</sup> Document 171.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 4, Document 171.

was in fact authorized to hint at a new Turkish offer which is at least worth further exploration by GOG. In any event, important points are (1) Averoff thinks Turks mean business on basis possibly acceptable to GOG and (2) there seems little else on horizon which has possibilities for preventing disastrous deterioration Cyprus situation.

Assuming British do in fact act along lines Averoff anticipates, most important prerequisite to initiation secret Greek-Turkish negotiation would be further period calm until Makarios actually returns Cyprus and gives his blessing (we cannot expect GOG to move before this happens). It might well be impossible [*possible*] secure continued peace if Department were prepared issue statement to effect USG greatly concerned over possibility further deterioration Cyprus situation, is therefore reviewing possible action it might take to help and calls upon all parties to follow course of reason and moderation. We should promptly inform GOT and GOG of our willingness make such statement and emphasize that its purpose is to enable them to control situation until they are in position to enter into direct negotiations on basis Averoff–Vergin conversation. We should then be prepared issue statement very promptly after British statement and before probably unfavorable public reactions in both Greece and Turkey can snowball. Despite obvious risks involved, believe above has real chance of opening way to Cyprus solution but in any event would recommend Department urgently consider it in absence any other alternative to meet very serious present situation.<sup>4</sup>

**Penfield**

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<sup>4</sup>In telegram 2318 to Athens, January 30, the Department of State declined to intervene publicly in the Cyprus issue, pointing out that a British statement on the future of the island would depend on the conclusions of the Lloyd–Menderes talks and that the content of the most recent Turkish proposals to Greece was unlikely to elicit a favorable response from the Greek Government. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/1–2258)

## 177. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State

Ankara, January 22, 1958, 5 p.m.

1973. Tehran for Secretary delegation. Re Nicosia telegram 198 to Department.<sup>1</sup> Embassy continues be sincerely concerned at reported drift on Cyprus toward new period violence. Renewal EOKA terrorism would be most unfortunate. Embassy sympathetic to Nicosia efforts encourage sufficient progress toward solution in order that Greek "moderates" be enabled control extremists.

While recognizing seriousness situation Cyprus, Embassy strongly of opinion joint or separate Anglo-American appeal to Turks might provoke most positive unfavorable reaction by GOT. Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Zorlu under various forms heavy pressures and are neither in mood change GOT position nor is it evident they feel politically strong enough to do so. Considering importance of reaching successful conclusion current BP meeting Ankara, Embassy strongly recommends Secretary State consider seriously probable unfavorable reaction to discussion Cyprus problem while in Ankara.<sup>2</sup>

As indication intensity Turkish feeling, British Embassy representative has quoted senior RPP leader Ismail Rustu Aksal as stating few days ago that Cyprus question now is entirely question Turkish prestige vis-à-vis Greeks. Aksal indicated he not particularly favorably inclined toward solution partition but national Turkish feeling against Greeks has revived spirit of 1920 war of independence.<sup>3</sup> Therefore, he strongly backs GOT determination not retreat one inch from insistence on partition.

Embassy believes Cyprus impasse has reached stage when, notwithstanding possibility renewed violence Cyprus, only safe course of US action (as we have indicated previous Embassy telegrams) is along line encourage parties directly concerned, i.e., UK, Greeks and Turks, use secret diplomacy to find means leading to solution. US has tremendous stakes at issue in ME today and our relations with Turkey vital and, so far as Embassy Ankara can see, non-involvement in Cyprus issue is vital to protection of US relationships with Turkey.

Warren

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/1-2258. Secret. Repeated to Athens, London, Paris, Nicosia, and Tehran.

<sup>1</sup> Telegram 198 from Nicosia, January 21, reported on Belcher's discussions with Foot on the possible resumption of EOKA terrorism and the prospects for Greek, Turkish, and Cypriot acceptance of the British Government's proposals. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/1-2158)

<sup>2</sup> Dulles was scheduled to visit Ankara January 27-30 for the meeting of the Baghdad Pact.

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to the revolution led by Kemal Atatürk which overthrew the Ottoman state. The revolution was ignited by the Treaty of Sèvres, which included in its provisions Greek occupation of large portions of Asia Minor. The Turkish Army subsequently drove the Greeks out of the areas they occupied.



## 178. Telegram From Secretary of State Dulles to the Department of State

Ankara, January 29, 1958.

Secto 29. Re Secto to Dept 20, rptd info London 201, Athens 177, Nicosia 75, and Paris for USRO 97.<sup>1</sup> In brief conversation with Secretary afternoon Jan 27, Lloyd said discussions which he and Foot had with Zorlu were very disappointing. He said he had subsequently told Menderes that he wished thereafter to talk with no one other than latter.

Zorlu had insisted upon three points contained reftel as minimum conditions to Turk acquiescence Brit plan. Lloyd said, however, that of three most important from Turkish viewpoint might be availability of base. That was not to say that Zorlu was any less insistent than heretofore upon assurances that Turkish community would have right to decide its future status after period self government.

Lloyd asked Secretary his evaluation whether Greeks might be persuaded go along with plan on these conditions. Secretary thought there might be some possibility Greeks agreeing to some sort arrangement for base (such as undertaking that Turks would have right to obtain from British base if it were ever abandoned by British) if conditions did not also include undertaking which would lead to likelihood of partition.

Lloyd felt somewhat optimistic that the Turkish reservation regarding "federal political elements"<sup>2</sup> could be met without causing great difficulty for Greeks.

Lloyd said discussions with Menderes would be held over next few days and he would keep us informed.<sup>3</sup> Secretary observed time might have come for British make definitive decision on basis plan most nearly acceptable to Greeks and Turks, but not fully acceptable to either. It appeared unlikely in view wide difference that there could ever be agreement on all points.

Lloyd commented Turks seemed be relying upon British not taking any action until agreement reached, but there was limit beyond which British could not go. There was great fear that widescale terrorism

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Source: Department of State, NEA/GTI Files: Lot 61 D 220, Negotiations—January 1958. Secret. Repeated to London, Athens, Nicosia, and Paris for USRO. Dulles was in Ankara for the meeting of the Baghdad Pact Ministerial Council January 27–30.

<sup>1</sup>Secto 20 from Ankara, January 27, reported the substance of Lloyd's January 25 meeting with Zorlu and January 26 discussions with Menderes. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 396.1-AN/1-2758)

<sup>2</sup>Reference is to the Turkish desire that any solution to the Cyprus question provide the Turkish Cypriot minority with autonomous institutions.

<sup>3</sup>Lloyd held further discussions with Menderes January 28–30.

would be resumed on Cyprus at any moment. He did not know how long UKG would be able continue present regime on Cyprus under such terroristic activities.

Dulles

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### 179. Memorandum of Conversation

Ankara, January 29, 1958.

US OBSERVER DELEGATION, FOURTH SESSION,  
MINISTERIAL COUNCIL, BAGHDAD PACT

*US Participants*

The Secretary

*Turkish Participants*

Prime Minister Menderes

SUBJECT

Cyprus Issue

The Prime Minister said that he knew that I was discussing with Mr. Lloyd a possible solution of the Cyprus issue. I said I was not familiar with the details but wished to express three thoughts: (1) I felt that the Cyprus issue should be settled. The times were too difficult and dangerous to permit the growing unrest attendant upon this issue; (2) I thought that Turkey was entitled to strategic security in the sense that it should have dependable and not mere paper guarantees that Cyprus would never fall into hands hostile to Turkey; (3) providing Turkey got assurance on point two, I thought Turkey should be flexible with respect to all other aspects of the settlement.

The Prime Minister thanked me and said that he too thought the problem ought to be solved and he deplored the very heavy responsibilities that rested upon me all around the world and said he would like to lighten them.

John Foster Dulles<sup>1</sup>

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Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Dulles. The discussion was held during dinner at the Ankara Palas Hotel.

<sup>1</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

## 180. Editorial Note

The National Security Council heard the following summary of the Cyprus situation at its 353d meeting on January 30:

“General Cabell said Cyprus had been the scene of repeated violence during January as the Turkish Cypriots had attacked the British for the first time in an effort to force a partition of Cyprus. However, the U.K. had 23,000 troops on the island and could probably maintain control. The position of the Turkish Government with respect to Cyprus had recently hardened. The Greeks wanted an undivided Cyprus and the Greek terrorist organizations were probably capable of extensive violence. In the next few weeks London was expected to announce a new plan for Cyprus, but both the Turks and the Greeks would probably find the plan unacceptable and a new wave of violence might be touched off. Eventual self-determination for Cyprus could not be ruled out of consideration.” (Memorandum of discussion prepared by Marion W. Boggs, January 31; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

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## 181. Telegram From the Consulate in Nicosia to the Department of State

Nicosia, January 31, 1958, 6 p.m.

217. Paris for USRO. Re Deptel 2318 to Athens and Athens 2015 (which not sent Nicosia) and Contel 216.<sup>1</sup> Believe deteriorating situation here<sup>2</sup> grave enough warrant USG urging GOG use influence with Makarios to persuade him consider again repercussions further recourse to violence and urge him consider other means of achieving justice for Greek Cypriot cause.

[*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] report Athens today that Ethnarchy Council here is recommending to Grivas that resumption

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/1–3158. Secret; Priority; Noforn. Repeated to London, Ankara, Athens, and Paris.

<sup>1</sup> Telegram 2318 is summarized in footnote 4, Document 176. In telegram 216 from Nicosia, January 31, Belcher reported that current British proposals on the future of Cyprus would be unacceptable to the Greek majority on the island since they would lead to partition, and renewed violence was likely once they became public. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/1–3158)

<sup>2</sup> Severe rioting broke out among the Turkish Cypriot populace on January 27–29.

violence too costly their cause and proposing institute intensified passive resistance campaign involving economic boycotts British firms, public ostracism of individuals and possibly refusal pay taxes. Such program to be progressively applied after testing mood of people who would be "persuaded" by EOKA if elements proved unenthusiastic [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] contact alleged decision taken recommend change in policy because of fear further violence might vitiate present favorable world opinion gained at UN. Also Labor Party might react unfavorably as suggested in recent Callaghan statement.<sup>3</sup> No indication what part Makarios has played so far in this proposal but visit Bishop of Kitium to Athens may be link.<sup>4</sup>

Altho no such admission given [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*], could well be Ethnarchy also influenced by recent evidence strength Turkey feeling and by thought that British reaction violence would be all-out campaign in which EOKA right-wing leadership would be either eliminated or severely limited in action thus leaving field open to Communists to usurp leadership.

Whether or not [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] report has substance a degree of judicious pressure by US, perhaps using some of foregoing reasoning, might be useful at present time before Greeks learn nature of British proposal and decide they must react as suggested previous telegram.<sup>5</sup>

**Belcher**

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<sup>3</sup> Apparently a reference to a statement by Callaghan during a January 23 question session in Parliament. For text, see House of Commons, *Parliamentary Debates*, 5th Series, vol. 580, col. 1235.

<sup>4</sup> Bishop Anthimis of Kitium, the Acting Ethnarch of Cyprus, visited Athens during the first 3 weeks of February.

<sup>5</sup> In telegram 2344 to Athens, February 1, the Department of State relayed the proposals in this telegram to the Embassy in Greece and instructed the Ambassador at his direction to make an approach to the Greek Government to restrain violence if after consultation with the British representatives in Greece such action seemed warranted. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/1-3158)

**182. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State**

Athens, February 4, 1958, 4 p.m.

2145. Approach along lines suggested Deptel 2344, February 1,<sup>1</sup> made to Foreign Minister February 2. Five other members Government also present. Presentation mainly made by Rountree,<sup>2</sup> who carefully reiterated US policy toward Cyprus issue and urgently requested Foreign Minister use influence upon EOKA prevent resumption violence.

Foreign Minister presented usual Greek argumentation, and alleged Turks not party to dispute but only rightfully concerned two points, security and protection Turk minority. Re Turkish security, GOG had already agreed international agency be empowered ensure military situation Cyprus would never constitute menace Cyprus. Re Turk minority, GOG had proposed neutral committee be set up safeguard such rights. No danger of subversion because EOKA had crushed Communists. Thus, Averoff alleged, recently intensified Turk intransigence, due in part desire divert attention internal domestic difficulties, not justified. Averoff believes US desires definite solution and confident Labor Party when in power will fix date for self-determination without reference to partition.<sup>3</sup>

Foreign Minister, joined by other members government, called for definitive and positive statement US policy. Rountree explained why unable depart from present position. Foreign Minister then called for expression US "opinion" which, coming from leader free world, would indicate right and wrong various sides. Rountree emphasized US not concerned fixation right and wrong, but in amicable settlement project by parties concerned.

Averoff and other Ministers elaborated at some length on necessity of and their desire for good long-term Greek-Turk relations.

Rountree strongly requested Averoff exert influence upon EOKA not resume violence. Averoff replied he "had no contact with EOKA." Rountree suggested admonition be passed EOKA through those having contact.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/2-458. Secret. Repeated to London, Ankara, Nicosia, and Paris for USRO.

<sup>1</sup> See footnote 5, Document 181.

<sup>2</sup> Rountree and Jones accompanied the Secretary of State to Iran (January 25–26) and to the Baghdad Pact talks (January 27–30). They traveled to Athens for talks on Cyprus with the Greek Government February 1–3.

<sup>3</sup> The British Parliament's 5-year term was to expire at the end of 1959 and elections had to be held prior to the expiration.

February 3, Averoff handed Rountree 8-page memo re Cyprus. Memo makes following points (full text by pouch):<sup>4</sup>

1. Question has reached critical phase, for which GOG cannot be held responsible.
2. GOG has shown moderation, but present or any future government cannot go beyond point of compromise already agreed to by GOG.
3. Right of self-determination can be reasonably postponed, given establishment truly democratic transition self-government, but right of self-determination cannot be abandoned.
4. GOG cannot accept partition.
5. Turkey not a "party directly concerned" in question.
6. Some quarters, even official, allege possibility that British will sicken of situation and retire, whereupon Turks will occupy part of island. Such an eventuality would not "remain without an answer" and would constitute threat not only against Greece but against others. If such threat materializes and international organizations unable correct situation, "let us all be ready see Cyprus turned into a blasting powder shop."
7. GOG once more warns of situation, regrets it has not received support its allies, and reaffirms anxiety see problem solved basis political possibilities.

Memo much stiffer in tone and substance than Averoff's oral remarks and was obviously written to put official Greek position on the record for possible future use, particularly in connection internal political situation. Our present recommendation is to ignore it.

**Penfield**

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<sup>4</sup>The Greek Government's memorandum was sent to the Department of State as an enclosure to despatch 578 from Athens, February 7. (Department of State, Central Files, 110.15-RO/2-758)

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### **183. Telegram From the Consulate in Nicosia to the Department of State**

Nicosia, February 4, 1958, 6 p.m.

225. Paris for USRO. ReContel 224.<sup>1</sup> At meeting with Governor today he told Jones (GTI) and me he and his government found them-

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/2-458. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Athens, Ankara, and Paris.

<sup>1</sup>Telegram 224 from Nicosia, February 4, reported on press reaction to the return to Cyprus of Kuchuk and to Foot's appeal to EOKA for an end to violence. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/2-458)

selves in “horrifying” dilemma. He and his advisers have been in session since 4 a.m. considering various ramifications of problem evidently arising out of Cabinet consideration and action on recommendations sent from here. It was intimated a decision might be made in London within next few days but its nature was not indicated. Although Governor aware gravity of situation on Greek side as evidenced by his statement on EOKA violence (Contel 220)<sup>2</sup> and although he feels need for new approaches to Athens if we are to stave off Greek Cypriot violence, his and HMG’s actions severely inhibited by extremely hard Turkish bargaining. Foot said they were faced with impossible situation of trying negotiate with Turks at time when latter admit they willing and able turn mob violence in Cyprus on or off to suit their case. Within this context he saw no immediate prospects for self-government.

The question which now so plagues British, evidently in London as well as here, is how to disengage without giving either or both Greeks and Turks excuse for further resort to violence. If British able disengage and Cyprus question enters new period of uneasy stalemate without violence, then deputy governor considered return to tripartite discussions including idea of condominium was possible next step.

Governor told me before he left for London in December<sup>3</sup> that any plan for final solution would be unsatisfactory in view inflamed situation. He is faced with this problem now with Turks evidently rejecting base offer and partition in seven years and pressing their advantage hard for a final solution now in form of partition.

British here now viewing problem as one involving whole future of NATO and Baghdad Pact and say situation rapidly unfolding where they may be forced to choose between Greece and Turkey, an eventual-ity which we have tried so assiduously to avoid. Here it seems clear that if forced to do so, they would choose Turkey and this is position into which Turks seem implacably to be forcing British.

While British here seem prepared face up to EOKA if necessary and appear confident that after initial severe losses they have force control it, they do not want face situation in which they obliged put down Turk Cypriot violence and consequent adverse impact on British-Turkish relations.

**Belcher**

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<sup>2</sup> Telegram 220 from Nicosia, February 2, transmitted the text of Foot’s February 2 appeal for an end of violence on Cyprus. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/2–258)

<sup>3</sup> Foot arrived in Cyprus on December 4, 1957, and left for London for consultations with the British Government on January 1, 1958.

## 184. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, February 5, 1958.

### SUBJECT

Cyprus—Message from Mr. Selwyn Lloyd regarding proposed talks in Athens

### PARTICIPANTS

Sir Harold Caccia, the British Ambassador  
Viscount Hood, British Minister

The Secretary

Mr. C. Burke Elbrick, Assistant Secretary, EUR

Mr. Lampton Berry, Acting Assistant Secretary, NEA

Mr. Murat W. Williams, Deputy Director, GTI

The British Ambassador called on the Secretary today to give him a "private message" from Mr. Selwyn Lloyd regarding Cyprus:

The British Ambassador in Athens was being instructed to tell Prime Minister Karamanlis that Mr. Selwyn Lloyd would like to come to Athens about February 10 to talk about Cyprus. The form of the talks would be very much the same as those last week in Ankara between Mr. Selwyn Lloyd and Prime Minister Menderes, that is, there would be no formal "cut-and-dried" proposals. Mr. Lloyd would intend to concentrate on the external or strategic aspects of the problem and the desirability of a three-power conference to discuss the external, strategic requirements. The Ambassador said that Mr. Lloyd was not too confident that this would be acceptable to the Greeks, but that he thought it was the best thing to do. Whether or not Sir Hugh Foot joins Mr. Lloyd in Athens will depend on how the talks go. The British were informing Menderes of these proposed talks and they hope that he and the Greeks keep it secret for the present.

In answer to a question, the Ambassador said that he did not know what the position was in regard to Mr. Spaak's participating in a three power conference. He asked what the Secretary would think about this.

The Secretary replied that he thought it would help to have Spaak take part in a conference with the Greeks and Turks, especially, he said, because the Greeks are fearful of being isolated in such discussions. He added that having a fourth element present would be an inducement for the Greeks to take part.

*Note:* After leaving the Secretary's office, Mr. Berry proposed to the Ambassador that we inform our Embassy in Athens on an "Eyes Only Basis" and suggest that our Chargé d'Affaires coordinate with the



British Ambassador. If the British Ambassador in Athens has no objections, our Chargé d'Affaires might see Karamanlis and tell him that the United States Government hopes that the Greek Government will look favorably upon Mr. Lloyd's proposal to come to Athens for these private talks. Sir Harold Caccia said he thought this would be helpful.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Telegram 2386 to Athens, February 5, summarized the conversation between Dulles and Caccia and instructed the Embassy as follows: "You should coordinate with British Ambassador and if he perceives no objection you should tell Karamanlis we hope he will look favorably upon Lloyd's desire for private discussions with him in Athens." (*Ibid.*)

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### 185. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

Athens, February 9, 1958, 11 a.m.

2191. I had long conversation with Karamanlis yesterday during which I concentrated on trying to convince him of necessity of facing Turkish problem directly and realistically. He at first seemed to get point but later relapsed into line of thought epitomized by excerpt from his letter to President quoted Embassy telegram 2016.<sup>1</sup> He repeated at some length his offer to agree to any kind of independence buttressed by any and all guarantees and sanctions considered by any disinterested body or individual as reasonably necessary to protect legitimate Turkish interests. His emphatic insistence on fairness and reasonableness of this position increases difficulty of persuading him to take more realistic and less purely moral view of Turkish problem.

He said he feels faced with choice of accepting partition and being traitor to Greek people or refusing and wrecking Western alliance. Both courses equally repugnant and impossible to him and if decision unavoidable he must resign. [3 lines of source text not declassified]

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/2-958. Secret; Presidential Handling.

<sup>1</sup> Telegram 2016 from Athens, January 22, quoted the second half of the seventh paragraph of Karamanlis' January 17 letter to Eisenhower, beginning with "Greece is not to blame" and commented that the quoted paragraph indicated Karamanlis' "present frustration over Cyprus question." (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/1-2258) Karamanlis' letter is printed as Document 174.

Karamanlis seems perfectly willing to talk amicably with Selwyn Lloyd but his mood and reasoning do not augur well for constructive results.

Penfield

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### 186. Editorial Note

Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd and Governor Sir Hugh Foot held talks with Greek leaders in Athens February 11–13 on the Cyprus issue. Foot also met privately with Archbishop Makarios. The British representatives urged Greek officials to use their influence to prevent further terrorist violence by EOKA and assured the Greeks that the United Kingdom would continue to govern the island until a solution satisfactory to all parties was achieved. Greek officials expressed qualified approval of the Foot Plan but rejected self-determination by the Greek and Turkish communities as a cover for a partition of the island and objected to a proposal for the establishment of a Turkish base on the island. Documentation on the British–Greek meetings is in Department of State, Central File 747C.00.

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### 187. Editorial Note

Secretary of State Dulles discussed the situation in Cyprus with Ambassador James W. Riddleberger on February 11, just before Riddleberger's departure for Athens to assume his new post:

"The Secretary said that he thought the Turks had a good case regarding Cyprus when they put it on a basis of security and said he thought the Turks had to be satisfied on this aspect of their claims regarding Cyprus. This satisfaction should be provided by something more than a paper guarantee. He thought that it might conceivably be provided by a Turkish base on the Island. As he saw it the idea of such a base made some sense. The Secretary said that he regarded partition as basically bad, since the Greeks and Turks were pretty widely dispersed all over the Island and drawing a partition line would not be easy. It was pretty clear that the Island was basically Greek and there could be [no?]

doubt that the Turks formed a definite minority within a basically Greek community. The Secretary was careful to point out that this was only the rudimentary framework of a plan which might have some chance of success and that he had not had time to consider all aspects of it.

"In response to a question from Ambassador Riddleberger as to whether the United States would have to become involved before the Cyprus issue could be settled, the Secretary expressed considerable doubt. However, he said that if asked by the three countries involved he thought that we should. One had always to keep in mind that our potential influence in helping bring about a settlement in this issue was not great and that we should be careful in the way we brought it to bear on the problem. He said he thought Ambassador Riddleberger, on arriving in Athens, would be best advised to take some soundings and then to think about the matter for some time before making any public statements in Athens." (Memorandum of conversation by L. Bruce Laingen, April 4; Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/4-458)

Riddleberger, nominated on February 5 to replace Ambassador Allen, arrived in Athens on February 27 and presented his credentials to King Paul on March 4.

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## 188. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

Athens, February 16, 1958, 11 a.m.

2259. Have talked with British Ambassador who confirms in general Averoff's account of conversations (Embtel 2243)<sup>1</sup> except that Greeks apparently did not go so far on assurances re controlling Greek Cypriot violence as Averoff did with me. British Ambassador does not admit to optimism but says he is less pessimistic as result talks, which turned out much better than he anticipated.

British have apparently decided to attempt settlement based on giving Greeks enosis and Turks a base on Cyprus. This of course involves many dangers and difficulties, most immediate being preservation of peace on Cyprus during essential period of negotiation. To do so, in addition to whatever may be necessary vis-à-vis Turks, Greek Cypriots must be given such hope of satisfactory settlement. This most

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/2-1658. Secret; Limited Distribution; NoFORN. Repeated to London, Ankara, Nicosia, and Paris for USRO.

<sup>1</sup> Telegram 2243 from Athens, February 14, summarized Averoff's report on the British-Greek negotiations over the future of Cyprus. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/2-1458)

difficult to do without arousing hopes and speculation here which could wreck any chance of success.

Aside from whatever difficulties there may be in getting GOG and GOT actually to agree, there is ever-present danger here that an unfortunate leak or maladroit statement or action in Athens, London or Ankara could cause situation here suddenly to revert to uncontrollable emotionalism.

Makarios is unpredictable quantity who could at any stage wreck or come close to wrecking plan.

Timing is all important. Difference between success and failure may well be whether self-government period is 10, 5 or 3 years, and whether Turk base installed immediately, in blank years, at end of self-government period but before self-determination plebiscite, after plebiscite but before enosis, or after enosis.

Despite all these and other potential difficulties there has in effect been a British offer in which GOG has shown definite interest (GOG commitment to examine a detailed plan (numbered point 5 Embtel 2243)<sup>2</sup> was both given and received as more than casual statement). This fact alone creates most hopeful situation here since Makarios–Harding talks failed.

Penfield

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<sup>2</sup>It reads: "GOG rejected idea of Turkish base on Cyprus because (A) Turkish troops would constitute continuing and serious potential source of trouble and violence, and (B) Cypriots would be violently opposed. However, GOG would be prepared to examine any plan including provision for Turkish base if provided with full details."

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### 189. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

Washington, February 22, 1958, 1:11 p.m.

5929. Following is text message from Lloyd to Secretary transmitted by Caccia Feb 21. Message should be treated on Noform, need-to-know basis.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/2-2258. Secret; Limit Distribution. Also sent to Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia and pouched to Paris for USRO.

“You will have heard from Harold Caccia<sup>1</sup> that Averoff was by no means entirely negative about the possibility of eventual agreement on the basis of our compromise plan. The essence of this, you will recall, is to try to wean the Turks away from partition by giving them some tangible guarantee covering their security and strategic interests; and to induce the Greeks to accept the idea of Turkish presence in a limited military enclave as the only means of achieving the evolution of the rest of the island (apart from British bases) towards a settlement on a unitary basis.

“Unfortunately the Greeks are not at present prepared to face up to any tripartite approach to the problem; and we must therefore try to bring the two sides closer together in a series of separate discussions with each party. We feel that the next step should be for us to talk to the Turks with the object of finding out more precisely what minimum guarantee of their security they might be induced to accept. We shall not at this stage attempt to argue them out of partition. Indeed, we expect them publicly to go on demanding it if only to discourage the Greeks from raising their own bid. But privately we shall hope to whittle Turkish demands down to the form of a concrete proposal which might eventually be reconcilable with the existence of a unitary Cyprus state.

“I have sent a message to Zorlu inviting him to initiate with us a joint study of Turkish security and strategic requirements. I propose to keep Spaak generally informed, on a personal basis, but otherwise to preserve absolute secrecy both about the fact and the scope of these talks.

“I shall of course let you know how we get on. I am sure that we shall need your help with the Turks as soon as we get to grips with the problem.”<sup>2</sup>

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> In a February 17 letter, Caccia provided Dulles with a summary of Lloyd’s account of his February 11–13 negotiations with the Greek Government. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>2</sup> In a February 27 letter to Lloyd, Dulles pledged U.S. support for British efforts to reach a solution in Cyprus and commented on the British proposals:

“I agree that a compromise plan involving a Turkish base in lieu of partition, coupled with self-determination, would require a great deal of hard bargaining with both Greeks and Turks. The Greek Cypriots might be even harder to convince than the Greek Government. I believe, however, that this approach to this problem is worth pushing, and I am glad to know that you are planning to move ahead along these lines by discussing with the Turks their strategic security requirements.” (*Ibid.*, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 64 D 204, Cyprus)

**190. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State**

London, March 11, 1958, 6 p.m.

5368. Foreign Office (Ross) informed Barbour today present status Cyprus negotiations.

As foreshadowed Department telegram 5929,<sup>1</sup> HMG has approached Turkish Government to explore Turk views regarding bases on Cyprus. Results this probing now received and Turks seem willing accept idea of base provided:

1. Turkey obtains in effect three bases in Cyprus. These mostly in cities. Foreign Office considers proposed sites not very realistic.

2. Turkey obtains these bases immediately, or at least in very near future. Turks also stress concern that any constitution for island be federal in nature, that is, give extensive autonomy to Turk Cypriots.

Ross says that HMG actively considering Turk reply but is not rushing ahead with next step in negotiations, for which Cabinet approval will be required in any case. As result, Foreign Office not unduly disturbed by recent Greek election developments,<sup>2</sup> even though this means some delay before obtaining Greek Government able and willing deal with problem. At same time, head Southern Department (Addis) speculates this delay has disadvantages and advantages with respect to Cyprus itself. The longer things continued in uncertain state, the greater danger of inter communal violence. At same time, if Cyprus could be kept peaceful, on plea it impossible take action until May, chances of violence may decrease and influence of EOKA might decline. Addis also thought that Ethnarchy might be inclined to temporize during period when there was no Greek Government to support it, and might therefore be willing to avoid encouraging if not actually to restrain Grivas for time being. Addis stressed his thinking both personal and tentative.

**Whitney**

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/3-1158. Secret; Limit Distribution; Noform; Need-To-Know. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, Nicosia, and Paris for USRO.

<sup>1</sup> Document 189.

<sup>2</sup> On March 2, the Karamanlis government resigned after 15 deputies, including 2 ministers, deserted it during a parliamentary vote on a bill to modify the electoral system. A caretaker government was formed by Constantine Georgakopoulos and new elections set for May 11.

**191. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State**

Ankara, March 13, 1958, noon.

2389. Embassy is pleased by evidence Turk flexibility on partition as reflected London 5368 to Department.<sup>1</sup>

At same time we are surprised because Ross report (1) does not reflect in any sense attitude GOT and particularly Zorlu repeatedly manifested to me and others over past few months, and (2) is inconsistent with growing Turk resentfulness of British over Cyprus which noticeable to many observers Ankara (including British Embassy personnel) and which taking form of (a) refusal permit UK Embassy military and civilian personnel travel to restricted zones of country; (b) vocal hostility ranking Turk military to UK; (c) closing certain air corridors previously available to UK aircraft flying over Turkey en route Iraq; and (d) harassment UK Embassy by Foreign Office with respect importation supplies for British diplomatic personnel Ankara.

At same time, Ross report may indicate that Turks have come to rationalization [*realization?*] that several bases on island now would give them significant measure of control over its eventual disposition.

**Warren**

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/3–1358. Secret; Limit Distribution; Noform; Need-To-Know. Repeated to London, Athens, Nicosia, and Paris for USRO.  
<sup>1</sup> Document 190.

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**192. Telegram From the Consulate in Nicosia to the Department of State**

Nicosia, March 17, 1958, 4 p.m.

270. During call on Foot this morning by Lyon, Goodyear and myself following personal observations by governor worthy of note:

1. Considers it virtually impossible find solution upon which GOG and GOT will agree.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/3–1758. Secret; Limit Distribution; Noform. Repeated to London, Ankara, Athens, and Paris for USRO.

2. HMG cannot simply mark time maintaining status quos; British electorate sick to death of Cyprus problem and he wonders how long they will continue to bear both economic cost (7-1/2 million from UK and 4 million from Cyprus budget in 1957) and international political cost of emergency.

3. Some way out must be found if we are to avoid another Palestine.

4. Agrees Secretary's suggestion (paragraph 5 Secto 29 from Ankara);<sup>1</sup> HMG must go through with one more round "sounding" and then set forth new policy based best possible compromise of contending views and proceed implement that policy.

5. One such possible course action might well be Turkish base concept but timing of the essence. Base would have to be in lieu of partition and not merely stepping stone thereto.

6. Considered either partition or enosis would lead to Greco-Turk hostilities.

7. Cannot afford let situation drift and hopes whatever final HMG decision is USG will find it possible support internationally.

8. Gave no indication any new plans but we talked at some length of problems involved in setting up base and motives of Turks and Greeks if they agreed. Turks might well consider only as step to partition and Greeks might consider it possible make base untenable if they had sovereignty over rest of island.

9. Neither Turks nor Greeks will believe that British honestly sincerely want out of Cyprus; that their only need is maintain base in support strategic needs NATO and Baghdad Pact; their only wish is find some solution which will maintain peace in area and not lead to breakdown in relations which would comfort only Soviets.

10. Believed whatever course action adopted it would at least provide Turks with what HMG would consider was sufficient guarantee their legitimate interests in Cyprus.

11. Although he hoped eventuality would never arise, if situation were to deteriorate to extent where HMG forced make choice between Greece and Turkey, he considered it mandatory choose latter.

*Comment:* Foregoing Foot's personal views and do not necessarily reflect latest Foreign Office thinking. Foot was slightly more optimistic than when Owen Jones saw him,<sup>2</sup> saying there was a "limited time" in which to find course least objectionable to all concerned and then embark upon it.

**Belcher**

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<sup>1</sup> Document 178.

<sup>2</sup> On February 4; see Document 183.



**193. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State**

London, March 29, 1958, noon.

5725. Selwyn Lloyd last night said that he is concerned over Cyprus and believes necessary to take further steps without delay. He feels that despite absence of Greek Government and problem posed by forthcoming Greek elections, Greeks generally much more disposed to settlement now than they have been in past since they seem finally to have realized strength of Turkish feeling and that in light thereof time is not working in Greek favor. Turks on other hand are becoming increasingly more intransigent [5-1/2 lines of source text not declassified].

In circumstances, Lloyd contemplates making a further effort with Turks with view to modifying Turkish position on possible base in Cyprus to realistic proportions and he inclined to think that this may be appropriate time to enlist maximum US support for such renewed approach to Turks. He expects consider matter further over weekend and anticipates drafting personal letter to Secretary which may be transmitted first next week.

Department repeat as desired.

Whitney

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/5-2958. Secret; Limit Distribution.

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**194. Telegram From the Consulate in Nicosia to the Department of State**

Nicosia, April 16, 1958, 2 p.m.

304. Foot told last night in strictest confidence that UK-Turk talks in Ankara at critical stage and on point breaking down completely. Sensitivity of position there completely frustrates any moves he might possibly make here in attempt calm Greek-Cypriots. Turkish reaction to anything remotely resembling gesture to Greeks typified by action Zorlu in protesting British Ambassador Ankara over fact UK subject,

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/4-1658. Secret; Limit Distribution; Noform. Repeated to London, Athens, Ankara, and Paris for USRO.

Makarios, might be allowed go London near future at invitation private groups.<sup>1</sup>

When shooting reported Contel 299<sup>2</sup> occurred Foot said he spent rest of day almost "in despair" realizing crying need some action here yet being unable move for above reasons. He was hoping use forthcoming budget announcement as excuse make further "hold-the-line" statement, but anything along lines suggested Contel 301<sup>3</sup> would have come from London. HMG position extremely difficult. GOG had requested British not indicate publicly they unable talk "interim" government. Foot pressing London make statement, however, and thought HMG might ignore request GOG and at any rate could not long hold line in face above demands for debate. Statement would require very careful wording in view talks Ankara. Unfortunate that preparation statement would take time and situation very explosive.

As during events leading March 25 celebrations<sup>4</sup> Foot asked me during next few days, in eleventh-hour effort prevent further deterioration, if opportunity arose convey following ideas to Greek Cypriots whose voices might carry as far as EOKA and Grivas:

1. Talks impossible in Athens until new GOG, but talks proceeding "elsewhere" as stated by Lloyd, on urgent basis. Such talks severely jeopardized by new outbreak violence.

2. Refer to recent Turkish party at restaurant where announcement new bombings brought Turk toasts to EOKA. As Foot said to Archbishop in Athens—"If EOKA resorts to fighting it will be fighting for partition".

3. Foot did not see Makarios because he had half hour waste—seeing him was recognition of him as essential figure this problem.<sup>5</sup>

4. Did say to Makarios in all sincerity "hope we shall be working together soon on Cyprus problem" (Contel 239).<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Makarios, as Archbishop of Cyprus, had been invited to a Church of England-sponsored conference at Lambeth, England.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 299 from Nicosia, April 15, reported on EOKA threats to widen its terrorist actions to include all British nationals. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/4-1558)

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 301 from Nicosia, April 15, outlined a proposed statement that the United States might suggest to the British Government to head off a reprise of EOKA violence. Belcher noted that the proposal had the support of British officials on Cyprus. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/4-1558)

<sup>4</sup> Greek independence day. EOKA marked the event by murdering members of the Communist trade union front, AKEL, and with a passive resistance campaign that included a boycott of all British goods.

<sup>5</sup> Reference is to Foot's February 13 meeting with Makarios in Athens; see Document 186.

<sup>6</sup> Telegram 239 from Nicosia, February 17, reported on discussions with Greek Cypriot leaders and on Makarios' efforts to prevent a renewal of EOKA violence. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/2-1758)

5. His greatest wish is see end emergency which would mean release detainees, revocation emergency regulations and return of Archbishop.

6. None these things presently possible in view present talks and in face continued violence.

Foot ended his outline by emphasizing again delicacy situation in Ankara, saying he acutely aware need for action and understood Greek Cypriot impatience, but he and his advisors feared Turk resort to violence (as on January 27–28)<sup>7</sup> as means pressuring British—and felt consequences EOKA violence (as result British failure make gesture now) possibly less severe and less lasting than violent Turk reaction to new British initiative which to Turks might seem pro-Greek.

*Comment:* As always Foot impresses with his candor and sincerity. He obviously frustrated by inability act here and hopes I will say things to key Greek Cypriots he would like say but can't.

Subsequently have had long and very friendly conversation Paschalides, Acting Secretary Ethnarchy and most direct contact we have with organization which may still have some influence with Grivas. Made most above points. Paschalides seemed impressed with logic of arguments but as usual with Greek Cypriots included caveat to effect may not be possible hold line till June and that “there comes time when men will fight for principle no matter what the consequences”. His comments were further indication as suggested Contel 301, that control movement may no longer be in hands more sophisticated leaders who are capable weighing consequences their actions.

**Belcher**

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<sup>7</sup>Reference is to the Turkish Cypriot riots in Nicosia in which 8 Turks were killed and 40 policemen injured.

## 195. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State

London, April 18, 1958, 4 p.m.

6058. London's 5985, Ankara's 2603, Department's 7380.<sup>1</sup> Foreign Office (Addis) April 17 told us following regarding Cyprus:

1. Telegraphic summary of memorandum from Zorlu received through British Embassy Ankara (paragraph 4 London reftel). Telegram, which Embassy officer allowed to read, states in essence, partition first put forward by Averoff in conversation with Turkish Ambassador and subsequently "highly recommended by British statesmen." Despite UN resolution of 1957,<sup>2</sup> HMG has confined itself to discussing Cyprus through diplomatic channels and has refrained from calling conference. During Ankara talks Turkey made clear that its acceptance of a phased course on Cyprus instead of immediate partition depended upon immediate grant of base. Turks again invoked parliamentary statement of 1956.<sup>3</sup> "Instability of position of HMG is obstacle to solution Cyprus problem and threat to Anglo-Turkish relations." Turkey was led to accept idea of base, but it has turned out to be "mirage base" and subject to numerous conditions including Greek approval. Turkish Government is being subjected to pressure from public opinion and unstable British policy. Nevertheless, Turks "making every effort to avoid reversing their policy on Cyprus." (Foreign Office not clear re meaning this sentence.) If they are to succeed, "HMG should help by convening early conference in accordance with previous decision to reach final settlement."

Addis commented Turks maintain UK agreed to conference during Ankara talks.<sup>4</sup> British view is Ankara talks were not as explicit on this point. British are waiting receipt full text memorandum before considering response.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/4-1858. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.

<sup>1</sup> Telegram 5985 from London, April 15, reported the latest developments in British-Turk negotiations and British concern over the lack of progress. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/4-1558) Telegram 2603 from Ankara, April 16, reported that the British had terminated talks on Turkish bases on Cyprus and warned that the Cyprus question was entering a "new and extremely dangerous phase." (*Ibid.*, 782.56347C/4-1658) Telegram 7380 to London, April 16, "urgently" requested the Embassy's comments on the information in telegram 2603 from Ankara. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>2</sup> For text of this resolution, adopted February 26, 1957, see U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.172 (XI).

<sup>3</sup> Presumably reference is to Colonial Secretary Alan Lennox-Boyd's statement of December 19, 1956. See footnote 2, Document 171.

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to Lloyd's January 27-30 talks with Zorlu and Menderes. Lloyd's talks with Zorlu are summarized in Document 178.

2. Foreign Office gave Birgi April 16 its comments on note left by Turkish Embassy summarizing Birgi–Lloyd meeting of April 3 (paragraph 2 London reftel).<sup>5</sup> Addis said that British comments intended to make sure Turks understood points made by Lloyd. Addis also said Lloyd’s remarks should be regarded as “ideas for exploration with Turks” rather than “proposals.”

3. Birgi scheduled leave London April 17 for meeting with Zorlu either in Ankara or during Zorlu’s European trip.<sup>6</sup> Addis reiterated he remained convinced Birgi had reported to Ankara talk with Lloyd on April 3 and that Zorlu’s memorandum diversionary move.

4. Zorlu’s absence from Ankara might delay progress on Cyprus, but on other hand, could provide desirable opportunity for discussions directly with Menderes.

*Embassy comments:*

5. As situation now stands UK has advanced “ideas” regarding substance and awaiting Turkish reaction. Turkey has proposed methods of procedure and is awaiting British reaction. Should Turks show interest in British ideas on substance, conference suggested by Turks might be used to work out details. (Addis recalled that when idea of conference last discussed with Greeks, they insisted on advance preparations including consideration of substance of problem.)

6. Re Depreftel. Paragraph 1 Ankara reftel appears to be erroneous version of British suggestions of April 3. Paragraph 2 Ankara reftel concerns Zorlu memorandum described above, we have no way of knowing whether Birgi actually reported April 3 *démarche*. In any case, he can hardly avoid doing so at forthcoming meeting with Zorlu.

7. We do not believe UK or Governor Foot could make statement along lines suggested by Nicosia’s 3017 without prejudicing Turkish consideration of April 3 ideas. Furthermore, Greeks have stated interim government prepared entertain proposals on Cyprus (Embtel 5483)<sup>8</sup> and probably would resist effort to assign blame for inaction to Greece’s lack of government.

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<sup>5</sup> It reads: “British anticipated that Birgi would consult Ankara and come back immediately with detailed analysis and counter-proposals. Instead, nothing happened until April 11 when Counselor of Turkish Embassy called on Addis and left with him long note which turned out to be nothing more than detailed and generally accurate account of Birgi–Lloyd meeting of April 3. Account had two or three minor errors.”

<sup>6</sup> Not further identified. Zorlu accompanied Prime Minister Menderes on an April 19–May 2 trip to the Far East.

<sup>7</sup> See footnote 3, Document 194.

<sup>8</sup> In telegram 5483 from London, March 17, Whitney reported that the British Government was surprised and skeptical at Greek insistence that a caretaker regime could carry on negotiations over Cyprus. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/3–1758)

8. From Nicosia's 304<sup>9</sup> appears that Governor Foot naturally primarily concerned by threat to security on island, is inclined to go further in direction of trying to reassure Greeks than HMG would think advisable in view of status talks with Turks. We are somewhat apprehensive over possible US involvement in conveying any assurances to Greeks, believing best tactic for US is to remain inactive pending Turkish reaction to April 3 "ideas".

9. It appears to us there is growing British preoccupation to find quick way to divest themselves of their responsibilities for Cyprus, retaining only British bases. Department will have noted emphasis in April 3 suggestions (which go far to meet Greek views) on early action and especially move directly to self-determination. Plan along these lines would require minimum local cooperation in its implementation.

Government was again pressed in Commons on April 15 for statement on Cyprus and again declined to speak. Cabinet may be under increasing temptation publicly to announce a plan with specific timetable which could involve withdrawal by British to base areas and relinquishment of sovereignty over remainder of island, even in absence of agreed solution. While such move might result in Palestine-type situation, threat of proceeding along these lines could force both Greeks and Turks towards accommodation. We do not mean to imply by speculation in this paragraph that we believe HMG has reached actual decision in favor of rapid disengagement from responsibilities for island, but rather to flag direction of tide.

Whitney

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<sup>9</sup> Document 194.

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**196. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State**

London, April 29, 1958, 1 p.m.

6246. Paris for USRO. Embtel 6092.<sup>1</sup> Emboff asked FonOff April 28 re thinking behind Governor Foot's broadcast that he "hoped" soon af-

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/4-2958. Secret, Limit Distribution; Noforn. Repeated to Nicosia, Ankara, Athens, and Paris.

<sup>1</sup> Telegram 6092 from London, April 21, reported on the progress of the British-Turkish negotiations. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/4-2158)

ter end of this month to go to London again for discussions with British Govt (Nicosia's 323).<sup>2</sup> FonOff replied broadcast authorized by HMG on Foot's recommendation in effort forestall outbreak EOKA violence. Foot had wanted more categorical statement regarding return to London but Ministers decided wording should be kept ambiguous and conditional. HMG wished to end dilly dallying on Cyprus problem but was firm in belief no definitive proposals should be advanced to Greece before elections May 11. Otherwise news bound to leak and Greek attitude be affected by stresses of campaign. UK also wished to avoid repetition January situation when world attention focused on Foot's return and expectation of policy statement which had to be deferred. FonOff stressed HMG planning on timing any statement went no further than indicated above. Re substance HMG still hoped something would materialize from current secret talks with Turks but had reached no decision.

*Embassy comments:*

Convergence several factors appears to be propelling Cyprus problem towards another "decisive" phase. These include: (1) Danger of eruption of new wave of EOKA terrorism; (2) Greek elections May 11; (3) Governor Foot's "hope" to return of consultations soon after end of April; (4) Labor Party's request for debate on Cyprus prior to Whitsun recess May 23 (govt has not yet responded to request).

At present signs point toward UK policy decision during early part of May after discussions with Governor Foot followed by statement and debate in Parliament. Same expectation arose in connection with Foot's visit to London in January.<sup>3</sup> Instead, HMG has sought through secret talks to find solution least objectionable to Greece and Turkey. Unfortunately, little common ground appears to have been found. UK likely have greater difficulty now than in January in securing tacit assent of parties to further delay for additional negots. This appears especially true in case EOKA which Nicosia's reports indicate is increasingly restive and unreceptive to moderate advice.

**Whitney**

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<sup>2</sup> Telegram 323 from Nicosia, April 27, transmitted the text of Foot's April 25 broadcast calling for an end to violence in Cyprus. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> Foot visited London January 1–9.

## MAY-JUNE 1958: THE MACMILLAN PROPOSALS

### 197. Memorandum of Conversation

USDel/MC/10

Copenhagen, May 4, 1958, 5 p.m.

#### UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE 21st MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

Copenhagen, Denmark, May 5-7, 1958

#### PARTICIPANTS

*United States*

The Secretary  
Ambassador Burgess  
Mr. Reinhardt  
Mr. Elbrick  
Mr. Porter

*United Kingdom*

The Right Honorable Selwyn Lloyd  
Sir Frank Roberts  
Sir Roderick Barclay  
Sir Anthony Rumbold  
The Honorable C.D.W. O'Neil  
Mr. A. Ross  
Mr. D.S. Laskey

#### SUBJECT

Cyprus

Mr. Lloyd said the British had just gone through an agonizing reappraisal of the whole Cyprus business. The Turks, he said, are completely unapproachable in the matter of giving up partition for a base on the island. He had found Zorlu simply not negotiable on the subject. The UK has decided, therefore, that after the Greek elections<sup>1</sup> it will put forward the tri-dominium idea, which Mr. Macmillan feels is bold and imaginative even though it bristles with practical difficulties. Mr. Macmillan is prepared to go to Athens and Ankara not just to put forward the plan but to stay with it and push it for three months if necessary. He would beg them not to turn it down and try to get them to deal with it as a big idea.

If nothing comes of this the British will examine some kind of partition. Mr. Lloyd had always been against this idea and of course it could not be broached now because it would cause civil war. Eventually, however, after a try had been made at the tri-dominium concept he thought that the UK Government would have a great deal of support at home for an attempt at partition. Mr. Lloyd asked if the Secretary would think

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1010. Secret. Drafted by Porter and cleared by Reinhardt and Elbrick in draft. The meeting was held at the British Embassy.

<sup>1</sup> May 11.



about this though he realized that we did not favor partition in principle.

The Secretary said that we are not against anything that seems likely to work. He felt, however, that the Greek Government could not accept such solutions. Today the Turks have only a moral position because Cyprus is close to Turkey, but they have no juridical status there and the Secretary believed the Greeks could not accept granting them such a status.

With respect to the plan under which the British offered the Turks a base this was something the British could do themselves. They could tell the Turks that this is the way it will be and if the Turks do not take advantage of it that would be up to them. The British under that plan could force the pace as against the need for negotiating the Greeks and Turks into a tripartite arrangement, for which he felt the possibility was slim. But if the UK desires it, the US will help in any way it can.

Mr. Lloyd felt that the Greeks are now getting frightened with respect to Turkish intentions and it was also true that the Turks are now saying very bad things about the British. They had started a campaign and he was not sure that they can stop it now though in the past they had occasionally turned the tap on and off. Mr. Lloyd felt that the British had erred in the past by not making public all of their offers on the Cyprus question. They would now wait until after the Greek elections, put the tri-dominium idea up to both Greeks and Turks, and make a public announcement concerning it. Mr. Lloyd repeated that Mr. Macmillan would not drop this idea simply because somebody says no to it at the outset.

(Mr. Ross of the British Delegation asked later that we hold the foregoing in strict confidence as they had not yet informed their people in the field concerning it.)

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**198. Memorandum of Conversation Between Secretary of State Dulles and Foreign Secretary Lloyd**

USDel/MC/22

Copenhagen, May 6, 1958, 10 p.m.

[Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1006. Top Secret. 1 page of source text not declassified.]

**199. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Dulles, at Paris**

Washington, May 9, 1958, 8:16 p.m.

Tosec 82. Suggest you may wish Embassy London to reiterate strong doubts you expressed Lloyd (Secto 8)<sup>1</sup> regarding feasibility of 3-power condominium as solution for Cyprus problem. We believe condominium plan presents many serious problems. Among these is question of where ultimate authority lies in event of dispute between co-domini or in case of crisis on island. (Deptel 2592 to London, Oct 7, 1957 rptd info Paris Topol 960)<sup>2</sup> To make it work Governor would need strong support from participating powers and general acceptance of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Before turning to condominium, which is virtually certain to be rejected by Greeks with violent reaction in both Greece and Cyprus, we suggest that it may be worthwhile to test further possibility of proposal which involves affording Turks a base on island in lieu of partition. We believe this proposal has considerable merit and are not convinced it cannot be made acceptable to other parties.

If British would consider it useful at this time, would be willing to resume type of general discussions with British conducted September 1957 between Barbour and Hoyer-Millar on Cyprus problem.<sup>3</sup>

If Secretary agrees with above request permission repeat Cyprus portion Secto 8 and Secto 16<sup>4</sup> to [from] London.

Herter

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/5-958. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Williams, Laingen, and Dale and cleared by Kohler and Calhoun. Dulles arrived in Paris on May 8 to attend the Western European Chiefs of Mission meeting May 9-12.

<sup>1</sup> Secto 8 from London, May 5, summarized Dulles' May 4 conversation with Lloyd (see Document 197). (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1010)

<sup>2</sup> For text, see *Foreign Relations, 1955-1957*, vol. XXIV, pp. 508-510.

<sup>3</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 500.

<sup>4</sup> Secto 16 from London, May 5, reported on U.S.-U.K. discussions on the specifics of the Macmillan plan. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1007)

**200. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State**

Athens, May 12, 1958, 1 p.m.

3146. Rome for McSweeney.

1. Reliable Cypriot source who has just seen Makarios states he decided on own initiative to bring conversation our attention. He informs us that he found Makarios in particularly conciliatory mood. He apparently recognizes need for realism in light present critical situation and told source he felt that if British were able to come forth with self-government formula for fixed period of years with provision for subsequent Cypriot self-determination, he personally would be willing to throw his weight into balance in favor. Source believes, and I agree, that were it possible for British to bring themselves to discuss formula with Makarios prior to announcement, there is some hope Makarios would lend his undoubted prestige to obtaining acceptance.

2. Source states he queried Makarios on desirability of establishing some form contact with Embassy and offered himself as possible intermediary.<sup>1</sup> After thinking matter over, Makarios said he opposed at this time to any surreptitious or private meetings. He gave no reason but it possible he may be either (a) holding out for "official" public contact with Embassy, or (b) reluctant to use as intermediary person not in his immediate entourage.

3. We have just seen Pesmazoglou who is here convalescing from recent accident. He reiterated most of views expressed last December (Embtel 1823),<sup>2</sup> emphasizing continually increasing Turkish intransigence, growing danger to west as long as solution not found, and his conviction that solution can be achieved through, and only through, strong but impartial pressure on both GOG and GOT. As to substance of solution, he believes Turkish base–Enosis solution cannot be considered for same reasons partition cannot, i.e. (a) Greek public opinion could not be brought to accept it and (b) more importantly, official GOG presence on island would sooner or later inevitably lead to armed conflict.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/5–1258. Secret. Repeated to London, Paris for USRO, Ankara, Nicosia, and Rome.

<sup>1</sup> In telegram 3130 from Athens, May 9, Riddleberger informed the Department of State that unless it objected he intended to "discreetly arrange for Penfield to meet Makarios shortly after the elections." (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/5–958) In telegram 3338 to Athens, May 12, the Department of State instructed Riddleberger not to establish contacts with Makarios without its specific authorization. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 1823 from Athens, December 28, 1957, reported that the Greek Government hoped to keep the Cyprus situation calm until Foot, Makarios, or Spaak could produce constructive proposals for a solution. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/12–2857)

He sees buying time as only way out of present situation and suggests as one alternative three 5-year periods starting with modest self-government and ending with full self-determination after 15 years. He recognizes that Turks would insist on unilateral caveat refusing to recognize an eventual Enosis decision but feels GOG, as well as British and ourselves, would just have to pass such statement off on "that remains to be seen" basis.

**Riddleberger**

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**201. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State**

Ankara, May 14, 1958, 3 p.m.

2271. Rome for McSweeney. Reference: Athens telegram 3146 to Department.<sup>1</sup> Department will recall (re Embtel 2504, April 30, 1957)<sup>2</sup> that GOT views with deep suspicion relations between Makarios and US official representatives while Embassy is mindful that contact between USG and Makarios probably would be desirable, establishment even private arrangement would eventually become known and would serve to embitter already resentful GOT on US position re Cyprus. Consequently, if some form of contact is developed, we hope that it will be in such form as to mitigate inevitable sting to Turks.

**Warren**

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/5-1458. Secret. Repeated to Athens, London, Paris for USRO, Nicosia, Istanbul, Izmir, Iskenderun, and Rome.

<sup>1</sup> Document 200.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 2504 from Ankara reported on unfavorable Turkish press reaction to reports of a meeting between Ambassador in Greece George Allen and Makarios. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/5-157)

**202. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State**

London, May 17, 1958, 1 p.m.

6634. As of last night Foreign Office (Addis) said Cabinet has not reached a decision on Cyprus. *London Times* announces this morning, however, that Allen returning Athens today and Bowker Ankara Monday. *Times* adds that Cabinet yesterday probably put finishing touches on new plan.

Evidence available to Embassy indicates that plan does not involve either partition or Turkish base on island. Nor does it envisage immediate giving up or sharing of British sovereignty. Principal elements appear to involve (1) a first stage of perhaps seven years during which major effort would be made satisfy aspirations of Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities as far as local problems are concerned by establishment communal assemblies and a ministerial council; (2) during this stage UK would not divide or give up its sovereignty over island; (3) representatives of Greek and Turk Governments, however, would be associated with ministerial council which would advise the governors; (4) eventual goal of this process would probably be shared responsibility or tridominium.

Tactics of implementation of plan are tentatively as follows:

In Parliament, government plans respond to question Monday, May 19 with holding statement. It will refer to current discussions, time required for consultation with interested governments, and therefore postponement full debate until after Whitsun recess (now scheduled last until June 10). By this maneuver, government hopes avoid detailed public statement for three weeks, giving time for negotiations with Greeks and Turks and consultation with US. Labour Party is planning meeting after Monday statement to determine its course of action, since if wishes it can insist on debate of Cyprus Thursday, May 22. Foreign Office obviously hopes Monday's statement will avoid a full-scale debate, before Whitsun recess, since government would be unable to spell out plan that soon. Addis remarked that Foreign Office hopes Foot will be able influence Labour leaders.

Addis also repeated fact Lloyd intends send message to Secretary as soon as definite decision reached. Addis personally thought message would be sent early in coming week.

As Department aware, Foreign Office is extremely desirous that elements of above plan not be divulged prematurely. Embassy recom-

mends that special care be taken in this regard particularly since we know that *London Times* already has a general knowledge of plan and possibility of leaks naturally exists in course of Foot's conversations with Labour leaders.

Whitney

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### 203. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State

London, May 23, 1958, 6 p.m.

6819. Department telegram 8280.<sup>1</sup> We believe following are principal elements in current UK thinking on Cyprus:

1. Since Suez, island has lost importance as base for supporting British national policy in Middle East area.<sup>2</sup> It still retains military value for NATO purposes and as stabilizing factor against international communism. HMG remains determined to hold military bases needed for defense against USSR.

2. UK financial stringency and resulting compulsion to retrench on world-wide scale, together with international public criticism of British role in Cyprus, are generating growing desire to cut commitments on island or at least have others share in burden of governing Cyprus.

3. Sense of responsibility to Western alliance and to Cypriots, coupled with desire to do what is "right," are strong motivations especially with Macmillan and Governor Foot. Foreign Office probably is more concerned with immediate practical difficulties.

4. Cyprus problem is dangerous disruptive influence on NATO.

Thus HMG shrinks from making "choice" between Turkey and Greece. Emotional pull towards Greece, together with feeling that Greek case may be morally stronger, is evident. On other hand, in last

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/5-2358. Secret; Limit Distribution; Noform. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, Nicosia, and Paris for USRO.

<sup>1</sup> Telegram 8280 to London, May 21, requested the Embassy's assessment of the "influences" at work on the formulation of British policy toward Cyprus. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/5-1758)

<sup>2</sup> The October 1956 invasion of Egypt by the United Kingdom and France was partially staged from Cyprus. The conflict was triggered by President Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company.

analysis we doubt HMG would adopt course which it judged would result in violent Turkish opposition, and preponderance of military opinion generally more sympathetic to Turkey. HMG probably would conclude that Turkish support for Western Middle East policy cannot be jeopardized.

In recent months HMG has studied series of possible solutions to Cyprus problem. We believe constant aim has been to find formula Turkish and Greek Governments and both communities on Cyprus could be brought to accept. HMG has shown considerable flexibility of ways and means, trying alternative ideas when firm opposition developed to any given suggestion. We see no evidence that UK is pursuing a devious, predetermined campaign.

HMG now has concluded that further delay and probing are not warranted by prospects of devising more acceptable solution. Therefore it has decided to proceed with proposals outlined Embassy telegram 6634.<sup>3</sup> We believe HMG would welcome and take into account Greek and Turkish suggestions consistent with framework of present proposals and would hope to work out detailed plan in collaboration with those 2 governments and Cypriots.

We sense it has been necessary to attempt to resolve considerable differences of opinion in Cabinet, some of which still linger. Also working levels of Foreign and Colonial Offices are apprehensive over complicated nature of proposals and need for currently nonexistent cooperation between communities on island if they are to work.

Should implementation of proposals prove impossible, we conjecture that HMG, having made one final effort at "right" solution, might move rather rapidly towards relinquishment of responsibilities (except for UK military bases) through solution that could be carried out unilaterally. In this case approach adopted might be Turkish "base" (perhaps of sufficient dimensions to pass for partition), combined with self-determination within short period for remainder of island.

We submit following answers to specific questions in reference telegram which to some extent have been covered by above assessment:

A. Base idea abandoned at least temporarily principally because of Turkish opposition. Tridominium concept shelved because of expressed US doubts and impracticability of bringing it about, except as last stage in evolutionary plan.

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<sup>3</sup> Document 202.

B. UK sees no real prospect that assistance US in fact would be able to render would budge Turks from existing opposition to base idea.<sup>4</sup>

C. Domestic pressures. In general, Conservatives inclined favor maintenance of British sovereignty or solution favorable to Turks, while Labour espouses Greek case. However, Cyprus is not burning issue at present. In our judgment the government should have no trouble with its followers over plan proposed. Labour currently displaying moderation (Embassy telegram 6763).<sup>5</sup> Public mood seems to be one of impatience with delays and desire that government make up its mind and seek way out of impasse, rather than firm support for any specific plan. We doubt domestic pressures are playing major role in government decisions at present. Such pressures have not led to conclusion that indefinite retention UK sovereignty is essential.

D. HMG tendency to accommodate itself more to Turkish than to Greek view explainable, we believe, more in terms of conclusion that Turkish support needed in Middle East than in terms of domestic pressures.

E. Reference 3 basic premises set forth in July, 1957,<sup>6</sup>HMG has not departed from first 2. While intending to try to insure peace and tranquility on island, HMG appears prepared accept temporary period of increased turmoil as transition to more enduring tranquility.

F. Risks involved. HMG believes Turks will accept proposals, but has doubts about Greek reaction. Proposals at least avoid risk of opposition from both communities. HMG appears to assess fairly bright its ability at present to cope with EOKA and seems willing to accept show-down with that organization. Once EOKA "neutralized," HMG anticipates majority of Greek Cypriots would accept proposals.

G. We do not believe main purpose of proposals is to set stage for subsequent move. However, as indicated above, if they fail, temptation to withdraw will be strong.

H. We have no current information on whether Spaak is being consulted or kept informed.

Whitney

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<sup>4</sup> In telegram 2889 from Ankara, May 28, Warren commented: "Re London telegram 6819 to Department, we concur in Embassy London estimate (paragraph B) that there no real prospect USG could in present circumstances budge Turks from existing opposition to base idea." (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/5-2858)

<sup>5</sup> Telegram 6763 from London, May 22, reported the views of senior Labour Party leaders on the British Government's Cyprus policy. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/3-2258)

<sup>6</sup> See vol. XXIV, p. 483, footnote 2.



**204. Message From Foreign Secretary Lloyd to Secretary of State Dulles**

London, May 23, 1958.

DEAR FOSTER: Since I spoke to you at Copenhagen we have spent a good deal of time working on the Cyprus problem and, as you know, Lennox-Boyd has told the House of Commons<sup>1</sup> that we shall be announcing our plan not later than June 17.

2. After consulting the Governor and our Ambassadors at Athens and Ankara we have decided that there are serious obstacles in the way of carrying out immediately the tridominium plan which I mentioned to you at Copenhagen.<sup>2</sup> You yourself expressed your doubts about the acceptability of this solution, particularly to the Greeks. We have come to the conclusion that the differences with regard to a final solution are too wide to be bridged by any formula that can be devised at present. We have been forced to think in terms of an interim solution which will pave the way for a lasting settlement when all concerned are ready for it.

3. Your Embassy here has been given in strictest confidence an outline of our plan.<sup>3</sup> In rough outline, the plan is that Cyprus should be associated not only with the United Kingdom but with Greece and Turkey and that the other two Governments should participate in a joint effort to bring back peace to the island. There will be a wide measure of communal autonomy under continued British sovereignty. There will be separate Houses of Representatives for the two communities. Each Government would be asked to appoint a representative to serve on the Governor's Council, which will have a Greek majority. In order to satisfy the desire of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots to be recognised as Greeks and Turks we will welcome an arrangement which gives them Greek or Turkish nationality, in addition to British. We would hope in this way to restore normal conditions so that the Emergency can be brought progressively to an end. I will send you full particulars when they are finalised.

4. We are in some difficulty over the time table. We want to announce the new plan in Parliament when Harold has returned from his

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Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Top Secret. Enclosure to a letter from Hood to Dulles, May 23.

<sup>1</sup> On May 19; see House of Commons, *Parliamentary Debates*, 5th Series, vol. 588, cols. 891–893.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 197.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 202.

visit to you<sup>4</sup> and have therefore fixed June 17 as the likely date. We propose to give it to the Greek and Turkish Governments beforehand, and possibly to have a confidential discussion in the NATO Council before the public announcement. The purpose of that would be to get other NATO countries to advise Greece and Turkey not hastily to reject our proposals.

5. I have had a talk along these lines with Spaak,<sup>5</sup> who is thinking the matter over. He said that he still thinks the best solution is Turkish and British bases, plus self-determination on a simply majority basis for the rest of the island. I told him that in Zorlu's present frame of mind there was no possibility of the Turks accepting that solution, although, as you know, it was one we had in mind in Ankara in January.

6. We are still exceedingly anxious about the situation in Cyprus and will need all your help in counselling both sides to give our proposals reasonable consideration.

Yours ever,

Selwyn<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Macmillan visited Washington June 7-11 and Ottawa June 12-13.

<sup>5</sup> The Spaak-Lloyd meeting has not been identified.

<sup>6</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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## 205. Letter From Secretary of State Dulles to Foreign Secretary Lloyd

Washington, May 27, 1958.

DEAR SELWYN: I am grateful for your message delivered on May 23<sup>1</sup> outlining in broad terms the plan you propose to put before the Greek and Turkish Governments with regard to Cyprus.

In considering the probable reaction to your plan of the various parties, my colleagues and I are deeply impressed with the difficulties

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Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Top Secret. Drafted by Owen T. Jones and Rountree.

<sup>1</sup> Document 204.

which you might expect to encounter. We realize, however, that it is always far easier to see the disadvantages and dangers of any particular course than to set forth a plan which might be rendered acceptable to all those concerned. Nevertheless, I believe that I should say in all frankness that your plan will in our judgment cause a strong reaction in Greece and Cyprus.

The Greek-Cypriot objection would, I imagine, relate primarily to the facts that the plan would put forth clearly the Turkish Government as a participant in the affairs of Cyprus and would open the way for increased Turkish influence on the island; and that even with this disadvantage from the Greek viewpoint there would continue to be an absence of any indication of what you are proposing eventually to offer the Cypriots after you have relinquished sovereignty over the island.

Whether or not it will be possible for you to make any changes designed to gain a greater measure of Greek and Cypriot acquiescence, I do not know. In any event, however, I would hope that you would plan to consult the Greek and Turkish Governments substantially in advance of any public announcement in order to afford yourself adequate time to assess the implications of their response. In this manner it might be possible to avoid the setting in motion of a chain of events which could lead to the necessity of endeavouring to enforce the plan even though it were quite unacceptable to some of the parties and that could also lead involuntarily to the partition of the island.

Despite our doubts regarding certain aspects of the plan as we now know it, we would like to be as helpful as we can. I am consequently writing you before taking leave of Washington for a few days<sup>2</sup> and before receiving the further details of your plan. If in the course of the necessary preparatory effort you believe our intervention in some form would be useful we would be prepared to consider it. I must say, however, that given the problem and the plan in its present form, I doubt that our influence would really be of much help in bringing about Greek acceptance.

Yours sincerely,

**John Foster Dulles<sup>3</sup>**

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<sup>2</sup> Dulles left Washington on May 27 and returned on June 2.

<sup>3</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

**206. Letter From the British Ambassador (Caccia) to Secretary of State Dulles**

Washington, June 3, 1958.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The Foreign Secretary has asked me to thank you for your message about Cyprus<sup>1</sup> which he received through the United States Embassy on the 29th May. The Prime Minister hopes to discuss the problem with you when he is in Washington.<sup>2</sup> Meanwhile both he and the Foreign Secretary thought that you might like to see for your personal and top secret information a copy of the draft statement which it is proposed to make, and which I enclose.

On the particular points which you made in your message, the Foreign Secretary believes that although there might be a reaction in Greece against the proposal for the participation of the Turkish Government, the Greek Government and the Greek Cypriots would be content to take their lead from Archbishop Makarios, who has recently declared his willingness to accept self-government within the Commonwealth and has placed less emphasis on arrangements being defined now for the exercise of self determination. It is our conviction that to attempt now to be more precise about self-determination would only alienate the Greeks or the Turks. Our view is that there is a great danger of a Turkish and Turkish Cypriot reaction and that unless Turkish Government participation and a Turkish communal house of representatives are offered now, there is not the least chance of Turkish acceptance of the plan. Indeed, it would be most difficult to persuade the Turks to accept the Greek Cypriot majority in the Governor's Council.

We think that from the point of view of the Cypriots the plan is imaginative and offers them a hope of peace. It also has advantages for the Greeks. For example, it is designed to take the heat out of the Cyprus problem from the international point of view for the next seven years, and does not prejudice the position thereafter. It gives full opportunity to Archbishop Makarios on the Greek Cypriot side, to reach agreement with the Governor within the framework of the plan.

The advantages of the policy for the Greek people of Cyprus are these:—

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Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Top Secret and Personal. Notations on the source text indicate it was seen by Dulles, Rountree, and Whitney.

<sup>1</sup> Document 205.

<sup>2</sup> June 7-11.

(i) *Specially-favoured status of the people of Cyprus*

The Greek people of Cyprus will enjoy the advantages of association with Greece without having to give up their association with the British Commonwealth. This policy will give them the best possible insurance for future progress and prosperity.

(ii) *Dual nationality*

If Greece agrees, the Greeks in Cyprus will enjoy Greek nationality while retaining British nationality. Thus they will be able to satisfy their desire to be recognized as Greeks without giving up advantages from which they now benefit.

(iii) *Constitutional advance*

The island will be administered under a unitary system of representative government which takes account of the majority position of the Greek community, provides for the election of ministers who will exercise authority in regard to both legislation and administration in a very wide field of public affairs, and also places the control of Greek Cypriot communal affairs in the hands of a representative legislature drawn entirely from the Greek community.

(iv) *Ending the Emergency*

Subject to violence ceasing the Emergency Regulations<sup>3</sup> will be relaxed, those now detained will be released, the State of Emergency will be brought to an end, and the exiles will return.

(v) *Co-operation between allies*

The new policy provides the opportunity for friendly relations between Great Britain, Greece and Turkey to be restored and strengthened, so that Cyprus may become a symbol of co-operation instead of a cause of conflict between the three allied Governments.

For our part we hope and intend that our plan will lead to an eventual settlement based on the continuing unity of the island and possibly also on the idea of shared sovereignty between the three interested Governments. Nevertheless it may be salutary to let the Greeks understand that if to our regret our plan cannot be carried through successfully, there is a real and imminent danger of partition.

We intend of course to give both the Greek and the Turkish Governments reasonable advance notice of our statement of policy. We shall invite their comments and tell them that we shall take them into account. It will, however, be represented as a British plan which will be carried through on British responsibility. Our last experience has convinced us that there is no hope of negotiating a Greek and Turkish agreement to any plan. We think that it is a merit in our plan that it will enable the Governor to carry on with the administration of the island on a set course which will give hope for the future. Sir Hugh Foot and all his advisers are greatly heartened by the Government's adoption of this set policy.

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<sup>3</sup> Effected by the proclamation of a state of emergency on the island of Cyprus, November 26, 1955.

The Foreign Secretary greatly hopes that these explanations and considerations will enable you to give us full support for this plan. We believe that this may make all the difference between its success and failure.

Yours sincerely,

Harold Caccia

### Enclosure<sup>4</sup>

## CYPRUS

### *Aims of Policy*

The policy of Her Majesty's Government in Cyprus has had four main purposes:

- (a) to serve the best interests of all the people of the Island;
- (b) to achieve a permanent settlement acceptable to the two communities in the Island and to the Greek and Turkish Governments;
- (c) to safeguard the British bases and installations in the Island, which are necessary to enable the United Kingdom to carry out her international obligations;
- (d) to strengthen peace and security, and co-operation between the United Kingdom and her Allies, in a vital area.

2. These are the aims which Her Majesty's Government have consistently pursued and which have guided their efforts in recent months to find common ground on which an agreed settlement might be reached. It is deeply regretted that all attempts in this direction have hitherto proved unsuccessful.

3. In view of the disagreement between the Greek and Turkish Governments and between the two communities in Cyprus, and of the disastrous consequences for all concerned if violence and conflict continue, an obligation rests with the United Kingdom Government, as the sovereign Power responsible for the administration of the Island and the well-being of its inhabitants, to give a firm and clear lead out of the present deadlock. They accordingly declare a new policy which represents an adventure in partnership—partnership between the communities in the Island and also between the Governments of the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey.

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<sup>4</sup>Top Secret; Personal.

4. The following is an outline of the partnership plan:

*The Plan*

I. Cyprus should enjoy the advantages of association not only with the United Kingdom, and therefore with the British Commonwealth, but also with Greece and Turkey.

II. Since the three Governments of the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey all have an interest in Cyprus, Her Majesty's Government will welcome the co-operation and participation of the two other Governments in a joint effort to achieve the peace, progress and prosperity of the Island.

III. The Greek and Turkish Governments will each be invited to appoint a representative to co-operate with the Governor in carrying out this policy.

IV. The Island will have a system of representative Government with each community exercising autonomy in its own communal affairs.

V. In order to satisfy the desire of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots to be recognized as Greeks and Turks, Her Majesty's Government will welcome an arrangement which gives them Greek or Turkish nationality, while enabling them to retain British nationality.

VI. To allow time for the new principle of partnership to be fully worked out and brought into operation in the necessary atmosphere of stability under this plan, the international status of the Island will remain unchanged for seven years.

VII. A system of self-government and communal autonomy will be worked out by consultation with representatives of the two communities and with the representatives of the Greek and Turkish Governments.

VIII. The essential provisions of the new constitution will be:—

(a) There will be a separate House of Representatives for each of the two communities, and these Houses will have final legislative authority in communal affairs.

(b) Authority for internal administration, other than communal affairs and internal security, will be undertaken by a Council presided over by the Governor and including the representatives of the Greek and Turkish Governments and six elected Ministers drawn from the Houses of Representatives, four being Greek Cypriots and two Turkish Cypriots.

(c) The Governor, acting after consultation with the representatives of the Greek and Turkish Governments, will have reserve powers to ensure that the interests of both communities are protected.

(d) External affairs, defence and internal security will be matters specifically reserved to the Governor acting after consultation with the representatives of the Greek and Turkish Governments.

(e) The representatives of the Greek and Turkish Governments will have the right to require any legislation which they consider to be discriminatory to be reserved for consideration by an impartial tribunal.

IX. If the full benefits of this policy are to be realised, it is evident that violence must cease. Subject to this, Her Majesty's Government intend to take progressive steps to relax the Emergency Regulations and eventually to end the State of Emergency. This process would include the return of those Cypriots at present excluded from the Island under the Emergency Regulations.

X. A policy based on these principles and proposals will give the people of the Island a specially favoured and protected status. Through representative institutions they will exercise authority in the management of the Island's internal affairs, and each community will control its own communal affairs. While the people of the Island enjoy these advantages, friendly relations and practical co-operation between the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey will be maintained and strengthened as Cyprus becomes a symbol of co-operation instead of a cause of conflict between the three Allied Governments.

#### *The Future*

5. Her Majesty's Government trust that this imaginative plan will be welcomed by all concerned in the spirit in which it is put forward, and for their part they will bend all efforts to ensuring its success. Indeed, if the Greek and Turkish Governments were willing to extend this experiment in partnership and co-operation, Her Majesty's Government would be prepared, at the appropriate time, to go further and, subject to the reservation to the United Kingdom of such bases and facilities as might be necessary for the discharge of her international obligations, to share the sovereignty of the Island with their Greek and Turkish allies as their contribution to a lasting settlement.



**207. Telegram From the Consulate in Nicosia to the Department of State**

Nicosia, June 9, 1958, 4 p.m.

389. Had interview Deputy Governor Sinclair today regarding tragic events of last three days.<sup>1</sup> He gave me details new severe emergency regulations enumerated Contel 388.<sup>2</sup> Said Turk leaders here have been extremely uncooperative, refusing government's requests urge restraint and instead, with utter cynicism, have repeated claim that Greek bomb at information center provoked Turk community. I pointed out admission Turk responsibility for later killings in words Kuchuk at Istanbul, who said Turk patriots "marched to Greek quarter killing two and wounding five" in retribution. Sinclair said all evidence, including condition interior building pointed to "planned" operation, and while government unable accuse openly, had informed press and wire services "for guidance" that incident apparently not Greek inspired.

He not so certain of role Ankara government but there again usual pattern would indicate complicity. In reply my query his assessment Turk purpose in forcing issue to verge civil war, Sinclair said "This is their all-out bid for partition". In spite obvious discouragement local officials and seeming hopelessness of effort, HMG planning press on with new initiative June 17. I gave him some of worst FBIS transcripts Ankara radio output yesterday, pointing out that our reports were to effect public radios in various centers pouring forth these lies and inflammatory statements to masses Turks who later demonstrated as in Limassol, Ktima, Larnaca and Famagusta. Such broadcasts obviously contributed to tragedy last night's knife and shovel killings Larnaca.

Sinclair agreed and said they now giving serious consideration jamming Ankara radio as well as Athens.

Also queried Deputy Governor with regard position Denktash<sup>3</sup> who, after fiery speech Nicosia and after request by Administration Secretary Reddaway for moderation, proceeded Larnaca and delivered

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6-958. Secret; Niact. Repeated to London, Athens, Ankara, and Paris for USRO.

<sup>1</sup> On the evening of June 7, a bomb exploded outside the Turkish Press Office in Nicosia, setting off violent rioting by the Turkish Cypriots. Bands of Turks invaded the Greek quarters of the city and attacked Greek Cypriots, killing two. Rioting spread throughout Cyprus on June 8.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 388 from Nicosia, June 9, reported that a 24-hour curfew had been imposed to prevent further violence and that Foot was trying to calm the situation in talks with Greek and Turkish leaders. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6-958)

<sup>3</sup> Denktash, a Turkish Cypriot, was a member of the British civil service on Cyprus, serving as Queen's Counsel and spokesman for the Turkish community.

same speech. Deputy Governor admitted they reexamining Denktash position in view recent actions. I then gave him FBIS transcript Kuchuk Istanbul speech for use by Governor when he meets Turk leaders this afternoon.

*Comment:* British now consider themselves in virtual Palestinian situation. In face events past few days and apparent willingness Turks go any length prove their point, do not see any hope for UK proposals unless we willing back them strongly. Utterly shameless, irresponsible manner in which Turks applying pressure here would seem call for some action our part to stop deteriorating Greek-Turk relations as well as situation on island. Am in no position judge whether this best accomplished in Ankara or at NAC meeting requested by Greece but do believe we cannot, as leaders this alliance, allow Cyprus situation drift any closer to chaos.

**Belcher**

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**208. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State**

Athens, June 10, 1958, noon.

3448. 1. Coming just before convening new Greek Parliament, which for first time has in it substantial, vocal and resourceful Neo-Communist opposition,<sup>1</sup> news of Sunday's Turkish riots in Cyprus<sup>2</sup> could not have been better calculated to give rise to explosive outburst from Greek people. Apparent delay by British in bringing Turkish rioters under control will support widespread Greek belief that British basically on Turkish side. US also blamed, since, as several newspapers point out today, US failure to take more forthright position, September

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6-1058. Secret; Niact. Repeated to Paris for USRO, Ankara, London, and Nicosia.

<sup>1</sup>In the May 11 national elections in Greece, the Communist-dominated United Democratic Left (EDA) won 79 seats making it the second largest party in Parliament.

<sup>2</sup>Reference is to widespread anti-Greek rioting by Turkish Cypriots which began on June 7.

1955<sup>3</sup> and later, considered by many Greeks (and was constantly presented in this manner to electorate during recent campaign) as abdication, in face unjustified Turkish demands, of historic US position of support for self-determination.

2. As separately reported, today's Athens press takes unanimously strong line in condemnation of Turkey and some papers criticize GOG for appealing to "colonial NATO"<sup>4</sup> rather than UNSC. In Greek eyes, therefore, NATO appeal is not only real test solidarity Greece's alliance system but may influence fate Karamanlis Government. Greek frustration over apparent Turkish success in using weapon of violence is so great that it could lead to serious threat of Greek withdrawal from NATO if they feel that organization lets them down. Fact that Turks are only taking leaf from Greek book only increases this frustration. I therefore strongly urge that we make every possible effort to stimulate NATO action which can be presented here as evidence real determination to grapple with problem on fair and objective basis.

**Riddleberger**

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is to the U.S. decision not to support the Greek position during the Tripartite Conference on Cyprus (August 29–September 7, 1955) and the Greek resolution on Cyprus during the September 21–23, 1955, debate at the 10th U.N. General Assembly.

<sup>4</sup> On June 10, in response to a Greek request for NATO consideration of the Cyprus question, the North Atlantic Council met in private session in Paris. The Council heard long and impassioned statements by the Greek and Turkish Representatives of their nations' positions on Cyprus. A special meeting was set for June 13 to hear the viewpoint of the British Government. W. Randolph Burgess, U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO, reported on the June 10 meeting in Polto 4096, June 10. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6–1058)

209. Memorandum of Conversation

MCT MC/13

Washington, June 10, 1958, 3 p.m.

MACMILLAN TALKS<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 9–11, 1958

SUBJECT

British Plan for Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS

*United States*

The Secretary  
Mr. Allen Dulles  
Mr. Reinhardt  
Mr. Berding  
Mr. Elbrick  
Mr. Toon  
Mr. Dale

*United Kingdom*

The Prime Minister  
Ambassador Caccia  
Sir Norman Brook  
Sir Patrick Dean  
Lord Hood  
Mr. Leishman  
Mr. W. Morris  
Mr. de Zulueta  
Mr. Frederick Bishop

Although he could not express confidence, the Prime Minister maintained that he is not altogether without hope regarding the situation on Cyprus. He believed that there is a chance the Turks and Greeks may, with difficulty, be brought to shrink back from the full consequences of the process they have started.

On the Turkish base proposal<sup>2</sup> which the UK had considered previously, he foresaw one great difficulty, namely, that the UK will have gone away (as far as security of the Island is concerned), leaving "practically a civil war" in its wake. This solution, which he said the British describe as "partition minus", would leave the Turks free to pour troops in through their base area, and the Greeks could be expected to do likewise without the British there to exercise the necessary security function. This would give rise to an intolerable situation and from a British point of view, it would be a cynical move, amounting to telling the Greeks and Turks to "go fight each other."

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Top Secret. Drafted by Dale on June 11 and cleared by Rountree and Reinhardt. The meeting was held at the Department of State.

<sup>1</sup> Macmillan visited Washington June 7–11. For additional documentation on the Macmillan visit, see volume VII, Part 2.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to Turkish Government demands for three bases on Cyprus as a condition for its acceptance of a final solution to the Cyprus issue.

The Prime Minister said that he intended to send a private communication to the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey which could be made public, if necessary. He read part of a draft of this message, which made the following main points:

(1) A situation of utmost gravity is developing on Cyprus which could be a threat to NATO.

(2) Means should be found to convert this situation into a partnership, showing what can be achieved by the Greeks and Turks living on the Island. The British plan is designed to provide an opportunity to accomplish this.

(3) The Prime Minister does not ask for immediate agreement to his plan, but he does ask for serious study and he asks the parties to refrain from action which would make progress with the plan impossible.

(4) The Prime Minister does believe that this plan offers a chance, and perhaps the last chance, of ending the dangerous situation on the Island.

(5) He asks for comments from the Prime Ministers and suggests personal discussion with each of them, and perhaps, if it is agreeable to them, with both together, suggesting Rome or Geneva as possible sites.

Mr. Macmillan expressed doubt whether the reaction to his letter would be good, but he hoped that at least self-government could be started on the Island. He said the plan<sup>3</sup> involves a "little Parliament for the Greeks, and a little Parliament for the Turks, and a Council to deal with common matters." He stressed that after seven years of opportunity to live together, they could perhaps be brought to share sovereignty over the Island with Britain.

The Prime Minister said he would be very grateful if, through our Ambassadors, we could ask the Greeks and Turks to consider the British plan very seriously and, as well, the Prime Minister's letter with its proposal for conferences at the Prime Ministerial level. He asked us to employ "strong advice" rather than "pressure." Mr. Macmillan said he expected that a statement would be made in the House of Commons on the 17th relating to Cyprus and that NATO would be consulted a day or two in advance. He also asked for US support in the NAC. Even if we fail, asserted the Prime Minister, we shall have proven that it is not our colonial ambition which stands in the way of settlement.

The Secretary described the British plan as a "noble effort" and promised such support as "we feel we can give." He explained that in anticipation of the British plan he had told the Greek Ambassador, who had come in a few days ago with an extreme position,<sup>4</sup> that although he

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<sup>3</sup> See the enclosure to Document 206.

<sup>4</sup> In a June 6 discussion with Dulles, Greek Ambassador George Mallas warned that unless a solution of the Cyprus issue satisfactory to Greece was reached his nation would swing to the far left and into the Soviet Union's sphere of influence. A memorandum of the Dulles-Mallas conversation is in Department of States, Central Files, 747C.00/6-658.

did not know its details, he thought that the UK plan would be a serious, carefully thought-out effort and should be considered with great care by the Greek Government. He mentioned that the Turks came in yesterday and saw the Under Secretary.<sup>5</sup> They had an equally extreme, though opposite position. The Secretary added that we would instruct our Embassies in Ankara and Athens to approach the Greek and Turkish Governments along the lines of what we had told the Greek Ambassador. The Secretary expressed doubt whether we should give the UK plan public support. Since we had not been consulted, he did not believe that we should engage our prestige in this way. However, he expressed our intention to give support to the plan privately. He agreed that the situation is becoming very dangerous and is already near a state of war. He remarked that all members of NATO should be prepared to support the UK plan and said that we certainly would.

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<sup>5</sup> In a June 9 conversation with Herter, Turkish Ambassador Ali Urgupulu urged that the United States not support British plans for Cyprus and reiterated the Turkish Government's demand for partition of the island. A memorandum of Herter's conversation with Urgupulu is *ibid.*, GTI/NEA Files: Lot 61 D 220, Cyprus 1958—Negotiations.

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## 210. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece

Washington, June 11, 1958, 5:42 p.m.

3634. Paris: Deliver Burgess 9 a.m. June 12. Separate message contains substance discussions between Prime Minister Macmillan and Secretary concerning Cyprus.<sup>1</sup> You will note Secretary undertook instruct AmEmbassies Athens and Ankara to approach GOG and GOT, at same time indicating he did not feel we should give public support to British plan. Ambassadors should therefore seek early meetings with respective Foreign Ministers or Prime Ministers and state that United States Government earnestly hopes that they will give to new British proposals

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6-1158. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Rountree, cleared by Timmons and Dale, and approved by Owen T. Jones who signed for Dulles. Also sent to Ankara, Nicosia, London, and Paris for USRO.

<sup>1</sup> Telegram 3635 to Athens, June 11, summarized the conversation (see Document 209). (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6-1158)

same serious study and careful consideration which British gave to development these proposals.

You should add that Cyprus situation has become highly explosive and we fear for its disruptive effects upon NATO and Western defense position. We know that GOG (GOT) must share our deep concern in this regard and will do everything in their power to avoid exacerbation of situation.

*For Athens:* Ambassador Riddleberger may add we aware recent events Cyprus have constituted serious provocations of great concern to GOG and inform GOG in strict confidence that Ambassador Warren is being instructed to express to GOT concern over dangerous implications from acts of violence in recent days by Turkish Cypriots.

*For Ankara:* Ambassador Warren should inform GOT that recent acts of violence committed by Turkish Cypriots have dangerous implications and we urge GOT to use its influence with Turkish Cypriots to refrain from acts of violence and extend to authorities in Cyprus their cooperation in preventing further communal strife.

Dulles

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**211. Telegram 3473 From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State**

Athens, June 11, 1958, 6 p.m.

[Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/5–1158. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution. 3 pages of source text not declassified.]

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**212. Editorial Note**

On June 12, ten “disinterested” member states of the North Atlantic Council met to discuss possible NATO involvement in the solution of the crisis. No decisions were taken. These discussions were reported in Polto 4147, June 12. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/

6–1258) Polto 4132, June 12, summarized the problem facing the North Atlantic Council and recommended a course of action:

“NAC is faced with decision as to how far it should get into act. It is, in effect, faced with two choices: (A) To continue to exhort interested parties to find solution by peaceful means, and to repeat availability of Secretary General for good offices mission; (B) to take somewhat more active role in search for solution or *modus vivendi*. Despite weighty and well-known arguments against NATO committing its prestige on what indeed seems impasse, we believe that increased deterioration of situation in Cyprus and in Greek-Turkish relations, involving possibilities of Greek-Turkish strife, collapse of NATO unity and defense effort in SE, and even of ultimate British pull-out leads us to believe that risk involved requires that more active role be taken by NATO.” (*Ibid.*)

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### 213. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State

London, June 12, 1958, 5 p.m.

7187. For Secretary. Foreign Office called me this morning to ask whether we had heard results of Secretary’s discussion with Macmillan on Cyprus,<sup>1</sup> adding Selwyn Lloyd had not yet received report and most anxious for news. We gave Foreign Office information contained Deptel 8838<sup>2</sup> regarding Secretary’s talk with Macmillan, making clear record not yet approved by Secretary. We also informed Foreign Office of instructions sent to Athens and Ankara (Deptel 8836)<sup>3</sup> and to Ambassador Burgess (Deptel 8835).<sup>4</sup>

Foreign Office has now officially requested US assistance in 2 further steps:

1. Approach by Embassy Athens to Makarios asking that he not take any irrevocable steps with respect to new British proposals until he

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6–1258. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution; Noforn. Received at 2:40 p.m. Repeated to Ankara, Nicosia, Athens, and Paris for USRO.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 209.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 8838 to London, June 11, summarized the Dulles–Macmillan talks. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6–1158)

<sup>3</sup> Printed as telegram 3634 to Athens, Document 210.

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 8835 to London, June 11, relayed Allen’s report of warnings from the Greek Foreign Ministry that news of the British proposals might provoke a coup by the Greek Army. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6–1158)



has had opportunity to discuss them with Governor Foot or representative of HMG. Such action would be in compliance with recommendation of British Ambassador Roger Allen (paragraph 1 Embtel 7178).<sup>5</sup>

2. Approach by Ambassador Burgess to Greek and Turkish NATO representatives prior to discussion in NAC June 13 urging them to take moderate line on Cyprus proposals. UK is anxious to avoid further acrimonious Greek-Turkish exchange such as occurred in NAC June 10.<sup>6</sup>

**Barbour**

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<sup>5</sup> Telegram 7178 from London, June 11, transmitted Allen's suggestion which followed warnings from the Greek Foreign Ministry that news of the British proposals might provoke a coup by the Greek Army. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>6</sup> See footnote 4, Document 208.

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#### 214. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece

Washington, June 12, 1958, 4:22 p.m.

3645. Re London 7178 rptd Athens 134.<sup>1</sup> FYI. British Embassy informs us that Selwyn Lloyd endorses view of British Ambassador in Athens that most useful action US could take at present time is to ask Makarios not take irrevocable action until Foot or senior British official has had chance to talk with him personally. End FYI.

After consultation with British Ambassador, Ambassador Riddleberger or such other Embassy official as he designates is requested to approach Makarios along following lines:

We are informed by British that Governor Foot or senior British official hopes to see Archbishop. We do not know substance of proposed discussion but we hope that Archbishop will afford British representative opportunity to see him and that Archbishop will not take any irrevocable action with respect to Cyprus situation until after this discussion has taken place.

**Dulles**

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6–1158. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Owen T. Jones and approved by Rountree. Repeated to London, Ankara, and Nicosia.

<sup>1</sup> See footnote 5, Document 213.

## 215. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

Athens, June 12, 1958, 3 p.m.

3481. 1. Have just come from lengthy conversation with Averoff in which I carried out instruction in Deptel 3684 [3634].<sup>1</sup> In so doing, I endeavored once more on personal basis point out certain aspects UK plan that should have some appeal to GOG, i.e., the proposal for Greek majority on the Council (point on which Harding–Makarios negotiations failed) and fact that eventual self-determination was not excluded. Referring practical objection of Prime Minister that plan would be continual bickering I observed that this would probably ensue under any plan. I reiterated our deep concern that Cyprus situation could result in disrupting effect on NATO and Western defense position and urged serious study of latest proposals.

2. Averoff replied that most serious defect of plan was creation Turkish legal right over Cyprus.<sup>2</sup> He observed that even if all the rest were acceptable no Greek Government could agree to this change in the legal situation. When I pointed out that eventual self-determination was not excluded he agreed but said that once Turkish right was re-established it would be impossible eliminate it.

3. Foreign Minister then said that he must inform me with all seriousness of which he was capable of the attitude of GOG. In its opinion the US position is one-sided and in effect is pro-Turkish. This is now the firm conviction of his government and he cited in support the message of the Secretary at the time of Istanbul riots in 1955<sup>3</sup> when he said the killers and the killed got the same treatment from US. GOG knows what it owes to us and will always have sentiments of gratitude and friendship, but on Cyprus issue it is obliged to say it has been ill-treated in manner which is politically unpleasant and morally unjustified. He would ask me put the following question to the Secretary and Rountree:

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6–1158. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Received at 6:09 p.m. Transmitted in two sections. Repeated to London, Paris for USRO, Ankara, and Nicosia.

<sup>1</sup> Document 210.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to points 3, 5, 7, and 8 of the British Plan, which would provide Turkish citizenship for Turkish Cypriots and give the Turkish Government a role in the creation of self-government in Cyprus together with veto powers over legislation that it considered discriminatory against Turks.

<sup>3</sup> For text of Dulles' September 17, 1955, message to Papagos, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 26, 1955, p. 496.

In Cyprus several Greeks have been hanged for having been found with unloaded arms;<sup>4</sup> has any Turk been punished by Britain because of murder of Greek or burning of Greek property? In similar situation would American Government accept such treatment of its people? GOG analysis of Cyprus problem has led it to conclusion that one of reasons for strong emotional reaction in Greece is because it has been humiliated by its allies and this sentiment is rampant in Parliament. Averoff requested me inform Secretary confidentially that both he and Prime Minister were heard by Parliament last night in freezing atmosphere and with only pro forma applause. Both he and Prime Minister must tell US Government that situation is so serious they cannot make any forecast for either evolution of situation in Greece or for the ties of alliance with Turkey, including those ties with Turkey which exist through NATO. Averoff said he was certain Secretary recognizes his sincerity and he cannot exaggerate seriousness of the situation here.

4. With respect to political situation, government has majority but number deputies are dissatisfied. If 20 of them should defect under pressure public sentiment the government will go. The best that could be expected afterward would be unsound, i.e. a military dictatorship which GOG does not want. However, amongst Greek people today the feeling is that with its allies only Turkey counts.

5. Foreign Minister said he had just read communiqué issued by GOT<sup>5</sup> which was bitter against UK and threatened unpleasant consequences unless "certain clarifications" are given. He added "il ne man-quit plus que ca". If UK should once more give in to Turkish intransigence situation will become explosive. When I pointed out that if Turks were dissatisfied plan could not be completely pro-Turkish, Foreign Minister referred once more creation Turkish legal right and said better for UK simply announce that partnership idea had been proposed and rejected by both Greece and Turkey.

6. Main preoccupation of GOG is now possible repercussions of present trend events on Greeks in Istanbul. Developments in Cyprus provoked deep reaction here but outbreak Istanbul will cause much deeper emotions as it affects Greeks on Turkish soil who are far away from Cyprus struggle but who because of Patriarchate have sentimental attachment Greek people. He thought it tremendously important that Greece's allies be firm in their efforts to protect these Greeks for if out-

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<sup>4</sup> Under the State of Emergency proclaimed by the British on September 26, 1955, unlawful possession of firearms was punishable by life imprisonment.

<sup>5</sup> A Turkish Foreign Ministry communiqué issued on June 11 at Ankara denied any Turkish Government responsibility for the riots and placed the blame on the British Government for attempting to force the Greek and Turkish Cypriots into "undesired cooperation."

burst comes nothing can be excluded in way of reaction from Greek people.

7. Averoff said it possible he would not be long in present position. GOG must shortly react Turkish provocations. It had moved with great care to date hoping that UK plan would provide something acceptable. GOG has not yet decided how react but it would be unpleasant for its allies. For his government, however, there are limits to what reaction it could demonstrate and if it goes too far the government will resign. The King had been informed and is highly concerned. Once more he must repeat that GOG is firmly convinced US has abandoned Greeks and backed UK in a pro-Turkish attitude. He cited with some bitterness a recent NATO order which he claimed Germany had placed in Turkey when Greek factories were far better equipped to deal with it. He said the Turks were barbarians and barbarians enjoyed liberty of action that was not possible for civilized peoples.

8. I am still strongly of opinion that only chance putting plan over here is for both US and UK make it unmistakably clear that plan is to be implemented insofar as possible regardless of GOG attitude and that it will be so much the worse for them if they refuse opportunity modify plan through discussion, combined with tangible proof continuing its interest in Greece by additional aid offers. Such position of course carries real risk that Greece will leave NATO and political chaos or dictatorship result here but I believe it also has chance of success. Probable alternative developments are in my opinion so serious that really firm try is worth the risk. Certainly GOG will continue on present line unless much more pressure is brought to bear. As our discussions to date have been confidential, we could presumably back away if such approach proves ineffective.

**Riddleberger**

**216. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations**

Washington, June 12, 1958, 8:03 p.m.

Topol 4581. Paris: Deliver to Nolting 9 A.M., June 13. Paris Topol 4550, 4548 and 4547. London 7143 rptd Paris Topol 196. London 7187 rptd Paris Topol 201.<sup>1</sup>

FYI. 1. We are deeply concerned about consequences of possible failure of British in their current efforts. They have indicated that, in event their new initiative fails, they will be obliged to consider partition. In view of attitude of Greeks and practical difficulties involved in drawing partition line it seems inevitable that attempt to apply partition would at this time result in greater civil strife in Cyprus and threaten even wider conflict between Greece and Turkey. While present British plan has number of serious defects, it is essential that British be given that degree of encouragement and support that would forestall their despairing finding solution of this difficult problem and resorting to Palestine-type of withdrawal without settlement.

2. Unless discussions can be undertaken on Cyprus issue in NATO or privately that may lead to some hope of compromise, problem will doubtless grow so much worse that the UN will be drawn into it and what is now a family controversy will become an issue in which the enemies of NATO may take a hand. Averoff reported in press to be considering taking problems to Security Council.

3. We are concerned over London reports that Spaak will urge that other nations "abandon their attitude of cautious reserve and give active support" to present UK approach.<sup>2</sup> It is not clear to us what this means and whether this envisages public announcement by NATO of such support. See separate telegram this aspect of issue.<sup>3</sup> End FYI.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6–1258. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Owen T. Jones and Murat Williams. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, London, and Nicosia.

<sup>1</sup> Topol 4550, June 11, summarized the Dulles–Macmillan talks on June 10 (see Document 209). (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6–1158) Regarding Topol 4548 (telegram 8835 to London), see footnote 4, Document 213. Topol 4547 is printed as telegram 3634 to Athens, Document 210. Telegram 7143 from London, June 10, reported on the initial reaction that the British Government had received to its proposals from the Turkish Government and from Spaak. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6–1058) Telegram 7187 is printed as Document 213.

<sup>2</sup> Spaak's comments were reported in telegram 7143 from London, June 10. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6–1058)

<sup>3</sup> Presumably Polto 4548.

In event UK plan is discussed June 13, you should commend British efforts to find solution without specifically endorsing UK plan. Within that context you may in your discretion make following points:

1. Continued encouragement and support of British efforts are essential to solution of this difficult problem and to preservation of NATO unity.

2. This quarrel within its own family is problem to which NATO should properly address itself.

3. We would hope that this would be regarded as private family matter and that no publicity be given to NATO proceedings.

4. We have encouraged Greek and Turkish Governments to give British proposals same serious study and careful consideration which British themselves clearly gave to their development.

5. We believe that hope in present situation lies in fact that serious efforts are now being made to solve this most difficult problem and that current British efforts afford useful basis for discussions that might lead to plan all parties can live with.

You are authorized to make approaches to Greek and Turkish NATO representatives requested by UK and reported in London's 7187.

**Dulles**

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## 217. Editorial Note

The North Atlantic Council met on June 13 to hear the British proposals for Cyprus together with the comments of the Representatives of Greece, Turkey, and other NATO member states. Both the Greek and Turkish Representatives indicated that the British proposals as they stood were unacceptable. The Representatives of the United States and other member states urged that all parties involved continue discussions in a spirit of compromise. The meeting adjourned without any resolution of the impasse. The discussion was summarized in Polto 4159 from Paris, June 13. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6-1358)

**218. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State**

Ankara, June 13, 1958, 11 a.m.

3054. In carrying out instructions contained Deptel 3639,<sup>1</sup> I chose to see Prime Minister Menderes rather than Foreign Minister Zorlu. Appointment was at 20:00 hours June 12. Menderes appeared tired but alert, and received me cordially. However as I went into message he became grave.

I said Secretary Dulles and top officials of USG had been much concerned by recent explosive events in Cyprus. Linking USA interest to disruptive effects upon NATO and present threatening international developments, and reading slowly and clearly from carefully prepared paper, I set forth three points in Deptel 3639 which I was instructed to present. Because we were alone and because Menderes made no notes, I left copy of paper with him.

After I had finished presentation Prime Minister spoke in this vein:

This is first time Turkey has reacted in Cyprus. For long years we have had to support terrorism in Cyprus, the work of EOKA, with backing of Greek Government. I do not know of events to which you refer. I shall learn about them. Anyway, it is first time it is said that Turk Cypriots are doing anything reprehensible. I remind you that GOT is subject to strongest pressure from Turk public, witness today's Ankara meeting<sup>2</sup> which, I may add, went off without incident. This pressure of Turk public opinion is so great that GOT cannot resist it and must take it into account. It is a sad thing that this issue has been raised between Turkey and Greece. It would have been possible for us to have gone on for years without this Greco-Turk conflict. Unfortunately, Greeks have launched endeavor which has resulted in this deadlock.

At this point, I said that I thought Secretary Dulles would want me to interject this idea: Regardless of how Greek-Turk issue has arisen, because the threat to NATO, to our good allies Turkey, Britain and Greece, and to the west is now so great, would it not be possible to consider this matter at this time solely in light of that peril?

Prime Minister responded: "I have stated what I want to say at this time." Then, picking up my talking paper, he added that he would pass it to Ministry of Foreign Affairs and ask them what he should say.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6-1358. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Received at 9:41 a.m. Repeated to Athens, Nicosia, Paris for USRO, and London.

<sup>1</sup> Printed as telegram 3634 to Athens, Document 210.

<sup>2</sup> A mass demonstration in support of partition.

In ending my part of conversation, I reiterated that I was relaying this message from Secretary Dulles, having in mind the USA-Turk association in NATO, our relations as allies, and our friendship and value of these relations under tremendous USSR threat that we all face today.

As I rose to go, the Prime Minister's cordiality returned. Walking with me to door he said: "Good luck to you (USA) and to all of us in our present situation".

*Comment:* Interview is yet another indication how important Zorlu has been in handling Cyprus matter (re Embdesp 755),<sup>3</sup> but is also plain Zorlu has had full backing of Prime Minister. Fact that Menderes said he would refer my paper to "Ministry" rather than to "Minister" may just possibly be significant.

Unfortunately, I fear that Ambassador Riddleberger's instructions to inform GOG "in strictest confidence" of substance my parallel approach Ankara will inevitably leak, and will do nothing but infuriate GOT. I venture to suggest that both Greek and Turk moods are not conducive to taking either one into confidence about the other.

Warren

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<sup>3</sup>Despatch 755 from Ankara, May 28, reported British speculation that Menderes may have delegated responsibility for Cyprus to Zorlu. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/5-2858)

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## 219. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

Athens, June 13, 1958, 3 p.m.

3498. 1. Permanent Under Secretary at Foreign Office asked me call urgently and handed me following aide-mémoire with request it be transmitted at once to Department:

*"(Begin Translation)*

1. The Greek population of the Island of Cyprus has, on many recent occasions, been subjected to attacks from the Turkish minority. But

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6-1358. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Received at 2:21 p.m. Repeated to London, Paris for USRO, Ankara, and Nicosia.



it is the first time that these attacks, instigated abroad, have reached such proportions during these last few days, causing several fatalities, more than one hundred wounded and the destruction by fire of an Orthodox Church and a large number of factories, stores and Greek property. Thus, only the Greeks have been the victims of these acts of violence.

These events have brought about an explosive situation on the Island and have brought Greco-Turkish relations to a particularly dangerous point of tension.

The Greek Government cannot remain indifferent in the face of these events. It already has had occasion to call the attention of the NATO Council and of certain of its allies to the very grave consequences that the development of the situation on Cyprus could have.

2. This crisis could reach a still more acute point if certain information received in Athens proved to be correct. Indeed, the Greek Government received information according to which, under pretext of the situation in Cyprus, the intention became apparent in Turkey to create disturbances which would result in the expulsion of the Greek population from Istanbul as well as that of the Oecumenical Patriarchate.

3. The Greek Government does not wish to believe that this information is true.

However, in view of the fact that events of the same nature have occurred in the past, the Greek Government feels obliged to call this matter to the attention of the United States Government.

If such excesses should occur against the Oecumenical Patriarchate or against Greeks, who, without interfering in the Cyprus question, live in Turkish territory by virtue of rights established by international treaties, the Greek Government would be obliged to resort to concrete measures.

4. Indeed, such action would be definitely hostile and completely contrary to the principles of the United Nations Charter and international treaties. The result would be that all the states signatories to the Lausanne Treaty would have to contemplate the necessity of sanctions against the party guilty of having violated that Treaty. Be that as it may, and independently of possible recourse to the United Nations, the Greek Government would be obliged to resort to the following measures:

- A. Sever its diplomatic relations with Turkey.
- B. Denounce all bonds of alliance with Turkey. If, under the influence of various factors and despite the desire of the Greek Government, this measure were to result in putting an end to the role which devolves upon Greece within the Atlantic Alliance, the Greek Government would be obliged to consider such a possibility.

C. Reexamine, for its part, the status of the Moslems of Thrace and of the Dodecanese Islands.<sup>1</sup>

D. Resort to any other measure rendered necessary by the application of the points enumerated above.

5. Although the Greek Government has firmly resolved to adopt such a policy, it earnestly and sincerely hopes that the evolution of the situation will not require it to make such decisions, as it considers that cooperation with Turkey is in conformity with the interests of both countries.

*(End Translation)"*

2. Upon reading this I inquired if it represented firm intention of GOG irrespective obligations assumed under NATO. With reference to paragraph 4 of aide-mémoire I pointed out that Greece has assumed obligations, together with number other countries not involved in Cyprus question, under NAT and asked whether this constituted notification intention withdraw unilaterally from NATO irrespective provisions NAT if certain circumstances arose which might be difficult control. Skefiris confirmed this was correct. At this point Averoff walked in and confirmed aide-mémoire represented firm position of GOG. I recalled to Minister what I had said yesterday about our démarche in Ankara<sup>2</sup> and said we hoped it would have calming effect.

3. This is no doubt Greek "reaction unpleasant for its allies" mentioned in paragraph 7 Embtel 3481.<sup>3</sup>

4. UK Ambassador was waiting as I left Foreign Office and is probably receiving same or similar communication now.

**Riddleberger**

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<sup>1</sup> A Turkish minority had been allowed to remain in Thrace under the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne. The Greek Government reacquired the Dodecanese Islands with its Turkish minority from Italy in 1947.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 210.

<sup>3</sup> Document 215.

**220. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State**

Athens, June 13, 1958, 5 p.m.

3503. Reference: Deptel 3645.<sup>1</sup>

1. I had Penfield see Rossides this morning sound him out on Makarios contact. Rossides, who is normally relatively calm and reasonable, was in very excited state and immediately launched into long tirade against British. He mentioned proposals only in passing, characterizing them briefly as impossible, and concentrated on alleged British perfidy in allowing "six days of anti-Greek rioting" on Cyprus.<sup>2</sup> He said that British security forces perfectly capable controlling this type situation which was much easier than handling hit-and-run attacks in which EOKA used indulge. He asserted it was height folly from security standpoint not retain curfew on Turk communities and claimed security forces only intervened stop pillage and arrest Greeks when latter organized protect themselves. He reasoned that only explanation this British attitude is that British "working hand-in-glove with Turks to bring about situation in which partition will be inevitable".

2. As Penfield was able break into this tirade he expressed personal conviction that this was false interpretation British actions and motives and asked whether it was not at least worthwhile for Makarios meet Foot or other high British official and hear their side of story and explanation plan. Rossides agreed but pretended ignorance any British offer arrange such meeting. Rossides also agreed with Penfield's suggestion that a private talk between Makarios and me might be useful. Whole matter meetings left vague, with Rossides promising get in touch with Penfield again after he had talked with Makarios.

3. British Ambassador states his original recommendation was based on assumption Makarios could be persuaded reject a plan in way which would leave door open subsequent discussions. In view deterioration situation he believes (and I agree) this now forlorn hope and says he has recommended against suggestion (not clear whether from London or from Foot) that Foot come Athens now to see Makarios.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6-1358. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Received at 2:30 p.m. Repeated to London, Ankara, and Nicosia.

<sup>1</sup> Document 214.

<sup>2</sup> Mob violence on Cyprus, which began on June 7 with Turkish riots in Nicosia, reached its climax on June 12 when 8 Greek Cypriots were killed by a mob of Turkish farmers near the village of Geunyeli. The Greeks were part of a group of 35 which had been arrested, disarmed, and then released by British security forces.

*Comment:* It is clear that unfortunate events Cyprus last few days have seriously prejudiced whatever small chance there was of Greeks not completely slamming door. I will of course continue with Makarios meeting if he is receptive but have little hope of making any impression.

Riddleberger

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## 221. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Herter) and President Eisenhower

June 13, 1958.

I told the President that the situation in Greece and Turkey was disquieting. About 4 p.m., after the Secretary had left, we received an aide-mémoire from Greece saying the Greek Government was considering breaking off diplomatic relations with Turkey and pulling out of NATO as a result of the state of affairs in Cyprus.<sup>1</sup> There was a further implication that the Greeks were being forced to leave Istanbul. Spaak, at NATO, was doing his best to pull things together, but I said I imagined he was having rough sledding.

I told the President it was the feeling here in the Department among Bill Rountree and some of the others who were here in the room that we should do whatever we could to get both Governments to keep their shirts on. The most effective way, it was felt, was for the President to send a personal message to the Prime Ministers of both countries. I said a draft of these messages could be sent up by helicopter or read over the phone. The President said he would like to hear them over the phone. The suggested text follows:

"I am, of course, aware that our governments have been in communication concerning recent Cyprus developments, including the current violence on the Island. In view of my great concern over the possible consequences of a failure to bring about a peaceful solution to this problem, and one which will not disrupt the very foundations of western defense to which both of our countries have made such a great

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations with the President. Secret. Drafted by Stimpson. The President was in Gettysburg and Herter was in Washington.

<sup>1</sup> Transmitted in Document 219.

contribution, I would like to share with you personally my own apprehensions.

"The United States is not directly a party to the dispute, although we have endeavored to be of assistance to our friends in bringing about an amicable settlement. I believe that such a settlement is both possible and desirable, and I am confident you share with me views upon the overriding importance of letting nothing happen which will make it more difficult and which would bring about grave losses in terms of the type of cooperation among our allies which is vital to the whole free world. In the present situation emotions are running high and I fear that unless immediate and effective steps are taken to bring about a calmer situation one event, in Cyprus or elsewhere, might lead to another with ultimate effects unwanted and unwelcomed by all of us.

"This matter is currently being considered by the North Atlantic Council. It is my fervent hope that the deliberations in the Council can lead to constructive measures which not only will contribute to a solution of the Cyprus problem itself but will immediately bring about a lessening of tensions and an improvement in the general atmosphere.

"I understand that proposals are now being formulated within the Council to accomplish this end. While I do not yet know what their content will be, I do know the motivations which lie behind them, and I earnestly hope that when they are received you will on your part give them most serious consideration in the context of the great importance of finding some way out of the present impasse. I am confident that you will do so, Mr. Prime Minister, and that you will use your great influence to the end that a harmonious atmosphere will quickly be restored."

The President inquired whether the "Council" referred to the Security Council, and I said it didn't, that it referred to NATO.

At the conclusion of the message the President said he thought it was all right. He added that there was no way we could soften anything. I agreed and said Spaak is doing his best but that we could not be specific. The British proposals haven't helped but have made both sides mad.

The President said he would like to see something at the end of the messages to the effect that "the great sacrifices your people and ours have made for peace must not be lost". He added that we had better get the message off quickly. I agreed and said there is real urgency or I would not have bothered him.<sup>2</sup>

**Christian A. Herter<sup>3</sup>**

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<sup>2</sup> After modifications in the wording of the proposed texts, similar messages were sent on June 13 in telegrams 3676 to Athens and 3684 to Ankara for delivery to Karamanlis and Menderes. These telegrams are both in Department of State, Central Files, 711.11-EI/6-1358.

<sup>3</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

## 222. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

Athens, June 14, 1958, 11 a.m.

3509. 1. King sent for me last night and in presence of Queen at Tatoi outlined critical situation in which Karamanlis government now finds itself. He said he knew of aide-mémoire which Foreign Office had given me<sup>1</sup> and said that almost simultaneously Prime Minister had come to him and threatened to resign because he could no longer hold his government together in face of rapidly developing reactions in Parliament. The King said his resignation had not been formally submitted and he was attempting to dissuade Karamanlis from such precipitate action. He emphasized, however, that he must inform me of gravity of situation and the difficulties with which he was now faced. He said he frankly did not see any way out if Karamanlis persisted in his intention to resign. If Greece were drawn now into another election it would probably result in increased Communist gains, which might be fatal to the future of this country. I inquired what the possibilities might be for a coalition government and the King responded that in existing circumstances he thought it would be useless as no political leader would be willing assume responsibility for taking decisions on Cyprus in present atmosphere. In his opinion a coalition government would fall apart almost as quickly as it was formed if indeed one could be formed. [6-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] He was therefore forced to conclusion that Karamanlis must be persuaded to carry on and he would do his best to this end.

2. Both King and Queen vigorously criticized the British plan and contended it was impossible of execution. I pointed out to them as I had done to Karamanlis and Averoff<sup>2</sup> the advantages which it offered Greece and emphasized importance of gaining time in the present explosive situation. I urged King to impress upon Karamanlis necessity of taking the plan as a point of departure to which Greek Government could make counter-proposals. I pointed out that it was a fundamental postulate of politics not to juggle a hot potato on the front porch but to get it to the cellar until cooling process could be completed. King said he agreed but in the present emotional state of Greek feeling, he was not certain he could persuade Karamanlis to follow such advice.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6-1458. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Received at 9:56 a.m. Transmitted in two sections. Repeated to London, Ankara, Paris for USRO, and Nicosia.

<sup>1</sup> Transmitted in Document 219.

<sup>2</sup> See Documents 211 and 215.

3. King cited the aide-mémoire handed me as an example of the emotions aroused in this country, and in particular paragraph 4 (B). The Queen at this point asked what that was and upon explanation said she could not believe it. When I explained what the implications were, the Queen was on verge of tears and said that Greece could not leave NATO and they might as well resign themselves.

4. The King expressed great apprehension respecting the Greeks in Istanbul and thought that we might be at mercy of an incident. He did not know what would happen in Greece if there were to be rioting in Istanbul against the Greeks there. He emphasized, as did Averoff, inevitable emotional reaction here should outburst occur. I told him we were attempting to exercise moderation on the Turks and I hoped it would be successful.

5. The King then said he had several suggestions to make which I agreed to put to Washington. He said he could not understand why British were so insistent upon making a statement in Parliament on June 17, and asked whether we could not use our influence with British to eliminate this deadline. He would also ask that we use all our persuasion to get the British to agree to further discussion before any public statement was made. Simultaneously, we might suggest to British that they reconsider the plan to see if something more acceptable to the Greeks could not be worked out. Finally, he asked that we urgently consider the possibility of making some public statement here which Karamanlis could use in Parliament to the effect that we appreciated and commended the restraint Greek Government had shown to date in the face of Turkish attacks against Greek Cypriots. He thought this would help him in dissuading Karamanlis from insisting upon immediate resignation which, he repeated, would lead to chaos in this country.

6. As Department may have realized from earlier telegrams and from this message, I have been attempting to gain in time and persuade GOG from taking action which would worsen situation. I cannot exaggerate the emotional reaction which is prevalent among the Greek leaders. [12-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

7. Parenthetically, I might add that the Turkish Ambassador here, who is an unemotional and objective diplomat, told me he now feels that present situation is so tense that "any fool who may break a window of his Embassy in Athens can set off riots in Istanbul." He went as far as any representative can go in suggesting that nothing will be accomplished until US makes up its mind to intervene and to talk sternly in both Ankara and Athens.

8. It is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain attitude calculated to be most useful in light probable future developments. British Ambassador indicates that if, as seems probable, both GOG and GOT reject plan Britain will probably adopt fall back position of attempting

proceed with such elements of plan as are not specifically rejected by both sides. If we envisage this as probable course developments we should now adopt line with Greeks which will not conflict. If, on other hand, we decide to take risk of attempting all-out effort force plan through (paragraph 8 Embtel 3481),<sup>3</sup> we should immediately start to move in this direction. Every hour of temporizing increases chances of disastrous blow-up in this part of the world.

Riddleberger

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<sup>3</sup> Document 215.

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## 223. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles

June 14, 1958, 3:41 p.m.

### TELEPHONE CALL TO THE PRESIDENT (Gettysburg)

[Here follows discussion of an unrelated subject.]

Pres. asked about Cyprus. Sec. said all we have is that there are big demonstrations going on in Athens largely Anti-American.

Pres. said he did not understand Greeks getting mad at us. Sec. said everywhere in the world everyone thinks we can fix everything. They don't realize we don't run the whole world.

Pres. said how do we do anything with the Turks or Greeks. Turkey is thinly populated—couldn't we get Turks out and in better position elsewhere? Sec. said we would never get them out of there. Pres. said there were only 5,000 Turks in Cyprus. Sec. said (after checking with Rountree) there were 160,000—about 20% of the total population. Pres. said that knocks out any resettlement.

Pres. said he guessed all we can do is pray.

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations. No classification marking. Transcribed by Phyllis D. Bernau. Secretary Dulles was in Washington.



## 224. Editorial Note

On June 14, Greek personnel attached to NATO Headquarters at Izmir, Turkey, were evacuated by airlift. On June 15, the Greek Government announced that as a result of anti-Greek violence on Cyprus, it was severing all its military links with Turkey within NATO's Southeast Europe Command. Greek military units stationed along the Turkish frontier were placed in a state of readiness.

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## 225. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State

Ankara, June 15, 1958, 2 a.m.

3079. Embtel 3077 (A).<sup>1</sup> Tonight after handing me referenced GOT reply to Secretary Dulles message re Cyprus of June 12 (Embtel 3054)<sup>2</sup> Foreign Minister Zorlu began long rambling almost incoherent recital. I shall try to reproduce his thoughts but my presentation will be in different and more logical order than his talk. His rehash Cypriot history last two years recited in way to back up his assertion that Turks have been correct in their attitudes during period and that they are still comporting themselves like self-respecting sovereign member of NATO and supporter of free world and that governments of Greece and UK are to blame for present impasse. Salient points in talk were as follows:

Zorlu said that GOG had been stirring up trouble for years. During period EOKA terrorism 30 Cypriot Turks killed but world opinion is now excited because four Cypriot Greeks killed. Why the change?

GOT has consistently avoided creating excitement through radio broadcasts such as done by Athens. When I reminded him of Turk broadcasts of speeches at recent demonstration containing cries of "partition or death" and report that 6,000 Turks have been inscribed for

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6-1558. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Received at 6:46 a.m. Repeated to Athens, London, Paris, and Nicosia.

<sup>1</sup> Telegram 3077 from Ankara, June 14, transmitted a Turkish aide-mémoire that denied involvement in events on Cyprus and blamed the Greek and British Governments for creating and fostering a climate of violence. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/6-1458)

<sup>2</sup> Document 218.

service in Cyprus, he was evasive and unconvincing. When I mentioned the activities of Kuchuk, Denktash and Turk Consulate General Cyprus, he said Consulate General has been entirely and consistently correct in what he had said or done (Zorlu said Greek Consulate General in Cyprus had not been correct). He mentioned Turk Consulate General returning Nicosia tomorrow and would continue follow his long-standing instructions try calm Cypriot Turks.

I mentioned that NATO is involved in the problem and noted that the Greek Government had seen fit this day to evacuate to Greece its elements in MD<sup>3</sup> to [from] Izmir. Zorlu characterized Greek move as "childish". When I expressed doubt world opinion would see Greek act in same light, he then asserted Greeks attempting apply pressure. Zorlu continued by stating that if Greeks wanted to get out of NATO, "let Greece go, we would be better without her." "If necessary GOT could get out." Zorlu then alleged that HMG believes it can do anything it likes because of aid and can place pressure on GOT. Turkey can get along without aid: "We can eat only bread and fight with our fingers; we admit no foreign pressure." "But GOT is under pressure of Turk public opinion. 120,000 Cypriot Turks know how protect themselves and can take care of 400,000 Cypriot Greeks." Replying I said that that was exactly the kind of strife USA wanted to avoid in Cyprus. We do not want to see Turks and Greeks killing each other. I stressed US aid to Turkey was not granted so that we could bring pressure on Turkey. Our aid was not meant to place Turkey under that kind of obligation. I further stated that Dulles' message was not effort at pressure but the attempt of a friend and ally to confer with Turkey about a matter that threatens NATO, an organization which USA holds vital to Turkey, USA, and entire West. I added that in all these relations we deal with Turkey solely as an equal.

Closing my remarks I reiterated importance we attach to NATO, our desire to have both Turks and Greeks as members that organization, expressed the hope that bloodshed be avoided in Cyprus and trusted that the next time he and I met our talk would be more encouraging. On this point I said "Good night".

*Comment:* I sensed Zorlu's extreme attitude prompted in part by: (1) Extreme irritation that GOT must accept foreign aid, (2) annoyance that Cyprus problem is being discussed in NATO and (3) resentment that NATO may try to bring pressure on GOT.

Ambassador Bowker told me GOT rejection new British proposals was communicated to Turkish Ambassador Birgi late Friday night and that Birgi had informed HMG Foreign Office Saturday morning that for

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<sup>3</sup>This reference is unclear.

“several reasons” he would like to delay delivery GOT reply until Sunday morning. Zorlu told me that President Eisenhower letter to Prime Minister which I delivered Saturday 11:20 hours (Embtel 3070)<sup>4</sup> was to be discussed Saturday evening cabinet meeting to be attended by Prime Minister and President Bayar. It is clear that GOT decision reject British proposal was taken before receipt of Eisenhower message and that the receipt has not caused GOT change its instruction to Birgi.

It was an unpleasant conversation.

Warren

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<sup>4</sup> In telegram 3070 from Ankara, June 14, Warren reported on his brief conversation with Menderes and Zorlu at the time he delivered Eisenhower’s June 14 message to Menderes. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.11–EI/6–1458)

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## 226. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

Athens, June 15, 1958, noon.

3534. 1. Immediately upon receipt Deptel 3676<sup>1</sup> I had the President’s letter delivered to Prime Minister. Last night Karamanlis asked me to call at which time I had lengthy discussion of which highlights follow. Prime Minister began by expressing grateful thanks for President’s letter and then launched into another discussion of difficulties facing him in Greece because of content and manner in which British plan had been presented. As most of this was largely repetition what he had told me June 11,<sup>2</sup> I do not repeat it here. He made no mention of resigning from office. He concluded in asserting that while he deeply appreciated the letter, he was not certain it represented any real change in American attitude. He referred once more to the great danger of Turk Cypriot violence.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.11–EI/6–1558. Secret; Niact; Presidential Handling. Received at 11:01 a.m. Repeated to Paris for USRO, London, and Ankara. A note on the source text reads: “Sec saw.”

<sup>1</sup> Telegram 3676 to Athens, June 13, transmitted Eisenhower’s letter to Karamanlis. (*Ibid.*, 711.11–EI/6–1358) For text of the letter, see Document 221.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 211.

2. In reply, I called his attention to several sentences of President's letter and in particular our feeling respecting recent outburst against Greek Cypriots. I emphasized again our fervent hope that his worst fears would not be fulfilled and repeated what I had said to Averoff.<sup>3</sup> Also called his attention to President's statement that US is using its influence in seeking to avoid any occurrences in Cyprus or elsewhere which might exacerbate situation.

3. Turning to question of present attitude, I underlined significance of first sentence of paragraph 2 of letter and urged Prime Minister to recognize significance of final paragraph. At this point Prime Minister broke in to say that original Greek appeal to NATO<sup>4</sup> had been designed to prevent further violence by Turk Cypriots and not raise entire issue of Cyprus in NAC. I replied that I understood this but that aide-mémoire given me by Foreign Office<sup>5</sup> might under certain contingencies jeopardize entire structure of NATO, and that in view of gravity with which Government of Greece envisaged possible course of events it was only natural that NAC should now discuss entire Cyprus issue. I referred to President's remark in last paragraph of letter where he points out that Council is now deliberating the question and constructive suggestions are being prepared. I said I was certain Government of Greece would recognize significance of this paragraph in connection with our attitude. This seemed to satisfy Karamanlis that American position had undergone a change and he then proceeded to outline his position.

4. He thought if we could get through present crisis there were several suggestions which could be discussed in future and which he hoped US Government would seriously consider supporting. These were: (a) granting of self-government to Cyprus with no promise of and no mention of future plans for self-determination; (b) self-government with arrangement whereby self-determination and partition would be categorically excluded; and (c) self-government under democratic constitution which would exclude both Enosis and partition indefinitely. Karamanlis emphasized hope of Government of Greece that such suggestions eliminating self-determination, Enosis and partition would eventually provide basis for fair settlement and thought they demonstrated conciliatory attitude of Government of Greece.

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 215.

<sup>4</sup> June 8.

<sup>5</sup> Transmitted in Document 219.

5. Atmosphere of our interview was vast improvement over that of June 11. Although Prime Minister is very much worried over internal repercussions here, he has obviously moved into a negotiating mood. There is, however, one point of great concern to him and that is UK decision to make a declaration in Parliament June 17. He is fearful that if substance of UK plan is announced rioting may break out here and he begged me to use all our influence at least to postpone any statement divulging contents of plan. In view rejection of plan by both Government of Greece and Government of Turkey, he recommended UK be urged to make no statement or declare that UK dropping plan but will revert to issue in near future, making no mention of partition or Enosis. He thought if we could get over this date whole question could be reexamined in calmer circumstances in which serious negotiations for a settlement in accordance with President's letter could be undertaken. I promised to transmit this urgently.

**Riddleberger**

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**227. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State**

Athens, June 15, 1958, 6 p.m.

3536. Re Karamanlis suggestions for Cyprus settlement set forth paragraph 4 Embtel 3534,<sup>1</sup> Foreign Minister asked to see me urgently this afternoon to suggest following. He said following conference with Prime Minister GOG would like to suggest that USG put forward possible solutions proposed by Karamanlis, particularly as GOG was prepared to abandon both Enosis and self-determination which would reassure Turks. GOG would like to see this done in NAC meeting tomorrow and if we could see our way clear to do it, Greek representatives would be instructed by telephone to accept. I replied I feared time was rather short for us to give such substantive instructions particularly as other ideas might also emanate from debate. I commented that this was

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.11–EI/6–1558. Secret; Niact; Presidential Handling. Received at 2:44 p.m. Repeated to London, Paris for USRO, and Ankara.

<sup>1</sup> Document 226.

type of proposal that perhaps should be discussed with Spaak in order to sound out reaction of other NATO governments. However, I promised in view importance of Greek suggestions to put it to Department.<sup>2</sup>

[1 paragraph (4-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

Riddleberger

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<sup>2</sup> In telegram 3691 to Athens, June 15, the Department of State commented: "We concur with your suggestion that Karamanlis' proposal might be better discussed with Spaak and we hope he will do so. In informing Karamanlis of this you should express our gratification over the Prime Minister's efforts to find a means for easing the present crisis." (Department of State, Central Files, 711.11-EI/6-1558)

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## 228. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, June 15, 1958, 5:10-6:45 p.m.

### SUBJECT

Cyprus

### PARTICIPANTS

The President

Department of State: The Secretary, The Under Secretary, Mr. Rountree, Mr. Macomber, Mr. Hanes

Department of Defense: Deputy Secretary Quarles, Gen. Twining

CIA—Mr. Allen Dulles

USIA—Mr. George Allen

The White House—Mr. Arthur Minnich

After discussion on another subject, the Secretary raised the problem of Cyprus. He gave the President cable 3509 from Athens to read.<sup>1</sup>

The Secretary then read cable 3536 from Athens<sup>2</sup> aloud stating that the Government of Greece was prepared to abandon both Enosis and self-determination in favor of self-government under the British, and

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6-1558. Secret. Drafted by Hanes.

<sup>1</sup> Document 222.

<sup>2</sup> Document 227.

wants the United States to support this initiative promptly, preferably early this week in NATO. Averoff stated that the GOG is prepared to “tell” Makarios that “This is it”.

The Secretary said he wished to urge Lloyd most strongly not to make the Parliamentary announcement of the British plan for Cyprus on Tuesday as planned.<sup>3</sup>

The President authorized this, and said it was important also to speak to Macmillan. He therefore asked that a second message go from him to Macmillan urging the same thing. The Secretary thereupon drafted such a cable to Whitney, and the President approved it.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>In telegram 8955 to London, June 15, Dulles instructed Whitney to see Lloyd and urge postponement of the British statement on Cyprus pending discussions in the North Atlantic Council. He warned that a public statement was likely to aggravate the crisis. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6–1458)

<sup>4</sup>Telegram 8956 to London, June 15, instructed Whitney: “President and Secretary have fully discussed matter of Parliamentary announcement of U.K. Cyprus plan. President wants Ambassador Whitney to tell Prime Minister he greatly hopes Prime Minister can defer Parliamentary presentation pending further NAC discussions.” (*Ibid.*, 711.11-EI/6–1558)

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## 229. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State

Ankara, June 15, 1958, 8 p.m.

3084. Paris for USRO, West and Thurston. Foreign Minister Zorlu called me Foreign Office 18:30 hours and handed me reply Prime Minister Menderes to message from President Eisenhower (Deptel 3864).<sup>1</sup> Message reads:

“Mr. President, I have received and carefully considered the messages<sup>2</sup> which you have been kind enough to send to me through Ambassador Fletcher Warren.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.11–EI/6–1558. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution; Presidential Handling. Received at 5:30 p.m. Transmitted in two sections. Repeated to London, Paris, Athens, and Nicosia.

<sup>1</sup> See footnote 2, Document 221.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to Eisenhower’s letter (see Document 221) and the message that Warren conveyed to Menderes on June 12 (see Document 218).

I had already had the opportunity of submitting to you the views of the Turkish Government in regard to the Cyprus question<sup>3</sup> which has become a dispute of increasing gravity for the last four years between three allies within the national alliance.

As you are already aware, Mr. President, the question was first created by Greece and all the efforts made by Turkey to find a peaceful solution have remained fruitless. Even when Turkey, with the object of reaching a compromise in this matter and at great sacrifice, accepted the idea of partition, which had first been put forward by Mr. Averoff, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece and later recommended by the United Kingdom,<sup>4</sup> Greece adopted a more pretensions (*sic*) attitude towards this concession and further intensified its encouragement of the campaign of terrorism which it had undertaken with the purpose of securing the annexation of the Island; I think that it would also be useful if I informed you in this connection, Mr. President, that Turks in villages where they are not as numerous as the Greeks have been subjected to a constant propaganda of terrorism for the last two years, and have been forced to migrate to places where the Turks are in majority.

The Turkish Government fully realizes the importance of NATO [not] only for Turkey but for the entire peace-loving world, and the necessity of maintaining maximum solidarity among allies in these critical times for the world. However, the Turkish Government is also of the opinion that the Turkish nation which has so valiantly taken its due place among the peoples that constitute the front of freedom and justice, would be justified in expecting to be treated in the same spirit by its NATO allies, in its national issues.

The Turkish Government has been in contact and discussion with the British Government for a long time, and is convinced that a radical solution of the dispute between the three governments can only be reached through the partition of the Island. A memorandum containing the basic reasons and convincing justification of this attitude of the Turkish Government had been handed to the United States Government on April 25, 1957,<sup>5</sup> and the same views were explained to the British Government. The only objection raised to partition up to now had been that of mandatory migration among the communities. As I have already pointed out, it has started in the Island and has been going on for over a year. But unfortunately this has been going on through threats

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<sup>3</sup> Document 175.

<sup>4</sup> No reference to a Greek proposal for partition has been found. In his December 19, 1956, statement to Parliament, Lennox-Boyd indicated that the British Government would consider partition as a last resort. See footnote 2, Document 171.

<sup>5</sup> Text of this aide-mémoire was transmitted to the Department of State in despatch 678 from Ankara, April 29, 1957. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/4-2957)



and violent incidents, and if it continues the actual partition of the Island would become a reality in a year's time, under most tragic circumstances.

I completely share your views in regard to the gravity of the situation. The patience of the Turkish community in Cyprus and of the Turkish people is going through a very hard test. My government and I personally will do our best to calm down our public opinion. But as you are very well aware, Mr. President, it is an extremely difficult course for governments to act against the justified feelings and emotions of public opinion. In particular when the Turkish Government has been trying to calm down the public opinion since the beginning of the Cyprus question, has been telling the country to trust its allies, but unfortunately has not received the same understanding from its allies. However, you may rest assured that the suggestion and views expressed by the US Government and its eminent President will be considered with great attention and due importance.

Now, the last hope of the Turkish Government, at the moment when the matter is being considered in the North Atlantic Council, is that Turkey's legitimate position would receive understanding and that the extreme expansionist aims of Greece would not have the benefit of favourable support.

I would also like to convey to you, Mr. President, my concern in regard to the dangers involved in the consideration of this question and in the adoption of any final decision in the North Atlantic Council. I sincerely hope that the result will be to the benefit of all of us.

I wish to assure you that Turkey will spare no effort for the preservation of peace and order. However, it is a fact that the Turkish community in Cyprus has been attacked and threatened during the past several years. I do not intend to go into the details of the recent incidents, for I do not wish to take up your valuable time, but I only want to say that the Turkish community today is in a position of self-defense. May I ask you, Mr. President, to share my well-founded conviction in this respect, and believe me that I mention this fact so that you may rest assured in your conscience.

With my highest regards and esteem,

Sincerely, Adnan Menderes"

[Here follows the remainder of the telegram.]

**Warren**

### 230. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State

London, June 16, 1958, 2 p.m.

7260. Reference Department telegram 8955.<sup>1</sup> I have just seen Prime Minister and Selwyn Lloyd together, and discussed Cyprus with them pursuant reference telegram. I said President and Secretary believed strongly a public announcement of British Cyprus proposals at this time would aggravate already tense situation in [and?] reduce NATO's maneuverability during its present discussion of Cyprus problem. I indicated we hoped that very fact that NAC now has this problem before it will provide basis for deferral of announcement in Parliament now scheduled for June 17. I urged need for utmost restraint in view current volatile nature of relations between Greeks and Turks and tense situation on Cyprus. Referring to Prime Minister's discussion of Cyprus with Secretary on June 10,<sup>2</sup> I noted Secretary had instructed our Embassies Athens Ankara to say he felt United Kingdom plan would be serious, carefully thought out effort and should be carefully considered.<sup>3</sup> Our Ambassadors Ankara and Athens have worked hard to make this position clear. In addition, as they knew, Karamanlis and Menderes have been informed our expression great concern on the current situation and dangers it poses for world security.<sup>4</sup>

We have urged them to use their influence to improve atmosphere and that they give most serious consideration to proposals on Cyprus being developed in NAC when they are received. I further noted that in his discussion with Macmillan, Secretary had said that while we would ask Greeks, Turks and NATO to give United Kingdom proposals careful consideration, we could only do this privately, and that Secretary had indicated we could not accord British plan public support. I emphasized that public discussion of proposal at present time would in our view have most unfortunate effects. I noted that the United States is not at present either approving or objecting to the specific British proposal. United States does not feel able to go down the line in NAC for this one plan to the exclusion of other ideas. Therefore, in discussion of plan at NAC today best position we can take is to support in any resolution which may be proposed language such as "deserving of careful consid-

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6-1658. Secret; Niact. Received at 3:37 p.m. Repeated to Paris, Athens, and Ankara.

<sup>1</sup> See footnote 3, Document 228.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 209.

<sup>3</sup> Document 210.

<sup>4</sup> See Documents 226 and 218.

eration and discussion." I concluded that we firmly oppose the development in NAC a situation in which one member of NATO or even two might be publicly branded as uncooperative or worse by other NATO members, and consequently we oppose any majority type resolution which could not be unanimous and might be used to isolate publicly one or more members. I gave them copy of statement our representative is authorized to make in NAC today.<sup>5</sup>

Macmillan said our representations re deferment announcement in Parliament will be given serious consideration. He expressed view that situation re Cyprus is clarifying. The Greeks insist on Enosis, Turks on partition, and in circumstances United Kingdom desires maintain its position taking step forward toward self-government and eliciting Greek and Turkish Government support toward partnership in governance of Island. He felt it impossible for him not to make some statement in Parliament tomorrow, indicating that if he refused to do so in current circumstances, he would anticipate his government being immediately thrown out. However, he felt there might be some misunderstanding as to British position. In fact, British proposal is not a new plan, but is a broad indication of British desire to enlist the cooperation of the peoples of the Island in self-government by establishing Greek and Turkish councils with considerable authority in matters of major importance to those communities. Lloyd interjected that in effect British proposals are not a plan but a policy, and he added that in any event British have never said that their proposals constitute only plan they prepared consider. Lloyd feared that postponement announcement would aggravate situation rather than the contrary. Macmillan noted that while Greek and Turkish Governments have reacted violently, and domestic political situations are critical, Makarios position is less clear and he has not yet come out in opposition. Prime Minister referred to fact he has communicated privately with both Karamanlis and Menderes, offering to discuss problem personally either together or separately, and that offer not yet rejected.

Regarding NAC, Macmillan noted United Kingdom not seeking NATO resolution endorsing United Kingdom proposals which they both agreed would be likely isolate one or more NATO partners.

They believe Spaak's views are consistent this objective, and that most appropriate result NAC consideration today would be agreement that consensus NAC is to effect problem should be considered by all parties concerned seriously and with restraint. Lloyd said proposed

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<sup>5</sup> Presumably a reference to the statement transmitted in Topol 4623, June 13, in which the United States indicated its backing for British efforts to settle the Cyprus question and urged that British proposals be used as the basis for further discussions. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6-1358)

United States statement exactly along lines they hoped for, and greatly appreciated. Macmillan concurred.

Following my reiteration point that United Kingdom announcement in Parliament tomorrow would seem likely restrict maneuverability of NAC and might prejudice further NAC consideration, Macmillan said possible he might be able refer to fact NAC seized of problem. In any event, he would avoid parliamentary discussion, cutting off questions with reference to fact debate scheduled for Monday June 23, and consequently, there will be opportunity for NAC situation to develop in meantime.

My feeling is, in light of conversation, that British position increasingly flexible and that while they will probably have to go ahead with parliamentary statement tomorrow, statement will announce proposals in general terms and indicate that they are subject to negotiation. Seems likely also that parliamentary presentation will play down rather than [emphasize] fact that proposals constitute change of policy regarding Cyprus, with principal emphasis on line that in view attitudes various interested governments, United Kingdom has no choice but to continue exercise sovereignty over Cyprus and endeavor achieve maximum cooperation of population in self-government. Finally, to emphasize, both were of the opinion that to postpone statement would be to increase present local violence rather than the opposite.<sup>6</sup>

**Whitney**

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<sup>6</sup> At 10 p.m. on June 16, C.R. Wiggin, First Secretary of the British Embassy in Washington, telephoned Jones to inform him that the British Government would delay its statement on Cyprus for 48 hours. A memorandum of the conversation is *ibid.*, NEA/GTI Files: Lot 61 D 220, Cyprus before August 15.

231. **Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State**

Paris, June 16, 1958, 9 p.m.

Polto 4202. Re: Cyprus. Following is summary constructive NAC meeting June 16. Full report follows soonest.<sup>1</sup>

Sarper, although he spoke at length about merits of partition, said Turks ready to join in tripartite conference with Greece and United Kingdom on Cyprus and asked if United Kingdom and Greece were ready to do so. Greece said had no instructions other than to say Greece not closing door now on United Kingdom proposals. United Kingdom said after plan announced in Parliament, HMG ready to discuss how put in operation, would pay careful attention to any comments and discuss in spirit of alliance and of reason.

The Council without dissent from Greece, Turkey and United Kingdom who made clear not empowered make commitments, asked United Kingdom to postpone statement to Parliament for 48 hours in hope Greece and Turkey could agree within that time to a conference or negotiations with or without Greek and Turkish Cypriot participation at outset, using United Kingdom plan as basis for negotiations.

Spaak, summing up, called on all nations to have Ambassadors support request for timed delay with United Kingdom and affirmative answer from Greeks and Turks on conference or negotiations by individual *démarches* in three capitals. Emphasized that this would not be exerting pressure, but that alliance was in danger and three governments should be warned that NATO has right to insist that talks take place in conformity with Article I, NAT. Such action would be essence of treaty.

Nothing to be said to press.

In response to Turk question, in clarification statement that United Kingdom plan to be "basis for negotiations," Belgium suggested "starting point." United Kingdom suggested "basis for constructive discussion."

*USRO comment:* Spaak carefully avoided using any draft piece of paper, and kept discussion on terms of principle.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6-1658. Secret; Niact. Received at 6:35 p.m. Repeated to London, Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia.

<sup>1</sup> Polto 4208, June 16. (*Ibid.*)

Roberts said he would recommend United Kingdom arranging postponement announcement to Parliament. We are sure Sarper and Melas will do their best, both having been helpful in meeting, which was marked by high purpose of all.

NAC to meet Thursday morning, June 19, unless nature of United Kingdom reply re postponement of statement calls for earlier meeting.

United Kingdom failure to grant extension would nullify this first step in right direction. Recommend in light this new situation, further high level approaches in London, Athens, and Ankara in accordance with foregoing. Suggest that approaches be to express gratification for high principled attitude and forbearance shown by all in Council and taking general line that we assume answers will be affirmative in view importance to all members of alliance to settle matter by conciliation and negotiation. Believe approaches necessary, as clearly Sarper and Melas need help at home.<sup>2</sup>

**Nolting**

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<sup>2</sup>Telegram 3722 to Ankara, June 16, instructed the Ambassadors in Turkey and Greece to make approaches at a "high level" and express U.S. hopes that the Turkish and Greek Governments would "send affirmative instructions" to their NATO Permanent Representatives. (*Ibid.*)

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**232. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations**

Washington, June 16, 1958, 8:59 p.m.

Topol 4670. Paris deliver Nolting 9 AM June 17. Spaak or Greek permanent representative may approach you concerning Karamanlis proposals of June 15.<sup>1</sup> We believe hope for anything fruitful coming out of NAC discussion lies in development of negotiable proposals that can be considered by parties immediately concerned. Greek efforts to find way

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6-1658. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Jones and cleared by Timmons and Skofield. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, London, and Nicosia.

<sup>1</sup>See Document 226.

out of this impasse should therefore be encouraged without, however, specifically supporting a Greek position. Appropriate encouragement of this sort may help in forestalling Greeks from taking Cyprus problem to Security Council.

In dealing with all three of primarily interested parties in NAC we should, as general rule, avoid being used as channel for their suggestions.

Dulles

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**233. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations**

Washington, June 17, 1958, 8:54 p.m.

Topol 4693. Paris Deliver Nolting 9 a.m. June 18. Ref: Topol 4651, sent Ankara 3722, Athens 3711, London 9001 rptd Nicosia 348; Polto 4207 rptd London Polto 786, Ankara Polto 140, Athens Polto 107, Nicosia Polto 26.<sup>1</sup> In reply to inquiry British Perm Rep concerning procedural aspects of further discussions on Cyprus, USRO should discuss following proposal with UK Perm Rep. Any discussion this proposal with Spaak should await further instruction.

*Begin Proposal.*

UK would meet with Greece and Turkey in series of bilateral or trilateral discussions chaired by Spaak or a member of an NAC advisory committee of three appointed to assist him. This committee might be appointed by the Secretary General of NATO with NAC's approval. It would relieve Secretary General of burden of being present and moder-

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6-1658. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Owen T. Jones and Williams; cleared by Kohler, Jandrey, Timmons (EUR), and Rountree; and approved by Herter. Repeated to London, Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia.

<sup>1</sup> Topol 4651 (renumbered 4673), June 16, is the same as telegram 3722 to Ankara; see footnote 2, Document 231. Polto 4207, June 16, reported that the British Permanent Representative to NATO indicated his government's willingness to postpone a statement on Cyprus. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6-1658)

ating all meetings which could be so prolonged as to interfere with his other duties. Spaak would, however, supervise generally committee's activities and advise it. From our point of view NAC advisory committee would be preferable to participating ourselves as member of a four or five power conference. FYI. This would be a form of good offices without the label. End FYI.

Terms of reference for committee would be exceedingly broad and should be based on spirit of three wise men recommendations of 1956.<sup>2</sup> Main efforts to arrive at agreement would continue to be duty of three principally interested parties. Committee might be asked to examine problem with a view to seeking insofar as possible to conciliate differences between parties. British proposals would serve as basis for constructive discussions though need not be limitation upon participants. As may be agreed to by HMG, GOG, GOT reps, Greek and Turk Cypriots could be invited on occasion to discussion. We would think it desirable to suggest that committee report back periodically to NAC though ample time should be allowed for its deliberation.

Regarding membership we would not seek to have U.S. named as member of committee though we would be willing to serve. Presumably Germans (who have much influence with Turks and as non-member of UN have not voted against Greece in UNGA) and Italians (as Mediterranean power) might also be willing to serve. As to level would assume each country would be represented by Ambassador or Undersecretary at least for start of talks.

We don't see much to be gained in uprooting these discussions from Paris at present time. We believe, however, that the advisory committee should at an early stage pay a visit to Cyprus. *End Proposal.*

*For London:* Suggest discuss informally this proposal with Foreign Office.

**Dulles**

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<sup>2</sup> Reference is to the NATO committee of three Foreign Ministers, Lester Pearson of Canada, Halvard Lange of Norway, and Gaetano Martino of Italy, who worked out a program to improve cooperation among NATO nations.



**234. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State**

Athens, June 17, 1958, 3 p.m.

3557. 1. I have just had long talk with Averoff during which he emphasized in strongest possible terms danger situation here and Cyprus, repeatedly stating "we are facing chaos" and asserting even military dictatorship would be ineffective. He cited inter alia information GOG has received recently on disaffection among lower ranks army officers.

2. When I was able carry out instructions paragraph 2, Deptel 3711<sup>1</sup> Averoff insisted public opinion would not accept discussions or negotiations under NATO aegis. When I pointed out advantages to Greece Averoff said he agreed with me personally but reiterated it absolutely impossible and too dangerous even try persuade public which convinced NATO is "colonialist organization". Averoff at same time inconsistently repeated he and Karamanlis ready to run great risk of supporting settlement based on elimination both enosis and partition. Believe overwrought nerves may partly account for this inconsistency but insofar as it is logical believe it is based on conviction that time is of the essence and it is therefore worth taking risk on something which would lead to quick solution but not on procedural step which would probably result in long drawn out discussion or negotiation. He expressed great disappointment that his plan had not been brought up in NATO meeting yesterday (Embtel 3538).<sup>2</sup>

3. I was able to get no firm commitment from him but we finally agreed in general terms on following:

(A) Another NAC meeting is necessary as that body is in fact seized of problem.

(B) This meeting should be held as promptly as possible, preferably tomorrow morning.

(C) At meeting, problem should be passed for separate simultaneous or seriatim bilateral discussion between British and GOG and British and GOT (Averoff insisted Greeks could not afford to go into tri-

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6-1758. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London, Ankara, Paris for USRO, and Nicosia.

<sup>1</sup>Telegram 3711 to Athens is the same as telegram 3722 to Ankara; see footnote 2, Document 231.

<sup>2</sup>Telegram 3538 from Athens, June 16, reads: "Deptel 3691 received garbled and meaning not yet entirely clear. We have nevertheless let Averoff know in general terms that his ideas welcome and he said he will phone Melas Paris to lend support. He emphasized that GOG can not take lead but will be receptive to initiative by US, Spaak or anyone else." (Department of State, Central Files, 711.11-EI/6-1658) Regarding telegram 3691, see footnote 2, Document 227.

partite discussions for same reasons they rejected British offer last August–September).<sup>3</sup>

(D) These discussions should concentrate on reaching prompt agreement on some solution. That is they should not be allowed drag on into negotiations on details of self-government, etc. For its part GOG prepared consider elimination enosis and partition or even—if Cypriots agreed, which Averoff doubted they would—self-government with moratorium for period of years on any final solution.

4. I must emphasize that although Greeks will probably go along with something on above lines, others must supply initiative and pressure. We wonder therefore whether Spaak or some other NATO representative could not be persuaded to carry ball. By so doing real progress might be made in 48 hours remaining before British announcement. Averoff said that if such progress could be made GOG might be able stall off Greek Parliament another week.

**Riddleberger**

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<sup>3</sup>The British proposal for a tripartite conference excluded a settlement based on either Enosis or partition.

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### **235. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State**

Ankara, June 17, 1958, 6 p.m.

3113. Paris for USRO, West and Thurston. Rome for McSweeney. I called on Prime Minister Menderes 4 p.m. June 17 and conveyed Secretary Dulles message orally as outlined Deptel 3722<sup>1</sup> paragraph 2 and last paragraph Polto 4202.<sup>2</sup> (On leaving I left copy of talking paper with Prime Minister.) Foreign Minister Zorlu who also present, commented that report of latest NAC meetings not received from Turkish delegation NATO. Referring to Secretary's message, Zorlu said that for two years

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6-1758. Secret; Niact. Repeated to London, Paris, Athens, Rome, and Nicosia.

<sup>1</sup> See footnote 2, Document 231.

<sup>2</sup> Document 231.

GOT had accepted idea of tripartite conference and that declaration to that effect had been made by Turkish delegation NATO. Zorlu also mentioned he had heard that Greek delegate NATO Melas had stated that he unable to accept idea of tripartite conference because he lacked instructions. Prime Minister then said that in principal GOT does not refuse come together to discuss problem; however, in order to give more precise reply, he would have to first study Secretary's message. He concluded with promise to speak to me again as soon as possible on this subject.

*Comment:* Both Prime Minister and Foreign Minister were more relaxed than I had seen them in a long time. Atmosphere of meeting was almost jovial.

Warren

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### 236. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State

London, June 18, 1958, 1 p.m.

7313. Paris Polto 4233.<sup>1</sup> I agree with reference telegram on desirability advance planning in case proposals now put to Greece and Turkey are not accepted at NAC meeting June 19.

British position at present is as follows:

1. United Kingdom intends to proceed insofar as possible with implementation of Cyprus proposal, regardless of whether Greek and Turkish acceptance obtained.

2. Prime Minister is committed to make statement June 19, and Gaitskell in House June 17 pointedly stated that he expected Prime Minister to do more than merely report on developments in NAC. Essential points in proposal have appeared in local press, and interested governments and public must realize newspaper articles are accurate.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6-1858. Secret; Niact. Received at 11:10 a.m. Transmitted in two sections. Also sent to Paris for USRO and repeated to Nicosia, Ankara, and Athens.

<sup>1</sup> Polto 4233, June 17, urged that the British Government be encouraged to be flexible in adopting a "frame of reference" for negotiations and recommended seeking further delay in the parliamentary statement on Cyprus. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/6-1758)

3. United Kingdom remains ready to show considerable flexibility in modifying proposal while retaining essential elements.

4. In his letters to Menderes and Karamanlis, Macmillan said he was prepared to meet with them either separately or together. Menderes in reply agreed to meet either alone with Macmillan or with others. (Embassy telegram 7263).<sup>2</sup> While Karamanlis has delayed replying to Macmillan, Athens Embassy telegram 3567<sup>3</sup> indicates Greeks might agree to separate discussions.

HMG delayed Parliamentary statement June 17 to provide Spaak and allies in NAC opportunity to use influence on Greece and Turkey to obtain their agreement to talks with British proposal "as basis for constructive discussion". United Kingdom will consider NAC deliberations successful only if language such as that quoted or with similar purport is included in resolution or (less desirable) in consensus summation by Spaak.

Reference telegram appears to envisage, depending upon developments in NAC, necessity for high-level approach to United Kingdom requesting some or all of following:

1. Further postponement of formal announcement of proposal in Parliament.

2. Settling for NAC resolution which would call only for further discussions on Cyprus problem with omission (or only incidental) reference to British proposal.

3. Holding in abeyance implementation proposal.

I do not believe approach along such lines would be successful or should be tried. There would be greatly increased danger of parliamentary reaction such as Lloyd wrongly predicted would occur June 17. British now have been negotiating for a long time with Greece and Turkey and are convinced that it is not possible to find plan which both willingly would accept. Watered down NAC resolution would amount to little more than GA resolution of February 1957.<sup>4</sup> In effect it would mean abandonment of all the effort HMG has put into developing its present proposal and starting again on road which United Kingdom believes has no end.

Introduction of new factor, such as offered by United States to become open party to negotiations or by NATO to help seek substantive solution, would alter picture. However, we note press statements that Greek Government, and previously Turkish Government, decline to accept "NATO mediation" on Cyprus issue.

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 16. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/6-1658)

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 3567 was renumbered 3557, Document 234.

<sup>4</sup> On February 26, 1957, the U.N. General Assembly adopted Resolution 1013 (XI) calling for the resumption of negotiations leading to a "just solution" of the Cyprus dispute. For text of this resolution, see U.N. doc. A/C.1/L172 (XI).

Under circumstances I recommend against asking United Kingdom to postpone again formal announcement of proposal. Instead I suggest urging HMG to make clear in Parliamentary statement that it is prepared to show flexibility in further discussions regarding proposal with Greeks and Turks, separately or together and with or without Cypriot participation.

With respect to NAC, ideal solution of course would be unanimous resolution calling for “constructive discussions” on basis of British proposal. I recognize Greece or Turkey may not accept such a resolution. In this eventuality I recommend against settling for broad, meaningless resolution just for sake of unanimity. Instead, Spaak might sum up results NAC’s efforts without resolution, along following lines:

1. There is unanimous agreement on need for further discussions between three allies directly concerned—United Kingdom, Greece, and Turkey—either separately or together and either with or without Cypriot representatives.
2. NAC hopes these negotiations will be undertaken promptly.
3. It is consensus of NAC members not directly involved that United Kingdom proposal should form basis for constructive discussions.

Problem remains of what to say publicly regarding NAC deliberations to avoid indicating one or more members of Alliance isolated. HMG will be pressed on this point in Parliament. Least disadvantageous course might be for United Kingdom to say NAC has recommended further discussions on Cyprus; these will be undertaken; United Kingdom will use its Cyprus proposal as basis for discussion.

**Whitney**

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### **237. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State**

Athens, June 18, 1958, 2 p.m.

3570. 1. As King is leaving within hour for Poros for some naval affair, I was obliged to convey contents of Deptel 3730<sup>1</sup> by telephone and

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6–1858. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Received at 11:18 a.m. Repeated to London, Ankara, Paris for USRO, and Nicosia.

<sup>1</sup> Telegram 3730 to Athens, June 17, instructed Riddleberger to stress to the King and Queen the need for further private discussions under NATO auspices, the need for flexibility in negotiations, and that the British deferral of a parliamentary statement offered a “real opportunity” for the interested parties to begin serious negotiations. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/6–1458)

no thorough discussion was possible. He said he had impression from inner Cabinet meeting last night that GOG attitude was still somewhat flexible but hurdle of full Cabinet discussion remained. King did not refer again to public statement by US Government.

2. Re paragraph 2 of Deptel 3731,<sup>2</sup> as I again urged prompt and flexible instructions to Greek permanent representative upon Averoff at 1 a.m. this morning, I doubt utility of repeating this again now.

Riddleberger

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<sup>2</sup> Paragraph 2 of telegram 3731 to Athens, June 17, reads: "For Athens: You should in your discretion continue urge upon Greeks need for prompt, affirmative and flexible instructions to Greek PermRep." (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/6-1658)

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### 238. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

Athens, June 18, 1958, 3 p.m.

3574. Re Embtel 3503.<sup>1</sup>

1. I saw Makarios at my residence late yesterday afternoon. I opened 3/4 hour conversation by reviewing current situation, emphasizing importance his attitude, expressing hope that British plan would receive same careful consideration as obviously went into its preparation, and making strong plea against any irrevocable action which might close door on such consideration. As British Ambassador stated idea of Foot visit has been dropped, I merely expressed hope that indication of willingness discuss plan might promptly lead to Archbishop's return to Cyprus where he could negotiate directly with Governor.

2. In his reply and throughout conversation Makarios was cordial, professedly moderate and extremely cautious. Unfortunately he was accompanied by Rossides who kept interjecting his opinions, at times even interrupting Archbishop, which were usually intransigent.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6-1858. Secret; Limit Distribution. Received at 1:55 p.m. Repeated to London, Ankara, and Nicosia.

<sup>1</sup> Document 220.

Makarios ignored most of these comments but occasionally implied disagreement by making some more moderate remark. I had impression this may have been planned teamwork.

3. Makarios described his position as very simple. Fate of Cyprus is matter between British and Cypriots. As leader of Greek Cypriots he perfectly willing discuss with British initiation of democratic self-government leaving timing and form eventual self-determination completely open. Except for this implied rejection he made no specific comment on British plans but did say he would make no public comment on it until after British announcement. He asserted that he himself could handle Greek public opinion in case of direct negotiation between him and British and GOG did not need to worry. He gave impression of irritation with GOG.

4. Following up on his "open-ended" self-determination position I pressed him on whether he would agree to permanent ruling out of both Enosis and partition. He finally said he would consider it. This struck me as rather forthcoming statement in light his generally cautious attitude.

Riddleberger

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**239. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State**

Paris, June 18, 1958, 6 p.m.

Polto 4240. Reference: Topol 4690.<sup>1</sup> Talked with Spaak pursuant instructions reference telegram. He was grateful for information. He said he would get in touch with Melas immediately in effort to avoid deadlock tomorrow on issue of whether discussions should be tripartite or

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6-1858. Secret; Niact. Received at 2:22 p.m. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, London, and Nicosia.

<sup>1</sup> Topol 4690, June 17, instructed the Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to request that Spaak initiate talks with the Greek Permanent Representative aimed at avoiding a direct confrontation between Greeks and Turks over the issue of bipartite or tripartite negotiations and to convince the Greek Government not to insist on rigid time limits on Cyprus talks. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/6-1658)

bilateral. He agrees that NAC record to date leaves both possibilities open and thinks, if it becomes necessary, same indefinite situation might be continued through tomorrow's hoped-for agreement.

When he asked for information we had re Turkish attitude and likely instructions to Sarper, I gave him information contained last paragraph reference telegram.<sup>2</sup>

He and I agreed that balance may be tipped unfavorably tomorrow if Greeks take position at this stage that they will not sit down and discuss with Turks present, since this attitude likely to provoke Turks to say (assuming Sarper has flexible instructions) that Greek attitude re negotiations makes it absolutely clear that "partnership" concept impossible and partition necessary.

Nolting

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<sup>2</sup>This paragraph reads: "For Ankara: Initial Turk response (reftel C) to reftel B, is disturbing in that Menderes and Zorlu appear to be thinking exclusively in terms of tripartite conference. You should also in your discretion continue urge Turks to send affirmative instructions soonest to PermRep, which instructions will we hope not tie him to insistence on tripartite conference." (*Ibid.*)

Reftel C is Document 235. Reftel B is telegram 3722 to Ankara; see footnote 2, Document 231.

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#### 240. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State

Ankara, June 18, 1958, 7 p.m.

3128. Paris for USRO, West and Thurston. Rome for McSweeney. Re Embtel 3113.<sup>1</sup> Zorlu, in his usual imperious fashion, convoked me at 12:45 p.m. June 18 (although I explained to his secretary that I had official luncheon engagement at 1:00 p.m.). I had not received Polto 141 or Deptel 3735<sup>2</sup> at time our meeting.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6-1858. Secret; Niact. Received at 5:59 p.m. Transmitted in two sections. Repeated to London, Paris, Athens, and Nicosia.

<sup>1</sup> Document 235.

<sup>2</sup> Polto 141 to Ankara, June 16, reported on the meeting of the North Atlantic Council that took place that day. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6-1658) Telegram 3735 to Ankara, June 17, is the same as Topol 4690 to Paris; see footnotes 1 and 2, Document 239.



Zorlu said he wanted to give me attitude GOT re NATO developments which had been formulated following GOT Cabinet meeting. He referred to GNA attitude on Cyprus in this connection (re Embtels 3107 and 3108).<sup>3</sup> Indicating that instructions along following lines had been sent to Turkey permanent representative NATO (Sarper), expressing hope US permanent representative would help GOT in NATO, Zorlu gave GOT present position as follows:

(1) GOT has studied with great care discussions at last two NAC meetings.

(2) GOT looks at present situation from two angles:

(A) UK statement, which by setting forth the principles of new UK [plan], merely follows idea set out by Macmillan in message to Menderes and Karamanlis re final solution of problem and international status of Cyprus;<sup>4</sup> declaration of Colonial Secretary Lennox-Boyd December 1956, which has been reiterated by UK, and which is only point on which there is agreement between GOT and HMG (partition).

(B) Statement by UK permanent representative NATO that HMG willing study "any change which may be proposed to their plan" (*Embassy note*: I asked Zorlu specifically to repeat this statement, which he did, and to tell me where statement had been made, to which he replied that it had been made in NAC).<sup>5</sup>

(3) Idea contained in subparagraph B above (Zorlu continued) was accepted and advanced by Spaak.

(4) GOT also took into consideration fact that UK said that they will allow no possibility for further terrorism on island. GOT, which is attached to partition, and which has always had very strong feeling that terrorism must be eliminated from island, pleased by this.

(5) GOT has been upset by attitude taken by GOG permanent representative who trying avoid tripartite negotiations. This attitude causes GOT to believe that GOG will continue its policy of terrorism.<sup>6</sup>

(6) Spaak stated that if parties immediately concerned desired tripartite conference, NATO in full agreement.

(7) GOT prefers tripartite conference be without Turk Cypriot or Greek Cypriot representation. Such representation could be arranged for later conference.

(8) To Spaak's inquiry whether effort get together could be accomplished thru conference or thru normal diplomatic channels, GOT is

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<sup>3</sup> Telegram 3107 from Ankara, June 16, reported on press coverage of the Turkish Grand National Assembly debates on Cyprus. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6-1658) Telegram 3108 from Ankara, June 17, reported on the efforts of the Turkish Government to display popular support for its Cyprus policies. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/6-1758)

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to proposals outlined in Lloyd's May 23 message to Dulles, Document 204.

<sup>5</sup> Not further identified, but see Macmillan's statements in Document 230.

<sup>6</sup> Reference is to the encouragement of the pro-Enosis movement in Cyprus by the Greek State radio and the supplying of EOKA with arms and equipment by the Greek Government.

expressing its view that conference more effective, even summit conference as proposed by Macmillan in message to Menderes and Karamanlis. GOT believes that "negotiation by correspondence" most difficult, and prefers "personal contact". Conference should be modest, discreet, without publicity.

(9) Referring to Spaak's suggestion that UK plan could be considered as "basic document" for conference or for other efforts to arrange discussion, Zorlu said: "Of course, we cannot consider it as a basic document (we would want it considered as a conference document). We ourselves would also want to present such a conference document. If the idea of tripartite conference is agreed upon, we could even accept a conference document from Greece. This is a slight difference, but an important one".

(*Embassy note:* At this point I asked Zorlu if what he had just said meant that GOT would not attend conference if acceptance of UK plan as basic document were a condition of its being held. He was taken aback. After a pause, he said that GOT would not attend, but there was no conviction in his reply.)

(10) If idea of conference is accepted, Zorlu continued, "we think it obvious that calm and quietness must be brought about in public opinion of Turkey, Cyprus and Greece. This would mean, of course, no announcement in UK Parliament".

For this exposé, I expressed my conviction that UK could not accept idea of no statement to Parliament. I said that British also have public opinion to which HMG is accountable. Zorlu airily said that public opinion on this subject in Great Britain is not important. I retorted that perhaps British think public opinion in Turkey is not important. Zorlu responded that there was all difference in world. "We have 120,000 Turks on the island (he said) they (British) do not have anything appreciable." In final reply, I stated that as friend of Turkey and of Greece, I must frankly say that in my opinion HMG could never accept such a thesis. Zorlu then summed up with statement that in that event there bound to be a conflict between GOT and HMG in conference.

At close of our interview, Zorlu emphasized that this constituted reply to démarche reported Embtel 3113.

I said that after I had had a chance study his reply, I might have certain questions to put to him. He encouraged me to return for further discussion.

*Comment:* We are coordinating with UK Embassy. Bowker is seeing Zorlu now, and results that meeting with my comments will follow.<sup>7</sup>

**Warren**

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<sup>7</sup> In telegram 3140 from Ankara, June 19, Warren reported that Zorlu had given Bowker "virtually the same treatment as myself (reported Embtel 3128)" and that the British Ambassador had pressed Zorlu to tone down anti-British press and radio comments. Bowker further commented that he felt that Zorlu was pursuing a tripartite conference on the assumption that the Greeks would boycott it and leave the way open for Turkey to press for partition of Cyprus. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6-1958)

**241. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Jones) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree)**

Washington, June 20, 1958.

SUBJECT

Next Steps on Cyprus Problem

1. *Situation Report*

The NAC meeting on June 19 was inconclusive in that neither Greece nor Turkey agreed to, nor flatly rejected, Mr. Spaak's suggestions concerning further discussions in the NAC.<sup>1</sup> Prime Minister Macmillan announced the new British proposals to Parliament on June 19, following the NAC meeting.<sup>2</sup> The British may now proceed with the implementation of their plan, or a part of their plan, depending on the cooperation they get from the Greek and Turkish Cypriots or the Greek and Turkish Governments. Alternatively, Mr. Spaak may seek again to get started in the NAC a discussion bearing on the British proposals. The most important determining factor will be the attitude of the Greeks and Turks in the wake of Mr. Macmillan's announcement.

The Greek Government has thus far made no public statement concerning the plan but Greek reactions through diplomatic channels have been negative.<sup>3</sup> In a public statement issued on June 19 commenting on the British plan, the Turkish Government asserts the Cyprus problem is one to be solved among the three governments concerned, reaffirms its belief that partition is the proper solution, and expresses a willingness to participate in a tripartite conference at which the UK plan would be one of several conference documents. It is too early to assess popular reaction in Greece and Turkey.

2. *Substantive Changes Needed to Warrant our Support of UK Plan*

In his public statement in presenting the plan, the Prime Minister said that "we are not asking for immediate acceptance of our policy in every particular." We continue to believe that it is unlikely that the

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Source: Department of State, NEA/GTI Files: Lot 61 D 220, Negotiations—June 1958. Secret. Drafted by Blood and Jones.

<sup>1</sup> Polto 4267, June 19, reported on the North Atlantic Council meeting. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 747C.00/6–1958)

<sup>2</sup> For text of Macmillan's statement, see House of Commons, *Parliamentary Debates*, 5th Series, vol. 589, cols. 1315–1318.

<sup>3</sup> The Greek Government publicly rejected the British plan on June 21.

present Greek Government could accept the present plan and survive. We also believe that the shared sovereignty concept will encounter serious administrative difficulties and is slanted in favor of eventual partition.

We believe, therefore, that the plan should be modified to minimize the need for formal acceptance or participation by the Greek and Turkish Governments and also to make it a more truly interim arrangement that does not exclude or even favor strongly any particular eventual solution. Specifically, we suggest:

(a) Elimination of the representation of the Governments of Greece and Turkey on the Ministerial Council and the provisions for consultation by right on specific issues between these representatives and the Governor. This is the point on which the Greeks are choking and it does in fact give the Turks a legal status on the Island and thus influence the nature of a final settlement.

(b) Elimination of the right of Greek and Turkish Cypriots to obtain Greek or Turkish citizenship, in addition to British. This provision has a great potential for mischief and could easily be employed by the Greeks and Turks as an excuse for intervention on behalf of their citizens on Cyprus.

### 3. *Procedures to be Followed*

The NAC meeting of June 19 was unable to get past two procedural hurdles: (a) the Greeks wanted bilateral talks with the United Kingdom only, while the Turks plumped hard for a tripartite conference, and (b) neither was willing to accept the British proposals as the basis for discussions, although the Turks indicated some flexibility in this matter.

We believe the procedure suggested by Mr. Spaak at the NAC meeting on June 19 could be made to surmount these difficulties. Mr. Spaak suggested that bilateral talks (UK-Greek, UK-Turks, Greek-Turk) should be preliminary to a tripartite conference, and that he as Secretary General, with perhaps help from others (this could embrace our suggestion of a three-power advisory committee) could sit down at the table with the Greek, Turkish and UK permanent representatives. We also believe Mr. Spaak is correct in arguing that there must be a single focus for discussions, which the British plan affords. Perhaps Mr. Spaak could avoid wrangling over whether the British proposals are a basic document or a point of departure, by simply summing up the consensus of the NAC that "all parties, recognizing the right and responsibility of HMG as sovereign of Cyprus to advance proposals respecting the status of the Island, agree to discuss these proposals in the spirit of the alliance. In entering upon these discussions, they are free to reserve their position with respect to any or all of the details of the British proposals."

If the NAC discussions should leave the British proposals behind and seem to be embarking with some chance of profit into a wider dis-

cussion of possible solutions, including final solutions, we should then offer to discuss with the British our detailed views on the possible implementation of the solution providing for a Turkish base and unitary self-determination for the rest of the Island. We do not believe the British have either pushed the base concept vigorously enough with the Turks or given sufficient study to the possibility of its effective application.

#### 4. *Timing to be Observed*

It would be advisable to wait and gauge the response of the Greek and Turkish Governments and the Cypriots to the British proposals and to assess the readiness of the British in the face of that response to attempt to carry out their proposals. (We do not believe they can put their plan into practicable operation against the strong objections of one or both of the Cypriot communities or of the Greek and Turkish Governments. If, as is likely, the British run into serious difficulties over their proposals, they might be more amenable than at present to suggested modifications of their proposals. There is always the chance, also, that during this time the Greeks and Turks might themselves come forth with constructive suggestions.

#### 5. *United States Role*

We have welcomed the idea of discussions in the NAC and have advanced for consideration by Mr. Spaak and the HMG a proposal for a three-power advisory committee on which we would, albeit reluctantly, be willing to serve.<sup>4</sup> In addition, we have urged the British, independently of Mr. Spaak's urging, to delay their Parliamentary announcement to permit further discussion in the NAC.<sup>5</sup> We have also urged the Greek and the Turkish Governments to give the UK plan the same serious consideration and careful study that the British clearly did in preparing their plan, and have cautioned against a public position that would make it difficult to participate in further discussions under NATO auspices.<sup>6</sup>

Although our substantive changes are designed to develop a situation where the UK will be implementing a plan that requires neither the acceptance nor the participation of the Greek or Turkish Governments, we do not believe that it can be realistically hoped that these two governments can be disengaged from the Cyprus problem. In order, therefore, to get any plan accepted, the cooperation and support of these

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 233.

<sup>5</sup> These proposals were sent to the Embassy in London in telegram 8956, June 15; see footnote 4, Document 228.

<sup>6</sup> See Documents 234 and 235.

two governments will be essential. It is not believed that this can be accomplished without the NATO generally and the United States in particular playing an active role. The Greeks in particular might look more favorably upon NAC discussions if they knew that the United States would play an active part.

We believe that the United States should be prepared to exercise an initiative in the NAC in any one of the following three contingencies: (a) if we detect that the British are faltering in their resolve to proceed with their proposals; (b) if the British display a determination to proceed and we have strong reason to believe that proceeding with the plan would evoke a dangerous situation in Cyprus or in the relations between Greece and Turkey; (c) if the British turn to us for help.

**JULY–OCTOBER 1958: REVISION AND IMPLEMENTATION  
OF THE MACMILLAN PROPOSALS; EFFORTS TO CONVENE  
A NATO CONFERENCE ON CYPRUS**

**242. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of  
State**

Athens, July 1, 1958, 6 p.m.

11. 1. Foreign Minister asked me to call urgently today which afforded opportunity to reiterate our attitude as laid down in Department telegram 3915.<sup>1</sup> He then spoke as follows:

2. He thought it important that any NATO discussion avoid appearance of pressure. He had communicated his suggestions as set forth in Embassy telegram 3730<sup>2</sup> to UK Ambassador who was departing for London today. He found Allen personally receptive who would discuss in London to see if anything could be done with Turks. Averoff thought he should now go to Paris to consult with Spaak who could then begin *tater le terrain* in NAC and ascertain preliminary reaction to GOG proposals. He thought this could be done in secret and he would like to do it in full accord with US and UK. If it appeared that some progress was possible, GOG would then ask for mediation by US (likewise in full accord with UK). If US found any merit in GOG suggestions, he realized this might be interpreted as US-Greek front against UK and Turks and therefore possibility of US mediation, if it appealed to us at that stage, should be discussed with UK. He said he knew Secretary was due in Paris on July 5<sup>3</sup> and suggested that after talking with Spaak appointment with Secretary be arranged.

3. I replied that I was not yet in position to comment on substance of Greek proposals which had been reported to Department and I was not aware of Secretary's schedule while in Paris. Averoff thought his suggestions corresponded to our ideas of proceeding under NATO aegis while still meeting political problems here and asked that they be submitted urgently which I promised to do.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/7-158. Secret; Limited Distribution. Repeated to London, Paris for USRO, Ankara, and Nicosia.

<sup>1</sup> Telegram 3915 to Athens, June 28, instructed Riddleberger to encourage Averoff to bring the Greek proposals to a meeting under NATO auspices. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/6-2758)

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 3730 from Athens, June 30, reported that Averoff was proposing that advisers to the Governor of Cyprus "should be chosen by two nationalities instead of by two governments," and that a plebiscite held after 7 years of self-rule by the Cypriots should exclude both enosis and partition. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/6-3058)

<sup>3</sup> Dulles visited Paris July 3-5 for talks with French leaders.

4. I then inquired how his projected trip to Paris would fit in with plan to go to Belgrade. He said that Popovic had invited him for July 8 to have tripartite talks while Nasser was in Yugoslavia.<sup>4</sup> He said that while he wanted to help Yugoslavs he was beginning to have doubts about going now, particularly because of the rumors of Belgrade–Athens–Cairo axis and had almost decided to put off his trip. He said he would welcome our advice whether he should go while Nasser is there.<sup>5</sup>

5. As UK Ambassador was leaving for airport just after my conversation with Averoff, I had only short conversation with him. He said he proposed to discuss Averoff suggestions upon arrival in London but was not too optimistic on probable London reaction to them.

6. As we appear close to attaining what Department desired from Greeks on procedure in NATO, I should appreciate instructions promptly what I can say to Averoff.<sup>6</sup>

Riddleberger

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<sup>4</sup>Nasser visited Yugoslavia July 2–22.

<sup>5</sup>In telegram 52 to Athens, July 3, the Department of State instructed Riddleberger to inform Averoff that in its view a decision to visit Yugoslavia during the Nasser visit was a matter for the Greek Government to decide. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.8168/7–358)

<sup>6</sup>See footnote 2, Document 244.

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#### 243. Telegram From the Consulate in Nicosia to the Department of State

Nicosia, July 5, 1958, 1 p.m.

9. [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] Governor requested us pass following information to Ethnarchy: Foot is anxious Makarios be informed of Governor's ideas regarding possibility his return to Cyprus. Governor does not want any declarations or prior agreements; he does require a period of de facto peace free from Greek violence



including EOKA killings and intimidation.<sup>1</sup> Such a period need not be “unduly prolonged”. Without being absolutely definite, which of course he could not be, this phrase could be interpreted to mean through the end of August.

I saw Foot this Noon and told him message delivered with good chance it would be passed on to Athens although I not sure what endorsement it might bear. Told Foot Ethnarchy representative had said given definite date would make Greek position easier but that I could easily understand why this was impossible.

Foot’s message to Makarios (Consulate telegram 5)<sup>2</sup> in reply to latter’s letter rejecting proposals has been delivered by Ambassador Allen. In it he argues points raised by Makarios re divisive nature of proposals and in final paragraph reiterates plea for de facto cessation violence saying this would permit ending emergency and “open way for negotiations with you on Cyprus”. Letter will probably be published in next few days.

**Belcher**

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<sup>1</sup>On June 30, a new wave of violence broke out on Cyprus as Greeks and Turks began attacking each other. The violence reached its climax on July 5 when British troops fired into a rioting crowd of Greeks, killing 2 and wounding 13. EOKA used British actions as the pretext for the assassination of both British officials and Turkish Cypriots.

<sup>2</sup>Telegram 5 from Nicosia, July 3, reported that Foot had advised the British Government that Makarios should be permitted to return to Cyprus and that Foot had sent the draft of a letter for Makarios to London for approval. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/7–358) Makarios had rejected the plan on June 20.

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#### **244. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State**

Athens, July 5, 1958, 7 p.m.

50. 1. Only opportunity I had take action yesterday on instructions Department telegram 51<sup>1</sup> was during Fourth July reception when I

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/7–558. Secret; Limited Distribution. Transmitted in two sections. Repeated to London, Paris for USRO, Ankara, and Nicosia.

<sup>1</sup>Telegram 51 to Athens, July 3, provided instructions for the Embassy and the Representative at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for responding to Greek approaches “within the context” of Spaak’s initiative. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/6–2958)

conveyed Averoff substance para 2.<sup>2</sup> He was obviously bitterly disappointed particularly at our refusal of meeting with Secretary in Paris although I did my best to assuage his resentment. He remarked it was "obviously very thin excuse". As it was impossible to have extended conversation at reception and as I had not yet received report of Hood-Rountree interview,<sup>3</sup> we agreed to meet today as Foreign Minister wanted to consult Karamanlis to consider our reply.

2. Today with fuller information I reviewed our positions with Foreign Minister leading off with our hope that his proposals may give impetus for constructive suggestions and explaining our views on procedure. Averoff replied he could now give GOG reaction, after consultation with Prime Minister and Greek Ambassadors recalled to Athens. Spaak invitation<sup>4</sup> is not rejected by GOG but it is not in favor of inviting three interested governments to discussion. Spaak had told Melas in Paris that discussions could be informal and GOG would permit Melas to participate without instructions. But if this invitation implied tripartite conference at another level, it was rejected and Foreign Minister said he must be altogether clear on this point. He envisaged this informal meeting without instructions to Greek Ambassador as something that is "tolerable" to see if further program can be made. Simultaneously, he must point out that advisory committee could be very dangerous to NATO if something disagreeable to Greece were to emerge from it. Unhappily, Greek suspicions of NATO continue to increase as Greek people regard NATO as supporting colonial positions. This is regrettable but true and in Averoff's opinion even establishment of advisory committee would provoke strong reaction here. GOG is convinced this reaction would immediately be exploited by all elements of opposition and would burst forth in press in manner that could not be controlled. Result

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<sup>2</sup> Paragraph 2 reads: "For Athens: In response Averoff approach reported Embtel 11, suggest you welcome his seeing UK Ambassador and express hope that Averoff's suggestions may provide impetus for constructive discussions. We do not however believe it appropriate for US to mediate with UK and GOT along lines suggested by Averoff. If Spaak and others so wish, US prepared participate in advisory committee along lines outlined Topol 4693 as amended by Topol 4701. You should encourage Averoff to see Spaak and emphasize impossibility Secretary being able see him at Paris in view of latter's full schedule during one day visit and necessity leaving Paris promptly midnight July 5 because of Ottawa trip. If Averoff presses you for response to his offer to come to Washington to discuss Cyprus suggest you discreetly discourage him by pointing out that talks between immediately interested parties appear to us to be more logical starting point for constructive discussions." Telegram 11 is printed as Document 242.

<sup>3</sup> Hood and Rountree discussed Cyprus on July 2, with particular emphasis on Greek objections to British proposals to give Turkey a legal status on the island. The conversation was reported to Athens in telegram 49, July 3. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/7-358)

<sup>4</sup> In discussions with Melas, Sarper, and Roberts during the first week of July, Spaak renewed his proposals for tripartite discussions on Cyprus to take place in Paris under NATO auspices. (Polto 67 from Paris, July 4; *ibid.*, 747C.00/7-458)

would be a priori failure of advisory committee in what concerns Greece and feeling amongst majority of Greek people that GOG has given way to heavy pressure by some of its allies, meaning US. GOG is seriously concerned that reaction against NATO might turn into increased anti-American sentiments and wishes to avoid this. Furthermore, establishment of advisory committee could lead to increased pressure for convocation of Parliament and if government refused even ERE deputies would waiver.

3. At this point, I interrupted to ask if composition of advisory committee could not prevent this reaction, pointing out that NATO was by no means composed entirely of colonial powers. Averoff replied that unfortunately NATO was regarded by Greeks as predominantly colonial-minded.

4. Averoff then commenced to back-water on his own proposals.<sup>5</sup> He said he must tell me that while he considers they bind him personally, this not the same as binding GOG. He remains hopeful they can eventually be accepted but recalled he had Makarios to deal with. He furthermore thought that if his suggestions are to have eventual success they should not be advanced as Greek ideas. If they are, the Turks will certainly object. He still thinks ideas can work because they avoid enosis and can be fitted into UK plan. At this point I said advisory committee would offer just the kind of forum where this might be accomplished. Again Averoff objected for same reasons, but insisted that exclusion of enosis should go far to meet Turkish desires and referred to a declaration attributed to Inonu just published in *The Economist*.<sup>6</sup>

5. I attempted again to get his agreement to advisory committee but was not successful. Finally, he said that GOG would agree to informal first contacts which would permit a preliminary exchange of views. This would be in effect without commitments. If this exchange shows any promise it could then be pursued quickly through diplomatic channels, and if any of the Greek ideas can be applied the results could then go to NATO. After the grand outline is decided, a special meeting of NAC could be convoked to approve the decision, leaving to Permanent Council the working out of small details. In this way NATO would have a success and not be faced with a possible failure.

6. Foreign Minister then said that he had received reports on the Spaak "Frigidaire" Theory. He remarked that in one sense this is what GOG has already proposed and under it a definitive solution could be postponed indefinitely. He realizes this implies formulation of some lib-

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<sup>5</sup> See footnote 2, Document 242.

<sup>6</sup> Inonu said that if the Greek Government pressed for enosis, then the island must be partitioned since enosis implied a partition. These remarks were reported in *The Economist* (London), July 5, 1958.

eral constitution for Cyprus but assumes it could be done. I assume this Spaak Frigidaire Theory refers to Spaak's ideas as set forth in first paragraph of Paris Polto 67 to Department.<sup>7</sup>

7. Averoff concluded in somber tones that GOG increasingly feels it is being mistreated by US which in fact if not in words adopts Turkish viewpoint. With some bitterness he said that substance of Greek proposals was being ignored and that my only reply to him is merely to go to NATO which GOG distrusts. I interjected remark that we had just expressed hope his suggestions might lead to constructive discussions and reminded him that all NATO was inevitably concerned in view of recent actions of GOG including aide-mémoire threatening withdrawal.<sup>8</sup> Averoff answered this by stating great concern of GOG is now to keep Greece in NATO and that is why it is prepared even to accept Spaak Frigidaire Theory. He reiterated his urgent need for an answer to his proposals as time is running out and situation in Cyprus is threatening, both from Turks and EOKA. If he cannot get answers on substance he will be compelled to go to UN which he had hoped to avoid.

8. I could have made some sharper replies to Averoff particularly in view of press attacks on US here and Greek tendency to blame US for its own shortcomings, but I decided in present atmosphere of bruised feelings and wounded amour-propre there was nothing to be gained. Averoff did not refer again to Washington trip and I did not mention it. I think he felt sure Secretary would receive him in Paris and he probably caused story to be leaked to press.<sup>9</sup> It is clear that our lack of response on substance of suggestions and refusal of Paris visit have bitten deeply. We have expatiated at some length in earlier cables on political risks GOG is taking and shall not repeat them here. There is no doubt an element of bluff, but with this unstable and egocentric people also a hard core of reality. Noting what Spaak said yesterday to Burgess about our influence,<sup>10</sup> I doubt if I can do much more here until we can give some reaction on substance of Greek suggestions. If we cannot, and I realize

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<sup>7</sup> The relevant portions of this paragraph read: "Elaborating his ideas, he said he had two principles in mind: (A) That a provisional solution was only kind on which agreement is possible at this time; (B) that such a provisional solution should not prejudice in any way the final solution, neither towards partition, nor enosis, nor independence. If these principles could be agreed, then the United Kingdom plan could be looked at in the light thereof, and perhaps modified so as to make it entirely consistent with principle (B)."

<sup>8</sup> Transmitted in Document 219.

<sup>9</sup> In telegram 11 from Athens, July 3, Riddleberger reported that the Athens newspaper *Eleftheria* had published a report that Averoff would meet with Dulles in Paris, and that Averoff had telephoned the Embassy to blame the United States for the leakage of this information. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/7-358)

<sup>10</sup> In Polto 67, Burgess reported that Spaak had told him that the United States was the only NATO nation which could keep Cyprus discussions on the right course.

there may be good reasons for this, perhaps the best policy is to push Spaak's Frigidaire Theory.

Riddleberger

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**245. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece**

Washington, July 10, 1958, 12:15 p.m.

124. Embtel 54.<sup>1</sup>

1. Your understanding Department's position on Cyprus as set forth paragraph 1 reftel<sup>2</sup> is accurate reflection of our current thinking and short-term objectives and your moderating influence on Greeks is deeply appreciated here.

2. We are very much aware of difficult position in which you are placed by Averoff's constant pressuring for our comments on substance his proposals. We have strong and we believe overriding reasons for not wishing to comment. We believe greatest hope for Cyprus settlement now lies in discussions based on UK plan under NATO aegis. By giving Averoff our views on substance we will in effect be drawn into bilateral negotiations with Greeks outside NATO context and before NATO discussions have commenced. It may be desirable for us to take position vis-à-vis Greeks and Turks on substance as discussions unfold. We do not believe we should do so before course discussions becomes apparent and certainly not before discussions have commenced.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/8-758. Secret; Limit Distribution; Noform. Drafted by Blood and Jones. Repeated to Ankara, London, Paris for USRO, and Nicosia.

<sup>1</sup>In telegram 54 from Athens, July 7, Riddleberger outlined his understanding of U.S. policy toward Cyprus and reported that the Greek Government was slowly adopting a more flexible position on the island's future. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/7-758)

<sup>2</sup>The relevant portion reads: "When I left Washington, I was under impression that partition was not favorably regarded and I assume that attitude has not altered. Therefore we have not pushed partition here but have strived for GOG concessions which would accord guarantees which GOT might eventually accept, while carefully refraining from espousing any specific solution. In this line of action which keeps our flexibility, we have had, it seems to me, at least a partial success in Athens."

3. FYI only, our present thinking on substance of Averoff's proposals (Embtel 3730)<sup>3</sup> runs along following lines:

A. Averoff's first proposal that advisors to Governor be chosen by two communities rather than by two Governments should be useful contribution to discussions. Proposal appears to fit into area of maneuver mentioned Hood-Rountree talk (Deptel 49)<sup>4</sup> i.e., between Greek desire to avoid giving Turks juridical status on island and Turk desire to avoid excluding partition as eventual solution. Ankara's 35 to Department<sup>5</sup> indicates GOT would not object such proposal while Foot has hinted (Nicosia 437 to Department)<sup>6</sup> that such modification might be possible.

B. Averoff's second proposal that enosis and partition be excluded from plebiscite choices offers less chance of contributing to discussions. Doubtful whether GOT would agree now to solution which does not to some extent recognize GOT interests in Cyprus and our hope is that this can be achieved in some way short of partition. Those solutions proposed to Turks by British thus far this year (Foot proposals, Turkish base cum self-determination, and current proposals) all offer GOT stake on island either immediately or in future. Turks will be little inclined to surrender apparent gains they have thus achieved. Macmillan's recent Parliamentary reference to Lennox-Boyd 1956 statement<sup>7</sup> will also make this proposal difficult one for UK to handle. With respect to independence, we believe central point is not Turks' unwillingness to accept major guarantees against enosis but rather Turks' insistence on more than paper guarantees for what they regard to be their legitimate security interests. We fail to see how sanctions against enosis will provide such guarantees.

4. We hope foregoing will be useful to you. You will note it is within context of Topol 4623 as modified<sup>8</sup> and Deptel 49. End FYI.

Herter

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2, Document 242.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 3, Document 244.

<sup>5</sup> Telegram 35 from Ankara, July 3, commented on the latest Greek proposals for modifying the British plan and warned that "we must point out that any GOG-USG-HMG triple play such as suggested by Averoff bound to confirm Turkish suspicions, always latent [*line of source text not declassified*] that gang-up against them on Cyprus is brewing. Nothing could be better calculated to vitiate results of efforts exerted by most NATO and other free world ambassadors Ankara to induce Zorlu to see advantageous points in UK plan." (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/7-758)

<sup>6</sup> Telegram 437 from Nicosia, June 21, reported that Foot hoped to delay implementation of the British plan in order to continue discussions with Makarios. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/6-2158)

<sup>7</sup> Macmillan made this statement on June 26 during a Parliamentary debate on the Cyprus plan. For text, see House of Commons, *Parliamentary Debates*, 5th Series, vol. 590, cols. 727-735.

<sup>8</sup> Topol 4623, June 13, transmitted the text of a statement that the Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was to read at the June 16 NAC meeting concerning Cyprus. The text included a statement of general support for British efforts and urged that British proposals be the basis of subsequent discussions. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6-1358) In Polto 4693, June 17, the Department of State outlined its views on procedure for tripartite meetings under NATO auspices. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/6-1658)

**246. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State**

Athens, July 10, 1958, 6 p.m.

100. 1. Prime Minister summoned me today just prior his departure for Geneva (where he is going for medical and personal reasons) to make another urgent and fervent plea for immediate US intervention on Cyprus. Describing UK plan as “worst yet and completely unacceptable to GOG” Karamanlis vehemently reviewed all of Greek objections, described his increasing internal political difficulties, reiterated Greece was being “abandoned and humiliated” by its friends and allies and predicted flatly he could not much longer hold line here and would therefore be compelled to adopt more intransigent position shortly. He declared his reply to Macmillan keeping door open for further talks had to be “jammed down throat” of Cabinet. He continued that latest Macmillan letter<sup>1</sup> following Averoff suggestions to UK Ambassador<sup>2</sup> had merely referred to Prime Minister’s declaration in House of Commons and he thought this was clear evidence that UK and Turkey had connived to bring about situation wherein Greece, abandoned by US, would be forced to accept Cyprus solution dictated by Turkey. GOG had gone very far in concessions contained in Averoff suggestions in hope that US would utilize them by taking initiative for settlement, particularly in view of hope for progress we had earlier expressed. He was doubly disappointed at our lack of reaction and asked me to impress upon USG absolute necessity of taking urgent action. He hoped I would be able to give him some reply to GOG suggestions within week as situation was steadily deteriorating in Greece and if nothing were done he would be compelled to change his attitude. There was much more in same tenor, but as it has been previously reported, I do not repeat it here.

2. [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] I told Prime Minister I could not follow his reasoning. I reminded him GOG had raised Cyprus in NATO,<sup>3</sup> had declared it might have to withdraw from alliance if certain events came to pass and that Spaak had offered certain suggestions

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/7–1058. Secret; Limit Distribution. Received at 4:18 a.m. on July 11. Repeated to London, Ankara, Paris for USRO, and Nicosia.

<sup>1</sup> In his letter to Karamanlis, Macmillan pressed for immediate and realistic negotiations on the basis of existing situations and proposed to meet with Karamanlis as soon as possible. A copy of the letter is *ibid.*, 747C.00/7–858.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 242.

<sup>3</sup> On June 10; see footnote 4, Document 208.

for procedure.<sup>4</sup> I reminded him Averoff suggestions had not yet been considered but I had informed Foreign Minister of our hope his suggestions would provide impetus for constructive discussions.<sup>5</sup> We had furthermore indicated our willingness to participate in advisory committee if Spaak and others so wish.<sup>6</sup> I said these matters were now under consideration in Paris and we hoped Averoff would see Spaak in near future. This I thought could hardly be construed as abandoning Greece or refusing to consider its suggestions. I said that as Greece was opposed to tripartite meeting we had to find some forum for discussion of Greek suggestions and this seemed best procedure. In reply Prime Minister admitted there might be some virtue in this proposed procedure but that as practical matter it would mean little until US was prepared to indicate its position on substance. At this point his wife reminded him for third time he must go to airport and he concluded with another urgent plea for reply from US.

3. Because of atmospheric conditions we have not yet received number of telegrams and therefore not certain I am up to date on exact situation today.

**Riddleberger**

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<sup>4</sup>Spaak's suggestions are summarized in Document 231.

<sup>5</sup>See Document 242, and footnote 2, Document 244.

<sup>6</sup>The U.S. position was outlined in Document 233.

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#### **247. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State**

Ankara, July 15, 1958, 3 p.m.

187. Paris for USRO, West and Thurston. During conversation with Foreign Minister Zorlu evening July 14 on Lebanon, reported separately,<sup>1</sup> he broached Cyprus.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/7-1558. Secret. Repeated to Athens, London, Paris for USRO, and Nicosia.

<sup>1</sup>Telegram 183 from Ankara, July 15. (*Ibid.*)



He referred bad news from island, and said two communities were close to civil war. Asserted he had repeatedly told HMG this unfortunate moment make such declarations as those made Commons June 19, and GOT begged HMG not to do so. He bluntly accused HMG of following perfidious policy of “divide and rule”. He accused Governor Foot of releasing Greeks from confinement in order show Turk Cypriots they cannot live without protection UK, and vice versa. He denied that single bomb, gun had reached Turk community Cyprus from Turkey.

Asked about fiery Ankara radio broadcasts to Cyprus, he rejoined these did not specifically incite Turk populace Cyprus indulge in killings and terrorism, as did EOKA.

With respect Foot plan for mutual cooperation between leaders Turk and Greek Cypriot communities and UK colonial government in order establish security,<sup>2</sup> he refused to be committed whether or not GOT specifically supported such proposals, merely indicating that Mayor Tervis was not power behind Greek Cypriot community but rather Grivas, Greek Government and Makarios.

[1 paragraph (4 lines of source text) not declassified]

Hall

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<sup>2</sup> See footnote 1, Document 170.

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#### 248. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

Athens, July 15, 1958, 6 p.m.

137. Embtel 120.<sup>1</sup>

1. Karamanlis returned yesterday afternoon<sup>2</sup> and last night Averoff conveyed to me, after consultation with Prime Minister, GOG position

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/7-1558. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London, Paris for USRO, Ankara, and Nicosia.

<sup>1</sup> Telegram 120 from Athens, July 13, reported that important differences over Cyprus appeared to exist between Averoff and Karamanlis and that Riddleberger was seeking clarification on the Greek Government's position. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/7-1358)

<sup>2</sup> From a July 10-14 personal visit to Geneva.

on Cyprus procedure. He explained that because of political situation here GOG could not agree to NATO intervention nor allow any impression to be created of NATO arbitration. This in effect would exclude any advisory committee procedure unless and until broad outlines of settlement were already agreed after which NATO could confer its blessing. This GOG decision did not however exclude informal discussions with Spaak as previously outlined (Embtel 50 paragraph 2).<sup>3</sup> Foreign Minister said he could be bold on substance but must be cautious on procedure. He then asked me if I had any reaction from Washington to his suggestions.

2. In reply I confirmed what I had said to Prime Minister on July 10 (Embtel 100 paragraph 2)<sup>4</sup> and said this could be taken as our answer. In addition, I said Foreign Minister should not overlook another important aspect in pressing us for replies on substance and that was attitude of Makarios. USG had to date no indication that Averoff suggestions would be acceptable to Archbishop even if we were in position to comment on substance. Foreign Minister replied he was 90 percent sure Makarios would accept.

3. In face of Greek rejection of advisory committee, I asked Foreign Minister how he thought Greek suggestions should be pursued. He affirmed Melas-Spaak informal conversations and if these showed any promise negotiations could be pursued through diplomatic channels. I pointed out this would first involve talks between Greek and UK Governments. Averoff agreed and expressed hope that the US would intervene directly with UK to support his suggestions.

4. Bearing in mind paragraph 2 of Deptel 124,<sup>5</sup> I made no comment on this idea nor did I press again for advisory committee, particularly in view of London's 138 to Department.<sup>6</sup> It may well be that we should encourage direct GOG-UK talks at this time and I did not want to discourage this by continuing to argue case for advisory committee.

**Riddleberger**

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<sup>3</sup> Document 244.

<sup>4</sup> Document 246.

<sup>5</sup> Document 245.

<sup>6</sup> In telegram 138 from London, July 9, Whitney advised that the United States would have to take a position on the substance of the Cyprus problem but recommended that it first get talks on Cyprus underway among the three interested parties. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/7-958)

**249. Editorial Note**

On July 16, NATO Secretary General Paul-Henri Spaak met with representatives of the Greek, Turkish, and British Governments in Paris for discussions on Cyprus. Spaak proposed and the three interested parties agreed to five basic principles for the discussion: 1) a final solution was not possible at present; 2) they should work for a provisional solution; 3) the provisional solution should not facilitate any particular final solution; 4) the provisional solution should increase Cypriot self-government; and 5) the settlement must include absolute safeguards for the Turkish minority. Whitney reported on these discussions in telegram 543 from London, July 21. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/7–2158)

On July 25, Secretary General Spaak met with the Greek, Turk and British Representatives to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for further discussions. Spaak presented a paper for discussion outlining his five principles for a settlement. After debate on the paper, Spaak agreed to redraft it to meet the objections and criticisms raised. Polto 356, July 25, reported on the discussions. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/7–2558) Text of the Spaak paper was sent to the Department of State in Polto 352, July 25. (*Ibid.*)

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**250. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State**

Paris, July 28, 1958, 6 p.m.

373. From Thurston.<sup>1</sup> At Averoff's request I saw him on July 24 and 25 and have passed on substance of our conversations to Ambassadors Burgess and Nolting. Latter suggested I make separate report on Cyprus aspects as supplement to information reported Poltos 356 and 361.<sup>2</sup>

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/7–2858. Secret; Priority; Noform. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, London, and Nicosia.

<sup>1</sup>Raymond L. Thurston, Counselor at Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe.

<sup>2</sup>Regarding Polto 356, July 25, see Document 249. In Polto 361, July 26, Burgess reported Spaak's analysis of the progress of the talks. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/7–2658)

First conversation took place before Averoff had seen Spaak. He said he was going to try to get Spaak interested in his suggestions for revision of UK plan along line he had taken with Ambassador Riddleberger. When reminded that Spaak was taking different approach which would call for provisional arrangement not prejudicial to any given final solution, Averoff said he was willing have a try in spirit Spaak formula but was very doubtful that it was practicably workable. He asked how could Greeks and Turks ever agree on provisional regime when both would look at every word and comma to see whether they were weighted in direction either Enosis or partition. Averoff also indicated concern about possible outcome of any NATO consideration Cyprus problem since if NAC should come up with recommendations for a solution having an unfavorable appearance from the Greek viewpoint, then the future of NATO in Greece would be very dubious indeed. On other hand, if through quiet efforts Spaak or any other means solid ground could be reached for settlement, then GOG would be delighted see NATO label put on settlement. In any event, Averoff emphasized, Spaak effort must move fast since GOG under compulsion of August 16 deadline for inscription Cyprus item UNGA agenda.<sup>3</sup>

At time our second conversation Averoff had seen Spaak and had received from him (as well as Melas) account of second luncheon mentioned Polto 356. Averoff and Seferiades, Greek Ambassador London, who also present, were both amused Sarper's statement he had not shown Spaak paper to his government. They referred to presence Zorlu Paris and to unlikelihood that any Ambassador would withhold such a document from his government. Only two points of substance at luncheon, according Averoff, were (1) reiterations by Sarper of desirability equal representation Greek and Turkish communities Cyprus on Governor's council, and (2) statement by Spaak that he would draft another paper and that he was wondering in that connection whether he should not bring into the picture either the full NAC or the twelve members thereof who were not direct parties to Cyprus issue.

In his account of conversation he had with Spaak after the luncheon Averoff said he had stressed the advantages of his two-point revision of the UK plans. Spaak's reaction, Averoff said, was not unfavorable. Spaak indicated to Averoff he was thinking of action along two lines (1) whether it would not be possible to associate Turkish financial exigencies<sup>4</sup> with a satisfactory Cyprus settlement and (2) whether he could

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<sup>3</sup> The 13th Session of the U.N. General Assembly was scheduled to begin on September 16 in New York. The Greek request that Cyprus be on the General Assembly's agenda was made on August 15.

<sup>4</sup> The Turkish Government had requested a stabilization loan from the International Monetary Fund to deal with rising inflation.

get the twelve non-involved members of NAC to agree to a statement of principles which should govern a Cyprus solution, one guiding principle being the natural desire of peoples for independence; the other, full guarantees for the religious, cultural, and educational rights of minorities.

From this springboard Averoff and Seferiades argued for independence either within or without the British Commonwealth as the best all around solution for Cyprus. Averoff said that he would be willing to subscribe to a guaranty that for 25 years the Cypriots would stay within the Commonwealth. Seferiades opined that this would have the support of the British in both the Conservative and Labor camps. At this point I asked Averoff why he seemed to exclude partition entirely from the list of solutions and referred to conversations we had had two years ago on this subject.<sup>5</sup> He replied that it was not a matter of the Greek Government itself refusing to consider partition but rather that it was absolutely impossible to get any support for his idea from the Greek Cypriots themselves. He then smilingly added that under these circumstances he could have no objection to the inclusion of partition as one of the alternatives in any Cyprus plebiscite.

Informal memorandum being transmitted on other subjects of interest covered in conversations with Averoff.<sup>6</sup>

**Houghton**

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<sup>5</sup>Reference is to the August 18, 1956, Greek proposals for a solution to the Cyprus problem.

<sup>6</sup>Not found.

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## 251. Message From Foreign Secretary Lloyd to Secretary of State Dulles

London, August 1, 1958.

You will be wondering whether we made any progress with Cyprus while Menderes was here.<sup>1</sup> There was of course the matter of the

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Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Top Secret. Enclosure to a letter from Hood to Dulles, August 1.

<sup>1</sup>July 28–30. For Macmillan's account, see *Riding the Storm*, pp. 672–674.

appeal for an end to violence about which we told the press at once.<sup>2</sup> Beyond this we agreed that there should be no official discussions about the British plan until Harold can meet Karamanlis and Menderes as he has all along hoped to do.

It looks as if the Turks will now accept our plan provided that the Government representatives are not eliminated. I know the objections to this feature but it really does not change in substance the present situation. There is in fact though not de jure a Turkish presence in the Island already. Recent events have proved this beyond doubt.

As against this I think we shall hear no more from the Turks about the base<sup>3</sup> or about immediate partition. They will at least acquiesce in the plan provided that it remains substantially unaltered.

This being the Turkish position—a considerable advance when one remembers that they rioted against the plan at the outset—Harold is very anxious to have a shot at the Greeks. He will now probably have to wait until something definite emerges about the Security Council meeting. He will offer to go to Athens first or—if Karamanlis prefers—to meet him in Geneva or Paris. But he will go to Ankara whether Karamanlis agrees to meet him or not.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Macmillan appealed for peace on Cyprus on July 31; Karamanlis made a similar appeal on July 30 and Menderes on August 1.

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to earlier Turkish demands for three bases on Cyprus.

<sup>4</sup> Printed from an unsigned copy.

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## 252. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

Athens, August 4, 1958, 7 p.m.

365. 1. In conversation with King at Tatoi he expressed anxiety over failure to make any progress toward Cyprus solution and told me he found Karamanlis discouraged and embittered over Turkish package aid with no apparent attempt on our part to influence GOT.<sup>1</sup>

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/8-458. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London, Paris for USRO, Ankara, and Nicosia.

<sup>1</sup> On August 4, the U.S. Government, the International Monetary Fund, and the OEEC announced a \$359 million stabilization loan program for Turkey. The United States provided \$234 million of the loan.

I explained it as best I could in light of facts I had, admittedly somewhat meager as to economic justification. In his customary calm and moderate way, King asked me to express to Secretary his hope that Averoff suggestions be given serious consideration. He was certain GOG could deal with Makarios on this basis if it were possible to move GOT in this direction. I in turn urged King to influence Prime Minister to exercise patience and pursue Spaak talks, recalling how long it had taken to find acceptable solutions to other post-war territorial problems. King did not disagree but remarked that continued violence on Cyprus was added complication. He himself was of opinion we should at least have made an effort with Turks before pushing package aid deal.

2. Have learned indirectly that announcement of US aid figures for Turkey prior to action on appropriations is being contrasted unfavorably within GOG with our reply to its aid requests.

**Riddleberger**

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### 253. Editorial Note

Prime Minister Harold Macmillan visited Athens August 7–9 for talks with Karamanlis and Averoff on the future of Cyprus. Macmillan then flew to Ankara where he met with Menderes and Zorlu on August 9 and 10 for further discussions on Cyprus. On August 11, Macmillan flew to Cyprus to meet with British administrators and representatives of the Greek and Turkish communities. For the Prime Minister's account of these meetings, see *Riding the Storm*, pages 674–683.

## 254. Memorandum of Conversation

Athens, August 9, 1958.

### SUBJECT

Middle East and Cyprus

### PARTICIPANTS

Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis  
Foreign Minister Evangelos Averoff  
Alexis Liatis, Greek Foreign Office  
Dimitri Bitsios, Greek Foreign Office

Deputy Under Secretary Robert Murphy<sup>1</sup>  
Ambassador Riddleberger  
Minister-Counselor Penfield  
Counselor Horner

The conversation, which lasted about three hours, was conducted principally in English, with Mr. Liatis occasionally serving as interpreter for the Prime Minister. The atmosphere was a relaxed and friendly one.

Mr. Murphy began by giving a general description of his recent trip to the Middle East, his impressions of the root causes of such events as the Iraqi coup d'état and the Anglo-American troop landings in The Lebanon and Jordan and the present and anticipated future attitude of UAR Prime Minister Nasser towards these events. There were frequent questions from the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, and they interjected views of their own on lines which are generally familiar. They seemed to take a more understanding attitude towards US landings in The Lebanon than they have recently evinced to Ambassador Riddleberger, although they made the point (with which Mr. Murphy emphatically agreed) that military actions cannot be a substitute for political agreements and activities. The Prime Minister and Mr. Liatis seemed particularly interested in Mr. Murphy's concept of the extent of Soviet and UAR interference in Jordan, Iraq and The Lebanon. The importance of the Orthodox Church in the Middle East was emphasized by the Foreign Minister, who stressed the need for action to prevent the Soviets from infiltrating the church.

The subject of Cyprus came up somewhat after halfway through the conversation. While the Prime Minister opened the discussion of

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Source: Department of State, NEA/GTI Files: Lot 61 D 249, Enosis—August. Secret. Drafted by Horner. The meeting was held at Prime Minister Karamanlis' residence.

<sup>1</sup> Murphy stopped at Athens during his return from Lebanon where he had been acting as a special emissary for the President.



this topic by saying he had not really meant to talk on Cyprus, the presence of Mr. Bitsios, who is the Foreign Office expert on the subject, seemed to belie his words. Both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, speaking alternatively, expressed the view that the recent Macmillan visit,<sup>2</sup> while it had resulted in no notable progress on the substance, possibly was useful in permitting a calm discussion of the positions of the respective governments. The Greek leaders spoke of the Cyprus problem in terms with which the Department is familiar; they were pessimistic but not overly emotional. They thought the GOG had made the ultimate concession, namely, it had agreed to shelve self-determination, and now wanted only a greater measure of self-government, within or outside the Commonwealth. Turkish intransigence was due, they thought, to their knowledge that they had the support of the European members of NATO, while the United States was neutral or even tending to support the Turkish thesis. The internal effects in Greece were described as being ominous: Mr. Averoff particularly felt that a good chance of the ERE government losing its majority through defections of deputies was in the cards, while the emotional response of the people was becoming more and more unfortunate from the viewpoint of the Atlantic Alliance. Mr. Averoff said that even in the present cabinet the Prime Minister was having difficulty in maintaining a conciliatory position; he had had to work hard to secure cabinet agreement on the moderate reply made by the GOG to the latest British plan. If the Government were to fall (and this could only be brought about because of the Cyprus issue), whatever followed would be less conciliatory; the opposition is waiting eagerly to attack the Government.

Mr. Karamanlis, towards the end of the meeting, had a message from the Minister to the Prime Minister, Tsatsos, that Macmillan had given full details of the Anglo-Greek talks to British correspondents;<sup>3</sup> this was now known to Greek correspondents, who were besieging the GOG for news. Mr. Karamanlis suggested that Mr. Macmillan had committed a breach of faith, since it had been agreed that both Governments were to be quite noncommittal.

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<sup>2</sup> August 7–9.

<sup>3</sup> Macmillan held a background briefing for the press immediately prior to his departure from Athens.

255. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, August 14, 1958.

Secto 6. Foreign Secretary Lloyd handed Secretary today following message:<sup>1</sup>

"August 14, 1958

My Dear Foster,

Harold's talks with the Greeks and Turks on Cyprus<sup>2</sup> have given us a very clear picture on their views. As I told you<sup>3</sup> we concluded after Menderes' visit to London that the Turks were prepared to go along with our plan. This was confirmed in Ankara last week. The Greek Government, however, made it clear to Harold that they still did not feel able to accept it as it stood mainly because they thought it would increase the Turkish Government's right to a say in the affairs of Cyprus. We have tried to convince them that the Turkish interest is already there and cannot be ignored.

Since Harold's return Ministers have looked at the whole problem again and have decided to make certain modifications in the way we shall put the plan into effect. We have designed these modifications to make the plan more acceptable to the Greeks without causing the Turks to run out. I am enclosing for your personal information the text of a statement which will be communicated to the Greeks and Turks later today and issued in London on August 15.<sup>4</sup> You will see that we have dropped for the moment the idea of dual nationality to which the Greeks objected and we have held out a hope of some single representative institution which they wanted. As for the government representatives to which both sides attach so much importance in different ways, we have changed their status so that they shall not sit on the Governor's Council: the Turks clearly would not agree to drop a government representative altogether but this is certainly a much less obtrusive form of Turkish presence in the island than anything like a Turkish base.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/8-1458. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London, Ankara, and Athens.

<sup>1</sup> Lloyd handed this message to Dulles during a meeting in his suite at the Waldorf Astoria in New York, where they were attending an emergency session of the U.N. General Assembly on the Middle East (August 13-20). Lloyd informed Dulles that the British Government would make an announcement on Cyprus on August 15. The original of Lloyd's letter is *ibid.*, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204.

<sup>2</sup> August 7-13.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 251.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed. For text, see RIIA, *Documents on International Affairs, 1958*, pp. 383-385.

At the same time we have made an addition to the plan by providing for the possibility of separate municipal councils although these would only deal with communal affairs and are thus consistent with the idea of communal autonomy.

Harold is writing to Menderes and Karamanlis to commend these new arrangements to them. We also propose to tell Spaak and the North Atlantic Council before the statement is issued. We hope we can count on Turkish support and although the Greek position is much more doubtful we think there is just a chance that they will give their more or less grudging acquiescence. There may well be a sharp outburst from the Archbishop and EOKA<sup>5</sup> but that seems to be in the cards anyhow. But we hope to persuade all concerned that we have done our best and that it is now imperative to make progress on these lines peacefully and without renewed violence. I feel sure we can count on your using all your influence in this direction.

Yours ever, Selwyn"

[Here follows the text of the August 15 statement.]

Dulles

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<sup>5</sup> Archbishop Makarios publicly rejected the British plan on August 16.

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## 256. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece

Washington, August 27, 1958, 7:53 p.m.

679. Following is current Department estimate of remaining gap between positions GOG and HMG on Cyprus and proposed steps which might be taken to help bridge this gap. Before discussing these with HMG Dept would welcome views all addressee posts but desires particularly Embassy Athens judgment as to whether attitude of GOG and Makarios would warrant such approach at this time.

1. It appears UK statement of Aug 15<sup>1</sup> may have appreciably narrowed margin of disagreement between GOG and HMG on essential

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/8-1658. Secret. Drafted by Blood. Repeated to London, Ankara, Paris for USRO, and Nicosia.

<sup>1</sup> See footnote 4, Document 255.

elements of provisional arrangement for Cyprus. Relatively moderate tone of Karamanlis reply to Macmillan,<sup>2</sup> reported mixed feelings of Greek Cypriot leaders about modified UK plan (see Nicosia 102 rptd London as 73),<sup>3</sup> and conciliatory views informally expressed by members Greek Embassy here (not including Ambassador),<sup>4</sup> have encouraged us to hope gap might be bridged by treating problem as one of interpretation.

2. We continue to doubt feasibility of carrying out plan without cooperation of overwhelming majority of Cypriot people. We believe Greek Cypriot cooperation might be obtained and necessary delicate equilibrium between Greeks and Turks achieved if additional minor concessions are made to Greeks.

3. We see Makarios more than GOG as key to Greek cooperation in carrying out plan. Assuming self-interest of Cypriots now lies in direction of holding their own through provisional arrangement, there may be chance Makarios may cooperate in plan if he is offered graceful way out. Certainly we believe chance is worth taking.

4. It seems desirable to have single assembly established and role of Greek and Turkish Governments minimized as far as possible. Our support of modified plan has been given on understanding that institutions of self-government will be established in such a way as not to prejudice any particular final solution and that there will be opportunity for these institutions to become truly representative of desires of Cypriot people.

5. Given this estimate of gap, Dept has in mind proposing that Embassy London discuss with Fonoff next steps re Cyprus in above context and offer to Fonoff following specific suggestions:

(a) If UK thinks it worthwhile, US Ambassador Athens would be instructed ask GOG if it would be willing go along with UK plan provided UK (1) clarified role of GOG and GOT representatives, pointing out that they would be advisors to Governor, principally with regard protection and welfare of two ethnic communities, and would not participate in administration of island, and (2) promised that single assembly would be established as soon as both communal assemblies were functioning. Such UK interpretive statement could be made in various ways; one might be form of another letter from Foot to Makarios. We note in Nicosia 114<sup>5</sup> that Foot is thinking along somewhat similar lines re timing of establishing single assembly.

<sup>2</sup> For text of Karamanlis' August 19 letter to Macmillan, see RIIA, *Documents on International Affairs, 1958*, pp. 385-387.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 102 from Nicosia, August 16, reported that Cypriots generally opposed outright rejection of the August 15 British proposals. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/8-1658)

<sup>4</sup> On August 18, Ambassador George V. Melas announced he had resigned in protest over U.S. efforts to promote a Cyprus settlement based on British proposals.

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 4, Document 257.

(b) If GOG is receptive, Ambassador Riddleberger would then with knowledge GOG talk with Makarios along same lines. If Makarios is willing to give assurances that he would cooperate in implementation of modified plan, Ambassador would offer to relay suggestion of such interpretive statement to UK.

6. In approaching GOG and Makarios we would couple suggestion to reaffirmation of US support for modified UK plan. We would of course be careful to disabuse Greeks of notion that our offer to be of help on specified course of action above constitutes general offer of mediation.

FYI. If British did not accept suggestion of interpretive statement, they may at least come up with some alternative proposals for bending their plan slightly more in direction of Greeks and thus facilitate chances of Greek acquiescence. British may be unwilling make any clarifying statement regarding plan without first checking with Turks. We would of course await British reaction before taking any action. End FYI.<sup>6</sup>

For USRO: You would be authorized later to inform Spaak of above at time we initiate approaches suggested.

**Herter**

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<sup>6</sup>In telegram 1209 from London, August 28, Whitney replied that he felt the British Government would generally welcome U.S. suggestions as long as Great Britain's leading role in a Cyprus settlement was recognized. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/8-2858)

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## 257. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

Athens, August 29, 1958, 6 p.m.

588. Deptel 679.<sup>1</sup> Agree general line Department thinking as summarized reference telegram. We particularly agree with Department's thinking that it not feasible to carry out British plan without cooperation Greek Cypriots and GOG. Sentiment here against plan as now envisaged continues to harden and will be further encouraged by Makarios press statement yesterday<sup>2</sup> in which he flatly rejected plan, in-

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/8-2958. Secret. Repeated to London, Paris for USRO, Ankara, and Nicosia.

<sup>1</sup>Document 256.

<sup>2</sup>Presumably a reference to an August 27 letter from Makarios to Macmillan which was released to the press; for text, see RIIA, *Documents on International Affairs, 1958*, pp. 387–388.

licated his almost complete alienation from Britain, and suggested his intention to press for UN intervention. We have feeling, however, that it would be more practical in light current situation here (as well, perhaps [garble] as for Turks) and more productive over long term, if plan and proposed actions could if possible be kept even more fuzzy than outlined reference telegram. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] At same time much can be accomplished with them through patient discussion. Macmillan's recent operation<sup>3</sup> was apparently based on partial recognition this situation but he was not sufficiently frank with Greeks and was too specific in his August 15 statement. Nevertheless situation has been left sufficiently flexible to warrant hope that progress can be made along lines Department suggests provided ambiguity and vagueness can be maintained and sufficient flexibility be preserved so that successive steps can be decided upon as events develop. Evidence our willingness play more active role would in itself have important influence on Greek attitude, and, incidentally, should improve overall US relations with GOG.

To illustrate our thinking we offer following comments on two of currently most important factors:

1. Makarios. We agree on his importance but still believe, as we have for some months, that he can most easily be handled by allowing his return Cyprus [1 line of source text not declassified] where he will be exposed to direct Greek Cypriot pressures, as well as Foot influence. Greek public and governmental opinion, which has been smarting under belief that British plan heavily weighted to favor Turks, also would be beneficially affected by Makarios' return in early future and prior any concrete British steps in implementation of plan. Nicosia telegram to Department 114<sup>4</sup> offers hope of progress along this line.

2. Government representatives. Britain might make separate "[garble—clarifying?]" statement" on this subject, perhaps only at Turk spokesman level, to effect that contemplated functions government representatives really within traditional competence ConGens and that therefore if special representatives not appointed Governor will feel free to call upon ConGens for advice and counsel he desires. It might be added that he would naturally expect ConGens to make such arrangements as they felt appropriate for informing themselves of opinions and desires of their respective ethnic communities. We would hope Greeks could be persuaded not to react definitively against some such formula.

**Riddleberger**

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to Macmillan's August 7-13 trip to Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus.

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 114 from Nicosia, August 26, reported that Foot proposed to hold out to Makarios the hope for a quick return to Cyprus in return for the Archbishop's aid in keeping political violence suppressed. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/8-2658)

**258. Message From Foreign Secretary Lloyd to Secretary of State Dulles**

London, September 13, 1958.

DEAR FOSTER: On my return to London and before we meet in New York,<sup>1</sup> I should like to let you have this account of our present thinking on Cyprus.

We have had useful discussions with the Governor of Cyprus since his return to London last Friday<sup>2</sup> and in the light of them we have reviewed the whole position and taken some decisions. We have decided to go ahead with carrying out the plan as announced on June 19 and August 15 insofar as that is possible with Turkish cooperation<sup>3</sup> and with the refusal of the Greek Government and Makarios to cooperate. There will be no further modifications of the policy as announced, and no further public statement for the time being. The first step in carrying out the policy will be the appointment by the Governor of a Municipal Commission to consider the question of the establishment of separate municipalities. The next will be the installation of the Turkish Government representative. Thereafter electoral rolls will be drawn up, and it may be possible to hold elections for the Turkish Cypriot Assembly early next year. This time-table will not be announced in advance, but each move will be revealed progressively as the time comes for the Governor to take action at each stage. We are well aware that the progressive carrying out of the policy on these lines even if it is done unobtrusively and without prior announcement contains the risk of precipitating a major outbreak of violence on the part of the Greek Cypriots. Our hope is that once the safeguards for Turkish interests provided for in the policy are successfully established, the Greek Cypriots may come to accept this position of fact and see that it is in their own interest to accept or at least to acquiesce in the remaining parts of the plan, which gives them not only virtual self-government in their own affairs but also a permanent built-in majority in the only all-Cypriot organ.

Before reaching these decisions we considered most carefully whether we should try to modify the plan still further in the interests of

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Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Secret. Enclosure to a letter from Caccia to Dulles, September 13.

<sup>1</sup> Lloyd returned to London after the August 13–20 emergency session of the U.N. General Assembly on the Middle East. He returned for the 13th General Assembly session September 13–December 13.

<sup>2</sup> September 5.

<sup>3</sup> On August 25, the Turkish Government announced its agreement to the British proposals of August 15.

the Greek Government and the Greek Cypriots. It seemed to us that to introduce any further modifications of substance would run a grave risk of losing the cooperation promised by the Turkish Government after the August 15 statement. On the other hand, it seemed doubtful whether it would be possible to go far enough to secure the Greek Government's cooperation without sacrificing the essential nature of the policy as announced. The Greek Government have indicated that they would be able now to accept something like the Radcliffe Constitution,<sup>4</sup> but they have given no indication that they could accept the Radcliffe Constitution plus the Colonial Secretary's declaration on self-determination of December 19, 1956, which was an essential part of that plan.

We have also been considering the question of the return of Makarios in relation to the carrying out of the policy, but have not yet reached firm decisions. I will of course keep you informed as things develop.

At the United Nations we shall aim to be unprovocative. We shall no doubt wish to make a firm statement explaining our policy, and to show that is the only available way at present of making political progress while allowing passions to cool before a final settlement is sought. We shall be discussing tactics with your people as soon as our ideas are a little further advanced. Your support for our policy has been a great encouragement so far; it will be invaluable to us in New York.

Yours ever,

Selwyn<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Reference is to Karamanlis' August 19 letter to Macmillan; see footnote 2, Document 256.

<sup>5</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.



**259. Memorandum of Conversation**

USDel/MC/25

New York, September 19, 1958, 3 p.m.

UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE THIRTEENTH SESSION  
OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

New York, September 14–20, 1958

PARTICIPANTS

*US*

The Secretary  
William M. Rountree

*Turkey*

Foreign Minister Zorlu  
Mr. Kural, Turkish Delegation to the  
UN

SUBJECT

Cyprus

Mr. Zorlu began by thanking the Secretary for the hospitality and cooperation extended to Finance Minister Polatkan during the latter's visit to Washington.<sup>1</sup> He said the GOT was most appreciative of the help which it has received from the US.

Mr. Zorlu mentioned that he had been discussing Cyprus with Mr. Rountree.<sup>2</sup> The Secretary expressed the hope that the GOT would find it possible to designate the Turkish Consul General in Nicosia as its representative in connection with the British plan when the latter was implemented. He felt that there was in fact considerable substance to the Greek Government's concern that implementation of the plan might bring about grave consequences, and thought that brought upon all of us the responsibility to do everything possible to reduce the danger. We should not dismiss as a mere threat the possibility that an apparent defeat of the present Greek Government in connection with Cyprus might bring about a change in the pro-Western orientation of that country.

Mr. Zorlu said that the British plan did not represent a victory for Turks. Indeed, the Turkish Government was making a sacrifice in going

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Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Rountree on September 23. The meeting was held in Secretary Dulles' suite at the Waldorf Towers.

<sup>1</sup> Polatkan visited Washington September 10–13.

<sup>2</sup> Rountree met with Zorlu shortly after Zorlu arrived in New York on the morning of September 19. They discussed the possibility of nominating the Turkish Consul General in Nicosia as the Turk representative to the British Governor. A summary of their discussion was reported in circular telegram 301, September 20. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9–2058)

along with it. The opposition was strongly criticizing the Government for its weakness in connection with Cyprus. He did not believe the Greeks would continue to reject the plan, but thought they would gradually be brought to cooperate. The Greeks could not leave NATO. They were merely bluffing in threatening to do so. It was necessary to show the Greeks that there was no possibility of gaining added advantages through these tactics. He said that, apart from psychological and political aspects, the Turkish Consul General was not qualified for this type of responsibility. In the first place, he knew no foreign language and in the second place he had no political experience. In any event, however, Mr. Zorlu did not think the position of the Turkish representative should be "diminished" since that aspect was the only advantage to the Turks of the British plan. He said that he had, however, transmitted this suggestion to his Government. He said that frankly he was opposed to it, but that perhaps the Government would feel otherwise.

[Here follows discussion of the Baghdad Pact.]

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## 260. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

Athens, September 20, 1958, 1 p.m.

789. Re Embtel 788.<sup>1</sup> Prime Minister has just handed me following message for President from King with request it be transmitted urgently. He accompanied this by another appeal for our intervention to effect postponement of UK plan on Cyprus:

"I have already had the opportunity of stating to you, Mr. President, Greece's position on the question of Cyprus.

For four years the people of Greece, in spite of its bitter feelings created by the lack of understanding from its allies has shown moderation and has remained faithful to its alliances.

For the sake of these alliances Greece has also made concessions which could have led to a friendly and prompt solution of the Cyprus problem.

However, the British Government insists upon the application of their plan, which complicates instead of solving the question and which my government has rejected for precisely this reason.

The impending unilateral application of this plan will aggravate the situation in Cyprus and will have dangerous repercussions not only on the internal conditions but also on the international relations of Greece.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9-2058. Confidential; Niact; Presidential Handling.

<sup>1</sup>Not printed.

Having these dangers in mind, I wish to request of you, Mr. President, that you exercise all your influence in view of averting them.”<sup>2</sup>

[Here follows the remainder of the telegram.]

**Riddleberger**

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<sup>2</sup> At 10:50 a.m. on September 22, Eisenhower (who was in Newport) called Dulles to discuss King Paul’s letter: “He feels we should let the British Amb know he has appealed and also in urging another reason for postponement by the British one might say the old saying—don’t make any mistakes in a hurry. Once it’s done, it’s done.” (Memorandum of telephone conversation; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations)

Dulles met with Caccia at 3:45 that afternoon and relayed the President’s suggestions as follows: “I told Sir Harold of the President’s reaction to his letter from the King of Greece; namely, that a postponement might be wise. I said that this was in no sense a final or firm position, being a reaction taken by the President at Newport without any general briefing on the situation. However, I said that it was our opinion in the State Department that if the plan went forward, the probability was that the Greeks would terminate their cooperation under the NATO treaty. Also I mentioned the danger that the Turkish representative on Cyprus might well be assassinated and that this could start up a chain of trouble.” Dulles requested that Eisenhower’s views be reported to Macmillan. (Memorandum of conversation; Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199)

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## 261. Editorial Note

On September 20, Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis informed NATO Secretary General Paul-Henri Spaak that the British Government’s determination to implement its Cyprus plan would undermine Greece’s position in NATO. Spaak conferred with Karamanlis in Athens on September 23 and returned to Paris on September 24 to present a new series of proposals on Cyprus to the North Atlantic Council. He requested a postponement of the October 1 date for the implementation of the British plan for Cyprus and proposed a meeting of representatives of the United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey, and the Cypriot communities under NATO auspices.

Spaak also offered a set of proposals as the basis for further negotiations: the creation of separate assemblies for each of the Cypriot communities, a single unified assembly body to deal with questions of interest to both communities, and the appointment of the heads of the two communities as advisers to the British Governor. At a September 25 NAC meeting, the Greek Government accepted the Spaak proposals but the

Turkish Government angrily rejected them, accusing Spaak of favoring the Greek position. Documentation on the Spaak proposals is in Department of State, NEA/GTI Files: Lot 61 D 249, Position Papers. Spaak's version of the these events is in *Combats Inachevés*, volume II, pages 147–150.

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**262. Message From Prime Minister Macmillan to President Eisenhower**

London, September 24, 1958.

DEAR FRIEND: I know you have many worries at present and you will know how much I am thinking of you. I wish sincerely that the problem of Cyprus was not one of them. It of course concerns us very deeply. We have, as you know, striven for a long time to reach agreement with the people of the Island and with the Greeks and Turks. It has unfortunately been made absolutely clear that we cannot find an agreed final solution at present. Before that can happen violence in Cyprus must cease and all concerned must have a breathing space. During that breathing space we must try to make progress with representative Government while safeguarding the rights of all parties. That is the basis of the policy which I announced in June and, as was made clear after my visits to Ankara and Athens in August, we still feel that in its broad lines it is the only possible course at present. We intend to put it into effect as far as we can step by step and quietly. The Turks have accepted it and with Turkey's key position that is of great importance. We hope that as the plan goes forward the Greek Cypriots will also realise the value to them of going along with it. It is quite unreal for them to object to the presence of a Turkish representative. Turkey's interest cannot be denied and this single man will be there to represent that interest directly instead of leaving the Turkish Government to make representations through diplomatic channels. There is no comparison here with the implications of partition of the Island or even of installing a Turkish base there.

I am sure you will agree that we cannot abandon what we have already secured, withdraw our offer which the Turks have accepted in

good faith and throw everything back into confusion again. I am sure too that the implementation of our plan would be the wish of the vast majority of Cypriots if they could freely express their feelings.

Meanwhile I am grateful to you for having suggested that the Turks should try to ease the Greek position by appointing as their representative the existing Consul-General.<sup>1</sup> I very much hope that they will agree to this. Of course the Greek Government have worked themselves up into a great emotion against the plan although I made many important concessions to their point of view after seeing them in August. I fear the truth is that they are not strong enough to accept any policy. The only hope is that in due course they will acquiesce. After all the plan does offer the Greek Cypriot population a permanent built-in majority in the local administration if they are willing to accept it. I am sorry to bother you but thought I ought to let you know my thoughts over this question with which you have been so helpful.

Yours ever,

**Harold<sup>2</sup>**

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<sup>1</sup> Burhan Isin. His appointment as representative and adviser to the British Governor of Cyprus was announced on September 29.

<sup>2</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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## 263. Memorandum of Conversation

MC-19

New York, September 26, 1958, 10 a.m.

### SECRETARY'S TRIP TO NEW YORK

#### PARTICIPANTS

*US*

The Secretary  
Mr. J. N. Greene, Jr.  
Mr. William M. Rountree

*UK*

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd  
Sir Pierson Dixon  
Sir Harold Caccia  
Mr. Anthony Moore  
Mr. Denis Laskey

SUBJECT

Cyprus

Following is a summary of the portion of the Secretary's meeting dealing with Cyprus:

Mr. Lloyd said he was deeply grateful for the support which we had given the British in connection with Cyprus. He would greatly appreciate it if the Secretary could make certain that the Turks would not go back on their promise to designate their Consul General in Cyprus as their representative under the British plan. He felt this might be accomplished by sending a message to Mr. Menderes complimenting him upon his statesmanlike decision. The Secretary agreed that this could be done and asked Mr. Rountree to prepare such a telegram.<sup>1</sup>

The Secretary referred to the NATO meeting on the preceding day at which the Turkish representative had made a speech violently criticizing the Spaak proposal with respect to Cyprus.<sup>2</sup> He said it was very difficult to oppose in principle a meeting of the parties concerned. However, he recognized that such a meeting would entail considerable difficulty. Mr. Lloyd responded that he had in mind a conciliatory answer saying in principle that the British accepted the idea of a conference. However, he did not feel they could agree to a delay in implementation of the British plan. He hoped it would be possible to take credit for the Turkish action in appointing their Consul General rather than sending in a special representative. The British greatly feared that if there should be a new conference in advance of implementing the plan, the Turks might try to impress the conference by inciting riots to demonstrate the depth of Turkish feeling on the issue. The substance of the matter would again be opened, and the Turks could be expected to go back to previous positions including demand for partition. Mr. Lloyd therefore was concerned that Mr. Spaak's well-intentioned initiative might result in a great setback on the Cyprus issue. He thought it important that our allies be made to realize this danger. The British plan in its present form really gave the Greeks what they wanted, although it could not be spelled out as they would like. It was most unfortunate that Greek opposition had been built up to such an extent regarding any Turk Government presence on the island, however innocuous that might be.

The Secretary recognized that the proposed conference had risks as well as possible advantages. For example, there was a grey area regarding the role and the functions of foreign advisers. That grey area would permit the Greeks to present the plan one way to their public, if they

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<sup>1</sup> Telegram 1073 to Ankara, September 26. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 747C.00/9-2358)

<sup>2</sup> See Document 261.

wanted to, and would permit the Turks to present it another way to their own public. Being specific might in fact hinder success of the plan rather than bring the parties together. He realized that there was strong sentiment for the conference and agreed with Mr. Rountree's observation that it would be extremely difficult to oppose it in principle.

The Secretary asked when the conference was planned, and mentioned the fact that Mr. Spaak was now in the United States,<sup>3</sup> with October 1 not far off. Mr. Rountree stated his understanding that the date of the conference was less important to Mr. Spaak and others than was the question of whether the British would postpone implementation of their plan until after the Spaak proposals could be discussed. Mr. Lloyd repeated that he would be greatly disturbed by any postponement, since not only might Turk support be lost but they might undertake very rash action to impress the conference.

The matter was left that we would send a telegram to Turkey on the appointment of the Turk Consul General,<sup>4</sup> and Mr. Lloyd would give further thought as to what could be done about the conference. Meanwhile both he and the Secretary would be talking with Mr. Spaak. Mr. Lloyd said the British answer on the conference should be available by Monday.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Spaak was arriving in Boston on September 27 for a meeting of the Atlantic Treaty Association. He was scheduled to be in Washington on September 29 for meetings with U.S. officials.

<sup>4</sup> Not found.

<sup>5</sup> September 29.

**264. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State**

Athens, September 26, 1958, 1 p.m.

844. For Secretary from Dillon.<sup>1</sup> Re Athens 842.<sup>2</sup> I do not wish to comment on substantive issues regarding latest Spaak proposal but feel that procedural aspects are of such importance that my first hand impressions might be helpful.

Greek Government, including most moderate elements, are shocked at what they considered to be negative US Government reaction in latest NAC meeting to Spaak proposal.

Since they accepted idea of NAC consideration of Cyprus at US urging they cannot understand why US stands alone among disinterested parties in avoiding positive support for Spaak proposals. They report that only UK, Turkey and United States failed to support Spaak and they particularly impressed by strength of Canadian support. They admit French support not clear in Thursday session but expect France to eventually back Spaak.

They are putting hope in another Council session Monday after Spaak has had opportunity talk directly with you.

If such a session is held I feel US would be in untenable position vis-à-vis Greeks if we did not support Spaak proposal for conference. Question of backstage pressure on UK and Turks to accept is entirely different matter and we might well decide to take no action in that regard. Nub of question is will we oppose or support in NAC an important NAC initiative toward settlement. From procedural point of view weight of argument would seem to be clearly on side of supporting Spaak both because of effect on NATO as an organization and because of our previous record of support for NATO initiative in this particular matter.

**Riddleberger**

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9-2658. Secret; Priority. Received at 4:03 p.m. Repeated to Paris for USRO, Ankara, and London. A typewritten note at the end of the telegram indicates it was passed to Secretary Dulles at USUN.

<sup>1</sup> Dillon left Washington on September 19 on an 11-nation tour to study the operations of the Mutual Security Program. He visited Athens September 25-27.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 842 from Athens, September 26, reported that Karamanlis had expressed disappointment at the reserved attitude of the United States toward the Spaak proposals. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9-2658)



265. Memorandum of Conversation

MC-16

Boston, September 27, 1958, 5:30 p.m.

SECRETARY'S TRIP TO BOSTON<sup>1</sup>

PARTICIPANTS

*United States*

The Secretary  
Ambassador Burgess  
Mr. Compton  
Mr. Greene

*NATO*

Secretary-General Paul Henri Spaak  
M. St. M'leux

SUBJECT

Cyprus

M. Spaak was not sure whether the present Greek adamancy on the British plan for Cyprus, scheduled to be put into effect on October 1, was a bluff or not. In Athens he had found Karamanlis discouraged and, he thought, sincere in his view that appointment of a Turkish Government representative as adviser to the Governor [was] a personal defeat for himself. While the Greeks will accept the principle of minority rights on Cyprus they would not, Spaak thought, accept the idea of a Turkish Government representative from Ankara, with its implication that Turkish administration is on the way back. He was inclined to think there may be something in the Greek point that, in its provision for the return to Cyprus of a Turkish Government representative, the British plan is a violation of the Treaty of Lausanne.<sup>2</sup>

M. Spaak said that he thought his plan for a conference is an important new element in the situation. He understood from Karamanlis that Makarios is prepared to accept the idea, but it may be too late and Karamanlis may be overtaken by events. M. Spaak wondered too why Greece should contemplate walking out on NATO, or at least on the North Atlantic Council; what is going on, he said, is not the fault of NATO. And now, according to a message from his Deputy in Paris (copy attached),<sup>3</sup> the Greek representative wants to publish the Spaak

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Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Greene. The meeting was held at the Sheraton Plaza Hotel.

<sup>1</sup> Dulles and Spaak were in Boston to address the meeting of the Atlantic Treaty Association. For texts of their speeches, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 13, 1958, pp. 571–574, and October 20, 1958, pp. 607–611.

<sup>2</sup> Under the 1923 treaty, both Greece and Turkey renounced their claims to Cyprus in favor of the United Kingdom.

<sup>3</sup> An undated message from Casardi to Spaak, not printed.

plan. While it may eventually become public, M. Spaak doubted the utility of letting it out now.<sup>4</sup>

The Secretary said he did not think the Greeks were bluffing and that if the British plan goes into effect they will probably take it out on NATO, at least by discontinuing cooperation in the military field and adopting a neutralist line in policy. The Turkish situation is not good either; we agree with the British that if they do not go ahead with their plan the Turks will turn out in mobs against the Greeks. With the stakes so high for both sides, and the substantive differences that remain so slight, the Secretary had not abandoned hope that a bridge could be found. Perhaps the British might agree to going ahead with the conference Spaak has proposed even though putting their plan into effect on October 1; to try to get agreement from the Greeks, the British might make it clear in advance that any agreed results of the conference could be put into effect as modifications of the British plan even after the latter is underway. Spaak agreed that it is worth trying this on the British and the Secretary said he would speak to Ambassador Caccia in this sense later in the evening.<sup>5</sup> The Secretary and Spaak noted too that someone, probably the United States, would have to urge on the Turks' acceptance of this formula, if the British agree.

The Secretary and Spaak agreed that in view of the critical situation, which will probably come to a head at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in the afternoon of September 29, M. Spaak should postpone his visit to Washington and return directly to Paris.

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<sup>4</sup>The Greek Foreign Office subsequently published this record.

<sup>5</sup>Dulles met with Caccia at 10:30 p.m. that day. After recounting his discussion with Spaak, he expressed the hope the British Government would agree to the conference proposal and urged that the October 1 implementation of the plan for Cyprus be suspended. Dulles also assured the British Government of U.S. support if it decided to go forward with the plan. A memorandum of the conversation is in Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

**266. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State**

Paris, September 28, 1958.

Polto 803. Personal to Secretary Dulles from Nolting. Would like you to have the following background concerning the Cyprus issue in NATO as we see it.

As you know, bad relations between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus have been a festering sore in NATO for a long time. They have become worse since Macmillan announced his plan in August. The British certainly acted in good faith, but they misjudged what was negotiable and their timing was bad. Spaak's proposals as of that time seemed to be, with effort, negotiable. The situation now, I believe, has become critical, threatening to cause the withdrawal of Greece from NATO. Ambassador Melas has told us that he expects soon to be withdrawn and not to be replaced. He is an honest man, not an alarmist. Casardi of NATO told us today he had the same thing from Melas. Norstad and Spaak, both of whom have recently been in Greece, are convinced this is not a bluff, as irrational as it may seem.

We have sent in over the past weeks several recommendations on this problem, the main thrust of which is that if the problem is to be moved from a dangerous deadlock, the US must take a firm and positive position. We did so in support of the Macmillan plan in August, but this would not go down with the Greeks. As Riddleberger said in a recent cable, we have fully discharged our commitment to support the UK plan.<sup>1</sup> In my opinion it is necessary now to support with vigor the Spaak effort to achieve a conference of the interested parties both NATO participation [*participants?*]. The Turks have refused this (in violent and abusive speech in NAC Thursday,<sup>2</sup> which was apparently written by Zorlu), and the British apparently are tending to limit it in a manner which will make it impossible for the Greeks to accept. But it is the Greeks who are apparently on the edge of desperation and irrational actions; the other two positions may have some give in them.

We sent a cable Saturday<sup>3</sup> suggesting a possible line for the US to take, in capitals and at Monday's NATO meeting. I hope you will have

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9-2858. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution. Repeated to London, Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia.

<sup>1</sup>Telegram 842 from Athens, September 26. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/9-2658)

<sup>2</sup>September 25; see Document 261.

<sup>3</sup>Polto 802, September 27, urged that the United States exert its "best influence" to gain an agreement for a conference on Cyprus and that that conference be announced prior to October 1. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9-2758)

the opportunity to read that and to give us your personal advice on how to help take the heat out of this dangerous situation.

Foregoing written before receipt your instructions to London (Deptel 3199 to London, repeated Topol 1015 to Paris).<sup>4</sup> We agree with Department's thinking but from what Roberts has told us, we fear British will not take up suggestion. We have thought this matter over carefully and are convinced that US position should be that, in interest of the alliance, a conference of the three governments and two communities, with NATO participation, is essential.

I hope highest level approaches Washington and three capitals will permit us to state this line clearly and firmly at tomorrow's NAC meeting with chance of success.

Nolting

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<sup>4</sup> Telegram 3199 to London, September 27, reported on Dulles' September 27 talks with Spaak on Cyprus and instructed the Embassy to determine whether the British Government would agree to the Spaak proposals by talking to British officials at the "highest level." (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/9-2758) A memorandum of Dulles' conversation with Spaak is printed as Document 265.

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**267. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations**

Washington, September 29, 1958, 12:11 a.m.

Topol 1025. Ankara pass Dillon.

1. Dept, conscious of grave threat posed to NATO by present Cyprus situation, has been giving constant and urgent thought to various aspects of problem as reported from addressee posts. Suggestion contained Deptel 3199 to London<sup>1</sup> was based upon our understanding that UK and Turks would not agree to postpone implementation of British

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9-2858. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Rountree and cleared by Timmons, Williams, and in substance by Dulles. Repeated to London, Ankara, Athens, and Nicosia.

<sup>1</sup> See footnote 4, Document 266.

plan and that some formula would have to be found taking this into account. While British response as reported London's 1779 to Dept,<sup>2</sup> repeated addressee posts, is not all that we might have hoped for, we are encouraged that British have accepted principle of conference. We understand from British Ambassador Washington that statement to be made by UK rep will make clear that while HMG cannot agree to suspending progressive application of program announced on June 18 and August 15, British are prepared accept in principle conference on basis and within scope of British plan and to discuss its application. UK Ambassador stated to Rountree<sup>3</sup> that if conference is called for purpose of discussing application of British plan, and if conference agrees upon modifications, these modifications would become effective. Rountree expressed hope this explanation might also be included in UK statement in NAC, although it not yet known whether this will in fact be done notwithstanding inclusion sentence along these lines in partial text contained London's 1779. Rountree also suggested deletion from British text of indication that Greek acceptance of Spaak proposal for conference including Turkish participation implied Greek recognition of Turkish interest in Cyprus. He expressed view this would cause considerable domestic political difficulty for GOG.

2. We hope that Spaak and other reps NAC will find British proposal constructive, although we realize there is widespread hope that British will defer implementation of plan. We feel our own statement should reflect optimism that talks are in prospect and might lead to constructive developments. We should bear in mind that beginning of implementation of plan does not mean that parts of it cannot later be modified by agreement.

3. USRO should take following line in making US statement in NAC Sept 29: US reaffirms its belief that it is proper for NATO allies to seek to resolve differences by discussion, and for that reason we believe Spaak's initiative in proposing conference was in line with his responsibilities in Committee of Three Report. We have on more than one occasion urged our allies to seek solution in NATO rather than in more public discussions.

Suggestions have been made for deferment of the execution of the British plan. We note that UK, while stating its willingness to participate in a conference, has not considered it possible to accept postponement of

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<sup>2</sup>Telegram 1779 from London, September 28, transmitted the text of the statement prepared by the British Government for presentation to the September 29 NAC meeting. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9-2858) See Document 269.

<sup>3</sup>A memorandum of Rountree's September 28 conversation with Caccia is in Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9-2858.

steps leading to beginning of implementation of plan, pending outcome of such a conference.

We believe however that the scope of the conference could be liberally interpreted. If as result of discussions there are changes agreed, these changes could be put into effect irrespective of fact that they might be inconsistent with prior actions.

We believe there is general desire here that those concerned with this matter will find it possible to undertake at an early date discussions which can lead to a constructive solution to this difficult problem. We are convinced that talks entered into in the spirit of the alliance can and will shed light on possible grounds for understanding and agreement. We believe that NATO may thus make a material contribution to a peaceful settlement and we ourselves shall of course stand ready to lend our assistance to our allies.

**Dulles**

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**268. Memorandum of Conversation Between President  
Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles**

Washington, September 29, 1958, 11 a.m.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

(3) We spoke of the Cyprus situation. The President recalled his farewell call from Ambassador Melas<sup>1</sup> and his emphatic presentation to the Ambassador of the importance of having a sense of proportion. He said that Greece for many centuries, going back to Pericles, had been a leader of human freedom and of democracy in the world, and that it would be a tragedy if it sold out its birthright because of a relatively minor dispute about Cyprus. Also, to wreck NATO on this account would be wholly unjustifiable.

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Memoranda of Conversation with the President. Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles.

<sup>1</sup> Eisenhower met with Melas on September 26. No record of their conversation has been found.

I recalled that I had urged Spaak to go back to Paris to be there for today's meeting, and also Burgess.<sup>2</sup> I expressed myself, however, as apprehensive as to the outcome in view of the very emotional attitude of the Greeks.

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<sup>2</sup>Dulles made this suggestion during his September 27 discussion with Spaak; see Document 265. No record of Dulles' instructions to Burgess has been found, but Burgess was present at the meeting with Spaak.

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## 269. Editorial Note

The North Atlantic Council discussed Cyprus on September 29. The British Representative read a statement in which he noted that the Turkish Government's appointment of its Consul General in Nicosia, Burhan Isin, as its representative on Cyprus was a conciliatory gesture and announced that the British Government would put its plan for Cyprus into effect on October 1, but was willing to meet with the Greek and Turkish Governments in a conference under NATO auspices to discuss the future of the island. The Turkish Representative also indicated his government's willingness to participate in a conference. The U.S. Representative read a statement based on instructions sent in Topol 1025, Document 267. Polto 819, September 29, reported on the meeting. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9–2958)

270. Letter From President Eisenhower to King Paul I

Washington, September 30, 1958.

DEAR KING PAUL: I want you to know that I have given most careful study to your recent message<sup>1</sup> expressing concern regarding the repercussions which may follow the application of the British plan for Cyprus.

The United States is gravely disturbed by the imminent dangers posed by the failure to reach a mutually satisfactory settlement of the Cyprus dispute. We have considerable sympathy and understanding for the difficult position in which Greece finds itself. I know you understand that since we are not a direct party to the controversy and are a friend of all concerned, we face real limitations on our ability to intervene in this matter. Nevertheless, we have been working quietly and urgently in an effort to find ways to reconcile the apparent British intention to proceed with initial steps to implement their plan with Greek objections to the plan. We will continue these efforts. It remains our fervent hope that all of those concerned with the dispute will seek a solution in the spirit of the alliance which binds us together.

From personal experience I know how staunchly you believe in the North Atlantic Alliance and the need to maintain Greece's ties with the West. I am sure that you are distressed, as I am, to see how the Cyprus dispute is undermining the unity of NATO and hampering the effective cooperation of allies whose full energies are needed against the common threat. I have been particularly disturbed by the implication in recent public and private statements of Greek Government officials that Greece might be led to risk its basic ties with the West in order to protest what might be considered an unacceptable interim settlement of the Cyprus problem.

I hope most earnestly, Your Majesty, that in pursuing its Cyprus policy Greece will measure its immediate objectives respecting Cyprus against its bonds of interest and interdependence with the other nations of the West. I know that you and I would not want to see endangered a basis of our common strength which, after all, offers the best hope for serving the long-term interests of the Cypriot people, as of the people of the entire free world.

With warm regard,  
Sincerely,<sup>2</sup>

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, Greece. Confidential. Transmitted to Athens in telegram 1048, September 30.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 260.

<sup>2</sup> Printed from an unsigned copy.



**271. Editorial Note**

On September 30, NATO Secretary General Spaak introduced a draft statement on Cyprus in the North Atlantic Council. The Spaak statement, as modified by the Council, noted NATO concern with the ongoing dispute in Cyprus and endorsed the presence of the Turkish representative on Cyprus within the limited role assigned him under the Macmillan Plan. The statement also reiterated the desirability of a three-power conference on Cyprus. For text of the Spaak paper, see *The Cyprus Question*, pages 10–11. Spaak's version of the meeting is in *Combats Inachevés*, volume II, pages 151–154.

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**272. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom**

Washington, October 1, 1958, 4:34 p.m.

3304. Re Calhoun–Barbour telephone conversation, following is message from the President to Prime Minister Macmillan. Advise date time delivery.

“October 1, 1958

Dear Harold:

Thank you for your message about Cyprus which Harold Caccia gave to me on September twenty-fourth.<sup>1</sup> I am grateful to you for giving me your thoughts on the way you intend to proceed on this difficult matter.

Much has happened since your letter arrived. Just after receiving it, the news came of Mr. Spaak's trip to Athens and his proposal for a conference.<sup>2</sup> In fact I have delayed replying to your letter until we could have some better idea of what might come of that proposal. Foster has been in close touch with Selwyn and with Harold Caccia on these new developments and we have appreciated their receptiveness

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/10–158. Secret; Presidential Handling.

<sup>1</sup> Document 262.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 261.

to suggestions we have made from time to time. I have made clear to the Greeks that they need a sense of proportion in this matter and should not sacrifice their ancient heritage of democracy, and their new bonds in NATO.<sup>3</sup>

At the moment there seems a chance that a basis for further discussions between your Government and Greece and Turkey can be found. We most assuredly hope that this much can be accomplished and have stated in the North Atlantic Council our willingness to help in whatever way may be appropriate.

With warm regard,

As ever, Ike''

Observe Presidential Handling.

Dulles

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is to Eisenhower's September 30 letter to King Paul, Document 270.

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### 273. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

Athens, October 2, 1958, 7 p.m.

896. 1. Continuing our efforts to influence GOG to agree to conference on basis Spaak paper,<sup>1</sup> have just concluded another conversation with Averoff in which I utilized Roberts statement quoted in Deptel 1070.<sup>2</sup> I have made this point often before but emphasized it was now statement by UK Representative. In addition, and following telephone consultation last night and this morning with Burgess, I again urged Averoff to continue NATO discussions in view of progress that had been made there. I underlined once again importance of paragraph ten

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/10-258. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Paris, Istanbul, London, Ankara, Nicosia, and USUN.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 271.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 1070 to Athens, October 1, reported that at the September 30 NAC meeting, Roberts stated that under British proposals Greek and Turkish representatives on Cyprus would not be members of the executive authority of the island and would have no role in its administration. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/10-158)

of Spaak paper and said if there is any misunderstanding another effort should be made in discussion tomorrow to clarify it. To me, paper should be considered as a whole and it was stipulated Spaak's modification could be discussed in conference.

2. Foreign Minister replied hot debate was still proceeding within GOG re Spaak paper and therefore he would not have "important communication" for me today. Karamanlis was fighting real battle to preserve Greece's Western orientation but was faced with threats by several Ministers to resign if he accepted conference on proposed basis. This internal debate was being waged on issue of role of Turk representative and influence would have on Governor. Furthermore there was contradiction between paragraphs eight and ten of Spaak paper. In reply I repeated argumentation in paragraph one of Embtel 869,<sup>3</sup> omitting however any reference to GOT acceptance of proposal. Averoff then said this was all very well but real point was that in NAC role of US was that of spectator and our weight had not been thrown to support what I said. Recent high level indications of our attitude had been general rather than specific and if we thought conference should consider modifications suggested by Spaak why did we not insist this be made clear, and give GOG some answer on where we stood on Spaak modifications. I replied we were working for compromise that would make progress along these lines possible but as he well knew could not dictate the answers.

3. Averoff then said he was in position to make suggestion that might help. US had urged GOG to accept modified Macmillan plan and there might be one way of Greece accepting it if it could be combined with proposal he had made in June. Now that Makarios statement on independence was issued,<sup>4</sup> if agreement could be reached to hold plebiscite in 7 to 10 years for independence excluding both enosis and partition, GOG might be brought to accept modified Macmillan plan. He asked me to submit this urgently.

4. I realize how difficult this negotiation is for Department in view of variety of pressures on US and am trying to steer course here which does not commit US to position which will merely raise problems elsewhere. But it would be enormously helpful to me if I could receive more precise instructions re our attitude on (A) powers of government representatives, (B) Spaak modifications of UK plan, and (C) points raised by

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<sup>3</sup> In telegram 869 from Athens, September 30, Riddleberger reported in paragraph 1 that in a meeting with Averoff that morning he stressed the limited role that a Turkish representative would have in Cyprus. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/9-3058)

<sup>4</sup> On September 29, Makarios submitted a proposal to the British Embassy in Athens calling for a period of 7 years of Cypriot self-government under British rule followed by full independence. The British Government rejected the plan.

Averoff in paragraph two of Embtel 869.<sup>5</sup> I believe we have now reached point in this negotiating where our neutrality is so compromised, or held to be so compromised, that we must risk more specific replies whether palatable or unpalatable to Greeks or Turks.

**Riddleberger**

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<sup>5</sup>In paragraph 2 of telegram 869 from Athens, Riddleberger reported that Averoff charged the United States with switching from support of the more acceptable Spaak plan to backing the Macmillan proposals which Greece could not accept. Averoff indicated that he felt that the United States was responsible for the introduction in Spaak's proposal of the idea of Turkish representation on Cyprus.

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#### **274. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece**

Washington, October 2, 1958, 8:43 p.m.

1093. For Ambassador. We are not sure whether at this time further pressure on GOG to accept Cyprus conference would be wise. If you believe it would be helpful you should deliver Karamanlis following message from Acting Secretary.

"Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

At this moment when the Cyprus problem presents the greatest danger to the NATO alliance and paradoxically at the same time is the closest yet to a mutually acceptable interim solution, I want to speak frankly as a friend of Greece.

In the last few weeks, we have been doing what we can, quietly but urgently, to bring the parties to this controversy closer to agreement. The British, whom we have urged to consider sympathetically your needs, are displaying considerable flexibility and a willingness to make concessions in the common interest, as evidenced by the statement made by the British NATO representative at the North Atlantic Council meeting on September 30<sup>1</sup> that the Greek and Turkish representatives

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/10-258. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution; Verbatim Text. Drafted by Blood and cleared by Herter. Repeated to Paris for USRO.

<sup>1</sup>The British statement was made on September 29; see Document 269.

would have no role as sovereigns or with respect to the administration of Cyprus.

We recognize that Greece has already made several significant concessions. We know that these concessions raise political difficulties for your Government, and we have appreciated your courage in making them. We are now asking you not to falter at this critical moment but to agree to attend a conference on the basis of Mr. Spaak's latest paper.<sup>2</sup>

Such a conference offers the possibility of a mutually satisfactory agreement. The United States would be willing to participate in a conference as an observer or as a member of a two or three member NATO advisory committee. During the conference we would be prepared to support the early establishment of a single assembly, in addition to the two communal assemblies, and to use our influence to achieve a mutually agreeable interpretation of the functions of the government representatives in keeping with the British NATO Ambassador's statement.

In such a conference Greece can strive for an interim arrangement within the framework of the British plan that will in effect not prejudice Greece's long term interests with regard to Cyprus and the Cypriot people. As the Belgian Representative at NATO pointed out Wednesday at NAC, NATO observers at a conference would assure Greece fair treatment.

You have an opportunity, Mr. Prime Minister, to influence greatly the course of this dispute. In weighing the effects of your decision, I urge you to remember the underlying importance of Greece's ties with the NATO alliance and, particularly, Greece's friendship and cooperation with the United States.<sup>3</sup>

Sincerely yours, Christian A. Herter"

**Herter**

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 271.

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 907 from Athens, October 3, Riddleberger reported that he had delivered Herter's message to Averoff since Karamanlis was unavailable. Averoff indicated that even allowing for the British interpretation of the role of the Turkish representative, further negotiations were needed to find a solution to Cyprus satisfactory to Makarios and other Cypriot leaders and that the Archbishop's suggestion for a 7-year period of self-rule would provide an excellent interim solution. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/10-358)

**275. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece**

Washington, October 3, 1958, 7:34 p.m.

1101. 1. We greatly appreciate your persistent efforts to penetrate Greeks' wounded pride and induce GOG to accept Cyprus conference on basis Spaak paper. Postponement NAC meeting until October 6 and account your talk with Averoff as reported in Embtel 896<sup>1</sup> had encouraged us to hope there remained some chance of getting Greeks to sit down at table for serious negotiations based on British plan.

2. However, Averoff's apparent insistence on agreement on plebiscite as precondition to conference as reported Embtel 907,<sup>2</sup> if actually GOG position as distinguished from Averoff bargaining tactic, could kill any hope of conference at this time. Agreement on independence plebiscite at this time is so clearly out of question that we question whether Averoff suggestion motivated more by determination thwart conference than by desire seek mutually acceptable solution.

3. Averoff's suggestion that British plan be prelude to plebiscite for independence excluding both enosis and partition seems to parallel suggestion recently made informally by one Greek representative that Makarios plan, modified to provide that change in independence status could be achieved only by agreement of interested parties, be superimposed on British plan.

4. You should try to dissuade Averoff from postulating plebiscite as precondition to conference. You should tell him flatly that we cannot support his proposal as conference precondition. He could of course raise proposal for plebiscite at conference based on Spaak paper but we frankly doubt that there is any possibility of achieving agreement on plebiscite at this time. In speaking with Averoff you may wish add following thoughts:

(a) We do not believe it practical at this time to consider final solution, which is what Averoff suggestion amounts to, in view present intensive effort within NATO to find basis for conference to discuss interim solution.

(b) This effort, which we believe offers real chance for agreement, based on assumption that aroused emotions make final solution impossible to achieve now. Both British plan and alternate Spaak proposals based on this assumption.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/10-358. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Blood. Repeated to Paris for USRO, London, Ankara, Nicosia, and USUN.

<sup>1</sup> Document 273.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, Document 274.

(c) Time for discussion final solution must wait until passions cool or interim period concluded. At that time we would expect some form of guaranteed independence would certainly be among various proposals considered.

5. We believe you should attempt to see Karamanlis urgently in order ascertain whether insistence on plebiscite as precondition is final GOG position. You are authorized in your discretion to tell Karamanlis and King that we think setting of such precondition would in effect sabotage conference which we believe could lead to mutually acceptable interim arrangement for Cyprus.

6. Deptel 1093<sup>3</sup> indicates as specifically as we believe we can at this time our attitude toward powers of government representatives and Spaak's modifications. (Deptel 1093 is being repeated to addressees this message.)

7. We agree that Averoff's remarks reported para 2 Embtel 869<sup>4</sup> should not go unanswered. We leave to your discretion time and method of refutation which we suggest include following points to set record straight:

(a) US did not urge GOG in early August to accept Spaak's set of principles for interim solution, nor did we ourselves take position on substance these principles. We urged Greeks to *discuss* Spaak principles as we are now urging GOG to discuss latest Spaak paper.

(b) US did not influence Spaak to modify his most recent set of principles. Spaak has developed each of his papers without any consultation with US, though of course our views had been made known in NAC as authorized Topol 1025.<sup>5</sup> We believe Spaak made modifications in attempt develop basis for discussion which might be more readily acceptable to all interested parties. We have not lobbied in NAC for changes in Spaak proposals.

**Herter**

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<sup>3</sup> Document 274.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 5, Document 273.

<sup>5</sup> Document 267.

**276. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State**

Athens, October 4, 1958, 1 p.m.

914. Embtel 907.<sup>1</sup>

1. Had lengthy conversation with King at Tatoi last night in which first half was devoted to review of Cyprus negotiations in recent weeks. Again I went over advantages for Greece in modified Macmillan plan and reasons why GOG should accept negotiations on basis of Spaak paper. I informed him of contents of Herter letter<sup>2</sup> and progress that had been made on defining powers of Turk representative. I argued once more that GOG should not overlook advantages of UK plan for Greece, expressing personal opinion that once communal assemblies and single assembly were established it would be impossible for UK to reverse these steps toward self-government and this would automatically mean end of any physical partition. Furthermore, conference with NATO observers would guarantee fair treatment and Spaak suggestions could be discussed. I said gap had been so narrowed for interim solution that we should all make supreme effort now to close it.

2. King, obviously influenced by our recent messages,<sup>3</sup> replied he had returned to find distressing political situation in Greece as result of UK insistence on implementing its plan while discussions were in progress. He thought internal situation in Greece was deteriorating daily and he did not know what outcome would be. Karamanlis wanted to resign, but this was no answer as new elections in the circumstances could be disastrous and must be avoided. Other alternative would be withdrawal from NATO which might assuage temporarily Greek feeling of humiliation by its allies, but this was no answer to problem. We knew his devotion to NATO and his strong feelings that Greece must remain member of alliance. His influence would certainly be exerted against any such decision. But he was constitutional monarch who had no desire to see dictatorship return to Greece. Therefore after reflection and consultation, he would ask me to send strong plea to highest US authorities to throw our great weight and influence behind what Averoff had proposed, i.e., (A) conference on basis of Spaak suggestions, or (B) agreement on plebiscite proposal to be followed by Greek acceptance of

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/10-458. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Paris for USRO.

<sup>1</sup> See footnote 3, Document 274.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 274.

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to Eisenhower's September 30 message to King Paul (Document 270) and Herter's October 2 message to Karamanlis.



modified Macmillan plan. I said I was not hopeful but would convey his message.

3. Late last night, Foreign Minister convoked me to read Prime Minister's reply to Herter letter. Karamanlis thanked Acting Secretary for letter, for our efforts and for promise of support for single chamber. Letter had received most careful study including last sentence. GOG was facing incredibly difficult situation but was doing its best to preserve its traditional policies. Taking into account internal dangers resulting from deep emotions generated in Greek people, Prime Minister suggested that if US wants to help find solution and as British have already appointed Turk representative, best way would be support new proposal for plebiscite. By this means, UK could maintain its plan, Turk could retain its representative and scene set for definitive solution.

4. Prime Minister pointed out in this case it goes without saying UK would retain bases and guarantees worked out for Turkish minority on island. Prime Minister asked I emphasize his belief that if only interim settlement is arranged, NATO would face renewed agitation and repetition of unhappy events now going on. GOG had been in constant contact with Makarios and his latest proclamation was written in strong terms. But now that both GOG and Makarios had abandoned Enosis, surely it was reasonable to propose plebiscite in which both Enosis and partition would be excluded. Prime Minister was personally of opinion if GOG went to conference and it failed, public opinion here would later demand larger concessions.

5. Averoff requested in addition to Prime Minister's remarks that I convey personal message from him. He does not yet know what policy GOG will adopt or whether it will try once more in NATO. Because of his great difficulties, Averoff will remain loyal to Karamanlis. But if Karamanlis fails, Averoff believes Greece will be lost to West within six months. If Karamanlis goes, he does not know what will happen.

6. Deptel 1101<sup>4</sup> just received. In view of King's plea and Prime Minister's reply set forth herein and in face of King's always moderate views on Cyprus, I shall defer action until this message has been considered.<sup>5</sup>

**Riddleberger**

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<sup>4</sup> Document 275.

<sup>5</sup> Telegram 1114 to Athens, October 4, instructed Riddleberger to "take action as instructed Deptel 1101." (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/10-458) In telegram 920 from Athens, October 5, Riddleberger reported on a "stormy" meeting with Karamanlis in which Karamanlis repeated his demand for a plebiscite in Cyprus and reiterated his threat to withdraw from NATO. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/10-558)

**277. Editorial Note**

On October 6, the North Atlantic Council met for discussions on Cyprus. The Greek Representative informed the Council that his government would participate in a conference on condition that its agenda include discussion of the ultimate solution to the status of Cyprus. The British Representative indicated his government's willingness to participate in a conference. The Turkish Representative also indicated his government's willingness to participate but rejected Spaak's September 30 memorandum outlining terms of reference for the meeting. Polto 885, October 6, reported on the meeting. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/10-658)

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**278. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State**

Ankara, October 6, 1958, 3 a.m.

1130. In compliance Department telegram 1166,<sup>1</sup> which somewhat at variance with Department telegram 1132,<sup>2</sup> I flew [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] hurriedly to Istanbul noon October 5 to seek interview with Prime Minister Menderes. At airport Ankara, I made point of seeing Foreign Minister Zorlu, who just returning from Istanbul to preside at luncheon to which I was invited, but from which, at last minute, I naturally had to bow out. I advised Zorlu purpose my trip, also giving him copy Herter letter (Department telegram 1132).

Although requested previously by telephone do so, Consul General Miner Istanbul had not been able arrange meeting with Menderes. Hence, upon arrival, I sought Menderes at Park Hotel where he residing. Was advised by his bodyguard that Prime Minister was "out" (parts unknown). I left card for his private secretary (Fenmen) stating my request and asking Fenmen call me Hilton Hotel when meeting could be arranged. (Firmly believe both Menderes and Fenmen were having

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/10-658. Secret; Niact. Repeated to Athens, Paris for USRO, Nicosia, Istanbul, Izmir, Iskenderun, and London.

<sup>1</sup> Telegram 1166 to Ankara, October 4, instructed Hall to present a letter from Herter to Menderes urging Turkish participation in the proposed NATO conference on Cyprus and to stress U.S. support for the conference proposal. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/10-458)

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 1132 to Ankara, October 2, transmitted the text of the Herter letter to Menderes and instructed Hall to deliver it if he believed it would be useful. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/10-258)

afternoon nap and had ordered no one disturb them.) Very shortly thereafter, Fenmen telephoned me in extremely angry mood for not having given him adequate warning my trip and claiming I putting pressure on him. Nevertheless, he promised call me if and when meeting could be arranged. I agreed stay all night Istanbul if necessary in order complete my mission.

While awaiting Fenmen call, I received call from Zorlu at half past seven from Ankara, asking me return capital at once. I asked Zorlu if this were known to Prime Minister and in accord his wishes. Not feeling sure Zorlu was not attempting to take play out of Prime Minister's hands, I made one more effort communicate with Fenmen to check this point. As I expected, I was told Fenmen was "out". Obviously, since I have to work with Zorlu, and in view of past experience, I had no choice but to return Ankara.

Found Zorlu awaiting me Foreign Office Ankara 11:45 p.m. I first asked him if he had conferred with Prime Minister during afternoon. He replied affirmatively, saying that he had also read him copy Herter letter (original for Menderes left with Miner for delivery, if possible, October 6). In following discussion, largely unilateral, since it was difficult for me to get in a word, Zorlu assured me he was reflecting views of Menderes, President Bayar and his own, in other words, policy of Turkish Government.

Despite all arguments that I could propound (in accordance Department telegram 1166) and others previously used, Zorlu stated categorically that while Turkish Government willing to enter into any number of conferences with Greeks or with Greece and UK, even with participation both Cypriot communities, Turkey would not do so under aegis of Spaak, nor would it consent to discuss status Turkish representative in Cyprus, which Zorlu said is already clearly established. Zorlu said he had expressed very same sentiments to UK Chargé and that he had full approval Menderes in this course. He added that President Bayar had warned him to yield no more, else Turkey would lose everything in Cyprus. Zorlu then said: "Off-the-record, Mr. Hall, I blame you for Turkey's present weakened position with respect to Cyprus" (referring to Consulate General deal).

Zorlu feels that NAC is not proper forum for discussion of disputes between NATO allies, saying: "Today, it is Cyprus, tomorrow it may be Iceland and Great Britain. If I had been Foreign Minister when 'three Wise Men' policy propounded, I would have fought it bitterly."

*Comment:* I have carried out instructions to fullest extent, on occasion contrary my judgment. I believe it is useless to try to push Turks further. We will lose ground gained lately in our relations.

**279. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State**

Ankara, October 7, 1958, 7 p.m.

1142. Re Paris Polto 117, sent Department 885.<sup>1</sup> Secretary General Foreign Office Esenbel called me 1500 October 7 to give me "last word" (which I believe may be literally true) on Turk position re proposed conference on Cyprus. He stated instructions being given Sarper under following four points which he hoped would be communicated to Department and US representatives soonest.

1. Turkey does not accept Spaak paper which evidently prepared in order to exert pressure on Turkey and satisfy Greece. It contains divergencies from truth and exaggerates gravity of situation. It tries downgrade real functions of representatives counseling Governor Cyprus. Turkey believes no procès verbale is necessary to "answer questions in Parliaments". GOT is not impressed by these pressure tactics.

2. If progress is to be made this is not time discuss the final status of island. On basis of UK plan better climate must be created, since if final solution were discussed at this time there would be no common ground. Greece and Turkey yet too far apart. Later if climate were improved, chances of success another conference (even in near future) would be greater.

3. Participation of France and Italy as proposed by Greece plus Spaak and US observers is not accepted by Turkey. France and Italy have nothing do with Cyprus. GOT cannot accept presence of Spaak at conference even as observer since he would do more harm than good. He would have to take sides for one or other party or be accused doing so as Foot is accused by both parties to be doing at this time. GOT feels Spaak's participation conference would not only do harm to his personal position but also to NATO.

4. GOT will accept amendments if relevant to subject and having bearing on UK plan.

Esenbel added GOT feels NATO being used as pressure tool by Greece. Turkey does not wish NATO to become another UN (Embtel 1130).<sup>2</sup> He said: "we are now making *démarche* to US as we would at UN." In his usual calm mood, he concluded GOT would not submit to Greek "blackmail" of being put between nutcracker jaws of UN and NATO.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/10-758. Secret; Niact. Repeated to Paris for USRO, Athens, London, Nicosia, Istanbul, Izmir, and Iskenderun.

<sup>1</sup> Polto 117 from Paris to Ankara, October 6, summarized the October 6 NAC meeting. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/10-658) See Document 277.

<sup>2</sup> Document 278.

*Comment:* By inference Esenbel silence re USA in context second sentence paragraph 3 above would seem indicate GOT would find USA as unacceptable as observer at conference as France and Italy, though this point not entirely clear.

Hall

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**280. Telegram 1154 From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State**

Ankara, October 8, 1958, 8 p.m.

[Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/10–858. Secret; Niact. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]

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**281. Editorial Note**

The North Atlantic Council discussed Cyprus at meetings on October 13, 17, and 23. At the October 13 meeting, the Council members agreed, subject to the approval of their respective governments, to sponsor a conference on Cyprus which would be attended by Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom as participants and at least one other NATO power as a neutral observer. The NATO Representatives also discussed further revisions of the terms of reference for Cyprus proposed by Spaak on September 30. Polto 978, October 14, reported on the October 13 meeting. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/10–1458)

At the October 17 meeting, the British, Turkish, and Greek Representatives agreed that Brussels would be the site of a Cyprus conference. Revisions to the proposed terms of reference were also discussed. Polto 1024, October 17, reported on this meeting. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/10–1758)

At the October 23 meeting, Sarper, the Turkish Permanent Representative, announced that Turkey accepted the proposal for a NATO-sponsored conference. Melas, the Greek Permanent Representative, reported that the proposal was not acceptable to Greece and that Foreign Minister Averoff was placing the matter of participation in a NATO-sponsored conference before the Greek cabinet. Polto 1081, October 23, reported on this meeting. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/10–2358)

**282. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State**

Athens, October 25, 1958, 6 p.m.

1060. Embtel 1040.<sup>1</sup>

1. Permanent Under-Secretary of Foreign Office asked me to call urgently this afternoon to communicate following at request of Foreign Minister re Cyprus Conference.

2. GOG has now formally decided to reject Conference on basis proposed and its NATO representative will be so instructed. Expected that Greek statement will be made next NATO meeting on October 27 or 28.

GOG has been brought to this conclusion as it is now convinced Conference is certain to fail because of UK and Turkish attitude toward Greek proposals for final solution of Cyprus problem. This is manifest from many indications including Lennox-Boyd speech<sup>2</sup> and Turk reaction to Sulzberger article in *New York Times* re outline for settlement under NATO aegis.<sup>3</sup> Skeferis said NATO would surely suffer if Conference were held and failed and GOG did not wish to put further strain on alliance ties.

3. I then reviewed situation in Paris as I understood it and pointed out flexibility seemed to exist respecting composition of conference. I emphasized Spaak draft letter<sup>4</sup> clearly provided for discussion of final solution and remarked that Greek attitude would be hard to defend amongst Allies when we seemed to be approaching conference on basis requested by GOG. Therefore it was difficult to understand Greek decision to reject conference at this point and this would in my opinion create impression of intransigence. Skeferis contented himself in replying that failure of conference, which was now certain, would be worse. In thanking US for its efforts, he hoped we would use our great influence in preparing NATO communiqué to prevent blame being cast on GOG for

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/10-2558. Secret; Niact. Also sent to USUN and repeated to Paris for USRO, London, Ankara, and Nicosia.

<sup>1</sup> Telegram 1040 from Athens, October 23, reported that the Greek Government was reluctant to participate in a conference on Cyprus due to its fear that it would be forced to accept British proposals for the island's future while any discussions or decisions on the ultimate fate of Cyprus would be avoided. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/10-2358)

<sup>2</sup> In a speech at Blackpool on October 9, the Colonial Secretary referred to Cyprus as "an offshore island of Turkey."

<sup>3</sup> *The New York Times*, October 22, 1958.

<sup>4</sup> The revised terms of reference proposed by Spaak on September 30 were to be sent in a letter to governments participating in the proposed conference on Cyprus.

breakdown of negotiations. He recalled that situation in Greece re attitude toward NATO had much improved in recent weeks and GOG was desirous of preventing any recrudescence of anti-NATO feeling. I [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] replied I would convey his remarks to Department, expressing hope simultaneously alliance would not be subjected to further strains as result of this decision.

[1 paragraph (3-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

Riddleberger

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**283. Message From Prime Minister Macmillan to President Eisenhower**

London, October 27, 1958.

DEAR FRIEND: I am afraid that the Greeks have been very weak about Cyprus. As I understand it, there was a very close vote in the Greek Cabinet<sup>1</sup> and they were finally swung against the idea of an immediate conference by the opposition of Makarios. The Archbishop in his turn had been frightened by the extremists who had attacked his recent utterances.<sup>2</sup>

All this is very regrettable, but the Foreign Secretary and I were luckily able to see Spaak today, as he had an engagement to make a speech in this country. We discussed the whole question with him very frankly and we agreed that the right course was to let the Greeks simmer for a period. In their hearts, most of the Greek Government realise that their attitude is indefensible; if we run after them now it will only consolidate them; but if we do nothing, their self-doubting will take effect. All I think that we should do is to make it quite clear that nothing on our part has prevented the conference.

Accordingly I propose in my speech on the opening of the new session of Parliament tomorrow to give a paraphrase of the Spaak propos-

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series. Secret. Enclosure to a letter from Hood to Eisenhower, October 27.

<sup>1</sup>On October 24.

<sup>2</sup>Makarios formally rejected proposals for an international conference on October 26. The Archbishop had been under pressure from Grivas and from hard line clerics on Cyprus, who favored enosis, since his proposal of September 28 for an independent Cypriot state.

als which will show that we were prepared for a frank discussion of the Cyprus question including possible long-term solutions.<sup>3</sup> I think that on Wednesday Spaak will arrange for publication of the basic document and of his covering letter.<sup>4</sup> This will at least ensure that the Greeks cannot re-open everything again when the time comes for them to decide that they would like a conference after all.

Although all this is disappointing, I am not unduly depressed. We have, after all, made great progress in the last few months and the Greeks have at least dropped all their talk about leaving N.A.T.O. The Greek Government is fundamentally weak and, at the moment, over-influenced by Makarios; we shall try to bring them along slowly. I am sure that you will help in this.

With warm regards,

As always,

Harold<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>For text of Macmillan's October 30 speech, see House of Commons, *Parliamentary Debates*, 5th Series, vol. 594, cols. 37-48.

<sup>4</sup>The documentation was subsequently published as *Discussions of Cyprus in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, Cmd. 566, October 1958.

<sup>5</sup>Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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## 284. Editorial Note

The North Atlantic Council met on October 29 for further discussions on Cyprus. The Greek Permanent Representative announced that his government would not participate in a NATO-sponsored conference on Cyprus. The Council members agreed to the declassification of documentation relating to the efforts of NAC to convene a conference on Cyprus in order that it could be released for the information of their respective parliamentary bodies. Polto 1154, October 29, reported on the meeting. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/10-2958) For text of the Greek Government's statement, see *The Cyprus Question*, pages 14-17.



**285. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom**

Washington, October 31, 1958.

4337. Deptel Presidential Handling 4231. Deliver following message to Prime Minister Macmillan from President. Confirm date and time delivery.

“October 31, 1958

Dear Harold:

Thank you for your message of October twenty-seventh<sup>1</sup> about the setback to the effort to get a conference about Cyprus under way.

I can readily understand your disappointment at the sudden decision of the Greek Government not to participate in a conference, especially in light of the long and painstaking discussions in the North Atlantic Council and the considerable efforts at compromise which your Government has made in the course of these discussions. We too were greatly disappointed by the Greek Government's decision, and we have made our disappointment known to the Greeks.<sup>2</sup>

We share your belief that there is probably little advantage to be gained in pressing the Greeks further at this time to attend a conference, and we also share your hope that a conference may yet be possible. In spite of our disappointment with the Greeks, we believe that it is very important to keep open the door to further NATO talks on Cyprus. To this end we hope that it will be possible to avoid any action by NATO which could create the impression that NATO is opposed to Greece on this issue. Within recent weeks, we have noticed a healthier and less suspicious attitude on the part of the Greek Government toward the idea of NATO consultation with regard to Cyprus. This new attitude should, in our opinion, be encouraged, since it holds forth the possibility of eventual further productive talks under the aegis of NATO.

I admire your refusal to be disheartened by recent Cyprus developments and your determination to continue to work toward a settlement of this vastly difficult problem. For our part, we always shall be ready to help whenever and however we appropriately can.

With warm regard,

As ever, Ike”

Observe Presidential Handling.

**Dulles**

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/10-3158. Secret; Presidential Handling.

<sup>1</sup> Document 283.

<sup>2</sup> Assistant Secretary of State Rountree expressed U.S. disappointment during an October 27 meeting with the Greek Ambassador. A memorandum of this conversation is in Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/10-2758.

## NOVEMBER–DECEMBER 1958: DISCUSSIONS AT THE UNITED NATIONS

### 286. Letter From the Representative to the United Nations (Lodge) to Secretary of State Dulles

New York, November 3, 1958.

DEAR FOSTER: Queen Frederika of Greece made an urgent plea to me for the United States to adopt a hands off attitude on the Cyprus question—if it should come into the United Nations.<sup>1</sup> She said “hands off” meant not only a public attitude but also not working in the background because the background work always got reported in Greece.

She said that the only strong politician in Greece today was Karamanlis and that if the United States got identified with being on the “wrong side” of the Cyprus question, his government would fall and then there would be only the King and the Queen to stand up for the alliance with the west.

This makes me think once again of the idea which we discussed driving into New York the other day, that is, that we adopt the same attitude on Cyprus and Algeria as we adopted on the Western New Guinea question—the attitude of total abstention. If we should adopt this attitude in the case of Cyprus, it would make it easier for us to adopt it in the case of Algeria and vice versa. The fact that the French themselves are abstaining on the Algerian question seems to me to afford some justification for our doing the same. It really should please them. It seems to me that under no circumstances can we become active lobbyists for any side in this question.

Looking back over the last six years, I think we have really come out as well as could be expected on the Western New Guinea question, and I do not think this is the case as regards Cyprus and Algeria.

It is really quite a step and I am still not sure, but my thinking is trending more and more that way.

I suggest that this letter be very closely held in view of the fact that it reports a conversation with Queen Frederika.

Faithfully yours,

**Cabot L.**

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/11–358. Secret.

<sup>1</sup> Queen Frederika of Greece visited the United States October 21–December 14.

## 287. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

Athens, November 10, 1958, 2 p.m.

1170. 1. Before departing for Bonn with Prime Minister,<sup>1</sup> Averoff asked me to call to discuss where we stood on Cyprus. He reviewed reasons which had led GOG to refuse conference citing as primary cause UK and Turk determination to discuss modified Macmillan plan and little else. He held it to be self-evident from tenor of NATO discussions and from Zorlu and Lennox-Boyd declarations<sup>2</sup> there could be no serious consideration of definitive solution and of GOG–Makarios proposal<sup>3</sup> for guaranteed independence. In these circumstances conference could only fail which would be worse for NATO prestige than refusal of conference. I countered by citing the various texts on which agreement had almost been reached and underlined that whatever mental reservations might exist respecting possibility of definitive solution in near future, nonetheless UK and Turkey had accepted principles of discussion. I said that we were disappointed at failure to agree on conference and continued by expounding policy outlined in Depcirtel 531.<sup>4</sup>

2. Foreign Minister replied he did not agree with us gap had been narrowed, basically because GOT had not moved one step from partition while GOG and Makarios had come forward with important concession of guaranteed independence which could make settlement possible. Behind all procedural debate in Paris was to be observed GOT determination to uphold partition as only solution and this attitude was in effect supported by UK. Therefore gap had not been narrowed on substance and conference in these conditions was certain to fail. During summer GOG had followed counsel of its friends, Spaak had come up with reasonable proposal<sup>5</sup> which GOG could accept, but UK had gone ahead with modified Macmillan plan as if Spaak proposal had never existed. Furthermore, UK was now proceeding to apply plan and Turks,

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/11–1058. Secret. Transmitted in two sections. Repeated to Ankara, London, Paris for USRO, Nicosia, and USUN.

<sup>1</sup> Karamanlis and Averoff visited Bonn November 10–14.

<sup>2</sup> During his October 9 speech at Blackpool, Lennox-Boyd reiterated that the British Government would implement its proposals of June 19 and August 15 in Cyprus. The Zorlu declaration is apparently a reference to an October 22 Turkish Government denial that it had abandoned partition as an objective for Cyprus.

<sup>3</sup> Makarios' September 28 proposal called for a period of self-government under British rule followed by independence for Cyprus.

<sup>4</sup> Circular telegram 531, October 30, reported the Department's view that discussions within the North Atlantic Council on Cyprus had helped to promote a solution to the crisis. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/10–3058)

<sup>5</sup> Reference is to Spaak's July initiatives; see Document 249.

in spite of their agreement with us, had now appointed governmental representative who was not Consul-General.<sup>6</sup> UK had refused time to discuss modified Macmillan plan although Spaak proposals were pending and it was clear from Paris discussions it had no intention of deferring application of plan. All this had been accepted with [*without?*] demur by NATO.

3. Therefore, said Averoff, GOG was compelled once more to go to UN where he would support guaranteed independence proposal. He hoped we would once more examine it carefully. He said he had informed Turkish Embassy if this could be eventually accepted GOG would be happy to see guarantees inserted in Cypriot constitution that proportionate number ministers would be granted to Turk Cypriots. This would be in addition to minority guarantees which GOG had always been ready to accept. Turk minority would therefore be assured of participation in government of island, including proportionate number of deputies. He would ask USG once more to review list of guarantees which GOG would accept: Participation of Turk minority in government; British bases; NATO bases; minority guarantees for freedom of religion, et cetera; guarantees against eventual enosis. He was convinced that if we would actively support such a program the solution on basis of guaranteed independence could be found.

4. Turning to UN debate, Averoff expressed optimism that if US maintained real neutrality, including neutrality "in the corridors" and particularly with LA delegations, GOG had chance of obtaining two-thirds for guaranteed independence. It doubted if it could do it without real neutrality by US. If we could not give active support, he expressed fervent hope that we would grant benevolent neutrality. I said I did not know as yet what our position would be but I assumed it would depend upon form of resolutions offered.

5. Averoff then said it should not be overlooked that if there were no progress on independence proposal it might not remain valid indefinitely and Archbishop might revert to self-determination and on other hand, if progress were made in UN, he implied Greece might come to NATO conference which would then have principle of independence endorsed by GA. (I find this highly speculative but am not informed of UN sentiment on guaranteed independence.)

6. In short conversation with Prime Minister at recent reception he likewise pleaded for our support for guaranteed independence proposal and requested that we draw up some sort of compromise if this idea did not appeal to us. Otherwise situation in Cyprus and Greece would continue to worsen.

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<sup>6</sup> Apparent reference to the appointment of Isin as Turkish representative on Cyprus.

7. From Ankara's 1343<sup>7</sup> assume Averoff is correct when he states GOT has not departed from partition. It always seemed realistic that London's 1770 of September 27<sup>8</sup> represented fundamental UK position in spite of what was said in Paris during discussion of conference. If these two assessments are accurate then success of conference was indeed problematical. When I left Washington in February partition was not favorably regarded but I gathered it was felt Turks were entitled to more than paper guarantees. Proposal of Turkish base was rejected by GOG. British hope of early this year that after one more big explosion EOKA would be brought under control has not come to pass. Postulate of modified Macmillan plan is idea of Anglo-Greek-Turk cooperation but GOG has rejected it and GOT accepted with stipulation it was consistent with partition (to which GOG is strongly opposed). Therefore any hope UK plan can be integrally applied has disappeared. In meantime, Makarios has moved from enosis to guaranteed independence and is supported by GOG.

8. This analysis brings me to conclusion that Cyprus will continue a running sore and will cause continued disruption of defense arrangements in eastern Mediterranean unless beginning is made on some compromise. If we believe neither enosis nor partition will be accepted and if pacification of island is unlikely in near future, it is logical to conclude some form of independence with reinforced guarantees to Turk minority and base rights for NATO offers only immediate possibility of progress. This of course is based on promise that UK intends to give up Cyprus as colony in foreseeable future. If this intention does not exist, which is opinion of many Greeks, obviously guaranteed independence is fantasy.

9. [9-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] believe we should have no illusions we are advancing toward solution on basis modified Macmillan plan. One glance at situation on Cyprus should dispel any such hope.

10. In these circumstances, if cannot support at this time any of basic solutions (enosis, partition, independence or continued colonial status) suggest that we revert to complete neutrality until such time when the three parties involved realized the senseless quarrel is not worth endangering their defense and disrupting military planning and aid programs. This will make it more difficult in Greece, as UK and Tur-

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<sup>7</sup>Telegram 1343 from Athens, October 31, warned that the Turkish Government had not ruled out a solution to Cyprus by partition. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/10-3158)

<sup>8</sup>Telegram 1770 from London reported that the British Government would not yield to Greek "pressure tactics" because it feared that an agreement based on Greek demands would lead to troubles in Cyprus and with the Turkish Government. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/9-2758)

key are more satisfied with status quo, but may [have] long-term advantage of instilling more realism into Greek policy which continues to cherish hope we shall eventually support it on moral basis of colonial liberation.

Riddleberger

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## 288. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, November 11, 1958.

### SUBJECT

Cyprus

### PARTICIPANTS

Lord Hood, Minister, British Embassy

Mr. Charles Wiggin, First Secretary, British Embassy

IO—Mr. Francis O. Wilcox

EUR—Mr. Dale

GTI—Mr. Jones

GTI—Mr. Blood

UNP—Mr. Sisco

UNP—Mr. Newlin

Lord Hood and Mr. Wiggin called at Lord Hood's request. Lord Hood referred to a personal note of November 9 from Ambassador Caccia to the Under Secretary which transmitted, inter alia, a request from Mr. Selwyn Lloyd that the US and the UK delegations in New York collaborate closely on the Cyprus item at the current session of the General Assembly.<sup>1</sup> Lord Hood said that Sir Pierson Dixon on November 10 had shown two texts of a prospective British resolution<sup>2</sup> to USUN in New York and he assumed Mr. Wilcox had seen them. The UK very much

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/11-1158. Confidential. Drafted by Newlin and initialed by Wilcox.

<sup>1</sup> Lloyd wanted the two delegations to "collaborate over Cyprus. If they do, he still hopes that it may be possible to restore the position to what it was before the NATO discussions broke down and if so, to get a worthwhile conference. But things could go badly wrong unless our delegations work together, not necessarily openly, but in fact." Caccia's note is in Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Cyprus.

<sup>2</sup> Texts of the British draft resolution were sent to the Department of State in Delga 394 from USUN, November 10. (Department of State, Central Files, 320.11/11-1058)

hoped the US would be able to cosponsor a British resolution. While the UK felt that its record on Cyprus was a good one and, consequently, did not fear a debate on the subject, the British Government hoped that UN consideration of Cyprus would make possible a resumption of discussions in NAC looking forward to a conference among the interested parties. Mr. Wilcox said that this was a good objective. The UK hoped, Lord Hood said, that the present session of the General Assembly would make it plain to the Greeks that appeals to the UN would not strengthen their case.

Mr. Wilcox speculated that the Greeks themselves might contemplate a resumption of the NAC discussions should the Assembly fail to adopt a resolution endorsing guaranteed independence. Mr. Wiggin said he thought the Greeks hoped to get the Assembly to adopt a resolution endorsing a substantive position favorable to Greece, i.e., self-determination or guaranteed independence. Such a development would seriously handicap additional efforts by NAC to arrange a conference. Mr. Wilcox said that a Greek resolution calling for guaranteed independence with both partition and enosis excluded might come close to commanding a two-thirds majority.

“That depends on the United States”, Mr. Wiggin replied.

Mr. Wilcox said that he thought a resumption of the NAC discussions was a reasonable objective. However, even though the US sympathized with the UK substantive position, cosponsorship of one of the UK draft resolutions, the texts of which he had seen, would raise certain problems. In the report he had received from New York, even Sir Pierson Dixon had indicated that the first UK draft resolution went quite far in endorsing the UK substantive position. What may happen, and this was not a suggestion Mr. Wilcox said, was that an extreme UK resolution might balance an extreme Greek resolution and a compromise resolution calling for resumed discussions under the aegis of NATO would develop. The US and UK delegations ought to discuss this possibility.

Lord Hood observed that even if two extreme resolutions were introduced such as Mr. Wilcox mentioned, the US might still have to lobby to prevent the adoption of a resolution calling for guaranteed independence. On the other hand, if a resolution calling for resumed discussions was desired, Mr. Wilcox said, it might be better for the US to stay in the background and play a conciliatory role. Mr. Wiggin observed that the US's conciliatory role “didn't come off” last year.<sup>3</sup>

The Greeks might also welcome a resolution calling for resumed discussions, Mr. Wilcox thought. According to Mr. Wiggin, Archbishop

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is to U.S. participation in the formulation of a resolution on Cyprus at the 12th U.N. General Assembly.

Makarios had denied this was a Greek goal. Mr. Wilcox then referred to a statement made by a member of the UK delegation in New York that the Greek Government, having been forced by Makarios to refuse to participate in a conference, might welcome a resolution by the General Assembly calling for a resumption of the NAC talks. Mr. Jones said that he thought such a theory was too optimistic.

Lord Hood said that since the Department had the prospective texts of a UK draft resolution, he would not spend time on them. He wished to request the wholehearted support of the US for the UK concerning Cyprus and hoped that the Department would consider cosponsoring a British resolution. Of utmost importance, was concerted action in New York between our respective delegations to develop tactics capable of yielding the best possible results.

Mr. Wilcox then summarized USUN's report of Sir Pierson Dixon's representation in New York.<sup>4</sup> He said that USUN felt that the Assembly was unlikely to endorse either of the draft texts since they went too far in the direction of endorsing the British position. Lord Hood said that he hoped that detailed discussions between the two delegations would continue in New York.

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<sup>4</sup> Reported in Delga 393 from USUN, November 10. (Department of State, Central Files, 320.11/11-1058)

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## 289. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State

Ankara, November 14, 1958, noon.

1470. At present stage Cyprus issue, Embassy at loss suggest any better tactics for handling problem than that Britain continue implement UK plan and attempt restrict EOKA terrorists. As expressed by Nicosia (Nicosia telegram 245),<sup>1</sup> Embassy also believes failure of British show

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/11-1458. Secret. Repeated to Athens, London, Paris for USRO, Istanbul, Izmir, and Iskenderun.

<sup>1</sup> Telegram 245 from Nicosia, November 12, reported that the British authorities had put off application of stringent security measures on Cyprus in view of the lower-than-expected level of EOKA violence but that they would act with determination if EOKA escalated its violence. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/11-1258)



determination continue carry out UK plan would incur grave risk of creating new "Palestine" situation on Cyprus, which would be more dangerous to US policies than present period of tension. Embassy may be suffering from "localitis", but only constructive new measure seen possible would be for British find some means bring forcefully home to Makarios appreciation hardships of Greeks on Cyprus and their reportedly increasing desire for early settlement (Nicosia telegram 209).<sup>2</sup>

GOT has not yet revealed its views on how it plans handle forthcoming UNGA debates re Cyprus (Embtel 1447).<sup>3</sup> Embassy believes Foreign Minister Zorlu would be satisfied with resolution worded along lines 11th UNGA resolution calling for conference of "interested parties".<sup>4</sup>

As indicated by local press resuming practice headline government statements re Cyprus and arrival Kuchuk to Ankara (Embtel 1460),<sup>5</sup> GOT may be moving toward new build-up local excitement re Cyprus in preparation of UNGA debates. Embassy therefore supports Nicosia recommendation (Nicosia telegram 246)<sup>6</sup> that Department have facts on voting record and texts US statements as well as text final resolution be sent interested posts by Priority if not Niact telegram.

Foreseeing that Greece will make major push at UNGA for concept "independence" (Athens telegram 1170),<sup>7</sup> Embassy wishes restate that basic factor determining Turkish position is need for security of Anatolia with protection Turkish community on Cyprus being given second consideration. "Independence", which provides only "paper" guarantees security Anatolia would not be acceptable GOT. GOT agreed support present UK plan because (1) it committed UK remain on island for at least seven years more, (2) through position of Turkish Government representative GOT obtained foothold on island and (3) HMG agreed to reiteration Lennox-Boyd statement December 19, 1956. Publicly GOT still firmly wedded to thesis "partition"; this thesis continues contain flexibility at least to extent not preventing GOT from agreeing support UK plan. Embassy unable envisage how Greek Government could embellish "independence" so that it would become harmonious with "partition" but was encouraged by Averoff's reported approach to Turkish Embassy Athens with request that Turks

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<sup>2</sup> Telegram 209 from Nicosia, October 14, reported that Makarios was searching for a compromise solution to the Cyprus issue. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/10-1458)

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 1447 from Ankara, November 12, reported that Zorlu had not been willing to discuss the Cyprus issue. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/11-1258)

<sup>4</sup> For text of this February 26, 1957, resolution, see U.N. doc. A/C. 1/L.172 (XI).

<sup>5</sup> Dated November 13. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/11-1358)

<sup>6</sup> Dated November 12. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/11-1248)

<sup>7</sup> Document 287.

re-examine concept of independence (Athens telegram 1170 paragraph 3). If possible Embassy feels USG should encourage more such direct Turkish-Greek talks.

Except for continued support of British efforts implement UK plan and for encouraging Greeks and Turks get together directly (Athens telegram 1170), Embassy feels it impossible map out next step in USG policy in UNGA until after Greeks-British-Turks expose their plans, possibly in UN debate.

Hall

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## 290. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

Athens, November 15, 1958, 9 p.m.

1212. 1. Had opportunity for short conversation with Foreign Minister before he departed New York today. Averoff renewed his plea for support by US of guaranteed independence arguing that it represents middle position between enosis and partition, is something that US can support as consistent with its overall policy, and will eventually help British with Turks as UK can argue it cannot hold out indefinitely for partition if consensus in UN favors independence. If we cannot actively support, Foreign Minister asked again for completely neutral position so that it can present case without American opposition, public or private.

2. Obviously encouraged by political discussions at Bonn<sup>1</sup> including Chancellor's attitude, Averoff said he planned to adopt moderate approach in UN unless forced by Zorlu to reply sharply. If even some sort of vague formula for guaranteed independence emerged from UNGA debate, GOG anticipates renewed discussions in NATO at December meeting of Ministers.<sup>2</sup> This cannot be said publicly now but it represents GOG attitude if it can emerge from UNGA discussions with

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/11-1558. Secret. Repeated to London, Paris for USRO, Ankara, Nicosia, and USUN.

<sup>1</sup> See footnote 1, Document 287.

<sup>2</sup> Scheduled for December 16-18 in Paris.

some progress toward guaranteed independence even if date for independence were not fixed.<sup>3</sup>

3. Averoff said both Makarios and GOG will push hard for guaranteed independence resolution from UNGA although it is recognized in Athens that UN solution is not likely. Although he did not say so specifically, I have strong impression that Greeks will advocate principle of independence, perhaps without asking date be fixed, on general theory that Cyprus as part of Europe is developed to point where independence is justified in view of liberation of less developed areas. If they are accused that this is just a cover for enosis, they will invite UN to stipulate guarantees which would preserve independence and accept them. In brief, Greeks plan to convert issue into one where vote will be for or against independence with guarantees laid down by UN. As GOG now has Archbishop publicly on record for guaranteed independence, it can safely proceed along this line and it obviously expects to obtain support. As Macmillan has proclaimed his plan does not prejudice final solution and as we have publicly maintained neutral position, Greeks will certainly argue we should not oppose their position. It would be helpful for me to know our attitude as soon as possible to guide me in discussions here.<sup>4</sup>

Riddleberger

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<sup>3</sup>In telegram 1213 from Athens, November 15, Riddleberger reported: "Averoff asked me to give his personal assurance, not yet cleared with GOG, that if guaranteed independence idea is approved in principle by UNGA, even though in form of vague resolution without date of independence being fixed, recommendation will be made to Cypriots to stop violence on ground that eventual liberation from colonial rule is certain. He asked this be kept strictly secret for time being but was certain it could be done if progress is made in UN. He said if such declaration were made it would without doubt have great effect on island and would certainly aid in pacification. Department may desire inform Lodge of this possibility." (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/11-1558)

<sup>4</sup>No reply has been found.

## 291. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, November 18, 1958.

### SUBJECT

Cyprus

### PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary  
Fatin Rustu Zorlu, Foreign Minister of Turkey  
Ali S.H. Urguplu, Turkish Ambassador  
Ambassador Kural, Turkish UN GA Delegation  
Mr. Rountree, NEA  
Ambassador Warren  
Mr. Owen Jones, GTI  
Mr. Joseph Sisco, UNP

Foreign Minister Zorlu said he was here for the Cyprus debate<sup>1</sup> and he hoped the United States would support the Turkish position in the United Nations. He recalled that the General Assembly had adopted a resolution in 1957 asking the parties to negotiate.<sup>2</sup> He said this resolution had not been implemented. While the Greek Government may have been inclined to a conference, Makarios had insisted upon the United Nations being tried again.<sup>3</sup>

The Secretary said that it was unlikely that a solution could be found in the United Nations since a solution could only be achieved by talks between the parties. We do not know precisely what our position will be on the different resolutions which will be presented. He recalled that he had discussed this matter with the Greeks yesterday, who had asked for support of their resolution.<sup>4</sup> The Secretary said he had responded that the United States cannot support a resolution, the content of which we do not know. He recalled also that he had expressed the hope to the Greeks that what takes place in the United Nations should facilitate a further evolution towards a solution of the Cyprus question through direct discussion by the parties concerned.

In response to the Secretary's inquiry, Foreign Minister Zorlu said that the Turkish Government had not decided whether to submit a reso-

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/11-1858. Confidential. Drafted by Sisco.

<sup>1</sup> Scheduled to begin November 25.

<sup>2</sup> Adopted by the General Assembly on February 26, 1957. For text, see U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.172 (XI).

<sup>3</sup> Presumably a reference to press reports of the substance of Makarios' talks with Karamanlis on October 25.

<sup>4</sup> A memorandum of Dulles' November 17 conversation with Liatis is in Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/11-1758.

lution to the Assembly. He described the UK plan as a kind of truce between the parties and affirmed that it has Turkish approbation. While the Turks believe that the Macmillan plan can be improved in certain ways, nevertheless they had given their support since it was a truce which would not prejudice an ultimate solution. It placed the Cyprus question in "refrigeration", leaving open the ultimate solution. During the seven-year period called for by the Macmillan plan, spirits could quiet down and allow for greater understanding, and the spirit of cooperation could develop so that a solution could be reached. He said the Greek approach had been negative. This was somewhat surprising since the idea of a conference was initially a Greek idea. Zorlu said when everybody accepted the idea, the Greeks then decided to turn it down and go to the United Nations instead. The Greeks had also made a similar reversal in the question of partition. When the UK and the Turks had agreed to partition, the Greeks had then changed their attitude. Foreign Minister Zorlu said that if the Greeks do not find a good climate in the United Nations, this will be conducive to greater understanding. Foreign Minister Zorlu stressed that the Turks have always been in favor of the idea of the conference, and he cited the Trieste case of how quiet discussions can lead to a solution.

Foreign Minister Zorlu then explained the Turkish concept of partition. He said that without dividing the stand [*land?*] they sought a "kind of an intellectual partition"; namely that the two communities must be given the idea that neither was being governed by the other. He believed the three governments principally concerned should cooperate to this end. He did not believe it was desirable to "mix the United Nations" in this matter. In particular, the Turks felt that it would be undesirable for the United Nations to establish a committee or some sort of machinery. The Turkish attitude was to keep this matter out of the United Nations as much as possible. As to the question of observers at any conference, the Foreign Minister said the Turks had agreed to the presence of Spaak, but in general the Turks favored a conference with limited participation since negotiations could then go on without speeches and demagoguery.

The Secretary said that we do not know at this point just what the Greeks intend to propose. Mr. Rountree said the principal Greek objective was to get the United Nations to support the idea of independence. He said the Greeks would be favorably disposed to negotiations outside the United Nations but they wanted prior endorsement by the Assembly of the principle of independence so that independence would constitute the basis for negotiations.

The Secretary said it would not be very easy to defeat an independence resolution in the United Nations. Zorlu was skeptical about this and said that while an independence resolution would have some

appeal, he did not believe that independence was as popular at the United Nations as made out to be since a number of governments understood the difficulties involved with this concept as it related to Cyprus. Moreover, they would recall Averoff's past tactics at the UN General Assembly<sup>5</sup> and the different views of Makarios and Kyprianos<sup>6</sup> on independence. He expressed the view that such a Greek proposal could not pass and he feared more the possible establishment of UN machinery. The Secretary demurred, and said in his view there was much more danger of a resolution on independence being adopted by the United Nations than a resolution which would have the United Nations take over the job of solving the Cyprus question. The Secretary said that such a resolution would be supported by the Soviet bloc, countries from Africa and Asia and would find some support among the Latin Americans. Foreign Minister Zorlu said he was much more hopeful than in the past regarding the Latin American attitude.

The Secretary said that we are in accord with the general views of the Turks. We hope the results of the General Assembly debate will lead to agreement on a conference of the type Spaak has had in mind. The question is how to bring about this objective. Mr. Rountree emphasized that one of our problems was to avoid compromises in the UNGA action that might jeopardize continuing negotiations outside the United Nations framework.

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<sup>5</sup> Presumably a reference to Averoff's justification for EOKA terrorism at the 12th Session of the General Assembly. For text of the debate, see U.N. doc. A/C.1/PV. 847 (XI).

<sup>6</sup> The Bishop of Kyrenia, a supporter of enosis, had been exiled with Makarios in March 1956.

292. **Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State**

Athens, November 20, 1958, 6 p.m.

1250. 1. In interview today with Prime Minister at his request, Karamanlis made impassioned plea for US intervention now to solve Cyprus dispute. Recalling that Soviet bloc would probably support self-determination in UNGA, he expressed anxiety this strategy would eventually force GOG to alter its present policy of advocating UK and NATO bases in Cyprus unless steps were taken to reach final solution. He predicted if progress were not soon made he could not hold the line here and would be forced into more intransigent position by opposition in Parliament. He repeated well-known argument GOG had made important concessions in guaranteed independence proposal and argued this would eventually bring peace in Cyprus and help UK in dealing with Turks. He thought Greek proposal was consistent with overall US policy and appealed once more for our support.

2. In reply I took same line as Secretary with Liatis (Deptel 1504)<sup>1</sup> and attempted to persuade Prime Minister that as no solution was likely in UN we hoped action in Assembly would be conducive to solution and would be so framed as to make possible renewed negotiations. This provoked outburst from Prime Minister in which he made it clear vague resolution for renewed negotiations would not be sufficient. Unless there could be established some basis for conference such as guaranteed independence Greece would not participate. I responded by pointing out how close we had come in Paris to conference in which final solution could be discussed and how far NATO members had gone to meeting GOG requests. [8-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

**Riddleberger**

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/11–2058. Secret. Repeated to Ankara, London, Paris for USRO, Nicosia, and USUN.

<sup>1</sup> Dated November 17. (*Ibid.*, 320.11/11–1758) Dulles' comments were similar to those he expressed to Zorlu on November 18; see Document 291.

### 293. Editorial Note

At the request of the Greek Government, the Political Committee of the U.N. General Assembly discussed the Cyprus question at its meetings of November 24–December 4. Seven resolutions were introduced by different member states of the Committee. An Iranian resolution, which urged the three concerned governments to hold a conference with the additional participation, if desired, of other governments to deal with an interim and final solution for Cyprus, received the support of the United Kingdom and Turkey. It was approved by the Political Committee on December 4 by a vote of 31 to 22 with 28 abstentions. For text of this resolution, see U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.226 and Rev. 1. A resolution introduced by Colombia, which had the backing of the Greek Government, failed of adoption. For text of this resolution, see U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.255. The United States abstained in the vote on the Colombian resolution and voted for the Iranian resolution. The U.S. position on Cyprus was outlined in a statement by James W. Barco to the Political Committee on November 28. For text of the statement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 5, 1959, pages 41–42.

### 294. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, December 1, 1958.

SUBJECT

Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS

The Acting Secretary  
 Lord Hood, Minister, British Embassy  
 NEA—Mr. Owen Jones  
 EUR—Mr. William Dale  
 UNP—Mr. Joseph Sisco

Lord Hood called at his request and expressed gratification for the statement made by the United States Representative in the Political



Committee last week on the Cyprus question.<sup>1</sup> He described the situation as fluid. He focussed the principal discussion on the UK redraft of the Iranian resolution which was communicated to the Department telephonically by USUN this morning.<sup>2</sup> Lord Hood said he hoped this redraft, which he referred to as the second Iranian resolution, will carry the day. The UK is encouraging the Iranians to put it forward. Lord Hood said it represented a real compromise since the resolution makes no reference to the UK plan, no reference to the UK initiative, nor to terrorism on the island, and does not preclude any final solution. He noted in this connection the language in the third preambular paragraph: "but also a discussion of a final solution, from which no possibilities would be excluded,". Lord Hood said the UK has tried to make the resolution as acceptable as possible, and in their view, it coincides exactly with the statement made by the United States Representative in the Committee on Friday that the General Assembly should not give lead to any specific final solution but rather that the General Assembly effort should be directed towards a resumption of negotiations. Lord Hood stressed that the UK cannot go any further than this draft in compromising and that they believed Averoff might not be too unhappy with the draft and might acquiesce in it (an abstention). In this connection, Lord Hood made the following request: (a) that the United States should encourage the Iranians to submit the aforementioned draft resolution; (b) that the United States should speak to the Greeks with a view to getting their acquiescence to the resolution; (c) that the United States vote for the revised Iranian resolution; and (d) that we let it be known we intend to vote for it.

The Acting Secretary noted that this draft resolution had come a long way to leave out a specific reference to the UK 7-year plan and that it was directed towards a conference of those concerned. He inquired as to the Greek reaction to the resolution and was informed that the Greeks are probably not yet aware of the redrafted resolution since it is developing behind the scenes and has not been submitted as yet. The Acting Secretary noted that the resolution comes very close to the expression of our views in the Political Committee and that voting for this resolution would not be too difficult. However, the Acting Secretary made no commitment regarding how we would vote since, for one thing, we did not know the Greek reaction. In conclusion, the Acting Secretary said we would keep in touch with the UK.

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<sup>1</sup> Regarding Barco's November 28 statement, see Document 293.

<sup>2</sup> In Delga 577 from USUN, December 1. (Department of State, Central Files, 320.11/12-158) For texts of the Iranian resolution and the British redraft, see U.N. docs. A/C.1/L.226 and Rev. 1.

**295. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State**

Athens, December 3, 1958, 10 a.m.

1322. 1. [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] Prime Minister convoked me last night for one of those midnight meetings in Parliament building (where heavy attack was proceeding against GOG for its anti-Communist measures).<sup>1</sup> By time I could arrive Karamanlis had been compelled to retire to bed with another kidney attack and Tsatsos spoke to me in his name assisted by some telephonic conversation between Prime Minister and me.

2. General tenor of their remarks was to effect that GOG had last night received reports we would oppose redrafted Indian resolution<sup>2</sup> which presumably was submitted yesterday and they wished to urge our benevolent neutrality as a minimum. Tsatsos said Indian resolution as redrafted refers to abandonment of enosis by GOG, states effective provisions for protection of minority rights are essential, requests continued negotiations for self-government in accordance with Charter of UN, mentions cessation of violence and calls upon all to respect the integrity of Cyprus. Tsatsos said GOG feared US would vote against Indian resolution [*1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*]. I replied indeed it might and as he had probably observed from Barco statement<sup>3</sup> we had maintained position of neutrality but doubted if frame of final solution would emerge from UN debate. I maintained that to date we had shown neutrality in this context.

3. Tsatsos replied he had impression we had not advocated partition as solution and therefore could consistently support Indian resolution. I said that speaking without benefit of texts it might depend upon interpretation given to this phrase, recalling we had earlier agreed in Paris to discussion of final solution but had not taken a position on any particular solution. Tsatsos said he hoped Indian resolution was sufficiently consistent with our position to enable us not to oppose it if we could not give it active support.

4. I enquired if Makarios would agree to Indian resolution and he replied affirmatively. He added Prime Minister had asked him to state

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/12-358. Secret; Niact. Repeated to London, Paris for USRO, Ankara, Nicosia, and USUN.

<sup>1</sup> EDA, in a parliamentary interpellation, had charged that the Karamanlis government was persecuting its members, following reports that the Greek police were investigating alleged ties between EDA members and the outlawed Greek Communist Party. On December 7, 13 members of EDA were arrested and charged with espionage.

<sup>2</sup> For text of this resolution, see U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.228.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 293.

specifically that if Indian resolution were adopted it would be sufficient for GOG to resume negotiations in NATO.

5. Not having seen complete text of Indian resolution I hesitate to comment as there may be other sections which are objectionable to us. [2 lines of source text not declassified] Without wishing to belabor point made earlier, perhaps it would help if I could give GOG our opinion whether modified Macmillan plan invalidates Lennox-Boyd declaration. If it does, we could possibly eliminate Greek belief UK goes into conference committed to partition if Turks insist.<sup>4</sup>

**Riddleberger**

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<sup>4</sup> The United States decided to support the Iranian instead of the Indian resolution. At 11:20 a.m. on December 3, Herter telephoned Wilcox on the status of the Cyprus issue. According to a memorandum of their conversation, "Wilcox said he, Merchant and Rountree had met after staff and had agreed to tell NY the Iranian proposal is consistent with our statement and has merit of not raising substance in the Assembly. British wanted us to make a speech but Merchant agreed we should not but wants to tell British we are supporting proposal."

Herter then telephoned Ambassador Lodge at 11:40 a.m.: "Lodge said the policy, as he understood it, is to support the Iranian resolution and abstain on the Indian. Does not think the Turkish, British and Greek resolutions will come up for a vote. CAH agreed." Memoranda of those conversations are in Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations.

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## 296. Editorial Note

On the evening of December 4, Averoff and Zorlu conferred and agreed on a compromise resolution on Cyprus which was introduced in the General Assembly on December 5 by the Mexican Representative. This resolution reaffirmed Resolution 1013 (XI) of the 12th Session of the General Assembly and called upon the parties to "continue efforts" to reach a just settlement in accordance with the U.N. Charter. This resolution was adopted unanimously and without debate by the General Assembly on December 5. For text of the Mexican resolution, see U.N. doc. A/Res/1287 (XIII).

## DECEMBER 1958–FEBRUARY 1959: THE FINAL SETTLEMENT ON CYPRUS

### 297. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State

Paris, December 19, 1958, 9 p.m.

2295. From Thurston. In separate encounters with Greek Foreign Minister (Averoff) and Turkish Ambassador Bonn (Iksel) at NATO Ministers Meeting,<sup>1</sup> following information gleaned on present Greco-Turkish effort to achieve measures of rapprochement between themselves on Cyprus question:

Averoff said that in discussions with Turks (presumably between himself and Zorlu) attempt being made to arrive at mutually acceptable formula for an independent Cyprus. Talks only in initial stage but involve practical questions as to share of Turkish community in future government of island. In certain spheres Turks were asking "too high a price", i.e., a fifty-fifty arrangement. In Averoff's opinion, Turks motivated in their current show of friendship by three factors: (1) widespread sentiment expressed in UNGA for independence as best solution, (2) genuine concern over ME developments, and (3) desire to reach relatively favorable settlement before possible advent Labor government in UK. He concluded by stating he was not sure UK entirely happy over Greek-Turkish get together, but that he hoped US would use its influence in London and Ankara to encourage continuance of this bilateral effort.

Iksel (who until recently was Turkish Ambassador in Athens) struck note of cautious optimism in commenting on improved atmosphere between two countries. He said all depended on whether Greeks were engaging in talks with good will. He then displayed other side of coin classified by Averoff as Turkish motivation by expressing fear that Greeks may simply have in mind a stalling operation until UK elections in hope return of Labor government would turn balance their favor.

Houghton

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/12-1958. Confidential; Noforn. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia.

<sup>1</sup> December 16-18.

**298. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State**

London, December 20, 1958, 8 p.m.

3289. From Rountree. I had a good talk yesterday with Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis, and also with Tsatsos, Minister to the Prime Minister and acting Foreign Minister, and Protopadakis, Minister of Coordination. At Ambassador's dinner I had further opportunity talk with latter two, and also with ex-Prime Minister Tsaldaris, Papandreou, Canellopoulos, Venizelos. This chance meet with both government and opposition useful in giving me picture Greek situation and feelings, and I am grateful to Ambassador Riddleberger for arrangements.

First portion Karamanlis meeting devoted Middle East as he interested my impressions based on visit there. Cyprus introduced into discussion by my reference three hopeful developments of which I had just heard: Averoff-Zorlu meetings Paris,<sup>1</sup> Macmillan statement on partition,<sup>2</sup> and commutation of death sentence for Greek Cypriots.<sup>3</sup> Prime Minister seemed feel atmosphere somewhat better but both he and Tsatsos thought it wise not be too optimistic. He seemed less emotional on question than I had ever seen him, although this is relative term. All Greeks with whom I talked feel that US had let them down badly, but government seems more resigned to our position. Karamanlis made point US had warned his predecessors not to raise Cyprus question at time, had always made clear its position that it would not support Greek views on substance of solution and Greeks would not therefore claim they misled, however resentful they feel.

He said he had worked hard to make it known that "US owed Greece nothing on this question".

Economic talks were pro-forma with Greeks mentioning need for US assistance on specific projects now under discussion.

**Whitney**

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/12-2058. Confidential. Repeated to Athens and Ankara.

<sup>1</sup> They met on December 18 during the NATO Ministerial Meeting in Paris; see Document 297.

<sup>2</sup> In a December 10 statement to Parliament, Macmillan reiterated British willingness to discuss a Cyprus settlement with Greece and Turkey. For text, see House of Commons, *Parliamentary Debates*, 5th Series, vol. 597, cols. 343-347.

<sup>3</sup> On December 18 at the joint request of Averoff and Zorlu, Foot commuted the death sentences of two Greek Cypriot terrorists.

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**299. Editorial Note**

On December 24, EOKA announced a unilateral truce in its campaign of terrorism against the British authorities on Cyprus. The EOKA action was a response to the request of Archbishop Makarios to allow negotiations on the Cyprus question to proceed in an atmosphere free from violence. The British Government responded on December 30 by commuting four death sentences imposed on EOKA terrorists.

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**300. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State**

Athens, December 24, 1958, 5 p.m.

1485. 1. As Foreign Minister fell ill upon his return I was only able to see him today re Paris tripartite talks on Cyprus. He opened by remarking he had hoped not to pester the Americans after developments in UNGA where in his opinion we had abandoned our benevolent neutrality and prevented GOG from obtaining good majority for guaranteed independence, but subsequent development would certainly interest US particularly in light of Rountree's remark that US hoped to play constructive role in solution. He then gave me very much same information set forth in Paris Polto 1770 and London 3303,<sup>1</sup> emphasizing however importance Greek-Turk reconciliation at this time would have on Near Eastern situation. If agreement can be reached, Averoff thought it would have great effect on Nasser, particularly after latter's Port Said speech,<sup>2</sup> and help stem Soviet penetration in that area.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/12-2458. Secret; Limit Distribution.

<sup>1</sup> Polto 1770, December 19, reported that the Greek, Turkish, and British Foreign Ministers had held talks on Cyprus during the NATO Ministerial Meeting, and in the view of Averoff, progress toward a final solution for the island was being made. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/12-1958) Telegram 3303 from London, December 22, reported that Zorlu and Lloyd met in Paris on December 18 and that Zorlu told Lloyd that the Greek and Turkish Governments would hold talks to reach an agreed plan for Cyprus. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/12-2258)

<sup>2</sup> In a December 23 speech at Port Said, UAR President Nasser denounced Communism as a threat to Arab nationalism.

If agreement could be reached with Turks, GOG planned several manifestations of good relations including visit to Ankara. Averoff said he and Zorlu agreed provisional solution would create more problems than it solved and it was preferable to attempt final solution based upon independence. [1 line of source text not declassified] In Averoff opinion two things were now essential—speed and indication of British attitude.

2. UK Ambassador was leaving as I arrived and Foreign Minister said he did not give clear reply but asked for more details. (I talked to Allen last night who was moderately hopeful that Greeks and Turks might get together in principle but feared they would eventually haggle over details.) Averoff said he outlined progress to date but now required reply whether HMG had any objection to principles so far reached. If UK reply were favorable, Zorlu and Averoff planned to meet secretly in Switzerland in near future. Foreign Minister thought we might help by urging HMG to make speedy and favorable reply. I hope we can.<sup>3</sup>

3. When I asked about Makarios' attitude Averoff said if agreement could be reached GOG planned to publish and run the risk. After all, he remarked, Archbishop had proposed independence. Foreign Minister underlined again speed and secrecy were essential.

Reverting again to good effect of Cyprus solution on Near East situation, Averoff recommended we urge Hussein of Jordan to send message to Nasser supporting Port Said speech. He thought Nasser would reply cordially and this would have good and stabilizing effect in Jordan and Iraq.

4. Averoff added he thought Turks were sincere in their desire for settlement. Both governments now were compelled to recognize neither enosis nor partition was likely and independence was natural compromise. If HMG meant what it had previously said about necessity of Greece and Turkey coming to terms over Cyprus, now was the time to help both parties. But he repeated speed was essential.

**Riddleberger**

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<sup>3</sup>Telegram 3353 from London, December 27, reported that the British Government had responded favorably to the proposed Greek-Turkish bilateral talks on Cyprus and cautioned against any direct U.S. support for Averoff's initiatives. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/12-2758)

### 301. Message From Prime Minister Macmillan to Secretary of State Dulles

London, January 17, 1959.

You are aware in general terms of the promising development in regard to the Cyprus question which has taken place since the debate in the United Nations. Zorlu and Averoff have had direct discussions<sup>1</sup> with a view to finding a new approach to the problems of Cyprus on the basis of restoring Greek-Turkish friendship. The two Foreign Ministers explained their ideas to the Foreign Secretary in Paris a week before Christmas<sup>2</sup> and asked if Her Majesty's Government were agreeable to their continuing their discussions. From the account which they gave, it seemed clear that at that stage in their discussions no details had been settled and that they had not done more than exchange very general ideas. After the Foreign Secretary's return to London the two Foreign Ministers were informed that Her Majesty's Government welcomed their new initiative and wished them every success.

2. The general plan was that the two Foreign Ministers should discuss between themselves the internal aspects of a settlement in Cyprus, and that when they considered they had made sufficient progress there should be a round of tripartite discussions both to consider the results of their discussions on the internal aspects and to discuss the external questions such as treaties and guarantees, etc.

3. Since the meeting in Paris there have been some exchanges in Ankara through the diplomatic channel.<sup>3</sup> We have not been given the details, and have deliberately refrained from questioning, but we understand that not much progress has been made. We learned very recently that the two Foreign Ministers would be meeting in Paris on January 16 or 17.

4. My colleagues and I regard these Greek-Turkish talks as a very important development to which we should give all possible encour-

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Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Confidential. Enclosure to a letter from Caccia to Dulles, January 17. Notations on the source text read: "Handed to Secy 1/17/59 by Caccia" and "Sec saw."

<sup>1</sup> See Document 296.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 297.

<sup>3</sup> Bilateral discussions between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus began in Ankara on December 28, 1958. George Pesmatzoglou, the Greek Ambassador in Turkey, represented his government. Foreign Minister Zorlu represented Turkey. Discussions centered on Turkish demands for bases on Cyprus and detailed guarantees for the safety and rights of the Turkish Cypriot minority, including representation in the government, civil service, and internal security forces of an independent Cypriot state. The talks concluded on January 4.



agement. None of the familiar difficulties has yet been solved. But in the past any attempt to approach a solution of the Cyprus problem has come up against the inescapable fact of Greek-Turkish disagreement. If the Greeks and Turks can now work out together an agreed basis for a settlement, that would open up very different and more hopeful prospects for us.

5. In advance of any new agreement, the internal arrangements for Cyprus which we announced last June and August<sup>4</sup> have to go steadily forward. It is not possible to stand still in Cyprus. If we do not go forward, there is the risk of slipping back and losing the ground gained since last summer. The steady advance of our progressive plan seems indeed to have been an important factor in bringing about the improved attitude of both Greeks and Turks. Certain further measures fall due to be taken at this stage. There is the Surridge Commission's report<sup>5</sup> on municipal government to which you will have seen references in the press. There is also the question of enabling legislation for the preparation of electoral rolls and constituencies for the Turkish House of Representatives. If the current talks come to nothing, we must be ready to fulfil our undertaking to the Turks to hold elections this year; and there is inevitably a time-lag between publication of the electoral legislation and the elections themselves. We had therefore decided that the electoral legislation should be published on January 15. However, when we heard that the two Foreign Ministers were to meet again in Paris this weekend, we decided that it would be right to defer publication of the legislation to enable the talks in Paris to take place in the best possible atmosphere. Unless the talks show some real signs of progress, we should not be justified in delaying more than a week or so. It must be remembered that in certain towns separate Turkish Councils have actually been functioning for some months and the situation requires to be regularised. As to the electoral lists, it is hardly conceivable that any agreement between Greeks and Turks could be other than on the basis of communal autonomy.

6. We expect an unfavorable reaction from the Greeks when these next steps are taken in Cyprus, even though both these publications would only be warnings of enactments to be made later. The Greeks are still deeply suspicious of our motives and are likely to represent, and possibly even to believe, that we are deliberately sabotaging Greek-

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<sup>4</sup> Reference is to Macmillan's June 19, 1958, proposals on Cyprus and the modifications announced on August 15.

<sup>5</sup> The Surridge Commission was established by the British Government to study the possibility of creating separate municipal councils for the Greek and Turkish Cypriot populations as a part of the Macmillan program for self-government. The Commission's report recommended both the establishment of such separate councils and prompt elections to fill them.

Turkish rapprochement. It is tragic that the Greeks should completely misunderstand our position in this way. Nothing indeed could please us more than Greek-Turkish agreement on those problems which have vexed us for so long. I hope that if the need arises you will once again help us by using your great influence to convince the Greeks of our sincerity and to disabuse them of any misunderstanding. We are of course saying nothing to the Greeks for the time being about the publication of the electoral bill and the municipal report, but there has already been some speculation in the press.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup>Printed from an unsigned copy.

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**302. Letter From Secretary of State Dulles to Prime Minister  
Macmillan**

Washington, January 21, 1959.

DEAR HAROLD: I very much appreciated your message which Harold Caccia delivered to me on January 17,<sup>1</sup> outlining the encouraging developments which have taken place with respect to Cyprus since the United Nations debate and the further steps which your Government may decide to take in proceeding with the arrangements envisaged under the interim plan.

We too have been heartened to see the Greeks and Turks at last sitting down with each other and trying to reach a basis of agreement. I can understand the difficult decisions which you have to make in balancing the possible gains to be achieved from uninterrupted Greek-Turkish talks against the obligation you feel, in the absence of any foreseeable agreement, to continue with the interim plan.

I doubt that the Greeks and Turks would be able to achieve an agreement sufficiently broad to warrant expanded talks with your Government without lengthy bargaining and a number of ups and downs. Misunderstandings and doubts are bound to arise, but they need not

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Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Confidential. A notation on the source text reads: "Secretary handed letter to Ambassador Caccia 1/21/59."

<sup>1</sup>Document 301.

prove fatal if the will to achieve a settlement is strong enough. We are, of course, willing, when and where we appropriately can, to encourage mutual good will and confidence among the interested parties, as well as an understanding of the difficulties which each of you faces in arriving at an agreed solution.

Faithfully yours,

Foster<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

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### 303. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State

Paris, January 23, 1959, 8 p.m.

2712. Nofofn from Thurston. On very confidential basis Melas gave me brief fill in last night on latest Zorlu–Averoff talks here.<sup>1</sup> He described atmosphere as good, even encouraging, and said substance related to internal government of an independent Cyprus as well as its international status. On internal side agreement reached in principle on application of two to one ratio for Greek-Turkish representation in various governing bodies, including central legislature. Re internal security forces, however, Turks were pressing for 50–50 arrangement. Melas opined that the two Foreign Ministers were getting into rather abstract and hypothetical realm in discussing an elaborate police organization designed to provide top jobs sufficient to satisfy the amour-propre of the two communities rather than to perform its functions efficiently. Melas also referred somewhat vaguely to the former mixed tribunals in Egypt as a model for the Cypriot judiciary.

Stickiest part of discussion appeared to be that relating to international status of Cyprus with Zorlu taking line that Cyprus should not be eligible in its own right for membership in international organizations and that Greece, Turkey and perhaps UK as well would have right to

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/1–2359. Secret; Limit Distribution; Nofofn. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, London, and Nicosia.

<sup>1</sup>January 18–20.

exercise veto on this subject. Melas thought exclusion of an independent Cyprus from UN would be hard pill to swallow.

I gathered impression from Melas that Zorlu and Averoff parted amicably with intention to continue discussions, though manner in which talks will be pursued not stated. Melas seemed rather uneasy about underlying attitude UK on this Greek-Turkish effort though he acknowledged that present official UK line was quite satisfactory.

Please protect source.

Houghton

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#### 304. Message From Foreign Secretary Lloyd to Secretary of State Dulles

London, January 27, 1959.

Harold and I were very grateful for your understanding message about Cyprus handed to Caccia on January 21.<sup>1</sup>

As you know the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers met in Paris from January 18 to 20 and we have had a general account of their discussions.<sup>2</sup> These seem to have gone reasonably well and views were exchanged on a number of detailed points. I understand that both Ministers then decided to report back and that they are considering the possibility of a further meeting which the two Prime Ministers might also attend and that this may take place very early in February. I therefore thought it right to see the Greek Ambassador on January 26 and assure him of our sincere wish to see the talks succeed. Nothing could please us more than a firm Greek-Turkish understanding on the basis of which we could build an agreed final solution of the Cyprus problem and I do not want the Greeks to have any misconception on this score.

I also gave the Ambassador a friendly warning that in the absence of any new agreement we would be bound to go ahead with internal

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Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Secret. Enclosure to a letter from Hood to Dulles, January 27. A notation on the source text indicates the letter was received at 9:30 p.m. Another notations reads: "Sec saw."

<sup>1</sup> Document 302.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 303.

arrangements in Cyprus and that the Greek Government should not be surprised or suspicious if we soon let them know of steps in this direction. Since my talk with the Greek Ambassador my colleagues and I have decided that the Electoral Bill for a Turkish House of Representatives mentioned in Harold's message of January 17<sup>3</sup> to you should be published on January 29. As you know, we had originally proposed to publish it on January 15 but decided to defer publication in order to give the Greek-Turkish talks in Paris the best possible chance of success. The Turks wanted delay at that time but they are now in favour of publication and think that this may assist the progress of the talks. We ourselves believe that this may be so, and in any case for the reasons explained in Harold's message we feel bound to go ahead. We have, however, decided only to publish the Electoral Bill on January 29 and to delay the decision on publishing the Report on Municipal Government until we see how things go.

We are giving the Greeks twenty-four hours notice of our intention to publish and repeating our assurances of good will in success of their talks with the Turks. It will of course be made clear to them that the Bill will only be an enabling act to carry forward the principle of communal autonomy which we understand to be generally agreed by all concerned and will only make it possible for elections to be held. The timing and circumstances in which the elections would take place will of course be for separate decision.

I wanted you to have this advance warning of what we are doing and to tell you again how grateful we are for the renewed assurances of your interest and good will in your message of January 21.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Document 301.

<sup>4</sup> Printed from an unsigned copy.

305. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State

London, January 29, 1959, noon.

3929. Deptel 6852.<sup>1</sup> Foreign Office (Addis) told us January 29 Ministers decided last night to postpone publication electoral bill for Turkish Cypriot House of Representatives. Reason is that Averoff and Zorlu now scheduled to meet again February 2, and HMG wishes avoid any move which might prejudice meeting.<sup>2</sup> No new date has been set for publication of electoral bill, but Addis indicated that in absence of definite progress during next round of Averoff-Zorlu talks, HMG probably would feel it necessary to move ahead shortly with implementation of British plan.

Addis said Turks had proposed meeting between Menderes and Karamanlis, but Greeks demurred, insisting that further talks between Foreign Ministers should first take place.<sup>3</sup>

British Embassy Washington instructed inform Department of postponement.

**Barbour**

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/1-2959. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Ankara, Paris for USRO, Athens, and Nicosia.

<sup>1</sup> Telegram 6852 to London, January 28, summarized Lloyd's January 27 letter to Dulles (Document 304), and instructed the Embassy to refer to the Department any Greek request for U.S. intervention with the British Government to halt publication of an electoral bill for Cyprus. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/1-2859)

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 340 from Nicosia, January 29, reported that Averoff, on being informed of the British decision, told the British Ambassador that publication of an electoral list would force cancellation of Greek-Turkish discussions on Cyprus. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/1-2959)

<sup>3</sup> Greece and Turkey subsequently agreed on January 31 to a meeting of their Prime Ministers.

306. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

Athens, January 31, 1959, 4 p.m.

1738. Ankara pass McGhee. Reference: Nicosia 338 to Department Repeated All.<sup>1</sup>

1. Noel-Baker endeavored see me yesterday, but I was tied up with McGhee all day and unable see him. Phoned me last night from airport to ask me to pass Department importance he attaches Makarios returning Cyprus this juncture as it would make all difference in producing Cyprus settlement. Gave no indication he had seen Makarios and I did not ask. In reply merely said would inform Department his views.

2. Doubt wisdom our intervention. Feel if Greek Government felt this key to settlement it would make proposal direct to HMG or visit our help.

3. When I took McGhee to meet Averoff this morning Foreign Minister made following observations on Cyprus talks:

A. While publicly he is saying he is “neither optimistic nor pessimistic” privately he feels talks “are going well”. Have reached a large measure of agreement, and while still difficulties in way including some demands Greece cannot accept, prospects of reaching settlement soon are hopeful.

B. Feels Turks earnestly and seriously searching for settlement for three reasons:

I. They are tired of Cyprus and under domestic pressure to settle Cyprus.

II. Disturbing situation in ME, particularly Iran and Iraq, make it essential this problem be resolved so that tripartite alliance<sup>2</sup> can begin function again.

III. Turks came away from UN debate badly shaken, not so much because they failed to get their resolution through, but because they were soundly condemned in the speeches during debate and drew conclusion they do not have world opinion on their side. While he objects US stance UN debate, in retrospect feels it contributed to Turkish willingness to negotiate.

C. While talks with Turks going well—and this accounted for his hopefulness—his fear arose from what UK might do to sabotage talks. Said there are two elements in British Cabinet: Tory die-hards who are

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/1–3059. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Repeated to London, Paris for USRO, Nicosia, and Ankara.

<sup>1</sup> Telegram 338 from Nicosia, January 29, reported that Labour Party support for the British Government policy in Cyprus appeared to be waning. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/1–2959)

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to the 1954 alliance of Greece, Yugoslavia, and Turkey.

determined hold Cyprus and will use any means to torpedo talks; others consist of Ministers who are "indifferent" as to Cyprus but on whole prepared to be "helpful." He placed Macmillan in latter group. Said Zorlu agreed with him that British Government divided in this fashion and was also disturbed.

D. Said renewal of military operations in Cyprus yesterday<sup>3</sup> was sample of die-hard influence, and he could cite others. (This apparently reference to planned publication of electoral register, but he did not refer to this.) Said if EOKA reacted with a renewal of violence, it would make continuance negotiations with Turks impossible. Said since British aware of fact he will be seeing Zorlu again in few days, renewal of military operations was deliberately inspired by die-hards to upset the talks.

E. He had seen British Ambassador Allen yesterday to plead with him to persuade British Government to give him and Zorlu "ten days more." He paid tribute to Allen who had been exceedingly helpful and understanding.

F. In response to point made by McGhee on importance restoring tripartite alliance, Averoff said that as soon as agreement reached on Cyprus they contemplated immediate announcement that tripartite alliance will be restored. This will be important stabilizing factor in ME. Greek-Yugoslav relations excellent and when alliance fully restored, he thinks this will make deep impression on Nasser. Unfortunately Turk relations with Arab countries and Egypt are not good, but Greek relations are good, especially with Egypt and with alliance restored he believes there will be important benefit to West in that it will open possibilities of better understandings with Turkey. Implied he has had some encouraging discussion with Nasser on this point.<sup>4</sup>

G. Averoff gave almost no details of content of his discussion with Zorlu,<sup>5</sup> except make point that it provided for complete British sovereignty over bases.

4. In course McGhee's call on Karamanlis January 29, Prime Minister said in respect Cyprus:

A. Greek-Turkish relations had improved. Turks were showing good will, but still several points on which Turkey insisted that impossible for Greece to agree. On other hand British actions unpredictable. Had that morning heard British plan circulate electoral lists.

B. He had gone about as far as any man could go. He had given up enough and was being called a traitor in some Greek circles. Although Turkish Cypriots only 18% of population, he had agreed to let them have representation of 35% all bodies.

C. Turkey wanted military establishment but this he could not agree to. He could not understand this since Cyprus security should be safeguarded by membership in NATO and presence of NATO forces.

<sup>3</sup> On January 20, Lennox-Boyd announced that the British Army would continue its security operations in Cyprus in spite of EOKA's declaration of a cease-fire.

<sup>4</sup> Averoff met with Nasser during a July 8-9 meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United Arab Republic, Yugoslavia, and Greece at Brioni.

<sup>5</sup> Reference is to the January 18-20 meeting of the Foreign Ministers in Paris.



D. He had run grave political risks in respect of concessions on Cyprus, far more risks than Turkish got, he could concede no more, and it was now up to Turks to show courage.

5. *Eleftheria* today reports Averoff may depart for Zurich tomorrow to confer Zorlu. Papers suggest this may be followed by Menderes–Karamanlis meeting some place depending on outcome next meetings.

**Berger**

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### 307. Editorial Note

Prime Ministers Menderes and Karamanlis together with Foreign Ministers Zorlu and Averoff and their staffs met in Zurich at the Dolder Hotel February 6–11, for talks leading to a final solution of the Cyprus question. On February 11, the two governments issued a statement announcing they had reached an accord on the future of the island. The text of the proposed accord was presented to the British Government the same day. Karamanlis returned to Athens on February 11 to discuss the Cyprus agreement with Archbishop Makarios who indicated his support for the proposed accord. Makarios publicly reaffirmed his support for the agreement on February 14 and the British Government invited representatives of the Greek and Turkish Governments to a conference in London for final discussions on the proposed agreement. February 17 was set as the opening date for the conference on Cyprus. For Macmillan's account of British reaction to the proposed accord, see *Riding the Storm*, pages 692–694.

**308. Letter From President Eisenhower to Prime Minister  
Macmillan**

Washington, February 12, 1959.

DEAR HAROLD: Press reports indicate that Turkey and Greece have settled their differences over Cyprus in a spirit of friendliness and conciliation. I realize that this cannot be finalized until you have approved, but if and when you do I should like to send both Menderes and Karamanlis a congratulatory telegram. My idea is to point out to each that the solution of the problem in this fashion cannot fail to be beneficial to the strength and vigor of the whole NATO alliance. Can you let me know whether the matter has been sufficiently finalized that you believe a congratulatory message from me would be in order.<sup>1</sup>

Of course I am saying nothing here about the hard work you have done for so many long months to bring this matter to some kind of a decent solution. I cannot tell whether or not it is completely satisfactory to you, but I have so assumed because of your frequent statements to me that "Anything Turkey and Greece will mutually agree on will be acceptable to us so long as our own requirements are met."

With warm regard,

As ever,

Ike<sup>2</sup>

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, International File. No classification marking. Transmitted to London in telegram 7313, February 12. (*Ibid.*, Whitman File, International File)

<sup>1</sup> In a February 13 letter to Eisenhower, Macmillan requested the President to withhold any congratulatory messages until further word. (*Ibid.*, Staff Secretary Records, International File)

<sup>2</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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**309. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the  
Department of State**

London, February 12, 1959, 1 p.m.

4196. I had brief opportunity this morning to ask Lloyd his reaction to Greek-Turkish Cyprus agreement. He said development most

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/2-1259. Secret. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, Nicosia, and Paris for USRO.

welcome and that he felt solution of problem is “in the bag” unless “the rats get at it.” To prevent latter he felt quick action essential. [2 lines of source text not declassified] Believe he also had in mind possible reaction of his own right-wing back-benchers.

Later Gaitskell, who was also present, expressed his gratification. Lloyd said details of agreement will be made available to us earliest.

Whitney

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**310. Letter From the British Ambassador (Caccia) to Acting Secretary of State Herter**

Washington, February 16, 1959.

DEAR MR. ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE: The Foreign Secretary has asked me to give you personally and in the strictest confidence the following account of latest developments and prospects on Cyprus.

Averoff and Zorlu arrived in London on Wednesday<sup>1</sup> bringing with them the documents approved and initialed by their Prime Ministers at Zurich. Briefly, these comprise the essential articles of a constitution for a Republic of Cyprus, together with a draft Treaty of Alliance between Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, and a draft Treaty of Guarantee to which the United Kingdom would be a party as well as the other three.

The constitution is of the “presidential” type and provides for a Greek Cypriot President and Turkish Cypriot Vice-President who, among other things, would both have a right of absolute veto over legislation on foreign affairs, defence and security, and a suspensory power over other legislation. There would be a single House of Representatives (with 70 percent of its members Greek Cypriots and 30 percent Turkish Cypriots) and a communal House for each community. There would be separate Turkish municipalities in the five main towns, but this provision would be reviewed within four years. Cyprus would have an army of 2,000 men and, in addition, security forces (gendarmérie and police) of 2,000 men. A balance between the two communities would be

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Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Personal and Secret. Initialed by Herter. Secretary Dulles was on medical leave beginning February 9.

<sup>1</sup>February 11.

preserved throughout, normally in proportion 70:30, but 60:40 in the army. These are the broad lines of a document which goes into considerable detail.

The Treaty of Alliance binds Greece, Turkey and Cyprus to protect the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic. For this purpose there will be a tripartite headquarters in Cyprus including 950 Greek officers and men and 650 Turkish officers and men, whose duties will include supervising the training of the Cypriot army. The command of the headquarters would rotate annually between a Greek, Turkish and Cypriot general.

The Treaty of Guarantee is aimed at preventing the partition of the island or its union with any other state and at ensuring respect for the constitution. Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom would be empowered jointly, or in an emergency separately, to act to safeguard the provisions of the Treaty.

The two Foreign Ministers have informed us that they intend to propose Cyprus as a member of N.A.T.O.

It is clear that both sides at Zurich were anxious to maintain the British connection with Cyprus and to allow for British sovereign bases on the island. They have left it to us to lay down how our requirements are to be met. We shall put forward a document for this purpose. Apart from the bases to be retained under British sovereignty (which will be confined to two relatively small areas) we shall, of course, want full use of our necessary installations elsewhere in the island and facilities such as communications for the use of our bases and installations. We also need unrestricted use of Nicosia Airport which would not be a British sovereign base. It is important to us that these requirements should be guaranteed by Greece and Turkey as well as by the new Republic. We are also concerned to ensure by agreement with Greece and Turkey that the transition to independence is orderly but also speedy, and that the interests of all categories of Cypriots and residents in Cyprus are cared for.

We are now hoping that the three Foreign Ministers can agree today, February 16, that the various documents shall be accepted as the basis of the final settlement. It is the intention that these documents shall then be endorsed by a further conference which is to convene in London tomorrow, February 17, at which Archbishop Makarios and Dr. Kutchuk, representing the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, will also be present. It is our hope that the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers will be present at the final stages of the conference, which we hope to complete in time for statements in the three Parliaments on February 19.

Provided that nothing goes wrong and that this time-table is kept, we can hope for decisions on the broad principles. There must then be a period of elaboration of the details of the agreement but we will do our best to keep this period to the minimum.<sup>2</sup>

Yours sincerely,

**Harold Caccia**

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<sup>2</sup> Herter's February 17 reply to Caccia's letter reads: "Please convey to Mr. Lloyd my very warm appreciation for his report on the present status of the Cyprus negotiations, which you transmitted in your letter of February 16. The progress achieved to date is indeed encouraging, and I share Mr. Lloyd's hope that the necessary further steps toward a settlement can be taken in accordance with the timetable he has indicated." (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204)

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### **311. Editorial Note**

The London Conference on Cyprus opened on February 17. Zorlu and Averoff represented Greece and Turkey and Archbishop Makarios and Dr. Fazil Kuchuk represented the major ethnic communities on the island. At the opening session of the conference, Foreign Secretary Lloyd announced that his government accepted the proposed Cyprus agreement subject to the retention of two military bases on the island under British sovereignty. Later that evening, an airplane carrying Prime Minister Menderes and his staff to the meeting crashed as it was landing at Gatwick Airport. Menderes and 14 other Turkish officials survived the crash, but the Prime Minister was unable to attend the conference.

On February 18, Archbishop Makarios suddenly announced that he could not support the proposed accords. Berger reported on efforts of the Greek Government to gain Makarios' support for the Zurich accords in telegram 1881 from Athens, February 18. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/2-1859) Eventually, the Greek Government succeeded in gaining Makarios' assent to the accords and the agreed texts of the Cyprus accords were initialed by Zorlu, Averoff, and Lloyd on the morning of February 19.

The agreements on Cyprus consisted of four documents: an agreement establishing the structure of the Republic of Cyprus; a treaty of guarantees among the Republic of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom; a treaty of alliance among Greece, Turkey, and the Republic of Cyprus; and a February 17 declaration by the Government of the United Kingdom of its intention to grant independence to Cyprus. For texts, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959*, pages 765–775. Macmillan's account of the negotiations is in *Riding the Storm*, pages 692–699.

**FEBRUARY 1959–JULY 1960: CONSTITUTION OF THE  
REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS; EFFORTS BY THE UNITED STATES  
TO SECURE ITS INTERESTS**

**312. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate  
General in Nicosia**

Washington, February 25, 1959, 6:35 p.m.

341. Contel 375.<sup>1</sup> In replying queries regarding future of US communication facilities in Cyprus you should avoid giving Cypriots grounds for belief question will be open for discussion between new Government of Cyprus and USG. You should seek to avoid comment but, if pressed, you may reply to such queries by saying USG expects provision for continuity of US facilities will be worked out in context detailed agreement which will give effect to documents signed in London.

FYI. We propose shortly to follow up on suggestion final para London 4378.<sup>2</sup> End FYI.

**Herter**

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 511.47C2/2–2459. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Blood. Repeated to London, Athens, and Ankara.

<sup>1</sup> Telegram 375 from Nicosia, February 24, requested guidance concerning a request by a representative of Reuters News Agency for a statement about the future of U.S. communications facilities on Cyprus. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 4378 from London, February 20, reported Foreign Office assurances that they had safeguarded U.S. interests in the agreement signed on February 19 and that these rights would extend to all agreements signed prior to the end of British administration in Cyprus. The final paragraph reported that the Foreign Office suggested consultations between the United States and United Kingdom over communications facilities prior to talks with Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/2–2059)

**313. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Nicosia**

Washington, February 25, 1959, 7:05 p.m.

342. Makarios' imminent return to Cyprus, reported in press as scheduled for this weekend, raises question as to how we can best reestablish effective working contact with Archbishop.

With this goal in mind we believe you should call on Makarios as soon after his return as you think appropriate and express deep satisfaction USG at conclusion of mutually acceptable agreement on Cyprus and our appreciation for his contribution to achievement of settlement. You should also express our particular gratification at promised restoration of peace and prosperity to Cyprus and reestablishment of friendly relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. You should wish Makarios well in his important task of providing leadership in giving practical effect to the agreements concluded in London, and express willingness and interest in meeting with him from time to time to discuss developing situation in Cyprus. In this connection if you consider it appropriate, you may specifically recall close and friendly relations between Archbishop and your predecessor.<sup>1</sup>

You may wish to apprise Cyprus Government in advance of any appointment with Makarios. You should follow call on Archbishop with similar call on Kuchuk.

**Herter**

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/2-2559. Confidential. Drafted by Blood. Repeated to London, Paris for USRO, Ankara, and Athens.

<sup>1</sup>Raymond F. Courtney, Consul in Nicosia, June 9, 1954–September 8, 1957.

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**314. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Dulles to Acting Secretary of State Herter**

Washington, February 26, 1959.

[Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/2-2659. Secret. 1 page of source text not declassified.]



**315. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State**

London, February 26, 1959, 7 p.m.

4454. Embtel 4453.<sup>1</sup> Foreign Office passed Embassy copy UK–Greece–Turkey agreed minutes re Cyprus white paper February 19<sup>2</sup> and informally made following points of interest to Department.

1. US facilities. Final clause (IV) paragraph B UK declaration (page 12 white paper) commits Cypriots to assume appropriate obligations. This considered obvious applicable provision US facilities problem. [5 lines of source text not declassified]

2. Committee in London<sup>3</sup> (paragraph 2 C of agreed measures re new arrangements in Cyprus, page 15 white paper). Foreign Office looking for premises committee, which probably will be organized at ministerial level with officials doing real work. Hopes it will meet within week.

3. Transitional committee on Cyprus (paragraph 2 B above document). Plans begun get it going, but names and details not worked out. While choice rests with Governor, he obviously will accept recommendations, and committee in fact, if not de jure, will become transitional government of island.

4. Date of independence.<sup>4</sup> Now that outside date set, Foot extremely eager get on with task and some hope he may finish ahead of time. At same time, Averoff said at conference and Foreign Office thinks it possible, UK could obtain short extension if date appears impracticable. Obviously too soon decide this question.

5. Definition of military areas (paragraph B UK declaration, page 12 white paper) not even begun, and much work to be done on this.

6. Most immediate problem is to get Makarios in and Grivas out with minimum of difficulties. Harding offer amnesty for EOKA was in effect “turn head other way,” but EOKA wants more formal acceptance

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/2–2659. Secret. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, Nicosia, and Paris for USRO.

<sup>1</sup> Telegram 4453 from London, February 26, transmitted the text of a February 19 secret protocol initiated by the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>2</sup> The minutes have not been identified. The White Paper was *The Conference on Cyprus* (London, February 1959), Cmd. 680.

<sup>3</sup> Regarding the three committees established to implement the London accords, see Document 316.

<sup>4</sup> The London accords called for the establishment of an independent Cypriot state by February 19, 1960.

of amnesty this time. Problem of face and prestige involved both sides. Makarios due on island March 1 or 2, and Foreign Office hopes inevitable celebrations won't get out of hand. It gave Greece approval for few students return for celebrations and now finds group numbers 800 and involves special ship. Foreign Office somewhat fearful Turk reaction and incidents between communities.

7. Foreign Office stressed main preoccupation at this time is maintain spirit genuine cooperation which existed at conference, without which implementation agreement next to impossible.

**Whitney**

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### **316. Editorial Note**

The Cyprus agreements were approved by the Parliaments of Greece (February 28), Turkey (March 4), and the United Kingdom (March 19). Archbishop Makarios returned to Cyprus after 3 years in exile on March 1. On March 9, EOKA leader George Grivas announced a cease-fire, and on March 17, as part of the settlement, Grivas left Cyprus and returned to Greece.

Three bodies were established to implement the London agreements on Cyprus. A Transition Committee of Greek and Turkish Cypriots was established in Nicosia to confer with British colonial officials and prepare for the transfer of administrative responsibilities on the island. This committee began work on March 3. A Joint Constitutional Committee, also based in Nicosia, was assigned the task of writing a constitution for the new republic. It comprised representatives of Greece and Turkey and of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. This committee met for the first time on March 23. A Joint Commission of Greek, Turkish, British, and Cypriot representatives met in London to prepare final treaties which would put the London agreements into effect. Its first meeting was held on April 4.

**317. Memorandum of Conversation**

Athens, March 5, 1959, 11:45 a.m.

**SUBJECT**

Cyprus; Yugoslav-Greek Talks at Rhodes

**PARTICIPANTS**

Minister of Foreign Affairs Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza

Mr. Phedon Annino Cavalierato, Chef de Cabinet

Mr. Alexander Matsas, Director, First Political Division, Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Owen T. Jones, Director, Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs, Department of State and Samuel D. Berger, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim

*Cyprus*

1. The Foreign Minister asked me to call, as this was the first time I had seen him since the Cyprus agreement. I expressed the great satisfaction of the United States with the settlement and congratulated him on this tremendous achievement, in which he had personally played so great a part.

2. He then spoke as follows about Cyprus:

a. It was, he said, a tremendous achievement, but it was not yet a settlement. It would depend upon whether it worked, and that in turn depended on the Greek and Turkish governments. For his part, he could say that the Greek government was in deadly earnest to maintain the closest cooperation with Turkey. This was an overriding necessity, in view of the dangerous Middle Eastern situation.

b. He himself was not happy about particular details of the settlement, and could not tell whether it was going to prove possible to move toward the concrete realization of self-government. This would depend in the main on Makarios. He thought Makarios was sincere and determined to make the agreement work.

c. It would also depend upon Grivas. He knew Grivas and had recently received communications from him. Grivas was not at all pleased with the settlement. However, in Grivas' last letter he had said that while he was dissatisfied he was, above all, a soldier, and he would remain silent. Mr. Averoff said "That is the best we can expect at the moment, and perhaps it will be possible to bring Grivas around. We plan to give him very high honors,<sup>1</sup> and the British have proved

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/3-659. Secret; Limited Distribution; Noform. Drafted by Berger. Enclosure to despatch 725 from Athens, March 6. The meeting was held in Averoff's office at the Greek Foreign Ministry.

<sup>1</sup>Grivas was flown by the Greek Air Force to Athens on March 17 for a public reception. He was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General (Retired) in the Greek Army and granted a pension commensurate with that rank.

understanding.” Grivas refuses to come out of his mountain hiding place until after all the men who fought with him have been released. The British were very understanding in the matter, and he hoped that all this would be accomplished very soon and that Grivas would be coming to Greece.

d. In an aside, Averoff told the following story: He said that he told Macmillan and Lennox-Boyd<sup>2</sup> that the wisest thing the British could do when Grivas leaves Cyprus is to send him out with a guard of honor at the airport. He said that Macmillan and Lennox-Boyd were at first taken aback at this suggestion, but when he explained that this single gesture would do a great deal to warm the hearts of the Greek Cypriots and the people of Greece, and restore good will toward the British, they saw the point. However, they said it was impossible to take such a dramatic step because of British public opinion. Mr. Averoff said the British gave indications that they would do something to indicate the respect in which they hold Grivas. Averoff said the British Army in Cyprus has a good deal of admiration for Grivas and from the British Army point of view, Macmillan could have gotten away with this gesture, but that he recognized it was impossible from the domestic British point of view.

e. Mr. Averoff then said in a further aside that one day he will let us have access to some of the secret files on Cyprus. They will show, he said, who shot Mrs. Cundliffe in the back and who shot the American Consul.<sup>3</sup> It was not, he could assure me, a Greek. Mrs. Cundliffe was shot because of a love affair. The Greek government knew this at the time, but could not publish it because once the woman was dead, it would have been regarded with disbelief in the emotional climate of the time. However, we would recall that the court did not find the accused guilty, and the whole thing was covered over. This whole story will be told in time, but the time is not yet. As he began to move on to other subjects, I interrupted him to ask if he could tell us the story of the shooting of the American Vice Consul. He said he was sorry he could not tell me anything more except that it was not a Greek who did it, but it was done by “those who wanted to create antagonism between the Greeks and the Americans.” He refused to be drawn out in the matter, merely saying we would be told in due course. I did not feel this was the occasion to engage in a discussion of the necessity for us to know the

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<sup>2</sup> Presumably during the London conference on Cyprus February 17–19.

<sup>3</sup> Mrs. Cundliffe, the wife of a sergeant in the 29th Field Regiment, Royal Artillery, was shot in the back by a terrorist on October 3, 1958, while leaving a store in Varosha, Cyprus. The attack came shortly after EOKA announced a terror campaign directed against all English persons on the island. John P. Wentworth, Vice Consul in Nicosia, was shot by gunmen on September 18, 1958, during a series of EOKA terrorist attacks in Nicosia.

circumstances surrounding the shooting of one of our officers, but this is a matter on which we should consider pressing at an appropriate time.

3. Averoff then said the ability to make the Cyprus settlement work also depended upon other countries. A United States gesture now would be most useful in terms of the Cypriots, and he strongly urged that we issue a statement congratulating the Cypriot people on their achievement and the prospects of independence and self-government, and indicating an American interest in the future of Cyprus, saying that the Americans seek nothing of Cyprus and ask only that they join the family of free nations.<sup>4</sup> When Mr. Matsas interrupted to suggest that the United States should indicate a willingness to offer economic help “without strings”, Mr. Averoff said he did not think that this was desirable for the purposes of this first statement. This was more in the nature of extending a hand of friendship to the Cypriot people. There had been in the papers this morning a report that the United States contemplated setting up missile bases in Cyprus. Mr. Averoff paused at that, as if to expect an answer from us, whereupon Mr. Jones and I said we knew nothing of any plans for missile bases in Cyprus, and were sure there was no truth to the report. Averoff implied in that event it would do no harm to deny the report, for there were those who were now seeking to damage the United States in the eyes of the Greeks and the Cypriots.

4. Averoff then said the following of the Russians. The Russians who usually were so skilled in exploiting any kind of situation had, in their handling of the Cyprus situation, not been very clever. Nor had they given any indication of friendship to the new Cyprus nation. They were plugging the line that the enosis had been betrayed. This was not going over in Cyprus because the people are so enthused with their new freedom that Russia appeared to them at the moment to be unfriendly. The Russian line was, however, creating something of a danger inside Greece and would have some effect on the Greek youth. In the final analysis, the future of Cyprus will depend upon what Makarios and Grivas say and do. If the local Communists come out against the settlement they will be called traitors in Cyprus but the local Communists will in the end do what Moscow tells them to. At the moment Makarios and Grivas were confronted by the large Communist controlled trade union movement. The Communists have done a good job of building the unions, representing them, and fighting for improvements, and in trade union terms are well regarded among the workers. Averoff estimates that about half the trade union members or somewhat less are Communists. The Archbishop has tried to build a new union

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<sup>4</sup> In telegram 2444 to Athens, March 12, the Department indicated that mention of U.S. satisfaction with the Cyprus settlement would be included in speeches celebrating the 10th anniversary of NATO. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/3-659)

movement, but so far has not had very much success. On the future handling of the trade unions, the Archbishop and Grivas disagree. The Archbishop is for a moderate policy of trying to wean the workers away from the Communist controlled unions into the new nationalist trade union movement. Grivas, who is vigorously anti-Communist, as everyone knows, is for a tough line and wants to take harsh and punitive measures against the Communist controlled unions and their leaders. Averoff then turned to Grivas again, saying he has indicated in his latest communication that he will return to his military career and will not take an active interest in politics, either in Greece or in Cyprus.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

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### 318. Telegram From the Consulate General in Nicosia to the Department of State

Nicosia, March 6, 1959, 4 p.m.

391. Ankara also for Jones. Deptel 342 repeated all addressees.<sup>1</sup> Carried out instructions reference telegram this morning. Archbishop expressed himself as being extremely grateful this official word from USG.

During ensuing half hour he made following points of interest:

1. Great problems both political and economic lay ahead.
2. Republic of Cyprus would need economic assistance from US and UK. Mentioned figure of 20 million dollars from US and 20 million pounds from UK for purpose of easing island over difficulties of next few years. He mentioned dangers of inflation if money not wisely used and said infusion must take place over reasonable period of time. He covered much same ground as Rossides (Contel 389)<sup>2</sup> and I replied in precisely same manner.
3. In response my mention of political problems he would face implementing London agreement, he launched on somewhat lengthy discussion his difficulties as spiritual-political leader pointing out that

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/3-659. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London, Ankara, Athens, and Paris for USRO.

<sup>1</sup> Telegram 342 to Nicosia, February 25, instructed Belcher to contact Makarios as soon as possible after his return from exile and attempt to re-establish an "effective working contact." (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/2-2559)

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 389 from Nicosia, March 5, reported that Rossides, during a March 5 conversation, cited growing unemployment and business recession in Cyprus in seeking U.S. aid. Belcher was "non-committal" about the prospect for aid and stressed the need for increased efforts to attract private investment. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/3-559)

people seem united in support of him but when it came to choice of ministers and legislators the opposite was the case. He recognized great difficulty in arriving at judicious choice of advisers and he expressed himself as being well aware of the degree of criticism leveled at most of his close associates. "God willing," he said, "I will make the right choices."

4. Expressed personal admiration for Foot and his belief that they would be able work effectively together during transition period. I said Foot had told me same thing about him last night.

5. Had heard of forthcoming Jones visit and naturally wishes opportunity present his views in person. I said visit not as pictured in press but that Mr. Jones would naturally appreciate opportunity discuss general situation.

*Comment:* As with most people meeting Archbishop for first time I was most impressed with magnetic personality and warmth of his manner. His remarks on economic assistance, which amounted to request, follow pattern set earlier by contacts among young lawyers and business people in Greek community. I was surprised that Makarios was even more frank and outspoken in his approach to this problem than Zenon Rossides had been. Believe USG must assume aid expected and our failure to assist new republic will be considered, whether justifiably or not, as amounting to dereliction of what Cypriots consider almost duty.

NSC 5718 Supplement, Paragraph 35<sup>3</sup> recognizes in principle that USG assistance may be required. Since this is case and in view, our considerable direct interests in island (FBIS monitor station, relay stations, projected VOA, Cyprus Mines Corporation) not to mention our general interest in seeing Cyprus become prosperous symbol of cooperation among Western allies, we should reach decision in principle on aid program at an early date.

Have appointment with Kuchuk Saturday and expect same request from him.<sup>4</sup>

**Belcher**

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<sup>3</sup> Reference should be to NSC 5718/1; for text, see *Foreign Relations, 1955–1957*, vol. XXIV, pp. 585–592.

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 394 from Nicosia, March 9, Belcher reported that Kuchuk had appealed for U.S. economic aid and stressed his desire to work in cooperation with the Greek Cypriot leadership. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/3–959)

**319. Telegram 5347 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom**

Washington, March 19, 1959, 6:48 p.m.

[Source: Department of State, Central Files, 511.47C4/3-1759. Secret. 1 page of source text not declassified.]

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**320. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State**

Athens, March 26, 1959, 10 p.m.

2193. Embassy telegram 2174.<sup>1</sup> In interview today on aid questions with Prime Minister separately reported,<sup>2</sup> he touched briefly on Cyprus. Underlining political risks and sacrifices which he had assumed in agreeing to settlement he repeated GOG determination to make settlement work and bespoke our influence to that end. He recalled powers given to Vice President<sup>3</sup> were most extensive and unless carefully utilized could disrupt possibilities of pacification and general acceptance by Cypriots. He was personally encouraged by attitude of GOT and he hoped to cement this progress in forthcoming visit to Ankara. However, there were some indications of Turkish Cypriot intention to make demands which would not be accepted by predominantly Greek population and he hoped we would use our great influence toward moderation. Prime Minister would not be drawn into giving anything specific but on deduction he might be referring to aid to Turkish Cypriots through GOT, I remarked I was confident US which had taken no decision on aid to Cyprus would certainly consider most

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/3-2659. Secret; Limit Distribution; Noform. Repeated to Ankara, Paris for USRO, London, and Nicosia.

<sup>1</sup> In telegram 2174 from Athens, March 24, Riddleberger reported on a March 23 conversation with Averoff in which Averoff expressed optimism over the progress of the Cyprus settlement. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/3-2459)

<sup>2</sup> Riddleberger reported on his discussion with Karamanlis in telegram 2192 from Athens, March 26. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/3-2659)

<sup>3</sup> The powers of the Vice President were outlined in the document on the basic structure of the Republic of Cyprus, signed on February 19; see Document 311.



carefully all complications of any aid problems before making decisions. I said that I was further confident that both UK and Turkey wanted to see agreements work and that with good will on all sides it could be done. Prime Minister did not mention NATO membership for Cyprus.

Riddleberger

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**321. Telegram From the Consulate General in Nicosia to the Department of State**

Nicosia, April 14, 1959, 5 p.m.

438. Joint State–USIA. Deptel 405 sent Athens Usito 234 repeated information London Usito 255 Ankara Usito 196.<sup>1</sup> Believe we should seriously consider giving Cypriots “right of first refusal” on VOA installation. We could go to Archbishop (either direct or through British) explaining we had all but signed agreement with British when London agreement reached and everything placed in abeyance; GOG was opposed but now appears possible install in Rhodes. Issue could be put clearly to Makarios pointing out value of investing substantial sum in Paphos area and of continuing annual local expenditures roughly similar to FBIS Karavas of \$350,000. If Greek Cypriots agreed to installation this would set pattern and simplify situation with regard existing facilities (Contel 437)<sup>2</sup> although latter facet need not be raised at same time.

Understand Cyprus better spot technically and several hundred miles closer to target area. “Offer” of additional U.S. investment now would be sign our interest and good will. Archbishop can only say no and we at least would have made offer to regime anxious for new investments.<sup>3</sup>

Belcher

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/4–1459. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Athens, and Ankara.

<sup>1</sup> This telegram, April 13, informed the Embassy in Athens that the USIA preferred a site on Rhodes rather than Cyprus for new VOA facilities. (*Ibid.*, 511.47C4/4–1359)

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 437 from Nicosia, April 14, Belcher reported on discussions with British officials regarding an approach to the Cypriots for discussions on retention of U.S. communications facilities on the island. (*Ibid.*, 116.1/4–1459)

<sup>3</sup> On April 15, the Department of State replied that a final choice of Cyprus had been made. (Telegram 409 to Nicosia, April 15; *ibid.*, 511.47C4/4–1559)

**322. Telegram From the Consulate General in Nicosia to the Department of State**

Nicosia, May 4, 1959, 2 p.m.

454. Question military aid to Cyprus Republic raised very informally by Governor just prior my departure for Ankara–Athens consultation. Informed Ambassador Riddleberger that Foot and military advisers favored use British equipment for new 2,000 man army. Much equipment and repair facilities already here. However, in case British equipment required payment they favored US equipment if it could be given free.

Situation now changed. Foot now tells me his advisers have reconsidered and are in favor Cyprus Army being equipped with material similar to that to be used by Greek and Turkish contingents. Since Greek and Turkish officers will be responsible for training new Cypriot Army they should be able work with familiar equipment. This would mean primarily US material of kind used by NATO forces.

Appears therefore, that when inevitable planning for new army starts, Cypriots will in all probability turn to USG for assistance in equipping force. It is estimated some 2,000,000 pounds required annually just to clothe, feed, house and pay new force. Additional equipment costs would be too burdensome for new government even if it had viable economy to back it up.

Recommend USG reach early decision in principle regarding willingness supply arms if requested but that at all costs we avoid predominantly military aid program to new nation whose attention focussed on more desirable and needed economic assistance.

**Belcher**

**323. Telegram From the Consulate General in Nicosia to the Department of State**

Nicosia, May 19, 1959, 3 p.m.

483. During course Hart<sup>1</sup> conversation with Makarios latter described his attitude towards municipalities issue<sup>2</sup> by reading excerpts from bill which he proposes present to transitional committee this week. In essence it is public position already known through press. It does not provide sine qua non of Turkish position, namely geographic partition of five main towns. Provides only for administrative division allowing Greeks to vote and pay taxes to Greek municipal council and Turks to vote and pay taxes to Turkish municipal council. When questioned regarding British bases Makarios expounded his belief that British should not insist on having populated centers in base areas. He believed they should accept his suggestion of series of enclaves connected by existing roads to which British would have unlimited access. He was fearful that inclusion of number Greek Cypriots, possible varying from 5 to 15,000 within base areas would be source of constant friction annoying both to British and to Cypriots. Such things should be avoided if possible.

When I questioned Makarios regarding failure of AKEL to join popular front organization, EDMA, and asked him what significance might be he said that when he had suggested EDMA be created shortly after he returned to island he had thought of EDMA as organization which could embrace all those factions on island who were against Communism. He had not anticipated truly united front and was glad that left wing had not joined. He believed way to beat Communists was for right wing to promote program which was as good or better than left wing. He understood that proposed program would be announced during next week or ten days. Archbishop did not mention aid program.

When we saw Kuchuk, who had the Minister of Agriculture and Acting Defense Minister<sup>3</sup> with him, we spent most of time discussing municipality issue although Kuchuk and Plumer opened meeting with plea for substantial aid program. Turks are adamant insisting on Geographic Division. They indicated they could go along with situation

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/5–1959. Secret. Repeated to London, Ankara, Athens, and Paris for USRO.

<sup>1</sup> Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Parker T. Hart visited Cyprus May 16–17 during a five-nation familiarization tour (May 9–27).

<sup>2</sup> Article 20 of the London agreement of February 19 provided for the establishment of separate Greek and Turkish municipalities in the five largest towns of Cyprus with the provision that this arrangement would be examined before the end of 4 years to evaluate its effectiveness.

<sup>3</sup> Fazil Plumer was Minister of Agriculture; Osman Orek was Minister of Defense.

whereby voting and tax payments would be to respective no matter in which area individual lived or owned property. [sic]

Significant part of discussion with Turkish leaders was theme of distrust which pervaded their statements. They do not believe in Greek good will toward them and within framework of Zurich they will attempt gain every possible advantage as insurance against future when British no longer here.

*Comment:* With regard to municipalities issue, believe Archbishop's announced policy is actually negotiation position from which he and Greeks will retreat once they find that it is impossible to sway Turks. Although many Greeks speak in the most adamant terms on supporting idea of administrative versus geographic division, more sensible and realistic leaders, such as Minister of Justice Clerides, have told me that it is impossible to visualize anything but geographic division as implied in London agreement. If they can persuade Turks to give in on question of taxes and voting they will in final analysis accept geographic division. Neither Makarios nor Minister gave indication GOG representation reported Contel 469,<sup>4</sup> but am certain Christopoulos has made position GOG clear to them.

**Belcher**

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<sup>4</sup>Telegram 469 from Nicosia, May 13, reported that the Greek Government was pressing Makarios to break the deadlock on the municipalities issue through a compromise. (Department of State, Central Files, 800.0047C/5-1359)

**324. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Nicosia**

Washington, June 6, 1959, 3:43 p.m.

477. Contels 454, 507.<sup>1</sup>

1. We would be most reluctant to become involved in direct US military assistance to Cypriot armed forces. Instead, we think Cypriots should look to Greeks and Turks as source of military equipment for their small army. It seems to us joint Greek-Turk cooperation in the provision of economic aid to Cyprus, as suggested in communiqué following Karamanlis–Menderes talks in Ankara,<sup>2</sup> might well be extended to field of military assistance. Tripartite military alliance and tripartite headquarters embracing Greek and Turkish training contingents could provide ready organizational framework through which equipment could be channeled.

2. Moreover, any US military assistance program for Cyprus would inevitably present us with problem of coordinating Cypriot requests with Greeks and Turks, and very probably, mediating among them.

3. We recognize we may be asked by Greeks and Turks to permit them to transfer to the Cypriot armed forces MAP equipment no longer required for purposes for which made available. Such transfers would require USG approval rather than bilateral agreement with Cyprus under Mutual Security Act.

4. If pressed by Foot for US views, Congen authorized reply along lines paras 1 and 2.

**Dillon**

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747.56/6–459. Secret. Drafted by Blood; cleared with the Department of Defense, International Cooperation Administration, Ellis, Rehm, McClellan, and Swihart; and approved by Rountree. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, Paris for USRO, and pouched to Rome for the Liaison Officer.

<sup>1</sup> Telegram 454 from Nicosia is printed as Document 322. Telegram 507 from Nicosia, June 4, reported that Foot had again pressed for U.S. military aid for Cyprus. Belcher told him that the United States was reluctant to be involved in arms supply. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.56/6–459)

<sup>2</sup> May 7–9.

**325. Airgram G-02 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom**

Washington, July 1, 1959, 5:39 p.m.

[Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6-1959. Confidential. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]

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**326. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State**

Athens, July 10, 1959, 7 p.m.

106. Reference: Embdes 1106, June 24, 1959.<sup>1</sup> Following telegram prepared by Berger and Horner in process when I arrived:<sup>2</sup>

1. From variety sources evidence accumulating Grivas planning possibly in few days or weeks, almost certainly in next three-six months to enter political arena. This now almost main subject local comment, rumor and gossip. Following are latest developments which have come to Embassy's attention.

2. Averoff told Berger July 8 Makarios and Grivas relations strained since London settlement now rapidly deteriorating. He believes Makarios press interview criticizing Grivas true, despite Makarios denial.<sup>3</sup> Said Makarios this week sent scorching letter to Grivas complaining of his attitude toward Cyprus matters which has infuriated Grivas. *Comment:* Rumor circulating today Grivas will declare himself publicly against Makarios within few days.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/7-1059. Secret; Limit Distribution; Noform. Repeated to Paris for USRO, London, Nicosia, and Ankara.

<sup>1</sup> Despatch 1106 from Athens reported on the possible disruptive effects on Greek politics of the entry into public life of Grivas. (*Ibid.*, 781.13/6-2459)

<sup>2</sup> On March 17, the President appointed Ellis O. Briggs as Ambassador to Greece, replacing Riddleberger who became Director of the Mutual Security Agency on March 3. Riddleberger left Athens on May 20 and Briggs arrived on July 7 and presented his credentials to King Paul on July 15.

<sup>3</sup> In an interview published in *The Washington Star*, July 5, Makarios warned that he, not Grivas, would govern Cyprus and that right-wing political organizations must abide by democratic rules.

3. Averoff also told Berger relations between Grivas and Karamanlis worsening, and Averoff saw Grivas July 8 for full discussion situation. Said his personal relations with Grivas excellent and he utilized this to advise Grivas abjure politics at this time and hold himself in reserve as possible replacement for Karamanlis should need arise. (*Comment: We have had indication from Rodopolous Speaker of House King has passed same advice to Grivas, and even gone so far as to warn Grivas Karamanlis enjoys King's confidence, and King will be forced oppose Grivas should he enter active politics at this time.*)

4. In replying to Averoff Berger said Embassy understands Grivas bitterly anti-Turk and anti-British, is critical of government's "servility and subservience to foreign powers" (i.e. US) and threatens upset Cyprus settlement. Averoff said our information correct and if Grivas held reins of power it would throw Greece into chaos and be an utter disaster. Averoff continued saying if Grivas can be kept from entering politics for another six months, Cyprus would than be on verge of independence and Grivas star would wane. However if there was blow-up in Cyprus, major government scandal, acute worsening economic situation, or should Karamanlis die or be unable carry on, or other external circumstances whole atmosphere here would change, in which circumstances Grivas would have his chance and nothing could stop him coming to power however grave consequences would be for Greece and its relations with main allies.

5. Averoff said Karamanlis concerned over Grivas emergence, but regards Grivas as political babe in arms and confident he can deal with any Grivas threat. Averoff said while he thought there was good chance of containing Grivas he was not as optimistic as Karamanlis.

6. For some considerable period GOG and Karamanlis personally have manifested unmistakable signs uneasiness over Embassy contacts with various and heterogenous opposition elements. Prospective political surfacing of Grivas has accentuated this uneasiness, and within last ten days Averoff has on two occasions spoken to Berger, and this week Rodopolous spoke separately to Berger and Horner on the dangers inherent in these contacts which anti-government elements are misusing to spread rumors that US dissatisfied with Karamanlis and not averse to change. They were assured that US thinks Greece has been well-served by Karamanlis government and that we [will] make this clear whenever the need or occasion for doing so arises.

7. As Department aware there is pronounced Greek propensity to read into words and actions of "American factor", however innocent, portents which simply do not exist. Given this tendency, [1 line of source text not declassified] potential advent of Grivas on political scene has enhanced GOG sensitivity. Embassy proposes as in past to maintain its contacts with opposition for purposes intelligence, but will reduce their

frequency. On other hand, we are more than cognizant of dangers to US policy objectives inherent in Grivas ascendancy and will be most cautious in avoiding any implication that we favor him in slightest. Our posture must be one of apparent neutrality and non-intervention. We must bear in mind however that Grivas could reach power, and we must be sufficiently flexible to be able out-step his animus if that rather unpleasant (and, at this reading, not likely) eventuality should occur.

Briggs

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**327. Telegram From the Consulate General in Nicosia to the Department of State**

Nicosia, July 25, 1959, 7 a.m.

32. Rome for Lister. Now seems apparent that Grivas-Makarios row which highlighted by Grebence article in *Express-Washington Star*<sup>1</sup> was brought into open on purpose by Makarios. Reason for so doing was existence of differences and Archbishop's conviction that it best have it out now rather than later. Makarios evidently believed he could establish his political supremacy on local scene in preparation for time when important and controversial decisions (bases, municipalities, etc.) would have to be announced. This belief supported by following facts: Foot given text by Grebence just after seeing me (Consulate telegram 2).<sup>2</sup> He raised same points I did with same answer from Makarios, observing that it contained political dynamite. Makarios said confidentially he aware of content and was prepared let it be published as written.

In continuation of trend as reported Consulate telegram 24th<sup>3</sup> there seems little doubt that Archbishop has accomplished his purpose and his position is more firmly established with increased support from

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/7-2559. Secret. Repeated to London, Ankara, Athens, Paris for USRO, and Rome.

<sup>1</sup> See footnote 3, Document 326.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 2 from Nicosia, July 1, transmitted the substance of Makarios' interview with Grebence and an assessment by Belcher that Makarios' comments about Grivas could be embarrassing to the Archbishop. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/7-159)

<sup>3</sup> Not further identified.



Ministers, EDMA and business circles. In marked change since writing my G-97, June 24,<sup>4</sup> Georgadjis and Papadopoulos now supporting Archbishop strongly. Makarios has also gained support among usually hyper-critical business community for sensible sterling area decision. Even those among EDMA Central Committee who were critical of Archbishop a month ago have apparently closed ranks behind him—not because of turning away from Grivas but from realization there is no other possible leader and further dissension in ranks would only help the Communists.

*[2 paragraphs (17-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]*

**Belcher**

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<sup>4</sup>Airgram G-97 from Athens, June 24, reported on growing divisions in the Greek Cypriot right-wing political movement. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6-2459)

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### **328. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State**

Athens, August 13, 1959, 5 p.m.

411. This is Country Team message.

1. Believe Greek plans for 950-man army contingent they are committed to supply Cyprus under agreement probably include furnishing unit with MAP equipment. We believe that such use of MAP equipment clearly in US interests, and that we should raise no objections. However, seems that among possible arrangements under which Greeks might discharge commitment, some might raise fewer problems for US than others. For example, might be desirable that unit chosen be MAP-supported national unit not among forces specifically committed to NATO. This solution would avoid problems of whether MAP equipment being diverted, of whether such diversion created further deficiencies to be filled by MAP, or whether NATO committed forces being diverted from

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.56/8-1359. Secret. Repeated to Ankara, Nicosia, and London.

proper tasks. Purpose this message to alert Washington to problem, and to inquire whether these are views which we should communicate to Greeks, before their planning has proceeded too far.

2. Closely allied subject which we believe should begin to receive consideration is problem of equipping native Cypriot force of 2,000 called for by agreement. This subject has not been raised with us by Greeks, and obviously not one on which we should take initiative. We have noted Deptel 3229<sup>1</sup> that US would be most reluctant to enter into bilateral military assistance agreement with Cyprus, and hope that needs of small Cypriot force could be met by GOG and GOT. This is obviously desirable solution, but complicated to achieve. Only, surplus material Greeks have is British, thus question of GOG supplying surplus MAP equipment to Cyprus does not arise. Adequate quantities of British equipment available in certain categories, such as rifles, Bren guns and possibly radio equipment, but vehicles and support weapons not available, and GOG will not be able to supply foreign exchange to purchase them. Moreover, there is problem of integration Greek contribution with that of Turks, who so far as known here, have no disposable British equipment.

3. Seems to us here that given above factors possible solution to problems of arming Cypriot native forces might lie in combined Greek, British, Turkish action. Greeks would supply their surplus British equipment, British supply those items Greeks do not have, Ankara may wish comment on nature of possible Turkish contribution.

4. Request advice pt. 1 for early discussion with Greeks and in event Greeks should raise pt. 2. At that time, would appreciate such guidance as Washington able provide.<sup>2</sup>

**Briggs**

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<sup>1</sup> Printed as telegram 477 to Nicosia, Document 324.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 601 to Athens, August 28, the Department instructed the Embassy to avoid raising the matter of the Greek contingent with the Greek Government and reaffirmed its reluctance to supply military equipment to Cyprus. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.56/8-1359)

**329. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom**

Washington, September 23, 1959, 11:35 a.m.

2380. Rome for Liaison Officer. Paris for USRO and USCINCEUR. Ref (a) Deptel 601 to Athens, rptd London 1965,<sup>1</sup> (b) London 1221.<sup>2</sup> (c) Nicosia 98.<sup>3</sup> Embassy requested informally raise with Foreign Office question financial and equipment support for Cypriot armed forces and endeavor ascertain British views on how problem can best be resolved.

As point of departure suggest Embassy refer informal Greek sounding re our receptivity to joint Greek-Turk démarche on possibility US support Cypriot forces (Athens 656).<sup>4</sup> Before answering Greeks we desire compare notes with British.

In explaining preliminary US views Embassy may draw upon reftel (a) less sections pertaining Greek contingent Cyprus, emphasizing our reluctance become involved in direct assistance Cypriot forces and our desire see Greeks and Turks concert their planning in this field. Tentatively we propose in reply Greeks to say (1) we do not want to become involved in matter support Cypriot armed forces, and (2) we believe appropriate course action would be for GOG to work out plans for Cypriot forces with GOT and appropriate Cypriot representatives and then discuss their plans with British.

FYI: We believe principal reason behind provision for Cypriot armed forces in Zurich Agreement was need to effect compromise solution, i.e., tripartite headquarters which would make Turkish military presence on island palatable Greeks. As practical matter, responsibility defense Cyprus will in first instance fall to British garrisons on island and secondarily to Greece and Turkey as military allies Cyprus. Internal security will presumably be job 2000-man gendarmérie and police. We would therefore find it exceedingly difficult endeavor justify military assistance to Cyprus.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9–359. Secret. Drafted by Blood. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, Paris for USRO, Rome, and Nicosia.

<sup>1</sup> See footnote 2, Document 328.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 1221 from London, September 3, endorsed the suggestion of an approach to the British on the question of arms supply for Cyprus. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9–359)

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 98 from Nicosia, September 9, reported that British officials on Cyprus were operating on the assumption that the Cypriot National Guard would be equipped similarly to the Turkish and Greek contingents on the island. (*Ibid.*, 747C.56/9–959)

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 656 from Athens, September 4, reported on discussions with Demetrios Bitsios, a senior official of the Greek Foreign Office. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/9–459)

While we see merit in idea minimizing problem of supporting Cypriot forces by reduction Cypriot troops (Nicosia 92)<sup>5</sup> and presumably proportionate reduction Greek and Turkish contingents to be sent Cyprus, we believe we should avoid discussing this idea lest we appear to encourage renegotiation London Agreements. End FYI.

Herter

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<sup>5</sup>Telegram 92 from Nicosia, September 2, reported on Turkish concern about Greek plans for training Cypriot forces and for labor policy. (*Ibid.*, 741.56347C/9-259)

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### 330. National Intelligence Estimate

NIE 32.5-59

Washington, October 6, 1959.

#### THE OUTLOOK FOR AN INDEPENDENT CYPRUS

##### The Problem

To estimate the outlook for the prospective Republic of Cyprus and the resulting implications for other interested states.

##### Conclusions

1. Cyprus is slated to become independent by February 1960, according to agreements reached early in 1959 between the UK, Greece, and Turkey, and accepted by Cypriot representatives. These agreements established a most complicated framework for the new state and left many troublesome problems to be worked out before independence is achieved. Moreover, the settlement is under virulent attack by die-hard proponents of enosis (union with Greece). However, we believe that the new republic will emerge about on schedule. (Paras. 7-18)

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Source: Department of State, INR-NIE Files. Secret. A note on the cover sheet reads in part:

"Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

"Concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on 6 October 1959." The representatives of the AEC and FBI abstained because the subject was outside their jurisdiction.

2. Independence will not eradicate serious tensions between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. The settlement is replete with provisions which will tend to perpetuate divisions between them. Though the new constitution will prohibit enosis, sentiment for union with Greece will persist not only on Cyprus but in Greece itself. The island's stability will depend in great part on whether the Greek and Turkish Governments continue to exert moderating influences on the two Cypriot communities. (Paras. 18–24, 28–29)

3. The Cypriot Communist Party is under able and disciplined leadership and has sufficient strength to create serious problems for the new state. It now controls the largest portion of organized labor and can disrupt government operations, industry, and commerce. Whether or not it is legalized, it will in fact probably control some 20 percent of the national legislature and will continue to play an important role in the municipal governments. (Paras. 25–27)

4. Cyprus' political problems are likely to be complicated by unrealistic economic expectations. Prospects for moderate economic growth during the next few years are reasonably good if Cyprus continues to receive substantial income and investment from foreign sources. Nevertheless unemployment will almost certainly increase. Moreover, known reserves of copper, the island's chief export, are limited. Cyprus will expect assistance from Greece, Turkey, the UK, and the US. The Soviet Union and Communist China would almost certainly extend aid if requested. The Bloc has indicated willingness to import substantial quantities of commodities which Cyprus has difficulty selling in world markets. (Paras. 31–39)

5. The settlement severely limits the Republic of Cyprus' room for maneuver in international affairs. Cyprus will probably become a member of the UN and will remain in the sterling bloc. It may remain in the Commonwealth, but will probably not join NATO. (Paras. 39–42)

6. The British are to retain sovereignty over two base areas, which are likely in time to become the subject of increasing Cypriot opposition. The status of US communications facilities is not under any imminent threat, though the price asked will increase. (Paras. 43–44)

[Here follows the "Discussion" section of the estimate.]

**331. Telegram From the Consulate General in Nicosia to the Department of State**

Nicosia, October 21, 1959, 6 p.m.

169. Called on Makarios Tuesday<sup>1</sup> afternoon to make oral presentation per instructions and then gave aide-mémoire to Archbishop to read.<sup>2</sup> He said there was no question but that US facilities welcome but he questioned me with regard to meaning of "existing arrangements" asking if there were any time limit on agreement with British. When I said no he asked if we paid any rent or royalty. I replied in negative explaining we paid rent for antenna rights but had bought the property on which stations stand. At this point he interjected "well, you know we will be poor and you will have to pay us something." I reiterated that at present time we did not pay any rent and that this of course was not provided for in agreement under which we had been operating. I suggested this was question which could be discussed at later date and that what we were interested in at moment was agreement in principle re recognition of existing arrangements.

In attempt divert discussion to other sources "financial aid" I emphasized need for economic survey as soon as possible so that when he as head of new government requested assistance requests could be shown to be within framework of plan drawn up by disinterested agency such as Ford Foundation, World Bank, or UN Technical Assistance Board. He agreed wholeheartedly and said he and his Ministers were in process of presenting memorandum for transmittal by British to UN requesting assistance in formulating a survey and plan. I also went into details of possibility of economic assistance from a variety of sources as suggested paragraph 7 of Department's 123.<sup>3</sup>

Makarios then suggested that at some time after his government had assumed power we should discuss details of an agreement along lines of present one but which would be formalized by his signature or

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Source: Department of State, Central Files; 747C.00/10-2159. Secret. Transmitted in two sections. Repeated to London, Ankara, and Athens.

<sup>1</sup> October 20.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 123 to Nicosia, October 9, the Department authorized Consul General Belcher to approach Makarios and Kuchuk at a time he judged best to discuss the future of U.S. communications facilities and gave instructions for presenting the U.S. position. (Department of State, Central Files, 947C.40/10-959)

<sup>3</sup> Paragraph 7 reads:

"In event Cypriot leaders attempt relate our continued use of facilities with our willingness to provide economic aid to Cyprus, Consulate General may reply along following lines:

that of Ministers of new government. Also suggested such agreement should have time limit since his "successors might not have same attitude toward US."

Archbishop then said only additional observation he wished to make was that he did not think this was appropriate subject to be taken up through London committee. He felt it should be settled here in Nicosia between himself, Doctor Kuchuk, Ministers concerned and Consul General. He said that naturally this was matter which the USG would decide for itself but for his part he was of opinion that this was an "internal" affair in which neither Greece, Turkey nor UK had a direct interest. It was a question of agreement between Cypriot leaders and US representatives and should therefore be handled here. I explained that our reasoning was based on feeling that our facilities in Cyprus would be here under an international agreement and that because of international aspects of problem London committee was place to discuss question. He reiterated earlier observations saying that approval by joint committee involved signature by HMG, Greece and Turkey and neither (particularly HMG) was concerned in problem. I said that I would report his views to the Department and would let him know in due course our reaction.

Makarios said he wished discuss subject with his Ministers and he would call me in next few days to discuss matter further. For his part he again said he was more than happy to have radio stations in Cyprus and as far as he concerned he could agree in principle to continuation of existing arrangements with caveat that sometime after new government was formed we would discuss details of these arrangements.

At this point conversation turned to other topics which are reported separately in following telegrams.<sup>4</sup>

*Comment:* I found Archbishop in jovial and friendly mood but obviously well briefed on possibilities of extracting some quid pro quo for continued operation of our radio stations. While there was no question of break in continuity upon change of sovereignty it was obvious that we would be requested go into some detail as to extent of "existing

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"USG following economic developments in Cyprus closely and with sympathetic interest. We recognize Cyprus Republic will face economic problems. At same time it will have available many potential sources of funds to assist in meeting its economic needs upon independence. Besides assistance to be offered by UK, Greece and Turkey, Republic may seek assistance from other European countries and from IBRD and IMF. US would encourage Cyprus application for membership in these organizations. Among American sources, Cyprus would be eligible for loans from Export-Import Bank and Development Loan Fund on same terms available to other countries. Should circumstances warrant, and if Cyprus meets eligibility requirements, consideration could be given to sales to Cyprus for local currency of surplus US agricultural products, in which case some of sales proceeds could be loaned to Cyprus for economic development purposes."

<sup>4</sup> See Document 332.

arrangements” sometime next spring and that we would be expected provide something in return for continued Cypriot “hospitality”. When Archbishop mentioned need for us to pay something for right to continue on here, I did not choose to go into any detailed discussion re our inability to pay rent or to discuss any details of how we might respond to this informal request in order avoid any question of negotiating at present time. No mention was made of any details re amount of money which we presently put into economy. It seemed from way conversation was proceeding that best thing to do was obtain agreement in principle while deferring details until later.

When Makarios mentioned question of payment for use present facilities am sure he did not necessarily have in mind payment of rent. However, when we do engage in further discussions am certain that subject will come up again and that it will be made quite clear that some financial quid pro quo is expected. As suggested previously I did not expect we could count on acquiescence in continuation status quo without some adjustment of “terms”.

Believe we must follow his advice on venue of further discussions even though by so doing we lose advantage of assistance from Greek, Turkish and British delegates. However, influence of GOG and GOT representatives here is considerable and could be used as result our requests in Athens and Ankara.

Believe during next meeting with Makarios I should mention continuity existing arrangements in context of British declaration (B2-IV)<sup>5</sup> in order remind him of obligations new government. We followed Foot’s advice in not mentioning this factor in initial presentation, but now it would seem appropriate in view Archbishop’s statements to me.

**Belcher**

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<sup>5</sup> Reference is to paragraph B, section 2, subparagraph 4 of the British declaration of February 17 which was part of the final settlement; see Document 311.



**332. Telegram From the Consulate General in Nicosia to the Department of State**

Nicosia, October 22, 1959, 8 a.m.

171. During conversation Tuesday with Archbishop Makarios on question our radio facilities,<sup>1</sup> he said he regretted “troubling me with so unimportant matter” but he had prepared letter to send me on subject of new Cyprus Army. He read letter and showed me list of arms and other equipment required for 2,000 man army. Text letter follows:

“I have honour to enclose list of armament and equipment required for use of Cyprus Army.

As you are aware Article 14 of Zurich agreement provides Cyprus Republic will have army of 2,000 men. Armament and equipment of this army will be very costly project, and will certainly be entirely beyond limited financial means of Cyprus.

I therefore wish enquire whether these armament and equipment could be provided by USG for use by Cyprus Army”.

The extensive enclosures to Archbishop’s letter will be pouched this week.<sup>2</sup>

In handing letter to me Archbishop said with smile “this is first time I have signed request on part of new republic to be for assistance of any kind. It is first but I know it won’t be last.”

Makarios went on to ask me what my views were on possibility of acceding to his request, I explained I would be happy send his letter as well as enclosures to Department for consideration and inform him of outcome in due course. In saying question had already been mentioned to me by Turkey prior Ministry Defense officials I said they had mentioned possibility that arms of US origin in use in Greece and Turkey be provided by latter governments since they would be standardized with those in use by Greek and Turkish contingents to be stationed in Cyprus and would therefore be more easily used by Greek and Turkish units charged with training of new army. I explained there were legal and financial problems involved in transfer of arms originating from US whether from either Greece or Turkey or direct from the US. I promised inform him as soon as possible of Department’s views.

*Comment:* Archbishop’s request should not come as surprise. Details in enclosures to his letter indicate that considerable degree of

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.5–MSP/10–2259. Secret. Repeated to London, Ankara, and Athens.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 331.

<sup>2</sup> Makarios’ October 17 letter and an annex outlining Cypriot defense requests were sent to the Department in despatch 69 from Nicosia, October 23. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.56/10–2359)

preparation was involved before presenting request. Since specifications have been presented in such detail it seems obvious someone well trained in military logistics has been involved in work. All specifications are as far as I can determine in US terms and my guess is this list has been prepared for Archbishop by Greek Government. Seems likely assumption process was got underway at time of visit of General Politakos (see Contel 92).<sup>3</sup> Do not believe request for arms connected with my call re communication facilities. Makarios had no way of knowing I would suggest call when I did, but it was obvious he was happy at opportunity make request in conjunction my approach.

Belcher

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote 5, Document 329.

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### 333. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State

Ankara, October 27, 1959, 7 a.m.

1026. Rome for Liaison. Zorlu sent for UK Ambassador Burroughs Sunday and recited to him Turkish tale of woe re Cyprus (Embtel 1014)<sup>1</sup> but with considerably more rancor than Esenbel had revealed to Ambassador on same subject three days earlier. Turks are steamed up and feel particularly incensed at conduct of British and Greeks, with *Deniz* cited as only last straw in long series of grievances.

In discussion with UK representatives today we agreed GOT not likely go beyond Friday statement and we therefore hope it is sufficient to do job (Nicosia 176 to Department).<sup>2</sup> We also feel there probably not

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/10-2759. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Athens, London, Paris for USRO, Rome, and Nicosia.

<sup>1</sup> Telegram 1014 from Ankara, October 24, reported on Turkish Government reaction to the *Deniz* incident. (*Ibid.*, 641.826-Caique Deniz/10-2459) On October 18, a British naval patrol stopped the *Deniz*, a ship of Turkish registry, off Cyprus. The Turkish crew scuttled the ship but the British recovered some of the arms the ship was carrying. In protest over the incident, Makarios suspended negotiations with the Turkish Cypriots.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 176 from Nicosia, October 24, reported that the Turkish Foreign Office statement on the *Deniz* incident was satisfactory to Makarios and might lead to a renewal of intercommunal talks. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/10-2459)

much we can do here at moment beyond expression pleasure with Friday statement, at fact tensions seem to have abated Cyprus and express hope at all levels that constitutional committee will get on with its work.

Neither Burroughs nor Embassy agree Foot assessment *Deniz* affair might be good thing (London 2197 to Department).<sup>3</sup> Seems to us here this merely highlights brittle nature Cyprus relationships and need keep lid on. Important that Turks who have made valient effort keep things calm last two months not be goaded [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. GOT has been given assurances on their request UK will do everything possible keep *Deniz* court proceedings quiet but UK Embassy has no idea what can be done.

Cowles

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<sup>3</sup> Telegram 2197 from London, October 23, reported on British Government reaction to the *Deniz* incident. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/10–2359)

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### 334. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

Athens, October 27, 1959, 7 p.m.

1114. Rome for Liaison. Conclusion that prevalent Turkish mood respecting Cyprus (Ankara telegram 1014 to Department)<sup>1</sup> is “resentful, aggrieved, stubborn” and inclined to revert to “Partition or Death” slogan, seems unduly pessimistic, as viewed from here. As indicated Embtel 1073,<sup>2</sup> Greek Government, although obviously aggrieved party in *Deniz* case, maintains its determination to see Zurich–London agreements implemented, and we gather from recent telegrams from Embassy London and Consulate General Nicosia that this too is position UK and Cypriot communities. We recognize that once hurdle negotia-

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/10–2759. Secret. Repeated to London, Ankara, Nicosia, Paris for USRO, and Rome.

<sup>1</sup> See footnote 1, Document 333.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 1073 from Athens, October 22, reported on public and official Greek reaction to the news of the seizure of the *Deniz*. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/10–2259)

tions are completed and Cypriot republic becomes fact, its chances of survival will be to major degree dependent upon support of Greek and Turkish Governments. I hope therefore that Texel was speaking for himself alone, and would note that Turkish Ambassador Athens Vergin maintains his opinion and I believe sincere belief that his government will faithfully implement Zurich–London agreement.

Briggs

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**335. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate  
General in Nicosia**

Washington, October 28, 1959, 4:24 p.m.

150. Rome for Liaison Officer. Contel 171.<sup>1</sup> From earlier indications (Athens 656)<sup>2</sup> we had expected request for US assistance Cypriot armed forces would come indirectly from Greece and Turkey. Direct request from Makarios gives rise to several delicate questions, quite apart from basic issue of desirability or undesirability of US military assistance to Cyprus. (1) Was Makarios' request made with knowledge and approval Kuchuk and other members Transitional Committee and does it therefore represent coordinated Cypriot request? (2) What is relationship, if any, between Makarios' request and current talks of Cypriot-Greek-Turkish military committee in Athens? (3) If none, are Greek and Turkish Govts privy this request?

Foregoing presumably cannot be put directly to Makarios without appearing challenge his competence speak at this time for Cypriot Govt-to-be, or implying he may have been indiscreet or playing Greek community politics. Similarly query Turkish Cypriots would run risk of arousing them if by chance Makarios' request turns out to be purely Greek Cypriot initiative. We have similar concern vis-à-vis Greek and

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.56/10-2859. Secret. Drafted by Blood and Marcy. Also sent to Nicosia, Athens, Ankara, and London and pouched to Rome.

<sup>1</sup> Document 332.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 656 from Athens, September 4, reported on Greek soundings regarding possible U.S. military assistance to Cyprus. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9-459)

Turkish Govts, though we have noted Congen's guess that Greek Govt already involved.

In light foregoing we contemplate no immediate reply to Makarios' request and are referring to Defense for study lists of requested equipment when they are received. Meanwhile comment action addressees desired as well as any information concerning above questions which they able develop without discussing matter with Cypriots or Greek or Turkish Govts. Nicosia authorized in its discretion discuss with Foot.

Our position on direct military assistance to Cyprus continues as set forth Deptels 477 to Nicosia 601 to Athens and 2380 to London.<sup>3</sup>

**Herter**

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<sup>3</sup>See footnote 2, Document 328.

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### 336. Editorial Note

Allen W. Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence, reviewed the situation in Cyprus during his briefing on significant world developments affecting U.S. security at the 424th meeting of the National Security Council, November 11:

"Mr. Dulles said he would mention the situation in Cyprus since a policy paper on that subject was a later item on the agenda. He reported that prospects were bright for a peaceful and successful transition to an independent Cyprus by February 19, 1960. The Constitutional Commission was now working smoothly after breaking a deadlock over the powers of the Turkish Vice President. Some clouds remained on the horizon, however. The Cypriots were violent people and the country had a strong, hard-core, Communist element which was for the present biding its time and making no effort to thwart the transition to independence. [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]" (Memorandum of discussion; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

A draft paper, NSC 5915, "U.S. Policy Toward Cyprus," was scheduled for discussion at the November 11 NSC meeting, but the discussion was postponed. NSC 5915 was subsequently modified and approved by the National Security Council as NSC 6003. NSC 6003 is printed as Document 347.

**337. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State**

London, November 30, 1959, 2 p.m.

2801. Rome for Liaison Officer. Deptel 4168.<sup>1</sup> In accordance reference telegram Barbour brought to attention of Hoyer-Millar (Permanent Under Secretary, Foreign Office) US concern over lifting proscription of AKEL. Embassy officer subsequently called on Addis (Head, Southern Department, Foreign Office) and left memorandum setting forth points given reference telegram.

Addis stated question lifting ban on AKEL had been under constant review at high level HMG since last summer. From [garble] representations made by Embassy, US views well-known and taken into account. Governor Foot strongly supported lifting ban. Decision to raise proscription taken in principle prior to difficulties over arms running. However, was also decided timing not propitious, and implementation delayed.

More recently Foot again recommended lifting ban. Under instructions from Foreign Office Foot consulted Makarios November 28. Makarios stated he in favor of lifting ban "as soon as possible." When asked whether subsequent events might induce him change his mind, Archbishop replied, "No." In reporting to Colonial Office, Foot commented might be thought lift of ban would weaken position of Makarios, but Makarios knew best how to play Cypriot political game.

HMG should accept his assessment. Foot added AKEL making all practical preparations to contest presidential elections in support of Clerides.

British Embassy Ankara consulted Zorlu November 28 who expressed no objection provided ban lifted from AKEL only and not from Cypriot Communist Party. (Addis explained HMG did not intend to lift proscription from Communist Party which banned by earlier ordinance enacted in 1931 or 1932. In response to question he admitted there was in fact little distinction between AKEL and Communist Party.)

Upon receipt of reports of discussions with Makarios and Zorlu, Foreign Office instructed British Embassy Athens to inform (not consult) Greeks. At same time Foot was authorized to announce lifting of

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/11-3059. Secret; Niact. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, Paris for USRO, Rome, and Nicosia.

<sup>1</sup> Telegram 4168 to London, November 25, instructed the Ambassador to reiterate to the Foreign Office continued U.S. objections to the legalization of AKEL. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/11-1959)

ban immediately when he received word from Athens that Greek Government informed.

*Comment:* Announcement of lifting of proscription of AKEL may be made at any time. We do not believe HMG could be induced at this stage to reverse decision. In considering this matter HMG all along has been aware of strong US views against lifting ban. Apparently there were wide differences of opinion within HMG, and decision was hard one take “on balance”.<sup>2</sup>

Addis states he will provide Embassy detailed statement rationale British decision.

Whitney

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<sup>2</sup> AKEL was legalized on December 4.

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### 338. Memorandum of Discussion at the 426th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, December 1, 1959.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1–2.]

3. *U.S. Policy Toward Cyprus* (Supplement to NSC 5718; NSC Action No. 1763; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated March 9 and November 6, 1959; NIE 32.5–59; NSC 5915)<sup>1</sup>

Mr. Gray said that in view of the shortage of time he would address himself primarily to the divergence of views in NSC 5915. After reading Paragraph 5 of his Briefing Note (a copy of which is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another copy of which is attached to this Memorandum),<sup>2</sup> Mr. Gray called the Council’s attention to Paragraph 43 of NSC 5915 which dealt with possible U.S. military assistance to Cyprus. The

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Boggs on January 26, 1960.

<sup>1</sup> The Supplement to NSC 5718 is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1955–1957*, vol. XXIV, pp. 493–494. Regarding NSC Action No. 1763, see *ibid.*, p. 489, footnote 3. The March 9 memorandum instructed the NSC Planning Board to prepare a draft statement of U.S. policy regarding Cyprus. (Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, Cyprus) The November 6 memorandum transmitted to the NSC the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the draft of NSC 5915. (*Ibid.*, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, Cyprus) NIE 32.5–59 is printed as Document 330. NSC 5915 is in Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351. The revised text (NSC 6003) is printed as Document 347.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. The minutes of all meetings of the National Security Council held during the Eisenhower administration are in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Official Meeting Minutes File.

majority version of this paragraph provided that the U.S. would not accede to a Cypriot request for direct U.S. military assistance; the minority version, while recognizing the undesirability of U.S. involvement in such direct U.S. military assistance, provided that the U.S. should be prepared to consider such assistance if measures provided for in Paragraphs 41 and 42—that is, encouraging the Cypriots to look to Greece, Turkey, and the U.K.—failed and if such assistance is believed absolutely essential for the achievement of U.S. objectives. Mr. Gray reported that the majority view was supported by Defense, Treasury, Budget and the JCS, while the minority views was supported by the State Department and OCDM. The majority anticipate requests for military assistance from other newly-emerging independent countries and believe that the U.S. at some point will have to draw the line or to accede to other requests of a similar nature. It appears to the majority that Cyprus is the place where the line should be drawn. The minority on the other hand thinks it is too early to say that the U.S. will provide no military assistance to Cyprus and believes that we should not tie our hands in the event preservation of U.S. interests on the island, including communications and intelligence facilities, might hinge on this type of aid.

The President said he was confused. Had Cyprus asked for U.S. military assistance? Mr. Gray reported that Archbishop Makarios had requested military assistance of \$2-1/2 million. However, this initial cost was only the beginning of the total cost of providing military assistance to Cyprus. The President said he would like to postpone further consideration of the paragraphs on military assistance in the Cyprus paper until he had had an opportunity to consult the Secretary of State.

*The National Security Council:*<sup>3</sup>

a. Noted the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 5915 and the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thereon (transmitted by the reference memorandum of November 6, 1959).

b. Tentatively adopted the statement of policy in NSC 5915 with the exception of paragraphs 41, 42, and 43, on which action was deferred pending consideration by the President in consultation with the Secretary of State.

[Here follow the remaining agenda items.]

**Marion W. Boggs**

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<sup>3</sup> Paragraphs a and b constitute NSC Action No. 2154, approved on December 3. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)



**339. Editorial Note**

On December 13, elections for the offices of President and Vice President were held by the Greek and Turkish communities. Archbishop Makarios was elected President of the new republic and Dr. Fazil Kuchuk, running unopposed, was elected Vice President. Belcher commented on the issues involved in the elections in telegram 224 from Nicosia, November 27. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/11–2759) He analyzed the results of the elections in telegram 256 from Nicosia, December 16. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/12–1659)

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**340. Telegram 296 From the Consulate General in Nicosia to the Department of State**

Nicosia, January 12, 1960, 1 p.m.

[Source: Department of State, Central Files, 947C.40/1–1260. Secret. 1 page of source text not declassified.]

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**341. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State**

London, January 13, 1960, 5 p.m.

3468. Nicosia's 296.<sup>1</sup> Embassy told Foreign Office (Wade-Gary, Cyprus Desk Officer) January 13 Makarios signed letter regarding United States communications facilities.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 947C.40/1–1360. Secret. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, and Nicosia.

<sup>1</sup> Document 340.

Wade-Gary said Assistant Under-Secretary Ross had asked him to inform Embassy that after considering advisability depositing copy of Makarios letter with London cmte (Embassy telegram 3434),<sup>2</sup> Foreign Office concluded is immaterial whether or not United States prompts Cypriots to deposit copy. As alternative United States might wish formally to transmit copies to British, Greek and Turkish Governments which would accomplish same purpose as depositing copy with London cmte.

In response to question Wade-Gary said "obligations" covered by para B-2 (IV) treated in Article 8 of draft treaty of establishment. United Kingdom draft, which not yet approved by other parties, reads: "All international obligations and responsibilities of government of United Kingdoms shall henceforth, insofar as they may be held to have application to Republic of Cyprus, be assumed by the Government of the Republic of Cyprus. The international rights and benefits heretofore enjoyed by the Government of the United Kingdom in virtue of their application to the territory of the Republic of Cyprus shall henceforth be enjoyed by the Government of Cyprus".

Wade-Gary stated is general practice not to list obligations in treaty. One reason is danger list subsequently may be found incomplete. However, United Kingdom has circulated to London cmte for its information list of obligations which United Kingdom believes are involved. List does not mention United States communications facilities because of problems involved in documenting agreements.

**Barbour**

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<sup>2</sup> Dated January 11. (Department of State, Central Files, 947C.40/1-1160)

**342. Airgram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom**

Washington, January 14, 1960, 7:33 p.m.

CG-438. Re London 2894, Ankara 1386, Athens 1576, Nicosia 245.<sup>1</sup> Useful exchange of views in reflets highlights problem of future role US might be called upon to play on Cyprus and degree of influence we should attempt to exert. We agree with general proposition that UK should take lead on Cypriot matters; that ours should be supplementary role; that we should, whenever appropriate, coordinate our approach with that of UK. Insofar as economic and military aid matters are concerned, this is consistent with current efforts to get European countries to carry greater burden.

Because of importance of our facilities on Cyprus and importance of Cyprus in Greek-Turkish relations and Eastern Mediterranean generally, it is desirable that US and UK keep in step re their assessments Cypriot problems and we hope that, consistent with our own interests on Island, UK will be willing and able assume main burden.

Embassy London therefore requested to seek early opportunity to discuss Cyprus problem with Foreign Office along following lines. Approach at Hoyer-Millar level suggested.

*US Role*

You might say we recognize British interests on Cyprus exceed those of any other power. We have kept HMG informed of significant approaches made to us by Cypriots and have assiduously avoided raising Cypriot hopes re US assistance in order, inter alia, not to jeopardize possibility Cypriots joining Commonwealth or to complicate work of implementing Cyprus Agreements. We also have refrained from positive response to various Cypriot approaches before obtaining British views. Our present approach promoted by desire to concert again with UK on assessment in several key areas and to assure in conjunction with UK our common objective—maintenance free world orientation of Cyprus.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/1-1460. Secret. Drafted by Blood, Owen T. Jones, and G. Lewis Jones. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, Paris for USRO, and Nicosia.

<sup>1</sup> Telegram 2894 from London, December 3, recommended strategies available to the United States for ensuring a pro-Western orientation for Cyprus. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/12-359) Telegram 1386 from Ankara, December 15, reported that the Turkish Government favored a multilateral approach to economic and military aid for Cyprus. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/12-1559) Telegram 1576 from Athens, December 7, warned that Cyprus would probably adopt a neutralist policy. (*Ibid.*, 847C.00/12-759) Telegram 245 from Nicosia, December 10, recommended a large and active U.S. role in providing aid to Cyprus. (*Ibid.*, 847C.00/12-1059)

*Economic*

We believe UK as former sovereign power and principal user of strategic Cyprus real estate patently should take primary responsibility in helping young Republic meet economic problems and in stimulating other interested countries of Western Europe, including Greece and Turkey, to assist Cyprus. We would be interested in British estimate of Cypriot requirements for external assistance. In this connection we have noted one study by private US economist which, assuming UK military base transfers of \$28 million yearly (about half of present level), copper tax-royalties of \$7 million and emigrant remittances of \$9 million, estimates foreign aid on order of \$5 to \$7 million annually will be required over next several years to preserve present levels of national income and assure minimum levels of economic growth required for political stability.

What are British intentions with regard level UK military expenditures in bases to be retained in Cyprus after independence, technical assistance, and development loans and grants in addition to those mentioned June 25 parliamentary statement? We were pleased to learn (London 3372)<sup>2</sup> that UK has sent note to Greek and Turkish Governments on desirability of coordinating their contributions to Cypriot development. We hope UK will maintain this initiative. What are UK views on adequacy of Cypriot foreign exchange resources now and over next several years to meet minimum needs? What does UK think international agencies might do on Cyprus? Are British pressing IBRD to undertake economic survey of Cyprus? FYI. We understand from IBRD British inquired informally whether Bank would make survey, and Bank replied it was reluctant to do so since Cyprus not IBRD member, Cypriots themselves had not requested survey, and Cypriots had asked UNTAB for survey. According IBRD British have not raised matter again. End FYI.

It is clear Cypriots entertain exaggerated ideas concerning possible US aid. Aid we will be able to proffer will be modest; from point of view strictly UK interests, probably more modest the better. Does UK agree? Ex-Im Bank and DLF would be prepared consider applications for economic development credits, if justified, and appropriate US agencies would consider PL 480<sup>3</sup> assistance, again if justified.

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<sup>2</sup> Telegram 3372 from London, January 6, 1960, summarized the contents of a British note which outlined the economic requirements of post-independence Cyprus. (*Ibid.*, 847C.00/1-660)

<sup>3</sup> For text of P.L. 480, the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, see 68 Stat. 454.

*Military*

We have already informed UK we have no desire become involved in direct military assistance to Cyprus. We plan tell Makarios this and at same time suggest he turn to UK, Greece and Turkey as more logical suppliers. In this connection we welcome British willingness consider request for equipment of Cypriot army (London tel 2655).<sup>4</sup> We inclined doubt ability Greeks, Turks and Cypriots to solve by themselves problems involved in establishment and equipment Cypriot army and believe some coordination and monitoring by British may be necessary. Have British yet consulted with Greeks, Turks or Cypriots on these problems? If not, do they plan to do so? When? How?

*Relations with Soviet and Neutralist Blocs*

These could be conditioned significantly by developments during period prior to establishment of Cypriot Republic. While we assume UK, like US, would prefer see completely pro-Western Cyprus, cannot assume this will automatically come about since it would seem inevitable that some neutralist sentiment will manifest itself, strength of which will in all probability depend in great measure on developments in larger East-West framework. We would seem well advised to do nothing, either by omission or commission, which would tend to facilitate Cypriot Government to move in direction Soviet Bloc or neutralism. This was, inter alia, one of considerations US had in mind in endeavoring persuade UK not prejudge issue of legalization of AKEL. While it may be unrealistic to expect that Cypriot Government will refuse to permit any Soviet Bloc representation at all, in view important military and communication facilities as well as broader political implications, we hope representation can be held to minimum. In any event, we believe situation should not be prejudged by British in favor of broader Bloc contacts and/or representation prior to Cypriot independence. Has HMG received any feelers this connection? What are HMG intentions in event Soviet softening-up gestures such as proposals for high level visits during transitional period should eventuate?

**Merchant**

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<sup>4</sup> Telegram 2655 from London, November 19, reported that the Foreign Office preferred to act on a combined and coordinated Greek-Turkish-Cypriot request for military assistance and hoped that the United States would encourage the three nations to coordinate their request. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.56/11–1959)

**343. Telegram 222 From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Nicosia**

Washington, January 15, 1960, 6:47 p.m.

[Source: Department of State, Central Files, 847C.062/1-1360. Secret; Priority. 1 page of source text not declassified.]

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**344. Message From Foreign Secretary Lloyd to Secretary of State Herter**

London, January 19, 1960.

DEAR CHRIS: You will have heard of the decision to postpone the date of independence for Cyprus until March 19. We gave your Embassy a pretty full account of the meetings on Saturday and Sunday.<sup>1</sup> I want to tell you something of the background of yesterday's announcement.

My meetings with the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey and with Archbishop Makarios and Dr. Kutchuk had reached no decisions up to yesterday, and virtually the whole time had been taken up in stating our military requirements, particularly as regards the size of the two sovereign areas. Makarios of course had no conception of what a base means in this modern age. We had complete support from Averoff and Zorlu. Makarios, however, remained obstinately on his old position that we were entitled to no more than the actual area of our present military installations. By yesterday it seemed to me that, short of applying intolerable pressure, we would not have the necessary measure of agreement to justify our presenting the Independence Bill for its second

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, Cyprus. Secret and Personal. Enclosure to a letter from Caccia to Herter, January 19.

<sup>1</sup> On January 16-17, representatives of the United Kingdom, Greece, and Turkey met Archbishop Makarios and Dr. Kuchuk in London in an effort to resolve outstanding differences and permit the Cypriot Republic to come into existence on February 19. The British and Cypriots were unable to resolve their differences over the issue of the territory and rights to be granted for British bases and the date of Cypriot independence was put back to March 19. Telegram 3598 from London, January 20, reported the Foreign Office's account of the January 16 and 17 meetings. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/1-2060)

reading in Parliament in time for independence on February 19. Weighing up the risks of presenting Makarios with a 48 hour ultimatum against those of a postponement, we decided that provided Makarios gave real evidence of a will to allow serious progress on the various aspects of the agreement during the remainder of this week, the right course was to agree to postponement. Averoff and Zorlu were in complete agreement. Of course, if we have not the makings of a satisfactory settlement of differences by the end of this week a very serious situation will arise, and I have reserved the right to reconvene the full meeting and consider radical measures in Cyprus itself. I think this has sunk in.

As to the various matters at issue, my impression and that of Averoff, who should be able to judge, is that in his heart Makarios realises that he cannot push us further on the base areas. His main concern is therefore to secure concessions from us in the matter of their administration. He has to justify to his people the claim that we cannot be allowed to maintain little colonies which might be a threat to the economy of the republic. We can do a lot to help him in this, provided that he does not expect us to impair our sovereignty. I am working on this with him and Kutchuk this morning. I shall be discussing our military requirements in the territory of the republic with them this afternoon. There is also the question of economics and finance. The latter is likely to prove quite important.

Some papers give the impression of a breakdown, but this is quite unjustified. I will let you know how things look at the end of this week. As you know, Makarios is not an easy customer, but I hope that the combination of firmness on our military requirements, extension of the time limit and face-saving in the matter of administration within our base areas may bring him round.<sup>2</sup>

All good wishes,  
Yours ever,

Selwyn<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> In a January 20 reply, Herter praised Lloyd for his efforts to carry the talks over Cyprus to a successful conclusion. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/1–2160)

<sup>3</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

**345. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State**

London, January 29, 1960, 8 p.m.

3795. Rome for Liaison Officer. Embtel 3598. <sup>1</sup>I had opportunity today to speak separately with Harold Watkinson, Minister of Defense, and Selwyn Lloyd about Cyprus negotiations. Political Counselor discussed problem with Foreign Office Assistant Under-Secretary Ross.

Watkinson expressed himself as quite optimistic. He said meetings had discussed and decided "everything" except extent of sovereign areas. UK intended stand firm on this point; from standpoint of defense requirements HMG could make no further concessions. On other matters Makarios' principal concern appeared to be to avoid agreements about British facilities outside sovereign areas which would appear to give away Cypriot sovereignty. Watkinson believes Makarios can sell arrangements as they now stand.

I found Selwyn Lloyd optimistic but a little less confident than Watkinson. He believes next ten days are pretty crucial. In Lloyd's opinion time is running against both British and Makarios but more strongly against Makarios. It is hard to see where Makarios can go if agreement not reached. Lloyd stressed that HMG has made considerable concessions. Re sovereign areas agreement has been reached on jurisdiction, administration of Cypriots residing there, taxation and so forth. HMG has offered to give Greek Cypriots sterling pounds 7.5 million over next five years and additional sterling pounds 0.5 million to Turkish Cypriots (although Lloyd was not specific funds are presumably for development purposes). HMG has undertaken reexamine possibility further aid at end of five years.

Lloyd found Makarios much more reasonable than his advisers whom he described as "small-town lawyers." These advisers, especially Rossides, were unable to take broad view, concentrating instead on minuscule points. For example, Lloyd believes things are pretty well agreed to except for extent of sovereign areas. UK plans keep 20,000 troops on Cyprus. He thinks Makarios wants to sell agreement back home and that he can do so. Makarios can count on support from Turkish Cypriots and Greek and Turkish Governments in putting agreement over. Some of Makarios' advisers apparently think there remains some more give in British position. Lloyd hopes he has convinced Archbishop

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/1-2960. Secret; Priority; Noform. Transmitted in two sections. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, Nicosia, Paris for USRO, and Rome.

<sup>1</sup> See footnote 1, Document 344.



this is not so. Governor Foot is convinced Makarios calls the shots on Cyprus and can put agreement over.

Lloyd said he had been turning over in his mind whether we could be of any help. I commented that I had felt we should stay out of the matter; that it was his business. Lloyd said he appreciated this attitude and agreed it had been the best tactic. However, next week it might be desirable for us to make clear to Greek Cypriots that we think HMG has gone as far as possible. In response to my inquiry he said he was not putting this to us as a request at present. He would let me know if after thinking it over he concluded it would be a good idea. Lloyd expressed himself as convinced Greek Governor could not do much more with Cypriots. Averoff already has exerted considerable pressure on Makarios and further efforts on his part would be counter-productive. Perhaps Karamanlis could have some useful effect. Also Turks might still have some influence they could bring into play. Greek Cypriots are afraid of Turks.

On timing, Lloyd referred to Parliamentary problem, saying agreement must be concluded in ten days if March 19 independence date to be met. He said he had not realized at beginning of present phase of talks how much paperwork remained to be done.

Lloyd commented press has been giving unduly pessimistic account. This line apparently fed by Greek Cypriots. To contrary, Lloyd believes talks have made a lot of progress and impasse not reached. Kutchuk has departed for Ankara and Makarios may be leaving today for Cyprus via Lausanne, apparently to see where draft of constitution stands.

Ross, who less optimistic than Minister, confirmed that this morning *Times* account (Embtel 3793)<sup>2</sup> of discussions virtually correct (except as noted below). Ross was rather tired and discouraged following two weeks almost uninterrupted and thus far inconclusive negotiations, and admitted going had been difficult. Rossides had been particularly trying, requiring British repeatedly to go over ground already covered.

Main problem still extent and administration of British sovereign areas. British had now offered to delegate virtually all normal civil administrative functions to Cypriots, but could only offer to delegate, i.e. rather than transfer, since latter would mean British no longer sovereign in these areas. So far Makarios had refused this proposal, and also still holding out for reduction in size sovereign areas. Commenting on *Times* story, Ross said British had not in fact offered to reduce areas by "some three square miles"; Lloyd had remarked that whoever started use of

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<sup>2</sup> Dated January 29. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/1-2960)

term "so and so many square miles" had certainly not been helpful to negotiations.

Ross said another outstanding difference related to demand by Greek Cypriots for annual payment in nature of "rent" (of sterling pounds three million) for British presence. British object in principle, i.e. not just to amount demanded, though quite prepared to pay for any actual services required.

In contrast, Ross said agreement virtually reached on British military facilities outside sovereign areas.

In reply to queries, Ross said Turkish Cypriots had been most cooperative and clearly anxious bring negotiations to prompt and successful conclusion. Greek and Turkish Governments had made clear their attitudes similar, and also seemed rather fed up with tactics of Greek Cypriots. Greek Government had indicated it felt British requirements as now stated entirely reasonable, and was even willing to indicate this publicly.

While discouraged, Ross said he believed there was still good chance negotiations may be successfully completed shortly. However, if not wound up by February 7, delay of at least two additional months in independence date almost certain. Ross admitted impossible tell what Makarios will do next; not clear whether his continued opposition based on political considerations in Cyprus, his conviction time working for him, or just what.

Meanwhile, London joint committee will resume work on various unfinished details, with hope that, once remaining major problems settled, agreements can be finalized promptly.

**Barbour**

**346. Memorandum of Discussion at the 434th Meeting of the National Security Council**

Washington, February 4, 1960.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda item 1.]

2. *U.S. Policy Toward Cyprus* (Supplement to NSC 5718; NSC Action No. 1763; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated March 9 and November 6, 1959; NIE 32.5–59; NSC 5915; Memo for All Holders of NSC 5915, dated January 11, 1960)<sup>1</sup>

Mr. Dulles presented this subject to the Council. (A copy of Mr. Gray's Briefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another copy is attached to this Memorandum.)<sup>2</sup> In the course of his briefing Mr. Gray asked whether Secretary Herter would care to comment on recent developments with respect to Cyprus.

Secretary Herter said he had within the last ten days had two letters from Selwyn Lloyd<sup>3</sup> giving details on the British negotiations with Archbishop Makarios on the acreage the UK was to be allowed to retain for its bases and other installations on Cyprus. Apparently the UK had already made considerable concessions regarding sovereignty in the base areas, but Makarios was still not satisfied. The Turks and the Greeks had supported the UK in the London talks. Makarios had now gone back to Cyprus as a result of the breakdown of the London negotiations. The UK was insisting that Makarios must provide an answer to the problem of the base areas by February 7 if the independence of Cyprus is to be achieved on the scheduled date (March 19), because the British Parliament will require time to pass the necessary legislation. Secretary Herter said he had been disturbed to learn recently that the Greeks and Turks are now about to support Makarios in insisting on a further reduction in the base areas sought by the UK. He estimated that the February 7 deadline set by the UK would pass without an agreement. The UK had not asked the US for any assistance on this problem;

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Boggs on February 4.

<sup>1</sup> The January 11 memorandum transmitted to the NSC revised pages of NSC 5915. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351) Regarding the other documents, see footnote 1, Document 338.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> Lloyd's January 19 letter is printed as Document 344. In his letter of January 29, Lloyd repeated for Herter the text of a telegram to Averoff in which Lloyd reviewed the British position on bases and appealed for Greek help in breaking the impasse with Makarios. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204)

indeed, we could not properly intervene in the matter except to say we hoped a settlement could be achieved. The President said a settlement might be reached if the Turks and the Greeks would continue to support the UK. Secretary Herter said Makarios stubbornly refused to understand the needs of the UK for large base areas. [3 lines of source text not declassified] The President asked how much acreage was in dispute. Secretary Herter said the UK wanted 120 square miles for its base areas, while Makarios offered 36 square miles. [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

Mr. Gray then called attention to Paragraphs 41, 42 and 43 of NSC 5915. He read Paragraphs 41 and 42 and asked Secretary Herter to comment on the split in Paragraph 42, from which the Department of State wished to delete a sentence providing that it should be pointed out to Greece and Turkey that transference of Greek and Turkish MAP equipment to the Cypriot armed forces would not be the basis for additional requirements for military equipment for the Greek and Turkish armed forces. Secretary Herter said the Department of State wished to leave the question of military assistance to Cyprus open, especially in Paragraph 43.<sup>4</sup> He believed a caveat against giving military assistance to Cyprus would not be desirable; he was interested in keeping the situation flexible. Mr. Gray pointed out that the split in Paragraph 42 which he had just alluded to was different from the issue in Paragraph 43. Secretary Herter said Paragraph 42 was really concerned with how much military assistance overall we wished to provide to Greece and Turkey. The President said he was somewhat frightened at the idea of having two of our allies give arms to Cyprus when there was a possibility that those arms might be used against a third ally. He thought it would be undesirable to arm any forces in Cyprus except the gendarmérie. Mr. Scribner believed that Paragraph 42 depended on Paragraph 43. If it is the policy in Paragraph 43 not to provide direct US military assistance to Cyprus, then assistance should not be provided indirectly through a provision in Paragraph 43 that Greece and Turkey can turn over MAP equipment to Cyprus. Mr. Gray said it seemed to him the essential issue was whether, if military assistance to Cyprus became essential to the achievement of US objectives, the question of giving such direct US assistance should be brought back to the Council for a Presidential decision or whether the responsible departments should be authorized to decide whether to give the aid. The President wondered whether we were not trying to solve a problem, the elements of which had not yet been clarified. We might be a bit premature in trying to establish a fixed policy at this time. Secretary Herter said he was willing to go on record in recognizing the undesirability of direct US military assistance to Cyprus, but he did not

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<sup>4</sup>See Document 338.

want to have the policy completely tie the hands of this government. The President felt that the question of whether Cyprus should be given direct US military assistance in the future should be referred back to the Council for a decision. He noted that for the present Britain retains sovereignty over Cyprus and added that when Cyprus had sought independence we had adopted a position of neutrality and had not been willing to take responsibility. He felt that the assumption on which the paper had been written, namely, that Cyprus would become independent, had not yet been realized. He would be inclined to give no direct US military assistance to Cyprus. Mr. Scribner said he would be pleased to have the question of whether to provide direct US military assistance to Cyprus come back to the Council for decision provided the actions of this government had not in the meantime foreclosed the possibility of deciding against such assistance.

*The National Security Council:*<sup>5</sup>

a. Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 5915, as amended by the enclosure to the reference memorandum of January 11, 1960; in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted by the reference memorandum of November 5, 1959.

b. Adopted the statement of policy contained in NSC 5915, subject to the following amendments:

(1) *Page 17, paragraph 42:* Delete the bracketed sentence and the footnote thereto, and substitute therefor the following:

“If Greece or Turkey use such transfers as the basis for requesting the U.S. to provide additional military equipment, any such request should be referred to the National Security Council for consideration in the light of the circumstances then existing.”

(2) *Page 17, paragraph 43:* Delete the alternatives and substitute the following:

“43. Do not provide direct U.S. military assistance to Cyprus unless the other measures in paragraphs 41 and 42 fail. If these measures fail and if it is believed absolutely essential for the achievement of U.S. objectives, consider in the National Security Council the question of direct military assistance to Cyprus under the circumstances then existing.”

*Note:* NSC 5915, as amended by the action in b above, subsequently approved by the President; circulated as NSC 6003 for implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S.

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<sup>5</sup> Paragraphs a and b and the Note that follows constitute NSC Action No. 2184. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

Government; and referred to the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency.

[Here follow the remaining agenda items.]

**Marion W. Boggs**

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### **347. National Security Council Report**

NSC 6003

Washington, February 9, 1960.

#### **STATEMENT OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD CYPRUS**

##### **General Considerations**

1. The agreements to establish an independent Cypriot republic in February 1960, which were reached at Zurich and London in early 1959, brought an unexpected end to four years of violence on Cyprus and justified hopes that a satisfactory solution might be achieved. It is likely that current efforts to implement these agreements will in fact culminate in Cypriot independence though difficult problems remain to be overcome, but there is at least a possibility that the settlement might collapse.

##### *Importance of Cyprus to the United States*

2. Cyprus has been important to the United States primarily because the controversy over the future status of Cyprus caused a dangerous deterioration of Greek-Turkish and Greek-British relations and disrupted NATO cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean. Now it is important that, when Cyprus gains its independence under the provisions of the London Agreements of February 1959, the new Republic become a stable and unifying, rather than disruptive, force in relations among Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Collapse of the Cyprus settlement could have disastrous consequences for the present pro-Western Government of Greece, could have serious implications for the

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Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 6003 Series. Secret. In a February 9 memorandum attached to the source text, Marion W. Boggs noted that this statement of policy was adopted by the NSC on February 4 and approved by the President on February 9. NSC 6003 superseded NSC 5718.

Turkish Government and could impair Greek-Turkish relations. It could also throw the island into a new period of violence and confused drift, reawakening Greek Cypriot demands for union with Greece and Turkish Cypriot demands for partition.

3. The chief strategic importance of Cyprus to the West will continue to lie in the British bases and their role in the United Kingdom's planning and posture for military operations in the Middle East and Mediterranean. Since the loss of British bases in Egypt, the strategic importance of Cyprus has increased. Cyprus is located within striking range of the USSR and its airfields are capable of handling medium jet bombers. The British currently maintain approximately one wing of light bombers on the island which they may be expected to contribute in support of CENTO plans. The British airfields on Cyprus are useful to the United States as a possible staging base for Middle East operations and as a possible back-up installation for the U.S. facilities located at Adana, Turkey.

4. The United States has other important interests on Cyprus. U.S. governmental facilities include a radio communications relay station which is vital to official U.S. communications throughout the Middle East and foreign broadcast monitoring stations which are important to our collection of foreign intelligence. On the whole, no serious troubles are anticipated in connection with U.S. installations, although Cypriot leaders have indicated that they will seek some form of quid pro quo for continued availability of these facilities. Any effort to relocate these facilities would be costly in terms of both time and money, and there is no other location in the area at which the assigned mission could be accomplished satisfactorily. The American-owned Cyprus Mines Corporation is the largest single business enterprise in Cyprus and its tax payments account for approximately one-sixth of the total governmental revenues of Cyprus. Other U.S. companies, particularly the Cyprus Chrome Company and the Forest Oil Company, have investments in Cyprus.

#### *International Political Orientation*

5. The London Agreements provide that an independent Cyprus will be tied closely to Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. These three countries will guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of Cyprus, all three will have armed forces stationed in Cyprus, and they will have the right to intervene singly or jointly to restore the situation established by the settlement. Cyprus will be linked with Greece and Turkey in a treaty of alliance, in accordance with which a tripartite military headquarters embracing command and training functions will be established in Cyprus. The forthcoming Cypriot Republic will probably elect to join the British Commonwealth.

6. Cyprus' many formal and natural bonds with Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom notwithstanding, a number of Greek Cypriots are drawn toward the Afro-Asian community. Remembrance of support from within the Afro-Asian group for Cypriot self-determination in the United Nations and the temptation to form a bridge between the Afro-Asians and NATO will fortify Cypriot inclinations to fashion an independent foreign policy. Any sentiment for an independent policy will most probably be encouraged by the Cypriot Communists. Under the presently foreseen constitutional set-up, the veto power, which will be exercised by both the Greek President and the Turkish Vice President of Cyprus over foreign affairs decisions, is likely, however, to circumscribe the new Government's room for diplomatic maneuver. The Soviet Bloc will probably try to establish diplomatic representation in Cyprus in order to have observers in such an important military and communications complex, and to take full advantage of the problems facing the new state.

#### *Cypriot Relations with the United States*

7. The Cypriot population has no special basis in past history for close relations with the United States. In fact the Greek portion of the population has recently been resentful of the unwillingness of the United States to support their aspirations for self-determination. This resentment is now receding and it is expected that the Cypriot government will seek cordial relations with the United States—and U.S. assistance—in order to offset the predominant U.K. position in Cypriot affairs. The Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities will each be sensitive to any U.S. action which appears to show partiality to the other.

#### *Internal Strengths and Weaknesses*

8. The Zurich–London Agreements institutionalize the historic separateness of the four-fifths Greek majority and the one-fifth Turkish minority in Cyprus in an intricate and delicately balanced governmental framework. Essentially a federation along ethnic lines, the arrangements can only work successfully with the good will of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities and the continued cooperation of the Greek and Turkish Governments. There are no indications that the establishment of an independent Cyprus will give rise to a specifically Cypriot nationalism. Recent years of emergency have subordinated moderate Cypriots, both Greek and Turkish, to extremist leaders who did not hesitate to use force and intimidation to ensure absolute adherence to the national program of their separate communities. Not since 1931 have the Cypriots had an island-wide legislative body, and their training in self-government has been limited to municipal administration and subordinate positions in the civil service. It will be difficult to find sufficient qualified personnel among the Turkish Cypriots to staff



the executive levels of the civil service in the 70–30 ratio prescribed by the Constitution, and even among the Greek Cypriots there will be a dearth of qualified administrators.

9. The Turkish community in Cyprus, politically more homogeneous and disciplined than the Greek, can be expected to follow the general lead of the Turkish Government. The Greek community is more faction-ridden, and Archbishop Makarios is the only leader prospectively capable of uniting it for the cooperative action needed to get the Republic of Cyprus underway. However, he will be hard put to maintain himself as a unifying and stabilizing force in the face of the subtle opposition of the Cypriot Communists and the tendency toward factionalism on the part of the Greek Cypriot community. Makarios' strength and prestige derive from his unique position as Archbishop and Ethnarch (which makes him both the religious and dominant political leader of the Greek community); his demonstrated abilities at compromise and conciliation; and the support accorded him by the Greek Government. Although at present willing to accept Communist support to avoid an initial electoral struggle, the Archbishop apparently hopes to fashion a reliable non-Communist political party from the former members of EOKA (the Greek Cypriot terrorist organization) and the Nationalist Greek Cypriot youth, labor and agricultural organizations.

10. The political ambitions of General Grivas, the former Chief of EOKA, appear to lie primarily in Greece. Nonetheless, he remains a potential disruptive element in Cypriot politics. Grivas' past attempts to undermine the Archbishop and the settlement itself have not seriously endangered Makarios' leadership, and open political support for Grivas in Cyprus seems limited to a small clique surrounding the Bishop of Kyrenia. Grivas can, however, play upon the admiration accorded him as the almost legendary hero of the liberation struggle and upon the continuing dedication to enosis of the majority of the Greek Cypriots, most of whom appear to hope that Cypriot independence is but a step toward eventual union with Greece.

11. Greek Premier Karamanlis is closely associated with the present settlement and is committed to its success. The cooperation between Makarios and Karamanlis, and the latter's thus far effective opposition to Grivas in the Greek political arena, have done much to lessen Grivas' ability to undermine Makarios on Cyprus and sabotage the settlement. If the Karamanlis government should be replaced by elements which are either not identified with the Cyprus settlement or actually opposed to it, the chances for stability on the island would worsen, and the situation could deteriorate rapidly.

12. In the longer run, the most serious threat to Makarios' political dominance and the future of an independent Cyprus is posed by the Communists. The only well organized party in Cyprus at this time is the

no longer proscribed Communist Party of Cyprus (AKEL) with a membership estimated at 6–12,000 Greek Cypriots. AKEL strength derives from its skilled mature leadership and its control of the 35,000-member Pan-Cypriot Federation of Labor (PEO) which enables it to dominate organized Cypriot labor. In general the Cypriot Communists have sought to maintain the appearance of unity with other Greek Cypriots. Capable of controlling today perhaps 30 per cent of the Greek Cypriot votes, they can be expected to cause serious problems for the new state, particularly in the event of serious unemployment or financial and political mistakes by the inexperienced nationalists. The large Communist role in municipal governments will probably continue, but is expected to be of less significance in the future because of the anticipated reduction in the importance of these governments following independence. Breaking the grip of the Communists over the labor movement through re-invigoration of the non-Communist labor movement (SEK) is difficult because of the ineffectiveness of present SEK leaders.

13. The autonomous Orthodox Church of Cyprus plays a very important role in the lives of Greek Cypriots by virtue of its restrictive control over the Greek Cypriot educational system, its considerable economic power derived from large-scale land holdings, and the political guidance given the villagers by their priests. Increased Cypriot participation with government which will come with independence will undoubtedly force some secularization of Greek Cypriot education and politics when the Republic is established. Church and Government will necessarily be intertwined, however, as long as Archbishop Makarios remains the political leader of the Greek Cypriots. This involvement of the Church in politics is likely, sooner or later, to provide an irresistible issue for exploitation by the Communists.

#### *Economic Problems*

14. Cyprus is a country of 563,000 people with a per capita income which surpasses that of all other states in the area except Israel. It is, however, a fragile economy marked by great disparities in the distribution of national income and a heavy reliance on foreign exchange from two sources; i.e., income from British bases and exports of copper by the American-owned mining company.

15. Cyprus is predominantly an agricultural country, with more than half of the labor force engaged in farming. Agricultural productivity suffers from an insufficient water supply, excessive land fragmentation and antiquated methods of farming. Minerals, particularly copper and iron pyrites, constitute an important economic resource. Production of minerals now accounts for approximately 13 per cent of GNP and 60 per cent of total exports. However, it is estimated that the largest and richest of the copper deposits will be depleted within about five to six

years, and it is unlikely that output of lower grade ores will be increased enough to maintain the present level of copper exports. Capital invested in mining operations is almost entirely of foreign origin, the principal mining enterprise being the American-owned Cyprus Mines Corporation. Industry is small-scale and primarily restricted to the processing of local products such as fruits, tobacco, beverages, olive oil, and building materials. Population increase is approximately two per cent even with a high rate of emigration. While the current unemployment rate of between two per cent and four per cent does not appear serious in itself, it is a matter of real and continuing concern because it is concentrated among higher skilled and better paid workers.

16. In recent years, despite its meager resources, Cyprus has enjoyed a high level of economic activity as a result of British expenditures on the island in connection with the bases there. If, as anticipated, these British military expenditures decline, the Cypriots will be faced with the need to expand both agriculture and industry in order to maintain income and employment, even though revival of the pre-emergency tourist trade should be of material assistance in meeting the problem. Quite apart from the trends in British military expenditures, however, general economic development and more equitable distribution of income will undoubtedly be among the major goals of the new Cypriot government.

17. Both Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders have indicated their intention to remain in the sterling area for at least ten years. If Cyprus ultimately joins the British Commonwealth, it will presumably do so in recognition of the economic benefits to be derived therefrom. The Greek and Turkish Governments have indicated an intention to provide some economic assistance to Cyprus. Their contributions are likely to be small and channelled so as to benefit primarily their respective ethnic communities in Cyprus. The British have announced their willingness to construct an airport terminal as a gift to Cyprus and to loan Cyprus funds for port improvement and the expansion of electrical distribution facilities, but they have apparently not yet decided on the future level of their economic and military expenditures in Cyprus. At present about three per cent of Cyprus' trade is with the Soviet Bloc. However, both the Soviet Union and Communist China have offered economic aid to Cyprus, and the Soviet Bloc is offering through a Cypriot Communist trading organization to barter Bloc goods for surplus Cypriot agricultural products, an intriguing proposal to the Cypriots in view of restricted markets in the West. The Cypriot leaders have publicly expressed their intention of asking the United States for economic aid and have already privately requested U.S. technical assistance.

*Defense Problems*

18. The British desire to retain sovereignty over two enclaves in Cyprus and the use of other facilities outside the enclaves will be a continuing source of Cypriot-British friction. Under the terms of the Cyprus settlement, Cyprus would have a 2000-man armed force, 60 per cent Greek Cypriot and 40 per cent Turkish Cypriot. The Cypriot armed force, together with a Greek contingent of 950 men and a Turkish contingent of 650, would come under the command of a tripartite headquarters. In addition Cyprus would have a 2000-man gendarmérie and police force. Makarios has expressed concern over the cost of establishing and maintaining a Cypriot armed force and has asked the United States to provide the arms and equipment required for the Cypriot armed forces. While the Greeks might welcome a smaller armed force, the Turks are apparently opposed to any reduction. The 2000-man armed force would not add significantly to the security of Cyprus against external attack, and would be costly in terms of available resources on Cyprus. If these forces were to be equipped as a constabulary or mobile guard they would be less expensive to maintain and could play a valuable role in coping with any Communist threats to stability.

19. Cyprus is not at present included in the NATO area. [3 lines of source text not declassified] The Cypriots are not likely, at least in the initial years of their independence, to seek membership in NATO.

20. The Greek and Turkish Governments are likely to want to send some of their MAP equipment to Cyprus with their contingents. They may also request us to help support the Cypriot forces with MAP equipment, preferring that the Cypriot forces be equipped with U.S. matériel, as are their own national forces, rather than with British matériel. The British have indicated that they will gladly consider requests for equipment for Cyprus, although they are not anxious to provide such equipment. They also expressed the hope that the United States would take a similar position.

*Objectives*

21. A politically stable Cyprus, linking Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom in a cooperative relationship, and willing and able to resist Communist subversion.

22. The continued availability to the West of the British military facilities on Cyprus.

23. The continued, unhampered use of U.S. communications facilities on Cyprus.

24. Cypriot economic development conducive to the development and maintenance of political stability, a pro-Western orientation and free democratic institutions.

Major Policy Guidance

25. Support an independent Cypriot state as the only feasible way of achieving under present circumstances a settlement of the Cyprus problem acceptable to all parties.

26. Endeavor, in collaboration with the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey, to seek to maintain a pro-Western outlook on Cyprus as a means of preserving present Free World interests on the island.

27. Endeavor, within the limits of feasibility, to maintain U.S. communications facilities on Cyprus for as long as they are required, being prepared to this end to offer reasonable quid pro quos, if necessary.

28. Avoid any U.S. action that might suggest partiality between the Greek and Turkish communities.

29. Support the admission of Cyprus to the U.N. and, subject to financial policy considerations, to Free World international financial institutions. Consider supporting admission to other intergovernmental organizations on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration the role which the Republic of Cyprus could be expected to play in such organizations.

30. Look with favor on Cypriot membership in the British Commonwealth as a means of strengthening Cyprus' ties with the United Kingdom and the Free World and of providing economic advantages to Cyprus.

31. Take no initiative to secure the admission of Cyprus into NATO but be prepared to consider such admission if the question is raised.

32. Encourage the Cypriot Government to establish sound economic policies and to maintain an investment climate which would promote both domestic and foreign private investment.

33. Discourage the Cypriot Government from establishing excessive economic ties with the Sino-Soviet bloc.

34. Encourage Cyprus to look to the United Kingdom, to Western Europe, including Greece and Turkey, to the Free World international financial institutions, and to private investment to meet its needs for external capital.

35. Urge the United Kingdom to exercise the major role in supporting Cypriot economic development efforts and in providing economic and technical assistance.

36. Encourage Greece, Turkey, and other Western European countries to take an active interest in promoting the economic welfare of Cyprus and to provide technical and economic assistance within their capabilities.

37. Be prepared to provide technical assistance on a small scale and to negotiate surplus commodity sales under P.L. 480 as an aid in accomplishing U.S. objectives with respect to Cyprus. Consider providing

economic development assistance to Cyprus in the event it does not prove feasible or desirable to rely wholly on the United Kingdom, Western Europe, and the Free World international financial institutions. Coordinate any U.S. aid with the assistance being provided by allied nations in order to minimize the possibility of misunderstandings and to prevent competition over particular aid projects.

38. As feasible help strengthen non-Communist labor organizations in Cyprus.

39. Be prepared, as appropriate and feasible, to encourage the reimposition of the ban on the Communist Party of Cyprus.

40. Discreetly encourage the new Cyprus Government to develop, maintain, and train its internal police and security services to combat Communist subversion.

41. Encourage the Cypriots to look to Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom and encourage these countries to take cooperative action to equip the Cypriot forces, preferably along the lines of a lightly armed, mobile constabulary with an internal security mission.

42. Be prepared, depending on amounts and types of equipment involved and without commitment to make up resulting deficiencies, to give sympathetic consideration to possible request from Greece and Turkey that their contingents destined for Cyprus be allowed to utilize MAP equipment and, in the event the provisions of paragraph 41 above prove inadequate, that Greece and Turkey be allowed to transfer to the Cypriot armed forces MAP equipment excess to over-all U.S. requirements. If Greece or Turkey use such transfers as the basis for requesting the United States to provide additional military equipment, any such request should be referred to the National Security Council for consideration in the light of the circumstances then existing.

43. Do not provide direct U.S. military assistance to Cyprus unless the other measures in paragraphs 41 and 42 fail. If these measures fail and if it is believed absolutely essential for the achievement of U.S. objectives, consider in the National Security Council the question of direct military assistance to Cyprus under the circumstances then existing.

44. Continue to consult with the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey, and, if appropriate, with the Government of Cyprus, with respect to the Communist threat on Cyprus, and, particularly if the Communists should move to gain control of the government, support counteraction.

### Financial Implications

#### *Military*

1. A preliminary review has been made by the Department of Defense of the list of equipment requested by Archbishop Makarios on

October 17, 1959.<sup>1</sup> The rough order-of-magnitude estimate of the cost to MAP for the provision of the entire list of equipment is approximately \$2.5 million. The preliminary estimate of the cost of providing the strictly military items is approximately \$2.0 million.

2. The purely military items in the list include small arms, ammunition, general purpose vehicles, communications equipment, and individual equipment. The list also includes many items which are not normally provided under grant military assistance, such as barber's tool kits, mantles and flat wicks for hurricane lamps, typewriters, miscellaneous furniture, cooking utensils, and office supplies. The criteria used in MAP programming normally screen out items which are available on the commercial market, on the basis that such items should be furnished by the country from indigenous resources.

3. In the event that a military assistance program for Cyprus is established and subsequently evolves in the normal pattern for less-developed countries, the initial equipment would represent only a small portion of the total MAP costs. In addition, there would be expenses for training, construction of storage and maintenance facilities, spare parts, overhaul of equipment, consumable items such as POL and ammunition, and other expenses. These additional expenses, under normal circumstances, would ultimately involve MAP costs greatly in excess of the initial equipment costs.

#### *Economic*

4. U.S. Government expenditures under this policy are expected to be relatively small. Technical assistance, if extended, is likely to be in the range of \$50,000 to \$100,000 per year. There is also a possibility of small agricultural commodity sales under P.L. 480.

5. The United States would not expect to provide economic development loans unless the contingency situation covered by paragraph 37 should arise. Even in that event, the United Kingdom, other Western European countries and the international lending institutions would be expected to provide the bulk of the total external development assistance rendered. Unofficial studies have estimated the ability of Cyprus to use foreign development assistance at \$5–7 million annually over the next few years.

#### *Educational Exchange and Information Programs*

6. A small educational exchange program now getting underway might cost as much as \$50,000 a year. The U.S. information program, which was initiated in July 1959, is not expected to cost more than about \$50,000 a year.

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<sup>1</sup> Makarios' request was delivered on October 20, 1959; see Document 331.

**348. Editorial Note**

On February 5, Julian Amery, Under Secretary for Colonial Affairs, flew to Nicosia to represent the British Government in a new series of discussions with Archbishop Makarios over the issue of British bases on Cyprus. Amery and Makarios failed to reach an agreement and on February 8, the Governor of Cyprus announced that the date for the island's independence was further (and indefinitely) postponed. Amery returned to London on February 11 after further unsuccessful discussions. On February 23, Amery returned to Nicosia to resume discussions with Archbishop Makarios over the future of British bases on Cyprus.

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**349. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Nicosia**

Washington, March 19, 1960, 3:57 p.m.

282. Rome for Liaison. Contel 394.<sup>1</sup> We are not convinced negotiations on base issue have as yet reached point when mediation either necessary or desirable. Of interested parties only Greek Cypriots have suggested mediation. In our view future British-Cypriot relations, as well as our own relations with all concerned, would be on healthier basis if two sides can resolve current issues without recourse mediation.

Greek Government is aware of Greek Cypriot interest in mediation but apparently does not believe time ripe for it (Athens 2210).<sup>2</sup> If Greeks or Turks or both should subsequently ask us to support idea of mediation with British, we would consider such request in light situation then prevailing. We do not wish ourselves to be mediating power.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.56341/3-1760. Secret. Drafted by Blood and cleared by G. Lewis Jones. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, and London and pouched to Paris for USRO and Rome.

<sup>1</sup> Telegram 394 from Nicosia, March 17, reported on a March 16 conversation between Belcher and Clerides, the Cypriot Justice Minister, in which Clerides appealed for U.S. intervention to settle the bases dispute with the British. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/3-1760)

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 2210 from Athens, February 9, reported that Averoff opposed U.S. mediation of the bases impasse. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/2-960)



If Clerides pursues matter, ConGen should reply Department believes Cypriots and British should continue endeavor reconcile their differences and in present circumstances believes any action on our part in encouragement of mediation would be inappropriate.

**Herter**

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**350. Telegram 409 From the Consulate General in Nicosia to the Department of State**

Nicosia, March 29, 1960, 6 p.m.

[Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/3–2960. Secret; Limit Distribution; Noform. 3 pages of source text not declassified.]

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**351. Telegram From the Consulate General in Nicosia to the Department of State**

Nicosia, April 5, 1960, 5 p.m.

420. Foot called me to Government House last night to discuss situation in light of weekend statements by Archbishop and 100 square mile compromise proposal of Kutchuk, which Makarios has described as “unacceptable”.<sup>1</sup> Governor told me that after seeing Makarios and obtaining his approval he called meeting Sunday<sup>2</sup> of all Greek Cypriot ministers and leading constitutional lawyer.

Foot said meeting was “last effort” make Cypriot leaders see the light; he claimed present situation was “high water mark” for Cypriot cause and to fail to close the bargain now would be grave mistake. Governor believed present precarious situation was brinkmanship with a vengeance, but there was no sign whatever that Makarios was willing meet British offer of flexibility with similar move. Governor told Cypriot leaders that if Amery left with no solution it would be very difficult

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/4–560. Secret; Noform. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, and London.

<sup>1</sup>In an April 1 speech commemorating the EOKA uprising of 1954, Makarios threatened a return to civil disobedience and unilateral implementation of the London agreements. On April 2, Kuchuk appealed for a compromise on the issue of British bases and suggested that the Cypriots and British settle on the figure of 100 square miles.

<sup>2</sup>April 3.

to get talks started again. Contrary to press reports he did not espouse Turkish compromise at meeting. Said he had impression Greeks thought they could drag matter out indefinitely; this was not so. He was most disheartened after meeting with Ministers and others saying he now convinced Makarios has no intention of meeting British even half way. He said there would be no solution unless Greek Cypriots willing do so since UK would never concede to Archbishop's demand for 80 square miles. In explanation he said in strictest confidence such substantial concession would split government and involve resignations of ministers. When I spoke of cost of alternatives, saying that perhaps Greeks counting on British people being unwilling pay bill in money, et cetera, for another round here, Foot said he was sure government quite willing endure considerable trials and expenses (he mentioned "millions") rather than give in.

Greek Cypriot contacts present at meeting, claim Governor asked them persuade Makarios to compromise but would not give indication of extent HMG willing to go. They say Governor kept saying he would not talk about extent in numbers but only wished impress on them that compromise solution must be found at this week's meeting (scheduled for Wednesday). Cypriots went on to say Governor would not commit himself on two questions they consider as vital as area—disposition of bases if UK leaves and method of formalizing agreements on administration. Cypriots were not optimistic. They did not like Foot's approach and suspect motives as result refusal to mention specific figures or reassure them on other two matters. I tried explain difficulties, pointing out that British were afraid give specific proposal until Makarios at least indicated flexibility on his part.

If talks break down Foot expects rapid split between Greek and Turk Cypriots. Says next step would be to call meeting of Foreign Ministers to discuss future possibilities. Governor asked me to do what I could to impress on Greeks fact that situation urgent and further delay impossible.

*Comment:* In discussing UK position with Governor I still have impression he disagreed in principle, but recognizes political imperatives that influencing his decisions whether inherently right or not. British patience is obviously running short; these moves are probably not merely pressure play. Believe most we can do here at this time is informally express conviction that British will not meet Archbishop's demands. Picture is not conducive to optimism.<sup>3</sup>

**Belcher**

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<sup>3</sup> Formal talks between Amery and Makarios broke down on May 6.

**352. Telegram 458 From the Consulate General in Nicosia to the Department of State**

Nicosia, May 3, 1960, 1 p.m.

[Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.5–MSP/5–360. Secret. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]

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**353. Telegram From the Consulate General in Nicosia to the Department of State**

Nicosia, June 25, 1960, 11 a.m.

365. Rome for Liaison. Reports from London on talks between Defense Secretary Gates and British Defense Minister Watkinson re alleged plan for dispersal British and American H-bombers with Cyprus to be used as one of bases has blown up storm of growing proportions here. Report apparently first appeared in *London Observer* (we did not see it) and was followed by discussion House of Commons. Timing particularly unfortunate. Past two weeks all Greek papers here have published articles protesting reported plan, editors have wired Macmillan and Makarios, trade unions have issued statements, and Communists planning protest rallies. Makarios has made statement expressing hope “reports unfounded,” and has so far resisted increasing pressure to introduce question in talks with Amery. While Communists clearly fanning flames they have struck responsive chord with Greek Cypriots. Turkish Cypriot papers, of course, have said nothing.

While we have not yet been approached directly for clarification on reported Gates–Watkinson talks, would appreciate any information on matter which Department and London can make available.<sup>1</sup>

**Heck**

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.56311/6–2560. Confidential. Repeated to London, Athens, Ankara, Paris for USRO, and Rome.

<sup>1</sup> In telegram 385 to Nicosia, June 28, the Department replied that Gates had denied that plans for the dispersal of strategic bombers were discussed during his meeting with Watkinson and that Watkinson made a similar denial in the House of Commons. (*Ibid.*, 747C.56311/6–2860)

**354. Editorial Note**

The draft text of a Cypriot constitution was initialed by representatives of Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus on April 4 and presented to the British Government. On July 1, British and Cypriot representatives announced agreement on the terms of a settlement of the British bases issue by which the United Kingdom retained two bases on the island covering a total of 99 square miles. On July 6, Makarios and Kutchuk initialed agreements setting the division of offices and responsibilities in the new national government of Cyprus between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The following day the text of a bill granting independence to Cyprus was presented in the House of Commons. For text of the British-Cypriot agreement, see *Cyprus*, Cmd. 1093 (London, 1960).

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**355. Telegram From the Consulate General in Nicosia to the Department of State**

Nicosia, July 8, 1960, 1 p.m.

16. Rome for Liaison. Now that agreement reached, Cypriots beginning tackle internal problems including establishment Cyprus Army. Believe we should no longer postpone informing Archbishop United States not providing military equipment he requested. As reported Con- tel 458<sup>1</sup> Archbishop certain to inquire about other possible U.S. assistance. This issue receiving increasing attention locally with nearly daily press commentaries and reminders of aid expected from United States. Example, English and Greek papers July 7 quick to quote *New York Times* editorial<sup>2</sup> suggesting "material aid" might be forthcoming from U.S. on proclamation independence.

If Archbishop raises question, propose take line that U.S. of course interested in economic well-being and viability of Republic. However we believe premature discuss possible U.S. aid program until Republic has had opportunity 1) canvass all aid possibilities from U.K., Greek

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.5-MSP/7-860. Secret. Repeated to London, Ankara, Athens, Paris for USRO, and Rome.

<sup>1</sup> Document 352.

<sup>2</sup> *The New York Times*, July 6, 1960.

and Turk Governments which directly concerned, 2) program spending of 12 million pounds British assistance during first 5 years, 3) study effects on economy of estimated 15 million pounds annual British military spending, 4) assess its own resources and needs which better judged after completion U.N. economic survey scheduled this fall. Meanwhile we prepared continue and possibly increase scope of exchange of persons program as well as consider PL 480 and Eximbank and DLF loans as outlined Deptel 271.<sup>3</sup>

Before seeing Archbishop, would be helpful have report from Department on status our recommendations for modest TC program (Con-  
tel 458). Since meeting with Archbishop cannot be deferred much longer, appreciate Department's reply soonest.<sup>4</sup>

**Heck**

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<sup>3</sup>Dated March 10. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.56/3-1060)

<sup>4</sup>In telegram 13 to Nicosia, July 13, the Department approved Heck's proposed reply to Makarios except the phrase "premature discuss possible U.S. aid program." The Department instructed Heck to state that the United States was prepared to provide a "modest" technical assistance program. (*Ibid.*, 747C.5-MSP/7-860)

## AUGUST–DECEMBER 1960: INITIAL U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS

### 356. Editorial Note

On July 29, the British Parliament enacted a bill empowering the Government of the United Kingdom to grant independence to Cyprus. The Republic of Cyprus came into existence on August 16 with the signature in Nicosia of the Cypriot constitution by representatives of the United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus. A treaty of alliance among Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus was signed the same day together with a Treaty of Guarantees and a Treaty of Establishment signed by the United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus. The Governments of the United Kingdom and Cyprus also exchanged notes outlining their agreement on the future of British bases on the island. For texts of these treaties, see *Cyprus*, Cmd. 1093 (London, 1960) and *Treaty Concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus*, Cmd. 1252 (London, 1960).

The United States recognized the new Republic on August 16 and announced that the Consulate General was being raised to the status of Embassy effective that date. L. Douglas Heck was appointed Chargé d’Affaires ad interim. Simultaneously, President Eisenhower nominated Fraser Wilkins as Ambassador to Cyprus. Wilkins’ nomination was confirmed by the Senate on August 27. The new Ambassador arrived in Cyprus on September 16 and presented his credentials to President Makarios on September 19.

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### 357. Editorial Note

The Operations Coordinating Board met on September 2 to discuss the first semiannual appraisal of policy toward Cyprus under NSC 6003. The OCB concurred with the conclusions of its Working Group on Cyprus that “there has not been sufficient opportunity to assess” the validity of U.S. policy toward Cyprus and concluded that no review of Cyprus policy was called for at that time. A copy of the OCB Semiannual Appraisal of Policy on Cyprus, September 2, is in Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Cyprus.

**358. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State**

Nicosia, September 28, 1960, 4 p.m.

161. Cyprus nearing end of third drought year, with serious deficit in wheat, barley, and corn. 35,000 tons purchased to finish 1960 and reserves will be exhausted by May 61. If winter crop fails, situation will become critical. Figures re final collections and imports for this year and estimate needs for 1961 expected shortly. We tentatively estimate Cyprus needs additional 40,000 tons during next few months.

We believe situation merits assistance under title II, PL 480 (Department's A-53 May 16).<sup>1</sup> Farmers' funds exhausted; banks and cooperatives refusing credit; moratorium on sale farmland being considered by Cypriot legislature. Farmers' families, baffled and touched by hunger, turning to GOC for help. Farmers being given seed. Possible budgetary deficit complicates import further wheat.

Political aspects have definite bearing. Cypriot Commies now working on farmers with greater success. Soviet Ambassador to Athens visited Cyprus, promising aid. It is predicted new Soviet Ambassador to Cyprus will soon arrive with gift of several shiploads of grain. I would hope that, if we decide to help, we will move before Soviets do.

We are continuing discuss situation with GOC. Final recommendation re total requirement will follow. Meanwhile Finance Minister, who plans discuss with Department while in Washington, will have additional information.<sup>2</sup>

**Wilkins**

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 880A.49/9-2860. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, and London.

<sup>1</sup> Airgram 53 to Nicosia outlined procedures for requesting aid under Title II of P.L. 480 and the legal requirements for receiving the aid. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 110 to Nicosia, October 6, the Department reported on discussions in Washington relating to the possibility of applying special P.L. 480 Title II programs to Cyprus. (*Ibid.*)

**359. Airgram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State**

Nicosia, October 11, 1960.

G-39. The position of the non-Communist trade union federation SEK has continued to deteriorate during the past several months while the relative strength of the Communist PEO has increased. PEO, as the Department is aware, is the most important component of the Communist apparatus in Cyprus. It is well led and appears to have no money problems although, so far as we can determine, most of its financing is internal. SEK, on the other hand, is torn by factionalism in its leadership with pro and anti-Pissas elements working at cross purposes. It is short of money and we are told has an indebtedness of 12,000 pounds. Pissas, SEK's General Secretary, is considered corrupt and self-seeking. He has for the past several months been trying to promote for himself a job in the diplomatic or consular service of the Government of Cyprus but has rejected the offer of a post as Consul in Khartoum.

We feel we can help by training SEK leaders, including new blood which may be brought into the organization, this to be done by sending a number of trade unionists to the US and bringing an American trade union organizer to Cyprus to remain here for a minimum period of six months, preferably longer, to work on the spot with SEK leaders in reorganizing the federation. We have informally advised the Minister of Labor and a handful of other reliable labor contacts that we are prepared to assist with training of trade union leaders in the US. The Department was previously requested to look into the possibility of bringing an American trade unionist to Cyprus. This was first proposed by the Minister of Labor and has been endorsed by other labor people here as even more helpful than training union leaders in the US.

We have repeatedly emphasized in our conversations with the GOC that we consider the removal of Pissas a precondition to any real progress in reorganizing SEK as a strong counter to PEO. The Labor Minister and others agree with this and say that Pissas will be eliminated. However, with its numerous preoccupations, the government has not given this problem a high priority. We feel that, if we could go to the GOC with a concrete proposal for training trade union leaders in the US and an offer to bring an American trade union leader to Cyprus to advise and work with new SEK leadership, we would stand a better chance of getting early action on Pissas.



We consider that meeting the challenge of PEO which, as noted earlier, is growing in strength daily while SEK is becoming progressively weaker, is one of the most pressing problems here in Cyprus. We do not see any significant disadvantages to the lending of our assistance in trying to build a strong non-Communist center here. We have every reason to believe that the Government of Cyprus would welcome this assistance and, as a matter of fact, there is evidence that the Communist leadership expects us to assist SEK in an active, overt way. AKEL and PEO would, of course, attack our participation in any program to resuscitate SEK, but we do not feel that this would bring on any serious opposition among the people of Cyprus. So far as we know, the British have no plans to help in the labor field. Some eighteen months ago the British trade union advisor to the then Commissioner of Labor suggested that a joint council of the four trade union groups here—PEO, SEK, the independent unions and the Turkish Federation—be established presumably with a view to eventual merger. The Embassy assumes that this proposal, while it may not have had the active advocacy of the British colonial government at the time, was at least accepted by it. Recent conversations, however, suggest that the British mission here now is not trying to promote a TUC-type labor center in Cyprus, and British mission officials may now understand that such a project would play into the hands of the Communists. We do not believe the British would object to our proposed program but feel they should be informed of it at the proper stage. We believe, in any event, that the Cypriots would be reluctant for local political reasons to turn to the UK for help in this field or to the ICFTU lest it provide a UK labor advisor or one of some other nationality schooled on TUC lines.

We do not believe either the Greek or Turkish Governments would object to our aiding the non-Communist labor movement, although in anything we do some help would have to be given the Turkish Federation. This would be desirable in any event since the Turkish Federation is short on leaders with trade union know-how and is an anti-Communist organization worth assisting.

Included in the terms of settlement of the recent strike of casual loading workers at the American owned Cyprus Mines Corporation<sup>1</sup> was a commitment by CMC management to give a definite answer on the question of union recognition following a meeting of the CMC Board which will take place in Cyprus later this month. Conversations which we have had with the CMC management indicate that the company is prepared to recognize one or more unions if a way can be found to

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<sup>1</sup> September 29–October 3. The strike was settled by an agreement on wage rates and on worker representation on the corporation safety committee. The question of company recognition of trade unions was postponed for one month.

freeze out PEO. The Minister of Labor some weeks ago suggested to the Embassy that the company might recognize as bargaining agent for its work force a joint committee of the Turkish Federation and SEK. The Minister asked the Embassy to explore this possibility with CMC and the Turkish Federation. We have done this and both appear favorably disposed in principle. With the question of union recognition by CMC coming to a head, we feel that the removal of Pissas takes on even greater urgency. He would certainly claim a part of the credit if CMC agreed to deal with SEK and the Turkish Federation, and this might delay his departure from the General Secretaryship of SEK. We hope it will be possible for the Department to reply favorably both as regards training SEK leaders in the US and as regards sending an American trade union organizer to Cyprus.

In a recent conversation with Makarios, the Ambassador discussed the trade union situation. Makarios indicated that he was aware of the urgency of replacing Pissas but was hoping SEK itself would take action or Pissas himself would resign or offer to go elsewhere. Makarios did not want to appear to be taking responsibility for the administration of SEK as that would subject GOC and SEK to Commie criticism. It would be wiser if Pissas were maneuvered into withdrawing. Meanwhile, Makarios agreed he would work on the problem and approved our continued cooperation with the Minister of Labor. We thus now have an opportunity to bring present situation to head and recommend that the program we have suggested be provided as an incentive to cooperation by GOC.

Wilkins

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**360. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State**

Nicosia, November 18, 1960, 5 p.m.

248. Situation in Cyprus, three months after independence, seems calm and orderly, but beneath surface there are economic and political developments taking place which will cause new government increasing difficulty and may be to disadvantage of US and free world.

Economic developments relate to drought, withdrawal of British, unemployment and loss of tourist trade. We have taken initiative in urgent drought situation by offering PL 480<sup>1</sup> and expect, with UK, Greece, Turkey and other countries, consider other kinds of economic assistance following completion UN survey report later in November.

Political developments pose real threat. On one hand AKEL, with strong apparatus in being, is expanding influence and gaining in respectability. Its Parliamentary spokesmen are effectively exploiting issues and government inertia. On other hand, Patriotic Front of Makarios is loose coalition which, with achievement of independence, has lost its common purpose and momentum. PF leaders neglecting party organization and grass roots contacts. In addition, Greek and Turkish communities remain preoccupied with communal phobia and post mortems on London–Zurich agreements, which divert attention from internal and external Communist threat. Greeks suffer from complacency while Turks handicapped by ineffectual leadership and divisions within community. Communist dangers will increase as Soviets open mission, step up economic relations through aid, barter and purchases of surpluses, and further expand existing energetic propaganda activities.

Basically, Cyprus continues friendly to West and clearly relies on it, especially US for support. At same time, Makarios is following policy in UN and elsewhere of equal friendship with all countries and avoiding thorny issues such as Israeli-Arab dispute.

To guard against Communist inroads and buttress new government, we have made several suggestions for US action, as follows:

1. PL 480 Title II program (Embtel 241).<sup>2</sup>
2. One-time military assistance for Cypriot Army (Embtel 205).<sup>3</sup>
3. Labor program including American trade union organizer to come to Cyprus (Embtel 180).<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The Cypriot Government requested P.L. 480 aid on November 3, and the United States announced its willingness to provide aid to Cyprus on November 8. The Cypriot Government's formal request for aid was submitted on November 14. Agreements for deliveries of grain under P.L. 480 were signed in Nicosia on December 12. For texts of these agreements, see 11 UST 2687 and 2693.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 241 from Nicosia, November 15, transmitted the specific list of Cypriot requests for assistance under P.L. 480. (Department of State, Central Files, 880A.49/11–1560)

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 205 from Nicosia, October 21, reported that during the visit of the U.S. Sixth Fleet commander the Cypriots again stressed their desire for U.S. military aid. (*Ibid.*, 780A.062/10–2160)

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 180 from Nicosia, October 7, reported on Communist influences in the Cypriot trade union movement and the need for action to strengthen the non-Communist SEK. (*Ibid.*, 880A.062/10–762)

We are presently awaiting replies from Washington on these suggestions.<sup>5</sup>

There is also most imperative need for stepped-up American information and cultural program here. Before independence, Cyprus was British responsibility, but now it is wide open and Soviet voice is clearly heard. We urgently need information center, mobile van for rural areas, and series of cultural visits. Further suggestions will follow.<sup>6</sup> Country Team concurs.

**Wilkins**

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<sup>5</sup>In telegram 173 to Nicosia, November 25, the Department outlined plans for increased shipment of grains to Cyprus. It to the request for military aid in Document 361. Plans for aiding Cypriot labor are in Document 362.

<sup>6</sup>Not further identified.

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### **361. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cyprus**

Washington, December 2, 1960, 6:46 p.m.

185. Paris for USCINCEUR. Rome for Liaison. Ankara's 735; Athens G-295.<sup>1</sup> GOT/GOG joint efforts solve problem equipping Cypriot Army, as reported reference communications, strike us as welcome and realistic approach to matter at this stage. We hope momentum can be maintained. Efforts supply Cypriot Army out of Greek and Turkish MAP surplus are fully consistent with established USG policy and we desire be as flexible and accommodating as possible in meeting Greek and Turkish requests this regard.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780A.56/11-2560. Confidential. Drafted by Atherton. Also sent to Ankara, Athens, London, and Nicosia and repeated to Paris for USRO and to Rome.

<sup>1</sup>Telegram 735 from Ankara, November 22, reported on Turkish progress in preparing a supply program for Cypriot armed forces. (*Ibid.*, 780A.56/11-2260) Airgram G-295, November 25, reported that the Greek Government was preparing for discussions with the Turks on supplying Cypriot armed forces and favored shipments of U.S. arms. (*Ibid.*, 780A.56/11-2560)

While USG has received no formal requests for transfer MAP surpluses and therefore unable make specific commitments at this time, addressee posts may draw on following background as appropriate in discussing question with Governments concerned:

1. Equipping Cypriot Army is of course matter for GOT, GOC and GOG to handle in manner they deem appropriate under their Treaty of Alliance. We are not familiar with details their thinking this regard, but would seem logical for Cypriot arms requirements to be coordinated through mechanism established in Treaty—i.e., Tripartite Hq and, if necessary, Tripartite Ministerial Committee or subsidiary body designated by it.

2. USG pleased note that (a) such procedure now apparently being contemplated (b) GOG and GOT already holding preliminary discussions and (c) attention being focused on what has to us always seemed natural starting point—i.e., serious examination of Greek and Turkish stocks to determine what can be spared to fill Cypriot needs which are after all on small scale.

3. USG prepared view sympathetically GOG and GOT requests for certification of reasonable quantities and types MAP arms and equipment as surplus to their needs and for authority to transfer such surplus to Cypriot Army. USG agencies for coordinating such requests are MAAGs in Greece and Turkey which will be instructed give them priority and sympathetic consideration but cannot commit USG to replace equipment furnished to Cypriot Army.

4. We assume Governments concerned in drawing up list of Cypriot Army requirements will be guided by realities of Cypriot economic situation and military needs. Would seem to us Cypriot Army should be in effect lightly armed constabulary-type force with internal security mission and that its activation should be phased over period of several years.

Defense concurs.

Dillon

**362. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cyprus**

Washington, December 17, 1960, 4:06 p.m.

210. Ref Nicosia Airgram G-61, November 29.<sup>1</sup> Dept in essential agreement ideas expressed ref airgram although probable period service any American unionist limited ninety days. UAW investigating availability Chiakalous. We also will be in touch with Nile about possible program. Need to know how many Cypriots could be programed in US at one time.

Primary job American unionist, as Dept views it, is develop and guide implementation structural changes, apply pressure for more aggressive leadership, prepare advice for workers education project through TC program in US and possibly on Cyprus itself if this is considered feasible by Embassy.

We continue believe with Emb that ideally US assistance to Cypriots in labor field should be initiated only when Cypriots have themselves evidenced determination take effective action against Communists in trade union movement. Realistically, however, we can envisage situation developing in way which would make it desirable to send American unionist Cyprus even though Cypriots had not done all we thought they might in attacking problem.

**Dillon**

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 880A.062/11-2960. Confidential. Drafted by Bruce H. Millen. Repeated to Beirut.

<sup>1</sup> Airgram G-61 reported on the results and recommendations of an Embassy review of the labor situation in Cyprus. (*Ibid.*, 880.062/11-2960) The recommendations reiterated those contained in Document 359.

**363. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey**

Washington, December 17, 1960, 4:08 p.m.

797. Rome for Liaison. Ankara's 772 and 773; Nicosia's 287.<sup>1</sup> Department gratified by further indications reftels that GOG, GOT and GOC actively and constructively exploring problem equipping Cypriot Army from MAP surpluses within context their Treaty of Alliance. However, Turkish views reported Ankara's 773, and plan hold tripartite discussions re defense of Cyprus Paris, with Cypriot FonMin present, seem to carry implication some kind of GOC–NATO relationship either exists or is contemplated.

Although Cyprus is not included in North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Cypriot developments are clearly of concern to NATO. Moves which tend focus attention on this latter circumstance, however, and suggest possibility GOC–NATO ties could have effect on neutralist currents in Cyprus and possibly complicate GOC position vis-à-vis Cypriot Communists and opposition nationalists. Would seem to us at this time that NATO interests adequately advanced by (a) presence UK sovereign bases in Cyprus, (b) continued Greek-Turkish cooperation, and (c) maintenance political stability in Cyprus under Government willing and able resist Communist/Soviet Bloc encroachments.

Basic element of US policy re Cyprus, however, is that it is area of primary Greek-Turkish-UK interest. Should these countries raise question of GOC–NATO relationship in Paris or elsewhere, we would of course consider without prior commitment such proposals as they might put forward. For our part, however, we have no intention of taking initiative this regard or of encouraging others to do so.

Without discussing with local Governments, addressee posts requested comment on Turkish views set forth Ankara's 773.<sup>2</sup>

**Dillon**

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780A.56/12–760. Confidential. Drafted by Atherton. Also sent to Ankara, Athens, London, Nicosia, and Paris for USRO and repeated to Rome.

<sup>1</sup> Telegram 287 from Nicosia, December 7, reported that Makarios favored a small, lightly-armed constabulary force for Cyprus. (*Ibid.*, 780A.56/12–760) Telegram 772 from Ankara, December 7, reported on Turkish Government plans for filling the supply requirements of Cypriot armed forces. (*Ibid.*) Telegram 773 from Ankara has not been found.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 313 from Nicosia, December 19, reported that the Cypriot Government did not desire a NATO tie. (*Ibid.*, 780A.56/12–1960) Telegram 882 from Ankara, December 24, reported that the Turkish Government did not contemplate Cypriot participation in NATO. (*Ibid.*, 780A.56/12–2460) Responses from the Embassies in Athens and London have not been found.

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




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